Even when investment tribunals display openness toward “exogenous” international law sources, their discourse entails an expansion of the “economic” idiom without a proper commitment to taking these sources seriously. In the Phoenix case, the tribunal enlarged the concept of “protected investment” and introduced an implicit condition of legality and good faith to the Salini test, the theoretical justification of which lies in a “teleological reading” of “protected investment” based upon general principles of international law. [9] Nevertheless, the tribunal explained that “nobody would suggest that ICSID protection should be granted to investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking of human organs”. If basic human concerns are taken into account at this early stage of legal reasoning, the hyperbole that finds expression in the award (even jus cogens violations are countenanced) shows that there is often a felt need to select extreme examples so as not to diminish the overriding importance of investment concerns.