certification has considerably diluted quality control and the rigourous application of the FSCs Principles and Criteria. A particular concern is a partnership formed by the WWF with the World Bank in 1998. Under their agreement, they are committed to bring 200 million hectares of the worlds production forests under independently certified sustainable management, by the year 2005 (WWF, 2001). This means an expansion in the area certified by the FSC by 700 % in the time period from fall, 2002 to 2005which various groups have argued is arbitrary and unattainable. The Rainforest Foundation estimates that around 18 million dollars flowed through the WWF between 1999 and 2001 alone, and that the dollars involved in the WWF fast growth strategy are seriously compromising certification standards. In addition, some observers are pointing out that the fast growth strategy is systemically biased against community-based forestry, which historically has been nurtured some of the most ecological forms of forestry. Ironically, according to the RF analysis of the new forest policy adopted by the World Bank in October 2002, the FSC does not fully measure up to the Banks principles for a credible certification system especially that of being free from vested conflicts of interests (Rainforest Foundation, 2002). Coincident with inadequate monitoring of the FSCs third-party assessment is growing tension within the FSC between stakeholders due to the growing power of the corporate segment. The three chambers of FSC organization are no longer equal in numbers or power, with community and indigenous representation. According to Counsell and Loraas (2002), The economic chamber has grown fast over the last few years and now comprise about 46% of the FSCs total membership, whilst the