jurisdiction: US

text:
 744 A.2d 25 (2000)
 357 Md. 303
 RAYNOR ASSOCIATES L.P.
 v.
 BALTIMORE DOOR AND FRAME COMPANY, INC.
 No. 62, Sept. Term, 1999.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 January 12, 2000.
 *26 Jeffrey S. Larson (Richard S. Basile, on brief), Greenbelt, for petitioner.
 Jeffrey S. Marcalus (Hillman, Brown & Darrow, P.A., on brief), Annapolis, for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.
 WILNER, Judge.
 We shall hold in this case that the Court of Special Appeals erred (1) in granting affirmative relief to an appellee whose own appeal, seeking only part of that relief, had earlier been dismissed for failure to file a timely brief, and (2) when that deficiency was brought to its attention, in achieving the same result by reinstating the appeal eight months after the appeal had been dismissed and two months after the court had issued its initial opinion erroneously granting the affirmative relief.
 *27 The dispute arose out of a commercial lease of a 22,600 square foot facility in an industrial park, to be used by respondent, Baltimore Door & Frame Company, Inc. (BDF), for the assembly and distribution of building materials. The lease term ended on June 15, 1996, but BDF, awaiting completion of a new facility, remained in possession and commenced negotiations with the landlord, petitioner Raynor Associates Limited Partnership (Raynor), for an extension of the lease to March, 1997. No agreement was ever reached on an extension, however. Although the lease provided that, if BDF remained in possession after termination, it would become a month-to-month tenant at a rental equivalent to 150% of the lease rental, BDF paid only the lease rental during its extended stay.
 In July or August, 1996, while negotiations for an extension were ongoing, Raynor insisted that BDF pave or repave certain common areas adjacent to the leased premises, claiming that BDF's trucks and fork lifts had damaged those areas. Although BDF denied any responsibility for the damage, it made the repairs, at a cost of nearly $16,000, apparently believing that, if it did so, Raynor would allow it to remain in possession at the lease rental rate. Raynor denied that it had made any such agreement and, in January, 1997, filed a summary ejectment action in the district court, alleging a failure by BDF to pay the required rent. The court apparently concluded that there was no enforceable extension agreement and rendered judgment for Raynor.
 BDF appealed that judgment to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In a separate action in the same court, BDF filed a four-count complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, an order for specific performance, and damages. Alleging that, at Raynor's request, it had made substantial repairs and improvements to Raynor's property, BDF asked the court to enjoin Raynor from enforcing the district court ejectment order, to declare BDF's rights under the lease, to order Raynor to perform its obligations under the lease, and for damages in the amount that the money spent on repairs and improvements exceeded any rent found to be due. BDF alleged that it had paid all disputed rent into an interest-bearing account, although it did not indicate in its complaint any details regarding the account.[1] Raynor answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. It contended that the lease required BDF to vacate the premises at the end of the lease term, on June 14, 1996, and made BDF liable for any actual damages incurred by Raynor, plus attorneys' fees, if it failed to do so. BDF failed to vacate, and Raynor sought $21,200 in damages.
 The appeal was on the record made in the district court, and that was taken up first. BDF claimed that the parties had actually reached an oral agreement for an extension of the lease, on the same terms, to March, 1997, on the condition that BDF make repairs to the parking areas adjacent to the leased premises. After listening to argument, the court determined that the findings of the district courtthat there was no enforceable extension agreement and that BDF had become a month-to-month tenantwere not clearly erroneous. It therefore affirmed the district court judgment, determined that Raynor was entitled to the damages it claimed, and indicated its intent to disburse the funds in the escrow account to Raynor. The correctness of those findings and the validity of the judgment affirming the ejectment order are not now before us.
 With respect to BDF's complaint, the court dismissed the claims for injunctive, declaratory, and specific performance relief on the ground that those claims all sprang from the alleged oral extension of *28 the lease, which the court had just resolved in the context of the district court appeal. Without mentioning the term, the court essentially applied the doctrine of res judicata. It turned then to BDF's claim for the amounts it expended on repairs and improvements, based on a theory of unjust enrichment. There was a significant dispute as to whether BDF was obliged to make the various repairs. Raynor admitted asking BDF to make certain repairs but claimed, and offered evidence to show, that some of the items repaired particularly access roads, parking areas, and interior dry-wallwere items that BDF had damaged. BDF averred otherwise. It denied having damaged the parking and access road areas and claimed nearly $16,000 for repaving those areas.[2] It also sought $400 for replacing ceiling tiles damaged because of leaks from the roof, which it claimed was Raynor's responsibility to repair. Raynor produced evidence that the tiles had been damaged about three years earlier, that Raynor had offered to replace them, but that BDF decided to replace them with tiles it already had in stock.
 After listening to the disputed evidence, the court disallowed the claim for most of the cost of repaving, but found an entitlement, on an unjust enrichment basis, to reimbursement for two items$400 for the ceiling tiles and $2,721 for paving two small areas, for a total of $3,122.[3] Judgment in that amount was entered for BDF on its complaint.
 The judge's findings were announced from the bench on September 26, 1997, at the conclusion of the hearing. Without waiting for the written judgment to be filed, BDF noted an appeal on October 2, 1997. Raynor filed a cross-appeal on October 20. Both appeals were from the money judgment in favor of BDF; they did not purport to concern the affirmance of the district court summary ejectment order, which would not have been appealable to the Court of Special Appeals in any event. The actual judgment was filed October 22. By virtue of Maryland Rule 8-602(d), both appeals are deemed to have been filed on October 22.[4] Because BDF filed its appeal first, it became the appellant and Raynor became the appellee/cross-appellant. See Md. Rule 8-111(a).
 In July, 1998, the Court of Special Appeals sent to the parties a briefing and argument schedule that clearly identified BDF as the appellant and advised that, in accordance with Md. Rule 8-502, its brief was due on August 24, 1998, with Raynor's brief to follow 30 days after the filing of BDF's brief. For whatever reason, BDF failed to file its brief by the due date, and, on September 21, 1998, the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, on the *29 court's own initiative, entered an order pursuant to Md. Rule 8-602(a)(7), dismissing BDF's appeal. Md. Rule 8-602(a)(7) permits the court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an appeal if a brief or record extract is not filed by the appellant within the time prescribed by Md. Rule 8-502. The order noted that BDF's appellant's brief was due August 24, 1998, that the brief had not been filed, but that Raynor had filed an appellee/cross-appellant's brief on August 25. That brief, curiously, contained the record extract that ordinarily would be attached to an appellant's brief.[5] In addition to dismissing BDF's appeal, the order stated that the appeal would proceed under the caption of Raynor v. BDF, directed Raynor to conform its brief and record extract to its new status as appellant, and ordered that BDF file an appellee's brief by October 30, 1998. Four days later, BDF's untimely appellant/cross-appellee's brief was filed.
 The parties complied, at least in part, with that order. Raynor refiled its brief and record extract, with a yellow cover and designating itself as the appellant. Its argument was that BDF had failed to establish the elements necessary to a claim of unjust enrichment. In particular, it urged (1) that the lease required BDF to repair any damage it caused and provided that all tenant improvements became the property of landlord, (2) that BDF thus knew when it made the repairs that it was doing only what it was obliged to do under the lease and that the improvements would become Raynor's property at the end of the lease, and (3) that apart from any lease requirements, there was no unjust enrichment because BDF was simply repairing damage it caused to Raynor's property. Raynor also noted that unjust enrichment is based on the value of a benefit conferred, not the amount spent, and that BDF had failed to produce any evidence of such value. In the absence of that evidence, it averred, there was no basis for a judgment for unjust enrichment. It sought a reversal of the circuit court judgment.
 BDF filed a new appellee's brief which, except for having a green cover and redesignating BDF as appellee and Raynor as appellant, was identical to the appellant/cross-appellee's brief that it untimely filed after its appeal had been dismissed. The brief responded, in part, to Raynor's arguments but urged that the court erred in not awarding BDF a greater sum. Significantly, although BDF had claimed, in the circuit court, an entitlement to approximately $16,000 in repaving costs alone, in its two briefsthe untimely appellant/cross-appellee's brief and the later appellee's briefit asserted a right to only $6,507. It averred that "the total amount of repairs Appellee made at the request of Appellant covering areas not damaged by Appellee was $6,507.25," and, in the "Conclusion" part of its briefs, it asked that the Court of Special Appeals "modify the Judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and enter judgment in favor of Appellee in the amount of $6,507.25 and assess the costs of this case to the Appellant."
 Notwithstanding that (1) because its own appeal had been dismissed, BDF was not entitled to any affirmative relief from the appellate court, and (2) in any event, the only relief it requested in its briefs was an increase in the judgment from $3,122 to $6,507, the Court of Special Appeals, on March 23, 1999, filed an opinion in which it concluded that the judgment for $3,122 should be vacated and that a new judgment should be entered for BDF in the *30 amount of $16,345. In reaching this odd, and wholly unauthorized, result, the panel was obviously unaware that BDF's appeal had been dismissed. At the beginning of its opinion, the court stated that BDF had filed "a cross-appeal" raising the question of whether the trial court erred in limiting its recovery to $3,122, but it never took account of the fact that the appeal, which was not a cross-appeal in any event, had been dismissed.
 The intermediate appellate court first disposed of Raynor's arguments, rejecting all of them and concluding that BDF had no obligation to repair any of the areas it repaired. It then held that the actual cost of the work, established by invoices admitted into evidence, could be taken to determine the amount of benefit conferred by BDF and, on that basis, excused the lack of any direct evidence establishing that value. The correctness of those holdings is not before us, as it was not raised in Raynor's petition for certiorari. The issue before us arose from the court's discussion in Part III of its opinion, where it considered BDF's nonexistent "cross-appeal." The "cross-appeal," it said, sought damages for the repairs made to the parking areas, which the appellate court determined to be $15,945.54. Having held that BDF was not obligated to make those repairs, the court concluded that "BDF is entitled to recover that amount from Raynor as well." The aggregate amount it found due was the $15,945.54 and the $400 for ceiling tiles, or $16,345.54. Accordingly, it vacated the judgment for $3,122.65 and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for BDF in the amount of $16,345.54.
 An unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals was filed March 23, 1999. On April 5, 1999, Raynor filed a motion for reconsideration, reminding the court that BDF's appeal had been dismissed on September 21, 1998 and that, in any event, BDF had never asked, in its appeal, for more than $6,507. It urged that, in light of the dismissal, the court had no jurisdiction to award affirmative relief to BDF. Accepting the fact that the court had rejected its own arguments for a reversal of the judgment, Raynor asked in its motion that the court simply affirm the judgment entered by the circuit court.
 The court granted the motion but denied the requested relief. In a supplemental opinion on the motion, the court conceded that the panel assigned to hear the case "was not made aware of the September 21, 1998 order and in the absence of any indication from the parties that BDF's appeal had been dismissed proceeded to address the merits." It concluded, then, that there was no prejudice to either Raynor or the court from the late filing of BDF's brief and determined that, because BDF's appeal had been dismissed on the court's initiative, rather than on motion, the court had the discretion to reinstate the appeal, which it proceeded to do. Continuing, nonetheless, to ignore the fact that BDF had limited its request for an increase to $6,507, the court confirmed its decision to direct an increase to $16,345.45.
 We granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) whether the Court of Special Appeals had authority to grant affirmative relief to BDF after BDF's appeal had been dismissed, and (2) whether the court had authority to reinstate the appeal eight months after it had been dismissed and two months after the court decided the appeal.
 There really is no dispute with respect to the first issue, which has only a conditional relevance at this point. In Taylor v. Wahby, 271 Md. 101, 110, 314 A.2d 100, 104-05 (1974), we noted that we have "consistently followed the rule that a judgment or decree from which no appeal has been taken may not be reversed for the benefit of one who did not appeal even though in regard to him the judgment or decree was both erroneous and injurious." See also Fitch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 329-30, 129 A.2d 93, 96 (1957); County Executive v. Supervisor, 275 Md. 64, 68, 337 A.2d 682, 685 (1975). In ruling on the *31 motion for reconsideration, the Court of Special Appeals itself recognized that it had no authority to grant affirmative relief to BDF in the absence of a pending appeal by that party. That is why, we presume, it granted the motion and attempted to achieve its ultimate end by reinstating BDF's appeal. BDF makes no effort in this Court to sustain the initial decision of the Court of Special Appeals, which obviously was wrong. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals currently under review, however, was not entered in the absence of a pending appeal by BDF. The primary question before us is the second one raised in the petitionwhether the intermediate appellate court acted properly in reinstating the appeal. If, as we shall hold, it erred in that action, then the principle noted above, precluding affirmative relief in the absence of a pending appeal, would dictate a reversal of that court's judgment.
 The Maryland Rules dealing with appellate procedure set forth both the grounds upon which an appeal may be dismissed in the Court of Special Appeals and the methods by which the appeal may be dismissed. Rule 8-602(a) states the 10 grounds upon which an appeal may be dismissed, either upon motion or on the court's own initiative. Maryland Code, § 1-403(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article requires that an appeal in the Court of Special Appeals be heard by a panel of not less than three judges and that the concurrence of a majority of the panel is necessary for "the decision of a case." In conformance with that general requirement, Rule 8-602(b) provides that, except as otherwise permitted in that section of the Rule, a motion to dismiss shall be ruled on by the number of judges required by law to decide an appeala minimum of three. Section (b) goes on to provide, however, that the Chief Judge, or a judge designated by the Chief Judge,[6] "may rule on a motion to dismiss that is based on any reason set forth in subsections (2), (3), (5), (7), or (8) of section (a) of this Rule or on a motion to dismiss based on subsection (a)(4) of this Rule challenging the timeliness of the information report."
 The areas in which the Chief Judge alone may act for the court, in the first instance, were selected with care and have a certain commonality to them. With the exception of subsections (2) and (8), they all deal with the failure of an appellant to meet a clear time deadline specified in other rulesthe failure to note the appeal timely (3), to file the record timely (5), to file the brief and record extract timely (7), or to file the information report required by Rule 8-205 timely (4). Those time requirements, in most instances, are easily and objectively ascertainable, as is a determination of whether they have been met. The document in question either has been filed by the relevant deadline or it has not. Although the grounds stated in subsections (2) and (8) are not time-based, they also are matters that, ordinarily, are objectively ascertainablethe failure to pay or obtain a waiver of the required filing fee (2), or filing a brief or record extract that does not comply with the content and style requirements of Rules 8-112, 8-501, 8-503, or 8-504. Those are matters that, in our rule-making capacity, we concluded could fairly and efficiently be determined by the Chief Judge alone in the first instance and ordinarily did not need to be presented to a panel. We obviously were aware that the judges of the Court of Special Appeals, like the judges of this Court, have their principal offices in their respective counties and normally are together only when they hear oral argument or on designated conference days. Requiring the convening of a panel to deal initially with those kinds of matters could substantially interfere with the efficient processing of the court's caseload, to no appreciable advantage.
 *32 Although the latter part of Rule 8-602(b) speaks of the Chief Judge ruling "on a motion to dismiss" based on those subsections, the law generally is that, unless a statute or rule expressly, or by necessary implication, provides otherwise, a court may ordinarily do on its own initiative what it may do on motion of a party, at least where the party benefitted by the action is not likely to oppose or be prejudiced by it. In Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982), we stated:
 "Except as limited by statute or rule, a trial court has inherent authority to control its own docket. A rule authorizing a litigant to file a procedural motion for this purpose in one respect or another should not be construed to prohibit the court from accomplishing the same object sua sponte unless such construction is compelled by clear language."
 See also Board of Nursing v. Nechay, 347 Md. 396, 701 A.2d 405 (1997), but compare Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 642 A.2d 219 (1994) (court has no authority, in the absence of a motion, to grant summary judgment) and Urquhart v. Simmons, 339 Md. 1, 660 A.2d 412 (1995) (court has no authority to transfer case for forum non conveniens on its own initiative).
 That same general principle is necessarily applicable to appellate courts and to the authority of the Chief Judge and the court itself to do on their own initiative what they could do on motion. We may take judicial notice of the operation and practices of the courts of this State (see Prince George's County v. Aluisi, 354 Md. 422, 434, 731 A.2d 888, 895 (1999); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 430 n. 5, 470 A.2d 1269, 1273 n. 5 (1984)), and, in that regard, we take judicial notice of the long-established procedure in the Court of Special Appeals for the Chief Judge to enter orders of dismissal on the enumerated grounds, on the court's own initiative, rather than on motions filed by an appellee or cross-appellee. The practice, some of which is described in PAUL SANDLER & ANDREW LEVY, APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER: STATE AND FEDERAL, Md. Inst. for Continuing Prof'l Educ. for Lawyers (1994), is for the clerks of the circuit courts, on a monthly basis, to inform the clerk of the Court of Special Appeals of the filing of appeals, for the appellate clerk then to develop a "tickler" of when information reports and records are due to be filed and, after an appropriate grace period and in the absence of any approved extension, to prepare and present to the Chief Judge an order of dismissal if the report or the record is not timely filed. Id. at 40. Similarly, once the record is filed and a briefing schedule is sent to the parties, the clerk of the Court of Special Appeals keeps track of when the appellant's brief and record extract is due and, after a grace period and in the absence of any approved or stipulated extension, prepares and presents to the Chief Judge an order of dismissal if the document is not timely filed. Id. at 41.
 Over the years, this practice, of allowing the Chief Judge to do on the court's own initiative what the Chief Judge could do on motion, has proven to be fair, reasonable, and efficient. We fail to see how an appellee, even if also a cross-appellant, can be prejudiced by or is likely to object to a routine dismissal of the appellant's appeal, by action of the Chief Judge, because the appeal was not taken timely, or an information report, the record, or the appellant's brief or record extract was not filed timely. Submission of such matters routinely by the clerk to the Chief Judge is not only for the convenience of the court, but it avoids the need for the appellee to file and serve a motion on the appellant and for the court then to have to wait for a possible answer. We thus conclude that the Chief Judge may exercise the same authority to act for the court with respect to matters arising under Rule 8-602(a)(2), (3), (4), (5), (7), and (8), on the court's own initiative, as he or she could on a motion.
 Reconsiderations by the Court of Special Appeals are dealt with in two different *33 rulesRule 8-602(c) and Rule 8-605. We are concerned here with the former, which deals specifically with the reconsideration of an order of dismissal entered under Rule 8-602. Rule 8-605 deals with the reconsideration of other dispositions of an appeal, normally on the merits and after briefing. Rule 8-602(c) draws a clear distinction between appeals dismissed by action of the Chief Judge alone and those dismissed by action of a panel. In that regard, it must be kept in mind that (1) the Chief Judge may act alone in only six of the ten categories enumerated in Rule 8-602(a), and (2) even in those categories, the matter could be presented to a panel the Chief Judge is not required to act alone, but is merely permitted to do so.
 Rule 8-602(c)(1) provides that, when an order of dismissal was entered by the Chief Judge alone, pursuant to Rule 8-602(b), "the order dismissing the appeal, on motion filed within ten days after entry of the order, shall be reviewed by the number of judges of the Court required by law to decide an appeal." (Emphasis added). It goes on to state:
 "The order dismissing the appeal (A) shall be rescinded if a majority of those judges decides that the motion to dismiss should not have been granted, (B) may be rescinded if the appeal was dismissed pursuant to subsection (4), (5), or (7) of section (a) of this Rule, and the Court is satisfied that the failure to file a report, transmit the record, or file a brief or record extract within the time prescribed by these Rules was unavoidable because of sickness or other sufficient cause, and (C) may be rescinded if the appeal was dismissed pursuant to subsection (a)(8) of this Rule and the Court is satisfied that a brief, appendix, or record extract complying with the Rules will be filed within a time prescribed by the Court."
 Paragraph (c)(2) of the Rule deals with an order of dismissal entered by a panel. It provides that, if an appeal is dismissed by the ruling of the Court or a panel pursuant to section (a)(4), (6), (8), or (9) of the Rule, "the order dismissing the appeal, on motion filed within ten days after entry of the order, may be rescinded if the Court is satisfied that a report, record, brief, appendix, or record extract complying with the Rules will be filed or the proper party will be substituted within a time to be prescribed by the Court." (Emphasis added).
 Rule 8-602(c) contains two other pertinent provisions. Section (c)(3) provides that, if an order of dismissal is rescinded, the case shall be reinstated on the docket on the terms prescribed by the Court. Section (c)(4) establishes the exclusivity of the reconsideration process specified in the Rule. It states that, "[w]hen an order dismissing an appeal is reviewed by the Court on motion filed pursuant to this section, the moving party may not obtain further reconsideration of the dismissal pursuant to Rule 8-605."[7]
 This special treatment of reconsideration of orders of dismissal entered under Rule 8-602 is purposeful. The kinds of issues that may arise from them, all relating to preliminary matters relevant to perfecting the appeal, rather than to the merits of the appeal, should be resolved preliminarily. If the appeal is to be dismissed on any of those grounds, it should be removed from the docket early in order (1) that the appeal not remain in the mix of cases assigned for argument, and (2) that the argument panel not have to plow through briefs and do research on the merits, only to find that there is a procedural impediment to their reaching those issues. When there is a surviving cross-appeal, as there was here, early resolution of a procedural problem under Rule 8-602(a) permits the parties to focus *34 their argument and the court to focus its attention on the issues remaining for resolution. The requirement that a motion to reconsider an order of dismissal entered under Rule 8-602 be filed within 10 days, whether the order of dismissal was entered by the Chief Judge or a panel, is critical to the achievement of these goals.
 In assuming the power to reinstate BDF's appeal eight months after the appeal was dismissed by the Chief Judge and two months after it erroneously decided the appeal, all on its own initiative and without any motion by BDF for that relief, the argument panel concluded (1) that the ten-day requirement for filing a motion to reconsider under Rule 8-602(c) applied only if the order of dismissal was entered by the Chief Judge on a motion to dismiss, rather than on his or her own initiative, and (2) that Raynor was not prejudiced by its belated action. Both of those conclusions were wrong.
 It is true that Rule 8-602(b) speaks of the authority of the Chief Judge to rule "on a motion to dismiss" pursuant to the six enumerated subsections of Rule 8-602(b), but, as we have said, by long-standing law and established practice in the Court of Special Appeals, that authority includes the power of the Chief Judge to act for the court on its own initiative. The reconsideration provision in Rule 8-602(c) thus necessarily applies to all orders of dismissal entered by the Chief Judge on behalf of the court. To conclude otherwise would be to invite terrible uncertainty as to the real and final status of appeals purportedly dismissed by the Chief Judge on his or her own initiative, especially in the case of cross-appeals, for, if the provisions of Rule 8-602(c) did not apply, Rule 8-605 likely would.
 The argument panel's conclusion that no prejudice from its action was suffered by Raynor is equally flawed. In reaching that conclusion, the court focused only on whether Raynor was prejudiced by the late filing of BDF's brief, but that is not the issue. Once BDF's appeal had been dismissed, Raynor reasonably could believe that it had nothing to lose by pursuing its own appeal. The worst that could happen would be for the court to affirm the $3,122 judgment, in which event it would have to pay the costs of the appeal. If it had known that, in considering its own appeal, the appellate court might decide to reinstate BDF's appeal and award BDF $16, 345$10,000 more than it asked forRaynor may, and probably would, have dismissed its appeal and terminated the appellate litigation, concluding that the risk of losing another $13,000 outweighed the prospect of gaining a $3,122 victory. Raynor clearly was prejudiced by being led to believe that BDF's request for affirmative relief was no longer before the court and then being ambushed, on its own motion for reconsideration, after the case was decided.
 The dismissal of BDF's appeal in September, 1998 effectively withdrew any authority of the appellate court to provide affirmative relief to BDF. The only remedy under the Rules available to BDF at that pointa fully effective remedy if it could make the casewas to file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 8-602(c) within 10 days. When it failed to do so, the court's ability under the Rules to provide affirmative relief ended.
 JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER, RAYNOR; COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT, BDF.
 NOTES
 [1] It appears from what was said at trial that the full rental, at the 150% rate, was paid into an escrow account held by the district court.
 [2] BDF claimed that the adjacent road and parking areas were not part of the leased premises and, for that reason, it had no obligation to repair them. Raynor conceded that there was no express provision in the lease requiring BDF to repair those areas but asserted that it was BDF's trucks and fork lifts that caused the damage, and that BDF was obliged to leave the property in the same condition it found it.
 [3] There is a discrepancy of approximately one dollar between the component figures and the sum of the judgment as computed by the trial court.
 [4] It would be helpful if litigants and their attorneys would follow the simple rules governing appeals. With exceptions not remotely relevant here, an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals may be taken only from a final judgment. Maryland Rule 2-601 requires that a judgment be set forth on a separate document and declares the judgment effective when that document is recorded by the clerk. That is when the 30-day period for noting an appeal commences. Although Rule 8-602(d) preserves an appeal taken after the announcement or signing of the judgment by the court but prior to its entry by the clerk, that rule is intended as a saving feature, not a preferred method of appellate practice. Disappointed litigants, and their attorneys, should wait for the entry of the judgment by the clerk before noting an appeal. Following that course not only makes the docket more coherent but eliminates uncertainty about the effect of a premature appeal on post-judgment motions, requests for in banc review, and the times for preparing and filing the record.
 [5] BDF attributes the peculiarity of its failure to timely file an appellant's brief, coupled with Raynor's filing its brief 30 days early, at about the time the appellant's brief was due, to confusion over which party was the appellant. On this record, we fail to see any basis for confusion. Apart from the clear mandate of Md. Rule 8-111(a), the scheduling order entered by the Court of Special Appeals in July, 1998 clearly identified BDF as the appellant and BDF's attorney as attorney "for appellant" and stated that the appellant's brief was due by August 24, 1998.
 [6] For convenience, we shall hereafter omit reference to a judge designated by the Chief Judge and refer only to the authority of the Chief Judge.
 [7] Rule 8-605 has a conforming provision. Section (a) of that Rule provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Rule 8-602(c), a party may file pursuant to this Rule a motion for reconsideration of a decision by the Court that disposes of the appeal."


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 27.8.2011
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 252/44
 Жалба, подадена на 1 юли 2011 г. — Bimbo/СХВП — Grupo Bimbo (GRUPO BIMBO)
 (Дело T-357/11)
 2011/C 252/95
 Език на жалбата: испански
 Страни
 Жалбоподател: Bimbo, SA (Барселона, Испания) (представител: J. Carbonell Callicó, abogado)
 Ответник: Служба за хармонизация във вътрешния пазар (марки, дизайни и модели)
 Друга страна в производството пред апелативния състав: Grupo Bimbo, SAB de CV (Мексико, Мексико)
 Искания на жалбоподателя
 Жалбоподателят иска от Общия съд:
 —
 съгласно член 65, параграф 3 от Регламент No 207/2009 да измени решението от 14 април 2011 г. на първи апелативен състав с довода, че е налице нарушение на член 8, параграф 5 от посочения регламент, като отхвърли изцяло заявката за регистрация на фигуративна марка No 5.025.598 „GRUPO BIMBO“ за всички посочени в нея стоки и услуги,
 —
 при условията на евентуалност, в случай че първото искане бъде отхвърлено, да отмени решението от 14 април 2011 г. на първи апелативен състав поради нарушение на член 8, параграф 5 от Регламент No 207/2009,
 —
 да осъди ответника да заплати съдебните разноски.
 Правни основания и основни доводи
 Заявител на марката на Общността: Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V.
 Марка на Общността, предмет на спора: фигуративна марка, която съдържа словния елемент „GRUPO BIMBO“ (заявка за регистрация No 5.025.598) за стоки и услуги от класове 5, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35 и 43
 Притежател на марката или знака, на която/който се прави позоваване в процедурата по възражение: жалбоподателят
 Марка или знак, на която/който се прави позоваване в подкрепа на възражението: испанска словна марка „BIMBO“ (No 2.689.432) за стоки от класове 5, 29 и 30, както и няколко испански фигуративни марки (No 464.785, No 2.244.562, No 2.244.563 и No 2.255.097), които съдържат словния елемент „BIMBO“ за стоки и услуги от класове 29, 30, 31, 32, 35 и 42.
 Решение на отдела по споровете: уважава възражението.
 Решение на апелативния състав: отменя частично обжалваното решение.
 Изложени правни основания: неправилно тълкуване и прилагане на член 8, параграф 5 от регламент No 207/2009, тъй като след като е приел, че конфликтните марки „BIMBO“ се общоизвестни на испанския пазар и че заявената марка „GRUPO BIMBO“ на практика е идентична с тях, заявката за тази марка е уважена частично с довода, че не е доказано наличието на извличане на неоснователна полза или на опасност за известността или отличителния характер на конфликтните марки.


text:
 26.1.2013
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 26/16
 A Raad van State (Hollandia) által 2012. október 5-én benyújtott előzetes döntéshozatal iránti kérelem — H. J. Kooistra, másik fél: Burgemeester van Skarsterlân
 (C-447/12. sz. ügy)
 2013/C 26/29
 Az eljárás nyelve: holland
 A kérdést előterjesztő bíróság
 Raad van State
 Az alapeljárás felei
 Felperes: H. J. Kooistra
 Másik fél: Burgemeester van Skarsterlân
 Az előzetes döntéshozatalra előterjesztett kérdések
 1.
 Úgy kell-e értelmezni a 2009. május 28-i 444/2009/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelettel módosított, a tagállamok által kiállított útlevelek és úti okmányok biztonsági jellemzőire és biometrikus elemeire vonatkozó előírásokról szóló, 2004. december 13-i 2252/2004/EK tanácsi rendelet (HL L 385., 1. o.) 1. cikkének (3) bekezdését, hogy e rendelet a tagállamok által, állampolgáraik részére kiállított személyazonosító igazolványokra, mint amilyen a holland személyazonosító igazolvány is, azok érvényességi idejétől és úti okmányként való felhasználhatóságától függetlenül nem alkalmazandó?
 2.
 Ha az első kérdésre adandó válaszból az derül ki, hogy a 2252/2004/EK rendelet módosításáról szóló, 2009. május 28-i 444/2009/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelettel (HL L 142., 1. o.; helyesbítés: HL L 188., 2009.7.18., 127. o.) módosított, a tagállamok által kiállított útlevelek és úti okmányok biztonsági jellemzőire és biometrikus elemeire vonatkozó előírásokról szóló, 2004. december 13-i 2252/2004/EK tanácsi rendelet (HL L 385., 1. o.) az úti okmányként való felhasználhatóságra tekintettel alkalmazandó a holland személyazonosító igazolványhoz hasonló személyazonosító igazolványokra, érvényes-e az említett rendelet 1. cikkének (2) bekezdése az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartájának 7. és 8. cikkére, valamint az emberi jogok és alapvető szabadságok védelméről szóló egyezmény 8. cikkére tekintettel?
 3.
 Amennyiben a második kérdésre azt a választ kell adni, hogy érvényes a 2252/2004/EK rendelet módosításáról szóló, 2009. május 28-i 444/2009/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelettel (HL L 142., 1. o.; helyesbítés: HL L 188., 2009.7.18., 127. o.) módosított, a tagállamok által kiállított útlevelek és úti okmányok biztonsági jellemzőire és biometrikus elemeire vonatkozó előírásokról szóló, 2004. december 13-i 2252/2004/EK tanácsi rendelet (HL L 385., 1. o.) 1. cikkének (2) bekezdése, úgy kell-e értelmezni a rendelet 4. cikkének (3) bekezdését az Európai Unió Alapjogi Chartájának 7. és 8. cikkére, az emberi jogok és alapvető szabadságok védelméről szóló egyezmény 8. cikkének 2. bekezdésére és a 95/46 irányelv (1) 6. cikke (1) bekezdésének b) pontjával összefüggésben értelmezett 7. cikkének f) pontjára tekintettel, hogy az említett rendelet tagállamok általi végrehajtása során jogszabály útján kell garantálni, hogy az említett rendelet alapján gyűjtött és tárolt biometrikus adatok nem „gyűjthetők”, kezelhetők és használhatók fel az okmánykiadástól eltérő célra?
 (1) A személyes adatok feldolgozása (helyesen: kezelése) vonatkozásában az egyének védelméről és az ilyen adatok szabad áramlásáról szóló, 1995. október 24-i 95/46/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv (HL L 281., 31. o.; magyar nyelvű különkiadás: 13. fejezet, 15. kötet, 355. o.).


type: other

text:
Vasemmistolaisesta taiteesta | Jukka Laajarinne
 Vasemmistolaisesta taiteesta
 Posted on helmikuu 13, 2010 by Jukka
 Kuvataiteilija, tutkija ja kuraattori Mikko Ijäs kirjoitti tämän päivän Hesarin yleisönosastolle kirjoituksen, jonka käytännöllisessä ajattelussa oli paljon kannattamaani asiaa, mutta jonka taustateoretisoinnit menivät ehkä hivenen metsään.
 Filed under: eksistenssi, Elämääni, Yhteiskunta | Tagged: Darwinismi, Kirkko, Konservatiivisuus, Mikko Ijäs, Oikeisto, Taide, Vasemmisto |
 « Turha tässä on enää vastaan rimpuilla Runotorstaita »
 Anu, on helmikuu 13, 2010 at 12:18 pm said:
 Jaksoin juuri ja juuri lukea/keskittyä aina siihen asti kunnes erehdyin toteamaan:
 Anu, on helmikuu 13, 2010 at 12:19 pm said:
 Argh – kirotut kirjoitusvirheet:
 tammikuu44, on helmikuu 13, 2010 at 5:31 pm said:
 Herra Jukka yrittää nyt kumartaa yhtäaikaa oikealle ja vasemmalle. Hienovaraisena ajattelijana hän näkee politiikassakin jotain ajattelua. Rohkeana työläisnaisena uskallan kuitenkin sanoa, että polittikassa pitäisi olla kyse käytännön työstä. Politiikka on hyvin raadollista.Sen tekijöden pitäisi omata tieto myös yhteiskunnan vähäosaisten oloista. Kyse on yhteisten perusasioiden hoidosta.
 Anun kanssa olen sama mieltä,että plutokratiasta koko politiika on lähtöisin. Rikkaus on valtaa ja se on aina taanut enemmän oikeuksia toimia kuin köyhyys.
 Raha on yhtä kuin valta ja oikesitlaisuutta.
 Jukka, on helmikuu 14, 2010 at 8:35 pm said:
 Anu: Hyviä täsmennyksiä. Tietenkään suurin osa maailmasta ei ole vielä postmodernissa tilassa, ja tarkastelukohteeni oli huonosti määritelty. Globaalisti tarkasteltuna jokseenkin kaikki suomalaiset – ehkä syrjäytyneimpiä yksilöitä lukuunottamata – ovat hallitsevaa luokkaa, haluavatpa sitä tunnustaa tai eivät.
 Mikko Ijäs, on helmikuu 14, 2010 at 9:27 pm said:
 Ihan kiinnostavia kommentteja. Kiitos siitä!
 Jukka, on helmikuu 14, 2010 at 9:44 pm said:
 Kiitos itsellesi ajatuksia herättävästä kirjoituksesta!
 Mikko, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 7:25 am said:
 Kiinnostava avaus ja keskustelu!
 Tero, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 11:41 am said:
 ”Valta. Valtarakennelmien suhteen vasemmisto on edelleen oppositiossa, oikeisto säilyttävässä asemassa.”
 Mikko Ijäs, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 12:34 pm said:
 Hienoa Jukka!
 Murrur, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 1:43 pm said:
 jos vasemmisto ymmärretään synonyyminä muutokselle ja oikeisto pysyvyydelle (perinteisyydelle, konservatiivisuudelle) jää jotain olennaista ulos. Enemmän näen että asiaa pitäisi käsitellä arvopohjan (”tavoite”) pohjalta, johta kohti muutos tai pysyvyys pyrkii. Se, että vasemmisto on ajanut muutosta on johtunut siitä, että vallanpitäjien arvopohja on ollut kaukana vasemmiston arvopohjasta. Ja nyt kun kokoomus (mm.) on viemässä peruspalveluita pois, on vasemmiston tavoitteen mukaista enemmän pysyvyys kuin muutos päinvastaiseen arvomaailmaan.
 Murrur, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 1:46 pm said:
 ”Lisäksi vielä on erikseen relativistinen vasemmisto/oikeisto ja absoluuttinen vasemmisto/oikeisto (riippuen tietysti millä kriteereillä nuo määritellään, joka ei ole tässä merkityksellistä).”
 Mikko Ijäs, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 5:17 pm said:
 Murrur, hyviä kommentteja!
 Siteeraan: ”jos halutaan määritellä vasemmistolainen tai oikeistolainen taide, on ensin määriteltävä se arvopohja mitä kukin näistä yleiskäsitteistä edustaa. parempi olisi määritellä enemmänkin pienempien lohkojen kautta, mutta jos vas-oikea jaolla tahdotaan määritellä on ensin määriteltävä kunkin arvopohja, jota vasten tätä peilataan.” Tavallaan tätä halusinkin kirjoituksellani käsitellä ja määritellä taiteilijan näkökulmasta hieman niitä ideologisia suuntauksia, miten ne näyttäytyvät taiteilijoiden silmissä. Tietenkään en koe edustavani koko taiteilijakuntaa, vaan ensisijaisesti kirjoitin omasta näkövinkkelistäni.
 Olen murrurin kanssa samaa mieltä, ettei vasemmistolaiset tai oikeistolaiset ideologiat ole mitenkään kiveen kirjoitettuja, vaan suomalaisessa puoluepoliittisessakin maailmassa nämä ideologiset suuntaukset limittyvät suurinpiirtein juuri Murrurin kuvaamalla tavalla.
 Kuvaamani darwinilais/vasemmistolaisen ideologian ja oikeistolaiskristillisen ideologian yhteys on ihan omaa aivoitustani, jolla oli tarkoitus niputtaa näiden kahden ideologian moraalista ajatusmaailmaa yhteen ja kuvata jonkin toimivan ja kuvaavan esimerkin kautta mahdollista taiteilijan ideologista ajatusmaailmaa. Perusväittämäni oli kenties, että ei ole ihme jos taiteilijat kallistuvat vasemmalle.
 Mutta upeaa, että asia kiinnostaa ja herättää keskustelua!
 Jukka, on helmikuu 15, 2010 at 10:28 pm said:
 Murrurin kommentteihin minulla ei ole mitään lisättävää. Ajateltua ja harkittua puhetta, joka avasi mainiosti erinäisiä keskustelussa esille tulleita näkökulmaeroja.
 Mikko Ijäs, on helmikuu 16, 2010 at 2:21 pm said:
 Ari Pennanen tämän päivän hesarissa! Lähinnä huvittaa...
 ”Vasemmistolaisuus ei takaa korkeatasoista taidetta
 Surkeata oli lukea Mikko Ijäksen kirjoituksen johtopäätöksiä (HS Mielipide 13. 2.). Hänen mukaansa vasemmistolaisuus käsittää kaiken hyvyyden ja empatian (tasa-arvo, oikeudenmukaisuus jne.) ja oikeistolaisuus sen vastakohdan.
 On anteeksiantamaton kömmähdys käsitellä darvinismia johonkin erityiseen (vasemmistolaiseen) ihanteeseen pyrkivänä luonnonvoimana. Darvinismi on selittävä mekanismi luonnon tapahtumille, ei metafyysinen kuvaus oikeasta. Vasemmistolaisuus pyrkii takaamaan tasa-arvon määrittelemällä ihmisten tarpeet ja tuottamalla ne kaikille tasa-arvoisesti.
 Oikeistolaisuus kokee mahdottomaksi määrittää ihmisten tarpeet, koska tarpeet vaihtelevat yksilöstä toiseen. Oikeistolaisuus korostaa yksilön omaa valintaa. Markkinatalous on seuraus, mekanismi, joka tunnustelee, mikä voisi olla yksilöille arvokasta. Sitten se pyrkii tuottamaan sellaista.
 Vasemmistolainen ihmisten tarpeiden määrittely edellyttää keskusjohtoista systeemiä määrittämään, mitkä ovat oikeita tarpeita, ja tuomitsemaan muut vääriksi. Siitä saadaan vääjäämättä yhteys stalinismiin, halusi Ijäs sitä tai ei. Se johtaa harvainvaltaan, ”oikean” mielipiteen ainutlaatuisuuteen.
 Ei taistolaisuus sattuma Suomessa Neuvostoliiton varjossa ollut, ainut hyväksyttävä mielipide. Ijäs peräsi oikean taiteen määrittelyä apurahojen suuntaamista varten. Siihen tarvitaan pieni ryhmä, joka määrittää oikean. Oikeistolaisuus suuntaisi varat ihmisten arvojakaumien mukaan. Se taas edellyttää markkinamekanismia, joka tunnustelee yhteiskuntaa.
 Tieteessä oikeistolaisuus kyllä toimii, Ijäksen mielipiteestä riippumatta. Pienet ryhmät eivät voi määrittää tieteen arviointia, se tapahtuu kaikkia arvosisältöjä kunnioittaen, ankaralla kilpailulla. Ijäksen mukaan ”taiteen korkeatasoisuus” perustuu julkiseen tukeen. Se väistämättä kaventaa ilmaisua ”oikeaksi hyväksyttyyn”.
 Näyttäisi kyllä kuitenkin siltä, että yksilöiden muutoksenhalu johtaa korkeatasoiseen taiteeseen. Vasemmistolaisessa Neuvostoliitossa korkeatasoista taidetta tekivät vasemmistolaisuudesta pois pyrkivät, Suomen taiteen kultakaudella Suomen kansallismieliset pyrkiessään pois Venäjän keskusjohdosta.
 Jukka, on helmikuu 16, 2010 at 3:25 pm said:
 ”Markkinatalous on seuraus, mekanismi, joka tunnustelee, mikä voisi olla yksilöille arvokasta. Sitten se pyrkii tuottamaan sellaista.”
 Tero, on helmikuu 16, 2010 at 4:54 pm said:
 ”Juu, erityisesti tämä pätee kaikkien anarkistipunkkarien pyrkimyksiin”
 Jukka, on helmikuu 16, 2010 at 5:35 pm said:
 Anarkismi on kyllä varsin yleisesti ja perinteisesti nähty vasemmistolaisena aatteena, ks. esim. Wikipedian englanninkielinen artikkeli: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-wing_politics
 Mikko Ijäs, on helmikuu 18, 2010 at 9:05 pm said:
 Teemu Mäki jatkaa keskustelua taidemaailman valtaapitävistä Voima-lehdessä:
 Ari Pennanen, on maaliskuu 15, 2010 at 9:41 am said:
 Käsittääkkesni Ijäksen hesarin teksi tähtäsi siihen, että yhteiskunnan tuella syntyy hyvää taidetta. Kun sitten vasemmistolaisuus tukee yhteiskunnan vahvaa panosta resurssiemme käytössä, niin kannattaahan taiteilijan kallistua vasemmalle, se lisää apurahoja. Ja sillä voi päästä porukkaan joka saa apurahoja.
 Jukka, on maaliskuu 15, 2010 at 10:52 am said:
 Ari Pennanen, on maaliskuu 15, 2010 at 11:27 am said:
 En minä niin raivokkaasti apurahoja vastusta. Mutta on se konservatiivinen järjestelmä, tukee pysyvyyttä, sitä hyväksi havaittua. Eivät Manet, Monet tai Gogh olisi apurahoja saaneet, he nousivat Akatemiaa vastaan. Laadukkaaseen taiteeseen, kuten tieteeseenkin liittyy paljon satunnaisuutta. Suuri määrä vaihtelua tuottaa aihioita, joista saattaa muodostua jotain joka koetaan laaduksi.
 Jukka, on maaliskuu 15, 2010 at 12:16 pm said:


type: contracts

text:
29.12.2004 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja L 388/3
 KIRJAVAHETUSE TEEL SÕLMITUD KOKKULEPE,
 ühelt poolt Euroopa ühenduste ja nende liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt endise Jugoslaavia
 Makedoonia Vabariigi vahelise stabiliseerimis- ja assotsiatsioonilepingu protokollile allakirjutamise ja
 selle ajutise kohaldamise kohta, et võtta arvesse Tšehhi Vabariigi, Eesti Vabariigi, Küprose Vabariigi,
 Läti Vabariigi, Leedu Vabariigi, Ungari Vabariigi, Malta Vabariigi, Poola Vabariigi, Sloveenia Vabariigi
 ja Slovaki Vabariigi ühinemist Euroopa Liiduga
 COUNCIL
 OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
 Brussels, 7 December 2004
 H.E. Mr Sasko STEFKOV,
 Ambassador,
 Head of the Mission of the former Yugoslav
 Republic of Macedonia to the European Communities.
 Sir,
 I have the honour to propose that, if it is acceptable to your Government, this letter and your confirmation shall together
 take the place of signature of the Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Commu-
 nities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, to take
 account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the
 Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and
 the Slovak Republic to the European Union.
 The text of the aforementioned Protocol, herewith annexed, has been approved for signature and provisional application by
 a decision of the Council of the European Union on 22 November 2004. In accordance with its Article 16.3, it shall apply
 provisionally with effect from 1 May 2004.
 Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
 For the European Community and its Member States
 ---pagebreak--- L 388/4 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 29.12.2004
 MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
 Brussels, 7 December 2004
 Dear Sir,
 On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter
 SGS4/14231 of today’s date regarding the signature of the Protocol to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between
 the Republic of Macedonia, of the one part, and the European Communities and their Member States, of the other part, to
 take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia,
 the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia
 and the Slovak Republic to the European Union.
 I confirm the acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia of the annexed text of the Protocol and consider
 your letter and this letter in reply as equivalent of its signature.
 However, I declare that the Republic of Macedonia does not accept the denomination used for my country in abovemen-
 tioned Protocol, having in view that the constitutional name of my country is the Republic of Macedonia.
 Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration,
 For the Republic of Macedonia
 Ambassador
 Saško STEFKOV
 ---pagebreak--- 29.12.2004 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja L 388/5
 COUNCIL
 OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
 Brussels, 7 December 2004
 H.E. Mr Sasko STEFKOV,
 Ambassador,
 Head of the Mission of the former Yugoslav
 Republic of Macedonia to the European Communities.
 Sir,
 I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today’s date.
 The European Community and its Member States notes that the Exchange of Letters between the European Community and
 its Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which takes the place of signature of the Protocol to the
 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and
 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the
 Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the
 Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, has
 been accomplished and that this cannot be interpreted as acceptance or recognition by the European Community and its
 Member States in whatever form or content of a denomination other than the «former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia».
 Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
 For the European Community and its Member States


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21992A0311(01)
 Protocollo riguardante il commercio e la cooperazione commerciale ed economica tra la Comunità europea del carbone e dell' acciaio (CECA), da un lato, e la Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca, dall' altra -
 Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 066 del 11/03/1992 pag. 0014 - 0029
 PROTOCOLLO riguardante il commercio e la cooperazione commerciale ed economica tra la Comunità europea del carbone e dell'acciaio (CECA), da un lato, e la Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca, dall'altroLA COMUNITÀ EUROPEA DEL CARBONE E DELL'ACCIAIO (CECA),da un lato, eLA REPUBBLICA FEDERATIVA CECA E SLOVACCA,dall'altro,CONSIDERANDO che il 24 settembre 1990 (1) la Comunità economica europea (CEE) e la Comunità europea dell'energia atomica (CEEA) e la Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca hanno concluso un accordo riguardante il commercio e la cooperazione commerciale ed economica per i settori soggetti alla suddetta Comunità,PERSEGUENDO gli stessi obiettivi e volendo trovare soluzioni analoghe per i settori soggetti alla CECA,DESIDERANDO completare il suddetto accordo al fine di applicare le stesse norme e gli stessi principi per i prodotti disciplinati dal trattato CECA,CONSIDERANDO gli sviluppi verificatisi dopo la conclusione di detto accordo, in particolare l'abolizione da parte della Comunità delle restrizioni quantitative specifiche relative ai prodotti disciplinati dal trattato CEE e originari della Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca,HANNO DECISO LE SEGUENTI DISPOSIZIONI:Articolo 1Gli articoli 1, 2, 4 e dal 12 al 19 dell'accordo tra la CEE e la Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca, concluso il 1o dicembre 1988 e riguardante il commercio e la cooperazione commerciale ed economica, si applicano anche ai settori disciplinati dal trattato che istituisce la CECA.Articolo 2Ciascuna parte contraente accorda alle importazioni dei prodotti dell'altra parte il livello di liberalizzazione più alto che essa applica di solito ai paesi terzi, tenendo conto delle disposizioni del GATT.A questo fine, a decorrere dall'entrata in vigore del presente protocollo, vengono abolite le restrizioni quantitative all'importazione in alcuni Stati membri indicati in allegato dei prodotti originari della Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca elencati e disciplinati dal trattato CECA.Articolo 3Il presente protocollo si applica, da un lato, ai territori in cui è in vigore il trattato che istituisce la CECA, alle condizioni in esso indicate, e, dall'altro, al territorio della Repubblica federativa ceca e slovacca.Articolo 4Il presente protocollo entra in vigore il primo giorno del secondo mese successivo alla data della notifica, ad opera delle parti contraenti, dell'espletamento delle procedure all'uopo necessarie (2). Esso cessa di essere applicabile qualora l'accordo di cui all'articolo 1 venga a scadere oppure sia denunciato.Articolo 5L'allegato al presente protocollo costituisce parte integrante dello stesso.Articolo 6Il presente protocollo è redatto in due esemplari nelle lingue cecoslovacca, danese, francese, greca, inglese, italiana, olandese, portoghese, spagnola e tedesca, ciascun testo facendo ugualmente fede.Fatto a Bruxelles, l'11 febbraio 1992. Per la Comunità europeadel carbone e dell'acciaioHorst KRENZLERDirettore generaleper le relazioni esternePer la Repubblica federativaceca e slovaccaIng. Ji Orí BRABECViceministroper il commercio estero(1) GU n. L 291 del 23. 10. 1990.(2) Le parti contraenti hanno notificato l'11 febbraio 1992 la conclusione dei procedimenti giuridici necessari.ALLEGATO GERMANIA >SPAZIO PER TABELLA>>SPAZIO PER TABELLA>BENELUX >SPAZIO PER TABELLA>>SPAZIO PER TABELLA>>SPAZIO PER TABELLA>ITALIA >SPAZIO PER TABELLA>>SPAZIO PER TABELLA>>SPAZIO PER TABELLA>


type: wikipedia

text:
Στα μαθηματικά, μία συνάρτηση λέγεται συνεχής όταν μια μικρή μεταβολή στο όρισμά της προκαλεί μικρή μόνο μεταβολή στην τιμή της. Για τις συναρτήσεις που ορίζονται στους πραγματικούς αριθμούς η γραφική παράσταση μιας συνεχούς συνάρτησης σε ένα διάστημα (και όχι σε μία ένωση διαστημάτων) μπορεί να σχεδιαστεί χωρίς να χρειαστεί να σηκώσουμε το μολύβι από το χαρτί.
 Συνέχεια πραγματικών συναρτήσεων
 Ορισμός Κωσύ (γαλλ. Cauchy) ή «έψιλον-δέλτα»
 Αν είναι μία συνάρτηση με πεδίο ορισμού και το ανήκει στο πεδίο ορισμού της, τότε η f ονομάζεται συνεχής στο αν
 Η έννοια της συνέχειας μιας συνάρτησης ορίζεται μόνο στα σημεία που ανήκουν στο πεδίο ορισμού της. Η συνάρτηση ονομάζεται συνεχής στο αν είναι συνεχής σε κάθε σημείο του , δηλαδή αν
 Σε αντιδιαστολή με την ομοιόμορφη συνέχεια, η συνέχεια αυτού του είδους λέγεται σημειακή συνέχεια.
 Ορισμός μέσω ορίων
 Ένας ορισμός που χρησιμοποιεί την έννοια του ορίου στις πραγματικές συναρτήσεις λέει ότι μία συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής σε κάποιο σημείο του πεδίου ορισμού της αν το όριο της συνάρτησης στο σημείο αυτό συμπίπτει με την τιμή της, δηλαδή αν:
 Αυτός ο ορισμός όμως δεν είναι αρκετός γιατί το όριο έχει έννοια μόνο όταν το είναι σημείο συσσώρευσης της συνάρτησης f και επομένως με τον ορισμό αυτό μπορούμε να ελέγξουμε αν μία συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής μόνο στα σημεία συσσώρευσής της, (αν όμως το δεν είναι σημείο συσσώρευσης της f, τότε είναι μεμονωμένο σημείο και επομένως η f είναι έτσι και αλλιώς συνεχής σε αυτό).
 Αρχή της μεταφοράς - ορισμός Χάινε (γερμ. Heine)
 Μια πραγματική συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής σε ένα σημείο του πεδίου ορισμού της Α αν και μόνο αν για κάθε ακολουθία στο Α, με:
 ισχύει:
 Με άλλα λόγια μία πραγματική συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής κατά Χάινε αν διατηρεί τα όρια, δηλαδή αν το όριο των εικόνων ισούται με την εικόνα του ορίου.
 Συνέχεια σε τοπολογικούς χώρους
 Μια συνάρτηση f ορισμένη στο X που λαμβάνει τιμές στο Y, όπου X και Y είναι τοπολογικοί χώροι, είναι συνεχής στο x όπου αν για κάθε γειτονιά V της f(x), υπάρχει μια γειτονιά U του x τέτοια ώστε . Με πιο απλά λόγια, αυτό σημαίνει ότι όσο μικρή κι αν γίνεται η V μπορούμε πάντα να βρούμε μια U του x που να απεικονίζεται στην V. Λέμε ότι η f είναι συνεχής αν είναι συνεχής σε κάθε .
 Συνέχεια σε διάστημα
 Ορισμός
 Μία συνάρτηση ονομάζεται συνεχής σε ένα κλειστό διάστημα , υποσύνολο του πεδίου ορισμού της , αν είναι συνεχής σε κάθε και
 Βασικά θεωρήματα συνεχών συναρτήσεων
 Θεώρημα Bolzano (Μπολτσάνο)
 Αν μια συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής σε ένα κλειστό διάστημα και ισχύει ότι , τότε υπάρχει ένα τουλάχιστον τέτοιο ώστε .
 Γραφικά, το θεώρημα Bolzano, σημαίνει ότι, αν η είναι συνεχής στο και ετερόσημοι, τότε η γραφική παράσταση της τέμνει τον άξονα σε ένα τουλάχιστον σημείο μεταξύ των .
 Όπως φαίνεται και από το παραπάνω σχήμα, το δεν είναι αναγκαστικά μοναδικό. Μπορεί να υπάρχουν περισσότερες από μία τιμές για τις οποίες είναι .
 Εδώ είναι
 Το αντίστροφο του θεωρήματος δεν ισχύει, δηλαδή : Αν υπάρχει τέτοιο ώστε , τότε ούτε η είναι υποχρεωτικά συνεχής στο , ούτε οι είναι οπωσδήποτε ετερόσημοι.
 Θεώρημα σταθερού σημείου
 Αν συνάρτηση συνεχής στο με , τότε υπάρχει ένα τουλάχιστον , τέτοιο ώστε .
 Θεώρημα ενδιάμεσης τιμής
 Το θεώρημα ενδιάμεσης τιμής βασίζεται στην αρχή της πληρότητας και διατυπώνεται ως εξής:
 Αν μια συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής σε ένα κλειστό διάστημα με , τότε για οποιοδήποτε μεταξύ των υπάρχει ένα τουλάχιστον τέτοιο ώστε .
 Το αντίστροφο και αυτού του θεωρήματος δεν ισχύει. Ακόμη, από το παραπάνω θεώρημα, δεν προκύπτει ότι οι τιμές της συνάρτησης ανήκουν υποχρεωτικά στο ,γιατί όπως φαίνεται στο παραπάνω σχήμα, υπάρχουν τιμές του , τέτοιες ώστε , αν και το δεν είναι μεταξύ των .
 Θεώρημα μέγιστης και ελάχιστης τιμής.
 Το θεώρημα μέγιστης-ελάχιστης τιμής διατυπώνεται ως εξής:
 Αν μία συνάρτηση είναι συνεχής στο κλειστό διάστημα , τότε υπάρχουν τέτοια ώστε
 Δηλαδή , οι τιμές και είναι αντιστοίχως, η ελάχιστη και η μέγιστη τιμή της στο .
 Το πιο πάνω δεν ισχύει αν η συνάρτηση είναι ορισμένη σε ανοικτό διάστημα. Για παράδειγμα η συνάρτηση με τύπο είναι συνεχής στο (0, 1) αλλά δεν έχει μέγιστο.
 Ομοιόμορφη συνέχεια
 Η έννοια της ομοιόμορφης συνέχειας είναι πιο ισχυρή από αυτή της (σημειακής) συνέχειας. Επιπλέον, ενώ η συνέχεια μιας συνάρτησης είναι τοπική έννοια, δηλαδή αναφέρεται σε συγκεκριμένα σημεία του πεδίου ορισμού της, η έννοια της ομοιόμορφης συνέχειας αναφέρεται σε ολόκληρο το πεδίο ορισμού της.
 Λέμε ότι μια συνάρτηση είναι ομοιόμορφα συνεχής αν
 Η θεμελιώδης διαφορά της ομοιόμορφης συνέχειας από τη σημειακή έγκειται στο ότι η ακτίνα δ δεν εξαρτάται από το κέντρο x0 κάθε φορά, παρά μόνο από την ακτίνα ε.
 Συνεχεια
 Λογισμός


text:
3o WRK de Kickboxing, valendo cinturão Profissional
 De 02/05/2015 a 02/05/2015 17:00
 BOLETIM OFICIAL No 06/2015
 1- 3o WRK de Kickboxing, valendo cinturão Profissional!
 Informo aos interessados que o 3o WRK de Kickboxing, será realizado no dia 02 de Maio, no Tamoio Futebol Clube, Av. Presidente Kennedy, 101 – Porto da Pedra – São Gonçalo, RJ, das 17:00 as 21:00 h.
 Low Kicks – masc. - até 66,800 Kg
 1a luta – Charles Fernandes de Oliveira - ACKB X Augusto Serafim Fernandes – SEP-FX
 2o luta – Gelson Lopes de Lima Junior - AUFAM X Lucas Alexsander dos Santos de Oliveira - AKGTRJ
 Low Kicks – masc. - até 60 Kg
 3a luta – Emerson Assis de Mello - AME X Jorge José Coutinho da Silva – AFKB
 4o luta – Petronio da Silva Oliveira – ALCERJ X Dennys da Silva Ferreira - SEP-FX
 K1 Rules – masc. - até 69,100 Kg
 5a luta – Jorge Roberto Cadilho da Silva Junior - AMKB X Carlos Alberto Cabral dos Santos – AUFAM
 6a luta – Derlecio Souza Azevedo - ALUMAR X Edgar Coelho Oliveira – AKBFF
 Full Contact – masc. + de 94,100 Kg
 7a luta – Cristiano Vicente da Silva Ferreira - ACKB X Alan Cardeck Freitas de Souza - AME Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 Low Kicks – masc. - até 56,400 Kg
 8a luta – Emerson Luiz Lima da Costa - FC X Marco Antonio Agostinho Dias - ACKB Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 Thai Kickboxing – masc. - até 64,500 Kg
 9a luta – Alexsander Abreu Santos Alberto - AME X Pablo Souza de Andrade – AFAM Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 K1 Rules – masc. - até 85,1000 Kg
 10a luta – Leandro Oliveira Cruz - AKGTRJ X Fabio Julio da Silva - AUFAM Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 K1 Rules – masc. - até 60 Kg
 11a luta – Raul de Andrade Brito - AKBFF X Lucas da Cruz Silva – AME Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 12a luta – Vencendor da 1a luta X Vencendor da 2a luta Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 13a luta – Vencendor da 3a luta X Vencendor da 4a luta Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 14a luta – Vencendor da 5a luta X Vencendor da 6a luta Valendo o cinturão do WRK
 3o WRK de Kickboxing
 Artigo 1o - O 3o WRK de Kickboxing é uma competição oficial do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, que será realizada pela Liga Gonçalense de Desportos e organizada pela FKBERJ, com o objetivo principal de estimular, propagar e divulgar o Kickboxing, onde participarão somente atletas que participaram do Campeonato Estadual 2014;
 Artigo 4o - As Associações terão como prazo para confirmar os Atletas convocados pelo Departamento Profissional da FKBERJ, para participar do 3o WRK de Kickboxing, até o dia 06.03.15, após esta data, convocaremos o atleta reserva, ou atletas que estão no Ranking Profissional da FKBERJ;
 Artigo 5o - Os atletas convocados pela FKBERJ, para participar do 3o WRK de Kickboxing, se obrigam a preencher ficha de filiação Profissional da FKBERJ, exceto os que já são registrados como Profissional na FKBERJ;
 Artigo 6o - Serão considerados aptos a competir no WRK, somente atletas Federados e com a carteira de Profissional da FKBERJ;
 Artigo 9o - A pesagem de todos os atletas, será realizada no dia 01 de Maio, no Clube Tamoio, São Gonçalo, as 16:00h. Maiores informações 21 964619073 Marcelo Marinho;
 Artigo 10 - Cada Associação participante é conhecedora das normas das Entidades e Órgãos superiores;
 Artigo 11 - A FKBERJ somente oferecerá luva. O atleta deverá portar todo material necessário para participar da sua modalidade. O não cumprimento deste artigo significará a desclassificação do mesmo;
 Artigo 12 - As infrações disciplinares serão julgadas pelo Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva da FKBERJ;
 Artigo 13 - Os casos omissos ao presente regulamento serão resolvidos pelo Presidente da FKBERJ;
 São Gonçalo, 26 de Fevereiro de 2015.


type: legislation

text:
 21.10.2011
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 276/13
 VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE KOMISIE (EÚ) č. 1051/2011
 z 20. októbra 2011,
 ktorým sa vykonáva nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 692/2011 o európskej štatistike cestovného ruchu, pokiaľ ide o štruktúru správ o kvalite údajov a zasielanie údajov
 (Text s významom pre EHP)
 EURÓPSKA KOMISIA,
 so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
 so zreteľom na nariadenie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 692/2011 zo 6. júla 2011 o európskej štatistike cestovného ruchu (1), a najmä na jeho článok 6 ods. 4 a článok 9 ods. 2 a 3,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Nariadením (EÚ) č. 692/2011 sa stanovil spoločný rámec pre systematický vývoj, tvorbu a zverejňovanie európskej štatistiky cestovného ruchu.
 (2)
 Mala by sa zabezpečiť primeraná úroveň kvality zverejňovaných údajov a zachovanie existujúcich štatistických radov o cestovnom ruchu.
 (3)
 Mali by sa stanoviť pravidlá pre správy o kvalite údajov a ich štruktúru, ako aj praktické opatrenia pre zasielanie údajov.
 (4)
 Je vhodné v čo najväčšom možnom rozsahu využívať európsku štatistiku o cestovnom ruchu, mala by sa však rešpektovať dôvernosť záznamov individuálnych údajov.
 (5)
 Určité údaje by sa mali sprístupniť členským štátom, aby mohli zverejniť štatistické údaje o cestovnom ruchu na vnútroštátnej úrovni.
 (6)
 Opatrenia stanovené v tomto nariadení sú v súlade so stanoviskom Výboru pre Európsky štatistický systém,
 PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
 Článok 1
 V prílohe I sa stanovujú pravidlá pre správy o kvalite údajov a ich štruktúru.
 Článok 2
 V prílohe II sa stanovuje štandard na výmenu agregovaných tabuliek.
 Článok 3
 V prílohe III sa stanovuje štandard na výmenu súborov mikroúdajov.
 Článok 4
 Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dvadsiatym dňom po jeho uverejnení v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
 Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
 V Bruseli 20. októbra 2011
 Za Komisiu
 predseda
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 192, 22.7.2011, s. 17.
 PRÍLOHA I
 Štruktúra správ o kvalite údajov
 Pravidlá a štruktúra poskytovania metaúdajov
 Členské štáty poskytnú Komisii (Eurostatu) referenčné metaúdaje v súlade so štruktúrou pre metaúdaje Euro SDMX podľa odporúčania Komisie 2009/498/ES (1) pre európsky štatistický systém.
 Členské štáty poskytujú požadované metaúdaje (aj metaúdaje o kvalite) v súlade so štandardom na výmenu stanoveným Komisiou (Eurostatom). Metaúdaje sa poskytujú Eurostatu prostredníctvom jednotného miesta vstupu alebo v takej forme, aby ich Komisia (Eurostat) mohla prijať v elektronickej podobe.
 Obsah metaúdajov a správ o kvalite údajov
 Správa obsahuje tieto pojmy a pokrýva vnútorný cestovný ruch (príloha I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011), ako aj národný cestovný ruch (príloha II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011):
 (1)
 Relevantnosť vrátane úplnosti údajov z hľadiska potrieb používateľa a úplnosti údajov z hľadiska požiadaviek a odporúčaní stanovených v článkoch 2, 3, 4 a 10 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 692/2011.
 (2)
 Presnosť vrátane chyby pokrytia (nadmerné pokrytie a nedostatočné pokrytie), systematickej chyby spôsobenej pamäťou, chyby v klasifikácii, položkovej a jednotkovej neodpovede (v členení podľa typu jednotkovej neodpovede), miery imputácie (pre oddiel 2 prílohy II), výberovej chyby a variačných koeficientov pre súbor hlavných ukazovateľov a členení (ako aj opis vzorcov alebo algoritmov použitých na výpočet variačných koeficientov) a revízie údajov (politika, prax, vplyv na hlavné ukazovatele).
 (3)
 Aktuálnosť vrátane informácií o kalendári procesu tvorby štatistiky až do zverejnenia výsledkov (prvé, definitívne a úplné výsledky).
 (4)
 Časová presnosť vrátane informácií o dátumoch zaslania údajov Komisii (Eurostatu) v porovnaní s lehotami stanovenými v článku 9 ods. 4 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 692/2011 pre všetky poskytnutia údajov týkajúce sa referenčného roka.
 (5)
 Prístupnosť a jasnosť vrátane informácií o harmonograme zverejnenia údajov pre hlavné publikácie (papierové alebo online) týkajúcich sa referenčných období referenčného roka.
 (6)
 Porovnateľnosť vrátanie porovnateľnosti medzi zemepisnými oblasťami, časovej porovnateľnosti (zlom v časovom rade) a porovnateľnosti medzi rôznymi oblasťami štatistiky.
 (7)
 Koherencia vrátane koherencie v rámci jednej oblasti s údajmi z iných zdrojov, koherencie s inými oblasťami štatistiky, koherencie medzi ročnými štatistikami a krátkodobými štatistikami.
 (8)
 Náklady a zaťaženie vrátane (ak je k dispozícii) kvantitatívnych/finančných a kvalitatívnych údajov o nákladoch súvisiacich so zberom a s tvorbou štatistiky a zaťažením respondentov a opisu nedávnych alebo plánovaných opatrení na zlepšenie efektívnosti nákladov a/alebo zníženie zaťaženosti respondentov.
 (9)
 Metaúdaje týkajúce sa prezentácie štatistiky a štatistického spracovania vrátane informácií (ak sú dostupné) o použitých pojmoch, vymedzeniach a klasifikáciách, použitých zdrojoch, opore výberu, cieľovej populácii, periodicite zberu údajov, type zisťovania a metódach zberu údajov, rozsahu (a obmedzeniach rozsahu), systéme zaraďovania do vzoriek a metodike, postupoch dopočtu, zaobchádzaní s dôvernými údajmi a kontrole zverejňovania údajov.
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 168, 30.6.2009, s. 50.
 PRÍLOHA II
 Agregované tabuľky na účely zasielania údajov uvedených v prílohe I a v oddieloch 1 a 3 prílohy II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 Štruktúra súboru a kódovanie
 Členské štáty poskytujú údaje požadované v tomto nariadení v súlade so štandardom na výmenu stanoveným Komisiou (Eurostatom). Údaje sa poskytujú Eurostatu prostredníctvom jednotného miesta vstupu alebo v takej forme, aby ich Komisia (Eurostat) mohla prijať v elektronickej podobe.
 Odkaz na „identifikátory“ znamená identifikátory špecifikované Komisiou (Eurostatom). Komisia (Eurostat) poskytne podrobnú dokumentáciu týkajúcu sa týchto identifikátorov a poskytne doplňujúce pokyny týkajúce sa štandardu na výmenu. Údaje, ktoré nie sú v súlade s ustanoveniami týkajúcimi sa štandardu na výmenu stanoveného Komisiou (Eurostatom), sa pokladajú za neposkytnuté údaje.
 Každý súbor údajov obsahuje políčka uvedené v tejto prílohe.
 Záhlavie
 Záhlavie má identifikovať rady zasielaných údajov a pozostáva z troch políčok:
 —
 Referenčné obdobie je sedemmiestne, prvé štyri uvádzajú rok a posledné tri obdobie v roku. Napríklad: 2012A00 (ročné údaje za rok 2012) alebo 2012M01 (mesačné údaje za január 2012).
 —
 Kód krajiny je dvojmiestny a obsahuje dvojmiestny kód členského štátu zasielajúceho údaje. Napríklad: BE (Belgicko), BG (Bulharsko) a pod.
 —
 Predmet pozostáva z jedného z týchto identifikátorov súboru údajov:
 —
 int_cap_annual
 vnútorný cestovný ruch – kapacita ubytovacích zariadení cestovného ruchu
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 1 prílohy I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 int_occ_annual
 vnútorný cestovný ruch – ročné údaje o využití ubytovacích zariadení cestovného ruchu (vrátane odhadu v súvislosti so zariadeniami nespĺňajúcimi prahové hodnoty)
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 2A prílohy I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 int_occ_mnight
 vnútorný cestovný ruch – mesačné údaje o prenocovaní
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 2B prílohy I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 int_occ_marrno
 vnútorný cestovný ruch – mesačné údaje o príchodoch a čistej miere využitia lôžok
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 2B prílohy I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 int_non_rented
 vnútorný cestovný ruch – ročné údaje o prenocovaní v neprenajatom ubytovaní
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 4 prílohy I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 nat_dem_partic
 národný cestovný ruch – účasť na cestovnom ruchu
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 1 prílohy II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 nat_dem_sdvout
 národný cestovný ruch – jednodňové návštevy v rámci pasívneho cestovného ruchu
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 3A prílohy II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 —
 nat_dem_sdvdom
 národný cestovný ruch – jednodňové návštevy v rámci domáceho cestovného ruchu
 údaje uvedené v oddiele 3B prílohy II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 Údaje
 Táto časť obsahuje hodnoty premenných a členení pre každý súbor údajov a pozostáva zo šiestich políčok:
 —
 Premenná obsahuje identifikátor premennej.
 —
 Členenie obsahuje identifikátor kategórie členenia alebo v prípade potreby kombinácie kategórií členenia.
 —
 Jednotka obsahuje identifikátor mernej jednotky.
 —
 Hodnota obsahuje dopočítanú hodnotu charakteristiky populácie týkajúcu sa premennej a členenia, ktoré boli uvedené.
 —
 Flag obsahuje „flags“ (označenie): „údaje sa môžu zverejniť“, „údaje sú nespoľahlivé a nemajú sa zverejniť, ale je možné ich kombinovať s inými údajmi v agregovaných tabuľkách na vyššej úrovni“ a „údaje podliehajú primárnej alebo sekundárnej ochrane údajov“.
 —
 Komentár obsahuje akýkoľvek krátky komentár alebo metaúdaje týkajúce sa jednej konkrétnej hodnoty (komentáre alebo poznámky pod čiarou týkajúce sa premenných alebo členení sa uvedú v poznámkach).
 Poznámky
 Táto časť obsahuje vysvetlivky, poznámky pod čiarou, metaúdaje týkajúce sa jednej alebo viacerých premenných alebo členení pre každý súbor údajov alebo všeobecné poznámky o celom súbore údajov a pozostáva z troch políčok:
 —
 Premenná obsahuje identifikátor premennej, ktorej sa poznámka týka.
 —
 Členenie obsahuje identifikátor kategórie členenia alebo v prípade potreby kombinácie kategórií členenia, ktorých sa poznámka týka.
 —
 Komentár obsahuje voľne formulovanú poznámku, ktorú je možné uverejniť ako metodickú poznámku alebo dodatočné vysvetlenie s cieľom lepšie pochopiť zasielané údaje.
 PRÍLOHA III
 Súbory mikroúdajov na účely zasielania údajov uvedených v oddiele 2 prílohy II k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 692/2011
 Štruktúra súboru a kódovanie
 Každá sledovaná cesta predstavuje individuálny záznam v zaslanom súbore mikroúdajov. Tento súbor mikroúdajov sa má úplne skontrolovať, upraviť a v prípade potreby imputovať, a má byť v súlade so štruktúrou súboru a kódovaním uvedenými v nasledujúcej tabuľke. Komisia (Eurostat) poskytne dodatočné usmernenie v súvislosti s formátom na zasielanie údajov.
 Údaje, ktoré nezodpovedajú ustanoveniam o štandarde na výmenu stanovenom v tejto prílohe, sa budú považovať za nezaslané.
 Stĺpec
 Identifikátor
 Opis
 Filter/poznámky
 1/6
 000001-999999
 Poradové číslo cesty
 CHARAKTERISTIKA CESTY
 7/8
 Mesiac odchodu
 01-24
 Číslo mesiaca (január referenčného roku = 01, december referenčného roku = 12; január predchádzajúceho kalendárneho roka = 13, december predchádzajúceho roka = 24)
 9/11
 Dĺžka cesty v počte prenocovaní
 001-366
 Počet nocí (trojmiestne číslo)
 12/14
 Dĺžka cesty: počet prenocovaní na domácom území
 Len pre cesty v rámci pasívneho cestovného ruchu.
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 000-183
 Počet nocí (trojmiestne číslo)
 15/17
 Hlavná cieľová krajina
 001-999
 Kód podľa zoznamu krajín v metodickej príručke vypracovanej podľa článku 10 nar. 692/2011
 18
 Hlavný dôvod cesty
 1
 Súkromný/osobný dôvod: zábava, rekreácia, dovolenka
 2
 Súkromný/osobný dôvod: návšteva príbuzných a priateľov
 3
 Súkromný/osobný dôvod: iný (napr. liečenie, púť)
 4
 Služobný/pracovný dôvod
 19/24
 Typ miesta určenia
 Stĺpec 18 = [1, 2, 3];
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 19
 1
 Mesto = áno
 2
 Mesto = nie
 9
 Mesto = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 20
 1
 Mesto pri mori = áno
 2
 Mesto pri mori = nie
 9
 Mesto pri mori = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 21
 1
 Vidiek (vrátane jazier, riek atď.) = áno
 2
 Vidiek (vrátane jazier, riek atď.) = nie
 9
 Vidiek (vrátane jazier, riek atď.) = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 22
 1
 Výletná loď = áno
 2
 Výletná loď = nie
 9
 Výletná loď = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 23
 1
 Hory (vysočiny, vrchoviny atď.) = áno
 2
 Hory (vysočiny, vrchoviny atď.) = nie
 9
 Hory (vysočiny, vrchoviny atď.) = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 24
 1
 Iné = áno
 2
 Iné = nie
 9
 Iné = neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 25
 Účasť detí
 Stĺpec 18 = [1, 2, 3];
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 9
 Neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 18 = 4)
 26
 Hlavný dopravný prostriedok
 1
 Lietadlo (letecké služby, pravidelné alebo nepravidelné linky, alebo iné letecké služby)
 2
 Loď (osobné linky a trajekty, okružné plavby, rekreačné lode, prenajímané plavidlo atď.)
 3
 Vlak
 4
 Autobus (pravidelné alebo nepravidelné linky)
 5
 Motorové vozidlo (súkromné alebo prenajaté)
 6
 Iný (napríklad bicykel)
 27
 Hlavný druh ubytovania
 1
 Prenajaté ubytovanie: hotelové alebo podobné zariadenia
 2
 Prenajaté ubytovanie: kempingy alebo miesta pre karavány (nie na trvalé bývanie)
 3
 Prenajaté ubytovanie: iné prenajaté ubytovanie (zdravotnícke zariadenia, mládežnícke ubytovne, miesta na spanie v jachtárskych prístavoch atď.)
 4
 Neprenajaté ubytovanie: vlastná rekreačná nehnuteľnosť
 5
 Neprenajaté ubytovanie: ubytovanie poskytnuté bezplatne u príbuzných alebo priateľov
 6
 Neprenajaté ubytovanie: iné neprenajaté ubytovanie
 28
 Rezervácia cesty: využitie služieb cestovných kancelárií alebo cestovných agentúr na rezerváciu hlavného dopravného prostriedku
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 9
 Neviem
 29
 Rezervácia cesty: využitie služieb cestovných kancelárií alebo cestovných agentúr na rezerváciu hlavného druhu ubytovania
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 9
 Neviem
 30
 Rezervácia cesty (nezávislá):
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 Stĺpec 28 = 2 a stĺpec 29 = 2
 1
 Služby boli rezervované priamo u poskytovateľa služieb
 2
 Rezervácia nebola potrebná
 9
 Neuplatňuje sa (stĺpec 28 ≠ 2 alebo stĺpec 29 ≠ 2)
 31
 Rezervácia cesty: organizovaný zájazd
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 32
 Rezervácia cesty: rezervácia hlavného dopravného prostriedku prostredníctvom internetu
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 9
 Neviem
 33
 Rezervácia cesty: rezervácia hlavného druhu ubytovania prostredníctvom internetu
 Premenná poskytovaná raz za tri roky. V rokoch, keď je zasielanie nepovinné, sa kód nevypĺňa.
 1
 Áno
 2
 Nie
 9
 Neviem
 34/41
 Výdavky týkajúce sa dopravy počas cesty (na osobu)
 00000000-99999998
 Suma v eurách (osemmiestna)
 42/49
 Výdavky týkajúce sa ubytovania počas cesty (na osobu)
 00000000-99999998
 Suma v eurách (osemmiestna)
 50/57
 Výdavky na stravu a nápoje v kaviarňach a reštauráciách počas cesty (na osobu)
 Nepovinná premenná; ak sa nezasiela, kód sa nevypĺňa.
 00000000-99999998
 Suma v eurách (osemmiestna)
 58/65
 Iné výdavky (na osobu) počas cesty (celkové iné výdavky vrátane tovaru dlhodobej spotreby a cenností)
 00000000-99999998
 Suma v eurách (osemmiestna)
 66/73
 Tovar dlhodobej spotreby a cennosti (podkategória iných výdavkov (na osobu) počas cesty)
 00000000-99999998
 Suma v eurách (osemmiestna)
 PROFIL NÁVŠTEVNÍKA
 74
 Pohlavie
 1
 Muž
 2
 Žena
 75/77
 Vek
 000-198
 Vek v zavŕšených rokoch (trojmiestne číslo)
 78/79
 Krajina bydliska
 Dvojmiestny kód krajiny (Belgicko = BE, Bulharsko = BG atď.)
 80
 Úroveň vzdelania
 Nepovinná premenná; ak sa nezasiela, kód sa nevypĺňa.
 1
 Nižšie (ISCED 0, 1 alebo 2)
 2
 Stredoškolské (ISCED 3 alebo 4)
 3
 Vysokoškolské (ISCED 5 alebo 6)
 81
 Ekonomické postavenie
 Nepovinná premenná; ak sa nezasiela, kód sa nevypĺňa.
 1
 Zamestnaný (zamestnanec alebo samostatne zárobkovo činná osoba)
 2
 Nezamestnaný(-á)
 3
 Študent (alebo žiak)
 4
 Iný nepracujúci jednotlivec
 82
 Príjem domácnosti v kvartiloch
 Nepovinná premenná; ak sa nezasiela, kód sa nevypĺňa.
 1
 Prvý kvartil
 2
 Druhý kvartil
 3
 Tretí kvartil
 4
 Štvrtý kvartil
 KOEFICIENT DOPOČTU
 83/91
 Koeficient dopočtu zo vzorky na populáciu
 000000-999999
 V stĺpcoch 83 až 88 sa uvádzajú celé čísla.
 000-999
 V stĺpcoch 89 až 91 sa uvádzajú desatinné čísla.


text:
Tuto († 10. Oktober 930) war neunter Bischof von Regensburg von 893 bis 930. Er wird als Seliger verehrt.
 Wie die anderen ersten Bischöfe des Bistums war Tuto auch Vorsteher von Kloster Sankt Emmeram.
 In kirchlichen Angelegenheiten reiste er nach Prag, wo er von Wenzel von Böhmen zum Bau einer Gedenkstätte für dessen Großmutter Ludmilla und später der Veitskirche auf der Prager Burg beratend hinzugezogen wurde.
 In seine Schaffenszeit fällt auch die Errichtung der Burg Stauf, die der Abwehr der Ungarn und der Verteidigung eines der wertvollsten Gebiete des Hochstifts diente.
 Er stand in engem Kontakt zu den letzten Karolingern Arnulf und Ludwig dem Kind. Arnulf schenkte dem Kloster den Codex aureus. Beide Herrscher und auch Tuto ließen sich im Kloster beisetzen.
 Literatur
 Michael Buchberger (Hrsg.): 1200 Jahre Bistum Regensburg. Regensburg 1939, S. 23
 Josef Staber: Kirchengeschichte des Bistums Regensburg. Regensburg 1966, S. 22
 Bischof von Regensburg
 Römisch-katholischer Bischof (9. Jahrhundert)
 Römisch-katholischer Bischof (10. Jahrhundert)
 Abt (Sankt Emmeram)
 Seliger
 Geboren im 9. Jahrhundert
 Gestorben 930
 Mann