type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' Smithsonian Institution \t Memo\n ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\n\n\n\n Date September 29,2006\n\n To \t Sheila P. Burke, Deputy Secretary and Chief Operating Officer \n\n Cristian Samper K., Director, National Museum of Natural History \n\n James J. McLaughlin, Director, Office of Protection Services \n\n\n cc \t William W. Brubaker, Director, Office of Facilities Engineering and Operations \n\n William Tompkins, National Collections Coordinator \n\n\n From A. Sprightley Ry ,ting Inspector General\n\nSubject \t Audit of Physical Security and Inventory Control Measures to Safeguard the National\n Collections at the National Museum of Natural History, Number A-05-06\n\n This report, the last in our series of three reports covering security issues at the\n Smithsonian,! presents the results of our audit of the security and inventory control\n measures safeguarding the collections at the National Museum of Natural History\n (NMNH). As noted in Concern at the Core, Managing Smithsonian Collections, the Office\n of Policy and Analysis\' comprehensive study of collections management at the Institution,\n Smithsonian collections are increasingly at risk because of declining resources to perform\n basic collections management. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this\n audit to examine physical security measures and inventory controls, two aspects of\n collections management that are essential to reduce the risk ofloss or theft.\n\n Our objectives were to determine whether (1) physical security is adequate to safeguard\n the collections, and (2) inventory controls are in place and working adequately. We\n assessed the use and effectiveness of security guards and security devices throughout\n NMNH; evaluated access to storage facilities by outside visitors, volunteers, and\n contractors; examined inventory controls; and identified missing or misplaced objects by\n testing inventories from six of seven departments. We also compared NMNH practices to\n other museums, including the American Museum of Natural History in New York. A\n detailed description of our audit scope and methodology is contained in Appendix A.\n\n BACKGROUND\n NMNH, with the largest natural history collection in the world, manages over 126 million\n objects, which account for over 92 percent of all the Smithsonian\'s collections. Of these\n objects, approximately 89 million (or 70 percent) are housed at the main NMNH building\n on the Mall, with the remainder at the Museum Support Center (MSC) in Suitland,\n Maryland, and smaller storage facilities in Columbia, Maryland and Virginia suburbs.\n Table 1 shows how the collections are divided among the seven NMNH departments.\n\n\n\n\n I Employee and Contractor Screening Measures, Report No. A-05-07 (August 21, 2006); Management\n Advisory Report on Access Controls, Report No. M-05-05 (July 25,2006).\n\n\n\n 1\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\n Table 1 \n\n Collection Objects by NMNH Department \n\n\n\n\n\n Paleobiology 42.7\n Invertebrate Zoology 34.3\n Entomology 32.5\n Vertebrate Zoology 9.6\n Botany 4.8\n Anthropology 2.3\n Mineral Sciences 0.3\n\n Total 126.5\n\nSmithsonian Directive (SD) 600, Collections Management, states that the Smithsonian will\nprovide reasonable access to its collections, both physical and intellectual, and will\nbalance that access with preservation and protection concerns. The policy further\nrequires that the Smithsonian establish authority, policies and procedures, and assign\nresponsibility to control, monitor, and document all access to and use of its collections.\nResponsibility for the physical security of perimeters of and entrances to collections rests\nwith the Office of Protection Services (OPS), a division of the Institution\'s Office of\nFacilities Engineering and Operations, as well as museum collecting units.\n\nThe Smithsonian\'s Security Handbook directs OPS to implement a comprehensive\nprotection and physical security program that includes access and property control\nrequirements to protect collections from unauthorized handling and removal or theft.\nThe Handbook requires OPS to install physical and electronic surveillance and to manage\nthe security officer staff, the alarm system and other security equipment. In addition to\nthese requirements, OPS issued "Protective Design Standards for Technical Security,"\nwhich outlines minimum technical protection requirements for vaults, collections\nstorage, and other collections areas. OPS must also conduct surveys of major facilities\nand offices at least once every 5 years to determine overall risk and to recommend\nappropriate security measures.\n\nMuseum collecting units are responsible for ensuring that collections are maintained in\ncontrolled areas that are adequately protected against theft and vandalism. SD 600\nspecifies that each collecting unit should develop, implement, and adhere to an\nauthorized, written collections management policy to ensure the proper physical care of\nits collections. It further states that each unit should provide documentation of each\ncollection item that will identify, locate, and give an account of its condition to ensure\nmaximum accessibility consistent with its security.\n\nTo further deter theft and maintain accountability over the collections, SD 600 requires a\ncontinuous inventory system, a process that includes (1) conducting, supervising, and\napproving cyclical inventories and reconciliation of collection records; (2) implementing\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\na written cyclical inventory plan; and (3) ensuring the separation of duties and\nimplementation of other internal controls to prevent the unauthorized removal of\ncollection objects.\n\nRESULTS IN BRIEF\nOverall, we concluded that physical security and access controls should be strengthened\nto reduce the risk of theft or damage to NMNH\'s collections. In particular, we found that\nalthough security was adequate in some departments, several areas need improvement:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Missing or inoperative security devices. There were many missing or inoperative\n security devices that could allow non-staff access to the collections, such as\n improperly secured doors; missing and inoperable card access readers; areas\n without alarms or with non-functioning alarms; unlocked cabinets; and an\n insufficient number of cameras or other devices to monitor individuals\n working in high-value collections areas.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Unlocked storage and poorly controlled keys. A significant portion of NMNH\'s\n collections were stored in unlocked cabinets or in locked cabinets in storage\n areas where the keys were poorly controlled. NMNH lacked a policy\n governing the use of keys and, in some departments, there were little or no\n controls over keys.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Inadequate interior guard coverage and in-person response to alarms. Security\n officer coverage of the collections areas has been significantly reduced, and\n officer response to alarms has been inadequate. OIG staff successfully entered\n collections storage areas, accessed collections, and exited through perimeter\n doors undetected. When alarms sounded, no security officers responded in\n person.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Inadequate supervision ofnon-staffin collections areas. Contractors,\n researchers, volunteers, maintenance staff and visitors were often left alone in\n collections areas without supervision. Visitors\' and employees\' bags were not\n checked going into or out of collections areas, contrary to policies and\n procedures at other museums.\n\nStaff shortages and budget constraints are the main reasons management cited for the\nproblems we identified. In light of these constraints, we believe NMNH and OPS officials\nshould, at a minimum, immediately prioritize deficiencies, focusing on those that pose\nthe greatest risk to the security of the collections, and assess the cost of complying with\ntechnical security standards. Management should also institute and enforce stricter\ncontrols over access to the collections, including access to keys to locked storage areas and\ncabinets, as well as over supervision of visitors, instead of relying on the goodwill and\ntrust of employees and visitors to the collections areas.\n\nUnderscoring a key finding from Concern at the Core, we also found that NMNH\ngenerally did not have established inventory plans or did not follow plans that were\n\n\n\n 3\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\ndeveloped. With few exceptions, cyclical inventories were not conducted, and inventory\nrecords we reviewed were inaccurate or incomplete. Based on our limited tests of the\ncollections inventory, we identified 53 of 2,320 objects sampled that were either missing\nor had been misplaced. Museum staff subsequently located 40 of the 53 objects. These\nand other weaknesses make it difficult to account for items and their location, thereby\nincreasing the risk of loss or theft. These weaknesses also mean that collections may not\nbe readily accessible to researchers, educators, and others from inside and outside the\nInstitution.\n\nAccording to management, NMNH does not have adequate staff to perform their own\nwork at an acceptable rate, much less document inventory control over the collections,\nupdate their collections information systems, and pursue any problems that are found.\nAccordingly, NMNH should implement the recommendations of Concern at the Core\nand, more specifically, develop plans for a prioritized cyclical inventory; make inventory\ngoals a part of collections managers\' performance plans; and finalize the museum\'s\ninventory plan.\n\nRESULTS OF AUDIT\nPhysical Security over the Collections Needs Strengthening\nWe concluded that physical security over the collections at NMNH needs strengthening\nto reduce the risk of theft or loss. First, numerous security devices were either missing or\ninoperative. Second, a significant portion ofNMNH\'s collections were stored in\nunlocked cabinets or in locked cabinets in rooms where the keys were poorly controlled.\nThird, over the last few years security officer coverage assigned to the collections areas has\nbeen significantly reduced and responses to alarms have been inadequate. Finally,\nsupervision of contractors, researchers, volunteers, and other visitors to the collections\nareas was minimal.\n\nInterior Perimeter Security Devices Were Missing or Inoperative\n\nIn December 2004, OPS issued design standards delineating protection requirements for\nSmithsonian facilities, including security devices for vaults, collections storage areas,\nexhibit galleries, and building perimeters. For interior perimeters of collections areas, the\nstandards require the installation of cameras, intrusion-detection sensors, door access\xc2\xad\ncard readers, and other security devices based in part on the value of the collections to be\nprotected.\n\nTo its credit, in May 2005, OPS completed a detailed assessment of all security devices at\nNMNH\'s Mall building. That assessment noted at least 190 instances where devices did\nnot meet technical security standards and, thus, could allow unauthorized access to the\nmuseum\'s collections storage areas. The deficiencies included missing or inoperative\nsensors on doors; a lack of motion detectors or cameras in some high-value collections\nareas; and stairwell doors with access to collections areas left unlocked.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nThrough observations and tests of security devices as well as discussions with OPS\nofficials, we detennined that most of the S\'\'!ll!\'ficiencies identified in the OPS\nassessment had not been corrected. Many a: card-access readers were inoperable\nand door locks in multiple areas were broken, ena ling easy access to several floors of\ncollections storage. For example, OIG auditors, without displaying any identification,\nrepeatedly succeeded in entering two sets of unlocked doors that led tala ol\n\ncollections storage areas, which housed numerous unlocked cabinets corltalnmlg f"l1\'\\lpr\'N\nvalued at several thousand dollars each. Auditors also entered a maintenance area near\n through unlocked doors, gaining access to multiple floors of\n areas see photo below). Appendix C, a floor diagram of one collections area\nin the NMNH Mall building, illustrates these security device problems, showing missing\ncameras and motion detectors, unlocked doors, and inoperable card readers.\n\n OPS officials stated that although it is their desire\n to lock -- access doors, the previous\n NMNH requested that the doors be left\n unlocked so his staff could move freely\n throughout the building. OPS also indicated that\n they are studying how to keep doors\n locked and also comply with fire and\n life-safety the access\n doors near la OPS officials\n informed us ar doors had an\n architectural design problem that was not\n compatible with the current card readers;\n however, they stated that the design work for new\n doors will be completed in the near future.\n\nAt the MSC facility, we found that the majority of\n"\'\'\'\'rllrl1h.r devices were in and operable. However,\n was not alarmed, and the\n and were left\n We also observed that the\n as well as those to the\n not been working for some\n able to enter and gain access to\n collections objects that were on a table to\n PH)Ce:ssela. After we brought these items to OPS\'\nattention, OPS and collections management officials\ninformed us that they repaired the card access readers\non the la doors and the SD807 Ex 2\ndoors were\n\nIn discussing the security device issues with OPS management, we noted that OPS had\nnot fully assessed the cost of bringing NMNH security devices into compliance with its\nsecurity standards, nor had it developed a prioritized list for making the needed\nimprovements. For some deficiencies, management postponed fixes until major\nrenovations planned for the museum, such as the new Oceans Exhibit (to open in 2008),\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nare completed. OPS officials cited stafflimitations and budget constraints as the primary\nreasons for not correcting the security device deficiencies.\n\nOPS officials indicated that their budget submissions go through several layers of review,\nincluding the Institution\'s Office of Planning Management and Budget and eventually to\nthe Office of Management and Budget, and their requests are frequently denied. OPS\nprovided us with its Security Design Standards Funding Plan, which contains $2.2 million\nin proposed security improvements for NMNH. About $950,000 of this amount is\nbudgeted for the installation and upgrading of various access controls in the collections\nstorage areas. We noted that the plan does not contain specific completion dates or\nidentify specific collections areas, and that OPS officials stated these funds are designated\nfor FY 2009.\n\nPhysical Safeguards Within Collections Areas Were Inadequate\nThe primary physical safeguards used to protect museum objects within the collections\nareas themselves are vaults, access doors with and cabinets with locks. At\nthe NMNH Mall building,\n_ _ _ _ and areas access\n~inets with locks. However, we observed that a substantial number\nof storage cabinets, some of which contain high-value collections, do not have locks.\nFurther, for those cabinets and collections areas with locks, controls over the assignment\nand tracking of keys were poor, weakening the protections afforded by the physical\ncontrols.\n\n For example, in four of seven departments, there\n were hundreds of unlocked cabinets containing\n collections of high commercial, scientific, or\n educational value. The more valuable scientific\n collections contain "type" specimens, which are\n considered to be the original reference or perfect\n specimen of a given and are crucial for\n classification. In the department,\n some of the most s are stored in\n unlocked cabinets that can be easily reached from\n stairwells and doors that lead to ublic areas. In\n two other and\n estimated\n were and 21,000 type specimens,\n respectively, stored in unlocked cabinets.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\n\n\n\n We also observed that the~ room of the\n :I , is often ~ throughout the\n "\'VJ""\'~,U\\J\'U" staff and volunteers, whose\n work involves items mainly in unlocked cabinets.\n Although this area has outside locked access doors,\n there are at least nine individuals who have card\n access to these outside doors and thus could enter\n the room. The objects in the\n room are of considerable monetary ,\n such as one specimen that the collections manager\n estimated was worth_. In our tests of\n inventory purchases ii\'iade"\'in FYs 2003 and 2004,\n we found that 116 out of 123 . which\n were part of a lot valued at were\n also stored in unlocked ....<UJLU"\'\'\'\'\n\n\n\n\nAccording to management officials, a lack of funding has hampered their ability to\nprocure new cabinets with locks. They indicated that new cabinets could easily exceed a\nthousand dollars each and there were literally thousands of storage cabinets without locks\nthroughout the museum. In addition, shortages of management and staff resources have\nmade it difficult to provide adequate oversight of volunteers and contractors who work\naround collections stored in the unlocked cabinets.\n\nWhile inthe short-term there is probably little NMNH officials can do to procure new\nlocking cabinets, they can reduce the risk to the collections through better management of\nkeys for those cabinets that do have locks. According to Suggested Guidelines for Museum\nSecurity/ museums should maintain a written security policy and practice sound key\ncontrol and retrieval. The Guidelines state that, at a minimum, all keys issued should be\nsigned for on a register; there should be a key retrieval system to make sure all keys are\nreturned when an employee leaves; all keys should be stored in a secure space and not be\nremovable without authorization; and one person should be responsible for key control,\nissuance, and retrieval.\n\nNMNH has no comparable museum-wide procedures or guidelines for distributing\ncabinet and storage room keys, and we found that controls over these keys vary widely\namong its departments. At NMNH\'s Mall building, collections managers indicated that\nthe smaller departments have as few as two to four staff members who have key access,\nwhile the largest departments have as many as 41 people (including non-staff with\nemeritus status) with various degrees of key access. One collections manager told us that\n\n2 These standards were adopted by the Standing Committee on Museum, Library, and Cultural Property\n\nProtection of the American Society for Industrial Security and the Museum Association Security Committee\nof the American Association of Museums, Revised 1997.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\n\x0c ADMIN~TRATIVELYCONFIDENTIAL\n\nher department does not track cabinet keys once they are given out, whether to\nvolunteers, contractors, researchers, or students. Clearly, the lack of written policy on\naccountability for cabinet keys and loose controls in some departments increases the risk\nof theft and loss of collections objects.\n\nAt MSC, with the exception of the Anthropology\'s Ethnology Division, accountability for\naccess door keys to collections is also a concern. The MSC Management Officer informed\nus that she does not have an inventory of all the keys at the facility and does not know\nwho has keys or where they are all located. She believes that all doors should be re-keyed\nand that she should maintain inventory control over all the keys to the collections areas.\nWe note that the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) in New York City\nrecently took this step, re-keying all access doors to collections areas to implement better\ncontrols over their key inventories.\n\nSecurity Officer Deployments Were Strained and Responses to Alanns Were\nInadequate\n\nOur audit identified two issues related to the use of security officers at NMNH, who are\ncritical to deterring the loss and theft of collections. First, staffing levels for security\nofficers at the NMNH Mall building have steadily decreased from a high of 112 in\nNovember 2003 to the current level of 78, a reduction of 34 positions or about 30 percent.\nOPS and NMNH security managers attribute the reductions at NMNH to budget\nconstraints and the normally high turnover rates for security officer positions. Further, in\nresponse to congressionally mandated post-September 11 Homeland Security priorities as\nwell as resource constraints generally, OPS eliminated 21 guard posts3 and redeployed its\nsecurity officer force to focus on the external perimeter areas of the museum,\nconcentrating coverage on controlling public entry into the museum rather than securing\nthe interior collections areas. As a result, OPS had not fully implemented staffing\nformulas it previously developed that took into account the extent of the patrol area and\nthe value of the collections.\n\nFor perspective, while the NMNH Mall building is the Smithsonian\'s largest museum,\nencompassing over 1.3 million square feet, receives an estimated 5 million visitors\nannually (it is the second most visited of the Smithsonian museums), and houses over\n70 percent of NMNH\'s collections, only about 10 percent of the Institution\'s security\nofficer force is assigned to NMNH. Consequently, the current assigned level of 78\nsecurity officers is considerably lower than museum industry standards. According to the\nInternational Committee on Museum Security, for natural history museums, security\ncoverage should be one guard for every 7,000 square feet. Our inquiries of non\xc2\xad\nSmithsonian museums identified comparable standards, with ideal ranges of one security\nofficer for every 8,000 to 9,000 square feet. Using industry-wide standards as a guide,\nNMNH should have between 144 and 162 security officers for its Mall building, which is\nabout double the current staffing leveL\n\nAccording to OPS records, the total number of authorized security officer positions\nInstitution-wide declined from 1,004 in 2003 to 816 in 2006. However, during this\n\n1 A guard post is an area patrolled by a security officer.\n\n\n\n 8\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nperiod, the actual number of filled positions remained about the same, at slightly less than\n800. Moreover, the opening of new museums (the Udvar-Hazy Air and Space Center and\nthe National Museum of the American Indian) and the reopening of the National Portrait\nGallery and American Art Museum have created severe strains on OPS\' ability to deploy\nadequate numbers of security officers at each facility.\n\nThe second issue we identified, based on discussions with collections managers as well as\nour observations during walkthroughs and visits to the NMNH Mall building and MSC, is\nthat security officers frequently did not respond in person to alarms that sounded in the\ncollections areas. We noted that the lack of response was contrary to industry best\npractices and Smithsonian policy. For example, Suggested Guidelines for Museum Security\nrequires that at a minimum, whenever an alarm sounds, an officer or other person with\nsecurity training should respond. These guidelines also emphasize that alarms should not\nbe ignored and that assumptions should not be made about their origins. In addition,\nOPS\' Unit Control Room Procedure Number 42 requires control room officers in each\nfacility to immediately acknowledge audible alarms and dispatch security personnel as\nappropriate.\n\nDuring our walkthroughs we observed the lack of officer response in person to alarms. In\none department, we entered two sets of unlocked doors that led to collections storage\nareas with valuable items in unlocked cabinets. Although alarms sounded as we entered,\nno security officer ever responded in person. The collections manager for this\ndepartment indicated that because the outer doors provide access for lll\n_ _ _, she has never witnessed officers responding to the alarms. ,\n~d a back door that led outside from one of the pods, an alarm sounded but\nno security officer appeared. We followed up with a security officer who said he did not\nget a report of any alarm going off. According to MSC collections managers, OPS officers\nrarely investigate door alarms, and sometimes the alarms on doors between connecting\nbuildings will stay on for several hours before security officers shut them off.\n\nOPS management officials informed us that although Smithsonian security procedures\nrequire a security guard response in person to a sounded alarm, they permit only\nsupervisory officers to enter collections storage areas to respond to alarms. Management\nagain indicated that staffing constraints were problematic, and that there simply was not\nenough supervisory coverage to respond to all alarms. At the time of our audit, there\nwere only 11 supervisory officers assigned to NMNH to cover all shifts.\n\n\nSupervision ofNon-Collections Staff and Visitors Was Minimal\nClosely monitoring non-collections staff, contractors, and other visitors while in\ncollections areas is essential to minimizing the risk of theft, damage, or the loss of\ncollection objects. Yet, in every department we reviewed, we either observed or were\ninformed by collections officials of instances where volunteers, contractors, and non\xc2\xad\ncollections staff that they were familiar with, such as maintenance workers, researchers,\neducators, and students, had unsupervised access to collections areas including those with\nunlocked cabinets and valuable objects.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nSD 600 states that the Institution will provide reasonable physical access to its collections,\nbut that this policy must be balanced with preservation and security concerns. Other\nindustry guidelines are more specific. Suggested Guidelines for Museum Security\nrecommends that all museums adopt a policy regulating access of all persons. Two non\xc2\xad\nSmithsonian museums we contacted, the American Museum of Natural History in New\nYork City and the Cleveland Museum of Natural History, have strict guidelines for non\xc2\xad\nstaff access. They prohibit general access to the collections for volunteers, contractors,\nand outside researchers and educators and require that such individuals, when in\ncollections areas, work under the direct supervision of a scientific staff member at all\ntimes.\n\nWe found that NMNH collections management oversight of visitors in the collections\nareas was not nearly as rigorous. During our audit we noted the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t The bags and personal belongings of employees, contractors, researchers,\n volunteers, and other visitors were not inspected on entry to or exit from\n collections areas at the NMNH Mall building or at MSC. Moreover, security\n personnel rarely checked for property passes when employees left the building\n with museum property. In contrast, we found that screening of all employees and\n visitors is standard in the private sector. The American Museum of Natural\n History in New York City, for example, routinely checks the bags of all visitors\n going in and out of its collections storage areas.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Non-Smithsonian researchers were frequently left alone in collections storage\n areas with unlocked cabinets. Further, maintenance and repair contractors\n occasionally worked in collections storage areas containing unlocked cabinets\n without the collection manager\'s knowledge or oversight, moving storage cabinets\n around and exposing the objects to damage or other loss.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t At MSC, according to the facility manager, individuals \n\n can walk around unnoticed and some visitors are given \n\n access cards to the storage areas (known as pods). \n\n These visitors are sometimes allowed to go into the \n\n pods with no supervision. Many areas in these pods \n\n contain valuable objects and artifacts on open shelving. \n\n\nCollections officials we spoke with acknowledged the\nimportance of proper monitoring of individuals in collections\nareas, but they believe it is unreasonable to require the same\ndegree of oversight over all types of non-staff visitors.\nCollections managers stated that they do screen and consider\nthe credentials of each visitor when granting access to the collections. However, they\nindicated that in the museum and research fields, it is a matter of professional courtesy to\nleave known colleagues from other institutions unsupervised. The managers did state\nthat severe staff shortages prevented them from providing the degree of oversight they\nwould like. They indicated that despite steady growth in the number of collections\nobjects - which has increased by over one-half million since FY 2003 - the number of\nNMNH collections staff has decreased by about 4 percent from FY 2003 to FY 2006.\n\n\n\n 10 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nTo strengthen physical controls over access to the collections storage areas and oversight\nof individuals working in the collections areas, we recommended that the Director, OPS:\n\n 1. \t Prioritize the repair, replacement, and upgrading of security devices identified in\n the 2005 Assessment Report that are related to direct or indirect access to the\n collections storage areas, and prepare a comprehensive budget and establish an\n appropriate timeframe for correcting the cited weaknesses.\n\n 2. \t Conduct a security assessment at MSC similar to the one done in 2005 at the \n\n NMNH Mall building and develop a plan to correct significant deficiencies. \n\n\n 3. \t Re-emphasize OPS requirements for security officer responses to alarms and\n consider expanding the supervisory pool of security officers that would be allowed\n to enter the NMNH collections areas to provide needed coverage.\n\nWe also recommended that the Director, NMNH:\n\n 4. \t Require each department collections manager to implement strict controls over the\n inventory and use of keys to collections storage cabinets, and develop a detailed\n budget and plan for replacing old cabinets without locking mechanisms with\n storage cabinets having locks for all collections with any significant commercial,\n scientific or historical value.\n\n 5. \t Establish requirements for closer supervision of non-collections staff, visitors, and\n other individuals allowed access to the collections, and consider screening less\xc2\xad\n known or new visitors as they leave higher-value collections areas.\n\n 6. \t Provide a list of specific high-value collections storage areas to OFEO to be used by\n OFEO to notify NMNH collections officials when outside contractor personnel will\n be working in these areas.\n\n\nInventory Control Measures Are Not in Place or Are Inadequate\nAn inventory, which SD 600 defines as an itemized listing of collections items, groups, or\nlots that identifies the current physical location of each item, group, or lot, is a\nfundamental and critical component of good collections care. As stated in Concern at the\nCore, "Knowing what you have and where it is ... is essential to deterring and detecting\ntheft and providing access."\n\nSD 600 requires each collecting unit to establish and implement a written cyclical\ninventory plan. SD 600 also refers to an "Implementation Manual" that is meant to\nprovide technical guidance and information to assist collecting units in implementing the\nDirective. However, the Manual, which is being developed by the Director of the\nSmithsonian\'s National Collections Program, was still in draft form at the time of our\naudit, and therefore was not available for use by the collecting units. The Smithsonian\'s\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nNational Collections Program Director is responsible for reviewing and approving\nmuseum collections plans.\n\nNMNH does not maintain accurate inventory records of all its collections objects, which\nmakes it difficult to account for, identify, and locate a specimen or object for research or\nexhibit. Also, museum staffs have not performed cyclical inventory reviews as required by\ntheir own department inventory policies, inventory records have not been updated to\nreclassify species name changes or to identify locations where objects have been moved,\nand inventory records are not in one complete format. Finally, our testing of the\ninventory showed a number of missing or misplaced objects.\n\nInventory Plans axe Incomplete or Not Followed\n 4\nNMNH does not have a formal, museum-wide Inventory Plan as required by SD 600.\nFurther, we found that only two departments had their own inventory plans, but those\nplans were outdated, lacked specific timeframes for cyclical inventories, and were not\nfollowed. To cite just a few examples, the Anthropology Department\'s plan, which was\ncreated in conjunction with its move from the Mall building to MSC during 1991-1995,\nhas not been updated since that time. . is being conducted of the\nMSC safe, which contains the plan also requires\ninventories of other on a us not define continuous\nbasis. The division of Physical Anthropology does conduct a minimal form of cyclical\ninventory each time objects are moved to other cabinets, maintaining all previous\nlocations in its database, and thereby making it easier to locate an object. Paleobiology\nalso has an inventory plan requiring an annual inventory of all collections with a\ncommercial value of over $5,000. However, the plan, developed as a result of a 1992 OIG\naudit recommendation, has not been updated since 1993, and the last inventory was\nconducted in 2000.\n\nWithout a museum-wide Collections and Inventory Plan, the departments lack central\nguidance for prioritizing and conducting cyclical inventories. They also may not know if\nany collections objects are missing. Yet the method to conduct cyclical inventories has\nbeen in place at the Institution since the late 1990s. The Institution\'s statistician, who has\nan office in the NMNH Mall building, developed a program to use for sample inventory\nreviews that was made available to all departments. Only Paleobiology used this program,\nand that was for a one-time inventory in 2000.\n\nOne way to ensure that more attention and resources are devoted to this area is to make\nindividuals accountable. For FY 2006, as suggested by Concern at the Core, the NMNH\nDirector\'s performance evaluation has a requirement to develop a cyclical inventory plan,\nwhich puts this responsibility at the highest level. We believe this responsibility should\nextend further in the organization and that the performance standards for department\nchairs should also incorporate specific inventory goals.\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 We note that at the time of our audit, NMNH\'s Collections Management Policy, which requires cyclical\ninventory plans, was still in draft and had been submitted to the Office of General Counsel for approval.\n\n\n\n\n 12 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nRecords Are Incomplete or Inaccurate\nNMNH does not have a complete or accurate count for all inventory records and objects.\nThe museum maintains a combination of electronic and paper-based records that in\nsome instances are incomplete and inaccurate and in others are duplicative. For example,\nmuseum officials told us they had converted approximately 5.8 million records (or\n12 percent) of about 50 million records at NMNH into an electronic collections system.\nBut as Concern at the Core noted, the number of electronic records may not be accurate\nbecause of duplicate records in the database, records remaining in the database even after\nthe objects have been deaccessioned, and objects on long-term loan but still listed in the\ndatabase.\n\nTo further complicate the problems of inaccuracy and duplication, paper records that\nhave not been converted to electronic collections systems are maintained on a\ncombination of ledger books, card files, and other documentation, some of it overlapping.\nAs a result, it has been difficult for museum personnel to identify the correct number of\nrecords.\n\nAlso, as reported in Concern at the Core, NMNH staff was unable to catalogue all objects\nto the appropriate item or lot level or to reconcile or correct conflicting data. The report\nstated that NMNH staff estimated that insufficient records and documentation affected\n62 million of its objects. As a result, NMNH still had significant catalogue work to be\ncompleted. In our opinion, conducting a complete collections inventory and\nmeticulously updating collections records are essential for ensuring the accuracy of the\nmuseum\'s collections records.\n\nSome examples of the inaccurate or incomplete records we found in our inventory review\nof high-value objects included:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Entomology did not have any inventory records for a collection of 600 rare \n\n butterflies kept in locked cabinets. \n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Invertebrate Zoology maintains a valuable Bledsoe seashell collection that\n numbered over 7,000 objects (4,210 records) and was appraised for almost\n when it was offered to the Institution in 1988. However, a complete\n ..,u.,..,i-.",.u has not been done since January 1989, when the collection numbered\n only about 4,800 objects. An OIG investigation at that time found a lack of\n security, accountability, and control for this collection, and the missing objects\n went unresolved. Adding to this accountability problem, the last inventory of\n Bledsoe seashells identified about 4,400 objects, or about 400 fewer than the\n complete inventory done in 1989.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t In Paleobiology and Vertebrate Zoology (Birds), 14 objects were reclassified and\n had either a taxonomic name change or were upgraded from a sub-species to a\n species, but these changes were not reflected in both the electronic record and in\n the inventory record location.\n\n\n\n\n 13 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nA backlog in accessioning, the formal process of recording a new object into a collection\nunit, compounds the problem of incomplete records. Concern at the Core noted that in\nFY 2000, NMNH had a processing backlog of over 5 million objects. The accession\ndocuments created for this process do not form a complete record and need to be\ncatalogued for security and research purposes before the objects can be formally entered\ninto a collections unit. If objects come into a backlogged department, they are susceptible\nto loss or theft because they will lack identifiable records and locations and may be left on\nopen shelves and tables or in unlocked cabinet drawers. NMNH collections managers\nindicated that at the rate they are able to catalogue with current statT and funding, they\ncannot keep up with new collections, much less make a dent in the retrospective data\ncapture needed.\n\nAccording to NMNH managers, staffing shortages and budget constraints have been the\nmajor reasons NMNH has been unable to update and maintain an accurate and current\ninventory of its constantly growing collections inventory. Federal funding for NMNH\ncollections staff has declined 59 percent in the last 10 years. In FY 2003, NMNH had\n158 full-time equivalent employees to oversee 125.9 million objects and specimens. As of\nthe end of FY 2005, the collections inventory had increased by over one-half million\nobjects, yet the collections statThas decreased to 152 full-time equivalent employees.\nAlthough NMNH has three times the collections staff of any other Smithsonian museum,\nit also has 20 times the number of collection items of the next largest Smithsonian\nmuseum. The NMNH collections continue to grow, which will only make it more\ndifficult for NMNH statT to correct inventory weaknesses.\n\nBecause of the extensive resources needed to review these millions of records, we believe a\nmore practical task would be to prioritize collections with significant commercial,\nscientific, or historical value and then accurately count and maintain electronic records of\nthose objects.\n\nA Sample Inventory Review Showed Missing or Misplaced Objects\n\nTo test the accuracy of the inventory records, we sampled inventory in six NMNH\ndepartments. Our results, summarized in Appendix B, show that of 2,320 objects (1,807\nrecords) in 15 inventory samples from the six departments, there were initially 53 objects\nthat were either missing or could not be readily located. Of these 53 objects, 40 were from\nfour inventories sampled in Gems and Minerals. By the close of our audit, 35 of the\n40 were located. From the Botany sample review, we originally identified 10 objects that\ncould not be found; the collections manager eventually located 5. We performed a\n100 percent review of the Martian meteorite inventory, and NMNH collections officials\nhave not been able to locate 3 of those 112 objects.\n\nAt the close of our audit, one of the statistical samples we reviewed still had objects that\ncould not be located. Based on our Gem sample, which had 2 objects that could not be\nlocated from the 192 objects inventoried, we estimated that slightly more than 1 percent\nof the gems were either misplaced or missing. We also found there was a lack of\ndocumentation for some objects in our mineral sample. We observed four instances\nwhere the collections staff had listed an object as being exchanged with an outside entity,\nbut they could not document what item(s) had been received in exchange.\n\n\n\n 14 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nTo strengthen inventory controls and identify and locate its most valuable collection\nobjects, we recommend that the Director, NMNH, follow the suggestions of Concern at\nthe Core, and:\n\n 7. \t Work with the National Collections Program Director to finalize the museum\'s\n Collections Management Policy and Inventory Plan and the SD 600\n Implementation ManuaL\n\n 8. \t Direct the Department of Mineral Sciences to conduct a complete inventory and\n update the inventory records for all valuable gems and minerals and develop a\n follow-up plan to locate all missing objects.\n\n 9. \t Require that the performance plans of department chairs contain specific inventory\n goals, including developing and implementing cyclical inventory plans, as a\n measure of job performance for appraisal purposes.\n\n 10. Direct the Registrar to work with department chairs to develop a priority list of\n NMNH\'s most valuable objects and type specimens and, with the assistance of the\n Institution\'s statistician, determine the appropriate percentage or number of those\n objects to review for each cyclical inventory.\n\n 11. Instruct the Associate Director and Registrar for Collections, and the Assistant\n Director for Information Technology, to develop and implement a plan, initially\n for all high-value objects and type specimens, to update and convert all electronic\n and paper records so they are consistent in documenting the status of the\n collections inventory.\n\nMANAGEMENT RESPONSE\nThe Directors ofNMNH and OPS provided formal written comments to our August 23,\n2006 draft report. The Directors generally concurred with our findings and\nrecommendations, except for recommendation number six, and identified actions\nplanned for each recommendation, as well as target dates for their completion. A brief\nsummary of management\'s response follows.\n\nRegarding recommendations 1 through 3, OPS has requested funding in the FY 2009\ncapital program to bring all collections storage areas in the Mall building up to OPS\nTechnical Security Standards. If the requested funding is appropriated, improvements\nshould be by January 2010. In the interim, OPS to repair the. and\n card readers and the doors near \t Similar security\n fJ,,,,IUH..U for MSC in the FY 2010\n\n\nOn the issue of security officer responses to alarms, OPS reiterated its policy to respond to\nall alarms in a timely manner at every SI facility. By October 2006, OPS will implement a\nnumber of actions, including the establishment of a new dedicated post named Collateral\nDutyl Alarm Response Officers, a weekly review of alarm activity reports with appropriate\n\n\n\n 15 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nfollow-up actions, and training for staff causing repeated alarm activations on proper\naccess procedures. The full text of OPS\' comments is attached as Appendix D.\n\nRecommendations 4 through 11, which were addressed to the Director, NMNH, covered\nthe physical safeguards over the collections areas as well as inventory procedures and\nrecordkeeping. NMNH agreed to issue a policy to strengthen controls over the use of\nkeys to collections storage cabinets and, by January 2007, to develop a priority listing and\ndetailed budget for acquiring storage cabinets with locking mechanisms for all collections\nwith significant commercial, scientific, or historical value. NMNH also will review its\nvisitor and collections procedures and issue updated policy guidance by March 2007.\nNMNH disagreed with recommendation six because it believed it would not be prudent\nto identify specific high-value areas of the collections to non-staff. Instead, it proposed to\nprovide OFEO with a list of department chairs and collections managers and their office\nphone numbers mapped to the areas of the buildings so that they will be contacted when\nany outside contractor personnel need to work in those areas.\n\nNMNH also agreed to finalize the museum\'s Collection Management Policy by\nJanuary 2007 and complete an inventory of the highest-value gems and minerals by\nJune 2007. NMNH also will include inventory goals in the performance plans for\ndepartment chairs for the evaluation cycle beginning in January 2007. While NMNH\nacknowledged that additional high-value objects still need to be inventoried and agreed to\ndevelop priority lists and determine appropriate percentages or counts for required\ncyclical inventories by the fourth quarter ofFY 2007, it noted that it did not have the\nresources to do the inventories. Further, while NMNH agreed to develop an\nimplementation plan to update and convert all electronic and paper records to consistent\nsupportable collections inventory records, the Director indicated that at the current level\nof resources it would be a multi-year effort and did not provide an end date. The full text\nofNMNH\'s comments is attached as Appendix E.\n\nOFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMENTS\nManagement\'s proposed actions are generally responsive to our recommendations and we\nconsider the recommendations resolved. We note, however, that several\nrecommendations are not scheduled to be completed until January 2010 or beyond, and\nare heavily dependent on the availability of additional resources. Given the sensitive\nnature of the weaknesses we identified and their effect on the security and accountability\nof the collections, we expect that management will make every effort to either acquire or\nreallocate resources necessary to ensure full implementation of the corrective actions as\nsoon as is practicable.\n\n\n\n\n 16 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL \n\n\nAppendix A. Scope and Methodology.\nThe objective of this audit was to determine ifNMNH\'s physical security was adequate to\nsafeguard the collections and collection inventory controls were in place and adequately\nworking to ensure the collections are properly accounted for in compliance with\ncollections management policies and procedures.\n\nPhysical Security\n\nTo assess physical security at NMNH, we toured the collections storage areas of all\nNMNH\'s departments to inspect and test security devices. We also toured two additional\nstorage facilities in Maryland, the Museum Support Center (MSC) in Suitland and the\nHuman Studies Film Archives storage building in Columbia. We went through alarmed\nentrances to determine the response of security officers and viewed the guard monitors in\nthe security control room in the mall building. We reviewed the 2005 OPS Security\nAssessment Report to identify all devices needing replacement or repair and discussed\nwith OPS officials plans for correcting these devices as well as how they allocate security\nofficers.\n\nWe met with collections management officials in each department to discuss their\nconcerns with physical security, communications with security officers, and policies and\nprocedures regarding access to collections for outsiders such as educators, researchers,\nstudents and others who may have an interest in a particular collection or contractors\nworking in the collections storage areas. We also held discussions with curators and\ncollections managers and reviewed the departments\' controls over the assignment and use\nof cabinet keys.\n\nTo gain information on how other museums approach the physical security of their\ncollections, we toured the American Museum of Natural History in New York City and\nobtained their policies, procedures, and other data. We obtained similar information\nfrom the Cleveland Museum of Natural History, as well as several publications,\nguidelines, and reports from national museum associations and committees.\n\nInventory Controls\n\nTo evaluate inventory controls over collections at NMNH, we examined both paper and\nelectronic inventory records for a sample of collections from the seven departments. We\ntraced the record for each sample selection back to its location in the storage or exhibit\narea. With input from the Chief of Collections (Registrar), and the collections managers\nfrom each department, we selected our samples from those collections considered most\nvaluable from a commercial, historical, or scientific perspective. Samples were designed\non a statistical, judgmental, or 100 percent basis, depending on the collection size, its\nstorage location, and other factors such as the extent of data in the records. We identified\nthe samples from the records or documents, not from individual collection objects,\nbecause NMNH\'s inventory records often included more than one object or specimen.\nWe also held discussions with the Institution\'s statistician on prior tests of collections and\nguidance on sampling methodologies for this audit. In summary:\n\n\n\n\n 17 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t We selected judgmental samples from the Paleobiology Department (specimens\n valued at over $5,000 with some in unlocked cabinets or on open shelves); the\n Invertebrate Zoology Department (Bledsoe seashells, which were reported in past\n OIG audits); the Vertebrate Zoology Department (Hawaiian Honeycreeper birds,\n which collections officials identified as having the most complete records); and\n the Physical Anthropology (human and (Herbarium\n Solanaceae), which were both located in and were near\n __ selected an\n \'ii\'iit\'ia\'I"\'(ems Clences Department to learn more about\n the population before designing statistical samples.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t We took random statistical samples from the ber\n and Burgess Shale collections), Gems (located in\n Minerals (located in and Anthr at\n MSC). The samples were an electronic inventory database using\n random generators and were designed to reflect a 95-percent confidence level, a\n 1.99 percent error rate (from past audit experience of OIG inventory audits), and\n a 1.90 percent precision rate.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2\t in the Martian meteorites\n and Mineral\n\n llliiiid\n collection over at the Mall\n the Anthropology vault at MSC that contains S0807 Ex. 2\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t For the Entomology Department, we chose a valued butterfly collection that was\n kept in locked cabinets, but because there were no detailed inventory records, we\n were unable to evaluate this collection against the department\'s records.\n\nAppendix B shows details of the sample inventories selected and the results from our\ntests.\n\nWe conducted our audit between July 2005 and August 2006 in accordance with\nGovernment Auditing Standards, as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United\nStates, and included tests of management controls as we considered necessary.\n\n\n\n\n 18 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\nAppendixB.\n\n OIG Sample Inventory - NMNH\n\n\n\n Total Est.- Sample Selection Size of Sampling Sample Size (b) Missing\'\n i2!2artment POl!ulationfltems ~2ecimen T1\xc2\xa32el Obl!!l~ ~[2l!1! Collection Group Method tal No. obiects NO,_J=ds MisDlaced\n (Recordsl\n Paleobiology 42,670,000 Burgess shale 3,026 statistical 171 171 0\n\n Amber collection \t 5,070 statistical 381 175 0\n\n Objects over $5,000 \t 415 judgment 83 83 0\n\n\n Anthropology 2,250,000 \t _ Gold artifacts 217 100 percent 217 217 0\n\n Archives Native American art 2,279 statistical 110 110 0\n\n Physical Anthropology - 1,257 judgment 90 90 0\n Selected skulls\n\n Mineral Sciences 340,000 Gems _-\':J 3229 i~ms) 7,874 statistical 192 177 2\n judgment 262 176 1\n 8,136 statistical 215 177 0\n\n Mineral purchases ~ $1 OK- 253 100 percent 253 129 2\n FY 2003/04\n\n Martian Meteorites 112 100 percent 112 112 3\n\n Vertebrates 9,560,000 Hawaiian Honey Creepers- (Birds) 782 judgment 32 31 0\n\n Invertebrate Zoology 34,320,000 SeaShells -Bledsoe Collection at NHB 2,289 judgment 45 30 0\n -Bledsoe shells at MSC judgment 78 30 0\n\n Entomology 32,520,000 Butterflies 600 nla 0 nla\n\n Botany 4,790,000 Herbarium Solanaceae 608 judgment 99 99 5\n\n\n Totals 126,450,000 \t 32,918 2,320 1,607 13\n\n (a) The statistical samples were based on random sampling criteria that had a 95 percent confidence level, 1.99 percent error rate, +1- 1.90 percent variance.\n (b) All samples were selected from inventory or catalog record numbers. However, some records had more than one object.\n\n\n\n\n 19 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix C. Collections Area Showing Security Device Problems\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix D. Management Comments, Office of Protection Services\n\n\n o\t Smithsonian Institution\n O~ o\xc2\xa3 Pr<>t\xc2\xabIi.(ln S/!!\'1\'iM\n Memo\n\n\n !)ate September 18, 2006\n\n To A, Sprightly Ryan. Acting Inspector General\n "" \t WiIlW\'n W. llrubaltt!. Dir\xc2\xab:tor, OffiGfl of ra\xc2\xa2ilities Engineering iUld Operations\n\n William Tompkim, National Colle<:tioos Coordinator .\n\n Cristian Samper K, Director, National MU5eumofNlltural H i$tQt \n\n\n\n $ub~ \t Response toInspectorGenc.m Draft Audit Report on Physical Security all.d Inventory \n\n ContrQ1Mel1surtll to Safcgumi the National CoUed:ions \n\n\n This respOllse is submitted on behalf of the Office ofProtection Servke.s (OPS). DPS bat\n agreed with National Museum of Natural History (NMNH) to provide a separate\n respanJe.\n In general, we aIXcpt the findin8$ afld feflommt\'ndatlons of the: entire audit. We have\n some clarifications ofsome pomts that will be detailed in our responses to\n rerommendlltions I - 3. Per our agreement, NMNH will respond to the rema.inins\n ~ommendatjQns.\n\n\n\n\n 1. \t Prio~ the .repair. replacement,!)t upgtading of SefiUr!ty devices identified in\n the 2005 ~nt 1U:port that\xc2\xb7are related to direct or indJrea access to the\n coDettiolls $t()~ areas, and prepare a comprehensive budget and elltablisb an\n appropriate tbneframe tor oorrecting the cited wea\'kntllJeS.\n\n\n\n\n SIPSSwas the main bead;.end monitoring IleCUrity syiStem ill each major 81 facility and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The first phft~ ofOPS\' Security Sys_ Modernization\n the repl~t of SJPPS. The second phase was to bring all 81\n with the newly developed Teelmical Security Stanl1ard$.\n ItUlOk approKintatety 4.5 yeal\'$ to accotn Ush Phasc:l ofthe SSMI\'. Since then OPS bas\n been atwmpting. as re~ permiUed \xe2\x80\xa2mllriIy rlu1:l\'ugh the Sf Facilities Capi1al\n Progmm)~ to eomplete Phase 11 throtlf!b the entire $I. In implementmg Phase II,OPS\n\n\n\n\n 21 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendixD. Management Comments, Office of Protection Services (continued)\n\n\n\n\n Tl:11\'get Date: 1 J~ 2{)07\n\n\n\n\n l"hew if funding requested in the FY09 Capital\n bring all eoU~Qns storage. IIatef1S (.d some\n .eet ba$ been def~\n \'tblIi project as a\n Y09. The prQJeetis\n emTefltly in design\xc2\xb7and iIhoUId be coinpletedby S~ 2001. The earlieSt date that a\n C011SU\'U<ItiOfi ~ <iO).iId be lI~ would be Oetober 2008. The CQtlW:uotion is\n lIIltil::ipaWd.1o last approximately 1 - !.S years.\n Target Date: JtlJl7I(1ry 20f0\n 2. \t Conduct .. seeurfty ~_ at MSC limillil\'~ tile (IRe doltt in :!OOS at the\n NMNB MaO buiding ami develop. pia to comet llipifiea"t detideD"\n Agn;e \'Wkh\xc2\xa2furi;ru:atkm: The ~ ~ at NMNH was done in unticlpatiO.\xc2\xb7n\n oithe design ~ for . eel. In the caseQfMS(;.a\n . Ushed m fun design for the\n ItS part oftbo Phase .... It inbi:lpes of\n a~acomp~ upgrade at this much smaller facllity However, that was not\n\n\n\n\n 22 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendixD. Management Comments, Office of Protection Services (continued)\n\n\n\n possible and th~ (I ~ bill been deftmed Inlulllly by OPS (until stPl"S was repJa<:OO)\n and. 81 budget development p~ Cutmltly. complete Phase 1I\n upgrades an: for the roo Capital Proawn.\n Target Dole: J(11IlKR\')\' 2011.\n\n The \t t MSC have ~.redand an: seoored adequately..\n 3. \t Re-empihllD OPS requiNmentll for SKtIrity of6eer ftlSpoues t. 311U"D1$ liDd\n .:mWder _anding the 50pt!M\'Urory\'Fol ofseeurity oftieen thatwQQld be\n IIftowed to enter the NMNH eo1lediOll5 Meal to provide needed coverage.\n\n clarifica,rio.n: way ofcIadiioodon. an OPS\n By. .\n\n\n\n\n collection storage at J\'I.\'MNH \n\n other collecti.()u storage can by \n\n not \'1Q(P4me.wed any issues in alarmMpO!lSe fbi time two areas. \n\n By l\'hr. the ml\\lmity of the warms that WI!I\'e identified by the 10 \'staffare considered\n \'\'nui!llltJ<le fIIarms" within the llCCUtity induslty. These ate vulld lilarmIl (not false); but are\n CllIUSed by situations that are not, pnerall:y, breaches ofsecurity. In this case, the locations\n identiW by the 10\xc2\xb7staffhave many \'\'nUlsance alarms" that are \xc2\xa2\\lUlled by issues s\\leh lIS\n ~notpresentinathelr~s r\n similat Occurrences. The plem\n complaeency in a IlCCUtity f\'on;e that has responded. 10 the same aIaml over and over and\n fuund no real1mlach in security. If II security force is understaffed, III idenlified by the JO\n staff, this problem can ellUSO these 00.", ~ alanns tohave a lower priorily\'in the .\n l\'IliSJlOtISt\'bilities ofsecurity staff. This is what ocourted atNMNH. An ~\n seoority fOl\'Ce must ~ their duties and~&e to wbaI is "Ukely\'" a real security\n ill<lident. Altboogb.~ QIl OPS investiptjons aU alartll!>l.recclved II, NSponse. It has\n taken It coosidemble amount oftime to respond 10 ctll1ain alarms in NMNH.\n Thill is otl\'ered as an expJtI:IlIHion oot !In excuse. It is OPS policy to\n respond to every alarm in a time is our intent moo $0 at every Sl facility.\n Tl:Iefollowing actions will be. ~ by OPS. at all facilities, to CIlSun:odeqlJiW\n ~ and to mlni~~aIiIrmll:\n\n It \t E3ch week the Controllomn Opetatiot\\$ Security Manager will run and review\n Alarm Arovity, port wl.U klentHy l\'e5poPse times. nulsan~ alarm!!\' and\n alatm tec;hnkid\n It \t The PKility Se<:!l1rigt Manager will disCU8!l ftn\xc2\xabings of the wecldy.181m activity report\n with 1M CwtrolRoom Ope:ration$ SecurityManager and will then discuS$ the results\n with Unit ~tySupervmm. .\n .. RqJeated activations disoovered to be the resfllt ofsbdf\n procedUfe& will be identitled aDd !;omnmnl\xc2\xabted to the\n\n\n\n\n 23 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix D. Management Comments, Office of Protection Services (continued)\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t TheNMNH Security Unit win establish 1.1 new dedicatlld post named Collateral\n Duty/Alw:n Respo1li(lOfficctL New Post Orduswill be written to retkct: the\n assignment. Although the postureinlt!flded to have other dutie$ 8u<:h U It gallery\n post, tbe posts\' tim pr\' response. Based on the number ofalarms\n cutrently received dally post will have to be dedicated to\n alarm response until flU\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t The Collateral/Alum R.espOQlle Offi~$) will document each alarm respi)1llJe daily.\n the mulb. time itlfwmed ofthe a~. and time the Control Room WG6 rontatted to\n reset the alarm. \t .\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t A blotter entrywiD be entered fOf each a1w:n from the fOrm the ofiker uses to noord\n the alarm adivation.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t SeQlrity MiIlIlI8I!meJ1t will wnduct periodic in&pection~of Conlfction Areas rewrding\n the result1n the blotter.\n Targtt1 Dat(!: 1 October t006\n\n\n\n\n 24 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix E. Management Comments, Director, National Museum ofNatural\nHistory\n\n\n\n Smithsonian\n National MUSeU"1 ofNatural History\n\n\n\n\n Date: September 27. 2006\n\n To: A. Sprightly.Ryan, Acting lruIpootor General\n\n Cc: William Brubaker, Director, Office ofFllcilities Bnsineering &. 0perati0ll1O\n William Tompkins, National Collections Coordinator\n lat1\'1(1S J. McIauglllro. Director, Oftke ofPtotectiOllServl.ces\n\n CristWl Sampcr K., Piroctor, Natiooai Musoum ofNatural History ~\n SubJoot: Respoose. to AugU$t 23, 2006 DrlItl: AudltR~ 011 Physical Security and\n Inventory Control M~ures to Safegllllrdlhe National o,lloetions\n\n\n NMNH II~ the opportnnityto respond to the Audit Report on Physical\n Security11M JnventoryControl ~ to ~d the National Collections. 1n\n ~ we II8f0I> with the overaU fmdlnS$. It had been some mosinee the last\n collections\xc2\xb7relatedaudit, and it can be helpthl to have extemnl pmipective on policies\n and practices. l\'be report\'s recognition of the effects of resourre constraints is very\n important, 11$ is theintetplay b\xc2\xabweet! security .findings, under tbejurlsdiction of t1w\n Oltke. ofProtecmon Service!!, and physical oonll\'Ol and Inventory, under NMNH\'s\n \xc2\xa2()!ltrol. Weare hoptltid that t1w reoommendmioll$ will support our requests fur\n :iddltiQlllll reJ!O\'U1\'CeS. lIS we fOimS thole limited ~ we \xc2\xae have on makillg\n necessary changei and developing plans fur resources as they arefbrthooming..\n\n\n RespI}Me W itooomUleJldationli.\n\n N(lte:RecomlUl.!lldaUom 14 are ~ OR physicalwntrols under the oversight of\n OPS. NMNH regards thcsu recommllIldatiooi as IlpptO\'priate.lU\'Jd anticipates tbat\n resulting actiws will yield WduabJe improvements to co1lectioos $CCllrity, NMNH will\n rely on thePi\'rector, 0}>8, to act 1.IpoIl the&} recommendmioDS.\n\n\n\n\n $MmI$Q!It~NIN~\n N\\iIImdHOiImY lI<Iwn 01 Ml\\C ~\n P.Q.llod70!1\n ~.\n _m_~ oo:!OOu.\xe2\x80\xa2lIni\n ;lI)\'US7Al\'1sul\'ol<\n\n\n\n\n 25 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix E. Management Comments, Director, National Museum ofNatural\nHistory (continued)\n\n\n\n\n 4. \t Require 118.department coDeeaeu!I mal. \xe2\x80\xa2\'" to implement striet controls\n over diemveatory and me of keys to eoUection storlileatblBets. and develOp\n a detded budget and plan fIn"\xc2\xb7repJaetng olclcabillets witho..tloddng\n medianfsms with storage cablBets havillg ~ for all Clllleetlolls wld1any\n sfgDUI~t tooimer.-., MeIltifiC oTJrlstoriw value.\n\n 4-A. Cmltnl over inventory and aH of keys to CJ:!llecttoas storage cablnets\n\n NMNH agrees that these OOII1roIlJ need Improvement mdc<msistency across the\n museum. The museum wiD review its ttUUlllpment ofcollecfions ~ ooit\n keys and will devel()p an NMNH-wide policy which will be IlIwed June, 2007.\n Implementation ofthis poncy will be included in appropriate performanoe plms\n of coDeruons managers and Dtpllrtment Chairs\xe2\x80\xa2\n\n ....\xc2\xbb. ~p a deWled budget lIud plan fin" replacing old eabJnets WIiIlout\n ioekillgttllllC!haD.!sms Mth storage cabJnets havlng lotkl for all ~oWl\n witll any slpHlellllt eommerdat,.Jdentiflc or bistorklll vahle.\n\n NMNH a~ that oollelltions with slgnifi~t value should be in locked\n cabinetry. In 200tS NMNH developed a museum-wide casereplaoemem plan.\n NMNH win aH this data to develop a priorityliiting and associated detailed\n budget by Janllllty 1,2001. This phm lind the detailed budget will be used a~ the\n bam fur propo!lllls to the SmithOOliian Cate and Premvatioo.Fond and future\n fedenII budget requtl$tti.\n\n\n 5. \t EatabHsb reqtl1rementi for cl<IHr supervision of noa-eolbledon stall\', vilIltOrt,\n g~rotblll\' indlvfdualullowed aeet1ll$to the coUediuaL CoumJer saeeniBg\n Iess..klIo\'l\'m or Dew vJsitort as thgy leave highe....value eoUeetIoo$ areas.\n\n NMNH .agrees. with the spirit ofthisreOOmmendatton, however. the staffneeded\n to iblfiU getlemiized closer supervision CaMQt be accompllll~ with exJ.!itins\n ~ while still fulfilling ~lIibmty expectations. Non-staffcollections\n WIitoI\'s ate3lreud,y ~ and in. somounits tOOte vmtorll m.~ wbm\n winS !he oolleetions. We feel the museum\'s general approach to visitor\n monitot;ing is ~ with other ~Qns that: bold scientific colleruoos,\n and is ~ for the majority of the oo11ectioll$\xe2\x80\xa2. To ensure that IIpproprlate\n practices ~ beingfollowed pel the nature ofthe specific groups ofthe\n eo~NMN.H will review its visitor andlXlUe\\:tiOmi procedures, examine\n those in p1aoe atwmpatable museums. and will ~ updatedpoUoy guid~ by\n M_2007. \'\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix E. Management Comments, Director, National Museum ofNatural\nHistory (continued)\n\n\n\n 6. \t Pro\'ride a UM of speeuk ldg&-vaJue coHeetiou storage areaS to OFEO tn be\n used by ono to ootify NMNH collections offielals wilen outside cwtraetor\n pel\'SllDDel will be working mthes& Ife&S.\n\n NMNHdisagrees with this rerommeildation because it oollldi.dendfy specific\n high value areas nf the collectiOllll to llon.staff. Instead, we suggest that a list of\n the Departmelrt Clmh:s and COUecliOllll MlUlllgers and their o\xc2\xa3lice phone n1lll\'lbm\n mapped to the arw ofthebuikting be provided to OPEO IiO that they will be\n c~ wbcn any outside contraoror peI\'1lQIDlel need to wOlt in tM.~ areat, This\n list aM asSOCli!!ted map will be provided in electronic form by October 31. 2006.\n\n\n 7. \t Work with the Natioulll COlleedollS Program Director to finsllzt Che\n ~m\'B CoJle!:tlons Management Polley aruJ Inventory Pl\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2 and the sn\n 600 Implemeaflltlon M.mual.\n\n NMNH agrees with this m:onunendlltion. The dmk policy is with the National\n CoUecuOllll Progmm and the Office of the ~1 COUlUIOI for final miew.\n NMNH wi\'ll wOlt with these ofiicellto finalize the polieyby January 1.2007. In\n addition, NMNH will SI/Pport the National CollectioWl Program who has the\n m.ponsibllityto completethe SO 600 lmpl~ti"l1. manual\n NMNH will furward a UlllIIeIIIlI\xc2\xb7level Inventory Plen for tbe Nlition.a1Collectiom\n Program ~lItor\'a and Undet Secretary for Science\'s review by December\n 3i.2006.\n\n .. \tDirectfileDepartmmt of MJneraJ ~ to eondod: a eomplettt tnVClIroty\n .md update the iIlventoryreeord. fur all valllabJer pms and mmBIIIs ami\n dflvelup afullow-up plan te Wcate aU missing DbJects.\n\n t.\'MNH &gMl& with this r~on, a.nd empb~ that our lIbility to\n intplement1:hln.w.ommoodioonis contingent \\lp(In nlCeiviflg limding fur\n lIdditional $tIIff. A oomplete inventory ofall the Department of Mineral Sdenees\'\n hol~ would be It goal should the ideal resources be avllilable fortms\n undetIiIkinl- Severalmo:re staffwouid be needed to ~ a complete\n inventory withjn a reasonable time fuune. Ann int\'Wlion ofnew at;df PlIlllike1y,\n NMNH SII~<!$I$ that the ~llSt.lful in~es. for rlIk ~purpoW$,\n am the following. to be completed ~ing to tbis schedule unless additfuntil\n staff support beeomea available, WhIle volnnteers maybe helpful in .other arw\n ofml.l$eWll WOJ:k, NMNH believes it is unwise to bave volnnteers _ist with\n inv~ oilUgb value oollectiOlls.\n\n\n\n\n 27 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix E. Management Comments, Director, National Museum ofNatural\nHistory (continued)\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Vault ~ wlll befl.nitllledby Deeember~10()6\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t DeSautels Room Will be fmished by June:, 2007\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t With l(hnidUiOll8l $taifworking fuU_1H10mplete invenlOQlofb Minerals\n Reference.Collection will be finished by March, 2008; otherwise, this inventory\n clllW\'itbe ~pl~ in a reaeonableutJIe tl\'anre.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \t Wlfh lfueeadditional stafi\' woildng< full time. a oomplem inventory oftile\n Metoodtell Colle\xc2\xa21i<ln will be finished by ~ber. 2007; otb.lltwise, this\n inwntoryt1llllOOt be aooompIifihed in a ~ble time&ame.\n\n After each ofthese inventories, areeonciliation plllll will be developed by the\n Depm:tmenl and the llegistrar for the AssOOate Director fur Researdt and\n Collllctions\' wview. ~ will be updated within six month$ of the completion\n of ~ inventoty.\n\n "fil.is ~hedule depends the receipt of llie IIddili0rutl slal\'freoot!tC",ltS\n outlined aL the be~ (ifFY 2001. NMNH wiII be pursuing\n additiormli\\mding ~ities for these pa$itions aud1 as~r-endfundiag.\n\n\n 9. \t Require\'that ~port\\Irmllmie plant afDqartmlmt Cbail\'$l[Ontain $Cplidlic\n loventlllY goals, tacImImj dl.weJaping and ~dug eytUcaJ IlIVOtnry\n ,~. ua meaSDte of lob ped\'OrtlWlce fot apprmal purposes.\n\n NMNH agrees with tbl3 recommendation, and will inclUde inventory goals in the\n perfu~plans fur the evaluation c)fole ~ng inJanuary. 2007.\n\n\n\n If.\tD irect the R~to work with deplll\'tmeDt chairpersons to develop a\n priority list otNMNH\'. most \'YUluable o~ and typ\xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2pecil1lell$ and, with\n the assiJtaneeof the InIdtution\'$statistieian. dewrmiae the!lptmlprlate\n l*cental!\\l~t "lIm_.r~ objeets to review for eaeb eydkal inventory.\n\n ~ ag,~withthls ~Oll, ami wltl develOp _ priorlW listland\n detlmn_~priaw.~ or counts for its eyelkat inventorles by-the 411>\n quarterofPY 2007.\n\n\n 1l.lnItructtheAssoeiateDirector (for Resem:h aDd COUooftODS ) and the\n llegbtrar. and the AlSistallt Director fo, ~imt Tedlnll~, to dAwlllop\n and impleIrIem ill \'lim~ tDitidftor all blglt-value ~ aDd types\n spedmeuJ,te IIpdllte and ~,,~ all tleetfOnk &dpaper ~"thQy are\n (Oumteat ill dollUUl.elltlllg the_WI for die t\'Olleedouinventory.\n\n\n\n\n 28 \n\n\x0c ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\n\nAppendix E. Management Comments, Director, National Museum of Natural\nHistory (continued)\n\n\n\n\n NMNH a~ with thi$~n. .JmpkunentariM is highly dependent\n upon $Wf~ and wiD reqW;re faet finding to ~the sme\xc2\xb7ofVariOlIS\n reoordt In each collections unit. Current estimatei! indicate that additional\n .sev. Fl\'Es win be ~ to e\xc2\xa2tnplete this,and\n the implementation plan. l\'be mutloom\'s collccuOll5 information\n Ii1I\n tilatestilllllte will updated in\n be\n is\n sy$wm the\n E1~ M"U$eUm (EMu), which will include a tl\'lIIlSaction mmagelMl1t\n t\'uncliomtlfty that is CUl:tCiItlyunder developmllJJt. As el~ and paper records\n are entenll.f intn EMu, the primary rerord for the item is established. As a flt\'St\n step to address thlll recommendation, NMNH win .review the records in EMu and\n win identify the high-value items that are not yet recorded in EMu by June. 2007.\n NMNR wiD then procccdwith an implementation plan that will :include tlqet\n m\n dat:es\xc2\xb7Wld an~ted completion date. At the ItIl!\'tent lilW\'J resoorces we\n estItnatethis to be a muJtl\xc2\xb7year effort.\n\n\n\n\n 29 \n\n\x0c'


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
28.8.1999 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee C 246/31
 ORDINANZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI PRIMO GRADO zia Viva Vacances, 33, rue de Strasbourg, contro Commissione
 delle Comunità europee (agente: signora Maria Wolfcarius),
 16 aprile 1999 avente ad oggetto le domande dirette ad annullare la decisione
 della Commissione di archiviare senza alcun seguito le denunce
 presentate dalla ricorrente rispettivamente il 4 e 5 dicembre
 nella causa T-142/98, Image Création SA contro Commis- 1996, segnalanti la concorrenza sleale di cui essa sarebbe
 sione delle Comunità europee (1) oggetto, il Tribunale (Prima Sezione), composto dai signori
 B. Vesterdorf, presidente, J. Pirrung e M. Vilaras, giudici;
 (Ricorso d’annullamento — Ritiro dell’atto impugnato — cancelliere: H. Jung, ha emesso il 21 maggio 1999 un’ordinan-
 Non luogo a statuire) za il cui dispositivo è del seguente tenore:
 (1999/C 246/62) 1. Le cause T-169/98 e T-170/98 sono riunite ai fini dell’ordi-
 nanza.
 (Lingua processuale: il francese) 2. I ricorsi sono dichiarati irricevibili.
 3. Non v’è luogo a provvedere sull’istanza d’intervento del Consiglio.
 Nella causa T-142/98, Image Création SA, con sede a Bruxelles,
 rappresentata dagli avv.ti Georges Vandersanden, Eric Gillet e
 Laure Levi, del foro di Bruxelles, con domicilio eletto in 4. La ricorrente sopporterà le proprie spese, nonché quelle sostenute
 Lussemburgo presso la Fiduciaire Myson SARL, 30, rue dalla Commissione.
 de Cessange, contro Commissione delle Comunità europee,
 (agenti: signora Christina Tufvesson e signor Bernard Mongin), 5. Il Consiglio, proponente l’istanza d’intervento, sopporterà le
 avente ad oggetto la domanda di annullamento della decisione proprie spese.
 della Commissione 10 giugno 1998, che fisse in 135 548 ECU
 la somma dovuta dalla ricorrente per il progetto «Troisième
 (1) GU C 378 del 5.12.1998.
 contrat Europuzzle, broadcasting in 4 Eastern European coun-
 tries, 52 clips» e, per quanto necessario, delle misure esecutive
 di tale decisione, il Tribunale (Seconda Sezione), composto dai
 signori A. Potocki, Presidente, C. W. Bellamy e A.W.H. Meij,
 giudici; cancelliere: H. Jung, ha pronunciato il 16 aprile 1999
 un’ordinanza il cui dispositivo è del seguente tenore:
 1. Non occorre più statuire.
 ORDINANZA DEL PRESIDENTE DEL TRIBUNALE DI
 2. La convenuta è condannata alle spese. PRIMO GRADO
 (1) GU C 340 del 7.11.1998. 26 febbraio 1999
 nella causa T-203/98 R, Yannis Tzikis contro Commis-
 sione delle Comunità europee
 (Procedimento sommario — Sospensione dell’esecuzione —
 Procedimento disciplinare — Destituzione)
 ORDINANZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI PRIMO GRADO
 (1999/C 246/64)
 21 maggio 1999
 nelle cause riunite T-169/98 e T-170/98, Schiocchet contro (Lingua processuale: il francese)
 Commissione delle Comunità europee (1)
 Nella causa T-203/98 R, Yannis Tzikis, funzionario della
 (Ricorso di annullamento — Eccezione di illegittimità — Commissione delle Comunità europee, residente in Boortmeer-
 Regolamento (CEE) n. 684/92 — Trasporti internazionali di beek (Belgio), rappresentato dagli avv. Georges Vandersanden
 viaggiatori effettuati con autocorriere e con autobus — e Laure Levi, del foro di Bruxelles, con domicilio eletto in
 Irricevibilità) Lussemburgo presso la fiduciaire Myson SARL, 30, rue de
 Cessange, contro Commissione delle Comunità europee, (agen-
 ti: signori Gianluigi Valsesia e Julian Currall), avente ad oggetto
 (1999/C 246/63) la domanda di sospensione dell’esecuzione della decisione
 27 ottobre 1998, con la quale l’autorità che ha il potere di
 nomina ha inflitto al ricorrente la sanzione disciplinare della
 (Lingua processuale: il francese) destituzione, senza riduzione né soppressione del diritto alla
 pensione d’anzianità prevista all’art. 86, n. 2, lett. f), dello
 Nelle cause riunite T-169/98 e T-170/98, Schiocchet, con sede Statuto del personale delle Comunità europee, il Presidente del
 in Beuvillers (Francia), con l’avv. Pascal Barbier, del foro di Tribunale ha emesso il 26 febbraio 1999 un’ordinanza il cui
 Thionville, con domicilio eletto in Lussemburgo presso l’agen- dispositivo è del seguente tenore:
 ---pagebreak--- C 246/32 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 28.8.1999
 1. L’esecuzione della decisione 27 ottobre 1998, con la quale è ORDINANZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI PRIMO GRADO
 stata inflitta al ricorrente la sanzione disciplinare della destituzio-
 ne senza riduzione né soppressione del diritto alla pensione
 21 giugno 1999
 d’anzianità, è sospesa fino alla pronuncia della sentenza del
 Tribunale che concluderà il procedimento.
 nel procedimento T-56/99 R, Marlines SA contro Com-
 missione delle Comunità europee
 2. Le spese sono riservate.
 (Concorrenza — Pagamento dell’ammenda — Garanzia
 bancaria — Procedimento sommario — Sospensione dell’ese-
 cuzione)
 (1999/C 246/66)
 (Lingua processuale: il greco)
 ORDINANZA DEL TRIBUNALE DI PRIMO GRADO
 Nel procedimento T-56/99 R, Marlines SA, con sede in
 Monrovia (Liberia), con l’avv. Dimitrios Papatheofanous, patro-
 9 marzo 1999 cinante presso l’Areios Pagos di Atene, con domicilio eletto in
 Findel (Lussemburgo) presso il signor Paul Attallas, route de
 Trèves, contro Commissione delle Comunità europee (agente:
 nella causa T-205/98, Clauni S.A. e altri contro Commis- sigg. Dimitris Triantafyllou e Richard Lyal), avente ad oggetto
 sione delle Comunità europee (1) una domanda di sospensione dell’esecuzione della decisione
 della Commissione 9 dicembre 1998, 1998/271/CE, relativa
 ad una procedura di applicazione dell’art. 85 del Trattato CE
 (Irricevibilità manifesta) (IV/34.466 - Traghetti greci) (GU 1999, L 109, pag. 24), che
 infligge alla richiedente, all’art. 2, un’ammenda di 0,26 milioni
 di ECU, per violazione dell’art. 81 CE (ex art. 85), il presidente
 (1999/C 246/65) del Tribunale ha emesso il 21 giugno 1999 un’ordinanza il cui
 dispositivo è del seguente tenore:
 1. La domanda di provvedimenti provvisori è respinta.
 (Lingua processuale: il francese)
 2. Le spese sono riservate.
 Nella causa T-205/98, Clauni S.A., con sede in Agen (Francia),
 signor Jean Marie Bissieres, residente in la Croix Blanche
 (Francia), SA Lomagenais, divenuta attualmente SA Loma, con
 sede in Penne D’Agenais (Francia), e signor André Lompech,
 residente in Canet (Francia), con gli avv.ti Daniel Veyssiere, del
 foro di Agen, con domicilio eletto in Lussemburgo presso lo
 studio dell’avv. Aloïse May, 31, Grand-Rue, contro Commis-
 sione delle Comunità europee, avente ad oggetto la domanda ORDINANZA DEL PRESIDENTE DEL TRIBUNALE DI
 volte a far sı̀ che il Tribunale accolga una domanda di sgravio PRIMO GRADO
 presentata il 20 dicembre 1995 dinanzi alle autorità doganali
 francesi dal primo ricorrente, e riguardante talune operazioni 1o giugno 1999
 d’importazione di funghi originari della Polonia, il Tribunale
 (Quarta Sezione), composto dal signor R.M. Moura Ramos,
 presidente, dalla signora V. Tiili e dal signor P. Mengozzi, nella causa T-93/99 R, Beatrice Bonaiti Brighina contro
 giudici; cancelliere: H. Jung, ha emesso il 9 marzo 1999 Commissione delle Comunità europee
 un’ordinanza il cui dispositivo è del seguente tenore:
 (Procedimento sommario — Urgenza — Assenza)
 1. Il ricorso è respinto in quanto manifestamente irricevibile.
 (1999/C 246/67)
 2. I ricorrenti sopporteranno le proprie spese.
 (Lingua processuale: l’italiano)
 (1) GU C 71 del 13.3.1999. Nella causa T-93/99 R, Beatrice Bonaiti Brighina, dipendente
 in servizio presso il centro comune di ricerca di Ispra,
 rappresentata dall’avv. Mirco Rizzoglio, del foro di Milano, e
 dall’avv. Franco Colussi, del foro di Lussemburgo, con domici-
 lio eletto in Lussemburgo presso lo studio dell’avv. Colussi,


text:
 20.11.2010
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 317/30
 Sentenza tal-Qorti Ġenerali tas-7 ta’ Ottubru 2010 — Accenture Global Services vs UASI — Silver Creek Properties (acsensa)
 (Kawża T-244/09) (1)
 (Trade mark Komunitarja - Proċedimenti ta’ oppożizzjoni - Applikazzjoni għat-trade mark Komunitarja figurattiva acsensa - Trade marks Komunitarji u nazzjonali verbali u figurattivi preċedenti ACCENTURE u accenture - Raġuni relattiva għal rifjut - Nuqqas ta’ probabbiltà ta’ konfużjoni - Nuqqas ta’ xebh tas-sinjali - Artikolu 8(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 40/94 (li sar l-Artikolu 8(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 207/2009) - Obbligu ta’ motivazzjoni - Artikolu 73 tar-Regolament Nru 40/94 (li sar l-Artikolu 75 tar-Regolament Nru 207/2009))
 2010/C 317/55
 Lingwa tal-kawża: l-Ingliż
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: Accenture Global Services GmbH (Schaffhausen, l-Isvizzera) (rappreżentant: R. Niebel, avukat)
 Konvenut: L-Uffiċċju għall-Armonizzazzjoni fis-Suq Intern (Trade marks u Disinni) (rappreżentant: O. Mondéjar Ortuño, aġent)
 Parti oħra fil-proċedimenti quddiem il-Bord tal-Appell tal-UASI: Silver Creek Properties SA (Panama, Panama)
 Suġġett
 Rikors ippreżentat kontra d-deċiżjoni tat-Tieni Bord tal-Appell tal-UASI, tal-20 ta’ Marzu 2009 (Każ R 802/2008-2), dwar proċedimenti ta’ oppożizzjoni bejn Accenture Global Services GmbH u Silver Creek Properties SA.
 Dispożittiv
 (1)
 Ir-rikors huwa miċħud.
 (2)
 Accenture Global Services GmbH hija kkundannata għall-ispejjeż.
 (1) ĠU C 193, 15.08.2009.


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 51998PC0324(03)
 Förslag till rådets förordning (EKSG, EG, Euratom) om ändring av rådens förordning nr 122/66 om fastställande av transportbidrag /* KOM/98/0324 slutlig */
 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning nr C 192 , 19/06/1998 s. 0010
 Förslag till rådets förordning (EKSG, EG, Euratom) om ändring av rådets förordning nr 122/66 om fastställande av transportbidrag (98/C 192/08) KOM(1998) 324 slutlig - 98/0190(CNS)(Framlagt av kommissionen den 20 maj 1998 enligt förfarandet i artikel 65.3 i tjänsteföreskrifterna)EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNINGmed beaktande av Fördraget om upprättandet av ett gemensamt råd och en gemensam kommission för Europeiska gemenskaperna,med beaktande av Fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen, särskilt artikel 1091.4 tredje meningen och artikel 235 i detta,med beaktande av rådets förordning (EG) nr 1103/97 av den 17 juni 1997 om vissa bestämmelser som har samband med införandet av euron (1),med beaktande av förordning (EG) nr . . ./98 (2) om införandet av euron,med beaktande av kommissionens förslag, ochmed beaktande av följande:Mot bakgrund av rådets förordning nr . . ./98 om ändring av förordning (EEG, Euratom, EKSG) nr 259/68 (3) om fastställande av tjänsteföreskrifter för tjänstemännen i Europeiska gemenskaperna och anställningsvillkor för övriga anställda i dessa gemenskaper vad avser fastställande av löner, pensioner och andra ekonomiska ersättningar i euro, bör följaktligen även rådets förordning (EEG, Euratom, EKSG) nr 122/66 (4) om fastställande av transportbidrag ändras.Rådet skall, i enlighet med det förfarande som avses i artikel 65.3 i tjänsteföreskrifterna, fastställa en förteckning över orter för vilka transportbidrag kan beviljas, detta bidrags maximala belopp samt reglerna för dess beviljande.HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.Artikel 1 I denna förordning skall "belgiska franc" ersättas med "euro" och beloppen i belgiska franc ersättas med motsvarande belopp i euroenheter till omräkningskursen.De regler för avrundning av penningbelopp som fastställs i förordning (EG) nr 1103/97 skall tillämpas.Artikel 2 Den 1 januari 1999 skall kommissionen i enlighet med denna förordning räkna om de olika belopp i belgiska franc som finns upptagna i rådens förordningar nr 7/66/Euratom och 122/66/EEG till euro; de nya beloppen skall offentliggöras i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning under januari 1999.Artikel 3 Denna förordning träder i kraft den . . .Den skall tillämpas från och med den 1 januari 1999.Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater.(1) EGT L 162, 19.6.1997, s. 1.(2) Rådets resolution av den 7 juli 1997 (EGT C 236, 2.8.1997, s. 1).(3) EGT L 56, 4.3.1968, s. 1.(4) EGT 150, 12.8.1966, s. 2751/66.


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
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 21995A0531(01)
 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Community and Barbados, Belize, the Republic of the Congo, Fiji, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Madagascar, the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Mauritius, the Republic of Suriname, Saint Christopher and Nevis, the Kingdom of Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zimbabwe on the accession of the Republic of Zambia to Protocol No 8 on ACP Sugar annexed to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention
 Official Journal L 120 , 31/05/1995 P. 0038 - 0038
 AGREEMENT in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and Barbados, Belize, the Republic of the Congo, Fiji, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, the Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Madagascar, the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Mauritius, the Republic of Suriname, Saint Christopher and Nevis, the Kingdom of Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zimbabwe on the accession of the Republic of Zambia to Protocol No 8 on ACP Sugar annexed to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention A. Letter No 1 Brussels, . . . . . .Sir,The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States referred to in Protocol No 8 on ACP Sugar annexed to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, the Republic of Zambia and the European Community have agreed on the following.The Republic of Zambia is hereby included in Article 3 (1) of the said Protocol with effect from 1 January 1995 with an agreed quantity of 0 tonnes.I should be obliged if you would acknowledge receipt of this letter and confirm that this letter and your reply constitute an Agreement between the Governments of the abovementioned ACP States and the European Community.Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.On behalf of the Council of the European UnionB. Letter No 2 Brussels, . . . . . .Sir,I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today which reads as follows:'The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States referred to in Protocol No 8 on ACP Sugar annexed to the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, the Republic of Zambia and the European Community have agreed on the following.The Republic of Zambia is hereby included in Article 3 (1) of the said Protocol with effect from 1 January 1995 with an agreed quantity of 0 tonnes.I should be obliged if you would acknowledge receipt of this letter and confirm that this letter and your reply constitute an Agreement between the Governments of the abovementioned ACP States and the European Community.`I have the honour to confirm the agreement of the Governments of the ACP States referred to in your letter with the contents thereof.Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.For the Governments of the ACP States referred to in Protocol No 8 and of the Republic of Zambia


text:
 Svarīgs juridisks paziņojums
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 22002D0040
 Oficiālais Vēstnesis L 154 , 13/06/2002 Lpp. 0027 - 0027
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas LēmumsNr. 40/2002(2002. gada 19. aprīlis),kas groza EEZ līguma XX pielikumu (Vide)EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,ņemot vērā Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līgumu, kas grozīts ar protokolu, kurš pielāgo Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līgumu, turpmāk tekstā — "līgums", jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,tā kā:(1) līguma XX pielikums ir grozīts ar EEZ Apvienotās komitejas 2002. gada 1. februāra Lēmumu Nr. 9/2002 [1];(2) līgumā jāiekļauj Padomes 2001. gada 23. jūlija Lēmums 2001/573/EK, kas groza Komisijas Lēmumu 2000/573/EK par atkritumu sarakstu [2],IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.1. pantsLīguma XX pielikuma 32.aa punktu (Komisijas Lēmums 2000/532/EK) papildina ar šādu ievilkumu:"— 32001 D 0573: Padomes 2001. gada 23. jūlija Lēmums 2001/573/EK (OV L 203, 28.7.2001., p. 18)".2. pantsLēmuma 2001/573/EK teksti islandiešu un norvēģu valodā, ko publicē Eiropas Kopienu Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ pielikumā, ir autentiski.3. pantsŠis lēmums stājas spēkā 2002. gada 20. aprīlī ar noteikumu, ka EEZ Apvienotajai komitejai ir sniegti visi paziņojumi saskaņā ar līguma 103. panta 1. punktu [3].4. pantsŠo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Kopienu Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un EEZ pielikumā.Briselē, 2002. gada 19. aprīlīEEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā —priekšsēdētājsP. Westerlund[1] OV L 88, 4.4.2002., 20. lpp.[2] OV L 203, 28.7.2001., 18. lpp.[3] Konstitucionālas prasības nav norādītas.--------------------------------------------------


text:
 11.3.2010
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 L 62/52
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS
 nr 151/2009,
 4. detsember 2009,
 millega muudetakse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingu XXI lisa (statistika)
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi „leping”, eriti selle artiklit 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1)
 Lepingu XXI lisa on muudetud EMP Ühiskomitee 22. oktoobri 2009. aasta otsusega nr 113/2009 (1).
 (2)
 Lepingusse tuleb inkorporeerida komisjoni 11. märtsi 2009. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 250/2009, millega rakendatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrust (EÜ) nr 295/2008 seoses NACE Rev.1.1 ja NACE Rev.2 klassifikaatori näitajate määratluste, andmete edastamise tehnilise vormingu, topeltaruandluse nõuetega ja ettevõtluse struktuurstatistika suhtes lubatavate eranditega (2).
 (3)
 Lepingusse tuleb inkorporeerida komisjoni 11. märtsi 2009. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 251/2009, millega rakendatakse ja muudetakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrust (EÜ) nr 295/2008 seoses struktuurilise ettevõtlusstatistika jaoks koostatavate andmesarjadega ning tegevusaladel põhineva toodete statistilise klassifikaatori (CPA) läbivaatamisest tulenevate kohandustega (3).
 (4)
 Määrusega (EÜ) nr 250/2009 tunnistatakse kehtetuks komisjoni määrused (EÜ) nr 2700/98 (4) ja (EÜ) nr 2702/98, (5) mis on lepingusse inkorporeeritud, kuid nende sätteid kohaldatakse jätkuvalt andmete kogumisel, koostamisel ja edastamisel vaatlusaastani 2007, viimane kaasa arvatud.
 (5)
 Määrusega (EÜ) nr 251/2009 tunnistatakse kehtetuks komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 2701/98, (6) mis on lepingusse inkorporeeritud, kuid selle sätteid kohaldatakse jätkuvalt vaatlusaastate kohta edastatavate andmesarjade suhtes aastani 2007, viimane kaasa arvatud,
 ON TEINUD JÄRGMISE OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Lepingu XXI lisa muudetakse järgmiselt.
 1)
 Punkti 1 (Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 295/2008) lisatakse järgmine tekst:
 „ , muudetud järgmise õigusaktiga:
 —
 32009 R 0251: komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 251/2009, 11. märts 2009 (ELT L 86, 31.3.2009, lk 170).”
 2)
 Punkti 1j (komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 1670/2003) järele lisatakse järgmised punktid:
 „1k.
 32009 R 0250: komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 250/2009, 11. märts 2009, millega rakendatakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrust (EÜ) nr 295/2008 seoses NACE Rev.1.1 ja NACE Rev.2 klassifikaatori näitajate määratluste, andmete edastamise tehnilise vormingu, topeltaruandluse nõuetega ja ettevõtluse struktuurstatistika suhtes lubatavate eranditega (ELT L 86, 31.3.2009, lk 1).
 1 l.
 32009 R 0251: komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 251/2009, 11. märts 2009, millega rakendatakse ja muudetakse Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrust (EÜ) nr 295/2008 seoses struktuurilise ettevõtlusstatistika jaoks koostatavate andmesarjadega ning tegevusaladel põhineva toodete statistilise klassifikaatori (CPA) läbivaatamisest tulenevate kohandustega (ELT L 86, 31.3.2009, lk 170).
 Käesolevas lepingus loetakse määruse sätteid järgmises kohanduses:
 I lisa kohaselt on Liechtenstein vabastatud andmeseeriate 9C ja 9D andmete kogumisest. Liechtenstein esitab andmed tegevuse jaotuse tasemete kohta ainult vastavalt NACE Rev.2 kahekohalisele tasemele.”
 3)
 Punktidele 1a (komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 2700/98) ja 1c (komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 2702/98) lisatakse järgmine kohandustekst:
 „Käesolevas lepingus loetakse selle määruse sätteid järgmises kohanduses:
 Määrus on tunnistatud kehtetuks kooskõlas määruse (EÜ) nr 250/2009 artikliga 6. Määruse sätteid kohaldatakse siiski jätkuvalt andmete kogumisel, koostamisel ja edastamisel vaatlusaastani 2007, viimane kaasa arvatud.”
 4)
 Punkti 1b (komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 2701/98) lisatakse järgmine kohandustekst:
 „Käesolevas lepingus loetakse selle määruse sätteid järgmises kohanduses:
 Määrus on tunnistatud kehtetuks kooskõlas määruse (EÜ) nr 251/2009 artikliga 2. Määruse sätteid kohaldatakse siiski jätkuvalt vaatlusaastate kohta edastatavate andmesarjade suhtes aastani 2007, viimane kaasa arvatud.”
 Artikkel 2
 Määruste (EÜ) nr 250/2009 ja (EÜ) nr 251/2009 islandi- ja norrakeelne tekst, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentsed.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus jõustub 5. detsembril 2009, tingimusel et EMP Ühiskomiteele on esitatud kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõike 1 kohased teated (7).
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 Brüssel, 4. detsember 2009
 EMP Ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja
 Oda Helen SLETNES
 (1) ELT L 334, 17.12.2009, lk 15.
 (2) ELT L 86, 31.3.2009, lk 1.
 (3) ELT L 86, 31.3.2009, lk 170.
 (4) EÜT L 344, 18.12.1998, lk 49.
 (5) EÜT L 344, 18.12.1998, lk 102.
 (6) EÜT L 344, 18.12.1998, lk 81.
 (7) Põhiseadusest tulenevaid nõudeid ei ole nimetatud.