text:
The Town of Forest Heights v. The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
 Commission, et al., No. 21, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J.
 [MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE,
 AND DISSOLUTION – TERRITORIAL EXTENT AND SUBDIVISIONS,
 ANNEXATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND DIVISION – ANNEXATION OR
 DETACHMENT OF TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES]
 The Court of Appeals held a municipal corporation’s legislative body is not required to
 obtain consent from owners of tax-exempt property within a proposed annexation area to
 effectuate such an annexation pursuant to the 25% consent requirement of Local
 Government Article § 4-403(b)(2).
 [MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE,
 AND DISSOLUTION – TERRITORIAL EXTENT AND SUBDIVISIONS,
 ANNEXATION, CONSOLIDATION, AND DIVISION – ANNEXATION OR
 DETACHMENT OF TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES]
 The Court of Appeals held the circuit court erred in determining that an annexation plan
 attempted to usurp law enforcement jurisdiction over certain lands owned and managed by
 Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning Commission where the annexation plan
 indicated that policing of the land would be performed “as permitted by law.”
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CAL16-29110
 Argued: October 4, 2018
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 21
 September Term, 2018
 THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS
 v.
 THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL
 PARK AND PLANNING COMISSION, ET
 AL.
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene,
 *Adkins,
 McDonald,
 Watts,
 Hotten,
 Getty,
 JJ.
 Opinion by Getty, J.
 Adkins, Watts, and Hotten, JJ., dissent.
 Filed: April 5, 2019
 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
 (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
 is authentic.
 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the
 2019-04-05 hearing and conference of this case while an
 09:18-04:00 active member of this Court; after being recalled
 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV,
 Section 3A, she also participated in the decision
 and adoption of this opinion
 In the present appeal, we are asked to determine whether a proposed municipal
 annexation, that encompasses an area consisting entirely of tax-exempt properties, requires
 consent from the owners of such properties pursuant to Local Government Article (“LG”)
 § 4-403(b)(2). Additionally, we are asked to determine whether the proposed annexation
 plan of the Town of Forest Heights (“Forest Heights”) attempts to usurp law enforcement
 jurisdiction over certain lands contained within the proposed annexation area that are
 owned and operated by the Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning Commission
 (“MNCPPC”).
 In its writ of certiorari, the Town of Forest Heights presents us with the following
 questions for review:
 1. Did the circuit court err when it invalidated two resolutions of the Town of
 Forest Heights that, collectively, annexed into the Town approximately 737 acres
 of land without the consent of the owners of 25% of the assessed value of the
 lands annexed by each resolution, where all the annexed lands were tax-exempt,
 and where, consistent with City of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life, 21 Md. App. 396
 (1974), the owners of the lands were not required to provide their consents to the
 annexation?
 2. Did the circuit court err when it determined that a portion of the Town’s
 Annexation Plan violates Md. Code, Local Gov’t § 4-104(b) and Land Use § 17-
 303(a), and, as a result, ordered that the Town may not exercise law enforcement
 on any land owned by Maryland-National Park and Planning Commission?
 We answer both questions in the affirmative, finding first that the 25% property
 owner consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) does not encompass tax-exempt property
 owners. Second, we conclude that the language contained within the annexation plan was
 appropriately conditioned as to avoid any attempted divestment, duplication, or usurpation
 of law enforcement jurisdiction over certain properties owned and managed by MNCPPC.
 BACKGROUND
 Petitioner, Forest Heights is a municipal corporation located within Prince George’s
 County that spans 306 acres of land southeast of Maryland’s border with the District of
 Columbia. In terms of municipal services, the Town provides road maintenance, street
 lighting, garbage collection, police, and code enforcement to its residents. Within the
 borders of Forest Heights are two public parks owned and maintained by Respondent,
 MNCPPC.
 Since its incorporation in 1949, Forest Heights has extended its corporate limits five
 times excluding the annexations at issue within this appeal. On April 20, 2016, the Town
 Council of Forest Heights introduced two annexation resolutions titled annexation
 resolutions No. 01-2016 and 02-2016.1 The proposed extensions are comprised of several
 tax-exempt properties owned by MNCPPC, Prince George’s County, the Board of
 Education of Prince George’s County, the State of Maryland, the United States, and the
 Oxon Hill Methodist Church.2
 Annexation resolution No. 01-2016 encompasses 446.88 acres of land located west
 of Forest Heights that extends to the boundary line of Washington, D.C. The proposed
 annexation area of resolution No. 01-2016 includes land owned by the federal government,
 1
 Forest Heights refers to these annexation resolutions No. 01-2016 and 02-2016 as
 extensions six and seven, collectively. The term extension is a colloquialism for an
 annexation, because annexations typically extend a municipality’s corporate boundaries.
 2
 The property located within the annexation area owned by the church is a cemetery and
 not the church itself.
 2
 under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, including Oxon Cove Park and Oxon
 Hill Farm, 3 and land owned by MNCPPC.
 Annexation resolution 02-2016 encompasses 289.97 acres of land located to the
 south of Forest Heights. The land falling within the proposed annexation area is owned by
 Prince George’s County, the Board of Education of Prince George’s County, MNCPPC,
 the State of Maryland, the federal government, and the Oxon Hill Methodist Church.
 Specifically, the annexation includes Oxon Hill Manor, the Potomac Vista Recreational
 Area, Betty Blume Neighborhood Park, Southlawn Local Park, John Hanson Montessori
 School, Oxon Hill High School, several undeveloped lots, and portions of the Washington
 Circumferential Highway, commonly known as the Capital Beltway (i.e. Interstates 95 and
 495).
 Together, the two annexation resolutions encompass an area of 736.85 acres which
 would more than double the corporate limits of Forest Heights. The proposed annexation
 area contains no residential properties and no registered voters reside therein. Forest
 Heights did not obtain consent from any of the property owners because the Town believed
 that – pursuant to LG § 4-403 – such consent was not required because all of the property
 owners enjoyed tax-exempt status. In total, MNCPPC owns seven properties within the
 proposed annexation area and Prince George’s County owns one. All properties involved
 in the proposed annexations are located within a special district for planning and zoning
 3
 These properties constitute a national historic district, listed on the National Register of
 Historic Places and include park facilities and a living history farm museum.
 3
 demarcated as the “Maryland-Washington Regional District.”4 In addition, the properties
 also fall within a largely overlapping special district for managing parklands known as the
 “Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District.”
 In 2014, Forest Heights attempted to annex the same properties at issue within the
 instant appeal. Although the State and federal governments did not object to the prior
 annexation attempt, Prince George’s County (“the County”) and MNCPPC opposed the
 annexation and spearheaded a judicial challenge in response. In that case, the attempted
 annexation was invalidated due to certain procedural deficiencies.5
 On April 20, 2016, Forest Heights adopted annexation plans for annexation
 resolutions No. 01-2016 and 02-2016. A public hearing regarding the two annexation
 resolutions was held on June 6, 2016, and the resolutions were passed. On the same day,
 4
 A special district “means a special tax area or district, sanitary district, park, or planning
 district . . . or public agency exercising specific powers in a defined area that does not
 exercise general municipal functions.” LG § 4-104(a). Special districts are generally
 protected from certain municipal action, including but not limited to municipal tax
 exemption and zoning. See LG § 4-104(c), (e)(1). These special districts were first
 established by the Regional District Act (“RDA”), which is now codified as Division II
 (Titles 14-27) of the Land Use Article. This Court has previously summarized that the
 RDA regulates “planning and zoning within the Regional District, which includes most of
 Prince George's and Montgomery Counties. To execute this delegation, the RDA divides
 broadly authority related to zoning, planning, and other land use matters between the
 county (district) councils, the [MNCPPC], and the county planning boards.” Cty. Council
 of Prince George’s Cty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 525 (2015). The Act also
 regulates the authority of MNCPPC. Id. at 526-27. See also infra note 20 (detailing
 MNCPPC’s statutory powers and responsibilities).
 5
 The attempted annexation in 2014 was ultimately declared a nullity because Forest
 Heights failed to formally notify the Prince George’s County Executive, as required by
 statute and failed to include a particular lot in the notice of annexation.
 4
 both MNCPPC and Prince George’s County submitted letters of opposition to Jacqueline
 Goodall, the Mayor of Forest Heights, requesting that the properties under their jurisdiction
 be removed from the annexation areas.
 Over a month later, MNCPPC and the County filed a complaint for declaratory
 judgment in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County challenging both annexations
 and seeking a declaratory judgment that the annexation resolutions were a nullity. The
 complaint against Forest Heights joined as parties the State of Maryland and the federal
 government. On August 25, the State of Maryland filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
 pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-506(a) to be excluded from the matter. Similarly, on
 November 21, the United States government filed a stipulation of dismissal. The circuit
 court granted both motions for dismissal.6
 Forest Heights filled a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on October 31,
 2016 and renewed this Motion on April 10, 2017. Nine days later, MNCPPC filed a
 response to Forest Heights’ motion accompanied by its own motion for summary judgment.
 After a hearing held on June 21, 2017, the circuit court issued a written opinion and order
 dated January 29, 2018, in which it found the annexation resolutions to be null and void.
 Specifically, the court found the Town’s failure to obtain consent from the property owners
 6
 With the State and federal government dismissed from the action, Respondents consist of
 MNCPPC, Prince George’s County, Prince George’s County Board of Education, and
 Oxon Hill Methodist Church. However, MNCPPC alone filed briefs and argued on behalf
 of Respondents.
 5
 fatal to the annexation and determined the annexation plan impermissibly attempted to
 divest law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC.
 A notice of appeal of the circuit court’s judgment was filed on February 23, 2018,
 by Forest Heights. While the appeal was pending before the Court of Special Appeals,
 Forest Heights filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted on
 June 1, 2018. Town of Forest Heights v. Md.—National Capital Park and Planning
 Comm’n, 459 Md. 400 (2018). Additional facts will be provided throughout our analysis.
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 In cases where the focus is statutory interpretation, this Court’s primary goal is to
 ascertain the purpose and intention of the General Assembly when they enacted the
 statutory provisions. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 460 Md.
 667, 682 (2018) (citing Shealer v. Straka, 459 Md. 68, 84 (2018)). We have previously
 commented that within the context of statutory interpretation
 [t]his Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by
 the General Assembly. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the
 statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the
 language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.
 We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language
 of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence
 or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the
 language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the
 statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Occasionally we see fit to examine
 extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s
 plain language. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the
 overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.
 Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550–51 401 (2017) (citing Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180,
 196-197 (2017)). Additionally, we have indicated that, in situations where “the plain
 6
 language of a statute is ‘subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statutory
 language is ambiguous.’” Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 29 (2013) (quoting
 Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 276 (2010)). Further,
 [w]here the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one
 reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when
 viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory
 scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in
 other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources
 intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.
 Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9 (2011) (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421-22
 (2010)).
 In addition, this Court’s inquiry is not limited to the particular statutory provisions
 at issue on appeal. Rather, as we have recently noted, “[t]his Court may also analyze the
 statute’s ‘relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly
 bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context
 within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.’” Blackstone v.
 Sharma, 461 Md. 86, 114 (2018) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of
 Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987)).
 DISCUSSION
 Article 11E of the Maryland Constitution, commonly referred to as the “Municipal
 Home Rule Amendment” was enacted by act of the General Assembly and ratified by
 voters in November 1954. 1954 Md. Laws ch. 53; Legis. Council of Md., Report to the
 7
 General Assembly of 1955, 217.7 This constitutional amendment granted specific home
 rule powers to municipalities. Md. Const., art. 11E. After the ratification of Article 11E,
 it was necessary for the General Assembly to pass new legislation to create a statutory
 scheme to implement this home rule authority. Legis. Council of Md., Report to the
 General Assembly of 1955, 308.
 In 1955, the General Assembly enacted the predecessor to the current Subtitle 4 of
 the Local Government Article. Article 23A § 19, (1955 Md. Laws ch. 423; Legis. Council
 of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1955, 3, 217). In their report to the General
 Assembly, the Legislative Council of Maryland explained that the legislation proposed for
 introduction in 1955 was a companion to the 1954 Constitutional Amendment and was
 necessary for the newly established municipal home-rule powers by “establishing
 procedures to be followed in amending town charters, repealing town charters, [and]
 annexing territory to towns[.]”8 Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of
 1955, 217.
 7
 The Legislative Council of Maryland was created in June 1939 and existed through 1975.
 Maryland State Law Library, Scanned Collections,
 https://www.lawlib.state.md.us/collections/scannedcollections.html
 [https://perma.cc/7ESY-KY6Z]. It was statutorily required to hold meetings at least once
 every three months. Hugh A. Bone, Maryland’s Legislative Council in Action, Nat’l Mun.
 Rev. Vol. XXXI, No. 3 A.K. Marsh. 1942 at 2-5. Primarily, the Council heard witness testimony
 on potential problems, researched issues facing the General Assembly during legislative
 interims, and drafted legislation. Id. The Council’s reports summarized proposed
 legislation, provided minutes of the Council’s meetings, and provided copies of bills
 developed by the Council. Id.
 8
 The Legislative Council of Maryland noted, “[a]s to the method of annexing territories,
 Mr. Johnson stated that, should the Home Rule Amendment pass, the General Assembly
 would be prohibited from passing legislation on this subject and thus there would have to
 8
 Although the power of annexation was not constitutionally granted to
 municipalities by the 1954 Constitutional Amendment, the statute passed the following
 year granted municipalities the authority to annex real property to expand their corporate
 limits. 1955 Md. Laws ch. 423. See generally LG § 4-401 (empowering municipalities to
 annex lands that are “contiguous and adjoining” to the borders of the municipality, not
 contained within another municipality, and which will not create an “enclave” – an
 unincorporated area surrounded on all sides by land within a municipality); LG § 4-403
 (imposing certain limits on the annexation powers of a municipal corporation).
 Primarily, there are two ways through which a municipality may initiate an
 annexation – by petition or through municipal legislative enactment. LG § 4-415(d). See
 also LG §§ 4-404, 4-403. First, an annexation may be initiated by petition if it is signed
 by a certain percentage of registered voters residing within the proposed annexation area
 and a certain percentage of those owning property within the area. LG § 4-404(a). Next,
 the presiding officer of a municipality’s legislative body must verify that the petition meets
 the statutory requirements and then must introduce a related annexation resolution before
 the municipal legislative body. LG § 4-404(b), (c).
 The second method, which was used by Forest Heights in the present appeal,
 commences with an annexation resolution introduced before the appropriate municipal
 be some new procedure set up.” Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly
 of 1955, 308. The Council further noted that if procedures regulating such issues were not
 codified into statute promptly, the authority to draft procedures relating to these areas of
 municipal governance would fall to municipal corporations themselves. Id. at 355.
 9
 legislative body. Such resolution must be filed in accordance with the procedure for
 municipal legislative enactments and amendments applicable to the municipality’s charter.
 LG § 4-403(a). A municipality’s ability to annex territory is limited by certain consent
 requirements, which – in some circumstances – require the municipality to obtain a certain
 level of consent from any registered voters residing within the area and from those who
 own property within the area. See LG § 4-403(b). An annexation resolution must describe
 the area intended to be annexed and provide a “detailed description of the conditions and
 circumstances that apply to: (i) the change in boundaries; and (ii) the residents and property
 in the area to be annexed.” LG § 4-403(c).
 A. The 25% Consent Requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) Does Not Require Consent
 from the Owners of Tax-Exempt Property.
 While LG § 4-401 is the primary source of authority through which a municipality
 may annex territories and expand its corporate boundaries, LG § 4-403(b) limits such
 annexation powers by requiring the consent of both registered voters and property owners
 in the manner provided by the statute which, in pertinent part, provides the following:
 (b) Before an annexation resolution is introduced, the legislative body shall obtain
 consent from:
 (1) at least 25% of the registered voters who are residents in the area to be
 annexed; and
 (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property
 in the area to be annexed.
 LG. § 4-403(b). For the annexation proposed by Forest Heights, no registered voters
 resided within the areas encompassed by annexation resolutions 01-2016 and 02-2016.
 Thus, our primary focus is the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) and whether
 the consent of tax-exempt property owners is mandated. Put narrowly, our analysis will
 10
 focus on the term “assessed valuation” as utilized within LG § 4-403(b)(2) and whether
 tax-exempt properties contribute to and constitute part of the assessed valuation of a
 proposed annexation area.
 Prior to 1971, tax-exempt property was not assessed for taxation. Legis. Council of
 Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1955, at 209-10 (1954); City of Salisbury v.
 Banker’s Life, 21 Md. App. 396, 404 (1974). Consequently, tax-exempt property included
 within an area that a municipality intended to annex prior to 1971 did not have an “assessed
 valuation” and, therefore, municipalities were not required to obtain consent from such
 property owners.
 In 1971, the General Assembly enacted a statute that requires that tax-exempt
 property be assessed. 1971 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1; Banker’s Life, 21 Md. App. at 403-04.
 Initially codified as Article 81, § 232B, these statutory provisions are currently § 7-106 of
 the Tax – Property Article (“TP”) and provide the following:
 (a) Except for real property owned by the federal government, real property that is
 exempt by law from the property tax shall be assessed under this article and in the
 manner required by the Director.
 (b) The assessments of exempt real property shall be maintained in the records of
 the Department and of the supervisor in each county in which the exempt property
 is located.
 (c) For the purpose of distributing State funds, the assessments of exempt property
 may not be included in the total assessment of all property.9
 9
 Since the original enactment of the statute, the statutory language has been modified to
 some degree. As initially enacted, Article 81, § 232B stated the following:
 Notwithstanding the provisions of § 9 of this article excluding exempt property from
 assessment for purposes of ordinary taxation and excepting the property of the
 United States from this section, all real property and any improvements thereon
 11
 In the present appeal, Forest Heights and Amicus Curiae, Maryland Municipal
 League, Inc. (“MML”), argue that the General Assembly’s enactment of Article 81, § 232B
 created ambiguity into the overarching statutory scheme regulating annexations. Primarily,
 they argue that this ambiguity was an unintended consequence which left one unable to
 discern, purely based on reference to LG § 4-403, whether the owners of tax-exempt
 properties ought to be included in consideration of the 25% consent requirement of LG §
 4-403(b)(2).
 On the other hand, MNCPPC asserts that the statute is not ambiguous and, under its
 plain language, municipalities must obtain consent from the owners of tax-exempt
 properties. In contrast, Forest Heights and MML rely upon the Court of Special Appeals’
 decision in Banker’s Life which held that, pursuant to Art. 23A, § 19(b), a municipality is
 not required to obtain consent from the owners of tax-exempt properties to effectuate an
 annexation. Having established the relevant facts, the parties’ respective arguments and
 the underlying statutory framework, we must now embark upon our journey of statutory
 located in the State and exempted from the payment of any ordinary taxes on July
 1, 1971 or becoming exempt at any time thereafter by any provisions of law shall
 be valued and assessed from time to time as may be necessary and as directed by
 the Director of the Department according to the method prescribed by this article by
 persons authorized by the Director to perform such valuations. These valuations
 shall be maintained in the records of the Department and of each county and
 Baltimore City in which exempt property is located, in the manner required by the
 Director. None of such valuations shall be included in the total assessment of all
 property subject to State, county or city ordinary taxation for the purpose of
 distribution of State moneys under any provision of law.
 Md. Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81 § 232B.
 12
 interpretation – an expedition that commences with a determination of whether the
 language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) is ambiguous.
 In accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation mentioned above, we
 begin our inquiry by looking to the plain language of the statute to discern whether any
 ambiguity exists. On its face, LG § 4-403(b)(2) is confusing because although the term
 “assessed valuation” likely was intended to mean the value assessed to a particular property
 for taxation purposes, the term is not defined within the Local Government Article. The
 “assessed valuation” of residential or commercial properties in the context of municipal
 annexations is easily understood. However, within the context of tax-exempt properties,
 the statute’s meaning is uncertain because such properties are not subject to taxation. Thus,
 we must determine whether a tax-exempt property is assessed and valued for tax purposes
 by looking beyond the plain language of LG § 4-403.
 There are potentially two different interpretations of the provision at issue. Forest
 Heights and MML interpret the term “assessed valuation” as excluding tax-exempt
 property and, therefore, contend that the consent of tax-exempt property owners is not
 required under the statute. Conversely, MNCPPC argues that the statutory language is
 clear on its face and “assessed valuation” encompasses tax-exempt property and therefore
 mandates that an annexation requires consent from such property owners.
 Ambiguity is present in situations where there are multiple reasonable, yet differing,
 interpretations of the same statutory provision. Koste, 431 Md. at 29. See also Gardner,
 420 Md. at 9. In terms of the provision at issue, no statutory definitions within the Local
 Government Article aid in determining the meaning of “assessed valuation.” As previously
 13
 mentioned, the introduction of TP § 7-106 complicated Maryland’s statutory framework
 surrounding municipal annexations. Prior to its passage in 1971, it is clear that tax-exempt
 property was not assessed and could not be subject to the 25% consent requirement of LG
 § 4-403(b)(2).
 While the words “assess(ed)” and “valuation” are not defined within the Local
 Government Article, the Tax – Property Article does contain definitions for the terms
 “assess” and “assessment.” See TP § 1-101. The definition of “assess” differs depending
 upon whether the property in question is real or personal property. In terms of real
 property, the statute defines “assess” as “determin[ing] the phased-in full cash value or use
 value to which the property tax rate may be applied[.]” TP § 1-101(b). Similarly, for real
 property, the statute defines the term “assessment” as meaning “the phased-in full cash
 value or use value to which the property tax rate may be applied.” TP § 1-101(c).
 Based on these statutory definitions, it is evident that the word “assessment” is an
 estimate of the value of a property which is then used to determine the overall tax liability
 due on that particular property. Tax-exempt property is assessed but not taxed. Forest
 Heights notes that tax-exempt property is “not subject to... the burdens of supporting a
 municipal government,” and, therefore, does not appear on the tax roll. See TP § 7-210(a)
 (exempting from property tax any lands owned by federal, State, county, municipal
 corporation, or an agency or instrumentality of the preceding entities).
 As defined by the Tax – Property Article, an “assessment roll” is “the official listing
 of assessments of property required under § 2-202(3) of this article.” TP § 1-101(d). TP
 § 2-202(3) provides that the Director of the State Department of Assessments and Taxation
 14
 has the power “to direct that the Department enter all taxable property on the assessment
 rolls, and regardless of whether the property is owned by an individual, corporation, or
 some other person, to value alike all property of a like kind.” TP § 2-202(3). Additionally,
 the Article defines a “tax roll” as “the assessment roll to which the property tax rate has
 been applied and on which the property tax on each property is shown.” TP § 1-101(nn).
 Therefore, these two distinct types of rolls exist that reinforce the distinction
 between assessment and taxation. The assessment rolls contain the list of all properties
 that are assessed; in contrast, tax rolls are a specific type of assessment roll – one to which
 the tax rate is applied to calculate the tax burden associated with a particular property. Tax-
 exempt properties are assessed and appear on an assessment roll yet do not appear on a tax
 roll. Prior to the enactment of Art. 81, § 232B in 1971, tax exempt properties were not
 assessed and there was no distinction between tax and assessment rolls. Clearly, at the
 time, tax exempt properties were not considered relative to the 25% consent requirement.
 Banker’s Life, 21 Md. App. at 402-3.10
 The Legislative Council’s Report to the General Assembly of 1971 provides the
 following explanation for the adoption of Art. 81, § 232B:
 This legislation offered by the Committee on Taxation and Fiscal Matters is related
 to the property tax rearrangement legislation. Although it arose from 1970 bills
 requiring the making of payments-in-lieu of taxes for some kinds of tax exempt
 property, the Committee found that it was impossible to consider those bills properly
 because tax exempt property is not valued and assessed. The Committee feels that
 10
 Maryland’s system of municipal annexations has undergone few modifications since
 1971. For a brief overview of municipal annexation procedure prior to the recodification
 of the Maryland Code, see Christopher Burlee Kehoe, Annexation Procedures in Maryland
 at 3-20 (MICPEL 1989).
 15
 the lack of any valuation for tax exempt property is an oversight in the State’s
 property and assessment laws which needs to be corrected. This information
 will provide a basis for consideration of payments-in-lieu proposals and also for
 evaluation of property tax exemptions.
 The bill below provides that exempt property will be valued, as the Department of
 Assessments and Taxation directs, by teams of assessors and completed by January
 1, 1973. The valuations will be maintained separately and will not affect any
 assessable base on which State aid is computed.
 Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1971, 253 (emphasis added).
 Clearly, in drafting Art. 81, § 232B, the General Assembly had intended to solve the policy
 issue that the State lacked any methodology of determining the potential value of tax-
 exempt properties for calculating payment-in-lieu of taxes proposals.
 Accordingly, the Legislative Council’s Report of 1971 indicates that the policy
 supporting the assessment of tax-exempt properties is to “provide a basis for consideration
 of payments-in-lieu proposals and also for evaluation of property tax exemptions.” Id.
 Although payments in lieu of taxes (“PILOTs”) have been broadly expanded in present
 times,11 they were historically interrelated to attempts to reduce the financial impact of
 State or federal tax exemptions on localities. For example, in the 1960s, the statute
 governing the enumeration of taxable property, e.g. Art. 81, § 8, contained a provision
 11
 For example, Maryland provides PILOTs, for certain tax-exempt properties, to counties
 and municipalities by statute. See Md. Code (1977, 2016 Repl. Vol.), Transportation § 6-
 308(c) (establishing payments in lieu of taxes between the Maryland Port Administration
 and counties to compensate those counties for the economic impact caused by the tax-
 exemption of Maryland Port Administration properties located within a county’s borders).
 See also Md. Code (1974, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Natural Resources (“NR”), §§ 5-212, 5-212.1
 (providing that the State will make payments to counties, in which State forests or parks
 are located, a certain percentage of revenues derived from these lands to offset the
 economic impact counties experience by virtue of these properties’ tax-exempt status).
 16
 under which individuals who leased or borrowed certain lands from the federal government
 for specific for-profit purposes,12 were subject to taxation as if they were the owner of the
 property. Art. 81, § 8(e). However, this provision did not apply to “federal or State
 property for which negotiated payments are made in lieu of taxes.” Id. Because property
 held by such entities was tax exempt, local governments would have difficulty determining
 the sufficiency of an entity’s payment in lieu of tax relative to the value of property the
 entity held. As indicated by the Council’s report, this was the foremost and primary reason
 the General Assembly enacted 1971 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1.
 The General Assembly did not express an intention to modify the statutory
 framework surrounding municipal annexations because it never referenced the relevant
 statutory provisions regarding municipal home rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the
 General Assembly’s introduction and enactment of 1971 Md. Laws ch. 361 § 1 was aimed
 at solving “an oversight in the State’s property and assessment laws” and the General
 Assembly had no intention of modifying the statutory framework surrounding municipal
 annexations. Legis. Council of Md., Report to the General Assembly of 1971, 253-54. The
 General Assembly intended only to modify and improve the State’s ability to account for
 tax-exempt properties existing within the State. Moreover, this legislative history is devoid
 12
 The statute is limited to those engaging in a for-profit business on leased or otherwise
 occupied federal land and it exempts certain public facilities such as airports, parks,
 markets, and fairgrounds if they are available for use by the general public. Md. Code
 (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 8.
 17
 of any indication that the General Assembly intended to alter the 25% consent requirement
 or amend municipal annexations generally. Id.
 Although counties and certain planning agencies do not have a statutory right to
 veto municipal annexations, the General Assembly has provided to them certain procedural
 leverage over the annexation process. The relevant statute was enacted in 1975, (1975 Md.
 Laws ch. 693 (H.B. 534)), and is currently codified in Title 4 of the Local Government
 Article. First, LG § 4-406 provides that a municipality must provide notice of an
 annexation to the governing body of the county in which the municipality is located and
 any regional or State planning agencies with jurisdiction within the county. LG § 4-406(c).
 Second, county, State, and regional planning agencies possess the “first right to be heard”
 at public annexation hearings. LG § 4-406(d). Third, a county’s governing body by a two-
 thirds vote may require that the annexation be put to referendum within the proposed
 annexation area. LG § 4-410. This essentially halts a municipality’s annexation resolution
 pending a successful referendum.
 Both Forest Heights and MML argue that even though counties enjoy the right to
 petition a proposed annexation to referendum, the legislative history of H.B. 534 indicates
 that the General Assembly did not intend to grant counties the authority or ability to veto
 a proposed municipal annexation. When attempting to ascertain legislative intent, this
 Court focuses on the specific intent of the General Assembly and not the intent of witnesses
 supporting or opposing a particular piece of proposed legislation. Anne Arundel County v.
 City of Annapolis, 352 Md. 117, 128 n.4 (1998).
 18
 However, witness testimony contributes to statutory interpretation because
 “[a]lthough the comments of those witnesses do not reflect legislative intent directly, they
 do help indirectly by identifying the issues the Legislature sought to address.” Id. In his
 testimony on H.B. 534, Jon Burrell (at that time Executive Director of MML) stated that
 MML had historically opposed granting counties the authority to force an annexation to
 referendum but that a compromise was reached between MML and the Maryland
 Association of Counties (“MACo”).13 See Bill File to H.B. 534, Testimony – Statement of
 Jon Burrell, MML, in support of H.B. 534 (1975). Mr. Burrell testified that the introduction
 of the two-thirds referendum requirement was intended merely to protect counties from
 municipal annexations in situations where a municipal corporation had not provided the
 county with an adequate justification.14 Id. Specifically, he testified that the referendum
 provision
 13
 Regarding the provisions of H.B. 534, Judge Hotten writes, “[t]his expansion of county
 annexation rights implies the General Assembly’s intent to provide counties, a tax-exempt
 entity, with authority over annexations initiated by municipalities.” Dissenting Opinion at
 13-14 (Hotten, J. dissenting). However, under the compromise forged in the General
 Assembly between MML and MACo, the power granted to counties to force a referendum
 is distinctly limited and does not extend to an authority to consent or deny municipal
 annexations. See LG § 4-410(a). A county is merely empowered to force the annexation
 to a referendum, where citizens residing within the area ultimately determine the fate of
 that annexation. Id.
 14
 Judge Hotten’s Dissenting opinion takes the position that counties and similarly situated
 entities have an “inherent right . . . to participate in municipal annexations.” Dissenting
 Opinion at 14 (Hotten, J. dissenting). However, this position conflates a right to participate
 with a right to unilaterally halt certain municipal annexations, i.e. those consisting of
 entirely tax-exempt property. Moreover, as the provisions of H.B. 534 make clear, counties
 have a limited role in the annexation process and the ultimate power to halt a referendum
 lies with those residing in the area not with a county itself. As the Attorney General has
 19
 would give assurance to the county government that, if they felt a referendum was
 not held because of lack of sufficient knowledge of [the effects] of annexation or
 because the petition fell just short of the requisite number of signatures, they then
 would have a remedy to force a referendum in the area to be annexed while drawing
 attention to their reasons for defeating the proposed annexation.
 Id.
 In addition to the above testimony, the Attorney General has issued several opinions
 regarding the interplay between a property’s tax-exempt status and municipal annexation.
 Although opinions by the Attorney General are merely persuasive and not binding upon
 this Court, they are afforded considerable weight within the context of statutory
 interpretation. State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Foundation, Inc., 330 Md. 460, 470 (1993);
 Read Drug & Chem. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 257 (1933). In considering opinions
 by the Attorney General, this Court has previously commented that “[t]he Legislature is
 presumed to be aware of the Attorney General’s statutory interpretation and, in the absence
 of enacting any change to the statutory language, to acquiesce in the Attorney General’s
 construction.” Chesek v. Jones, 406 Md. 446, 463 (2008) (citing Read Drug & Chemical
 Co., 165 Md. at 257-58); Crescent Cities Jaycees Foundation, Inc., 330 Md. at 470.
 In 1981, the Attorney General provided an unpublished opinion to Lawrence E.
 Speelman, the county attorney for Frederick County, regarding a county’s ability to veto a
 proposed municipal annexation. 15 66 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 267 (1981). The synopsis
 consistently opined, absent specific statutory language, tax-exempt properties are not
 included in the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2).
 15
 Although the opinion itself was not published, a synopsis of the opinion was printed in
 66 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 267 (1981). Opinion of the Attorney General Op. No. 81-020
 addressed to Lawrence E. Speelman County Attorney, Frederick County Commissioners
 20
 printed in the published volumes of the Attorney General summaries the opinion as
 follows:
 Under Article 23A, § 19, counties do not have the power to consent to or to veto a
 municipal annexation of territory, even where county-owned land is located in that
 territory. However, counties do have the right to be notified of the proceedings, to
 be heard first at a public hearing, to receive an outline for the extension of services
 and public facilities to the territory to be annexed, and to petition the annexation
 resolution to a public referendum of the residents in that territory.
 Id.
 A subsequent opinion by the Attorney General considered whether the City of Havre
 de Grace could annex an uninhabited island located in the Susquehanna River. 87 Md.
 Att’y Gen. Op. 161 (2002). In a footnote, the Attorney General indicated that Maryland
 has “a policy against a county referendum or veto.” Id. Further, in distinguishing between
 a county’s ability to veto by forcing an annexation to a county-wide referendum, the
 Attorney General opined, “[t]his amendment was the result of deliberations by
 representatives of the Maryland Municipal League and the Maryland Association of
 Counties. The purpose of the legislation was to enhance the role of the counties without
 abandoning the policy against a county-wide referendum or county government approval
 requirement.” Id.
 The policy underlying this enactment, as explained by the Attorney General, largely
 mirrors that advanced by Forest Heights and MML in this case. In sum, this policy
 (Sept. 18, 1981). In this letter, the Attorney General cites to Banker’s Life, 21 Md. App. at
 404, for the proposition that the consent of tax-exempt property owners within a proposed
 annexation area is not required to effectuate a municipal annexation. Id.
 21
 underscores that a county or other similarly situated tax-exempt entity was never intended
 to have the ability to block or veto a municipal annexation and supports the position that
 the 25% consent requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) excludes the owners of tax-exempt
 property. 16
 Both parties in this case urge this Court to turn to the decision in Banker’s Life for
 guidance. Forest Heights and MML argue that Banker’s Life was correct and, although not
 binding upon this Court, should guide our analysis because it properly ascertained the
 legislative intent behind the pertinent statutes that have been followed for over forty years
 in shaping Maryland’s procedure for municipal annexations. In contrast, MNCPPC
 responds that Banker’s Life is distinguishable from the instant appeal or was incorrectly
 decided, because the controlling statutory authority is clear and unambiguous.
 In Banker’s Life, the Court of Special Appeals considered a proposed annexation by
 the City of Salisbury that encompassed both publicly and privately-owned lands. Banker’s
 Life, 21 Md. App. at 400. Of primary import, the decision in Banker’s Life considered the
 first question presented before this Court, i.e. whether the present day 25% consent
 16
 As demonstrated, this situation is not limited specifically to counties. This also
 encompasses land owned by the State, the United States, and regional planning agencies,
 such as MNCPPC, all of which are exempt from property taxes pursuant to TP § 7-210.
 The term “count(ies)” will be momentarily used to represent any of these similarly situated
 entities for simplicity’s sake within the limited context of this particular argument.
 22
 requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) required municipalities to obtain consent from the owners
 of tax-exempt lands.17 Id. at 400-01.
 One such publicly-owned property that the City of Salisbury attempted to annex
 was owned by the Wicomico County Board of Education and was tax-exempt due to its
 status as an educational property. Id. at 399-400. In contrast to the instant appeal, the City
 of Salisbury obtained consent from the Wicomico County Board of Education and counted
 the Board’s consent towards the 25% property owner consent threshold of Art. 23A, §
 19(b). Id. at 400-01. In response, four property owners challenged the annexation on the
 basis that the Wicomico County Board of Education’s property was tax-exempt and should
 not be included in a determination of whether the City of Salisbury had satisfied the 25%
 property owner consent threshold. Id. at 400. Without the consent of the Wicomico County
 Board of Education, the City of Salisbury’s proposed annexation fell short of the 25%
 consent requirement. Id. at 401.
 Ultimately, after determining that Art. 81, § 232B (currently LG § 4-403) was
 ambiguous, the Court of Special Appeals briefly considered the legislative history and
 concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the 25% property owner consent
 requirement to require consent from the owners of tax-exempt properties contained within
 a proposed annexation area. Id. at 404-05. It concluded that “the Legislature never
 departed from an intent that only those who were to bear the financial burdens of a city
 17
 Banker’s Life was decided at a time before the recodification of Art. 81, 232B as LG §
 4-40.
 23
 government by the payment of real property taxes were to be allowed a voice in the
 annexation of real property to the municipal corporation.” Id. at 404. Therefore, the
 intermediate appellate court voided the City of Salisbury’s annexation resolution because,
 excluding the consent of the Wicomico County Board of Education, the City fell short of
 the 25% consent required by statute.
 Overall, we find MNCPPC’s arguments to overturn the policy articulated in
 Banker’s Life unavailing. Although MNCPPC avers that there is no ambiguity and the
 plain language of LG § 4-403 controls, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that
 ambiguity exists as to whether the statutory consent requirement includes tax-exempt
 properties. As noted, both MNCPPC’s and Forest Heights’ interpretations of LG § 4-
 403(b) are reasonable and we have no basis for determining which interpretation is
 preferable; therefore, ambiguity exists and needs to be remedied. See Koste, 431 Md. at
 29.
 Although MNCPPC argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Banker’s
 Life, we do not find these arguments persuasive. MNCPPC contends that, if correctly
 decided, Banker’s Life is distinguishable because the Court of Special Appeals merely
 determined that the consent of a tax-exempt property owner such as the Wicomico County
 Board of Education should not contribute towards the 25% consent requirement. MNCPPC
 also contends that the procedural posture is different in the present case because the tax-
 exempt property owners are not attempting to consent to municipal annexation. Here, the
 tax-exempt property owners are attempting to prohibit a municipal annexation by
 withholding consent. However, our independent review of the legislative intent for both
 24
 TP § 7-106 and LG § 4-403(b) is consistent with the decision in Banker’s Life.18 Our
 review confirms that the General Assembly had no intention of modifying the annexation
 procedures required of municipalities when it enacted TP § 7-106. The General Assembly
 intended for only those subject to municipal taxation to participate in the consent
 requirement of the annexation proceedings. 21 Md. App. 396, 404 (1974).
 Additionally, MNCPPC contends that Banker’s Life is distinguishable because it
 did not address situations in which proposed annexation areas consist of entirely tax-
 exempt properties. However, on prior occasions, this Court has considered cases
 concerning annexations consisting of entirely tax-exempt land without noting or invoking
 a prohibition against the annexation of entirely tax-exempt property. See Koste, 431 Md.
 at 19-21. Therefore, proposed annexation areas consisting of entirely tax-exempt
 properties have previously succeeded and this fact has not historically been detrimental to
 municipal annexations and should not stand to undermine the municipal annexation
 underlying the instant appeal. In addition to the above considerations, a holding requiring
 the consent of tax-exempt property owners to permit a municipal annexation would create
 the potential of gross inequities between the State, federal, and county governments and
 their authority to block or veto municipal annexation proceedings.19
 18
 The conclusion of Judge Watt’s Dissenting opinion suggests an override of Banker’s Life
 based upon a plain meaning analysis. Dissenting Opinion at 1 (Watts, J. dissenting).
 However, based on our review of the legislative history of the surrounding statutes, we
 determine that Banker’s Life was correctly decided and should not be overruled simply
 based upon the statute’s plain language.
 19
 Judge Hotten’s Dissenting opinion distinguishes this case from Banker’s Life on the basis
 that the tax-exempt properties should be treated differently depending upon whether
 owners of the tax-exempt property are attempting to accept or oppose the annexation.
 25
 As noted by Judge Hotten’s Dissent, MNCPPC occupies a unique statutory role that
 distinguishes it from the Wicomico County Board of Education, the entity involved in
 Banker’s Life. Dissenting Opinion at 14-16 (Hotten, J. dissenting). This necessitates a
 brief discussion of MNCPPC, its role, and its associated powers. 20 MNCPPC is a state
 Dissenting Opinion at 17-18 (Hotten, J. dissenting). Such a distinction would result in an
 untenable position where the owners of tax-exempt properties can oppose annexation
 proceedings but cannot approve them. Judge Hotten’s Dissenting opinion also offers a
 plain meaning analysis of LG § 4-403(b)(2) that would include tax-exempt property in the
 25% consent requirement. See Dissenting Opinion at 13-14 (Hotten, J. dissenting).
 However, pursuant to TP § 7-106(a), property owned by the federal government is not
 assessed and therefore does not constitute part of the assessed valuation of a proposed
 annexation area. The result is a contradictory interpretation of LG § 4-403(b)(2), which
 would take into account the consent of the State or a county but would specifically exclude
 consent of the federal government, because the latter is not assessed. Therefore, holding
 that the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) requires consent from all owners of tax-exempt
 property is inherently impractical. From a policy perspective, it would be unlikely that the
 General Assembly intended this dichotomy between the treatment of federal and State tax-
 exempt property for municipal annexations.
 20
 Primarily, MNCPPC’s relevant unique statutory powers involve: (1) enforcing certain
 sections of the Capper-Cramton Act which regulates the acquisition of parklands within
 the metropolitan district; and (2) acquiring interests in real property for preservation
 purposes or for public recreation. LU § 15-302(3). NR § 5-1202. See also LU §§ 17-101;
 17-108. The Commission holds such property for the general benefit of the State citizenry,
 particularly those living in the metropolitan district. LU § 17-201. MNCPPC is statutorily
 authorized to transfer any property no longer required for public use and may sell or
 exchange any such land if the proceeds are used to construct, acquire, or improve other
 MNCPPC properties. LU §§ 17-205, 17-206, 15-302(1). Any such property acquired or
 held by MNCPPC is tax exempt. LU § 17-203. MNCPPC has some additional powers not
 relevant to the instant appeal. See Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. at 526-28. In terms of zoning,
 the County Councils of particular counties (i.e. Montgomery and Prince George’s
 Counties) act as district councils over land owned and maintained by MNCPPC and such
 district councils maintain the authority to regulate zoning. LU §§ 22-101; 22-104(a). As
 noted, Forest Heights does not regulate its lands through zoning.
 26
 agency established by § 15-101 of the Land Use Article (“LU”). It acts as a representative
 of the state and the municipal home rule article of the Maryland Constitution (Article 11E)
 does not apply to MNCPPC. See LU § 14-202. However, there is no indication within the
 associated statutory framework that municipal annexation of MNCPPC property would
 interfere with any of these responsibilities, nor are there any provisions that would grant
 MNCPPC special status to veto a municipal annexation. Simply put, the Attorney
 General’s discussion of a county’s inability to veto a municipal annexation applies equally
 to MNCPPC and there is no worthwhile distinction which would warrant granting this
 ability to MNCPPC.21
 Further, we note that after the Banker’s Life decision, the Attorney General’s Office
 reaffirmed its prior opinions stating that consent from the owners of tax-exempt property
 is not required under municipal annexation statutes. In 1986, former Assistant Attorney
 General Richard E. Israel replied to an inquiry from Elroy G. Boyer, the town attorney for
 the Town of Betterton. Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant Attorney General, to Mr.
 Elroy Boyer, Town Attorney for Betterton, (Apr. 10, 1986). The Town of Betterton had
 21
 The entire statutory framework is devoid of any language that grants authority to
 MNCPPC over municipal annexations. In summation, although MNCPPC is tasked with
 the unique role of managing preservation and recreational properties, there is no indication
 in the statute that annexation of MNCPPC properties by a municipal corporation would in
 any way affect these unique responsibilities. Although Judge Hotten’s Dissent points out
 that MNCPPC’s role is unique, this unique role does not distinguish MNCPPC from a
 County to the extent that it would warrant providing MNCPPC with the ability to veto a
 municipal annexation, especially considering the longstanding prohibition against a
 county’s ability to veto a municipal annexation. See Dissenting Opinion at 14 (Hotten, J.
 dissenting).
 27
 sought advice regarding a proposed annexation of an area of uninhabited land adjacent to
 the town.22 Id. Specifically, the Town of Betterton sought advice regarding the 25%
 property-owner consent requirement and in response the Attorney General indicated that
 “there was no initial consent requirement for annexation proceedings commenced by a
 legislative body.” Id. The Attorney General opined that, based on the Court of Special
 Appeals’ holding in Banker’s Life, obtaining consent from a non-resident owner, who was
 a registered voter, was not necessary. Id. Therefore, the Attorney General has consistently
 advised on the consent standard both prior and subsequent to the Court of Special Appeals’
 decision in Banker’s Life. We find no basis to conclude that the Attorney General’s advice
 was erroneous.
 In summation, our review of the statute’s legislative history and relevant sources
 clearly reveals that the General Assembly did not intend LG § 4-403(b)(2) to require
 consent from the owners of tax-exempt properties. There is insufficient evidence to
 support MNCPPC’s claim to the contrary and, therefore, we find MNCPPC’s calls to
 overrule Banker’s Life unpersuasive. Accordingly, we hold that the 25% consent
 requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) is not applicable to the owners of tax-exempt properties
 and the circuit court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.
 22
 This advice was made prior to the introduction of the Local Government Article when
 Art. 23A § 19 controlled.
 28
 B. Forest Heights’ Annexation Plan Does Not Attempt to Divest, Usurp, or Duplicate
 Law Enforcement Jurisdiction over Lands Owned and Managed by MNCPPC.
 The circuit court found certain provisions of Forest Heights’ annexation plan invalid
 as an improper usurpation of MNCPPC’s law enforcement jurisdiction over lands that it
 owns and operates. Specifically, the circuit court concluded that if Forest Heights were to
 exercise police jurisdiction over MNCPPC property it would contravene both LG § 4-
 104(b) and LU § 17-303(a). Based upon these conclusions, the circuit court ordered that
 Forest Heights shall not exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over MNCPPC property.
 Forest Heights contends such findings are an erroneous interpretation of the
 annexation plan for resolution No. 01-2016. Alternatively, Forest Heights asserts that the
 circuit court lacked a present justiciable controversy to support its conclusion on this point
 because the court had already invalidated its annexation resolutions and, therefore, a
 determination based upon its annexation plan was unnecessary. MNCPPC responds that
 the circuit court properly precluded Forest Heights from exercising law enforcement
 jurisdiction on MNCPPC property.
 Under the statutes controlling municipal annexations, a municipal corporation must
 devise an annexation plan and adopt such plan through an annexation resolution. See
 generally LG § 4-415. Annexation plans are separate from and do not constitute a part of
 the annexation resolution. LG § 4-415(a). An annexation plan must describe the intended
 land use of the proposed annexation area, set forth a schedule regarding municipal services,
 and describe how a municipality plans to finance any extensions of municipal services to
 the proposed annexation area. LG § 4-415(b). Additionally, an annexation plan must “be
 29
 presented so as to demonstrate the available land for public facilities that may be
 considered reasonably necessary for the proposed use, including facilities for schools,
 water or sewage treatment, libraries, recreation, or fire or police services.” LG § 4-415.
 Several statutory provisions regulate and limit shared law enforcement jurisdiction
 between MNCPPC, counties, and municipalities. First, LG § 4-104(b)(1) provides,
 “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a municipality located in a special
 district may not exercise, divest, or duplicate in the municipality’s corporate limits any
 special power or duty conferred on the special district.”23 Second, pursuant to LU § 17-
 303, park police and Prince George’s County police have concurrent jurisdiction over
 particular areas under MNCPPC’s jurisdiction.24 Third, MNCPPC and municipal
 corporations are permitted to enter into mutual aid agreements under which park or
 municipal police may act outside of their jurisdiction and within the jurisdiction of the
 other entity. Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 2-105(e)(1).25
 23
 In its brief, MNCPPC attempts to argue that the Commission “enjoys enhanced authority
 on its property arising out of jurisdiction over zoning administration and park stewardship,
 therefore express consent was required.” However, as Forest Heights notes, the Town does
 not “approve subdivisions, plan for future land uses or regulate the use of land through
 zoning regulations[.]” Therefore, MNCPPC’s argument on this point is unavailing.
 24
 Municipal corporations do not share concurrent jurisdiction with MNCPPC over areas
 within MNCPPC’s jurisdiction. The statute explicitly limits the concurrent jurisdiction
 between MNCPPC, Prince George’s, and Montgomery County police. See LU § 17-
 303(a). Therefore, Forest Heights has no independent authority to exercise police
 jurisdiction over the lands in question.
 25
 The statute controlling mutual aid agreements reads, in pertinent part,
 [t]he governing body of a county or municipal corporation or the Maryland—
 National Capital Park and Planning Commission may make a reciprocal agreement
 for the period that it considers advisable with the District of Columbia or a county,
 30
 Fourth, a municipality cannot “exercise its powers of annexation or incorporation as to
 affect the power of . . . [MNCPPC] relating to zoning[.]” LG § 4-104(e).
 Overall, the circuit court erred in determining that Forest Heights’ annexation plan
 attempted to divest or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC. The
 annexation plan for annexation resolution No. 01-2016, which the circuit court invalidated,
 includes the following provision:
 Police Service. The Annexation property is served by the U.S. Park Police and
 Maryland National Capital Park Police, and also, as permitted by law, may be
 further served by the Forest Heights Police Department on a limited basis for
 purposes of police protection. Certain services may also be provided by the Prince
 George’s County Police Department pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding
 regarding jurisdictional police services entered into between the Town and the
 County governments. Such services may commence after annexation, using
 existing personnel and equipment, at the same time or similar level of service now
 being provided to the Town in areas where police protective services are provided
 on a concurrent basis with another police agency.
 (Emphasis added).
 The annexation plan’s language is hypothetical, indefinite, and narrowly tailored.
 The plan indicates the proposed annexation area is currently policed by U.S. Park Police
 and Maryland National Capital Park Police. However, it provides that Forest Heights may
 municipal corporation, or the Maryland—National Capital Park and Planning
 Commission, within or outside the State, and establish and carry out a plan to
 provide mutual aid by providing its police officers and other officers, employees,
 and agents[.]
 CP § 2-105(e)(1). Such mutual aid agreements may also empower park police to exercise
 jurisdiction outside of park property. See LU § 17-303(a). In certain situations, police may
 also act outside their jurisdiction if in response to a request by another officer, part of a
 joint investigation, or in response to an emergency. CP § 2-102(b).
 31
 exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over the area “as permitted by law[.]” As is evident
 from the statutory framework explained above, Forest Heights has no default authority to
 exercise police jurisdiction over lands contained within the proposed annexation area. The
 primary manner through which Forest Heights could exercise police jurisdiction over these
 lands, notwithstanding the limited exceptions in CP § 2-102(b), involves entering into a
 mutual aid agreement with MNCPPC authorizing such action. See supra note 25.
 Therefore, the annexation plan does not expressly indicate that Forest Heights
 intends to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction on the lands in question. Quite simply,
 the annexation plan tentatively indicates that Forest Heights may exercise law enforcement
 jurisdiction on the properties to the extent cognizable under the law. A mutual aid
 agreement is the appropriate avenue through which this end may be achieved. Thus, the
 circuit court’s conclusion that the annexation would, in fact, usurp law enforcement
 jurisdiction from MNCPPC was unduly speculative and erroneous.
 Indeed, the annexation plan does not purport to grant to Forest Heights immediate
 unilateral authority to police land owned by MNCPPC. Interpreted fairly, the plain
 language of the annexation plan suggests that Forest Heights would likely acquire a mutual
 aid agreement setting forth an agreement between the Town and MNCPPC with respect to
 policing the proposed annexation area.26 It is quite clear that this is the only method
 26
 Based on the text of the annexation plan, we presume that if Forest Heights and
 MNCPPC were unable to come to an agreement regarding joint policing of the associated
 properties then Forest Heights would be unable to exercise police jurisdiction over the
 lands, because a mutual aid agreement between the two parties is the primary method
 32
 through which Forest Heights could acquire law enforcement jurisdiction over land owned
 and managed by MNCPPC. See CP § 2-105(e). It is possible that Forest Heights’
 annexation plan could have purported to divest or duplicate the law enforcement
 jurisdiction of MNCPPC, but this would require more direct and less hypothetical language
 in the annexation plan – language indicating that Forest Heights intends to exercise law
 enforcement jurisdiction on MNCPPC land but without a clause indicating that the Town
 intends to exercise law enforcement jurisdiction only to the extent legally permissible.
 While annexation plans must be devised alongside annexation resolutions, they are
 separate documents and distinct from annexation resolutions. See LG § 4-415(a) (“In
 addition to, but not as part of, an annexation resolution, the legislative body of the
 municipality shall adopt an annexation plan for the area to be annexed.”). Pursuant to LG
 § 4-415, annexation plans, among other things, must describe the area intended to be
 annexed, set forth a schedule regarding municipal services, describe financing, and must
 be made available for public inspection and discussion at a subsequent public hearing. LG
 § 4-415(b). Prior to the public hearing on the annexation resolution, the annexation plan
 must be provided to: (i) any county governing bodies; (ii) the Department of Planning; and
 (iii) all regional or state planning agencies with jurisdiction within that county. LG § 4-
 415(f). Additionally, the annexation plan must be presented and open to public review at
 the public hearing regarding the annexation resolution. LG § 4-415(g)(1).
 through which Forest Heights could exercise jurisdiction over the lands “as permitted by
 law.”
 33
 The above provisions highlight the role of annexation plans, as an informative
 planning document, largely intended to satisfy certain notice and informational
 requirements. The purpose of this document is secondary to that of an annexation
 resolution, which is the primary document through which annexation procedure is initially
 undertaken. See generally LG §§ 4-403, 4-407. Further underlining this distinction
 between annexation resolutions and annexation plans is the fact that amendments to an
 annexation plan do not require amendments to the underlying annexation resolution or a
 re-initiation of annexation proceedings. LG § 4-415(g)(2).
 In short, annexation resolutions and annexation plans are distinct and separate
 documents with distinct and separate effects. The circuit court’s decision fails to recognize
 this distinction in two respects. First, assuming arguendo that Forest Heights’ annexation
 plan impermissibly attempted to divest or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction from
 MNCPPC, this would not constitute independent grounds upon which to invalidate Forest
 Heights’ annexation resolution. See LG § 4-415(g)(2). As evident from the secondary
 relationship between annexation plans and annexation resolutions, once the circuit court
 invalidated the annexation resolution, then invalidating the annexation plan had no effect
 and was unnecessary. Rather, the annexation plan could simply be amended and this would
 not necessitate amendment of the underlying annexation resolution. See LG § 4-415.
 In sum, we conclude that Forest Heights’ annexation plan did not attempt to divest
 or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction over lands owned and managed by MNCPPC.
 Our conclusion is based on the language of Forest Heights’ annexation plan which only
 specified the exercise law enforcement jurisdiction over the lands “as permitted by law”
 34
 that, as noted, could be accomplished through a mutual aid agreement. Moreover, the
 circuit court’s determination regarding Forest Heights’ annexation plan and its ultimate
 effect on Forest Heights’ annexation resolution was inappropriate based on the distinct and
 separate nature of annexation resolutions and plans. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
 court erred with respect to its determination that Forest Heights’ annexation plan sought to
 divest, usurp or duplicate law enforcement jurisdiction over the MNCPPC’s lands.
 CONCLUSION
 The General Assembly intended to exclude the consent of tax-exempt property
 owners from the 25% requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2). The legislative history of the
 statute and opinions of the Attorney General confirm this interpretation and the record is
 entirely devoid of any indication that the General Assembly intended the 25% consent
 requirement of LG § 4-403(b)(2) to include tax-exempt property owners.
 In addition, the circuit court erred in its determination that Forest Heights’
 annexation plan attempted to usurp law enforcement jurisdiction from MNCPPC. The
 annexation plan is a separate document to the underlying annexation resolution and thus
 should not affect the validity of an annexation resolution itself. Moreover, the language
 contained within the annexation plan indicating that Forest Heights would exercise law
 enforcement jurisdiction “as permitted by law” is appropriately conditioned and therefore
 too speculative to constitute any form of usurpation of MNCPPC’s law enforcement
 jurisdiction over certain properties it owns and manages.
 35
 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further
 proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
 REVERSED, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED
 TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER
 PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
 OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
 THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
 PAID BY RESPONDENT.
 36
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CAL16-29110
 Argued: October 4, 2018
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 21
 September Term, 2018
 ______________________________________
 THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS
 v.
 THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL
 PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, ET
 AL.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene
 *Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which Adkins,
 J., joins.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: April 5, 2019
 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the
 hearing and conference of this case while an
 active member of this Court; after being recalled
 pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV,
 Section 3A, she also participated in the decision
 and adoption of this opinion.
 Respectfully, I dissent. I would hold that the plain language of Md. Code Ann.,
 Local Gov’t (2013) (“LG”) § 4-403(b)(2) (Proposal for annexation—Initiation by
 legislative body) requires a municipality, prior to propounding an annexation resolution, to
 obtain the consent of the owners of at least 25% of all real property in the area to be
 annexed, regardless of whether the real property is tax-exempt.1 LG § 4-403(b) provides
 that before an annexation resolution may be introduced in a municipality’s legislative body,
 a municipality “shall obtain consent from: (1) at least 25% of the registered voters who are
 residents in the area to be annexed; and (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed
 valuation of the real property in the area to be annexed.” LG § 4-403(b) (emphasis
 added).
 The phrase “assessed valuation of the real property in the area to be annexed” in LG
 § 4-403(b)(2) is not ambiguous and it is not subject to more than one reasonable
 interpretation. The phrase “assessed valuation of the real property in the area to be
 annexed” includes the assessed valuation of all real property in the area to be annexed
 regardless of whether the real property is tax-exempt. The term “tax-exempt” does not
 appear anywhere in the Annexation Subtitle, let alone within LG § 4-403(b)(2). There is
 no distinction between the owners of taxable real property and the owners of tax-exempt
 real property in the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2). Put simply, the plain language of
 the statute requires municipalities to obtain the consent of the owners of taxable real
 1
 Given that I would conclude that the Town’s annexation resolutions are void
 because the Town did not fulfill the consent requirements of LG § 4-403(b)(2), I would not
 reach a conclusion with respect to the Annexation Plan associated with the annexation
 resolution.
 property and the owners of tax-exempt real property alike.
 The only distinction that the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2) draws is between
 real property that can be “assessed” and real property that cannot be “assessed.” Md. Code
 Ann. Tax-Prop. (1986, 2012 Repl. Vol.) (“TP”) § 7-106(a) provides that “real property that
 is exempt by law from the property tax shall be assessed under this article[.]” (Emphasis
 added). Accordingly, because the value of tax-exempt property shall be assessed pursuant
 to TP § 7-106(a), LG § 4-403(b)(2) requires municipalities to obtain consent from the
 owners of taxable real property located in the area to be annexed as well as the owners of
 tax-exempt real property located in the area to be annexed. Given the plain language of
 the statute, a resort to legislative history as a confirmatory process is unnecessary.
 Based on the plain language of LG § 4-403(b)(2), I would conclude, as the Circuit
 Court of Prince George’s County did, that the consent of owners of at least 25% of all real
 property to be annexed includes the consent of owners of real property that is tax exempt.
 For the above reasons, respectfully, I dissent.
 Judge Adkins has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.
 -2-
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CAL16-29110
 Argued: October 4, 2018 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 21
 September Term, 2018
 __________________________________
 THE TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS
 v.
 THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL
 CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
 COMMISSION, ET AL.
 __________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.,
 Greene,
 *Adkins,
 McDonald,
 Watts,
 Hotten,
 Getty,
 JJ.
 __________________________________
 Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J.
 __________________________________
 Filed: April 5, 2019
 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the
 hearing and conference of this case while
 an active member of this Court; after being
 recalled pursuant to the MD. Constitution,
 Article IV, Section 3A, she also
 participated in the decision and adoption of
 this opinion.
 Respectfully, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince
 George’s County.
 At issue is whether the two annexation Resolutions by the town of Forest Heights
 (“the Town”) to enlarge its boundaries by annexing approximately 736.85 acres of real
 property, without the consent of the owners of 25% of the assessed value of that property,
 resulted in a legal nullity that was not consistent with the relevant provisions of the
 Maryland Code, Local Government Article or Land Use Article, or otherwise consistent
 with the case of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. 396, 319 A.2d 865 (1974). I shall
 explain.
 ANNEXATION RESOLUTIONS 01-2016 AND 02-2016
 Annexation Resolutions 01-2016 and 02-2016 (“2016 Resolutions”) are
 substantially similar to the Town’s Annexation Resolutions 01-2014 and 02-2014 (“2014
 Resolutions”). The 2014 Resolutions similarly sought to annex what the Town refers to as
 the Sixth and Seventh Extensions of the corporate boundaries of Forest Heights.
 The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (“MNCPPC”) and
 Prince George’s County (“the County”) challenged the 2014 Resolutions and on January
 29, 2016, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County determined that the 2014
 Resolutions were a legal nullity and void for several procedural errors. The Maryland
 National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. The Town of Forest Heights, Circuit
 Court for Prince George’s County, Case No.: CAL15-04255; Opinion and Order of the
 Court dated January 29, 2016 (“Forest Heights I”). On or about February 16, 2016, the
 Town noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals (No. 2711, September Term, 2015),
 but voluntarily dismissed the appeal on or about November 22, 2016.
 The 2016 Resolutions at issue sought to annex tax-exempt property owned by six
 different entities: MNCPPC, the County, the State of Maryland, the United States of
 America, the Prince George’s County Board of Education, and the Oxon Hill Methodist
 Church (cumulatively, “Plaintiff-Appellees”).1 The Sixth Extension encompasses 446.88
 acres,2 while the Seventh Extension encompasses 289.97 acres.3 In total, the 2016
 Resolutions sought to annex 736.85 acres, which would more than double the land area of
 the Town. All of the annexation properties are situated within two different special districts
 created by the General Assembly. One district was created for planning and zoning and is
 denominated as the “Maryland-Washington Regional District.” All of the subject
 properties are also situated in a second, largely overlapping special district for managing
 park land and public recreation and is denominated as the “Maryland-Washington
 Metropolitan District.” There are no registered voters in the areas sought to be annexed.
 1
 The primary opposition to the Town’s annexation plan did not come from
 the State of Maryland or the United States of America, neither of which consented
 to the annexations, but both of which were voluntarily dismissed. (E. 38)
 2
 The Sixth Extension to the west encompasses all but five acres of National Park
 Service land that includes Oxon Cove Park and Oxon Hill Farm.
 3
 The Seventh Extension is comprised of federal, State and County-owned land, as
 well as properties owned by the County Board of Education, the historic Oxon Hill Manor
 owned by MNCPPC and the Oxon Hill Methodist Church. These properties include
 several highway rights-of-way including a portion of the Capital Beltway near Woodrow
 Wilson Bridge, a public high school campus, a church cemetery, a historic manor house,
 park land, and several undeveloped lots or open spaces.
 2
 The Town seeks to proceed with its annexation plan despite Plaintiff-Appellees’
 assertion that the Town did not abide by Md. Code, Local Government Article § 4-403(b),
 discussed infra.
 CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING AND BANKER’S LIFE PRECEDENT
 After the Town enacted the 2016 Resolutions, MNCPPC and the County filed a
 Complaint for Declaratory Relief, seeking to nullify the resolutions. Maryland Code,
 Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 3-403, 3-406, 3-409. On January 31, 2018, after
 a series of filings from both parties, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County filed its
 opinion, granting declaratory relief in favor of the MNCPPC and the County and nullifying
 the 2016 Resolutions.
 Before the circuit court, MNCPPC and the County contended that the Town failed
 to seek or obtain the consent of property owners of 25% of the assessed value of real
 property in the area to be annexed, in violation of Md. Code, Local Government Article
 (“Local Gov’t”) § 4-403(b), which states:
 (b) Before an annexation resolution is introduced, the legislative body shall
 obtain consent from:
 (1) at least 25% of the registered voters who are residents in the area to be
 annexed; and
 (2) the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property
 in the area to be annexed.
 Because both parties agreed that there are no registered voters in the area to be
 annexed under the 2016 Resolutions, Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(1) is inapplicable. The
 provision at issue was Local Gov’t §4-403(b)(2). The Town conceded that it did not seek
 the consent of Plaintiff-Appellees under § 4-403(b)(2), but asserted that it did not have to
 3
 pursuant to City of Salisbury v. Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. 396, 319 A.2d 865 (1974),
 which held that, in ascertaining whether the requisite 25% consent has been obtained for
 agreeing to an annexation, one does not consider consent from tax-exempt property
 owners.
 The circuit court wrote:
 Normally, the court would look to the language of the statute as instructed
 by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals has already looked at
 the annexation statutes and their relationship to the requirement that property
 be valued, even if exempt from taxation, and therefore, this court will need
 to analyze this case in light of the opinion in Banker’s Life.
 The Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. The Town of
 Forest Heights, Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No.: CAL16-29110;
 Opinion and Order of the Court dated January 31, 2018 (“Forest Heights II”) (footnote
 omitted).
 In Banker’s Life, the Council for the City of Salisbury introduced an annexation
 resolution to enlarge its corporate boundaries. 21 Md.App. at 400, 319 A.2d at 867.
 Several private property owners in the annexed area attacked the validity of the resolution,
 contending that it was “invalid because the [city] [c]ouncil had not obtained the consent of
 the owners of 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in the annexed area.”
 Forest Heights II at 4 (citing 21 Md.App. at 400, 319 A.2d at 867). The property owners
 asserted that the city council should not have included the Wicomico County Board of
 Education (“Board”) as a party for the requisite consent because the Board was exempt
 from assessment and ordinary taxation. Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. at 400, 319 A.2d at
 4
 867. Without consent from the Board, the city council did not have the requisite consent
 for annexation under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). Id. at 400-01, 319 A.2d at 867.
 The Court of Special Appeals “conced[ed] that the court normally looks to the ‘plain
 meaning rule’ in construing statutes, [but] found the need ‘to look to the legislative intent.
 . . .’” due to the enactment of Article 81, § 232B, discussed infra. Forest Heights II at 5
 (quoting Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. at 402, 319 A.2d at 868).
 The Court of Special Appeals noted that, at the time municipalities were granted the
 right to annex property, there was no requirement that property exempt from taxation be
 valued or assessed. Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. at 402-03, 319 A.2d at 868. Therefore,
 tax-exempt properties were not considered in the requisite 25% mandated by Local Gov’t
 § 4-403(b)(2). Id. at 403, 319 A.2d at 868. In 1971, the General Assembly enacted § 232B,
 which required that all property, even if exempt from taxation, be assessed and valued for
 the purpose of “provid[ing] a basis for consideration of payments-in-lieu [of taxes] and
 also for evaluation of property tax exemptions.” Id. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869 (quoting
 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND, Report to the General Assembly (1971)). The City
 Council of Salisbury argued that passage of § 232B meant that owners of tax exempt
 property were to be counted in determining whether the requisite 25% consent had been
 obtained, since all property was now assessed and valued.
 The [Court of Special Appeals] disagreed with the City, finding that the
 legislative history showed ‘that the General Assembly had no intention
 whatsoever that the Act in any way alter the requirements for the annexation
 of real property by a municipal corporation. Before passage of [§] 232B,
 qualification to give consent was limited to owners of property subject to
 5
 taxation in the area proposed to be annexed. We believe[ ] that [§] 232B did
 not change this.’
 Forest Heights II at 5 (quoting Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869).
 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Board should not be included in
 determining the requisite consent for annexation.
 The circuit court distinguished the case at bar from Banker’s Life, writing:
 Since it was issued on May 24, 1974, Banker’s Life has never been cited by
 either the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals in any reported
 decision. The decision is very fact-specific—it involved a proposed
 annexation of both taxable and tax-exempt property and it holds only that the
 consent of the Wicomico County Board of Education was not to be included
 in determining whether the owners of 25% of the assessed valuation of the
 real property had consented to the annexation. The Court of Special
 Appeals never expressly addressed whether or not State property could
 be annexed without consent –it simply stated in dicta that ‘only those who
 were to bear the financial burdens of a city government by the payment of
 real property taxes were to be allowed a voice in the annexation of real
 property to the municipal corporation.’ [21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at
 869].
 Banker’s Life . . . does not . . . answer the question of what the court is to do
 where all the annexed property [Extension Six] or almost all the annexed
 property [Extension Seven, which also contains a private church] is owned
 by a county or state planning agency. Banker’s Life served as a shield to
 keep municipalities from expanding their boundaries; here the Town
 attempts to use it as a sword to gain more land.
 Forest Heights II at 5-6 (emphasis added). As a result of the distinct facts of Banker’s Life,
 the circuit court held that the Town had not annexed property in accordance with Local
 Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) and therefore, the annexation was unlawful.
 6
 DISCUSSION
 I agree with the rationale advanced by the circuit court, finding that the Town’s
 annexation was unlawful, based on several statutory provisions and the distinct facts of
 Banker’s Life.
 A. Statutory Authority
 1. MD Code, Local Government Article § 4-403, Proposal for Annexation.
 Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) dictates that, before an annexation resolution is
 introduced, the legislative body of the municipality proposing the annexation must obtain
 consent from the owners of at least 25% of the assessed valuation of the real property in
 the area to be annexed. The issue at the center of this case is the definition of “assessed
 valuation.” In considering statutory interpretation, one examines the intent of the General
 Assembly and begins with the plain meaning of the language of the statute. Lockshin v.
 Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274, 987 A.2d 18, 28 (2010) (citations omitted). The inquiry ends
 at a plain meaning analysis when the language of the statute is “unambiguous and clearly
 consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose[.]” Id. at 275, 987 A.2d at 28 (citations
 omitted). “[O]nly when the language or terminology used in a statute is unclear or
 ambiguous may the court construe its meaning by resorting to evidence of custom or usage
 in light of the legislative intent and purpose.” Perdue v. State Department of Assessments
 and Taxation, 264 Md. 228, 235, 286 A.2d 165, 169 (1972) (citation omitted). Maryland
 law disfavors a modification of a statute’s plain meaning unless an irreconcilable conflict
 or repugnancy emerges absent such modification. City of Bowie v. Washington Suburban
 Sanitary Comm’n, 249 Md. 611, 618, 241 A.2d 396, 400 (1968).
 7
 In conceptualizing the plain meaning of the term “assessed valuation,” the Town
 contends that MNCPPC properties have no “assessed value” within the meaning of Local
 Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). However, the Town does not dispute that MNCPPC’s properties are
 indeed assessed. All Commission-owned real properties are “subject to assessment” and
 “actually assessed,” even though they are exempted from property taxes. See Md. Code,
 Tax-Property Article (“Tax-Prop.”) § 6-101(a)(1) (stating that: “Except as otherwise
 provided in this article, all property located in this State is subject to assessment and
 property tax and is taxable to the owner of the property.”); see also Tax-Prop. § 7-106(a)
 (stating that: “Except for real property owned by the federal government, real property
 that is exempt by law from the property tax shall be assessed under this article and in
 the manner required by the Director.”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the terms “assess”
 and “assessment,” as defined in Tax-Prop. § 1-101, inherently attribute value to the
 assessed property.4 As such, the term “assessed valuation” has an unambiguous meaning
 4
 Tax Prop. §1-101 provides the following definitions for “assess” and
 “assessment:”
 (b) “Assess” means:
 (1) for real property, to determine the phased-in full cash value or use
 value to which the property tax rate may be applied; and
 (2) for personal property, to determine the value to which the property tax
 rate may be applied.
 (c) “Assessment” means:
 (1) for real property, the phased-in full cash value or use value to which
 the property tax rate may be applied; and
 (2) for personal property, the value to which the property tax rate may be
 applied.
 8
 that is applicable to MNCPPC-owned lands that the Town seeks to annex. We should not
 generate an ambiguity in a statute where none exists. The plain-meaning analysis of the
 statute’s clear language reveals that the Town was required to obtain consent from the
 owners of at least 25% of the property, which it did not do, in violation of Local Gov’t §
 4-403(b)(2).
 2. Article 81, § 232B, Assessment of Exempt Properties.
 The Town contends that a plain-meaning approach is not applicable to the case at
 bar, because the General Assembly’s passage of Article 81, § 232B in 1971, now codified
 as Tax-Prop. § 7-106, created an ambiguity regarding what constitutes “assessed valuation”
 in § 4-403(b)(2).
 Tenets of statutory construction require reading beyond a plain meaning approach
 when terminology in the statute is unclear or ambiguous, or if the intention of the General
 Assembly is doubtful. Giant v. State’s Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 511, 298 A.2d 427, 433
 (1973) (“[W]e cannot disregard the natural import of statutory language unless some
 Note that even though the terms “assess” and “assessment” associate value with taxation,
 it is undisputed that MNCPPC lands are assessed. As such, any argument that the tax-
 exempt status of MNCPPC lands implicate their assessment is meritless. Rather, the
 definitions of “assess” and “assessment” reveal that the properties at issue have value. Per
 Tax-Prop. § 6-101(a)(1) and § 7-106(a), tax-exempt properties are assessed. Given the
 MNCPPC lands at issue have value that is assessed, there is an “assessed valuation” of
 them.
 The majority’s distinction between “tax rolls” and “assessment rolls” does not detract
 from the contention that tax-exempt lands have “assessed valuation.” See slip op. at 14-
 15.
 9
 imperative reason is found in the statute for enlarging or restricting its meaning.”); see also
 Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946) (“Where there is
 ambiguity in the provisions of a statute, or the intention of the [General Assembly] is
 doubtful, the Court may look to the consequences[.]”). In Banker’s Life, the Court of
 Special Appeals stated that the passage of §232B required an analysis of the General
 Assembly’s intent. 21 Md.App. at 402, 319 A.2d at 868 (“We think the application of Art.
 81, § 232B to [Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2)] is not clear and unambiguous, and that we are
 obliged to look to the legislative intent and to the consequences.”).
 Article 81, § 232B, as amended, provided in pertinent part:
 Notwithstanding the provisions of s 9 [of chapter 350][5] of this article
 excluding exempt property from assessment for purposes of ordinary
 taxation and excepting the property of the United States from this section all
 real property and any improvements thereon located in the State and
 exempted from the payment of any ordinary taxes on July 1, 1971 or
 becoming exempt at any time thereafter by any provisions of law shall be
 valued and assessed from time to time as may be necessary and as directed
 by the Director of the Department according to the method prescribed by this
 article by persons authorized by the Director to perform such valuations.
 These valuations shall be maintained in the records of the Department and of
 each county and Baltimore City in which exempt property is located, in the
 manner required by the Director. None of such valuations shall be included
 in the total assessment of all property subject to State, county or city ordinary
 taxation for the purpose of distribution of State moneys under any provision
 of law. . . .
 Banker’s Life, 21 Md.App. at 399-400, 319 A.2d at 866-67 (emphasis added). According
 to the Court in Banker’s Life, prior to passage of Article 81, § 232B, tax exempt properties,
 5
 S 9 of chapter 350 is now recodified in parts of the Maryland Code, Tax-Property
 Article, Title 7.
 10
 including those owned by municipalities, were exempt from assessment and valuation. Id.
 at 398, 319 A.2d at 866. However, given the passage of § 232B, an ambiguity was created
 relative to the legislative intent for including newly-assessed tax exempt properties as part
 of the requisite 25% in Local Gov’t §4-403(b)(2).
 Based on its analysis of legislative intent, the Banker’s Life Court concluded that
 the General Assembly’s amendment to the Tax Code, via passage of § 232B, had no
 bearing on the Annexation Statute. The Court asserted that:
 The only conclusion reasonably to be drawn from the language of [§] 232B
 and its history is that the General Assembly had no intention whatsoever that
 the Act in any way alter the requirements for the annexation of real property
 by a municipal corporation. Before the passage of [§] 232B, qualification to
 give consent was limited to owners of property subject to taxation in the area
 proposed to be annexed. We believed that [§] 232B did not change this.
 Looking to the consequences, we believe that the [General Assembly] never
 departed from an intent that only those who were to bear the financial
 burdens of a city government by the payment of real property taxes were
 to be allowed a voice in the annexation of real property to the municipal
 corporation.
 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869 (emphasis added). Somehow, the Banker’s Life Court
 determined that only those property owners subject to taxation could fall within the
 category of people required to provide consent to annexation pursuant to Local Gov’t § 4-
 403(b)(2). According to the Court, even if tax-exempt properties were now subject to
 “assessed valuation” within the plain meaning of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2), they were not
 capable of providing consent to annexation. The Court analyzed the original statute, a 1972
 re-enactment, and a Report to the General Assembly for 1971 by the Legislative Council
 of Maryland to arrive at its conclusion. Id. at 398-400, 403-04, 319 A.2d at 866-67, 869.
 11
 Though the Court’s legislative analysis demonstrated that § 232B in no way implicated
 taxation on exempt properties, the analysis did not establish a nexus to the Court’s ultimate
 conclusion that only taxed entities could provide consent to annexation. Therefore, the
 Banker’s Life Court improperly created a nexus between taxation and consent to
 annexation where one did not exist. In the face of the General Assembly’s silence about
 whether to impart a consistent meaning of “assessed valuation” as between the Tax Code
 and the Annexation Statute, the Court imparted two separate meanings to the term despite
 the lack of any substantive proof of legislative intent to do so. As such, the Banker’s Life
 Court miscategorized the effect of § 232B because the amendment to the Tax Code applied
 to the Annexation Statute: any lands with “assessed valuation” were subject to the consent
 provisions of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) regardless of whether or not those lands were
 taxed.
 3. House Bill (HB) 534, Annexation by Municipal Corporations.
 The Majority contends that HB 534, enacted in 1975, provides greater
 support for its argument that tax-exempt entities are not a consideration for the
 requisite 25% consent under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). HB 534 amended the
 Annexation Statute and represented a compromise agreement between
 municipalities and counties. Bill File to H.B. 534, Testimony – Statement of Jon
 Burrell, MML, in support of H.B. 534 (1975). The agreement provided greater
 authority to counties for annexation purposes, partially through the first right of
 12
 counties to notice (currently codified in Local Gov’t §4-4066) and through
 counties’ referendum authority (currently codified in Local Gov’t § 4-4107).
 Despite acknowledging that HB 534 granted greater county authority, the Majority
 states “that the General Assembly did not intend to grant counties the authority or
 ability to veto a proposed municipal annexation.” Slip op. at 18. Though the
 legislative history of HB 534 is interesting, it provides no answers to the central
 issue of this case. HB 534 was simply a compromise agreement, and if anything,
 it expanded the right of counties to annexation, rather than limiting it.
 This expansion of county annexation rights implies the General Assembly’s intent
 6
 Local Gov’t §4-406 reads, in pertinent part:
 Notice to county and planning agencies
 (c) Immediately after the first publication of the public notice [for
 annexation], the municipality shall provide a copy of the public notice to:
 (1) the governing body of the county in which the municipality is
 located; and
 (2) any regional or State planning agency with jurisdiction in the county.
 First right to be heard
 (d) The county and any regional or State planning agency with jurisdiction
 in the county has the right to be heard before the public at the hearing on the
 proposed annexation.
 (emphasis in original).
 7
 Local Gov’t §4-410 reads:
 (a) At any time within 45 days after enactment of an annexation resolution,
 the governing body of the county or counties in which the municipality is
 located, by at least a two-thirds majority vote, may petition the chief
 executive and administrative officer of the municipality for a referendum
 on the resolution.
 13
 to provide counties, a tax-exempt entity, with authority over annexations initiated by
 municipalities. The current provisions of HB 534, codified as Local Gov’t §§ 4-406 and
 4-410, provide voice to counties, contrary to the Town’s assertion that counties do not have
 significant voice in the annexation process due to their tax-exempt status.8
 The Town’s analysis of HB 534 neglects to consider the inherent right of
 governmental, tax-exempt owners to participate in municipal annexations.
 Beyond the statutory analysis of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2), the facts of the case at
 bar are distinct from those of Banker’s Life. These distinctions will be discussed infra.
 B. Distinctions from Banker’s Life
 1. MNCPPC, as opposed to the Board in Banker’s Life, is a unique entity with
 specified roles and responsibilities as evidenced by a designated portion of
 the Maryland Code.
 The Maryland Code has a designated portion specifically related to
 MNCPPC, which is codified in Titles 14-27 of the Land Use Article (“Land Use”).
 MNCPPC is an agency and representative of this State for purposes designated by
 statute and was created by chapter 448 of the laws of Maryland of 1927. Land Use
 §§ 15-101(b), 15-302, Capper-Cramton Act, Public Law 71–284, 46 Stat. 482
 (1930) (as amended in 1946 and 1958). The agency uses the properties it owns for
 8
 The Majority supports its interpretation of HB 534 by pointing to several Attorney
 General opinions. These opinions largely reiterate the rationale advocated in Banker’s Life,
 which I have concluded was a mistaken interpretation of the Annexation Statute.
 14
 the general benefit of Maryland residents, particularly those in the metropolitan
 district. 9 Land Use §17-201(a).
 MNCPPC has the authority to procure property for public recreation and to
 acquire property in the metropolitan district for purposes of establishing parks,
 forests, roads and other public ways, grounds, and spaces. Land Use § 17-101.
 MNCPPC is also entitled to dispose of certain properties that it acquires only after
 determining that a property is no longer needed for park purposes or other purposes
 authorized by statute. Land Use § 17-205.
 In addition, MNCPPC is responsible for protecting lands under the Capper-
 Cramton Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1930 to “protect land on both
 sides of the Potomac River as an integrated park and parkway system known as
 the George Washington Memorial Parkway.” Surina Singh, Protecting Capper-
 9
 Land Use § 19-101 defines the “metropolitan district” as follows:
 The area in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County within the
 boundaries specified in this title is known as the Maryland-Washington
 Metropolitan District.” Land Use § 19-101(a). The metropolitan district is
 the authority of the Commission for the purposes [described by statute].
 Land Use § 19-101(b).
 Land Use § 19-102 specifies the boundaries of the Metropolitan District:
 The boundaries of the metropolitan district are the same as existed on
 October 1, 2012, with the exclusion of:
 (1) any property annexed into the City of Rockville, the City of
 Gaithersburg, or the Town of Washington Grove under Chapter 429 of
 the Acts of the General Assembly of 2007; and
 (2) the City of Greenbelt as it existed on July 1, 2016.
 15
 Cramton Parks, NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION,
 https://www.ncpc.gov/news/item/45/, archived at https://perma.cc/KX2C-G7K8
 (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). Land Use § 15-302(3) provides MNCPPC with the
 authority to act as the representative of this State in fulfilling the mandate of the
 Capper-Cramton Act in Maryland. The Act enables MNCPPC to enter into
 agreements with the National Capital Park and Planning Commission (“NCPPC”)
 for extending and developing protected lands in Maryland. Therefore, the Capper-
 Cramton Act provided for cooperation between NCPPC and MNCPPC, enabling
 MNCPPC to act as administrator over preserved lands. The Town’s annexation
 properties are in the immediate vicinity of lands specified for MNCPPC oversight
 in the Capper-Cramton Act with respect to the “Oxon Run Parkway.” See THE
 TOWN OF FOREST HEIGHTS, MARYLAND ANNEXATION PLAN (Sixth & Seventh
 Extensions, 2016).
 The Town has strategically crafted its annexations to bypass seeking consent
 from any registered voters (Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(1)). Its annexations also
 acquire government property that runs exceedingly close to preserved lands. The
 Town seeks to use Banker’s Life to more than double its property without any
 oversight or consent from the entities that own the annexed lands. The Court of
 Special Appeals’ analysis of legislative intent in Banker’s Life did not contemplate
 such unchecked annexation authority, nor did it consider the implications of
 annexing lands from a tax-exempt entity having statewide statutory authority. In
 Banker’s Life, the Court’s consideration was limited to the Wicomico County
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 Board of Education—a local entity with limited authority. In contrast to the
 Wicomico County Board of Education, MNCPPC, the entity in primary opposition
 to the Town’s annexation plan, has statutory responsibilities bound to its role as a
 landowner that it cannot simply discharge. I do not contend that MNCPPC has
 unique annexation authority, but only that it should have a right to consent to
 annexation under Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2) particularly due to its unique statutory
 role.
 2. Banker’s Life addressed a tax-exempt entity’s acceptance of annexation, as
 opposed to a tax-exempt entity’s opposition to annexation.
 In Banker’s Life, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Board’s
 acceptance of the city council’s plan to annex property did not apply as part of the
 requisite 25% of § 4-403(b)(2). 21 Md.App. at 404, 319 A.2d at 869. Banker’s
 Life did not address the implications of § 4-403(b)(2) if the Board had been
 opposing the annexation. In Banker’s Life, had the court considered the Board as
 part of the requisite 25%, it would have stacked the vote of a governmental entity
 against those of private property owners who challenged the city’s annexation of
 their property. Permitting the Board to serve as part of the requisite 25% would
 have enabled the city to annex land from private property owners—an unjust result.
 In contrast, the case at bar considers governmental entities’ interest in opposing an
 annexation—preserving the status quo in current land ownership, whether public
 or private. I do not contend that the requisite process of annexation looks different
 based on whether a tax-exempt entity is consenting or opposing annexation, but
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 simply, point out a distinction. Banker’s Life did not address the issue of the
 consent required if no taxable property was involved in the annexation. The Court
 did not contemplate the Board’s rights with respect to its consent to annexation
 because the Board had already consented. In the case at bar, injustice results when
 landowners, tax-exempt entities but assessed in valuation nevertheless, are not
 permitted any say in the annexation of their property.
 Further, Banker’s Life considered the annexation of both taxable and tax-
 exempt property, so there was some measure of landowner’s consent that resulted
 in accepting the annexation. In contrast, the Town’s annexations are in areas
 without voters, so the Town’s reading of the annexation statutes would enable
 annexation with the consent of absolutely no one.10 Surely Banker’s Life did not
 intend to establish the dangerous precedent of completely abolishing the right to
 voice opposition to an annexation for tax-exempt entities.
 I conclude that Banker’s Life is not the antidote for this occasion. I am not
 persuaded that the General Assembly expressly intended to exclude the consent of tax-
 10
 The Majority writes that “on prior occasions, this Court has considered cases
 concerning annexations consisting of entirely tax-exempt land without noting or invoking
 a prohibition against the annexation of entirely tax-exempt property.” Slip Op. at 25. The
 Majority cites to Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 63 A.3d 582 (2013) to support its
 proposition. In Koste, the town of Oxford sought to introduce a resolution annexing acres
 of submerged lands adjacent to the Town’s boundaries. Id. at 17, 63 A.3d at 584 (emphasis
 added). For one, the annexation of submerged lands poses a distinction from the case at
 bar. The County lands at issue house recreational areas and preserved lands. Secondly,
 the issue in Koste pertained to the electorate’s right to a referendum, id., a completely
 separate issue from that presented in the instant case.
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 exempt property owners from the 25% requirement of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b)(2). Based
 on the analysis of Local Gov’t § 4-403(b) and the subsequent amendment to the tax code
 through Article 81, § 232B, in addition to the distinct facts of Banker’s Life, I would affirm
 the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Accordingly, I dissent.
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