type: wikipedia

text:
Trzynastka (lub 13) – średniometrażowy, telewizyjny film dokumentalny Ewy Borzęckiej (reżyseria i scenariusz) z 1996 roku.
 O filmie
 Film podejmuje trudną tematykę – losy matki samotnie wychowującej trzynaścioro dzieci. Życie codzienne tej kobiety i jej licznego potomstwa przedstawiono z dużym dystansem i obiektywizmem, ukazując jego najzwyklejsze aspekty.
 Nagrody dla Ewy Borzęckiej
 1997 – Nagroda Międzynarodowej Federacji Prasy Filmowej FIPRESCI (wyróżnienie) na Konkursie Międzynarodowym Festiwalu Filmowego w Krakowie (uzasadnienie: za ludzkie potraktowanie uniwersalnych problemów w kontekście współczesnego polskiego społeczeństwa)
 1997 – I Nagroda w kategorii filmu telewizyjnego na Festiwalu Filmów Państw Bałtyckich
 Przypisy
 Linki zewnętrzne
 Polskie filmy dokumentalne
 Filmy produkcji TVP
 Polskie filmy z 1996 roku


text:
Paradoks (grč. παράδοξος, paradoksos = nevjerojatan; para- = protiv, dóxa = mišljenje) jest misao i figura koja u sebi sadrži proturječnost nekoj tvrdnji koja je općeprihvaćena, ili nekom ispravnom zaključku. Paradoks se ne mora odnositi na nešto općeprihvaćeno: dovoljno je da pretpostavka implicira vlastitu negaciju i obrnuto da ju nazivamo paradoksom. Paradoks je važno sredstvo u govorništvu jer se njime postiže veća uvjerljivost misli koju govornik zastupa. Prema definiciji koju daje Mark Sainsbury paradoks je: "Jedan naizgled neprihvatljiv zaključak koji proizlazi iz naizgled prihvatljive premise, putem naizgled prihvatljiva zaključka". U filozofiji i ekonomiji termin se koristi kao sinonim za antinomiju.
 Paradoks daje snažan poticaj za razmišljanje. On otkriva slabosti naših sposobnosti da sudimo, ali i ograničenja naših intelektualnih instrumenata rasuđivanja.
 Često su paradoksi na temelju jednostavnih koncepta doveli do velikog intelektualnog napretka. Ponekad je to bilo pitanje otkrivanja novih matematičkih pravila ili otkrivanja novih fizikalnih zakona kako bi se prihvatili zaključci koji su u početku bili "očigledno neprihvatljivi".
 Od početka pisane povijesti, postoje reference na paradokse, od Zenonovih paradoksa, Kantovih antinomija sve do dostizanje paradoksa kvantne mehanike i teorije opće Relativnosti, čovječanstvo je oduvijek bio zainteresirano za paradokse. Usto postoji jedno cijelo filozofsko-vjersko strujanje, Zen budizam, komu su povjerena učenje u zen-koanama, paradoksalnim pričama-zagonetkama koje munjevitom brzinom osvjetljavaju teško sagledive duhovne odnose.
 Paradoks se od oksimorona i ironije razlikuje po tome što njegovi pojmovi nisu proturječni, nego samo neskladni.
 Paradoks nije proturječnost (kontradikcija); njega dokaz nije logički upitan, no sam je intuitivno vrlo upitan.
 Primjeri paradoksa
 Poznati paradoks dolazi iz stare Grčke, a glasi: "Znam da ništa ne znam". Njegovim se autorom smatra filozof Sokrat. Primjetna je obostrana negacija dijelova zaključka.
 Postoje također i matematički paradoksi, ali su najčešći upravo logički. Filozof Zenon poznat je po svojim - Zenonovim paradoksima.
 Izvori
 Retorika
 Logika
 Figure misli
 Paradoksi


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 30.10.2014
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 L 310/55
 BESLUIT VAN HET GEMENGD COMITÉ VAN DE EER
 Nr. 91/2014
 van 16 mei 2014
 tot wijziging van bijlage XIII (Vervoer) bij de EER-overeenkomst
 HET GEMENGD COMITÉ VAN DE EER,
 Gezien de Overeenkomst betreffende de Europese Economische Ruimte (de „EER-overeenkomst”), en met name artikel 98,
 Overwegende hetgeen volgt:
 (1)
 Verordening (EU) nr. 1213/2010 van de Commissie van 16 december 2010 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van wegvervoerondernemingen (1) moet in de EER-overeenkomst worden opgenomen.
 (2)
 Bijlage XIII bij de EER-overeenkomst dient derhalve dienovereenkomstig te worden gewijzigd,
 HEEFT HET VOLGENDE BESLUIT VASTGESTELD:
 Artikel 1
 In bijlage XIII bij de EER-overeenkomst wordt na punt 19aa (Besluit 2009/992/EU van de Commissie) het volgende punt ingevoegd:
 „19ab.
 32010 R 1213: Verordening (EU) nr. 1213/2010 van de Commissie van 16 december 2010 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van wegvervoerondernemingen (PB L 335 van 18.12.2010, blz. 21).”
 Artikel 2
 De in het EER-supplement bij het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie bekend te maken teksten in de IJslandse en de Noorse taal van Verordening (EU) nr. 1213/2010 zijn authentiek.
 Artikel 3
 Dit besluit treedt in werking op 17 mei 2014, op voorwaarde dat alle in artikel 103, lid 1, van de EER-overeenkomst bedoelde kennisgevingen hebben plaatsgevonden (2), of op de dag van inwerkingtreding van Besluit nr. 88/2014 van het Gemengd Comité van de EER van 16 mei 2014 (3), als dat later is.
 Artikel 4
 Dit besluit wordt bekendgemaakt in het EER-gedeelte van en in het EER-supplement bij het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.
 Gedaan te Brussel, 16 mei 2014.
 Voor het Gemengd Comité van de EER
 De voorzitter
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) PB L 335 van 18.12.2010, blz. 21.
 (2) Geen grondwettelijke vereisten aangegeven.
 (3) Zie blz. 40 van dit Publicatieblad.


type: legislation

text:
 29.6.2021
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 229/3
 РЕГЛАМЕНТ ЗА ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕ (ЕС) 2021/1062 НА КОМИСИЯТА
 от 28 юни 2021 година
 за поправка на текста на шведски език на Регламент (ЕС) No 965/2012 за определяне на технически изисквания и административни процедури във връзка с въздушните операции в съответствие с Регламент (ЕО) No 216/2008 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета
 ЕВРОПЕЙСКАТА КОМИСИЯ,
 като взе предвид Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз,
 като взе предвид Регламент (ЕС) 2018/1139 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 4 юли 2018 г. относно общи правила в областта на гражданското въздухоплаване и за създаването на Агенция за авиационна безопасност на Европейския съюз и за изменение на регламенти (ЕО) No 2111/2005, (ЕО) No 1008/2008, (ЕС) No 996/2010, (ЕС) No 376/2014 и на директиви 2014/30/ЕС и 2014/53/ЕС на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и за отмяна на регламенти (ЕО) No 552/2004 и (ЕО) No 216/2008 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и Регламент (ЕИО) No 3922/91 на Съвета (1), и по-специално член 31 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 Текстът на шведски език на Регламент (ЕС) No 965/2012 на Комисията (2) съдържа грешки в приложение VII [част NCO], подчаст E, раздел 6, точки NCO.SPEC.MCF.100, NCO.SPEC.MCF.110, NCO.SPEC.MCF.120 и NCO.SPEC.MCF.125 и в приложение VIII [част SPO], подчаст E, раздел 5, точки SPO.SPEC.MCF.100 и SPO.SPEC.MCF.125 по отношение на неправилни заглавия и неправилни позовавания.
 (2)
 Поради това текстът на Регламент (ЕС) No 965/2012 на шведски език следва да бъде съответно поправен. Поправката не се отнася за текста на останалите езици.
 (3)
 Мерките, предвидени в настоящия регламент, са в съответствие със становището на комитета, посочен в член 127 от Регламент (ЕС) 2018/1139,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩИЯ РЕГЛАМЕНТ:
 Член 1
 (не засяга българската версия)
 Член 2
 Настоящият регламент влиза в сила на двадесетия ден след деня на публикуването му в Официален вестник на Европейския съюз.
 Настоящият регламент е задължителен в своята цялост и се прилага пряко във всички държави членки.
 Съставено в Брюксел на 28 юни 2021 година.
 За Комисията
 Председател
 Ursula VON DER LEYEN
 (1) OB L 212, 22.8.2018 г., стр. 1.
 (2) Регламент (ЕС) No 965/2012 на Комисията от 5 октомври 2012 г. за определяне на технически изисквания и административни процедури във връзка с въздушните операции в съответствие с Регламент (ЕО) No 216/2008 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета (ОВ L 296, 25.10.2012 г., стр. 1).


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b"Office of Material Loss Reviews\nReport No. MLR-10-002\n\n\nMaterial Loss Review of Cape Fear Bank,\nWilmington, North Carolina\n\n\n\n\n October 2009\n\x0c Executive Summary\n\n Material Loss Review of Cape Fear Bank,\n Wilmington, North Carolina\n Report No. MLR-10-002\n October 2009\n\nWhy We Did The Audit\n\nOn April 10, 2009, the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks closed Cape Fear Bank\n(Cape Fear) of Wilmington, North Carolina, and named the FDIC as receiver. On April 23, 2009, the\nFDIC notified the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s total assets at closing were\n$466.8 million and the estimated loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) was $131 million. As required\nby section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, the OIG conducted a material loss review of\nthe failure of Cape Fear.\n\nThe audit objectives were to (1) determine the causes of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s failure and resulting material loss to\nthe DIF and (2) evaluate the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of Cape Fear, including the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of\nthe Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provisions of section 38.\n\nBackground\n\nCape Fear was a state-chartered nonmember institution established on June 22, 1998. The institution was\nheadquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina, and maintained seven other branch locations. Cape Fear\nwas a wholly owned subsidiary of the Cape Fear Bank Corporation, Inc., a one-bank holding company.\nCape Fear engaged principally in commercial real estate (CRE) and acquisition, development, and\nconstruction (ADC) lending within its local marketplace.\n\nAudit Results\n\nCauses of Failure and Material Loss\n\nCape Fear failed because its Board and management did not implement effective risk management\npractices pertaining to (a) rapid growth and significant concentrations of CRE and ADC loans, (b) loan\nunderwriting and credit administration, and (c) heavy reliance on non-core funding sources, particularly\nbrokered deposits. Although examiners expressed concern about Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s risk management practices\nin the years preceding the institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure, the actions taken by Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management to\naddress these concerns were not timely or adequate in preventing the institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure.\n\nWhen the North Carolina real estate market began to deteriorate in 2007, weaknesses in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s risk\nmanagement practices quickly translated into a significant decline in the quality of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan\nportfolio. The associated losses and provisions depleted Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s capital and earnings and\nsignificantly impaired the institution\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity. Further, in April 2009, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s parent company\nnotified the Securities and Exchange Commission that substantial doubt existed regarding the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\nability to continue as a going concern. The notification generated negative media attention and resulted in\nsubstantial depositor withdrawals, placing additional pressure on the institution\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity and capital.\nThe North Carolina Commissioner of Banks closed Cape Fear due to its deficient liquidity position.\n\nFDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Supervision of Cape Fear\n\nThe FDIC, in conjunction with the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, provided supervision of Cape\nFear through regular on-site risk management examinations, periodic visitations, and certain off-site\nmonitoring procedures. The FDIC also pursued three informal enforcement actions and one formal\n\n\n\n To view the full report, go to www.fdicig.gov.\n\x0c Executive Summary Material Loss Review of Cape Fear Bank,\n Wilmington, North Carolina\n Report No. MLR-10-002\n October 2009\n\nenforcement action to address weak risk management practices identified by examiners. In addition, the\nFDIC performed daily monitoring of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity position in the days preceding the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\nfailure. Through its supervisory efforts, the FDIC identified risks in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s operations and brought\nthese risks to the attention of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management. These risks included weak\nmanagement practices pertaining to the institution\xe2\x80\x99s rapid loan growth, credit concentrations, loan\nunderwriting and credit administration, and reliance on non-core funding sources.\n\nIn retrospect, the FDIC could have taken stronger supervisory action based on the risks identified during\nthe April 2006 examination. At that time, Cape Fear had a high risk profile. The institution had\nsignificant concentrations in CRE and ADC loans (which are historically vulnerable to economic\ndownturns), weak loan underwriting and credit administration practices, and a growing reliance on non-\ncore funding sources. The FDIC could have pursued an informal enforcement action, such as a\nMemorandum of Understanding, that required Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management to commit to a plan\nand timeline for addressing the key risks identified during the examination. Stronger supervisory action\nat that time may have influenced Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management to take more timely and adequate\naction to address examiner concerns, thereby mitigating, to some extent, the losses incurred by the DIF.\n\nWith respect to PCA, we concluded that the FDIC had properly implemented applicable PCA provisions\nof section 38 based on the supervisory actions taken for Cape Fear. However, PCA\xe2\x80\x99s effectiveness in\nmitigating losses to the DIF was limited because PCA did not require action until the institution was at\nserious risk of failure. Based on information contained in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Call Reports, the institution fell\nfrom well capitalized to adequately capitalized for PCA purposes on September 30, 2008 and remained\nadequately capitalized through the end of 2008. However, examiners concluded during the October 2008\nexamination that, given the high-risk profile of Cape Fear, its capital levels were \xe2\x80\x9ccritically deficient\xe2\x80\x9d and\nthe probability of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure was high.\n\nManagement Response\n\nOn October 22, 2009, the Director, DSC, provided a written response to a draft of this report. The\nresponse is provided in its entirety as Appendix 4 of this report. In its response, DSC reiterated the OIG\xe2\x80\x99s\nconclusions regarding the causes of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s failure. Regarding our assessment of FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision\nof Cape Fear, DSC cited several supervisory activities, discussed in our report, that were taken to address\nkey risks at the institution prior to its failure. In its response, DSC also recognized that strong supervisory\nattention is necessary for institutions like Cape Fear that have high CRE and ADC concentrations\nsupported by volatile funding sources. Accordingly, DSC has issued updated guidance reminding\nexaminers to take appropriate action when such risks are imprudently managed.\n\n\n\n\n To view the full report, go to www.fdicig.gov.\n\x0c Contents\n Page\nBackground 2\n\nCauses of Failure and Material Loss 2\n Rapid Loan Growth 3\n Controls to Manage Risks Associated with Loan Concentrations 4\n Loan Underwriting and Credit Administration 6\n Reliance on Non-Core Funding 6\n\nThe FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Supervision of Cape Fear 8\n Supervisory History 8\n Supervisory Response to Key Risks at Cape Fear 10\n Implementation of PCA 12\n\nCorporation Comments 13\n\nAppendices\n 1. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14\n 2. Glossary of Terms 16\n 3. Acronyms 17\n 4. Corporation Comments 18\n\nTables\n 1. Financial Condition of Cape Fear 2\n 2. On-site Examinations and Visitations of Cape Fear 9\n 3. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Actions to Address Selected Key Risks Identified 11\n During the April 2006 Examination\n 4. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Capital Levels Relative to PCA Thresholds for Well 13\n Capitalized Institutions\n\nFigures\n 1. Annual Growth of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Loan Portfolio Relative to Peers 3\n 2. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Loan Mix as of March 31, 2009 4\n 3. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s ADC Loan Concentrations Relative to Peers 5\n 4. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Use of Brokered Deposits Relative to Peers 7\n\x0cFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation\n3501 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22226 Office of Inspector General\n\n\nDATE: October 23, 2009\n\nMEMORANDUM TO: Sandra L. Thompson, Director\n Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection\n\n\n /Signed/\nFROM: Stephen M. Beard\n Assistant Inspector General for Material Loss Reviews\n\n\nSUBJECT: Material Loss Review of Cape Fear Bank, Wilmington,\n North Carolina (Report Number MLR-10-002)\n\n\nAs required by section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), the FDIC\nOffice of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a material loss1 review of the failure of\nCape Fear Bank (Cape Fear), Wilmington, North Carolina. The North Carolina Office of\nthe Commissioner of Banks (North Carolina Commissioner) closed Cape Fear on\nApril 10, 2009 and named the FDIC as receiver. On April 23, 2009, the FDIC notified\nthe OIG that Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s total assets at closing were $466.8 million and that the\nestimated loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) was $131 million.\n\nWhen the DIF incurs a material loss with respect to an insured depository institution for\nwhich the FDIC is appointed receiver, the FDI Act states that the Inspector General of the\nappropriate federal banking agency shall make a written report to that agency. The report\nis to consist of a review of the agency\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of the institution, including the\nagency\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of FDI Act section 38, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA); a\ndetermination as to why the institution\xe2\x80\x99s problems resulted in a material loss to the DIF;\nand recommendations to prevent future losses.\n\nThe objectives of this material loss review were to: (1) determine the causes of Cape\nFear\xe2\x80\x99s failure and the resulting material loss to the DIF and (2) evaluate the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s\nsupervision2 of Cape Fear, including the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of the PCA provisions\nof section 38 of the FDI Act. This report presents our analysis of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s failure and\nthe FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to ensure that Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board of Directors (Board) and\nmanagement operated the institution in a safe and sound manner. The report does not\n1\n As defined by section 38 of the FDI Act, a loss is material if it exceeds the greater of $25 million or\n2 percent of an institution\xe2\x80\x99s total assets at the time the FDIC was appointed receiver.\n2\n The FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision program promotes the safety and soundness of FDIC-supervised institutions,\nprotects consumers\xe2\x80\x99 rights, and promotes community investment initiatives by FDIC-supervised insured\ndepository institutions. The FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC) (1) performs\nexaminations of FDIC-supervised institutions to assess their overall financial condition, management\npolicies and practices (including internal control systems), and compliance with applicable laws and\nregulations; and (2) issues related guidance to institutions and examiners.\n\x0ccontain formal recommendations. Instead, as major causes, trends, and common\ncharacteristics of financial institution failures are identified in our material loss reviews,\nwe will communicate those to management for its consideration. As resources allow, we\nmay also conduct more in-depth reviews of specific aspects of DSC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision\nprogram and make recommendations, as warranted. Appendix 1 contains details on our\nobjectives, scope, and methodology. Appendix 2 contains a glossary of key terms and\nAppendix 3 contains a list of acronyms. Appendix 4 contains the Corporation\xe2\x80\x99s\ncomments on this report.\n\n\nBackground\nCape Fear was established in June 1998 as a state-chartered non-member institution.3\nThe institution had eight locations, consisting of a main office in Wilmington, North\nCarolina, and seven full-service branches in the southeast area of North Carolina. The\nmajority of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s lending was in real estate, particularly commercial real estate\n(CRE) and acquisition, development, and construction (ADC), within its local market\narea. Cape Fear was wholly owned by the Cape Fear Bank Corporation, a publicly traded\ncompany. Collectively, the institution\xe2\x80\x99s Board controlled approximately 4 percent of the\nCape Fear Bank Corporation. Cape Fear had no other affiliates or subsidiaries. Table 1\nprovides details on Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s financial condition as of March 31, 2009 and for the 5\npreceding calendar years.\n\nTable 1: Financial Condition of Cape Fear\nFinancial Measure 31-Mar-09 31-Dec-08 31-Dec-07 31-Dec-06 31-Dec-05 31-Dec-04\nTotal Assets ($000s) $492,418 $473,112 $463,944 $424,402 $342,725 $201,755\nTotal Loans ($000s) $402,820 $401,488 $387,239 $354,616 $284,175 $170,202\nTotal Deposits ($000s) $385,039 $390,507 $370,678 $334,409 $278,386 $162,399\nNet Loan Growth Rate 1.91% 4.63% 10.62% 20.01% 71.48% 56.57%\nNet Income (Loss) ($1,851) ($5,175) $1,946 $2,813 $1,777 $1,148\n($000s)\nSource: OIG Analysis of Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR) for Cape Fear.\n\n\n\nCauses of Failure and Material Loss\nCape Fear failed because its Board and management did not implement effective risk\nmanagement practices pertaining to (a) rapid growth and significant concentrations of\nCRE and ADC loans, (b) loan underwriting and credit administration, and (c) heavy\nreliance on non-core funding sources, particularly brokered deposits. Examiners\nexpressed concern about Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s risk management practices in the years preceding\nthe institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure. However, the actions taken by Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and\nmanagement to address these concerns were not timely or adequate in preventing the\ninstitution\xe2\x80\x99s failure.\n3\n Cape Fear opened as the Bank of Wilmington on June 22, 1998. The institution changed its name to Cape\nFear in October 2006.\n\n\n 2\n\x0cWhen the North Carolina real estate market began to deteriorate in 2007, weaknesses in\nCape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s risk management practices quickly translated into a significant decline in the\nquality of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio. The associated losses and provisions depleted\nCape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s capital and earnings and significantly impaired the institution\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity.\nFurther, in April 2009, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s parent company notified the Securities and Exchange\nCommission that substantial doubt existed regarding the institution\xe2\x80\x99s ability to continue\nas a going concern. The notification generated negative media attention and resulted in\nsubstantial depositor withdrawals, placing additional pressure on the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\nliquidity and capital. The North Carolina Commissioner closed Cape Fear on April 10,\n2009 due to its deficient liquidity position.\n\nRapid Loan Growth\n\nDuring 2004 and 2005, Cape Fear grew its loan portfolio at a pace that significantly\nexceeded both the institution\xe2\x80\x99s peer group and its own internal growth plans. During\nthese years, the institution ranked among the 96th and 97th percentile of its peer group for\nasset growth. Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio relative\nto its peer group during these years.\n\nFigure 1: Annual Growth of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Loan Portfolio Relative to Peers\n\n 80\n 70\n Growth Rate (%)\n\n\n\n\n 60\n 50\n Cape Fear\n 40\n Peers\n 30\n 20\n 10\n 0\n Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mar-09\n Year\n\n\n Source: OIG Analysis of UBPRs for Cape Fear.\n\n\nExaminers noted the rapid growth of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio during the February 2005\nexamination but did not express concern at that time because the institution\xe2\x80\x99s risk\nmanagement policies and practices were considered adequate. During the April 2006\nexamination, examiners noted that although Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s financial condition was\ngenerally satisfactory, management had not adequately planned for or monitored the\ngrowth of its loan portfolio. Among other things, Cape Fear had not developed a written\nstrategic plan to help manage the affairs of the institution. Although management\ndeveloped a written strategic plan in 2007, the plan was of limited benefit because it was\nnot sufficiently detailed. Additionally, growth in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio,\nprincipally concentrated in ADC loans, had already occurred. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board adopted\na revised strategic plan on January 31, 2008. However, examiners again concluded\nduring the October 2008 examination that the plan was inadequate.\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0cControls to Manage Risks Associated with Loan Concentrations\n\nAt the time of its failure, approximately 95 percent of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio was in\nreal estate. Included within the loan portfolio were significant concentrations of high-risk\nloans, including CRE and ADC loans. Figure 2 summarizes Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan mix based\non its Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) for the quarter ending\nMarch 31, 2009.\n\n Figure 2: Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Loan Mix as of March 31, 2009\n\n 4.8%\n Construction and Development\n 2.1% (ADC)\n 11.0% CRE - Nonfarm/Nonresidential\n 36.0%\n 1-4 Family Residential - excluding\n Home Equity Line of Credit\n 15.1%\n Home Equity Loans\n\n Other Real Estate Loans\n\n Non-Real Estate Loans\n 31.1%\n\n\n\n Source: OIG Analysis of UBPRs for Cape Fear.\n\n\nThe FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s December 2006 guidance, entitled Concentrations in Commercial Real\nEstate Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices, recognizes that there are substantial\nrisks posed by CRE concentrations, and in particular ADC concentrations. Such risks\ninclude unanticipated earnings and capital volatility during a sustained downturn in the\nreal estate market. The December 2006 guidance defines institutions with significant\nCRE concentrations as those institutions reporting loans for construction, land\ndevelopment, and other land (i.e., ADC) representing 100 percent or more of total capital;\nor institutions reporting total CRE loans representing 300 percent or more of total capital\nwhere the outstanding balance of CRE has increased by 50 percent or more during the\nprior 36 months. Due to the risks associated with CRE and ADC lending, regulators\nconsider institutions with significant CRE and ADC concentrations to be of greater\nsupervisory concern.\n\nAt the close of 2003, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s CRE and ADC loans represented 387 and 143 percent\nof the institution\xe2\x80\x99s total capital, respectively. By December 31, 2008, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s CRE\nand ADC loans had swelled to 828 and 436 percent of total capital, respectively.4 Figure\n3 illustrates the rapid growth in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s ADC loan concentrations compared to its\npeers.\n\n\n\n4\n It should be noted that much of the increase in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s CRE and ADC loan concentrations during\n2007 and beyond was the result of a decline in capital rather than an increase in loans.\n\n\n 4\n\x0c Figure 3: Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s ADC Loan Concentrations Relative to Peers\n\n ADC Loans/Total Capital (%)\n 500\n\n 400\n\n 300 Cape Fear\n 200 Peers\n\n 100\n\n 0\n Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mar-09\n Year\n\n Source: OIG Analysis of UBPRs for Cape Fear.\n\nAlthough examiners noted an ADC concentration in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio during the\n2003 and 2005 examinations, the examiners concluded that the institution\xe2\x80\x99s monitoring\npractices were acceptable at that time. During the 2006 examination, examiners noted\nthat the institution\xe2\x80\x99s CRE and ADC concentrations had increased measurably and that\nCape Fear did not have appropriate controls to manage the risks associated with the\nconcentrations. Specifically, the institution had not established limits on its loan\nconcentrations; developed goals to diversify its loan portfolio; or developed specific\nstrategies or procedures for assessing, managing, or monitoring its concentrations. The\ninstitution had also not established any limits on its other high-risk loan types or\npractices, such as interest-only loans, speculative land-carry notes, unsecured credits, or\nloans with multiple renewals or extensions. As of March 31, 2006, almost half of Cape\nFear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio required interest-only payments. Such loans are considered high-\nrisk because they do not require principal payments and can, therefore, mask a\nborrower\xe2\x80\x99s inability to ultimately repay the loan.\n\nBy the October 2008 examination, the financial condition of the institution had\ndeteriorated significantly. At that time, the institution had $48.3 million in adversely\nclassified assets, representing 120 percent of Tier 1 Capital and Reserves. Of the\n$48.3 million, $39.8 million (or 83 percent) consisted of CRE loans, and the majority of\nthese CRE loans ($34.1 million, or 71 percent) were ADC loans. Following a change in\nBoard membership, Cape Fear established limits on its CRE concentrations on\nOctober 30, 2008, to prevent further growth in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s CRE concentrations.\nHowever, the limits were not particularly beneficial because they reflected the\ninstitution\xe2\x80\x99s elevated CRE positions and no plans existed to reduce the CRE\nconcentrations. Further, nearly half of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan portfolio continued to require\ninterest-only payments. Additionally, the risks associated with Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan\nconcentrations were exacerbated by weak loan underwriting and credit administration\npractices.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\x0cLoan Underwriting and Credit Administration\n\nWeaknesses in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s loan underwriting and credit administration practices were a\ncontributing factor to the asset quality problems that developed in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan\nportfolio when the North Carolina real estate market began to deteriorate in 2007.\nExaminers began raising concerns about Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s credit administration practices\nduring the 2006 examination. Among other things, examiners commented that:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan policy did not meet the needs of the institution. For\n example, the policy provided only general underwriting parameters for unsecured\n commercial loans and did not address amortization and repayment ability\n considerations.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Policies and procedures for interest-only and unsecured lending needed to be\n reviewed and strengthened.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Loans originated as exceptions to policy were not being tracked and reported to\n the Board.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Management was not monitoring the volume of, or tracking renewal for, high-risk\n loans, such as interest-only loans and unsecured loans.\n\nSubsequent examinations of Cape Fear identified weak underwriting practices. Such\npractices included, but were not limited to, the capitalization of interest for loan renewals,\na failure to establish and enforce appropriate loan repayment programs, inadequate\nanalysis of borrower repayment capabilities, liberal renewal and extension practices,\ninadequate borrower equity in real estate projects, over-reliance on collateral as the\nprimary repayment source, and unsupported real estate appraisals.\n\nReliance on Non-Core Funding\n\nIn the years preceding its failure, Cape Fear became increasingly dependent on non-core\nfunding sources, particularly brokered deposits, to fund its loan growth and maintain\nadequate liquidity. When properly managed, such funding sources offer important\nbenefits, such as ready access to funding in national markets when core deposit growth in\nlocal markets lags behind planned asset growth. However, non-core funding sources also\npresent potential risks, such as higher costs and increased volatility. According to the\nDSC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, placing heavy reliance on\npotentially volatile funding sources to support asset growth is risky because access to\nthese funds may become limited during distressed financial or market conditions. Under\nsuch circumstances, institutions could be required to sell assets at a loss in order to fund\ndeposit withdrawals and other liquidity needs.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\x0cCape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s net non-core funding dependence ratio5 grew steadily in the years preceding\nits failure. By December 2007, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s net non-core funding dependence ratio was\nin the 94th percentile for its peer group. The elevated ratio was driven, in part, by Cape\nFear\xe2\x80\x99s decision in 2004 to begin using brokered deposits to grow its loan portfolio.\nFigure 4 illustrates Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s use of brokered deposits relative to its peers. By the\nclose of 2008, brokered deposits represented approximately 35 percent of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s\ntotal deposit base.\n\n Figure 4: Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Use of Brokered Deposits Relative to Peers\n Brokered/Total Deposits (%)\n\n\n\n\n 40\n 35\n 30\n 25\n Cape Fear\n 20\n Peers\n 15\n 10\n 5\n 0\n Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Mar-09\n Year\n\n Source: OIG Analysis of UBPRs for Cape Fear.\n\nDuring 2006 and 2007, examiners determined that Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity position was\nminimally adequate given the institution\xe2\x80\x99s heavy reliance on non-core funding. In\naddition, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s use of non-core funding was increasing the cost of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\nfunds and placing downward pressure on its earnings. As of March 31, 2006, Cape Fear\nwas paying 95 basis points more than its peer average for interest-bearing funds, placing\nthe institution in the 94th percentile of peers for the cost of funds. In an effort to generate\ngrowth in local core deposits and help alleviate its growing dependence on non-core\nfunding sources, Cape Fear embarked on an aggressive expansion of its branch locations\nin 2006 and 2007. However, the new branches did not attract sufficient local deposits to\nreduce Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s dependence on non-core funding sources, and the cost of the branch\nexpansion weighed heavily on earnings.\n\nBased on information contained in its Call Report for the quarter ending September 30,\n2008, Cape Fear fell from well capitalized to adequately capitalized for PCA purposes.\nPart 337.6 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations prohibits adequately capitalized\ninstitutions from accepting, renewing, or rolling over brokered deposits without a waiver\nfrom the FDIC. Cape Fear submitted a brokered deposit waiver application on\n\n\n5\n The net non-core funding dependence ratio is a measure of the degree to which an institution relies on\nnon-core funding to support longer-term assets (e.g., loans that mature in more than 1 year). An elevated\nratio reflects heavy reliance on potentially volatile funding sources that may not be available in times of\nfinancial stress.\n\n\n 7\n\x0cOctober 31, 2008. At that time, the institution had over $40 million in brokered deposits\nthat were scheduled to mature by March 31, 2009. Cape Fear subsequently withdrew its\nbrokered deposit waiver application on December 23, 2008 because it was determined\nthat other sources of liquidity were available to the institution at that time. Although\nCape Fear had a funds management policy describing the factors that management should\nconsider during a liquidity crisis, the institution did not have a well-defined contingency\nfunding plan. As the institution\xe2\x80\x99s financial condition deteriorated, Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity\nposition became increasingly strained.\n\n\nThe FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Supervision of Cape Fear\nThrough its supervisory efforts, the FDIC identified risks in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s operations and\nbrought these risks to the attention of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management through\nregular discussions and correspondence, Reports of Examination (ROEs), and informal\nand formal enforcement actions. Key risks identified by examiners included weak risk\nmanagement practices pertaining to the institution\xe2\x80\x99s rapid loan growth, ADC and CRE\nloan concentrations, loan underwriting and credit administration functions, and reliance\non non-core funding sources. Although the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s actions in this regard were positive,\nthe FDIC could have taken stronger supervisory action based on the risks that it identified\nduring the April 2006 examination. Stronger supervisory action following the April 2006\nexamination may have influenced Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management to take more\ntimely and adequate action to address examiner concerns, thereby mitigating, to some\nextent, the losses incurred by the DIF.\n\nSupervisory History\n\nThe FDIC, in conjunction with the North Carolina Commissioner, provided supervision\nof Cape Fear through regular on-site risk management examinations, periodic visitations,\nand certain off-site monitoring procedures. In addition, the FDIC performed daily\nmonitoring of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity position in the days preceding the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\nfailure. Table 2 summarizes key information pertaining to the on-site risk management\nexaminations and visitations that the FDIC and North Carolina Commissioner conducted\nof Cape Fear from 2002 until the institution failed, including the institution's supervisory\nratings.6\n\n\n\n\n6\n Financial institution regulators and examiners use the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System\n(UFIRS) to evaluate a bank\xe2\x80\x99s performance in six components represented by the CAMELS acronym:\nCapital adequacy, Asset quality, Management practices, Earnings performance, Liquidity position, and\nSensitivity to market risk. Each component, and an overall composite score, is assigned a rating of 1\nthrough 5, with 1 having the least regulatory concern and 5 having the greatest concern.\n\n\n 8\n\x0cTable 2: On-site Examinations and Visitations of Cape Fear\n Supervisory Informal or\n Ratings Formal Action\n Date On-Site Effort (UFIRS) Taken* Date Action Lifted\n 07/08/2002 Joint Examination 333332/3 BBR 11/21/02 8/27/03\n 06/23/2003 Joint Examination 222222/2 None\n 02/14/2005 State Examination 122222/2 None\n 04/19/2006 FDIC Examination 223322/2 BBR** 9/21/06 12/18/08\n 12/11/2006 FDIC Visitation No Rating N/A\n 05/08/2007 FDIC Visitation No Rating N/A\n Replaced with C&D\n 08/06/2007 State Examination 223322/3 BBR 9/26/07\n 2/24/09\n 02/05/2008 Joint Visitation No Rating N/A\n 10/06/2008 Joint Examination 554454/5 C&D 2/24/09 4/10/09\n 04/07/2009 FDIC Visitation*** No Rating N/A\nSource: FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Virtual Supervisory Information on the Net system and ROEs for Cape Fear.\n* Informal enforcement actions often take the form of Bank Board Resolutions (BBR) or Memorandums of\nUnderstanding (MOU). Formal enforcement actions often take the form of Cease and Desist (C&D) Orders,\nbut under severe circumstances can also take the form of insurance termination proceedings.\n** As described below, this BBR was limited to Information Technology (IT) security issues.\n*** This visitation focused on monitoring the institution\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity position.\n\nAs shown in Table 2, four visitations were conducted at Cape Fear from 2006 to 2009 in\naddition to the required risk management examinations. The purposes of these visitations\nwere as follows:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 December 2006 and May 2007: Determine the progress that Cape Fear was\n making in addressing the IT security control deficiencies discussed in the\n September 2006 BBR. As part of these visitations, FDIC examiners also assessed\n Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to address the concerns raised in the April 2006 examination\n related to the extent of, and controls over, CRE and ADC concentrations.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 February 2008: Follow up on Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s progress in addressing the weak risk\n management practices discussed in the September 2007 BBR.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 April 2009: Monitor Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s liquidity position.\n\nThe FDIC and North Carolina Commissioner pursued a total of three informal\nenforcement actions and one formal enforcement action to address weak risk\nmanagement practices identified by the examiners. A brief description of these actions\nfollows.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 November 2002 BBR. In response to the July 2002 joint examination, this BBR\n required Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s management to take such actions as strengthening its loan\n policy to address the acquisition and analysis of financial information on\n borrowers, documenting credit decisions, performing real estate appraisals, and\n making ADC loans; improving the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan grading system; and\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0c developing a plan to comply with the Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate\n Lending Policies.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 September 2006 BBR. This BBR focused on addressing IT security control\n deficiencies and did not address financial matters identified in the April 2006\n examination.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 September 2007 BBR. As a result of the August 2007 examination, this BBR\n required Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s management to take various actions, such as developing a\n comprehensive strategic plan, documenting an acceptable methodology for\n determining the adequacy of the loan loss reserve, improving the institution\xe2\x80\x99s loan\n grading and review system, setting specific limits for CRE lending, and adopting\n a formal loan policy to address how the institution would manage all types of\n loans in its portfolio.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 February 2009 C&D. This corrective action was taken in response to the\n October 2008 examination. Among other things, the C&D directed Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s\n Board and management to implement a written funds management policy;\n discontinue the acceptance, renewal, or roll over of brokered deposits unless a\n waiver was obtained from the FDIC; reduce undue loan concentrations, including\n concentrations in CRE; implement written lending and collection policies; and\n formulate a written strategic plan.\n\nWith regard to offsite monitoring, the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s systems did not identify Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s rapid\ngrowth as a supervisory concern because, according to FDIC officials, the systems were\ndesigned to flag the top 2 percent of rapidly growing institutions. As discussed earlier,\nCape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s growth at its height in 2004 and 2005 was in the 96th and 97th percentile of\nits peer group. However, as detailed below, the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s on-site examinations and\nnumerous visitations identified key risks in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s operations years before its\nfailure.\n\nSupervisory Response to Key Risks at Cape Fear\n\nThe FDIC could have taken stronger supervisory action based on the risks that examiners\nidentified during the April 2006 examination. The results of that examination indicated\nthat Cape Fear had a high-risk profile. Among other things, the institution had not\nimplemented adequate risk management practices or taken corrective action to effectively\nmanage key risks discussed earlier in the report, including:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Rapid growth in the loan portfolio.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Significant concentrations of CRE and ADC loans.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Weaknesses in loan underwriting and credit administration.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Heavy reliance on non-core funding sources.\n\n\n 10\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 Weaknesses in the internal risk grading of loans and the Allowance for Loan and\n Lease Losses (ALLL) methodology.\n\nStronger supervisory action may have included an informal enforcement action, such as\nan MOU, requiring Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and management to commit to a plan and timeline\nfor addressing the key risks identified by examiners. Examiners with whom we spoke\nindicated that they contemplated pursuing an informal enforcement action based on the\nresults of April 2006 examination. In retrospect, such an action may have been prudent\nbecause the actions that the institution took in response to the results of the examination\nwere generally not timely or adequate, as summarized in Table 3.\n\nTable 3: Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Actions to Address Selected Key Risks Identified During the\n April 2006 Examination\n Concerns Identified in Actions Taken by Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Board and Management\n the April 2006\n Examination\n Management had not Cape Fear did not develop a written strategic plan until 2007, after its\n adopted a written strategic critical growth period. Examiners concluded that the plan was general\n plan to help manage the in nature and of limited value. The Board adopted a revised strategic\n institution\xe2\x80\x99s rapid growth. plan on January 31, 2008. Examiners, however, criticized the plan as\n flawed during the October 2008 examination. Cape Fear was working\n to revise its strategic plan at the close of the October 2008 examination.\n Management did not have The Board did not establish specific CRE concentration limits until\n specific limits regarding October 30, 2008. However, examiners concluded that these limits\n credit concentrations or were of negligible value because they mirrored the institution\xe2\x80\x99s elevated\n goals to diversify the loan CRE positions. Further, the October 2008 ROE indicated that plans did\n portfolio. not exist to reduce the institution\xe2\x80\x99s CRE positions.\n Loan underwriting and Examiners noted in the August 2007 examination that although\n credit administration management had improved the tracking of its CRE loans, many of the\n practices needed loan underwriting and credit administration weaknesses identified in the\n improvement. April 2006 examination had not been addressed. Although the\n institution developed comprehensive guidance for its lending function\n in July 2008, the quality of the loan portfolio was already deteriorating.\n Liquidity was minimally Although Cape Fear expanded its branches during 2006 and 2007 in an\n adequate due to a growing effort to increase its core deposit base, the effort did not result in a\n reliance on non-core meaningful decline in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s reliance on non-core funding\n funding sources. sources. Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s net non-core funding dependence ratio increased\n in the years following the April 2006 examination. In addition,\n examiners noted during the October 2008 examination that although\n management had taken some contingency funding planning measures, it\n had not developed a well-defined contingency funding plan.\n The institution\xe2\x80\x99s internal Examiners noted in the August 2007 examination that risk grade\n risk grading system and assignments and the ALLL methodology continued to need\n the ALLL methodology improvement. The ALLL was also cited as a material weakness in the\n did not capture key risk March 26, 2008 audit report on the Cape Fear Bank Corporation\xe2\x80\x99s 2007\n characteristics of the loan consolidated financial statements. Although Cape Fear updated its loan\n portfolio and needed grading and review system and ALLL methodology in July 2008,\n improvement. examiners noted continued weaknesses in both areas during the October\n 2008 examination.\nSource: OIG Analysis of ROEs for Cape Fear.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0cTo its credit, the FDIC conducted on-site visitations of Cape Fear in December 2006 and\nMay 2007, during which it assessed Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s progress in addressing examiner\nconcerns raised in the April 2006 examination. Generally, these visitations found that the\ninstitution was making progress in addressing prior examiner concerns. Of particular\ninterest, examiners noted that overall supervision of the institution had improved, asset\nand loan growth had slowed, management had begun reporting more detailed loan\ninformation to the Board, the ALLL methodology had been improved, and a full-time\ninternal auditor had been hired. However, examiners noted that, among other things, a\nnew loan policy and strategic plan had been drafted, but not yet finalized. In addition,\nsignificant loan concentrations continued to exist and the institution\xe2\x80\x99s recently initiated\nbranch expansion was not generating enough core deposits to offset its continued reliance\non non-core funding sources, including brokered deposits.\n\nThe FDIC also conducted a visitation in February 2008 to assess Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s progress in\naddressing the weak risk management practices discussed in the September 2007 BBR.\nAlthough not required, it may have been prudent for the FDIC to have requested Cape\nFear to provide regular status reports describing the institution\xe2\x80\x99s progress in addressing\nthe provisions of the September 2007 BBR. Requiring status reports would have further\nelevated supervisory attention to key risks in the institution. Finally, we noted that the\nFDIC issued a C&D on February 24, 2009, based on the results of the October 2008\nexamination. Although a C&D was appropriate for the risks that were identified during\nthe October 2008 examination, the ultimate viability of the institution was already in\nserious question by the time the C&D was issued.\n\nImplementation of PCA\n\nThe purpose of PCA is to resolve problems of insured depository institutions at the least\npossible long-term cost to the DIF. Part 325 of the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s Rules and Regulations\nimplements the requirements of PCA by establishing a framework of restrictions and\nmandatory supervisory actions that are triggered by an institution\xe2\x80\x99s capital levels. Based\non the supervisory actions taken, the FDIC properly implemented applicable PCA\nprovisions of section 38. However, PCA\xe2\x80\x99s effectiveness in mitigating losses to the DIF\nwas limited because PCA did not require action until the institution was at serious risk of\nfailure.\n\nIn the case of Cape Fear, capital was a lagging indicator of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s financial\nhealth. Based on information contained in Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Call Reports, the institution fell\nfrom well capitalized to adequately capitalized for PCA purposes on September 30, 2008,\nand remained adequately capitalized through the end of 2008.7 Table 4 illustrates Cape\nFear\xe2\x80\x99s capital levels relative to the PCA thresholds for well capitalized institutions during\nthis period. However, examiners concluded during the October 2008 examination that,\ngiven the high-risk profile of Cape Fear, its capital levels were \xe2\x80\x9ccritically deficient,\xe2\x80\x9d and\nthe probability of the institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure was high.\n\n7\n Section 38 of the FDI Act and 57 Federal Register 44866-01 defines Adequately Capitalized as Total Risk\nBased Capital of 8 percent or more, Tier 1 Risk Based Capital of 4 percent or more, and Leverage Capital\nof 4 percent or more.\n\n\n 12\n\x0cTable 4: Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s Capital Levels Relative to PCA Thresholds for Well\n Capitalized Institutions\n Capital Ratio PCA Threshold September 30, 2008 December 31, 2008\n Leverage Capital 5% or more 6.76% 5.66%\n Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital 6% or more 7.94% 6.74%\n\n Total Risk Based Capital 10% or more 9.21% 8.01%\nSource: OIG Analysis of UBPRs for Cape Fear and Section 38 of the FDI Act and 57 Federal Register\n44866-01.\n\nConsistent with the PCA provisions of section 38, the FDIC notified Cape Fear on\nNovember 20, 2008 that, based on information contained in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s Call Report\nfor the quarter ending September 30, 2008, the institution was considered adequately\ncapitalized for purposes of Part 325 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations. The FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s\nnotification included a reminder of the requirements that Cape Fear had become subject\nto based on its PCA capital category. Such requirements included, among other things, a\nprohibition on the acceptance, renewal, or roll-over of brokered deposits without a waiver\nfrom the FDIC. The November 2008 notification also included a reminder that, pursuant\nto Part 337.6 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, adequately capitalized institutions are\nsubject to certain restrictions on the interest rates that can be paid on deposits. The FDIC\nprovided Cape Fear with a similar notification that the institution was adequately\ncapitalized on February 12, 2009, based on information contained in the institution\xe2\x80\x99s Call\nReport for the quarter ending December 31, 2008.\n\n\nCorporation Comments\nWe issued a draft of this report on October 1, 2009. We subsequently met with\nrepresentatives of DSC to discuss the results of our review. Based on our discussion, we\nmade certain changes to the report that we deemed appropriate. On October 22, 2009, the\nDirector, DSC, provided a written response to the draft report. The response is provided\nin its entirety as Appendix 4 of this report.\n\nIn its response, DSC reiterated the OIG\xe2\x80\x99s conclusions regarding the causes of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s\nfailure. Regarding our assessment of the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of Cape Fear, DSC cited\nseveral supervisory activities, discussed in our report, that were undertaken to address\nkey risks at the institution prior to its failure. In its response, DSC also recognized that\nstrong supervisory attention is necessary for institutions like Cape Fear that have high\nCRE and ADC concentrations supported by volatile funding sources. Accordingly, DSC\nhas issued updated guidance reminding examiners to take appropriate action when such\nrisks are imprudently managed.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0c Appendix 1\n\n Objectives, Scope, and Methodology\n\n\nObjectives\n\nWe performed this audit in accordance with section 38(k) of the FDI Act, which\nprovides, in general, that if a deposit insurance fund incurs a material loss with respect to\nan insured depository institution, the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking\nagency shall prepare a report to that agency reviewing the agency\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of the\ninstitution. The FDI Act requires that the report be completed within 6 months after it\nbecomes apparent that a material loss has been incurred.\n\nOur audit objectives were to (1) determine the causes of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s failure and the\nresulting material loss to the DIF and (2) evaluate the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of Cape Fear,\nincluding the FDIC\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of the PCA provisions of section 38 of the FDI Act.\n\nWe conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to October 2009 in accordance\nwith generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we\nplan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a\nreasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We\nbelieve that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and\nconclusions based on our audit objectives.\n\n\nScope and Methodology\n\nThe scope of this audit included an assessment of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s operations from March 31,\n2002 until the institution\xe2\x80\x99s failure on April 10, 2009. Our review also entailed an\nevaluation of the regulatory supervision of the institution during the same period.\n\nTo accomplish our objectives, we performed the following procedures and techniques:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Analyzed examination and visitation reports prepared by the FDIC and North\n Carolina Commissioner from July 2002 through April 2009.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed the following information:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Financial institution data and correspondence maintained in DSC\xe2\x80\x99s Atlanta\n Regional Office (ARO) and Raleigh, North Carolina, Field Office.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reports prepared by the Division of Resolutions and Receiverships (DRR)\n and DSC relating to the institution\xe2\x80\x99s closure and records maintained by DRR\n at the bank\xe2\x80\x99s former location in Wilmington, North Carolina.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Working papers and reports prepared by the institution\xe2\x80\x99s external auditor,\n Dixon Hughes, at its offices in Raleigh, North Carolina.\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0c Appendix 1\n\n Objectives, Scope, and Methodology\n\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Relevant FDIC policies, procedures, and guidelines.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Interviewed the FDIC officials having supervisory responsibilities pertaining to\n Cape Fear, including:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DSC examination staff in the Washington, D.C. office, ARO, and Raleigh,\n North Carolina, Field Office.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DRR personnel in the Dallas Regional Office.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Met with officials from the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks\n in Raleigh, North Carolina, to obtain their perspective on the institution\xe2\x80\x99s\n supervision and examinations and to discuss relevant state banking laws and other\n activities related to the state\xe2\x80\x99s supervision of the institution.\n\n\nInternal Control, Reliance on Computer-processed Information,\nPerformance Measurement, and Compliance With Laws and Regulations\n\nConsistent with our audit objectives, we did not assess DSC\xe2\x80\x99s overall internal control or\nmanagement control structure. We relied on information in DSC\xe2\x80\x99s systems, reports,\nROEs, and interviews of examiners to obtain an understanding of Cape Fear\xe2\x80\x99s\nmanagement controls pertaining to the causes of failure and material loss as discussed in\nthe body of this report. We obtained data from various FDIC systems but determined that\ninformation system controls were not significant to the audit objectives and, therefore,\ndid not evaluate the effectiveness of information system controls. We relied on our\nanalysis of information from various sources, including ROEs, correspondence files, and\ntestimonial evidence to corroborate data obtained from systems that was used to support\nour audit conclusions.\n\nThe Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) directs\nExecutive Branch agencies to develop a customer-focused strategic plan, align agency\nprograms and activities with concrete missions and goals, and prepare and report on\nannual performance plans. For this material loss review, we did not assess the strengths\nand weaknesses of DSC\xe2\x80\x99s annual performance plan in meeting the requirements of the\nResults Act because such an assessment is not part of the audit objectives. DSC\xe2\x80\x99s\ncompliance with the Results Act is reviewed in program audits of DSC operations.\n\nRegarding compliance with laws and regulations, we performed tests to determine\nwhether the FDIC had complied with provisions of PCA and limited tests to determine\ncompliance with certain aspects of the FDI Act. The results of our tests are discussed,\nwhere appropriate, in the report. Additionally, we assessed the risk of fraud and abuse\nrelated to our objectives in the course of evaluating audit evidence.\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0c Appendix 2\n\n Glossary of Terms\n\nTerm Definition\nAdversely Classified Assets subject to criticism and/or comment in an examination report. Adversely\nAssets classified assets are allocated on the basis of risk (lowest to highest) into three\n categories: Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss.\nAllowance for Loan Federally insured depository institutions must maintain an ALLL that is\nand Lease Losses adequate to absorb the estimated loan losses associated with the loan and lease\n(ALLL) portfolio (including all binding commitments to lend). To the extent not\n provided for in a separate liability account, the ALLL should also be sufficient\n to absorb estimated loan losses associated with off-balance sheet loan\n instruments such as standby letters of credit.\nBank Board A Bank Board Resolution is an informal commitment adopted by a financial\nResolution (BBR) institution\xe2\x80\x99s Board of Directors (often at the request of the FDIC) directing the\n institution\xe2\x80\x99s personnel to take corrective action regarding specific noted\n deficiencies. A BBR may also be used as a tool to strengthen and monitor the\n institution\xe2\x80\x99s progress with regard to a particular component rating or activity.\nCall Report Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (also known as the Call Report)\n are reports that are required to be filed by every national bank, state member\n bank, and insured nonmember bank pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance\n Act. These reports are used to calculate deposit insurance assessments and\n monitor the condition, performance, and risk profile of individual banks and the\n banking industry.\nCease and Desist A formal enforcement action issued by financial institution regulators to a bank\nOrder (C&D) or affiliated party to stop an unsafe or unsound practice or violation. A C&D\n may be terminated when the bank\xe2\x80\x99s condition has significantly improved and\n the action is no longer needed or the bank has materially complied with its\n terms.\nConcentration A concentration is a significantly large volume of economically related assets\n that an institution has advanced or committed to a certain industry, person,\n entity, or affiliated group. These assets may, in the aggregate, present a\n substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the institution.\nMemorandum of A Memorandum of Understanding is an informal agreement between the\nUnderstanding institution and the FDIC, which is signed by both parties. The State Authority\n(MOU) may also be party to the agreement. MOUs are designed to address and correct\n identified weaknesses in an institution\xe2\x80\x99s condition.\nPrompt Corrective The purpose of PCA is to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions\nAction (PCA) at the least possible long-term cost to the DIF. Part 325 of the FDIC Rules and\n Regulations, 12 Code of Federal Regulations, section 325.101, et. seq.\n implements section 38, Prompt Corrective Action, of the FDI Act, 12 United\n States Code section 1831(o), by establishing a framework for taking prompt\n supervisory actions against insured nonmember banks that are less than\n adequately capitalized. The following terms are used to describe capital\n adequacy: Well Capitalized, Adequately Capitalized, Undercapitalized,\n Significantly Undercapitalized, and Critically Undercapitalized.\nUniform Bank The UBPR is an analysis of financial institution financial data and ratios that\nPerformance Report includes extensive comparisons to peer group performance. The report is\n(UBPR) produced by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council for the use\n of banking supervisors, bankers, and the general public and is produced\n quarterly from Call Report data submitted by banks.\n\n\n\n 16\n\x0c Appendix 3\n\n Acronyms\n\n\nADC Acquisition, Development, and Construction\nALLL Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses\nARO Atlanta Regional Office\nBBR Bank Board Resolution\nC&D Cease and Desist Order\nCAMELS Capital, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and\n Sensitivity to Market Risk\n\nCRE Commercial Real Estate\nDIF Deposit Insurance Fund\nDRR Division of Resolutions and Receiverships\nDSC Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection\nFDI Federal Deposit Insurance\nIT Information Technology\nMOU Memorandum of Understanding\nOIG Office of Inspector General\nPCA Prompt Corrective Action\nROE Report of Examination\nUBPR Uniform Bank Performance Report\nUFIRS Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0c Appendix 4\n\n Corporation Comments\n\n\n\nFDIC!\nFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation\n 550 171h Street NW. Washingon. DC. 2029-999 Divisio 01 SupeisiOn and Consume Precon\n\n October 22, 2009\n\n MEMORANDUM TO: Stephen Beard\n Assistant Inspector General for Material Loss Reviews\n\n FROM: Sandra L. Thompson'\n Director\n\n SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report Entitled, Material Loss Review of Cape Fear\n Bank, Wilmington, North Carolina\n (Assignent No. 2009-039)\n\nPursuat to Section 38(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), the Federal Deposit\nInsurance Corporation's Offce ofInspector General (OIG) conducted a material loss review of\nCape Fear Ban (Cape Fear) which failed on April 10,2009. This memoradum is the response\nof the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection (DSC) to the OIG's Draft Report\n\n(Report) received on October 1,2009.\n\nThe Report concludes that Cape Fear's failure was due to the ineffective risk management\npractices of the Board and senior management over its rapid growt in commercial real estate\n\n(CRE) and acquisition, development, and construction (ADC) loans and its growing dependence\non non-core funding sources, particularly brokered deposits. Examiners expressed concern over\nCape Fear's risk management practices; however, the Board and management did not take\nadequate or timely actions to implement corrective practices that could have prevented the\nfailure.\n\nThe Report further states that the Nort Carolina real estate market began to deteriorate in 2007\nand that Cape Fear's weak risk management practices quickly traslated into a significant\ndecline in loan portfolio quality. The associated loan losses and provisions depleted Cape Fear's\ncapital and earnings and impaired liquidity. Further, in April 2009, negative media attention and\nits adverse effect on Cape Fear's capital and liquidity grew when the parent company notified the\nSecurities and Exchange Commission that doubt existed as to the institution's ability to continue\nas a going concern. The notification resulted in depositor withdrawals placing additional\npressure on Cape Fear's capital and liquidity.\n\nAs part of our supervisory program, examiners conducted on-site risk management\nexaminations, made periodic visitations, and used certain offsite tools, including personal contact\nwith ban management, to monitor Cape Fear's condition. Additionally, DSC pursued three\ninformal corrective actions and one formal enforcement action against Capc Fear to address its\nweak risk management practices and performed daily monitoring of\n its liquidity position in the\ndays preceding failure. In recognition that strong supervisory attention is necessary for\ninstitutions with high CRE/ADC concentrations and volatile funding sources, such as Cape Fear,\nDSC has issued updated guidance reminding examiners to take appropriate action when these\nrisks are imprudently managed.\n\nThan you for the opportunity to review and comment on thc Draft Audit Report.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0c"


text:
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type: caselaw

text:
 12.4.2008
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 C 92/27
 Ordonnance du Tribunal de première instance du 22 janvier 2008 — Efkon/Parlement et Conseil
 (Affaire T-298/04) (1)
 («Recours en annulation - Directive 2004/52/CE - Interopérabilité des systèmes de télépéage routier - Défaut d'affectation individuelle - Irrecevabilité»)
 (2008/C 92/55)
 Langue de procédure: l'allemand
 Parties
 Partie requérante: Efkon AG (Graz-Andritz, Autriche) (représentants: initialement G. Zanger, puis M. Novak, avocats)
 Parties défenderesses: Parlement européen (représentants: U. Rösslein et A. Neergaard, agents) et Conseil de l'Union européenne (représentants: A. Lopes Sabino et M. Bauer, agents)
 Partie intervenante au soutien des parties défenderesses: Commission des Communautés européennes (représentants: R. Vidal Puig et G. Braun, agents)
 Objet
 Demande en annulation totale, ou à titre subsidiaire, partielle de la directive 2004/52/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 29 avril 2004, concernant l'interopérabilité des systèmes de télépéage routier dans la Communauté (JO L 166, p. 124, rectificatif au JO L 200, p. 50).
 Dispositif
 1)
 Le recours est rejeté comme irrecevable.
 2)
 Efkon AG supportera ses propres dépens ainsi que ceux exposés par le Conseil.
 3)
 Le Parlement et la Commission supporteront leurs propres dépens.
 (1) JO C 262 du 23.10.2004.


text:
Il-politika ta’ koeżjoni hija l-istrateġija tal-Unjoni Ewropea' biex tippromwovi u tappoġġja l-‘iżvilupp globali armonjuż’ tal-Istati Membri u r-reġjuni tagħha.
 Minquxa fit-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (l-Artikolu 174), il-'politika ta’ koeżjoni tal-UE għandha l-għan li ssaħħaħ il-koeżjoni ekonomika u soċjali billi tnaqqas id-disparitajiet fil-livell ta’ żvilupp bejn ir-reġjuni. Il-politika tiffoka fuq l-oqsma prinċipali li se jgħinu lill-UE tiffaċċja l-isfidi tas-seklu 21 u li din tibqa’ globalment kompetittiva.
 Madwar 32,5 % tal-baġit tal-UE għall-2014-2020 (ekwivalenti għal madwar EUR 351,8 biljun fuq seba' snin għall-prezzijiet tal-2014) huwa allokat għall-istrumenti finanzjarji li jappoġġjaw il-politika ta’ koeżjoni. Dawn huma ġestiti u mwassla fi sħubija bejn il-Kummissjoni Ewropea, l-Istati Membri u l-partijiet interessati fil-livell lokali u reġjonali.
 Referenzi
 Il-Fond ta’ Koeżjoni, Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea
 Ekonomija tal-Unjoni Ewropea