type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b'U.S. Department of Agriculture\n Office of Inspector General\n Audit Report\n\n\n\n\n Assessment of APHIS and FSIS\n Inspection Activities to Prevent the\n Entry of Foot and Mouth Disease\n Into the United States\n\n\n\n\n Report No.\n 50601-0003-CH\n July 2001\n\x0c UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE\n\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n Washington D.C. 20250\n\n\n\n\nDATE: July 23, 2001\n\nREPLY TO\nATTN OF: 50601-0003-Ch\n\nSUBJECT: Assessment of APHIS and FSIS Inspection Activities to Prevent the\n Entry of Foot and Mouth Disease Into the United States\n\nTO: Craig A. Reed\n Administrator\n Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service\n\n Thomas J. Billy\n Administrator\n Food Safety and Inspection Service\n\n\nDuring the outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Europe and South America in\n2001, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Food Safety and\nInspection Service (FSIS) assured the Secretary of Agriculture and the public that their\ncontrols at ports of entry were sufficiently stringent to protect U.S. commerce from the\nentry and spread of this disease. Because we were already engaged in two separate\naudits of these agencies and because the global prevalence of foot and mouth disease\nposed a grave threat to the American livestock industry, we reviewed the Department\xe2\x80\x99s\ncontrols to ensure that the Nation was adequately protected against the increased\nthreat of an FMD outbreak from abroad.\n\nBased on our limited review we determined the Department needed more stringent\ncontrols to ensure that meat products entering the United States were free of FMD.\nCommunications between FSIS and APHIS were weak, particularly during the critical,\ninitial stages of this emergency situation. For instance, a shipment of over\n32,000 pounds of meat products from an FMD-restricted country arrived in the Port of\nHouston and was released by APHIS to FSIS. However, this product was discovered in\na warehouse in San Antonio, Texas, 9 days after it was improperly released by APHIS.\nNeither agency was aware the shipment was missing. Over one-sixth of the shipment\nhad to be destroyed because of the possibility that it had been exposed to FMD before\nentering the United States.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 2\n\n\nWe also found that APHIS needed to improve its accountability over imported products\nfrom their arrival at U.S. ports of entry through their disposition by the respective\nagencies. The manual recordkeeping system employed by APHIS cannot reliably track\nthe status of shipments on hold at the ports, and there is currently no central automated\nsystem to allow agency-wide access to information on such shipments. Neither we nor\nAPHIS could ensure that the physical inventories that we conducted at the ports actually\nidentified all products on hold from FMD-restricted countries. At the Port of Houston, for\ninstance, APHIS officers could not locate over 213,000 pounds of meat products that their\nrecords indicated were on hold there. It required a review by APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 Investigative and\nEnforcement Services to determine the whereabouts of these three shipments.\n\nWe also found one instance in which APHIS approved prohibited meat products for entry\ninto the United States. The health certificates on the shipment clearly showed the products\nhad been packaged after Department restrictions went into effect. This prohibited product\ncould have entered U.S. commerce if it had not been identified and held by the FSIS import\ninspector.\n\nDuring the course of our audit, we issued three management alerts (on May 1, May 8,\nand May 24, 2001) to which the agencies responded in a generally positive manner.\nThe agencies\xe2\x80\x99 response to the official draft report is attached to this report. Overall,\nAPHIS and FSIS have made or are making improvements that will strengthen internal\ncontrols over FMD inspection activities. Based on these actions, we were able to reach\nmanagement decisions on all recommendations.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nAPHIS has the primary responsibility to ensure that animal products do not enter the\nUnited States if they are contaminated by diseases. FSIS is responsible for performing\nreinspections of imported meat products. When meat products arrive at U.S. ports,\nAPHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) officers review shipment documentation\nto determine whether the product originated in a country with animal disease\nrestrictions. If the products are determined to be enterable, APHIS releases the\nproducts to FSIS for reinspection to determine the effectiveness of foreign countries\xe2\x80\x99\ninspection systems to ensure that only wholesome, unadulterated, and properly labeled\nproducts enter U.S. commerce.\n\nFSIS communicates to its field personnel at ports of entry through its Automated Import\nInformation System (AIIS), its e-mail network, and by facsimile. The AIIS provides the\nreinspection assignment and should restrict assignments for prohibited products.\nAdvice on restrictions should be timely forwarded through the FSIS e-mail network.\nAPHIS communicates with its ports through an Animal Import Byproduct Manual, which\nis issued to each PPQ officer and is accessible on the Internet. During the current FMD\nemergency, APHIS has also used FMD Alerts to advise field units of new developments\nsuch as the addition of countries to the restricted list or new inspection procedures and\nrequirements.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 3\n\n\n\nTo protect U.S. livestock from an outbreak of FMD, the Department prohibited meat\nproducts from countries with FMD outbreaks from entering the United States. The\nprohibitions were date specific. Products prepared for shipment before this date were\nenterable, but products prepared after this date were not. APHIS procedures allowed\nshipments containing both enterable and prohibited product to be sorted by production\ndate. This procedure was intended to accommodate so-called \xe2\x80\x9cmixed shipments\xe2\x80\x9d\nen route to the United States at the time APHIS issued the change in the country\xe2\x80\x99s\nanimal disease status. This sorting frequently occurred in an FSIS-regulated import\nfacility (I-House) because of space, refrigeration, and product control needs. Product\nproduced before the prohibition date was allowed to move routinely to be reinspected by\nFSIS. Restricted product was to be held at the facility under APHIS control until it was\nre-exported or destroyed.\n\nDuring this emergency response situation, APHIS and FSIS officials assured the\nSecretary and the public that their controls were sufficiently stringent to protect U.S.\ncommerce from the threat of an FMD outbreak. According to the Department\xe2\x80\x99s press\nrelease, these controls included prohibiting shipments of products from high-risk\ncountries; increasing personnel and surveillance at ports of entry, tightening regulatory\nenforcement; and strengthening Federal, State, and industry coordination. We\nperformed a review to determine whether these steps had been initiated.\n\nOBJECTIVE\n\nWe assessed the Department\xe2\x80\x99s accountability and control over meat products from\ncountries with FMD restrictions that were arriving at U.S. ports of entry.\n\nSCOPE\n\nWe performed the fieldwork between April 23 and May 24, 2001. Two other separate\nOIG audits of APHIS and FSIS were underway in April, but we interrupted work on\nthose audits to perform this review and present APHIS and FSIS with our assessment\nof the effectiveness of the controls in place to stop products contaminated with FMD\nfrom entering the United States and thereby prevent an outbreak of the disease in this\ncountry. The conditions noted in this report have already been communicated to APHIS\nand FSIS in the three management alerts mentioned above.\n\nFor this review, we visited five FSIS Inspection Houses (I-Houses) in Dundalk and\nJessup, Maryland; and Elizabeth, Woodstown, and Mullica Hills, New Jersey. Based on\nthe review of information in FSIS\xe2\x80\x99 AIIS database, we determined that these I-Houses\ntraditionally reinspected a significant amount of product from countries which are\ncurrently under FMD restrictions. We also visited the three APHIS regional offices\nlocated at Raleigh, North Carolina; Brownsville, Texas; and Sacramento, California; and\nthe ports of Miami, Florida; Houston, Texas; Long Beach, California; Philadelphia,\nPennsylvania; and Detroit, Michigan.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 4\n\n\n\nThis audit was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing\nstandards.\n\nMETHODOLOGY\n\nWe assessed the controls over meat products arriving from countries with FMD\nrestrictions by interviewing appropriate officials, observing activities, reviewing the\nagencies procedures and instructions, and examining key records, such as the FSIS\nForm 9540-1, Import Inspection Application and Report, and conducting physical\ninventories. We also had discussions with Customs officials concerning their Automated\nManifest System.\n\nAUDIT RESULTS\n\nFINDING NO. 1 - COMMUNICATION NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED BETWEEN APHIS\nAND FSIS\n\nFSIS and APHIS officials at the ports of entry were not clear on their respective roles and\nresponsibilities for product received from restricted countries. This occurred because, at\nthe time of our review, there was no centralized communication by APHIS and FSIS to\nfield units. Also, neither APHIS nor FSIS had issued clear procedures identifying the\nseparate roles of port personnel and the areas in which coordination was necessary. As a\nresult, there was an increased risk that prohibited product could enter U.S. commerce.\n(See Findings 2, 3, and 4.)\n\nDuring the week of April 23, 2001, we visited I-House No. 44 in Elizabeth, New Jersey,\nto confirm FSIS\xe2\x80\x99 procedures and controls for preventing products from restricted\ncountries from entering U.S. commerce. The FSIS inspector alerted us to almost\n260,000 pounds of prohibited products stored in an unsecured area of the I-House. The\nproducts were part of mixed shipments that were released by APHIS at the port of entry\nbetween March 20 and April 10, 2001. These mixed shipments were accompanied by\nhealth certificates with production dates that ranged from prior to the product restriction\ndate (qualifying the shipment as enterable) to on or after the restriction date (identifying\nthe shipment as prohibited). The FSIS inspector advised us that the product was still at\nthe I-House facility because it had not been presented for reinspection by the broker\n(import certificates were processed directly through APHIS to the broker, who was then\nresponsible for presenting them to FSIS by way of the warehouse management). Also,\nuntil April 23, 2001, the FSIS inspector had not received specific guidance about how to\nhandle this product.\n\nOur discussions with FSIS and APHIS officials in New Jersey revealed confusion\nregarding their respective roles and responsibilities for this product. We noted a lack of\ncentralized communication by APHIS/FSIS to field units on changes in country status\nand inspection procedures. Each agency independently communicated with its\nrespective field units, resulting in a lack of coordinated effort, delays in communication,\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 5\n\n\nconfusion in instructions, and the lack of an effective way to clarify the Department\xe2\x80\x99s\nexpectations. For example, note in the following the lack of clarity in each agency\xe2\x80\x99s\ndirection for sorting and processing mixed shipments.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On April 17, 2001, APHIS issued guidance to its PPQ port offices to clarify\n procedures for handling mixed shipments, stating that it was allowable to\n separate enterable product from prohibited product shipped in one container,\n but that this separation of product had to be supervised by PPQ. The\n guidance stated that the need to move the product to an FSIS-approved\n facility was eliminated. APHIS guidance was also provided on shipments\n where production dates were missing from the inspection certificates: the\n importer/broker was to be given a maximum of 5 days to provide the specific\n production data, and the imported/broker was to be contacted if any shipment\n had been on hold for longer than 2 weeks.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On April 23, 2001, FSIS issued guidance to its inspectors that stated for\n mixed shipments, the prohibited product was not to be refused entry by FSIS\n inspectors. The lots could be sorted by the import establishment under FSIS\n or APHIS supervision. When prohibited product was sorted, FSIS inspectors\n were to notify the local APHIS-PPQ office and provide them the details (e.g.,\n importer name, location, amount of product, etc.) and document the file.\n\nWe reported these deficiencies to APHIS and FSIS in a management alert dated May 1,\n2001, based on our work in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (We also found these deficiencies\nduring subsequent work in I-Houses in Woodstown and Mullica Hills, New Jersey, and\nJessup, Maryland.) In response, both agencies explained their methods of\ncommunication. FSIS said that it communicated with its ports via e-mail and faxes;\nAPHIS said it communicated through a product manual that was accessible on the\nInternet. However, we found that these methods of communication (fax, e-mail, and\nInternet) were not always available at the ports. For example, at two I-Houses we\nvisited, FSIS inspectors had access to only one telephone line. The inspectors did not\nhave access to FSIS\xe2\x80\x99 e-mail system to obtain instructions or restrictions while the AIIS\nwas being accessed for an inspection assignment.\n\nBoth FSIS and APHIS noted that when APHIS develops its operating procedures, it\nclears those procedures through FSIS prior to field implementation. However, there is\nno manual or directive that ties FSIS and APHIS procedures into a single document.\n\nWe concluded that FSIS and APHIS need to develop joint procedures that specifically\nidentify the roles and responsibilities of each agency at U.S. ports. We also concluded\nthat each agency needs to coordinate its communications to field units so field\ninspectors are up to date on all new instructions or restrictions. Timely notification of\nthese instructions and restrictions is essential since product quickly moves out of the\nI-House into U.S. commerce.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 6\n\n\n\nRecommendation No. 1:\n\nCentralize communication/coordination with FSIS/APHIS field units on country\nrestrictions and inspection procedures.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nThe agencies agreed that operational procedures for handling meat and poultry\ninvolving both FSIS and APHIS are not well documented. Both FSIS and APHIS will\ndevelop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance communications in\nsituations involving animal disease restrictions. The MOU will be completed by\nDecember 1, 2001.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept management decision on this recommendation. We believe that the MOU\nmay help to address some future situation, as long as it answers the need for\ncoordination and centralizes communication at the field level in an emergency situation\nlike the recent one involving FMD.\n\nRecommendation No. 2:\n\nDevelop a joint APHIS/FSIS procedure that specifically identifies the roles and\nresponsibilities of personnel at the U.S. ports of entry regarding products received from\nrestricted countries. This procedure should detail the required coordination and\nfollowup required by the respective APHIS/FSIS field units.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nIn the response to the official draft report, the agencies agreed to amend their existing\nMemorandum of Understanding to specifically define the roles and responsibilities of\nboth agencies at the U.S. ports of entry regarding products received from restricted\ncountries. The amended MOU will address the two agencies\xe2\x80\x99 respective functional\nresponsibilities and requirements for coordination at Headquarters and in the field. The\nMOU is scheduled to be completed in December 2001, and instructions will be provided\nto field personnel by the end of February 2002.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nRecommendation No. 3:\n\nCoordinate the disposition of the prohibited product at the I-House in Elizabeth, New\nJersey.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 7\n\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nBoth APHIS and FSIS concurred with our finding and recommendation. The prohibited\nproduct was destroyed or exported.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nFINDING NO. 2 - THE DEPARTMENT NEEDS IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY AND\nCONTROL OVER IMPORTED PRODUCT FROM COUNTRIES WITH FMD\nRESTRICTIONS\n\nNeither APHIS nor FSIS had adequate accountability and control of product from\ncountries with FMD restrictions. This primarily occurred because APHIS did not\nindependently notify FSIS about product entering the United States and could not\nreadily track shipments released to FSIS. APHIS officials acknowledged that their\nagency was responsible for the control of the product and agreed that there were\ninadequate controls to ensure proper disposition of the product. Under these\ncircumstances, prohibited product could enter U.S. commerce without either FSIS\xe2\x80\x99 or\nAPHIS\xe2\x80\x99 knowledge. In one case, 32,000 pounds of imported sheep, beef, and hog\ncasings en route from APHIS to FSIS at Houston were transported instead to a\ncommercial warehouse in San Antonio. After the product was discovered by the broker,\nFSIS and APHIS inspected the shipment and destroyed over one-sixth of it as\nunallowable for entry.\n\nWe found that neither APHIS nor FSIS had adequate control over product that arrived at\nports of entry and was placed on hold. Warehouse management retained control of\nshipments that were stored in I-Houses, usually in unsecured areas, until they were\npresented to FSIS for reinspection. Although procedures varied from port to port, we\nfound that at some ports APHIS-PPQ officers did not independently notify FSIS of\nproduct entering the United States but rather processed the FSIS Form 9540-1, Import\nApplication and Report, directly with the brokers. At two ports, the warehouses\nprovided the FSIS Form 9540-1 to the FSIS inspectors after receiving them from the\nbrokers, when product was to be reinspected. Until the warehouses presented\nshipments for reinspection, the FSIS inspectors did not know they were coming. Under\nthese circumstances, product released by APHIS can potentially be diverted, and\ncontrol over it depends on the relationship and coordination between the warehouse\nand FSIS.\n\nWe noted this condition at I-Houses in New Jersey and Maryland. The FSIS inspector\ndid not have a record (FSIS Form 9540-1) of product released to the I-House by APHIS\nuntil it was provided by the warehouse. At the I-Houses, we found mixed shipments in\nunsecured areas that had been released by APHIS-PPQ to the warehouse. According\nto APHIS and FSIS instructions, (dated April 17, 2001, and April 23, 2001, respectively)\nthese shipments could be sorted so that only enterable product was presented to FSIS\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 8\n\n\nfor reinspection and later moved into U.S. commerce. We found that the remaining\n(prohibited) portions of the shipments were being held at the I-Houses in unsecured\nstorage and could have easily been mixed with enterable product.\n\nWe found other instances in which product had not been properly accounted for and\ncontrolled, as noted below.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 During the week of April 30, 2001, we visited FSIS I-Houses in Woodstown\n and Mullica Hills, New Jersey. We found conditions similar to those in\n Elizabeth, New Jersey. (See Finding 1.) Sixteen shipments totaling\n 341,798 pounds of prohibited product from Argentina and Uruguay that\n arrived at the ports of entry between March 13 and April 27, 2001, were in\n unsecured storage at the I-Houses. The FSIS inspector in Woodstown, New\n Jersey, contacted local APHIS officials in late March to attempt to determine\n how the product should be disposed of. However, an APHIS-PPQ officer did\n not visit the I-House until April 25, almost a month later, to conduct a joint\n inventory of the prohibited product with the FSIS inspector. As of May 4, the\n Woodstown shipments were still in storage at the I-House. The FSIS\n inspector informed us that disposition of the product would be resolved by the\n warehouse, the broker, APHIS, and Customs.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 At the request of the FSIS inspectors in Woodstown and Mullica Hills, New\n Jersey, we visited the I-House in Mullica Hills to review the circumstances\n surrounding the disposal of two shipments totaling about 15,400 pounds of\n beef from Argentina that arrived at the I-House in mid-March. We interviewed\n the warehouse owner who expressed frustration in his attempts to find out\n how this product should be disposed of. The owner stated he did not want\n this product at his warehouse and made numerous attempts to contact APHIS\n officials, to no avail. Therefore, he made the decision in consultation with the\n broker to ship the product back to Argentina on a vessel that would soon\n arrive at the port of entry. The FSIS official discovered the product being\n loaded on a truck and stopped the shipment until the proper APHIS clearance\n could be obtained. A local APHIS veterinary officer worked quickly with the\n FSIS inspector to process the required paperwork so that the product could\n be shipped back. This situation, while controlled by the local FSIS inspector,\n demonstrates the potential that product could be easily diverted by\n unscrupulous individuals if not properly controlled by the Department.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 A mixed shipment totaling over 32,000 pounds of sheep, beef, and hog\n (sausage) casings from Finland, an FMD country, were removed from the\n Port of Houston and transported to San Antonio, Texas, without authorization.\n This shipment arrived in Houston on March 12, 2001, and was approved by\n APHIS for transport to the FSIS I-House on April 23. When APHIS approved\n the transfer of the shipment to the I-House, they improperly released the hold\n on the shipment in violation of agency procedures. Because of a lack of\n coordination between APHIS and FSIS, neither agency was aware that the\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 9\n\n\n product was instead sent to a commercial warehouse in San Antonio. It was\n not until May 2, 2001, that the broker discovered the error and informed\n APHIS of the improper transport. APHIS directed the product be returned to\n Houston. This was subsequently done, and 5,580 pounds out of the 32,000\n in the original shipment were determined to be non-enterable and were\n incinerated. However, because APHIS depends on the brokers to inform\n FSIS of product on its way to the I-Houses, no controls existed to prevent this\n shipment from entering commerce within the United States after it left the port\n facility in Houston.\n\nWe notified the agencies of these deficiencies in three management alerts issued on\nMay 1, May 8, and May 24, 2001. Generally both APHIS and FSIS concurred with our\nfindings and took corrective actions in accordance with the recommendations we had\nmade. These actions are noted below.\n\nRecommendation No. 4:\n\nDiscontinue the policy of allowing shipments containing both prohibited and enterable\nproduct to move from the port to I-House for sorting.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nBoth APHIS and FSIS concurred there was a need to tighten this procedure. On May 7,\n2001, APHIS issued an FMD-Notice which banned the entry of all mixed shipments\nfrom FMD-restricted countries effective June 30, 2001.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 5:\n\nDevelop a system that requires the APHIS-PPQ officers to independently transmit a\ncopy of the FSIS Form 9540-1, Import Inspection and Application Report, to the\napplicable FSIS inspector.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nIn their response to the official draft report, the agencies stated that they expect to\ncomplete the system for communicating Form FSIS 9540-1 to applicable FSIS Inspectors\nby December 2001. They also stated that FSIS would report all pink juice meat testing\nresults to APHIS since all cooked meats are moving under a cautionary hold.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 10\n\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nRecommendation No. 6:\n\nEstablish a timeframe for disposing of prohibited products disclosed by the planned\ninventory of shipments being held at the ports.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nThe inventory of prohibited product has been completed. The results of the inventory\nand product disposition were included in the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 June 25, 2001, summary report\nto the Secretary\xe2\x80\x99s office and OIG.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nRecommendation No. 7:\n\nDevelop controls to identify product that has not been presented for reinspection within\na specified timeframe.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nIn the response to the official draft report, the agencies stated that they would develop\nrequirements and controls for identifying product that has not been presented for\nreinspection. These controls will incorporate a requirement that APHIS be notified when\nproduct has been improperly moved. This process should be completed by March\n2002. A decision will also be rendered by June 2002 on whether statutory changes are\nnecessary in the areas of bonding and redelivery authority for APHIS. Additionally,\nAPHIS is initiating review functions to ensure that prohibited meat does not enter the\ncountry.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 11\n\n\nFINDING NO. 3 - APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 SYSTEM TO TRACK PRODUCTS ON HOLD AT EACH\nPORT DID NOT RELIABLY ACCOUNT FOR THOSE PRODUCTS\n\nAPHIS did not adequately keep track of imports that were on hold and awaiting release\nfrom ports. This occurred because port personnel kept manual records of imports; there\nwas no central automated system that controlled imports entering U.S. ports of entry\nthrough to the point of disposition, and there was no reconciliation performed between\nAPHIS and FSIS records to ensure that all shipments recorded as having been sent to\nFSIS I-Houses were identified. As a result, APHIS could not be certain of accurately\nidentifying the amount, type, or location of product on hold at the I-Houses or port\ncontainer yards; for example, APHIS officials at the port of Houston could not account\nfor 3 of the 14 shipments that their records showed to be on hold as of May 7, 2001.\n\nWe conducted physical inventories of product on hold by APHIS at the container yards\nof the ports we visited, as well as product transported to the FSIS I-Houses for sorting,\nreinspection, or retention. However, we were unable to ensure that all such shipments\nwere included in the inventories because neither FSIS nor APHIS maintained an\nadequate system of controls or records to track shipments through to final disposition of\nthe prohibited product. To identify these shipments, APHIS port officials had to conduct\na search of manual records. APHIS officials could not demonstrate that they had\nadequate controls to track and follow up on the disposition of these shipments, and at\nsome ports FSIS would only know that product had been released to them if the broker\nor warehouse told them.\n\nOfficials at the APHIS regional offices stated that there was no centralized\nrecordkeeping system which would allow them to quickly collect information on the\nnumber, type, and location of shipments on hold from FMD countries other than to\ncontact the director of each individual port. We, therefore, asked APHIS officials at\neach port for a listing of products they had on hold with emphasis on those products that\nwere held due to FMD restrictions. Upon our arrival at the ports, we attempted to verify\nthe information provided to us and found that the ports could not readily identify all\nshipments placed on hold during a given time period or whether shipments sent to FSIS\nI-Houses while still on APHIS hold were presented for reinspection or tracked to\ndisposition.\n\nFor instance, APHIS officials at Houston\xe2\x80\x99s maritime port informed us that they had\n14 shipments on hold as of the date of our visit, based on a manual review of their\nrecords. However, in our preliminary reconciliation, three of these could not be located\nby the auditors or APHIS officers at either the container yard or the FSIS I-House. The\nthree shipments were meat products totaling 213,385 pounds. Some of these\nshipments had been on hold since November 2000, prior to the FMD crisis. Such\ndelays can increase the chances of product being improperly moved into commerce. In\naddition, while at the FSIS I-House, we found another shipment on hold that had not\nbeen identified by APHIS in its own search.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 12\n\n\nAs a result of our review, APHIS-PPQ port officials brought in officers from the\nInvestigations and Enforcement Services (IES), to determine the status of the missing\nshipments. IES officials advised us that two of the three shipments, which had initially\narrived at the port in November 2000, were immediately re-exported.\n\nThe third missing shipment, 48,525 pounds of meat product (pre-FMD period) from\nUruguay, was determined by IES to have been transported from Houston to\nLos Angeles. IES officials told us that although the shipment was still officially on hold\nstatus in Customs\xe2\x80\x99 database, the shipping line informed the Houston Port Authority that\nthe hold had been released. According to Customs officials at Houston, unauthorized\nremovals can happen without the knowledge of either APHIS or Customs because the\nHouston Port Authority depends on the shipping line to inform it when a shipment has\nreceived all necessary clearances and may be removed from the port. APHIS needs to\nassess this control weakness and its impact on APHIS inspection activities. IES is\ncontinuing to perform its review to determine how this occurred.\n\nAlthough it should be possible to trace individual shipments manually, if needed, the\nsheer volume of manual records and the lack of an automated database would make it\nimpractical to perform tasks such as tracking the status and disposition of all shipments\nfrom a country with an identified FMD problem over a period of weeks. Although USDA\nmodified its import restrictions to ban all mixed shipments from countries having FMD,\nincluding shipments en route to the United States at the time the ban was declared,\nmixed shipments from these countries have already been admitted into the United\nStates in significant numbers and may pose a threat of spreading the disease if not\nproperly accounted for and controlled.\n\nThese conditions demonstrate the need for APHIS to improve its recordkeeping system\nto track product being held at the ports. In its response, APHIS officials stated that the\nagency had requested funding from the Department to develop and implement an\nautomated tracking system that PPQ officers can reference at ports of entry to analyze\ncargo manifests directly from the Customs database. Such a system would, according\nto APHIS officials, have the capability of flagging problem areas and items of interest to\nPPQ.\n\nWe reported these deficiencies in our three management alerts issued on May 1,\nMay 8, and May 24, 2001. Generally both APHIS and FSIS concurred with our finding\nand took corrective actions in accordance with the recommendations we had made.\nThese actions are noted below.\n\nRecommendation No. 8:\n\nPerform an assessment of the controls in place to prevent shipments listed as being on\nhold in Customs\xe2\x80\x99 database from exiting ports of entry without proper authorization.\nCoordinate with Customs as necessary.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 13\n\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS agreed to assess how this problem occurred and to complete its assessment by\nthe end of the fiscal year. It also agreed to adopt corrective measures to ensure the\nsituation is not repeated.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 9:\n\nDevelop an automated system that provides control and accountability of imports\nentering U.S. ports of entry through disposition by the respective agencies.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS and FSIS agreed that electronic transmission of information between agencies\nwould enhance communications. Currently, APHIS is developing its Port Information\nNetwork Operations (PINOPS) database to track meat and animal product shipments.\nPINOPS will track the shipment by bill and disposition. It is expected that PINOPS will\nbe fully implemented in about 1 year. Also, APHIS is working on their own system\ncalled Automated Manifest System, which is being designed to set up rules that\nautomatically target shipments for holds. Full implementation of the system is\nanticipated in about 2 years.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nRecommendation No. 10:\n\nDevelop controls that require followup when the broker does not provide requested\ninformation lacking on import certificates within specified timeframes.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS has notified PPQ personnel, brokers, and importers that if meat shipments are\nnot submitted for entry with the necessary meat inspection certificates, the shipment is\nto be refused entry. This action was implemented effective July 1, 2001.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 14\n\n\nRecommendation No. 11:\n\nRequire all APHIS ports of entry and FSIS I-Houses to identify the amount, type, and\nlocation of all shipments currently on hold, from countries identified as having FMD.\nThis effort should be coordinated between the two agencies.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nBoth APHIS and FSIS concurred with this recommendation and responded on June 25,\n2001, that the inventory had been completed. All shipments recorded as having been\nsent to the I-Houses have been identified.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 12:\n\nMaintain an audit trail (both APHIS and FSIS) so that the assurances provided in the\nreport on product inventory and disposition can be independently validated by agency\ncompliance officials and/or OIG.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nBoth APHIS and FSIS concurred with this recommendation. PPQ will maintain records\nof the inventory, surveillance, and disposition of all meats. Records will document the\nrelease of enterable products and the destruction or return of prohibited products to the\ncountry of origin.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 13:\n\nPerform reconciliations between APHIS and FSIS records to ensure that all shipments\nrecorded as having been sent to FSIS I-Houses are identified as part of the inventory\nprocess. This process should include shipments from restricted countries going back to\nthe beginning of the current FMD outbreak, including those no longer on hold at the\nI-Houses.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nFSIS compiled an inventory from some of the I-Houses holding products from countries\nwith FMD, and APHIS is continuing the inventory of the remaining I-Houses. APHIS will\ninvestigate any discrepancies to ensure records are reconciled.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 15\n\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 14:\n\nResolve the status of the missing third shipment of meat products at the port of\nHouston.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS\xe2\x80\x99 IES found that the missing third shipment had been shipped to Los Angeles but\nhas not yet determined the circumstances that caused this to occur. IES is continuing\nits review.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision on this recommendation.\n\nRecommendation No. 15:\n\nProvide a weekly joint report to the Acting Under Secretary and the Inspector General\non the status and disposition of prohibited product from restricted countries.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS and FSIS submitted an initial summary report on June 25, 2001, and agreed to\nprovide semiannual updates until June 2002, unless results warrant a longer reporting\nperiod. A memo of explanation for terminating this reporting will be provided to OIG.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nFINDING NO. 4 - NOT ALL RESTRICTED PRODUCTS HAVE BEEN REFUSED ENTRY\n\nAPHIS approved prohibited meat products for entry into the United States. This\noccurred because APHIS personnel did not thoroughly review import certificates that\nshowed restricted dates. As a result, this prohibited product could have entered U.S.\ncommerce if it had not been identified and held by the FSIS import inspector.\n\nAPHIS personnel at Baltimore, Maryland, allowed eight shipments of pork loin ribs from\nDenmark totaling 122,670 pounds to be moved on hold to the FSIS I-House in Jessup,\nMaryland, even though the product in these shipments was entirely produced after the\nrestriction date. This product should have been refused entry because the health\ncertificates for these shipments clearly showed the product was produced from\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 16\n\n\nFebruary 21, 2001, to March 16, 2001. On March 13, 2001, APHIS instructed its\npersonnel to restrict pork and pork products from Denmark produced after February 19,\n2001.\n\nAPHIS port personnel could not explain why this product was not refused entry as it\nshould have been under APHIS procedures. These shipments were processed by\nAPHIS between April 6 and April 19, 2001.\n\nWe notified APHIS of this condition in our management alert issued on May 24, 2001.\nHowever, on May 25, 2001, USDA removed import restrictions on European countries\ndetermined to be free of FMD. Meat products from these countries, which had been on\nhold, were eligible to be released.\n\nRecommendation No. 16:\n\nRequire APHIS personnel to thoroughly review the documentation associated with\nshipments received from FMD-affected countries to ensure that prohibited product is\nrefused entry, when appropriate.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS is examining the documentation. The results of the review will be included in the\nsummary report to the Under Secretary which was to be issued on June 25, 2001.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 management decision.\n\nRecommendation. No 17:\n\nDetermine whether APHIS should refuse entry on the 122,670 pounds of pork loin ribs\nfrom Denmark at I-House No. 158.\n\nAgencies\xe2\x80\x99 Response:\n\nAPHIS has determined that the product is now releasable because the Department has\nfound Denmark to be FMD-free.\n\nOIG Position:\n\nWe accept APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 management decision on this recommendation.\n\x0cCraig A. Reed, et al. 17\n\n\nCONCLUSIONS AND REQUIRED AGENCY ACTIONS:\n\nWe accept your management decisions on all recommendations. The Office of the\nChief Financial Officer (OCFO), U. S. Department of Agriculture, has responsibility for\nmonitoring and tracking final action for the findings and recommendations. Please note\nthat final action on the findings and recommendations should be completed within\n1 year of each management decision. Follow your agency\xe2\x80\x99s internal procedures in\nforwarding final action correspondence to OCFO.\n\nWe appreciate the assistance and cooperation of your staffs during our audit.\n\n\n/s/\n\nROGER C. VIADERO\nInspector General\n\n-Attachment\n\x0cATTACHMENT - AGENCIES\xe2\x80\x99 RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT\n\x0cATTACHMENT - AGENCIES\xe2\x80\x99 RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT\n\x0cATTACHMENT - AGENCIES\xe2\x80\x99 RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT\n\x0cATTACHMENT - AGENCIES\xe2\x80\x99 RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT\n\x0c'


type: wikipedia

text:
Invazia este o acțiune militară, consistând în intrarea trupelor într-o zonă străină (o națiune, un teritoriu sau parte din ele), puterea invadatoare obținând controlul asupra acelei zone (ocupație), pe o perioadă scurtă sau mai lungă. Invaziile deseori întâmpină rezistență din partea popoarelor indigene.
 Invaziile pot fi produse pentru a schimba conducerea unei națiuni sau a unui teritoriu. Acest tip de invazie poate fi perceput fie ca un act de uzurpare, fie de eliberare.
 Cuvântul intervenție este folosit uneori ca un eufemism pentru invazie.
 Invazii în istorie
 Invazia asiriană a Regatului Israel
 Invazia persană a Greciei
 Invazia macedonǎ a Persiei
 Invazia romană a Britaniei
 Invaziile barbarilor
 Expansiunea musulmană
 Invaziile vikingilor
 Cucerirea normandă
 Cruciadele
 Invazia lui Ginghis Han asupra Chinei
 Invazia mongolǎ în Europa
 Invazia timuridǎ a Indiei
 Invazia manciurianǎ a Chinei
 Invaziile otomane în Europa
 Invazia olandezǎ a Angliei
 Invazia francezǎ al Rusiei
 Invazia sovietică a Poloniei
 Invazia germanǎ a Uniunii Sovietice
 Invazia americană a Irakului
 Vezi și
 Listă de invazii
 Război
 Știință militară
 Războaie


text:
Antika ( < – senovinis) – senovės istorijos laikotarpis, trukęs apytikriai nuo 1250 m. pr. m. e. iki Vakarų Romos imperijos žlugimo 476 m. Geografiškai apima Viduržemio jūros kraštus: senovės Graikiją, Romos imperiją. Šiuo laikotarpiu klestėjo graikų ir romėnų visuomenės, kurios darė didžiulę įtaką didžiojoje Europos, Šiaurės Afrikos ir Vakarų Azijos dalyje.
 Kai kurie istorikai antikos pabaiga laiko Platono akademijos Atėnuose uždarymą 529 m. Antikos terminą XVIII a. pasiūlė vokiečių scholastas Kristopas Keleris.
 Senovės graikų kultūra kartu su kai kuriomis senovės Artimųjų Rytų įtakomis buvo Europos meno, filosofijos, visuomenės ir švietimo pagrindas iki pat Romos imperijos laikotarpio. Romėnai šią kultūrą išsaugojo, mėgdžiojo ir skleidė Europoje, kol patys galėjo su ja konkuruoti, o klasikinis pasaulis ėmė kalbėti ne tik graikiškai, bet ir lotyniškai.
 Šis graikų-romėnų kultūros pamatas turėjo didžiulę įtaką šiuolaikinio pasaulio kalbai, politikai, teisei, švietimo sistemoms, filosofijai, mokslui, karybai, poezijai, istoriografijai, etikai, retorikai, menui ir architektūrai. Išlikę klasikinės kultūros fragmentai lėmė XIV a. prasidėjusį atgimimą, kuris vėliau imtas vadinti Renesansu, o XVIII ir XIX a. vyko įvairūs neoklasicizmo atgimimai.
 Romos imperija (I a. pr. m. e.–V a.)
 Šiuolaikiniai istorikai ginčijasi dėl tikslios Romos respublikos pabaigos. Tuometiniai Romos piliečiai nepripažino, kad Respublika nustojo egzistuoti. Ankstyvieji Julijų-Klaudijų imperatoriai tvirtino, kad res publica vis dar egzistuoja, nors ir saugoma jų nepaprastųjų galių, ir galiausiai sugrįš į savo visiškai respublikonišką formą. Romos valstybė ir toliau vadinosi res publica, kol joje kaip valstybinė kalba buvo vartojama lotynų kalba.
 Roma de facto tapo imperija 130 m. pr. m. e., kuomet užkariavo Cizalpinę Galiją, Ilyriją, Graikiją ir Ispaniją, o I a. pr. m. e. – Judėją, Mažąją Aziją ir Galiją. Didžiausio imperijos išsiplėtimo metu, valdant Trajanui (117 m.), Roma kontroliavo visą Viduržemio jūrą, taip pat Galiją, dalį Germanijos ir Britanijos, Balkanus, Dakiją, Mažąją Aziją, Kaukazą ir Mesopotamiją.
 Romos imperija buvo gerokai helenizuota, tačiau joje taip pat klestėjo sinkretinės „Rytų“ tradicijos, tokios kaip mitraizmas, gnosticizmas ir ypač krikščionybė.
 III amžiaus krizės metu imperija pradėjo nykti.
 Nors kartais lyginama su klasikine Graikija, klasikinės Romos šeimyninis gyvenimas labai skyrėsi. Tėvai turėjo didelę įtaką vaikams, o vyrai – žmonoms. Tiesą sakant, žodis „šeima“, lotyniškai familia, iš tikrųjų reiškė tuos, kurie buvo pavaldūs vyriškos lyties šeimos galvai. Tai apėmė ir giminystės ryšiais nesusijusius narius, pavyzdžiui, vergus ir tarnus. Santuokoje tiek vyrai, tiek moterys buvo lojalūs vienas kitam ir dalijosi turtu. Pirmą kartą skyrybos buvo leistos nuo I a. pr. m. e. ir jas galėjo atlikti tiek vyras, tiek moteris.
 Vėlyvoji antika (IV–VI a.)
 Vėlyvosios antikos metu, valdant Konstantinui I, iškilo krikščionybė, kuri 393 m. Teodosijaus dekretais galutinai išstūmė Romos imperijos kultą. Nuoseklūs germanų genčių įsiveržimai į Vakarų Romos imperiją V a. galutinai ją sužlugdė. Tuo tarpu Rytų Romos imperija, jos piliečių vadinta Romos imperija, o vėlesnių istorikų – Bizantijos imperija, išliko per visus viduramžius. Helenistinę filosofiją pakeitė platonizmas ir epikūrizmas, o neoplatonizmas ilgainiui padarė įtaką Bažnyčios tėvų teologijai.
 Daugelis istorikų bandė nustatyti konkrečią simbolinę antikos „pabaigos“ datą. Dažniausiai yra minimos paskutiniojo Vakarų Romos imperatoriaus nuvertimo data 476 m., Rytų Romos imperatoriaus Justiniano I paskutinės Platono akademijos Atėnuose uždarymo data 529 m. ir naujojo musulmonų tikėjimo pergalė didžiojoje Viduržemio jūros regiono dalyje nuo 634 iki 718 m. Šie musulmonų užkariavimai: Sirija (637 m.), Egiptas (639 m.), Kipras (654 m.), Šiaurės Afrika (665 m.), Ispanija (718 m.), Pietų Galija (720 m.), Kreta (820 m.) ir Sicilija (827 m.), Malta (870 m.) (ir Rytų Romos sostinės apgultis, Pirmoji arabų Konstantinopolio apgultis (674–678 m.) ir Antroji arabų Konstantinopolio apgultis (717–718 m.)), nutraukė ekonominius, kultūrinius ir politinius ryšius, kurie tradiciškai vienijo klasikines kultūras aplink Viduržemio jūrą, ir taip užbaigė antiką.
 Pradinis Romos senatas dekretus skelbė ir VI a. pabaigoje, o paskutinis Rytų Romos imperatorius, Konstantinopolyje naudojęs lotynų kalbą kaip savo dvaro kalbą, buvo imperatorius Maurikijus, valdęs iki 602 m. Maurikijaus nuvertimas, kurį įvykdė sukilusi Dunojaus kariuomenė, vadovaujama Foko, lėmė slavų invaziją į Balkanus ir Balkanų bei graikų miestų kultūros nuosmukį (tai lėmė Balkanuose lotyniškai kalbančių žmonių pabėgimą į kalnus), taip pat išprovokavo 602–628 m. Bizantijos-Sasanijos karą, per kurį buvo prarasti visi didieji Rytų miestai, išskyrus Konstantinopolį. Kilusi sumaištis nesibaigė tol, kol VII a. musulmonų užkariavimai galutinai užbaigė negrįžtamą visų didžiųjų Rytų Romos imperijos miestų, išskyrus pačią sostinę, praradimą. Šiuo laikotarpiu Konstantinopolyje iškilęs imperatorius Heraklėjas savo dvarui vadovavo graikų, o ne lotynų kalba, nors graikų kalba visada buvo administracinė Rytų Romos regionų kalba. Rytų ir Vakarų ryšiai susilpnėjo pasibaigus Bizantijos popiežystei.
 Rytų Romos imperijos sostinė Konstantinopolis liko vienintelis neužkariautas didelis miestų centras iš pirminės Romos imperijos ir didžiausias miestas Europoje. Tačiau daug klasikinių knygų, skulptūrų ir technologijų, kartu su klasikine romėnų virtuve ir mokslo tradicijomis ten išliko iki pat viduramžių, kai didžiąją jų dalį „iš naujo atrado“ atvykę Vakarų kryžiuočiai. Iš tiesų Konstantinopolio gyventojai ir toliau save vadino romėnais, kaip ir 1453 m. juos užkariavę osmanai. Klasikinį mokslą ir kultūrą, kurie vis dar buvo išlikę Konstantinopolyje, išsivežė pabėgėliai, bėgę nuo jo 1453 m. užkariavimo, ir taip padėjo Europoje įžiebti Renesansą.
 Galiausiai tai buvo lėtas, sudėtingas ir laipsniškas socialinės ir ekonominės struktūros pokytis Europos istorijoje, lėmęs klasikinės antikos ir viduramžių visuomenės perėjimą, ir jokia konkreti data negali būti tikras to pavyzdys.
 Antikos atstovai
 Žymiausi atstovai:
 Senovės Graikija – Homeras, Sokratas, Aristotelis, Aischilas, Sofoklis, Ezopas, Hesiodas, Euripidas, Aristofanas, Lukianas;
 Senovės Roma – Vergilijus, Horacijus, Ovidijus, Titas Livijus.
 Taip pat skaitykite
 Senovės istorija
 Metrų reikšmė graikų lyrikoje
 Senovės Graikijos istorija
 Pastabos
 Nuorodos
 Karatajienė D. Antika: grožis, menas, ugdymas (mokomasis metodinis leidinys), Vilnius, 2004


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22001A1117(01)
 Συμφωνία υπό μορφή ανταλλαγής επιστολών μεταξύ της Eυρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας για τον τερματισμό του πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για την εγκαθίδρυση σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας αφετέρου
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 301 της 17/11/2001 σ. 0036 - 0036
 Συμφωνίαυπό μορφή ανταλλαγής επιστολών μεταξύ της Eυρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας για τον τερματισμό του πρωτοκόλλου αριθ. 1 για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για την εγκαθίδρυση σύνδεσης μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους, αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας αφετέρουA. Επιστολή της Ευρωπαϊκής ΚοινότηταςΚύριε ...,Έχω την τιμή να αναφερθώ στο πρωτόκολλο αριθ. 1 της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης.Ενόψει της προσχώρησης της Εσθονίας στον ΠΟΕ και, συνεπώς, στην Πολυμερή Συμφωνία Κλωστοϋφαντουργικών και Ειδών Ένδυσης (ΣΚΕΕ), η Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα φρονεί ότι το πρωτόκολλο αριθ. 1 της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης θα πρέπει να λήξει με ισχύ από την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2001.Σας παρακαλώ να επιβεβαιώσετε ότι η κυβέρνησή σας συμφωνεί με τα ανωτέρω.Με εξαιρετική εκτίμηση,Για την Ευρωπαϊκή ΚοινότηταB. Επιστολή της Δημοκρατίας της ΕσθονίαςΚύριε ...,Έχω την τιμή να σας γνωρίσω ότι έλαβα σημερινή επιστολή σας η οποία έχει ως εξής: "Έχω την τιμή να αναφερθώ στο πρωτόκολλο αριθ. 1 της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης.Ενόψει της προσχώρησης της Εσθονίας στον ΠΟΕ και, συνεπώς, στην Πολυμερή Συμφωνία Κλωστοϋφαντουργικών και Ειδών Ένδυσης (ΣΚΕΕ), η Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα φρονεί ότι το πρωτόκολλο αριθ. 1 της ευρωπαϊκής συμφωνίας για το εμπόριο κλωστοϋφαντουργικών προϊόντων και ειδών ένδυσης θα πρέπει να λήξει με ισχύ από την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2001.Σας παρακαλώ να επιβεβαιώσετε ότι η κυβέρνησή σας συμφωνεί με τα ανωτέρω."Έχω την τιμή να επιβεβαιώσω ότι η κυβέρνησή μου συμφωνεί με το περιεχόμενο της επιστολής σας.Με εξαιρετική εκτίμηση,Για την κυβέρνηση της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας


text:
I míochaine nó leigheas, is éard is frithghníomhaithe fuilaistrithe ann ná freagairt gan choinne san othar atá bainteach le fuilaistriú fola nó comhábhar fola. Chun go n-íoslaghdófaí an baol nó an contúirt a bhaineann le fuilaistriú, moltar gan an chóir leighis a thabhairt ach de réir mar is gá.
 Cineálacha frithghníomhaithe
 Frithghníomhuithe Géara Fuilaistrithe (FGF)
 Ar na frithghníomhuithe géara tá:
 Frithghníomhuithe Haemalaíocha Géara Fuilaistrithe ( FHGF)
 Is é an sainmhíniú ar FHGF, frithghníomhuithe a tharlaíonn taobh istigh de 24 uair a chloig i ndiaidh fuilaistriú agus gnéithe cliniceacha agus/nó saotharlainne den haemalú i láthair ( Grúpa Oibre ISBT Capetown, 2006).
 Ar na cúiseanna leis an haemalú géar tá neamh-chomhoiriúnacht ABO, neamh-chomhoiriúntacht antaigine eile e.g. Rh D, Kell nó tosca neamh-dhíonacha ar nós tuaslagáin hipeartonacha/hipeatonacha nó táirgí míochaine a meascadh leis an gcomhábhar fola.
 Úsáideann an tAontas Eorpach an córas rangaithe seo a leanas:
 Haemalú imdhíonachta ag éirí as neamh-chomhoiriúnachr ABO
 Haemalú imdhíonachta ag éirí as alla-antasubstaint eile-Géar
 Haemalú neamh-imdhíonach
 Frithghníomhuithe Neamh-haemalaíocha Fiabhrasacha Fuilaistrithe
 Frithghníomhuithe Ailléirgeacha & Anaifiolachtacha Géara Fuilaistrithe (FAAGF)
 Tarlaíonn Anaifiolachtacht/Hipiríogaireacht le hothar a réamhíograíodh le haillérigin agus a athnochtar don antaigin airithe sin arís. Tá beagán othar ann a bhfuil dian-easpa IgA orthu agus a fhorbraíonn antashubstaintí do IgA. D'fhéadfadh dian-anaifiolachtacht a bheith ar roinnt de na hothair sin má nochtar le IgA iad trí fhuilaistriú ( McClelland, 2001)
 Frithghníomhuithe Neamh-Ghéara Fuilaistrithe (FNGF)
 Frithghníomhuithe Haemalaíocha Moillithe Fuilaistrithe (FHMF)
 An sainmhíniú ar FHMF, gur fianaise atá ann ar ghnéithe cliniceacha nó saotharlainne an haemalaithe a tharlaíonn breis agus 24 uair fichead agus suas le 38 lá i ndiaidh le fianaise shéireolaíoch an antasubstaintí. (Buíon Oibre ISBT, Capetown, 2006)
 Féach freisin
 Tagairtí
 Naisc sheachtracha
 Fuilaistriú


type: legislation

text:
 EVROPSKÁ KOMISE
 V Bruselu dne 17.12.2019
 COM(2019) 636 final
 PŘÍLOHA
 návrhu rozhodnutí Rady
 o postoji, který má být zaujat jménem Evropské unie ve Správním výboru Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR k návrhu změn úmluvy
 DOPLNĚK
 Změny Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR (Úmluva TIR z roku 1975)
 A. Změny Úmluvy TIR
 1.Článek 1, nové písmeno s)
 s)
 „režimem eTIR“ režim TIR realizovaný formou elektronické výměny dat, který představuje funkční ekvivalent karnetu TIR. Podrobnosti režimu eTIR v souvislosti s uplatňováním Úmluvy TIR jsou definovány v příloze 11.
 1a.Čl. 3 písm. b)
 b)
 přepravní operace se provádějí za ručení sdružení zmocněných podle ustanovení článku 6. Musí se provádět na podkladě karnetu TIR shodného se vzorem uvedeným v příloze 1 této úmluvy nebo formou režimu eTIR.
 2.Článek 43
 Vysvětlivky uvedené v příloze 6, ve třetí části přílohy 7 a v druhé části přílohy 11 podávají výklad některých ustanovení této úmluvy a jejích příloh. Rovněž popisují některé doporučené postupy.
 3.Nový článek 58-c
 Bude ustaven Technický prováděcí orgán. Jeho složení, funkce a jednací řád jsou uvedeny v příloze 11.
 4.Článek 59
 1.
 Tato úmluva včetně svých příloh může být měněna na návrh smluvní strany postupem podle tohoto článku.
 2.
 S výhradou ustanovení článku 60-a každý pozměňovací návrh k této úmluvě posuzuje Správní výbor, složený ze všech smluvních stran, podle jednacího řádu stanoveného v příloze 8. Každý pozměňovací návrh tohoto druhu, který byl posouzen nebo vypracován na zasedání Správního výboru a přijat tímto výborem dvoutřetinovou většinou přítomných a hlasujících členů, předá generální tajemník Organizace spojených národů smluvním stranám k přijetí.
 3.
 S výhradou ustanovení článků 60 a 60-a každý pozměňovací návrh oznámený podle ustanovení předchozího odstavce vstoupí v platnost pro všechny smluvní strany tři měsíce po uplynutí dvanácti měsíců ode dne, kdy oznámení bylo učiněno, jestliže během této doby žádný stát, který je smluvní stranou, neoznámil generálnímu tajemníkovi Organizace spojených národů, že proti podanému pozměňovacímu návrhu vznáší námitku.
 4.
 Jestliže proti podanému pozměňovacímu návrhu byla podle ustanovení odstavce 3 tohoto článku oznámena námitka, považuje se pozměňovací návrh za nepřijatý a nemá žádný účinek.
 5.Nový článek 60-a
 Zvláštní postup pro vstup přílohy 11 a jejích změn v platnost
 1.
 Příloha 11, která byla posouzena v souladu s ustanoveními čl. 59 odst. 1 a 2, vstoupí pro všechny smluvní strany v platnost tři měsíce po uplynutí dvanácti měsíců ode dne, kdy byla generálním tajemníkem Organizace spojených národů oznámena smluvním stranám, s výjimkou smluvních stran, jež generálnímu tajemníkovi v uvedené tříměsíční lhůtě písemně oznámily, že přílohu 11 nepřijímají. Pro smluvní strany, které stáhly své oznámení nepřijetí, vstoupí příloha 11 v platnost šest měsíců po dni, kdy oznámení o stažení obdržel depozitář.
 2.
 Každý pozměňovací návrh k příloze 11 posuzuje Správní výbor. Pozměňovací návrhy se přijímají většinou přítomných a hlasujících smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11.
 3.
 Pozměňovací návrhy k příloze 11, které byly posouzeny a přijaty podle odstavce 2 tohoto článku, budou generálním tajemníkem Organizace spojených národů oznámeny všem smluvním stranám pro informaci a smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11 k přijetí.
 4.
 Datum vstupu těchto změn v platnost se stanoví v okamžiku jejich přijetí, a to většinou přítomných a hlasujících smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11.
 5.
 Změny vstoupí v platnost v souladu s odstavcem 4 tohoto článku, jestliže k dřívějšímu dni, stanovenému při jejich přijetí, pětina států nebo pět států, které jsou smluvními stranami vázanými přílohou 11, podle toho, který počet je menší, neoznámí generálnímu tajemníkovi, že proti pozměňovacím návrhům vznášejí námitky.
 6.
 Jakmile změna přijatá v souladu s postupem stanoveným v odstavcích 2 až 5 vstoupí v platnost, nahradí pro všechny smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 všechna dřívější ustanovení, na která se vztahuje.
 6.Článek 61
 Generální tajemník Organizace spojených národů uvědomuje všechny smluvní strany a všechny státy uvedené v odstavci 1 článku 52 této úmluvy o každé žádosti, oznámení nebo námitce podané podle ustanovení článků 59, 60 a 60-a a o dni, kterým každá změna vstupuje v platnost.
 7.Příloha 9, první část odst. 3 nový bod xi)
 xi)
 v případě havarijního postupu popsaného v čl. 10 odst. 2 přílohy 11 za smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 na žádost příslušných orgánů potvrdit, že záruka je platná a že přeprava TIR probíhá v režimu eTIR, a poskytnout další informace týkající se přepravy TIR.
 B.Příloha 11 – Režim eTIR
 1.První část
 Článek 1
 Rozsah působnosti
 1.
 Ustanovení této přílohy upravují zavádění režimu eTIR definovaného v čl. 1 písm. s) úmluvy a platí pro vztahy mezi smluvními stranami, které jsou touto přílohou vázány, jak je uvedeno v čl. 60-a odst. 1.
 2. Režim eTIR nelze použít pro přepravu, jejíž část se koná na území smluvní strany, která není vázána přílohou 11 a je členským státem celní nebo hospodářské unie s jednotným celním územím.
 Článek 2
 Definice
 Pro účely této přílohy se rozumí:
 a)
 „mezinárodním systémem eTIR“ systém informačních a komunikačních technologií určený k elektronické výměně informací mezi aktéry režimu eTIR;
 b)
 „specifikacemi režimu eTIR“ podrobné údaje o koncepci, funkcích a technických vlastnostech režimu eTIR přijaté a změněné v souladu s článkem 5 této přílohy;
 c)
 „předběžnými údaji TIR“ údaje o záměru držitele propustit zboží do režimu eTIR zaslané příslušným orgánům země odeslání, v souladu se specifikacemi režimu eTIR;
 d)
 „předběžnými změnami údajů“ oznámení záměru držitele změnit údaje v prohlášení zaslané příslušným orgánům země, v níž byla podána žádost o změnu údajů v prohlášení, v souladu se specifikacemi režimu eTIR;
 e)
 „údaji v prohlášení“ předběžné údaje TIR a předběžné změny údajů přijaté příslušnými orgány;
 f)
 „prohlášením“ úkon, kterým držitel nebo jeho zástupce oznámí, v souladu se specifikacemi režimu eTIR, záměr propustit zboží do režimu eTIR. V okamžiku přijetí prohlášení příslušnými orgány, na základě předběžných údajů TIR nebo předběžných změn údajů, a přenosu údajů v prohlášení do mezinárodního systému eTIR se stává právním ekvivalentem uznaného karnetu TIR;
 g)
 „průvodním dokumentem“ tištěný elektronický dokument vygenerovaný celním systémem v návaznosti na přijetí prohlášení v souladu s pokyny ve specifikacích režimu eTIR. Průvodní dokument lze použít k zaznamenání incidentů na trase, kdy nahrazuje havarijní protokol podle článku 25 této úmluvy, a k havarijnímu postupu;
 h)
 „autentizací“ elektronický postup, který umožňuje potvrdit elektronickou identifikaci fyzické či právnické osoby nebo původ a integritu dat v elektronické podobě.
 Vysvětlivky k čl. 2 písm. h)
 11.2 h)-1
 Než bude stanoven jednotný postup a než bude popsán ve specifikacích režimu eTIR, mohou smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 provést autentizaci držitele jakýmkoliv způsobem stanoveným jejich vnitrostátním právními předpisy, včetně, nikoli však výlučně, na základě uživatelského jména a hesla nebo elektronického podpisu.
 11.2 h)-2
 Integrita dat vyměňovaných mezi mezinárodním systémem eTIR a příslušnými orgány, jakož i autentizace systémů informačních a komunikačních technologií bude zajištěna bezpečným připojením, jak je definováno ve specifikacích režimu eTIR.
 Článek 3
 Zavedení režimu eTIR
 1.
 Smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 připojí svůj celní systém k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR podle specifikací režimu eTIR.
 2.
 Každá smluvní strana si sama zvolí, do jakého data připojí svůj celní systém k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR. Datum připojení oznámí všem ostatním smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11, a to nejméně šest měsíců před skutečným dnem připojení.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 3 odst. 2
 11.3.2
 Smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11 se doporučuje, aby aktualizovaly svůj vnitrostátní celní systém a zajistily jeho připojení k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR, jakmile pro ně příloha 11 vstoupí v platnost. Celní a hospodářské unie si mohou zvolit pozdější datum, tak aby měly na připojení vnitrostátních celních systémů svých jednotlivých členských států k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR dostatek času.
 Článek 4
 Složení, funkce a jednací řád Technického prováděcího orgánu
 1.
 Členy Technického prováděcího orgánu jsou smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11. Orgán zasedá v pravidelných intervalech nebo na žádost Správního výboru tak, jak to vyžaduje správa specifikací režimu eTIR. Technický prováděcí orgán o své činnosti a svých záměrech pravidelně informuje Správní výbor.
 2.
 Smluvní strany, které nepřijaly přílohu 11, jak je stanoveno v čl. 60-a odst. 1, a zástupci mezinárodních organizací se mohou účastnit zasedání Technického prováděcího orgánu jako pozorovatelé.
 3.
 Technický prováděcí orgán dohlíží na technické a funkční aspekty zavádění režimu eTIR a koordinuje a podporuje výměnu informací v záležitostech, jež spadají do jeho kompetence.
 4.
 Technický prováděcí orgán na svém prvním zasedání přijme svůj jednací řád a předloží jej Správnímu výboru ke schválení smluvními stranami vázanými přílohou 11.
 Článek 5
 Přijetí a změny specifikací režimu eTIR
 Technický prováděcí orgán:
 a)
 přijímá technické specifikace režimu eTIR a jejich změny tak, aby byl zajištěn soulad s funkčními specifikacemi režimu eTIR. V okamžiku jejich přijetí rozhoduje rovněž o přiměřeném přechodném období pro jejich zavedení;
 b)
 připravuje funkční specifikace režimu eTIR a jejich změny tak, aby byl zajištěn soulad s koncepčními specifikacemi režimu eTIR. Funkční specifikace a jejich změny se předávají Správnímu výboru ke schválení většinou přítomných a hlasujících smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11 a zavádějí se; v případě potřeby se k datu stanovenému v okamžiku přijetí rozpracovávají do technických specifikací;
 c)
 na žádost Správního výboru zvažuje změny koncepčních specifikací režimu eTIR. Koncepční specifikace režimu eTIR a jejich změny se schvalují většinou přítomných a hlasujících smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11 a zavádějí se; v případě potřeby se k datu stanovenému v okamžiku přijetí rozpracovávají do funkčních specifikací;
 Článek 6
 Předkládání předběžných údajů TIR a předběžných změn údajů
 1.
 Držitel nebo jeho zástupce předkládá předběžné údaje TIR a předběžné změny údajů příslušnému orgánu jak v zemi odeslání, tak v zemi, jež si vyžádala změnu údajů v prohlášení. Jakmile jsou prohlášení nebo změna v souladu s vnitrostátním právem schváleny, zašle příslušný orgán údaje v prohlášení nebo jejich změnu do mezinárodního systému eTIR.
 2.
 Předběžné údaje TIR a předběžné změny údajů podle odstavce 1 lze předložit buď přímo příslušným orgánům, nebo prostřednictvím mezinárodního systému eTIR.
 3.
 Smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 přijímají předložené předběžné údaje TIR a předběžné změny údajů prostřednictvím mezinárodního systému eTIR.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 6 odst. 3
 11.6.3
 Doporučuje se, aby smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 uznávaly předložení předběžných údajů TIR a předběžných změn údajů pokud možno způsoby uvedenými ve funkčních a technických specifikacích.
 4.
 Příslušné orgány uveřejní seznam všech elektronických prostředků, jejichž prostřednictvím je možné předběžné údaje TIR a změny údajů předkládat.
 Článek 7
 Autentizace držitele
 1.
 Při přijetí prohlášení v zemi odeslání nebo změn údajů v prohlášení v kterékoli zemi na trase příslušné orgány v souladu s vnitrostátním právem provedou autentizaci předběžných údajů TIR nebo předběžné změny údajů a držitele.
 2.
 Smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 uznají autentizaci držitele provedenou v mezinárodním systému eTIR.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 7 odst. 2
 11.7.2
 Mezinárodní systém eTIR zaručí prostředky popsanými ve specifikacích režimu eTIR integritu předběžných údajů TIR a předběžných změn údajů a skutečnost, že údaje byly zaslány držitelem.
 3.
 Příslušné orgány uveřejní seznam dalších mechanismů neuvedených v odstavci 2 tohoto článku, jež lze použít k autentizaci.
 4.
 Smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 uznají údaje v prohlášení přijaté prostřednictvím mezinárodního systému eTIR od příslušných orgánů země odeslání i země, jež si vyžádala změnu údajů v prohlášení, coby právní ekvivalent uznaného karnetu TIR.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 7 odst. 4
 11.7.4
 Mezinárodní systém eTIR zaručí prostředky popsanými ve specifikacích režimu eTIR integritu údajů v prohlášení a skutečnost, že údaje byly zaslány příslušnými orgány zemí podílejících se na přepravě.
 Článek 8
 Vzájemné uznávání autentizace držitele
 Autentizaci držitele provedenou příslušnými orgány smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11, jež přijaly prohlášení nebo změnu údajů v prohlášení, uznají i příslušné orgány všech následných smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11 na celé trase přepravy TIR.
 Vysvětlivka k článku 8
 11.8
 Mezinárodní systém eTIR zaručí prostředky popsanými ve specifikacích režimu eTIR integritu údajů v prohlášení zaslaných příslušnými orgány nebo příslušným orgánům, včetně totožnosti držitele potvrzené příslušným orgánem, jenž příslušné prohlášení schválil.
 Článek 9
 Požadavky na dodatečné údaje
 1.
 Kromě údajů uvedených ve funkčních a technických specifikacích si příslušné orgány mohou vyžádat dodatečné údaje dle vnitrostátních právních předpisů.
 2.
 Své požadavky na údaje by příslušné orgány měly v co největší možné míře omezit na ty, jež jsou obsaženy ve funkčních a technických specifikacích, a předkládání dodatečných údajů usnadnit, aby přeprava TIR prováděná v souladu s touto přílohou nebyla narušena.
 Článek 10
 Havarijní postup
 1.
 Nelze-li režim eTIR z technických důvodů v celním úřadě odeslání zahájit, může držitel karnetu TIR použít režim TIR.
 2.
 Jestliže byl režim eTIR zahájen, avšak z technických důvodů v něm nelze pokračovat, příslušné orgány průvodní dokument schválí a zpracují jej způsobem popsaným ve specifikacích režimu eTIR, s výhradou dostupnosti dodatečných informací z jiných elektronických systémů, jak je popsáno ve funkčních a technických specifikacích.
 3.
 Příslušné orgány smluvních stran jsou rovněž oprávněny vyzvat vnitrostátní záruční sdružení, aby potvrdila, že záruka je platná a že přeprava TIR probíhá v režimu eTIR, a poskytla další informace týkající se přepravy TIR.
 4.
 Postup popsaný v odstavci 3 bude stanoven dohodou mezi příslušnými orgány a vnitrostátními záručními sdruženími, jak je uvedeno v písmeni d) odstavce 1 části I přílohy 9.
 Článek 11
 Provozování mezinárodního systému eTIR
 1.
 Mezinárodní systém eTIR bude provozován a spravován pod záštitou Evropské hospodářské komise OSN (EHK).
 2.
 Komise EHK bude zemím nápomocná při připojování jejich celních systémů k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR, mimo jiné posuzováním shody, aby bylo před zprovozněním připojení zajištěno jejich řádné fungování.
 3.
 Komisi EHK budou dány k dispozici zdroje nezbytné k plnění povinností uvedených v odstavcích 1 a 2 tohoto článku. Pokud nebude mezinárodní systém eTIR financován ze zdrojů z běžného rozpočtu OSN, budou nezbytné zdroje podléhat finančním předpisům a pravidlům platným pro mimorozpočtové zdroje a projekty OSN. O mechanismech financování provozu mezinárodního systému eTIR v EHK rozhodne a schválí je Správní výbor.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 11 odst. 3
 11.11.3
 V případě nutnosti mohou smluvní strany rozhodnout, že náklady na provoz mezinárodního systému eTIR budou hrazeny z poplatků za přepravu TIR. V takovém případě smluvní strany rozhodnou o vhodném načasování zavedení alternativních mechanismů financování a jejich modalitách. Potřebný rozpočet vypracuje EHK, posoudí jej Technický prováděcí orgán a schválí Správní výbor.
 Článek 12
 Správa mezinárodního systému eTIR
 1.
 Komise EHK provede nezbytná opatření umožňující ukládání a archivaci dat z mezinárodního systému eTIR po dobu nejméně deseti let.
 2.
 Veškerá data uložená v mezinárodním systému eTIR může EHK jménem odpovědných orgánů dle této úmluvy použít pro účely extrakce souhrnných statistických dat.
 3.
 Příslušné orgány smluvních stran, na jejichž území probíhá přeprava TIR v režimu eTIR, jež se stane předmětem správního nebo soudního řízení ohledně platební povinnosti přímo odpovědné osoby nebo osob nebo vnitrostátního záručního sdružení, si mohou od EHK za účelem ověření vyžádat informace uložené v mezinárodním systému eTIR, jež se daného sporu týkají. Tyto informace lze ve vnitrostátním správním nebo soudním řízení předložit jako důkaz.
 4.
 V ostatních případech, které nejsou v tomto článku uvedeny, je šíření či zpřístupnění informací uložených v mezinárodním systému eTIR neoprávněným osobám či subjektům zakázáno.
 Článek 13
 Uveřejňování seznamu celních úřadů oprávněných k provádění operací eTIR
 Příslušné orgány zajistí, aby byl seznam celních úřadů odeslání, pohraničních celních úřadů a celních úřadů určení oprávněných k provádění operací TIR v režimu eTIR, který je k dispozici v elektronické databázi pověřených celních úřadů vyvinuté a spravované Výkonnou radou TIR, vždy úplný a aktuální.
 Článek 14
 Zákonné požadavky týkající se předkládání údajů podle přílohy 10 Úmluvy TIR
 Zákonné požadavky týkající se předkládání údajů, jež jsou stanoveny v odstavci 1, 3 a 4 přílohy 10 této úmluvy, se považují za splněné zavedením režimu eTIR.
 ---documentbreak---
 EVROPSKÁ KOMISE
 V Bruselu dne 17.12.2019
 COM(2019) 636 final
 2019/0279(NLE)
 eTIR Package
 Návrh
 ROZHODNUTÍ RADY
 o postoji, který má být zaujat jménem Evropské unie ve Správním výboru Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR k návrhu změn úmluvy
 DŮVODOVÁ ZPRÁVA
 1.Předmět návrhu
 Tento návrh se týká rozhodnutí o postoji, který má být jménem Unie zaujat ve Správním výboru zřízeném podle Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR
 1
 (dále jen „Úmluva TIR“) v souvislosti s plánovaným přijetím změn souvisejících s ustavením právního základu pro elektronický režim TIR (dále také „eTIR“).
 2.Souvislosti návrhu
 2.1.Celní úmluva o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR
 Účelem Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR ze dne 14. listopadu 1975 („Úmluva TIR“) je usnadnit mezinárodní přepravu zboží z celních úřadů odeslání do celních úřadů určení a přes tolik zemí, kolik je potřeba.
 Úmluva TIR vstoupila v platnost v roce 1978. K lednu 2019 podepsalo úmluvu 76 smluvních stran zahrnujících 75 států a Evropskou unii. Evropská unie je smluvní stranou Úmluvy TIR
 2
 od 20. června 1983. Rovněž všechny členské státy EU jsou smluvními stranami úmluvy.
 2.2.Správní výbor
 V mezích Úmluvy TIR jedná Správní výbor. Jeho úlohou je zvažovat a přijímat změny úmluvy. O návrzích se hlasuje a každý stát, který je smluvní stranou a je zastoupen na zasedání Správního výboru, má jeden hlas. Výlučnou pravomoc v oblasti cel, která se řídí Úmluvou TIR, má Unie. Jakožto mezinárodní organizace však nemá hlasovací práva; ta mají coby smluvní strany členské státy EU.
 Změny Úmluvy TIR se přijímají dvoutřetinovou většinou přítomných a hlasujících stran. Výbor je usnášeníschopný, pokud je přítomna nejméně jedna třetina států, jež jsou stranami úmluvy.
 2.3.Zamýšlený akt Správního výboru
 Správní výbor na zasedání v únoru 2020 pravděpodobně rozhodne o přijetí pozměňovacích návrhů k Úmluvě TIR (dále jen „zamýšlený akt“).
 Účelem zamýšleného aktu je stanovit potřebný právní základ pro režim eTIR. Právním základem bude nová příloha 11 Úmluvy TIR a několik souvisejících změn textu úmluvy a její přílohy 9.
 Zamýšlený akt se stane pro smluvní strany závazným v souladu s článkem 59 Úmluvy TIR, který stanoví: „S výhradou ustanovení článku 60 každý pozměňovací návrh oznámený podle ustanovení předchozího odstavce vstoupí v platnost pro všechny smluvní strany tři měsíce po uplynutí dvanácti měsíců ode dne, kdy oznámení bylo učiněno, jestliže během této doby žádný stát, který je smluvní stranou, neoznámil generálnímu tajemníkovi Organizace spojených národů, že proti podanému pozměňovacímu návrhu vznáší námitku. Jestliže proti podanému pozměňovacímu návrhu byla podle ustanovení odstavce 3 tohoto článku oznámena námitka, považuje se pozměňovací návrh za nepřijatý a nemá žádný účinek.“
 3.Postoj, který má být jménem Unie zaujat
 3.1 Popis navrhovaných změn Úmluvy TIR
 Jelikož Úmluva TIR spadá do výlučné pravomoci Unie, musí Unie k navrhovaným změnám úmluvy zaujmout společný postoj jménem všech svých členských států, které jsou smluvními stranami úmluvy. Rozhodnutí, které má být přijato, spočívá v tom, zda má být Unie vázána navrhovanou novou přílohou 11, která má představovat právní základ pro možnost používat namísto papírového karnetu TIR elektronický režim TIR. Je však třeba poznamenat, že i pokud se Unie rozhodne být navrhovanou novou přílohou 11 vázána, bude mít Unie i její členské státy stále možnost zvolit si, kdy k elektronickému systému TIR provozovanému Organizací spojených národů připojí své počítačové systémy.
 Níže následuje podrobný popis obsahu navrhované nové přílohy 11 a navrhovaných změn textu Úmluvy TIR, jež z přijetí uvedené přílohy vyplývají.
 Články Úmluvy TIR související s přílohou 11
 Novou přílohu 11 nelze přijmout bez změny textu a přílohy 9 Úmluvy TIR.
 Byl vypracován návrh nového písmene s) článku 1 Úmluvy TIR, který obsahuje definici „režimu eTIR“ coby režimu TIR realizovaného formou elektronické výměny dat a představujícího funkční ekvivalent karnetu TIR. Uvedený článek dále stanoví, že „režim eTIR“ je právně vymezen v nové příloze 11 Úmluvy TIR.
 Návrh na změnu čl. 3 písm. b) Úmluvy TIR vychází z potřeby upřesnit skutečnost, že za přepravu TIR, jež probíhá v režimu eTIR, musí ručit schválené sdružení.
 Návrh na změnu článku 43 Úmluvy TIR má zohlednit novou vysvětlivku k druhé části přílohy 11, jež vysvětluje určitá ustanovení úmluvy a jejích příloh. Tuto změnu lze považovat za změnu redakční povahy.
 Návrh nového článku 58-c byl vypracován za účelem ustavení Technického prováděcího orgánu. Ten bude pověřen přijímáním technických specifikací režimu eTIR a jejich změn v souladu s koncepčními a funkčními specifikacemi schválenými Správním výborem.
 Návrh na změnu článku 59, nového článku 60-a a na změnu článku 61 Úmluvy TIR obsahuje postup pro vstup přílohy 11 a jejích budoucích změn v platnost. Příloha 11 vstoupí v platnost pro všechny smluvní strany s výjimkou těch, jež oznámí generálnímu tajemníkovi Organizace spojených národů, že přílohu 11 nepřijímají. V důsledku toho budou některé smluvní strany Úmluvy TIR novou přílohou vázány, a jiné nikoliv.
 Návrh nového pododstavce xi) odstavce 3 části I přílohy 9 zavádí novou povinnost schválených sdružení pro případ, že v režimu eTIR nastane havarijní situace. Sdružení budou muset na žádost příslušných orgánů potvrdit, že přeprava TIR probíhá v režimu eTIR a že záruka je platná, a poskytnout jakékoliv další informace týkající se přepravy TIR.
 Nová příloha 11
 První část přílohy 11 sestává z čtrnácti článků, jež podrobně popisují fungování budoucího režimu eTIR.
 Článek 1 zdůrazňuje, že ustanovení přílohy 11 platí pouze pro smluvní strany, které jsou jí vázány, jak je uvedeno v čl. 60-a odst. 1. Úmluvy TIR, a že režim eTIR nelze použít pro přepravu, jejíž část se koná na území smluvní strany, která není vázaná přílohou 11 a je členským státem celní nebo hospodářské unie s jednotným celním územím.
 Článek 2 obsahuje nezbytné definice s cílem nový režim eTIR řádně popsat. Definuje tyto termíny: „mezinárodní systém eTIR“, „specifikace režimu eTIR“, „předběžné údaje TIR“, „předběžná změna údajů“, „údaje v prohlášení“, „prohlášení“, „průvodní dokument“ a „autentizace“.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 2 písm. h) zdůrazňuje, že než bude stanoven jednotný postup a než bude popsán ve specifikacích režimu eTIR, mohou smluvní strany provést autentizaci držitele v rámci režimu eTIR způsobem stanoveným jejich vnitrostátním právními předpisy. Dále stanoví, že bezpečnost dat vyměňovaných mezi mezinárodním systémem eTIR a příslušnými orgány bude zajištěna tak, jak je definováno v technických specifikacích režimu eTIR.
 Článek 3 upravuje konkrétní způsoby zavádění režimu eTIR, k němuž je nutné, aby smluvní strany připojily své počítačové systémy k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR. Dotčený článek však v souladu s formulací navrženou Unií dává smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11 volnost, aby si samy zvolily, do jakého data svůj celní systém k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR připojí. Tento bod je pro Unii zásadní, neboť bude mít dopad na celní počítačové systémy všech členských států i na centrální komponenty provozované Evropskou komisí (a společné systémové specifikace EU). To znamená, že i pokud Unie a její členské státy budou vázány přílohou 11 a budou mít vliv na její budoucí změny, budou se moci samy rozhodnout, kdy své systémy k novému mezinárodnímu systému eTIR připojí.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 3 odst. 2 doporučuje smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11, aby aktualizovaly svůj vnitrostátní celní systém a zajistily jeho připojení k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR, jakmile pro ně příloha 11 vstoupí v platnost. Celní a hospodářské unie si však v souladu s požadavkem Unie mohou zvolit pozdější datum, tak aby měly na připojení vnitrostátních celních systémů svých jednotlivých členských států k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR dostatek času.
 Článek 4 stanoví složení, funkce a obsah jednacího řádu nového Technického prováděcího orgánu ustaveného na základě nového článku 58-c Úmluvy TIR. Je třeba zdůraznit, že členy tohoto orgánu budou výhradně smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11. Smluvní strany, které přílohu 11 nepřijaly, se mohou zasedání Technického prováděcího orgánu účastnit jako pozorovatelé.
 Článek 5 vysvětluje, jakým způsobem se bude nový Technický prováděcí orgán připravovat na přijímání koncepčních a funkčních specifikací mezinárodního systému eTIR a jejich změn Správním výborem. Článek dále stanoví, jakým způsobem bude Technický prováděcí orgán připravovat a přijímat technické specifikace režimu eTIR a jejich změny v souladu s koncepčními a funkčními specifikacemi.
 Článek 6 popisuje předkládání předběžných údajů TIR. Ty budou předkládat provozovatelé předem elektronickými prostředky. Příslušné orgány zveřejní seznam všech elektronických prostředků, jejichž prostřednictvím bude možné předběžné údaje TIR a změny údajů předkládat. Tento článek by se měl vykládat ve spojení s navrhovaným článkem 9 přílohy 11, který popisuje, jak lze k předběžným údajům TIR připojit požadavky na dodatečné údaje vyplývající z legislativy. Kromě toho článek stanoví, že smluvní strany by měly umožnit předkládání takových dodatečných údajů spolu s předběžnými údaji TIR.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 6 odst. 3 doporučuje smluvním stranám vázaným přílohou 11, aby uznaly metody předkládání předběžných údajů TIR uvedené ve specifikacích režimu eTIR.
 Článek 7 definuje mechanismy nezbytné k autentizaci držitele, který předkládá předběžné údaje TIR příslušným orgánům, či jeho zástupce. Je nutné zdůraznit, že údaje v prohlášení přijaté prostřednictvím mezinárodního systému eTIR od příslušných orgánů jak země odeslání, tak země, jež si vyžádala změnu údajů v prohlášení, budou smluvní strany vázané přílohou 11 muset uznat.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 7 odst. 2 obsahuje ujištění o tom, že mezinárodní systém eTIR je schopen potvrdit integritu předběžných údajů TIR a předběžných změn zaslaných držitelem.
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 7 odst. 4 obsahuje ujištění o tom, že mezinárodní systém eTIR je schopen potvrdit integritu údajů v prohlášení zaslaných příslušnými orgány.
 Článek 8 připomíná jeden ze základních principů Úmluvy TIR, kterým je vzájemné uznávání autentizace držitele vydaných příslušnými orgány smluvních stran vázaných přílohou 11.
 Vysvětlivka k článku 8 obsahuje ujištění o tom, že mezinárodní systém eTIR je schopen potvrdit integritu označení držitele zaslaného příslušným orgánem, jenž schválil příslušné prohlášení.
 Článek 10 zavádí havarijní postup pro případ, kdy režim eTIR nelze z technických důvodů použít, a připomíná, jaké povinnosti mají v takové situaci vnitrostátní záruční sdružení.
 Články 11 a 12 popisují provozování, financování a správu mezinárodního elektronického systému TIR. Unie byla již od začátku diskuzí na toto téma pro to, aby byl elektronický systém TIR provozován a spravován pod přímou záštitou Evropské hospodářské komise OSN a tím byla zaručena jeho nezávislost na mezinárodní organizaci (v současnosti IRU).
 Vysvětlivka k čl. 11 odst. 3 objasňuje pravidla financování nákladů na provoz mezinárodního systému eTIR v případě, že by se hradily z poplatků za přepravu TIR. V takovém případě rozhodnou o vhodných mechanismech financování a jejich modalitách smluvní strany. Rozpočet bude schvalovat Správní výbor.
 Článek 13 stanoví pravidla uveřejňování seznamu celních úřadů oprávněných k provádění operací eTIR. Příslušné orgány zajistí, aby byl seznam celních úřadů oprávněných k provádění operací TIR v režimu eTIR, který je dostupný v elektronické databázi pověřených celních úřadů vyvinuté a spravované Výkonnou radou TIR, úplný a aktuální.
 Článek 14 uvádí, že požadavky na předkládání údajů k ukončení operace TIR se považují za splněné použitím režimu eTIR.
 3.2 Navrhovaný postoj
 Unie souhlasí s cílem navrhované nové přílohy 11 Úmluvy TIR: po více než patnácti letech příprav je čas převést systém TIR do elektronického prostředí. To je plně v souladu s politikou a legislativou EU o elektronickém celním systému, jejichž podstatou je přechod na bezpapírové, plně elektronické a interoperabilní prostředí vyznačují se jednoduchostí, praktičností a rychlostí.
 Navrhované změny byly s členskými státy konzultovány v rámci skupiny celních odborníků na TIR (Koordinace Ženeva). Další konzultace se konaly během zasedání pracovní skupiny Evropské hospodářské komise Organizace spojených národů (EHK OSN) pro celní otázky ovlivňující přepravu. V rámci jednání pod záštitou EHK OSN se Evropská komise jménem Unie a některých členských států zapojila také do expertních skupin, jejichž úkolem bylo vypracovat návrhy právních ustanovení a technických parametrů systému eTIR.
 Z vnitřní koordinace a společných diskuzí s členskými státy jasně vyplynulo, že navrhovaná nová příloha 11 má širokou podporu.
 Navrhuje se proto, aby Unie přijetí změn souvisejících s ustavením právního základu pro elektronický režim TIR (eTIR) podpořila.
 4.4. Právní základ
 4.1.Procesněprávní základ
 4.1.1.Zásady
 Ustanovení čl. 218 odst. 9 Smlouvy o fungování Evropské unie (SFEU) zavádí rozhodnutí, kterými se stanoví „postoje, které mají být jménem Unie zaujaty v orgánu zřízeném dohodou, má-li tento orgán přijímat akty s právními účinky, s výjimkou aktů, které doplňují nebo pozměňují institucionální rámec dohody“.
 Ustanovení čl. 218 odst. 9 SFEU se použijí bez ohledu na to, zda je Unie členem dotyčného orgánu nebo stranou dotyčné dohody
 3
 .
 Pojem „akty s právními účinky“ zahrnuje akty, které mají právní účinky na základě pravidel mezinárodního práva, kterým se řídí dotyčný orgán. Zahrnuje rovněž nástroje, které podle mezinárodního práva nemají závazný účinek, ale „mohou rozhodujícím způsobem ovlivnit obsah právní úpravy přijaté zákonodárcem Unie“
 4
 .
 4.1.2.Uplatnění v tomto konkrétním případě
 Správní výbor je orgán zřízený dohodou, konkrétně Celní úmluvou o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR.
 Akt, který má Správní výbor přijmout, představuje akt s právními účinky. Zamýšlený akt bude závazný podle mezinárodního práva v souladu s články 59 a 60 Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR.
 Procesněprávním základem navrhovaného rozhodnutí je čl. 218 odst. 9 SFEU.
 4.2.Hmotněprávní základ
 4.2.1.Zásady
 Hmotněprávní základ rozhodnutí podle čl. 218 odst. 9 SFEU závisí v první řadě na cíli a obsahu zamýšleného aktu, k němuž se postoj jménem Unie zaujímá. Sleduje‐li zamýšlený akt dvojí účel nebo má-li dvě složky a lze‐li jeden z těchto účelů nebo jednu z těchto složek identifikovat jako hlavní, zatímco druhý účel či druhá složka je pouze vedlejší, musí být rozhodnutí přijaté na základě čl. 218 odst. 9 SFEU založeno na jediném hmotněprávním základu, a sice na tom, který si žádá hlavní nebo převažující účel či složka.
 4.2.2.Uplatnění v tomto konkrétním případě
 Hlavní cíl a obsah zamýšleného aktu se týká oblasti cel.
 Hmotněprávním základem navrhovaného rozhodnutí je tudíž článek 207 SFEU.
 4.3.Závěr
 Právním základem navrhovaného rozhodnutí by měl být článek 207 ve spojení s čl. 218 odst. 9 SFEU.
 5.Zveřejnění zamýšleného aktu
 Vzhledem k tomu, že akt Správního výboru změní Celní úmluvu o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR a její přílohy, je vhodné jej po přijetí zveřejnit v Úředním věstníku Evropské unie.
 2019/0279 (NLE)
 Návrh
 ROZHODNUTÍ RADY
 o postoji, který má být zaujat jménem Evropské unie ve Správním výboru Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR k návrhu změn úmluvy
 RADA EVROPSKÉ UNIE,
 s ohledem na Smlouvu o fungování Evropské unie, a zejména na článek 207 ve spojení s čl. 218 odst. 9 této smlouvy,
 s ohledem na návrh Evropské komise,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1)Celní úmluva o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR ze dne 14. listopadu 1975 (dále jen „Úmluva TIR“) byla jménem Unie uzavřena nařízením Rady (EHS) č. 2112/78
 5
 a vstoupila ve Společenství v platnost dne 20. června 1983
 6
 .
 (2)Podle článku 59 Úmluvy TIR může Správní výbor přijmout změny dvoutřetinovou většinou přítomných a hlasujících smluvních stran.
 (3)Na svém zasedání v únoru 2020 má Správní výbor schválit novou přílohu 11 a související změny Úmluvy TIR.
 (4)Je vhodné stanovit postoj, který má být ve Správním výboru jménem Unie zaujat, neboť změny Úmluvy TIR budou pro Unii závazné.
 (5)Unie podporuje přijetí nové přílohy 11 a nezbytných změn textu Úmluvy TIR, neboť to odpovídá politickému směřování stanovenému v nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) č. 952/2013
 7
 , podle něhož má být v zásadě veškerá komunikace s celními orgány elektronická.
 (6)Nové písmeno s) článku 1 Úmluvy TIR má definovat „režim eTIR“ vztahující se na elektronickou výměnu dat mezi celními orgány.
 (7)Nový článek 58 Úmluvy TIR má ustavit technický prováděcí orgán, který bude pověřen přijímáním technických specifikací mezinárodního systému eTIR.
 (8)Nový článek 60-a má stanovit zvláštní postup pro vstup přílohy 11 Úmluvy TIR a jejích budoucích změn v platnost.
 (9)Změny článků 43, 59 a 61 představují nezbytné úpravy v souvislosti s přijetím nové přílohy 11.
 (10)Nová příloha 11 Úmluvy TIR má smluvním stranám vázaným touto přílohou umožnit používat operace eTIR. Má Unii a jejím členským státům umožnit, aby samy rozhodly o okamžiku, kdy své systémy připojí k mezinárodnímu systému eTIR.
 (11)Postoj, který má být jménem Unie zaujat v rámci Správního výboru by proto měl vycházet z návrhu změn připojených k tomuto rozhodnutí,
 PŘIJALA TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 Postoj, který má být jménem Unie zaujat na sedmdesátém druhém nebo následujícím zasedání Správního výboru, vychází z návrhů změn připojených k tomuto rozhodnutí.
 Článek 2
 Postoj uvedený v článku 1 vyjádří členské státy Unie, jež jsou členy Správního výboru, jednajíce společně.
 Článek 3
 Jestliže si to jednání vyžádají, může zástupce Unie ve Správním výboru schválit další úpravy návrhu změn podle článku 1 tohoto rozhodnutí.
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí vstupuje v platnost dnem přijetí.
 Toto rozhodnutí je určeno členským státům.
 V Bruselu dne
 Za Radu
 předseda/předsedkyně
 (1)
 Zkratka TIR znamená „Transports Internationaux Routiers“ neboli mezinárodní silniční doprava.
 (2)
 Nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2112/78 ze dne 25. července 1978 o uzavření Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR (Úmluva TIR) ze dne 14. listopadu 1975, Ženeva (Úř. věst. L 252, 14.9.1978, s. 1).
 (3)
 Rozsudek Soudního dvora ze dne 7. října 2014, Německo v. Rada, Věc C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, bod 64.
 (4)
 Rozsudek Soudního dvora ze dne 7. října 2014, Německo v. Rada, věc C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, body 61 až 64.
 (5)
 Nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2112/78 ze dne 25. července 1978 o uzavření Celní úmluvy o mezinárodní přepravě zboží na podkladě karnetů TIR (Úmluva TIR) ze dne 14. listopadu 1975, Ženeva (Úř. věst. L 252, 14.9.1978, s. 1).
 (6)
 Úř. věst. L 31, 2.2.1983, s. 13.
 (7)
 Nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) č. 952/2013 ze dne 9. října 2013, kterým se stanoví celní kodex Unie (Úř. věst. L 269, 10.10.2013, s. 1).