enforced by lawas in the case of many forms of EPR. But it will also mean more flexible forms of regulation, including those implemented by non-state entities in civil society and emergent green industries. This flexibility is quite a different sort than most of that currently promoted by multinational corporations seeking less economic accountability. Stronger rules and more flexibility or participation are not in contradiction. Stronger rules that encompass deeper social and ecological values actually enable the state to be more of a guide and coordinator. Regulation in an ecological economy is closely related to design, and design is intimately related to knowledge and information. The state can also play a vital role in guiding the research and coordinating the knowledge necessary for green development, whether this information is generated by the state, the universities, NGOs or particular industries. Indicator projectsfrom product life-cycle assessment, firm eco-accounting, eco-footprinting, national mass-balance accounts, to sustainable community indicators ultimately must connect to government-supervised Green Plans and Community Development Plans. At a certain point, governments will have to consciously choose against policies geared to serve corporate globalization, export economies, resourceintensity, etc. But, because of the win/win nature of so many green economic initiatives, such either/or decisions may need not be made until ecological alternatives are wellestablished and an obvious choice. Nevertheless even the most clearcut win/win propositions find stubborn resistance from what Lovins (1993) called the institutional inefficiency of organizations and individual trapped in what Roberts calls the silo mentality and organizational structures of large bureaucracies, be they public or private. Green development is what Roberts and