jurisdiction: US

text:
David Payne, et ux v. Erie Insurance Exchange, et al.
 No. 38, September Term, 2014
 Automobile Liability Insurance – Omnibus Clause – Second Permittee. An “omnibus
 clause” in an automobile insurance policy defines the individuals protected by the policy and
 may extend liability coverage to one who uses the insured vehicle with the permission of an
 individual who is a named insured in the policy. A person who receives such permission is
 referred to as a “first permittee.” Coverage can also extend to another driver as a “second
 permittee” if that driver operates the vehicle within the scope of the permitted use and either
 (1) the first permittee is present in the automobile or (2) the second permittee otherwise
 operates the vehicle for the benefit of the first permittee. But coverage under the omnibus
 clause does not extend to that driver if the first permittee is not in the car and the driver
 deviates from the purpose for which the first permittee authorized the driver to operate the
 vehicle.
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CAL11-34091
 Argued: January 12, 2015
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 38
 September Term, 2014
 D AVID P AYNE, ET UX.
 v.
 E RIE INSURANCE E XCHANGE, ET AL.
 Barbera, C.J.
 Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts,
 JJ.
 Opinion by McDonald, J.
 Harrell, Battaglia, and Watts, JJ., concur.
 Filed: March 30, 2015
 Automobile insurance policies in Maryland cover persons named in the policy – the
 named insured – with respect to the vehicles identified in the policy. Coverage under a
 policy also can extend to some extent to other vehicles driven by the named insured and to
 other persons who drive the vehicles identified in the policy. The part of the policy that
 extends coverage to other persons is sometimes called the “omnibus clause.” In particular,
 an omnibus clause may extend insurance coverage to drivers who use a vehicle with the
 permission of the named insured.
 But what if the person with permission to use the car – the “first permittee” – enlists
 someone else to drive the car for the benefit of the first permittee? And what if that driver
 has previously been forbidden to drive the car by the named insured? Under what
 circumstances might an omnibus clause extend coverage to that driver as a “second
 permittee”?
 Prior appellate decisions have identified alternative scenarios under which an omnibus
 clause covers the operation of the vehicle on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a first permittee
 by a driver other than the first permittee. We hold that the omnibus clause in the policy at
 issue in this case would extend coverage to a second permittee who drove the car for the
 benefit of the first permittee at her request, regardless of whether the first permittee happened
 to be physically in the car at that time. The omnibus clause did not extend coverage to that
 driver, however, when he operated the car for a purpose other than that requested by the first
 permittee.
 I
 Background
 Automobile Insurance – Omnibus Clauses
 Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law makes automobile liability
 insurance a prerequisite to the registration of a motor vehicle in Maryland. Maryland Code,
 Transportation Article, §§17-103, 17-104. The law is designed to ensure that “those who
 own and operate motor vehicles registered in the State are financially able to pay
 compensation for damages resulting from motor vehicle accidents.” Enterprise Leasing Co.
 v. Allstate Insurance Co., 341 Md. 541, 549, 671 A.2d 509 (1996) (citation and internal
 quotation marks omitted). The public policy underlying the law “is to give innocent third
 parties a source of private sector insurance funds from which to obtain compensation for their
 injuries.” Enterprise Leasing Co., 341 Md. at 548-49. While insurance is linked to the
 registration of a vehicle and the law thus may be characterized as “vehicle-based,” 1 policies
 typically provide coverage for specified individual drivers, sometimes referred to as the
 “named insured.”
 Liability coverage is extended to certain other drivers of the insured vehicle by virtue
 of a policy provision known as the “omnibus clause.”2 Although there is no statutory
 1
 A. Janquitto, Maryland Motor Vehicle Insurance (3d ed. 2011), §2.8 at 38.
 2
 Although the term “omnibus” derives from the dative plural of omnis, the Latin word
 for “all,” an omnibus clause does not cover all potential drivers of the insured vehicle, as this
 case illustrates.
 2
 requirement that a policy include an omnibus clause, most policies contain one. A. Janquitto,
 Maryland Motor Vehicle Insurance (3d ed. 2011), §7.7 at 195. The clause usually extends
 coverage to designated categories of potential drivers of the insured vehicle, including family
 members and permissive users of the vehicle. Id. at 196. The extent to which a permissive
 user may authorize another individual to drive the vehicle and be covered by means of the
 omnibus clause of the policy has generated a number of reported appellate decisions. The
 facts of this case pose yet another factual scenario.
 The Car, the Driver, and the Policy
 At the time of the accident in February 2008 giving rise to this case, Respondents
 Alan and Maureen Dwyer lived in Cheverly in Prince George’s County. Also resident in
 their household was their 34-year old daughter, Karen Dwyer, and her three children. The
 Dwyers provided support for Karen, who was disabled as a result of lupus, and their
 grandchildren, two of whom attended a school a few blocks from their residence. At the
 time, Karen was in a relationship with the father of her children, Ameen R. Abdulkhalek.
 Alan Dwyer owned a 1995 Subaru Legacy. Karen Dwyer was the primary driver and
 had unrestricted use of the vehicle. Mr. Dwyer, however, had forbidden Mr. Abdulkhalek
 to drive the car. The Subaru was insured by a policy in Mr. Dwyer’s name with Respondent
 Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”). That policy included an omnibus clause in the section on
 liability coverage that read as follows:
 3
 “Anyone we protect” means:
 1. “you” or any “relative” using an “auto we insure,”
 2. any person using, or any person or organization legally
 responsible for the use of, an “owned auto we insure.”
 This use must be with “your” permission unless the use
 is by a “relative;” and
 3. any person or organization legally responsible for the
 use, by “you” or a “relative,” of any “nonowned auto.”
 This protection applies only if the person or organization
 does not own or hire the vehicle being used.
 (boldface in original). The policy elsewhere defined “you” and “your” as referring to the
 named insured identified in the declarations page of the policy. The policy defined the term
 “relative” to include a resident of the household related to the named insured by blood,
 marriage or adoption.
 The Accident
 On the afternoon of February 11, 2008, Karen Dwyer had fallen ill when it was time
 to pick up two of her children from school. Instead of going to the school for the children
 as she usually did, she gave Mr. Abdulkhalek the keys to the Subaru and asked him to
 retrieve the children – a two-minute drive from the home. According to Mr. Abdulkhalek,
 he then drove to a gas station on Route 202 before heading to the school. The record does
 not reveal the reason for Mr. Abdulkhalek’s trip to the gas station. According to Mr.
 Abdulkhalek, after stopping at the gas station, he made a U-turn on Route 202 and, as he
 4
 approached a stoplight, collided with a car occupied by Petitioners David and Claudia Payne.
 Had he driven straight to the school, he would not have been on Route 202.
 The Litigation
 In October 2010, the Paynes filed a tort action against Mr. Abdulkhalek, the Dwyers,
 and the Paynes’ own automobile insurer, GEICO General Insurance (with respect to
 uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits). Case No. CAL 10-34352 (Prince George’s
 County Circuit Court). A question arose as to whether any liability of Mr. Abdulkhalek was
 covered by the Erie insurance policy relating to the Subaru. On November 23, 2011, the
 Paynes filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a complaint for declaratory
 judgment naming the Dwyers, Mr. Abdulkhalek, Erie, and GEICO as defendants and seeking
 a determination as to whether coverage was afforded to Mr. Abdulkhalek by the Erie policy
 in connection with the accident. Case No. CAL 11-34091 (Prince George’s County Circuit
 Court). The complaint expressly invited the court to resolve the declaratory judgment action
 on cross motions for summary judgment. The tort action was stayed pending resolution of
 the insurance coverage question in the declaratory judgment action.
 The Paynes and Erie filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory
 judgment action. After a hearing, the Circuit Court determined that Mr. Abdulkhalek’s use
 of the vehicle was not covered under the omnibus clause of the policy. Based on that
 conclusion, the court granted Erie’s motion for summary judgment, and denied the Paynes’
 motion for summary judgment.
 5
 The Paynes appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. 216 Md. App. 39,
 84 A.3d 212 (2014). The Court concluded that “the coverage of the policy did not extend
 to [Mr.] Abdulkhalek, the ostensible second permittee, who was expressly prohibited from
 driving the [Subaru], who nonetheless did so without the necessary presence of the first
 permittee, and who in any event exceeded the scope of any even implicitly permitted use.”
 Id. at 58, 84 A.3d at 223. The Paynes filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this
 Court granted.
 II
 Discussion
 Standard of Review
 The Circuit Court decided this case on cross motions for summary judgment. Under
 the Maryland Rules, a circuit court may grant a motion for summary judgment if there is no
 dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
 Maryland Rule 2-501(f). The court is to consider the record in the light most favorable to
 the non-moving party and consider any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
 undisputed facts against the moving party. Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 435
 Md. 584, 598, 80 A.3d 269 (2013). When parties file cross motions for summary judgment,
 the court must assess each motion on its own merits. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. V.
 Callaway, 375 Md. 261, 278, 825 A.2d 995 (2003). Although the court is considering the
 same record, it might draw different inferences from the same basic facts in considering the
 6
 opposing motions. It is, of course, possible that a court would deny both motions in light of
 the different inferences drawn from the same facts. In other words, the resolution of cross
 motions for summary judgment is not a zero sum game. Both combatants may remain
 standing.
 Because a circuit court’s decision to award summary judgment turns on a question of
 law, not a dispute of fact, an appellate court is to review whether the circuit court was legally
 correct without according any special deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions.
 Mathews, 433 Md. at 598. We thus consider the legal question at issue anew – or, in the
 Latin phrase, de novo.
 Whether this Case can be Decided on Summary Judgment
 In this case the basic facts are undisputed and the legal question at issue in this
 declaratory judgment action may be susceptible to resolution on summary judgment, unless
 contrary inferences drawn from those facts would require denial of both motions for
 summary judgment.
 It is clear that Karen Dwyer’s use of the Subaru would be covered under the omnibus
 clause as she was both a relative resident in the household of the named insured and also had
 general unrestricted permission from the named insured – her father – to use the vehicle. But
 Mr. Abdulkhalek was neither a named insured in the Erie policy nor a “relative,” as defined
 in that policy. Thus, he would only be covered under the policy if he came within the
 7
 permissive use provision of the omnibus clause. Erie asserts that Mr. Abdulkhalek is not
 covered under the permissive use provision for two reasons.3
 First, it argues that an individual who is otherwise forbidden from driving an insured
 vehicle is only covered by the permissive use provision as a second permittee when the first
 permittee – Karen Dwyer, in this case – is physically in the vehicle at the time of the
 accident. There is no dispute that Ms. Dwyer was not in the vehicle when it collided with
 the Paynes’ car.
 Second, even if there could be coverage of a second permittee without the presence
 of the first permittee in the vehicle, Erie argues that a second permittee must be driving the
 car for the benefit of the first permittee and that, in this case, Mr. Abdulkhalek’s trip to the
 gas station that resulted in his driving the car to the scene of the accident on Route 202 was
 not for the benefit of the first permittee. Accordingly, even if Karen Dwyer could bring Mr.
 Abdulkhalek within the scope of the omnibus clause as a second permittee by authorizing
 him to drive the car for her benefit, there was no coverage for his deviation from the task that
 she had assigned him.
 . Thus, one of the two bases that Erie offers for summary judgment in its favor turns
 on a basic fact about which there is no disagreement – whether Karen Dwyer was in the car
 at the time of the accident. The second reason turns more on what inferences may be drawn
 3
 Alan and Maureen Dwyer adopt Erie’s view in their brief.
 8
 from the undisputed facts – whether Mr. Abdulkhalek was operating the car for the benefit
 of Ms. Dwyer at the time of the accident.
 The Criteria for Coverage as a Second Permittee under the Omnibus Clause
 Prior appellate decisions have identified alternative scenarios under which an omnibus
 clause covers the operation of the vehicle when a named insured authorizes another
 individual – the “first permittee” – to use the car, but forbids or limits the operation of the
 car by others. While the reported decisions in which courts have found coverage have
 involved factual situations in which the first permittee was physically present in the car at the
 time of the accident, the test articulated in those decisions does not require the presence of
 the first permittee. Rather, the courts have stated a test in the disjunctive which requires
 either that the first permittee be in the car while it is being operated by the second permittee
 or that the second permittee drive the car with the authorization of the first permittee for the
 first permittee’s benefit. Three of the leading decisions state this disjunctive test as follows:
 (1) Kornke
 [Even if the named insured expressly prohibited a second
 permittee from use of the automobile] the law permits coverage
 [under the omnibus clause] because a) the original permittee was
 riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of the
 accident; or b) because the second permittee was serving some
 purpose or advantage of the first permittee when the accident
 occurred.
 9
 Maryland Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kornke, 21 Md. App. 178, 196-97, 319 A.2d 603 (1974)
 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).4
 (2) Federal Insurance Co.
 The “general rule” that a permittee may not allow a third party
 to “use” the named insured’s car has generally been held not to
 preclude recovery under the omnibus clause where (1) the
 original permittee is riding in the car with the second permittee
 at the time of the accident, or (2) the second permittee, in using
 the vehicle, is serving some purpose of the original permittee.
 Federal Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 Md. 460, 471, 341 A.2d 399 (1975) (quoting 7 Am.
 Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance, §117 (1963)) (emphasis added).5
 (3) Bond
 [There are] two variations from the general rule denying
 coverage to the second permittee where the named insured
 expressly prohibited the first permittee from allowing others to
 drive the car. They are, one, where the first permittee was riding
 in the car, or was benefitted by its operation, and two, where the
 4
 In Kornke, the named insured gave his teenage son permission to drive the car, but
 forbade its use by others. When the car developed an electrical problem during one trip, the
 son repaired the problem but suffered an electrical shock, asked one of his passengers to take
 over the wheel, and an accident ensued. The court found that the insurance policy extended
 coverage to the driver as a second permittee under both tests set forth in the passage quoted
 in the text. 21 Md. App. at 197.
 5
 In Federal Insurance, the named insured – an automobile delivery company – had
 contracted with the first permittee to drive a car from New York to Florida. The first
 permittee had recruited a couple friends to accompany him and one of the passengers took
 a turn driving the car part way through the trip, during which there was an accident. Applying
 the two tests quoted in the text, this Court held that the friend was covered as a second
 permittee because, not only was the first permittee in the car at the time of the accident, but
 in taking a turn driving, the friend was also serving the purposes of both the named insured
 and the first permittee. 275 Md. at 472.
 10
 second permittee’s driving was occasioned by an emergency or
 a situation involving elements of urgency or necessity,
 benefitting the first permittee. Neither of these variations are
 applicable here, and we have in this case no occasion to consider
 their viability[.]
 Bond v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 289 Md. 379, 386 n.1, 424 A.2d
 765 (1981) (emphasis added).6
 In each of the cases, the court recognized two alternative situations in which coverage
 would extend to operation of the car by a person other than the first permittee – one where
 the first permittee is a passenger, though not driving the car, and a second in which the driver
 is operating the car for the benefit of the first permittee, even though the first permittee is not
 physically present in the car. See also Nationwide General Ins. Co. v. GEICO, 81 Md. App.
 104, 115, 566 A.2d 1117 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 72, 570 A.2d 864 (1990) (noting that
 Kornke and Bond alluded to two tests for coverage of a “second permittee” under the
 omnibus clause, only one of which involves the presence of the first permittee).
 The rationale for this disjunctive test would appear to be as follows. An omnibus
 clause that contemplates that the named insured may authorize the “use” of the vehicle by
 6
 In Bond, the named insured allowed her daughter, the first permittee, exclusive use
 of the car. On the day of the accident, the daughter picked up two friends to go to a dance
 in Essex. En route to the dance, they stopped at a bar, and the daughter left the car with her
 friends while she went off with a boyfriend. One of her friends then drove the car to a nearby
 carnival and was involved in an accident on the return trip. This Court held that the circuit
 court properly found that the car was not being used by anyone expressly or impliedly
 authorized to drive it at the time of the accident. In a footnote, the Court noted that the
 friend’s operation of the car was not covered by the omnibus clause under any of the criteria
 in the passage quoted in text above. 289 Md. at 386 n.1.
 11
 a first permittee extends coverage to a second permittee only if the use of the car is consistent
 with the scope of permission granted to the first permittee.7 The presence of the first
 permittee in the car at the time it is operated by another driver is an indication that it is being
 operated for the benefit of the first permittee – i.e., used by the first permittee, even if driven
 by someone else. One case has alluded to the notion that the first permittee remains the
 “master of the ship”8 even if the first permittee is not operating the car. However, there does
 not appear to be any requirement that the first permittee be actively directing the operation
 of the car – in Kronke, the first permittee was asleep in the car at the time of the accident.
 If the first permittee is not physically present in the car, it must be clear that the driver is
 operating the vehicle for the benefit of the first permittee – within the scope of the first
 permittee’s authorized use of the car – in order to have coverage as a second permittee.9
 7
 It has long been held that permission to “use” a vehicle encompasses more than
 permission to drive it oneself. See Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Mitnick, 100 Md. 604,
 607, 26 A.2d 393 (1942) (“use” in an omnibus clause includes “making use of it by riding
 while driven by another”); Melvin v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 232 Md. 476, 478-
 79, 194 A.2d 269 (1963) (“actual use” not limited to operation of vehicle “where the operator
 is the agent or servant of another and subject to his immediate and present direction and
 control”). When the named insured grants permission to the first permittee for a limited
 purpose, the same limitations also constrain the use of the vehicle by a second permittee. See
 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 154 Md. App. 604, 616,
 841 A.2d 46 (2004) (when named insured allowed his son – the first permittee – to use
 insured vehicle for the purpose of transporting his mother, omnibus clause did not extend
 coverage to a friend whom the son allowed to drive the car during a detour that the two took
 to Washington, D.C., without the mother).
 8
 Mitnick, 180 Md. at 607.
 9
 The concurring opinion expresses a concern that, absent a requirement that the first
 (continued...)
 12
 Erie argues that the two tests should be combined and considered as conjunctive rather
 than disjunctive. Erie would rewrite each of the passages quoted above to replace the word
 “or” in each instance with the word “and.” But a little word can make a big difference.
 Under Erie’s position, an innocent injured third party would have no recourse against the
 insurance policy that covered the car that caused the accident, even if the driver was driving
 the car at the request of, and for the benefit of, an authorized user of the vehicle. Rather, the
 innocent injured party would have to seek compensation from the driver alone, whatever
 uninsured motorist benefits the injured party might happen to have, or the uninsured
 component of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund. In our view, this is at odds with
 the public policy underlying the compulsory insurance law and with the consistent
 interpretation of omnibus clauses such as the one in the Erie policy.10
 9
 (...continued)
 permittee be present in the car, there will be a “slippery slope” leading to coverage of “third,
 fourth, or even fifth permittees.” Concurring slip op. at pp. 18-19 & n.4. It is true that, under
 the second alternative of the Kornke/Federal Insurance/Bond formulation, there is the
 potential that different individuals could drive the vehicle at the direction of the first
 permittee, but in order to have coverage under the omnibus clause, each such driver would
 have to be operating the vehicle for the benefit of the first permittee – the individual whose
 “use” of the vehicle was authorized by the named insured. Each such driver would thus be
 another second permittee – just as there may be multiple individuals who could drive the
 vehicle at the direction of the first permittee with the first permittee in the car. In both cases,
 the driver is a second permittee covered by the omnibus clause. The imagined “third, fourth
 or fifth permittee” is simply an alternative second permittee, as there is only one driver at any
 particular time. There is no “slippery slope.”
 10
 The Court of Special Appeals adopted Erie’s position as one of its alternative
 reasons for affirming summary judgment in Erie’s favor. The court’s scholarly opinion
 draws an analogy to a classic double play combination of the Chicago Cubs, in which a
 (continued...)
 13
 Application to Mr. Abdulkhalek’s Trip
 The omnibus clause in the Erie policy contemplates that the named insured may
 authorize the “use” of the vehicle by others. The undisputed facts are that Mr. Dwyer had
 granted Karen Dwyer – the first permittee – unrestricted use of the Subaru. Indeed, as a
 relative of the named insured who lived in his household, Karen Dwyer was covered under
 the omnibus clause in the Erie policy even without Mr. Dwyer’s explicit permission. Thus,
 there is no question that it was within the scope of Karen Dwyer’s permitted use of the car
 to use it to pick up her children from school.
 On the day of the accident, Karen Dwyer asked Mr. Abdulkhalek to pick up two of
 their children from an elementary school two blocks from the Dwyer house. Mr.
 Abdulkhalek, however, went elsewhere – to a gas station that led him to the intersection
 where he collided with the Paynes’ car. On this record, the purpose of the trip to the gas
 station is a bit of a mystery, but there is no indication that it was for the benefit of Karen
 Dwyer. One cannot say that, on the basis of the undisputed facts, there was coverage of Mr.
 10
 (...continued)
 baseball passed from shortstop Joe Tinker to second baseman Johnny Evers to first baseman
 Frank Chance to complete a double play. 216 Md. App. at 40-41. In other words, much as
 the baseball had to physically end up with Chance for the batter to be called out, in the view
 of the Court of Special Appeals there would be no insurance coverage for a second permittee
 under an omnibus clause unless the first permittee is physically in the car while it is driven
 by the second permittee. Under our opinion, a more apt analogy in this case might be the
 infield fly rule, under which there would be no need for Tinker – or Evers – to get the ball
 to Chance to have the batter called out. Nor is there any need to belabor the analogy. More
 information on the infield fly rule can be found at Note, The Common Law Origins of the
 Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1474 (1975).
 14
 Abdulkhalek under the omnibus clause as a matter of law. The Circuit Court was clearly
 correct in its decision to deny the Paynes’ motion for summary judgment
 As noted above, the fact that the Paynes’ motion for summary judgment fails does not
 necessarily mean that Erie’s opposing motion for summary judgment succeeds. In assessing
 the Paynes’ motion, we indulged all reasonable inferences in favor of Erie. One might
 reasonably infer that a trip to a gas station is inconsistent with carrying out a request to take
 a two-block trip to an elementary school to pick up children. But in assessing Erie’s motion,
 the winds blow in the opposite direction and all inferences are to be taken in favor of the
 Paynes.11 Nevertheless, the inferences must be reasonable and not simply speculation.
 Although Mr. Abdulkhalek potentially had coverage under the omnibus clause as a
 second permittee, he did not have the same discretion as Karen Dwyer, the first permittee,
 to use the car as he pleased. In her absence, he was covered only to the extent that he drove
 for her benefit. In the end, what we know from this record is that Mr. Abdulkhalek was
 asked to drive to the elementary school for the benefit of Karen Dwyer, the first permittee
 (there is no suggestion in the record before us that she sent him on any other errand); that he
 drove to a gas station instead of the elementary school; and that he was in an accident shortly
 after he left the gas station. We might speculate that he went to the gas station to benefit Ms.
 Dwyer; that even if it was not for the benefit of Ms. Dwyer, he had returned to that purpose
 11
 Cross motions for summary judgment may be contrasted to a bench trial, such as
 occurred in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, 154 Md. App.
 at 608, in which a circuit court may make factual findings and need not indulge inferences
 in favor of one party or the other.
 15
 when the accident intervened; or that the apparently circuitous route he was taking to the
 school was the best he knew. The problem is that we cannot root any of these musings in the
 record before us. They do not qualify as reasonable inferences that allow the Paynes to
 escape summary judgment. We thus agree with the second alternative holding of the Court
 of Special Appeals that this deviation from his assigned task took Mr. Abdulkhalek outside
 the coverage of the omnibus clause. See 216 Md. App. at 54-58.
 III
 Conclusion
 An omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy that extends liability coverage
 to a permissive user of an insured vehicle also encompasses a driver who operates the vehicle
 for the benefit of an individual who has permission from the named insured to use the car.
 Coverage does not extend to that driver if, as in this case, the driver deviates from the
 purpose for which he was authorized to drive the car for the benefit of first permittee. We
 thus hold that the Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Erie.
 J UDGMENT OF THE C OURT OF S PECIAL A PPEALS
 A FFIRMED. C OSTS TO BE P AID BY P ETITIONER.
 16
 Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
 Case No. CAL11-34091
 Argued: January 12, 2015
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 38
 September Term, 2014
 ______________________________________
 DAVID PAYNE, ET UX.
 v.
 ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, ET AL.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Concurring Opinion by Watts, J., which Harrell
 and Battaglia, JJ., join
 ______________________________________
 Filed: March 30, 2015
 Respectfully, I concur in the judgment only.1 I would hold that, where a named
 insured has expressly prohibited a second permittee from driving a vehicle, coverage under
 an omnibus clause may extend to the second permittee only if, at the time of the accident:
 (1) the first permittee is in the vehicle; (2) the second permittee is using the vehicle for
 some purpose or benefit of the first permittee; and (3) the use of the vehicle is within the
 scope of permission for use that the named insured granted.
 After a thorough review of the relevant case law, I am convinced that Maryland
 precedent firmly establishes that coverage under an omnibus clause of an automobile
 liability insurance policy does not extend to a second permittee who is expressly forbidden
 from driving the insured vehicle and who gets into an accident when the first permittee is
 not in the vehicle.
 In Md. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Kornke, 21 Md. App. 178, 179, 193, 197, 319 A.2d 603,
 604, 612, 614 (1974), the Court of Special Appeals held that coverage under an omnibus
 clause of an automobile liability insurance policy extended to a second permittee where the
 named insured of the vehicle had restricted use of the vehicle to a first permittee, but the
 first permittee was in the vehicle at the time of the accident. That Court described omnibus
 clauses as follows:
 The so-called ‘omnibus clause,’ required by statute in a number of states, is
 in addition to the general insuring clause and extends the protection of the
 automobile liability insurance policy to any person using the insured vehicle
 provided the use (or ‘actual use’) is by the named insured or with his
 permission or consent. The clause, irrespective of language variations,
 1
 I fully join the Majority’s conclusion that Ameen R. Abdulkhalek is not covered
 under the insurance policy because he was not using the vehicle for the first permittee’s
 benefit at the time of the accident. See Maj. Slip Op. at 15-16.
 clothes the named insured with broad authority to constitute other persons as
 ‘additional insureds.’
 Id. at 180, 319 A.2d at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
 In Kornke, id. at 181-82, 319 A.2d at 605, Kornke, the named insured, gave his
 teenage son permission to drive the car for purposes of going to school and work, and the
 son drove the car “almost every day” for those purposes. The son was “under explicit
 instructions not to allow anyone else to drive the [] car.” Id. at 182, 319 A.2d at 606. One
 day, with his father’s permission, the son drove the car, with three of his friends, to a farm.
 Id. at 182, 319 A.2d at 606. On the way to the farm, the car experienced an electrical
 problem, and the son stopped the car and received an electric shock while fixing the
 problem, causing his right arm to temporarily go numb. Id. at 182, 319 A.2d at 606. One
 of the son’s friends then took over driving, with the son as a passenger in the car, and an
 accident occurred. Id. at 183, 319 A.2d at 606. The Court of Special Appeals indicated
 that the question for decision was whether the car was being used with the father’s
 permission given the father’s “express prohibition . . . against allowing anyone else to
 drive.” Id. at 183-84, 319 A.2d at 606-07.
 That Court began by observing that the policy’s omnibus clause extended coverage
 to “any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally
 responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named
 insured or such spouse or with the permission of either.” Id. at 180-81, 319 A.2d at 605
 (emphasis added). For guidance, the Court of Special Appeals relied on Hardware Mut.
 Cas. v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A.2d 393 (1942) and Melvin v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 232
 -2-
 Md. 476, 194 A.2d 269 (1963), “neither of which . . . involved the question of coverage
 vel non of a second permittee.” Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 184, 319 A.2d at 607. 2 After
 reviewing Mitnick, Melvin, and other relevant authorities, the Court of Special Appeals
 reached the following six conclusions concerning construction of omnibus clauses:
 1) Where coverage is extended by the omnibus clause only to persons using
 the vehicle with the permission of the named insured (or other designated
 person) coverage depends upon the scope of the permission granted.
 2) In determining whether the scope of permission has been exceeded,
 Maryland has not adopted the strict rule, the liberal rule, or the minor
 deviation rule. However, Melvin supports by implication the minor
 deviation rule.
 3) ‘Actual’ use with the permission of the named insured is ‘the particular
 use contemplated when permission is granted and relied on.’
 4) Such use and the operation of the car at the time of accident are not
 ‘synonymous,’ for using a car by a borrower includes riding in it while
 another drives, at least where the former remains ‘the custodian of the
 2
 In Mitnick, 180 Md. at 605-07, 26 A.2d at 393-94, the first permittee was a
 passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the omnibus clause extended
 coverage to any person using the vehicle provided “the actual use is with the permission of
 the named insured[,]” and we held that “using” a vehicle includes riding in it while another
 drives. We explained: “[U]sing a car in the ordinary acceptation of the words seems clearly
 to include a borrower’s making use of it by riding while driven by another. [The first
 permittee] was still the director of the enterprise, still the custodian of the instrumentality
 confided to [her] keeping, still the master of the ship.” Id. at 607, 26 A.2d at 394 (citations
 and internal quotation marks omitted) (last alteration in original).
 Similarly, in Melvin, 232 Md. at 477-79, 194 A.2d at 270-71, the first permittee was
 a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the omnibus clause provided
 coverage to individuals using the vehicle “provided the actual use thereof is with the
 permission of the named insured[,]” and we stated: “We see no reason to limit the meaning
 of the words ‘actual use’ to the operation of a vehicle, where the operator is the agent or
 servant of another and subject to his immediate and present direction and control.”
 Significantly, in both Mitnick and Melvin, in holding that “use” includes riding
 while another drives, key to our decisions was that the first permittees were in the vehicles
 at the time of the accidents; the first permittees were still the masters of the ship, and the
 second permittees were subject to the first permittees’ immediate direction and control.
 -3-
 instrumentality confided to his keeping,’ or the latter ‘is the agent or servant
 of another and subject to his immediate and present direction and control.’
 5) There is no case in Maryland squarely addressing the issue of whether a
 restriction upon the operation of the car, i.e., a prohibition against permitting
 a third person to drive it, is not a factor in determining whether the operation
 of the car is in accordance with the particular use contemplated when
 permission was granted and relied on.
 6) Nevertheless, the thrust of Maryland decisions is that in determining
 whether the operation is within the permission required by the omnibus
 clause ‘one must examine the total facts,’ and the facts of paramount
 significance respecting a clause for permitted use (as against permitted
 operation) do not pertain to the identity of the driver but to whether at the
 time of the accident the operation of the car was for a purpose germane to the
 permission granted, whether it was for the convenience of the named insured
 or the first permittee, and whether the latter was present in the car at the time
 of the accident.
 Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 191-92, 319 A.2d at 611. The Court of Special Appeals observed
 that the sixth conclusion was “in accord with the large majority of cases cited by the Court
 of Appeals in Mitnick and Melvin[.]” Id. at 192-93, 319 A.2d at 611 (italics added).
 Based on these conclusions, the Court of Special Appeals held:
 [T]he total facts in this case support a finding that [the son] was still ‘using’
 his father’s car, even though [the son’s friend] was driving the car at the time
 of the accident, and that the ‘actual use’ was with the permission of [the
 father]. Certainly, at the time of the accident, the operation of the car by the
 second permittee was for a purpose germane to the permission granted by
 father to son; it was, at the very least, for the convenience of the first
 permittee (if not, indeed, a matter of necessity in the light of the son’s
 testimony), and, of course, the first permittee was present in the car at the
 time of the accident.
 Id. at 193, 319 A.2d at 612. As to the circumstance that the father had prohibited the
 operation of the car by any person other than his son, the Court of Special Appeals
 concluded that such a prohibition did not preclude extending coverage to the son’s friend
 -4-
 under the omnibus clause. Id. at 194, 319 A.2d at 612. That Court explained:
 [A] distinction is validly made between situations where the law denies
 coverage under the omnibus clause because the named insured expressly
 prohibited the use of the automobile by any person other than his permittee
 and a second permittee had used the car solely for his own benefit; and, on
 the contrary, where the law permits coverage because a) the original
 permittee was riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of the
 accident; or b) because the second permittee was serving some purpose or
 advantage of the first permittee when the accident occurred.
 Without being required to choose between the ‘liberal rule’ and the
 moderate or ‘minor deviation’ rule, [] we hold that as both of the above tests
 were satisfied in the instant case, then upon either rule the Kornke automobile
 was being used within the scope of the permission granted by the named
 insured when the accident occurred, and that, therefore, [the son’s friend]
 was an insured under the omnibus clause of the . . . policy issued to [the
 father].
 Id. at 196-97, 319 A.2d at 613-14 (citations and some paragraph breaks omitted).
 A year after Kornke, in Fed. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 Md. 460, 472, 341
 A.2d 399, 406-07 (1975), this Court held that coverage under an omnibus clause of an
 automobile liability insurance policy extended to a second permittee where the first
 permittee was in the vehicle at the time of the accident. In that case, Direct Way Auto
 Shippers, a company that delivered vehicles for its customers from New York to Florida,
 hired a driver, Frank, to deliver a vehicle to Florida. Id. at 463-64, 341 A.2d at 402. Despite
 Direct Way not having granted Frank permission to have other drivers or passengers on the
 trip, Frank took his girlfriend and another friend, Straz, on the trip. Id. at 464, 341 A.2d at
 403. Straz was driving the vehicle when an accident occurred in Maryland. Id. at 464-65,
 341 A.2d at 403.
 We observed that the critical question was whether Frank and Straz were insured
 -5-
 under Direct Way’s insurance policy with Allstate. Id. at 470, 341 A.2d at 405. We held
 that Frank was covered under the Allstate insurance policy, explaining:
 Since Frank, the first permittee of Direct Way, was in the car while
 enroute to Florida at the time of the accident, it was still being used for the
 purpose for which it was given to Frank. Because Frank was the ‘custodian
 of the instrumentality confided’ to him, it is clear under the Maryland cases
 that he was using the automobile. Accordingly, Frank is an insured under
 the Allstate policy.
 Id. at 470-71, 341 A.2d at 406. As to Straz, we observed that, given the language of the
 Allstate insurance policy, he would be covered as a second permittee “only if he was using
 the automobile with the implied permission of Direct Way.” Id. at 471, 341 A.2d at 406.
 To that end, we stated:
 The ‘general rule’ that a permittee may not allow a third party to ‘use’ the
 named insured’s car has generally been held not to preclude recovery under
 the omnibus clause where (1) the original permittee is riding in the car with
 the second permittee at the time of the accident, or (2) the second permittee,
 in using the vehicle, is serving some purpose of the original permittee.
 Id. at 471, 341 A.2d at 406 (quoting 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance, § 117 (1963)).
 Thus, we held that Straz was covered under the Allstate insurance policy as a second
 permittee, explaining:
 [T]here was implied permission from Direct Way to Frank to subdelegate the
 driving to Straz, in light of these facts: the first permittee (Frank) was a
 passenger in the car and had control and direction of the car; subdelegation
 of permission to drive was not specifically forbidden; the second permittee
 (Straz) was serving some purpose of Frank; and both Straz and Frank, by
 driving the [] vehicle to Florida, were serving a purpose of the named insured
 (Direct Way). Consequently, Straz is also an insured under the omnibus
 clause of the Allstate policy.
 Id. at 472, 341 A.2d at 406-07.
 In Bond v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 289 Md. 379, 385-86, 382, 424 A.2d 765,
 -6-
 768-69, 767 (1981), we held that coverage under an omnibus clause of an automobile
 liability insurance policy did not extend to a second permittee where the named insured
 had expressly prohibited the first permittee from allowing the second permittee to drive the
 car and the first permittee was not in the car at the time of the accident. The named insured
 permitted her daughter to “enjoy near exclusive use of the” car, but expressly instructed
 the daughter not to allow anyone else, including the daughter’s friend, to drive the car. Id.
 at 382-83, 424 A.2d at 767. The car was insured under a policy that provided coverage to
 the “insured,” which included “any other person using such automobile with the permission
 of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other
 actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission.” Id. at 381, 424 A.2d at 766.
 One day, the daughter permitted her friend to drive the car, and an accident occurred. Id.
 at 382, 424 A.2d at 767.
 We stated “that the principal focus of our inquiry [was] on the relationship between
 the named insured (the mother) and the first permittee ([the daughter]) and not . . . between
 the first and second permittees.” Id. at 385, 424 A.2d at 768. We held that the daughter’s
 friend was not covered under the insurance policy, and explained:
 [O]nce the trier of fact determined . . . that the named insured “had
 specifically restricted her daughter [] from allowing anybody, including [the
 daughter’s friend], to drive the car,” and that this express ban was operative
 when the accident occurred, there is no escape from [the trial court]’s further
 conclusion that “you cannot imply something in face of an express statement
 to the contrary.” This is so because implied permission arises from the use
 of circumstantial evidence showing a course of conduct indicative of mutual
 acquiescence or a lack of objection signifying permission and, thus, it flows
 by inference to fill the void created by the absence of an express statement.
 But when an uncountermanded express statement exists, there is no vacuum
 to be filled. The vast majority of our sister jurisdictions considering the
 -7-
 matter have reached a decision which is in accord with the view we express.
 Id. at 385-86, 424 A.2d at 768-69 (citations and footnote omitted). We added, however:
 [There are] two variations from the general rule denying coverage to
 the second permittee where the named insured expressly prohibited the first
 permittee from allowing others to drive the car. They are, one, where the
 first permittee was riding in the car, or was benefited by its operation, and
 two, where the second permittee’s driving was occasioned by an emergency
 or a situation involving elements of urgency or necessity, benefiting the first
 permittee. Neither of these variations are applicable here, and we have in
 this case no occasion to consider their viability[.]
 Id. at 386 n.1, 424 A.2d at 769 n.1.
 Eight years later, in Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 81 Md. App.
 104, 107, 566 A.2d 1117, 1118 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 72, 570 A.2d 864 (1990), the
 Court of Special Appeals held that a second permittee was covered under the omnibus
 clause of an automobile liability insurance policy because the second permittee was a
 permitted user of the vehicle, the actual use of the vehicle was within the scope of that
 permission, and, significantly, the first permittee was in the vehicle at the time of the
 accident. The named insured allowed his daughter to use the vehicle for transportation to
 and from school, and expressly instructed the daughter that nobody else, including her
 boyfriend, was allowed to drive the vehicle. Id. at 106, 108, 566 A.2d at 1118. The
 omnibus clause provided to coverage to the named insured; his or her relatives; “any other
 person using the auto with [the named insured’s] permission” provided that “[t]he actual
 use [was] within the scope of that permission”; and “any other person . . . for his . . . liability
 because of acts or omissions of an insured under” the other categories of coverage. Id. at
 108, 566 A.2d at 1119 (emphasis omitted). One day, on the way to school, the daughter’s
 -8-
 boyfriend drove the car, in which the daughter was a passenger, and an accident occurred.
 Id. at 106, 566 A.2d at 1118.
 In evaluating the case, the Court of Special Appeals distinguished Bond, noting that:
 (1) “[u]nlike Kornke and the instant case, the first permittee was not present in the
 automobile when the Bond accident occurred”; and (2) “[t]he omnibus clause at issue in
 Bond contained language which limited the ‘actual operation’ to the scope of such
 permission.” Nationwide, 81 Md. App. at 113-14, 566 A.2d at 1121-22. The first
 distinction was critical to that Court’s holding, as it explained:
 [T]he instant case falls within the first proposed exception alluded to in Bond,
 and meets the Kornke “tests” since [the daughter], the first permittee, was in
 the car with [the second permittee, her boyfriend] and was benefitted by its
 operation. . . . Further, the present case is factually quite similar to Kornke
 and unlike Bond since the first permittee accompanied the second permittee.
 Nationwide, id. at 115, 566 A.2d at 1122. The Court of Special Appeals observed that its
 holding was in accord with other jurisdictions, explaining that “the broad view is that[,]
 even where the first permittee is expressly prohibited from allowing[] others to drive[,]
 coverage ordinarily extends to a second permittee if the first permittee is a passenger in the
 vehicle at the time of the accident.” Id. at 117, 566 A.2d at 1123 (citation omitted). At the
 conclusion of the opinion, the Court of Special Appeals stated: “[T]his case, like Kornke,
 fits the first exception alluded to in Bond since the first permittee was both present and
 benefitted by the second permittee’s driving.” Id. at 123, 566 A.2d at 1126.
 More recently, in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 154 Md. App. 604,
 610, 616, 841 A.2d 46, 49, 53 (2004), the Court of Special Appeals held that a second
 permittee was not covered under the omnibus clause of an automobile liability insurance
 -9-
 policy even though the first permittee was in the vehicle at the time of the accident because,
 at the time of the accident, the second permittee was not operating the vehicle within the
 scope of permission that the named insured granted. The automobile liability insurance
 policy defined “insured” as “[y]ou and any person while using a covered automobile with
 your permission” and “[a]ny person . . . legally responsible for the use of a covered
 automobile provided its actual use is by you or with your permission.” Id. at 610, 841 A.2d
 at 49. One day, the named insured instructed his son to use the car to take his mother to
 work and then bring the car back. Id. at 607, 841 A.2d at 48. After leaving the named
 insured’s house with the car, the son picked up his friend and his mother, and the son
 dropped off his mother at work. Id. at 607-08, 841 A.2d at 48. After dropping off his
 mother, the son and his friend decided to visit the friend’s cousin in Washington, D.C.;
 because the son was not familiar with the area, he let his friend drive. Id. at 608, 841 A.2d
 at 48. While driving the vehicle, the friend struck a parked car, which was propelled into
 a pedestrian. Id. at 608, 841 A.2d at 48.
 The Court of Special Appeals observed that there was “ample evidence” that the
 father and son had a “mutual understanding” that only the son would drive the car. Id. at
 611, 841 A.2d at 50. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals held:
 Because [the son] was prohibited from allowing others to drive his father’s
 vehicle, and because the vehicle was on the way back from an unauthorized
 detour when the accident occurred, [the son’s friend] was not covered by the
 [insurance] policy. Moreover, as we shall see, appellant’s claim that the
 [trial] court erroneously relied on Bond and not Kornke in deciding this case
 is without merit, as it is Bond which is applicable to the instant case and
 Kornke which is distinguishable from it.
 Id. at 612-13, 841 A.2d at 51. Relying on Bond, the Court of Special Appeals explained:
 - 10 -
 “[T]he owner’s insurance company is not the primary insurer in instances where the owner
 of the covered vehicle has not given express or implied permission to the second permittee
 to drive his car.” Id. at 614, 841 A.2d at 52. That Court concluded:
 Even though [the friend] was driving because he reportedly knew the
 D.C. area better than [the son], the operation of [the named insured]’s car
 was not “for a purpose germane to the permission granted.” There is no
 dispute that [the son] was given permission to use the car only for the purpose
 of taking his mother to work. After completing that task, [the son] and [the
 friend] decided, without consulting [the named insured], to continue on into
 the District of Columbia to pick up [the friend]’s cousin. Since [the son] was
 not granted permission to use the car for any other purpose than to take his
 mother to work, the use of the car at the time of the accident was outside the
 scope of the permission granted. Therefore, the [trial] court did not err in
 finding that [the friend] was not covered under the [insurance] policy.
 Id. at 616, 841 A.2d at 53 (citation omitted).
 After examining the principles and authorities above, I would hold that, where a
 named insured expressly prohibits a second permittee from driving the vehicle, coverage
 under an omnibus clause may extend to the second permittee only if, at the time of the
 accident: (1) the first permittee is in the vehicle; (2) the second permittee is using the
 vehicle for some purpose or benefit of the first permittee; and (3) use of the vehicle is
 within the scope of permission for use that the named insured granted. In applying this
 holding, I would start by identifying the key players and the scope of permission. Dwyer
 was the named insured. Karen was the first permittee, as Dwyer permitted Karen to drive
 and use the Subaru. Abdulkhalek was the second permittee, as Karen gave him the keys
 to the Subaru and tasked him with picking up their children from school. As to the scope
 of permission between the named insured and the first permittee, see Bond, 289 Md. at
 385, 424 A.2d at 768 (“[T]he principal focus . . . i[s] on the relationship between the named
 - 11 -
 insured . . . and the first permittee . . . and not . . . between the first and second permittees.”),
 the record demonstrates that Dwyer permitted Karen to drive and use the Subaru without
 restriction; in other words, Karen’s use of the Subaru was not limited to certain purposes
 or tasks, but rather included use for any purpose, including picking up her children from
 school. As Abdulkhalek knew, however, Dwyer expressly prohibited him from driving the
 Subaru; in other words, Dwyer’s permission to Karen, although not limited as to purposes
 or tasks, was restricted in that Abdulkhalek was not permitted to drive the Subaru.
 I know of no case in which a Maryland appellate court has extended coverage under
 an omnibus clause of an automobile liability insurance policy to a second permittee where
 the second permittee was expressly prohibited by the named insured from driving the
 vehicle and the first permittee was not in the vehicle at the time of the accident. To the
 contrary, a review of the case law leads to the exact opposite conclusion—that coverage
 under an omnibus clause does not extend to a second permittee where the named insured
 expressly prohibits the first permittee from allowing the second permittee to drive the
 vehicle and where the first permittee is not in the vehicle at the time of the accident. See
 Bond, id. at 385-86, 424 A.2d at 768-69. For coverage under an omnibus clause to be
 extended to a second permittee, the first permittee must be in the vehicle at the time of the
 accident, and the second permittee must be serving some purpose or benefit of the first
 permittee. See, e.g., Allstate, 275 Md. at 472, 341 A.2d at 406-07 (We held that coverage
 extended to the second permittee because, in relevant part, “the first permittee [] was a
 passenger in the car and had control and direction of the car; [and] the second permittee []
 was serving some purpose of” the first permittee); Nationwide, 81 Md. App. at 115, 566
 - 12 -
 A.2d at 1122 (The Court of Special Appeals held that coverage extended to the second
 permittee because “the first permittee[] was in the car with [the second permittee] and was
 benefitted by its operation.”); Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 197, 193, 319 A.2d at 614, 612 (The
 Court of Special Appeals held that coverage extended to the second permittee because, at
 the time of the accident, the second permittee’s driving of the car was, “at the very least,
 for the convenience of the first permittee . . ., and, of course, the first permittee was present
 in the car[.]”).
 Precedent clearly establishes that, for coverage under an omnibus clause to extend
 to a second permittee, when the second permittee has been expressly forbidden by the
 named insured from driving the vehicle, the first permittee must be in the vehicle at the
 time of the accident. Indeed, not only must the first permittee be in the vehicle at the time
 of the accident, but also, the use of the vehicle itself must be within the scope of permission
 that the named insured granted. See Liberty, 154 Md. App. at 616, 841 A.2d at 53 (“[T]he
 operation of [the named insured]’s car was not ‘for a purpose germane to the permission
 granted.’ . . . [T]he use of the car at the time of the accident was outside the scope of the
 permission granted.” (Citation omitted)); Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 193, 319 A.2d at 612
 (“[A]t the time of the accident, the operation of the car by the second permittee was for a
 purpose germane to the permission granted by” the named insured).
 I would reject Petitioners’ contention that there is an exception in Maryland case
 law providing coverage to a second permittee, even if the first permittee is not in the vehicle
 at the time of the accident, so long as the second permittee’s use of a vehicle serves some
 purpose of, or benefits, the first permittee. In support of this position, Petitioners seize on
 - 13 -
 the following language in Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 197, 319 A.2d at 613-14: “or b) because
 the second permittee was serving some purpose or advantage of the first permittee when
 the accident occurred.” (Emphasis added) (citations and paragraph break omitted).
 Petitioners theorize that Kornke sets forth an “either/or” test, under which coverage may
 extend to second permittees either where the first permittee is in the vehicle at the time of
 the accident or where the first permittee is not in the vehicle but the second permittee is
 serving some purpose or benefit of the first permittee. In Kornke, id. at 196-97, 319 A.2d
 at 613-14, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
 [A] distinction is validly made between situations where the law denies
 coverage under the omnibus clause because the named insured expressly
 prohibited the use of the automobile by any person other than his permittee
 and a second permittee had used the car solely for his own benefit; and, on
 the contrary, where the law permits coverage because a) the original
 permittee was riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of the
 accident; or b) because the second permittee was serving some purpose or
 advantage of the first permittee when the accident occurred.
 (Citations and paragraph break omitted). That the Court of Special Appeals in Kornke
 used the word “or,” however, is not dispositive given that Court’s holding and the long
 history in both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals of applying the language in
 Kornke with the word “and.”
 In Kornke, id. at 192, 319 A.2d at 611, preceding the language set forth above, the
 Court of Special Appeals stated:
 [T]he thrust of Maryland decisions is that in determining whether the
 operation is within the permission required by the omnibus clause ‘one must
 examine the total facts,’ and the facts of paramount significance respecting a
 clause for permitted use (as against permitted operation) do not pertain to the
 identity of the driver but to whether at the time of the accident the operation
 of the car was for a purpose germane to the permission granted, whether it
 - 14 -
 was for the convenience of the named insured or the first permittee, and
 whether the latter was present in the car at the time of the accident.
 (Emphasis added). Thus, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that, based on its
 review of the relevant authorities, in determining coverage under an omnibus clause, there
 are three significant factors—(1) whether at the time of the accident operation of the car
 was for a purpose germane to the permission given; (2) whether the car’s operation was for
 the convenience of the named insured or the first permittee; and (3) whether the first
 permittee was in the car at the time of the accident. The Court of Special Appeals used the
 term “and” when describing the factors; thus, all three factors must be satisfied.
 Later, when discussing the exception—that, under certain circumstances, coverage
 may extend to a second permittee where the named insured expressly prohibited anyone
 other than the first permittee from driving the vehicle—the Court of Special Appeals set
 forth factors “a” and “b” as described above and concluded:
 Without being required to choose between the ‘liberal rule’ and the
 moderate or ‘minor deviation’ rule, [] we hold that as both of the above tests
 were satisfied in the instant case, then upon either rule the Kornke automobile
 was being used within the scope of the permission granted by the named
 insured when the accident occurred, and that, therefore, [the second
 permittee] was an insured under the omnibus clause of the . . . policy issued
 to [the named insured].
 Id. at 196-97, 319 A.2d at 613-14 (citations and some paragraph breaks omitted). Viewed
 in context, it is evident that the Court of Special Appeals intended “a” and “b” as being two
 factors that formed a conjunctive test (or joint requirements) for coverage, and determined
 that both factors had been satisfied in Kornke because, at the time of the accident, the first
 permittee was in the vehicle and the second permittee was serving some purpose of, or
 - 15 -
 benefitted, the first permittee. In Kornke, the Court of Special Appeals did not resolve the
 case on the basis of one factor having been satisfied—instead, that Court determined both
 factors, or requirements, to be satisfied. The Court of Special Appeals stated that, given
 that both factors were satisfied, it did not matter (i.e., the Court was not required to resolve)
 whether the “liberal rule” or the “minor deviation rule”3 applied in Maryland. Kornke, 21
 Md. App. at 197, 319 A.2d at 614. In other words, in Kornke, the Court of Special Appeals
 stated that, if both factors are satisfied—i.e., at the time of the accident, the first permittee
 is in the vehicle and the second permittee’s use of the vehicle is for the benefit or purpose
 of the first permittee—it does not matter whether Maryland is a “liberal rule” State or a
 “minor deviation rule” State because, under either rule, coverage would extend to the
 second permittee. In Kornke, the first permittee’s presence in the vehicle at the time of the
 accident played a key role not only in satisfying both factors, but also in determining in the
 first instance that the first permittee was “using” the vehicle, as that term was used in the
 omnibus clause.
 To the extent that Petitioners read Kornke as setting forth two separate tests or
 “exceptions” instead of two factors that are jointly required, such a reading is inaccurate;
 and, in any event, such tests would be dicta. It is clear that, in Kornke, 21 Md. App. at
 183, 319 A.2d at 606, the first permittee was in the vehicle at the time of the accident.
 Thus, under Petitioners’ interpretation, Kornke’s providing two alternative means for
 3
 In Kornke, 21 Md. App. at 188, 319 A.2d at 609, the Court described the “liberal
 rule” as “whereby it is held that once permission is given, it will extend to any and all uses
 of the vehicle[,]” and described the “minor deviation rule” as a rule “under which the
 Courts hold that a slight deviation does not preclude coverage under the omnibus clause.”
 - 16 -
 coverage was not based on the case’s facts, which did not involve an absent first permittee;
 thus, consideration of that circumstance was not necessary to the decision of the Court of
 Special Appeals.
 In post-Kornke case law, it has become abundantly clear that the Court of Special
 Appeals and this Court view the two circumstances—i.e., that, at the time of the accident,
 the first permittee is in the vehicle and the second permittee is serving some purpose or
 benefit of the first permittee—as two factors that must both be satisfied to extend coverage
 under an omnibus clause to a second permittee. In other words, despite the one-time use
 of the word “or” in Kornke, the Court of Special Appeals and this Court have always
 applied the factors as a conjunctive, or two-part, test, and have required both factors to be
 satisfied. For example, in Allstate, 275 Md. at 471-72, 341 A.2d at 406-07, we employed
 a conjunctive, or two-part, test, holding that the second permittee was covered as an insured
 because, among other things, “the first permittee [] was a passenger in the car and had
 control and direction of the car” and “the second permittee [] was serving some purpose
 of” the first permittee. (Citation omitted). In other words, we held that coverage under the
 omnibus clause extended to the second permittee because both factors were satisfied.
 And, in Bond, 289 Md. at 386 n.1, 424 A.2d at 769 n.1, although repeating the word
 “or,” we described the two factors as part of one of two possible variations from the general
 rule, stating:
 [There are] two [possible] variations from the general rule denying
 coverage to the second permittee where the named insured expressly
 prohibited the first permittee from allowing others to drive the car. They are,
 one, where the first permittee was riding in the car, or was benefited by
 its operation, and two, where the second permittee’s driving was occasioned
 - 17 -
 by an emergency or a situation involving elements of urgency or necessity,
 benefiting the first permittee.
 (Emphasis added). Later, in Nationwide, 81 Md. App. at 115, 123, 566 A.2d at 1122, 1126,
 the Court of Special Appeals harmonized the two factors and used the word “and” when
 setting forth the factors, stating: “We hold that the instant case falls within the first
 proposed exception alluded to in Bond, and meets the Kornke ‘tests’ since [] the first
 permittee[] was in the car with [the second permittee] and was benefitted by its operation”;
 and “we hold that this case, like Kornke, fits the first exception alluded to in Bond since
 the first permittee was both present and benefitted by the second permittee’s driving.”
 (Emphasis added). Given Kornke and subsequent case law, I would hold that the first
 permittee’s presence in the vehicle at the time of the accident is a factor that must be
 satisfied to extend coverage under an omnibus clause to a second permittee.
 A close reading of Maryland case law indicates that both this Court and the Court
 of Special Appeals have always required that the first permittee be in the vehicle at the
 time of the accident for coverage to extend to a second permittee. This critical
 circumstance is warranted for common sense reasons. By reading Kornke as the Majority
 does, see Maj. Slip Op. at 12-13—that Kornke establishes an “either/or” disjunctive test
 permitting coverage to be extended to a second permittee where, at the time of the accident,
 the first permittee is not in the vehicle so long as the second permittee is serving some
 purpose or benefit of the first permittee—going forward, this Court will undoubtedly be
 faced with situations in which parties seek to extend insurance coverage under an omnibus
 clause to third, fourth, or even fifth permittees based solely on the assertion that the
 - 18 -
 permittees were using vehicles for the benefit or purpose of a first permittee. 4 Under this
 scenario, any number of extended permittees could presumably seek coverage. Rather than
 go down a slippery slope, I am convinced that Maryland is best served by maintaining what
 years’ worth of case law has established—that a first permittee must be in the vehicle at
 the time of the accident for coverage to extend to a second permittee.
 Nor am I persuaded that Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme
 mandates that coverage be extended in situations where a first permittee is not in the vehicle
 at the time of the accident. To be sure,
 Maryland is a compulsory motor vehicle insurance state. Since the
 enactment of Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972, effective January 1, 1973, “the
 owner of a motor vehicle registered or required to be registered in Maryland
 must maintain a motor vehicle insurance policy on the vehicle, or self-
 insurance approved by the [Motor Vehicle Administration].”
 Montgomery Cnty. v. Distel, 436 Md. 226, 236, 81 A.3d 397, 403 (2013) (citation omitted)
 (alteration in original). The purpose of Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance
 scheme is “to provide coverage, or payment, for liability claims.” Id. at 237, 81 A.3d at
 403 (citations and footnote omitted). Omnibus clauses, such as the one in the policy at
 issue here, generally “extend[] coverage to a third party who operates the vehicle within
 4
 A third, fourth, and fifth permittee are those individuals extended permission in
 sequence from the second permittee; in other words, the second permittee grants
 permission to a third permittee to drive a vehicle, a third permittee grants permission to a
 fourth permittee to drive a vehicle, and a fourth permittee grants permission to a fifth
 permittee to drive a vehicle, and so on. In short, if the first permittee’s presence in the
 vehicle is not required, there could be a chain of permittees who grant permission to another
 subsequent permittee such that the first permittee may not even know who is driving the
 vehicle in the end; in other words, at least theoretically, anyone could use the vehicle for
 the benefit of the first permittee whether they received authorization directly from the first
 permittee, or from a second permittee, or a third permittee.
 - 19 -
 the permission of the named insured.” Id. at 249, 81 A.3d at 411 (citation omitted). In
 Distel, id. at 249-50, 81 A.3d at 411, we explained:
 The purpose of an omnibus clause is to protect the named insured, the persons
 within the omnibus clause, and the public generally and its members injured
 by the negligent operation of the insured automobile on a public highway. . .
 . [T]he Court of Special Appeals described the objectives served by an
 omnibus clause, including providing: (1) the injured person a right to proceed
 against the insurer in cases in which the insurer would not otherwise be liable
 because the automobile was not driven by the [named] insured; and (2) the
 additional insured the protection of automobile liability insurance without his
 having procured such a policy[.]
 (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (last alteration in original). Although,
 under Maryland’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme, every vehicle is required
 to be covered by an automobile liability insurance policy, an omnibus clause in a policy is
 not intended to extend coverage to any and all possible drivers of the insured vehicle. There
 are recognized limitations to coverage. For example, nothing in Maryland’s compulsory
 motor vehicle insurance scheme mandates the extension of coverage to car thieves or
 drivers who fall outside the extended coverage of an omnibus clause, such as those drivers
 who operate the vehicle outside of the scope of permission that the named insured granted.
 See id. at 250, 81 A.3d at 411 (“A permissive use clause limits the coverage under the
 omnibus clause to claims that arise while the third party is operating the vehicle within the
 scope of the permission granted by the named insured.” (Citation, footnote, and internal
 quotation marks omitted)). Obviously, use of a vehicle by a thief would be fall outside the
 scope of extended coverage of an omnibus clause, as the thief would not be using the
 vehicle for the benefit of the first permittee, and the thief may or may not be in a vehicle
 with the first permittee. The point of the comparison is, however, that Maryland’s
 - 20 -
 compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme—although intended to protect the public—
 contemplates, and, indeed, anticipates, that there are times in which there will not be
 insurance coverage; in other words, there is no doubt that there will be certain situations
 that are not afforded the extended coverage of an omnibus clause. As with other limitations
 on coverage under an omnibus clause, the requirement that a first permittee be in the
 vehicle at the time of an accident for coverage to extend to a second permittee is an
 allowable limitation that is firmly established in Maryland case law.
 For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur in the judgment only.
 Judge Harrell and Judge Battaglia have authorized me to state that they join in this
 opinion.
 - 21 -


type: wikipedia

text:
Frank Amankwah est un footballeur ghanéen né le à Obuasi. Il évoluait au poste de défenseur.
 Biographie
 En club
 Frank Amankwah joue au Ghana, en Allemagne, aux Pays-Bas et en Grèce.
 Il dispute sept matchs en deuxième division allemande, et six matchs en première division grecque.
 En équipe nationale
 Il est médaillé de bronze avec le Ghana lors des Jeux olympiques d'été de 1992. Il dispute l'intégralité des matchs lors du tournoi olympique.
 International ghanéen, il reçoit 33 sélections pour 2 buts marqués en équipe du Ghana entre 1992 et 1997. Il dispute notamment la Coupe d'Afrique des nations en 1994 et 1996. Le Ghana se classe quatrième de la CAN en 1996.
 Carrière
 1990-1996 : Asante Kotoko
 1996-1997 : FC Gütersloh 2000
 1997-1999 : AZ Alkmaar
 1999-2000 : Iraklis Thessalonique
 2000-2004 : Asante Kotoko
 Palmarès
 Avec Asante Kotoko :
 Champion du Ghana en 1992, 1993 et en 2003.
 Vainqueur de la Coupe du Ghana en 1995.
 Avec le Ghana :
 Médaillé de bronze aux Jeux olympiques d'été de 1992.
 Références
 Liens externes
 Footballeur international ghanéen
 Joueur de l'Asante Kotoko FC
 Joueur de l'AZ Alkmaar
 Joueur de l'Iraklis Thessalonique
 Footballeur aux Jeux olympiques d'été de 1992
 Médaillé de bronze olympique ghanéen
 Naissance en décembre 1971
 Naissance au Ghana


text:
Der rund 170 Meter lange Wehrsteg ist eine Fußgängerbrücke über die Isar in München.
 Der Steg verläuft über das Wehr VI, das Museumsinsel und Praterinsel verbindet. Durch zehn Wehröffnungen kann hier Wasser von der Großen Isar in die Kleine Isar abgelassen werden. Der heute vorhandene Steg wurde 1966 erbaut. Direkt am nördlichen Ende der Brücke verbinden die Mariannenbrücke und der Kabelsteg die Praterinsel mit dem West- bzw. Ostufer der Isar.
 Ein Vorgängerwehr mit Steg bestand schon 1888.
 Literatur
 Einzelnachweise
 Weblinks
 Re.photos: Vergleich von zwei Ansichten von um 1920 und 2019
 Isarbrücke
 Fußgängerbrücke in München
 Bauwerk im Lehel
 Bauwerk in Haidhausen
 Erbaut in den 1960er Jahren
 Isar bei München
 Brücke in Europa
 Museumsinsel (München)
 Praterinsel


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 24.11.2007
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 283/11
 Talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari mressqa mill-Corte d'appello di Milano (l-Italja) fit-22 ta' Awwissu 2007 — Marco Gambazzi vs DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., CIBC Mellon Trust Company
 (Kawża C-394/07)
 (2007/C 283/19)
 Lingwa tal-kawża: It-Taljan
 Qorti tar-rinviju
 Corte d'appello di Milano
 Partijiet fil-kawża prinċipali
 Rikorrent: Marco Gambazzi
 Konvenuti: DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc., CIBC Mellon Trust Company.
 Domandi preliminari
 1)
 Il-qorti ta' Stat li quddiemha titressaq talba għal eżekuzzjoni tista', abbażi tad-dispożizzjoni dwar l-ordni pubbliku esposta fl-Artikolu 27(1) tal-Konvenzjoni ta' Brussell, tieħu in kunsiderazzjoni l-fatt li l-qorti ta' l-Istat li tat id-deċiżjoni rrifjutat li tagħti, lil parti li tilfet, il-possibbiltà ta' difiża wara l-adozzjoni ta' digriet ta' esklużjoni (debarment) skond il-kundizzjonijiet esposti iktar 'il fuq,
 2)
 jew l-interpretazzjoni ta' din id-dispożizzjoni, moqrija flimkien mal-prinċipji li jirriżultaw mill-Artikoli 26 et seq tal-Konvenzjoni ta' Brussell, dwar ir-rikonoxximent reċiproku u l-eżekuzzjoni tas-sentenzi fil-Komunità, tipprekludi lill-qorti nazzjonali milli tikkunsidra li kawża ċivili, li matulha waħda mill-partijiet ġiet miċħuda l-eżerċizzju tad-drittijiet tad-difiża permezz ta' digriet ta' esklużjoni mogħti mill-qorti minħabba nuqqas ta' eżekuzzjoni minn din il-parti ta' inġunzjoni li hija kienet tat, tmur kontra l-ordni pubbliku fis-sens ta' l-Artikolu 27(1) ta' l-imsemmija Konvenzjoni?


text:
Eršketinės (Acipenseridae) – eršketžuvių šeima. Išilgai kūno eina 5 eilės kaulinių rombo formos plokštelių: 2 šoninės, 2 pilvinės ir 1 nugarinė. Šnipo apačioje yra 4 ūseliai.
 Gyvena Šiaurės Amerikos, Europos ir Azijos upėse. Didžiąją dalį gyvenimo praleidžia jūrose, tačiau reguliariai grįžta į didžiąsias upes, kai kurios rūšys pavasarį išleisti ikrus, kai kurios vėliau dėl ne iki galo aiškių priežasčių. Tik kelios rūšys gyvena išimtinai gėluose vandenyse. Neaptinkamos tropikuose ir Pietiniame pusrutulyje.
 Šeimoje 4 gentys ir 28 rūšys.
 Sistematika
 Pošeimis. Acipenserinae
 Eršketai (Acipenser): Lietuvoje – 2 rūšys:
 Sturys, arba atlantinis eršketas (Acipenser sturio). Paplitęs Baltijos jūroje. Nerštui migruoja į Nemuno žemupį. Rūšis įrašyta į Lietuvos raudonąją knygą.
 Sterlė (Acipenser ruthenus). Lietuvoje labai reta introdukuota žuvis.
 Didieji eršketai (Huso):
 Didysis eršketas, arba beluga (Huso huso)
 Daūrinis eršketas, arba kaluga (Huso dauricus)
 Pošeimis. Scaphirhynchinae
 Azijiniai plokščiašnipiai (Pseudoscaphirhynchus):
 Amudarjos didysis plokščiašnipis (Pseudoscaphirhynchus kaufmanni)
 Amerikiniai plokščiašnipiai (Scaphirhynchus)
 Eršketžuvės


type: legislation

text:
 22.3.2017
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 76/8
 VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE RADY (EÚ) 2017/490
 z 21. marca 2017,
 ktorým sa vykonáva nariadenie (EÚ) č. 270/2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči určitým osobám, subjektom a orgánom s ohľadom na situáciu v Egypte
 RADA EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE,
 so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
 so zreteľom na nariadenie Rady (EÚ) č. 270/2011 z 21. marca 2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči určitým osobám, subjektom a orgánom s ohľadom na situáciu v Egypte (1), a najmä na jeho článok 12 ods. 1,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Rada 21. marca 2011 prijala nariadenie (EÚ) č. 270/2011.
 (2)
 Na zozname fyzických a právnických osôb, subjektov a orgánov uvedenom v prílohe I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 270/2011 by už nemali byť uvedené dve osoby.
 (3)
 Príloha I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 270/2011 by sa preto mala zodpovedajúcim spôsobom zmeniť,
 PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
 Článok 1
 Príloha I k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 270/2011 sa mení tak, ako sa uvádza v prílohe k tomuto nariadeniu.
 Článok 2
 Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dňom nasledujúcim po jeho uverejnení v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
 Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
 V Bruseli 21. marca 2017
 Za Radu
 predseda
 E. SCICLUNA
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 76, 22.3.2011, s. 4.
 PRÍLOHA
 Vypúšťajú sa záznamy týkajúce sa týchto osôb:
 13.
 Rachid Mohamed Rachid Hussein.
 14.
 Hania Mahmoud Abdel Rahman Fahmy.


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21994D0224(01)
 Decision No 1/94 of the EC-Cyprus Association Council of 14 February 1994 derogating from the provisions concerning the definition of the concept of 'originating products' laid down in the Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus
 Official Journal L 053 , 24/02/1994 P. 0019 - 0022 Finnish special edition: P. 0007
 DECISION No 1/94 OF THE EC-CYPRUS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL of 14 February 1994 derogating from the provisions concerning the definition of the concept of originating products laid down in the Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus (94/112/EC)THE EC-CYPRUS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL, Having regard to the Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus (1), signed at Brussels on 19 December 1972, hereinafter referred to as 'the Agreement`, Having regard to the Protocol concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation annexed to the Additional Protocol to the said Agreement (2), and in particular Article 25 thereof, Whereas it was agreed, in the Joint Declaration by the Contracting Parties concerning the rules of origin, attached to the Final Act of the Protocol laying down the conditions and procedures for the implementation of the second stage of the Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus and adapting certain provisions of the Agreement (3), which was signed at Luxembourg on 19 October 1987 and entered into force on 1 January 1988, that the Community and the EC-Cyprus Association Council would, once the said Protocol had entered into force, take a decision on additional Cypriot requests for derogations from the rules of origin applicable to products under heading Nos 6102 and 6103 of the Common Customs Tariff; Whereas a derogation from the relevant provisions concerning the definition of the concept of originating products for the goods in question was granted to Cyprus for a period of two years by Decision No 1/89 of 28 July 1989 of the EEC-Cyprus Association Council; whereas the said derogation was prolonged for a further period of two years by Decision No 1/91 of 19 December 1991 of the EEC-Cyprus Association Council; Whereas the reasons for the said decision remain valid; whereas it is consequently desirable to prolong the said derogation for a further period of two years, HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 By way of derogation from Article 3 (1) of the Protocol concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation, products listed in Annex I to this Decision and manufactured in Cyprus shall, within the limits of the quantities indicated and under the conditions set out below, be considered as originating products for the purposes of the Agreement. Article 2 1. For the purposes of Article 1, products listed in Annex I shall be considered as originating in Cyprus provided that, as a result of working or processing carried out in Cyprus, the products obtained are classified under a tariff heading other than that covering each of the materials worked or processed. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the manufacture of garments from parts of garments falling within CN code 6217 90 00 shall not be considered as sufficient working or processing, unless the parts have been obtained in the Community from fabric cut to size and are covered by a supplier's declaration made out on an invoice or other accompanying document, of which a specimen is given in Annex III. Article 3 Materials not originating in Cyprus or in the Community and used for the manufacture of the products referred to in Article 1 shall not be eligible for any form of drawback, exemption from customs duties or charges having equivalent effect to customs duties, with the exception of any amounts exceeding the corresponding duties of the Common Customs Tariff. Article 4 Movement certificates EUR 1 issued pursuant to this Decision shall be endorsed: 'DEROGATION - DECISION No 1/94 DEDUCTION COMMUNITY QUOTA` in the box marked 'remarks`, in one of the languages in which the Agreement is drawn up. Article 5 The competent authorities of Cyprus shall send the Commission monthly statements of Cypriot imports and exports of fabrics listed in Annex II. Article 6 This Decision shall enter into force the day on which it is adopted. This Decision shall apply for a period of two years, starting on 28 July 1993. Done at Brussels, 14 February 1994. For the Association Council The President Y. PAPANTONIOU ANNEX I >TABLE> ANNEX II >TABLE> ANNEX III >START OF GRAPHIC>DECLARATION FOR PRODUCTS NOT HAVING PREFERENTIAL ORIGIN STATUS I, the undersigned, declare that the goods listed on this invoice (1) were produced in (2) and incorporate the following components or materials which do not have Community origin for preferential trade: (3) (4) (5) (6) I undertake to make available to the customs authorities any additional evidence they may require. 7 8 (9) Note: The text inside the box suitably completed in conformity with the footnotes below, constitutes a suppliers' declaration. The footnoters do not have to be reproduced. >END OF GRAPHIC>