economic growth resulting was totally unprecedented even for capitalismwhich in its mercantile forms was essentially a process of unequal exchange. Capitalist growth in industrialism depended on new concentrated sources of energy which could make possible the systems amazing mobilization of resources. First it was water and steam power, but ultimately growth depended upon the concentrated solar energy of fossil fuels. As Lyle (1994, p. 29) has emphasized, this centralization and concentration of energy generation effectively shifted prime productivity from the landscape to machinery (precisely opposite what he argues postindustrialism must do: i.e. disperse energy generation and flows into the landscape, not through a return to peasant agriculture, but via eco-design, and increasingly human-scale advanced technology). The popular mythology is that industrialism constituted the highest level of economic efficiency ever seen. But in fact, as Geddes (1915) emphasized almost 100 years ago, early industrialism employed a crude paleo-technology that, from an energyin/energy-out perspective was quite inefficient. E.F. Schumacher (1974) pointed this out in citing garden agriculture as being far more thermodynamically efficient than corporate agribusiness, which is capital- and resource-intensive. What gave industrialism its power was not its efficiency, but its ability to process vast amounts of natures materials with its new energy technologies and division of labour. In the last several decades, many writers have pointed to the dependence of these arrangements on the invisibility and undervaluing of both nature and certain kinds of human labour. On one hand, undervalued or unvalued materials have been churned through the industrial megamachine, even as ecosystem serviceswhich clean our air and water and absorb wasteshave (until recently) remained completely invisible. On