type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 14.5.2005
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 115/20
 PIRMĀS INSTANCES TIESAS SPRIEDUMS
 2005. gada 9. martā
 lietā T-33/03 Osotspa Co. Ltd pret Iekšējā tirgus saskaņošanas biroju (preču zīmes, paraugi un modeļi) (ITSB) (1)
 (Kopienas preču zīme - Iebildumu process - Valsts un Kopienas agrākas grafiskās preču zīmes “SHARK” - Kopienas vārdiskās preču zīmes “HAI” reģistrācijas pieteikums - Relatīvs atteikuma pamatojums - Sajaukšanas iespēja - 8. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkts Regulā (EK) Nr. 40/94)
 (2005/C 115/38)
 tiesvedības valoda — vācu
 Lietā T-33/03 Osotspa Co. Ltd, Bangkoka (Taizeme), ko pārstāv K. Gasauers — Fleisners [C. Gassauer-Fleissner], advokāts, kas norādīja adresi Luksemburgā, pret Iekšējā tirgus saskaņošanas biroju (preču zīmes, paraugi un modeļi) (ITSB) (pārstāvji — A. fon Mīlendāls [A. von Mühlendahl], T. Eihenbergs [T. Eichenberg] un G. Šneiders [G. Schneider]), otram procesa ITSB Apelāciju padomē dalībniekam un personai, kas iestājusies lietā Pirmās instances tiesā, esot Distribution & Marketing GmbH, Zalcburga (Austrija), ko sākotnēji pārstāvēja K. Haeurs [C. Hauer], pēc tam — V. fon Bomhards [V. Von Bomhard], A. Renks [A. Renck] un A. Polmans [A. Pohlmann], advokāti, par prasību par ITSB Apelāciju trešās padomes 2002. gada 27. novembra lēmumu (lieta R 296/2002-3), kas attiecas uz iebildumu procesu starp Osotspa Co. Ltd un Distribution & Marketing GmbH, Pirmās instances tiesa (ceturtā palāta) šādā sastāvā: palātas priekšsēdētājs I. Legāls [H. Legal], tiesneši V. Tīli [V. Tiili] un V. Vadapals [V. Vadapalas], sekretāre D. Kristensena [D. Christensen], administratore, 2005. gada 9. martā ir pasludinājusi spriedumu, kura rezolutīvā daļa ir šāda:
 1)
 prasību noraidīt;
 2)
 prasītāja atlīdzina tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 (1) OV C 135, 07.06.2003.


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22003X0830(10)
 Celebración del Memorándum de acuerdo con Eslovenia sobre su participación en el programa de acción comunitario en el ámbito de la salud pública (2003-2008)
 Diario Oficial n° C 205 de 30/08/2003 p. 0008 - 0008
 Celebración del Memorándum de acuerdo con Eslovenia sobre su participación en el programa de acción comunitario en el ámbito de la salud pública (2003-2008)(2003/C 205/14)El 13 de diciembre de 2002 se firmó el Memorándum de acuerdo entre la Comisión Europea, en nombre de la Comunidad Europea, y el Gobierno de Eslovenia sobre la participación de éste último en el programa de acción comunitario en el ámbito de la salud pública (2003-2008).El texto íntegro en inglés del Memorándum de acuerdo se puede consultar en la siguiente página web:http://europa.eu.int/comm/ enlargement/pas/ocp/ocp_index.htm


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE\n PIPELINE SECURITY\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration\n\n Report Number: AV-2008-053\n Date Issued: May 21, 2008\n\x0c U.S. Department of\n Memorandum\n Transportation\n Office of the Secretary\n of Transportation\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\nSubject: ACTION: Actions Needed To Enhance Date: May 21, 2008\n Pipeline Security\n Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\n Safety Administration\n Report Number AV-2008-053\n\n From: Lou E. Dixon Reply to\n Attn. of: JA-10\n Assistant Inspector General\n for Aviation and Special Program Audits\n\n To: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials\n Safety Administrator\n\n This report presents the results of our review on multi-agency actions to\n implement the pipeline security annex to the Memorandum of Understanding\n (MOU) between the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of\n Homeland Security (DHS). The Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and\n Safety Act of 2006 1 requires the Office of Inspector General to assess actions\n taken to implement the annex.\n\n Consistent with the act, our audit objectives were to: (1) assess the adequacy and\n effectiveness of the process by which DOT communicates and coordinates with\n DHS on matters of pipeline security; (2) assess the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 status in\n implementing the program elements outlined in the annex; and (3) review the role,\n responsibility, and authority of DOT regarding pipeline security matters. We\n conducted this review between June and November of 2007 in accordance with\n generally accepted Government Auditing Standards as prescribed by the\n Comptroller General of the United States. Exhibit A details our objectives, scope\n and methodology, and related audits. Exhibit B outlines the program elements in\n the annex.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Pub. L. No. 109-468 (2006).\n\x0c 2\n\n\nSECURING THE NATION\xe2\x80\x99S PIPELINE SYSTEMS IS A\nCONTINUING CHALLENGE\nThe Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline infrastructure is a network of approximately 2 million miles\nof pipelines that move millions of gallons of hazardous liquids and billions of\ncubic feet of natural gas daily. Within the United States, there are about\n2,200 natural gas pipeline operators and 300 hazardous liquids pipeline operators.\n\nDOT\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is\nresponsible for overseeing the safety of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline system. The\nTransportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS is responsible for\nsecuring the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s transportation infrastructure, including pipelines.\n\nSafeguarding the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s massive pipeline infrastructure from catastrophic events\n(i.e., terrorism or natural disasters) is a continuing challenge for DOT and DHS.\nIn 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast region and demonstrated the\nvulnerabilities of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s critical infrastructure. Loss of electrical power to\npumping stations forced three major pipeline operators to shut down. This\neliminated most fuel sources to the entire eastern seaboard and caused a vast array\nof economic disruptions, including hoarding and severe price spikes.\n\nIt should be noted that the most frequently targeted mode of transportation by\nterrorists worldwide is pipeline systems. In Colombia, for example, rebels have\nbombed the Ca\xc3\xb1o Lim\xc3\xb3n oil pipeline over 600 times since 1995. Terrorist plots\nagainst pipelines have also occurred within the United States.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In December 1999, Federal agents arrested two anti-government militia\n members for plotting to detonate 24 million gallons of liquid propane at a\n storage facility in Elk Grove, California.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In June 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested members of a terrorist\n group planning to attack jet fuel pipelines and storage tanks at the John F.\n Kennedy (JFK) International Airport in New York.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In November 2007, a U.S. citizen was sentenced to 30 years in Federal prison\n for plotting to help an alleged al-Qaeda operative blow up U.S. oil pipelines\n and refineries.\n\nIn addition, pipeline incidents can have deadly implications, such as the\nAugust 19, 2000, natural gas transmission pipeline (30-inch-diameter) that\nruptured adjacent to the Pecos River near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The released\ngas ignited and burned for 55 minutes. Twelve people who were camping under a\nconcrete-decked steel bridge that supported the pipeline across the river were\nkilled, and their three vehicles were destroyed. Two nearby steel suspension\nbridges for gas pipelines crossing the river were also extensively damaged.\n\x0c 3\n\n\nThese events underscore the need for a well-defined, well-coordinated,\ninteragency approach to prevent, detect, and respond to such events. As we have\nstated in our DOT Top Management Challenges reports, 2 there is growing\ninterdependency between DOT and other Federal agencies to ensure safe, secure,\nand efficient transportation. This is most evident in the responsibility to protect\nthe public from criminal and terrorist acts, particularly in DOT\xe2\x80\x99s working\nrelationship with DHS.\n\nIn today\xe2\x80\x99s constrained fiscal environment, DOT and DHS must leverage their\nresources to secure the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipelines. TSA\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline security program\xe2\x80\x94\nwith just 11 personnel\xe2\x80\x94has the biggest challenge to effectively oversee the vast\nnetwork of natural gas and hazardous liquids pipeline operators. Although\nPHMSA has regional offices and about 80 inspectors nationwide, it partners with\nstate agencies\xe2\x80\x94which have over 400 inspectors\xe2\x80\x94to oversee and enforce\ncompliance with pipeline safety requirements, primarily operators of natural gas\ndistribution pipeline systems. Thus, it is incumbent upon PHMSA, TSA, and their\nstate partners to effectively work together to enhance the security of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s\npipeline infrastructure.\n\nCongress continues to emphasize the importance of securing the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s\npipelines and related infrastructure. On August 3, 2007, the President signed into\nlaw the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007\n(9/11 Commission Act). 3 The law mandates, by 1 year after enactment, that the\nSecretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation develop and\nimplement a plan to review and inspect the 100 most critical pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99\npipeline security plans and critical facilities.\n\n\nRESULTS IN BRIEF\nWe found that PHMSA and TSA have taken initial steps toward formulating an\naction plan to implement the provisions of the pipeline security annex, which are\nimportant to enhance pipeline security, clearly define roles, maximize resources,\nand prevent duplication of effort. However, further actions need to be taken with\na sense of urgency because the current situation is far from an \xe2\x80\x9cend state\xe2\x80\x9d for\nenhancing the security of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipelines.\n\nIn September 2004, DOT and DHS entered into an MOU to facilitate the\ndevelopment and deployment of transportation security measures. In August\n2006, PHMSA and TSA signed an annex to the MOU to establish clear lines of\nauthority and responsibility over pipeline security matters. To accomplish this, the\n2\n OIG Report Number PT-2006-007, \xe2\x80\x9cDOT\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2006 Top Management Challenges,\xe2\x80\x9d November 15, 2005, and OIG\n Report Number PT-2005-008, \xe2\x80\x9cDOT\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2005 Top Management Challenges,\xe2\x80\x9d November 15, 2004. OIG reports\n are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.\n3\n Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007).\n\x0c 4\n\n\nannex requires PHMSA and TSA to jointly develop an action plan by February\n2007 to implement the annex provisions and program elements. Some program\nelements of the annex include identifying critical infrastructure and key resources;\nperforming risk assessments; strategic planning; developing regulations,\nguidelines and directives; and conducting inspection and enforcement actions.\n\nPHMSA and TSA established a joint working group tasked with developing a\nmulti-year action plan to execute the annex provisions and program elements.\nHowever, PHMSA and TSA have neither finalized the action plan to implement\nthe annex nor initiated key program elements due to a working relationship that\nwas not always cooperative. Both PHMSA and TSA agreed that they did not\nalways coordinate their efforts in a collegial manner.\n\nBeginning in the second half of 2007, PHMSA and TSA began improving their\ncoordination to address the annex provisions and program elements. For example,\nPHMSA created and staffed a new management position within the Office of the\nPHMSA Administrator. This manager is responsible for all aspects of PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s\nemergency management and security policy activities and reports directly to the\nChief Safety Officer. This individual will also liaison with other agencies,\nincluding TSA and other stakeholders, regarding emergency management and\nsecurity policy issues.\n\nTo further enhance the security of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline infrastructure, PHMSA\nand TSA need to complete the following actions:\n\nFinalize and effectively execute the action plan to implement the security\nannex. PHMSA and TSA signed the annex 21 months ago, but the two agencies\nstill have not finalized the action plan to fully implement the program elements of\nthe annex\xe2\x80\x94even though the deadline (February 2007) elapsed over a year ago. In\nDecember 2007, the agencies had not completed 9 of the 11 program elements,\nand the action plan did not contain several initiatives designed specifically to\nenhance coordination efforts. These include procedures to coordinate on\nobservations or recommended measures from vulnerability assessments to\ndetermine if they conflict with current or planned safety requirements.\nInteragency coordination is essential to prevent the implementation of security\nrecommendations that could inadvertently contradict safety regulations and put the\nsafety of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipelines at risk.\n\nDuring the first 2 months of 2008, the two agencies began addressing outstanding\nannex program elements. PHMSA and TSA developed a new action plan, dated\nFebruary 11, 2008, which estimates that most of the program element initiatives\nwill be complete by the last quarter of 2009. While PHMSA and TSA have made\nprogress toward finalizing the action plan, this progress began nearly a year after\nthe completion deadline agreed to in the annex. Both agencies must sustain and\n\x0c 5\n\n\nexpedite these collaborative efforts to finalize and effectively execute the annex\nprovisions and program elements.\n\nDelineate roles and responsibilities in overseeing and enforcing security\nregulations for operators of liquid natural gas (LNG) facilities. 4 By law, TSA\nholds the lead authority and primary responsibility for security activities in all\nmodes of transportation, including pipelines. TSA currently conducts reviews of\npipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with TSA voluntary guidance 5 but does not have\nregulations related to pipeline security and does not take enforcement actions\nagainst pipeline operators. PHMSA has\xe2\x80\x94and enforces\xe2\x80\x94its own security\nregulations that existed prior to the creation of TSA in 2001. As a result, both\nagencies conduct reviews of LNG operators\xe2\x80\x99 security procedures. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s\nregulations have specific security requirements 6 for operators of LNG facilities,\nand PHMSA inspects LNG facilities to ensure that they meet those requirements.\nTSA has stated that it can issue security directives, but it has not done so. These\ndirectives would allow TSA to take enforcement actions against pipeline\noperators.\n\nBecause the annex does not explicitly state which agency has primary oversight\nand enforcement authority for LNG operators, there is a lack of clearly defined\nroles at the working level. This could cause pipeline operators to receive\nconflicting or duplicative guidance, which will ultimately impede security\nmeasures. To resolve this issue, the annex should be amended to clearly delineate\nthe roles and responsibilities of PHMSA and TSA in overseeing and enforcing\nsecurity regulations for LNG operators.\n\nMaximize the strategy to assess pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and\nguidance. The 9/11 Commission Act requires DOT and DHS to develop a plan to\nreview the 100 most critical operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and critical facilities by\nAugust 2008. 7 The act also requires that DOT and DHS issue security\nrecommendations by February 2009 to operators of natural gas and hazardous\nliquids pipelines and pipeline facilities. The act also stipulates that if DHS\ndetermines that regulations are appropriate, it is required to consult with DOT.\nOne of the two agencies shall then promulgate the regulations and perform\nnecessary inspection and enforcement functions. The need for new security\nregulations will be partly determined by the degree to which pipeline operators are\nfollowing TSA\xe2\x80\x99s current security guidance.\n4\n LNG is natural gas cooled to an extremely low temperature, which causes it to liquefy. There are 113 LNG facilities\n in the United States.\n5\n Following the events of September 11, 2001, PHMSA (formerly the Research and Special Programs Administration)\n developed voluntary pipeline security guidance in 2002, which TSA has since formally adopted.\n6\n Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 193 (2007).\n7\n PHMSA security guidance defines a facility\xe2\x80\x99s critical categorization by three factors: (1) whether it is a viable\n terrorist target, (2) how important it is to the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s energy infrastructure, and (3) how likely it is to be used as a\n weapon to harm people.\n\x0c 6\n\n\nHowever, TSA\xe2\x80\x99s current security guidance is not mandatory and remains\nunenforceable unless a regulation is issued to require industry compliance. To\nadequately determine if new security regulations are needed, PHMSA and TSA\nwill need to conduct covert tests of pipeline systems\xe2\x80\x99 vulnerabilities to assess the\ncurrent guidance as well as evaluate operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance. Until this is done,\nthere is no way to effectively assess the adequacy of the security guidance or to\nmeasure operator compliance with the guidance.\n\nIn our opinion, actions are needed from both PHMSA and TSA to maximize\nresources for assessing pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and guidance. These\nactions should include:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensuring that PHMSA is actively involved in the inspections of the 100 most\n critical operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and critical facilities. To date, PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s role\n has been limited to an \xe2\x80\x9cas needed\xe2\x80\x9d basis. According to PHMSA, it has not\n regularly attended past TSA security reviews of pipeline operators. To ensure\n effective and timely execution of this congressional mandate, PHMSA should\n participate in these inspections on a regular basis, especially given its level of\n expertise in security-related matters.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Developing testing protocols and performing vulnerability tests to ascertain,\n among other things, if unauthorized individuals can penetrate operators\xe2\x80\x99\n critical infrastructure (including cyber attacks). Currently, there are no plans to\n develop protocols and conduct vulnerability tests. Without testing, there is no\n way to effectively measure operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with existing guidance or\n assess the adequacy of the guidance.\n\nPHMSA and TSA must work together to develop a pipeline security strategy that\nmaximizes the value and efficiency of both agencies\xe2\x80\x99 efforts. This is a\nfundamental factor in enhancing pipeline security. PHMSA must make every\neffort possible to communicate and coordinate with TSA to resolve the issues\nidentified in this report. If PHMSA and TSA are unable to expedite the actions\nneeded and improve coordination, it may be necessary for Congress to take action.\n\nOur complete recommendations are listed on page 12. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s comments and\nour response are discussed on pages 13 and 14.\n\x0c 7\n\n\n\nFINDINGS\nPHMSA and TSA have taken initial steps toward formulating an action plan to\nimplement the provisions of the annex; however, further actions are needed as the\ncurrent situation is far from an \xe2\x80\x9cend state\xe2\x80\x9d for enhancing the security of the\nNation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline system. After PHMSA and TSA signed the annex, they\ndesignated a joint working group to develop a multi-year action plan for\nimplementing the provisions and program elements of the annex. The working\ngroup was to complete its efforts on developing the action plan by February 2007.\nAlmost a year later, the working group developed a multi-year action plan, which\nidentified many, but not all, of the initiatives and milestones to execute each\nprogram element.\n\nBased on our review, PHMSA and TSA need to complete the following actions to\nfurther enhance the security of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline infrastructure: (1) finalize and\neffectively execute the action plan for implementing the security annex, (2) amend\nthe annex to delineate the roles and responsibilities of PHMSA and TSA in\noverseeing and enforcing security regulations for LNG operators, and\n(3) maximize the strategy used to assess pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and\nguidance to ensure effective and timely execution of congressional mandates in\nthe 9/11 Commission Act.\n\nPHMSA and TSA Need To Finalize and Effectively Execute the Action\nPlan for Implementing the Security Annex\nPHMSA and TSA signed the annex 21 months ago; yet, the two agencies have\nneither finalized the action plan to implement the annex program elements nor\ndeveloped several initiatives. This has delayed key elements of the annex that\nwere designed specifically to enhance communication and coordination efforts\nbetween the two agencies. For example, PHMSA and TSA have not developed an\ninitiative to coordinate on observations or recommended measures from\nvulnerability assessments to determine if they conflict with current or planned\nsafety requirements. This coordination is essential to prevent security\nrecommendations that could unintentionally contradict safety regulations and put\nthe safety of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipelines at risk.\n\nTowards the end of 2007, we found that the agencies had not completed 9 of the\n11 annex program elements because there are no deadlines to foster timely reviews\nand decision processes; further, the agencies are not held accountable for failure to\nabide by the annex provisions. Without interim deadlines and accountability,\nthere is no guarantee the action plan will be finalized and properly executed.\n\x0c 8\n\n\nFor example:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The December 2007 action plan to implement the annex did not contain some\n of the initiatives for program elements. For instance, the plan did not include\n certain items that the agencies agreed to in the annex, such as (1) an initiative\n for PHMSA to provide TSA with data and information collected during\n PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s security inspections or reviews of security plans, (2) protocols for\n ongoing information sharing and participation in their respective research and\n development planning, and (3) an initiative for TSA to coordinate with PHMSA\n on observations or recommended measures\xe2\x80\x94derived from the results of criticality\n and vulnerability assessments\xe2\x80\x94to evaluate whether they conflict with or\n adversely affect current or planned safety requirements.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PHMSA and TSA had not established target dates to complete some of the\n elements and element initiatives. Under the annex, PHMSA and TSA agreed\n to develop a plan with specific timeframes for implementing the program\n elements. For example, the December 2007 plan did not contain timeframes\n to: (1) develop a procedure for requesting special permits to install pipeline\n facilities in the event of a security incident, (2) provide training to TSA staff on\n technical issues related to PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s mission, or (3) perform a study on the\n petroleum pipeline network supply.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Some elements have future target dates that extend out to 2009 (we are\n concerned that PHMSA and TSA will not meet these deadlines, since they\n have been unable to finalize the action plan to execute the annex).\n\nDuring the first 2 months of 2008, the two agencies began addressing outstanding\nannex program elements. PHMSA and TSA developed a new action plan, dated\nFebruary 11, 2008, which estimates that most of the program element initiatives\nwill be complete by the last quarter of 2009. Also, the plan now contains\ninitiatives for PHMSA to invite TSA to its security reviews of LNG facilities and\nfor PHMSA and TSA to share security-related enforcement actions. However, the\ncurrent action plan still does not contain initiatives (1) to develop protocols for\nongoing information sharing and participation in the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 respective research\nand development planning and (2) for TSA to coordinate with PHMSA on\nobservations or recommended measures\xe2\x80\x94derived from the results of criticality and\nvulnerability assessments\xe2\x80\x94to evaluate whether they conflict with or adversely affect\ncurrent or planned safety requirements.\n\nWhile PHMSA and TSA have made progress toward finalizing the action plan,\nthis progress began nearly a year after the completion deadline agreed to in the\nannex. Both agencies must sustain and expedite these collaborative efforts to\nfinalize and effectively execute the annex provisions and program elements.\n\x0c 9\n\n\nPHMSA and TSA Need To Delineate Their Roles and Responsibilities\nfor Overseeing and Enforcing Security Regulations for Operators of\nLNG Facilities\nA central goal of the annex was to delineate clear lines of authority and prevent\nduplication of effort. Yet, the annex does not contain language that explicitly\nstates which agency will be responsible overseeing and enforcing security\nregulations for operators of LNG facilities. Since both PHMSA and TSA can\nconduct reviews of LNG facilities, a clear line of authority does not exist. This\ncreates the potential for duplicative efforts and confusion among LNG operators\nregarding which agency they should look to for guidance as the lead Federal\nsecurity regulator.\n\nBy law, TSA holds the lead authority and primary responsibility for security\nactivities in pipelines. In practice, PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s role, responsibility, and authority in\npipeline security include enforcing its LNG safety regulations (which include\nspecific security requirements) that existed prior to the creation of TSA. Under\nPHMSA regulations, LNG facilities must have, among other things, a (1) security\nmanual, (2) security training program for employees, (3) security communications\nsystem, and (4) security lighting and monitoring system. PHMSA inspects LNG\nfacilities to ensure they are meeting these requirements. The LNG facilities\nregulations are the only PHMSA pipeline regulations that specifically delineate\noperators\xe2\x80\x99 security responsibilities in detail. For hazardous liquid and gas\npipelines, PHMSA has other pipeline safety regulations that require pipeline\noperators to prevent vandalism and unauthorized use of equipment.\n\nWhile PHMSA continues to oversee the security of LNG facilities, TSA has stated\nthat it can issue security directives, but it has not done so. These directives would\nallow TSA to take enforcement actions against pipeline operators. TSA currently\nconducts reviews of pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with voluntary guidance but\ndoes not have regulations related to pipeline security and does not take\nenforcement actions against pipeline operators.\n\nTo further complicate the matter, the United States Coast Guard\xe2\x80\x94a DHS agency\nresponsible for marine and port security\xe2\x80\x94also has authority to oversee and\nenforce its security regulations for operators of LNG facilities. 8 Several of the\noperators\xe2\x80\x99 LNG facilities are located in the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s ports or along its eastern\nseaboard.\n\nPHMSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 9\nexecuted an interagency agreement in 2004 for safety and security reviews of\n\n8\n Maritime Security: Facilities, 33 C.F.R. \xc2\xa7 105 (2007).\n9\n The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is responsible for authorizing the site and construction of onshore LNG\n facilities and also conducts environmental, safety, and security reviews of LNG plants and related pipeline facilities.\n\x0c 10\n\n\nLNG facilities. The purpose of the agreement was, among other things, \xe2\x80\x9cto avoid\nduplication of effort and to maximize the exchange of relevant information related\nto the safety and security aspects of LNG facilities and the related marine\nconcerns.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nIn our view, a similar approach should be taken with the pipeline security annex to\nresolve the issue of overlapping authority between PHMSA and TSA. The annex\nshould be amended to specifically delineate the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 roles and responsibilities\nin overseeing and enforcing security regulations for LNG operators.\n\n\nPHMSA and TSA Need To Maximize the Strategy Used To Assess\nPipeline Operators\xe2\x80\x99 Security Plans and Guidance\nCongress continues to emphasize the importance of securing the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s\npipelines and related infrastructure. In August 2007, Congress passed the\nImplementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. The act mandates,\namong other things, the following actions related to pipeline security for the\nSecretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS, in consultation with DOT, is required to establish a program for\n reviewing pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 adoption of recommendations in a 2002 PHMSA\n security guidance document. The PHMSA guidance recommended that,\n among other things, pipeline operators: (1) identify critical facilities,\n (2) develop and implement a corporate security plan, and (3) review the\n corporate security plan on an annual basis and revise as necessary to reflect\n changing conditions. The program must also include a plan to review pipeline\n security plans and critical facility inspections by May 2008.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS and DOT are required to develop and implement a plan for reviewing and\n inspecting the 100 most critical pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 pipeline security plans and\n critical facilities. 10 The agencies are required to develop and implement a plan\n by August 3, 2008.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS and DOT shall develop and transmit to pipeline operators security\n recommendations for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and pipeline\n facilities by February 2009.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 If DHS determines that regulations are appropriate, it is required to consult\n with DOT. One of the two agencies shall then promulgate the regulations and\n perform necessary inspection and enforcement functions.\n\n10\n PHMSA security guidance defines a facility\xe2\x80\x99s critical categorization by three factors: (1) whether it is a viable\n terrorist target, (2) how important it is to the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s energy infrastructure, and (3) how likely it is to be used as a\n weapon to harm people.\n\x0c 11\n\n\nTo determine whether additional security regulations are needed, PHMSA and\nTSA will need to evaluate and test the adequacy of existing security standards as\nagreed to under the annex. The need for new security regulations will be partly\ndetermined by the degree to which pipeline operators are following existing\nguidance.\n\nHowever, the current security guidance created by PHMSA, TSA, and pipeline\nindustry associations is not mandatory and remains unenforceable unless a\nregulation is issued to require industry compliance. Further, the guidance is\ngeneral in nature and only provides a broad overview of security issues in industry\nand effective policies and practices. To determine if new security regulations are\nneeded, PHMSA and TSA will need to conduct covert tests of pipeline systems\xe2\x80\x99\nvulnerabilities to assess the current guidance as well as evaluate operators\xe2\x80\x99\ncompliance.\n\nAlthough the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of\n2006 also requests an assessment of TSA security guidance, we did not perform\nthose activities for several reasons. To truly assess whether existing security\nguidance is adequate, we would have needed to: (1) evaluate operators\xe2\x80\x99\ncompliance with the guidance; (2) develop testing protocols; and (3) perform\nvulnerability tests to ascertain, among other things, if unauthorized individuals can\npenetrate operators\xe2\x80\x99 critical infrastructure. It is not within the DOT Office of\nInspector General\xe2\x80\x99s jurisdiction to perform such activities. We discussed these\nmatters with the congressional committees of jurisdiction.\n\nBecause PHMSA and TSA have reviewed pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with\nsecurity guidance in the past, these agencies would be best suited to evaluate this\narea. Therefore, it would be appropriate for PHMSA and TSA to collaborate in\nassessing whether existing security guidance is adequate.\n\nIn our opinion, however, actions are needed from both PHMSA and TSA to\nmaximize the strategy for assessing pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and\nguidance. These actions should include the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensuring that PHMSA is actively involved in the inspections of the 100 most\n critical operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and critical facilities. To date, PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s role\n has been limited to an \xe2\x80\x9cas needed\xe2\x80\x9d basis. According to PHMSA, it has not\n regularly attended past TSA security reviews of pipeline operators. To ensure\n effective and timely execution of this congressional mandate, PHMSA should\n participate in these inspections on a regular basis, especially given its level of\n expertise in security-related matters.\n\x0c 12\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Developing testing protocols and performing vulnerability tests to ascertain,\n among other things, if unauthorized individuals can penetrate operators\xe2\x80\x99\n critical infrastructure (including cyber attacks). Currently, there are no plans\n to develop protocols and conduct vulnerability tests. Without testing, there is\n no way to effectively measure operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with existing guidance or\n assess the adequacy of the guidance.\n\nPHMSA and TSA must work together to develop a pipeline security strategy that\nmaximizes the value and efficiency of both agencies\xe2\x80\x99 efforts. This is a\nfundamental factor in enhancing pipeline security. PHMSA must make every\neffort possible to communicate and coordinate with TSA to move forward in\ncompleting the actions identified in this report. If PHMSA and TSA are unable to\nexpedite the actions needed and improve coordination, it may be necessary for\nCongress to take action.\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nPHMSA should make it a top management priority to finalize and execute the\naction plan for implementing the security annex and meet the deadlines mandated\nin the 9/11 Commission Act. Therefore, we recommend that the PHMSA\nAdministrator collaborate with the TSA Administrator to complete the following\nactions:\n\n 1. Finalize the action plan for implementing the annex provisions and program\n elements and effectively execute the action plan.\n\n 2. Amend the annex to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of\n PHMSA and TSA in overseeing and enforcing security regulations for\n LNG operators.\n\n 3. Maximize the strategy used to assess pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and\n guidance to ensure effective and timely execution of congressional mandates\n in the 9/11 Commission Act. At a minimum, enhancements to the strategy\n need to include (a) actively engaging PHMSA assistance in inspecting the\n 100 most critical pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 pipeline security plans and critical\n facilities and (b) developing protocols and conducting vulnerability tests to\n effectively measure operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with existing guidance or assess\n the adequacy of the guidance.\n\x0c 13\n\n\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\nRESPONSE\nOn January 31, 2008, we provided PHMSA Headquarters officials with a\npreliminary draft and discussed our results with them. On February 1, 2008, we\nsubmitted our draft report to PHMSA and requested its formal comments. We\nsubsequently met with PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Chief Safety Officer to discuss her views on the\nissues presented in this report. We agreed to revise the draft as appropriate to\ninclude the Agency\xe2\x80\x99s recent progress toward finalizing the action plan to fully\nimplement the annex program elements. We provided PHMSA with our revisions\non February 15, 2008.\n\nWe received PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s formal response on March 7, 2008, which concurred with\nour recommendations and provided appropriate planned actions and target dates.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Recommendation 1: PHMSA stated it will continue to work with its TSA\n partners to regularly update and prioritize items on the action plan and then\n execute those items. Also, to improve accountability and management\n visibility, the action plan will be updated monthly and forwarded to PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s\n Chief Safety Officer for review. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s actions taken to resolve this\n recommendation were effective as of March 7, 2008.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Recommendation 2: PHMSA stated it will work with TSA and the other\n agencies with which it has Memoranda of Understanding concerning LNG\n facilities to determine if further clarification of roles and responsibilities in\n oversight and enforcement of security regulations for affected LNG operators\n is warranted. PHMSA will also assist TSA in its communication and work\n with appropriate state agencies that have regulatory oversight of peak-\n shaving 11 LNG facilities. PHMSA will notify our office of this determination\n by June 30, 2008.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Recommendation 3: PHMSA stated that it will work closely with TSA to\n execute the pipeline mandates in the 9/11 Commission Act. Because\n PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline safety inspection resources are already committed for FY\n 2008, it is unlikely to actively participate with TSA in the remaining\n inspections of the top 100 pipeline operators. However, PHMSA will work\n with TSA as it compiles and analyzes the results of the inspections to\n determine the extent to which operators voluntarily complied with 2002\n security standards.\n\n\n11\n LNG peak-shaving facilities store surplus natural gas that is to be used to meet the requirements of peak\n consumption later during winter or summer.\n\x0c 14\n\n\n PHMSA also stated that it has little experience in covertly assessing the\n effectiveness of security plans and must defer to TSA for this expertise.\n Nonetheless, based on TSA\xe2\x80\x99s inspections and vulnerability assessments,\n PHMSA will work with TSA to determine if the security standards and\n guidance adequately ensure the safety of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline facilities and\n whether security-focused regulations are needed. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s actions taken to\n resolve this recommendation were effective as of March 7, 2008.\n\nPHMSA also provided several general comments, such as emphasizing that, as a\nmatter of policy, it recognizes that TSA has primary responsibility for pipeline\nsecurity and it is committed to support TSA\xe2\x80\x99s leadership in these matters.\nPHMSA further emphasized recent actions taken to enhance communication and\ncoordination between PHMSA and DHS, including the DOT Secretary and\nDeputy Secretary quarterly meetings with the DHS Secretary and Deputy\nSecretary to discuss interdepartmental issues and initiatives. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s full\nresponse is included in the appendix to this report.\n\nWe also provided TSA Headquarters officials with a copy of the draft report on\nFebruary 8, 2008, and have incorporated their comments as appropriate.\n\n\nACTIONS REQUIRED\nPHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s response and planned actions address the intent of our\nrecommendations. In accordance with the provisions of DOT Order 8000.1C, we\nwill follow up with PHMSA to ensure its corrective actions are consistent with our\nrecommendations.\n\nWe appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of PHMSA and TSA representatives\nduring this audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact\nme at (202) 366-0500 or Scott Macey, Program Director, at (415) 744-0434.\n\n\n #\n\x0c 15\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY, AND\nRELATED AUDITS\n\nObjectives\nThe Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006 (Pub. L.\nNo. 109-468 [2006]) directed the Office of Inspector General to review DOT\xe2\x80\x99s\nactions to implement the pipeline security annex to the memorandum of\nunderstanding between DOT and DHS. Consistent with the act, our audit\nobjectives were to: (1) assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the process by\nwhich DOT communicates and coordinates with DHS on matters of pipeline\nsecurity; (2) provide the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 status in implementing the program elements\noutlined in the annex; and (3) review the role, responsibility, and authority of DOT\nregarding pipeline security matters.\n\nScope and Methodology\nWe conducted the audit between June 2007 and November 2007 in accordance\nwith generally accepted Government Auditing Standards prescribed by the\nComptroller General of the United States. We included necessary tests to provide\nreasonable assurance of detecting abuse or illegal acts.\n\nTo assess DOT\xe2\x80\x99s process for communicating and coordinating with DHS on\nmatters of pipeline security, we interviewed agency officials at PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Office\nof Pipeline Safety and TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Security Division. We reviewed\ncorrespondence on pipeline security matters between the two agencies and various\nassociated documents.\n\nTo provide the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 status in implementing the annex program elements, we\ninterviewed officials at PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline\nSecurity Division to discuss actions taken and needed by the two agencies to\nimplement the annex. We examined (1) the security annex between PHMSA and\nTSA to identify the roles and responsibilities between the two agencies,\n(2) provisions and program elements of the annex, and (3) the PHMSA/TSA\naction plan initiatives and target dates to implement the annex.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audits\n\x0c 16\n\n\nTo determine the role, responsibility, and authority of PHMSA regarding pipeline\nsecurity matters, we examined the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Aviation Transportation and Security Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107-71\n [2001].\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296 [2002].\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007\n (Pub. L. No. 110-53 [2007]).\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 192, 193, and 195 pertaining to\n pipeline security operations.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 5, \xe2\x80\x9cManagement of\n Domestic Incidents,\xe2\x80\x9d HSPD 7, \xe2\x80\x9cCritical Infrastructure Identification,\n Prioritization, and Protection,\xe2\x80\x9d and HSPD 8, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Preparedness.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nWe also interviewed agency officials at PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Pipeline Safety and\nTSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Security division to obtain each agency\xe2\x80\x99s perspective on the\ndivision of pipeline security roles, responsibilities, and authority.\n\nAlthough the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of\n2006 also requests an assessment of TSA security guidance, we did not perform\nthose activities for several reasons. To truly assess whether existing security\nguidance is adequate, we would have needed to: (1) evaluate operators\xe2\x80\x99\ncompliance with the guidance; (2) develop testing protocols; and (3) perform\nvulnerability tests to ascertain, among other things, if unauthorized individuals can\npenetrate operators\xe2\x80\x99 critical infrastructure. It is not within DOT\xe2\x80\x99s Office of\nInspector General\xe2\x80\x99s jurisdiction to perform such activities. We discussed these\nissues with the congressional committees of jurisdiction.\n\nHowever, we did examine the 2002 Pipeline Security Information Circular, which\nPHMSA developed and TSA later adopted. We also examined the following:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity Guidelines - Natural Gas Industry - Transmission and Distribution,\xe2\x80\x9d\n developed by the Intrastate Natural Gas Association of America, the American\n Gas Association, and the American Public Gas Association\n \xe2\x80\xa2 \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry,\xe2\x80\x9d developed by the American\n Petroleum Institute.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 TSA\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cPipeline Security Smart Practices.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Applicable laws and regulations.\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audits\n\x0c 17\n\n\nWe also interviewed representatives of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of\nAmerica, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Association of Oil Pipeline to\nobtain their perspectives on the adequacy of Federal and industry pipeline security\nguidance.\n\nDuring the audit, we visited or spoke with (via telephone) representatives from\nPHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Eastern and Southwest regional offices to obtain their perspectives on\nfield operations relating to pipeline security matters. We also visited five pipeline\noperators in Texas (Centerpoint Energy, ConocoPhillips, El Paso, Kinder Morgan,\nand Panhandle Energy); one pipeline operator in Virginia (Dominion); and one\npipeline operator in California (Pacific Gas and Electric). At each location, we\ninterviewed key program officials to obtain their perspectives on pipeline security\nmatters and, where possible, toured their facilities.\n\nRelated Audit and Testimony Coverage\nReport SC-2004-064, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Taken and Needed for Improving Pipeline\nSafety,\xe2\x80\x9d June 15, 2004. We reported that, among other things, it was unclear\nwhich agency or agencies would be responsible for pipeline security rulemaking,\noversight, and enforcement and recommended that the delineation of roles and\nresponsibilities between DOT and DHS be defined by executing a Memorandum\nof Understanding or Memorandum of Agreement.\n\nTestimony CC-2004-055, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Taken and Needed for Improving Pipeline\nSafety,\xe2\x80\x9d June 15, 2004. The OIG presented testimony before the Senate\nCommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding actions taken\nand needed for improving pipeline safety. We reported that, among other things,\nDOT\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA need to establish their respective\npipeline security roles and responsibilities and then define them at the operational\nlevel.\n\nTestimony CC-2004-061, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Taken and Actions Needed To Improve\nPipeline Safety,\xe2\x80\x9d June 16, 2004. The OIG presented testimony to the House\nCommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways,\nTransit, and Pipelines regarding actions taken and needed for improving pipeline\nsafety. We provided the same recommendation to the Senate Committee that we\npresented to the House Committee the previous day.\n\nTestimony CC-2004-071, \xe2\x80\x9cProgress and Challenges in Improving Pipeline\nSafety,\xe2\x80\x9d July 20, 2004. The OIG presented testimony before the House Energy\nand Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality regarding\nprogress and challenges in improving pipeline safety. We provided the same\nrecommendation to the House Committee that we presented to the House\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audits\n\x0c 18\n\n\nSubcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines and the Senate Committee on\nCommerce, Science, and Transportation the previous month.\n\nTestimony CC-2006-023, \xe2\x80\x9cPipeline Safety: Progress and Remaining\nChallenges,\xe2\x80\x9d March 16, 2006. The OIG presented testimony before the House\nTransportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Highways,\nTransit, and Pipelines regarding progress and remaining challenges in improving\npipeline safety. We reported that the DOT\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA\nstill need to define their roles and responsibilities at the operational level in an\nannex to the MOU. A lack of clearly defined roles among the Office of Pipeline\nSafety and TSA at the working level could lead to duplicative or conflicting\nefforts, less than effective intergovernmental relationship, and\xe2\x80\x94most\nimportantly\xe2\x80\x94the potential for an uncoordinated response to a terrorist attack.\n\nTestimony CC-2006-039, \xe2\x80\x9cPipeline Safety: Progress and Remaining\nChallenges,\xe2\x80\x9d April 27, 2006. The OIG presented testimony before the House\nCommittee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality\nregarding progress and remaining challenges in improving pipeline safety. We\nprovided the same recommendation to the House Committee that we presented to\nthe House Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines the previous month.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audits\n\x0c 19\n\n\n\n\nEXHIBIT B. PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN THE PIPELINE SECURITY\nANNEX\n Program Element Description\n\n1. Identification of Critical The agencies agreed to review existing definitions of criticality and\nInfrastructure/Key Resources consider the need to refine definitions. To support TSA efforts in this\nand Risk Assessments area, PHMSA agreed to provide compliance data, other information\n collected in the course of security inspections or reviews of security\n plans (including those required under 49 CFR 172.800), and activities\n of transportation carriers and shippers.\n\n Also, TSA will coordinate with PHMSA on observations or\n recommended measures derived from the results of criticality and\n vulnerability assessments, including on pipelines, to evaluate whether\n they conflict with or adversely affect current or planned safety\n requirements.\n\n2. Strategic Planning The agencies will seek consensus concerning measures to reduce risk\n and minimize consequences of emergencies involving pipeline\n infrastructure. Also, the agencies will identify initiatives and activities\n for achieving performance goals and will develop a program\n framework and timetable for their completion.\n\n3. Standards, Regulations, The agencies will seek early and frequent coordination in the\nGuidelines, and Directives development standards, regulations, guidelines, or directives affecting\n transportation security; identify best practices; and explore\n opportunities to build on existing standards-setting activities. In the\n course of discharging their safety and security missions, the agencies\n will review the adequacy of existing standards in the private and public\n sector, identifying any gaps that should be addressed through\n rulemaking, guidelines, or directives.\n\n4. Inspections and Enforcement The agencies will explore opportunities for collaboration in inspection\n and enforcement activities, with the objective of maximizing the use of\n available resources and targeting enforcement resources on the basis of\n system risks. The agencies will immediately develop procedures for\n referral of safety and security issues to PHMSA and TSA, respectively;\n inventory existing inspection and enforcement resources; and develop\n specific plans for closer coordination in the deployment and use of\n inspectors, including any necessary additional training.\n\n5. PHMSA Technical Support TSA can ask for PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s support to develop, staff, implement, or\n enforce regulations, orders, directives, plans, programs, or other\n measures. TSA can also ask for PHMSA support to conduct security\n reviews during an elevated security threat.\n\n6. Sharing Information During The agencies agreed to promptly share information about emergency\nEmergency Response situations that implicate the missions and interests of each other.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit B. Program Elements in the Pipeline Security Annex\n\x0c 20\n\n\n\n7. Public Communication, The agencies will review existing protocols for public communication\nEducation, and Outreach concerning security-related matters, specifically including review of\n existing protocols for publication of information contained in the\n national pipeline mapping system (a map of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipelines\n developed by PHMSA).\n\n8. Communicating Protective The agencies agreed to consult with one another before disseminating\nMeasures to Affected security requirements, voluntary standards, and guidelines that impact\nOrganizations security to the public.\n\n9. Research and Development The agencies will review their safety- and security-related projects and\n identify opportunities to collaborate and support their strategic plan\n through identification, development, and testing of new or modified\n technologies or processes. Also, the agencies will establish protocols\n for ongoing information sharing and participation in their respective\n research and development planning processes.\n\n10. Legislative Matters The agencies are to consult with each other as soon as possible on the\n development of proposed legislation, comments on legislative\n proposals, draft testimony or briefings to be given before congressional\n bodies or staff, and answers to questions for the record.\n\n11. Budget The agencies agreed to communicate throughout the budget\n development, justification, and execution process in order to develop\n and present a coordinated position on transportation security funding\n matters and to avoid duplicative requests for funding in connection\n with pipeline and hazardous material transportation security.\n\n\n\n\nExhibit B. Program Elements in the Pipeline Security Annex\n\x0c 21\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS\n\n\n\nU.S. Department 1200 New Jersey,S.E.\nof Transportation Washington, D.C. 20590\n\n\nPipeline and Hazardous\nMaterials Safety\nAdministration\n\n\nMarch 07, 2008\n\nMr. David A. Dobbs\nPrincipal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and Evaluation\nOffice of the Inspector General\nU.S. Department of Transportation\n1200 New Jersey Ave, SE\nWashington, DC 20590\n\nRE: OIG Project 07A3018A000\n\nDear Mr. Dobbs:\n\nThe Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) thanks the\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Inspector General (OIG) for its efforts, reported in Project\n07A3018A000, to examine the complex issues of pipeline security; to interview a wide range\nof government and private sector stakeholders; and to render its opinions on areas of pipeline\nsecurity that need improvement. This letter responds to the recommendations contained in\nthat report.\n\nPHMSA, as a matter of policy, recognizes that the Transportation Security Administration\n(TSA) has primary responsibility for pipeline security. PHMSA is committed to support\nTSA\xe2\x80\x99s leadership in these matters. The TSA/PHMSA Annex to the Department of\nHomeland Security (DHS), DHS/DOT Memorandum of Understanding identifies eleven\nProgram Elements for TSA and PHMSA cooperation and collaboration to promote pipeline\nsecurity.\n\nPHMSA has acknowledged TSA\xe2\x80\x99s role in leading security inspections of pipeline operators\nand their facilities. PHMSA has, in large part, discontinued performing inspections of\npipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with security protocols that would duplicate TSA\xe2\x80\x99s\ninspections. We have no reports of overlapping or duplicative security inspections from\npipeline operators.\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 22\n\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nPHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Safety Program has always addressed the risks that security issues posed\nto safe operation of pipeline systems. Before 9/11, PHMSA addressed such risks by\nrequiring operators to have plans and capabilities to protect pipeline facilities from vandalism\nand to facilitate response to foreseeable emergencies at their facilities.\n\nEarly in 2002, PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s predecessor, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA),\nworked with industry and State agencies, through the consensus standards process, to formulate\nconsistent guidance for protecting Liquefied Natural Gas facilities, natural gas and hazardous liquid\npipelines and their associated facilities. These guidelines identified protective actions that were\nscaled to the National Threat Advisory System levels.\n\nIn Section 1557 of the 9/11 Commission Act (Pub. L. 110-53), the Congress directed TSA and\nPHMSA to collaboratively develop and implement security standards, assess their effectiveness, then\nevaluate if regulations are needed to ensure pipeline security. The MOU Annex and the Pipeline\nSecurity Action Plan uniformly shows TSA as the leader in each provision, with support,\ncollaboration, and consultation from PHMSA.\n\n\nRECENT PHMSA ACTIONS\n\n\nThe following examples illustrate the enhanced communications and coordination between PHMSA\nand DHS that have been implemented in the past year. At the Departmental level, the Secretary and\nDeputy Secretary of Transportation meet quarterly with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of\nHomeland Security to discuss cross-cutting and cross-Department issues and initiatives. PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s\nAdministrator also meets regularly with the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security \xe2\x80\x93\nTransportation Security Administration. Assisting TSA achieve its goals has been and remains a\nmatter of the highest agency priority.\n\nPHMSA representatives have met with TSA Pipeline Security Division staff at least quarterly to\ndiscuss accomplishments and milestones. In September, 2007, 9/11 Act items were placed on the\nAction Plan. At their meeting in December, 2007, both organizations identified primary points of\ncontact to pass incident notification and follow-on with more detailed, operational information as\nevents unfold. At a follow-up meeting in January 2008, changes to the Action Plan were made to\nreflect the agencies placing a priority on items in the 9/11 Commission Act. We plan routine\ncoordination meetings between executives of each agency.\n\nPHMSA recently established the new position of Planning and Preparedness Manager in the Office of\nthe Administrator, reporting directly to the Chief Safety Officer. The manager is responsible for all\naspects of PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s emergency management and security policy activities and to provide liaison\nwith other agencies, including TSA and stakeholders. Operationally, the manager is the designated\nPoint of Contact for incident notification to TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Security Division\xe2\x80\x99s Policy Director.\n\nIn December, 2007, a senior PHMSA headquarters staff member accompanied TSA as it conducted a\nCorporate Security Review (CSR) of a pipeline operator that had experienced a leak of product\ncaused by vandalism. The official also attended a meeting hosted by the Commander, United States\nCoast Guard (USCG), DHS, Sector St. Petersburg, of the Sector\xe2\x80\x99s Maritime Security Council,\nconcerning the vandalism event.\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 23\n\n\n\nIn another example, PHMSA worked with its TSA counterparts to address how the potentially\nsensitive information on PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS), originally\nwithdrawn from the public website after the 9/11 attacks, could be made available as an information\ntool for the public and community planners. As a result of this cooperation, the NPMS Public Viewer\nwas restored on the web in April, 2007.\n\nPHMSA participates in the DHS-sponsored Oil and Natural Gas, and Energy Government\nCoordinating Councils and associated Pipeline Sector Specific Council for coordination of a wide\nrange of pipeline security issues with other Federal agency and private-sector officials. PHMSA\nparticipated in the February, 2008, DHS-sponsored Energy Critical Infrastructure Partnership\nAdvisory Committee meeting. In December, 2007, TSA and DOT collaborated on a Transportation\nSecurity Information Sharing Plan that addresses several domains of security information, not\notherwise addressed in the Annex.\n\nSince November, 2007, PHMSA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the\nDepartment of Energy (DOE), and the Protective Security Coordination Division of the Office of\nInfrastructure Protection, TSA, and USCG, of DHS, have been collaboratively developing procedures\nto perform Comprehensive Reviews (CRs) for security of Maritime Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)\nFacilities. PHMSA has existing MOUs with FERC and USCG concerning security review\nresponsibilities at Waterfront Import / Export LNG facilities. We have discussed plans to harmonize\nmanagement of inspection for these facilities. We believe that CR practices developed by this\nworkgroup may be applied by TSA in CRs for inland, Peak-Shaving LNG facilities.\n\nIn total, PHMSA continues to communicate about pipeline incidents and facility safety information,\ncoordinate pipeline security inspection activities, and work with TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Security Division to\naccomplish the activities listed in the Pipeline Security Action Plan. PHMSA will improve its\ndocumentation of plans, activities and milestones and initiate regular reporting on the Action Plan to\nPHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s senior leadership. Additionally, PHMSA will continue to participate in several\nGovernment Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating Councils, hosted by the Department of\nHomeland Security\xe2\x80\x99s National Protection and Programs Directorate to bring its experience in pipeline\nsafety and security to the critical infrastructure context of those Councils.\n\nPHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nRecommendation #1. Finalize the action plan for implementing the annex provisions and program\nelements and effectively execute the action plan.\n\nRESPONSE: Concur: As the action plan is a dynamic document, changes and adjustments to\nmilestones are anticipated. PHMSA will particularly pursue issues where the interplay between\nsafety and security may give PHMSA opportunities to share its safety knowledge, operational\nexperience, and its extensive state partnerships in support of TSA\xe2\x80\x99s security goals and\nimplementation plans.\n\nPLANNED ACTION: PHMSA will continue to work with its TSA partners to regularly update and\nprioritize the items on the Action Plan, and then execute those items. The last update to the Action\nPlan is dated February, 2008. To improve accountability and management visibility, the pipeline\nsecurity action plan will be updated monthly and forwarded to PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Chief Safety Officer for\nreview.\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 24\n\n\nRecommendation #2. Amend the annex to delineate the roles and responsibilities of PHMSA and\nTSA in overseeing and enforcing security regulations for LNG operators.\n\nRESPONSE: Concur. PHMSA will work with TSA and the other agencies with which PHMSA has\nexecuted Memoranda of Understanding concerning LNG facilities 1 to determine if further\nclarification of roles and responsibilities in oversight and enforcement of security regulations for\naffected LNG operators is warranted. PHMSA will notify the OIG of this determination by June 30,\n2008.\n\nPLANNED ACTION: Regardless of the determination, PHMSA will propose to incorporate LNG\nfacility inspections into the Action Plan at the next working group meeting. PHMSA will assist TSA\nin its communication and work with appropriate State pipeline agencies that have regulatory oversight\nof peak shaving LNG facilities, which make up the majority of LNG facilities in the Nation. PHMSA\nalso will work with TSA to determine the extent to which the data PHMSA has collected, and its state\npartners\xe2\x80\x99 field activities can inform TSA decisions on requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act and\nimplement any resulting policy decisions.\n\nRecommendation #3. Maximize the strategy used to assess pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 security plans and\nguidance to ensure effective and timely execution of congressional mandates in the 9/11 Commission\nAct. At a minimum, enhancements to the strategy need to include actively engaging PHMSA\nassistance in inspecting the 100 most critical pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 pipeline security plans and critical\nfacilities, and developing protocols and conducting vulnerability tests to effectively measure\noperators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with existing guidance or assess the adequacy of the guidance.\n\nRESPONSE: Concur. PHMSA will work closely with TSA to help execute the pipeline security\nmandates in the 9/11 Commission Act, as listed in the current Action Plan. When participating in a\nTSA CSR, PHMSA inspectors participate in an advisory role, based on their safety and regulatory\nfocus, as TSA seeks voluntary operator cooperation on security issues. However, PHMSA inspectors\nwould address a safety issue encountered during a CSR.\n\nPLANNED ACTION: While TSA generally advises PHMSA as they schedule CSR, PHMSA has\nnot participated in the great majority of those reviews. PHMSA completed its FY08 pipeline safety\ninspection plan well before the OIG completed the investigation, and is into the second quarter of\ncompleting the scheduled inspections. PHMSA asked TSA how it intends to inspect the remainder of\nthe top 100 operators\xe2\x80\x99 critical facilities. TSA stated it plans to hire consultants to assist them perform\ninspections of the remaining critical facilities of the top 100 operators. As PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline\ninspection resources for FY08 are committed, it is unlikely that PHMSA would participate in these\ninspections.\n\nPHMSA recognizes that the separate issues of: (1) adequacy of existing standards and guidance, and\n(2) voluntary compliance with those standards, are both required for successful protection of the\nNation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline infrastructure. As TSA and their consultants complete the inspections of the top\n100 operators\xe2\x80\x99 critical facilities, PHMSA will work with TSA as it compiles and analyzes the results\nof the reviews to determine the extent to which operators have voluntarily complied with 2002\nsecurity standards.\n\n\n\n\n1\n Currently, PHMSA has an MOU with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Coast Guard concerning\n regulatory purview of Waterfront LNG Import/Export facilities.\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c 25\n\n\nPHMSA has little experience in covertly assessing the effectiveness of security plans that the OIG\ndiscusses in this report and must defer to TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Pipeline Security Division, TSA\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Security\nAssessments, and the Protective Security components in DHS for this expertise. Nonetheless,\nPHMSA also is very interested in working with TSA to review the macro definition used to define the\ntop 100 operators, the variability in compliance among those operators, and the significance of any\nnon-compliances found. PHMSA will continue to work with TSA as they determine if the 2002\nsecurity standards and guidance are adequate to ensure the security of pipeline facilities.\n\nBased on the reviews of the Top 100 pipeline operators\xe2\x80\x99 compliance with existing standards, and\nfrom the review of systematic (and perhaps covert) prospective assessments of vulnerability described\nby the OIG in the subject report, PHMSA looks forward to assisting TSA to determine if security-\nfocused regulations are needed to ensure the security of the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s pipeline infrastructure. Whether\nregulations are determined to be required or not, PHMSA can assist TSA use program development\npractices similar to those applied to PHMSA\xe2\x80\x99s Integrity Management Programs to help systematize\nour security support activities. This process is consistent with the actions detailed in the 9/11\nCommission Act and also detailed in the current Action Plan.\n\n Sincerely,\n\n\n\n\n Stacey L. Gerard\n Assistant Administrator / Chief Safety Officer\n\n\n\n\nAppendix. Agency Comments\n\x0c'


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21999D0415(01)
 Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 55/98 av den 4 juli 1998 om ändring av bilaga II (Tekniska föreskrifter, standarder, provning och certifiering) till EES-avtalet
 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning nr L 100 , 15/04/1999 s. 0038 - 0039
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉNS BESLUTnr 55/98av den 4 juli 1998om ändring av bilaga II (Tekniska föreskrifter, standarder, provning och certifiering) till EES-avtaletGEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR BESLUTAT FÖLJANDEmed beaktande av Avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, justerat genom protokollet med justeringar av Avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, nedan kallat avtalet, särskilt artikel 98 i detta, ochav följande skäl:Bilaga II till avtalet ändrades genom Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 44/98 av den 29 maj 1998(1).Kommissionens direktiv 97/39/EG av den 24 juni 1997 om anpassning till den tekniska utvecklingen av rådets direktiv 75/443/EEG av den 26 juni 1975 om tillnärmning av medlemsstaternas lagstiftning om backväxel och hastighetsmätarutrustning på motorfordon(2) bör införlivas med avtalet.HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.Artikel 1Följande strecksats skall läggas till i punkt 18 (rådets direktiv 75/443/EEG) i kapitel I i bilaga II till avtalet: "- 397 L 0039: Kommissionens direktiv 97/39/EG av den 24 juni 1997 (EGT L 177, 5.7.1997, s. 15)."Artikel 2Texterna till direktiv 97/39/EG på isländska och norska, som bifogas respektive språkversion av detta beslut, är giltiga.Artikel 3Detta beslut träder i kraft den 1 augusti 1998 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i avtalet har gjorts till Gemensamma EES-kommittén.Artikel 4Detta beslut skall offentliggöras i EES-delen av och EES-supplementet till Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.Utfärdad i Bryssel den 4 juli 1998.På Gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnarF. BARBASOOrdförande(1) EGT L 30, 4.2.1999, s. 43.(2) EGT L 177, 5.7.1997, s. 15.


type: legislation

text:
 2021.4.7.
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 118/10
 A BIZOTTSÁG (EU) 2021/568 VÉGREHAJTÁSI RENDELETE
 (2021. április 6.)
 a 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének az egyes baromfiáruk Unióba történő behozatala és Unión keresztül történő átszállítása céljából engedélyezett harmadik országok, területek, övezetek és területi egységek jegyzékében az Egyesült Királyságra vonatkozó bejegyzés tekintetében a magas patogenitású vírustörzsek okozta madárinfluenza megjelenése nyomán szükségessé vált módosításáról
 (EGT-vonatkozású szöveg)
 AZ EURÓPAI BIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződésre,
 tekintettel az emberi fogyasztásra szánt állati eredetű termékek termelésére, feldolgozására, forgalmazására és behozatalára irányadó állategészségügyi szabályok megállapításáról szóló, 2002. december 16-i 2002/99/EK tanácsi irányelvre (1) és különösen annak 8. cikke bevezető mondatára, 8. cikke (1) bekezdésének első albekezdésére, 8. cikke (4) bekezdésére és 9. cikke (4) bekezdésére,
 tekintettel a baromfi és keltetőtojás Közösségen belüli kereskedelmére és harmadik országból történő behozatalára irányadó állategészségügyi feltételekről szóló, 2009. november 30-i 2009/158/EK tanácsi irányelvre (2) és különösen annak 23. cikke (1) bekezdésére, 24. cikke (2) bekezdésére és 25. cikke (2) bekezdésére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A 798/2008/EK bizottsági rendelet (3) megállapítja azokat a követelményeket, amelyeket a baromfinak és a baromfitermékeknek (a továbbiakban: áruk) az Unióba történő behozatalával és az Unió területén való átszállításával összefüggésben – az átszállítás ideje alatti tárolást is ideértve – az állategészségügyi bizonyítványok tekintetében alkalmazni kell. A rendelet előírja, hogy az áruk kizárólag abban az esetben hozhatók be az Unióba, illetve szállíthatók át az Unió területén, ha a rendelet I. mellékletének 1. részében található táblázat 1. és 3. oszlopában felsorolt harmadik országokból, területekről, övezetekből, illetve területi egységekből érkeznek.
 (2)
 A 798/2008/EK rendelet megállapítja továbbá, hogy a harmadik országok, területek, övezetek vagy területi egységek milyen feltételek mellett tekinthetők magas patogenitású vírustörzsek okozta madárinfluenzától (a továbbiakban: HPAI) mentesnek.
 (3)
 A Nagy-Britannia és Észak-Írország Egyesült Királyságának az Európai Unióból és az Európai Atomenergia-közösségből történő kilépéséről szóló megállapodással (a továbbiakban: a kilépésről rendelkező megállapodás) és különösen az Írországról/Észak-Írországról szóló jegyzőkönyv 5. cikkének az említett jegyzőkönyv 2. mellékletével összefüggésben értelmezett (4) bekezdésével összhangban a 2002/99/EK és a 2009/158/EK irányelv és az azok alapján elfogadott bizottsági jogi aktusok a kilépéséről rendelkező megállapodásban előírt átmeneti időszak végét követően Észak-Írország tekintetében továbbra is alkalmazandók az Egyesült Királyságra és az Egyesült Királyságban.
 (4)
 Ezért az Egyesült Királyság, Észak-Írország kivételével, a 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének 1. részében foglalt táblázatban olyan harmadik országként van feltüntetve, amelynek csupán egyes területeiről engedélyezett – a HPAI jelenlétének függvényében – bizonyos baromfiáruk Unióba történő behozatala és Unió területén történő átszállítása. Az Egyesült Királyság e régiókba sorolását az (EU) 2021/256 bizottsági végrehajtási rendelettel (4) módosított 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének 1. része tartalmazza.
 (5)
 2021. március 29-én az Egyesült Királyság megerősítette a H5N8 altípusba tartozó HPAI egy East Staffordshire területén található baromfitartó gazdaságban való jelenlétét.
 (6)
 Az Egyesült Királyság állategészségügyi hatóságai 10 km-es ellenőrzési övezetet hoztak létre az érintett gazdaság körül, és az érintett állományok felszámolására irányuló intézkedést hajtottak végre a HPAI megfékezése és e betegség terjedésének korlátozása céljából. Az Egyesült Királyság állategészségügyi hatóságai ezenfelül megerősítették, hogy azonnali hatállyal, Észak-Írország kivételével az Egyesült Királyság egész területére kiterjedően felfüggesztették az állategészségügyi bizonyítványok kiadását az Unióba történő kivitelre szánt áruszállítmányok tekintetében.
 (7)
 Az Egyesült Királyság információkat nyújtott be a Bizottságnak a területén tapasztalható járványügyi helyzetről és a HPAI további terjedésének megelőzése érdekében hozott intézkedésekről, amelyeket a Bizottság megvizsgált. E vizsgálat alapján helyénvaló korlátozni az azon területről származó áruknak az Unióba történő behozatalát, amelyre vonatkozóan az Egyesült Királyság állategészségügyi hatóságai a jelenlegi HPAI járványkitörés miatt korlátozásokat vezettek be.
 (8)
 A 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének 1. részében található táblázatban szereplő, az Egyesült Királyságra vonatkozó bejegyzést ezért a harmadik ország jelenlegi járványügyi helyzetére figyelemmel módosítani kell.
 (9)
 A 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletét ezért ennek megfelelően módosítani kell.
 (10)
 Az e rendeletben előírt intézkedések összhangban vannak a Növények, Állatok, Élelmiszerek és Takarmányok Állandó Bizottságának véleményével,
 ELFOGADTA EZT A RENDELETET:
 1. cikk
 A 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének 1. része e rendelet mellékletének megfelelően módosul.
 2. cikk
 Ez a rendelet az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában való kihirdetését követő harmadik napon lép hatályba.
 Ez a rendelet teljes egészében kötelező és közvetlenül alkalmazandó valamennyi tagállamban.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2021. április 6-án.
 a Bizottság részéről
 az elnök
 Ursula VON DER LEYEN
 (1) HL L 18., 2003.1.23., 11. o.
 (2) HL L 343., 2009.12.22., 74. o.
 (3) A Bizottság 798/2008/EK rendelete (2008. augusztus 8.) azon harmadik országok, területek, övezetek és területi egységek jegyzékének megállapításáról, ahonnan baromfi és baromfitermékek behozhatók a Közösségbe és átszállíthatók a Közösségen, valamint az állategészségügyi bizonyítványok követelményeinek megállapításáról (HL L 226., 2008.8.23., 1. o.).
 (4) A Bizottság (EU) 2021/256 végrehajtási rendelete (2021. február 18.) a 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének az egyes baromfiáruk Unióba történő behozatala vagy Unión keresztül történő átszállítása céljából engedélyezett harmadik országok, területek, övezetek és területi egységek jegyzékében az Egyesült Királyságra vonatkozó bejegyzés tekintetében a magas patogenitású vírustörzsek okozta madárinfluenza megjelenése nyomán szükségessé vált módosításáról (HL L 58., 2021.2.19., 36. o.).
 MELLÉKLET
 A 798/2008/EK rendelet I. mellékletének 1. részében az Egyesült Királyságra vonatkozó bejegyzés helyébe a következő szöveg lép:
 „GB – Egyesült Királyság (*1)
 GB-0
 Az egész ország
 SPF
 EP, E
 GB-1
 Az Egyesült Királyság egész területe, a GB-2 terület kivételével
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 A
 WGM
 POU, RAT
 N
 GB-2
 Az Egyesült Királyság alábbi területe:
 GB-2.1
 North Yorkshire megye:
 az N54.30 és a W1.47 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.6.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.6.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.6.
 GB-2.2
 North Yorkshire megye:
 az N54.29 és a W1.45 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.8.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.8.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.8.
 GB-2.3
 Norfolk megye:
 az N52.49 és a E0.95 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.10.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.10.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.10.
 GB-2.4
 Norfolk megye:
 az N52.72 és a E0.15 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.11.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.11.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.11.
 GB-2.5
 Derbyshire megye:
 az N52.93 és a W1.57 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.17.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.17.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.17.
 GB-2.6
 North Yorkshire megye:
 az N54.37 és a W2.16 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.19.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.19.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.19.
 GB-2.7
 Orkney-szigetek:
 az N59.28 és a W2.44 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 GB-2.8
 Dorset megye:
 az N51.06 és a W2.27 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.20.
 GB-2.9
 Norfolk megye:
 az N52.52 és a E0.96 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.23.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.23.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.23.
 GB-2.10
 Norfolk megye:
 az N52.52 és a E0.95 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.28.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.28.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.28.
 GB-2.11
 Norfolk megye:
 az N52.53 és a E0.66 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10,4 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.2.7.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.2.7.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.2.7.
 GB-2.12
 Devon megye:
 az N50.70 és a W3.36 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.31.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.31.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.1.
 2021.1.31.
 GB-2.13
 Amlwch közelében, Isle of Anglesey, Wales:
 az N53.38 és a W4.30 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.1.27.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.1.27.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.1.27.
 GB-2.14
 Redcar közelében, Redcar and Cleveland, Anglia:
 az N54.57 és a W1.07 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.2.8.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.2.8.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.2.8.
 GB-2.15
 Glenrothes, Fife, Skócia:
 az N56.23 és a W3.02 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.2.12.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.2.12.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.2.12.
 GB-2.16
 Staffordshire megye, Derbyshire megye:
 az N52.99 és a W1.85 (WGS84 rendszerben megadott) decimális koordináták által meghatározott ponttól tekintett 10 km-es sugarú körön belül eső terület
 BPP, BPR, DOC, DOR, HEP, HER, SRP, SRA, LT20
 N
 P2
 2021.3.29.
 A
 WGM
 P2
 2021.3.29.
 POU, RAT
 N
 P2
 2021.3.29.
 (*1) A Nagy-Britannia és Észak-Írország Egyesült Királyságának az Európai Unióból és az Európai Atomenergia-közösségből történő kilépéséről szóló megállapodással és különösen az Írországról/Észak-Írországról szóló jegyzőkönyv 5. cikkének az említett jegyzőkönyv 2. mellékletével összefüggésben értelmezett (4) bekezdésével összhangban e melléklet alkalmazásában az Egyesült Királyságra való hivatkozásokat úgy kell értelmezni, hogy azok nem foglalják magukban Észak-Írországot.”.


text:
Underleverantören - Шведский - Мальтийский Переводы и примеры
 Вы искали: underleverantören (Шведский - Мальтийский)
 I fall som innefattar kontrakt med underleverantörer får exportdeklarationen även inges till det tullkontor som är behörigt på den plats där underleverantören är etablerad.
 F'każi li jinvolvu sub-kuntratti, id-dikjarazzjoni ta'l-esportazzjoni tista'wkoll tkun ippreżentata fl-uffiċċju doganali kompetenti għall-post fejn is-sub-kuntrattur ikun stabbilit.
 Detta gäller särskilt om större delen av konstruktionsutvecklingen, tillverkningen, provningen eller andra kritiska processer utförs hos underleverantören eller leverantören.
 Dan japplika b’mod partikolari jekk il-parti ewlenija tal-iżvilupp, manifattura, ittestjar ta’ disinn jew proċess kruċjali ieħor tkun tinsab għand is-sottokuntrattur jew il-fornitur.
 Stödmottagarenanordnar projektlednings-mötenen gångvar ellervarannan månad,i vilka den centrala finansierings- och upphandlingsenheten, Europeiska kommissionens delegation och underleverantören deltar.
 Il-benefiċjarjujorganizzalaqgħatdwaril-ġestjoni talproġett fuq bażi ta’ kull xahar jew kullxahrejnlifihomjipparteċipawis-CFCU, id-Delegazzjonital-KEul-kontrattur.S’issa l-EUSG għadu maattendix dawnil-laqgħat.
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha befogenhet att utföra revision, på grundval av handlingar och kontroller på plats och inspektioner, hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit unionsfinansiering enligt programmet.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa ta' awditjar, abbażi ta' dokumenti u kontrolli u spezzjonijiet fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji tal-għotjiet, il-kuntratturi u s-sottokuntratturi kollha li jkunu rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni taħt il-Programm.
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ges befogenhet att på grundval av handlingar och genom kontroller på plats granska alla bidragsmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som har tagit emot medel från unionen inom ramen för programmet.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa tal-awditjar, fuq il-bażi tad-dokumenti u verifiki fuq il-post, fir-rigward tal-benefiċjarji kollha tal-għotja, il-kuntratturi u sottokuntratturi kollha li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni skont il-Programm.
 Kommissionen, dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha rätt att utföra revisioner på grundval av handlingar och utföra kontroller på plats iförhållande till alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer eller annan tredje part som erhållit EU-finansiering.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri huma b'dan mogħtija s-setgħa li jagħmlu tverifiki, fuq il-bażi ta’dokumenti u fuq il-post, fir-rigward tal-benefiċjarji kollha tal-għotja, il-kuntratturi, is-sottokuntratturi u partijiet terzi oħra li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni.
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha befogenhet att utföra revision, på grundval av handlingar och på plats, hos alla bidragsmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit unionsfinansiering inom ramen för Horisont 2020.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa tal-awditjar, abbażi ta' dokumenti u fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji tal-għajnuna finanzjarja, il-kuntratturi u s-sottokuntratturi kollha, li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni taħt Orizzont 2020.
 l-identifikazzjoni, fejn huwa applikabbli, tal-intrapriżi li keċċew lill-impjegati, il-fornituri jew il-produtturi aktar 'l isfel fil-katina tal-produzzjoni, is-setturi, u l-kategoriji ta’ benefiċjarji speċifikati mqassma skont is-sess u l-grupp tal-etajiet;
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha rätt att utföra granskningar av handlingar och kontroller på plats hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit EU-finansiering enligt denna förordning.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandhom ikollhom is-setgħa ta' verifika, abbażi ta' dokumenti u fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji tal-għotja, il-kuntratturi u s-subkuntratturi kollha li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni taħt dan ir-Regolament.
 Om så krävs för genomförandet av åtgärden får de anlita tredje parter, inklusive underleverantörer, för att utföra arbete inom åtgärden, eller utnyttja resurser som ställs till förfogande av tredje parter genom naturabidrag enligt villkoren i bidragsavtalet.
 Fejn ikun meħtieġ għall-implimentazzjoni tal-azzjoni, jistgħu jsejħu lil partijiet terzi, inkluż subkuntratturi, biex iwettqu ħidma taħt l-azzjoni jew jistgħu jużaw riżorsi magħmula disponibbli minn partijiet terzi permezz ta’ kontribuzzjonijiet in natura, skont il-kondizzjonijiet stabbiliti fil-ftehim dwar l-għotja.
 Tredje parter som inte är underleverantörer får utföra arbete inom åtgärden i enlighet med de villkor som fastställs i bidragsavtalet.
 Partijiet terzi minbarra subkuntratturi jistgħu jwettqu ħidma taħt l-azzjoni skont il-kondizzjonijiet stabbiliti fil-ftehim dwar l-għotja.
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha befogenhet att utföra revision, på grundval av handlingar och kontroller på plats, hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit unionsfinansiering inom ramen för denna förordning.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa li jwettqu verifika, abbażi ta' dokumenti kif ukoll fil-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji ta' għotjiet, il-kuntratturi u s-subkuntratturi kollha li jkunu rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni skont dan-ir-Regolament.
 Kommissionen, dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha rätt att granska stödjande handlingar och utföra kontroller på plats hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit unionsfinansiering inom ramen för programmet.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa ta’ awditjar, abbażi ta’ dokumenti u kontrolli fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji, il-kuntratturi u s-sottokuntratturi kollha li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni skont il-Programm LIFE.
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha befogenhet att utföra revision, på grundval av både handlingar och kontroller på plats, hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare och underleverantörer som erhållit unionsfinansiering inom ramen för programmet.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandu jkollhom is-setgħa tal-awditjar, fuq il-bażi ta' dokumenti u fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji ta' għotjiet, il-kuntratturi u s-subkuntratturi kollha li jkunu rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni taħt dan ir-Regolament.
 arbetstagare en person som utför arbete, oavsett om det är tillfälligt eller stadigvarande, om det liknar ett anställningsförhållande, även personal som arbetar för leverantörer och underleverantörer.
 “ħaddiem” ifisser kwalunkwe persuna li tagħmel xogħol, kemm jekk b’mod regolari kif ukoll b’mod temporanju, fil-kuntest ta’ relazzjoni ta’ impjieg inkluż il-persunal li jaħdem għal kuntratturi u sottokuntratturi;
 Kommissionen eller dess företrädare och revisionsrätten ska ha befogenhet att utföra revision, på grundval av handlingar och kontroller på plats, hos alla stödmottagare, uppdragstagare, underleverantörer och andra tredjeparter som erhållit unionsfinansiering enligt den här förordningen.
 Il-Kummissjoni jew ir-rappreżentanti tagħha u l-Qorti tal-Awdituri għandhom ikollhom is-setgħa ta’ verifika, abbażi ta' dokumenti u verifiki fuq il-post, fuq il-benefiċjarji, il-kuntratturi, is-sottokuntratturi u partijiet terzi oħrajn kollha li rċevew fondi tal-Unjoni skont dan ir-Regolament.
 sottokuntrattur
 anbud som inlämnats av europeiska anbudsgivare som anlitar underleverantörer eller experter i AVS-staterna.
 offerti ippreżentati minn appaltaturi Ewropew b'sub-kuntratturi jew esperti ACP.
 Meta l-kunsinnatur in konto juża kuntrattur:
 Buteljeringsföretag – som köper PET för sina flasktillverkande/omvandlande underleverantörers räkning (”hard tolling”) eller förhandlar fram PET-priset för dessas räkning (”soft tolling”).
 il-bottiljaturi - li jixtru l-PET għall-konvertituri/produtturi tal-fliexken subkontrattati tagħhom (hard tolling) jew jinnegozjaw il-prezz li bih il-konvertitur subkontrattat u/jew il-produttur tal-flixkun se jakkwista l-PET (soft tolling).
 blue cinema (Хинди>Английский)deborde (Французский>Итальянский)남매섹스 (Корейский>Английский)enterotossigena (Итальянский>Чешский)patribus mortis (Латинский>Английский)ricordato (Итальянский>Хорватский)poda loosu (Тамильский>Английский)relocate (Английский>Греческий)ka darījums konkurencei (Латышский>Английский)noris nos (Латинский>Итальянский)väikepakenditesse (Эстонский>Итальянский)snoep (Голландский>Китайский (упрощенный))mera ek sapna hai ke dekhu tujeh sapno me (Хинди>Английский)tum sahi keh rahe ho (Хинди>Английский)hola senorita como esta (Испанский>Английский)chlorobutyl (Английский>Немецкий)打针 (Китайский (упрощенный)>Малайский)b0kep jepang (Индонезийский>Английский)xin lỗi, tôi đang bận (Вьетнамский>Английский)totalmente (Английский>Португальский)electrical (Английский>Зулусский)prod (Датский>Английский)multinational company (Английский>Тагальский)prevoznika (Словенский>Английский)


text:
 7.11.2009
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 267/24
 Жалба, подадена на 3 юли 2008 г. от Cofra srl срещу решението, постановено от Първоинстанционния съд (пети състав) на 15 април 2008 г. по дело T-478/07, Cofra srl/Комисия на Европейските общности
 (Дело C-295/08 P)
 2009/C 267/42
 Език на производството: италиански
 Страни
 Жалбоподател: Cofra srl (представител: адв. M. A. Calabrese)
 Друга страна в производството: Комисия на Европейските общности
 С Определение от 29 юни 2009 г. Съдът (осми състав) отхвърля жалбата.


text:
 4.9.2017
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 293/6
 Urteil des Gerichtshofs (Dritte Kammer) vom 13. Juli 2017 (Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky — Slowakische Republik) — Radosław Szoja/Sociálna poisťovňa
 (Rechtssache C-89/16) (1)
 ((Vorlage zur Vorabentscheidung - Anwendung der Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit - Wandererwerbstätige - Person, die eine Beschäftigung und eine selbständige Erwerbstätigkeit in zwei verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten ausübt - Bestimmung der anzuwendenden Rechtsvorschriften - Verordnung [EG] Nr. 883/2004 - Art. 13 Abs. 3 - Verordnung [EG] Nr. 987/2009 - Art. 14 Abs. 5b - Art. 16 - Wirkungen der Entscheidungen der Verwaltungskommission für die Koordinierung der Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit - Unzulässigkeit))
 (2017/C 293/07)
 Verfahrenssprache: Slowakisch
 Vorlegendes Gericht
 Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky
 Parteien des Ausgangsverfahrens
 Kläger: Radosław Szoja
 Beklagte: Sociálna poisťovňa
 Beteiligte: WEBUNG, s.r.o.
 Tenor
 Art. 13 Abs. 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 883/2004 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 29. April 2004 zur Koordinierung der Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit in der durch die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 465/2012 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 22. Mai 2012 geänderten Fassung ist dahin auszulegen, dass für die Bestimmung der nationalen Rechtsvorschriften, die nach dieser Vorschrift auf eine Person wie den Kläger des Ausgangsverfahrens anzuwenden sind, die gewöhnlich in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten eine Beschäftigung und eine selbständige Erwerbstätigkeit ausübt, die in Art. 14 Abs. 5b und Art. 16 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 987/2009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 16. September 2009 zur Festlegung der Modalitäten für die Durchführung der Verordnung Nr. 883/2004 in der durch die Verordnung Nr. 465/2012 geänderten Fassung aufgestellten Anforderungen zu berücksichtigen sind.
 (1) ABl. C 175 vom 17.5.2016.


text:
 18.1.2014
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 15/6
 2013 m. spalio 17 d.Centrale Raad van Beroep (Nyderlandai) pateiktas prašymas priimti prejudicinį sprendimą byloje Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank prieš E. Fischer-Lintjens
 (Byla C-543/13)
 2014/C 15/07
 Proceso kalba: olandų
 Prašymą priimti prejudicinį sprendimą pateikęs teismas
 Centrale Raad van Beroep
 Šalys pagrindinėje byloje
 Apeliantė: Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank
 Kita apeliacinio proceso šalis: E. Fischer-Lintjens
 Prejudiciniai klausimai
 1.
 Ar Reglamento Nr. 1408/71 (1) 27 ir paskesnių straipsnių sąvoką „mokama“ reikia aiškinti taip, kad nustatant, nuo kokio momento turi būti mokama pensija, svarbus sprendimo suteikti pensiją, pagal kurį turi būti mokama pensija, priėmimo momentas arba momentas, nuo kurio pradedama mokėti atgaline data suteikta pensija?
 2.
 Jeigu sąvoka „mokama“ reiškia momentą, nuo kurio pradedama mokėti atgaline data suteikta pensija:
 Ar tai suderinama su tuo, kad į Reglamento (EEB) Nr. 1408/71 taikymo sritį patenkantis teisę į pensiją turintis asmuo pagal Nyderlandų teisės aktus negali sudaryti sveikatos draudimo sutarties tokia pačia atgaline data?
 (1) 1971 m. birželio 14 d. Tarybos reglamentas (EEB) Nr. 1408/71 dėl socialinės apsaugos sistemų taikymo pagal darbo sutartį dirbantiems asmenims ir jų šeimos nariams, judantiems Bendrijoje (OL L 149, p. 2; 2004 m. specialusis leidimas lietuvių k., 5 sk., 1 t., p. 35).