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506/2009 Z.z. - Zákon o ochranných známkach - SLOV-LEX
 byť vyjadrené v registri ochranných známok Úradu priemyselného vlastníctva Slovenskej republiky (ďalej len „register“) spôsobom, ktorý príslušným orgánom a verejnosti umožňuje jasne a presne určiť predmet ochrany poskytnutej majiteľovi ochrannej známky.
 je tvorené výlučne tvarom alebo inou vlastnosťou výrobku, ktoré vyplývajú z povahy samotného výrobku, sú potrebné na dosiahnutie technického výsledku alebo dávajú výrobku podstatnú hodnotu,
 by bolo jeho používanie alebo zápis v rozpore s osobitným predpisom alebo v rozpore so záväzkami, ktoré vyplývajú Slovenskej republike alebo Európskej únii z medzinárodných zmlúv, týkajúcimi sa najmä ochrany označení pôvodu a zemepisných označení, tradičných pojmov pre víno a zaručených tradičných špecialít,7a)
 obsahuje alebo vo svojich podstatných prvkoch reprodukuje starší názov odrody rastliny zapísaný v súlade s osobitným predpisom alebo s medzinárodnou zmluvou, ktorej zmluvnou stranou je Slovenská republika alebo Európska únia, upravujúcou ochranu práv k odrodám rastlín8a) a ak sa týka odrôd rastlín rovnakého druhu alebo blízko príbuzného druhu.
 je označenie zhodné so staršou ochrannou známkou a je prihlásené pre zhodné tovary alebo služby alebo
 z dôvodu zhodnosti alebo podobnosti označenia so staršou ochrannou známkou a zhodnosti alebo podobnosti tovarov alebo služieb, na ktoré sa označenie a staršia ochranná známka vzťahujú, existuje pravdepodobnosť zámeny na strane verejnosti; za pravdepodobnosť zámeny sa považuje aj pravdepodobnosť asociácie so staršou ochrannou známkou,
 majiteľom staršej ochrannej známky, ak je označenie zhodné alebo podobné so staršou ochrannou známkou, ktorá má na území Slovenskej republiky a v prípade ochrannej známky EÚ na území Európskej únie dobré meno, ak by použitie tohto označenia v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, ktoré sú zhodné, podobné alebo nepodobné tým, pre ktoré je staršia ochranná známka zapísaná, bez náležitého dôvodu neoprávnene ťažilo z rozlišovacej spôsobilosti alebo dobrého mena staršej ochrannej známky, alebo by bolo na ujmu rozlišovacej spôsobilosti staršej ochrannej známky alebo jej dobrému menu,
 majiteľom ochrannej známky chránenej v štáte alebo vo vzťahu k štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Parížskeho dohovoru na ochranu priemyselného vlastníctva alebo členom Svetovej obchodnej organizácie,5) ak prihlasovateľ, ktorý je alebo ktorý bol obchodným zástupcom majiteľa tejto ochrannej známky alebo jeho zástupcom na základe iného právneho vzťahu (ďalej len „obchodný zástupca“), požiadal o zápis označenia do registra vo svojom mene bez súhlasu jej majiteľa; to neplatí, ak mal obchodný zástupca na také konanie oprávnený dôvod,
 užívateľom nezapísaného označenia alebo užívateľom iného označenia používaného v obchodnom styku, ak právo k tomuto označeniu vzniklo pred dňom podania prihlášky a toto označenie nemá len miestny dosah, ak z dôvodu zhodnosti alebo podobnosti prihláseného označenia s nezapísaným označením alebo s iným označením používaným v obchodnom styku a zhodnosti alebo podobnosti tovarov alebo služieb, na ktoré sa tieto označenia vzťahujú, existuje pravdepodobnosť zámeny na strane verejnosti; za pravdepodobnosť zámeny sa považuje aj pravdepodobnosť asociácie s nezapísaným označením alebo s iným označením používaným v obchodnom styku,
 Ak počas piatich rokov odo dňa zápisu ochrannej známky do registra nezačal majiteľ ochrannú známku skutočne používať v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná, alebo ak bolo také používanie prerušené na nepretržité obdobie piatich rokov, ochranná známka podlieha následkom ustanoveným v § 14a, § 32 ods. 4 a 5, § 34 ods. 1 písm. a) a § 37a ods. 4 a 5; to neplatí, ak má majiteľ ochrannej známky na nepoužívanie ochrannej známky oprávnené dôvody.
 používanie ochrannej známky v podobe, ktorá sa od podoby, v ktorej bola ochranná známka zapísaná, odlišuje len v prvkoch, ktoré nemenia jej rozlišovaciu spôsobilosť; to platí aj vtedy, ak je ochranná známka v podobe, v akej sa používa, tiež zapísaná ako iná ochranná známka pre toho istého majiteľa,
 umiestňovanie ochrannej známky na tovare alebo na obale tovaru na území Slovenskej republiky výlučne na účel vývozu.
 Ak ide o medzinárodnú ochrannú známku, na účely odseku 1 sa za dátum zápisu považuje dátum priznania ochrany medzinárodnej ochrannej známke pre územie Slovenskej republiky.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky má výlučné právo používať ochrannú známku v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná. Majiteľ ochrannej známky je oprávnený používať spolu s ochrannou známkou značku ®.
 ak existuje z dôvodu jeho zhodnosti alebo podobnosti s ochrannou známkou a zhodnosti alebo podobnosti tovarov alebo služieb pravdepodobnosť zámeny na strane verejnosti; za pravdepodobnosť zámeny sa považuje aj pravdepodobnosť asociácie medzi ochrannou známkou a označením,
 zhodné alebo podobné s ochrannou známkou, ktorá má na území Slovenskej republiky dobré meno, ak by používanie tohto označenia v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, ktoré sú zhodné, podobné alebo nepodobné tým, pre ktoré je ochranná známka zapísaná, bez náležitého dôvodu neoprávnene ťažilo z rozlišovacej spôsobilosti alebo z dobrého mena ochrannej známky alebo by bolo na ujmu rozlišovacej spôsobilosti ochrannej známky alebo jej dobrému menu.
 ponuka alebo uvádzanie na trh označeného tovaru alebo jeho skladovanie na tieto účely, alebo ponuka alebo poskytovanie označenej služby,
 používanie označenia ako obchodného mena alebo názvu právnickej osoby alebo ako časti obchodného mena alebo časti názvu právnickej osoby,
 Bez toho, aby boli dotknuté práva nadobudnuté pred dňom podania prihlášky alebo pred dňom práva prednosti ochrannej známky, majiteľ ochrannej známky má právo zabrániť tretím osobám v preprave tovaru v obchodnom styku na územie Slovenskej republiky bez prepustenia tohto tovaru na území Slovenskej republiky do voľného obehu, ak tento tovar vrátane jeho obalu pochádza z tretích krajín a je neoprávnene označený označením zhodným s ochrannou známkou zapísanou pre také tovary alebo označením, ktoré nie je možné v základných hľadiskách odlíšiť od ochrannej známky zapísanej pre také tovary; to neplatí, ak v konaní vo veci určenia, či sa porušilo právo duševného vlastníctva začatom podľa osobitného predpisu,10bc) deklarant alebo držiteľ tovaru preukáže, že majiteľ ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený zakázať uvedenie tovaru na trh v krajine konečného určenia.
 Ak bola ochranná známka zapísaná do registra na meno obchodného zástupcu majiteľa ochrannej známky chránenej v štáte alebo vo vzťahu k štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Parížskeho dohovoru na ochranu priemyselného vlastníctva alebo členom Svetovej obchodnej organizácie,5) bez jeho súhlasu, má majiteľ uvedenej ochrannej známky právo zakázať mu používanie tejto ochrannej známky; to neplatí, ak mal obchodný zástupca na svoje konanie oprávnený dôvod.
 Ak existuje nebezpečenstvo, že obaly, štítky, visačky, ochranné prvky, prvky pravosti alebo akékoľvek iné prostriedky, na ktoré sa umiestňuje ochranná známka, môžu byť použité v súvislosti s tovarmi alebo so službami a také použitie by predstavovalo porušenie práv majiteľa ochrannej známky podľa odsekov 2 a 3, majiteľ ochrannej známky má právo zakázať tretím osobám v obchodnom styku
 umiestňovať označenie, ktoré je zhodné s ochrannou známkou alebo je jej podobné, na obaly, štítky, visačky, ochranné prvky, prvky pravosti alebo akékoľvek iné prostriedky, na ktoré možno ochrannú známku umiestniť,
 ponúkať alebo uvádzať na trh obaly, štítky, visačky, ochranné prvky, prvky pravosti alebo akékoľvek iné prostriedky, na ktorých je označenie umiestnené, alebo ich na tieto účely skladovať, dovážať alebo vyvážať.
 označenia alebo údaje, ktoré nemajú rozlišovaciu spôsobilosť alebo ktoré sa týkajú druhu, kvality, množstva, účelu, hodnoty, zemepisného pôvodu, času výroby tovaru alebo poskytnutia služby alebo inej vlastnosti tovaru alebo služby a
 ochrannú známku na účely identifikácie alebo uvádzania tovaru alebo služby ako tovaru alebo služby majiteľa uvedenej ochrannej známky, najmä ak je použitie ochrannej známky potrebné na označenie účelu tovaru alebo služby, predovšetkým ak ide o príslušenstvo alebo náhradné diely.
 Odsek 1 sa uplatní, len ak tretia osoba údaje podľa odseku 1 použije v súlade s obchodnými zvyklosťami, dobrými mravmi a pravidlami hospodárskej súťaže.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky je povinný strpieť, ak tretia osoba používa v obchodnom styku označenie, ktoré má len miestny dosah, jeho používanie sa začalo pred dňom podania prihlášky alebo pred dňom práva prednosti ochrannej známky a rozsah jeho používania sa nezmenil.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky je oprávnený domáhať sa zákazu používať označenie len v rozsahu, v akom jeho práva v čase podania žaloby nepodliehajú zrušeniu podľa § 34 ods. 1 písm. a).
 Ak ku dňu podania žaloby uplynulo od zápisu ochrannej známky najmenej päť rokov, majiteľ ochrannej známky na žiadosť žalovaného predloží dôkazy o skutočnom používaní ochrannej známky (§ 7c) počas piatich rokov, ktoré predchádzajú dňu podania žaloby, v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná a na ktorých je založená žaloba, alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený domáhať sa zákazu používať neskoršiu ochrannú známku, ak by neskoršia ochranná známka nemohla byť vyhlásená za neplatnú
 z dôvodu, že podmienky pre vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú, ktoré sa týkajú rozlišovacej spôsobilosti ochrannej známky, zvýšenej rozlišovacej spôsobilosti ochrannej známky nevyhnutnej pre konštatovanie pravdepodobnosti zámeny podľa § 7 písm. a) druhého bodu alebo dobrého mena ochrannej známky podľa § 7 písm. b), neboli splnené ku dňu podania prihlášky alebo ku dňu práva prednosti neskoršej ochrannej známky alebo
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený domáhať sa zákazu používať neskoršiu ochrannú známku EÚ, ak by táto neskoršia ochranná známka EÚ nemohla byť vyhlásená za neplatnú podľa osobitného predpisu.12b)
 Ak majiteľ ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený domáhať sa zákazu používať neskoršiu ochrannú známku podľa odseku 1 alebo 2, majiteľ neskoršej ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený v konaní o porušení práv z ochrannej známky domáhať sa zákazu používať staršiu ochrannú známku, aj keď táto staršia ochranná známka už nemôže byť uplatnená proti neskoršej ochrannej známke.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený zakázať tretím osobám používanie jeho ochrannej známky na tovaroch, ktoré boli s touto ochrannou známkou uvedené ním alebo s jeho súhlasom na trh v štáte, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Dohody o Európskom hospodárskom priestore.13)
 Prevod ochrannej známky nadobúda účinnosť voči tretím osobám dňom jeho zápisu do registra. Práva tretích osôb nadobudnuté pred dňom účinnosti prevodu ochrannej známky zostávajú zachované. Zápis prevodu ochrannej známky vykoná úrad na základe žiadosti, ktorú je oprávnená podať ktorákoľvek zo zmluvných strán. Úrad žiadosť o zápis prevodu ochrannej známky zamietne, ak žiadateľ k žiadosti nepriloží doklady, ktoré prevod ochrannej známky preukazujú; pred rozhodnutím o zamietnutí žiadosti o zápis prevodu ochrannej známky úrad umožní žiadateľovi vyjadriť sa k zisteným dôvodom, na ktorých základe má byť táto žiadosť zamietnutá.
 Prechod ochrannej známky nadobúda účinnosť voči tretím osobám dňom jeho zápisu do registra. Práva tretích osôb nadobudnuté pred dňom účinnosti prechodu ochrannej známky zostávajú zachované. Zápis prechodu ochrannej známky vykoná úrad na základe žiadosti jej pôvodného majiteľa alebo jej nového majiteľa. Úrad žiadosť o zápis prechodu ochrannej známky zamietne, ak žiadateľ k žiadosti nepriloží doklady, ktoré prechod ochrannej známky preukazujú; pred rozhodnutím o zamietnutí žiadosti o zápis prechodu ochrannej známky úrad umožní žiadateľovi vyjadriť sa k zisteným dôvodom, na ktorých základe má byť táto žiadosť zamietnutá.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky chránenej v štáte alebo vo vzťahu k štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Parížskeho dohovoru na ochranu priemyselného vlastníctva alebo členom Svetovej obchodnej organizácie,5) môže podať na súd návrh na určenie práva na zápis zmeny majiteľa ochrannej známky, ak bola ochranná známka zapísaná do registra na meno jeho obchodného zástupcu. Súd návrh zamietne, ak mal obchodný zástupca na svoje konanie oprávnený dôvod. Na základe právoplatného rozhodnutia súdu úrad na žiadosť zapíše zmenu majiteľa ochrannej známky.
 Majiteľ ochrannej známky môže licenčnou zmluvou udeliť inej osobe oprávnenie na používanie ochrannej známky pre niektoré tovary alebo služby alebo pre všetky tovary alebo služby, pre ktoré je ochranná známka zapísaná (ďalej len „licencia“).
 Ak majiteľ ochrannej známky udelil výlučnú licenciu, nesmie udeliť tretej osobe licenciu a je povinný, ak nie je v licenčnej zmluve dohodnuté inak, sám sa zdržať používania ochrannej známky. Nadobúdateľ výlučnej licencie je povinný ochrannú známku používať (§ 7c), ak nie je v licenčnej zmluve dohodnuté inak.
 Úrad na žiadosť záložného veriteľa alebo záložcu vykoná zápis záložného práva do registra. Úrad žiadosť o zápis záložného práva k ochrannej známke zamietne, ak žiadateľ k žiadosti nepriloží doklady, ktoré zriadenie záložného práva k ochrannej známke preukazujú; pred rozhodnutím o zamietnutí žiadosti o zápis záložného práva k ochrannej známke úrad umožní žiadateľovi vyjadriť sa k zisteným dôvodom, na ktorých základe má byť táto žiadosť zamietnutá.
 Najneskôr šesť mesiacov pred uplynutím platnosti zápisu ochrannej známky úrad o tejto skutočnosti informuje majiteľa ochrannej známky. Informácia podľa prvej vety je právne nezáväzná a jej neposkytnutie nezakladá zodpovednosť úradu.
 Tovary a služby, pre ktoré má byť označenie zapísané ako ochranná známka, sa v zozname tovarov alebo služieb zatrieďujú podľa triedenia ustanoveného medzinárodnou dohodou17) (ďalej len „medzinárodné triedenie“).
 Prihlasovateľ musí v zozname tovarov alebo služieb uviesť tovary alebo služby, pre ktoré požaduje ochranu, dostatočne jasne a presne, aby príslušným orgánom a verejnosti, najmä hospodárskym subjektom, bolo umožnené na tomto základe určiť rozsah požadovanej ochrany.
 Prihlasovateľ môže v zozname tovarov alebo služieb použiť všeobecné výrazy uvedené v názvoch tried medzinárodného triedenia alebo iné všeobecné výrazy, len ak sú jasné a presné.
 Všeobecné výrazy vrátane všeobecných výrazov uvedených v názvoch tried medzinárodného triedenia zahŕňajú všetky tovary alebo služby jednoznačne zahrnuté v doslovnom význame týchto výrazov; použitie týchto výrazov nezakladá nárok na ochranu tovarov alebo služieb, ktoré nie sú zahrnuté v doslovnom význame týchto výrazov.
 Ak prihlasovateľ žiada o zápis tovarov alebo služieb, ktoré patria do viac ako jednej triedy, zoskupí tovary a služby podľa tried medzinárodného triedenia, pred každou skupinou uvedie číslo triedy, do ktorej skupina tovarov alebo služieb patrí, a skupiny uvedie vo vzostupnom poradí.
 Tovary a služby sa nepovažujú za vzájomne podobné len z toho dôvodu, že patria do tej istej triedy medzinárodného triedenia. Tovary a služby sa nepovažujú za vzájomne nepodobné len z toho dôvodu, že patria do rôznych tried medzinárodného triedenia.
 Ak podanie neobsahuje údaje a náležitosti podľa odseku 1, úrad prihlasovateľa vyzve na ich doplnenie a na tento účel mu určí lehotu, ktorá nemôže byť kratšia ako dva mesiace. V tomto prípade je dňom podania prihlášky deň doručenia podania, ktorým prihlasovateľ tieto údaje a náležitosti doplnil, inak sa prihláška považuje za nepodanú.
 Na základe žiadosti prihlasovateľa úrad prihlasovateľovi vydá doklad o práve prednosti v listinnej podobe.
 Prihlasovateľ je až do zápisu označenia do registra oprávnený rozdeliť prihlášku obsahujúcu v zozname viac ako jeden tovar alebo službu tak, že z prihlášky vyjme niektoré tovary alebo služby do jednej alebo viacerých samostatných prihlášok. Právo prednosti a deň podania z pôvodnej prihlášky sa zachovajú aj pre rozdelené prihlášky. Rozdelením prihlášky podľa prvej vety v priebehu konania o námietkach nie je prípustné rozdeliť tie tovary alebo služby, proti ktorým podané námietky smerujú.
 Ustanovenia odsekov 1 až 3 sa primerane použijú aj na ochrannú známku. Rozdelením zápisu podľa odseku 3 v priebehu konania o návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú nie je prípustné rozdeliť tie tovary alebo služby, na ktoré sa vzťahuje návrh na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú. Rozdelením zápisu podľa odseku 3 nie je dotknutý zápis licencie (§ 20), zápis záložného práva (§ 21) alebo zápis exekúcie (§ 41a) a úrad zapíše licenciu, záložné právo alebo exekúciu aj k ochranným známkam, ktoré vznikli rozdelením zápisu podľa odseku 3.
 Ak prihláška nespĺňa podmienky podľa § 24 ods. 2 a 3, § 24a ods. 1 až 3 a 5, úrad vyzve prihlasovateľa, aby nedostatky v určenej lehote odstránil. Ak prihlasovateľ v určenej lehote nedostatky neodstráni, úrad konanie o prihláške zastaví; ak sa dôvody na zastavenie konania podľa § 24a ods. 2 a 3 týkajú len určitej časti tovarov alebo služieb, úrad konanie o prihláške zastaví len pre tieto tovary alebo služby. Na túto skutočnosť musí úrad prihlasovateľa vo výzve na odstránenie nedostatkov upozorniť.
 Ak je prihlásené označenie zhodné so staršou ochrannou známkou (§ 4) iného prihlasovateľa alebo majiteľa pre zhodné tovary alebo služby, úrad pred zverejnením prihlášky vo Vestníku Úradu priemyselného vlastníctva Slovenskej republiky (ďalej len „vestník“) oznámi túto skutočnosť prihlasovateľovi alebo majiteľovi staršej ochrannej známky.
 Ak označenie nie je spôsobilé na zápis podľa § 5, úrad prihlášku zamietne. Pred rozhodnutím o zamietnutí prihlášky úrad musí umožniť prihlasovateľovi vyjadriť sa k dôvodom, na ktorých základe sa má prihláška zamietnuť.
 Ak konanie o prihláške nebolo zastavené podľa odseku 2 alebo ak prihláška nebola zamietnutá podľa odseku 4, úrad prihlášku zverejní vo vestníku.
 Každý môže až do zápisu označenia do registra podať písomné pripomienky proti zápisu označenia do registra z dôvodov podľa § 5; na pripomienky úrad prihliadne pri rozhodovaní o zápise označenia do registra. Osoba, ktorá podala pripomienky, nie je účastníkom konania o prihláške ochrannej známky.
 Námietky môžu byť podané na základe jedného staršieho práva alebo viacerých starších práv podľa § 7, ak patria tomu istému majiteľovi. Námietky môžu byť podané na základe časti tovarov alebo služieb alebo na základe všetkých tovarov alebo služieb, pre ktoré je staršie právo chránené alebo prihlásené, a môžu smerovať proti časti tovarov alebo služieb alebo proti všetkým tovarom alebo službám, pre ktoré má byť označenie zapísané do registra.
 Ak námietky neboli podané riadne a včas podľa § 30 ods. 1, úrad konanie o námietkach zastaví. Rozhodnutie o zastavení konania úrad doručí namietateľovi.
 Ak sa prihlasovateľ k námietkam v lehote podľa odseku 2 nevyjadrí, úrad vo veci rozhodne podľa obsahu spisu.
 Ak ku dňu podania prihlášky alebo ku dňu vzniku práva prednosti uplynulo od zápisu staršej ochrannej známky (§ 4) najmenej päť rokov, namietateľ na žiadosť prihlasovateľa predloží dôkazy o skutočnom používaní (§ 7c) staršej ochrannej známky počas piatich rokov, ktoré predchádzajú dňu podania prihlášky alebo dňu vzniku práva prednosti, alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie.
 Žiadosť podľa odseku 1 môže podať prihlasovateľ úradu do dvoch mesiacov od upovedomenia o námietkach podľa § 31 ods. 2.
 Namietateľ predloží dôkazy o skutočnom používaní staršej ochrannej známky alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie podľa odseku 1 do štyroch mesiacov odo dňa doručenia výzvy úradu; na dôkazy predložené po uplynutí tejto lehoty sa neprihliada.
 Ak namietateľ dôkazmi predloženými v lehote podľa odseku 3 nepreukáže skutočné používanie staršej ochrannej známky alebo nepreukáže oprávnené dôvody na jej nepoužívanie a ak je staršia ochranná známka jediným právom uplatneným namietateľom, úrad námietky zamietne; inak na takúto staršiu ochrannú známku v konaní o námietkach neprihliada.
 Ak namietateľ preukázal skutočné používanie len pre časť tovarov alebo služieb, pre ktoré je staršia ochranná známka zapísaná, považuje sa staršia ochranná známka na účely preskúmania námietok za zapísanú len pre túto časť tovarov alebo služieb.
 Počas konania o námietkach poskytne úrad prihlasovateľovi a namietateľovi na základe ich spoločnej žiadosti najmenej dva mesiace na zmierlivé vyriešenie ich sporu.
 Ak žiadosť podľa odseku 1 bola podaná počas lehoty podľa § 31 ods. 2 a ak nedošlo k zmierlivému vyriešeniu sporu medzi účastníkmi, úrad po uplynutí lehoty podľa odseku 1 určí prihlasovateľovi novú lehotu na vyjadrenie sa k podaným námietkam.
 Ak žiadosť podľa odseku 1 bola podaná počas lehoty podľa § 32 ods. 2 alebo 3 a ak nedošlo k zmierlivému vyriešeniu sporu medzi účastníkmi, uplynutím lehoty podľa odseku 1 začínajú lehoty podľa § 32 ods. 2 alebo 3 plynúť odznova.
 Ak sú splnené podmienky na zápis označenia do registra a konanie o prihláške nebolo zastavené, v lehote podľa § 30 ods. 1 neboli podané námietky alebo ak sa konanie o námietkach skončilo právoplatným rozhodnutím úradu o zastavení konania alebo zamietnutí námietok, úrad označenie zapíše do registra.
 Účinky zápisu ochrannej známky do registra nastávajú dňom zápisu označenia do registra. Týmto dňom sa prihlasovateľ stáva majiteľom ochrannej známky; majiteľovi vydá úrad osvedčenie o zápise ochrannej známky do registra v listinnej podobe.
 na území Slovenskej republiky nebola skutočne používaná v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná, počas nepretržitého obdobia najmenej piatich rokov; ak majiteľ ochrannej známky nepreukáže opak alebo nemá na jej nepoužívanie oprávnené dôvody, platí, že ochranná známka sa na území Slovenskej republiky nepoužívala počas piatich po sebe idúcich rokov. Úrad ochrannú známku nezruší, ak sa ochranná známka medzi uplynutím tohto päťročného obdobia a podaním návrhu na jej zrušenie začala skutočne používať alebo sa jej používanie obnovilo; na používanie ochrannej známky, ktoré sa začalo alebo obnovilo v lehote troch mesiacov pred podaním návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky, pričom táto lehota začala plynúť až po uplynutí nepretržitého päťročného obdobia nepoužívania, sa však neprihliada, ak prípravy na toto používanie začali až potom, ako sa majiteľ ochrannej známky dozvedel, že môže byť podaný návrh na jej zrušenie,
 Zrušenie ochrannej známky je účinné odo dňa podania návrhu na jej zrušenie alebo od skoršieho dňa, ktorý bol na žiadosť účastníka konania v rozhodnutí o zrušení ochrannej známky určený ako deň, ku ktorému dôvod zrušenia nastal, ak účastník konania o zrušení ochrannej známky preukáže právny záujem.
 Úrad vyhlási ochrannú známku za neplatnú aj na návrh osoby uvedenej v § 7 z dôvodov podľa § 7, ak sa v konaní o vyhlásení ochrannej známky za neplatnú preukáže, že tento dôvod existuje. Podmienky pre uplatnenie starších práv uvedených v § 7 musia byť splnené už ku dňu podania prihlášky alebo ku dňu vzniku práva prednosti návrhom dotknutej ochrannej známky.
 Majiteľ staršej ochrannej známky (§ 4) alebo užívateľ starších práv uvedených v § 7 písm. c), d) a f) nie je oprávnený žiadať vyhlásenie neskoršej ochrannej známky za neplatnú pre tovary alebo služby, pre ktoré sa táto neskoršia ochranná známka používa, ak strpel jej používanie počas piatich po sebe nasledujúcich rokov, pričom si bol tohto používania vedomý; to neplatí, ak prihláška neskoršej ochrannej známky nebola podaná v dobrej viere.
 Ak majiteľ staršej ochrannej známky alebo užívateľ starších práv uvedených v § 7 písm. c), d) a f) nie je oprávnený žiadať vyhlásenie neskoršej ochrannej známky za neplatnú podľa odseku 1, majiteľ neskoršej ochrannej známky nie je oprávnený brániť používaniu staršej ochrannej známky alebo starších práv uvedených v § 7 písm. c), d) a f), aj keď táto staršia ochranná známka alebo tieto staršie práva už nemôžu byť uplatnené proti neskoršej ochrannej známke.
 Návrh na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú sa môže týkať časti tovarov alebo služieb alebo všetkých tovarov alebo služieb, pre ktoré je ochranná známka zapísaná. Návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú môže byť podaný na základe jedného staršieho práva alebo na základe viacerých starších práv podľa § 7, ak patria tomu istému majiteľovi. Návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú môže byť podaný na základe časti tovarov alebo služieb alebo na základe všetkých tovarov alebo služieb, pre ktoré je staršie právo chránené.
 Ak úrad konanie o návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú nezastaví podľa odseku 3 alebo 7, upovedomí o návrhu majiteľa ochrannej známky a vyzve ho, aby sa k návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú v určenej lehote vyjadril.
 Ak sa majiteľ ochrannej známky v lehote podľa odseku 4 k návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky alebo návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú nevyjadrí, úrad vo veci rozhodne podľa obsahu spisu.
 Ak úrad v konaní o návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky zistí, že nie sú splnené podmienky podľa § 34 ods. 1 až 3, alebo v konaní o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú zistí, že nie sú splnené podmienky podľa § 35 ods. 1 alebo 3, návrh zamietne.
 Úrad konanie o návrhu na zrušenie ochrannej známky podľa § 34 alebo konanie o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú podľa § 35 zastaví, ak odpadol dôvod, pre ktorý bol návrh podaný.
 Ak ku dňu podania návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú uplynulo od zápisu staršej ochrannej známky (§ 4) najmenej päť rokov, navrhovateľ na žiadosť majiteľa neskoršej ochrannej známky predloží dôkazy o skutočnom používaní (§ 7c) staršej ochrannej známky počas piatich rokov, ktoré predchádzajú dňu podania návrhu, v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná a na ktorých je založený návrh, alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie. Ak ku dňu podania prihlášky alebo ku dňu vzniku práva prednosti neskoršej ochrannej známky uplynulo od zápisu staršej ochrannej známky (§ 4) najmenej päť rokov, navrhovateľ okrem dôkazov podľa prvej vety predloží aj dôkazy o skutočnom používaní staršej ochrannej známky počas piatich rokov, ktoré predchádzajú dňu podania prihlášky alebo dňu práva prednosti neskoršej ochrannej známky, v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, pre ktoré je zapísaná a na ktorých je založený návrh, alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie.
 Žiadosť podľa odseku 1 môže podať majiteľ neskoršej ochrannej známky úradu do dvoch mesiacov od upovedomenia o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú podľa § 37 ods. 4.
 Navrhovateľ predloží dôkazy o skutočnom používaní staršej ochrannej známky alebo dôkazy o oprávnených dôvodoch na jej nepoužívanie podľa odseku 1 do štyroch mesiacov odo dňa doručenia výzvy úradu; na dôkazy predložené po uplynutí tejto lehoty sa neprihliada.
 Ak navrhovateľ dôkazmi predloženými v lehote podľa odseku 3 nepreukáže skutočné používanie staršej ochrannej známky alebo nepreukáže oprávnené dôvody na jej nepoužívanie a ak staršia ochranná známka bola jediným navrhovateľom uplatneným právom, úrad návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú zamietne; inak na takúto staršiu ochrannú známku v konaní o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú neprihliada.
 Ak navrhovateľ preukázal skutočné používanie len pre časť tovarov alebo služieb, pre ktoré je staršia ochranná známka zapísaná, považuje sa na účely preskúmania návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú táto staršia ochranná známka za zapísanú len pre túto časť tovarov alebo služieb.
 Žiadosti podľa odseku 2 nemožno vyhovieť v prípade zmeškania lehôt podľa § 31 ods. 2, § 32a ods. 2 a § 37 ods. 4.
 Kolektívna ochranná známka je ochranná známka, ktorá je takto označená pri podaní prihlášky a ktorá je spôsobilá rozlíšiť tovary alebo služby pochádzajúce od členov združenia výrobcov, producentov, poskytovateľov služieb alebo obchodníkov, ktoré má právnu subjektivitu (ďalej len „združenie“), od tovarov alebo služieb iných osôb.
 Prihlášku kolektívnej ochrannej známky môže ako prihlasovateľ podať združenie alebo právnická osoba, ktorá sa spravuje verejným právom.
 Ak § 44 až 45a neustanovujú inak, platia pre prihlášku kolektívnej ochrannej známky, pre práva z kolektívnej ochrannej známky, jej zánik, ako aj na konanie vo veci zrušenia kolektívnej ochrannej známky alebo jej vyhlásenia za neplatnú ustanovenia tohto zákona.
 Prihlasovateľ je povinný s prihláškou kolektívnej ochrannej známky predložiť zmluvu o používaní kolektívnej ochrannej známky (ďalej len „zmluva o používaní“), ktorá obsahuje zoznam osôb oprávnených používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku vrátane ich identifikačných údajov, podmienky členstva v združení a podmienky používania kolektívnej ochrannej známky vrátane sankcií.
 by mohla klamať verejnosť o povahe alebo o význame prihláseného označenia, najmä ak by mohlo byť prihlásené označenie považované za niečo iné ako kolektívnu ochrannú známku.
 Úrad nezamietne prihlášku kolektívnej ochrannej známky podľa odseku 2, ak prihlasovateľ zmenou zmluvy o používaní odstráni nedostatky uvedené v odseku 2.
 Pripomienky proti zápisu označenia ako kolektívnej ochrannej známky do registra (§ 29) môžu byť podané aj z dôvodov podľa odseku 2.
 Úrad zapíše údaj o zmene zmluvy o používaní do registra; to neplatí, ak nie sú splnené požiadavky podľa § 44 ods. 1 alebo ak by bol dôvod na zamietnutie prihlášky podľa § 44 ods. 2 písm. b) a c).
 Ak sa zmena zmluvy o používaní týka zoznamu osôb oprávnených používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku, úrad zmenu v zozname zapíše do registra.
 Výlučné právo používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku pre tovary alebo služby, pre ktoré je kolektívna ochranná známka zapísaná, majú členovia združenia uvedení v zozname podľa § 44 ods. 1.
 Pri neoprávnenom zásahu do výlučného práva podľa odseku 1 je v mene osôb oprávnených používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku oprávnený uplatniť nároky podľa § 8a žalobou podľa Civilného sporového poriadku alebo návrhom podľa osobitného predpisu10a) majiteľ kolektívnej ochrannej známky.
 Ak nie je v zmluve o používaní uvedené inak, pri neoprávnenom zásahu do výlučného práva podľa odseku 1 môže osoba oprávnená používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku vo svojom mene a na vlastný účet uplatniť nároky podľa § 8a žalobou podľa Civilného sporového poriadku alebo návrhom podľa osobitného predpisu10a) len so súhlasom majiteľa kolektívnej ochrannej známky. Ustanovením predchádzajúcej vety nie je dotknuté právo osoby oprávnenej používať kolektívnu ochrannú známku vstúpiť do konania začatého majiteľom kolektívnej ochrannej známky ako intervenient.
 majiteľ kolektívnej ochrannej známky neurobil príslušné opatrenia, aby zabránil používaniu kolektívnej ochrannej známky spôsobom nezlučiteľným s podmienkami používania uvedenými v zmluve o používaní vrátane akejkoľvek zmeny tejto zmluvy zapísanej v registri (§ 44a ods. 4),
 môže kolektívna ochranná známka v dôsledku spôsobu jej používania oprávnenými osobami klamať verejnosť spôsobom uvedeným v § 44 ods. 2 písm. c),
 bol údaj o zmene zmluvy o používaní zapísaný do registra v rozpore s požiadavkami podľa § 44a ods. 2; to neplatí, ak majiteľ kolektívnej ochrannej známky ďalšou zmenou zmluvy o používaní týmto požiadavkám vyhovie.
 Úrad vyhlási kolektívnu ochrannú známku za neplatnú aj vtedy, ak bola zapísaná v rozpore s požiadavkami podľa § 44 ods. 2; to neplatí, ak majiteľ kolektívnej ochrannej známky zmenou zmluvy o používaní týmto požiadavkám vyhovie.
 Medzinárodná ochranná známka, pri ktorej je vyznačená Slovenská republika, podlieha prieskumu, či spĺňa podmienky podľa § 5, a podlieha aj námietkam ako národná prihláška.
 Práva z ochrannej známky EÚ možno uplatniť najskôr odo dňa, keď Slovenská republika pristúpila k Európskej únii.22)
 adresu na doručovanie na území štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Dohody o Európskom hospodárskom priestore,
 z dôvodu zhodnosti alebo podobnosti ochrannej známky zapísanej v registri, ktorá má na území Slovenskej republiky dobré meno, s ochrannou známkou EÚ by použitie ochrannej známky EÚ v spojení s tovarmi alebo so službami, ktoré sú zhodné, podobné alebo nepodobné tým, pre ktoré je ochranná známka zapísaná v registri, bez náležitého dôvodu neoprávnene ťažilo z rozlišovacej spôsobilosti alebo dobrého mena ochrannej známky zapísanej v registri alebo by bolo na ujmu rozlišovacej spôsobilosti ochrannej známky zapísanej v registri alebo jej dobrému menu.
 Povinné zastúpenie podľa odseku 2 sa nevzťahuje na účastníkov konania, ktorí sú občanmi štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Dohody o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, majú sídlo alebo podnik na území štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Dohody o Európskom hospodárskom priestore.
 Účastník konania alebo jeho zástupca je povinný oznámiť úradu adresu na doručovanie na území štátu, ktorý je zmluvnou stranou Dohody o Európskom hospodárskom priestore.
 Úrad konanie preruší, ak sa začalo konanie o predbežnej otázke, ktorú úrad nie je oprávnený riešiť. Len čo odpadne prekážka, pre ktorú sa konanie prerušilo, pokračuje úrad v konaní i bez návrhu. Počas prerušenia konania lehoty podľa tohto zákona neplynú; to neplatí, ak ide o lehoty podľa § 22 ods. 3 a 4. Ak bolo konanie prerušené počas lehoty podľa § 32 ods. 2 alebo 3 alebo podľa § 37a ods. 2 alebo 3, len čo odpadne prekážka, pre ktorú sa konanie prerušilo, začínajú lehoty podľa § 32 ods. 2 alebo 3 alebo podľa § 37a ods. 2 alebo 3 plynúť odznova.
 Ak v odseku 12 nie je ustanovené inak, podanie urobené v elektronickej podobe bez autorizácie podľa osobitného predpisu28a) je potrebné dodatočne doručiť v listinnej podobe alebo v elektronickej podobe autorizované podľa osobitného predpisu;28a) ak sa dodatočne nedoručí úradu do jedného mesiaca, na podanie sa neprihliada. Úrad na dodatočné doručenie podania nevyzýva.
 Podanie sa posudzuje podľa jeho obsahu. Z podania musí byť zrejmé, kto ho podáva, akej veci sa týka a čo sa ním navrhuje. Každé podanie musí byť podpísané osobou, ktorá ho podáva. Podanie v elektronickej podobe autorizované podľa osobitného predpisu28a) musí obsahovať identifikátor osoby účastníka konania a identifikátor osoby zástupcu podľa osobitného predpisu,28c) ak je účastník konania zastúpený.
 náležitostiach žiadosti o preukázanie skutočného používania staršej ochrannej známky v konaní o námietkach alebo v konaní o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú,
 Lehoty, ktoré začali plynúť do 13. januára 2019, plynú podľa tohto zákona v znení účinnom do 13. januára 2019 a ich právne účinky zostávajú zachované.
 Práva a právne vzťahy z ochranných známok zapísaných do registra do 13. januára 2019 sa posudzujú podľa tohto zákona v znení účinnom od 14. januára 2019. Vznik, zmena a zánik práv a právnych vzťahov, ako aj nároky z nich vzniknuté do 13. januára 2019 sa posudzujú podľa predpisov účinných v čase ich vzniku.
 Žiadosť o predloženie dôkazov o skutočnom používaní ochrannej známky podľa § 14a ods. 2 je žalovaný oprávnený podať v tých súdnych konaniach o porušení práv z ochrannej známky, ktoré sa začali po 13. januári 2019.
 Čl. 1 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) 2017/1001 zo 14. júna 2017 o ochrannej známke Európskej únie (kodifikované znenie) (Ú. v. EÚ L 154/1, 16. 6. 2017).
 Čl. 39 a 40 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 2017/1001.
 Napríklad čl. 3 Lisabonskej dohody o ochrane označení pôvodu a ich medzinárodného zápisu z 31. októbra 1958, revidovanej v Štokholme 14. júla 1967 (vyhláška ministra zahraničných vecí č. 67/1975 Zb.), čl. 23 ods. 2 Dohody o obchodných aspektoch práv duševného vlastníctva, zákon č. 469/2003 Z. z. o označeniach pôvodu výrobkov a zemepisných označeniach výrobkov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v znení neskorších predpisov, čl. 23 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 110/2008 z 15. januára 2008 o definovaní, popise, prezentácii, označovaní a ochrane zemepisných označení liehovín a o zrušení nariadenia (EHS) č. 1576/89 (Ú. v. EÚ L 39/16, 13. 2. 2008) v platnom znení, čl. 41 nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 607/2009 z 14. júla 2009, ktorým sa ustanovujú určité podrobné pravidlá vykonávania nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 479/2008, pokiaľ ide o chránené označenia pôvodu a zemepisné označenia, tradičné pojmy, označovanie a obchodnú úpravu určitých vinárskych výrobkov (Ú. v. EÚ L 193/60, 24. 7. 2009) v platnom znení, čl. 14 a 24 ods. 1 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1151/2012 z 21. novembra 2012 o systémoch kvality pre poľnohospodárske výrobky a potraviny (Ú. v. EÚ L 343/1, 14. 12. 2012) v platnom znení, čl. 102 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1308/2013 zo 17. decembra 2013, ktorým sa vytvára spoločná organizácia trhov s poľnohospodárskymi výrobkami, a ktorým sa zrušujú nariadenia Rady (EHS) č. 922/72, (EHS) č. 234/79, (ES) č. 1037/2001 a (ES) č. 1234/2007 (Ú. v. EÚ L 347/671, 20. 12. 2013) v platnom znení.
 Napríklad nariadenie Rady (ES) č. 2100/94 z 27. júla 1994 o právach spoločenstva k odrodám rastlín (Ú. v. ES L 227, 1. 9. 1994) v platnom znení, zákon č. 202/2009 Z. z. o právnej ochrane odrôd rastlín, Medzinárodný dohovor o ochrane nových odrôd rastlín (oznámenie Ministerstva zahraničných vecí Slovenskej republiky č. 351/2009 Z. z.).
 Napríklad Lisabonská dohoda o ochrane označení pôvodu a ich medzinárodného zápisu, zákon č. 444/2002 Z. z. o dizajnoch v znení neskorších predpisov, zákon č. 469/2003 Z. z. v znení neskorších predpisov, nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 110/2008 v platnom znení, nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1151/2012 v platnom znení, nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1308/2013 v platnom znení.
 Čl. 18 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 2017/1001.
 § 4 zákona č. 147/2001 Z. z. o reklame a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov v znení neskorších predpisov.
 Zákon č. 486/2013 Z. z. o presadzovaní práv duševného vlastníctva colnými orgánmi. Nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 608/2013 z 12. júna 2013 o presadzovaní práv duševného vlastníctva colnými orgánmi a zrušení nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1383/2003 (Ú. v. EÚ L 181, 29. 6. 2013).
 Čl. 60 ods. 1, 3 alebo 4, čl. 61 ods. 1 alebo 2 alebo čl. 64 ods. 2 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) 2017/1001.
 Čl. 110 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 2017/1001.
 Čl. 140 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 2017/1001.
 § 2 Označenie, ktoré môže tvoriť ochrannú známku
 § 4 Staršia ochranná známka
 § 7Označenie sa nezapíše do registra na základe námietok proti zápisu označenia do registra (ďalej len „námietky“) podaných podľa § 30
 DRUHÁ ČASŤ PRÁVA Z OCHRANNEJ ZNÁMKY
 § 7a Majiteľ ochrannej známky
 § 7b Spolumajiteľstvo ochrannej známky
 § 7c Používanie ochrannej známky
 § 11 Právo na informácie
 § 12 Súdna ochrana práv
 § 13 Zábezpeka na strane navrhovateľa neodkladného opatrenia
 § 14 Obmedzenie práv z ochrannej známky
 § 14a Nepoužívanie ochrannej známky ako procesná obrana v konaní o porušení práv z ochrannej známky
 § 14b Procesná obrana majiteľa neskoršej ochrannej známky v konaní o porušení práv z ochrannej známky
 § 15 Vyčerpanie práv z ochrannej známky
 § 17 Prevod ochrannej známky
 § 18 Prechod ochrannej známky
 § 20 Licenčná zmluva
 § 21 Záložné právo
 § 22 Platnosť a obnova zápisu ochrannej známky
 § 23 Zánik ochrannej známky
 § 24 Prihláška
 § 24a Tovary a služby
 § 25 Deň podania prihlášky
 § 26 Právo prednosti
 § 27 Úprava označenia a rozdelenie prihlášky
 § 28 Prieskum a zverejnenie prihlášky
 § 29 Pripomienky proti zápisu označenia do registra
 § 32 Preukazovanie skutočného používania staršej ochrannej známky v konaní o námietkach
 § 33 Zápis ochrannej známky
 § 34 Zrušenie ochrannej známky
 § 35 Vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú
 § 35a Strpenie používania neskoršej ochrannej známky
 § 36 Osobitné ustanovenia o účinkoch zrušenia ochrannej známky alebo vyhlásenia ochrannej známky za neplatnú
 § 37 Návrh na zrušenie ochrannej známky a návrh na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú
 § 37a Preukazovanie skutočného používania staršej ochrannej známky v konaní o návrhu na vyhlásenie ochrannej známky za neplatnú
 § 38 Predĺženie lehoty a pokračovanie v konaní
 § 39 Uvedenie do predošlého stavu
 § 40 Rozklad
 § 41 Register
 § 41a Zápis exekúcie do registra
 § 42 Vestník
 ŠTVRTÁ ČASŤ KOLEKTÍVNA OCHRANNÁ ZNÁMKA
 § 44 Osobitné ustanovenia o prihláške kolektívnej ochrannej známky
 § 44a Zmeny zmluvy o používaní kolektívnej ochrannej známky
 § 45 Osobitné ustanovenia o právach z kolektívnej ochrannej známky
 § 45a Osobitné ustanovenia o zrušení kolektívnej ochrannej známky a vyhlásení kolektívnej ochrannej známky za neplatnú
 PIATA ČASŤ MEDZINÁRODNÁ OCHRANNÁ ZNÁMKA A OCHRANNÁ ZNÁMKA EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE
 § 49 Premena prihlášky ochrannej známky EÚ a premena ochrannej známky EÚ na národnú prihlášku
 § 53 Splnomocňovacie ustanovenie
 § 54a Prechodné ustanovenia k úpravám účinným od 1. januára 2018
 § 54b Prechodné ustanovenia k úpravám účinným od 14. januára 2019
 567/2009 Z. z. Vyhláška Úradu priemyselného vlastníctva Slovenskej republiky, ktorou sa vykonáva zákon č. 506/2009 Z. z. o ochranných známkach
 Číslo: 506/2009 Z. z.
 2. 01.01.2010 - 30.06.2016
 3. 01.07.2016 - 31.12.2017 125/2016 Z. z.
 4. 01.01.2018 - 31.12.2018 242/2017 Z. z.
 5. 01.01.2019 - 13.01.2019 242/2017 Z. z.
 6. 14.01.2019 - 291/2018 Z. z.


type: other

text:
Skat.dk: Vurderingsstyrelsens kommentarer til Højesterets dom af 27. november 2018 (sag 244/2017)
 Ejendomsvurdering, fradrag for grundforbedringer
 Skatteforvaltningslovens § 33, stk. 3, jf. lov nr. 427 af 6. juni 2005, som senest ændret ved lov nr. 925 af 18. september 2012, og § 3, stk. 10, i lov nr. 925 af 18. september 2012
 Den juridiske vejledning A.A.8.4.2.3.
 SKM2019.35.HR Grundejer berettiget til ekstraordinær genoptagelse
 Højesteret afsagde den 27. november 2018 dom i sagen Civica mod Skatteministeriet (SKM2019.35.HR). I dommen tog Højesteret stilling til, om Civica var berettiget til at få genoptaget ejendomsvurderingen for år 2000 med henblik på at få indsat et fradrag for grundforbedringer efter de dagældende regler om ekstraordinær genoptagelse.
 Højesteret fandt, at Civica havde godtgjort, at betingelserne for ekstraordinær genoptagelse var opfyldt og pålagde Skatteministeriet at genoptage vurderingen for år 2000 ekstraordinært og indsætte et fradrag for grundforbedringer.
 Sagen er en del af et større sagskompleks (GLEG-komplekset), hvor det tidligere SKAT gennemgik en lang række tidligere afgjorte ordinære genoptagelsessager om fradrag for grundforbedringer for at undersøge, om vurderingerne skulle indstilles ekstraordinært genoptaget.
 Vurderingsstyrelsen finder derfor anledning til at tilkendegive styrelsens opfattelse af dommen.
 Vurderingsstyrelsens kommentarer til dommen
 Det er Vurderingsstyrelsens opfattelse, at Højesteret med dommen har tiltrådt den i hidtidig praksis anlagte fortolkning af retsgrundlaget om ekstraordinær genoptagelse, idet det fremgår af dommens præmisser, at det som anført i Den juridiske vejledning beror på en samlet individuel bedømmelse af forholdene, om der skal ske ekstraordinær genoptagelse, og at der i den forbindelse kan lægges vægt på, om der er tale om objektive fejl i vurderingerne, myndighedsfejl, væsentlig beløbsmæssig afvigelse eller særlige omstændigheder i øvrigt.
 Det er videre Vurderingsstyrelsens opfattelse, at Højesteret med dommen har tiltrådt, dels at det er grundejeren, der har bevisbyrden for, at betingelserne for ekstraordinær genoptagelse er opfyldt, dels at grundejer kan fortabe kravet ved passivitet. Der henvises til præmisserne. Det forhold, at Højesteret i den konkrete sag - med henvisning til det faktiske forløb - har anlagt en lempeligere tilgang til grundejerens pligt til at reagere, ændrer ikke ved, at Højesteret med denne del af præmisserne grundlæggende har anerkendt, at det er relevant at lægge vægt på, om grundejer har udnyttet sine reaktionsmuligheder.
 Det fremgår af Højesterets præmisser, at sagsøgers ejendom og naboejendommen var registreret i et andet grundværdiområde end de øvrige ejendomme i udstykningen og med forkert planmæssig anvendelse, at disse to storparceller bevarede gamle ejendoms- og matrikelnumre fra de hidtidige kolonihaveejendomme i området, og at disse to storparceller i modsætning til de øvrige parceller i udstykningen ikke fik et oprindeligt fradrag for forbedringer.
 Det fremgår også, at Højesteret under henvisning hertil fandt det tilstrækkelig godtgjort, at to af storparcellerne - i modsætning til de øvrige storparceller i udstykningsområdet - ikke fik fradrag for forbedringer i år 2000 på grund af et ikke retvisende oplysningsgrundlag i de it-systemer, der understøttede det kommunale vurderingsråds ejendomsvurdering.
 Højesteret fandt på dette grundlag, at der i den konkrete sag forelå en konkret myndighedsfejl, som var årsag til, at der ikke på de to storparceller var ansat et korrekt fradrag for forbedringer, og som af denne grund kan begrunde ekstraordinær genoptagelse.
 Det er Vurderingsstyrelsens opfattelse, at Højesterets præmisser må forstås således, at det ikke er enhver myndighedsfejl, der kan begrunde en ekstraordinær genoptagelse med henblik på ansættelse af et korrekt fradrag for forbedringer. Det kræves tillige, at fejlen er relevant, sådan at den fejlagtige eller manglende ansættelse skal være en følge af den konkrete fejl.
 Det er videre Vurderingsstyrelsens opfattelse, at dommen er konkret begrundet inden for rammerne af hidtidig praksis. Vurderingsstyrelsen vil derfor ikke foretage en fornyet gennemgang af samtlige sager i GLEG-komplekset, ligesom der ikke vil blive offentliggjort et styresignal.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 718 A.2d 211 (1998)
 351 Md. 241
 Robert GRIER
 v.
 STATE of Maryland.
 No. 91 Sept. Term, 1997.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 September 23, 1998.
 *213 Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
 Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.
 *212 Raker, Judge.
 Petitioner Robert Grier was convicted before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with the crimes of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, mayhem with intent to disfigure, and other related offenses. At trial, the State elicited evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence, and Petitioner entered a general objection. We consider three issues in this case. First, we consider whether a general objection to the admission of evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Second, we consider whether evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was admissible as "fair response" to the defense theory of the case. Finally, if we find error, was the admission of evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence harmless error.
 We shall hold that because the State's questions did not generate any admissible evidence, a general objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Petitioner's post-arrest silence was not admissible as "fair response." Finally, the trial court's error admitting evidence of post-arrest silence was not harmless. Accordingly, we shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals.
 I.
 While on patrol, two Baltimore City police officers observed Robert Grier (Petitioner) and Carl Mack struggling with each other in the middle of the street. While the officers were turning their vehicle around, Grier and Mack stopped struggling, and Grier started to walk away. Grier was carrying a camera case. The officers noticed that Mack had a deep cut on his left hand, and that he was hysterical. Officer Farley remained on the scene and spoke with Mack, who told the officer that Grier had attacked him and stolen his backpack. Officer Purtell followed Grier. Officer Purtell stayed 20 feet behind Grier both for safety reasons and because he did not want to approach Petitioner "right off the bat" until he "knew what was going on." After calling an ambulance for Mack, Officer Farley also followed in pursuit of Grier. Officer Farley observed Grier walk into a dead-end alley and throw something onto a porch. As Grier came out of the alley, the officers "got him and put him on the ground and then took him into custody."
 Grier was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He was convicted of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Article 27, § 488; statutory maiming, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 385[1]; and other related offenses.
 *214 At trial, defense counsel told the jury in opening statement:
 Now, as the prosecutor has said, you will hear from a number of witnesses, two police officers and Mr. Mack, the infamous Mr. Mack....
 Now, you will hear through these witnesses what they did, at least the police officers, what they did by way of investigation, what they didn't do by way of investigation, and you will also find testimony from these witnesses to be lacking. You will find the physical evidence to be lacking.
 Officer Farley, the State's first witness, testified to his observation of the struggle, his questioning of Mack, and his subsequent pursuit of Grier.
 OFFICER FARLEY: When we rode by, I seen them standing right in front of each other arguing. After that point we did a U-turn and came back through. And as we did the U-turn I seen them struggling with each other. The defendant had grabbed the victim. By the time we got down there, he had let go and starting walking away.
 THE STATE: When you got down there, who let go and started walking away?
 OFFICER FARLEY: The defendant, I mean, yeah, the defendant let go of the victim and starting walking away from us.
 THE STATE: And what happened to Mr. Mack?
 OFFICER FARLEY: He was there. I had approached him and my partner went towards the defendant. I had approached Mr. Mack and I observed
 THE STATE: Was he standing, sitting, laying down, how was he?
 OFFICER FARLEY: He was standing. He was holding his hand when I approached him.
 THE STATE: And, what, if anything, did you see with his hand?
 OFFICER FARLEY: I saw blood all over his hand.
 * * * * * *
 THE STATE: Okay. Now, when you saw the defendant, did you see the defendant walk away?
 OFFICER FARLEY: Yes, sir.
 * * * * * *
 THE STATE: And so what did you do? Did you leave Mr. Mack and continue on
 OFFICER FARLEY: After I called the ambulance, I left Mr. Mack to go with my partner.
 THE STATE: And where did your partner go, if you know?
 OFFICER FARLEY: He was walking eastbound down on 30th.
 THE STATE: Your partner was walking?
 OFFICER FARLEY: Well, he was walking right behind the defendant. The defendant was walking very fast.
 THE STATE: And where did the defendant go, if you know?
 OFFICER FARLEY: When we were going down, he attempted to go through an alley which was a dead end, and then he came back out and tried to go back down the street and that is where we got him.
 * * * * * *
 THE STATE: So when [Grier] came out of the alley, what, if anything, did he do next?
 OFFICER FARLEY: He walked down, continued eastbound on 30th, and it looked like he had thrown something, I didn't know what happened at that time, onto a porch there, and at that time we got him and put him on the ground and then got him into custody.
 THE STATE: And did anyone go back up to the porch?
 OFFICER FARLEY: Yes sir, my partner did.
 THE STATE: You didn't go up there?
 OFFICER FARLEY: No.
 THE STATE: Did the defendant offer any explanation as to what this was about?
 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.
 THE COURT: Sustained.
 *215 THE STATE: Your Honor, may we approach?
 THE COURT: Yes.
 (Counsel and the defendant approached the bench and the following ensued:)
 THE STATE: Judge, I believe that the question does not elicit any hearsay.
 THE COURT: What does it elicit?
 THE STATE: Just whether he offered an explanation or not.
 THE COURT: It's as well a leading question.
 THE STATE: Well, I will rephrase it.
 * * * * * *
 THE COURT: Do you expect him to give you an answer about what explanation was offered?
 THE STATE: No.
 THE COURT: You expect him to say no explanation?
 THE STATE: Uh-huh.
 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Well, you have to ask it right.
 * * * * * *
 THE STATE: Officer, what, if any, explanation did the defendant offer to you ever why he was or why this was taking place?
 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection Your Honor.
 THE COURT: You may answer, sir.
 OFFICER FARLEY: He didn't offer any.
 THE COURT: The Court does overrule the objection.
 Grier elected not to testify at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for twelve years for the attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon and fifteen years for the statutory maiming, to be served concurrently.
 Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his post-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. The Court of Special Appeals held that Petitioner's "general objection was insufficient to preserve the post-arrest silence issue" for review and affirmed. Grier v. State, 116 Md.App. 534, 542, 698 A.2d 1133, 1137 (1997). The court reasoned as follows:
 Md. Rule 5-103(a)(1) provides that the erroneous admission of evidence is not preserved for appellate review by a general objection when a specific ground is required by the applicable rule. Before the bench conference concluded, appellant's trial counsel was well aware that the fair and accurate answer to the "explanation" question would generate (1) admissible evidence of appellant's pre-arrest silence, and (2) inadmissible evidence of appellant's post-arrest silence. Under these circumstances, Md. Rule 5-105 required that appellant's trial counsel make a specific request that Judge Hubbard restrict the answer to its proper scope. The general objection was insufficient to preserve the post-arrest silence issue for our review.
 Grier, 116 Md.App. at 542, 698 A.2d at 1137. Alternatively, the court found that the evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 542-43, 698 A.2d at 1137. We granted Grier's petition for writ of certiorari to consider the following questions:
 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that a general objection was insufficient to preserve for appellate review the question of whether or not the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt?
 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that admission of evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
 II.
 We address first whether counsel's general objection was sufficient to preserve for appellate review the trial court's decision to admit evidence of Petitioner's silence. Petitioner argues that there was no reason for defense counsel to anticipate that the "explanation" question would generate any admissible evidence. Therefore, his general objection to the admissibility of evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. *216 The State argues that the questioning at issue generated both admissible and inadmissible evidence. Thus, Petitioner was required to object specifically to that portion of the evidence that was inadmissible. We conclude, contrary to the Court of Special Appeals, that the questioning as to defendant's silence elicited no admissible evidence, and therefore, a general objection properly sustained the issue for appellate review.
 A.
 Maryland Rule 2-517(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he grounds for [an] objection need not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, so directs." Rule 5-103(a)(1) similarly provides:
 Rule 5-103. Rulings on evidence
 (a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling, and
 (1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was requested by the court or required by rule[.]
 If neither the court nor a rule requires otherwise, a general objection is sufficient to preserve all grounds of objection which may exist. See Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 305-06, 550 A.2d 925, 930 (1988); von Lusch v. State, 279 Md. 255, 262-63, 368 A.2d 468, 472 (1977).
 The State contends, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that Maryland Rule 5-105 required defense counsel to limit his objection to evidence of Defendant's post-arrest silence. Rule 5-105 provides:
 Rule 5-105. Limited Admissibility.
 When evidence is admitted that is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
 As a threshold matter, we note that Rule 5-105 is inapplicable to the issue in this case. Rule 5-105 addresses the situation in which evidence is admissible only for a limited purpose. Even under the State's analysis, i.e., that the question asked of the police officer generated admissible evidence of pre-arrest silence and inadmissible evidence of post-arrest silence, Rule 5-105 is inapplicable.
 Rule 5-105 applies when evidence is admissible for a limited purpose. For example, Rule 5-105 is implicated when "other crimes" evidence is admitted for the limited purpose of proving defendant's intent or motive, and not for the purpose of proving propensity for criminal conduct. See Rule 5-404. In that circumstance, a court, upon defendant's request, should instruct the jury that the evidence should be used only for the limited purpose of proving intent or motive.
 Whether a specific objection is required when a question elicits both inadmissible and admissible evidence is not addressed by the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Because we conclude that the question in this case elicited no admissible evidence, we need not address this issue. When a question elicits no admissible evidence, a general objection is sufficient to preserve the question of admissibility for appeal. See Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 305-06, 550 A.2d 925, 930 (1988).
 B.
 Both the State and Petitioner agree that the question"What, if any explanation did the defendant offer to you ever why he was or why this was taking place?"elicited evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence. They disagree as to whether the questioning also elicited admissible evidence of Petitioner's pre-arrest silence. The State argues that there was a period of initial questioning and detention of Grier that generated admissible evidence of Grier's pre-arrest silence. The State maintains that "[a]fter Grier exited the dead-end alley and began to go back down the street, he was stopped for questioning by Officers Farley and Purtell."
 Officer Farley's testimony contradicts this characterization of the events. Officers Farley and Purtell never stopped Grier for a period of initial questioning. After Grier *217 came out of the dead-end alley, the officers immediately arrested him. The officers pursued Grier, "got" him, and put him on the ground. Once Petitioner was on the ground and in the custody and control of the police officers, he was certainly under arrest. See Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 515-16, 350 A.2d 130, 133 (1976). Although Officer Farley may have had the right simply to detain and question Petitioner before placing him in custody, he did not do so.
 Because there was no initial investigatory detention, any evidence of "pre-arrest silence" necessarily would have occurred during the time that the police officers pursued Petitioner. Although Petitioner was technically "silent" during this period, this pre-arrest silence was not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
 Evidence of a person's silence is generally inadmissible because "[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force." United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975). We have recently reaffirmed that silence is considered probative and admissible as substantive evidence of guilt if it amounts to a tacit admission, that is, if it is in response to an assertion which the party would, under all circumstances, naturally be expected to deny. Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 817, 709 A.2d 1305, 1307 (1998). See also Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 244, 322 A.2d 211, 217 (1974); Miller v. State, 231 Md. 215, 218, 189 A.2d 635, 636 (1963); Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 618-19, 180 A.2d 857, 859-60 (1962); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 160, at 648 (J. Strong, ed., 4th ed.1992). Accordingly, we have held that prearrest silence may be admissible as substantive evidence of guilt, on a case-by-case basis, when it amounts to a tacit admission. Key-El, 349 Md. at 818-19, 709 A.2d at 1308.
 In the instant case, however, there is no tacit admission because, quite simply, there was no accusation to deny. Before Petitioner was taken into custody, Officers Purtell and Farley did not accuse Petitioner of any criminal conduct, nor did they question Petitioner as to what had happened. They were at least twenty feet behind Petitioner as they pursued him.[2]
 The State argues that even in the absence of an accusation, Petitioner's failure to come forward and tell the officers his version of events constitutes pre-arrest silence. According to the State, the natural response of an innocent person in Grier's shoes would be to speak out and tell the police his story at the time of the crime.[3] Thus, the State seeks to expand the notion of admissible "pre-arrest silence" beyond tacit admissions to include a defendant's mere failure to tell the police his version of the events in question.
 We reject the notion that a person's failure to come forward and tell the police his or her version of events constitutes pre-arrest silence such that it is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. Such evidence carries little or no probative value. Further, any minimal amount of probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
 Silence under these circumstances differs significantly from a tacit admission, which this Court has found in some situations to be probative evidence of guilt. To qualify as a tacit admission, pre-arrest silence first must meet the threshold requirements set out by the Court in Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 241, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991), and reaffirmed in Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 817, 709 A.2d 1305, 1307 (1998):
 In order for the other's statement to be considered the party's tacit admission, the following prerequisite must be satisfied: (1) the party heard and understood the *218 other person's statement; (2) at the time, the party had an opportunity to respond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's position, who disagreed with the statement, would have voiced that disagreement. The party must have had first-hand knowledge of the matter addressed in the statement.
 (quoting L. MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, § 801(4).3, at 312-13 (1987)). We noted in Key-El that these prerequisites ensure to some extent that a defendant's pre-arrest silence is probative of guilt before admitted into evidence.
 The premise underlying the tacit admission rule is that silence in the face of an accusation is probative of guilt, because a false accusation "`would naturally rouse the accused to speak in his or her defense.'" Key-El v. State, 349 Md. at 817, 709 A.2d at 1307 (quoting Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 241, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991)). In the absence of an accusation, a defendant's failure to come forward does not constitute an admission, and lacks probative value. Citizens ordinarily have no legal obligation to come forward to the police. See Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 335, 686 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996). Failure to come forward to the police may result from numerous factors, including a belief that one has committed no crime, general suspicion of the police, or fear of retaliation. See, e.g., People v. DeGeorge, 73 N.Y.2d 614, 543 N.Y.S.2d 11, 541 N.E.2d 11, 13 (1989). Such silence is simply not probative as substantive evidence of guilt. It is thus inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief.
 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980), does not compel a different result. Jenkins involved a defendant's pre-arrest silence that was used to impeach his trial testimony, not used as substantive evidence of his guilt. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's admission of evidence of the defendant's failure to come forward with his version of events did not violate the defendant's Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 238-39, 100 S. Ct. at 2129. At trial, the defendant testified that he had killed the victim in self-defense. Id. at 233, 100 S. Ct. at 2126. The prosecutor, in cross-examination and closing, emphasized that the defendant had not waited at the scene to tell the police what had happened, and had not gone subsequently to the police to tell them that he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 233-34, 100 S. Ct. at 2126-27. The Court held that when the defendant testified, impeachment of him with his pre-arrest silence was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 240-41, 100 S. Ct. at 2130. It then left to each jurisdiction "to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative," id. at 239, 100 S. Ct. at 2129, and to "defin[e] the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative th[a]n prejudicial." Id. at 240, 100 S. Ct. at 2130.
 Unlike the instant case, Jenkins involved the use of pre-arrest silence for the purpose of impeachmentto call into question the veracity of the defendant's testimony that he had acted in self-defense. The defendant had elected to testify and thereby placed his credibility at issue. Id. at 238, 100 S. Ct. at 2129. The probative value of the defendant's pre-arrest silence was the inconsistency with the defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bolus, 545 Pa. 103, 680 A.2d 839, 844 (1996)(holding that evidence of the defendant's failure to come forward with his version of events was admissible to impeach defendant's testimony); State v. Holmes, 290 N.J.Super. 302, 675 A.2d 1125 (App.Div.1996)(stating that "[a] defendant's silence is never substantive evidence of guilt, but is admissible only to cast doubt upon the credibility of his exculpatory testimony at trial"); State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 464 S.E.2d 414 (1995)(determining that evidence of the defendant's failure to tell police his version of events was inconsistent with the defendant's trial testimony and admissible to impeach); State v. Williams, 27 Conn.App. 654, 610 A.2d 672 (1992)(holding that evidence of pre-arrest silence to impeach defendant's testimony was proper); State v. Sabbah, 13 Ohio App. 3d 124, 468 N.E.2d 718, 731 (1982)(leaving to the trial court to determine, "on a case-by-case basis, the precise circumstances under which a defendant's pre-arrest silence, when juxtaposed to his exculpatory testimony, is so genuinely inconsistent with it *219 that references to such silence are probative of credibility or recent fabrication"); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1042, at 1056-58 (Chadbourn ed.1970); Annot., Impeachment of Defendant in Criminal Case by Showing Defendant's Prearrest SilenceState Cases, 35 A.L.R. 4th 731 (1981); But see Farley v. State, 717 P.2d 111, 113 (Okla.Crim.App.1986)(holding that evidence of pre-arrest silence cannot be used to impeach because it does not increase the probability that a defendant's testimony is false); People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935-36 (1981)(holding that absent unusual circumstances, evidence of pre-arrest silence is inadmissible even when offered solely to impeach); People v. Sheperd, 37 Colo. App. 336, 551 P.2d 210, 211-12 (1976) (holding that "[s]ilence, in the form of failing to appear voluntarily before the police and give a statement, prior to being arrested, is of such little probative value that it should not be introduced" even to impeach).[4]
 In this case, the State did not use evidence of Grier's silence as impeachment evidence. Instead, the State used the evidence as substantive evidence of guilt. At trial, Grier exercised his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and elected not to testify, and therefore, evidence of his failure to come forward with his version of the incident lacked probative value. We hold that, with the exception of circumstances constituting a "tacit admission," ordinarily a defendant's failure to approach the police with his or her account prior to arrest lacks probative value, and is inadmissible evidence in the State's case-in-chief.[5]
 In summary, the questioning at issue generated no admissible evidence of pre-arrest silence. There was no preliminary detention during which Petitioner was questioned about the events. Further, Petitioner could not naturally be expected to assert his innocence as police pursued him, and as a result, Petitioner's silence at that time was not a tacit admission. Finally, we soundly reject the State's argument that Petitioner's failure to come forward and tell the police his version of events was admissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
 III.
 We now turn to the State's claim that evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence was properly admitted, or at least "not prejudicial," as fair response to defense allegations of an improper police investigation.
 Evidence of post-arrest silence, after Miranda warnings are given, is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624 n. 37, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). As a constitutional matter, allowing such evidence "would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S. Ct. at 2245. As an evidentiary matter, such evidence is also inadmissible. Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 244, 322 A.2d 211, 217 (1974); Miller v. State, 231 Md. 215, 218-19, 189 A.2d 635, 636-37 (1963). When a defendant is silent following Miranda warnings, he may be acting merely upon his right to remain silent. Younie, 272 Md. at 244, 322 A.2d at 217; Miller, 231 Md. at 218-19, 189 A.2d at 636-37. Thus, a defendant's silence at that point carries little or no probative *220 value, and a significant potential for prejudice. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2138, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975).
 The Supreme Court has held that the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), leaving to each state to determine the admissibility of such evidence on evidentiary grounds. Although this Court has not had occasion to consider the issue, the Court of Special Appeals has held that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is too ambiguous to be admissible, even as impeachment evidence. Judge Karwacki, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, reasoned:
 [S]ince "[s]ilence may be motivated by many factors other than a sense of guilt or lack of an exculpatory story," McCormick, Evidence, § 270 at 800 (1984 ed.), it carries little, if any, probative value.
 But "[n]ot only is evidence of silence at the time of arrest generally not very probative of a defendant's credibility, ... it also has a significant potential for unfair prejudice." Hale, 422 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 2138, 45 L.Ed.2d at 107. See also Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 241-42, 322 A.2d 211 (1974).
 Wills v. State, 82 Md.App. 669, 678, 573 A.2d 80, 85 (1990).
 Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has addressed the related question of whether the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief.[6] In the case before us, however, the State does not contend that there was a period of time, post-arrest but pre-Miranda, when Defendant's silence was admissible as a tacit admission of guilt.[7] The State pursues a different argument. The State contends that any evidence of post-arrest silence, without reference to Miranda warnings, was admissible as "fair response" to the defense strategy in the case. According to the State, the theory of Grier's defense was that the police considered only the victim's version of events and failed to consider Grier's version or account.[8] The State argues that reference to Petitioner's failure to tell his version of events to police was admissible as "fair response" to this defense argument.
 In opening statement, defense counsel stated:
 Now, you will hear through these witnesses what they did, at least the police officers, what they did by way of investigation, what they didn't do by way of investigation, and you will also find testimony from these witnesses to be lacking. You will find the physical evidence to be lacking.
 *221 After opening statements, the State presented its first witness, Officer Farley, who testified to Petitioner's silence. The State argues that under the "fair response" rule articulated in United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33-34, 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1988), Petitioner's silence was admissible to explain why the police conducted such a limited investigation. We conclude that the State's evidence of post-arrest silence remained inadmissible under either the Supreme Court's "fair response" rule or the evidentiary "opening the door" doctrine.
 Under the "opening the door" doctrine, otherwise irrelevant evidence may be admitted when the opposing party has "opened the door" to such evidence. See Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 545, 693 A.2d 781, 790 (1997); Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 84, 629 A.2d 1239, 1242 (1993). "Generally, `opening the door' is simply a contention that competent evidence which was previously irrelevant is now relevant through the opponent's admission of other evidence on the same issue." Clark, 332 Md. at 85, 629 A.2d at 1243. We have described the "opening the door" doctrine as a rule of expanded relevancy that, under limited circumstances, "allows the admission of evidence that is competent, but otherwise irrelevant." Conyers, 345 Md. at 545, 693 A.2d at 790. We have noted, however, that "the `opening the door' doctrine does not permit the admission of incompetent evidence." Id. at 546, 693 A.2d at 791. Incompetent evidence refers to evidence that is inadmissible for reasons other than relevancy. Clark, 332 Md. at 87 n. 2, 629 A.2d at 1244 n. 2. We held in Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 87, 629 A.2d 1239, 1244 (1993), that the defense's incompetent hearsay evidence was inadmissible to neutralize the State's prejudicial testimony. Similarly, in the instant case, the State's evidence of Grier's post-arrest silence was incompetent, not merely irrelevant. Consequently, it is not admissible under the "opening the door" doctrine.
 The State argues that the evidence was admissible under the Supreme Court's "fair response" rule. Reasoning that the prosecution's comment on the defendant's refusal to testify is a penalty imposed upon the defendant for exercising a constitutional privilege, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965):
 [T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.
 In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33-34, 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1988), the Court declined to extend Griffin to preclude a prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument by the defendant, and held that the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment. During closing argument at Robinson's trial, defense counsel repeatedly claimed that the government unfairly had denied the defendant the opportunity to explain his actions. Id. at 27, 108 S. Ct. at 866. In his rebuttal summation, the prosecutor stated that the defendant had many opportunities, including testifying at trial, to explain his conduct. Id. at 28, 108 S. Ct. at 867. The Court first noted that "the prosecutorial comment did not treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt, but instead referred to the possibility of testifying as one of several opportunities which the defendant was afforded, contrary to the statement of his counsel, to explain his side of the case." Id. at 32, 108 S. Ct. at 869. Analyzing the constitutionality of the State's comment upon defendant's failure to take the stand, the Court concluded:
 It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the prosecutor may not treat a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning would prohibit the prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence.... [W]e decline to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present one.
 Id. at 34, 108 S. Ct. at 870 (emphasis added).
 We consider the evidence in context to determine whether the State's comments *222 constituted a fair response to a defense argument. At the time the State introduced evidence of post-arrest silence, Petitioner had said nothing to generate a response by the State. Petitioner merely asked the jurors to pay close attention to the police officers' investigation. Defense counsel's comments cannot be construed as justification for the State's evidence. We conclude that evidence of post-arrest silence was not admissible under the doctrine of fair response.
 IV.
 We now examine whether the trial court's failure to sustain the objection was harmless error. The State points to testimony of Mack's injuries, Grier's flight from the scene, and Grier's attempted disposal of a knife. The fact that Grier never offered an explanation to the police, the State concludes, was inconsequential. Petitioner contends that the prosecution's vigorous pursuit of that line of questioning, and the prosecution's reliance upon it in closing, prejudiced the defense.
 In its initial closing argument, the State commented:
 Officer Farley, did you at any time receiveor what, if any, explanation did the defendant offer you in regard to this incident? Officer Farley, he had nothing to say.
 In rebuttal closing, the State argued:
 And when he was caught, he offered no reason, nothing. He had nothing to say to the police, nothing to say at all. Not yeah, yeah, that guy attacked me. There was nothing. There was nothing. And all he had to do was give an explanation like Mr. Mack did over what happened and the details of what happened and let them jive with what the police saw.
 The State improperly used Petitioner's failure to explain his version of events as substantive evidence of guilt. An error is not harmless unless, upon an independent review of the record, a reviewing court is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). The prejudice to a defendant resulting from reference to his silence is often substantial. As the Fifth Circuit observed, "[w]e would be naive if we failed to recognize that most laymen view an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as a badge of guilt." Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.1968). Silence at the time of arrest "has a significant potential for unfair prejudice." United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 2138, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975). We cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
 NOTES
 [1] Defendant was arrested on October 26, 1995, tried on July 24-25, 1996, and sentenced on September 5, 1996. Article 27, § 385 was repealed by Acts of 1996, ch. 632, § 1, effective October 1, 1996. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.) Art. 27, § 12 et seq.
 [2] According to Officer Farley's testimony, Petitioner "started walking away" when police arrived on the scene and was "walking very fast." Petitioner's "flight" from the scene was before the jury and was admitted to show consciousness of guilt. Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 137-38, 586 A.2d 15, 17 (1991); Huffington v. State, 295 Md. 1, 16, 452 A.2d 1211, 1218 (1982).
 [3] During oral argument, the State argued:
 I think that it would be reasonable for a person to say, get him; he tried to steal my goods, leave me alone or some comment, but the fact that he didn't is the pre-arrest [silence].
 [4] This Court addressed a related question in Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 686 A.2d 1083 (1996). In Davis, we considered whether an alibi witness could be impeached with the fact that the witness had not previously come forward to the authorities. We held that such evidence was admissible to impeach the witness, but only after the trial court established that the witness's failure to report the testimony was inconsistent with his testimony at trial. We noted:
 The threshold fact to be established, by way of foundation, is that the natural response of the witness, assuming the witness was in possession of exculpatory evidence, would have been to disclose that information to the proper authorities. From that fact, the inconsistency between his or her pretrial silence and his or her trial testimony may be inferred. If that burden is not satisfied "proof of silence lacks any significant probative value and must therefore be excluded." Hale, 422 U.S. at 176, 95 S. Ct. at 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d at 104.
 Id. at 388, 686 A.2d at 1086 (internal citation omitted).
 [5] We do not address the question of whether a defendant's failure to come forward with his account may be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial.
 [6] Other states have addressed this issue. Some states have excluded this evidence by construing their state constitutions as providing criminal defendants with greater protection than the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 38 Wash.App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (1984); Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537, 540 (1982). Others have decided the issue on evidentiary grounds, finding that post-arrest silence, regardless of whether a defendant is advised of his rights under Miranda, is too ambiguous to have any probative value. See Morris v. State, 112 Nev. 260, 913 P.2d 1264, 1267 (1996); Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 648, 582 N.E.2d 961, 964 (1991); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 609-11 (Colo.1983)(en banc).
 Several states have recognized a policy basis to reject the position that only post-Miranda silence is inadmissible. Those states reason that if a defendant's silence prior to Miranda warnings were admissible to imply guilt, it would encourage police to delay reading Miranda warnings to preserve the opportunity to use the defendant's silence against him at trial, only later giving the suspect Miranda warnings to secure a statement. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 913 P.2d at 1267; State v. Davis, 686 P.2d at 1146.
 [7] We decline to address this issue today on our own initiative. This issue was not raised in either the petition for certiorari or the briefs of the parties. Nor was it raised in the trial court or the Court of Special Appeals. Md. Rule 8-131.
 Further, we can not determine from the record before us whether there was a period of time when Petitioner was arrested and had not received Miranda warnings or whether Petitioner was advised at any time of his Miranda rights. Because we can not determine whether this period existed, we can not tell whether Petitioner demonstrated any silence during such a time period that would rise to the level of a tacit admission.
 [8] The State did not object to the admissibility of this evidence on relevancy grounds and we express no opinion on that issue.