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 51998PC0303
 Proposta de regulamento (CE) do Conselho que altera o Regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 que institui um regime de controlo aplicável à política comum das pescas /* COM/98/0303 final - CNS 98/0170 */
 Jornal Oficial no C 201 de 27/06/1998 p. 0014
 Proposta de regulamento (CE) do Conselho que altera o regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 que institui um regime de controlo aplicável à política comum das pescas (98/C 201/08) COM(1998) 303 final - 98/0170(CNS)(Apresentada pela Comissão em 14 de Maio de 1998)O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 43o,Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão,Tendo em conta o parecer do Parlamento Europeu,Tendo em conta o parecer do Comité Económico e Social,Considerando que as práticas de pesca, de transporte dos produtos da pesca e de comercialização evoluíram; que é, pois, necessário adaptar as medidas de controlo; que, nesse sentido, são introduzidas alterações para suprir lacunas específicas do regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 do Conselho (1), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) no 2635/97 (2);Considerando que o registo das espécies a bordo constitui uma obrigação fundamental dos capitães dos navios de pesca para efeitos de controlo; que essa obrigação deve ser simplificada; que é, em consequência, necessário modificar o artigo 6o do Regulamento no 2847/93 do Conselho e revogar o artigo 5o do Regulamento (CEE) no 2241/87 do Conselho, de 23 de Julho de 1987, que estabelece certas medidas de controlo em relação às actividades piscatórias (3), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CEE) no 3483/88 (4);Considerando que devem ser reforçadas os controlos após o desembarque; que as informações sobre os produtos da pesca referidas no Regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 do Conselho devem estar disponíveis desde o desembarque até à última fase da comercialização dos referidos produtos; que, nesse sentido, devem ser estabelecidas notas de venda e declarações de tomada a cargo de que constem as informações necessárias para fins de controlo;Considerando que as operações de transbordo e, em geral, as que implicam a acção conjunta de vários navios nas águas comunitárias apresentaram importantes dificuldades de controlo em determinadas pescarias; que é, pois, necessário submetê-las a determinadas condições ligadas ao respeito dos processos de controlo que terão sido definidos;Considerando que é necessário garantir à Comissão, a seu pedido específico, o acesso directo às bases de dados actualizadas pelos Estados-membros, para lhe permitir cumprir eficazmente as tarefas de controlo que lhe são confiadas a título do Regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 do Conselho;Considerando que é necessário integrar, no presente regulamento, as medidas de controlo, de inspecção e de vigilância aplicáveis aos navios de pesca que arvoram pavilhão de um país terceiro e exercem actividades de pesca na zona de pesca comunitária; que é, nomeadamente, conveniente submeter esses navios, que operam nessa zona, à vigilância contínua por satélite a partir da data em que o sistema «Vessel Monitoring System» (VMS) seja aplicável a todos os navios de pesca comunitários que excedam um certo comprimento; que é igualmente importante reforçar a inspecção e a vigilância dos desembarques efectuados pelos navios que arvoram pavilhão de um país terceiro, bem como, nomeadamente na sequência das medidas adoptadas por determinadas organizações regionais de pesca cujo objectivo é reforçar a eficácia das medidas de conservação dos recursos no alto mar, das capturas realizadas nessas zonas;Considerando que, para permitir à Comissão assumir o seu papel eficazmente, é necessário prever processos de observação que permitam aos inspectores mandatados pela Comissão verificar a aplicação do presente regulamento;Considerando que, para reforçar e facilitar a cooperação entre todas as autoridades que participam no controlo na Comunidade, bem como a inspecção e a vigilância das actividades do sector das pescas, é conveniente prever um quadro geral que permita às autoridades solicitar a assistência mútua e a troca das informações pertinentes entre todas as autoridades em causa e estabelecer programas de controlo específicos, nomeadamente com vista a remediar os problemas ligados à sobreexploração de determinadas unidades populacionais;Considerando que é conveniente adiar a aplicação das novas disposições relativas aos transbordos e outras operações conjuntas de pesca entre vários navios de pesca até à entrada em vigor das regras de execução;Considerando que as regras em matéria de saúde pública e de higiene aplicáveis aos produtos da pesca, tanto comunitários como importados, são fixadas pelas Directivas 91/492/CEE e 91/493/CEE (5);Considerando que é, pois, conveniente alterar o Regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 do Conselho,ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO:Artigo 1o O Regulamento (CEE) no 2847/93 é alterado do seguinte modo:1. O título I passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«TÍTULO IControlo, inspecção e vigilância»2. O artigo 2o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«Artigo 2o1. A fim de assegurar o respeito do conjunto da regulamentação em vigor, cada Estado-membro controlará, inspeccionará e vigiará, no seu território e nas águas marítimas sob a sua soberania ou jurisdição, todas as actividades do sector das pescas e nomeadamente o exercício da pesca, as actividades de transbordo e de desembarque, de comercialização, de transporte e de armazenagem do pescado, bem como o registo dos desembarques e das vendas.2. Cada Estado-membro controlará e, se for caso disso, inspeccionará e vigiará, fora da zona de pesca comunitária, as actividades dos seus navios de pesca, com vista a assegurar o respeito da regulamentação comunitária aplicável nessas águas.»3. No no 2 do artigo 3o, é suprimida a segunda frase:4. O artigo 5o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«Artigo 5oAs regras de execução do presente título são adoptadas, sempre que necessário, de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o, nomeadamente, em relação:a) À identificação dos inspectores oficialmente designados, bem como dos navios, das aeronaves e de quaisquer outros meios de inspecção que possam ser utilizados por um Estado-membro;b) Ao processo de inspecção e de vigilância das actividades do sector das pescas;c) À marcação e identificação dos navios de pesca e das suas artes;d) À certificação das características dos navios de pesca relativas ao exercício das actividades de pesca.»5. O no 2 do artigo 6o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«2. Devem ser inscritas no diário de bordo todas as quantidades de uma espécie mantida a bordo superiores a 50 kg de peso vivo.»6. O no 2 do artigo 9o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«2. Se a primeira colocação no mercado de produtos da pesca desembarcados num Estado-membro for efectuada de forma diferente da prevista no no 1, os produtos da pesca desembarcados não poderão ser levantados enquanto não tiver sido apresentado às autoridades competentes um dos seguintes documentos:- uma nota de venda, nos casos em que os produtos são colocados à venda no local de desembarque,- uma cópia de um dos documentos previstos no artigo 13o, nos casos em que os produtos são colocados à venda num lugar diferente do de desembarque, devendo essa cópia ser completada por uma nota de venda estabelecida no momento da venda efectiva,- uma declaração de tomada a cargo, nos casos em que os produtos não são colocados à venda nem destinados a uma colocação à venda posterior.O comprador e o titular da declaração de tomada a cargo são responsáveis pela exactidão das informações que devem constar respectivamente da nota de venda e da declaração de tomada a cargo.O disposto no presente artigo não é aplicável à colocação à venda dos produtos da pesca que são objecto de um transbordo na acepção do artigo 11o»7. Ao no 3 do artigo 9o, é aditado o seguinte travessão:«- se for caso disso, a referência do contrato de venda».8. O no 4 do artigo 9o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«4. As notas de venda são apresentadas às autoridades competentes responsáveis pelo controlo da primeira colocação no mercado em condições que permitam incluir os seguintes dados:- a identificação externa e o nome do navio de pesca que desembarcou os produtos em causa;- o nome do armador ou do capitão do navio,- o porto e a data de desembarque,- a referência da declaração de desembarque ou do diário de bordo,- se for caso disso, a referência dos documentos previstos nos nos 1 e 4, alínea b, do artigo 13o»9. Após o no 4 do artigo 9o, são inseridos os seguintes números:«4oA Sempre que a nota de venda não corresponda à factura ou a um documento que a substitua, referido no artigo 22, no 3 da Sexta Directiva 77/388/CEE do Conselho (1), o Estado-membro adoptará as disposições necessárias para que as informações relativas aos preços sem imposto para as entregas de bens ao comprador sejam idênticas às constantes da factura.4oB A declaração de tomada a cargo, estabelecida pelo proprietário dos produtos da pesca desembarcados, ou o seu mandatário, referida no no 2, deverá conter, pelo menos, os seguintes dados:- em relação a todas as espécies, o peso discriminado por tipo de apresentação dos produtos,- a identificação do navio de pesca que desembarcou os produtos em causa,- a identificação do capitão do navio,- o porto e a data de desembarque,- os locais de armazenagem dos produtos,- a referência da declaração de desembarque ou do diário de bordo,- se for caso disso, a referência dos documentos previstos nos nos 1 e 4, alínea b, do artigo 13o4oC Sempre que os produtos da pesca desembarcados se destinem a ser vendidos posteriormente e que a colocação dos produtos da pesca no mercado tenha sido objecto de um preço contratual ou de um montante forfetário fixado para um determinado período, o Estado-membro procederá, anualmente, às verificações pertinentes junto das empresas ou das pessoas interessadas, a fim de controlar a veracidade das informações constantes respectivamente da declaração de tomada a cargo e da nota de venda referidas no no 2.(1) Sexta Directiva do Conselho, de 17 de Maio de 1977, relativa à harmonização das legislações dos Estados-membros respeitantes aos impostos sobre o volume de negócios - sistema comum do imposto sobre o valor acrescentado: matéria colectável uniforme. JO L 145 de 13.6.1997, p. 1.»10. O no 5 do artigo 9o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«5. As notas de venda e as declarações de tomada a cargo são transmitidas às autoridades competentes ou aos outros organismos aprovados pelo Estado-membro, em conformidade com a legislação do Estado-membro em cujo território são efectuadas as operações.»11. Ao no 6 do artigo 9o, é aditado o seguinte parágrafo:«Sempre que a primeira colocação no mercado dos produtos da pesca desembarcados não seja efectuada no Estado-membro em que foram desembarcados ou que os produtos se destinem a uma colocação à venda posterior, as autoridades competentes responsáveis pelo controlo da primeira colocação no mercado transmitirão, imediatamente, uma cópia da nota de venda ou da declaração de tomada a cargo às autoridades responsáveis pelo controlo do desembarque de tais produtos.»12. É suprimido o artigo 10o13. O artigo 11o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«Artigo 11o1. São autorizadas as operações de transbordo e as operações de pesca que impliquem a acção conjunta de vários navios e que se realizem nos portos ou nas águas sob soberania ou jurisdição de um Estado-membro, desde que estejam preenchidas as condições definidas em conformidade com o no 2, nomeadamente no respeitante:- à definição dos locais autorizados,- aos processos de inspecção e de vigilância,- às condições de registo e de comunicação da operação de transbordo e das quantidades transbordadas.2. As regras de execução do presente artigo serão adoptadas atendendo às observações dos Estados-membros interessados, de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o»14. Após o no 5 do artigo 13o, é inserido o seguinte número:«5oA Sempre que os produtos da pesca, que tenham sido declarados vendidos em conformidade com o artigo 9o, sejam transportados para um local diferente do de desembarque ou de importação, o transportador deve poder provar, em qualquer momento, que foi efectivamente realizada uma venda.»15. Ao artigo 13o, é aditado o seguinte número:«7oA As regras de execução do presente artigo serão adoptadas de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o»16. Ao artigo 17o, é aditado o seguinte número:«4. As regras de aplicação do presente artigo serão adoptadas de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o»17. Ao artigo 18o, é aditado o seguinte número:«4. As regras de execução do presente artigo serão adoptadas de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o»18. O no 3 do artigo 19o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«3. Os Estados-membros adoptarão as medidas necessárias para garantir que os dados referidos no no 1 sejam registados na base de dados o mais rapidamente possível.As informações relativas aos recursos regulados a título do artigo 8o do Regulamento (CEE) no 3760/92, inscritas no diário de bordo, na declaração de desembarque, na nota de venda e na declaração de tomada a cargo, são registadas na base de dados referida no no 2 num prazo não superior a 15 dias a contar da data da comunicação dessas informações às autoridades competentes. Se a taxa de utilização de uma quota for superior a 85 %, o prazo não excederá 5 dias úteis.»19. O no 4 do artigo 19o passa a ter seguinte redacção:«4. Os Estados-membros procederão anualmente à avaliação da aplicação do presente artigo e, nomeadamente, do grau de fiabilidade dos dados, e incluirão os resultados no seu relatório a título do artigo 35o»20. O no 5 do artigo 19o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«5. Os Estados-membros adoptarão as medidas necessárias para facilitar a recolha dos dados, a sua validação e as verificações por comparação e permitir à Comissão aceder à distância aos ficheiros registados na base de dados referida no no 1, após apresentação de um pedido específico.»21. Ao no 3, primeiro parágrafo, do artigo 21o, é aditada a seguinte frase:«A Comissão informa imediatamente os Estados-membros dessa data.»22. O no 3, último parágrafo, do artigo 21o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«A partir da data prevista no primeiro parágrafo, o Estado-membro de pavilhão proibirá provisoriamente a pesca de peixes dessa unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais pelos navios que arvorem seu pavilhão, assim como a manutenção a bordo, o transbordo e o desembarque do peixe capturado após essa data e fixará uma data até à qual serão autorizadas os transbordos e os desembarques ou as declarações definitivas de captura. Esta medida será imediatamente notificada à Comissão, que dela informará os outros Estados-membros.»23. Após o no 2 do artigo 28o, é inserido o seguinte número:«2A Sempre que, por força do artigo 4o do Regulamento (CEE) no 3760/92, tenha sido fixado um tamanho mínimo para uma determinada espécie, os transportadores ou vendedores de peixes dessa espécie de tamanho inferior ao atrás referido devem poder estabelecer, em qualquer momento, a origem dos produtos.»24. Após o artigo 28o, é inserido o seguinte título:«TÍTULO VIAControlo das actividades de pesca dos navios de países terceirosArtigo 28oANa acepção do presente título, entende-se por "navio de pesca de um país terceiro", qualquer navio arvorando pavilhão e registado num país terceiro que opere na zona de pesca comunitária ou que efectue operações de desembarque ou de transbordo.Artigo 28oB1. Na zona de pesca comunitária, um navio de pesca de um país terceiro só será autorizado a capturar, manter a bordo, transbordar ou transformar produtos da pesca se lhe tiverem sido concedidas uma licença de pesca e uma autorização de pesca especial em conformidade com o artigo 9o do Regulamento (CE) no 1627/94 (1).2. Além disso, os navios de pesca de um país terceiro só poderão efectuar operações de transbordo ou operações de pesca que impliquem a operação conjunta de vários navios se preencherem as condições definidas em conformidade com o artigo 11o do presente regulamento.(1) Regulamento (CE) no 1627/94 do Conselho, de 27 de Junho de 1994, que estabelece as disposições gerais relativas às autorizações de pesca especiais. JO L 171 de 6.7.1994, p. 7.Artigo 28oCQualquer navio de pesca de um país terceiro que opere na zona de pesca comunitária fica sujeito às seguintes obrigações:- registar, num diário de bordo, as informações mencionadas no artigo 6o do presente regulamento,- a partir de 1 de Janeiro de 2000, o mais tardar, estar equipado com um sistema de localização VMS aprovado pela Comissão,- até à aplicação do sistema VMS, dar cumprimento a um regime de comunicação das deslocações do navio,- dar cumprimento a um regime de comunicação das capturas efectuadas e mantidas a bordo,- dar cumprimento às instruções das autoridades competentes em matéria de controlo, nomeadamente no respeitante às inspecções antes da saída da zona de pesca comunitária,- dar cumprimento às regras de marcação e de identificação dos navios de pesca e das suas artes.Artigo 28oDA Comissão fixará, com base nas informações disponíveis, a data em que, relativamente a uma unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais, se considera que as capturas sujeitas a quota, efectuadas pelos navios de um país terceiro, esgotaram a respectiva quota. A Comissão informará, imediatamente, o país terceiro e os Estados-membros interessados dessa data.A partir dessa data, será provisoriamente proibida a pesca de peixes dessa unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais pelos referidos navios, assim como a manutenção a bordo, o transbordo e o desembarque de peixes capturados após essa data. A Comissão fixará igualmente uma data até à qual serão autorizados os transbordos e os desembarques ou as declarações definitivas de captura.Artigo 28oE1. O capitão de um navio de pesca de um país terceiro deve comunicar às autoridades competentes do Estado-membro de que pretenda utilizar os portos o lugares de desembarque, a hora de chegada ao porto de desembarque e as capturas mantidas a bordo e indicar a zona ou as zonas em que foi exercida a pesca, bem como, se for caso disso, a zona de pesca comunitária ou uma outra zona sob jurisdição ou soberania de um país terceiro, pelo menos 72 horas antes da hora de chegada ao porto prevista.A operação de desembarque não pode ser iniciada sem autorização das autoridades competentes do Estado-membro em causa.2. Salvo caso de força maior ou de emergência, um navio de pesca de um país terceiro só pode entrar nos portos designados pelo Estado-membro de que pretenda utilizar um porto ou local de desembarque.3. A Comissão pode, de acordo com o procedimento previsto no artigo 36o, isentar certas categorias de navios de pesca de países terceiros da obrigação prevista no no 1, por um período limitado e prorrogável, ou prever um novo período para notificação, tendo nomeadamente em conta a distância entre os pesqueiros, os locais de desembarque e os portos onde esses navios estão registados ou recenseados.4. O disposto nos nos 1 e 2 é aplicável sem prejuizo das disposições específicas previstas nos acordos de pesca celebrados entre a Comunidade e determinados países terceiros.Artigo 28oFO capitão de um navio de pesca de um país terceiro, ou seu mandatário, submeterá às autoridades competentes do Estado-membro cujos portos ou locais de desembarque utilize, uma declaração por cuja exactidão o capitão ou o seu mandatário é responsável, que mencione as quantidades desembarcadas e a data e o local de cada captura.Os Estados-membros comunicarão, a pedido da Comissão, as informações relativas aos desembarques efectuados pelos navios de pesca de países terceiros.Artigo 28oG1. Sempre que o capitão do navio de pesca de um país terceiro declare ter realizado as capturas no alto mar, as autoridades competentes só autorizarão o desembarque após ter inspeccionado o navio de pesca.2. Se o capitão do navio de pesca de um país terceiro, ou o seu mandatário, fornecer provas suficientes para as autoridades competentes de que:- as espécies mantidas a bordo foram capturadas fora de uma zona de regulamentação de uma organização internacional competente a que a Comunidade aderiu,- as espécies mantidas a bordo foram capturadas em conformidade com as medidas de conservação e de gestão adoptadas pela organização regional competente a que a Comunidade aderiu,estas últimas autorizarão o desembarque.Artigo 28oHAs regras de execução do presente título, incluindo as listas dos portos designados, serão adoptadas de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o, em concertação com os Estados-membros em causa.»25. Após o no 3 do artigo 29o, é inserido o seguinte número:«3A Os inspectores comunitários, que operem no âmbito das verificações sem préaviso, podem efectuar observações quanto à execução do presente regulamento.No âmbito das suas missões de observação, os inspectores comunitários terão acesso aos ficheiros e documentos pertinentes, aos locais e lugares públicos, bem como aos navios e locais privados, aos terrenos e aos meios de transporte em que sejam exercidas actividades abrangidas pelo presente regulamento, em condições idênticas às aplicáveis aos inspectores nacionais, a fim de recolher dados de carácter não nominativo, necessários para o cumprimento da sua tarefa.Na sequência das verificações sem pré-aviso, a Comissão transmitirá imediatamente ao Estado-membro em causa o relatório resultante de tais observações.»26. O no 2, segundo parágrafo, do artigo 30o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«O mais tardar três meses a contar da data do pesdido da Comissão, os Estados-membros em causa informarão a Comissão dos resultados do inquérito e fornecer-lhe-ão uma cópia do relatório estabelecido.»27. Após o no 2 do artigo 31o, é inserido o seguinte número:«2A O Conselho, deliberando de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 43o do Tratado, adoptará uma lista das infracções da regulamentação comunitária referida no artigo 1o, consideradas graves, bem como as medidas de acompanhamento.»28. Após o artigo 33o, é inserido o seguinte título:«TÍTULO VIIIACooperação entre as autoridades de controlo dos Estados-membros estas com a Comissão»29. O artigo 34o é substituído pelos seguintes artigos:«Artigo 34oAs autoridades competentes incumbidas nos Estados-membros do controlo da aplicação do presente regulamento colaborarão entre si e com a Comissão, com vista a assegurar o respeito das regras da política comum da pesca, de acordo com as condições a seguir estabelecidas.Artigo 34oA1. Os Estados-membros prestar-se-ão mutuamente a assistência necessária para a execução dos controlos previstos no presente título.2. Sempre que, aquando de uma inspecção ou operação de vigilância, as autoridades competentes de um Estado-membro verifiquem que navios de pesca comunitários ou os navios de pesca arvorando pavilhão de um país terceiro e registados num país terceiro exerceram actividades de pesca, referidas no artigo 2o, susceptíveis de comprometer a regulamentação comunitária, o Estado-membro em questão comunicará, imediatamente, todas as informações úteis, se for caso disso, ao Estado-membro de pavilhão do ou dos navios em causa, aos outros Estados-membros interessados, bem como à Comissão. São considerados Estados-membros interessados, os Estados-membros em cujo território ou nas águas sob jurisdição ou soberania dos quais as actividades são exercidas ou susceptíveis de serem exercidas.O Estado-membro em questão pode solicitar aos outros Estados-membros interessados que realizem controlos específicos, indicando os motivos precisos do pedido.Os Estados-membros manter-se-ão mutuamente informados e informarão a Comissão do seguimento dado aos pedidos evocados acima, incluindo, se for caso disso, dos resultados do controlo e dos procedimentos instaurados contra as eventuais infracções.3. Os Estados-membros informar-se-ão mutuamente das medidas nacionais adoptadas para o efeito, nomeadamente das adoptadas a título do no 2 do artigo 9o do Regulamento (CEE) no 3760/92.4. As regras de execução do presente artigo serão adoptadas, sempre que necessário, de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36oArtigo 34oBAquando de uma inspecção num Estado-membro, a Comissão pode determinar que os seus inspectores sejam acompanhados por um ou vários inspectores das pescas de um outro Estado-membro, na qualidade de observadores.Para o efeito, os Estados-membros estabelecerão uma lista de inspectores das pescas nacionais susceptíveis de serem solicitados pela Comissão no sentido de estarem presentes nas inspecções supramencionadas.A Comissão manterá a lista assim estabelecida à disposição do conjunto dos Estados-membros.Artigo 34oC1. A Comissão determinará as pescarias que serão submetidas a um programa de controlo específico de duração não superior a dois anos, assim como as condições específicas de tais programas, em conformidade com o processo previsto no artigo 36o, em concertação com os Estados-membros interessados.2. Os programas definem os objectivos, os meios humanos e materiais que devem ser aplicados, os períodos e as zonas em que serão utilizados, os resultados esperados das acções indicadas no programa de controlo específico referido no no 1, bem como qualquer condição que permita uma inspecção o mais eficiente e económica possível.3. Os Estados-membros adoptarão as medidas adequadas para facilitar a execução dos programas de controlo específicos, nomeadamente no respeitante à assistência requerida por todas as autoridades competentes em causa.»30. O artigo 35o passa a ter a seguinte redacção:«Artigo 35o1. Os Estados-membros transmitirão anualmente à Comissão, o mais tardar em 1 de Março, um relatório sobre a aplicação do presente regulamento durante o ano civil anterior.2. A Comissão elaborará de três em três anos, com base nos relatórios dos Estados-membros e nas suas próprias observações, um relatório de avaliação. A Comissão publicará o relatório juntamente com as respostas dos Estados-membros e, eventualmente, medidas e propostas destinadas a atenuar as carências verificadas.3. As regras de execução do presente artigo serão adoptadas, sempre que necessário, de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 36o, nomeadamente, em relação:- aos meios técnicos e humanos utilizados específicamente para o controlo das pescas,- às disposições legislativas, regulamentares e administrativas que os Estados-membros adoptem para prevenir ou proceder contra as irregularidades.- aos resultados das inspecções ou controlos efectuados por força do presente regulamento, incluindo o número e o tipo das infracções verificadas, bem como o sequimento que lhes é dado.»Artigo 2o É revogado o artigo 5o do Regulamento (CEE) no 2241/87.Artigo 3o O presente regulamento entra em vigor em 1 de Janeiro de 1999.Todavia, o artigo 11o e o no 2 do artigo 28oB são aplicáveis a partir da data de entrada em vigor das regras de execução referidas no no 2 do artigo 11oO presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente aplicável em todos os Estados-membros.(1) JO L 261 de 20.10.1993.(2) JO L 356 de 31.12.1997.(3) JO L 207 de 29.7.1987.(4) JO L 306 de 11.11.1988.(5) JO L 268 de 24.9.1991.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 8.10.2011
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 L 264/25
 REGOLAMENTO DI ESECUZIONE (UE) N. 996/2011 DELLA COMMISSIONE
 del 7 ottobre 2011
 che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 657/2008, (CE) n. 1276/2008 e il regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 543/2011 per quanto riguarda gli obblighi di modifica nell’ambito dell’organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli
 LA COMMISSIONE EUROPEA,
 visto il trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea,
 visto il regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio, del 22 ottobre 2007, recante organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli e disposizioni specifiche per taluni prodotti agricoli (regolamento unico OCM) (1), in particolare l’articolo 102, l’articolo 103 nonies, l’articolo 170, lettera c), e l’articolo 192, paragrafo 2, in combinato disposto con l’articolo 4,
 considerando quanto segue:
 (1)
 Il regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009 della Commissione, del 31 agosto 2009, che stabilisce le modalità con le quali gli Stati membri notificano alla Commissione le informazioni e i documenti necessari nell’ambito dell’attuazione dell’organizzazione comune dei mercati, del regime dei pagamenti diretti, della promozione dei prodotti agricoli e dei regimi applicabili alle regioni ultraperiferiche e alle isole minori del Mar Egeo (2) fissa norme comuni per la comunicazione alla Commissione di informazioni e documenti da parte delle autorità competenti degli Stati membri. Tali norme comprendono, in particolare, l’obbligo per gli Stati membri di utilizzare i sistemi informatici messi a disposizione dalla Commissione e la convalida dei diritti di accesso delle autorità o delle persone abilitate a inviare notifiche. Il succitato regolamento sancisce inoltre principi comuni applicabili ai sistemi di informazione affinché questi garantiscano l’autenticità, l’integrità e la leggibilità nel tempo dei documenti e disciplina la protezione dei dati personali.
 (2)
 Ai sensi del regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009, l’obbligo di utilizzare i sistemi di informazione in conformità del medesimo regolamento deve essere prescritto dai regolamenti che impongono un particolare obbligo di notifica.
 (3)
 Nell’ambito delle sue procedure interne di lavoro e delle sue relazioni con le autorità che operano nel settore della politica agricola comune, la Commissione ha elaborato un sistema informatico che consente la gestione elettronica di documenti e procedure.
 (4)
 Si ritiene che alcuni obblighi di notifica possano ormai essere assolti mediante il suddetto sistema conformemente al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009, in particolare quelli previsti dai regolamenti (CE) n. 657/2008 della Commissione, del 10 luglio 2008, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio relativamente alla concessione di un aiuto comunitario per la distribuzione di latte e di taluni prodotti lattiero-caseari agli allievi delle scuole (3), (CE) n. 1276/2008 della Commissione, del 17 dicembre 2008, relativo al controllo mediante controlli fisici delle esportazioni di prodotti agricoli che beneficiano di una restituzione o di altri importi (4) e il regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 543/2011 della Commissione, del 7 giugno 2011, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio nei settori degli ortofrutticoli freschi e degli ortofrutticoli trasformati (5).
 (5)
 Ai fini dell’efficienza amministrativa e in base all’esperienza acquisita, è opportuno semplificare e specificare le notifiche in tali regolamenti.
 (6)
 Occorre pertanto modificare i regolamenti (CE) n. 657/2008, (CE) n. 1276/2008 e il regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 543/2011.
 (7)
 Le misure di cui al presente regolamento sono conformi al parere del comitato di gestione per l’organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli,
 HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO:
 Articolo 1
 Nel regolamento (CE) n. 657/2008, l’articolo 17 è sostituito dal seguente:
 «Articolo 17
 Comunicazioni
 1. Entro il 31 gennaio successivo al termine del precedente periodo dal 1o agosto al 31 luglio gli Stati membri trasmettono alla Commissione i seguenti dati ripartiti per richiedente ai sensi dell’articolo 6 del presente regolamento:
 a)
 numero di richiedenti;
 b)
 numero di richiedenti sottoposti a controllo;
 c)
 numero totale di istituti scolastici ai quali i richiedenti sottoposti a controllo hanno fornito i prodotti sovvenzionabili e numero degli istituti scolastici sottoposti a controllo in loco;
 d)
 numero di controlli sulla composizione dei prodotti;
 e)
 importo dell’aiuto richiesto, pagato e sottoposto a controllo in loco (in euro);
 f)
 riduzione degli aiuti in seguito a verifiche amministrative (in euro);
 g)
 riduzione degli aiuti in seguito a ritardi nella presentazione della domanda conformemente all’articolo 11, paragrafo 3 (in euro);
 h)
 aiuti recuperati in seguito ai controlli in loco conformemente all’articolo 15, paragrafo 9 (in euro);
 i)
 riduzione degli aiuti in seguito a ritardi nella presentazione della domanda conformemente all’articolo 15, paragrafo 10 (in euro);
 j)
 numero di richiedenti il cui riconoscimento è stato ritirato o sospeso conformemente all’articolo 10.
 2. Anteriormente al 31 gennaio di ogni anno gli Stati membri comunicano alla Commissione almeno i seguenti dati relativi al precedente periodo dal 1o agosto al 31 luglio:
 a)
 i quantitativi di latte e di prodotti lattiero-caseari, ripartiti per categorie e sottocategorie, per i quali è stato versato l’aiuto;
 b)
 la quantità massima ammissibile;
 c)
 le spese dell’Unione Europea;
 d)
 il numero approssimativo di allievi che partecipano al regime di distribuzione di latte nelle scuole;
 e)
 il contributo nazionale.
 3. Le comunicazioni di cui al presente regolamento sono effettuate conformemente al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009 della Commissione (6).
 Articolo 2
 All’articolo 16 del regolamento (CE) n. 1276/2008, il secondo comma è sostituito dal seguente:
 «Le comunicazioni di cui al primo paragrafo sono effettuate conformemente al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009 della Commissione (7).
 Articolo 3
 Il regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 543/2011 è modificato come segue:
 1)
 all’articolo 97, lettera b), il testo della seconda frase è sostituito dal seguente:
 «La relazione annuale contiene in particolare le informazioni riportate nell’allegato XIV e la sua notifica è effettuata conformemente al regolamento (CE) n. 792/2009 della Commissione (8);
 2)
 nell’allegato XIV, parte A, il punto 1, lettera b) è soppresso.
 Articolo 4
 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il terzo giorno successivo alla pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.
 Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 7 ottobre 2011
 Per la Commissione
 Il presidente
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) GU L 299 del 16.11.2007, pag. 1.
 (2) GU L 228 dell’1.9.2009, pag. 3.
 (3) GU L 183 dell’11.7.2008, pag.17.
 (4) GU L 339 del 18.12.2008, pag. 53.
 (5) GU L 157 del 15.6.2011, pag. 1.
 (6) GU L 228 dell’1.9.2009, pag. 3.»
 (7) GU L 228 dell’1.9.2009, pag. 3.»
 (8) GU L 228 dell’1.9.2009, pag. 3.»;


type: caselaw

text:
 15.12.2014
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 448/38
 Определение на Съда на публичната служба (трети състав) от 5 ноември 2014 г. — CY/ЕЦБ
 (Дело F-68/13) (1)
 ((Смърт на жалбоподателя - Възобновяване на устната фаза на производството - Отказ на правоприемника да встъпи в производството - Липса на основание за произнасяне))
 (2014/C 448/48)
 Език на производството: английски
 Страни
 Жалбоподател: CY (представители: L. Levi и M. Vandenbussche, адвокати)
 Ответник: Европейска централна банка (представители: E. Carlini и F. Feyerbacher, и B. Wägenbaur, адвокат)
 Предмет
 Искане за отмяна, от една страна, на решението за закриване на административната проверка относно проявен според жалбоподателя спрямо него психически тормоз, и от друга страна, искане за отмяна на доклада от проверката и за заплащане на обезщетение за твърдените неимуществени вреди
 Диспозитив
 1)
 Липсва основание за произнасяне по жалбата.
 2)
 Всяка страна поема направените от нея съдебни разноски.
 (1) ОВ C 274, 21.9.2013 г., стр. 31.


text:
 25.6.2011
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 166/20
 IZVEDBENA UREDBA KOMISIJE (EU) št. 622/2011
 z dne 24. junija 2011
 o določitvi standardnih uvoznih vrednosti za določitev uvozne cene za nekatere vrste sadja in zelenjave
 EVROPSKA KOMISIJA JE –
 ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
 ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1234/2007 z dne 22. oktobra 2007 o vzpostavitvi skupne ureditve kmetijskih trgov in o posebnih določbah za nekatere kmetijske proizvode (Uredba o enotni SUT) (1),
 ob upoštevanju Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 543/2011 z dne 7. junija 2011 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1234/2007 za sektorja sadja in zelenjave ter predelanega sadja in zelenjave (2) ter zlasti člena 136(1) Uredbe,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 Izvedbena uredba (EU) št. 543/2011 na podlagi izida večstranskih trgovinskih pogajanj urugvajskega kroga določa merila, po katerih Komisija določi standardne vrednosti za uvoz iz tretjih držav za proizvode in obdobja iz dela A Priloge XVI k tej uredbi –
 SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
 Člen 1
 Standardne uvozne vrednosti iz člena 136 Izvedbene uredbe (EU) št. 543/2011 so določene v Prilogi k tej uredbi.
 Člen 2
 Ta uredba začne veljati 25. junija 2011.
 Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah.
 V Bruslju, 24. junija 2011
 Za Komisijo V imenu predsednika
 José Manuel SILVA RODRÍGUEZ
 Generalni direktor za kmetijstvo in razvoj podeželja
 (1) UL L 299, 16.11.2007, str. 1.
 (2) UL L 157, 15.6.2011, str. 1.
 PRILOGA
 Pavšalne uvozne vrednosti za določitev vhodne cene za nekatere vrste sadja in zelenjave
 (EUR/100 kg)
 Oznaka KN
 Oznaka tretjih držav (1)
 Pavšalna uvozna vrednost
 0702 00 00
 AR
 23,1
 MK
 54,8
 TR
 73,2
 ZZ
 50,4
 0707 00 05
 TR
 83,7
 ZZ
 83,7
 0709 90 70
 TR
 97,5
 ZZ
 97,5
 0805 50 10
 AR
 62,3
 BR
 40,6
 TR
 65,0
 UY
 65,6
 ZA
 110,3
 ZZ
 68,8
 0808 10 80
 AR
 132,6
 BR
 78,0
 CA
 105,9
 CL
 99,5
 CN
 118,6
 NZ
 109,7
 US
 166,4
 UY
 91,7
 ZA
 92,9
 ZZ
 110,6
 0809 10 00
 AR
 89,7
 TR
 241,9
 ZZ
 165,8
 0809 20 95
 TR
 327,3
 XS
 382,4
 ZZ
 354,9
 0809 30
 EC
 116,4
 TR
 179,1
 ZZ
 147,8
 (1) Nomenklatura držav, določena v Uredbi Komisije (ES) št. 1833/2006 (UL L 354, 14.12.2006, str. 19). Oznaka „ZZ“ predstavlja „druga porekla“.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 10 A.3d 1167 (2011)
 417 Md. 479
 Charles Francis WILLIAMS, Jr.
 v.
 STATE of Maryland.
 No. 16, September Term, 2010.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 January 5, 2011.
 *1168 James Brewster Hopewell, Riverdale, MD, for petitioner.
 Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland (Jeremy M. McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS, BARBERA, JJ.
 BATTAGLIA, J.
 In this case, we enter into the constitutional fray involving the scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms,[1] recently explored by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010).
 Petitioner, Charles F. Williams, Jr., seeks to overturn his conviction in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for unlawful possession of a handgun, pursuant to Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002),[2] asserting that Maryland's regulatory scheme for handguns violates his right to "keep and carry arms" under the Second Amendment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Williams' conviction, in a reported opinion, Williams v. State, 188 Md.App. 691, 982 A.2d 1168 (2009), and we granted certiorari, Williams v. State, 412 *1169 Md. 495, 988 A.2d 1008 (2010), to answer the following question:
 Are Md.Code Ann. Criminal Law § 4-203, Public Safety §§ 5-301, et seq., and COMAR 29.03.02.04 unconstitutional in light of Heller v. District of Columbia?[[3]]
 We shall hold that Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article, which prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, without a permit and outside of one's home, is outside of the scope of the Second Amendment. We also shall hold that, because Williams failed to apply for a permit to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, he lacks standing to challenge Section 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003),[4] as well as COMAR 29.03.02.04.[5] As a result, Williams's conviction *1170 will stand.
 During a bench trial before the Honorable Sean D. Wallace, the State presented the following facts, describing a police officer's encounter with Williams near a bus stop:
 The facts, as stipulated, had the matter gone to trial, the facts would show that on October 1, 2007, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Officer Molake with the Prince George's County Police Department, was in the area of the BaltimoreWashington Parkway and Landover Road in Prince George's County, Maryland, and as he was driving in that area, he observed the defendant going through a backpack near a wooded area nearby the cross area, and at one time, as the officer turned his cruiser around, he observed the defendant turn and place something in the brush area as if he was hiding something.
 Officer Molake made contact with the defendant, who he would identify as the gentleman seated to the left with the green shirt and asked him what he was doing. The defendant told him he was going through the backpack to see what was in it. He then asked the defendant what he went and hid in the bushes, and the defendant hesitated and then stated "my gun."
 The facts described the police officer's recovery of Williams's handgun and Williams's statement to police:
 Officer Molake then recovered an Austria [sic] made, black Glock handgun with 15 rounds in the magazine in the brush area where he saw the defendant go.
 The defendant gave a written statement after being given his Miranda rights by Officer Santa Cruz, admitting to possession of the gun and placing the gun in the bush area where the officer subsequently located it.
 The handgun test-fired as positive.
 The facts provided the following, regarding Williams's purchase of the handgun, apparently for "self-defense":
 The defense would have provided evidence by way of documents that would show that the defendant purchased the handgun in Realco at 6108 Marlboro Pike in Forestville, Maryland, on August *1171 15 of 2007, and that would be shown through Exhibit 1. Paid the balance that was due on that handgun on September 14, 2007, which will be shown in Exhibit 2; that the defense would have provided evidence that the defendant completed the Maryland State Police application and affidavit to purchase a regulated firearm application, which is a total of three pages, on August 15, 2007, which will be shown in Exhibit 3. He received the certificate of completion, which is shown in Exhibits 4 and 5, on August 15, 2007.
 The defendant would have testified that he purchased the handgun for self-defense, and that on the date of this arrest, he had just left the handgun at his girlfriend's house, place of residence. When he got off work, he went to her residence and picked up that handgun and was en route to his home when the arrest occurred behind the bus stop.
 The defendant was again given Miranda rights and gave a written statement that will be shown in the State's Exhibits Number 3 and 4.
 Judge Wallace found Williams guilty of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in violation of Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) and sentenced him to three years' incarceration, with two years suspended. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, determining that the Second Amendment is not applicable to the States,[6] and that, were the Second Amendment to apply to Maryland, "it would not invalidate the statute at issue here," because Section 4-203(b)(6) expressly permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in one's residence, thereby preserving the right "to keep and bear arms in the home for the purpose of immediate self-defense." Williams, 188 Md.App. at 699, 982 A.2d at 1172.
 Before us, as he did in the Circuit Court in a "Motion to Dismiss Indictment," and in his brief before the Court of Special Appeals, Williams asserts that the prohibition in Section 4-203(a) against wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun without a permit and outside of one's home, infringes upon his Second Amendment right "to keep and bear arms." He contends that the Supreme Court opinions in Heller and McDonald make clear that the Second Amendment establishes a general "right of persons to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes."
 The State counters that the opinions in Heller and McDonald together stand for the proposition that, pursuant to the Second Amendment, "states may not generally prohibit the possession of a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense, but remain free to enact reasonable restrictions on the possession and use of firearms." The State contends that the statutory scheme embodied in Section 4-203 is eminently reasonable, because Section 4-203(b)(6) expressly permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in the home.
 We begin by exploring the dictates of Section 4-203(a) of the Criminal Law Article, which contains a prohibition against wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in public, "whether concealed or open":
 (a) Prohibited.(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person may not:
 *1172 (i) wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person; or
 (ii) wear, carry, or knowingly transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State.
 The exceptions to the prohibition, contained in Section 4-203(b), are many:
 (b) Exceptions.This section does not prohibit:
 (1) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person who is on active assignment engaged in law enforcement, is authorized at the time and under the circumstances to wear, carry, or transport the handgun as part of the person's official equipment, and is:
 (i) a law enforcement official of the United States, the State, or a county or city of the State;
 (ii) a member of the armed forces of the United States or the National Guard on duty or traveling to or from duty;
 (iii) a law enforcement official of another state or subdivision of another state temporarily in this State on official business;
 (iv) a correctional officer or warden of a correctional facility in the State;
 (v) a sheriff or full-time assistant or deputy sheriff of the State; or
 (vi) a temporary or part-time sheriff's deputy;
 (2) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person to whom a permit to wear, carry, or transport the handgun has been issued under [§§ 5-301-5-314 of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003)];
 (3) the carrying of a handgun on the person or in a vehicle while the person is transporting the handgun to or from the place of legal purchase or sale, or to or from a bona fide repair shop, or between bona fide residences of the person, or between the bona fide residence and place of business of the person, if the business is operated and owned substantially by the person;
 (4) the wearing, carrying, or transporting by a person of a handgun used in connection with an organized military activity, a target shoot, formal or informal target practice, sport shooting event, hunting, a Department of Natural Resourcessponsored firearms and hunter safety class, trapping, or a dog obedience training class or show, while the person is engaged in, on the way to, or returning from that activity;
 (5) the moving by a bona fide gun collector of part or all of the collector's gun collection from place to place for public or private exhibition if each handgun is unloaded and carried in an enclosed case or an enclosed holster;
 (6) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person on real estate that the person owns or leases or where the person resides or within the confines of a business establishment that the person owns or leases;
 (7) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a supervisory employee:
 (i) in the course of employment;
 (ii) within the confines of the business establishment in which the supervisory employee is employed;
 (iii) when so authorized by the owner or manager of the business establishment; or
 (8) the carrying or transporting of a signal pistol or other visual distress signal approved by the United States Coast Guard in a vessel on the waterways of the State or, if the signal pistol or other visual distress signal is unloaded and carried in an enclosed case, in a vehicle.
 *1173 Here, the relevant exceptions are Section 4-203(b)(2), involving a permit to wear, carry, or transport a handgun in public, as well as Section 4-203(b)(6), permitting the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun in one's residence. What is notable in the present case is that Williams did not apply for a permit.[7] Moreover, at the time of his arrest, he was not wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in his residence, as permitted by the statute.
 Williams, nevertheless, principally relies upon the Supreme Court's opinions in Heller, 554 U.S. at 570, 128 S. Ct. at 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d at 637, and McDonald, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 894, in asserting that the Second Amendment establishes a general "right of persons to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes." In Heller, Mr. Heller had applied for and was denied a "registration certificate" to possess a handgun in his home, pursuant to the District of Columbia's gun control scheme. 554 U.S. at 573-77, 128 S.Ct. at 2788, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 647. Section 7-2502.01(a) of the D.C.Code (2001) prohibited "possess[ion] or control" of any firearm, without a "valid registration certificate":
 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this unit, no person or organization in the District of Columbia ("District") shall receive, possess, control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, give, or deliver any destructive device, and no person or organization in the District shall possess or control any firearm, unless the person or organization holds a valid registration certificate for the firearm.
 Section 7-2502.02(a)(4) of the D.C.Code (2001) prohibited the registration of handguns, without an exception for possession in one's home:
 (a) A registration certificate shall not be issued for a:
 (1) Sawed-off shotgun;
 (2) Machine gun;
 (3) Short-barreled rifle; or
 (4) Pistol[[8]] not validly registered to the current registrant in the District prior to September 24, 1976, except that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any organization that employs at least 1 commissioned special police officer or other employee licensed to carry a firearm *1174 and that arms the employee with a firearm during the employee's duty hours or to a police officer who has retired from the Metropolitan Police Department.
 Section 7-2507.02 of the D.C.Code (2001) mandated that any other firearm within one's home be kept "unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock":
 Except for law enforcement personnel described in § 7-2502.01(b)(1), each registrant shall keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless such firearm is kept at his place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of Columbia.
 Sections 22-4504(a) and 22-4515 of the D.C.Code (2001) made carrying an unlicensed pistol in one's home or on one's land a misdemeanor. Section 22-4504(a) stated, in relevant part:
 (a) No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in § 22-4515....
 Section 22-4515 of the D.C.Code (2001) in turn, stated:
 Any violation of any provision of this chapter for which no penalty is specifically provided shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.
 Mr. Heller filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the denial of his application for a "registration certificate" to possess a handgun in his home, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibited the carrying of a handgun in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibited the possession of "functional firearms" in the home. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Second Amendment precluded the District from "flatly ban[ning] the keeping of a handgun in the home." Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C.Cir.2007). The Supreme Court granted the District's petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the following question:
 Whether the following provisions D.C.Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?
 Before the Court, the District argued that the Second Amendment protects "only militia-related firearm rights." Alternatively, the District contended that prohibiting handgun possession in the home was reasonable, because residents were permitted to possess shotguns and rifles, albeit unloaded or bound by a trigger lock. Mr. Heller countered that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm for "traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home." 554 U.S. at 577, 128 S.Ct. at 2789, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 648.
 Embracing an original meaning approach, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, interpreted the language of the Second Amendment as conferring an individual right "to keep and bear Arms." 554 U.S. at 581, 128 S.Ct. at 2791, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 651. The Court considered the substance of that individual right as "simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else." *1175 Id. at 583, 128 S. Ct. at 2792, 171 L.Ed.2d at 652. Similarly, the phrase "bear Arms," reasoned the Court, referred to the "carrying of weapons," both in an organized militia and for other purposes, such as self-defense. Id. at 584-87, 128 S. Ct. at 2793-94, 171 L.Ed.2d at 653-54. The Court concluded that "preserving the militia" was not the only aim of the Second Amendment, as the founders "most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting." Id. at 599, 128 S. Ct. at 2801, 171 L.Ed.2d at 662. This right "to keep and bear Arms," however, has limitations:
 Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through 19th century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
 Id. at 626-27, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17, 171 L.Ed.2d at 678 (internal citations omitted).
 In declaring Sections 7-2502.02(a)(4) (prohibiting the registration of handguns, without a home exception) and 22-4504(a) (prohibiting carrying a handgun within one's home, without a license) unconstitutional, the Court emphasized that handguns were "overwhelmingly chosen by American society" for self-defense and determined that under any standard of scrutiny, "banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one's home and family, would fail constitutional muster." Id. at 628-29, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18, 171 L.Ed.2d at 679 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District's trigger-lock requirement, contained in Section 7-2507.02, did not fare any better, according to the Court, because the provision "ma[de] it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense" within the home. Id. at 630, 128 S. Ct. at 2818, 171 L.Ed.2d at 680. Therefore, the prohibition against handguns, even within one's home, as well as the trigger-lock requirement for all firearms kept within the home, were declared unconstitutional.
 Shortly thereafter, in McDonald, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 894, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Second Amendment applied to the States.[9] In that case, Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that several Chicago ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The Chicago residents alleged that the City had denied their applications to register handguns for possession in the home, in violation *1176 of the Constitution. In a related lawsuit, the National Rifle Association and two residents of Oak Park, a Chicago suburb, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that several Oak Park ordinances were invalid pursuant to the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. That complaint alleged that, but for the gun control laws, the individual plaintiffs would keep handguns in their homes for self-defense.
 The statutes at issue were "similar to the District of Columbia's," according to the Court. ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3026, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 903. Section 8-20-040(a) of the Chicago, Illinois Code prohibited possession of a firearm unless registered, while Section 8-20-050(c) provided that "[n]o registration certificate shall be issued for any of the following types of firearms ... (c) Handguns." The only non-governmental exception to the prohibition against handguns was for "[t]hose validly registered to a current owner in the City of Chicago prior to [1982]." Section 27-2-1 of the Oak Park, Illinois Code also provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to possess or carry, or for any person to permit another to possess or carry on his/her land or in his/her place of business any firearm." Section 27-1-1, in turn, defined "firearms" as "pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms of a size and character that may be concealed on or about the person, commonly known as handguns."
 The district court judge entered judgment on the pleadings for both municipalities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court had never considered whether the Second Amendment should be applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. City of Chicago, Illinois and Village of Oak Park, Illinois, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.2009).
 In reversing, the Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms "is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty," and as a result, the Due Process Clause rendered it applicable to the States. Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3036, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 914, citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968). The Court characterized Heller as safeguarding an individual right of "self-defense," when home possession was in issue, id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3036, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 914, but, nevertheless, reiterated that regulatory schemes prohibiting handgun ownership by dangerous individuals, or prohibiting wearing, carrying, or transporting handguns in various public places outside of the home, were permissible:
 We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill," "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."
 Id. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3047, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 926, quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 171 L.Ed.2d at 678.[10]
 *1177 In the present case, Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of which Williams was convicted, prohibits "wear[ing], carry[ing], or transport[ing] a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person," in public, without a permit. Here, sufficient evidence was adduced to demonstrate that Williams was wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in public, and Williams had conceded that he had not obtained, or even applied for, a permit.
 Williams, however, attempts to bring his conviction of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in public, without a permit, within the ambit of Heller and McDonald by claiming that those opinions would prohibit his conviction. This is not the case, because Heller and McDonald emphasize that the Second Amendment is applicable to statutory prohibitions against home possession, the dicta in McDonald that "the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home," notwithstanding. ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 3044, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 922. Although Williams attempts to find succor in this dicta, it is clear that prohibition of firearms in the home was the gravamen of the certiorari questions in both Heller and McDonald and their answers. If the Supreme Court, in this dicta, meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly.
 *1178 Williams was convicted of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in public, rather than for possession of a handgun in his home, for which he could not be prosecuted under Section 4-203(b)(6). It is the exception permitting home possession in Section 4-203(b)(6) that takes the statutory scheme embodied in Section 4-203 outside of the scope of the Second Amendment, as articulated in Heller and McDonald. Section 4-203(b)(6) clearly permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun "by a person on real estate that the person owns or leases or where the person resides," without registering or obtaining a permit, wholly consistent with Heller's proviso that handguns are "the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one's home and family." 554 U.S. at 628-29, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18, 171 L.Ed.2d at 689.
 In affirming Williams' conviction, we find persuasive opinions from other courts, addressing analogous situations, in which a defendant was convicted pursuant to a statute prohibiting public possession of a firearm, while providing an exception for possession within the home. For example, in People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010), Dawson had been found guilty of three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in connection with the attempted murder of Mario Brantley. Id., 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 599. Dawson argued that his convictions under the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute should be reversed, because the measure violated the Second Amendment. Id., 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 599-600. The Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute under which Dawson was convicted mirrors Maryland's Section 4-203 and relevantly provides:
 "(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon when he or she knowingly:
 (1) Carries on or about his or her person or in any vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person except when on his or her land or in his or her abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm;
 * * *
 [and]
 * * *
 (3) One of the following factors is present:
 (A) the firearm possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the time of the offense[.]"
 Id., 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 604, quoting 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2006) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The Illinois intermediate appellate court affirmed Dawson's conviction, reasoning that in Heller, the Supreme Court "ultimately limited its holding to the question presentedthat the Second Amendment right to bear arms protected the right to possess a commonly used firearm, a handgun, in the home for self-defense purposes." Id., 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 605 The court further emphasized that, in McDonald, the Supreme Court addressed "the limited question of whether a ban on the possession of a handgun in the home violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms." Id. The court concluded that the statute under which Dawson was convicted was constitutional, because it specifically permitted possession of a firearm within one's home. Id., 343 Ill. Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d at 607.
 In Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096 (D.C.2010), Little was convicted by a jury of one count of carrying a pistol without a license, one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, as a result of his involvement in an attempted robbery. Little argued that his convictions *1179 must be reversed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, because the statutes "functioned as a total ban on handguns." Id. at 1100. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected that argument and affirmed Little's conviction, reasoning that in Heller, "the issue was the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's ban on `the possession of usable handguns in the home,'" id. at 1101, quoting Howerton v. United States, 964 A.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C.2009), and Little had conceded that he was outside of his home.
 In People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674 (Cal.Ct.App.2008), Yarbrough was arrested and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in public, in violation of a California statute, which provided:
 A person is guilty of carrying a concealed firearm when he or she does any of the following:
 (1) Carries concealed within any vehicle which is under his or her control or direction any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed on the person.
 (2) Carries concealed upon his or her person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
 (3) Causes to be carried concealed within any vehicle in which he or she is an occupant any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
 Id. at 313 n. 5, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, quoting Section 12025(a) of the California Penal Code. The California intermediate appellate court noted that a separate measure provided an exception for possession of concealed weapons "anywhere within the citizen's or legal resident's place of residence, place of business, or on private property owned or lawfully possessed by the citizen or legal resident." Id. at 314 and n. 6, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, quoting Section 12026 of the California Penal Code. Although Yarbrough argued that the concealed weapons statute was unconstitutional in light of Heller, the court rejected that argument and affirmed his conviction, reasoning that in Heller, the Supreme Court considered a narrow question, namely whether "the District's ban on handgun possession in the home violate[d] the Second Amendment." Id. at 312, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674. The court concluded that, "[u]nlike possession of a gun for protection within a residence, carrying a concealed firearm presents a recognized threat to public order, and is prohibited as a means of preventing physical harm to persons other than the offender." Id. at 314, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 As a result, we affirm Williams' conviction of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in violation of Section 4-203(a)(1)(i) of the Criminal Law Article.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
 MURPHY, J., concurs.
 MURPHY, J., concurring.
 While I agree with the majority that the Petitioner's conviction should be affirmed, I would not hold that the Petitioner's conduct is "outside of the scope of the Second Amendment." I would affirm on the ground that, although the Second Amendment is applicable to an "on the street" possession of a handgun, that Amendment is satisfied by a statute that places reasonable restrictions on the constitutional right to bear arms.
 NOTES
 [1] The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
 A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
 [2] All references to Section 4-203 of the Criminal Law Article throughout are to Maryland Code (2002), unless otherwise noted. Section 4-203(a) generally prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun:
 (a) Prohibited.(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person may not:
 (i) wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person; or
 (ii) wear, carry, or knowingly transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, in a vehicle traveling on a road or parking lot generally used by the public, highway, waterway, or airway of the State.
 Section 4-203(b) enumerates several exceptions to the prohibition, significantly when one has secured a permit:
 (2) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person to whom a permit to wear, carry, or transport the handgun has been issued under [§§ 5-301-5-314 of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003)];
 and when one wears, carries, or transports a handgun on "real estate that the person owns or leases":
 (6) the wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun by a person on real estate that the person owns or leases or where the person resides or within the confines of a business establishment that the person owns or leases;....
 [3] In his brief in this Court, Williams also argued that evidence of the handgun should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and that a statement he made to police should have been suppressed, because he was subjected to custodial interrogation. Williams, however, did not include any questions regarding such in his Petition for Certiorari. Further, when asked to address the same concerns, the Court of Special Appeals had determined that those issues were not properly preserved for appellate review.
 [4] All references to Section 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article throughout are to Maryland Code (2003), unless otherwise noted. Section 5-301(d) defines a "permit" as follows:
 (d) Permit."Permit" means a permit issued by the Secretary to carry, wear, or transport a handgun.
 Section 5-302 establishes a "Handgun Permit Review Board" in the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Section 5-303 requires a "permit" before a person "carries, wears, or transports a handgun." Section 5-304 provides that an application for a permit "shall be made under oath." Section 5-305 states that permit applicants must undergo a "criminal history records check," and Section 5-306 states various "qualifications for permit," as follows:
 (a) In general.Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds:
 (1) is an adult;
 (2)(i) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed; or
 (ii) if convicted of a crime described in item (i) of this item, has been pardoned or has been granted relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c);
 (3) has not been convicted of a crime involving the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance;
 (4) is not presently an alcoholic, addict, or habitual user of a controlled dangerous substance unless the habitual use of the controlled dangerous substance is under legitimate medical direction; and
 (5) based on an investigation:
 (i) has not exhibited a propensity for violence or instability that may reasonably render the person's possession of a handgun a danger to the person or to another; and
 (ii) has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.
 (b) Applicant under age of 30 years.An applicant under the age of 30 years is qualified only if the Secretary finds that the applicant has not been:
 (1) committed to a detention, training, or correctional institution for juveniles for longer than 1 year after an adjudication of delinquency by a juvenile court; or
 (2) adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for:
 (i) an act that would be a crime of violence if committed by an adult;
 (ii) an act that would be a felony in this State if committed by an adult; or
 (iii) an act that would be a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years if committed by an adult.
 [5] COMAR 29.03.02.04 describes "criteria for issuance of permit" and relevantly
 In making a determination as to whether a permit will be issued to the applicant, the following areas will be a part of every investigation and will be considered in determining whether a permit is issued:
 A. Verification of the information supplied by the applicant in the application;
 B. Occupation or profession of the applicant;
 C. Geographical area of residence and employment of the applicant;
 D. Criminal record of applicant, including any juvenile record for an applicant younger than 30 years old, as specifically outlined in Public Safety Article, § 5-306(b), Annotated Code of Maryland;
 E. Medical history of applicant as it may pertain to the applicant's fitness to wear, carry, or transport a handgun;
 F. Psychiatric or psychological background of applicant as it may pertain to the applicant's fitness to wear, carry, or transport a handgun;
 G. Reasons given by the applicant as to whether those reasons are good and substantial;
 H. Age of applicant;
 I. Applicant's use of intoxicating beverages and drugs;
 J. Information received from personal references and other persons interviewed;
 K. Information received from business or employment references as may be necessary in the discretion of the investigator;
 L. Whether the applicant has any alternative available to him for protection other than a handgun permit;
 M. Whether the applicant falls within those classes of individuals who do not need permits as outlined in the Handgun Permit Law;
 N. The applicant's propensity for violence or instability which could reasonably render his wearing, carrying, or transporting of a handgun a danger to himself or other persons he may come in contact with;
 O. Whether the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution for the applicant against apprehended danger.
 [6] The Circuit Court's decision and the Court of Special Appeals's opinion in the present case were rendered prior to the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010), which made the Second Amendment applicable to the States via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 [7] Williams argues, in this regard, that Sections 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, Maryland Code (2003), as well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of Maryland Regulations, together governing handgun permitting, impose an impermissible burden on citizens seeking to exercise the right to "keep and carry a handgun." Williams acknowledges that he has "not filed an application for a permit to carry a handgun," but asserts that as a result of the regulatory scheme, "any such application would have been denied." The State counters that nearly 93 percent of handgun permit applicants from 2006 to 2009 were issued permits. See Maryland Department of State Police 2009 Annual Report, available at http://www.mdsp.org/downloads/ 2009_Annual_Report.pdf. Nevertheless, because Williams failed to file an application for a permit to carry a handgun, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 5-301 et seq. of the Public Safety Article, as well as Title 29, subtitle 3 of the Code of Maryland Regulations. See, e.g., Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 704 n. 2, 976 A.2d 999, 1002 n. 2 (2009) (reasoning appellant had standing to file "Petition for DNA Evidence Post Conviction Review," because he had been convicted of first-degree murder); Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 328, 914 A.2d 25, 68 (2006) (reasoning that "an individual or an organization `has no standing in court unless he has also suffered some kind of special damage from such wrong differing in character and kind from that suffered by the general public'") (citation omitted).
 [8] Section 7-2501.01(12) of the D.C.Code defines a "pistol" as "any firearm originally designed to be fired by use of a single hand." (emphasis added).
 [9] In so doing, the Supreme Court considered the following question on certiorari:
 Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.
 [10] In determining that Heller and McDonald addressed prohibitions and limitations on handgun possession in the home, we find informative decisions from other courts interpreting those opinions. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir.2010) (reasoning that Heller and McDonald recognized that "the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens to possess [handguns] for self-defense in the home"); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that Heller recognized that "the Second Amendment creates individual rights, one of which is keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense"); People v. Dykes, 46 Cal. 4th 731, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 209 P.3d 1, 49 (2009) (concluding that a statute prohibiting possession of a loaded and concealed firearm without a permit did not violate the Second Amendment, because Heller recognized a limited right to keep and bear arms for personal protection in the home); State v. Knight, 42 Kan. App. 2d 893, 218 P.3d 1177, 1189 (2009) (reasoning that a statute which criminalizes the possession of a concealed firearm was outside the province of the Second Amendment, because the Supreme Court's decision in Heller "turned solely on the issue of handgun possession in the home"); Commonwealth v. Runyan, 456 Mass. 230, 922 N.E.2d 794, 799 (2010) (determining that a statute requiring safe storage of a firearm was outside the scope of the Second Amendment, because the statute in issue "does not make it impossible for those persons licensed to possess firearms to rely on them for lawful self-defense" as did the District of Columbia ordinances in Heller); People v. Perkins, 62 A.D.3d 1160, 1161, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y.App.Div.2009) (reasoning that "New York's licensing requirement remains an acceptable means of regulating the possession of firearms," because the statute at issue did not "effect a complete ban on handguns" as in Heller); State v. Sieyes, 168 Wash.2d 276, 225 P.3d 995, 1005 (2010) (determining that a statute regulating the circumstances under which children could lawfully possess firearms was outside the scope of the Second Amendment, because no authority supported "an original meaning of the Second Amendment, which would grant children an unfettered right to bear arms").
 In addition, after oral argument in the present case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals filed Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237 (D.C.2010), upon which Williams relies, in which the defendant was convicted of "unlawful possession of ammunition," after police found two boxes of ammunition in his bedroom. The statute in issue required the prosecution to demonstrate only "that the defendant possessed ammunition, and that he did so knowingly and intentionally." Id. at 1240. Herrington argued that his conviction should be reversed, because the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heller "encompass[ed] the possession of handgun ammunition in the home." Id. at 1241. The court reversed Herrington's conviction, reasoning that "the Second Amendment guarantees a right to possess ammunition in the home that is coextensive with the right to possess a usable handgun there." Id. at 1243. Thus, Herrington is consistent with our interpretation of Heller and McDonald as addressing prohibitions against handgun possession in the home, as banning possession of ammunition in the home would certainly undermine the interest in "defense of self, family, and property" recognized in Heller.


text:
22.3.2003 EL Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης C 70/25
 Κατά τους προσφεύγοντες, η φέτα δεν πληροί τις προϋποθέσεις Οι προσφεύγουσες ζητούν από το Πρωτοδικείο:
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 φέτα θεωρείται στην Ελλάδα ως ονομασία γένους ακριβώς όπως αγωγή ( 1) στις 30 Οκτωβρίου 2002 ενώπιον του Νew
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 Λόγοι ακυρώσεως και κύρια επιχειρήματα
 ( 1) Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) 1829/2002 της Επιτροπής, της 14ης Οκτωβρίου
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 ( 3) Επί των συνεκδικασθεισών υποθέσεων C-289/96, C-293/96 και αποζημιώσεως και χρηματικής ικανοποιήσεως λόγω ηθικής βλά-
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 ενέργειες ή παραλείψεις, επειδή όπως υποστηρίζεται οι προσφεύ-
 γουσες μετείχαν σε πρακτικές ξεπλύματος χρημάτων.
 Οι προσφεύγουσες υποστηρίζουν ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα,
 εκπροσωπούμενη από την Επιτροπή, στερείται αρμοδιότητας να
 ασκήσει την αμφισβητούμενη αγωγή για λόγαριασμό της και για
 λογαριασμό κρατών μελών για τους ακόλουθους λόγους:
 Προσφυγή των εταιριών R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings,
 Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds
 Tobacco International, Inc., και RJR Acquisition Corp. — το άρθρο 2 ΕΚ δεν παρέχει ειδικές και αυτόνομες εξουσίες
 κατά της Επιτροπής των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων που ασκή- στα κοινοτικά όργανα·
 θηκε στις 9 Ιανουαρίου 2003
 — το άρθρο 281 ΕΚ απλώς ορίζει ότι η ΕΚ έχει νομική
 προσωπικότητα, χωρίς να κάνει λόγο για ζητήματα
 (Υπόθεση Τ-6/03)
 αρμοδιότητας·
 (2003/C 70/41) — το άρθρο 282 ΕΚ δεν παρέχει καμία αρμοδιότητα στην ΕΚ,
 εκπροσωπούμενη από την Επιτροπή, να ασκεί αγωγή ενώπιον
 δικαστηρίου μη κράτους μέλους·
 (Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η αγγλική)
 — το άρθρο 280 ΕΚ δεν χορηγεί στην ΕΚ, εκπροσωπούμενη
 από την Επιτροπή, καμία αρμοδιότητα να ασκεί αγωγές για
 την προστασία των οικονομικών συμφερόντων της Κοινό-
 Οι εταιρίες R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., με έδρα το τητας. Το άρθρο 280 απλώς παρέχει περιορισμένη αρμοδιό-
 Winston-Salem, Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής, R.J. Reynolds τητα στην Κοινότητα να εξασφαλίζει ότι τα κράτη μέλη
 Tobacco Company, με έδρα το Winston-Salem, Ηνωμένες λαμβάνουν αποτελεσματικά μέτρα προς προστασία των οικο-
 Πολιτείες της Αμερικής, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International, νομικών συμφερόντων της Κοινότητας και να επικουρεί τα
 Inc., με έδρα το Winston-Salem, Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερι- κράτη μέλη στο έργο αυτό·
 κής και RJR Acquisition Corp, με έδρα το Wilmington, Ηνωμένες
 Πολιτείες της Αμερικής, εκπροσωπούμενες από τους δικηγόρους
 Εric Morgan de Rivery και Francesca Marchini Camia, άσκησαν — ακόμα και αν υποτεθεί ότι το άρθρο 280 παρέχει τέτοια
 στις 9 Ιανουαρίου 2003 ενώπιον του Πρωτοδικείου των Ευρωπαϊ- αρμοδιότητα στην ΕΚ, η αμφισβητούμενη πράξη της Επιτρο-
 κών Κοινοτήτων προσφυγή κατά της Επιτροπής των Ευρωπαϊκών πής δεν πληροί τις προϋποθέσεις του άρθρου 280, παράγρα-
 Κοινοτήτων. φος 1, ΕΚ, δηλαδή δεν αποσκοπεί στην καταπολέμηση της
 ---pagebreak--- C 70/26 EL Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης 22.3.2003
 απάτης κατά των οικονομικών συμφερόντων της Κοινότητας, Η προσφεύγουσα ζητεί από το Πρωτοδικείο:
 δεν ακολουθεί τη διαδικασία του άρθρου 280, παράγρα-
 φος 4, σε συνδυασμό με το άρθρο 251 ΕΚ, και είναι αντίθετη
 προς τον ρητό αποκλεισμό των τομέων του ποινικού δικαίου — να ακυρώσει την απόφαση του Τετάρτου Τμήματος Προσφυ-
 και της απονομής της δικαιοσύνης δυνάμει του άρθρου 280, γών, του Γραφείου Εναρμονίσεως στο πλαίσιο της Εσωτερικής
 παράγραφος 4, ΕΚ· Αγοράς (ΓΕΕΑ), της 3ης Οκτωβρίου 2002, που εκδόθηκε
 στο πλαίσιο των υποθέσεων 700/200-4 και 746-2000-4·
 — η προσβαλλόμενη πράξη καταστρατηγεί την κοινοτική νομο-
 θεσία περί ξεπλύματος χρημάτων· — να απαγορεύσει την καταχώριση του κοινοτικού σήματος
 αριθ. 203570·
 — η ΕΚ, εκπροσωπούμενη από την Επιτροπή, ανέλαβε
 αυτόκλητα τον ρόλο του «Ευρωπαίου ∆ημόσιου Κατήγορου»,
 σε αντίθεση με τη Συνθήκη και τη βούληση των κρατών — να καταδικάσει το καθού στα δικαστικά έξοδα.
 μελών.
 Οι προσφεύγουσες διατείνονται ότι η ΕΚ, εκπροσωπούμενη από
 την Επιτροπή, προέβη σε ένα «forum shopping» με σκοπό την Λόγοι ακυρώσεως και κύρια επιχειρήματα
 παράκαμψη των αδυναμιών των κρατών μελών και της ΕΚ, καθώς
 και ότι δεν είναι από συνταγματικής απόψεως αρμόδια να ενεργεί
 για λογαριασμό των κρατών μελών. Αιτούσα την καταχώρηση EMILIO PUCCI S.R.L.
 κοινοτικού σήματος:
 Περαιτέρω, οι προσφεύγουσες ισχυρίζονται ότι η προσβαλλόμενη
 πράξη δεν είναι το πρόσφορο μέσο για τη διευθέτηση των Το αποτελούν το αντικεί- Το σήμα «EMILIO PUCCI» με χει-
 διαφορών σχετικά με την ερμηνεία και την εφαρμογή της Συνθήκης μενο της αιτήσεως κοινο- ρόγραφους χαρακτήρες — αίτηση
 σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 292 ΕΚ. Επίσης, προσβάλλει την υποχρέωση τικό σήμα: αριθ. 203570 για προϊόντα των
 παραθέσεως αιτιολογίας και τις ακόλουθες αρχές και τα εξής κλάσεων 3, 18, 24 και 25.
 θεμελιώδη δικαιώματα: την αρχή της αναλογικότητας, τις αρχές
 της δικαιολογημένης εμπιστοσύνης και της ασφαλείας δικαίου, ∆ικαιούχος του σήματος Η αιτούσα.
 καθώς και τα δικαιώματα άμυνας και το δικαίωμα για μια δίκαιη ή σημείου του οποίου
 δίκη. Τέλος, οι προσφεύγουσες υποστηρίζουν ότι η καθής διέπραξε γίνεται επίκληση στη δια-
 κατάχρηση εξουσίας με την έκδοση της προσβαλλομένης πράξεως. δικασία ανακοπής:
 ( 1) Οι προσφεύγουσες προσέβαλαν την απόφαση ασκήσεως της πρώτης Σήμα ή σημείο σχετικά με Τα ισπανικά σήματα «EMIDIO
 αγωγής στην υπόθεση T-379/00 (ΕΕ C 79, της 10.3.2001, σ. 24). Οι το οποίο προβάλλονται TUCCI» (με χειρόγραφους χαρακτή-
 προσφεύγουσες προσέβαλαν επίσης την απόφαση ασκήσεως δεύτερης αντιρρήσεις: ρες, αριθ. 1908876, για προϊόντα
 αγωγής στην υπόθεση T-260/01 (ΕΕ C 3, της 5.1.2002, σ. 39). της κλάσεως 3, και αριθ. 855782,
 για προϊόντα της κλάσεως 25.
 Απόφαση του τμήματος Απόρριψη της αιτήσεως καταχω-
 ανακοπών: ρίσεως αναφορικά με προϊόντα των
 κλάσεων 3, 18 και 25, ενώ η σχετική
 αίτηση έγινε δεκτή για τα προϊόντα
 της κλάσεως 25 καθώς και
 Προσφυγή της Εl Corte Inglés κατά του Γραφείου Εναρμονί-
 συγκεκριμένα προϊόντα της κλά-
 σεως στο πλαίσιο της Εσωτερικής Αγοράς (ΓΕΕΑ) που ασκή- σεως 18.
 θηκε στις 10 Ιανουαρίου 2003
 Απόφαση του τμήματος Απορρίφθηκε η προσφυγή του ανα-
 (Υπόθεση Τ-8/03) προσφυγών: κόπτοντος, ενώ έγινε δεκτή αυτή
 του αιτούντος για τα απορριφθέντα
 (2003/C 70/42) προϊόντα στην κλάση 18.
 (Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η ισπανική) Προβαλλόμενοι λόγοι: Εσφαλμένη εφαρμογή του
 άρθρου 8, παράγραφος 1, στοι-
 χείο β', του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 4094
 (κίνδυνος συγχύσεως), καθώς και
 Η Εl Corte Inglés, με έδρα τη Μαδρίτη (Ισπανία), εκπροσωπούμενη του άρθρου 8, παράγραφος 5, του
 από τον δικηγόρο Juan Luis Rivas Zurdo, άσκησε ενώπιον του ίδιου κανονισμού.
 Πρωτοδικείου των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, στις 10 Ιανουαρίου
 2003, προσφυγή κατά του Γραφείου Εναρμονίσεως στο πλαίσιο
 της Εσωτερικής Αγοράς (ΓΕΕΑ).