jurisdiction: US

text: b"SIGAR\nSPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for JULY 30\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JULY 30, 2010\nFOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n Afghanistan Reconstruction 2010\n2221 South Clark Street\nSuite 800\nArlington, VA 22202-3712\n\n\n\n\n 3 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS\n\x0cCover Captions (clockwise from left):\nTribal and religious leaders gather in\nKandahar to discuss a range of local\nissues in June. Earlier in the month, the\nGIRoA hosted the three-day Peace Jirga,\nat which some 1,600 religious scholars,\ntribal leaders, civil society organization\nleaders, Afghan refugees, and govern-\nment representatives discussed ways to\nend violence and achieve lasting peace in\nAfghanistan. (U.S. Navy photo)\nAn Afghan soldier from the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s Close\nSupport Kandak participates in the first-ever\njoint engineering task with the 21st Regi-\nment of the British Army\xe2\x80\x99s Royal Engineers.\nThe combined teams are working on infra-\nstructure projects at Patrol Base Rahim in\nNahr-e Saraj, Helmand.\xc2\xa0(ISAF photo)\nFifteen Afghan women attend a workshop\nin journalism held at Herat University. The\nworkshop was promoted by the Herat PRT\nthis quarter. (ISAF photo)\nTwo Afghans measure grain to sell at\nthe Koru Chareh Bazaar in Marjah in May.\nSince the initial fighting to take the city\nfrom insurgent control, residents have\nreturned to their homes, and the market- An Afghan musician plays the rubab at the Anab Gull Poetry Festival in Farah in May. A rubab is a lute-like instrument\nplace\xe2\x80\x94the hub of the community\xe2\x80\x94has typically made from the trunk of a mulberry tree and animal skin. During the festival, male and female poets of all\nreopened. (U.S. Marine Corps photo, ages recited their poems to an audience of coalition forces, provincial leaders, and Afghans from the 10 districts of\nLCpl James Clark) Farah. The festival was the first of its kind in two years. (U.S. Air Force photo, SrA Rylan K. Albright)\n\x0cSIGAR Special Inspector General for\n Afghanistan Reconstruction\n JULY 30\n 2010\n\n\n\n\nThe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) established\nthe Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).\n\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the indepen-\ndent and objective\n\xe2\x80\xa2 conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and\n operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the\n reconstruction of Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to pro-\n mote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs\n and operations; and prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs\n and operations.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and\n currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of\n such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.\nAfghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other\nfunding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government\nthat involves the use of amounts appropriated, or otherwise made available for the\nreconstruction of Afghanistan.\n\nSource: P.L. 110-181, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/28/2008.\n\x0cISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN\n\n UZBEKISTAN CHINA\n TAJIKISTAN\n\n\n\n TURKMENISTAN JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN\n BALKH TAKHAR\n\n\n SAMANGAN\n FARYAB BAGHLAN\n SAR-E PUL PANJSHIR\n NURISTAN\n BADGHIS\n PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR\n BAMYAN LAGHMAN\n KABUL\n HERAT WARDAK\n NANGARHAR\n GHOR LOGAR\n DAYKUNDI PAKTIYA\n GHAZNI KHOWST\n\n URUZGAN\n FARAH\n PAKTIKA\n ZABUL\n\n\n\n PAKISTAN\n NIMROZ\nIRAN HELMAND\n KANDAHAR\n\x0c SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR\n\n AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\n\nJuly 30, 2010\n\n\n I am pleased to submit SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s quarterly report to Congress on the U.S. reconstruction effort in\nAfghanistan. This report documents SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s activities and provides an update on the status of reconstruc-\ntion programs in Afghanistan for the quarter ending June 30, 2010.\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s auditors and investigators had a productive quarter. We issued 4 audit reports and announced\n5 new audits, bringing the total number of ongoing contract, performance, and forensic audits to 18. SIGAR\nopened 27 new investigations and closed 14 cases, bringing the number of ongoing investigations to 55.\nWe participated in a number of joint investigations, including one in which two Afghan companies have\npleaded guilty to bribery. SIGAR also collaborated with other federal law enforcement agencies to investi-\ngate the sources of bulk cash shipments leaving Afghanistan through the Kabul airport.\n In the past year, SIGAR has produced 24 reports, including audits of construction contracts and project\nmanagement as well as performance reviews of large programs, such as the $627 million that the Congress\nhas earmarked for Afghan women and girls. As I testified on two occasions this quarter\xe2\x80\x94once before\nthe Commission on Wartime Contracting and once before the State, Foreign Operations Appropriations\nSubcommittee of the House of Representatives\xe2\x80\x94our work has made me increasingly concerned about four\nissues that are impeding the reconstruction effort.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 lack of accountability and insufficient oversight by implementers\n\xe2\x80\xa2 inadequate attention to metrics\n\xe2\x80\xa2 inadequate attention to sustainability\n\xe2\x80\xa2 insufficient capacity building in Afghan institutions\n\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s work has identified a number of areas where implementing agencies could improve their\nability to monitor projects and better account for reconstruction dollars. For example, U.S. agencies have\nno shared database of reconstruction contracts. Despite the recommendations of our audit last year, the\nUnited States still lacks an integrated management information system that would help agencies coordi-\nnate projects and track completed, ongoing, and planned reconstruction activities. Implementing agencies\nneed accurate and timely information to ensure appropriate oversight.\n We must establish better metrics to use in determining whether a program is sustainable. This quar-\nter, we found that the Capability Milestone rating system, which had been used since 2005 to measure the\nprogress of the Afghan security forces, was unreliable. This audit underscored the critical need for good\nmetrics. Similarly, our audit of the energy sector found that the U.S. government did not have an effective\nway to track progress toward delivering more electricity to the Afghan people.\n\n\n\n\n 2221 SOUTH CLARK STREET, SUITE 800 ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202\n\x0c We must also give much greater thought to sustainability: all of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audits of infrastructure projects have\nidentified operations and maintenance issues. For example, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan is not\nyet able to operate and maintain any of the facilities that have been built to house the Afghan security forces. To\nprotect our investment, the U.S. government is awarding two contracts\xe2\x80\x94totaling $800 million\xe2\x80\x94to provide opera-\ntions and maintenance for more than 650 security force facilities over the next five years. SIGAR is seeing similar\nsustainability issues throughout the reconstruction effort.\n I am also concerned that we have not done enough to build the Afghans\xe2\x80\x99 capacity to manage their govern-\nment and develop their economy. U.S. implementing agencies must include robust capacity-building measures in\nevery reconstruction program. The U.S. Department of State is taking steps to address this problem through its\ncivilian surge and by channeling more reconstruction dollars through Afghan institutions. A key component of\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s mission is to provide oversight of this crucial effort.\n Last February, in just our 16th month of funded operations, I asked the Council of the Inspectors General on\nIntegrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) to conduct an early peer review of SIGAR. A peer review typically occurs after\nthe third year of operations, but I requested this early review so that we could quickly benefit from the input of\nour peers and enhance our ability to conduct effective oversight. In July, CIGIE concluded its review. Our Audit\nDirectorate passed the review with deficiencies, and we are implementing CIGIE\xe2\x80\x99s recommendations to correct\nthem. The CIGIE review found that the Investigations Directorate was not yet in full compliance with certain\nadministrative requirements, but CIGIE concluded that our implementation of new policies and procedures is\nlikely to result in full compliance in the near future.\n The United States is in its ninth year in Afghanistan, implementing an extensive reconstruction program in a\ndangerous, difficult, and rapidly changing environment. The United States and its coalition partners are trying to\nsimultaneously provide security, build governing institutions, and promote economic development so that\nmilitary forces can be drawn down a year from now. Because of the complexity of this effort, it is critical to\nidentify systemic problems quickly.\n As our work this quarter demonstrates, SIGAR is providing real-time oversight of individual projects as\nwell as of the systems that underpin the entire reconstruction effort. We will continue to conduct the broad\nrange of contract, performance, and forensic audits needed to detect and prevent the waste, fraud, and abuse\nof funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.\n\n\n\n\nVery respectfully,\n\n\n\n\nArnold Fields\nSpecial Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n\n 2221 SOUTH CLARK STREET, SUITE 800 ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202\n\x0c\x0cTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 1\n AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n 3 Kabul Conference Streamlines\n Reconstruction Priorities\n 4 Security\n 6 Governance and the Rule of Law\n 7 Economic and Social Development\n 8 Reconciliation and Reintegration\n 9 Regional Cooperation\n 9 Looking Ahead\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 2\n SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n 13 SIGAR Audits\n 30 SIGAR Investigations\n 32 Peer Review\n 33 SIGAR Budget\n 33 SIGAR Staff\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 3\n RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n 37 Overview\n 41 Status of Funds\n 55 Security\n 69 Governance\n 89 Economic and Social Development\n 107 Counter-Narcotics\n\x0cTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 4\n OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n 119 Completed Oversight Activities\n 123 Ongoing Oversight Activities\n 132 Other Agency Investigations\n 133 Other Agency Inspections\n\n\n\n\n APPENDICES & ENDNOTES\n 136 Appendix A: Cross-Reference of Report\n to Statutory Requirements\n 140 Appendix B: U.S. Government Appropriated Funds\n 142 Appendix C: SIGAR Audits\n 144 Appendix D: SIGAR Investigations and Hotline\n 145 Appendix E: Abbreviations and Acronyms\n 148 Endnotes\n\x0c Moving forward\n A U.S. soldier travels to the village of Paspajak in Logar\n province in June. The new Afghan reconstruction plan puts\n Afghan security forces in charge of military operations\n throughout the country by 2014.\n (U.S. Army photo, SGT Russell Gilchrest)\n\n\n\n\n222 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c1 AFGHANISTAN\n OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cThe Afghan government can\n guarantee security only when its\n people are confident in its\n ability to deliver public services,\n good governance, human rights\nprotection\xe2\x80\x94including gender equality\xe2\x80\x94\n and economic opportunities.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94Kabul Conference Communiqu\xc3\xa9\n\n\n\n\n Source: Kabul Conference, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/19/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 2 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\nThis reporting period, concerns mounted over the pace of the reconstruction\neffort in Afghanistan, now in its ninth year. A sense of urgency pervades both\nAfghanistan and the international community: the Government of the Islamic\nRepublic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must take more responsibility for the country\xe2\x80\x99s\nfuture. The success of the U.S. and international strategy for reconstruction rests\non the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to independently provide for the nation\xe2\x80\x99s security and lead\nsustained economic development.\n The GIRoA took an important step toward achieving these goals by develop-\ning a new reconstruction plan, which the international community endorsed at\nthe Kabul Conference on July 20. At this conference, the largest ever hosted in\nAfghanistan, representatives from more than 60 countries and a dozen interna-\ntional organizations gathered to realign the international reconstruction effort\nwith Afghan priorities.\n U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the conference \xe2\x80\x9ca milestone in a\nlong and difficult journey.\xe2\x80\x9d At the same time, she cautioned that the road ahead\nwould not be easy: it will be necessary to honestly assess the progress made,\nidentify the gaps between expectations and performance, and resolve to close\nthose gaps. Closing those gaps will require robust oversight of the reconstruction\nprogram.\n\nKABUL CONFERENCE STREAMLINES\nRECONSTRUCTION PRIORITIES\nThe Kabul Conference delegates endorsed a new, three-year Prioritization and\nImplementation Plan, which builds on the 2008 Afghanistan National Development\nStrategy. The new plan establishes Afghan national priorities in five critical areas:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 security\n\xe2\x80\xa2 governance and the rule of law\n\xe2\x80\xa2 economic and social development\n\xe2\x80\xa2 reconciliation and reintegration\n\xe2\x80\xa2 regional cooperation\n The international participants at the conference agreed to realign their\nassistance to advance Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s priorities and supported the goal of chan-\nneling at least 50% of their aid through the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s budget within two years. This\ncommitment is contingent on the GIRoA successfully implementing reforms\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 3\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n Delegates from more than 60 countries take part in the International Conference on\n Afghanistan, co-hosted by the GIRoA and the UN. The Kabul Conference endorsed Afghan-led\n programs aimed at improving development, governance, and security. (UNAMA photo)\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cThe Afghan people have to strengthen public management systems, reduce corruption, improve budget\n execution, and increase revenue collection to finance critical national programs.\n charted a comprehensive The Kabul Conference underscored how much the U.S. reconstruction\n strategy for their future. strategy has evolved over the last two years\xe2\x80\x94from one that primarily bypassed\n Their plans are detailed, the Afghan government by funding reconstruction projects through private\n practical, and reflect a contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants, to one that channels funds\n through the Afghan government. To do this effectively and to protect these funds\n great deal of work and\n from waste and corruption, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s public institutions must be greatly\n consultation. And we are strengthened.\n here as representatives In this rapidly changing environment in which the United States is spending\n of individual nations and large sums of money, oversight bodies must quickly identify systemic prob-\n as members of the global lems so that implementing agencies can adjust programs before tax dollars are\n wasted. To provide effective oversight, SIGAR is conducting a broad mix of\n community to offer our contract, program management, and performance audits that focus on the use of\n support and align our U.S. funds in the newly realigned priority areas of the reconstruction effort.\n resources behind Afghan\ngoals and Afghan policies.\xe2\x80\x9d SECURITY\n \xe2\x80\x94U.S. Secretary of State More than $25 billion\xe2\x80\x94about half of all U.S. reconstruction dollars spent in\n Hillary Clinton Afghanistan since 2001\xe2\x80\x94has been appropriated for the Afghan Security Forces\n Fund (ASFF) to train, equip, and house the Afghan National Security Forces\nSource: DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRemarks: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham\nClinton, Intervention at the Kabul Conference,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010.\n (ANSF). The Administration\xe2\x80\x99s requests for the FY 2011 appropriation and the\n FY 2010 supplemental appropriation include an additional $14 billion to increase\n the troop strength of the Afghan National Army to 171,600 and the Afghan\n\n\n\n\n 4 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nNational Police to 134,000 by October 2011\xe2\x80\x94a 30% increase from current\nsecurity force levels.\n Under the current U.S. strategy for securing and stabilizing Afghanistan, the\nUnited States will begin to withdraw its military forces in July 2011. U.S. officials\nhave said the rate of this withdrawal will depend on conditions in Afghanistan;\nhowever, the Afghan Prioritization and Implementation Plan established a\ntimeline that would put Afghan security forces in charge of military operations\nthroughout the country by 2014. The success of both U.S. and Afghan plans\ndepends on the success of efforts to build the capability of the Afghan army and\npolice forces to provide security. As of June 30, 2010, the U.S. Department of\nDefense (DoD) has allocated nearly $5.75 billion for the infrastructure projects\nneeded to house and train the ANSF.\n This quarter, SIGAR issued three audits related to efforts to build the capabil-\nity of the ANSF:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an evaluation of the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a review of construction to build a garrison for the ANA in Farah province\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a review of construction of an ANP compound in Kandahar\nWhen SIGAR began its audit of the CM rating system, the CM was the primary\nmetric for measuring the development of the ANSF. SIGAR found that the\nsystem, which had been in use since 2005, could not provide a reliable or consis-\ntent assessment of the capabilities of the ANSF. In early March, SIGAR auditors\nbriefed military commanders on their findings. In late April, the International\nSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command replaced this system with a\nnew, unit-level assessment. It is too early to assess the new system, but SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\nfindings and recommendations pertain to any system designed to evaluate the\noperational effectiveness of the ANSF. The United States and the GIRoA must\nhave a reliable way to measure the progress of the ANA and the ANP if they are\nto achieve their goal of transferring responsibility for the security of Afghanistan\nto the ANSF. Section 2 of this report provides a summary of this audit.\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audits of the ANA garrison in Farah province and an ANP compound\nin Kandahar identified a number of problems, including inadequate project plan-\nning and insufficient quality assurance, that have resulted in project delays and\ncost increases. For example, the ANA garrison at Farah was built in two phases,\nboth of which were more than a year behind schedule at the time SIGAR com-\npleted its audit. The estimated cost of phase one\xe2\x80\x94$29.4 million\xe2\x80\x94had increased\nby about 30%.\n Similarly, construction of the four facilities that constitute the Joint Regional\nAfghan Security Forces Compound (JRAC) in Kandahar experienced delays rang-\ning from six months to two years. Moreover, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\n(USACE), which was responsible for the contract, did not have a master plan\nthat integrated the four projects. Consequently, the JRAC has some redundant\npower, water, and sewer systems, as well as a variety of heating and cooling\nsystems. In addition, the armory was placed next to the barracks, unnecessarily\nposing a potential danger to security forces stationed at the JRAC. Section 2 of\nthis report provides summaries of both of these SIGAR audits.\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 5\n\x0cAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR has four ongoing audits in the security sector. Two are assessing three\ninfrastructure contracts to build eight ANSF facilities. One is reviewing the\nprocess that the United States, its coalition partners, and the GIRoA are using\nto determine how many ANA and ANP facilities are needed and where these\nfacilities should be built. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s fourth audit is evaluating the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s personnel\nmanagement systems. As part of this work, SIGAR will identify the sources of\nfunding for ANP salaries and the extent to which the ANP has systems in place to\nmitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse.\n\nGOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW\nBoth the U.S. strategy and the Afghan Prioritization and Implementation Plan\nemphasize the need to improve governance and strengthen the rule of law at\nevery level\xe2\x80\x94from Kabul to the provincial capitals and rural communities. The\ncommuniqu\xc3\xa9 released at the close of the Kabul Conference underscored that\nneed: \xe2\x80\x9cGood governance, the rule of law, and human rights form the foundation\nof the strategy to achieve a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Improvements in\nthese areas should not only increase the confidence of the Afghan people in their\nown future, but also underpin security improvements and social developments.\xe2\x80\x9d1\n The GIRoA pledged to take action on numerous issues to improve gover-\nnance, including strengthening local institutional capacity, combating corruption,\nand implementing electoral reform. The U.S. government is relying on an influx\nof civilians to assist Afghans. Since the beginning of this year, the Department\nof State (DoS), in coordination with other U.S. departments and agencies, has\ntripled the number of civilian experts deployed to help build Afghan capac-\nity. According to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for\nAfghanistan and Pakistan, these civilians \xe2\x80\x9care engaged in a range of activities,\nfrom rebuilding Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s once vibrant agriculture sector, to working with\nkey Afghan ministries to improve the provision of health, education, justice, and\nother services outside of provincial capitals.\xe2\x80\x9d2\n The success of the U.S. strategy depends on the ability of these civilians\nto work with their Afghan counterparts to design, implement, and oversee\nreconstruction projects. SIGAR is conducting an audit of the civilian surge to\nidentify the number and types of personnel who are being deployed through-\nout Afghanistan and to assess the extent to which these civilians are able to\nwork with their Afghan counterparts to advance U.S. strategic and program-\nmatic reconstruction goals. In July 2010, SIGAR and the DoS Office of Inspector\nGeneral agreed to conduct portions of this audit jointly.\n\nCorruption\nCorruption continues to be of serious concern to both international donors and\nAfghan citizens. Because the United States is committed to provide more funding\nassistance through Afghan ministries, these ministries must have the capability\nto account for this funding. SIGAR will be looking closely at the steps taken by\n\n\n\n\n 6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nU.S. agencies to help ensure that donor funds channeled through the GIRoA are\nreasonably protected from waste, fraud, and abuse.\n More than a year ago, SIGAR initiated a series of audits to determine the\nfollowing:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 what the United States and other donor countries are doing to build the capac-\n ity of Afghan institutions to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the extent to which Afghan institutions that receive significant U.S. funding\n have the systems in place to account for donor funds\nAs part of this program to assess Afghan institutional capacity, SIGAR has\ncompleted seven audits and is conducting four. Two of the completed audits\nassessed key Afghan oversight bodies\xe2\x80\x94the High Office of Oversight (HOO)\nand the Control and Audit Office (CAO). Despite the important role that these\nAfghan oversight institutions should play in combating corruption and providing\naccountability over donor funding, very little had been done until recently to help\nthem develop their capacity.\n SIGAR is finalizing a review of U.S. assistance programs that are designed to\nhelp the GIRoA develop its anti-corruption capabilities. Although multiple U.S.\nagencies now conduct anti-corruption assistance programs, most of this assis-\ntance has been provided without the benefit of a comprehensive anti-corruption\nstrategy. Although a draft strategy exists, a final strategy is urgently needed to\nguide and direct U.S. anti-corruption assistance. SIGAR will report on this review\nnext month.\n\nElectoral Reform\nThe United States and the international community view elections as critical to\nsustaining a legitimate government. After last year\xe2\x80\x99s fraud-marred presidential\nelection, a SIGAR audit recommended that the international community take\nsteps to build the capacity of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Independent Election Commission\n(IEC) to sustain the electoral process. In the Kabul Conference communiqu\xc3\xa9, the\nGIRoA pledged to \xe2\x80\x9cinitiate within six months a strategy for long-term electoral\nreform that addresses in particular the sustainability of the electoral process.\xe2\x80\x9d3\n Since the presidential election, President Karzai has replaced key electoral\nofficials, but it is not clear how these changes will affect the September parlia-\nmentary elections. In July, the IEC announced the final list of 2,556 candidates,\nwhich included 406 women. The United States is providing assistance to a num-\nber of organizations, including the United Nations, for these elections.\n During the next quarter, SIGAR will publish a review that identifies lessons\nlearned from past elections to improve the electoral process in Afghanistan.\n\nECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\nIn his opening remarks at the Kabul Conference, President Karzai urged the\ninternational community to support Afghan-run programs, such as the National\nSolidarity Program (NSP). The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 7\n\x0cAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nDevelopment started this program in 2003 to help Afghan communities develop\ntheir own projects. Since then, the United States and other international donors\nhave provided nearly $1 billion for the program, which the ministry says has\nbrought 40,000 projects to completion.\n SIGAR is conducting an audit of the NSP to identify donor assistance, to deter-\nmine what the United States and other donors have done to ensure that the NSP\ncan account for their contributions, and to examine the capacity of the Ministry\nof Rural Rehabilitation and Development to plan, manage, and monitor the pro-\ngram. The United States has pledged $440 million to this program.\n The GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s new priorities to spur the economy include building large-scale\ninfrastructure projects to develop the country\xe2\x80\x99s mineral resources, expanding\nirrigation systems, extending the road network, and increasing the supply of\nelectricity. Earlier this year, a SIGAR review of the energy sector found that the\nGIRoA urgently needed an updated master plan to guide international investment\nin this sector.\n Participants at the Kabul Conference reiterated their commitment to protect\nwomen\xe2\x80\x99s rights. From 2003 through 2010, the Congress has appropriated\n$627 million to address the needs of Afghan women and girls. This quarter, SIGAR\nissued an audit assessing whether DoS and the U.S. Agency for International\nDevelopment (USAID) had complied with congressional directives and whether\nthis money had funded activities that were consistent with U.S. and Afghan\nnational strategies. SIGAR found that DoS and USAID did not coordinate their\napproach to reporting on the use of these funds, only partially met congressional\ndirectives, and did not show linkages between U.S.-funded activities and Afghan\ngoals and benchmarks. Section 2 of this report provides a summary of this audit.\n\nRECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION\nIn early June, the GIRoA convened a Consultative Peace Jirga to discuss ways to\nbegin a process of reconciliation with insurgents who are willing to accept the\nAfghan Constitution and renounce ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.\nAbout 1,600 Afghans from around the country participated in the Peace Jirga and\nissued a 16-point resolution that called on the government to develop a program\nto implement a peace process.\n At the Kabul Conference, the GIRoA unveiled the Afghanistan Peace and\nReintegration Program. President Karzai had earlier announced the formation\nof the High Peace Council to lead the program. A new Peace and Reintegration\nTrust Fund, supported though international contributions, has been established\nto fund its activities. The program seeks to reintegrate thousands of former\ncombatants and stabilize 4,000 communities in 220 districts over 5 years.\n DoD has received congressional approval to provide $100 million from\nthe Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program for the reintegration effort.\nAmbassador Holbrooke said the reintegration program was one of the most impor-\ntant initiatives to come out of the Kabul Conference because defeating the Taliban\nrequires a political process that goes hand in hand with the military campaign.\n\n\n\n\n 8 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n Improving security is essential to the success of the reconstruction program in\nAfghanistan. SIGAR will continue to observe the evolving process of reconcilia-\ntion and provide oversight of U.S. spending as needed.\n\nREGIONAL COOPERATION\nThe United States and its international partners have been encouraging greater\nregional cooperation to help stabilize Afghanistan and facilitate increased trade\nand investment to fuel economic development. These efforts have been par-\nticularly focused on improving Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s relationship with Pakistan. In a\nbreakthrough this quarter, the two countries reached a trade transit agreement\nthat will allow Afghan trucks to transport products through Pakistan to the\nIndian border.\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Prioritization and Implementation Plan calls for greater interna-\ntional investment in regional infrastructure projects, such as railways and roads\nto link Afghan cities to markets in central Asia, south Asia, and Europe. Other\npriorities include building a natural gas pipeline and expanding regional electric-\nity transmission networks. Most of these projects would have to be funded by the\ninternational community and will require effective oversight.\n\nLOOKING AHEAD\nAt the Kabul Conference, the GIRoA vowed to implement key reforms, such as\nimproving its public financial management systems, to ensure that donor funds\nchanneled through the government benefit the Afghan people. The final commu-\nniqu\xc3\xa9 from the Conference noted that donors must review the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s progress\nin achieving its goals; nevertheless, it did not provide a mechanism or timeline\nfor conducting those reviews.\n U.S. implementing agencies have the primary obligation to ensure that\ntaxpayer dollars are spent wisely in support of U.S. strategic goals. SIGAR is\ncommitted to providing the critical real-time oversight needed to quickly identify\nproblems and prevent the waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S. reconstruction funds.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 9\n\x0c Growing local industries\n An Afghan worker packs honey into jars in a USAID-funded\n facility in Jalalabad. Regenerating agribusiness is a key goal\n of the U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization\n Strategy. (USAID Photo)\n\n\n\n\n10 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c2 SIGAR\n OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cAccountability is the cornerstone\nof good governance. Without it, we risk\n losing our investment in Afghanistan\n to waste, corruption, and fraud.\n Everyone involved in the\n reconstruction effort\xe2\x80\x94the U.S.\n implementing agencies, private\n contractors, nongovernment\n organizations, and the Afghan\n government\xe2\x80\x94must be held\n accountable for public funds at\n their disposal.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94Special Inspector General Arnold Fields\n\n\n\n\n Source: Special Inspector General Arnold Fields, \xe2\x80\x9cOversight of U.S. Civilian Assistance for Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d testimony before the State,\n Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 7/15/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 12 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR OVERSIGHT\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Audit, Investigations, and Management directorates had a highly\nproductive quarter. SIGAR completed four audits and announced five new\naudits, bringing the total number of ongoing contract, performance, and forensic\naudits to 18. SIGAR opened 26 new investigations; it also participated in joint\noperations with other federal law enforcement agencies to determine the source\nof bulk cash shipments leaving Afghanistan through the Kabul airport. As a result\nof SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s public outreach campaign, the SIGAR Hotline recorded a 77% jump in\nthe number of complaints it received alleging fraud, waste, and abuse of recon-\nstruction dollars. Table 2.1 lists SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s completed audits as of July 30.\n During this reporting period, SIGAR also continued to build its staff. SIGAR has\n93 full-time employees when this report went to press. SIGAR is working with the\nU.S. Embassy in Kabul and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan to increase the number of\npeople it can station at the Embassy and at other locations in Afghanistan.\n\nSIGAR AUDITS\nA key goal of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to develop self-sufficient Afghan\nsecurity forces that can independently provide internal and external security for\nthe country. More than half of all reconstruction funding is used to train, equip,\nand house the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police\n(ANP). Three of the four SIGAR audits completed this quarter were related to\nthis critical effort.\n The United States has also committed to promoting gender equity in\nAfghanistan. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s fourth completed audit this quarter reviewed the use of\n\n\nTABLE 2.1\n\n\nCOMPLETED SIGAR AUDITS, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JULY 30, 2010\nReport Identifier Report Title Date Issued\nSIGAR-Audit-10-14 ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall, but Some Construction 7/30/2010\n Issues Should Be Addressed\nSIGAR-Audit-10-13 Greater Coordination Needed in Meeting Congressional Directives To 7/30/2010\n Address and Report on the Needs of Afghan Women and Girls\nSIGAR-Audit-10-12 ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project 7/22/2010\n Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues\nSIGAR-Audit-10-11 Actions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force 6/29/2010\n Assessments\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 13\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nthe $627 million that the Congress has earmarked since 2003 to assist Afghan\nwomen and girls.\n\nCompleted Audit Reports\nThis quarter, SIGAR issued four audit reports, which are summarized in the\nfollowing subsections.\n\nAudit 10-11: Afghanistan Security Forces\nActions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments\nThe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends on building the country\xe2\x80\x99s capacity by\ntraining and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide for\nsecurity. Since 2002, the United States has provided about $27 billion\xe2\x80\x94more than\nhalf of all reconstruction dollars\xe2\x80\x94for ANSF training, equipping, and sustainment.\nCurrent ANSF force-generation goals, which were agreed to by the GIRoA and the\ninternational community, call for 171,600 ANA troops and 134,000 ANP members\nby October 2011. In the short term, ANSF capabilities are essential to the U.S. and\ncoalition counter-insurgency strategy, which calls for securing key population areas\nand relies on bolstering the Afghan people\xe2\x80\x99s confidence in their government. In the\nlong term, ANSF progress is critical because the United States and the international\ncommunity aim to transfer responsibility for security to the Afghan security forces.\nSince 2005, the United States has used the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system\nto monitor and report on progress in the development of ANSF capabilities.\n\nOBJECTIVES\nThe audit addressed four objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the reliability of the CM rating system.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess summary reports provided to decision makers.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify challenges to U.S. and coalition efforts to assess the ANSF.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify systemic ANSF deficiencies that have undermined efforts to develop\n unit-level capabilities.\n\nFINDINGS\n1. SIGAR found that the CM rating system has not provided reliable or con-\n sistent assessments of ANSF capabilities. The assessments depended on\n quantitative data such as supplies and numbers of personnel rather than\n subjective evaluations of a unit\xe2\x80\x99s ability to perform its mission effectively. In\n some cases, ANA personnel numbers were inflated because they were based\n on the number assigned to a unit rather than the number present for duty.\n2. The measurements used in the assessment system overstated the capabili-\n ties of the ANSF, particularly for top-rated army and police units that did\n not always maintain the ability to conduct independent operations. The\n rating system inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF units to progress\n toward a top-level rating, because they faced the prospect of losing force\n protection, expertise, supplies, funding, and prestige.\n\n\n\n\n 14 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n3. Summary reports of ANSF capability ratings included outdated assessment\n data because monthly CM assessments were missing. The submissions were\n missing because of a lack of mentors and partners to provide reporting,\n among other reasons. In the case of ANP records, the ratings either were\n missing or had been carried over for as long as four months.\n4. U.S. and coalition efforts to assess the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s capabilities face serious\n challenges, including security conditions, mentor shortages, and inadequate\n training. ANP mentoring and assessment have been significantly limited and\n sometimes ineffective in areas where enemy activity is intense. The shortfall\n in mentors and partners and their lack of training have significantly affected\n the development and assessment of ANSF units, particularly the police.\n5. Systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined efforts to develop unit capa-\n bilities. These deficiencies include logistics problems, personnel attrition,\n inadequate personnel authorizations, infrastructure deficiencies, corrup-\n tion, drug abuse, and illiteracy. For example, mentors and partners reported\n logistics problems such as vanishing supply requests, hoarding, and the\n inability to track supply request forms through ministerial supply chain sys-\n tems. Another key issue is the attrition that has drained a large portion of the\n police trained through the Focused Police District Development (FPDD) pro-\n gram. The attrition occurred largely because of pressure from anti-coalition\n forces and disappointment over pay levels.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nIn use since 2005, the CM rating system has not provided a consistent and reli-\nable means of reporting on the effectiveness of ANSF units. According to officials\nfrom the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC),\nthe CM rating system is being replaced by a new unit-level assessment system,\nwhich SIGAR has not yet reviewed. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s recommendations remain relevant\nto the new system: without the recommended measures, decision makers will\nnot have a clear understanding of the extent to which progress is being made in\ndeveloping Afghan security forces that are capable of independently conducting\noperations and ultimately securing Afghanistan.\n To obtain more reliable assessments of ANSF operational effectiveness,\nSIGAR recommended that IJC take the following actions:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Emphasize subjective assessment of the overall operational capability\n provided by mentor and partner team evaluators.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop a manual for mentors and partners that incorporates real-world\n examples and best practices to support more consistent evaluation.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Work with the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan/Combined Security\n Transition Command - Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) to provide additional\n training and guidance to mentor and partner teams on decrees and proce-\n dures from the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Encourage an equivalent understanding among raters of different ANSF units\n to ensure that rating-level definitions are consistent.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 15\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Incorporate present-for-duty figures as a percentage of assigned personnel\n into assessments for both ANP and ANA units.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Conduct independent validations of top-level ANP unit capabilities.\n To improve the transparency and accuracy of ANSF assessment reporting,\nSIGAR recommended that IJC take these actions:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Begin to systematically track the number of unit-level evaluations not sub-\n mitted each month and the number of elements not observed within those\n assessments.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Add an additional overall rating level to represent units \xe2\x80\x9cnot assessed\xe2\x80\x9d where\n no mentors/partners are assigned.\n To maximize visibility into ANP capabilities, SIGAR recommended that IJC\ntake this action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Require all U.S. and coalition military mentor and partner teams to submit\n unit assessments, and begin requesting unit assessments from civilian advis-\n ers in districts where no military mentors/partners are assigned.\n To counteract disincentives resulting from the ANSF assessment system,\nSIGAR recommended that IJC take this action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate\xe2\x80\x94in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MoI, and MoD\xe2\x80\x94the creation\n of an incentive system to reward Afghan units for top-level capabilities.\n SIGAR also recommended that NTM-A/CSTC-A take these actions:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 To monitor supply requests, work with MoI and MoD to implement better\n tracking systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 To counterbalance the effects of attrition in FPDD units, develop a program\n to train new recruits who are assigned to FPDDs that have previously\n received training.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 To enable each ANSF unit to extend driver training using its own personnel,\n implement a train-the-trainer driving program.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\nIJC concurred or partially concurred with 10 recommendations, stating that\nit intended to address the recommendations as it implemented its new rating\nsystem, the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). IJC disagreed with two\nrecommendations, which SIGAR removed from the final report because IJC\xe2\x80\x99s\nresponses fulfilled the spirit of the recommendations.\n In its response, NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with the recommendations but sug-\ngested that the report included out-of-date information. However, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit\nwork relied on interviews and information collected from October 2009 through\nMay 2010, including field observations of 18 ANSF units made during February\nand March 2010.\n The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy provided additional infor-\nmation, including clarification about the nature of DoD reports to the Congress\nand comments regarding DoD\xe2\x80\x99s concerns about the CM rating system. OSD\nPersonnel and Readiness also commented on the report and provided additional\n\n\n\n\n 16 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\ninformation regarding the history of efforts to improve ANSF assessments,\nincluding details on OSD\xe2\x80\x99s involvement in attempting to address reliability and\nintegrity problems with the CM rating system.\n\nAudit 10-12: Kandahar ANP Compound\nANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project Planning,\nOversight, and Sustainability Issues\nThe international coalition in Afghanistan is working to provide facilities to train\nand house the ANP. With the ANP force size growing from 95,000 in December\n2009 to 134,000 by October 2011, CSTC-A has helped fund a country-wide build-\ning program to meet the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s needs. As a part of this effort, CSTC-A provided\n$45 million to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to fund the construc-\ntion of the Joint Regional Afghanistan Security Forces Compound (JRAC) in\nKandahar. The compound is located outside the Kandahar Airfield.\n The compound consists of four separate ANP projects: a Regional Logistics New generators begin operation at the\n Kandahar ANP compound. SIGAR found that\nCenter, an Afghan National Civil Order Police battalion, the Afghan Uniform\n the JRAC had some redundant power sys-\nPolice\xe2\x80\x99s regional headquarters, and the Afghan Border Police\xe2\x80\x99s zone command. tems due to a lack of integrated planning.\nUSACE awarded a firm-fixed-price contract for the Regional Logistics Center proj- (SIGAR photo)\nect and firm-fixed-price task orders for construction of the projects for the Afghan\nNational Civil Order Police, Afghan Uniform Police, and Afghan Border Police.\n\nOBJECTIVES\nThe audit addressed three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether the JRAC was constructed within the terms of the con-\n tracts, including schedule and cost.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether USACE oversight of construction was conducted in accor-\n dance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), USACE requirements,\n and oversight provisions of the contract.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify what plans are in place to sustain these facilities once they are\n turned over to the GIRoA.\n\nFINDINGS\n1. SIGAR found that three of the four JRAC projects experienced delays rang-\n ing from 6 to 12 months. The fourth project was delayed two years, in part\n because of a land dispute between CSTC-A and the U.S. Drug Enforcement\n Administration, which led to its relocation to the JRAC site. Nearly $280,000\n in USACE expenses was related to the project\xe2\x80\x99s relocation. In addition, the\n prime contractor has filed a request for equitable adjustment for $665,000 in\n additional costs. SIGAR noted that the final JRAC project is scheduled for\n occupancy by July 2010. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s inspection of completed work revealed no\n apparent construction problems.\n2. Inadequate project planning affected all four projects. USACE staff did not\n prepare a master plan for the JRAC that fully integrated the four projects. As\n a result, the JRAC had some redundant power, water, and sewer systems and\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 17\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nWork continues on the Kandahar ANP Compound. This quarter, a SIGAR audit made a\nnumber of recommendations to ensure that the GIRoA can sustain the facilities in the future.\n(SIGAR photo)\n\n\n varying heating and cooling systems. In addition, an armory for one project\n was constructed adjacent to a barracks for another project.\n3. Project oversight was also deficient in several respects. USACE quality\n assurance procedures were not fully adhered to, which raises the risk that\n construction problems could surface later in the life of the project, increase\n operations and maintenance costs, and compromise occupant safety. In\n addition, the results of site inspections were not always documented; prime\n contractors did not adequately document the results of site inspections and\n whether required testing and inspections had occurred.\n4. CSTC-A officials stated that the GIRoA does not have the financial or tech-\n nical capacity to sustain ANSF facilities in the near term once they are\n completed. To address this issue, USACE intends to award two five-year\n contracts for the operation and maintenance of ANSF facilities throughout\n Afghanistan, at an estimated cost of $800 million. These contracts include\n provisions for developing the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s sustainment capabilities.\n5. A key development that will help the ANP provide for its own operations and\n maintenance is the move toward \xe2\x80\x9caustere\xe2\x80\x9d construction standards, as defined\n by CSTC-A. However, these standards do not include details on heating and\n cooling options and electrical and plumbing fixtures that could promote the\n long-term sustainability of U.S.-constructed facilities such as the JRAC.\n\n\n\n\n 18 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nThe United States has already committed to paying an estimated $800 million to\nsupport all ANSF facilities over the next five years. To enhance compliance with\nUSACE\xe2\x80\x99s quality assurance and control procedures and increase the likelihood\nthat the GIRoA will be able to sustain the facilities without assistance from the\nUnited States, SIGAR recommended that the Commanding General, USACE, take\nthe following actions:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Direct that future projects adhere to USACE\xe2\x80\x99s established quality assurance\n and quality control procedures.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Review and update current guidance on austere construction standards to\n include more details on heating and cooling options for different types of\n facilities, with the option of allowing for regional differences.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Include additional guidance regarding appropriate electrical, plumbing, and\n other fixtures for facilities.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\nCSTC-A concurred with SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s recommendations to update guidance on\naustere construction standards in Afghanistan. USACE concurred with the\nrecommendation to better adhere to quality assurance and quality control pro-\ncedures. Both CSTC-A and USACE commented on SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s observation that an\narmory and a barracks had been built adjacent to each other. CSTC-A indicated\nthat the armory was for securing weapons and not ammunition, implying that\nthere was no safety concern. In contrast, USACE stated that it was in discussions\nwith CSTC-A about installing 20-foot concrete barriers between the two areas.\nSIGAR noted that this matter needs to be resolved because the facilities will be\ntransferred to Afghan authorities at the end of July 2010, according to USACE\nofficials from Afghanistan Engineering District (AED)-South.\n\nAudit 10-13: Women and Girls\nGreater Coordination Needed in Meeting Congressional Directives To Address and Report\non the Needs of Afghan Women and Girls\nFrom 2003 through 2010, the Congress earmarked $627 million in appropri-\nated funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls. The Congress also\nperiodically directed the Department of State (DoS) to report on the use of\nthese funds. These earmarked funds signal congressional concern that, without\ngreater attention to the challenges facing women and girls in Afghanistan, the\ncountry\xe2\x80\x99s prospects for economic growth and democratic development will be\nsharply reduced, according to a 2004 conference report. Although the United\nStates and its allies cited the defense of women\xe2\x80\x99s rights as one of the primary\nreasons for commitment to Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s future after the defeat of the Taliban,\nAfghan women continue to be among the worst off in the world, according to a\nDecember 2009 Human Rights Watch Report.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 19\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nBefore the Kabul Conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton participates in\na women\xe2\x80\x99s empowerment event hosted by EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Catherine\nAshton in Kabul on July 20, 2010. (DoS photo)\n\n\nOBJECTIVES\nThe audit had three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the approach that DoS and the U.S. Agency for International\n Development (USAID) used to attribute and report on funds covering activi-\n ties for Afghan women and girls for FY 2008 and FY 2009.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which specific earmarks to certain organizations\n met congressional directives.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether reported activities were consistent with U.S. and Afghan\n national strategies, including the National Action Plan for the Women of\n Afghanistan.\n\nFINDINGS\n1. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s report focused on the DoS October 2009 report of U.S.-funded\n activities for women and girls in Afghanistan, and to some extent on DoS\xe2\x80\x99s\n 2008 report. In reviewing the 2009 report, SIGAR found that DoS and USAID\n did not coordinate their approach to reporting on the use of the funds ear-\n marked for Afghan women and girls. The reports submitted to the Congress\n in 2008 and 2009 did not provide complete and consistent information about\n the reported activities in which women and girls were intended beneficia-\n ries, such as relating funded activities to numbers of female beneficiaries or\n services provided.\n2. SIGAR found other problems with DoS\xe2\x80\x99s reporting. For example, the\n reports used different time frames for and approaches to the data presented.\n Although DoS and USAID took action in the past year to coordinate gender-\n related issues in Kabul, DoS did not develop guidelines or a rationale for\n determining and reporting earmark attributions. The report provided no\n explanation for why certain activities were included and others were not.\n\n\n\n 20 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n As a result, the reports to the Congress did not provide a clear picture of\n how the funds were used to address the needs of Afghan women and girls.\n3. Congressional legislation also specified that certain Afghan organizations\n should receive earmarks of specific amounts. DoS and USAID partially met\n these congressional directives. For example, the Ministry of Women\xe2\x80\x99s Affairs,\n which has responsibility for implementing GIRoA policies to secure and\n expand the legal rights of women, did not receive appropriated funds for\n each year it was mentioned in legislation. Other organizations received only\n partial amounts of the funds earmarked for them by the Congress, including\n the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and nongovernmen-\n tal organizations and civil society organizations led by Afghan women.\n4. U.S. policy is to support women\xe2\x80\x99s rights, gender integration, and Afghan\n national strategies. However, the 2009 report did not show linkages between\n U.S.-funded activities and Afghan goals and benchmarks included in the\n National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan, a key tool by which the GIRoA\n seeks to realize its gender equity goals. Such linkage is important to ensure\n that the reported activities address the needs of Afghan women and girls.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nEarmarks of appropriated funds for addressing the needs of Afghan women\nand girls have increased significantly over time, from $5 million in 2003 to\n$175 million for 2010. Although the Congress has directed DoS to report on the\nuse of these funds for Afghan women and girls, the reporting has not provided a\nclear picture of how the funds have been used to benefit Afghan women and girls\nor how U.S.-funded activities support the goals of National Action Plan for the\nWomen of Afghanistan. SIGAR thus recommended that the Secretary of State,\nin consultation with the USAID Administrator, take the following actions before\nSeptember 30, 2010, when DoS\xe2\x80\x99s next report to the Congress is due:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop consistent reporting requirements for all USAID and DoS programs\n and activities to provide data on female beneficiaries and on the measurable\n impacts of activities intended to address the needs of Afghan women and girls.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop a coordinated approach for determining the earmark attribution\n amounts and reporting on the use of earmarked funds that provides consis-\n tent information about each activity, identifies funding sources, and provides\n the rationale for reporting activities.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Align activities to ensure consistency with the goals and benchmarks stated\n in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s national strategies, particularly the National Action Plan for\n the Women of Afghanistan.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Target funds to address the organizations specified in the legislation\xe2\x80\x94\n including the Ministry of Women\xe2\x80\x99s Affairs, the Afghanistan Independent\n Human Rights Commission, and nongovernmental organizations and civil\n society organizations led by Afghan women\xe2\x80\x94to ensure that appropriated\n funds are used as directed by the Congress and address the needs of Afghan\n women and girls.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 21\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n AGENCY COMMENTS\n At the time this publication went to press, the agencies were still preparing formal\n comments on a draft of the report. The final audit report contains the agency\n comments and response to the findings and recommendations (www.sigar.mil).\n\n Audit 10-14 Farah ANA Garrison\n ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall, but Some\n Construction Issues Should Be Addressed\n The international coalition seeks to build Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to provide for\n its own security by training and equipping the ANSF. From FY 2005 to FY 2010,\n more than $25 billion has been appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces\n Fund, which provides the funding to train and equip the ANSF. New require-\n ments call for the ANA troop levels to grow to 171,600 by October 2011. As a\n result, additional facilities are needed to train and base the Afghan force. The\n garrison at Farah, located in Farah province, will house approximately 2,000\nThe Farah Garrison project is nearly personnel. The ANA began occupying the garrison in October 2009. CSTC-A is\ncomplete. When finished, the facility will funding two contracts, for a total of $68.1 million, to construct the garrison in\nhouse approximately 2,000 ANA personnel.\n two phases. USACE\xe2\x80\x99s AED-South awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts for\n(SIGAR photo)\n program management and oversight of Phases I and II to Fazlullah Construction\n and Engineering Co. (an Afghan firm) and United Infrastructure Projects (an\n American firm).\n\n OBJECTIVES\n The audit addressed four objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether the Farah garrison was constructed within the terms of\n the contract, including schedule and cost.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess USACE oversight of construction and whether it was conducted in\n accordance with the FAR, USACE requirements, and oversight provisions of\n the contract.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Review the plans for sustaining ANSF facilities.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s overall justification for the garrison.\n\n FINDINGS\n 1. SIGAR found that, although the Farah garrison project was nearly complete,\n Phase I was completed about 16 months after its original completion date.\n Phase II was scheduled to be completed by July 2010\xe2\x80\x94about 12 months past\n its original completion date. The cost to CSTC-A of Phase I, awarded for\n $29.4 million, increased by almost $10 million, largely because of contract\n options exercised by AED-South and changes to the scope of work. In addi-\n tion, issues with the security of ground transportation led to an increase of\n $100,000 to fly in building materials. The cost of Phase II, awarded for\n $34.6 million, decreased by more than $5.7 million because of the removal\n of line items that duplicated Phase I.\n 2. Overall, the garrison appeared to be well constructed; however, during the\n site inspection, SIGAR observed some construction issues related to site\n\n\n\n 22 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n grading, asphalt roads, and silt accumulation that should be addressed.\n Grading at the site was not sufficiently sloped, which will allow water to\n collect around buildings. Asphalt was not always properly compacted and\n will deteriorate and will need repair. The unlined drainage ditches at the site\n will collect silt and require frequent maintenance.\n3. SIGAR found that overall contract management and oversight met contract\n requirements. Progress payments were documented properly, and qual-\n ity assurance reports met USACE requirements. However, the Resident\n Management System reports and two modifications for Phase I contained\n some incorrect information.\n4. According to CSTC-A, the GIRoA does not have the financial or technical Afghan workers dig a drainage trench dur-\n capacity to sustain all ANSF facilities. AED-South is in the process of award- ing construction of ANA facilities in Farah\n ing two contracts to provide operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities. province. A SIGAR audit this quarter identi-\n The contracts as planned total $800 million and will cover 663 ANSF sites. fied a number of construction issues that\n should be addressed.\n5. CSTC-A did not provide SIGAR with an overall justification for the Farah garri-\n (SIGAR photo)\n son, such as a rationale for its location. SIGAR reviewed various documents that\n addressed certain other ANSF facilities, but none addressed garrisons. Rather\n than make a recommendation regarding facility planning at this time, SIGAR is\n undertaking a separate audit of CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s planning efforts for ANSF facilities.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nThe United States has provided more than $68 million to build this garrison\nto support ANA operations in Farah province. To protect the U.S. investment\nand provide a sustainable facility for ANA troops, the construction issues that\nSIGAR observed should be addressed. To ensure that the garrison is completed\nin accordance with the contract and that sustainability issues are minimized,\nSIGAR recommended that the Commanding General, USACE, direct AED-South\nto address the following construction issues:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensure that the site is properly graded around buildings to prevent the\n pooling of water.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensure that the asphalt roads and parking lots are properly compacted to\n minimize deterioration.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Consider mitigating silt accumulation in the unlined drainage ditches around\n the garrison to minimize maintenance.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\nAt the time this publication went to press, the agencies were still preparing for-\nmal comments on a draft of the report. The final audit report contains the agency\ncomments and response to the findings and recommendations (www.sigar.mil).\n\nNew Audits Announced This Quarter\nThis quarter, SIGAR initiated five new audits that will assess the planning and\nimplementation of infrastructure projects for the Afghan security forces, review\ncooperative agreements with nongovernmental organizations, and evaluate a\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 23\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nselection of projects that are funded by the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\nProgram (CERP).\n\nPlanning for ANSF Facilities\nThis audit is examining the process used in providing a rationale for ANSF\ninfrastructure and facilities and for meeting the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s changing requirements.\nAs noted in SIGAR audit reports issued this quarter, without an updated facilities\nplan that reflects current ANSF requirements, CSTC-A runs the risk of building\nfacilities that are inadequate for the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s projected force strength. The audit\nhas three objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Review CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s overall plan for constructing ANSF infrastructure and facili-\n ties in Afghanistan.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Review CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s strategic and tactical rationale for ANSF infrastructure and\n facilities, including justifications for the deployment of ANSF personnel, the\n locations of the various facilities, and their role in the operational missions\n of the ANA and the ANP.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess how CSTC-A updates its facilities plans to ensure that current and\n planned ANSF infrastructure and facilities meet changing requirements.\n\nReview of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the\nEnvironment Infrastructure Projects in Herat and in Mazar-e Sharif\nSIGAR is examining two infrastructure projects undertaken by the U.S. Air Force\nCenter for Engineering and the Environment. This review has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether the projects are being completed within the terms of the\n contracts, including schedule and cost.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether construction is in accordance with approved construc-\n tion plans and specifications.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether U.S. contract administration and construction oversight\n are effective.\n\nReview of Construction Projects for Six ANP Facilities\nin Helmand and Kandahar\nSIGAR is initiating a performance audit to assess the construction and progress\nof six ANP district headquarters facilities, which are being constructed under\nUSACE contract. The work will be conducted at three sites in the Helmand\ndistricts of Garmsir, Nahri Saraj, and Nad \xe2\x80\x99Ali, and three sites in the Kandahar\ndistricts of Spin Boldak, Zheley, and Registan. This audit has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether the infrastructure projects were completed within the\n terms of the contract, including schedule and cost.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether the construction is in accordance with approved construc-\n tion plans and specifications.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate the nature and adequacy of U.S. contract administration and con-\n struction oversight.\n\n\n\n\n 24 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nReview of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Cooperative Agreement with CARE\nInternational for the Food Insecurity Response for Urban\nPopulations of Kabul (FIRUP-K) Program\nSIGAR is initiating an audit of an estimated $60 million cooperative agreement\nbetween USAID and CARE International. The agreement, the Food Insecurity\nResponse for Urban Populations of Kabul (FIRUP-K), is for one of four programs\naddressing food insecurity in major urban areas in Afghanistan. Although the\ncompletion date of the one-year program was originally March 2010, USAID\nhas recently indicated it was extended to September 2011. SIGAR will examine\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s award and oversight processes, program start dates and results, and\nchallenges to implementation. The audit has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess USAID\xe2\x80\x99s process for awarding cooperative agreements, particularly\n FIRUP-K, and USAID\xe2\x80\x99s management and oversight of the program.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Review the goals and objectives of the program, assess how USAID mea-\n sures results, and identify what the program has achieved.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify challenges the program has encountered, how they have affected\n implementation, and what USAID and CARE have done to address them, in\n particular the rationale for extending the planned completion date.\n\nReview of Selected CERP Projects in Afghanistan\nThis review is a pilot audit of a selection of Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\nProgram (CERP) projects. SIGAR intends to replicate the pilot in selected\ngeographical areas and categories of CERP assistance. The audit will examine\nschedules and costs, outcomes, U.S. oversight, and plans for sustaining the\nprojects. The audit will address four objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether the CERP projects were completed within the terms of the\n project plans, including schedule and cost.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Examine the processes in place for evaluating CERP projects and the extent\n to which CERP project outcomes have been assessed.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the nature and extent of U.S. administration and oversight for\n CERP projects.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the plans that exist for Afghan authorities to take possession of the\n projects, perform maintenance, and pay for sustainment.\n\nOngoing Audits\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR continued work on 10 audits, including\ncontract assessments, program reviews, and audits related to SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s anti-\ncorruption initiative. The audits address reconstruction issues related to security,\ngovernance, and development.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 25\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nReview of the Implementation of the Civilian Uplift in\nSupport of the U.S. Reconstruction Effort in Afghanistan\nSIGAR has coordinated the scope of this audit with the Government Accountability\nOffice (GAO). GAO is examining how the U.S. government determined its\nrequirements; SIGAR is assessing the implementation of the increased civilian\ndeployment. The audit has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the number and types of personnel provided to implement the\n civilian uplift.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the extent to which required resources have been provided to\n support the operational and support needs of these additional personnel\n in Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the extent to which civilians in the field are being used to achieve\n stated strategic and programmatic goals, including collaborating with\n military and international partners and assisting with contract oversight\n responsibilities.\n\nReview of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s National Solidarity Program\nThis audit is related to a series of audits SIGAR is conducting to examine U.S.\nand other donor assistance in support of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption capabilities.\nThese audits also assess the internal controls that Afghan public institutions are\nable to exercise to ensure that donor assistance funds provided to the GIRoA are\nreasonably protected against waste, fraud, and abuse.\n In 2003, the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development estab-\nlished the National Solidarity Program to help Afghan communities identify,\nplan, manage, and monitor their own development projects. Since then, the\nprogram has received more than $900 million in international funding and has\nreported completing nearly 40,000 small infrastructure projects. The audit has\ntwo objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify U.S. and donor assistance to the program and determine actions\n taken by the United States and other donors to ensure that their contri-\n butions are adequately accounted for, appropriately programmed, and\n ultimately used for their intended purposes.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Examine the capacity of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and\n Development to plan, manage, and monitor the program, to provide reason-\n able assurance that adequate internal controls are in place and are used\n properly to achieve the program\xe2\x80\x99s intended results.\n\nReview of U.S. Efforts To Improve the Accountability\nand Anti-Corruption Capabilities and Performance of the\nNangarhar Provincial Government\nThis audit is examining funding, accountability, and capacity issues related to\nNangarhar province. This is a pilot audit resulting from survey work conducted\non the accountability and anti-corruption capabilities and performance of pro-\nvincial governments. If successful, SIGAR will replicate this audit in other key\nprovinces in the future. The audit has three objectives:\n\n\n\n 26 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the amounts, sources, and purposes of donor and Afghan funding\n for Nangarhar.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the steps the U.S. government has taken to ensure that U.S. recon-\n struction funds provided for Nangarhar are used according to national and\n provincial priorities.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which Nangarhar\xe2\x80\x99s provincial government can\n ensure that funds are properly protected from misuse and used according to\n national and provincial priorities.\n\nU.S. and International Efforts To Build the Afghan\nGovernment\xe2\x80\x99s Capacity To Fight Corruption\nMost of the more than $51 billion provided for the reconstruction of Afghanistan\nhas been managed directly by U.S. agencies, bypassing the GIRoA. Consistent\nwith a new donor approach adopted in January 2010, the United States plans\nto direct up to half of future development assistance through GIRoA channels.\nHowever, this support is contingent on the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to reduce corruption,\namong other things. The audit is assessing U.S. and international efforts to help\nthe GIRoA build the capacity to manage, monitor, and account for donor funds\nand deter corruption.\n\nReview of Salary Support Provided by U.S. Government\nAgencies to Afghan Government Officials\nThis audit is part of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s effort to assess the internal controls and account-\nability procedures of key GIRoA institutions. It is reviewing all U.S. government\nsalary support for GIRoA officials, except for uniformed ANSF members. The\nreview has these objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify all U.S. government salary support to Afghan officials.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Examine the internal controls and other accountability mechanisms for\n determining the recipients of salaries and the amounts paid.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify challenges, if any, in providing salary support.\n\nIdentification of Major Vendors for Reconstruction\nContracts in Afghanistan\nSIGAR initiated this audit to identify and describe the largest U.S. reconstruc-\ntion contracts; this information will help guide SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s contract audits. GAO has\nprovided SIGAR with access to the database it compiled to prepare its reports\naddressing contracting in Afghanistan during FY 2007, FY 2008, and the first six\nmonths of FY 2009. SIGAR has analyzed GAO\xe2\x80\x99s data to identify and rank the prime\nvendors by total obligations during that period. This audit has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Ensure that the vendors and associated contracts identified are for recon-\n struction in Afghanistan (rather than support for the U.S. presence).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the value and purpose of the contracts identified.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Document each contract\xe2\x80\x99s reported total obligations and expenditures\n through FY 2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 27\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR is working with DoS, DoD, and USAID to identify any prime contrac-\ntors that have active contracts for substantive reconstruction assistance to\nAfghanistan that did not appear in GAO\xe2\x80\x99s database. To minimize duplication of\neffort, SIGAR is coordinating this work with GAO\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing compilation of contract\nobligations for the last six months of FY 2009.\n\nReview of U.S. Assistance for the Preparation and Conduct of\nPresidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan\nThis audit, the third in a series of reports on the election process, is reviewing\nindependent assessments of the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections\nand actions taken by U.S. and international donors to support the 2010 parlia-\nmentary elections. This review will identify the lessons learned from the 2009\nelections and actions taken to address electoral reforms priorities and issues.\n\nReview of U.S. Agencies\xe2\x80\x99 Use of Contractors To Provide\nSecurity for Reconstruction Programs in Afghanistan\nSIGAR is conducting this audit to identify the number and volume of contracts in\nplace to provide security services in Afghanistan. The audit has these objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the number of security contractors and personnel working for\n U.S. federal agencies in Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 management and oversight of security contractors\n and subcontractors.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which GAO and the inspector general community\n have conducted audits of private security contracts.\n\nContract Audit: Reconstruction Security Support Services\nfrom Global Strategies Group, Inc.\nThis audit, which is related to SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of private security contractors in\nAfghanistan, is examining whether the USACE received the security services it\nneeded from the contractor at a reasonable cost. This quarter, SIGAR re-scoped\nthis audit to clarify the objectives. The re-scoped audit has these objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the services provided by Global Strategies Group (Global) and deter-\n mine whether those services were provided in accordance with the contract,\n including schedule, cost, and any modifications.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether USACE conducted its oversight of the Global contract in\n accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, USACE requirements,\n and any oversight provisions in the contract.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the private security subcontractors that were used, if any, and deter-\n mine how they were vetted and considered to be capable of performing the\n contracted services.\n\nReview of Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Management\nSIGAR is conducting this audit to evaluate the extent to which the ANP has\ndeveloped accurate systems for personnel accounting. This audit originally\n\n\n\n\n 28 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nfocused on both the ANP and ANA, but SIGAR re-scoped the audit to focus only\non the ANP in order to avoid duplicating work being conducted by GAO and to\nmeet the growing interest in the ANP. The re-scoped audit has four objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Describe ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Describe actions taken by the GIRoA and donors to implement and maintain\n ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify any challenges that may impede the implementation and sustain-\n ment of ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the extent to which risks of fraud, waste, and abuse are being\n mitigated.\n\nForensic Audits\nSIGAR is conducting three reviews, including two announced this quarter,\nunder the authority of P.L. 110-181, as amended. The legislation requires SIGAR\nto investigate improper payments\xe2\x80\x94such as duplicate payments or duplicate\nbillings\xe2\x80\x94and to prepare a final forensic audit report on all programs and opera-\ntions funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the\nreconstruction of Afghanistan. The new reviews will examine USAID and DoS\ntransaction data related to reconstruction funding.\n\nForensic Review of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\nTransaction Data\nSIGAR initiated a review of DoD appropriation, obligation, and expenditure\ntransaction data related to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for\nFY 2005 to FY 2009. This initiative will analyze transactional data to identify\nanomalies that may indicate fraud, using data-mining techniques and fraud indi-\ncators. The results could support or lead to SIGAR audits or investigations.\n\nForensic Review of U.S. Agency for International Development\nTransaction Data Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction\nSIGAR is initiating a review of USAID appropriation, obligation, and expenditure\ntransaction data related to Afghanistan reconstruction activities from FY 2002\nto the present. This initiative will analyze transaction data to identify anomalies,\nusing data-mining techniques and fraud indicators. The results could support or\nlead to SIGAR audits or investigations.\n\nForensic Review of Department of State Transaction\nData Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction\nSIGAR has announced an initiative to review DoS appropriation, obligation,\nand expenditure transaction data related to Afghanistan reconstruction activi-\nties from FY 2002 to the present. The objective of this initiative is to analyze\ntransaction data to identify anomalies, using data-mining techniques and fraud\nindicators. The results could support or lead to SIGAR audits or investigations.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 29\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 2.1\n SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS\n This quarter, the SIGAR Investigations Directorate opened 27 new cases and\nCASES UNDER INVESTIGATION BY STATUS\n closed 14 cases. SIGAR has 55 ongoing cases divided among three investigative\n activities, as authorized by the Attorney General guidelines for inspectors general\n Total: 55 with statutory law enforcement authority. The three activities are assessments,\n preliminary investigations, and full investigations; the distinctions between them\n derive from the authorized investigative methods and the nature of the informa-\n tion regarding the alleged crime. As of July 30, 2010, SIGAR is conducting\n Full 1 assessment, 19 preliminary investigations, and 35 full-scale investigations.\n Investigations\n 35 Preliminary\n SIGAR thoroughly assesses all allegations of criminal activity to determine\n Investigations whether reconstruction funds are involved. The United States is funding so many\n 19 interrelated military and civilian activities in Afghanistan that contractors and\n their subcontractors often work for multiple entities engaged in multiple activi-\n ties. This often makes it difficult to quickly determine the source of funds, such\n Assessments\n 1 as in the case of bulk cash shipments.\n The cases under investigation involve contract fraud, public corruption, pro-\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/19/2010. curement fraud, and miscellaneous criminal activities. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2\n provide a breakdown of the cases by status and type.\nFIGURE 2.2\n Building Investigative Capacity\nCASES UNDER INVESTIGATION BY TYPE Since the last reporting period, SIGAR has hired three new investigators and\n is on track to meet its targeted staffing level of 32 by the end of the fiscal year.\n Total: 55 SIGAR investigators are senior-level, career law enforcement officers with expe-\n rience in white collar crime, accounting, and fraud examination.\n Of the 24 investigators already on staff, 14 are in Afghanistan, and 10 are\n based at SIGAR headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. SIGAR has assigned inves-\n Contract Public tigators to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, CSTC-A headquarters at Camp Eggers,\n Fraud Corruption\n 14 Bagram Air Field, and Kandahar Air Field. To expand its investigative pres-\n 23\n ence in Afghanistan, SIGAR is in the process of adding seven new field offices\n Procurement in five provinces where significant reconstruction work is planned or under\n Fraud\n 11 way\xe2\x80\x94Nangarhar, Logar, Khowst, Herat, and Balkh. SIGAR is coordinating with\n the commanders of ISAF and USFOR-A and with DoS officials to facilitate the\n Other logistics, including force protection and life support services.\n 7\n SIGAR investigators work in close cooperation with other federal law enforce-\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/19/2010.\n ment agencies in Afghanistan and in the United States to maximize resources\n and to ensure that all allegations of the misuse of U.S. taxpayer dollars are seri-\n ously considered. SIGAR maintains a permanent, full-time presence at the Joint\n Operation Center of the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF)\n in Washington, D.C. The ICCTF is the principal U.S. law enforcement organiza-\n tion coordinating U.S. federal investigations of fraud internationally.\n\n\n\n\n 30 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTwo Afghan Companies Plead Guilty to Bribery and Are Fined\n$4.4 Million\nOn June 25, 2010, two Afghan trucking companies pleaded guilty to paying bribes\nto U.S. public officials in exchange for unfair advantages in obtaining trucking\nservice contracts at the Bagram Air Field. These companies were transporting\nreconstruction materials, among other commodities. The case is the result of\na joint investigation by SIGAR, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the\nU.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Division, and other members of\nthe ICCTF. The plea agreements require the companies, Afghan International\nTrucking (AIT) and Afghan Trade Transportation (ATT), to pay a combined total\nof $4.4 million in criminal fines.\n The investigation revealed that AIT made corrupt payments totaling more than\n$120,000 to various U.S. military officials, and ATT made corrupt payments of more\nthan $30,000 to one of those officials. According to the statement of facts, AIT\nemployees began offering money to officials in the transportation office in 2004. At\none point, AIT paid a government official $70,000 cash stuffed in a box of candy.\n\nSIGAR Is Investigating Cash Leaving Afghanistan\nSIGAR investigators are working closely with other federal agencies, including\nU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to determine the source of\nbulk cash shipments leaving Afghanistan through the Kabul Airport. At the end\nof March, ICE and other federal law enforcement agencies launched a three-day\noperation to examine cash leaving the airport. During this period, seven passen-\ngers declared $8.2 million in cash. No arrests were made because each of these\npassengers had declared the money in their possession, as required by Afghan law.\n During April and May, SIGAR investigative teams made three trips to Dubai\nto support ongoing investigations, which included looking at the flow of cash\nbetween Afghanistan and Dubai. SIGAR has provided relevant information con-\ncerning fraud and bulk cash shipments to ICE in both Kabul and Dubai.\n\nSIGAR Hotline and Complaints Management System\n This quarter, the SIGAR Hotline and Complaints Management System (HCMS)\nreceived 62 complaints\xe2\x80\x94up 77% from last quarter. Since becoming operational\nin January 2009, the HCMS has received 196 reports of alleged fraud, waste, and\nabuse in Afghanistan reconstruction.\n Of the 62 complaints received this quarter, SIGAR referred 11 internally for\nappropriate action and 13 to other agencies; 19 are being coordinated or are under\nreview. Also, SIGAR closed 19 complaints that were found to be without merit.\n During this reporting period, the Hotline received several complaints alleg-\ning that Afghan subcontractors had not been paid for work completed. SIGAR\nis looking into these allegations because failure by a U.S. contractor to pay\nAfghan subcontractors for work properly executed undermines the U.S.\nreconstruction effort.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 31\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n A SIGAR Hotline billboard raises awareness of waste, fraud, and abuse. This billboard is on\n the road leading to the Kabul Airport. (SIGAR photo)\nFIGURE 2.3\n\n\nSOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, SIGAR Investigations initiated a broad public outreach campaign this quarter\nAPRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JUNE 30, 2010 to increase awareness of the SIGAR Hotline, using these and other methods:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 posters and business cards in English, Dari, and Pashtu\n \xe2\x80\xa2 commercial billboards along heavily travelled routes in Kabul\n Total: 62\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a television advertisement on the Armed Forces Network\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a radio advertisement in Dari and Pashtu\n \xe2\x80\xa2 fraud awareness briefings with civilian and military working groups\n Figure 2.3 shows the sources of SIGAR Hotline complaints.\n E-mail\n 37\n Phone\n 21\n PEER REVIEW\n Last February, SIGAR asked the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity\n and Efficiency (CIGIE) to conduct an early peer review to help SIGAR enhance\n its ability to conduct effective oversight. This quarter, CIGIE concluded its\n Walk-in Written (not e-mail) review of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Audit and Investigations directorates. The Audit Directorate\n 1 3 passed its review and is implementing recommendations to correct deficiencies\n that were noted. Although the CIGIE review team found that the Investigations\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/14/2010.\n Directorate was not yet in full compliance with administrative record-keeping\n requirements, the team concluded that SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of new policies\n and procedures was likely to result in full compliance in the near future.\n\n\n\n\n 32 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR BUDGET\nSince 2008, the Congress has appropriated $46.2 million to cover SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s operat-\ning expenses. In the last year, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s staff has more than doubled, enabling the\norganization to significantly expand its audit and investigations work. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\nFY 2011 budget request of $35.6 million would provide the resources to fully staff\nthe 132 positions needed to conduct oversight of the expanding reconstruction\neffort in Afghanistan. Table 2.2 summarizes SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s funding through FY 2010.\n\nSIGAR STAFF\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR increased its staff by about 18%\xe2\x80\x94from 79\nat the end of April to 93 when this report went to press. SIGAR is aggressively\nrecruiting qualified personnel to reach its goal of 132 staff members in FY 2011.\n SIGAR has offices in Kabul and three other locations in Afghanistan. At the\nend of July, SIGAR had 25 staff members in Afghanistan, including 19 assigned\nto the U.S. Embassy Kabul and 2 on temporary duty there. SIGAR is working\nwith the U.S. Embassy to increase the number of people it can station full-time\nin Kabul from 20 to 32. SIGAR is also working with U.S. Forces - Afghanistan to\nincrease our staffing at military-controlled facilities. Meanwhile, SIGAR continues\nto send additional staff on temporary duty rotations to conduct audits and\ninvestigations throughout Afghanistan.\n\nTABLE 2.2\n\n\nSIGAR FUNDING SUMMARY ($ MILLIONS)\nAppropriation Public Law Appropriated Made Available Expires Amount\nSupplemental Appropriations for P.L. 110-252 6/30/2008 6/30/2008 9/30/2009 $2.0\nFiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2642\nSupplemental Appropriations for P.L. 110-252 6/30/2008 10/1/2008 9/30/2009 $5.0\nFiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2642\nConsolidated Security, Disaster P.L. 110-329 9/30/2008 9/30/2008 9/30/2010 $9.0\nAssistance, and Continuing\nAppropriations Act, 2009\nSupplemental Appropriations for P.L. 111-32 6/24/2009 6/24/2009 9/30/2010 $7.2\nFiscal Year 2009, H.R. 2346\nConsolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117 12/16/2009 10/1/2009 9/30/2010 $23.0\n2010, H.R. 3288\nTotal $46.2\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 33\n\x0c Breaking ground\n Afghans work together in Logar province on one of the\n many community-based projects that are essential to rural\n development throughout Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo,\n Sgt Russell Gilchrest)\n\n\n\n\n34 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c3 RECONSTRUCTION\n UPDATE\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\x0c RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cOnly through the provision of\nservices, establishing law and order,\n and fostering economic activity\n nationwide can the Government\n garner legitimacy in the eyes\n of its constituents.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94Afghan Prioritization and\n Implementation Plan\n\n\n\n\n Source: GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, p. 4.\n\n\n\n\n 36 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\nOVERVIEW\nSection 3 presents a holistic view of Afghanistan during this reporting period.\nUpdates on accomplishments, challenges, and local initiatives provide context\nfor the oversight needed in reconstruction efforts. The section is divided into\nfive subsections: Status of Funds, Security, Governance, Economic and Social\nDevelopment, and Counter-Narcotics. The Security, Governance, and Economic\nand Social Development subsections mirror the three pillars set forth in the\n2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The Counter-Narcotics subsec-\ntion focuses on a cross-cutting issue identified in that strategy.\n\nTOPICS\nSection 3 discusses five broad topics: historical and current funding information,\nsecurity conditions, governance activities, economic and social development\nprograms, and counter-narcotics initiatives. Quarterly highlights dispersed\nthroughout this section accent a single topic related to reconstruction efforts\nwithin a specific subsection.\n The Status of Funds subsection provides a comprehensive discussion of the\nmonies pledged and spent for Afghanistan reconstruction. It also includes specific\ninformation on major U.S. funds, international contributions, and the budget of the\nGovernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).\n The Security subsection details the activities of the Afghan National Security\nForces, including the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, and\ndiscusses U.S. and international efforts to bolster security. A quarterly highlight\nfocuses on three of the main insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan.\n The Governance subsection provides an overview of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s efforts and\nprogress toward achieving good governance. It presents an overview of progress in\nreintegration; elections; public administration, justice, and prison reforms; anti-\ncorruption efforts; and aspects of human rights, including gender equality and\nreligious freedom. A quarterly highlight focuses on minority representation.\n The Economic and Social Development subsection focuses on reconstruction\nactivities in areas ranging from agriculture and energy to health services. It provides\na snapshot of the state of the economy and updates on the progress being made in\nachieving fiscal sustainability, delivering electricity, and boosting agricultural output.\nA quarterly highlight discusses the rapid growth of communication media.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 37\n\x0cRECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\n The Counter-Narcotics subsection describes efforts to reduce the prevalence\nof narcotics in the Afghan economy. It provides updates on progress in interdiction,\ndrug demand reduction, alternative development programming, and develop-\nment of capacity to conduct counter-narcotics work. This subsection discusses\nU.S. and Afghan joint efforts to combat the drug trade and the challenges imped-\ning the success of those efforts. A quarterly highlight provides information about\ndrug addiction in Afghanistan.\n\nMETHODOLOGY\nSection 3 was compiled using information and data from open sources and U.S.\nagencies. Except where SIGAR audits or investigations are specifically referenced,\nSIGAR has not verified this data; the information does not reflect SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s opinions.\nAll data and information is attributed to the reporting organization in endnotes to\nthe text or notes to the tables and figures; because multiple organizations provide\nthe data, numbers may conflict. For a complete discussion of SIGAR audits and\ninvestigations this quarter, see Section 2.\n\nData Call\nThe data call is a series of questions directed to U.S. agencies about their contri-\nbutions and involvement in reconstruction programming, and the state of affairs\nin Afghanistan. The U.S. agencies that participated in the data call for this quar-\nterly report include the following:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of State\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of Defense\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Office of Management and Budget\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Trade and Development Agency\nA preliminary draft of the report was provided to the responding agencies prior to\npublication to allow these agencies to verify and clarify the content of this section.\n\nOpen-Source Research\nOpen-source research draws on the most current, publicly available data from\nreputable sources. A representative list of sources used in this quarterly report\nincludes the following:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. agencies represented in the data call\n \xe2\x80\xa2 International Security Assistance Force\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Government Accountability Office\n \xe2\x80\xa2 United Nations (and relevant branches)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 International Monetary Fund\n \xe2\x80\xa2 World Bank\n \xe2\x80\xa2 GIRoA ministries and other Afghan government organizations\nMost of the open-source research is included in the preliminary draft that is\ndistributed to agencies participating in the data call, for review before this\nreport is published.\n\n\n\n\n 38 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GRAPHICS KEY\n\n\n\n\nUNDERSTANDING THE GRAPHICS\nAll figures and tables report data for this quarter, except where identified in titles or notes.\n\n\n\nBAR CHARTS HEAT MAPS\nThis report discusses many funds and projects with Heat maps assign colors to provinces, based on\ndollar values ranging from millions to billions. To pertinent data. Each color represents a data set,\nprovide an accurate graphical representation of these defined in a legend; darker colors represent larger\nnumbers, some bar graphs appear with a break (a numbers, lighter colors show smaller numbers.\nwavy line) to indicate a jump between zero and a\nlarger number.\n\n $500 $200\n\n $450\n $150\n $400\n $100\n $350\n\n $50\n 0\n 1\xe2\x80\x9320\n $0 $0 21\xe2\x80\x9340\n 41\xe2\x80\x93200\n Bar chart with a Bar chart without 201\xe2\x80\x93429\n break in scale a break in scale\n\n\n\nDISTINGUISHING BILLIONS AND MILLIONS FUNDING MARKERS\nBecause this report details funding in both billions Funding markers identify individual funds discussed\nand millions of dollars, it uses a visual cue to distin- in the text. The agency responsible for managing the\nguish the two measurement units. Dollars reported in fund is listed in the tan box below the fund name.\nbillions are represented in blue, and dollars reported\nin millions are depicted in green.\n\n\n\n\n ESF\n\n\n\n USAID\n\n\n\n\n Pie Chart in Billions Pie Chart in Millions\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 39\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 40 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nSTATUS OF FUNDS\nAs of June 30, 2010, the United States had appropriated more than $51.50 billion for\nrelief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. This cumulative\nfunding total is based on data reported by agencies and amounts appropriated in\nFY 2010, as shown in Appendix B. This total has been allocated as follows:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 nearly $26.75 billion for security\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $14.74 billion for governance and development\n\xe2\x80\xa2 nearly $4.24 billion for counter-narcotics efforts\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $2.05 billion for humanitarian aid\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $3.72 billion for oversight and operations\nFigure 3.1 provides an overview of the major U.S. funds that contribute to\nthese efforts.\n\nFIGURE 3.1\n\n\nU.S. FUNDS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n FUNDING SOURCES (TOTAL: $51.50)\n ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces\n Fund\n ASFF CERP DoD CN ESF INCLE Other\n\n CERP: Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency\n $25.23 $2.64 $1.43 $9.74 $2.68 $9.78\n Response Program\n\n\n AGENCIES DoD CN: DoD Drug Interdiction and\n Counter-Drug Activities\n Department of Distributed\n Department of Defense (DoD) USAID\n State (DoS) to Multiple ESF: Economic Support Fund\n $29.30 $9.74\n $2.68 Agenciesa\n\n INCLE: International Narcotics Control\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. USAID data is as of 3/31/2010, because updates were unavailable at the time this report and Law Enforcement\nwent to press.\na. Multiple agencies include DoJ, DoS, USAID, Treasury, and USDA.\nSources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call 7/14/2010, 7/13/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Defense Other: Other Funding\nExplanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010 and 7/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call,\n7/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010, 1/8/2010, and\n10/9/2009; DoJ, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 41\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN\n ASFF CERP DoD CN ESF INCLE As of June 30, 2010, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in\n Afghanistan totaled more than $51.50 billion. This total can be divided into five\n major categories of reconstruction funding: security, governance and development,\n DoD USAID DoS counter-narcotics, humanitarian, and oversight and operations. Updated agency\n data resulted in lower cumulative appropriation totals for FY 2009 and higher\n cumulative appropriation totals for FY 2010. For complete information regarding\nThe amount provided by the five major\n U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.\nU.S. funds together represents 81.0%\n As shown in Figure 3.2, cumulative appropriations as of FY 2010 increased\n(nearly $41.72 billion) of total recon-\n by almost 30.1% over cumulative appropriations as of FY 2009, to more than\nstruction assistance in Afghanistan\nsince FY 2002. Of this amount, almost $51.50 billion. Since FY 2002, security efforts have received the largest cumulative\n82.9% (more than $34.56 billion) appropriations. Appropriations for security (nearly $26.75 billion) account for more\nhas been obligated, and more than than 51.9% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance. In FY 2010, security had a large\n73.1% (nearly $30.50 billion) has been gain in cumulative appropriations over FY 2009 (more than 32.5%), followed by gov-\ndisbursed. The following pages provide ernance and development (nearly 27.6%), and counter-narcotics (more than 20.8%).\nadditional details on these funds. As shown in Figure 3.3 on the facing page, appropriations for FY 2010 amounted\n to nearly $11.91 billion, surpassing FY 2009 levels by over 15.0%. This is the largest\n amount appropriated in a single year for the reconstruction effort.\n FY 2010 appropriations for security increased by more than 17.0% over\n FY 2009 appropriations, to more than $6.56 billion. Of the total appropriations for\n FY 2010, security initiatives accounted for almost 55.1%, followed by governance\n and development with almost 26.8%. Appropriations in FY 2010 for security (more\n than $6.56 billion) are the second-largest appropriations made in a single year; the\n largest (nearly $7.41 billion) occurred for security in FY 2007.\nFIGURE 3.2\n\n\nCUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010 ($ BILLIONS)\n\n $51.50\n $50\n $45\n $39.59\n $40\n $35\n $30 $29.23\n\n $25 $23.04\n $20\n $15 $13.01\n $10 $9.53\n $4.68\n $5 $2.08\n $1.06\n $0\n 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010\n\n\n Security Governance/Development Counter-Narcotics Humanitarian Oversight and Operations Total\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding.\nSources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call 7/14/2010, 7/13/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Defense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010 and\n7/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010, 1/8/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ,\nresponse to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n 42 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n Figure 3.3 displays annual appropriations by funding category from FY 2002\nto FY 2010. The bars show the dollar amounts appropriated, and the pie charts\nshow the proportions of the total appropriated by category. These figures reflect\namounts as reported by the respective agencies and amounts appropriated in the\nfollowing legislation:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the FY 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (FY 2010 DoD\n Appropriations Act)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the FY 2010 Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban\n Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (FY 2010\n Consolidated Appropriations Act)\n In previous quarterly reports, the cumulative comparison graphics for each\nfund depicted the amounts appropriated as reported by the pertinent agency.\nLast quarter, these graphics also depicted total appropriated funding for FY 2010\nas reported by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This quarter, total\namounts appropriated are reported as provided by OMB in those instances when\ndata is unavailable or reported only as part-year amounts. To reflect this change,\nthe representation of previously reported data has been adjusted in the cumula-\ntive comparison graphics on the following pages.\n\nFIGURE 3.3\n\nAPPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n $11.91\n $12\n $11\n $10.03 $10.36\n $10\n $9\n $8\n $7 $6.19\n $6\n $4.85\n $5\n $4 $3.48\n $3 $2.60\n $2\n $1.06 $1.01\n $1\n $0\n 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010\n\n\n Percentage\n\n\n\n\n Security Governance/Development Counter-Narcotics Humanitarian Oversight and Operations Total\n\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding.\nSources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010, 7/13/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Defense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010 and\n7/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010, 1/8/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ,\nresponse to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 43\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND\n ASFF The Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to\n provide the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with equipment, supplies,\n services, and training, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation,\n DoD and construction.4 The primary organization responsible for building the ANSF\n is the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition\n Command - Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A).5\nASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n As of June 30, 2010, nearly $25.23 billion had been appropriated to the U.S.\nDoD reported ASFF funds as available, Department of Defense (DoD) for building the ANSF\xe2\x80\x94almost 49.0% of total\nobligated, or disbursed. U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. DoD reported that of this amount,\nAvailable: Total monies available for more than $21.83 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $20.79 billion had\ncommitments been disbursed.6 Figure 3.4 displays the amounts made available for the ASFF\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies by fiscal year.\nDisbursements: Monies that have been DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of June 30, 2010, increased by more\nexpended than $1.56 billion over cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010. Cumulative\nSource: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.\n disbursements as of June 30, 2010, increased by nearly $2.37 billion over cumulative\n disbursements as of March 31, 2010.7 Figure 3.5 provides a cumulative comparison\n of amounts made available, obligated, and disbursed for the ASFF.\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.4 FIGURE 3.5\n\n ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n Available Available\n $8.0 $25.0 $25.23 $25.23\n\n\n\n Obligated\n $6.0 $21.83\n Obligated Disbursed\n $20.0 $20.27 $20.79\n Disbursed\n $18.42\n $4.0\n\n\n\n $15.0\n $2.0\n\n\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2005 06 07 08 09 10 As of Mar 31, 2010 As of Jun 30, 2010\n\n Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Amounts reported as\n Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010. provided by DoD.\n Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010\n and 4/13/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 44 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nASFF Budget Activities\nDoD allocates funds to three budget activity groups within the ASFF:8 Budget Activity Groups: categories\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, or ANA) within each appropriation or fund\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, or ANP) account that identify the purposes,\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations) projects, or types of activities financed\nFunds for each budget activity group are further allocated to four sub-activity by the appropriation or fund\ngroups: Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, Training and Operations,\n Sub-Activity Groups: accounting\nand Sustainment.9\n groups that break down the command\xe2\x80\x99s\n As of June 30, 2010, DoD had disbursed nearly $20.79 billion for ANSF\n disbursements into functional areas\ninitiatives. Of this amount, nearly $13.62 billion was disbursed for the ANA and\nnearly $7.08 billion for the ANP; the remaining $0.09 billion was directed to\nrelated activities.10 Sources: DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cManual 7110.1-M Department\n of Defense Budget Guidance Manual,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n As shown in Figure 3.6, of the funds disbursed for the ANA, the largest 9/28/2009; Depar tment of the Navy, \xe2\x80\x9cMedical Facility\n Manager Handbook,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed 10/2/2009, p. 5.\nportion\xe2\x80\x94nearly $6.25 billion\xe2\x80\x94supported Equipment and Transportation.\nOf the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion\xe2\x80\x94nearly $1.94 billion\xe2\x80\x94\nalso supported Equipment and Transportation, as shown in Figure 3.7.11\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.6 FIGURE 3.7\n\nASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP\nBy Sub-Activity Group, By Sub-Activity Group,\nFY 2005\xe2\x80\x93June 30, 2010 ($ BILLIONS) FY 2005\xe2\x80\x93June 30, 2010 ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n Total: $13.62 Total: $7.08\n Equipment and\n Transportation\n $1.94\n Equipment and\n Transportation\n $6.25\n Sustainment Infrastructure\n Sustainment Infrastructure $1.92 $1.59\n $3.69 $2.48\n\n\n\n Training and Training and\n Operations\n Operations $1.63\n $1.21\n\n\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding. Note: Numbers affected by rounding.\nSource: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010. Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 45\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n COMMANDER\xe2\x80\x99S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM\n CERP The Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S.\n commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and recon-\n struction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs\n DoD that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is\n intended for small projects that are estimated to cost less than $500,000 each.12\n Projects with cost estimates exceeding $1.00 million are permitted, but they\nCERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY require approval from the Commander of U.S. Central Command.13\nOMB reported CERP funds as appropriated.\nAppropriations: Total monies available for Status of Funds\ncommitments The FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act provides $1.20 billion for CERP to\n promote and support development activities. Of this amount, $1.00 billion is for\nDoD reported CERP funds as appropriated, initiatives in Afghanistan.14 This brings the cumulative total funding for CERP\nobligated, or disbursed. to nearly $2.64 billion\xe2\x80\x94more than 5.1% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance\nAppropriations: Total monies available for\n in Afghanistan.15 As of June 30, 2010, DoD reported that of this amount, nearly\ncommitments\n $1.64 billion had been obligated, of which more than $1.24 billion has been\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies\nDisbursements: Monies that have been disbursed.16 Figure 3.8 shows CERP appropriations by fiscal year.\nexpended\n FIGURE 3.8 FIGURE 3.9\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010;\nDoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/14/2010.\n CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n\n $1,000 $3.0\n\n Appropriated Appropriated\n $2.5 $2.64 $2.64\n $800\n\n\n $2.0\n $600\n Obligated Obligated\n $1.5 $1.60 $1.64\n\n Disbursed\n $400 Disbursed $1.24\n $1.0 $1.14\n\n\n $200\n $0.5\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Mar 31, 2010 As of Jun 30, 2010\n\n Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Amounts reported as\n by rounding. provided by DoD and OMB.\n Sources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; DoD, Sources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; DoD,\n response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2010. responses to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010, 4/14/2010, and\n 1/13/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 46 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of June 30, 2010, increased by more\nthan $33.88 million over cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010. Cumulative\ndisbursements as of June 30, 2010, increased by more than $98.91 million over\ncumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2010.17 Figure 3.9 provides a cumulative\ncomparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for CERP projects.\n\nCategories of CERP Funding\nAccording to DoD, there are two categories of recipients of CERP funding:\nlocal Afghan contractors and local Afghan civilians. Projects and payments\ninclude battle damage and condolence payments, as well as small-scale projects\n(less than $5,000).18\n DoD reported that in cases when local Afghan contractors cannot fulfill a\nrequirement, CERP funds may be suballocated to other organizations that can\nfulfill the requirement. These cases include transfers to U.S. government agen-\ncies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which receive CERP funds to\nmanage some large-scale infrastructure projects that require a high degree of\ntechnical expertise and project management experience. Domestic and foreign\n(non-Afghan) contractors or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) occasion-\nally receive CERP funding to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction projects\nin Afghanistan because Afghan contractors either lack the capacity or are not\navailable at a particular place or time.19\n CERP funds are not used to pay ministries of the Government of the Islamic\nRepublic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) directly or to duplicate services provided by\nprovincial governments. CERP funds are paid to Afghan contractors to support\ncertain ministry projects (such as paying local Afghans to repair a school for\nthe Ministry of Education or repairing a courthouse to support the Ministry of\nJustice). Using CERP funds to pay salaries, bonuses, or pensions to Afghan\nmilitary or civilian government personnel is strictly prohibited.20\n The National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647-329 authorizes the\nSecretary of Defense to transfer up to $50.00 million of FY 2010 CERP funding to\nthe Department of State to support the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program.\nDoD reported that it expects to transfer the entire amount ($50.00 million) during\nthe current fiscal year.21\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 47\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n DoD DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES\n DoD CN DoD\xe2\x80\x99s Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DoD CN) fund supports\n DoD\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related\n activities. The DoD CN fund provides support to the counter-narcotics effort in\n DoD the following ways:22\n \xe2\x80\xa2 supporting military operations against drug traffickers\n \xe2\x80\xa2 expanding Afghan interdiction operations\nDoD CN FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n \xe2\x80\xa2 building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement\xe2\x80\x94including the Afghan\nDoD reported DoD CN funds as appropriated, Border Police\xe2\x80\x94with specialized training, equipment, and facilities\nobligated, or disbursed. As of June 30, 2010, nearly $1.43 billion had been appropriated to DoD for\nAppropriations: Total monies available for counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94almost 2.8% of total U.S. reconstruc-\ncommitments\n tion assistance in Afghanistan.23 Figure 3.10 displays DoD CN appropriations by\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies\n fiscal year. DoD reported that of this amount, nearly $1.40 billion had been obli-\nDisbursements: Monies that have been\nexpended gated and disbursed.24 Figure 3.11 shows the cumulative amounts appropriated,\n obligated, and disbursed for DoD CN\xe2\x80\x93funded initiatives.\nSource: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.10 FIGURE 3.11\n\n DOD CN APPROPRIATIONS BY DOD CN FUNDS, CUMULATIVE ($ BILLIONS)\n FISCAL YEAR ($ MILLIONS)\n\n $350 $1.45\n\n Appropriated Appropriated\n $300 $1.43 $1.43\n Obligated Obligated\n $1.40 $1.40 $1.40\n $250\n Disbursed Disbursed\n $1.40 $1.40\n $200\n $1.35\n\n $150\n\n\n $100 $1.30\n\n\n $50\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Mar 31, 2010 As of Jun 30, 2010\n\n Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Amounts reported as\n affected by rounding. provided by DoD. No quarterly comparison made because data is\n Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010. unchanged. Obligation data was not provided; thus, obligations\n were assumed to equal disbursements.\n Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 48 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND\nEconomic Support Fund (ESF) programs advance U.S. interests by helping ESF\ncountries meet short-term and long-term political, economic, and security needs.\nESF programs support counter-terrorism; bolster national economies; and assist\nin the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more USAID\ntransparent and accountable government.25\n Because data for this quarter was not available at press time, the data presented\n ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\nhere is as of March 31, 2010. The FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act provides\nalmost $2.04 billion for ESF programs in Afghanistan. This brings the cumulative OMB reported ESF funds as appropriated.\ntotal funding for the ESF to nearly $9.74 billion\xe2\x80\x94more than 18.9% of total U.S. assis- Appropriations: Total monies available for\ntance to the reconstruction effort.26 As of March 31, 2010, USAID reported that of this commitments\namount, more than $7.57 billion had been obligated, of which more than $5.39 billion\nhas been disbursed.27 Figure 3.12 shows ESF appropriations by fiscal year. USAID reported ESF funds as appropriated,\n USAID reported that cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010, increased obligated, or disbursed.\nby more than $36.81 million over cumulative obligations as of December 31, Appropriations: Total monies available\n for commitments\n2009. In addition, cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2010, increased by\n Obligations: Commitments to pay monies\nnearly $419.65 million over cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2009.28\n Disbursements: Monies that have been\nFigure 3.13 provides a cumulative comparison of the amounts appropriated,\n expended\nobligated, and disbursed for ESF programs.\n Sources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010;\nFIGURE 3.12 FIGURE 3.13 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010.\n\n\nESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n\n\n $2.0 $10.0 Appropriated Appropriated Funds appropriated for ESF programs in\n $9.74 $9.74 Afghanistan support various categories of\n $8.0 recipients. Appropriations to each category\n Obligated Obligated are as follows:\n $1.5\n $7.0\n $7.53 $7.57\n \xe2\x80\xa2 0.21% to local Afghan contractors\n \xe2\x80\xa2 0.84% to GIRoA ministries\n $6.0 \xe2\x80\xa2 1.95% to non-U.S. and non-Afghan\n contractors\n $1.0 Disbursed\n $5.0 Disbursed $5.39 \xe2\x80\xa2 26.20% to international organizations\n $4.97 \xe2\x80\xa2 69.56% to domestic U.S. contractors\n\n $4.0\n \xe2\x80\xa2 1.24% to the U.S. government\n $0.5 Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/6/2010.\n\n $3.0\n\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Dec 31, 2009 As of Mar 31, 2010\n\nNotes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by\naffected by rounding. Data is as of 3/31/2010 because rounding. Amounts reported as provided by USAID and OMB. Data is as\nupdates were unavailable at press time. of 3/31/2010 because updates were unavailable at press time.\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; Sources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; USAID, re-\nUSAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010 and sponses to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009.\n10/9/2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 49\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW\n INCLE ENFORCEMENT\n The U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)\n manages an account for advancing rule of law and combating narcotics produc-\n DoS\n tion and trafficking\xe2\x80\x94the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement\n (INCLE) account. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police,\nINL FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n counter-narcotics, and rule of law and justice.29\n As of June 30, 2010, more than $2.68 billion had been allotted to INL for\nOMB reported INL funds as appropriated. INCLE-funded efforts\xe2\x80\x94more than 5.2% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance\nAppropriations: Total monies available for in Afghanistan. INL reported that of this amount, nearly $2.13 billion had been\ncommitments obligated, of which nearly $1.68 billion had been liquidated.30 Figure 3.14 displays\n INCLE allotments by fiscal year.\nINL reported INCLE and other INL funds\n INL reported that cumulative obligations as of June 30, 2010, increased by\nas allotted, obligated, or liquidated.\n nearly $32.65 million over cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2010. Cumulative\nAllotments: Total monies available\nfor commitments\n liquidations as of June 30, 2010, increased by more than $89.59 million over\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies\n cumulative liquidations as of March 31, 2010.31 Figure 3.15 provides a cumulative\nLiquidations: Monies that have been expended\n comparison of amounts allotted, obligated, and liquidated.\n\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; FIGURE 3.14 FIGURE 3.15\nDoS, response to SIGAR data call, 4/9/2010.\n INCLE ALLOTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n\n\n $700 $2.75\n Allotted Allotted\n $2.69 $2.68\nFunds allotted to INCLE for initiatives in $600 $2.50\nAfghanistan support various categories of\nrecipients. Allotments to each category are $500\n $2.25\nas follows: Obligated\n\xe2\x80\xa2 68% to local Afghan contractors $400\n Obligated\n $2.09\n $2.13\n\xe2\x80\xa2 20% to GIRoA ministries $2.00\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 7% to international organizations $300\n\xe2\x80\xa2 3% to U.S. government and quasi-\n government organizations\n $1.75\n Liquidated\n $200 Liquidated $1.68\n\xe2\x80\xa2 2% to U.S.-based nongovernmental\n organizations\n $1.50 $1.59\n $100\nNote: Derived from informal data as provided by DoS.\nSources: DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/19/2010; DoS, $0 $0\nresponse to SIGAR data call, 1/9/2010. 2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Mar 31, 2010 As of Jun 30, 2010\n\n Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected\n affected by rounding. by rounding. Updated data from DoS resulted in a lower figure for\n Source: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010. allotments than the figure reported last quarter by OMB for\n appropriations.\n Sources: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010; OMB,\n response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; DoS, response to SIGAR\n data call, 4/9/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 50 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nGIRoA BUDGET AND BUDGET EXECUTION\nUpdated data for the GIRoA budget was unavailable at the time this report\nwent to press.\n\nINTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION\nFUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN\nThe international community provides a significant amount of funding, in\naddition to assistance provided by the United States, to support reconstruction\nefforts in Afghanistan. Concerns regarding the institutional capacity within the\nGIRoA caused many international donors to use trust funds as a method to pro-\nvide assistance to Afghanistan, as noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report.\nDonors also use trust funds to accomplish other efforts:32\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Channel resources in line with Afghan priorities to strengthen the ownership\n and accountability of the GIRoA.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Channel resources through the Afghan budget to strengthen the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s\n capacity to use the budget to prioritize, direct, and allocate resources.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Offer a collective platform for donor funding to reduce the transaction costs\n for the government.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Offer a collective platform for donor-government dialogue to create leverage\n for the government to implement critical reforms.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Offer an efficient channel for funding national priority programs\xe2\x80\x94which are\n more effective mechanisms for development than individual projects.\n Funds from international donors are pooled and then distributed for recon-\nstruction activities. The two main sources of such funding are the Afghanistan\nReconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for\nAfghanistan (LOTFA).33\n\nContributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund\nFrom 2002 to May 21, 2010, according to the World Bank, 32 international donors\nhad contributed $3.7 billion to the ARTF. The United States has provided nearly\n$722 million of this amount. These contributions maintain the trust fund\xe2\x80\x99s status\nas the largest contributor to the GIRoA budget for both operating costs and\ndevelopment programs.34 Contributions are divided into two funding channels\xe2\x80\x94\nthe Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window. As of May 21,\n2010, contributions to the RC Window amounted to $1.95 billion. The RC Window\nsupports the operating costs of the GIRoA, because domestic revenues continue\nto be insufficient to support its recurring costs.35 The Investment Window sup-\nports the costs of development programs.36 As of May 2010, the ARTF funded 20\nactive projects. These projects have a combined commitment value of more than\n$1.03 billion, of which $779.92 million has been disbursed.37\n The GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s operating costs continue to increase year over year, resulting in a\ndeclining share of support to the overall budget from the RC Window, as reported\nby the World Bank. Approximately 50% of the ARTF\xe2\x80\x99s RC Window resources are\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 51\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.16 FIGURE 3.17\n\nARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 2010 BY ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 2010 BY DONOR, AS OF JUNE 21, 2010 ($ MILLIONS)\nSTATUS, AS OF JUNE 21, 2010\nProportion of Amounts Paid In to Amounts Total Commitments: $740 Total Paid In: $87\nCommitted ($ MILLIONS)\n\n United States 15 540\n Total Commitments: $740\n Netherlands 0 38\n\n Paid In Norway 0 36\n $87\n Canada 27 27\n\n Australia 19 26\n\n United Kingdom 24 24\n Pledged\n $653 Sweden 0 18\n\n Spain 0 14\n\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding. Others 3 17\nSource: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cARTF: Administrator\xe2\x80\x99s Report on\nFinancial Status as of 6/21/2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 1. 0 100 200 300 400 500\n\n\n Paid In Commitments\n Note: Numbers affected by rounding.\n Source: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cARTF: Administrator's Report on Financial Status as of 6/21/2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 1.\n\n\n\n\n provided to the Ministry of Education. The ministry receives such a significant\n amount of resources from the ARTF because roughly 60% of the nonuniformed\n civil service consists of teachers.38 In the past two years, the Investment Window\n has increased significantly in volume and scope, according to the World Bank.\n In fact, commitments for investments over this time period have exceeded those\n for recurrent costs. The World Bank reported that the disbursement rates for the\n Investment Window have also been high, with 75% of commitments disbursed as\n of May 21, 2010.39 Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17 show contributions by status and\n by donor to the ARTF as of June 21, 2010.\n During the reporting period, the GIRoA and international donors reached an\n agreement on the ARTF\xe2\x80\x99s Incentive Program for the Afghan fiscal year 1390 (the\n solar year that runs from March 20, 2010, to March 21, 2011). The agreement pro-\n vides for funding to be made available to the ARTF RC Window and for additional\n discretionary funding\xe2\x80\x94on an annual basis\xe2\x80\x94in return for concomitant economic\n policy reforms. The agreement has three themes:40\n \xe2\x80\xa2 sustaining domestic revenues\n \xe2\x80\xa2 improving public sector governance\n \xe2\x80\xa2 enabling private sector development\n\n\n\n\n 52 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n The GIRoA has included the ARTF Incentive Program in its reform pro-\ngram for the July 20 Kabul Conference.\xc2\xa0On June 12, 2010, a Memorandum of\nUnderstanding was signed between the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance.\nThe Incentive Program has the following objectives:41\n \xe2\x80\xa2 predictable ARTF RC Window funding over the medium term\n \xe2\x80\xa2 support for the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s core policy reforms, including domestic revenue\n generation\n \xe2\x80\xa2 strengthening the ARTF as a platform for policy dialogue between donors\n and the GIRoA\n \xe2\x80\xa2 clearer strategic objectives for the ARTF RC Window\nThe Incentive Program also allows for increased allocations towards the\nfinancing of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s core development programs through the ARTF\nInvestment Window.42\n\nContributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan\nIn its progress report for the first calendar quarter of 2010, the United Nations\nDevelopment Programme (UNDP) reported that expenditures from the LOTFA\nover the reporting period amounted to nearly $138.10 million.43 A large portion\nof these funds paid the salaries of approximately 96,000 ANP personnel\xe2\x80\x94a\nprincipal priority of the fund.44 The LOTFA has been implemented in phases; it is\ncurrently in its fifth phase, which has the following priorities:45\n\xe2\x80\xa2 payment of ANP salaries\n\xe2\x80\xa2 institutional development\n\xe2\x80\xa2 procurement, maintenance, and operations of non-lethal police equipment\n and supplies\n\xe2\x80\xa2 rehabilitation, maintenance, and operations of police facilities\n\xe2\x80\xa2 gender orientation (selection, recruitment, and training of police)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 payment of uniformed personnel employed by the Central Prisons\n Department through specially earmarked contributions\n According to the UNDP report, the LOTFA reimburses the MoF for the pay-\nment of ANP salaries and food allowances, in addition to other project priorities.\nThis helps to ensure that the ANP receives salary payments in a transparent and\ntimely manner.46 In an effort to promote the fiscal sustainability of LOTFA expen-\nditures and to lessen the financial burden on donors, the MoF agreed to forego\nreimbursement of food allowance payments and to assume full responsibility for\nthese payments to the ANP.47 The fifth phase of LOTFA is set to end on August 31,\n2010. The UNDP noted that the GIRoA and international donors will discuss\nwhether to extend the fund and for what duration of time.48\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 53\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 54 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nSECURITY\nDeveloping capable, well-trained, and self-sufficient Afghan National Security\nForces (ANSF) continues to be a key component of the U.S. strategy to help the\nGovernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) become sustain-\nable.49 This strategy is in line with the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s stated plans and goals. At the\nKabul Conference, Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that, by 2014,\nAfghanistan will assume all military and security responsibilities. The details of\nthe Afghan Prioritization and Implementation Plan for the transition of security\nresponsibilities to the ANSF calls for the four stages of the plan to include the\nfollowing milestones and goals:50\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Stage One: Transfer responsibilities for Provincial Reconstruction Teams\n (PRTs) from military to civilian leadership; the ANSF maintains the lead for\n security operations with the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF),\n moving from a supported to supporting role.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Stage Two: Provinces provide adequate justice and public services; PRTs\n become Provincial and District Support Teams; ISAF transitions from partner\n to mentor and liaison to the ANSF.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Stage Three: ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) continue\n to support the ANSF to increase its capabilities; OMLTs progressively reduce\n in size commensurate with increased ANSF capabilities.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Stage Four: Complete Afghan ownership of security; the ANSF is able to\n conduct operations independently; ISAF provides minimal advisory and\n mentoring assistance; the strategic partnership between Afghanistan and\n international partners is further deepened and expanded.\n As of June 30, 2010, the United States had appropriated nearly $26.75 bil-\nlion\xe2\x80\x94including more than $6.56 billion for FY 2010\xe2\x80\x94to develop the ANSF. Most\nof these funds were appropriated through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\n(ASFF), administered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which provides\nequipment, services, training, and infrastructure-related assistance to the ANSF.51\nAs shown in Appendix B of this report, this amount is more than all other U.S.\nrelief and reconstruction funding categories combined.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 55\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.1\n\n\nSTRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR SECURITY\n ANDS Completion\nPriority ANDS Target Current Target Status Date\nAfghan National Army 80,000 troops (plus 6,600 in training) 134,000 troops 129,885 troops (as of 6/20/2010) End of 2010\n (by 10/2010)\n 171,600 troops\n (by 10/2011)\nAfghan National Police 82,180 police officers 109,000 police officers 105,873 police officers (as of End of 2010\n (by October 2010) 6/20/2010)\n 134,000 police officers\n (by 10/2011)\nDisarmament of Illegal All illegal armed groups disbanded in 98 of 140 DIAG-targeted districts March 20, 2011\nArmed Groups all provinces declared compliant\nRemoving Unexploded Land area contaminated by mines and End of 2010\n UN: Land area contaminated by\nOrdnance unexploded ordnance reduced by 70%\n mines and unexploded ordnance\n 90% of all known areas contaminated by reduced by 47% 2012\n mines or explosive remnants of war cleared\n DoS: 665 million square meters\n All emplaced anti-personnel mines cleared 2013\n of contaminated land remain\n\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Priorities were originally based on Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) targets.\n\nSources: GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2008, p. 6; NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s New Beginning Programme:\nDIAG Fast Facts,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/3/2010; UN, \xe2\x80\x9cMine Action Programme of Afghanistan Newsletter: May 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010, p. 4; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2010.\n\n\n\n\n SECURITY GOALS\n The ANSF force strength, according to DoD, has surpassed targeted goals, grow-\n ing from 170,537 in May 2009 to 235,758 in June 2010. This latest number includes\n 129,885 in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 105,873 in the Afghan National\n Police (ANP).52 Table 3.1 shows the status of progress toward security goals.\n\n SECURITY EVENTS\n On June 6, the chief of the Afghan National Directorate for Security and the\n Minister of Interior resigned, at the behest of Afghan President Hamid Karzai,\n following the insurgent attacks on the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s Peace Jirga.53 On June 23, U.S.\n President Barack Obama accepted the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal\n as the commander of ISAF and the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A)\n and nominated General David Petraeus as his replacement.54 On July 4, 2010,\n Petraeus, the former commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),\n assumed his new duties in Afghanistan.55\n\n Operation Moshtarak\n In February 2010, coalition forces launched Operation Moshtarak, which mobi-\n lized 15,000 ANA and ISAF troops, according to DoD, to force the Taliban out of\n central Helmand and central Kandahar.56 During the first phase, the operation\n worked to create freedom of movement across southern Afghanistan, mainly on\n\n\n\n\n 56 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nthe major highways. The second phase\xe2\x80\x94which continued this quarter\xe2\x80\x94is a shape,\nclear, hold, and build operation in central Helmand. The ANSF will lead the third\nphase, to expand into central Kandahar.57 DoD officials have repeatedly stressed\nthe importance of Operation Moshtarak in turning the tide against the Taliban and\nestablishing Afghan-led security.58 DoD reported that it expects total security forces\nin Kandahar to number more than 20,000 by the end of August 2010\xe2\x80\x94up from 7,300\nin June 2009.59\n This quarter, U.K. soldiers and Afghan security forces made inroads south into\ninsurgent-held territory in Helmand, according to CENTCOM, to force Taliban\nfighters from the Nad \xe2\x80\x99Ali district. The forces established three patrol bases to\nuse as footholds to provide protection to local inhabitants from insurgents while\nU.K. bomb disposal experts cleared IEDs from nearby roads. In June, CENTCOM\nreported that these forces were focused on holding their ground so that recon-\nstruction and development projects can begin.60\n\nSIGAR Audits the Capability Milestone Rating System\nDeveloping a self-sufficient ANSF is one of the main components of the U.S.\nstrategy to improve security in Afghanistan.61 Over the past five years, ANSF\nreadiness has been measured by the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system.\nThis quarter, SIGAR released an audit report on the effectiveness of the CM\nrating system.62 The audit was conducted from October 2009 to May 2010.63\n In April, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) stopped using the CM rating system,\ntransitioning to a new system, the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).64\nThe CUAT system, which is managed by IJC, is now in use and operating on\na six-week cycle. The new system includes ratings on leadership, operations,\nintelligence, logistics, equipping, personnel, maintenance, communications,\nand training and education.65 DoD plans to begin reporting the results of the Direct fire attack: Any engagement or at-\nassessments in the upcoming months and to include them in the October tack initiated with only direct fire weapons.\nsubmission of the Section 1230 report to the Congress.66\n For more information on SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of the CM rating system, see Section 2 Indirect fire attack: Engagements and\nof this report. attacks involving indirect fire weapons sys-\n tems, including mortars, rockets, etc.; does\n not involve other weapons.\nSECURITY INCIDENTS\nThis quarter, the IJC reported that attacks were up by 53% over last quarter; how- IED attack: An incident caused by the\never, DoD reported that this was due to the increased presence of ISAF troops detonation of an improvised explosive\nin areas they had not previously occupied.67 In June 2010, the Acting Minister of device.\nInterior told the press that only 9 of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s 364 districts were considered\nsafe.68 IJC reported 6,880 attacks on the ANSF, coalition forces, and civilians: Complex attack: Any engagement involv-\n \xe2\x80\xa2 3,918 direct fire attacks ing a combination of weapon deployment\n \xe2\x80\xa2 1,026 indirect fire attacks systems, such as direct fire following an\n \xe2\x80\xa2 1,428 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks IED attack or a direct attack following a\n \xe2\x80\xa2 508 complex attacks mortar attack.\nNearly half of all direct fire attacks occurred in Helmand.69\n Source: IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 4/1/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 57\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.18 In June, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) reported that\n armed clashes and IED incidents accounted for one-third of incidents reported\nANA CASUALTIES BY PROVINCE\n this quarter. On average, about three suicide attacks occurred per week\xe2\x80\x94half\n of which were carried out in the southern region. Complex suicide attacks\n occurred at an average rate of two per month, double the figure recorded in 2009.\n For example, recent attacks in Kabul and Helmand targeted guesthouses used\n by international civilians. In addition, insurgents assassinated approximately\n seven people per week (mainly in the southern and southeastern areas where\n Operation Moshtarak has been under way since February)\xe2\x80\x94a 45% increase over\n the same period in 2009. In the city of Kandahar, assassinations targeted civil\n 0\n 1\xe2\x80\x9320\n servants, clerics, and elders.70\n 21\xe2\x80\x9340 According to the Secretary-General, the rate of IED attacks within the first\n 41\xe2\x80\x9360 four months of 2010 was 94% higher than during the same period in 2009.\n 61\xe2\x80\x93120\n According to IJC, 1,449 IEDs were identified and cleared during the quarter\xe2\x80\x94\nNote: Casualties reported from 4/1/2010 to 6/30/2010.\n about the same number as last quarter.71 Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19 show that\nSource: IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010. the provinces with the highest numbers of ANA and ANP casualties were in the\n south, where Operation Moshtarak is under way.\n\n\nFIGURE 3.19 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY\n As of June 20, 2010, ANA troop strength was 129,885\xe2\x80\x94an increase of more than\nANP CASUALTIES BY PROVINCE 17,000 troops since March 20, 2010.72 According to ISAF, the ANA has a target\n troop strength of 171,600 by October 2011.73 This quarter, the NATO Training\n Mission - Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan\n (NTM-A/CSTC-A) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) fielded 25 ANA units, rang-\n ing from company to battalion size. The units included brigade headquarters,\n support units, infantry kandaks, a commando kandak, and the first four Special\n Forces teams.74\n 0\n 1\xe2\x80\x9310 ANA Training\n 11\xe2\x80\x9320 NATO commanders have expressed concern about the lack of well-trained\n 21\xe2\x80\x9340\n officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the ANA. On June 2, 2010, the\n 41\xe2\x80\x93100\n NTM-A deputy commander pointed out that despite the growth in troop strength,\n there is a critical shortfall of trained leaders.75 NTM-A is planning to train approx-\nNote: Casualties reported from 4/1/2010 to 6/30/2010.\nSource: IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n imately 4,500 officers and 15,000 NCOs in 2011. As part of this plan, NTM-A\n announced that it will send the top recruits from every Basic Warrior training\n class to the NCO training course. DoD reported that 1,650 recruits began training\n this quarter and that an expansion of the program will result in approximately\n 1,500 NCOs being trained during each 12-week cycle.76\n This quarter, NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that 27,392 ANA personnel received\n some form of training in a spectrum of subjects.77 Of those who were trained,\n 14,359 graduated from training courses to prepare them for placement within\n their assigned unit, as shown in Figure 3.20. Of those who graduated, 785 were\n officers, and 1,244 were NCOs.78 Figure 3.21 shows how many students graduated\n from ANA training schools.\n\n\n\n\n 58 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report, work has begun on the new\ntraining center for the ANA that will house the Afghan Defense University.79 The\nUniversity, which will include the West Point-style National Military Academy,\nwill be located on a 105-acre site in Kabul. It is expected to serve approximately\n7,000 students and faculty members through eight schools for the ANSF and\ngovernment ministries. As of June 16, 2010, the school is 20% complete; ISAF\nreported that it is expected to open in March 2011.80\n\nFIGURE 3.20\n\n\nANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY UNIT ASSIGNMENT\n\n Total Graduates: 14,359 Other Graduates: 2,911\n 201st 209th 215th\n Corps Corps Corps\n 1,853 1,507 1,568\n Commando Brigade 674\n Military Police Brigade 568\n 111th Capital Division 542\n Other\n 203rd Graduates Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 252\n Corps 2,911\n 2,361 Air Corps 230\n 205th\n Corps 207th Corps 219\n 4,159\n Other Specialized Support or Training Units 426\n\n 0 200 400 600\n\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.21\n\n\nANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY SCHOOL\n\n Total Graduates: 27,392 Other Training Programs: 499\n\n Consolidated\n Fielding Center a Combat Service 221\n Regional Military Support School\n 3,144\n Training Centers Engineer School 110\n 9,738\n Other Training 97\n Logistics School\n Programs\n Kabul Military Counter-Insurgency\n 499 53\n Training Center Training Center\n 12,020 b\n Bridmal Academy Command and\n 18\n 1,991 Staff College\n\n 0 50 100 150 200\n\na. At the Consolidated Fielding Center, units form, equip, and conduct initial collective training.\nb. Bridmal Academy is for NCOs.\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 59\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n Women in the ANA\n This quarter, NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that 301 women serve in the ANA (0.2%\n Tashkil: Lists of personnel and equipment of all personnel)\xe2\x80\x94166 officers, 104 NCOs, and 31 officer candidates. Women are\n requirements used by the MoD and the assigned to duties in information technology, health care, investigations, educa-\n MoI that detail authorized staff positions tion and training, administration, family support, security, logistics, engineering,\n and equipment items, in this case for the aviation, and communications. NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that many women serv-\n ANA and the ANP. ing in the ANA had prior experience with military service. On May 1, 2010, the\n first ANA training course for female officers was initiated. The rank structure\n for women ranges from sergeant to brigadier general; however, many women\nSource: GAO, GAO-08-661, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2008,\np. 18. serve in positions beneath their pay grade, and no woman serves in a tashkil\n position higher than colonel.81\n\n ANA Infrastructure\n This quarter, DoD reported that 3 new infrastructure projects were awarded\n (worth $48.2 million), 50 were ongoing ($840.8 million), and 3 were completed\n ($70.5 million). These projects are designed to contribute to the long-term\n viability of the ANA. They include construction projects and the procurement\n of permanent equipment necessary for support, redeployment, and operations\n of army forces. Construction projects included barracks, headquarters, training\n buildings or ranges, administrative spaces, warehouses and storage buildings,\n and maintenance facilities. Once completed, facilities are sustained through a\n national operation and maintenance (O&M) contract, which includes training in\n preparation for the eventual turnover of O&M responsibility to the MoD. DoD\n noted that increasing the involvement of local governments and workforces is\n key to addressing the central challenge of establishing and maintaining security.82\n\n ANA Equipment\n This quarter, NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that DoD conducted the first training for\n Afghan officers in the U.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.\n Thirty officers participated in the training, which prepared them to use the\n government-to-government method for purchasing U.S. defense equipment,\n services, and training.83\n This quarter, NTM-A/CSTC\xe2\x80\x90A worked with the Defense Security Cooperation\n Agency and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command to speed up the deliv-\n ery of weapons and communication equipment to meet fielding plans. Figure\n 3.22 shows that the ANA fielded 5,025 U.S.-made M16A4 rifles and 1,452 other\n weapons from April 1 to June 23, 2010. Table 3.2 shows that 647 vehicles and\n 902 radios were fielded. All this equipment supplemented existing equipment; no\n replacement equipment was issued. In addition, the ANA Air Corps added two\n C-27 transport aircraft to its inventory, bringing its fleet to the following totals:84\n \xe2\x80\xa2 25 Mi-17 and 9 Mi-35 helicopters\n \xe2\x80\xa2 1 An-26, 5 An-32, and 5 C-27 transports\n \xe2\x80\xa2 3 L-39 jets\n\n\n\n\n 60 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.22 TABLE 3.2\n\n\nANA WEAPONS FIELDED ANA RADIOS AND VEHICLES FIELDED\n Vehicles\n Weapons Fielded: 6,477 Other Weapon Systems: 1,452 Light and medium tactical vehicles 484\n Up-armored HMMWVsa 163\n Radios\n M249 Machine Gun 531\n VHF radiosb 661\n M203A2 Grenade\n 342 HF radiosc 241\n Launcher\n Other Weapon\n M16A4 Rifle\n Systems M240 Machine Gun 267 a. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and\n 5,025 M1152 ambulance models.\n 1,452 b. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various con-\n M24 Sniper Rifle 236 figurations of the PRC-1077 and HH7700 radio systems.\n c. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configura-\n tions of the RT-7000 and PRC-1099 radio systems.\n M2 Machine Gun 76\n Source: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call,\n 7/6/2010.\n 0 100 200 300 400 500\n\nNote: These weapons were transferred to ANA forces from 4/1/2010 to 6/23/2010.\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\nAFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE\nAs of June 20, 2010, ANP personnel strength was 105,873\xe2\x80\x94an increase of more\nthan 6,000 personnel.85 According to ISAF, the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to reach 109,000\npersonnel by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011.86\n The ANP includes the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police\n(ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); all but the ANCOP\nhad surpassed their targeted end-strength goals as of late June. To encourage\nrecruitment and retention, ISAF is giving hazardous duty incentive pay and\nsigning bonuses to ANCOP personnel. Moreover, ISAF is looking at providing\ncoalition mentoring and other measures to reduce ANCOP attrition.87\n On June 25, 2010, SIGAR informed officials from DoD and the Department of\nState (DoS) that it will conduct an audit of personnel management in the ANP. This\naudit was originally designed to review the ANSF; the scope was changed to avoid\nduplicating an audit of the ANA being done by the Government Accountability\nOffice. Fieldwork for SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit is scheduled to begin in August 2010.88\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 61\n\x0cSECURITY\n\n\n\n\nANP Training\nThis quarter, NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that 11,981 ANP students registered for\ntraining programs and that 10,974 students graduated from them, as shown in\nFigure 3.23. The programs cover a range of topics, including basic and advanced\npatrolling, counter-narcotics, driving, investigations, trauma assistance, border\nsecurity, and leadership.89\n DoD leads the U.S. effort to staff, train, and equip the ANP, and several separate\ncontracts support this effort. For example, DoS manages a contract to provide\ncivilian police trainers to the ANP. However, DoD reported that DoS is in the pro-\ncess of transferring management of this contract to DoD. In preparation for taking\nover contract management, DoD is conducting an open competition. Although\nthe process of awarding a contract of this size (estimated at $1 billion over three\nyears) usually takes 12 months to complete, DoD reported that it has accelerated\nthe milestones associated with this procurement. On May 25, 2010, DoD issued a\ndraft request for proposals; more than 80 companies attended the related industry\ndays on June 9 and 10. DoD reported that it posted the final request for proposals\non July 16 and expects to award the contract by the end of the year.90\n On June 21, 2010, more than 1,100 cadets graduated from a six-month train-\ning program at the ANP Academy in Kabul. The new officers will be the first to\nbe deployed through the Ministry of Interior\xe2\x80\x99s (MoI) new process for assigning\nofficers on the basis of unit requirements and operational priorities. According to\nNTM-A, two additional six-month training cycles are planned for 2011.91\n\nFIGURE 3.23\n\n\nANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM\n\n Graduates: 10,974\n\n\n Basic 8 2,825\n\n KSA Cycle 1,635\n\n ANCOP\n 1,445\n Basic and NCO\n Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Course 1,104\n (6-month)\n Focused Border\n 932\nDevelopment Basic\n Focused District 687\n Development\n Border Police 614\n Basic and NCO\n Other Specialized 1,732\n Training\n 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000\n\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 62 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n U.S. Marines and Italian Carabinieri continued to work together to train\nmembers of the AUP and the ANCOP\xe2\x80\x94more than 1,000 recruits, NCOs, and\nofficers this quarter. Training took place at the Afghan National Training Center\nin Adraskan, Herat.92\n The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan reported that\n265 international and 163 local staff members were providing police training and\nrule-of-law expertise to the MoI and ANP, as of June 6, 2010. From March 2009\nthrough June 2010, EUPOL trained approximately 675 Afghan police trainers, 300\nMoI inspectors (in anti-corruption investigation techniques), and more than 1,000\nAfghan police officers (in basic investigations and crime scene investigation tech-\nniques). EUPOL has a budget of \xe2\x82\xac54.6 million for the period from May 31, 2010,\nto May 31, 2011.93 On May 18, 2010, the Council of the European Union extended\nEUPOL\xe2\x80\x99s mission to May 31, 2013.94\n\nANP Literacy\nSince March 2009, the ANP literacy program has been using the Ministry of\nEducation\xe2\x80\x99s adult literacy curriculum to address low literacy rates among its per- ANP members participate in a three-\n day training course at the Rokha Police\nsonnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that 2,889 ANP members (including 36 officers\n Headquarters in Panjshir. The students\nand 231 NCOs) have graduated from the program as of June 30, 2010. This figure enhanced their ability to work with maps,\nincludes 2,497 members of the AUP, 184 members of the ABP, 169 Special Police, give and find coordinates, identify terrain\nand 39 members of the ANCOP. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, 12,806 personnel features, and measure the distances\nenrolled in the literacy program in April 2010, and 12,753 enrolled in May 2010; between points. (U.S. Air Force photo, 2nd\n Lt. Jason Smith)\nhowever, most do not continue beyond the mandatory 64 hours of instruction\nrequired during basic training. In April and May 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A randomly\ntested ANCOP personnel and found that about 6% of them were literate. To\naddress the need for literacy training, NTM-A/CSTC-A fielded literacy program\ninstructors to ANCOP Battalion and Brigade Headquarters.95\n\nWomen in the ANP\nAs of late June 2010, approximately 1,100 women were serving in the ANP,\naccording to DoD. Because only women can interact freely with other women in\nAfghanistan, those who serve in the ANP fill an important cultural role in search-\ning women and gathering intelligence from them. The MoI\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to have 5,000\nwomen in the ANP and MoI by 2014. This quarter, the MoI implemented a recruit-\ning campaign aimed at attracting more female candidates for the ANP, according\nto DoD.96\n\nANP Infrastructure\nThis quarter, DoD reported that 15 new infrastructure projects were awarded\n(valued at $39.6 million), 250 were ongoing ($796 million), 9 were completed\n($7.72 million), and 4 were de-scoped ($2.38 million).97\n The MoI and NTM-A are working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and\nlocal contractors to construct new living facilities and temporary holding cells in\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 63\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n police districts throughout Afghanistan. Some ANP personnel live in substandard\n facilities that lack ventilation, refrigerators, or toilet facilities, according to an\n NTM-A/CSTC-A press report.98\n On June 12, 2010, an Afghan construction company began laying the founda-\n tion for a new facility at Police District 12 in Kabul, according to NTM-A. The\n two-story complex will include living and dining areas, a break room, and bath-\n room facilities.99\n\n ANP Equipment\n The strategy for equipping the ANP focuses on providing weapons, transport,\n Cross-leveling: At the strategic and and communications equipment that will help the ANP field more units and\n operational levels in a theater, the process meet the October 2011 goal, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A. This quarter, NTM-A/\n of diverting materiel from one military CSTC-A reported an increase in the number of weapons distributed by the ANP\n element to meet the higher priority of to personnel in the field; this change follows the MoI\xe2\x80\x99s short-term moratorium on\n another. Cross-leveling plans must include issuing new weapons. NTM-A/CSTC-A has been working with the MoI to imple-\n specific reimbursement procedures. ment and enforce greater accountability and cross-leveling of excess weapons.100\n The ANP fielded 6,821 weapons, including former Warsaw Pact weapons such as\n the AK-47, as shown in Figure 3.24.\nSource: DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDictionary of Military Terms,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online\n7/12/2010. This quarter, the continued training of ANP drivers resulted in the fielding of\n 818 up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); 91\n of these vehicles were ambulances. NTM-A/CSTC-A reported that it is procuring\n additional up-armored HMMWVs for the ANP and expects to receive an average\n of 250 vehicles per month over the next 7 months.101 Table 3.3 shows that the\n ANP also procured communication equipment to support its training, equipping,\n and sustainment mission.\nTABLE 3.3 FIGURE 3.24\n\n\nANP RADIOS AND VEHICLES FIELDED\n ANP WEAPONS FIELDED\nVehicles\nLight and medium tactical vehicles 988 Total Weapons: 6,821 Other Weapon Systems: 990\nUp-armored HMMWVa 818\nRadios GP-25/30 Grenade 402\n 9MM Handgun Launcher\n b 1,531\nVHF radios 2,323 RPK Machine Gun 203\nHF radiosc 119 Other Weapon\na. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152\n Systems PKM Machine Gun 196\nambulance models. AK-47 990\nb. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various Assault Rifle RPG-7 Grenade Launcher 172\nconfigurations of Motorola or ICOM radio systems.\nc. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations 3,508\nof CODAN radio systems. DShK Heavy Machine Gun 17\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call,\n7/6/2010.\n 0 100 200 300 400\n\n Note: These weapons were transferred to ANP forces from 4/1/2010 to 6/23/2010.\n Source: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 64 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nREMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE\nSince 1993, DoS has provided $165 million for the destruction of conventional\nweapons and for assistance with humanitarian mine actions in Afghanistan,\naccording to the DoS Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement within the\nBureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA). DoS funds Afghan nongovern-\nmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs, and commercial companies\nto carry out sustained clearance operations, remove and mitigate abandoned\nand at-risk conventional weapons, and develop Afghan technical and managerial\ncapacity.102\n The PM/WRA reported continued progress through its Community-Based\nDe-Mining (CBD) initiative. The PM/WRA reported that the overarching objec-\ntive of CBD projects is the collaborative coordination of de-mining programs.\nAccording to DoS, the PM/WRA is funding CBD programs in Helmand, Kandahar,\nand Kunar and is looking to align future projects with the needs of Regional\nCommands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It is also working with\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Infrastructure and with the Mine Action Coordination Center\nof Afghanistan, an NGO, to fund the construction of a headquarters for the\nGIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s Department of Mine Clearance.103\n\nCOALITION FORCES\nAs of March 31, 2010, DoD reported approximately 87,000 U.S. forces and\napproximately 46,500 international forces in Afghanistan; it expected U.S. forces\nto approach 98,000 by August.104 Of those numbers, ISAF reported that it had\n78,430 U.S. troops and 41,315 international troops from 45 nations in Afghanistan\nas of June 30, 2010.105 However, as of April 2010 at least 21 coalition partner\nnations still have \xe2\x80\x9cnational caveats\xe2\x80\x9d on their forces, according to DoD. These\ncaveats limit or restrict the forces\xe2\x80\x99 conduct and may affect the ISAF commander\xe2\x80\x99s\nutilization of forces.106\n As of July 20, 2010, DoD reported 1,100 U.S. military fatalities in and around\nAfghanistan since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Of that num-\nber, 878 were killed in action; an additional 222 died as a result of non-hostile\nincidents. In addition, 3,811 were wounded in action; and an additional 3,199\nwere wounded but able to return to duty within 72 hours.107\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 65\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nINSURGENT THREATS report noted that several key Taliban figures have\n been captured or killed this year, including the\n February arrests of Omar\xe2\x80\x99s top deputy and two Taliban\nIn its Section 1230 report to the Congress in April \xe2\x80\x9cshadow governors\xe2\x80\x9d and the March arrests of Omar\xe2\x80\x99s\n2010, DoD noted that insurgents perceived 2009 son-in-law and another notable QST member.117\nas their most successful year.108 DoD recorded more\nthan 21,000 enemy-initiated attacks that year\xe2\x80\x94a HAQQANI NETWORK\n75% increase over the number recorded in 2008. Jalaludin Haqqani, the Minister of Tribal Affairs in the\nMoreover, from September 2009 to March 2010, pre-2001 Taliban government, founded the Haqqani ter-\nattacks against coalition forces were up 83%, attacks rorist network. Sirajuddin (\xe2\x80\x9cSiraj\xe2\x80\x9d) Haqqani, Jalaludin\xe2\x80\x99s\nagainst civilians were up 72%, and attacks against son and a senior leader of the Haqqani Network, main-\nthe ANSF were up 17%, compared with the same time tains close ties to al-Qaeda. According to DoS, Haqqani\nperiod one year earlier.109 admitted to planning a 2008 attack against a Kabul\n According to DoD, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s insurgency includes hotel that killed six people, including an American, as\nthree major groups: the Quetta Shura Taliban, the well as an attempted assassination of President Karzai\nHezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and the Haqqani in April that year.118 More recently, the Haqqani Network\nNetwork (HQN). These groups cooperate and coordi- may have been responsible for a January 2010 attack\nnate to undermine the central government and to expel near the presidential palace in Kabul, according to the\nforeign forces from Afghanistan. They tend to operate in CRS.119 Believed to be residing in Pakistan, Haqqani\ngeographically and demographically determined areas, has coordinated and participated in cross-border\nmainly in the Pashtun-majority regions and in small attacks against coalition forces, according to DoS.120\nPashtun areas of the north, as shown in Figure 3.25.110 According to a DoD press report, the younger\n Haqqani represents a style of leadership that is more\nTHE QUETTA SHURA TALIBAN aggressive than past leadership and often uses\nMullah Mohammad Omar\xe2\x80\x99s Taliban regime in brutality as a means to secure power. He has been\nAfghanistan sheltered Osama Bin Laden and his responsible for training, influencing, commanding,\nal-Qaeda network following the September 11, 2001 and leading the Haqqani Network, using kidnappings,\nattacks.111 Omar\xe2\x80\x99s group relocated to Quetta, Pakistan, assassinations, beheadings of women, indiscriminate\nin 2002, according to the Institute for the Study of War killings, and suicide bombings.121 In March 2010, DoS\n(ISW) and is now called the \xe2\x80\x9cQuetta Shura Taliban\xe2\x80\x9d\n(QST). The QST, however, refers to itself as the\nIslamic Emirates of Afghanistan and considers itself\nAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s legitimate government.112 According to\nthe ISAF commander, the QST\xe2\x80\x99s aim is to capture the\ncity of Kandahar, their philosophical home.113\n The ISW noted that almost all Afghan insurgent\ngroups have sworn allegiance to Omar.114 By U.S.\nmilitary and Afghan estimates, the number of Taliban\nfighters in Afghanistan is more than 20,000, as\nreported in June 2010 by the Congressional Research\nService (CRS).115 Figure 3.25 identifies areas in which\nTaliban fighters loyal to the QST are operating.\n Automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and communi-\n On June 10, 2010, the ISAF commander reported cation equipment are part of a large cache of materiel captured\nthat coalition forces killed or captured 121 Taliban from Haqqani and Taliban insurgents by a joint Afghan-\nleaders during the preceding 90 days.116 The CRS international security force in June. (ISAF Photo)\n\n\n\n\n 66 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.25\n\nINSURGENT AREAS OF OPERATION\n\n\n\n\n Kabul\n\n\n\n\n Khowst\n\n Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin\n\n Haqqani Network\n Now Zad\n Lashkar Gah Taliban\n\n Kandahar\n\n\n\n\n HEZB-E ISLAMI GULBUDDIN\n Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) is led by Gulbuddin\n Hekmatyar, one of the main mujahedeen leaders\n supported by the United States during the Soviet\nSource: DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d\n4/2010, p. 23.\n occupation of Afghanistan. Active in Kapisa, Kunar,\n Nangarhar, and Nuristan, the HIG is allied with\n al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents, according to the\noffered a reward of up to $5 million\xe2\x80\x94through a pro- CRS.125 It reported that U.S. military and Afghan esti-\ngram administered by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic mates set the number of HIG fighters in Afghanistan\nSecurity\xe2\x80\x94for information leading to the location and at approximately 1,000.126\narrest of Siraj Haqqani.122 U.S. military and Afghan On March 22, 2010, representatives of the GIRoA\nestimates set the number of Haqqani Network fighters and the HIG confirmed that they were holding talks,\nin Afghanistan at approximately 1,000, according to including meetings with President Hamid Karzai.\nthe CRS. These fighters are mainly active in provinces Since 2007, Hekmatyar has expressed a willing-\naround Khowst, as shown in Figure 3.25.123 ness to discuss a cease-fire with the GIRoA; some of\n This quarter, ISAF reported that joint ANP and President Karzai\xe2\x80\x99s allies in the National Assembly are\ncoalition forces captured a Haqqani Network IED cell former members of Hekmatyar\xe2\x80\x99s mujahedeen party.\nleader and several other insurgents in a compound in In January 2010, Hekmatyar outlined conditions for\nKhowst. The cell leader was responsible for emplacing reconciliation with President Karzai that included elec-\nIEDs, acquiring and distributing weapons, and coordi- tions under a neutral caretaker government following\nnating suicide bombings against coalition convoys.124 a U.S. withdrawal.127\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 67\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 68 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nGOVERNANCE\nSince 2002, the United States has appropriated more than $14.74 billion for\ngovernance and development activities in Afghanistan. The U.S. Department of\nDefense (DoD), U.S. Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International\nDevelopment (USAID), and U.S. Department of Agriculture use this funding in\npart to support programs for governance, rule of law, and human rights. For\ndetails on funding amounts, see Appendix B of this report.\n In a joint statement issued on May 12, 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama and\nAfghan President Hamid Karzai emphasized the importance of improving Afghan\ninstitutions to help the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan\n(GIRoA) meet the needs of its people. In the past, almost no U.S. funding was\ndirected through the GIRoA; however, over the next two years, the United States\nintends to channel up to 50% of its reconstruction funding through Afghan insti-\ntutions that are certified as transparent and accountable.128\n\nOVERVIEW OF RECENT EVENTS\nThis quarter, the GIRoA launched the Afghan Peace and Reintegration program.\nLed by the High Peace Council, the program is designed to promote peace\nthrough regional and international cooperation, to create political and judi-\ncial conditions for peace and reconciliation, and to encourage combatants to\nrenounce violence and join in reintegration and peace-building. The program\naims to reintegrate thousands of former insurgents and stabilize 4,000 com-\nmunities in 220 districts across Afghanistan over the next five years.129 The new\nreintegration program will offer incentives to insurgents who are willing to\ndisarm and accept the Afghan Constitution. Generally, reintegration is offered to\nlower-level insurgents, not extremist leaders.130\n According to Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, DoD plans to spend up to\n$100 million from Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program funds to sup-\nport initial reintegration efforts.131 The director of the International Security\nAssistance Force (ISAF) reintegration effort emphasized that Afghans expect\nthe GIRoA to carry out significant government reforms. Doing so will demon-\nstrate that the GIRoA is working to improve the lives of Afghan citizens, thereby\nencouraging Afghans to support their government.132\n As of July 2010, the GIRoA is focusing reintegration programming at the dis-\ntrict and local levels, with assistance from the United States and the international\ncommunity. At those levels, reintegration programs address grievances while\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 69\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cToday, I invite us to\n elevate our vision above\n the din of the battle with\n our common enemies and\n to focus on our noble goal:\n a peaceful, prosperous,\n and stable Afghanistan.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94Afghan President\n Hamid Karzai\n\nSource: GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cKabul Conference,\xe2\x80\x9d\n7/20/2010.\n\n\n\n\n Afghan President Hamid Karzai and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon unveil the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s\n new action plan to improve governance, economic and social development, and security at the\n Kabul Conference in July. (UNAMA photo)\n\n maintaining the dignity of all parties. In the future, reintegration is expected to take\n place at provincial and national levels, while still continuing at the local level.133\n This quarter, the GIRoA hosted two events to discuss reconstruction and the\n reintegration of insurgents: the Kabul Conference and the National Peace Jirga.134\n\n Kabul Conference\n At the July 20 Kabul Conference, the GIRoA unveiled its Prioritization and\n Implementation Plan\xe2\x80\x94an action plan aimed at improving governance, economic\n and social development, and security. Building on the 2008 Afghanistan National\n Development Strategy, the new plan aims to strengthen government institutions\n and improve opportunities for Afghan citizens. The GIRoA used its new develop-\n ment goals to establish national priorities and align international assistance with\n those priorities.135\n National priorities for governance and rule of law focus on strengthening\n government accountability, democratic processes and institutions, human rights,\n the rule of law, and the delivery of public services. Based on these priorities, the\n GIRoA has established national programs with a range of overarching themes,\n including transparency, accountability and efficiency in government, financial\n and economic reform, human rights and equality, and local governance.136\n\n Peace Jirga\n From June 2 to June 4, 2010, the GIRoA hosted a National Consultative Peace\n Jirga to discuss ways to end violence and achieve lasting peace. The 1,600\n delegates represented religious scholars, tribal leaders, civil society organiza-\n tions, and Afghan refugees residing in Iran and Pakistan, as well as government\n representatives from provincial councils and the two houses of the National\n\n\n\n 70 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nAssembly.137 Although reintegration was discussed at the Jirga, extremist\nelements and terrorist networks were not involved in these discussions.138\n At the Peace Jirga, the GIRoA presented a reintegration plan for encourag-\ning insurgents to disarm voluntarily. The plan proposed such incentives as\njobs, amnesty and protection, and the opportunity to take part in securing\ncommunities.139\n At the conclusion of the Peace Jirga, the delegates released a 16-point resolu-\ntion in which they supported the proposed incentives and made requests of the\nGIRoA and the international community.140 Article 8 of the resolution called on\nthe GIRoA and the international troops in Afghanistan to take major actions, Women attend the Kabul Peace Jirga\nincluding the following:141 in June. The 3-day Jirga gathered 1,600\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Review information about detainees in Afghan prisons, and free those who participants, including 300 women, who\n prepared and presented recommendations\n have been detained on the basis of inaccurate information or unsubstanti-\n on how to move forward in the peace pro-\n ated allegations. cess. (UNAMA photo)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Strike from the UN terrorist blacklist all insurgency members who are not\n associated with al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks.\n On June 6, President Karzai designated a committee, headed by the Minister\nof Justice, to review the cases of detainees connected with insurgent groups.\nThe head of the Presidential Legal Advisory Board is part of the committee,\nalong with representatives from the Supreme Court, the Independent Peace and\nReconciliation Commission, and the Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office.142 On July 12,\nthe committee announced the release of 28 detainees who were being held\nwith no clear evidence of wrongdoing on their part. The Minister of Justice also\nannounced that the committee is freeing an additional 45 detainees.143\n On June 22, the UN Security Council agreed to begin removing members from\nthe terrorist blacklist on a case-by-case basis. According to the Security Council,\nthe terrorist blacklist includes only individuals who currently represent a threat.144\nTo be removed, individuals must break all ties with al-Qaeda and other insurgency\ngroups, lay down their arms, and fully accept the Afghan Constitution. They must\nalso prove to the UN Security Council that they have met these criteria. All 15\nmembers of the Security Council must agree to the removal.145\n\nANTI-CORRUPTION\nCorruption undermines the authority and accountability of the GIRoA by\nweakening public trust in government, security, and human rights development,\naccording to the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s High Office of Oversight (HOO). The HOO has attrib-\nuted corruption in Afghanistan to several factors:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the legacy of a quarter-century of conflict\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the erosion of state institutions\n\xe2\x80\xa2 irregular financing of the conflict from various sources\n\xe2\x80\xa2 worsening tensions among ethnic and tribal groups\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the growth of informal and illicit economic activities\nThe HOO also has noted that the growth of the drug trade and the influx of inter-\nnational aid have created more opportunities for corruption within the country.146\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 71\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n This quarter, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) released the results of a corrup-\ntion survey, which found that Afghans consider corruption to be the third-largest\nproblem in the country, following security and unemployment. Approximately 75%\nof respondents believed that the problem of corruption became more significant\nover the course of 2009: 28% of adults paid a bribe to obtain a public service. The\nIWA also revealed that 70% of Afghans perceived corruption as a common way of\ndoing business with their government; however, 90% of respondents stated that\nthey felt guilty for taking part in corrupt activities.147\n The average bribe that respondents paid in 2009 was Af 7,769 ($156), accord-\ning to the survey; this amount represents 31% of the average annual income\nin Afghanistan ($502). Afghans who earned less than Af 3,000 ($60) a year\nreported the highest exposure to bribery; they listed corruption as the largest\nproblem in Afghanistan.148\n The IWA survey showed that the highest levels of corruption occur in connec-\ntion with the following government services:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 registration and issuance of ID cards and passports\n \xe2\x80\xa2 police services\n \xe2\x80\xa2 justice in the court system\nRespondents also reported increasingly high levels of corruption in the health\nand education sectors, where bribes tend to entail larger sums of money.149\n\nAnti-Corruption Initiatives\nAs part of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the\nUnited States pledged to partner with the GIRoA to reach two overarching anti-\ncorruption goals:150\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to reduce corruption by strengthening institutions that can provide checks\n on government power\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to communicate the progress made by the GIRoA in reducing the level of\n corruption\nIn May 2010, President Obama and President Karzai re-emphasized in a joint\nstatement that the fight against corruption is a top priority. President Obama\npledged to improve oversight of U.S. government contracting procedures and\nto provide technical and financial support to bolster the powers of the HOO.\nPresident Karzai restated his inauguration pledge to bring to justice those who\nare involved in corrupt activities. He also underscored the necessity of reforming\nthe formal justice sector by strengthening capacity and reducing corruption in\ngovernment justice institutions.151\n The IWA survey showed that anti-corruption efforts by the international\ncommunity have yet to earn the Afghans\xe2\x80\x99 trust. According to the survey, 43% of\nrespondents did not know if the international community was supporting honest\nofficials, and 18% believed that it was not.152\n\n\n\n\n 72 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nHigh Office of Oversight\nSince its creation in 2008 by presidential decree, the HOO has been responsible\nfor inter-agency coordination in the fight against corruption in Afghanistan. The\nHOO is also responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of\nthe GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption strategy and for implementing administrative proce-\ndural reforms in Afghanistan. The Afghan president appoints the director general\nof the HOO; office responsibilities are split between Policy and Oversight and\nAdministrative Affairs.153\n Although the HOO recognizes the importance of enforcement in anti-corruption\nefforts, it focuses on fighting the problem through coordination, prevention, and\nawareness-raising. According to the HOO, the number of corruption cases does\nnot reflect the extent of corruption.154\n The HOO\xe2\x80\x99s Asset Registration Department is charged with creating an asset\nregistry based on declarations of government officials\xe2\x80\x99 personal assets, as\nmandated by Article 154 of the Afghan Constitution. According to the Asset\nRegistration Department, verification is the most complicated component of\nasset declaration because many transactions, including the purchase of land\nand homes, take place through informal channels. The U.S. Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the U.S. Embassy Kabul\nprovide international assistance for these efforts.155\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of the HOO, released in December 2009, found that the office\nhad limited organizational capacity to meet its hefty mandate. The audit also\ndetermined that the GIRoA had not passed legislation necessary to give the\nHOO appropriate authority or enforcement power.156 For more information, see\nSIGAR Audit 10-2, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s High Office of Oversight Needs Significantly\nStrengthened Authority, Independence, and Donor Support to Become an\nEffective Anti-Corruption Institution.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nControl and Audit Office\nAs Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Supreme Audit Institution, the Control and Audit Office (CAO)\nis responsible for auditing the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s financial matters. The CAO has audit\nauthority over all GIRoA institutions in the central and provincial governments,\nas well as public enterprises. It also conducts audits of the funds provided to\nAfghanistan by external donors.157\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of the CAO, released in April 2010, found that Afghan legislation\ndid not provide the CAO with sufficient independence or authority to serve as an\nindependent supreme audit institution. One result of this lack of independence\nwas conflicting responsibilities, particularly between the CAO and the Ministry\nof Finance. In addition, SIGAR determined that the CAO suffered from limited\ncapacity, including a lack of qualified auditors.158 For more information, see\nSIGAR Audit 10-8, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Control and Audit Office Requires Operational\nand Budgetary Independence, Enhanced Authority, and Focused International\nAssistance to Effectively Prevent and Detect Corruption.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 73\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n SEPTEMBER 2010 ELECTIONS\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s Support to the Electoral The elections for the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly),\nProcess program provides support to scheduled for September 18, 2010, will be the second such elections since the fall\nbuild the capacity of the IEC to ensure of the Taliban regime; the first elections were held in 2005.159 DoS identified secu-\nthe legitimacy of voter registration and rity as its primary concern during these elections; security issues include voter\nthe electoral process.\n intimidation. ISAF is working closely with the GIRoA on the security issue.160 In\n The International Foundation for\n April 2010, in preparation for the elections, the Afghanistan Independent Election\nElectoral Systems program aims to build\non the momentum in Afghan society Commission (IEC) released a timeline of events. Figure 3.26 highlights events\nto advance political and electoral completed during this quarter.\nprocesses, however incrementally, and\nto channel desires for change into Elections Support\norganized, peaceful, and legitimate As of June 30, 2010, according to DoS, the IEC estimated that the 2010 elections\naction. will cost approximately $120 million.161 This quarter, DoS reported that the UN\nSources: USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cSupport to the Electoral Process,\xe2\x80\x9d\n Development Programme (UNDP) retained $27 million from last year\xe2\x80\x99s election\naccessed online 7/19/2010; IFES, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan in Brief,\xe2\x80\x9d fund for the 2010 elections.162 The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-\naccessed online 7/19/2010.\n General in Afghanistan has reported that the UNDP plans to use its election\n assistance to provide core support for Afghan electoral authorities.163\n The United States has provided USAID with $80 million to support elections.164\n DoS reported that USAID elections funding is divided between two programs: the\n Support to the Electoral Process program and the International Foundation for\n\nFIGURE 3.26\n\n\nWOLESI JIRGA ELECTION EVENTS, 2010\n\n Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct\n Publication of election calendar Mar 25\n Launch of candidate registration process Apr 13\xe2\x80\x9319\n Nomination of candidates Apr 20\xe2\x80\x93May 4\n Display of preliminary candidate list; challenges, corrections, and appeals May 12\xe2\x80\x9318\n ECC hearings and decisions May 12\xe2\x80\x93Jun 10\n ECC informs IEC of decisions on nominations Jun 11\n IEC prepares final list of candidates Jun 12\xe2\x80\x9321\n Voter registration Jun 12\xe2\x80\x93Aug 12\n Publication of final list of candidates Jun 22\n Political campaign period Jun 23\xe2\x80\x93Sep 16\n Election Day Sep 18\n Start and finish date for counting Sep 18\n Transfer of results from Counting Center to National Tally Center Sep 19\xe2\x80\x9325\n Data entry and announcement of preliminary results Sep 21\xe2\x80\x93Oct 8\n Announcement of partial results Oct 9\n ECC hearings on complaints after partial results Oct 10\xe2\x80\x9323\n ECC sends final decisions on complaints to IEC Oct 24\n Announcement of final results of election Oct 30\n\n\n Completed In Progress Not Completed\n\nSources: IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cKey Dates,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/20/2010; IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cIEC Press Release on Launch of Candidate Nomination for Wolesi Jirga Election,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/12/2010; IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination,\xe2\x80\x9d\n5/17/2010; UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cParliamentary Poll Voter Registration in Full Swing in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s East,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010; IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination: Verification of Supporters\xe2\x80\x99 Lists,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/22/2010; IEC,\n\xe2\x80\x9cIEC Press Release on Announcement of Final Figures and Candidate List for Wolesi Jirga Elections,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/12/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 74 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nElectoral Systems (IFES).165 In 2010, IFES is assisting the Electoral Complaints Eligible candidates for the National\nCommission (ECC) with capacity development.166 Assembly must meet the following\n In preparing for the coming elections, the IEC has demonstrated that it has requirements, as established by the Afghan\nlearned from USAID and international groups, according to DoS. This knowledge Constitution and Electoral Law\nwill enable the IEC to carry out its operations more independently; however, of Afghanistan:\nDoS noted that it is difficult to measure the capacity of the IEC because there is \xe2\x80\xa2 must be a citizen of the Islamic Republic\n of Afghanistan\nno way to know how the new IEC will respond to the political pressures of the\nelections.167 \xe2\x80\xa2 must not be convicted of any crime,\n including crimes against humanity\n \xe2\x80\xa2 must be at least 25 years old on the day\nIEC Preparations for Elections of candidacy\nOn July 12, 2010, after accounting for duplicate applications, withdrawals, \xe2\x80\xa2 must be registered to vote\nexclusions, and ECC disqualifications, the IEC released its final list of candidates\n Source: IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/17/2010.\nfor the 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga. The 2,556 candidates included 2,150 men\nand 406 women.168 The nomination of candidates was the first significant opera-\ntion in the September 2010 election process, according to the IEC.169\n The IEC is responsible for all nomination procedures except challenges to\ncandidate nominations, which are the responsibility of the ECC. Following the\nnomination period, the IEC launched a three-part verification process, outlined in\nTable 3.4. The IEC notified candidates who did not pass the verification procedures of\nthe reasons for their exclusion; these candidates can submit challenges to the ECC.170\n The IEC included many of the initially excluded nominees in the final can-\ndidate list. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General expressed\ndisappointment with the vetting committee\xe2\x80\x99s decision to allow many of these\ncandidates to participate, stating that \xe2\x80\x9cthe process of vetting has not produced\na satisfactory result so far.\xe2\x80\x9d171\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.4\n\n\nIEC VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, 2010 ELECTIONS\nStep Action Taken\nManual Verification Teams at IEC headquarters in Kabul checked the number of pages (67 minimum), the\n number of signatures (1,000 minimum), and the completeness of each record. Teams\n also checked for signs of fraud, including more than 10 registration numbers listed in\n sequence on a single page or identical\xe2\x80\x90looking signatures or thumbprints.\nDatabase Verification More than 3 million signatures and more than 200,000 pages were submitted in\n nominations for these elections. The IEC verified 10% of each applicant\xe2\x80\x99s supporters.\n Supporters were checked against the records in the IEC\xe2\x80\x99s voter registration database;\n this was the first time the database was used on such a large scale.\nFinal Verification The IEC reviewed each application to verify that the first two steps in checking were\n carried out correctly. At this stage, the IEC either approved the applicant for candidacy\n or referred the application to the IEC Board of Commissioners.\nSource: IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination: Verification of Supporters Lists,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/22/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 75\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n ENHANCING LOCAL GOVERNANCE\n \xe2\x80\x9cIn order to enhance As of May 10, 2010, according to U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, the\n security and stability, our U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan had grown to more than 1,000 people\xe2\x80\x94\n more than triple the number present last year. These civilian personnel include\n civil-military teams on the diplomats, development specialists, and agricultural experts. Ambassador\n ground employ Cash-for- Eikenberry reported that the U.S. Embassy Kabul has been restructured to\n Work programs to provide enhance coordination between U.S. civilian organizations and U.S. law\nemployment opportunities, enforcement agents in Afghanistan.172\n In 2010, both the U.S. government and the GIRoA are focusing their efforts on\njump-start a rural economy, local governance programs, according to U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. The\n and demonstrate an United States provides local assistance through programs managed by Provincial\nattractive alternative to that Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and District Support Teams (DSTs), both of which\n offered by the enemy. But are joint civilian-military efforts.173\n stability must be balanced\n against the imperatives of Provincial Reconstruction Teams\n PRTs work to improve security, extend the authority of the GIRoA, and\n sustainable development.\xe2\x80\x9d coordinate reconstruction efforts in provinces. In its program overview, USAID\n \xe2\x80\x94U.S. Ambassador describes PRTs as the primary means of delivering U.S. and international foreign\n Karl W. Eikenberry aid outside Kabul, especially in unstable provinces.174\n According to ISAF, 27 PRTs operate in Afghanistan. Thirteen are now under\n U.S. authority, including the Uruzgan PRT, which previously was managed by\n the Netherlands.175 To compensate for the withdrawal of Dutch personnel, U.S.\n personnel from the Parwan PRT were transferred to Uruzgan.176 In the past,\n Australia provided military support for the Uruzgan PRT; however, when the\n Netherlands announced that it would withdraw all troops by the end of 2010,\n Australia announced that it would not send additional troops for assignment\n to the PRT.177\n On July 1, 2010, control of the Parwan PRT was officially transferred from the\n United States to the Republic of Korea.178 Other nations responsible for PRTs are\n Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, New Zealand,\n Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.179\n\n District Support Teams\n According to ISAF, one of the primary purposes of the DST program is to provide\n district-level support for PRT efforts; DST programs aim to build the capacity\n of the GIRoA at the district level.180 ISAF\xe2\x80\x99s ideal DST consists of one military\n company and three civilians, one each from USAID, DoS, and the Department of\n Agriculture. Civilians are stationed with DSTs for 12 to 18 months, establishing\n relationships with district-level officials.181\n DSTs operate alongside the Afghan Independent Directorate of Local Governance\n to implement the District Delivery Program, which aims to improve government ser-\n vices in 80 of the country\xe2\x80\x99s 364 districts. Concentrated in southern Afghanistan, these\n 80 districts have been the focus of the 2010 counter-insurgency campaign.182\n\n\n\n\n 76 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM\nThe United States has committed support to assist the GIRoA in building its\ninstitutions and resources.183 This section provides information on those institu-\ntions and the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s progress in increasing their capacity.\n This quarter, the Afghan Civil Service Commission worked to more clearly\ndefine positions in the government. Government positions now have specific\ndescriptions, performance criteria, and pay and bonus criteria; other formal\nprocedures have also been established.184\n\nPresidential Cabinet\nSince his reelection, President Karzai has faced difficulty in obtaining confirma-\ntion of his cabinet nominees from the National Assembly.185 This quarter, the\nNational Assembly confirmed appointments for an additional seven cabinet posi-\ntions.186 As of June 30, 2010, according to DoS, permanent appointments had still\nnot been made for the following ministries:187\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Communications and Technology\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Higher Education\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Public Health\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Transportation\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Urban Development\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Water and Energy\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Women\xe2\x80\x99s Affairs\n Following the attacks on the Peace Jirga in June, President Karzai accepted\nthe resignations of the Minister of Interior and the director for National\nSecurity.188 A new Minister of Interior was appointed in time to organize security\nfor the Kabul Conference on July 20, 2010.189\n\nNational Assembly\nThe members of the Wolesi Jirga are chosen by popular election. Two-thirds of The Afghan National Assembly has two houses:\nthe Meshrano Jirga members are chosen by provincial councils, and one-third \xe2\x80\xa2 the Meshrano Jirga, also known as the\n House of Elders or Upper House\nare chosen by the Afghan president. Therefore, the Meshrano Jirga is often\nmore likely to support the president\xe2\x80\x99s legislative goals, according to a June \xe2\x80\xa2 the Wolesi Jirga, also known as the House\n of the People or Lower House\nCongressional Research Service report.190\n This quarter, DoS reported that the strength of the National Assembly has Source: CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,\ngrown in relation to the power of the Afghan president.191 For example, the and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 13.\n\nWolesi Jirga rejected the president\xe2\x80\x99s change to the Electoral Law last quarter,\nhighlighting its separation from the president\xe2\x80\x99s office. (The Meshrano Jirga\nupheld the altered law when it did not schedule a vote on the issue.)192\n Despite its increased strength, DoS reported that the National Assembly contin-\nues to suffer from weak capacity. Both houses have difficulty maintaining a quorum\nand are slow to pass legislation. DoS also reported that because the National\nAssembly lacks organized political parties, it struggles to organize agendas.193\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 77\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nAfghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program\nThe United States supports the National Assembly through the Afghanistan\nParliamentary Assistance Program (APAP), implemented by the State University\nof New York Research Foundation under a contract with USAID.194 According to\nUSAID, the program\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to improve the National Assembly\xe2\x80\x99s institutional,\ntechnical, and political capacity.195 The program assists the National Assembly in\ncreating policy documents to enhance capacity. For instance, the APAP is helping\nNational Assembly staff amend the Parliamentary Code of Conduct, with several\nobjectives:196\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to create standard measures of behavior to assess the attitudes and\n behaviors of National Assembly members\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to present National Assembly members with materials that provide\n guidelines for the assessment of the performance of assigned duties\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to establish standard reactions to unacceptable behavior\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to assure the public that their representatives are acting in a professional\n manner\n The APAP also is assisting the National Assembly in developing a Parliamentary\nOversight Strategy, which is intended to guide Assembly staff in conducting over-\nsight. In addition, the program provides the National Assembly with budgetary\nguidance, technical assistance, and public information support, including radio\nbroadcasts, Web site development, and support on gender-related issues.197\n\nU.S. Support for GIRoA Capacity Development\nIn 2010, the United States has increased coordination with Afghan institutions\nand resources, in order to build the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to meet the needs of the\nAfghan people.198 Programs such as the Performance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund and\nthe Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program work to build that capacity.199\n\nPerformance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund\nAs described in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April quarterly report, the Performance-Based\nGovernors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund works to enhance the power of provincial governments by\nproviding participating governors with funding for their operating budgets.\nAccording to USAID, the funds are not transferred directly to governors. Instead,\nthe governors provide budgets to direct where the money should go, and\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s implementing partner distributes the funds to the appropriate party.200\n With this funding, governors can provide needed public services, which will\nstrengthen their relationships with residents of the provinces.201 This quarter,\nUSAID reported that all 34 provincial governors received funding from the\nPerformance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund. Since the first disbursement in March\n2010, provincial governors have spent approximately $1.71 million of the avail-\nable funds of $2.55 million\xe2\x80\x94about 67%.202\n\n\n\n\n 78 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nAfghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program\nThe Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program aims to build the capacity of\nmunicipalities throughout the country, according to USAID. Within these cities,\nthe program focuses on developing services, including water and power manage-\nment, sanitation, safe roads, and youth activities.203\n USAID reported that on June 10, 2010, new contracts for the program were\nsigned in ISAF Regional Command (RC) South and RC East. As of June 30, USAID\nreported that the RCs are working with the Afghan Independent Directorate of\nLocal Governance to determine which municipalities to target and when to begin\nthe program.204\n As of June 30, 2010, municipality programming in RC North and RC West was in\nprocurement. According to USAID, the new Municipal Strengthening Program is\ncommitted to work in 33 provincial capitals. Kabul is the only exception: it will have\nits own municipal program, which was also in procurement as of June 30.205\n The original contract for the Municipal Strengthening Program has expired.206\nUSAID reported that all programming for the 12 municipalities in that program\nwill cease on August 31, 2010. The original program was active only in cities in\nRC South and RC East.207\n\nJUDICIAL REFORM AND RULE OF LAW\nThe Afghan justice system includes the Afghan corrections system and the As a result of illiteracy and isolation, many\ncourt system, both of which receive support from international donors, includ- Afghans do not understand the legal rights\ning the United States. In his joint statement with President Obama, President afforded to them under their Constitution.\nKarzai underscored the importance of improving formal justice in Afghanistan. Source: INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n\nHe pledged to increase the accessibility and capacity of the justice system, as a\nmeans of combating corruption and strengthening the GIRoA.208\n In a report issued this quarter, DoS noted that the United States has also\nincreased support for the informal justice sector in 2010.209 The IWA survey\n Shura: consultative council of elders\nreport released this quarter showed that Afghans have limited trust in the formal\n in a community\njustice system. According to the survey report, corruption prevented 50% of\n Mullah: religious leader educated in\nAfghan households from resolving legal issues within the formal justice system.\n theology and Islamic law\nAs a consequence, these households turned to informal channels, including local\nshuras and mullahs.210\n Source: IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of\n Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, p. 12.\nCourt System\nThe Afghan court system differs greatly from the U.S. system, according to INL,\nin that it is based on civil law instead of common law. The Afghan Constitution,\nwhich is based on religious doctrine, mandates that no secular law can contra-\ndict Islamic law. INL reported that the Afghan justice system generally prioritizes\ncompensating victims rather than punishing offenders.211\n Unlike the United States which has state and federal courts, Afghanistan has\nonly a national court system. It has three levels: primary courts, appellate courts,\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 79\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n Members of the Supreme Court gather in June at the Jalalabad Court House for continuing\n legal education. Such education helps judges and lawyers keep up to date on the latest\n changes to Afghan law. (U.S. Army photo, SPC Richard Daniels, Jr.)\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cFighting corruption and the Supreme Court. According to INL, the Supreme Court is the head of the\n court system; however, the term \xe2\x80\x9cSupreme Court\xe2\x80\x9d can have multiple meanings\n and supporting the rule in Afghanistan:212\n of law in Afghanistan \xe2\x80\xa2 Because Afghanistan has only a national system, all judges within the Afghan\n are top priorities for this court system work for the Chief Justice and can therefore be considered\n Administration, and we members of the Supreme Court. By this definition, which DoS used in its\n \xe2\x80\x9c2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices,\xe2\x80\x9d there are 1,531 Supreme\n will continue to assist Court judges, as of June 30, 2010.\n the Afghan government \xe2\x80\xa2 Because either party involved in a court case can appeal, the Supreme Court\n in creating and sustain- employs enough judges to process the high volume of appeals within the\n ing the effective criminal system. By this definition, which DoS used in its 2009 edition of the human\n rights report, there are 77 Supreme Court judges, including 7 women.\n justice system to which\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s high-level Supreme Court hears cases and acts as an adminis-\n the Afghan people are trative authority for all the judges in the country. By this definition, there are\n entitled.\xe2\x80\x9d 9 Supreme Court judges.\n \xe2\x80\x94U.S. Attorney General Compared with other countries that have systems based in civil law,\n Eric Holder Afghanistan is unique in that it has no investigative judges. Instead, it has investi-\nSource: U.S. Embassy Kabul, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels\n gative prosecutors who have strong subpoena power, without court oversight. As\nto Afghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d\n6/30/2010.\n of June 30, 2010, there were 2,421 prosecutors in the court system, an increase\n of approximately 336 prosecutors from 2009. There were also approximately 970\n defense attorneys in Afghanistan, an increase of about one-third from 2009.213\n\n\n\n\n 80 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nCriminal Procedure Code\nAccording to INL, no policies have been instituted to improve the criminal\nprocedure code (CPC) in 2010. Although it was scheduled for revision in 2009,\nthe release of the updated CPC has been delayed so that international commu-\nnity experts can review and comment on the draft. INL reported that the release\nwas also delayed because anti-corruption laws became a higher priority. There\nis no indication of when the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) will update the revision\nschedule; however, the minister is currently reviewing the CPC draft.214\n\nU.S. Justice Sector Support Program\nEstablished in 2005, the JSSP has focused on developing and strengthening the The U.S. Corrections System Support\ncapacity of the institutions in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s criminal justice system. The program Program (CSSP) is the primary U.S. program\nalso supports coordination between defense lawyers and others in the criminal supporting the Afghan corrections system.\njustice system.215 Managed by INL, the CSSP works directly\n As of June 30, 2010, the JSSP had 77 lawyers working in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x9438 Afghans with the Afghan Central Prison Directorate\n (CPD) to improve living and working stan-\nand 39 Americans. According to INL, which funds the program, the JSSP received a\n dards in the prison system.\nnew task order this quarter. With the funding from the task order, INL plans to add\nan additional 81 lawyers\xe2\x80\x9455 Afghans and 26 Americans\xe2\x80\x94by fall 2010.216 Source: INL, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Program Overview: CSSP,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n online 7/7/2010.\n In June 2010, the JSSP hosted a provincial justice conference in Logar, one in a\nseries of conferences at which high-level figures from the Kabul justice system work\nwith provincial justice leaders to identify and prioritize the needs of the province\xe2\x80\x99s\njustice system.217 Approximately 75 members of the justice system attended the\nLogar conference.218 INL reported that it conducts provincial justice conferences in\nthose provinces where it does not have a permanent presence.219\n\nCorrections System and Prison Reform\nIn his joint statement with President Karzai, President Obama reaffirmed the\nU.S. commitment to begin transitioning U.S.-managed Afghan detention centers\nto GIRoA control. The first transfer, in Parwan, is set for January 2011. According\nto the joint statement, successful transition to Afghan control would be an impor-\ntant milestone in meeting President Karzai\xe2\x80\x99s inaugural commitment to assume\ncomplete responsibility for detention centers.220\n As of June 30, 2010, there were a total of 17,169 prisoners in Afghanistan,\nincluding 15,902 individuals in provincial prisons (12,263 convicted prisoners and\n3,639 detainees), and 1,267 detainees in district detention centers.221 According to\nINL, the Afghan court system has no parole provisions; as a result, prison popula-\ntions have increased exponentially.222\n The corrections system in Afghanistan consists of two types of facilities:\ndetention centers and prisons. Ministry of Interior (MoI) detention centers are\nmanaged by the Afghan National Police. After their arrest, alleged criminals are\nfirst imprisoned in MoI detention centers. The detainees are then transferred to\nMoJ detention centers while awaiting trial. If convicted, detainees are then trans-\nferred to a provincial prison for long-term incarceration; prison facilities are also\nmanaged by the MoJ.223\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 81\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n Some buildings being used to detain or imprison Afghans were not designed\n as prisons, according to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission\n (AIHRC). It found that in seven provinces, no prisons or detention centers had\n been constructed at all; instead, provincial governments had rented buildings to\n use in this capacity. The General Department of Prisons and Detention Centers\n plans to build several new prisons and centers every year, in an attempt to reduce\n the number of ordinary buildings being used for this purpose.224\n\n Support for the Corrections System\n In addition to U.S. support through the U.S. Corrections System Support\n Program (CSSP), international support for the Afghan corrections system is\n provided by the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, the European Union, the UN, and\n the International Committee of the Red Cross.225 Specific international support\n efforts are highlighted in this section.\n According to INL, the United Kingdom trains detention center officers at the\n facilities of the National Directorate of Security.226 In 2008, it worked with the\n CPD in Helmand to regain control of Lashkar Gah prison from insurgent pris-\n oners. The United Kingdom also funded the renovation of Lashkar Gah prison,\nAfghan women play volleyball in a Herat\ncorrectional facility, which has the capac-\n which was completed in October 2009.227\nity to hold up to 110 detainees and their Canada provided assistance by renovating Kandahar\xe2\x80\x99s Sarposa prison and\nchildren. (UNAMA photo) providing training and mentoring opportunities for the prison staff. In addition,\n Canada refurbished the CPD Kabul Headquarters.228\n Italy provided support for the Afghan corrections system by funding the\n construction of the new women\xe2\x80\x99s prison in Herat and cell blocks in the Gardez\n prison. Italy also funded the construction of the Juvenile Rehabilitation Center\n and Female Prison and Detention Center in Kabul.229\nFIGURE 3.27\n\n CONVICTS IN PROVINCIAL PRISONS, Provincial Prisons\n AS OF JUNE 30, 2010 Of the 12,263 convicts in provincial prisons, 11,846 are men, and 417 are women.\n As of July 10, 2010, the provincial prisons in Kabul and Herat housed the highest\n populations of convicts, as indicated in Figure 3.27.230\n This quarter, the CSSP instructed and assisted Afghan records staff in reor-\n ganizing Pol-i-Charkhi and Kabul Female Detention Facility prisoner files. Prior\n to the reorganization, prisoner files were stored at sites throughout the facili-\n ties, with no standard file maintenance protocol. Now all files at Pol-i-Charkhi\n are centrally located, which makes it possible for trained staff to maintain files\n 0\xe2\x80\x9320\n 30\xe2\x80\x9399\n properly. This ensures that the prison has current commitment orders, confirms\n 100\xe2\x80\x93399 release dates, and enables prisons to transfer files to other facilities when they\n 400\xe2\x80\x93999\n transfer prisoners.231 For information about the treatment of prisoners in Afghan\n 1,000+\n prisons and detention centers, see the \xe2\x80\x9cHuman Rights\xe2\x80\x9d discussion in this section\n of the report.\nSource: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 82 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.28\n\n\nDistrict Detention Centers DETAINEES IN DISTRICT DETENTION\nEach Afghan district is required by law to have a police detention center, managed CENTERS, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010\nby the Afghan National Police under the MoI. According to INL, detainees are to\nremain in police detention centers for no longer than 72 hours while the police\ninvestigate the alleged crimes. If the allegation is sustained, detainee cases are\nturned over to the Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office for prosecution, and the detainees are\ntransferred to a MoJ district detention center.232\n By Afghan law, detainees are to remain in MoJ district detention centers for\nonly 15 days, though 15 additional days can be requested. During that period, the\nAttorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office investigates the case, according to INL.233 0\n U.S. support for improving the prison system has focused on MoJ facilities 1\xe2\x80\x9320\n 21\xe2\x80\x9360\nbecause they house most of the prisoners and hold people longer than the MoI\xe2\x80\x99s\n 61\xe2\x80\x93260\npolice detention centers. This quarter, INL reported that before June 2010, no No Detention\nsingle organization had worked with the police to improve detention centers. Over Centers\n\nthe next year, INL plans to assess the conditions of police detention centers.234\n Notes: Kabul does not have district detention centers; it has\n Figure 3.28 shows the distribution of detainees in district detention centers gender-specific provincial detention centers. As of 7/10/2010,\n the Kabul Female Prison and Detention Center held 143\nthroughout the country. If no detention centers are available (as is the case in 7 of women\xe2\x80\x94104 convicts and 39 detainees. The Kabul\n Detention Center held 409 men, all detainees. An additional\nthe 34 provinces), detainees are typically held in provincial prisons with convicted 55 male detainees were being held at the Counter-Narcotics\ncriminals.235 Figure 3.29 shows the proportions of detainees relative to convicts in Justice Center.\n Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\nthe provinces that hold the highest numbers of detainees in prisons.\n\n FIGURE 3.29\nHUMAN RIGHTS\nAfghanistan continues to face human rights challenges. In addition to dealing INMATES IN SELECT PROVINCIAL PRISONS,\nwith issues related to displacement, Afghans struggle with issues of gender AS OF JUNE 30, 2010 (PERCENT)\nequity and religious freedom.236 The GIRoA also continues to have difficulty\nmeeting international standards in the treatment of prisoners.237 This section\nprovides an overview of the status of human rights issues in Afghanistan. Herat 23% 77%\n\n Kabul 9% 91%\nTreatment of Prisoners in the Corrections System\n Kandahar 40% 60%\nThis quarter, INL reported that conditions in Afghan prisons were improv-\ning; however, there were still many reports of poor conditions. For instance, Ghazni 75% 25%\nin a May 2010 report, DoS stated that the Afghan corrections system was still\n Nangarhar 18% 82%\nholding prisoners past the expiration of their sentences. The United States is\nworking with the AIHRC to identify and release these prisoners.238 Uruzgan 84% 16%\n In a June 2010 report, the AIHRC noted that Afghan prison and deten-\n Takhar 31% 69%\ntion center buildings do not meet the standards required by the European\nCommittee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Farah 31% 69%\nor Punishment, which sets international standards for prison conditions. The Helmand 19% 81%\nCommittee stated that a cell measuring 5.5 m2 is barely acceptable for short-\nterm detention of one person\xe2\x80\x94and inadequate for long-term incarceration.239 Laghman 42% 58%\n\n The Afghan Law of Prisons and Detention Centers does not mandate a 0 20 40 60 80 100\nspecific amount of space for each person, despite the suggestions of the\nCommittee. The law stipulates only that the MoJ take measures to ensure that Detainees Convicts\ndetainees and convicts have \xe2\x80\x9cenough\xe2\x80\x9d space.240 The AIHRC found that the Source: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 83\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n space available was insufficient for the number of detainees and convicts in\n the system.241 As shown in Figure 3.30, many provincial prisons fail to meet this\n minimal standard. In fact, seven of the provincial prisons depicted have five or\n more people crowded into the recommended space for one inmate.\n As a result of the overcrowding, many facilities cannot segregate convicted\n criminals from detainees. In 24 of the 34 provinces, younger detainees and\n prisoners (ages 18 to 25) are not separated from older convicts.242 Segregation of\n men from women is fairly consistent throughout the provinces, according to the\n AIHRC. Where women do not have separate facilities, they are held separately\n from men. In Kabul prisons, however, the AIHRC reported that male guards are\n sometimes used to monitor female inmates.243\n As of May 2010, the United States was in the planning stages of implementing\n a program of small grants to support women and children in prisons. The grants\n are expected to be used to implement a comprehensive support plan for these\n inmates. The plan will include training and support for corrections officers (male\n and female) who deal with female inmates and their children.244\n The AIHRC was unable to conduct a systematic review of all Afghan prisons\n and detention centers because of technical and logistic difficulties, and problems\n accessing the centers. In each review, the AIHRC found that information was\n missing, particularly in district detention centers.245\n\n\nFIGURE 3.31 Refugees and Returnees\n At the July 20 Kabul Conference, President Karzai urged the GIRoA and the\nAFGHAN RETURNEES, 2010 international community to assist Afghan refugees in their \xe2\x80\x9cvoluntary, safe, and\n gradual return.\xe2\x80\x9d This quarter, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)\n UZBEKISTAN noted that since the start of 2010, it had helped approximately 85,040 Afghans\n TAJIKISTAN return home.246 Figure 3.31 shows the number of returnees from neighbor-\n TURKMENISTAN\n ing countries. Interviews with returnees revealed that many were harassed by\n IRAN\n authorities in Iran and Pakistan, and economic conditions in both countries had\n 81,044 worsened.247\n from Pakistan\n Although many Afghan refugees have returned, the UNHCR estimated that\n 3,964 PAKISTAN approximately 1.7 million still resided in Pakistan, and more than 1.0 million in\n from Iran Iran, as of July 20, 2010. Approximately 97% of refugees in Iran reside in urban\n or semi-urban settlements. The number of refugees strains local infrastructure,\n including health care and education systems.248 According to DoS, UNHCR\n programs for 2010 will work to improve water and shelter services for returnees.\nNote: The UNHCR reported an additional 32 returnees from\nthe Russian Federation and India.\n Repatriation plans focus on community-based initiatives that promote coop-\nSource: UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cVoluntary Return to Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010. eration between communities and new returnees, and mitigate conflict over\n resources.249\n For FY 2010, the United States has pledged $37.5 million to support UNHCR\n repatriation programming and other nongovernmental organization aid for\n returnees. The United States provides additional support for Afghan refugees\n and returnees through other international organizations, such as the World Food\n Program. The United States also provides support for Afghan returnees through\n programs in Afghanistan.250\n\n\n\n 84 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.30\n\n\nOVERCROWDING IN SELECTED PROVINCIAL PRISONS, 2010:\nNumber of Inmates per 5.5m2 of Space\n\n FARYAB 4.6 JOWZJAN 3.4 BALKH 11.0 SAMANGAN 3.4 KUNDUZ 5.5 BAGHLAN 5.5 TAKHAR 7.7 BADAKHSHAN 8.3\n\n\n\n\n JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN\n BALKH TAKHAR\n\n\n SAMANGAN INTERNATIONAL\n FARYAB BAGHLAN STANDARD\n SAR-E PUL 5.5 m2\n PANJSHIR NURISTAN\n BADGHIS\n PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR\n BAMYAN LAGHMAN\n KABUL\n WARDAK\n NANGARHAR Minimum acceptable\n HERAT\n GHOR LOGAR one-person space\n DAYKUNDI PAKTIYA\n GHAZNI KHOWST\n\n\n URUZGAN\n FARAH\n PAKTIKA\n ZABUL\n\n\n\n\n NIMROZ\n HELMAND\n KANDAHAR\n\n\n\n\n NIMROZ 4.6 GHOR 5.5 KANDAHAR 2.1 DAYKUNDI 4.6 BAMYAN 5.5 KHOWST 4.6 NANGARHAR 4.8\n\nNotes: Numbers are averages. Minimum acceptable one-person space (5.5 m2) determined by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.\nSource: AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, pp. 7\xe2\x80\x938.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 85\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nMINORITY VOICES IN must accept the entire Constitution, particularly\n protections for human rights and women\xe2\x80\x99s equality.\nAFGHANISTAN As Holbrooke stated, \xe2\x80\x9cOur position on this last point\n is unambiguous. Afghan-led peace efforts must not be\n a vehicle for reversing the progress of Afghan women\n and girls since 2001.\xe2\x80\x9d254\nMany minorities in Afghanistan continue to experience\n From 2003 to 2010, the Congress earmarked\npersecution within their own country. This highlight\n $627 million for USAID and DoS programs to sup-\npresents a glimpse of the state of gender equity and\n port Afghan women and girls. According to DoS,\nreligious freedom in Afghanistan for this quarter. It also\n these funds were set aside in recognition of the\nexamines political representation of these groups.\n concern that without greater attention to gender\n issues, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s ability to achieve broad eco-\nGENDER EQUITY nomic growth and democratic development would be\nAccording to DoS, the lives of Afghan women are\n \xe2\x80\x9csharply reduced.\xe2\x80\x9d In 2010, the Congress provided an\nimproving in some areas: girls have more educational\n additional $175 million for women and girls.255\nopportunities, and more health care facilities employ\n This quarter, SIGAR released an audit on the\nfemale health care workers to interact with women.\n earmarked funds which found that DoS and USAID\nDoS nonetheless emphasized that much work\n did not coordinate their reports on their use of\nremains to be done to help women attain political,\n funds. SIGAR determined that DoS and USAID took\neconomic, and social empowerment.251 U.S. pro-\n action to coordinate gender-related programming in\ngramming empowers women across sectors, which\n Afghanistan; however, DoS did not develop guidelines\nincludes expanding their access in key areas:252\n or rationales for determining and reporting earmark\n\xef\x81\xae economic opportunities (particularly in the\n attributions. In addition, DoS and USAID did not\n agriculture sector)\n connect U.S.-funded programs with Afghan goals\n\xef\x81\xae justice services\n and benchmarks in the National Action Plan for the\n\xef\x81\xae health services and education\n Women of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94a crucial linkage in deter-\n\xef\x81\xae political participation opportunities\n mining how U.S. funding addresses the documented\n The United States also manages a program of needs of Afghan women and girls.256\nsmall grants aimed at strengthening women\xe2\x80\x99s roles\nin civil society. As of May 2010, these grants were RELIGIOUS FREEDOM\nsupporting women\xe2\x80\x99s groups that advocate passing Approximately 99% of Afghans consider themselves\nand enforcing women\xe2\x80\x99s rights legislation, including Muslim\xe2\x80\x9480% Sunni and 19% Shiite. The remaining\nthe Elimination of Violence Against Women Act. The 1% includes 500 to 8,000 Christians, approximately\ngrants will also focus on empowering women within 3,000 Sikhs and Hindus, some 400 Baha\xe2\x80\x99is, and\nthe justice system by providing local defense attor- 1 who identifies himself as Jewish. Afghanistan\nneys, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers with has no Christian or Jewish schools.257 According to\nspecialized training about violence against women. DoS, religious freedom remains a struggle for non-\nThe United States is also funding women\xe2\x80\x99s shelters in Muslims, who continue to face discrimination and\nKabul, Faryab, and Badghis.253 persecution.258\n As discussed at the beginning of this section, the This quarter, DoS reported that two Afghan citizens\nGIRoA and the international community are empha- were arrested on charges of proselytizing even though\nsizing reintegration in 2010. To meet reintegration the Afghan Criminal Code does not define religious\nrequirements, former insurgents must accept the conversion as a crime, and the Afghan Constitution\nAfghan Constitution. In a statement this quarter, forbids the punishment of a citizen for crimes that are\nAmbassador Holbrooke emphasized that insurgents not defined in the criminal code. However, Article One\n\n\n\n 86 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.5\n\n\nIEC ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE MINORITY AND FEMALE NOMINEES, 2010\nAssisting Organization Activity\nMinistry of Women\xe2\x80\x99s Affairs The IEC held several high\xe2\x80\x90level meetings and phone conferences with the ministry to address the low numbers\n of female candidates. The ministry also drew on its provincial networks to identify and reach out to potential\n women applicants.\nSupreme Council of Ulema, Shuras, The IEC met with representatives of these organizations, who sent out nomination messages to their local\nand the Ministry of Hajj branches in provinces with low numbers of candidates.\nMinistry of Culture and Information The IEC communicated daily with ministry officials and members in provincial offices. The IEC also contacted the\n Afghan Women\xe2\x80\x99s Network and civil society groups to reach potential women applicants through their local networks.\nKuchi Shura The IEC had several meetings with Kuchi Shura representatives to address the low numbers of Kuchi candidates.\n The representatives used provincial Shuras to reach out to Kuchi applicants and to motivate the Shuras to nominate\n candidates. In addition, the IEC liaised with current Kuchi members of the National Assembly to facilitate higher\n female participation within the Kuchi constituency.\nYouth Association of Afghanistan The IEC coordinated closely with this association, which is believed to have one of the strongest grassroots\n support bases in the country. Its support resulted in several women applicants in provinces where women were\n poorly represented.\nMedia Organizations Two radio and two television announcements were produced and broadcast daily through four television and\n six radio channels from April 13 to May 4, 2010.\nSource: IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination: Female Candidates,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/17/2010.\n\n\n\nof the Penal Code states that Hudud crimes\xe2\x80\x94serious were particularly under-represented in the central\ncrimes against Islamic penal codes\xe2\x80\x94are to be pun- highlands, as well as in the south and southeast. In\nished in accordance with religious law. DoS reported response, the IEC launched a campaign to encourage\nthat under some interpretations of this religious law, participation. Four factsheets with general informa-\napostasy is punishable by death.259 tion about the Wolesi Jirga were delivered to all IEC\n In addition, the Ministry of the Economy (which reg- provincial offices for distribution in provincial capitals\nulates nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan) and nearby districts.262 Additional programming devel-\nsuspended two Christian organizations after an oped in association with other Afghan organizations is\nAfghan media outlet accused them of proselytizing. listed in Table 3.5.\nIf the ongoing investigation finds these organizations According to DoS, U.S. support for the National\nguilty, they will be referred to law enforcement agen- Assembly includes specific programming for minor-\ncies. The organizations have denied any wrongdoing, ity and underprivileged representatives, particularly\nand DoS reported that the organizations are cooperat- women and the Kuchi minority group. U.S. program-\ning with the GIRoA.260 ming aims to include these groups in all development\n In the past year, the GIRoA has done little to events organized by the National Assembly. In May\nimprove religious freedom, according to DoS. DoS 2010, a DoS report stated that women are consis-\nattributed the government\xe2\x80\x99s inaction to the residual tently demonstrating increased participation in the\neffects of Soviet occupation, civil strife, Taliban rule, National Assembly.263\nsuspicion of outsiders and foreigners, and weak According to the IWA survey released this quarter,\ndemocratic institutions.261 31% of Afghans relied on a shared ethnic heritage to\n build relationships with corrupt government officials\nPOLITICAL REPRESENTATION in 2009\xe2\x80\x94an increase from the 14% of Afghans who\nAt the start of the nomination process for the 2010 used this tactic in 2007. According to the survey, 46%\nelections, minority and female participation was of civil servant respondents believed that ethnic favor-\nlower than the IEC had anticipated. These groups itism was prevalent in corruption exchanges.264\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 87\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 88 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n This quarter, Afghanistan continued to enjoy mostly favorable macroeconomic\n conditions, including solid growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and a mild\n rate of inflation.265 These conditions follow a record-setting year (2009/10) in\n which the economy (excluding opium) grew by an estimated 22.5%, according\n to the most recently updated statistics from the International Monetary Fund\n (IMF).266 The World Bank noted that this is the highest annual rate of growth\n since reconstruction began; last year\xe2\x80\x99s record agricultural production was a\n major driver of this growth.267\n Growth in the overall economy, however, remains unbalanced. World Bank Unbalanced growth: The World Bank reported\n analyses show that legal exports remain low compared with imports and that donor assistance currently accounts for\n assistance from international donors.268 In fact, data from the Afghan Central approximately 45% of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s GDP, and\n Statistics Office for the first three quarters of 2009/10 suggests that the value of legal exports account for 5%.\n total exports (including dried fruit and carpets) may have fallen by as much as\n Source: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update\n 40% from the previous year.269 Cash inflows from international donors increased 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010, p. 57.\n\n three times as much as the decline in exports.270\n\n\n\n\n An Afghan salesman displays his inventory of Afghan carpets. Connecting domestic industries\n with international markets is a key goal of the U.S. stabilization strategy in Afghanistan.\n (ISAF \xe2\x80\x9cWhy Afghanistan Matters\xe2\x80\x9d photo contest, submitted by Alida Bata)\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 89\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n At the July 20 Kabul Conference, the GIRoA provided a detailed plan of its\npriorities for accelerating economic growth and development over the next three\nyears. The plan recognized the crucial role that Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral and hydro-\ncarbon resources could play as an engine of growth and revenue generation.\nAs part of the Kabul Process, the GIRoA also acknowledged the importance of\nremoving constraints to private-sector investment in order to stimulate growth.\nThe GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s plan emphasized a number of priorities, including the following:271\n\xe2\x80\xa2 large-scale environmentally friendly infrastructure projects to develop\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral resources\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a national energy supply program to meet increasing demand for domestic\n and imported energy\n\xe2\x80\xa2 large-scale irrigation projects, as well as water management, land manage-\n ment, and rural energy development projects\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a nationwide road-construction and maintenance program to better connect\n farmers with markets\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a program to enhance the employability of Afghan youth and young adults\n by identifying skills in demand in the market and partnering with the private\n sector to offer literacy, technical, and vocational education\n\nLEADING INDICATORS\nThis section provides details on the growth, inflation, and exchange rate trends\nin Afghanistan this quarter.\n\nGDP/Economic Growth\nThe World Bank has estimated that Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s GDP growth will continue to be\npositive for the current solar year (March 20, 2010\xe2\x80\x93March 21, 2011); it is averag-\ning about 8% annually.272 On a note of concern, however, the World Bank estimated\nthat Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s industrial growth last year lagged behind previous years. This\nwas due primarily to relatively lower growth rates in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s manufacturing\nand construction sectors.273 The decline in manufacturing and construction growth\nrates coincided with the government\xe2\x80\x99s low rate of spending of its core develop-\nment budget, which reached only 40% in 2009/10.274 It also coincided with last year\xe2\x80\x99s\ndecline in foreign direct investment in Afghanistan. Foreign direct investment in\nAfghanistan fell by 40% last year after several years of modest growth, according to\nthe Economist Intelligence Unit.275 On a positive note, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mining sector\ngrew by 30% in the last two years and is expected to continue to grow this year.276\n In a reform-related development this quarter, the IMF and the GIRoA reached\nan agreement on a three-month extension (until September 25, 2010) of the\nThree-Year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility.277 This IMF pro-\ngram provides a $120 million low-cost loan to Afghanistan on the condition that\nkey economic and structural reforms are implemented.278 A major long-term\nobjective of this loan program is to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to\ncollect higher domestic revenues so it can reduce its dependence on foreign aid,\naccording to the IMF.279\n\n\n\n\n 90 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n In the letter requesting the loan extension, the officials stated that the GIRoA On July 22, 2010, the U.S. government\n expected to complete most of the structural reforms required under the IMF signed an agreement cancelling 100% of\n program by mid-July 2010, with two exceptions: Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s existing debt ($180 million)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the comprehensive financial review of the state-owned fuel company with the United States. The U.S. Ambassador\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the implementation of a new business model for border controls to Afghanistan noted that debt relief is\n critical because it allows the GIRoA to\n The officials noted that implementation of these reforms has been delayed by\n spend more of its resources on programs\n the lag in appointments, technical difficulties, and the complexity of the issues\n to help the Afghan people.\n involved. The letter committed the GIRoA to include these two key reforms in\n the arrangement negotiated with the IMF.280 Source: DoS/U.S. Embassy Kabul, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cUnited\n States, Afghanistan Sign Debt Relief Agreement,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/22/2010.\n\n\n Inflation\n In April 2010, the World Bank reported that when final data is available, it will\n likely show that Afghanistan experienced disinflation of approximately -12% last\n year.281 This disinflation was due primarily to falling food prices, which account\n for 28% of the goods and services that constitute the Consumer Price Index.282\n The World Bank reported that disinflation appeared to have ended in December\n 2009 and that food prices were rebounding.283 World Bank analysts predicted that\n inflation will average a relatively modest 5% in 2010/11.284\n\n Exchange Rate\n According to data provided to the World Bank by the Da Afghanistan Bank, the\n Afghani appreciated about 3% (in nominal terms) against the U.S. dollar in 2009\n before leveling off late in the year.285 The World Bank reported that the Afghani\n also appreciated last year against the currencies of other major trading part-\n ners and appears to be valued fairly.286 That development is significant because\n an overvalued currency can negatively impact domestic industries by making\n Hawala: Afghanistan has an extensive,\n exports more expensive and encouraging higher levels of imports, according to\n informal financial system known as\n the Economist Intelligence Unit.287\n Hawala, which is based on a network\n of money brokers called Hawaladars.\n BANKING For centuries, Hawala practitioners have\n The Afghan banking sector is growing and deposits continue to outpace loans, provided a wide range of financial services\n according to the World Bank. Official GIRoA statistics indicate low vulnerability including sending remittances abroad,\n in the sector as non-performing loans continued to decline from March 2006 to money exchanges, and micro-finance.\n December 2009. In April 2010, however, World Bank analysts urged caution in Whereas banking transactions leave a\n using official statistics to evaluate the health of Afghan banks because of con- paper trail, Hawala transactions can be\n placed anonymously without revealing\n cerns about loan-classification standards, the lack of supervisory capacity, and a\n the identity of the remitter or the source\n general lack of transparency.288\n of the funds, according to a 2003 World\n This quarter, in response to concerns about large amounts of cash being Bank study.\n moved out of the country, the Minister of Finance publicly called for an inter-\n national investigation into the Hawala banking system.289 Previously, in April\n 2010, DoD reported to the Congress that a joint U.S.-Afghan team raided seven Sources: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul:\n Hawalas that were actively involved in transferring money to insurgents.290 As A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2003, pp.\n 1\xe2\x80\x938; DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in\n a result of these raids, the report noted that the United States identified several Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 21.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 91\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\nmoney laundering networks with direct links to insurgent groups, narcotics traf-\nfickers, and corrupt government officials. In a related effort, three branches of a\nKabul-based money exchange were searched in January 2010.291\n\nFISCAL SUSTAINABILITY\nImproving the fiscal sustainability of the GIRoA is a key economic development\ngoal of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy and the\nKabul Conference participants.292\n\nRevenue Collection\nSince 2006, the GIRoA has made progress in increasing the amount of revenue it\ncollects domestically. Figure 3.32 provides a preliminary, unofficial estimate of\nGIRoA revenue collection from 2006/07 to 2009/10, in Afghanis and dollars.\n This quarter, the World Bank and the U.K. Department for International\nDevelopment released a 2010 public expenditure review of the GIRoA. They\nfound that although the GIRoA has increased revenue collection, progress\ntoward fiscal sustainability remains a challenge.293\n The GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s revenue collection in 2009/10 surged by 53% over the previous\nyear, according to the World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s most recent Southeast Asia economic\nupdate.294 At the same time, however, the World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s public expenditure review\nfound that public expenditures\xe2\x80\x94especially for the security forces\xe2\x80\x94continued\n\n\nFIGURE 3.32\n\nESTIMATED DOMESTIC REVENUE COLLECTION, 2006/07\xe2\x80\x932009/10 (Af BILLIONS, $ BILLIONS)\n\n Af 63.3a\n ($1.41)\n\n 60\n\n\n 50 Af 41.4\n ($0.91)\n 40 Af 33.4\n Af 28.8 ($0.73)\n ($0.62)\n 30\n\n\n 20\n\n\n 10\n\n 0\n 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10\n\nNotes: Figures are preliminary estimates. Af 45 = $1.\na. Projected figure, as of 4/10/2010.\nSources: Ministry of Finance; Da Afghanistan Bank.\n\n\n\n\n 92 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n TABLE 3.6\n\n\n PROJECTED ANSF EXPENDITURES, 2008/09\xe2\x80\x932023/24\n 2008/09a 2013/14 2018/19 2023/24\n Expenditures by Security Force ($ BILLIONS)\n ANAb $3.2 $3.8 $5.0 $6.5\n c $1.5 $1.7 $2.1 $2.7\n ANP\n Total $4.7 $5.5 $7.1 $9.2\n\n Expenditures Relative to Revenues (PERCENT)\n ANSF Expenditures as a Share of Projected\n GIRoA Domestic Revenues 449% 270% 195% 154%\n Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Includes operating and investment expenditures.\n a. Estimated actual.\n b. World Bank Manpower Level Assumptions: ANA strength increases to 240,000 by 2012/13; ANP strength increases to 160,000\n by 2013/14. These differ from the troop levels agreed to at the January 2010 London Conference, which were 171,600 for the ANA\n and 134,000 for the ANP by October 2011.\n c. Macroeconomic assumptions: Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s long-term GDP growth rate averages 6% annually; inflation decreases to 3% in 2012/13\n and beyond; GIRoA domestic revenue rises to 13% of GDP by 2028/29.\n Sources: World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Security Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d pp. 23\xe2\x80\x9324; DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress\n Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, pp. 104, 115.\n\n\n\n\n to rise and outpace revenues.295 Table 3.6 shows World Bank projections of ANA The World Bank defines fiscal sustainability\n and ANP expenditures (in billions of dollars and as a percentage of domestic in Afghanistan as the point at which the\n revenues) for 2008/09 through 2023/24. According to these projections, annual GIRoA collects enough revenue to cover its\n spending on security forces alone will likely exceed total domestic revenue col- operating expenses. From 2003/04 through\n lection for the foreseeable future.296 The World Bank concluded that Afghanistan 2008/09, wages and salaries of govern-\n ment employees consumed 66% of the\n will require sustained external support for some time if it is to maintain the ANA\n GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s operating expenses. According to\n and ANP force levels specified in the public expenditure review.297\n the World Bank, more than 500,000 people\n Salaries for teachers and other education personnel are the second major work for the GIRoA; more than 80% are\n component of the GIRoA operating budget, according to the World Bank public either security force members or teachers.\n expenditure review.298 The review concluded that spending on education must\n increase 180% in constant terms in order to achieve the Millennium Development Source: World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure\n Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal\n Goal of full primary school participation by 2020.299 Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d pp. 2, 9.\n\n\n\n Capacity Building\n At the London and Kabul conferences, international donors welcomed the\n GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s commitment to assume greater financial responsibility for its affairs.300\n Donors acknowledged, in principle, the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s request to channel more devel-\n opment funds through the Afghan central government if reforms were made\n and corruption reduced.301 This quarter the GIRoA presented proposals for\n an Afghan-led development agenda to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring\n Board and at the Kabul Conference and requested that donors align funding\n with these initiatives.302\n The World Bank noted that although the GIRoA has made progress on\n public financial management reforms, it faces a significant gap in its capacity\n to administer public expenditures.303 For example, the World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s public\n expenditure review reported that the GIRoA was able to disburse\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 93\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n only about 40% of its core development budget in 2009/10.304 This is the lowest\n Budget execution rate: Defined by budget execution rate for the core development budget since 2005/06.305\n the World Bank as the ratio of actual Figure 3.33 shows trends in expenditures for the core development budget,\n disbursements to the mid-year which improved between 2005/06 and 2007/08, and then began to worsen in\n approved budget. 2008/09. The World Bank attributes declines in the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s budget execution\n rate to a variety of factors, including the lack of absorption capacity of line\n ministries, technical difficulties related to bridge financing, and confusion over\nSource: World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure\nReview 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal program budgeting.306\nSustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n\n\n ESSENTIAL SERVICES\n The World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s public expenditure review focused on Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s reli-\n ance on international donors for education funding and the need to continue\n to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Education (MoE). In June,\n the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released a report on water in the Kabul\n Basin, highlighting the need to improve the management and conservation of\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water resources. The Asian Development Bank announced that\n to support essential reconstruction work and economic development, it would\n increase grant funds (from $386 million to $548 million in 2011/12). In addition\n to supporting irrigation and energy projects, the extra funds are intended to\n help Afghanistan address cost overruns linked to building the Ring Road.307\n\n Energy\n This quarter, the Minister of Energy and Water told the press that an estimated\n 70% of Afghans still do not have access to a reliable source of electricity, and that\n the country continues to rely on imported electricity to meet its needs, as shown\n\n FIGURE 3.33\n\n\n CORE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET: EXECUTION RATES, 2005/06\xe2\x80\x932009/10 (PERCENT)\n\n\n 2009/10 40%\n\n 2008/09 43%\n\n 2007/08 54%\n\n 2006/07 54%\n\n 2005/06 41%\n\n 0 20 40 60 80 100\n\n\n Disbursed Not Disbursed\n\n Note: Related to Mid-Year Review.\n Source: World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cPublic Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d Working Paper 2 for Afghanistan Public Expenditure\n Review 2010, 3/31/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 94 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n in Figure 3.34.308 The ANDS goals of providing electricity to 65% of urban house-\n holds and 25% of rural households by the end of 2010 will clearly not be met.309\n As reported in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of the energy sector, the U.S. government had\n spent more than $732 million refurbishing Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s energy sector as of\n January 2010.310 Despite this progress, many challenges remain. Among other\n findings, the audit concluded that Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s lack of capacity to collect suf-\n ficient revenue is a major factor limiting its ability to operate independently, to\n expand its power system, and to recruit and retain qualified staff.311\n The security environment is another factor that limits the supply of domes-\n tically produced energy. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s January 2010 quarterly report,\n transporting a new turbine to the Kajaki Dam in Helmand in September 2008\n required a combined force of 4,000 ISAF and ANSF troops because of insurgent\n and IED activity in the area.312 Last quarter, work on installing the third Kajaki\n turbine was suspended indefinitely because of continuing security challenges.313\n Two older, refurbished turbines at the dam are operational and supplying\n power.314 This quarter, however, NATO reported that the Taliban blew up a struc-\n ture that supported some Kajaki Dam supply lines, cutting off electricity to parts\n of Helmand; the Taliban initially refused to allow government engineers access to\n the area to repair the damage.315 Later negotiations made it possible for govern-\n ment engineers to repair the supply lines.316\n This quarter, the U.S. government officially handed over the 105-MW\n Tarakhil Power Plant in Kabul to the GIRoA.317 The first six blocks of the power\n plant were brought on line in August 2009, and the plant became completely\n operational on May 31, 2010, according to the U.S. Agency for International\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.34\n\n\n DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED AND IMPORTED ELECTRICITY, 2006\xe2\x80\x93MAY 2010 (PERCENT)\n\n\n\n 2010a 35.9 4.8 59.2\n\n 2009 39.0 4.5 56.5\n\n 2008 39.4 12.6 48.0\n\n 2007 48.0 13.4 38.6\n\n 2006 49.9 16.5 33.5\n\n 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100\n\n\n Domestic Hydro Domestic Thermal Imported\n\n Note: Numbers affected by rounding.\n a. Figures for January through May.\n Source: USAID, Afghanistan Energy Information Center (AEIC), \xe2\x80\x9cPower Production and Supply Statistics,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/10/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 95\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\nDevelopment (USAID).318 The agency reported that the Tarakhil plant has the\ninstalled capacity to provide electricity for up to 600,000 residents in Kabul who\nare connected to the North East Power System.319 The United States contributed\n$300 million to support this project and will continue to support capacity-\nbuilding programs to maintain this facility, according to U.S. Ambassador Karl\nEikenberry.320\n\nEducation\nThe recent World Bank public expenditure review noted that the GIRoA is heav-\nily dependent on international donors for education resources. According to the\nreview, about 60% of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s current education expenditures are funded by\nthe external budget; the majority of these expenditures, therefore, are financed\nby international donors.321\n The World Bank review noted that wages and salaries (primarily for teachers)\naccount for more than 90% of the operating expenses of the MoE.322 Salaries are\ngenerally paid in cash in front of witnesses, and recipients are required to sign\na receipt.323 The review noted, however, that relying on cash to pay teachers\xe2\x80\x99\nsalaries makes the system vulnerable to abuses such as skimming and \xe2\x80\x9cghost\xe2\x80\x9d\nemployees. This is especially true in remote areas, where one person may be\ndesignated to receive the total cash disbursement to pay all teacher salaries. The\nreview noted that in 2008/09, the MoE identified 5,000 potential ghost employ-\nees during its teacher registration process and deleted them from the official\npayroll.324 As a result, the MoE is moving toward paying teacher salaries through\nbanks to reduce potential corruption, according to the review.325\n\n\n\n\nAfghan girls attend a class. Increasing access to education for girls and young women is a\npriority of the GIRoA and the international community. (ISAF photo)\n\n\n\n\n 96 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n The public expenditure review also reported that capacity challenges pre-\n vented the MoE from spending more than 38% of its core development budget\n in 2008/09.326 One reason is that the MoE and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are\n unprepared to disburse education funds to the provinces on a timely basis. The\n delays arise because most of the budget funds work is done manually.327 Another\n example is an increase in the number of forms that the MoE\xe2\x80\x99s budget department\n must fill out to disburse education funds to the provinces.328 The review noted\n that since 2007/08, the number of required forms has risen from 185 to approxi-\n mately 1,480. This increase is significant because 78% of the operating budget is\n allocated to the provinces, according to the review.329\n This quarter, the USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG) released\n an audit of a $105 million, four-year USAID construction program through\n which approximately 776 health clinics and schools were built throughout\n Afghanistan.330 Because of the precarious security conditions where many of\n the structures are located, auditors were given a representative sample of 30\n schools to visit on site.331 The auditors concluded that those schools were being\n used for their intended purposes, with the exception of one school building\n being used by the MoE.332 The schools were staffed with 1,385 teachers, who\n taught 57,744 students.333 Nevertheless, auditors observed many challenging\n conditions in the schools:334\n \xe2\x80\xa2 21 school buildings with no electricity (17 of them in areas where electricity\n was not available)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 14 schools with no water or insufficient water\n \xe2\x80\xa2 12 schools without toilets\n \xe2\x80\xa2 18 schools without adequate furniture\n The audit identified two major factors that contributed to these challenges\xe2\x80\x94lack\n of compliance with the International Building Code and lack of operating funds.335\n This quarter, the UN Secretary-General reported that attacks against schools\n continued to increase throughout Afghanistan. He noted that the overwhelm-\n ing majority of these attacks were made by anti-government groups; attacks\n included intimidation of pupils and teachers; abductions, beatings, and killings of\n school staff; arson; and improvised explosive devices placed in schools.336\n\n Health Services\n The USAID OIG audit on schools also covered health clinics.337 Auditors visited\n a representative sample of 20 health clinics. They concluded that most of the\n structures were being used for their intended purposes.338 The 20 health clin-\n ics employed 109 clinical staff and provided treatment to approximately 39,500\n patients.339 But auditors found many unsatisfactory conditions, including insuf-\n ficient plumbing, equipment, or water as well as a lack of personnel. The auditors\n could not determine whether some of the deficiencies were related to poor\n construction or to the lack of maintenance and support from the GIRoA.340\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 97\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Water and Sanitation\n This quarter, the USGS released a report on water resources in the Kabul\n Basin.341 According to the Afghan Ambassador to the United States, the water\n flowing into the city of Kabul traditionally originated from pristine sources.342\n The USGS noted that population growth and drought have created new stresses\n on Kabul\xe2\x80\x99s water supply, resulting in many contaminated, dry, unusable wells.343\n According to the USGS report, Kabul had no municipal waste or wastewater\n treatment plant. In less populated areas, however, the water quality was\n relatively good.344\n To meet the need for clean water resources in Afghanistan, the United States\n has provided funding for 912 small and medium-size water and sanitation proj-\n ects between June 2004 and June 2011. According to U.S. Central Command\n (CENTCOM), the estimated total cost of these projects was $28 million, and the\n median project cost was an estimated $14,490. Examples of these clean water\n and sanitation projects include water wells, water tanks, septic systems, small-\n scale irrigation projects, and restroom facilities.345\n\n INDUSTRY AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT\nA local elder demonstrates that a village This quarter, Afghanistan was on track to produce another bountiful cereal\nwell is dry. Of the 50 wells in the returnee crop harvest, and the GIRoA presented proposals for more water development\nvillage of Barikop in Parwan, only 4 still\n projects at the Kabul Conference. The potential value of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral\nwork. (U.S. Air Force photo, MSgt Kelley\nJ. Stewart)\n resources received renewed attention when the U.S. Department of Defense\n (DoD) released a new report estimating the potential value of these resources.\n The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) released a new survey of\n small business owners in Afghanistan that focused on their plans for the future,\n including the hope that the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s contracting processes would become more\n transparent and accessible.\n\n Agriculture\nSince 2004, the USGS has been working Accelerating progress in agriculture is a top priority of the U.S. stabilization strat-\nwith the Afghan Geological Survey and the egy in Afghanistan and Kabul Conference participants.346 The U.S. government has\nMinistry of Energy and Water to address awarded approximately $1.4 billion toward agricultural programs in Afghanistan\nfuture water availability in the Kabul Basin. since 2002, according to the GAO.347\nTo provide a scientific basis for managing According to the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Afghanistan is on\nthis important resource, the USGS has\n track for its second consecutive successful growing season. The FAS reported\ndeveloped a database of information on\n that rain was plentiful during autumn 2009, enabling wheat crops to become well\nground and surface water in the area.\n established before the harshest winter months. Somewhat less favorable weather\nUSAID funds this effort.\n conditions prevailed during the winter and spring. These less favorable condi-\nSource: USGS, \xe2\x80\x9cAvailability of Water in the Kabul Basin,\nAfghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d Fact Sheet 2010-3037, 5/2010, p. 1. tions included substantially lower snow accumulation, which is the principal\n source of moisture for irrigated crops, and higher-than-normal temperatures in\n major lowland wheat-growing regions. Nevertheless, in May the FAS forecasted\n that Afghanistan will produce approximately 3.7 million tons of wheat in 2010,\n which is 18% above average.348\n\n\n\n\n 98 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Despite the recently improved harvests, the World Bank reported in April 2010 This quarter, USAID announced a new $100\n that Afghanistan continues to import about one-sixth of its cereals annually to million Agricultural Development Fund,\n meet domestic consumption needs.349 which will provide Afghan farmers with\n USAID OIG recently completed an audit of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan Vouchers for credit to buy the equipment, seed, and other\n Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) program, which provides vouchers for materials necessary to expand agricultural\n production.\n modern seeds and fertilizers to help improve Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s wheat harvest. In addi-\n tion, the program funded agriculture-related stabilization activities in Helmand and Source: DoS/U.S. Embassy Kabul, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan\n Farmers Gain More Access to Credit through new $100 million\n Kandahar, including cash-for-work programs, such as cleaning irrigation canals; Agricultural Development Fund,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/21/2010.\n offering small farming equipment grants; and providing saplings and seeds for high-\n value alternative crops.350\n As of December 31, 2009, total funding for the program was approximately\n $185.2 million. USAID OIG concluded that the program had achieved its planned\n goals of distributing seeds or fertilizer to 296,920 Afghan farmers and had con-\n tributed to the increased wheat harvests. The audit also concluded, however,\n that it was impossible to measure the program\xe2\x80\x99s exact contribution because\n some of the reported results were not reliable. It also noted that the stabilization\n program in Helmand and Kandahar could not be fully implemented because of\n security challenges.351\n\n\n\n\n Afghan farmers prepare pesticides to be sprayed on crops. (USAID photo)\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 99\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.7 Capacity Building\n As of June 30, 2010, the United States had nine agribusiness development teams\nAGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT TEAMS (ADTs) in Afghanistan to provide technical assistance to help strengthen the\nIN PLACE, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010\n country\xe2\x80\x99s agricultural sector, as shown in Table 3.7. These teams are National\nUnit State Location\n Guard units consisting of farmers and experts in animal husbandry, horticulture,\nTX ADT #3 Texas Ghazni\n irrigation, food storage, and distribution. They provide advice and training to\nIN ADT #2 Indiana Khowst\n Afghan farmers, provincial ministries, and universities, and they train Afghan\nCA ADT #1 California Kunar\n extension agents to teach modern farming methods.352\nSC ADT #1 South Carolina Logar\n According to CENTCOM, the teams have identified a number of obstacles\nMO ADT #3 Missouri Nangarhar\nOK ADT #1 Oklahoma Paktiya\n to agricultural progress:353\nKY ADT #2 Kentucky Parwan\n \xe2\x80\xa2 interpreters\xe2\x80\x99 lack of sufficient agricultural vocabulary\nKS ADT#2 Kansas Laghman\n \xe2\x80\xa2 farmers\xe2\x80\x99 dependence on wheat, although other crops may be more\nAR ADT #1 Arkansas Zabul compatible with the rocky terrain\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the lack of sufficient irrigation projects\nSource: CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the lack of businesses to support the agriculture industry, such as\n equipment leasing\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Afghan government corruption\n\n\n\n\n A technical advisor for the Ministry of Agriculture visits a greenhouse at the Department of\n Agriculture compound in Farah in April, where farmers are given the opportunity to view new and\n different agricultural techniques. (U.S. Air Force photo, SrA Rylan K. Albright)\n\n\n\n\n 100 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Irrigation\n Better management of water resources is key to the future of agricultural From 1950 to 1980, approximately 165\n development in Afghanistan, according to the Afghan Ambassador to the United stream gauges operated in Afghanistan,\n States. If enough water were available all year, farmers would be more likely to measuring stream levels and flow, accord-\n plant pomegranates and other valuable crops that require more intensive irriga- ing to USGS officials. During the years of\n tion. According to USGS officials, some areas of Afghanistan are relatively rich in war, the gauges fell into disuse. The USGS\n analyzed and made available online the his-\n underground water resources; however, these resources may be ancient aquifers\n torical data gathered by these gauges, and\n located deep underground, and their sustainability needs further evaluation.\n the Ministry of Energy and Water recently\n Officials noted that the most significant challenge to developing Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s reactivated the gauges as a resource for\n water resources is the lack of skills and technical capacity to manage these water management planning.\n resources effectively. The USGS, therefore, is working with the Afghan Geological\n Survey (AGS) and the Ministry of Energy and Water to develop that capacity. In Source: USGS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/24/2010.\n\n recognition of the importance of water resources, plans for large-scale water\n development projects were presented at the Kabul Conference.354\n According to the Afghan Ambassador, the GIRoA is working to define\n water rights and obligations to lay the groundwork for developing its river\n water resources. He noted that most of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s rivers flow into neighboring\n countries that also use the water; therefore, it is important to develop a frame-\n work for regional cooperation before building new dams and other water-related\n infrastructure near the borders of other countries. USGS officials noted that\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s neighbors use approximately twice as much water per person\n as Afghanistan.355\n\n Mining\n This quarter, the DoD Task Force on Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan\n (TFBSO) released an updated report on Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral wealth. It included\n new estimates of the potential economic value of these resources, based on recently\n collected data. The goal was to provide high-quality, verifiable data that meets private-\n sector investment standards. The Ministry of Mines presented the new information at\n the first International Symposium on Mineral Sector Opportunities in Afghanistan, in\n London on June 25, 2010.356\n As SIGAR noted in its January 2010 quarterly report, the USGS first released an\n assessment of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral resources in 2007.357 This data was presented at\n the third annual U.S.-Afghan Business Matchmaking Conference, organized by the\n Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce, in Washington, D.C., in November 2007.358\n This preliminary report was based on surveys carried out between 1950 and 1985,\n according to the USGS. The data was hidden from Afghan authorities during the 1990s\n and returned to the GIRoA in 2001. Subsequently, it was used as the basis for further\n research by the USGS, in partnership with the AGS and the Ministry of Mines.359 From\n 2005 to March 31, 2009, the USGS produced approximately 189 reports of geologi-\n cal surveys in Afghanistan, including assessments of coal, oil, natural gas, water, and\n other resources.360 USAID provided the funding for these surveys.\n In the fall of 2009, the TFBSO partnered with the USGS to further explore\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral resources; after extensive field visits, the team created a list\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 101\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.8\n\n\nMINERAL RESOURCES (NON-FUEL): of priority areas of interest. Table 3.8 lists Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s potential mineral resources\nESTIMATED POTENTIAL GROSS and their potential value, as calculated by the TFBSO. As SIGAR has noted in previous\nIN-PLACE VALUE, DECEMBER 2009 quarterly reports, experts from the World Bank and other organizations agree that\nMineral Amount Value development of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s mineral resources provides the best opportunity to\n(non-fuel) (Tonnes) ($ Billions)\n generate sustainable, long-term revenue growth for the GIRoA.361\nIron 1,490,944,000 420.85\n The TFBSO has expanded its sampling effort to include not only U.S. government\nCopper 40,895,800 274.00\n experts, but staff from the AGS and industry geologists. As of July 14, 2010, more than\nNiobium 3,500,000 81.20\n 700 samples have been collected and submitted to the USGS laboratory for analysis.\nCobalt 600,000 50.82\n Geochemical assay work has been completed on more than 500 of the submitted\nGold 685 25.00\n samples, and the results are being reviewed and analyzed to better understand the\nMolybdenum 724,010 23.89\n size, type, and value of the deposits.362 Figure 3.35 shows the 11 provinces that the\nRare earth elements 1,400,000 7.41\n TFBSO visited to collect samples and make field observations.\nAsbestos 13,365,563 6.32\nSilver 9,067 5.34\nPotash 27,513,690 5.09 FIGURE 3.35\nAluminum 2,290,175 4.43\nGraphite 1,055,223 0.67\n POTENTIAL RESOURCES IN 11 PROVINCES\nLapis lazuli 1,300 0.65\nFluorite/fluorspar 8,791,000 0.64\nPhosphorus 6,200,000 0.58\nLead and zinc 243,900 0.55\nMercury 32,234 0.50\n JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN\nStrontium 329,100 0.41 BALKH TAKHAR\nSulfur 6,450,000 0.23\n SAMANGAN\nTalc 1,250,000 0.16 FARYAB BAGHLAN\n PANJSHIR\nMagnetite 31,200 0.16 SAR-E PUL NURISTAN\n BADGHIS\nKaolin \xe2\x80\x94 0.05 PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR\n BAMYAN\n LAGHMAN\nTotal Estimated Value 908.95 KABUL\n WARDAK\n NANGARHAR\n HERAT\nNote: \xe2\x80\x94 = not available. GHOR LOGAR\nSource: DoD, TFBSO, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Economic Sovereignty: DAYKUNDI\nEstablishing a Viable Nation,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/14/2010, p. 5. PAKTIYA\n GHAZNI KHOWST\n\n\n URUZGAN\n FARAH\n PAKTIKA\n ZABUL\n\n\n\n\n NIMROZ Cement\n HELMAND\n KANDAHAR Copper\n Gold\n Industrial Minerals\n Iron\n Lithium\n Rare Earth Elements\n Silver\n Travertine\n Uranium\n\n\n Note: Potential resources identified during TFBSO visits.\n Source: DOD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 102 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n According to the TFBSO and the USGS, Afghan engineers or geologists have been\n included in these efforts whenever possible, to build domestic capacity for assessment\n work. In addition, the TFBSO and USGS have assessed the information technology\n and data storage and analysis capabilities of the AGS, and submitted a proposal to that\n agency to strengthen its technical systems.363\n The TFBSO is working with industry experts, the AGS, and the USGS to compile\n all data into packages for presentation to potential investors. This includes archiving\n and translating Soviet-era field reports and maps that provide valuable geochemical\n and geologic information on many of these areas. This information is being adapted\n for use with modern geospatial programs and tools that are required for current-day\n exploration and development activities. In addition, the TFBSO has begun to identify\n and engage with international firms interested in the development of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\n mining sector.364\n\n Other Energy Resources Development\n To assess the current state of oil and gas infrastructure, the TFBSO and the\n USGS have sent field expeditions to Sheberghan (Jowzjan province), Mazar-e\n Sharif (Balkh province), Kunduz (Kunduz province), and Herat (Herat prov-\n ince). The TFBSO/USGS team also conducted a seismic feasibility study to\n determine whether two-dimensional seismic surveys could be run from the city\n of Sheberghan to Kunduz. Such surveys would identify subsurface structures\n that trap oil and gas, as well as the best places to drill sample wells. Table 3.9\n provides USGS estimates of potential quantities of oil and gas resources and the\n TFBSO\xe2\x80\x99s calculations of the potential value of these resources.365\n The TFBSO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of\n Mines to support a proof-of-concept project to lay the groundwork for restarting\n production from existing oil wells in Afghanistan. Among other benefits, restarting\n oil production wells would demonstrate the country\xe2\x80\x99s capacity for oil and gas pro-\n duction and distribution, strengthen investor interest, and expand the Afghan First\n Program to include petroleum-derived products such as asphalt and fuel.366\n To help build capacity for other energy-producing infrastructure, the TFBSO\n has also partnered with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to\n assess potential micro-hydropower sites in Afghanistan. As of July 14, 2010, visits\n had been made to 2 of the estimated 15 to 30 sites, according to the TFBSO.367\n\n TABLE 3.9\n\n\n MINERAL RESOURCES (FUEL): ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL CURRENT VALUE\n Resource Primary Location Quantity Potential Value (Billions)\n Crude oil Afghan-Tajik Basin 1,596 billion barrels $123.2 (at $77.19/barrel)\n Natural gas Amu Darya Basin 15,687 billion cubic feet $56.3 (at $3.59/MMbtu)\n Natural gas liquids Amu Darya Basin 562 million barrels $43.4 (at $77.19/barrel)\n Total $222.9\n Source: DoD, TFBSO, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Economic Sovereignty: Establishing a Viable Nation,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/14/2010, p. 6.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 103\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\nThe CIPE survey found that businesses Private-Sector Development\nperceived a lack of transparency and fair- On May 6, 2010, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Center for Private\nness in the awarding of GIRoA contracts,\n Enterprise (CIPE), and Charney Research released a survey of small and medium-\nbut 6 in 10 hoped the government would\n size Afghan businesses in the country\xe2\x80\x99s six largest cities. Of the businesses\nbe more transparent in the coming year.\n surveyed, 92% grossed less than $10,000 annually. Most were either sole proprietor-\nSource: National Endowment for Democracy, CIPE, Charney ships or family-owned businesses.368\nResearch, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Business Attitudes on the Economy,\nGovernment, and Business Organizations,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 7. The survey found that, in general, the businesses surveyed were positive about\n economic conditions in their local communities. Most of these businesses served\n Afghan consumers directly, rather than other businesses, foreign markets, or\n foreign companies. Three-fourths of those polled expected their sales, number of\n employees, and net profits to increase during the next six months. Six in 10 busi-\n nesses surveyed planned to hire more people during that period; 4 in 10 planned to\n purchase general office equipment.369\n The survey showed that businesses continue to rely primarily on profits and\n private savings for financing, rather than loans. Only 7% of respondents reported\n obtaining loans from private individuals; 6% reported obtaining loans from banks.\n Survey results pointed to opportunities for growth in the financial system. Three-\n quarters of surveyed businesses relied on cash to purchase goods and services; only\n one in six relied on bank transfers to make purchases.370\n Consistent with surveys described in previous SIGAR quarterly reports, the CIPE\n found that corruption is a significant burden on the private sector. More than half\n of the businesses polled reported paying bribes, unofficial fees, or gifts to operate:\n 41% reported paying local government officials, 28% paid customs officials, and 26%\n paid national government officials; others paid the road police and tax collectors.\n Businesses also identified the perceived lack of fairness in the awarding of GIRoA\n contracts as a significant concern. Specifically, many businesses reported that gov-\n ernment officials favored relatives and friends in awarding contracts and that the\n process was not transparent.371\n In an important trade-related development, DoS announced that the govern-\n ments of Afghanistan and Pakistan reached a transit trade agreement on July 18,\n 2010. The agreement will make it easier for Afghan trucks to transport products\n through Pakistan to the Indian border.372\n\n\n\n\n 104 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTHE RAPID GROWTH\nOF COMMUNICATIONS\nMEDIA IN AFGHANISTAN\nSince 2002, the broadcast media have expanded\nrapidly in Afghanistan. In 2002, there was one national,\nstate-owned radio broadcasting system with an esti-\nmated two to three local FM radio stations. As of July\n2010, according to the Department of State (DoS),\napproximately 300 radio stations and re-broadcasters\ncover virtually all provinces. Similarly, in 2002 only one\ntelevision station operated in Afghanistan, but as of Telecommunication towers rise from the top of \xe2\x80\x9cTV Mountain\xe2\x80\x9d\nJuly 2010, about a dozen privately owned networks and over Kabul. (UNAMA photo)\none state-owned television network were broadcasting\nto all the major cities, according to DoS.373\n Ownership of radio and television sets in of phone subscribers in Afghanistan as of March 2010.\nAfghanistan has skyrocketed. According to a 2009 The table shows that cell phones predominate. In fact,\nsurvey by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 83% of the MCIT estimates that approximately 80% of the\nAfghans have a radio in their household, and 39% have Afghan population has access to a cell phone.377 The\na television. The Asia Foundation reported that about MCIT further notes that the four GSM providers and\n80% of Afghans living in urban areas own a television one CDMA/fixed-network provider in Afghanistan have\nset, compared with 30% of Afghans living in more rural invested more than $1.5 billion cumulatively in the tele-\nareas. According to USAID, the average estimated cost communications sector.378 In 2002/03, the U.S. Trade\nof a radio in Afghanistan is less than $8; the average and Development Agency (USTDA) provided funding for\nestimated cost of a television set in Afghanistan is a consultant who advised the GIRoA to issue addi-\napproximately $100.374 tional cellular operator licenses, which helped attract\n The major national radio stations broadcast 2 to private-sector investment.379 The USTDA also funded\n18 hours of programming daily; most of the smaller, a technical assistance program to help the Afghan\nlocal stations are on the air for a few hours each day. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority improve\nSimilarly, major television stations broadcast for 8 to access to telecommunications technology in rural and\n18 hours a day while local stations broadcast only a underserved areas.380 Competition among providers\nfew hours a day, according to DoS.375 Recently, how- has resulted in a decrease in monthly phone bills from\never, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Tolo TV network launched the coun- approximately $54 in 2002 to approximately $5.60 in\ntry\xe2\x80\x99s first 24-hour satellite news channel. According 2008, according to the MCIT.381\nto USAID, most radio and television programming\n TABLE 3.10\noriginates locally, except for movies and serials, which\nare imported primarily from India, Dubai, Turkey, and TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATISTICS, AS OF MARCH 2010\nPakistan.376 GSM subscribers (Wireless) 13,304,533\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s telecommunications sector has also CDMA subscribers (Wireless) 83,809\ngrown rapidly since 2002, according to the Ministry of Landlines 56,357\nCommunications and Information Technology (MCIT).\n Source: GIRoA, MCIT, Telecommunication statistics, www.mcit.goc.af, accessed online\nTable 3.10 shows the MCIT\xe2\x80\x99s estimates of the number 7/8/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 105\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n106 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\nSince 2002, the U.S. government has appropriated nearly $4.24 billion for\ncounter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.382 Prior to February 2010, U.S.\ncounter-narcotics efforts focused primarily on eradication. However,\neradication proved to have a minimal impact on the size of the regional\ndrug trade and it targeted farmers instead of narco-traffickers.383 To address\nthe shortcomings of the old strategy, the United States announced a new\ncounter-narcotics strategy last quarter, which centered on interdicting drugs\nand precursor chemicals, stopping drug trafficking, building capacity, and\narresting drug lords.384\n This quarter, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) began to implement the\nnew strategy, which sets out two specific goals and the objectives that must\nbe met to achieve them. The first goal is to weaken the link between narcotics\nand the insurgency by significantly reducing the support the insurgency\nreceives from the narcotics trade. To meet this goal, the strategy identifies\neight objectives:385\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Disrupt and dismantle targets in the narcotics-insurgency-corruption\n nexus.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop more capable, accountable, effective, and self-reliant Afghan\n counter-narcotics security forces.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Fully integrate counter-narcotics activities into civil-military campaign\n planning.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Enhance and increase agricultural development and licit alternatives to\n poppy, in line with the objectives set forth in national and provincial\n development strategies.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Increase support for the demand reduction and treatment programs of the\n Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Support subnational supply reduction efforts.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Improve counter-narcotics strategic communications.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Work with international organizations and Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s regional neigh-\n bors to further disrupt the insurgency-narcotics network and eliminate\n their safe havens.\n The second goal is to reduce corruption fueled by narcotics, which reduces\nAfghans\xe2\x80\x99 support for their government. This goal has three objectives:386\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop institutional capacity in support of the overall governance strategy.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Designate and prosecute major traffickers.\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 107\n\x0cCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Align law enforcement, justice, and targeted financial measures and\n corrections development programs.\nThis section highlights the advances made this quarter in support of the\ncounter-narcotics strategy.\n\nPOPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM PRODUCTION\nIn February 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)\nreported that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was expected to remain stable.\nHowever, reports this quarter indicate that an apparent blight has adversely\naffected the productivity of the poppy crop\xe2\x80\x94effectively reducing the volume\nof opium production.387 Although a decrease in opium production would be\nwelcome, stocks of opium are sufficient to supply users for at least two years,\naccording to the UNODC\xe2\x80\x99s 2010 World Drug Report.388\n According to the June 2010 report of the Secretary-General of the United\nNations (UN), decreased production could lead to increases in opium prices.389\nHigher prices could create a perverse incentive to cultivate poppy, as noted\nin May 2010 by the UNODC spokesman in Kabul.390 The Ministry of Counter-\nNarcotics (MCN), the UNODC, and their partners are conducting a survey to\nassess the situation according to the UN Secretary-General.391\n From May 2009 to May 2010, the prices of dry and fresh opium increased\nsignificantly, according to the MCN and the UNODC. Specifically, the farm-gate\nvalue of dry opium increased by 71% and that of fresh opium by 104%. The trader\nprice of dry opium increased by 72% and that of fresh opium by 92%.392 However,\nit is premature to ascribe the increase in opium prices to the disease affecting the\npoppy crop.\n\nCOMBATING THE DRUG TRADE\nIn support of the objectives outlined in the new counter-narcotics strategy,\nefforts over the reporting period focused primarily on interdiction operations,\ndrug demand reduction, international cooperation, and capacity and alternative\ndevelopment. The following subsections provide details on these efforts.\n\nInterdiction Operations\nAs noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report, interdiction has become a\ncentral focus of the new U.S. counter-narcotics strategy. In support of this shift\nin strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported that the Afghanistan\nNational Security Forces (ANSF) and the International Security Assistance\nForces (ISAF) conducted a series of interdiction operations during this quarter.\nThe operations included partnered patrols, cordon and search procedures, and\nmonitoring activities. As a result of these operations, 70 suspects were arrested,\nand large caches of drugs and drug-related materials were seized.393 Figure 3.36\ndisplays drug seizures in four provinces by type, amount, and location.\n\n\n\n\n 108 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\n To support these joint operations, the United States provided transportation,\nintelligence, airlift, and quick reaction forces. According to DoD, the U.S. Drug\nEnforcement Agency (DEA) mentored specialized units of the Counter-Narcotics\nPolice of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the intelligence community provided target-\ning and analysis support to law enforcement and the military at the strategic,\noperational, and tactical levels.394\n In another effort, the DEA, the U.S. Marines, and the CNPA conducted an\ninterdiction operation on May 18, 2010 that resulted in the capture of high-\nvalue targets and a large cache of drugs.395 The search-and-seizure portion of\nthe operation was conducted entirely by CNPA officers, according to the U.S.\nMarine Corps.396\n\nFIGURE 3.36\n\nDRUGS SEIZED BY AFGHAN AND COALITION FORCES\nResults of 33 Counter-Narcotics Operations, April\xe2\x80\x93June 2010\n\n\n 24 Operations: 1 Operation:\n Marijuana seeds: 1,134 kg Opium gum: 60 lb\n Marijuana seeds: 200 lb\n Marijuana seeds: 136 kg\n Marijuana: 900 kg\n Opium, raw: 926 kg\n Opium, raw: 40 kg\n Opium, raw: 2,090 kg JOWZJAN KUNDUZ\n BALKH\n Opium, processed: 851 kg 1 Operation: BADAKHSHAN\n TAKHAR\n Opium, wet: 4.5 kg Opium, wet: 70 kg\n Opium, wet: 150 kg\n Opium, wet: 30 kg SAMANGAN\n FARYAB BAGHLAN\n Opium, wet: 30 kg\n Opium, resin: 2,250 kg SAR-E PUL PANJSHIR\n Opium, liquid: 75 kg NURISTAN\n BADGHIS\n Opium: 30 kg\n BAMYAN PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR\n Opium: 30 kg LAGHMAN\n Opium: 18 kg KABUL\n Opium: Four 6-kg to 9-kg bags HERAT WARDAK\n NANGARHAR\n Opium: 11 kg GHOR LOGAR\n Opium: 120 kg DAYKUNDI\n Opium: 450 kg PAKTIYA\n Opium: Two 15-lb bags GHAZNI KHOWST\n Opium: 655 kg\n Heroin: 11 kg URUZGAN\n Heroin: 90 kg FARAH\n Heroin: 90 kg PAKTIKA\n Heroin: 20 kg ZABUL\n Heroin: 39 large stamped, packaged bags 7 Operations:\n Heroin: 15 kg Opium, wet: 30 bags\n Hashish: 279 kg Opium, wet: 45-lb bag\n Hashish: 4.5 kg NIMROZ HELMAND KANDAHAR Opium: 3 kg\n Morphine: 60 kg Opium: 70 kg\n Powdered charcoal: 60 kg Heroin: 1,300 kg\n Poppy seeds: 6 kg Hashish: 300 lb\n Narcotics processing equipment Hashish and heroin: 226 kg\n\n\n\n\nNote: Data reflects separate drug seizures as reported in ISAF press releases.\nSources: ISAF, press releases, 4/9\xe2\x80\x936/27/2010, accessed online 7/7/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 109\n\x0cCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nISAF forces prepare to burn more than 7,700 kilograms of illicit drugs seized in a single raid\nin Helmand in June. Interdiction is a central focus of the new U.S. counter-narcotics strategy.\n(ISAF photo)\n\n\n This quarter, the CNPA also coordinated\xe2\x80\x94for the first time\xe2\x80\x94an international law\nenforcement meeting on interdiction, according to a UN Secretary-General report.\nThe purpose of the meeting was to enhance regional coordination and support for\nfuture interdiction operations. These efforts promote the \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanization\xe2\x80\x9d process, a\ncentral theme of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.397\n To improve interdiction efforts, DoD continued to provide training, infra-\nstructure, and equipment support to U.S. and Afghan counter-narcotics law\nenforcement agencies. At the request of the DEA, DoD trained an additional 280\npersonnel for the National Interdiction Unit of the CNPA, which now comprises\n500 officers. According to DoD, implementation plans in support of interdiction\nwill help create unity of effort at the inter-agency level.398\n\nDemand Reduction\nApproximately one million Afghans are drug users, according to the most recent\ndrug use survey by the UNODC in June 2010. On a national scale, drug treatment\nis still viewed as inadequate\xe2\x80\x94only 40 treatment centers operate throughout the\ncountry. These centers have the cumulative capacity to treat only 10,216 drug\nusers, according to the UNODC and INL.399\n Recent reports have highlighted the growing issue of drug use in the Afghan\nNational Police (ANP). To assess the extent of such drug use, the Ministry of\nInterior (MoI) and the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan\nconducted drug testing on 136,000 police officers from January 1, 2009 to May\n31, 2010, according to the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A). Of those\ntested, 10,880 tested positive for some form of illicit substances; tetrahydro-\ncannabinol (THC), the active substance in marijuana, was the most prevalent.\nPrompted by the results of the drug tests, MoI staff drafted a new drug and\n\n\n\n\n 110 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nalcohol policy that outlines annual drug testing requirements for all police forces.\nAccording to NTM-A, the MoI legal department is reviewing the draft policy.400\n The MoI also offers drug rehabilitation services for officers who suffer from\ndrug dependency, according to NTM-A. In December 2009, the MoI transformed a\nbuilding in West Kabul into a drug treatment center with the capacity to treat 126\ninpatients. To tackle drug dependency, the Combined Training Advisory Group -\nPolice is revising anti-drug programming; that programming will be implemented\nthrough basic training, according to NTM-A.401\n The international community and the GIRoA are tackling the problem of\ndemand for drugs in a number of ways, including training programs and regional\nand global projects. For example, the UN is supporting a series of training pro-\ngrams that will educate the local community on the harmful effects of narcotics,\nincluding the risk of HIV infection. The training programs will include informa-\ntion on outreach, the needle syringe program, and overdose management, among\nother topics.402\n In April 2010, the UNODC released a document outlining the 20 active projects\nthat support counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan; they are valued at approxi-\nmately $82 million. Funding is provided by more than 10 countries, including the\nUnited States, as well as by international organizations. Eight of the 20 projects\nsupport initiatives to reduce drug demand.403 Table 3.11 identifies the eight drug\ndemand reduction projects and their budgets.\n\nTABLE 3.11\n\n\nREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROJECTS\n Budget\nRegional Projects ($ Millions)\nCapacity Building for Drug Demand Reduction in Afghanistan $2.9\nDrug Demand Reduction Information, Advice and Training Communities Living in Refugee Camps in $0.9\nBaluchistan Service for Afghan and NWFP, Pakistan\nHIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Care for Female Injecting Users and Female Prisoners in $1.1\nAfghanistan\nSurvey on Opiate Abuse in Afghanistan and Setting Up a Drug Abuse Information System $0.3\nSub-regional Project for the Provision of Comprehensive HIV Prevention and Care Services to Afghan $1.9\nRefugee Drug Users in Iran and Pakistan and Returnees in Afghanistan\nInternational Projects\nDrug Abuse and HIV/AIDS Prevention $0.2\nPartnership for Action on Comprehensive Treatment (PACT) \xe2\x80\x93 Treating Drug Dependence and its Health $0.9\nConsequences/OFID-UNODC Joint Program to Prevent HIV/AIDS through Treatment Phase II\nThe Paris Pact Initiative \xe2\x80\x93 A Partnership to Counter Traffic in and Consumption of Afghan Narcotics $0.2\nTOTAL $8.4\nSource: UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cProgramme in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 5.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 111\n\x0cCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nInternational Cooperation\nThe inability of Afghanistan to control its borders has led to an international\ndrug trafficking problem which has affected countries around the world, accord-\ning to the president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).404\nEmphasizing the need for the international community to work together to\ncombat this issue, the 2010 World Drug Report stated that the international com-\nmunity needed to incorporate drug supply and demand reduction initiatives and\nintegrate national efforts into international strategies.405\n In June 2010, the INCB hosted an international forum called \xe2\x80\x9cDrug\nProduction in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community.\xe2\x80\x9d At the\nforum, the president of the INCB appealed to attendees to \xe2\x80\x9ccontinue to enhance\nthe effectiveness and sustainability of measures to curb poppy cultivation and\nto ensure that farming communities involved in illicit crop cultivation are provided\nwith sustainable, legitimate livelihoods.\xe2\x80\x9d406 In addition, the INCB identified\ndevelopment and law enforcement as the two most powerful tools for curtailing\ndrug production in Afghanistan. The INCB emphasized the importance of bilat-\neral and multilateral economic development institutions in helping Afghanistan\nestablish an economic power base. These efforts will help Afghan farmers who\nhave abandoned poppy cultivation to overcome poverty and the temptation to\nperpetrate violence.407\n The INCB stressed that the international community needs to help prevent\ndrug traffickers from colluding with anti-government groups to cause instability.\nCooperation from the international community is a key element for success in\nthis effort, according to the INCB.408\n\nAlternative Development Programming\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report noted that the U.S. stabilization strategy\nemphasizes agriculture as the main reconstruction priority. Agriculture is the\nfastest means to create licit jobs, which in turn will slow the funding stream that\npoppy cultivation provides for the insurgency, according to DoS.409 According\nto Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, nearly 100 U.S. government agricultural\nexperts from the Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International\nDevelopment (USAID) have been deployed to Afghanistan. They work in close\ncoordination with GIRoA officials to help Afghanistan regain its former status\nas a regional leader in the export of high-value crops, such as melons, grapes,\napples, and pomegranates.410\n The UNODC and the World Food Program have partnered to curb the produc-\ntion of heroin in western Afghanistan, according to a UN announcement. The\nprogram is designed to rehabilitate an irrigation canal in the Kohsan district\nof Herat.411 Kohsan is considered virtually poppy-free, but trafficking in drugs\nremains a significant issue. Villagers who are unable to find work in the district\ntravel to Farah or Helmand to harvest poppies\xe2\x80\x94they are paid approximately\nAf 500 (roughly $11) per day. To counter the perceived need to travel to poppy-\ncultivating districts to earn income, the UN program pays villagers to clean out\n\n\n\n\n 112 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nAn Afghan man sells a variety of melons at a local market. Nearly 100 U.S. agricultural experts\nare working to help develop licit alternatives to poppy, including high-value crops, such as fruits.\n(U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)\n\n\nthe irrigation canal, which has filled with sand over the past few years of drought\nand deforestation. The canal will serve as a lifeline for planting licit crops.412\n\nCapacity Development\nThis quarter, the U.S. and international community contributed to developing\nthe capacity of the GIRoA to combat the drug trade in a number of ways. These\ncontributions centered on the expansion of counter-narcotics facilities and\nenhancements to CNPA units.\n\nU.S. Efforts\nThis quarter, the U.S. government provided $12.9 million to support construc-\ntion of the new CNPA headquarters in Kabul; this amount will be augmented\nby $3.9 million annually. According to DoS, this facility enables the CNPA to\ncentralize all major counter-narcotics functions, which should improve coordi-\nnation among all its units.413\n On May 13, 2010, a ceremony was held to recognize the work of the MoI\xe2\x80\x99s\nAir Interdiction Unit (AIU). The AIU is a counter-narcotics aviation unit men-\ntored by the U.S. Army that supports ground units with its fleet of 16 Mi-17\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 113\n\x0cCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nhelicopters. Manned solely by Afghans, the AIU crews conduct regular training\nand operational missions in support of the MoI, the ANP, and other counter-\nnarcotics forces around Afghanistan, according to the U.S. Air Force.414 Over\nthe past 12 months, the AIU had the following accomplishments:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 implementing the 2010/11 tashkil, enabling significant growth within\n the AIU\n\xe2\x80\xa2 issuing and using new equipment, vehicles, and uniforms provided by\n the U.K. government\nAccording to the U.S. Air Force, these advances enable the AIU to provide\nstronger support to the ANP and the MoI.415\n\nInternational Efforts\nThe European Union and France funded an extension to the Counter-\nNarcotics Training Academy in Kabul, according to the International\nOrganization for Migration (IOM). This addition more than doubled the facil-\nity\xe2\x80\x99s capacity from 200 to 440 students. The Academy trains the CNPA, which\nis tasked with eliminating illicit narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse.416\n In June 2010, the UN Secretary-General reported that a train-the-trainer\nprogram had been completed at the Academy. As a result, Afghans assumed\ncontrol of future training, and the MCN gave its first-ever briefing for the inter-\nnational community\xe2\x80\x94an exercise set to recur on a regular basis.417\n\nCHALLENGES\nAs noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report, the new counter-narcotics\nstrategy seeks to eliminate the revenue stream that the narcotics industry\ngenerates for the Taliban and its allies. The narcotics industry undermines licit\neconomic development, erodes government legitimacy, and threatens stability\nand security in Afghanistan and across the region, according to INL.418\n To counter the narcotics-insurgency nexus, the Combined Joint Interagency\nTask Force - Nexus was expanded this quarter to provide greater support to the\nmilitary and law enforcement. According to DoD, this expansion will increase\nthe pace of operations. In addition, DoD reported that the CNPA Development\nUnit developed 24 key proposals to strengthen its capacity. Four of the propos-\nals have been prioritized, and implementation plans are under way.419\n\n\n\n\n 114 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nDRUG ADDICTION According to the survey, a typical male Afghan drug\n user is a 28-year-old father of three who does not\n\nIN AFGHANISTAN live with his wife. He lives with his extended family, is\n probably unemployed, has little to no education, and\n is poor. A typical female drug user is more than likely\n widowed or divorced, has little to no education, and is\nOn June 21, 2010, the UNODC, the MCN, and the\n probably unemployed.422\nMinistry of Public Health (MoPH) released the results\nof Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s seventh national drug use survey,\nwhich was conducted with 2,614 drug users and\n HEALTH RISKS\n When drug users are unable to pay for drugs, they\n2,614 key informants. Almost one million Afghans\n often exchange sexual favors to support their habit.\nuse drugs\xe2\x80\x94roughly 8% of the population ages 15\n Because of cultural constraints related to discussing\nto 64. This figure is twice the average for the global\n this topic, only 6% of respondents admitted engag-\ndrug-using population, and those surveyed see drug\n ing in sexual intercourse to pay for drugs, as noted\nuse as a worsening problem. In fact, the survey\n by the UNODC. Survey respondents reported never\nindicated that 50% of drug users in the northern and\n using or seldom using a condom. Of those surveyed,\nsouthern regions give opium to their children. This\n 3% tested positive for HIV; however, those who tested\npractice effectively condemns the younger genera-\n positive, as well as others who had heard of HIV\ntion to a life of addiction, according to the survey.420\n did not know how it spreads or how to prevent its\nFor more information on the growing problem of drug\n transmission.423\naddiction in Afghanistan, see SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010\n Injecting drugs increases exposure to HIV/AIDS\nquarterly report.\n and other bloodborne illnesses. According to the\n survey, approximately 87% of intravenous drug users\nDRUG USE reported sharing syringes with multiple people without\nThe UNODC, the MCN, and the MoPH surveyed drug\n cleaning the syringes properly or at all.424\nuse among Afghan men, women, and children in vari-\nous age categories. The survey showed that opium\nuse occurs in every age and gender category.421 The\n DRUG TREATMENT\n The UNODC reported that 21 of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s 34\nsubstances used most commonly within each age\n provinces have treatment centers\xe2\x80\x94mainly residential\nand gender category are shown in Table 3.12.\n and home-based treatment. These forms of treat-\nTABLE 3.12 ment focus primarily on detoxification, residential\n rehabilitation, and aftercare, which is limited, accord-\nMOST COMMONLY USED SUBSTANCES, BY ing to the survey. Approximately 11% of respondents\nAGE AND GENDER reported receiving treatment; 90% expressed their\nAge and Gender Category Substances by Order of Use need for treatment. The UNODC, the MCN, and the\nMen (age 26 and older) Cannabis, opium, and heroin MoPH emphasized establishing a range of accessible\nWomen (age 26 and older) Opium, tranquilizers, and opioids services and interventions, especially those aimed\n (painkillers)\n at community outreach, motivational interviewing,\nMen (ages 16\xe2\x80\x9325) Cannabis, opium, and heroin\n and treatment readiness.425 The results of the survey\nWomen (ages 16\xe2\x80\x9325) Opium, cannabis, and heroin\n show that drug use is increasing, and current treat-\nAdolescents (ages 10\xe2\x80\x9315) Cannabis, opium, and heroin\n ment services are inadequate.426\nChildren (under 10 years old) Opium, tranquilizers, and cannabis\nSource: UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d\n6/21/2010, p. 6.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 115\n\x0c Educating girls\n Afghan schoolgirls receive school supplies from ANA\n soldiers in a tent in Dizak, Farah province. Many schools\n throughout the country continue to rely on makeshift\n structures. (U.S. Air Force photo, SSgt Nicholas Pilch)\n\n\n\n\n116 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c4 OTHER AGENCY\n OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n 117\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n118 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\nEach quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and\nongoing oversight activities. These agencies are performing oversight activities\nin Afghanistan and providing results to SIGAR:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Government Accountability Office (GAO)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General\n (USAID OIG)\nThe descriptions appear as they were submitted, with these changes for consis-\ntency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of\nfull names; standardized capitalization, hyphenation, and preferred spellings; and\nthird-person instead of first-person construction.\n\nCOMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES\nTable 4.1 lists the 12 oversight projects related to reconstruction or security that\nthe participating agencies reported were completed this quarter. This section\nincludes all the descriptions that the agencies provided.\n\nDepartment of Defense Office of Inspector General\nReinvestigation of Combat Action at Wanat Village, Afghanistan\n(Report H10L111565072, Issued June 22, 2010)\nDoD OIG reviewed the reinvestigation conducted by Lieutenant General Richard\nNatonski, U.S. Marine Corps, into the battle of Wanat, at the direction of General\nDavid Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command. DoD OIG concluded that\nthe reinvestigation sufficiently established the facts regarding the combat action\nat Wanat and reasonably assigned accountability by identifying those individuals\nwhose acts or omissions could be characterized as dereliction in the perfor-\nmance of duties. It concluded that company, battalion, and brigade commanders\nwere derelict in the performance of their duties through neglect or culpable\ninefficiency but determined that Division staff exercised due care in the matter.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 119\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 4.1\n\n\nRECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010\nAgency Report Number Date Issued Project Title\nDoD OIG H10L111565072 6/22/2010 Reinvestigation of Combat Action at Wanat Village, Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D-2010-062 5/24/2010 Controls Over Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq Processed Through the Foreign Military Sales Network\nGAO GAO-10-829T 6/29/2010 Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed To Improve How DoD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support\nGAO GAO-10-842T 6/25/2010 Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DoD\xe2\x80\x99s Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to\n Afghanistan\nGAO GAO-10-655R 6/15/2010 Afghanistan Security: The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan\nGAO GAO-10-613R 5/5/2010 Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Security Environment\nGAO GAO-10-465 4/16/2010 Military Training: Actions Needed To Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine\n Corps Support Forces\nGAO GAO-10-357 4/12/2010 Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration\n in Iraq and Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-0088-ALL 4/14/2010 Agreed-Upon Procedures Attestation To Evaluate Bulk Fuel Requests for Forward Operating Base Shank, Afghanistan (FOUO)\nUSAID OIG 5-306-10-002-O 6/24/2010 Review of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction\n and Refurbishment Program\nUSAID OIG 5-306-10-009-P 5/21/2010 Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan\nUSAID OIG 5-306-10-008-P 4/20/2010 Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) Program\nNote: MERO = Middle East Regional Office. Sources: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; GAO, response to SIGAR data call,\n7/8/2010; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n Controls Over Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq\n Processed Through the Foreign Military Sales Network\n (Report No. D-2010-062, Issued May 24, 2010)\n The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) ensured that funds appropri-\n ated for assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq placed under its oversight were used\n for their intended purpose and were properly reported in the DoD Cost of War\n Report. However, improvements are necessary to ensure effective management\n of these appropriated funds. Specifically, $6 million was not returned to DoD\n or the military departments before the funds\xe2\x80\x99 cancellation date and were not\n properly accounted for. In addition, $31.6 million were not returned to Multi-\n National Security Transition Command-Iraq before the funds expired. Also,\n DSCA needs to fully review and determine the proper disposition of at least an\n additional $25.7 million of expired unobligated funds held in the FMS Trust Fund.\n\n U.S. Army Audit Agency\n Agreed-Upon Procedures Attestation To Evaluate Bulk Fuel Requests for Forward\n Operating Base Shank, Afghanistan (FOUO)\n (Report No. A-2010-0088-ALL, Issued April 14, 2010)\n This report is protectively marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) Law Enforcement\n Sensitive. The International Contract Corruption Task Force, Bagram Airfield,\n Afghanistan requested this attestation review. Auditors reconciled initial bulk fuel\n\n\n\n 120 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nrequests with delivery records kept at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank\nbulk fuel farm for the period 1 December 2009 through 18 February 2010. These\nreconciliations were made to determine the number of potential fraudulent bulk\nfuel requests and the respective amount of fuel losses.\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development\nOffice of Inspector General\nReview of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed\nUnder the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment Program\n(Report No. 5-306-10-002-O, Issued June 24, 2010)\nThe final report was issued on June 24, 2010 (A.R. No. 5-306-10-002-O). The review\nwas performed under contract to the OIG by KPMG Kabul. Per the contract,\nKPMG conducted site visits to a statistical sample of 50 buildings (30 schools and\n20 clinics) of the 776 buildings completed under the program. The review had two\nobjectives: to (1) determine whether the schools and clinics were being used for\nintended purposes and (2) to review the impact of the program on the provision\nof education and health services to the people\xc2\xa0of Afghanistan.\n KPMG found only 2 cases in the sample of 50 where buildings were not being\nused for intended purposes. In one case a school was being used for educational\nadministration as it could not accommodate the students living in the area; in\nthe other case a clinic was abandoned because of a precarious security situation.\nWith regard to program impact, KPMG found that the 30 schools were staffed\nwith 1,385 teachers and were educating 57,744 students. The 20 health clinics\nemployed 109 clinical staff and provided medical treatment to approximately\n39,500 patients monthly. The report recommended that the mission consider\nrequesting from the concerned ministries a list of facilities not being used for their\nintended purposes and make a determination if any adjustments are needed.\n At the same time, KPMG noted numerous deficiencies with regard to the\nphysical condition of the schools and clinics, including structural problems, poor\nhardware, and deficient water service and plumbing\xe2\x80\x94as well as a widespread\nlack of maintenance. KPMG noted that these deficiencies in some cases created\nan environment not conducive to quality education and health services and might\nexpose students, patients, and staff to unhealthy and even dangerous conditions.\nThe report recommended that the mission evaluate these deficiencies and\ndevelop an action plan to correct those that are serious.\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Oversight of Private Security Contractors\nin Afghanistan\n(Report No. 5-306-10-009-P, Issued May 21, 2010)\nThe final audit report was issued on May 21, 2010 (A.R. No. 5-306-10-009-P).\nThe audit determined that the mission received 149 \xe2\x80\x9cincident reports\xe2\x80\x9d between\nOctober 2006 and June 2009, 44 of which met the definition of a serious incident.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 121\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nHowever, these reports do not include all of the incidents that occurred because\nthe mission has no standard provision in its agreements that requires reporting.\n The audit also found the mission has not ensured that only responsible private\nsecurity contractors (PSCs) are employed by its implementing partners. While\nthe mission took some limited actions in this regard, 2 funded PSCs were not\nlicensed with the Afghan government; subcontracting consent for 17 PSCs was\nnot given; and the mission did not include a required contract clause to require\nvarious security measures. Also, the mission had no grant provision related to\nsecurity, so about a third of awards with subcontracted security had no standard\nsecurity requirements. However, even if the mission had properly addressed\nthese matters, its efforts would not have been sufficient, because statutory and\nregulatory provisions intended to provide for the oversight of the qualifications\nand conduct of PSCs in Afghanistan had not been implemented through formal\nmission-wide instructions.\n The audit also found that PSCs charged about $167 million for security\nservices. On average, these services accounted for 8.3% of award disburse-\nments. However, the percentage of private security subcontracting costs to total\ndisbursements varied widely. Percentages for security services could run approx-\nimately 8% to 10% for areas deemed relatively safe, but could rise to 20%, 30%, or\neven 50% in areas considered extremely dangerous.\n The report recommended that USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s contracting officer\nrequest in writing that the Chief of Mission issue mission-wide instructions\nfor non-DoD PSCs and their personnel to either (1)\xc2\xa0implement standards set\nforth by the geographic combatant commander or (2)\xc2\xa0instruct non-DoD PSCs\nand their personnel to follow the guidance and procedures developed by the\ngeographic combatant commander and/or subordinate commander. Other\nrecommendations addressed the need for USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Director of\nAcquisitions and Assistance to issue written guidance regarding various secu-\nrity-related requirements.\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Vouchers for Increased Productive\nAgriculture (AVIPA) Program\n(Report No. 5-306-10-008-P, Issued April 20, 2010)\nThe final report was issued on April 20, 2010 (A.R. No. 5-306-10-008-P). The\npurpose of this audit was to determine if the $360 million AVIPA program\nwas achieving its main goals of increasing wheat production and carrying out\nagriculture-related stabilization activities. The program has two components:\nthe distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s northern, western,\nand central provinces; and the implementation of a variety of agriculture-related\nstabilization activities in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s southern provinces of Helmand and\nKandahar, including cash-for-work projects and a small grants program.\n The audit determined that the program, by providing thousands of small\nfarmers with wheat seed and fertilizer, had contributed toward the country\xe2\x80\x99s\nincrease in domestic wheat production. However, the extent to which the\n\n\n\n\n 122 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nprogram played a role in this increase was unclear since the audit found that\nsome of the reported results were not reliable and could not be fully validated in\n57% of the cases reviewed due to irregularities found in the supporting records.\nThese possible cases of fraud were referred to IG Investigations. In addition,\nwhile the program had initiated stabilization activities in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s southern\nprovinces (Helmand and Kandahar), the security situation there was preventing\nthe program from being able to implement these activities as widely as planned,\nthereby limiting the program\xe2\x80\x99s ability to fully achieve its goal in this region. As\na result, the audit determined that the implementing partner will not be able to\nspend the funds authorized by the program\xe2\x80\x99s termination date of August 31, 2010,\nand will likely end up with a surplus.\n The report recommended that USAID/Afghanistan require its implementer to\nestablish appropriate procedures and controls to strengthen its monitoring of the\nprogram and to detect irregularities. The implementer also needs to reassess the\nimpact of the wheat seed distribution using a justifiable methodology. The report\nalso recommended that the mission should determine the amount of surplus\nfunds and reprogram them appropriately.\n\nONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES\nAs of June 30, 2010, the participating agencies reported 32 ongoing oversight\nactivities related to reconstruction or security in Afghanistan. The activities\nreported are listed in Table 4.2. This section includes all the descriptions that the\nagencies provided.\n\nDepartment of Defense Office of Inspector General\nDoD continues to face many challenges in executing its Overseas Contingency\nOperations (OCO), formerly known as \xe2\x80\x9cthe Global War on Terror (GWOT).\xe2\x80\x9d DoD\nOIG has identified priorities based on those challenges and has responded by\nexpanding its coverage of OCO operations and its presence in Southwest Asia.\nAs DoD continues its OCO, to include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it\nwill stay focused on issues important to accomplish the mission and ensure the\ndepartment makes efficient use of its resources to support the warfighter.\n During the third quarter of FY 2010, DoD OIG continued to deploy additional\nauditors and investigators to Iraq and Afghanistan. The additional staff support\nthe increased oversight workload required by statutory requirements,\ncongressional requests, senior DoD and military officials requests, and the\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s drawdown efforts in Iraq and increased operational tempo in\nAfghanistan. Field offices in Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan enhance its\nability to provide audit, inspection, and investigative support to DoD operations\nin support to OCO. In addition, DoD OIG is preparing to deploy additional per-\nsonnel into Southwest Asia, including Afghanistan.\n DoD OIG\xe2\x80\x93led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group coordinates and decon-\nflicts federal and DoD OCO\xe2\x80\x93related oversight activities. The Group held its\n13th meeting in May 2010. During the May 2010 Southwest Asia Joint Planning\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 123\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 4.2\n\n\nONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF JUNE 30, 2010\nAgency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JO-0229.000 6/14/2010 Construction of the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JB-0157.000 3/4/2010 Afghanistan National Army Equipment Maintenance Apprenticeship and Services Program Contract\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0165.000 2/22/2010 Review of a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Contract for Linguist Support\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0138.000 2/18/2010 Information Operations in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000FL-0100.000 2/18/2010 Internal Controls Over the Disbursing Process for Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program Payments\n Made to Support Operations in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0091.000 12/9/2009 Force Protection Programs for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2009-D000LC-0237.000 6/11/2009 Air Cargo Transportation Contracts in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom\nDoD OIG D2008-D000CD-0256.000 8/7/2008 DoD Body Armor Contracts\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3004 2/2010 Review of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Program Effectiveness To Reintegrate and\n Resettle Afghan Refugees\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3002 2/2010 Review of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE To Provide Operations and Maintenance to Embassy Kabul\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3001 2/2010 Review of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE To Provide Operations and Maintenance to Afghan\n Counter-Narcotics Units in Afghanistan\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3007 2/2010 Kabul Embassy Security Force (KESF)\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3008 3/2010 Limited-Scope Review of Policies and Procedures for Vetting Foreign Service Nationals at Embassy\n Kabul in Afghanistan\nGAO 351492 4/30/2010 Personnel, Equipment, and Supply Support for Operations in Afghanistan\nGAO 320766 4/1/2010 Review of U.S. Civilian Surge in Afghanistan\nGAO 351463 3/12/2010 Afghanistan ISR Capabilities\nGAO 120874 11/12/2009 Annual Mandated Review of Contracting in Afghanistan and Iraq\nGAO 351388 10/2/2009 Availability of Trained and Ready Forces To Support Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan\nGAO 320712 9/2/2009 U.S. Efforts To Develop Capable Afghan National Army (ANA) Forces\nGAO 351395 8/21/2009 Supply and Equipment Support for U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan\nGAO 351393 8/21/2009 DoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations\nGAO 351376 7/30/2009 Readiness of Air Force Combat and Expeditionary Combat Support Forces\nGAO 351387 7/30/2009 Army and Marine Corps Training Capacity\nGAO 320680 5/8/2009 Potable Water, Sanitation, and Crop Irrigation Projects in Afghanistan\nGAO 320662 3/16/2009 USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Agricultural and Alternative Development Projects in Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-ALL-0480.000 Not provided Agreed-Upon Procedures Attestation for USFOR-A LOGCAP Course of Action - Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-ALL-0103.000 2/22/2010 Controls Over Vendor Payments Phase II - Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2009-ALL-0531.000 5/19/2009 Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP) - Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2009-ALL-0106.000 2/2/2009 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94Jalalabad (Afghanistan)\nUSAAA A-2008-ALL-0401.000 9/1/2008 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94Kandahar and Salerno (Afghanistan)\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Alternative Development Program Expansion, South West\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Review of Security Costs Charged to Three USAID Projects by Edinburgh International for the Period January 1 to\n December 31, 2009\nSources: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2010; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call,\n7/7/2010; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 124 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nGroup, the Army Materiel Command briefed its Southwest Asia efforts, includ-\ning supporting the shifting of forces in Southwest Asia. Through the Group, the\nmembers continue to coordinate, collaborate, and deconflict their respective\nand joint oversight efforts, including working with the Commission on Wartime\nContracting and its respective mission.\n For FY 2010, the completed and remaining ongoing OEF-related oversight\naddresses the safety of personnel with regard to construction efforts, force\nprotection programs for U.S. personnel, accountability of property, contract\nadministration, information operations, armoring capabilities, and acquisition\nplanning and controls over funding for Afghan Security Forces.\n\nOversight Activities\nFor the third quarter of FY 2010, DoD OIG had 34 ongoing oversight activities\nand issued 15 reports that support OEF. Of those 34 ongoing projects, 8 directly\nrelate to reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan and are incor-\nporated in this quarterly report. Of the 15 issued reports, 2 directly relate to\nreconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan and are incorporated in this\nquarterly report.\n\nConstruction of the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JO-0229.000, Initiated June 14, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S.\nForces - Afghanistan procured construction services and administered the\nconstruction contract for the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, in accor-\ndance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and other applicable laws and\nregulations. Specifically, DoD OIG will determine whether the U.S. Army Corps\nof Engineers properly monitored contractor performance during construction of\nthe Detention Facility in Parwan and whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\nhas taken or should take recourse against the contractor because of potential\nlatent defects, negligence, or fraud.\n\nAfghanistan National Army Equipment Maintenance Apprenticeship and\nServices Program Contract\n(Project No. D2010-D000JB-0157.000, Initiated March 4, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether adequate quality assurance and quality control\nprocedures exist for the Afghanistan National Army Vehicle and Maintenance\nContract. Specifically, DoD OIG will determine whether government contractual\nrequirements have been met and adequate contract surveillance is being con-\nducted. In addition, DoD OIG will determine whether the contractor requires\nadditional warehouse space to effectively perform contractual tasks and whether\nthe contractor submitted a fair and reasonable request for equitable adjustment\nfor parts reimbursement.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 125\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nReview of a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Contract\nfor Linguist Support\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0165.000, Initiated February 22, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security\nCommand contract for linguist support in Afghanistan (W911W4-07-D-0010)\nincluded appropriate security provisions.\n\nInformation Operations in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0138.000, Initiated February 18, 2010)\nDoD OIG is evaluating the ability of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces -\nAfghanistan to conduct information operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, DoD\nOIG will assess the support provided by DoD organizations that enable those\ncommands to conduct Information Operations.\n\nInternal Controls Over the Disbursing Process for Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency\nResponse Program Payments Made to Support Operations in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000FL-0100.000, Initiated February 18, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether the internal controls over the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s\nEmergency Response Program payments made to support operations in\nAfghanistan, and processed through DoD disbursing systems, are adequate.\nSpecifically, it will determine whether the controls ensure the reliability of\ncomputer-processed payment data and whether the payments are proper and\nused for their intended purpose.\n\nForce Protection Programs for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0091.000, Initiated December 9, 2009)\nDoD OIG is reviewing the force protection programs for primary gathering\nfacilities and billeting areas of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Specifically, it is\nassessing the program support and resources that commanders have for facility\nplanning, antiterrorism, and safety programs protecting their forces. The audit\nis focusing on Bagram Airfield, Kandahar Airfield, Camp Eggers, and the New\nKabul Compound.\n\nAir Cargo Transportation Contracts in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and\nOperation Enduring Freedom\n(Project No. D2009-D000LC-0237.000, Initiated June 11, 2009)\nDoD OIG is determining whether air cargo transportation contracts in support\nof Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF are administered in accordance with\napplicable federal and DoD regulations. Specifically, DoD OIG will determine\nwhether the decision to use air transportation was justified, whether delivery\norders were awarded in accordance with vendor selection criteria, and whether\nthe cargo transported by air was delivered within required time frames.\n\n\n\n\n 126 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nDoD Body Armor Contracts\n(Project No. D2008-D000CD-0256.000, Initiated August 7, 2008)\nDoD OIG is examining the contracts and contracting process for body armor and\nrelated test facilities. Specific objectives will include evaluating the background\nand qualifications of the contractors, the criteria for awarding the contracts, the\nquality assurance process, and any relationships that may exist between the con-\ntractors and government officials. The review of the quality assurance process\nwill include reviewing the results of First Article Testing and Lot Acceptance\nTesting for the body armor contracts. DoD OIG issued Report No. D-2010-029, on\nDecember 21, 2009, discussing the contract award of DoD body armor contracts.\nDoD OIG plans to issue additional reports related to this project.\n\nDepartment of State Office of Inspector General \xe2\x80\x93\nMiddle East Regional Office\nOversight Activities\n\nReview of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Program\nEffectiveness to Reintegrate and Resettle Afghan Refugees\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3004, Initiated February 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of agreements with UNHCR, ICRC, and NGOs;\n(2) how assistance requirements were calculated; (3) whether assistance\nreached intended targets; (4) if program performance measures were estab-\nlished and achieved; and (5) the effectiveness of Embassy Kabul and Provincial\nReconstruction Teams to manage and coordinate the humanitarian response in\nAfghanistan.\n\nReview of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE to Provide Operations and\nMaintenance to Embassy Kabul\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3002, Initiated February 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of the contract and task orders; (2) the amount of\nfunding the Department has obligated and expended to provide embassy facil-\nity operations and maintenance through contracts for FY 2005\xe2\x80\x932009; (3) the\neffectiveness of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s contract performance in providing facility operations and\nmaintenance to Embassy Kabul; (4) PAE\xe2\x80\x99s controls for inventorying, record-\ning, and safeguarding U.S. government-furnished equipment and property in\nAfghanistan, whether the equipment has been properly accounted for, and the\nchallenges to maintaining accountability; (5) how well the Department admin-\nisters and manages the contract and task orders to provide oversight of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s\nperformance in Afghanistan; (6) whether the contract includes FAR clause\n52.222.50, which provides administrative remedies if, during the term of the\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 127\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\ncontract, the contractor or subcontractor engage in severe forms of trafficking in\npersons; and (7) how the Department ensures that costs are properly allocated\nand supported.\n\nReview of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE to Provide Operations and\nMaintenance to Afghan Counternarcotics Units in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3001, Initiated February 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of the contract and task orders; (2) the amount of\nfunding the Department has obligated and expended to provide embassy facil-\nity operations and maintenance through contracts for FY 2005\xe2\x80\x932009; (3) the\neffectiveness of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s contract performance in providing facility operations and\nmaintenance to Afghan counternarcotics units in Afghanistan; (4) PAE\xe2\x80\x99s controls\nfor inventorying, recording, and safeguarding U.S. government-furnished equip-\nment and property in Afghanistan, whether the equipment has been properly\naccounted for, and the challenges to maintaining accountability; (5) how well the\nDepartment administers and manages the contract and task orders to provide\noversight of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s performance in Afghanistan; (6) whether the contract includes\nFAR clause 52.222.50, which provides administrative remedies if, during the term\nof the contract, the contractor or subcontractor engage in severe forms of traf-\nficking in persons; and (7) how the Department ensures that costs are properly\nallocated and supported.\n\nKabul Embassy Security Force (KESF)\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3007, Initiated February 2010)\nObjectives: To provide an overall review and summary of the requirements and\nprovisions of the Kabul Embassy Security Force contract. Specific objectives\nare (1) the requirements and provisions of the contract; (2) whether contract\nperformance measures have been established and are being achieved; (3) how\nwell the Department has administered the contract to provide proper oversight\nof Armor Group of North America in Kabul; (4) whether the contract is being\neffectively managed; (5) whether the contract includes FAR clause 52.222.50,\nwhich provides administrative remedies if, during the term of the contract, the\ncontractor or subcontractor engage in severe forms of trafficking in persons; and\n(6) whether Armor Group of North America provides for a safe and adequate\nliving environment for the guards and whether the Department provides proper\noversight of the contract and task orders.\n\nLimited-Scope Review of Policies and Procedures for Vetting Foreign Service\nNationals at Embassy Kabul in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3008, Initiated March 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to (1) review the policy\nand procedures used by the Foreign Service National Investigators (FSN-I) in\npre-employment personnel security vetting of Afghan locally engaged staff;\n\n\n\n 128 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n(2) review foreign service national investigation files; (3) document investiga-\ntion techniques used by FSN-I personnel to vet foreign service nationals prior\nto employment with the Embassy; and (4) determine the degree of family and\nfriendship relationships of current Embassy staff.\n\nGovernment Accountability Office\nDuring the last quarter, GAO testified twice before the Congress and released\nthree reports pertaining to Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s security environment, training of\nU.S. forces, and contracting issues and a special publication on the Strategic\nFramework for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The first testimony was before the House of Representatives Committee on\n Oversight and Government Reform\xe2\x80\x99s Subcommittee on National Security\n and Foreign Affairs. It addressed changes needed to how DoD plans for\n and manages operational contract support. This testimony noted that\n while efforts have been made within the DoD and the individual services to\n improve the planning for and management of contractors, these efforts do\n not fully work toward integrating operational contract support throughout\n DoD and no systematic changes have been made. GAO recommended for\n DoD to consider how it currently uses contractors in contingency operations,\n how it will use contractors to support future operations, and the impact that\n providing management and oversight of these contractors has on the opera-\n tional effectiveness of deployed units (GAO-10-829T).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The second testimony was before the House of Representatives Committee\n on Appropriations\xe2\x80\x99 Subcommittee on Defense. It addressed DoD\xe2\x80\x99s progress\n and challenges in distributing equipment to Afghanistan. This testimony\n found that terrain, weather, lack of a railway, few roads, and limited airfield\n infrastructure hinder DoD\xe2\x80\x99s ability to distribute supplies. GAO identified the\n lack of full visibility over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at\n logistics hubs, difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment,\n and poor delivery coordination with coalition partners as other challenges to\n equipment delivery and distribution (GAO-10-842T).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s report on Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s security environment found that DoD attack\n data as of March 2010 show that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks in\n Afghanistan has remained seasonal in nature, generally peaking from June\n through September each year and then declining during the winter months.\n While attacks have continued to fluctuate seasonally, the annual attack peak\n (high point) and trough (low point) for each year since September 2005 have\n surpassed the peak and trough, respectively, for the preceding year. The\n lack of a secure environment has continued to challenge reconstruction and\n development efforts. Some specific effects of these security challenges are\n (1) delayed programs and increased costs, (2) hampered progress of some\n counter-narcotics operations; and (3) limited ability to conduct oversight\n of ongoing programs. The number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan\n is expected to increase. In addition to the ongoing expansion of the U.S.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 129\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n military presence in Afghanistan, the United States has also significantly\n increased its civilian presence in Afghanistan (GAO-10-613R).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s report on the training of U.S. forces noted that CENTCOM has issued a\n list of training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services\xe2\x80\x99 training require-\n ments, before deploying to its area of operations. However, service members are\n not being trained on some required tasks prior to deploying and there is confu-\n sion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply to, the conditions\n under which the tasks are to be trained, and the standards for successfully com-\n pleting the training. Both CENTCOM and the services lack complete information\n on the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing\n required combat skills training. While the services have formal and informal\n means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at the\n various training sites are not consistently sharing information about the changes\n they have made to their training programs (GAO-10-465).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s report on contracting issues noted that DoD, DoS, and USAID\xe2\x80\x99s use\n of contractors to help administer contracts and grants was substantial,\n although the agencies did not know the full extent of their use of such con-\n tractors. GAO found that the agencies generally cited the lack of sufficient\n government staff, the lack of in-house expertise, or frequent rotations of\n government personnel as key factors contributing to the need to use contrac-\n tors. GAO also found that to mitigate risks associated with using contractors,\n agencies have to understand when, where, and how contractors should be\n used, but agencies\xe2\x80\x99 decisions were generally not guided by agency-wide\n workforce planning efforts. Additionally, GAO found that DoD, DoS, and\n USAID took actions to mitigate conflict of interest and oversight risks\n associated with contractors helping to administer other contracts or grants,\n but did not always fully address these risks. Lastly, GAO found that DoD,\n DoS, and USAID contracting officials generally did not ensure enhanced\n oversight as required for situations in which contractors provided services\n closely supporting inherently governmental functions despite the potential\n for loss of government control and accountability for mission-related policy\n and program decisions (GAO-10-357).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s special publication on the Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in\n Afghanistan describes the relevant strategies and plans that collectively\n guide U.S. activities and personnel in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94the Afghan National\n Development Strategy, the U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,\n and the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. The\n framework also includes U.S. plans: the OEF Campaign plan, the National\n Security Council Strategic Implementation Plan, and the U.S. Integrated\n Civilian-Military Campaign Plan (ICMCP). The ICMCP describes three lines\n of effort\xe2\x80\x94security, governance, and development\xe2\x80\x94to be implemented\n by U.S. civilian and military personnel. Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty\n\n\n\n\n 130 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n Organization (NATO) plans include the NATO Comprehensive Strategic\n Political Military Plan, and the operational plans for NATO and for NATO\xe2\x80\x99s\n subordinate command\xe2\x80\x94the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)\n (GAO-10-655R).\nIn addition, GAO began two new engagements focusing on how DoD is supplying\noperations in Afghanistan within established timelines, and a review of the U.S.\ncivilian surge in Afghanistan.\n\nU.S. Army Audit Agency\nOversight Activities\n\nAgreed-Upon Procedures Attestation for USFOR-A LOGCAP Course of\nAction-Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2010-ALL-0480.000, Initiated 3Q FY10)\nThis attestation is being performed in Afghanistan. It will determine if the correc-\ntive actions presented in the USFOR-A LOGCAP course of action decision brief\nwere implemented and provide assurance that requirements were processed\nthrough the appropriate review board.\n\nControls Over Vendor Payments Phase II \xe2\x80\x93 Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2010-ALL-0103.000, Initiated February 22, 2010)\nThis audit will determine if the Army has effective controls to ensure the\naccuracy of vendor payments for contingency operations in Southwest Asia\n(Afghanistan).\n\nCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP)-Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2009-ALL-0531.000, Initiated May 19, 2009)\nThis audit will determine if the CERP in Afghanistan had sufficient internal\ncontrols in place to ensure commanders and unit personnel implemented the\nprogram properly.\n\nContracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94\nJalalabad (Afghanistan)\n(Project Code A-2009-ALL-0106.000, Initiated February 2, 2009)\nThis audit will determine if goods and services acquired under the contract were\nproperly justified, awarded, and administered.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 131\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nContracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x94\nKandahar and Salerno (Afghanistan)\n(Project Code A-2008-ALL-0401.000, Initiated September 1, 2008)\nThis audit will determine if goods and services acquired under contract were\nproperly justified, awarded, and administered.\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development\nOffice of Inspector General\nOversight Activities\nDuring this quarter USAID OIG conducted a Quality Control Review (QCR) on\nwork done for the office by a public accounting firm in Afghanistan and issued a\nreport on that review. The review found that their work was generally performed\nin accordance with applicable standards and OIG guidelines. Also during this\nquarter, five financial audits were being planned, were in process, or were in the\ndraft report phase. These Afghanistan financial audits are being performed for\nUSAID and the USAID/OIG by DCAA and a public accounting firm.\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Alternative Development Program Expansion,\nSouth West\nObjective: Determine if USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Alternative Development Program\nExpansion, South and West, is achieving its main goal of counteracting illicit\npoppy cultivation by providing alternative development programs and improved\neconomic opportunities in selected southern and western provinces.\n\nReview of Security Costs Charged to Three USAID Projects by Edinburgh\nInternational for the Period January 1 to December 31, 2009\nObjective: Determine if there an indication that Edinburgh International misused\nUSAID funds to pay the Taliban or others in exchange for protection.\n\nOTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS\nSIGAR regularly coordinates with other government agencies conducting\ninvestigations in Afghanistan to monitor the progress of those investigations.\nAs of June 30, 2010, five open cases were being investigated by DoS OIG\nInvestigations (DoS OIG-INV). Table 4.3 lists the number of open and closed\ninvestigations as of June 30, 2010.\nTABLE 4.3\n\n\nINVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS\nAgency Open Cases Closed Cases Total Cases\nDoS OIG-INV 5 0 5\nTotal 5 0 5\nSource: DoS OIG-INV, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 132 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nOTHER AGENCY INSPECTIONS\nSIGAR also coordinates with other agencies that are conducting inspections in\nAfghanistan. During the past quarter, DoS OIG-ISP had one ongoing inspection,\nlisted in Table 4.4.\n\nTABLE 4.4\n\n\nONGOING INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INSPECTIONS\n Project Date Project\nAgency Number Initiated Title Objective\nDoS OIG-ISP 09-ISP-3051 9/2009 Kabul Embassy To evaluate the Embassy\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of\n Inspection policy, management of resources, adequacy of\n management controls, and measures to protect\n people, information, and facilities.\nSource: DoS OIG-ISP, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 133\n\x0c The Official Seal of SIGAR\n The Official Seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts\n between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability\n and oversight of reconstruction activities. The phrase along the top\n side of the seal\xe2\x80\x99s center is in Dari and, translated into English, means\n \xe2\x80\x9cSIGAR.\xe2\x80\x9d The phrase along the bottom side of the seal\xe2\x80\x99s center is in\n Pashtu and, when translated into English, has the same meaning.\n\n\n\n\n134 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cAPPENDICES\nAND ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n 135\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX A \xe2\x80\x93\nCROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY\nREQUIREMENTS\nThis appendix cross-references the pages of this report to the quarterly reporting\nand related requirements under SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s enabling legislation, the National Defense\nAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. No. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229 (Table A.1).\n\nTABLE A.1\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSupervision\nSection 1229(e)(1) The Inspector General shall report directly Report to the All sections\n to, and be under the general supervision Secretary of State\n of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary and the Secretary of\n of Defense Defense\nDuties\nSection 1229(f)(1) OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN Review appropriated/ All sections\n RECONSTRUCTION.\xe2\x80\x94 available funds\n It shall be the duty of the Inspector General\n to conduct, supervise, and coordinate Review programs,\n audits and investigations of the treatment, operations, contracts\n handling, and expenditure of amounts using appropriated/\n appropriated or otherwise made available available funds\n for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and\n of the programs, operations, and contracts\n carried out utilizing such funds, including\xe2\x80\x94\nSection 1229(f)(1)(A) The oversight and accounting of the obligation Review obligations and SIGAR\n and expenditure of such funds expenditures of appropri- Oversight\n ated/available funds\n Funding\nSection 1229(f)(1)(B) The monitoring and review of reconstruction Review reconstruc- SIGAR\n activities funded by such funds tion activities funded Oversight\n by appropriations and\n donations\nSection 1229(f)(1)(C) The monitoring and review of contracts funded Review contracts using Note 1\n by such funds appropriated and avail-\n able funds\nSection 1229(f)(1)(D) The monitoring and review of the transfer Review internal and Appendix B\n of such funds and associated information external transfers of\n between and among departments, agencies, appropriated/available\n and entities of the United States, and private funds\n and nongovernmental entities\nSection 1229(f)(1)(E) The maintenance of records on the use of such Maintain audit records SIGAR\n funds to facilitate future audits and investiga- Oversight\n tions of the use of such fund[s] Appendix C\n Appendix D\n\n\n\n\n 136 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(f)(1)(F) The monitoring and review of the effective- Monitoring and review Audits\n ness of United States coordination with as described\n the Governments of Afghanistan and other\n donor countries in the implementation of the\n Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan\n National Development Strategy\nSection 1229(f)(1)(G) The investigation of overpayments such as Conduct and reporting Investigations\n duplicate payments or duplicate billing and of investigations\n any potential unethical or illegal actions of as described\n Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated\n entities, and the referral of such reports, as\n necessary, to the Department of Justice to\n ensure further investigations, prosecutions,\n recovery of further funds, or other remedies.\nSection 1229(f)(2) OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT.\xe2\x80\x940 Establish, maintain, and All sections\n The Inspector General shall establish, main- oversee systems, proce-\n tain, and oversee such systems, procedures, dures, and controls\n and controls as the Inspector General consid-\n ers appropriate to discharge the duties under\n paragraph (1)\nSection 1229(f)(3) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER Duties as specified in All sections\n INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978.\xe2\x80\x94 Inspector General Act\n In addition,. . .the Inspector General shall\n also have the duties and responsibilities of\n inspectors general under the Inspector General\n Act of 1978\nSection 1229(f)(4) COORDINATION OF EFFORTS.\xe2\x80\x94 Coordination with the Other Agency\n The Inspector General shall coordinate with, inspectors general of DoD, Oversight\n and receive the cooperation of, each of the DoS, and USAID\n following: (A) the Inspector General of the\n Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector\n General of the Department of State, and (C)\n the Inspector General of the United States\n Agency for International Development\nFederal Support and Other Resources\nSection 1229(h)(5)(A) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.\xe2\x80\x94 Expect support as All sections\n Upon request of the Inspector General for requested\n information or assistance from any depart-\n ment, agency, or other entity of the Federal\n Government, the head of such entity shall,\n insofar as is practicable and not in con-\n travention of any existing law, furnish such\n information or assistance to the Inspector\n General, or an authorized designee\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 137\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(h)(5)(B) REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE.\xe2\x80\x94 Expect support as All sections\n Whenever information or assistance requested requested\n by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of\n the Inspector General, unreasonably refused\n or not provided, the Inspector General shall\n report the circumstances to the Secretary of\n State or the Secretary of Defense, as appropri-\n ate, and to the appropriate congressional\n committees without delay.\nReports\nSection 1229(i)(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS.\xe2\x80\x94 Report \xe2\x80\x93 30 days after All sections\n Not later than 30 days after the end of each the end of each calendar Appendix B\n fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General quarter\n shall submit to the appropriate committees of\n Congress a report summarizing, for the period Summarize activities of\n of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the inspector general\n the period from the end of such quarter to\n the time of the submission of the report, the Detailed statement of all\n activities during such period of the Inspector obligations, expenditures,\n General and the activities under programs and and revenues\n operations funded with amounts appropri-\n ated or otherwise made available for the\n reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each report\n shall include, for the period covered by such\n report, a detailed statement of all obligations,\n expenditures, and revenues associated with\n reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in\n Afghanistan, including the following \xe2\x80\x93\nSection 1229(i)(1)(A) Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/ Obligations and expen- Appendix B\n donated funds ditures of appropriated/\n donated funds\nSection 1229(i)(1)(B) A project-by-project and program-by-program Project-by-project and Funding\n accounting of the costs incurred to date for program-by-program\n the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with accounting of costs. List Note 1\n the estimate of the Department of Defense, unexpended funds for\n the Department of State, and the United each project or program\n States Agency for International Development,\n as applicable, of the costs to complete each\n project and each program\nSection 1229(i)(1)(C) Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds Revenues, obligations, Funding\n provided by foreign nations or international and expenditures of donor\n organizations to programs and projects funded funds\n by any department or agency of the United\n States Government, and any obligations or\n expenditures of such revenues\nSection 1229(i)(1)(D) Revenues attributable to or consisting of Revenues, obligations, Funding\n foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute and expenditures of funds\n to programs and projects funded by any U.S. from seized or frozen\n government department or agency, and any assets\n obligations or expenditures of such revenues\n\n\n\n\n 138 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\n CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\n P.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(i)(1)(E) Operating expenses of agencies or entities Operating expenses Funding\n receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise of agencies or any\n made available for the reconstruction of organization receiving Appendix B\n Afghanistan appropriated funds\nSection 1229(i)(1)(F) In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, Describe contract Note 1\n or other funding mechanism described in details\n paragraph (2)* \xe2\x80\x94\n (i) The amount of the contract or other funding\n mechanism;\n (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the\n contract or other funding mechanism;\n (iii) A discussion of how the department or\n agency of the United States Government\n involved in the contract, grant, agreement,\n or other funding mechanism identified and\n solicited offers from potential contractors to\n perform the contract, grant, agreement, or\n other funding mechanism, together with a list\n of the potential individuals or entities that\n were issued solicitations for the offers; and\n (iv) The justification and approval documents\n on which was based the determination to use\n procedures other than procedures that provide\n for full and open competition\nSection 1229(i)(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.\xe2\x80\x94 Publish report www.sigar.mil\n The Inspector General shall publish on a as directed\n publically-available Internet website each Dari and\n report under paragraph (1) of this subsec- Pashtu in\n tion in English and other languages that the process\n Inspector General determines are widely used\n and understood in Afghanistan\nSection 1229(i)(4) FORM.\xe2\x80\x94 Publish report All sections\n Each report required under this subsection as directed\n shall be submitted in unclassified form, but\n may include a classified annex if the Inspector\n General considers it necessary\nNote 1: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Web site, (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively\nraw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed, and organized for all future SIGAR purposes.\n\n* Covered \xe2\x80\x9ccontracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms\xe2\x80\x9d are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of P.L. No.\n110-181 as being\xe2\x80\x94\n\n\xe2\x80\x9cany major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States\nGovernment that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any\npublic or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:\n\nTo build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.\nTo establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.\nTo provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 139\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n APPENDIX B\n U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATED FUNDS ($ MILLIONS)\n Table B.1 lists appropriated funds by program, per year, for Afghanistan\n reconstruction efforts.\n TABLE B.1\n\n\n U.S. FUNDING SOURCES AGENCY TOTAL\n SECURITY\n Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) DoD 25,229.24\n Train & Equip (DoD) DoD 440.00\n Foreign Military Financing (FMF) DoS 1,058.50\n International Military Education and Training (IMET) DoS 8.30\n NDAA Section 1207 Transfer Other 9.90\n Total: Security 26,745.94\n GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT\n Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) DoD 2,639.00\n Economic Support Fund (ESF) USAID 9,738.59\n Development Assistance (DA) USAID 887.22\n Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) DoD 550.00\n Child Survival & Health (CSH + GHAI) USAID 486.42\n Commodity Credit Corp (CCC) USAID 25.87\n Freedom Support Act (FSA) USAID 5.00\n USAID (other) USAID 31.37\n Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, & Related (NADR) DoS 371.60\n Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisors USDA 5.70\n Treasury Technical Assistance Treasury 3.52\n Total: Governance & Development 14,744.29\n COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE) DoS 2,684.75\n Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities, (DoD CN) DoD 1,425.27\n Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) DoJ 127.37\n Total: Counter-narcotics 4,237.39\n HUMANITARIAN\n P.L. 480 Title I USDA 5.00\n P.L. 480 Title II USAID 701.21\n International Disaster Assistance (IDA) USAID 346.33\n Transition Initiatives (TI) USAID 33.86\n Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) DoS 594.83\n Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO) DoS 69.30\n Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA) DoS 25.20\n Food for Progress USDA 109.49\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. USAID data is as 416(b) Food Aid USDA 95.18\nof 3/31/2010, because updates were unavailable\nat the time this report went to press. Food for Education USDA 50.49\na. Multiple agencies include DoJ, DoS, USAID, Treasury,\nand USDA.\n Emerson Trust USDA 22.40\n Total: Humanitarian 2,053.29\nSources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call 7/14/2010,\n7/13/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS\nDefense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR\ndata call, 7/13/2010 and 7/12/2010; Treasury, response\n Oversight 76.20\nto SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR Other 3,644.70\ndata call, 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call,\n1/15/2010, 1/8/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ, response to Total: International Affairs Operations 3,720.90\nSIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data\ncall, 4/2009. TOTAL FUNDING 51,501.81\n\n\n\n\n 140 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nFY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010\n\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 995.00 1,908.13 7,406.40 2,750.00 5,606.94 6,562.77\n 0.00 0.00 150.00 290.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 57.00 191.00 413.70 396.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.20 0.30 0.60 0.80 0.80 1.10 1.60 1.40 1.50\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.90 0.00 0.00\n 57.20 191.30 564.30 1,682.60 1,908.93 7,407.50 2,761.50 5,608.34 6,564.27\n\n 0.00 0.00 40.00 136.00 215.00 209.00 488.33 550.67 1,000.00\n 117.51 239.29 893.89 1,278.97 473.39 1,210.71 1,399.51 2,088.32 2,037.00\n 18.30 42.54 153.14 169.58 187.02 166.81 149.43 0.40 0.00\n 0.00 165.00 135.00 250.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 7.52 49.68 33.40 38.00 41.45 100.77 63.07 58.23 94.30\n 7.30 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.02 4.22 0.00\n 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 0.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.32 3.55 0.00\n 44.00 34.70 66.90 38.20 18.20 36.60 26.60 48.60 57.80\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.70 0.00\n 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.95 0.19 0.13 0.75 0.44 0.00\n 194.63 534.04 1,332.39 1,911.70 935.25 1,724.02 2,163.03 2,760.13 3,189.10\n\n 60.00 0.00 220.00 709.28 232.65 251.74 307.08 484.00 420.00\n 0.00 0.00 71.80 224.54 108.05 290.97 189.64 230.06 310.21\n 0.58 2.87 3.72 16.77 23.66 20.38 40.59 18.80 0.00\n 60.58 2.87 295.52 950.59 364.36 563.09 537.31 732.86 730.21\n\n 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 159.50 46.10 49.20 56.60 60.00 60.00 177.00 65.41 27.40\n 197.09 86.67 11.16 4.24 0.04 0.03 17.01 27.29 2.80\n 8.07 11.69 11.22 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.41\n 135.47 61.50 63.30 47.10 36.00 53.80 44.25 76.79 76.62\n 23.90 9.90 20.00 15.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00\n 0.00 4.96 9.08 30.10 23.24 9.47 20.55 12.09 0.00\n 46.46 14.14 34.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 9.27 6.12 10.02 25.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.40 0.00 0.00\n 595.49 249.23 204.66 165.16 144.36 123.30 281.21 182.65 107.23\n\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 14.30 25.90 33.50\n 155.60 35.30 207.60 136.10 131.90 207.80 434.40 1,047.60 1,288.40\n 155.60 35.30 207.60 136.10 131.90 210.30 448.70 1,073.50 1,321.90\n1,063.50 1,012.74 2,604.47 4,846.15 3,484.80 10,028.21 6,191.75 10,357.48 11,912.71\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 141\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX C\nSIGAR AUDITS\n\nCompleted Audits\nSIGAR completed four audits as of July 30, 2010, as listed in Table C.1.\n\nTABLE C.1\n\nCOMPLETED SIGAR AUDITS, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JULY 30, 2010\nReport Identifier Report Title Date Issued\nSIGAR-Audit-10-14 ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall, but Some Construction 7/30/2010\n Issues Should Be Addressed\nSIGAR-Audit-10-13 Greater Coordination Needed in Meeting Congressional Directives To Address 7/30/2010\n and Report on the Needs of Afghan Women and Girls\nSIGAR-Audit-10-12 ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project 7/22/2010\n Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues\nSIGAR-Audit-10-11 Actions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments 6/29/2010\n\n\n\n\nNew Audits\nSIGAR initiated five new audits this quarter, as listed in Table C.2.\nTABLE C.2\n\nNEW SIGAR AUDITS, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JULY 30, 2010\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-030A Review of Selected CERP Projects in Afghanistan 7/2010\nSIGAR-029A Review of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Cooperative Agreement with CARE International for the Food 7/2010\n Insecurity Response for Urban Populations of Kabul (FIRUP-K) Program\nSIGAR-028A Planning for ANSF Facilities 7/2010\nSIGAR-025A Review of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 5/2010\n Infrastructure Projects in Herat and in Mazar-e Sharif\nSIGAR-024A Review of Construction Projects for Six ANP Facilities in Helmand and Kandahar 5/2010\n\n\n\n\n 142 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nOngoing Audits\nSIGAR has 10 audits in progress, as listed in Table C.3.\nTABLE C.3\n\nONGOING SIGAR AUDITS, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JULY 30, 2010\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-013A Review of Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Management 6/2010\nSIGAR-008A Review of U.S. Efforts To Improve the Accountability and Anti-Corruption 5/2010\n Capabilities and Performance of the Nangarhar Provincial Government\nSIGAR-023A Review of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s National Solidarity Program 4/2010\nSIGAR-021A Review of the Implementation of the Civilian Uplift in Support of the U.S. 4/2010\n Reconstruction Effort in Afghanistan\nSIGAR-020A Review of Salary Support Provided by U.S. Government Agencies to Afghan 1/2010\n Government Officials\nSIGAR-018A Identification of Major Vendors for Reconstruction Contracts in Afghanistan 12/2009\nSIGAR-017A Contract Audit: Reconstruction Security Support Services from Global Strategies 11/2009\n Group, Inc.\nSIGAR-009A Review of U.S. Agencies\xe2\x80\x99 Use of Contractors To Provide Security for 7/2009\n Reconstruction Programs in Afghanistan\nSIGAR-007A U.S. and International Efforts To Build the Afghan Government\xe2\x80\x99s Capacity To Fight 6/2009\n Corruption\nSIGAR-006A Review of U.S. Assistance for the Preparation and Conduct of Presidential and 3/2009\n Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan\n\n\n\n\nForensic Audits\nSIGAR is conducting three forensic audits, including two announced this quarter,\nas listed in Table C.4.\nTABLE C.4\n\n SIGAR FORENSIC AUDITS, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JULY 30, 2010\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-027A Forensic Review of Department of State Transaction Data Related to 6/2010\n Afghanistan Reconstruction\nSIGAR-026A Forensic Review of U.S. Agency for International Development 6/2010\n Transaction Data Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction\nSIGAR-022A Forensic Review of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund Transaction Data 2/2010\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 143\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\n APPENDIX D\n SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE\nFIGURE D.1\n SIGAR Investigations\nSIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: OPEN CASES, This quarter, SIGAR opened 26 new investigations and closed 14. The number\nAPRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JUNE 30, 2010 of open investigations is now 55. Of those open investigations, most involved\n contract fraud and corruption, as shown in Figure D.1. Of the 14 closed inves-\n tigations, most lacked prosecutive merit, or the allegations were unfounded, as\n Total: 55\n shown in Figure D.2.\n FIGURE D.2\n\n\n Contract Public SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: CLOSED CASES, APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JUNE 30, 2010\n Fraud Corruption\n 23 14\n Total: 14\n Procurement\n Fraud\n Lack of Prosecutive Merit 7\n 11\n Allegations Unfounded 5\n Other Merged with Other Investigation 1\n 7\n Not Reconstruction Money 1\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/19/2010. 2 4 6 8\n\n Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/19/2010.\n\n\nFIGURE D.3\n SIGAR Hotline\nSOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, Of the 62 Hotline complaints received last quarter, most were received by email\nAPRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JUNE 30, 2010 or telephone, as shown in Figure D.3. Of these complaints, many are closed,\n under coordination, or referred to other agencies, as shown in Figure D.4.\n Total: 62\n FIGURE D.4\n\n STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: APRIL 1\xe2\x80\x93JUNE 30, 2010\n\n E-mail Total: 62\n 37\n Phone\n Closed 19\n 21\n Coordinationa 15\n Referred Out 13\n Referred (Internal) 11\n Walk-in Written (not e-mail)\n Under Review 4\n 1 3\n 5 10 15 20\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/14/2010.\n a. Case has been reviewed, and SIGAR is obtaining additional information.\n Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 7/14/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 144 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX E\nABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\n\n ACRONYM OR\n ABBREVIATION DEFINITION\n ABP Afghan Border Police\n ADT Agribusiness Development Team\n AED Afghanistan Engineering District\n AEIC Afghan Electricity Information Center\n AGS Afghan Geological Survey\n AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission\n AIT Afghan International Trucking\n AIU Air Interdiction Unit\n ANA Afghan National Army\n ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police\n ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy\n ANP Afghan National Police\n ANSF Afghan National Security Forces\n APAP Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program\n ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund\n ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\n ATT Afghan Trade Transportation\n AUP Afghan Uniformed Police\n AVIPA Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture\n CAO Control and Audit Office (Afghan)\n CBD Community-Based De-mining\n CENTCOM Central Command (U.S.)\n CERP Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program\n CIGIE Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency\n CIPE Center for International Private Enterprise\n CM Capability Milestone\n CNPA Counter-Narcotics Police - Afghanistan\n CPC Criminal Procedure Code\n CPD Central Prison Directorate (Afghan)\n CRS Congressional Research Service\n CSSP Correctional System Support Program\n CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan\n CUAT Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Unit Assessment Tool\n DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)\n DoD Department of Defense (U.S.)\n DoD CN Department of Defense Counternarcotics (U.S)\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 145\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\n ACRONYM OR\n ABBREVIATION DEFINITION\n DoS Department of State (U.S.)\n DST District Support Team\n ESF Economic Support Fund\n EUPOL European Union Police Mission\n FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation\n FAS Foreign Agricultural Service (U.S.)\n FIRUP-K Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations of Kabul\n FMS Foreign Military Sales\n FPDD Focused Police District Development\n FY fiscal year\n FY 2010 Consolidated FY 2010 Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban\n Appropriations Act Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act\n FY 2010 DoD FY 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act\n Appropriations Act\n GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.)\n GDP gross domestic product\n GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan\n Global Global Strategies Group\n HCMS Hotline and Complaints Management System (SIGAR)\n HF high frequency\n HIG Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin\n HMMWV high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle\n HOO High Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption (Afghan)\n HQN Haqqani Network\n ICCTF International Contract Corruption Task Force\n ICE Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy (Afghan)\n IEC Independent Election Commission (Afghan)\n IED improvised explosive device\n IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems\n IJC ISAF Joint Command\n IMF International Monetary Fund\n INCB International Narcotics Control Board\n INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S)\n INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\n IOM International Organization for Migration\n ISAF International Security Assistance Force\n ISW Institute for the Study of War\n IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan\n JRAC Joint Regional ANSF Compound\n LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan\n MCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (Afghan)\n\n\n\n\n146 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\n ACRONYM OR\nABBREVIATION DEFINITION\n MCN Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (Afghan)\n MoD Ministry of Defense (Afghan)\n MoE Ministry of Education (Afghan)\n MoF Ministry of Finance (Afghan)\n MoI Ministry of Interior (Afghan)\n MoJ Ministry of Justice (Afghan)\n MoPH Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)\n NCO noncommissioned officer\n NGO nongovernmental organization\n NSP National Solidarity Program\n NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan\n O&M operations and maintenance\n OMB Office of Management and Budget (U.S.)\n OMLT Operational Mentor and Liaison Team\n OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)\n PACT Partnership for Action on Comprehensive Treatment\n PM/WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs - Office of Weapons Removal and\n Abatement (U.S.)\n PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team\n QST Quetta Shura Taliban\n RC Regional Command (ISAF)\n RC Window Recurrent Cost Window\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n TFBSO Task Force on Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan\n U.K. United Kingdom (adj.)\n U.S. United States (adj.)\n UN United Nations\n UNDP UN Development Programme\n UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees\n UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime\n USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\n USAID U.S. Agency for International Development\n USAID OIG USAID Office of Inspector General\n USFOR-A U.S. Forces - Afghanistan\n USGS U.S. Geological Survey\n USTDA U.S. Trade and Development Agency\n VHF very high frequency\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 147\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n1. Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/19/2010.\n2. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy: Appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign\n Relations,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010.\n3. Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/19/2010.\n4. P.L. 111-32, \xe2\x80\x9cSupplemental Appropriations Act 2009,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/24/2009.\n5. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n6. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n7. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n8. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/17/2010.\n9. DoD OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cDistribution of Funds and the Validity of Obligations for the Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund \xe2\x80\x93 Phase I,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/5/2007, accessed online 1/12/2010, p. 2.\n10. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n11. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n12. DoD, Financial Management Regulation, \xe2\x80\x9cCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program: Vol. 12, Ch. 27,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2009, p. 27-3.\n13. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/21/2010.\n14. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDefense Explanatory Statement,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 405.\n15. H.R. 3326, \xe2\x80\x9cDepartment of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 57.\n16. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n17. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n18. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n19. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n20. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n21. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n22. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense FY 2009 Supplemental Request Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities,\xe2\x80\x9d\n accessed online 4/13/2010.\n23. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010.\n24. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010.\n25. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2009.\n26. H.R. 111-366, \xe2\x80\x9cDepartments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 3.\n27. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010.\n28. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010.\n29. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.\n30. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010.\n31. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2010.\n32. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2010.\n33. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/30/2010, p. 53.\n34. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 16; World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cARTF: Administrator\xe2\x80\x99s Report on Financial Status as of June\n 21, 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 4.\n35. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 17.\n36. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 16.\n37. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 17.\n38. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 17.\n39. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2010, p. 17.\n40. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2010.\n41. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2010.\n42. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2010.\n43. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 20.\n44. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 5.\n45. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 7.\n46. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 8.\n47. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 9.\n48. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 1st Quarter Project Progress Report [2010],\xe2\x80\x9d p. 17.\n49. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Security Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010, p. 20.\n50. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cPress Conference at the Close of the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010; Afghan National Development\n Strategy, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan: Volume 1,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, pp. 36\xe2\x80\x9337.\n51. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n52. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2009, p. 28; NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010;\n OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 148 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n53. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, pp. 13\xe2\x80\x9314; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n54. White House, Statement by the President in the Rose Garden, 6/23/2010, accessed online 7/6/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n55. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cGeneral David H. Petraeus,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/4/2010.\n56. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, pp. 29\xe2\x80\x9330; ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cNews Release: Operation Moshtarak,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 2/13/2010, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n57. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, pp. 29\xe2\x80\x9330.\n58. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cMullen: Kandahar Vital to Success in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, accessed online 6/17/2010.\n59. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Media Roundtable with Gen. McChrystal NATO Headquarters in Brussels,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/10/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n60. U.K. Ministry of Defence, \xe2\x80\x9cBritish, Afghan Troops Push Back Taliban in Nad \xe2\x80\x99Ali,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/8/2010, accessed online 6/18/2010.\n61. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Security Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010, p. 20.\n62. SIGAR Audit-10-11, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/29/2010, p. ii.\n63. SIGAR Audit-10-11, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/29/2010, p. ii.\n64. SIGAR Audit-10-11, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/29/2010, p. 4; OSD, response to\n SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n65. SIGAR Audit-10-11, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/29/2010, p. 2; OSD, response to\n SIGAR data call, 7/21/2010.\n66. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n67. IJC, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010 and 4/1/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n68. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cFeatured News,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/17/2010, accessed online 6/17/2010.\n69. IJC, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010 and 4/1/2010.\n70. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, pp. 4\xe2\x80\x935, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n71. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, pp. 4\xe2\x80\x935, accessed online 6/21/2010;\n IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n72. NTM-A/CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010 and 4/1/2010.\n73. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cFacts and Figures: Afghan National Army,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n74. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n75. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan National Army on \xe2\x80\x98Glide Path\xe2\x80\x99 to Meeting Quality, Growth Goals,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n76. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan National Army on \xe2\x80\x98Glide Path\xe2\x80\x99 to Meeting Quality, Growth Goals,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR\n vetting, 7/21/2010.\n77. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n78. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n79. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the United States Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/30/2010.\n80. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cUniversity Offers Opportunities for Afghan Forces,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, accessed online 6/17/2010.\n81. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n82. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n83. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Foreign Military Sales\xe2\x80\x94What Took So Long?\xe2\x80\x9d 5/20/2010, accessed online 6/15/2010; DSCA, \xe2\x80\x9cForeign Military Sales,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n online 6/15/2010.\n84. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n85. NTM-A/CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010 and 4/1/2010.\n86. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cFacts and Figures: Afghan National Police,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010;\n87. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n88. SIGAR Audit Directorate, 6/20/2010.\n89. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n90. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/21/2010.\n91. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cNew Assignment Process for Afghan Police Cadets,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/20/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n92. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Training Center Adraskan: The Carabinieri/Marine Team,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010; OSD, response to SIGAR\n vetting, 7/21/2010.\n93. EU, \xe2\x80\x9cFactsheet on the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n94. EU, \xe2\x80\x9cEuropean Union Police Mission in Afghanistan Extended for 3 Years,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/18/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n95. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n96. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n97. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n98. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan National Police Living in Substandard Conditions,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/13/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n99. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan National Police Living in Substandard Conditions,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/13/2010, accessed online 6/21/2010.\n100. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n101. NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n102. DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2010 and 4/1/2010.\n103. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/30/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 149\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n104. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 5.\n105. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cKey Facts and Figures,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/6/2010, accessed online 7/11/2010.\n106. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 17.\n107. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cOperation Enduring Freedom U.S. Casualty Status,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, accessed online 7/20/2010.\n108. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 21.\n109. GAO, GAO-10-613R, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Security Environment,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/5/2010, pp. 2\xe2\x80\x933.\n110. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 22.\n111. The National Counterterrorism Center, \xe2\x80\x9cMullah Omar,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/16/2010.\n112. Institute for the Study of War, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operation, and Shadow Government,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 12/21/2009, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n113. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 23; American Forces Press Service, \xe2\x80\x9cMcChrystal Reports\n on Progress in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/17/2010, accessed online 7/15/2010.\n114. Institute for the Study of War, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operation, and Shadow Government,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 12/21/2009, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n115. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 52.\n116. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Media Roundtable with Gen. McChrystal NATO Headquarters in Brussels,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/10/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n117. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, pp. 23\xe2\x80\x9324.\n118. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRewards for Justice: Sirajuddin Haqqani,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/25/2009, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n119. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 26.\n120. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRewards for Justice: Sirajuddin Haqqani,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/25/2009, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n121. American Forces Press Service, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan, Coalition Forces Battle Taliban, Narcotics, Emphasize Training,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/19/2007.\n122. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRewards for Justice: Sirajuddin Haqqani,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/25/2009, accessed online 7/16/2010.\n123. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, pp. 26, 52; DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRewards for Justice,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/23/2010.\n124. ISAF, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n125. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 25.\n126. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 52.\n127. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 25.\n128. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n129. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, pp. 7\xe2\x80\x938.\n130. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 31, pp. 36-37; Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke,\n \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy: Appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010.\n131. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy: Appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign\n Relations,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010; SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the United States Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/30/2010, p.71.\n132. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cTranscript: British Army Maj. Gen. Phillip Jones Provides Update on Reintegration Process,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/1/2010.\n133. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cTranscript: British Army Maj. Gen. Phillip Jones Provides Update on Reintegration Process,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/1/2010.\n134. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cKabul Conference,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/9/2010; Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in New York, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Resolution Adopted at\n the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace Jirga,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n135. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, p. 4.\n136. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, pp. 5\xe2\x80\x936.\n137. Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in New York, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace\n Jirga,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010; GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, p. 7.\n138. Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in New York, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace\n Jirga,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n139. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 36.\n140. Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in New York, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace\n Jirga,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n141. Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN in New York, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace\n Jirga,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n142. GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cFirst Step Taken To Implement the Jirga Proposals,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n143. GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cTwenty-Eight Detainees Released Following Case Review by Special Committee,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/12/2010.\n144. GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cUN Security Council Agrees to Gradual Removal of Taliban Names from Black List,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/22/2010; UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cUN\n Security Council Press Conference in Kabul,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/24/2010.\n145. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cUN Security Council Press Conference in Kabul,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/24/2010.\n146. HOO, Web site, \xe2\x80\x9cCorruption in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/15/2010.\n147. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, pp. 10, 14, 23.\n148. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, pp. 10, 12.\n149. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, p. 10.\n150. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 150 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n151. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n152. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, pp. 20\xe2\x80\x9321.\n153. HOO, Web site, \xe2\x80\x9cWho We Are,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/15/2010.\n154. HOO, Web site, \xe2\x80\x9cWho We Are,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/15/2010.\n155. HOO, Web site, \xe2\x80\x9cAsset Registration Department,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/21/2010.\n156. SIGAR Audit 10-2, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s High Office of Oversight Needs Significantly Strengthened Authority, Independence, and Donor Support to\n Become an Effective Anti-Corruption Institution,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2009, p. ii.\n157. SIGAR Audit 10-8, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Control and Audit Office Requires Operational and Budgetary Independence, Enhanced Authority, and\n Focused International Assistance to Effectively Prevent and Detect Corruption,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/9/2010, p. ii.\n158. SIGAR Audit 10-8, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Control and Audit Office Requires Operational and Budgetary Independence, Enhanced Authority, and\n Focused International Assistance to Effectively Prevent and Detect Corruption,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/9/2010, p. ii.\n159. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s International Backers Ready To Provide Support for the Parliamentary Elections, Pledging To Fill the Funding Shortfall,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 5/11/2010.\n160. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n161. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cSupport to the Electoral Process,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/19/2010.\n162. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n163. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s International Backers Ready To Provide Support for the Parliamentary Elections, Pledging To Fill the Funding Shortfall,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 5/11/2010.\n164. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n165. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cSupport to the Electoral Process,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/19/2010.\n166. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n167. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n168. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cIEC Press Release on Announcement of Final Figures and Candidate List for Wolesi Jirga Elections,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/12/2010; CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-\n Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 13.\n169. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/17/2010.\n170. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/17/2010.\n171. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination: Verification of Supporters Lists,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/22/2010; UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Representative\xe2\x80\x99s Comments on the Electoral\n Vetting Process,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/23/2010.\n172. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cPress Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs; Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Ambassador to Afghanistan; and General Stanley\n McChrystal, Commander of ISAF and Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/10/2010.\n173. U.S. Embassy Kabul, \xe2\x80\x9cRemarks as Prepared by U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry to the Command and General Staff College Graduation\n Ceremony, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/11/2010.\n174. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cProvincial Reconstruction Teams: Program Overview,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/2/2010.\n175. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cDevelopment in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010; CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 6/7/2010, p. 85; Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, \xe2\x80\x9cKorean PRT To Officially Start Operation in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n176. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, \xe2\x80\x9cKorean PRT To Officially Start Operation in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n177. Embassy of the Netherlands, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Netherlands in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/16/2009, accessed online 7/2/2010; CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban\n Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, pp. 40, 85.\n178. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, \xe2\x80\x9cKorean PRT To Officially Start Operation in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n179. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cProvincial Reconstruction Teams,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/2/2010.\n180. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/5/2010; ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cDevelopment in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010.\n181. ISAF, \xe2\x80\x9cDevelopment in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010.\n182. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 18.\n183. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n184. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 17.\n185. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. i.\n186. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the United States Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/30/2010, p. 77; DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n187. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n188. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Minister of Interior Resigns,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010.\n189. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cFeatured News,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/12/2010.\n190. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 13.\n191. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n192. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 14.\n193. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n194. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n195. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Program,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n196. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 151\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n197. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n198. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n199. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cPerformance-Based Governors Fund,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n online 7/7/2010.\n200. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n201. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cPerformance-Based Governors Fund,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n202. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n203. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n204. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n205. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n206. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n207. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n208. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n209. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n210. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, p. 12.\n211. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n212. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n213. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n214. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n215. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cJSSP: Welcome,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n216. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n217. JSSP, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report: JSSP Provincial Justice Conferences, Follow-on Trainings and Quick Impact Projects,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/26/2008.\n218. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n219. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n220. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement from the President and President Karzai of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/12/2010.\n221. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010; INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n222. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n223. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n224. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 5.\n225. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010; INL, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Program Overview: CSSP,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n226. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n227. UK, Ministry of Defence, \xe2\x80\x9cHelmand PRT-led Projects,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/11/2010; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n228. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n229. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n230. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n231. INL, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n232. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n233. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n234. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n235. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010.\n236. UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9c2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile \xe2\x80\x93 Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 6/21/2010; AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and\n Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 3; CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 4.\n237. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 6.\n238. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010; DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n239. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 6.\n240. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, pp. 3, 6.\n241. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 3.\n242. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 4.\n243. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 5.\n244. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n245. AIHRC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation of Detention Centers and Prisons in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010, p. 2.\n246. UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cFifty Thousand Refugees Return this Year,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/23/2010; UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cVoluntary Return to Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010; NATO, Civil-Military\n Fusion Centre, Issue 7/10, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Humanitarian Assistance,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/23/2010, p. 3.\n247. DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n248. DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010; UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cUNHCR Seeks US$18 Million To Assist Afghan Refugees in Iran,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010; NATO, Civil-\n Military Fusion Centre, Issue 7/10, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Humanitarian Assistance,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/23/2010, p. 3.\n249. DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010.\n250. DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2010; WFP, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/23/2010; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cOne Woman Makes a Difference,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/13/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 152 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n251. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n252. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n253. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n254. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Governance and the Civilian Strategy: Appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign\n Relations,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/14/2010.\n255. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n256. SIGAR Audit 10-13, \xe2\x80\x9cGreater Coordination Needed in Meeting Congressional Directives to Address and Report on the Needs of Afghan Women\n and Girls,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/30/2010, p. iii.\n257. CRS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/7/2010, p. 4.\n258. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n259. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n260. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n261. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n262. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cCandidate Nomination: Female Candidates,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/17/2010.\n263. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n264. IWA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/7/2010, p. 13.\n265. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 1.\n266. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 3.\n267. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 3.\n268. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010, p. 57.\n269. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 6.\n270. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010, p. 57.\n271. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan National Development Strategy: Prioritization and Implementation Plan, Vol. 1,\xe2\x80\x9d presented at the Kabul Conference,\n July 19\xe2\x88\x9220, 2010, pp. 6, 7, 23, 28.\n272. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010, p. 58.\n273. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 3.\n274. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n275. EIU, \xe2\x80\x9cCountry Report: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 19.\n276. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010, 6/6/2010, p. 57.\n277. IMF, \xe2\x80\x9cIMF Country Report No. 10/171,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, p. 1.\n278. IMF, \xe2\x80\x9cIslamic Republic of Afghanistan- Program Note,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9/2010, p. 1.\n279. IMF, \xe2\x80\x9cIslamic Republic of Afghanistan- Program Note,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9/2010, pp. 1\xe2\x80\x932.\n280. IMF, \xe2\x80\x9cIMF Country Report No. 10/171,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, Appendix 1: Letter of Intent, p. 4.\n281. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 4.\n282. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 4.\n283. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 4.\n284. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/6/2010, p. 58.\n285. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 7.\n286. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 7.\n287. EIU, \xe2\x80\x9cCountry Report: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 12.\n288. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, pp. 7\xe2\x80\x938.\n289. Wall Street Journal, \xe2\x80\x9cFinance Minister Calls for Probe of Afghan Money Network,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/2/2010.\n290. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 77.\n291. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 77.\n292. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010, p. 18.\n293. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 2.\n294. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Bank South Asia Economic Update 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 58.\n295. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms,\xe2\x80\x9d pp. 3\xe2\x80\x934.\n296. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Security Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 24.\n297. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Security Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 24.\n298. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 2.\n299. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 2.\n300. London Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/29/2010; Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010.\n301. London Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cCommuniqu\xc3\xa9,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/29/2010.\n302. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cUnited Nations and Afghan Officials Unveil Programme for Kabul Conference,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/12/2010.\n303. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reforms,\xe2\x80\x9d p. i.\n304. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n305. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 153\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n306. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n307. ADB, \xe2\x80\x9cADB Allocates More Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/16/2010.\n308. Tolo TV, English transcript of interview with GIRoA Minister of Energy and Water, 6/3/2010.\n309. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan National Development Strategy: 1387\xe2\x80\x931391,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 78.\n310. SIGAR, Audit 10-4, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Energy Supply Has Increased, but an Updated Master Plan is Needed, and Delays and Sustainability Concerns\n Remain,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/15/2010, p. ii.\n311. SIGAR, Audit 10-4, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Energy Supply Has Increased, but an Updated Master Plan is Needed, and Delays and Sustainability Concerns\n Remain,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/15/2010, p. ii.\n312. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010, pp. 100\xe2\x80\x93101.\n313. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 101.\n314. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010, p. 101.\n315. NATO/Civil-Military Fusion Centre, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9/2010, p. 3.\n316. NATO/Civil-Military Fusion Centre, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9/2010, p. 3.\n317. USAID/Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cTarakhil Power Plant Handed Over to Afghan Government,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010.\n318. USAID/Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cTarakhil Power Plant Handed Over to Afghan Government,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010.\n319. USAID/Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cTarakhil Power Plant Handed Over to Afghan Government,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010.\n320. DoS, transcript, Remarks of U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, \xe2\x80\x9cTarakhil Power Plant Inauguration,\xe2\x80\x9d 8/5/2009, p. 1.\n321. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 2.\n322. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n323. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n324. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n325. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 12.\n326. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 9.\n327. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 10.\n328. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 10.\n329. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 10.\n330. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 1.\n331. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 2.\n332. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 2.\n333. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 3.\n334. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, pp. 19, 21.\n335. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, pp. 19, 21.\n336. UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d p. 14.\n337. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 1.\n338. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 2.\n339. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 3.\n340. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cReview of School and Health Clinic Buildings Completed Under the Schools and Clinics Construction and Refurbishment\n Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Report No. 5-306-10-002-0, 6/24/2010, p. 2.\n341. USGS, \xe2\x80\x9cAvailability of Water in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d Fact Sheet 2010-3037, 5/2010, pp. 1\xe2\x80\x932.\n342. USGS, response to SIGAR data call, 06/24/2010.\n343. USGS, \xe2\x80\x9cAvailability of Water in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d Fact Sheet 2010-3037, 5/2010, p. 1.\n344. USGS, \xe2\x80\x9cAvailability of Water in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d Fact Sheet 2010-3037, 5/2010, p. 3.\n345. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n346. DoS, Afghanistan and Pakistan Stabilization Strategy, 1/2010, p. i.\n347. GAO, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Agricultural\n Programs,\xe2\x80\x9d GAO-10-368, 7/2010, p. 33.\n348. USDA, FAS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Above-Average Wheat Production Outlook in 2010/11,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/11/2010, p. 1.\n349. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, p. 9.\n\n\n\n\n 154 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n350. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Audit Report No.\n 5-306-10-008-P, 4/20/2010, pp. 1\xe2\x80\x932.\n351. USAID OIG, \xe2\x80\x9cAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) Program,\xe2\x80\x9d Audit Report No.\n 5-306-10-008-P, 4/20/2010, p. 1.\n352. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n353. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n354. USGS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/24/2010; USGS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/24/2010.\n355. USGS, response to SIGAR data call, 6/24/2010.\n356. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DfID, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Mineral Deposits,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/27/2010.\n357. USGS, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cSignificant Potential for Undiscovered Resources in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/13/2007.\n358. USGS, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cSignificant Potential for Undiscovered Resources in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/13/2007, p. 1.\n359. USGS, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cSignificant Potential for Undiscovered Resources in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/13/2007, p. 1; USGS, response to SIGAR data call,\n 6/25/2010.\n360. USGS, Afghanistan Project Products, 3/31/2009, V.12.0.\n361. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n362. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n363. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n364. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n365. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n366. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n367. DoD/TFBSO, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2010.\n368. National Endowment for Democracy, CIPE, Charney Research, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Businesses\xe2\x80\x99 Attitudes on the Economy, Government, and Business\n Organizations,\xe2\x80\x9d pp. 4, 31, 34.\n369. National Endowment for Democracy, CIPE, Charney Research, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Businesses\xe2\x80\x99 Attitudes on the Economy, Government, and Business\n Organizations,\xe2\x80\x9d pp. 5\xe2\x80\x936.\n370. National Endowment for Democracy, CIPE, Charney Research, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Businesses\xe2\x80\x99 Attitudes on the Economy, Government, and Business\n Organizations,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 6.\n371. National Endowment for Democracy, CIPE, Charney Research, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Businesses\xe2\x80\x99 Attitudes on the Economy, Government, and Business\n Organizations,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 7.\n372. DoS/U.S. Embassy Kabul, \xe2\x80\x9cSigning of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/19/2010.\n373. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n374. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n375. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n376. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2010.\n377. MICT, \xe2\x80\x9cMinister\xe2\x80\x99s Statement,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/12/2010, accessed online 7/8/2010.\n378. MICT, \xe2\x80\x9cMinister\xe2\x80\x99s Statement,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/12/2010, accessed online 7/8/2010.\n379. USTDA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n380. USTDA, response to SIGAR data call, 7/15/2010.\n381. MICT, \xe2\x80\x9cMinister\xe2\x80\x99s Statement,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/12/2010, accessed online 7/8/2010.\n382. Data provided in Appendix B of this report.\n383. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/2010, p. 1.\n384. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Counter-narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, March 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/24/2010, pp. 1\xe2\x80\x932.\n385. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Counter-narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, March 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/24/2010, pp. 5\xe2\x80\x939.\n386. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Counter-narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, March 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/24/2010, pp. 9\xe2\x80\x9310.\n387. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cUNODC Predicts Stable Opium Crop in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/10/2010, accessed online 7/8/2010; UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the\n Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, p. 12.\n388. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Drug Report 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 12.\n389. UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, p. 12.\n390. Reuters, \xe2\x80\x9cMysterious disease blights Afghan opium poppy crop,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/13/2010, accessed online 6/28/2010.\n391. UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, p. 12.\n392. MCN/UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Opium Price Monitoring Monthly Report,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010, p. 2.\n393. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n394. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n395. USMC, \xe2\x80\x9cMarines, DEA, Afghan Police Nab Drug Kingpin in Early Morning Raid,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n396. USMC, \xe2\x80\x9cMarines, DEA, Afghan Police Nab Drug Kingpin in Early Morning Raid,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/1/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n397. UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, p. 12; DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\n and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/2010, p. 1.\n398. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanization and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/2010, p. 17; DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JULY 30, 2010 155\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n399. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 19; INL, \xe2\x80\x9cMedia Factsheet: Drug Use and Treatment in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010,\n accessed online 7/17/2010.\n400. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Ministry of Interior Drug Testing Police, Offering Drug Rehab,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/3/2010, accessed online 7/14/2010.\n401. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Ministry of Interior Drug Testing Police, Offering Drug Rehab,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/3/2010, accessed online 7/14/2010.\n402. UN News Service, \xe2\x80\x9cUN backs training on harmful use of narcotics in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/24/2010, accessed online 6/18/2010.\n403. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cProgramme in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2010, pp. 12\xe2\x80\x9316.\n404. INCB, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Production in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community \xe2\x80\x93 Statement by Professor Hamid Ghodse, President of\n the International Narcotics Control Board,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9\xe2\x80\x9310/2010, p. 1.\n405. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cWorld Drug Report 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 11.\n406. INCB, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Production in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community \xe2\x80\x93 Statement by Professor Hamid Ghodse, President of\n the International Narcotics Control Board,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9\xe2\x80\x9310/2010, p. 2.\n407. INCB, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Production in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community \xe2\x80\x93 Statement by Professor Hamid Ghodse, President of\n the International Narcotics Control Board,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9\xe2\x80\x9310/2010, p. 2.\n408. INCB, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Production in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community \xe2\x80\x93 Statement by Professor Hamid Ghodse, President of\n the International Narcotics Control Board,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9\xe2\x80\x9310/2010, p. 2.\n409. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/30/2010, p. 121.\n410. America.gov, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Envoy Holbrooke on U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/9/2010, accessed online 6/18/2010.\n411. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cUN Daily News: Two UN Agencies Team Up To Keep Afghan Villagers Away from Heroin Production,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/12/2010, accessed online\n 6/28/2010.\n412. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cUN Daily News: Two UN Agencies Team Up To Keep Afghan Villagers Away from Heroin Production,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/12/2010, accessed online\n 6/28/2010.\n413. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Joins Afghan Leaders for Grand Opening of Counter-narcotics Police Compound,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/18/2010, accessed online 6/22/2010.\n414. U.S. Air Forces Central, \xe2\x80\x9cAir Interdiction Unit Gets a Boost,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/13/2010, accessed online 6/22/2010.\n415. U.S. Air Forces Central, \xe2\x80\x9cAir Interdiction Unit Gets a Boost,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/13/2010, accessed online 6/22/2010.\n416. IOM, \xe2\x80\x9cKabul Counter-Narcotics Training Academy Doubles Capacity with EU, French Funding,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/6/2010, accessed online 7/6/2010.\n417. UN Security Council, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917 (2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 6/16/2010, p. 12.\n418. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Counter-Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, March 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/24/2010, accessed online 6/14/2010.\n419. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/16/2010.\n420. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 3.\n421. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 6.\n422. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, pp. 9\xe2\x80\x9310.\n423. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 10.\n424. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 17.\n425. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 18.\n426. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, Executive Summary,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/21/2010, p. 19.\n\n\n\n\n 156 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cCover Captions (clockwise from left):\nTribal and religious leaders gather in\nKandahar to discuss a range of local\nissues in June. Earlier in the month, the\nGIRoA hosted the three-day Peace Jirga,\nat which some 1,600 religious scholars,\ntribal leaders, civil society organization\nleaders, Afghan refugees, and govern-\nment representatives discussed ways to\nend violence and achieve lasting peace in\nAfghanistan. (U.S. Navy photo)\nAn Afghan soldier from the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s Close\nSupport Kandak participates in the first-ever\njoint engineering task with the 21st Regi-\nment of the British Army\xe2\x80\x99s Royal Engineers.\nThe combined teams are working on infra-\nstructure projects at Patrol Base Rahim in\nNahr-e Saraj, Helmand.\xc2\xa0(ISAF photo)\nFifteen Afghan women attend a workshop\nin journalism held at Herat University. The\nworkshop was promoted by the Herat PRT\nthis quarter. (ISAF photo)\nTwo Afghans measure grain to sell at\nthe Koru Chareh Bazaar in Marjah in May.\nSince the initial fighting to take the city\nfrom insurgent control, residents have\nreturned to their homes, and the market- An Afghan musician plays the rubab at the Anab Gull Poetry Festival in Farah in May. A rubab is a lute-like instrument\nplace\xe2\x80\x94the hub of the community\xe2\x80\x94has typically made from the trunk of a mulberry tree and animal skin. During the festival, male and female poets of all\nreopened. (U.S. Marine Corps photo, ages recited their poems to an audience of coalition forces, provincial leaders, and Afghans from the 10 districts of\nLCpl James Clark) Farah. The festival was the first of its kind in two years. (U.S. Air Force photo, SrA Rylan K. Albright)\n\x0cSIGAR\nSPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for JULY 30\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JULY 30, 2010\nFOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n Afghanistan Reconstruction 2010\n2221 South Clark Street\nSuite 800\nArlington, VA 22202-3712\n\n\n\n\n 3 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS\n\x0c"