text:
Borussia Dortmund - AS Monaco 2-3, în sferturile Ligii Campionilor
 Liga Campionilor 12.04.2017 - 22:02
 AS Monaco a învins-o în deplasare pe Borussia Dortmund cu scorul de 3-2 (2-0), miercuri seara, într-un meci din prima manșă a sferturilor de finală ale Ligii Campionilor la fotbal, care trebuia să aibă inițial marți, dar a fost amânat din cauza unor explozii care au avut loc lângă autocarul echipei germane.
 Monaco a luat o opțiune importantă pentru semifinale, grație dublei reușite de Kylian Mbappé (19, 79) și autogolului lui Sven Bender (35). Pentru Borussia au punctat Ousmane Dembélé (57) și Shinji Kagawa (84).
 Monegascii au ratat și un penalty, în min. 17, prin Fabinho.
 Oaspeții au început cu presing, dar prima oportunitate de gol a aparținut Borussiei, prin Aubameyang (11).
 La doar două minute după ce Fabinho a ratat lovitura de pedeapsă, acordată în urma unui fault comis de Papastathopoulos la Mbappé, echipa din Principat a deschis scorul, prin același talentat Mbappé, care a finalizat centrarea Lemar, la capătul unui contraatac.
 Japonezul Kagawa (31) a fost aproape de egalare, dar nu a putut relua cum trebuie centrarea lui Piszczek.
 Oaspeții s-au desprins în min. 35, când Bender a deviat în propria poartă centrarea lui Raggi. Monaco a mai avut o ocazie până la pauză, dar Silva a tras peste poartă (40).
 La reluare, Borussia a pus tot mai multă presiune, iar șutul lui Dembélé (53) a fost blocat, după care Subasic a reținut mingea expediată cu capul de Ginter (56).
 Echipa antrenată de Thomas Tuchel a redus din diferență în min. 57, când Dembélé a reluat simplu în plasă centrarea lui Kagawa.
 Monaco a fost aproape să o surprindă pe Borussia pe contraatac în min. 75, când Falcao a reluat peste poartă centrarea lui Lemar, însă a reușit acest lucru în min. 79, când Mbappé a interceptat o pasă de la Piszczek la Papastathopoulos și a scăpat singur, marcând al treilea gol al oaspeților.
 Dortmund s-a apropiat din nou la un gol (84), când Kagawa a marcat la centrarea lui Ginter, ratând egalarea în prelungiri (90+1), când Aubameyang a reluat cu capul peste poartă centrarea lui Dembélé.
 Borussia pierduse doar un meci pe teren propriu din precedentele 12 jucate în cupele europene.
 Returul este programat în data de 19 aprilie.
 Liga Campionilor - sferturi de finală (tur)
 Dortmund, Signal Iduna Park: 65.849 spectatori
 Borussia Dortmund - AS Monaco 2-3 (0-2)
 Au marcat: Ousmane Dembélé (57), Shinji Kagawa (84), respectiv Kylian Mbappé (19, 79), Sven Bender (autogol, 35).
 Fabinho (Monaco) a ratat un penalty în min. 17 (șut pe lângă)
 Dortmund: 38. Roman Burki - 28. Matthias Ginter, 25. Sokratis Papastathopoulos, 6. Sven Bender (8. Nuri Șahin, 46) - 26. Lukasz Piszczek, 23. Shinji Kagawa, 33. Julian Weigl, 29. Marcel Schmelzer (căpitan; 22. Christian Pulisic, 46) - 7. Ousmane Dembélé, 13. Raphaël Guerreiro - 17. Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang. Antrenor: Thomas Tuchel.
 Rezerve neutilizate: 1. Roman Weidenfeller - 9. Emre Mor, 24. Mikel Merino, 30. Felix Passlack.
 Monaco: 1. Danijel Subasic - 38. Almamy Touré, 25. Kamil Glik, 5. Jemerson, 24. Andrea Raggi - 10. Bernardo Silva (7. Nabil Dirar, 66), 2. Fabinho, 8. Joao Moutinho, 27. Thomas Lemar - 9. Radamel Falcao (căpitan; 18. Valere Germain, 85), 29. Kylian Mbappé. Antrenor: Leonardo Jardim.
 Rezerve neutilizate: 16. Morgan De Sanctis - 6. Jorge, 33. Irvin Cardona, 34. Abdou Diallo, 35. Kévin N'Doram.
 Cartonașe galbene: Papastathopoulos (16), Ginter (40), Jemerson (46), Lemar (58), Dirar (69), Fabinho (82), Subasic (87).
 Arbitru: Daniele Orsato; arbitri asistenți: Mauro Tonolini, Lorenzo Manganelli; arbitri asistenți adiționali: Paolo Valeri, Massimiliano Irrati; arbitru de rezervă: Alessandro Costanzo (toți din Italia).
 Taguri: Liga Campionilor Borussia Dortmund AS Monaco Kylian Mbappé Sven Bender Ousmane Dembélé Shinji Kagawa
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type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS
 Bruselas, 24.10.1995
 COM(95) 4% final
 Propuesta de
 REGLAMENTO (CEI DEL CONSEJO
 | por el que se fijan, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, los precios de orientación de los productos de la
 pesca en las letras A, D y E del Anexo I del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92
 (presentada por la Comisión)
 Propuesta de
 REGLAMENTO (CE) DEL CONSEJO
 por el que se fijan, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, los precios de
 orientación de los productos de la pesca enumerados en el
 Anexo II del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92
 (presentada por la Comisión)
 Propuesta de
 REGLAMENTO (CE) DEL CONSEJO
 Ipor el que se fija, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, el precio a la producción comunitaria de atunes
 destinados a la fabricación industrial de los productos del código NC 1604
 (presentada por la Comisión)
 ---pagebreak--- ---pagebreak--- EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS
 El presenta Reglamento tiene por objeto fijar para el año 1996 los precios de orientación correspondientes
 a los productos quefiguranen las letras A, D y F del Anexo I del Reglamento (CFF) n° 3759/92 por el que
 se establece la organización común de mercados en el sector de los productos de la pesca. El artícuf l) del
 citado Reglamento establece que debefijarseel precio de orientación de cada uno de esos productos p? a cada
 campaña pesquera, sobre la base de la media de los precios registrados en los mercados al por may» r o en
 ios puertos representativos durante las tres últimas campañas pesqueras anteriores a la fijación de ese creció,
 respecto de una parte significativa de la producción comunitaria y un producto con características comerciales
 bien definidas. A la hora de fijar dichos precios, también se tienen en cuenta la evolución de la producción
 y de la demanda, así como otros criterios relacionados con la estabilización de los precios, la ayuda a la renta
 de los productores y el interés del consumidor.
 Como en años anteriores, el procedimiento de fijación de precios para 1996 se inició comparando la media
 de los precios registrados durante el período de 1993-1995 (1995: seis meses) y la del período del 992-1994,
 que se utilizó como base para fijar los precios de orientación de 1995.
 El precio de la mayoría de las especies de pescado blanco ha registrado en el periodo de 1993-1995 un
 descenso que oscila entre un 3% y un 15%, si bien, en términos generales,ha experimentado un aumento en
 el primer semestre de 1995 con respecto al semestre correspondiente de 1994, salvo en el caso del eglefino,
 del merlán y de la merluza.
 Dada la evolución de los precios a largo plazo, la Comisión propone reducir entre un 1% y un 4% el precio
 de las distintas especies de pescado blanco, exceptuando el alitán, la castañeta, el rape, el lenguado y la
 platija, especies para cuyos precios la Comisión propone el statu quo; en el caso del rascacio, de la solía y
 de la limanda, la Comisión propone un aumento entre un 1% y un 2%.
 En lo que atañe a las especies pelágicas, la variación de precios registrada en el periodo de 1993-1995 con
 respecto al de 1992-1994 se sitúa entre -13% y +l%,si bien ha sido aún mayor considerando los periodos
 semestrales de 1995 con respecto a 1994 (-20% a +2%). En el caso de esas especies y del atún blanco, dado
 que la diferencia entre los precios medios del mercado y los precios de orientación sigue siendo demasiado
 importante, se propone una mayor reducción de los precios que en el caso del pescado blanco: entre -6% y -
 2%.
 Por lo que respecta a las demás especies, quisquilla, cangrejo, cigala y jibia, la Comisión propone el statu
 quo, salvo en el caso de la cigala descabezada, para la que conviene fijar un precio en relación con el precio
 real del mercado, y el camarón cocido cuyo precio, fijado en fechas recientes, es necesario adaptar (-1%).
 Se propone por lo tanto lo siguiente:
 reducir el precio de orientación del arenque un 5%, de la sardina un 5%, de la mielga un 1%, del
 bacalao un 3%, del carbonero un 2%, del eglefino un 4%, del merlán un 4%, de la maruca un 1%,
 de la caballa un 5%, del estornino un 6%, del boquerón un 2%, de la merluza un 2%, del gallo un
 2%, del atún blanco un 5% y del camarón cocido un 1%;
 mantener en 1996 los precios de orientación de 1995 del alitán, la castañeta, el rape, la quisquilla, el
 buey, la cigala entera, la platija, el lenguado y el camarón fresco;
 aumentar un 1% el precio de orientación de la solía y de la jibia y un 2% el del rascacio y de la
 limanda;
 fijar en 4.347 ecus por tonelada el precio de orientación de la cigala descabezada.
 s\
 ---pagebreak--- REGLAMENTO (CE) N° / DEL CONSEJO
 de
 por el que se fijan, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, los precios de orientación de los productos de la
 pesca en las letras A, D y E del Anexo I del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92
 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA,
 Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea,
 Visto el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 1992, por el que se establece
 la organización común de mercados en el sector de los productos de la pesca y de la acuicultura \
 modificado por el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3318/94 2, y, en particular, el apartado 3 de su artículo 9,
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión,
 Considerando que los apartados 1 y 2 del artículo 9 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 prevén que, para
 cada uno de ios productos enumerados en las letras A, D y E del Anexo I de dicho Reglamento, se fijará
 un precio de orientación a un nivel tal que contribuya a garantizar la estabilización de las cotizaciones en
 los mercados, sin provocar, por ello, la formación de excedentes en la Comunidad ; que dicho nivel debe
 contribuir igualmente al mantenimiento de la renta de los productores tomando en consideración el mismo
 tiempo los intereses de los consumidores ;
 Considerando que el precio de orientación sefijarábasándose en la media de los precios, tal como se define
 en el apartado 2 del artículo 9 de dicho Reglamento, y habida cuenta las perspectivas de la evolución de
 la producción y la demanda ;
 ]
 DO n° L 388 de 31.12.1992, p. 1.
 2
 DO n° L 350 de 31.12.1994, p. 15.
 ---pagebreak--- Considerando que la aplicación de estos criterios mencionados, conduce a un aumento de determinados
 productos y para otros productos al mantenimiento o a la disminución de los mismos para otros pro^ ictos
 para la campaña de pesca de 1996 en relación con los precios válidos durante la campaña en curso ;
 HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO :
 Artículo 1
 Los precios de orientación de la campaña de pesca que abarca del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre de 1996
 para los productos enumerados en las letras A, D y E del Anexo I del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 y las
 categorías comerciales a las que se refieren se fijan en el Anexo del presente Reglamento.
 Artículo 2
 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el 1 de enero de 1996.
 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado
 miembro.
 Hecho en Bruselas, Por el Consejo
 ---pagebreak--- ANEXO
 Especie Características comerciales (1) Precio de orientación(en ECU/t)
 Categoría de Talla Presentación
 frescura
 1 .Arenques de la especie Ciupea Extra, A 1 pescado entero 278
 harengus
 2. Sardinas de la especie Sardina Extra 3 pescado entero 488
 pilchard us
 3.Galludos (Squaius acanthias) Extra, A 2 pescado entero
 pescado vaciado, con ) 1046
 cabeza
 4. Pintarrojas (Scyiiorhinus spp.) Extra, A 1 pescado entero
 pescado vaciado, con )790
 cabeza
 S. Gallinetas nórdicas (Sebastes spp.) A 2 pescado entero 1121
 6. Bacalaos de la especie Gadus A 2 pescado vaciado, con
 morhua 0 cabeza
 A 3 pescado vaciado, con ) 1491
 cabeza
 7. Carboneros (Follachius virens) A 2 pescado vaciado, con
 0 cabeza
 A 3 pescado vaciado, con ) 762
 cabeza
 8. Eglefinos (Melanogrammus A 2 pescado vaciado, con
 aeglefinus) 0 cabeza
 A 3 pescado vaciado, con ) 1041
 cabeza
 9. Merlanes (Merlangius merlangus) A 2 pescado vaciado, con
 0 cabeza
 A 3 pescado vaciado, con ) 883
 cabeza
 10. Marucas (Molva spp.) Extra, A 1,2 pescado vaciado, con 1117
 cabeza
 11. Caballas de la especie Scomber- Extra 1 pescado entero
 scombrus 0 )272
 A 2 pescado entero
 12. Caballas de la especie Extra 1 pescado entero
 Scomber japonicus 0 )322
 A 2 pescado entero
 13. Boquerones (Engraulis spp.) Extra 2 pescado entero 1145
 ---pagebreak--- 1 A 2 pescado vaciado, con 1.1.1996 }
 14 Solías (Pieuronectes platessa) o cabeza -> 30.4.1996 > 978
 A 3 1.5.1996 {
 ->31.12.1996{ 1345
 15. Merluzas de la especie A 1 pescado vaciado, con 3697
 Merluccius meriuccius cabeza
 ¡6 Gallos (Lcpidorhombus spp.) Extra, A 1, 2 pescado entero, o pescado 2312
 vaciado, con cabeza
 17. Japutas (Brama spp.) Extra, A 1 pescado entero 1764
 18. Rapes (Lophius spp.) Extra, A 2,3 pescado entero, o vaciado 2677
 con cabeza
 Extra, A 2,3 pescado decapitado 5449
 19. Quisquillas de la especie Crangon A 1 simplemente cocidas en 2110
 crangon agua
 20. Buey (Cancer pagurus) . 1 pescado entero 1767
 21. Cigales (Nephrops norvegicus) E, A 1,2 pescado entero 5129
 E, A 2 cola 4347
 22. Limanda (Limanda limanda) Extra, A 1 Pescado vaciado, con 915
 cabeza
 23. Platija (Platichthys flesus) Extra, A 1 Pescado vaciado, con 542
 cabeza
 24. Albacoras o atunes blancos Extra, A 1 Pescado entero 2039
 (Thunnus alalunga) 1 Pescado vaciado, con 2379
 cabeza
 25. Jibia (Sepia officinalis y Rossia Extra, A 1.2 Entero 1598
 macrosoma)
 26. Lenguados (Solea spp.) Extra, A 2, 3 Pescado vaciado, con 6022
 cabeza
 27. Camarón boreal (Pandalus Borealis) A 1 seimplemente cocidas en 6138
 agua
 A 1 Frescas o refrigeradas 1690
 (1) Las categorías defrescura,talla y presentación son las que se definen en aplicación del articulo 2 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92.
 ---pagebreak--- EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS
 El Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92, por el que se establece la organización común de mercados en e! sector
 de los productos de la pesca, establece que debe fijarse un precio de orientación para cada uno de los
 productos enumerados en el Anexo II del citado Reglamento, respecto de un producto con características
 comerciales bien definidas y sobre la base, en particular, de la media de los precios registrados respecto de
 una parte significativa de la producción comunitaria en los mercados al por mayor o ios puertos
 representativos durante las tres últimas campañas pesqueras anteriores a la fijación de ese precio.
 El análisis de la evolución de los precios del mercado, por una parte, y del nivel de los precios de
 orientación de los productos congelados, por otra, pone de manifiesto la conveniencia de reducir los precios
 de orientación aplicables en Î995 a la dorada, la merluza, el calamar (Illex y Loligo) y a los camarones
 {Parapenaeus longilostris).
 En tales condiciones, la Comisión propone para la campaña pesquera de 1996 ajustar los precios de
 orientación comunitarios a las tendencias a largo plazo del mercado, reduciendo por tanto los de la merluza
 (-3%), la dorada (-3%), los calamares Illex (-1%), los calamares Loligo (-2%) y los camarones {Parapenaeus
 longirostris) (-4%).
 En cambio, dado que los precios han aumentado considerablemente, sobre todo durante los seis primeros
 meses de 1995, resulta oportuno aumentar el precio de orientación del pulpo un 3%, de la jibia un 2%, de
 los camarones (otros Penaeidae) un 2% y del fletan negro un 2%.
 /
 ---pagebreak--- REGLAMENTO (CE) N° / DEL CONSEJO
 de
 por el que se fijan, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, los precios de
 orientación de los productos de la pesca enumerados en el
 Anexo II del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92
 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA,
 Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea,
 Visto el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 1992, por el que se establece la
 organización común de mercados en el sector de los productos de la pesca y de la acuicultura1, modificado
 por el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3318/94 2, y, en particular, el apartado 3 de su artículo 9,
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión,
 Considerando que el apartado 1 del artículo 9 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 prevé que anualmente se fije
 un precio de orientación para cada uno de los productos o grupos de productos enumerados en el Anexo II
 de dicho Reglamento ;
 Considerado que, basándose en los criterios mencionados en el apartado 2 del artículo 9 de dicho Reglamento
 y en los datos actualemente disponibles en lo que se refiere a los precios de los productos en cuestión, es
 conveniente, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, mantener o disminuir estos precios según las especies,
 HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO :
 *DO n° L 388 de 31.12.1992, p. 1.
 2
 DO n° L 350 de 31.12.1994, p. 15.
 -*
 ---pagebreak--- Artículo 1
 Los precios de orientación de la campaña pesquera que abarca desde el 1 de enero hasta el 3 ! de diciembre
 de 1996 para los productos enumerados en el Anexo II del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 y las categorías
 comerciales a las que se refieren se fijan como se indica en el Anexo del presente Reglamento.
 Artículo 2
 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el 1 de enero de 1996.
 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado
 miembro.
 Hecho en Bruselas, Por el Consejo
 ---pagebreak--- ANEXO
 (en ecus/t)
 Groupo de productos Características comerciales Precio de orientación
 1. Espáridos (Dentex dentex y Pagel lus Congeladas, en lotes o en embalajes de origen que 1481
 ¿EZ-l contengan productos homogéneos
 2. Calamares de la especie Loligo Congelados, sin limpiar, en embalajes de origen que 1091
 patagónica contengan productos homogéneos
 3. Potas (Ommastrephes sagittatus) Congelados, sin limpiar, en embalajes de ongen que 961
 contengan productos homogéneos
 4. Illex argentinus Congelados, sin limpiar, en embalajes de origen que 906
 contengan productos homogéneos
 5. Sepias (Sepia officinalis, Rossia Congeladas, en embalaje de origen que contengan 1949
 macrosoma) y sépioles (Sepiola productos homogéneos
 rondel ett i)
 6 Pulpos (Octopus spp.) Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 1769
 productos homogéneos
 7. Fletan negro (Rheinhardtius Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 1880
 hippoglossoides) productos homogéneos •
 8. Merluzas enteras del género Merluccius Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 1289
 J£k productos homogéneos
 9. Filetes de merluza del género Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 1626
 Merluccius spp. productos homogéneos
 10. - Gambas de la especie Parapenaeus Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 5608
 longirostris productos homogéneos
 - Otras especies de la familia Penaeidae Congelados, en embalaje de origen que contengan 7985
 productos homogéneos
 J
 ---pagebreak--- EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS
 El Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92, por el que se establece la organización común de mercados en el sector
 de los productos de la pesca, establece que debe fijarse un precio de producción comunitario del atún
 destinado a la industria conservera, respecto de un producto con características comerciales bien definidas
 y sobre la base, en particular, de la media de los precios registrados en los mercados al por mayor o los
 puertos representativos durante las tres últimas campañas pesqueras anteriores a la fijación .de ese precio y
 respecto de una parte significativa de la producción comunitaria.
 La evolución del precio medio de producción comunitario refleja el aumento de precios registrado durante
 estos tres últimos años, que se ha confirmado durante los seis primeros meses de 1995.
 No obstante, dado que este aumento no ha hecho más que situar el precio medio de mercado al nivel del
 precio de producción comunitario, la Comisión propone mantener el precio de producción comunitario del
 atún durante la campaña pesquera de 1996 al nivel del precio de la campaña pesquera de 1995.
 y*>
 ---pagebreak--- REGLAMENTO (CE) N° / DEL CONSEJO
 de
 por el que se fija, para la campaña pesquera de 1996, el precio a la producción comunitaria de atunes
 destinados a la fabricación industrial de los productos del código NC 1604
 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA,
 Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea,
 Visto el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 1992, por el que se establece
 la organización común de mercados en el sector de los productos de la pesca y de la acuicultura1,
 modificado por el Reglamento (CEE) n° 3318/94 2, y, en particular, el apartado 1 de su artículo 17,
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión,
 Considerando que el apartado 1 del artículo 17 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 prevé que se fijará un
 precio a la producción comunitaria de atunes (del género Thunnus), listados [Euthynnus (Katsuwonus)
 pelamis] y otras especies del género Euthynnus destinados a la fabricación industrial de los productos del
 código NC 1604 ;
 Considerando que, basándose en criterios establecidos en los guiones primero y segundo del apartado 2 del
 artículo 9 asi como en el apartado 1 del artículo 17 de dicho Reglamento, es conveniente disminuir dicho
 precio para la campaña pesquera de 1996,
 HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO :
 'DO n°L 388 de 31.12.1992, p. 1.
 2
 DO n° L 350 de 31.12.1994, p. 15.
 S*
 ---pagebreak--- Artículo 1
 El precio a la producción comunitaria de la campaña pesquera que abarca del 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre
 de 1996 para los atunes (del género Thunnus), listados [Euthynnus (Katsuwonus) pelamis] y otras especies
 del género Euthynnus destinados a la fabricación industrial de los productos del código NC 1604 y la
 categoría comerciale a la que se refiere se fijará como sigue :
 (en ECUs/toneladas)
 Especie Características comerciales Precio a la producción
 comunitaria
 Rabiles (Thunnus albacares) Entero, que pese más de 10 1217
 kg/pieza
 Artículo 2
 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el 1 de enero de 1996.
 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado
 miembro.
 Hecho en Bruselas, Por el Consejo
 n-
 ---pagebreak--- ¡ FICHA DE FINANCIACIÓN
 FECHA
 1. LÍNEA PRESUPUESTARIA: Bl-261 CRÉDITOS
 2. DENOMINACIÓN: Tres propuestas de Reglamentos del Consejo por los que se fijan los
 precios de orientación de los productos pesqueros (apartados A, D y E del Anexo I y
 Anexo II del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92 y el precio de producción comunitaria de" atún
 (Anexo I I I ) .
 3. FUNDAMENTO JURÍDICO: Artículos 9 y 17 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 3759/92
 4. OBJETIVOS: Fijación anual de precios en el sector pesquero (campaña pesquera de
 1996).
 5.REPERCUSIÓN FINANCIERA: 1995 1996
 5..0 Gastos a cargo :
 - del presupuesto de la CE 35 millones
 (restituciones/intervencio de ecus
 nes)
 5.1. Ingresos :
 - recursos propios de la
 CE (exacciones
 reguladoras/derechos de
 aduana)
 - en el ámbito nacional
 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Medida circunscrita a la campaña de 1996 (16.10.95
 5.0.1 PREVISIONES DE GASTOS 15.10.96)
 5.1.1 PREVISIONES DE INGRESOS
 5.2 MÉTODO DE CÁLCULO DE LAS INTERVENCIONES DEL PRESUPUESTO DE LA O . C . M .
 r e t i r a d a s y prórrogas comunitarias y autónomas: 23 millones de ecus
 indemnización compensatoria por e l atún: 7 millones de ecus
 ayuda a l almacenamiento privado: 2 millones de ecus
 saldo de la l i q u i d a c i ó n de la indemnización compensatoria por l a s s a r d i n a s : 3 millones de ecus
 6.0 FINANCIACIÓN POSIBLE CON CRÉDITOS CONSIGNADOS EN EL CAPÍTULO CORRESPONDIENTE DEL
 PRESUPUESTO EN CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN.
 6.1 FINANCIACIÓN POSIBLE MEDIANTE TRANSFERENCIA ENTRE CAPÍTULOS DEL PRESUPUESTO EN
 CURSO DE EJECUCIÓN.
 6.2 SE PRECISA UN PRESUPUESTO SUPLEMENTARIO. NO
 6.3 SE CONSIGNARAN CRÉDITOS EN LOS PRÓXIMOS PRESUPUESTOS. SI
 OBSERVACIONES: Al tratarse de una fijación de precios, la incidencia en los gastos
 es indirecta. Los gastos dependen en gran medida de la evolución de la situación del
 mercado y de las cantidades desembarcadas.
 /3
 ---pagebreak--- ISSN 0257-9545
 COM(95) 496 final
 DOCUMENTOS
 ES 03
 Nc de catálogo : CB-CO-95-538-ES-C
 ISBN 92-77-94634-2
 Oficina de Publicaciones Oficiales de las Comunidades Europeas
 L-2985 Luxemburgo
 ¥


type: wikipedia

text:
Устина е село в Южна България. То се намира в община Родопи, област Пловдив.
 География
 Село Устина се намира в планински район.
 В близост до селото се намира водопад Устина – Устински водопад.
 История
 Разположено в полите на северните Родопи, близо до римския път, свързващ древния Филипопол и Беломорието, село Устина е наследник на тракийското селище Бесапара, съществувало през II в. преди новата ера и известно в древността като голям административен център, който обхващал териториите от Пастуша (днес квартал на гр. Перущица) до Кричим и Исперихово.
 В наследство от това славно минало са намерените колони с огромен диаметър, гробници. Открити са три църкви, останали на дъното на язовира до селото, заровени в земята древни останки от сгради, много монети и делви, които понастоящем се съхраняват в Археологическия музей в гр. Пловдив.
 Римският път, минаващ близо до село Устина, е третият трансконтинентален път, който бил окончателно съграден при император Траян (98 – 117). Той идвал от Панония (Унгария) и Дакия (югозападна Румъния). Прекосявал Дунав при Улпия Ескус (на северозапад от с. Гиген, Плевенска област, на 5 км южно от вливането на р. Искър в Дунав). Оттам покрай с. Рибен и Плене се отправял към Хемус при Троянския проход и оттам през Тракия за Филипопол. Продължавал през Родопите и се насочвал по посока на Егейско море към големия път Виа Игнация.
 Население
 Численост на населението според преброяванията през годините:
 Етнически състав
 Преброяване на населението през 2011 г.
 Численост и дял на етническите групи според преброяването на населението през 2011 г.:
 Религии
 Предците на днешното смесено население на селото в миналото са изповядвали павликянство.
 Културни и природни забележителности
 Параклисът „Св. Георги“ – разположен е на височина от около 420 м н.в. и отстои на 60 минути от село Устина и минаващата до него р. Въча. На 20 минути южна посока от параклиса се извисява връх Кулата, който впечатлява със своята монолитна осанка. По тези места всеки гост може да се наслади на красивата гледка – на север е тракийското поле, а на юг – пределите на Върховръшкия дял, който е част от родопския дял Чернатица.
 От връх Кулата се вижда местността Калето, където се намира и едноименната пещера. Предания разказват, че в миналото бездетни жени успели да преминат отвора, се сдобивали с рожба.
 Редовни събития
 Провежда се събор на 24 май. На събора се провеждат годишни борби.
 Личности
 Иван Георгиев (1898 – ?) – български офицер, полковник
 Неждет Залев – 1960 Олимпийски вицешампион по свободна борба
 Стоян Стоянов – 1977 и 1978 г. е европейски шампион по свободна борба
 Други
 Морският нос Устина на остров Тауър, Антарктика е наименуван в чест на селището Устина.
 Галерия
 Бележки
 Села в област Пловдив
 Населени места в община Родопи


jurisdiction: US

text:
 II
 109th CONGRESS
 2d Session
 S. 2
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 December 8, 2006
 Ms. Snowe introduced the
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
 Committee on
 Finance
 A BILL
 To make determinations by the United States Trade
 Representative under title III of the Trade Act of 1974 reviewable by the Court
 of International Trade and to ensure that the United States Trade
 Representative considers petitions to enforce United States trade rights, and
 for other purposes.
 1.Short
 titleThis Act may be cited as
 the Trade Complaint and Litigation
 Accountability Improvement Measures Act or the
 Trade CLAIM
 Act.
 2.Review of
 determinations of the United States Trade Representative by the Court of
 International TradeSection
 1581 of title 28, United States Code, is amended—
 (a)in subsection
 (i)—
 (1)in the matter
 preceding paragraph (1), by striking subsections (a)–(h) and
 inserting subsections (a)–(h) and (k); and
 (2)in paragraph (4),
 by striking subsections (a)–(h) and inserting subsections
 (a)–(h) and (k); and
 (b)by adding at the end the following:
 (k)The Court of
 International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action
 commenced by a petitioner requesting that the United States Trade
 Representative take action under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
 U.S.C. 2411) to review de novo any determination or action of the United States
 Trade Representative under section 301(a), 302(a)(2), 304(a)(1),
 305(a)(2)(A)(ii), 306(b), or 307(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
 2411(a), 2412(a)(2), 2414(a)(1), 2415(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2416(b), or
 2417(a)(1)).
 .
 3.Consideration by
 the United States Trade Representative of petitions to enforce United States
 trade rights
 (a)Actions by
 United States Trade RepresentativeSection 301 of the Trade Act
 of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) is amended—
 (1)in subsection
 (a)—
 (A)in paragraph (1)
 in the flush text at the end, by striking , subject to the specific
 direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action,;
 and
 (B)in paragraph
 (2)—
 (i)in
 the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking in any case in
 which and inserting if;
 (ii)in
 subparagraph (A)(ii)(II), by striking ; or and inserting a
 semicolon; and
 (iii)by striking
 subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
 (B)the foreign
 country has—
 (i)agreed to
 imminently eliminate the act, policy, or practice, or
 (ii)agreed to a
 solution to imminently relieve the burden or restriction on United States
 commerce resulting from the act, policy, or practice;
 (C)the Trade
 Representative finds that it is impossible for the foreign country to achieve
 the results described in subparagraph (B), but the foreign country agrees to
 provide to the United States compensatory trade benefits that are equivalent in
 value to the burden or restriction on United States commerce resulting from the
 acts, policy, or practice;
 (D)in extraordinary
 cases, the Trade Representative finds that the taking of action under this
 subsection would have an adverse impact on the United States economy
 substantially out of proportion to the benefits of such action, taking into
 account the impact of not taking such action on the credibility of the
 provisions of this chapter; or
 (E)the Trade
 Representative finds that the taking of action under this subsection would
 cause serious harm to the national security of the United
 States.
 ;
 and
 (2)in subsection
 (c)(1)(D)—
 (A)by amending
 clauses (i) and (ii) to read as follows:
 (i)imminently
 eliminate the act, policy, or practice that is the subject of the action to be
 taken under subsection (a) or (b),
 (ii)imminently
 relieve the burden or restriction on United States commerce resulting from the
 act, policy, or practice,
 ;
 and
 (B)by amending
 subclause (I) of clause (iii) to read as follows:
 (I)are equivalent in
 value to the burden or restriction on United States commerce resulting from the
 act, policy, or practice,
 and
 .
 (b)Initiation of
 investigationsSection 302 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
 2412) is amended—
 (1)in subsection
 (a)(2), by striking the period and inserting based on whether the
 petitioner has alleged facts that, if assumed to be true, would meet the
 criteria set forth in section 301(a)(1).; and
 (2)in subsection
 (c), by striking (a) or.
 (c)ConsultationsSection
 303 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2413) is amended—
 (1)in subsection
 (a)(2), by striking mutually acceptable resolution and inserting
 resolution acceptable to the Trade Representative, the foreign country,
 and the petitioner (if any); and
 (2)in subsection
 (b)(1)(A), by striking after consulting with and inserting
 with the consent of.
 (d)Implementation
 of actionsSection 305(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
 2415(a)(1)) is amended by striking , subject to the specific direction,
 if any, of the President regarding any such action,.
 (e)Monitoring of
 foreign complianceSection 306(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
 U.S.C. 2416(b)) is amended—
 (1)in paragraph (1),
 by striking the Trade Representative considers and inserting
 the Trade Representative or the petitioner (if any) considers;
 and
 (2)in paragraph
 (2)(A), by striking the Trade Representative considers and
 inserting the Trade Representative or the petitioner (if any)
 considers.
 (f)Modification
 and termination of actionSection 307(a)(1) of the Trade Act of
 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2417(a)(1)) is amended by striking , subject to the
 specific direction, if any, of the President with respect to such
 action,.


text:
Милтиад () е атински стратег (пълководец), живял през 5 век пр.н.е. и умрял около 488 пр.н.е.. По време на Гръко-персийските войни побеждава персите в битката при Маратон (490 пр.н.е.).
 Битката с персите при Маратон се забавя няколко дни, защото поредните командващи стратези не се осмеляват да проведат двубоя срещу няколко пъти по-многочислената персийска армия. Така битката не се състои, докато идва деня на командването на стратега Милтиад Младши, който взема героичното решение да даде начало на бойните действия, в които малочислените атиняни обръщат многобройната персийска армия в бягство.
 Милтиад произхожда от стар аристократичен род. През 524 г. пр.н.е. е избран за архонт-епоним в Атина, а по-късно (от 520 г. пр.н.е.) управлява в качеството на тиран на тракийския Херсонес като наследник на Милтиад Старши. През 513 г. пр.н.е. е принуден да стане васал на персийския цар Дарий Хистасп и да го съпровожда в похода му срещу скитите, и е оставен с другите гърци да охранява построения от персите мост над река Дунав. По време на Йонийското въстание, Милтиад е принуден да напусне Херсонес и да се укрие в Атина. Там той е обвинен в това, че е бил тиранин в Тракия, но е оправдан.
 След съда, Милтиад става един от най-влиятелните политици на Атина.
 Източници
 Древногръцки пълководци
 Гръко-персийски войни
 Родени в Атина
 Починали в Атина


type: caselaw

text:
 232 Md. 659 (1963)
 194 A.2d 443
 DOMNEYS
 v.
 WARDEN OF THE MARYLAND PENITENTIARY
 [App. No. 23, September Term, 1963.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided October 21, 1963.
 Before the full Court.
 Decided October 21, 1963. Certiorari denied, 377 U.S. 949.
 HAMMOND, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 On April 3, 1961, Frank Oliver Domneys, the applicant for leave to appeal, was found guilty of rape by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, and was sentenced to death by Judge Carter. In his appeal to this Court the judgment was affirmed. Domneys v. State, 229 Md. 388.
 Domneys then filed a petition in the Criminal Court of Baltimore under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, alleging that: (1) he did not receive a fair and impartial trial; (2) he did not receive adequate legal representation; and (3) the evidence presented by the State was not legally sufficient to sustain the charge of rape. When counsel was appointed, the petition was amended to include the allegation that the jury was not fairly and adequately instructed that they might add to their verdict, if they decided the defendant was guilty of rape, the phrase "without capital punishment." Judge Prendergast denied petitioner's application for relief. From that denial, he applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
 All contentions were carefully considered by Judge Prendergast, and we adopt the reasons assigned by him in his original memorandum for denial of relief on petitioner's first three grounds. In a supplemental memorandum he held that there was no merit to the fourth contention, and we agree. (We note, in passing, that the charge of the trial judge was not excepted to on this ground and the point was not mentioned in brief or argument on appeal.)
 Judge Carter said in his charge to the jury that counsel on both sides had discussed the matter of "the disposition of the case in the event you find the defendant guilty." He then read to the jury Sec. 461 of Art. 27 of the Code, providing that every person convicted of rape shall at the discretion of the *661 court suffer death or confinement for life or confinement for not less than eighteen months nor more than twenty-one years, and added: "* * * you will notice in that section that there are certain extremes. * * * In other words, under that section, a conviction could be either the death penalty or life imprisonment or not less than eighteen months nor more than twenty-one years." Judge Carter immediately followed this explanation by the following:
 "Section 463 is headed Verdict without Capital Punishment. The jury which finds any person guilty of rape under Section 461 of this sub-title, which I just read to you, or guilty of carnal knowledge, under Section 462 of this sub-section, which is not applicable here, may add to their verdict the words, `without capital punishment' in which event the sentence of the court shall not exceed twenty years in the penitentiary; and in no such case in which the jury has returned a verdict including the words, `without capital punishment,' shall the court in imposing sentence, sentence the convicted person to pay the death penalty or to be confined in the penitentiary for more than twenty years."
 We think there can be no real doubt that the jury was made fully aware that, if it deemed it proper, it could prevent the death penalty by qualifying its verdict of guilty by the phrase "without capital punishment."
 Application denied.


text:
 291 Md. 701 (1981)
 436 A.2d 906
 RICHARD EUGENE RICKETTS
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 [No. 167, September Term, 1979.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided November 6, 1981.
 *702 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.
 George E. Burns, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.
 Richard B. Rosenblatt, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
 COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. MURPHY, C.J., dissents and files a dissenting opinion at page 714 infra.
 In this case we shall decide whether a prior conviction for indecent exposure was admissible to impeach the credibility of the defendant.
 The facts may be stated briefly. Richard Eugene Ricketts was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on charges of second degree rape, second degree sexual offense, and burglary. When Ricketts took the witness stand to testify in his defense the trial judge, over the objection of defense counsel, allowed the prosecutor to question Ricketts regarding a three year old conviction for indecent exposure for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. Ricketts was convicted and appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the conviction in an unreported per curiam opinion, No. 354, September Term, 1979, filed December 4, 1979. We granted certiorari to address the important question presented.
 Before us Ricketts contends that Maryland law does not *703 permit cross-examination on prior convictions for any offenses other than infamous crimes and crimes of moral turpitude, or lesser crimes affecting the credibility of the witness. He argues that indecent exposure fits none of these categories and, therefore, it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of this prior conviction. The State argues that indecent exposure is a crime of moral turpitude which may be used to attack the defendant's veracity.
 We begin our consideration of this issue by recognizing that in our system of criminal justice every defendant has the right to testify in his own defense. Equally fundamental to the system is the right of the State to cross-examine such defendant and impeach him, if it can, as to the truthfulness of his testimony. The evidentiary tool the State customarily uses to attack the defendant's credibility is evidence of his prior convictions. The only details ordinarily allowed to be presented to the jury are the nature of the charge and the fact of conviction. The purpose in admitting such evidence is to assist the factfinder in measuring the credibility of the defendant.
 The danger in admitting prior convictions as evidence to impeach the defendant stems from the risk of prejudice. The jury may improperly infer that the defendant has a history of criminal activity and therefore is not entitled to a favorable verdict. Such evidence may detract from careful attention to the facts, despite instructions from the Court, influencing the jury to conclude that if the defendant is wrongfully found guilty no real harm is done. Where the crime for which the defendant is on trial is identical or similar to the crime for which he has been previously convicted the danger is greater, as the jury may conclude that because he did it before he most likely has done it again. The net effect of such evidence is often to discourage the defendant from taking the stand.
 Thus, the role of the trial judge takes on added importance. It becomes his function to admit only those prior convictions which will assist the jury in assessing the credibility of the defendant. The trial judge must weigh the probative *704 value of the convictions against the prejudice to the defendant in asserting his defense. Obviously, not all prior convictions will survive this balancing process. The problem arises when the trial judge seeks to determine which crimes do prevail and are, therefore, admissible.
 The jurisdictions vary in their legislative and judicial determinations of what crimes may be used to impeach. At one end of the spectrum are Hawaii and Montana which allow no cross-examination on the subject of impeachment by use of prior convictions. Hawaii reaches its result on constitutional grounds, State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971), Montana by legislative enactment. Rule 609, Mont. R. Evid. See, State v. Camitsch, 626 P.2d 1250 (Mont. 1981). West Virginia has a similar approach, it excludes evidence of prior crimes in every case except where the defendant has been convicted of perjury. State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1977). Florida and Virginia allow the prosecutor to introduce the existence of prior convictions but not to reveal what crimes those convictions are for (with the exception that in Virginia the prosecutor is allowed to particularize if the conviction is for perjury). Johnson v. State, 380 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1979); Harmon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 442, 185 S.E.2d 48 (1971).
 At the other end of the spectrum, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Oregon allow the prosecutor to introduce evidence of any prior conviction based on their construction of applicable statutes. State v. Prather, 290 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); Forbis v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 760, 88 A.L.R. 3d 62 (Mo. App. 1974) and State v. Rush, 248 Or. 568, 436 P.2d 266 (1968).
 The States which remain are largely those which permit impeachment by proof of conviction of infamous crimes or crimes involving moral turpitude. See generally, 3A Wigmore, Evidence, § 980 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970), and those states which employ a weighing or balancing test, giving considerable deference to the trial court's discretion in determining which crimes may be used to impeach. *705 Among the states that employ this test two cases are frequently cited for guidance, Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965), and Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 (1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S. Ct. 1421, 20 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1968). See, e.g., Bogie v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971); Bustillos v. State, 464 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Cr. App. 1971). Luck proposed that the trial court should weigh the prejudicial effect of impeachment against the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. 348 F.2d at 768. To assist the trial court in its determination Luck also recited four relevant factors to consider: "the nature of the prior crimes [footnote omitted], the length of the criminal record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior conviction." 348 F.2d at 769.
 Gordon cited and approved the balancing test of Luck, then went on to explain its application:
 In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversly on a man's honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on the other hand, which may result from a short temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes, generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity. A "rule of thumb" thus should be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not; traffic violations, however serious, are in the same category. The nearness or remoteness of the prior conviction is also a factor of no small importance. Even one involving fraud or stealing, for example, if it occurred long before and has been followed by a legally blameless life, should generally be excluded on the ground of remoteness. [383 F.2d at 940 (footnote omitted)].
 *706 While this Court has not approved guidelines as broad as those announced in Gordon nor sanctioned a balancing test with all the factors outlined in Luck, it has set certain standards to be followed and has also recognized the importance of considering several factors in determining whether lesser crimes have any relevance or probative value impacting upon the defendant's credibility. A cursory examination of Maryland law will illustrate the point.
 Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.), § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that "[e]vidence is admissible to prove ... the fact of [a witness'] conviction of an infamous crime." This statute, in one form or another, has been in effect since 1864, Chapter 109, Acts of 1864, and has received the attention of this Court in various contexts.[1]
 In 1884 this Court explained in State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354, 360 (1884) that at common law "[a]n `infamous crime' is such crime as involved moral turpitude, or such as rendered the offender incompetent as a witness in court, upon the theory that a person would not commit so heinous a crime unless he was so depraved as to be unworthy of credit." In Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 383, 62 A.2d 631 (1905) we further elaborated:
 The crimes which the common law regarded as infamous because of their moral turpitude were treason, felony, perjury, forgery and those other offenses, classified generally as crimen falsi, which *707 impressed upon their perpetrator such a moral taint that to permit him to testify in legal proceedings would injuriously affect the public administration of justice.
 However, what offenses could properly be said to be crimes of moral turpitude were still undetermined. We recognized that the term was imprecise but acknowledged that it connoted conduct which was base or vile and contrary to the accepted and customary conduct between men. Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 320, 191 A. 240 (1937).
 In Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A.2d 488 (1962) we recognized a broader base for the use of prior convictions to impeach. We said:
 It has been held by this court that evidence of the accused's previous conviction of crime need not be restricted to infamous crimes or those involving moral turpitude, provided the violation of law may have some tendency to show that the person charged is not to be believed under oath. Taylor v. State, 226 Md. 561 [, 174 A.2d 573, (1961)]; Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212 [, 96 A.2d 246 (1953). 230 Md. at 4 (emphasis supplied)].
 Prior to Cousins, in Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 69, 139 A. 564 (1927), we held that every conviction does not affect a witness' credibility; and if it does not, evidence of such is irrelevant and should not be admitted. Most recently, in State v. Huston, 281 Md. 455, 460, 379 A.2d 1027 (1977), we repeated the words of Judge W. Mitchell Digges in Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153 (1931) where he set forth the purpose, breadth, and limitation on admitting evidence of prior convictions.
 The issue always is the truth of the witness' testimony. In other words, is the witness devoid of moral perception, such a person as would regard lightly the obligations of an oath to tell the truth? In judging of a man's moral fibre, his previous conduct, covering a reasonable time before the inquiry, *708 undoubtedly has a real and substantial bearing upon the question. It seems to us that there can be little argument that previous conduct of a witness can be shown to be such as, by the common experience of the average man, would justify a belief in his unworthiness as a witness. Certainly, if it be shown that a witness had previously been convicted of perjury, it would materially discredit, if not entirely destroy, the value of his testimony. Conviction of many other crimes could properly have the same effect; while, on the other hand, there may be convictions of violations of hundreds of police regulations, which in no real or true sense can be taken as tending to make one so convicted unworthy of belief.
 Our cases then clearly point out that while infamous crimes, felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, deceit, or dishonesty are not the only types of crimes which are admissible for purposes of impeachment, lesser crimes, to be admissible, must tend to show that the person charged is not to be believed under oath. In Cousins v. State, supra, 230 Md. at 4, we announced two factors to be considered in deciding the admissibility of lesser crimes: (1) "the length of time since it occurred considered with [(2)] the nature of the crime." We deem these factors relevant for consideration here.
 Returning to the case sub judice, our precedents dictate that if indecent exposure is an infamous crime or a crime of moral turpitude, as the State contends, it was admissible for purposes of impeachment. However, if it is a lesser crime, then its admissibility must be determined under a different standard.
 Classifying indecent exposure as infamous, a crime of moral turpitude or a lesser violation is no easy task. We are concerned, here, with a vague crime having its roots in the law of blasphemy and vagrancy. See 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 470 (1883). Indecent exposure was first dealt with statutorily in Maryland when the General Assembly amended Article 27, "Crimes and Punishment", *709 adding § 122, "Disturbance of the Public Peace." Acts of 1902, Ch. 281, § 67 A. The Act was amended in 1967 to include exposure "on or about any public place" as well as in other places previously mentioned. Acts of 1967, Ch. 520. Effective July 1, 1977, the legislature excised the words "or indecently exposing his person" from the disturbing the peace statute and added § 335A to Article 27. Acts of 1977, Ch. 384, §§ 1-2. Article 27, § 335A now reads: "Every person convicted of the common-law crime of indecent exposure is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both."
 The common law crime of indecent exposure was described by this Court in Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 606, 130 A.2d 578 (1956):
 Indecent exposure, to amount to a crime, must have been done intentionally. Intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused and the circumstances and environment of the occurrence. The essential intent is a general and not a specific intent. An exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when [a] defendant exposes himself at such a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others. State v. Martin (Iowa), 101 N.W. 637; Peyton v. District of Columbia, 100 A.2d 36, 37.
 By thus labeling indecent exposure a general intent crime, the types of offenses brought within its scope vary from the reprehensible to the arguably innocuous, from offenses indicative of a specific intent to offenses which can only be characterized as negligent. A review of a few cases on the subject will illustrate the point.
 In Messina v. State, supra, the defendant was seated in a parked car and exposed himself to two thirteen year old girls who were walking by. The girls testified that, at the time, the defendant "was giving them a `funny' look, a look that `made us feel funny.'" 212 Md. at 604. The defendant was *710 found guilty and judged to have displayed the requisite intent.
 In State v. Sousa, 2 Conn. Cir. 452, 201 A.2d 664 (1964), the court relied on Messina in upholding an indecent exposure conviction. There a man had been observed masturbating in front of a window in his home in the middle of the day. "Intent," ruled the court, "may be inferred from recklessness." 201 A.2d at 666.
 Davenport v. United States, 56 A.2d 851 (D.C. 1948), upheld an indecent exposure conviction where the defendant was accused of urinating by a tree at night in view of a women's dormitory. There was no evidence that the defendant intended others to see him, though the Court noted the defendant made no attempt to hide himself. The Court apparently satisfied the intent inquiry by finding willfulness with regard to the exposure element and negligence with regard to the public element.
 A clearer case of general intent inferred from negligence is State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970). There the court sustained the conviction of two nude sunbathers after police, acting upon an anonymous tip, used binoculars to spot them on an isolated beach. There was no showing that anyone, other than the police, had seen the sunbathers or had been offended.[2]
 The point we stress is that an indecent exposure conviction, without more, says little about the conduct for which the person was convicted. Because the offense requires only a general intent, the gamut of offenses and circumstances that fall within the ambit of the crime are so widely varied that, while one person may indeed have shown a moral depravity sufficient to impact upon his credibility, another may have committed a very minor infraction indicative of nothing more than momentary poor judgment perhaps dictated by necessity. The intent required for the crime does not *711 require the accused to have performed a flagrant act damnable as an affront to decency and social norms but encompasses acts committed where the accused was unaware that his or her lack of apparel would be noticed.
 It is this vagueness or uncertainty in the nature of the offense that makes it difficult to classify indecent exposure as infamous or something less. As we have noted, the crimes that are normally associated with the term "infamous because of their moral turpitude [are] treason, felony, perjury, forgery and those other offenses, classified generally as crimen falsi," Garitee v. Bond, supra, 102 Md. at 383. They leave no doubt as to the type of conduct committed and condemned. The courts, legislature, and society have made the determination that such crimes, because they show such a lack of regard for societal norms and values, are relevant in assessing the credibility of one who has been convicted of those offenses. It is our view that the wide spectrum of conduct and degrees of depravity associated with indecent exposure make it clear that it does not conform with those offenses regarded as infamous. We, therefore, conclude that whatever else it may be, indecent exposure is not an infamous crime.
 Moral turpitude, while being somewhat less specific than infamous crimes, still connotes such a disregard for social values on the part of the perpetrator, that one could reasonably infer that such a person's testimony is suspect. Additionally, we note that what constitutes a crime of moral turpitude may involve different considerations compelling different results in different circumstances. An excellent example of this is provided by the State's reliance in the instant case on Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240 (1937).
 In Lazzell a dentist contested the revocation of his license to practice dentistry by the Board of Dental Examiners on the basis of three prior convictions of indecent exposure. The Board based its action on a statute allowing it to cancel the registration and certificate of a dentist upon a showing that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The dentist alleged that indecent exposure was not a crime *712 of moral turpitude and that, therefore, the Board's action was illegal.
 The Lazzell Court first noted that while moral turpitude may not be hard to define, characterizing offenses as involving moral turpitude was a different matter. After listing a compendium of cases where offenses were adjudged as involving moral turpitude the Court said that "[i]t has been decided that moral turpitude is not involved in a charge unless it is intentional or not innocent in its purpose, or not accidental [citations omitted]." 172 Md. at 322. The Court then found that the facts showed that the dentist's conduct had been public and intentional and that "it require[d] no discussion to argue or prove that the offense [indecent exposure] is so base, vile, and shameful as to leave the offender not wanting in depravity, which the words `moral turpitude' imply." 172 Md. at 321.
 The first and most fundamental distinction we note between Lazzell and the case at bar is that the Court in Lazzell was assessing the propriety of a licensing board's determinations whereas here we are concerned with the cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal trial. In Lazzell the question was whether a dentist had violated the ethical standards of his profession. In the case sub judice the question is whether the conviction was relevant to an assessment of the credibility of a criminal defendant. Therefore, the light under which the conviction is examined as well as the effect it would produce on the examiners is drastically different. A second basic difference is that the Board of Examiners in Lazzell was apprised of the circumstances attending Lazzell's convictions. In the instant case there is no such factual background. Because of these differences and because of the unique aspects of the criminal trial process, we decline to apply the holding of Lazzell to the instant circumstances. However, while Lazzell may not be a controlling precedent in our present inquiry, the case is instructive.
 The Lazzell Court found that conduct must be "intentional" and "not accidental" to constitute moral turpitude. 172 Md. at 322. We agree. Accidental or negligent conduct *713 cannot be perceived as indicating the requisite depravity and baseness normally associated with the term moral turpitude. Since in a criminal proceeding the jury is not allowed to investigate into the circumstances of a conviction, merely referring to a prior indecent exposure conviction does not tell them how socially reprehensible the conduct is.
 At this point, then, our conclusion is obvious. Indecent exposure is a general intent crime that includes within its scope an innumerable variety of offenses, including acts that are reckless or negligent. As such its meaning is entirely too unspecific to warrant the appellation of a crime of moral turpitude, at least in the context with which we are here concerned.
 This leaves one possible category of offenses within which indecent exposure may yet fit, i.e., the lesser violations which affect credibility. We need not pause long here as our previous discussion covers most of the relevant ground.
 As we said before, Cousins mandates that we take at least two factors into consideration; length of time and nature of the offense. The length of time involved here is three years. We have held longer periods to be insufficient to vitiate the import of a particular crime and do not consider this length of time significant enough to be dispositive.
 At the very heart of our determination of this matter, however, is the kinds of conduct which give rise to this offense. We believe that whether the crime sought to be used to impeach describes with sufficient specificity the conduct reflecting on the defendant's credibility is another factor to be weighed by the trial court. If the crime is so ill-defined that it causes the factfinder to speculate as to what conduct is impacting on the defendant's credibility, it should be excluded. Stated differently, since the issue is always the truth of the witness, where there is no way to determine whether a crime affects the defendant's testimony simply by the name of the crime that crime should be inadmissible for purposes of impeachment. It is clear to us that the introduction of a prior conviction for indecent exposure sheds no light on what it is the defendant has done and hence it is beyond *714 the ken of any factfinder to assess what, if any, impact such conviction has upon the defendant's veracity.
 The argument arises that the defendant has the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding his prior conviction, allowing him to offset whatever prejudicial effect the conviction might have. This, however, is manifestly unfair and would amount to a retrial of the prior conviction before the present jury. The prejudice resulting from such a procedure clearly would outweigh whatever minute probative value the conviction had.
 We hold, therefore, that, for purposes of impeachment, indecent exposure is not an infamous crime, a crime of moral turpitude, a felony, nor a crime involving dishonesty or deceit. Further, we hold, it is a lesser crime for which the proscribed conduct includes such a wide variety of behavior that the factfinder would be unable to make a reasoned judgment as to whether the offense affects the defendant's credibility; it is inadmissible for purposes of impeachment. Under the circumstances of the instant case, where the defendant was on trial for sex related offenses, the prejudicial effect of its admission, though impossible to gauge, could have been significant and, therefore, constitutes reversible error.
 Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed; case remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and remand to that court for a new trial.
 Costs to be paid by the County.
 Murphy, C.J., dissenting:
 The Court holds that a prior conviction for indecent exposure is per se inadmissible to impeach the credibility of a defendant testifying in his own behalf in a criminal case. It concludes that the offense is a general intent crime *715 encompassing "types of offenses [which] ... vary from the reprehensible to the arguably innocuous, from offenses indicative of a specific intent to offenses which can only be characterized as negligent." The majority opines that "the intent required for the crime does not require the accused to have performed a flagrant act damnable as an affront to decency and social norms but encompasses acts committed where the accused was unaware that his or her lack of apparel would be noticed." The Court holds that a prior conviction for indecent exposure "sheds no light on what it is the defendant has done and hence it is beyond the ken of any factfinder to assess what, if any, impact such conviction has upon the defendant's veracity." According to the majority, for the purposes of impeachment, indecent exposure "is not an infamous crime, a crime of moral turpitude, a felony, nor a crime involving dishonesty or deceit," but instead "is a lesser crime for which the proscribed conduct includes such a wide variety of behavior that the factfinder would be unable to make a reasoned judgment as to whether the offense affects the defendant's credibility." In so holding, the majority disregards the settled law of Maryland and injects needless confusion into the law governing the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach credibility. I, therefore, respectfully dissent and give my reasons.
 The record discloses that the trial judge, before admitting the prior indecent exposure conviction in evidence, inquired of the defendant's counsel, out of the presence of the jury, "what the nature of the indecent exposure was." Counsel responded by stating his recollection that the act "occurred at Congressional Plaza and [involved] exposing the penis outside of a business establishment." In admitting the prior conviction, the court instructed the jury that it was only to be considered as impeachment evidence with respect to the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
 In Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 130 A.2d 578 (1957), the defendant was convicted of the common law offense of indecent exposure for having exposed his "private parts" to two young school girls on a public street. Quoting from Hochheimer on Crimes and Criminal Procedure, at 430 (2d. *716 ed. 1904), the Court noted that the offense consists of "exposure in public of the entire person, or of parts that should not be exhibited." In affirming the conviction, the Court said:
 "Indecent exposure, to amount to a crime, must have been done intentionally. Intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused and the circumstances and environment of the occurrence. The essential intent is a general and not a specific intent. An exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when defendant exposes himself at such a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others. [citations omitted)." Id. at 660 (emphasis supplied).
 In Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240 (1937), the Court flatly held that the common law offense of indecent exposure was a crime involving moral turpitude. We said:
 "it requires no discussion to argue or prove that the offense is so base, vile, and shameful as to leave the offender not wanting in depravity, which the words `moral turpitude' imply." Id. at 321.
 In that case, the defendant's license to practice dentistry was revoked under a statute which authorized such a revocation upon conviction of a crime of moral turpitude. While the defendant had pled guilty to the offense, he argued at the revocation hearing that he had not committed the act of indecent exposure intentionally but only accidentally. The question squarely before the Court was whether the offense of indecent exposure involved moral turpitude. The Court defined moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of the law and duty between persons. 172 Md. at 321. The Court rejected Lazzell's claim that the exposure was accidental, indicating in effect that *717 had it been accidental, no conviction would have been warranted. The Court stated that the offense encompassed both "publicity and intention" and that "moral turpitude is not involved in a charge unless it is intentional or not innocent in its purpose, or not accidental." Id. at 322.
 The definition of moral turpitude, set forth in Lazzell, continues to be a part of the law of Maryland. See Atty. Griev. Comm'n v. Klauber, 289 Md. 446, 423 A.2d 578 (1981); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 374 A.2d 354 (1977); Braverman v. Bar Assn. of Balto., 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956). The question whether a crime involves moral turpitude under Maryland law does not depend, as the majority indicates, upon whether the offense is being used to impeach credibility in a criminal case or as evidence in a civil license revocation proceeding. The standard is, and can only be the same in all cases, i.e., whether the crime in question involves moral turpitude. Messina and Lazzel together stand for the proposition that the offense of indecent exposure involves moral turpitude and is not committed unless there is a deliberate and intentional act of public exposure; an act which is merely negligent, reckless, accidental, or otherwise unintentional is not sufficient.
 It is, of course, elementary that when a defendant in a criminal case elects to testify on his own behalf, he asks the jury to credit his testimony rather than the conflicting testimony of other witnesses. He presents himself before the jury as a person worthy of belief and thereby places in issue his credibility as a witness. Under Maryland Code (1981), § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, evidence is always admissible for impeachment purposes, without regard to time, to establish that a witness was convicted of "an infamous crime." As the majority indicates, our cases hold that an infamous crime is a crime that involves moral turpitude and includes treason, felony, perjury, forgery and such other offenses as are classified generally as crimen falsi. See Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A.2d 488 (1962); Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 62 A. 631 (1905); State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354 (1884). It has long been the *718 law of this State that evidence of an accused's previous conviction of a crime need not be restricted to infamous crimes, or those involving moral turpitude, provided the violation may have some tendency to show that the witness is not to be believed under oath. State v. Huston, 281 Md. 455, 379 A.2d 1027 (1977); Taylor v. State, 226 Md. 561, 174 A.2d 573 (1961); Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153 (1931); Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927). These cases indicate that as to those offenses which are not infamous or do not involve moral turpitude, the trial judge must exercise discretion as to the nature of the prior conviction but that his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless the prior conviction is so clearly irrelevant to impeach credibility that its admission constituted an abuse of discretion. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that we have been loath to reverse a criminal conviction on the ground that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting a prior conviction to impeach the credibility of a witness or a defendant. For example, we have repeatedly held that a prior conviction for assault is not per se inadmissible as having no bearing on the credibility of a witness. Taylor v. State, supra; Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 96 A.2d 246 (1953); Burgess v. State, supra; Balto. & Ohio R. Co. v. Strube, 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909); Burrell v. State, 42 Md. App. 130, 399 A.2d 1354 (1979). See also Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596, 69 A.2d 505 (1949) (prior conviction for operating a gambling table properly admitted in evidence).
 I find inexplicable the majority's view that the crime of indecent exposure does not connote "such a disregard for social values on the part of the perpetrator, that one could reasonably infer that such a person's testimony is suspect." I think the intentional and deliberate public exposure of one's person is a deceitful act which reeks of moral taint; it is an act so infected with moral turpitude as would permit a rational person reasonably to conclude that one who would commit such a crime would be less likely to speak the truth than a person who had not committed such an offense.
 The majority's holding that indecent exposure is a general *719 and not a specific intent crime does nothing to lessen the gravity of the offense or to dissipate the moral taint associated with it. There are, of course, two components of every crime  the actus reus (the guilty or criminal act) and the mens rea (the guilty mind or the mental state accompanying a forbidden act). The term "general intent" is frequently used to mean the general notion of mens rea, to encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, or to characterize an intent to commit an act on an undetermined occasion, while "specific intent" is used to characterize the mental state required for a particular crime, or to denote an intent to commit an act at a particular time and place. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law, at 201-02 (1972). See also McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 371 A.2d 129 (1977), a case involving commingling and misuse of client funds by an attorney, where Judge Orth, for the Court, noted that a general mens rea or intent includes those consequences which (a) represent the very purpose for which an act is done, regardless of likelihood of occurrence, or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result, regardless of desire. A specific intent, on the other hand, is required when an element of the mens rea of a particular offense is some intent other than to do the actus reus specifically required for guilt. Id. at 29. The Court pointed out in McBurney that in general intent crimes, the essential intent is to do the actus reus and a requirement that the criminal act be done wilfully does not impose a specific intent as an essential ingredient of an offense. Surely, the Court in the present case does not mean to suggest that all general intent crimes are per se inadmissible to impeach credibility.
 If indecent exposure is an infamous crime under § 10-905 of the Courts Article, it is admissible under the statute in all cases. Assuming, however, that the crime is not infamous, notwithstanding the fact that it involves moral turpitude under our cases, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to admit the prior conviction in evidence for impeachment purposes. Consistent with our prior cases, this Court must not disturb that discretion unless it is clearly abused. There *720 is no such abuse in this case, particularly since the decision of the trial judge to admit the prior conviction was fortified by knowledge of the details of the prior offense, and he instructed the jury that the offense could not be used other than to impeach credibility. I would affirm the conviction.
 NOTES
 [1] See, e.g., State v. Huston, 281 Md. 455, 379 A.2d 1027 (1977); Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A.2d 488 (1962); Taylor v. State, 226 Md. 561, 174 A.2d 573 (1961); Linkins v. State. 202 Md. 212, 96 A.2d 246 (1953); Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153 (1931); Niemoth v. State, 160 Md. 544, 154 A. 66 (1931); Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927); Lavine v. Abramson, 142 Md. 222, 120 A. 523 (1923); Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365, 111 A. 84 (1920); U. Rwys. & E. Co. v. Phillips, 129 Md. 328, 99 A. 355 (1916); Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 95 A. 1073 (1915); Balto. & Ohio R. Co. v. Strube, 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909); Mattingly v. Montgomery, 106 Md. 461, 68 A. 205 (1907); Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 62 A. 631 (1905); Deck v. Balto. & Ohio R. Co., 100 Md. 168, 59 A. 650 (1905); Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 A. 496 (1902); McLaughlin v. Mencke, 80 Md. 83, 30 A. 603 (1894); Smith v. State, 64 Md. 25, 20 A. 1026 (1885); State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354 (1884).
 [2] The purpose in citing these out-of-state cases is simply to illustrate the various types of conduct that have been classified as indecent exposure. It is not intended to indicate our agreement or disagreement with the results reached.


text:
Klass è un film del 2007 diretto da Ilmar Raag.
 Trama
 Il timido Joosep è costantemente vittima dei bulli della sua classe, capitanati da Anders. Solamente Kaspar si dimostra dalla parte del ragazzo e ciò provoca l'ira di Anders, il quale gli rivolge contro tutti i compagni di classe. Kaspar è così costretto a troncare l'amicizia con Joosep.
 Dopo l'ennesimo sopruso, Joosep e Kaspar si muniscono di armi e vanno a scuola per uccidere Anders e gli altri compagni di classe. Dopo aver fatto una strage i due decidono di suicidarsi, ma in realtà è solo Joosep a spararsi. Il film si conclude con un'immagine su Kaspar.
 Collegamenti esterni
 Film drammatici
 Film sul bullismo
 Film ambientati in Estonia


text:
 26.1.2013
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 26/7
 A BIZOTTSÁG 71/2013/EU VÉGREHAJTÁSI RENDELETE
 (2013. január 25.)
 Uruguaynak a friss húsnak az Európai Unióba való behozatalára engedéllyel rendelkező harmadik országok, e harmadik országok területei vagy területeinek részei jegyzékébe való felvétele tekintetében a 206/2010/EU rendelet módosításáról, valamint az említett rendeletnek a behozatal után tenyésztésre vagy termelésre szánt juhfélék és kecskefélék állat-egészségügyi bizonyítványmintáinak tekintetében történő helyesbítéséről
 (EGT-vonatkozású szöveg)
 AZ EURÓPAI BIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződésre,
 tekintettel az egyes élő patás állatok Közösségbe történő behozatalára, valamint a Közösségen történő átszállítására vonatkozó állat-egészségügyi szabályok megállapításáról, a 90/426/EGK és 92/65/EGK irányelv módosításáról szóló, 2004. április 26-i 2004/68/EK tanácsi irányelvre (1) és különösen annak 6. cikke (1) bekezdésére, 7. cikke e) pontjára és 13. cikke (1) bekezdésére,
 tekintettel az emberi fogyasztásra szánt állati eredetű termékek termelésére, feldolgozására, forgalmazására és behozatalára irányadó állat-egészségügyi szabályok megállapításáról szóló, 2002. december 16-i 2002/99/EK tanácsi irányelvre (2) és különösen annak 8. cikke bevezető mondatára, valamint (1) és (4) bekezdésére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A 206/2010/EU bizottsági rendelet (3) meghatározza, hogy egyes élő állatokat vagy friss húst tartalmazó szállítmányok Unióba való behozatalakor milyen követelmények vonatkoznak az állat-egészségügyi bizonyítványokra. Megállapítja továbbá azon harmadik országoknak, azok területeinek vagy területeik részeinek jegyzékeit, amelyek eleget tesznek bizonyos kritériumoknak, és ahonnan az Unió területére szállítmányok hozhatók be.
 (2)
 A 206/2010/EU rendelet Uruguay egész területéről engedélyezi a friss kicsontozott és érlelt marhahús behozatalát.
 (3)
 Uruguay mentes a ragadós száj- és körömfájástól; az állatokat ennek ellenére oltják. Így általános egészségügyi státusa a szarvasmarhák tekintetében eltér az Unióétól. Ezért Uruguay kizárólag friss kicsontozott és érlelt marhahúst exportálhat. A behozatali követelmények szerint azokat a szarvasmarhákat, amelyeket friss hús Unióba történő exportálásának céljával szánnak levágásra, közvetlenül a származási gazdaságból küldik a vágóhídra. Ez a szabály sok kis gazdaságot megakadályoz abban, hogy az uniós piacra termeljen, mivel az általuk tenyésztett állatokat a levágás előtt először mindig gyűjtőközpontokba vagy állatpiacokra szállítják.
 (4)
 Egy 2012-es uniós ellenőrzés megerősítette, hogy az Uruguayban működő, az állatok azonosítását és mozgásuk nyilvántartását biztosító rendszer lehetővé teszi az igazoló állatorvosok számára az állatok előzetes tartózkodási helyének ellenőrzését. A rendszer így biztosítja, hogy az állatok a vágóhídra szállításuk előtt 40 napig folyamatosan egy gazdaságon belül tartózkodjanak. Uruguay biztosítani tudja továbbá, hogy azon szarvasmarhák tekintetében, amelyeket friss hús Unióba történő exportálásának céljával szánnak levágásra, akkor is teljesüljenek az Unió által a behozatalra előírt állat-egészségügyi követelmények, ha az említett állatok gyűjtőközpontokon és/vagy állatpiacon keresztül jutnak a vágóhídra, ugyanis egy olyan rendszert alkalmaz, amely minden szarvasmarhát egyenként azonosít, biztosítva ezáltal a származásig való visszakövetés lehetőségét.
 (5)
 Uruguay ezáltal elegendő garanciát nyújt annak biztosításához, hogy minden szarvasmarha, melynek húsát uniós exportra szánják, ugyanolyan egészségi állapotban legyen, amikor az ország területén a levágást megelőzően gyűjtőközponton (ideértve a piacokat is) megy keresztül. Ezért a 206/2010/EU rendelet II. mellékletének 1. részében szereplő jegyzékben a szóban forgó országhoz tartozó bejegyzést módosítani kell.
 (6)
 A 206/2010/EU rendelet I. mellékletének 2. részében szereplő „OVI-X” bizonyítványminta II.2. részében a lábjegyzetekben két hivatkozás hibás. Az 206/2010/EU rendeletet ezért ennek megfelelően módosítani és helyesbíteni kell.
 (7)
 Az e rendeletben előírt intézkedések összhangban vannak az Élelmiszerlánc- és Állategészségügyi Állandó Bizottság véleményével,
 ELFOGADTA EZT A RENDELETET:
 1. cikk
 Módosító rendelkezések
 A 206/2010/EU rendelet II. mellékletének 1. részében az Uruguayra vonatkozó bejegyzés helyébe a következő szöveg lép:
 A harmadik ország ISO-kódja és neve
 A terület kódja
 A harmadik ország, területe vagy része megnevezése
 Állat-egészségügyi bizonyítvány
 Egyedi feltételek
 Záró nap(2)
 Nyitónap(3)
 Minta (minták)
 SG
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 „UY – Uruguay
 UY-0
 Az egész ország
 EQU
 BOV
 A és J
 1
 2001. november 1.”
 OVI
 A
 1
 2. cikk
 Helyesbítő rendelkezések
 A 206/2010/EU rendelet I. mellékletének 2. részében, az „OVI-X” bizonyítványminta II. részének helyesbítése a következő:
 a)
 a II.2.8. pontban az alábbi mondat:
 „(1)
 vagy [II.2.8.2.
 olyan, termelésre szánt állatok, amelyek olyan gazdaságokban születtek, és amelyeket olyan gazdaságokban tartottak folyamatosan, ahol a surlókór előfordulását soha nem diagnosztizálták;]”
 helyébe a következő szöveg lép:
 „(2)vagy [II.2.8.2.
 olyan, termelésre szánt állatok, amelyek olyan gazdaságokban születtek, és amelyeket olyan gazdaságokban tartottak folyamatosan, ahol a surlókór előfordulását soha nem diagnosztizálták;]”
 b)
 a II.2.9. pontban az alábbi mondat:
 „az állatokat származási gazdaságukból vagy gazdaságaikból – anélkül, hogy valamely piacon keresztülhaladnának – az alábbi helyekre szállítják/szállították(1):”
 helyébe a következő szöveg lép:
 „az állatokat származási gazdaságukból vagy gazdaságaikból – anélkül, hogy valamely piacon keresztülhaladnának – az alábbi helyekre szállítják/szállították(2):”
 3. cikk
 Hatálybalépés
 Ez a rendelet az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában való kihirdetését követő huszadik napon lép hatályba.
 Ez a rendelet teljes egészében kötelező és közvetlenül alkalmazandó valamennyi tagállamban.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2013. január 25-én.
 a Bizottság részéről
 az elnök
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) HL L 139., 2004.4.30., 321. o.
 (2) HL L 18., 2003.1.23., 11. o.
 (3) HL L 73., 2010.3.20., 1. o.