But, as with the postwar welfare state, command-and-control tended to be implemented as much to avoid fundamental solutions. In the 1930s and 1940s, when markets driven by accumulation failed to work, markets propelled by social and environmental need could have been fashioned, increasing the quality of life and free time, even while dematerializing production. Later on, with the rise of environmental regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental law could have attacked the source of pollution through prevention instead of end-of-pipe control measures. It was not simply that environmental rules were not comprehensive and mandatory enough (although this is probably true, especially in Canada), but that their primary concernenvironmental protectionwas fundamentally limited. The primary need was not to protect the environment from our wasteful and toxic economy, but to stop our wasteful and toxic practices altogether. For Barry Commoner (1990), the US regulatory modelthe basis for environmental regulation throughout the capitalist worldhas failed because it has avoided pollution prevention and fundamental technology change. His classic work, Making Peace With the Plane, systematically examined twenty years of US regulatory history (1970-90) to discover what worked and what didnt. He shows convincingly that what has worked is preventione.g. the banning of most applications of lead and asbestos; and what hasnt worked are painstaking efforts to monitor and control toxic substances and polluting technologies that shouldnt have been permitted in the first place. Commoner points out that the most damaging modern technologies have come from the petrochemical industry, and unlike the wondrous innovations of the electronics industry, synthetic petrochemical substances have been largely substitutes for more