type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al., No. 70, September Term,
 2018
 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. (1974, 2015 REPL. VOL.) (“RP”) § 12-205(a) –
 MOVING AND RELOCATION EXPENSES – RP § 12-201(e) – “DISPLACED
 PERSON” – Court of Appeals held that former tenant of public market in Baltimore City
 was not “displaced person,” as defined in RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), because it voluntarily
 terminated its lease and abandoned its stall at market before action by defendants to
 terminate lease and before any redevelopment occurred. Tenant left market on its own
 accord before any action to terminate lease, other than advisement that it would not “fit in
 [redevelopment] plans” for market and that it should pursue other options. Thus, tenant
 did not qualify as “displaced person” under plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), and it
 was not entitled to moving and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a).
 Moreover, tenant was not “displaced person” because it “lease[d] from [] displacing agency
 after [] displacing agency [took] title to [] real property[.]” RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii).
 Applying plain and unambiguous language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)—that person who
 leases from displacing agency after displacing agency takes title to real property is not
 displaced person—led to inescapable conclusion that tenant was not displaced person, as
 it undisputedly leased property well after displacing agency took title to property.
 Although unnecessary to resort to review of legislative history, holding concerning plain
 language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) was fully supported by legislative history, and
 legislative history did not compel contrary interpretation.
 Circuit Court for Baltimore City
 Case No. 24-C-17-003125
 Argued: May 2, 2019
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 70
 September Term, 2018
 ______________________________________
 WIRELESS ONE, INC.
 v.
 MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
 BALTIMORE, ET AL.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 *Greene
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty
 Booth,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Opinion by Watts, J.
 Barbera, C.J., and McDonald, J., dissent.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: August 23, 2019
 *Greene, J., now retired, participated in the
 hearing and conference of this case while an
 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
 Materials Act
 active member of this Court; after being recalled
 (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
 pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV,
 2019-08-23 15:35-04:00 Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
 and adoption of this opinion.
 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
 This case involves an action by a former tenant of a public market in Baltimore City
 to recover moving and relocation expenses under Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. (1974, 2015
 Repl. Vol.) (“RP”) § 12-205(a) and for an alleged unconstitutional taking. Under RP § 12-
 205(a), “[w]henever a program or project undertaken by a displacing agency will result in
 the displacement of any person, the displacing agency shall make a payment to the
 displaced person, on proper application as approved by the displacing agency for[,]” among
 other things, the “[a]ctual reasonable expenses” of moving and searching for a replacement
 business, and for “[a]ctual direct loss of tangible personal property as a result of moving
 or discontinuing a business[.]” Whether a person is entitled to moving and relocation
 expenses under RP § 12-205(a) depends on whether the person is a “displaced person,” as
 defined in RP § 12-201(e). To state the obvious, if a person is not a “displaced person,” as
 that term is statutorily defined, then the person seeking compensation is not entitled to
 moving and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a).
 RP § 12-201(e) defines a “displaced person” as follows:
 (1) “Displaced person” means:
 (i) Any person who moves from real property, or moves his [or her]
 personal property from real property:
 1. As a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or
 the acquisition of such real property in whole or in part by a
 displacing agency; or
 2. On which that person is a residential tenant or conducts a
 small business, a farm operation, or a nonprofit organization,
 in any case in which the head of the displacing agency
 determines that displacement is permanent, as a direct result of
 rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity as the
 lead agency may prescribe, undertaken by a displacing agency;
 and
 ***
 (2) “Displaced person” does not include:
 (i) Except to the extent that this exclusion conflicts with federal
 financial participation requirements, any person who, on the open
 market, without threat of condemnation, sells his [or her] real property
 to a displacing agency;
 (ii) Unlawful occupants, or anyone occupying such dwelling for the
 purpose of obtaining assistance under this subtitle; or
 (iii) A person who leases from the displacing agency after the
 displacing agency takes title to the real property, or any person other
 than a person who was an occupant of such property at the time it was
 acquired who occupies the property on a rental basis for a short term
 or period subject to termination when the property is needed for the
 program or project.
 In this case, Baltimore City has owned and operated the market since 1847. From
 2004 to February 2017, the tenant leased space in the market; as of 2016, the tenant’s lease
 was on a month-to-month basis. In late 2016, a rental agent for the market advised the
 tenant that its business did not “fit in the [redevelopment] plans” for the market and that it
 “should pursue other options[.]” In February 2017, the tenant vacated the market. In June
 2017, the tenant sued, seeking compensation for moving and relocation expenses as a
 displaced person and for an alleged unconstitutional taking. The defendants filed a motion
 to dismiss, which the trial court granted, concluding that the former tenant did not qualify
 as a “displaced person” because of the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). The Court of
 Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, agreeing that the exemption in RP §
 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applies and that the former tenant was not a “displaced person.” Against
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 this backdrop, we must decide whether the former tenant is a “displaced person,” as that
 term is defined in RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), whether the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)
 applies, and whether the tenant has stated a claim for an unconstitutional taking.
 We hold that the former tenant is not a “displaced person,” as that term is defined
 in RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), because it voluntarily terminated its lease and abandoned its stall
 at the market before action by the defendants to terminate the lease and before any
 redevelopment occurred. The former tenant left its stall at the market on its own accord
 before any action to terminate the lease, other than the advisement that it would “not fit in
 the [redevelopment] plans” for the market and that it should pursue other options. Thus,
 the former tenant does not qualify as a “displaced person” under the plain language of RP
 § 12-201(e)(1)(i), and it was not entitled to moving and relocation expenses under RP §
 12-205(a). In addition to concluding that the former tenant is not a “displaced person”
 under the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), we hold that the tenant is not a “displaced
 person” because it “lease[d] from the displacing agency after the displacing agency [took]
 title to the real property[.]” RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). Applying the plain and unambiguous
 language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)—that a person who leases from a displacing agency
 after the displacing agency takes title to the real property is not a displaced person—
 inescapably leads to the conclusion that the tenant is not a displaced person, as it
 undisputedly entered into its lease well after the displacing agency took title to the market.
 Although unnecessary to resort to a review of the legislative history, our holding
 concerning the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is fully supported by the legislative
 history, and the legislative history does not compel a contrary interpretation. As such, we
 -3-
 hold that the tenant was not wrongfully denied moving and relocation expenses, and there
 was no unconstitutional taking. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals’s
 judgment.
 BACKGROUND
 In 1847, the Cross Street Market (“the Market”) was established in Baltimore City.
 At all times since 1847, the Mayor and Council of Baltimore City (“the City”), Respondent,
 has owned and operated the Market. In 1994, the City established the Baltimore Public
 Markets Corporation (“the Markets Corporation”), Respondent, to assist with the
 regulation, control, and maintenance of the Market and other public markets in Baltimore
 City. In 2004, Wireless One, Inc. (“Wireless One”), Petitioner, began leasing a stall in the
 Market from the City.1 Wireless One’s business consisted of leasing cell phones and
 related equipment, such as chargers. As of 2016, Wireless One’s lease was a month-to-
 month lease.
 On November 9, 2016, through the Markets Corporation, the City entered into a
 management agreement with CSM Ventures, LLC (“CSM”), a subsidiary of Caves Valley
 Partners (“Caves”), to operate and redevelop the Market. The management agreement
 authorized CSM to lease portions of the Market and terminate existing tenancies. Under
 the management agreement, the Markets Corporation was required to pay CSM $2 million
 to redevelop and operate the Market.
 It is undisputed that, in late 2016, Wireless One was advised that it would not fit
 1
 Since 2013, Wireless One has traded under the name “Digital 2000 LLC.”
 -4-
 into the plans for the redeveloped Market, and that it should pursue other options. On
 December 21, 2016, on behalf of CSM and Caves, a representative sent an e-mail message
 to Wireless One and other Market tenants concerning the redevelopment of the Market. In
 the e-mail, the representative stated, in pertinent part:
 [O]n January 9th, most of you will receive a Letter of Intent, along with
 current draft space plans for the new [M]arket, for your review and
 consideration as prospective tenants. There are a very limited number of
 tenants who we know will not fit in the plans. Those tenants have been
 informed that they should pursue other options going forward. . . .
 At the merchants[’] meeting last month, Arsh Mirmiran from CSM []
 promised that the current [M]arket would continue to operate until at least
 April 1, 2017. I would like to reiterate that and let you know that it will likely
 continue for a bit longer than that. Once we know an official date, we will
 let you all know.
 ***
 Regardless of whether or not we are able to reach agreement for you
 to be part of the redeveloped [M]arket, we will work with you and the []
 Markets Corporation to provide options for temporary and/or permanent
 relocation spaces. These spaces would be in either Lexington Market or
 Hollins Market, both of which are going to be refreshed, as well. The
 Markets Corp[oration] has confirmed that there is adequate space to
 accommodate all current tenants of [the] Market, should you so choose. If
 neither of those options is of interest, I can work directly with you to find
 you space closer to Cross Street, either in currently vacant storefronts or in
 existing spaces that may become available.
 ***
 As I mentioned, please let me know if you’d like any additional information.
 All of this is still a work in progress and we don’t have all the answers yet,
 but we are methodically getting there and we appreciate your continued
 interest and patience.
 According to an affidavit from Arsh Mirmiran, a partner at Caves, on or around
 January 24, 2017, a Wireless One representative requested to terminate Wireless One’s
 -5-
 month-to-month lease and to vacate the stall at the Market by February 1, 2017, with the
 agreement that Wireless One would not be billed for February 2017 rent. Mirmiran averred
 that management agreed with Wireless One’s request. On February 8, 2017, Wireless One
 vacated the Market. At that time, Wireless One removed all of its inventory, but left the
 physical stall, including counters and storage shelves, which were affixed to the stall and
 unable to be removed.
 Circuit Court Proceedings
 On June 2, 2017, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Wireless One filed a
 complaint against Respondents, alleging that it was a “displaced person,” as defined by RP
 § 12-201(e)(1), that Respondents were displacing agencies as defined by RP § 12-201(f),
 and that it was entitled to moving and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a). Wireless
 One also alleged that there had been an unconstitutional taking of its property without
 compensation, in violation of the United States and Maryland Constitutions. As to the
 circumstances surrounding its vacating of the Market, in the complaint, Wireless One
 alleged that it “was informed that it would not fit in the plans for the redeveloped [M]arket
 and that it should pursue other options[,]” and that it “vacated the [M]arket on February 8,
 2017.” Wireless One alleged that “[i]t removed the cell[ ]phone inventory but left the
 physical stall consisting of counters, storage shelves, etc., since they were built in and not
 able to be moved.”
 On July 11, 2017, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
 summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Wireless One was not a “displaced
 person” because Wireless One terminated its lease voluntarily and because of the
 -6-
 exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), and that there was no taking. Respondents contended
 that Wireless One did not meet the definition of a “displaced person” under RP § 12-
 201(e)(1) because Wireless One “walked away from its month-to-month lease voluntarily.”
 According to Respondents, although Wireless One “may have been informed that it would
 not fit into some future plans for a new, redesigned [M]arket [], the threat of redevelopment
 alone [was] not sufficient for [Wireless One] to be considered a displaced person that [was]
 entitled to moving and relocation expenses.” (Citation omitted). Respondents argued that
 Wireless One had failed to allege that rehabilitation had occurred or been undertaken, that
 Respondents had “made any sort of effort to evict [Wireless One] from the Market in
 pursuit of [] renovation[,]” or that there had been written notice of an intent to acquire or
 acquisition of the real property. Respondents asserted that, moreover, Wireless One was
 “exempt from the definition of ‘displaced person’” under RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) because it
 leased the stall in the Market after the City acquired title to the Market. Respondents
 attached as an exhibit to the motion Mirmiran’s affidavit, dated July 6, 2017, in which he
 averred, in pertinent part:
 [] On or around January 24, 2017, a representative from Wireless One[]
 contacted representatives of management and requested to terminate the
 month-to-month lease and vacate the stall by February 1, 2017, with the
 agreement that they would not be billed for February rent.
 [] Management agreed, and Wireless One[] voluntarily vacated the premises
 in February 2017.
 [] CSM [] did not terminate Wireless One’s lease, nor did it notify Wireless
 One[] that it had to leave by a date certain.
 [] While CSM [] eventually plans to renovate [the] Market, it has not yet
 begun to do so, nor has it terminated the leases of any tenants in pursuit of
 -7-
 this project; in fact, all remaining tenants were offered, and agreed to, lease
 renewals through September 5, 2017. Wireless One[] was not offered this
 lease renewal because it had already vacated the [M]arket at that time.
 [] While the items left behind by Wireless One[] are fixtures, it is welcome
 to return and remove the items. CSM [] has no plans to utilize the fixtures
 for the public use.
 On September 11, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion and
 heard argument from the parties. On the same day, the circuit court issued an order granting
 the motion and dismissing the complaint. In the order, the circuit court explained that it
 agreed with Respondents’ argument that the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applied,
 stating:
 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Market was established by
 [the] City in 1847, and has been owned and operated by [the] City since its
 inception. [Wireless One] cannot overcome the plain language of [RP] § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii), which specifically exempts “[a] person who leases from the
 displacing agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real
 property.” [Wireless One]’s lease was executed in 2004, many years after
 [the] City acquired title to the Market. Additionally, the Management
 Agreement between [the] City and Caves [] did not transfer title to the
 Market; rather, the Management Agreement merely gave Caves [] the ability
 to operate, manage, and redevelop the Market. Thus, [Wireless One] has
 failed to state a claim for relocation and moving expenses pursuant to [RP] §
 12-20[5(a)].
 (Emphasis and some alterations in original). The circuit court also ruled that “no taking
 ha[d] occurred” because Wireless One was “not within the class of persons entitled to relief
 under [RP] § 12-20[5(a)].” The circuit court rejected Wireless One’s argument that there
 was a taking because its fixtures became valueless, explaining that Mirmiran averred that
 Wireless One was “welcome to return and remove the items[,]” and that, “[i]t [was] quite
 -8-
 clear, then, that [Wireless One] abandoned its property affixed to the Market.” 2
 On September 20, 2017, Wireless One filed a motion to alter or amend, which the
 circuit court denied.
 Appellate Proceedings
 Wireless One appealed.3 On December 21, 2018, in a reported opinion, the Court
 of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.4 See Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor
 2
 In its opinion, as to the circuit court’s ruling, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
 We note that the format of the court’s judgment did not strictly comply
 with the requirement of Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(1), which mandates: “Each
 judgment shall be set forth on a separate document and include a statement
 of an allowance of costs as determined in conformance with Rule 2-603.”
 Here, the court’s judgment of dismissal appears on the sixth page of the
 written opinion explaining the court’s reasoning. . . . Nevertheless, the
 separate document requirement is not jurisdictional, and strict compliance
 may be waived where a technical application of the separate document
 requirement would only result in unnecessary delay. The Court of Appeals
 has held that strict compliance with the separate document rule can be
 waived, at least where the trial court intended the docket entries made by the
 court clerk to be a final judgment and where no party objected to the absence
 of a separate document after the appeal was noted. In this case, no party has
 objected to the form of the court’s order of dismissal, and the docket entry of
 9/14/17 accurately sets forth the substance of the court’s judgment.
 Accordingly, we deem the lack of a separate document to be waived.
 Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 239 Md. App. 687, 695
 n.3, 198 A.3d 892, 897 n.3 (2018) (cleaned up). We agree with the Court of Special
 Appeals’s reasoning on this point.
 3
 Wireless One also filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we
 denied on April 20, 2018. See Wireless One v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 458
 Md. 600, 183 A.3d 166 (2018).
 4
 The Court of Special Appeals initially filed an unreported opinion on November
 16, 2018. See Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, No. 1852,
 Sept. Term, 2017, 2018 WL 60015808 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 16, 2018). On November
 30, 2018, the City filed a Request for Designation of Opinion for Reporting. On December
 -9-
 and City Council of Baltimore City, 239 Md. App. 687, 689, 198 A.3d 892, 893 (2018).
 The Court of Special Appeals quoted with approval the circuit court’s reasoning that the
 exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applied, holding: “We agree with the [circuit] court’s
 analysis.” Wireless One, 239 Md. App. at 695, 198 A.3d at 896-97 (footnote omitted).
 The Court of Special Appeals also determined that, because “the City did not wrongfully
 deny Wireless [One] moving and relocation expenses, . . . the [circuit] court did not err in
 ruling that Wireless [One] ‘ha[d] failed to state a claim for an unconstitutional taking.’”
 Id. at 696, 198 A.3d at 897.
 On December 27, 2018, Wireless One petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the
 following two issues:
 [1.] Under [RP §] 12-201[(e)](1)(i)(2), is a person who leaves a publicly
 funded facility as a result of demolition or rehabilitation excluded from
 relocation benefits if it leased after the unit of government acquired title to
 the real property?
 [2.] Has Wireless [One] stated a claim for an unconstitutional taking?
 On February 4, 2019, this Court granted the petition. See Wireless One v. Mayor and City
 Council of Baltimore, 462 Md. 556, 201 A.3d 1228 (2019).
 On May 2, 2019, this Court heard oral argument in the case. At oral argument,
 questions arose concerning the statutory construction and legislative history of RP §§ 12-
 201 and 12-205. On May 3, 2019, this Court issued an order authorizing the Attorney
 11, 2018, Wireless One filed a response in which it “support[ed] the request to designate
 [the] opinion for reporting.” On December 21, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals issued
 a reported opinion. See Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City,
 239 Md. App. 687, 198 A.3d 892 (2018).
 - 10 -
 General to file an amicus brief. In the order, we stated:
 Whereas, this appeal involves construction of the relocation and
 assistance provisions of [RP] § 12-201 et seq.[,] an issue in which the State
 may have an interest, and pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Art. V, § 6, it
 is this 3rd day of May[,] 2019,
 ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, pursuant to
 Maryland Rule 8-511(a)(3), that the Attorney General may file a brief in the
 above-captioned case as Amicus Curiae concerning the appropriate
 construction of [RP] § 12-201 et seq.
 On June 12, 2019, the Attorney General filed an amicus brief. In the amicus brief,
 the Attorney General contended that RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is ambiguous, that there is a
 “latent ambiguity” in the definition of “displacing agency” in RP § 12-201(f), and that RP
 § 12-201 should be construed consistently with the counterpart federal statute. The
 Attorney General argued:
 With respect to the appropriate construction of [RP] § 12-201(e)(2)(iii),
 which excludes from the definition of “displaced person” a “person who
 leases from the displacing agency after the displacing agency take[s] title to
 the real property,” that provision should be construed consistently with its
 federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii), such that this exclusion is
 only applicable in those cases in which the displacing agency has acquired
 property for a program or project (and any lease has taken effect after such
 acquisition).
 On July 2, 2019, Respondents filed a reply to the amicus brief, contending that the
 language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is plain and unambiguous, that the Attorney General’s
 interpretation of the provision conflicts with the statute’s plain language and legislative
 history, and that the Attorney General’s reading of the legislative history is “flawed.” We
 set forth the contentions raised in the amicus and reply briefs in greater detail below.
 - 11 -
 DISCUSSION
 The Parties’ Contentions
 Wireless One contends that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss
 because, under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)(2), “a person who leaves a publicly funded facility as
 a result of demolition or rehabilitation is not excluded from relocation benefits if it leased
 after the unit of government acquired title to the real property.” In other words, Wireless
 One argues that it qualified as a “displaced person” under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)(2).
 Wireless One asserts that the City was not a “displacing agency” because it was not
 carrying out a public works project, or a project with State financial assistance, when the
 City established the Market in 1847. Wireless One maintains: “Applying the test of [RP
 §] 12-201(f), it is clear that the [circuit] court [erred] when it applied the exclusion of [RP
 §] 12-201[(e)](2) to the City’s establishment of the [] Market in [1]847 simply on the basis
 of the City’s ownership in [1]847.” Wireless One contends that the circuit court’s
 interpretation of the relevant statutes essentially renders compensation for moving and
 relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a) a “nullity” because someone in Wireless One’s
 position—i.e., a tenant who entered into a lease after the lessor acquired title—would never
 be able to recover.
 Respondents counter that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint for
 failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Respondents contend that
 Wireless One is not entitled to relocation expenses because it is not a “displaced person”
 under RP § 12-201(e). Specifically, Respondents argue that, under the plain language of
 RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), Wireless One is excluded from the definition of “displaced person,”
 - 12 -
 as it is undisputed that Wireless One leased the Market stall from the City more than 150
 years after the City acquired title to the Market. Respondents assert that the applicability
 of RP § 12-201(e)(2) does not depend on when the lessor became a “displacing agency,”
 because nothing in that provision “requires the City to have been a displacing agency at
 the time it acquired title to trigger the exception.” (Emphasis omitted). Respondents
 maintain that, because the plain language of RP § 12-201(e) is clear and unambiguous, this
 Court need not go further, but Respondents also contend that the legislative history
 “confirms that the definition of ‘displaced person’ excludes anyone who leases after the
 government takes title to the property, regardless of whether the government was a
 ‘displacing agency’ at the time it took title.”
 Respondents assert that interpreting RP § 12-201(e)(2) in the manner in which the
 circuit court and Court of Special Appeals did, and applying it in this case, does not create
 a legal nullity, as there may be persons who enter into leases before a displacing agency
 takes title. Respondents contend that, even if RP § 12-201(e)(2) does not bar recovery,
 dismissal of the case was nevertheless proper because Wireless One’s relocation was not
 the result of a displacement due to a program or project undertaken by the City, but instead
 was the result of its own unilateral decision to terminate its lease. Respondents argue that,
 although the City owned the Market at the time that “Wireless One abandoned the
 premises, its rehabilitation was far from certain. And[,] during that time, either party could
 have terminated the month-to-month tenancy, for any reason, with a mere thirty days’
 notice.” (Footnote omitted). As such, Respondents assert that “Wireless One’s voluntary
 departure could not have been the ‘direct result’ of rehabilitation[,]” as required to recover
 - 13 -
 moving and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a).
 Standard of Review
 Recently, in Floyd v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 463 Md. 226, 241, 205 A.3d
 928, 937 (2019), we stated that “we review without deference a trial court’s grant of a
 motion to dismiss,” explaining:
 Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
 which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a
 light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and
 allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may
 reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations
 and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff,
 i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be
 granted. Consideration of the universe of “facts” pertinent to the court’s
 analysis of the motion are limited generally to the four corners of the
 complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any. The well-pleaded
 facts setting forth the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient
 specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not
 suffice. Upon appellate review, the trial court’s decision to grant such a
 motion is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct.
 (Citation omitted). And,
 [s]imilarly, where, in considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court considers
 materials, such as affidavits, outside of the complaint (i.e., the complaint and
 documents attached thereto), we treat the trial court’s grant of a motion to
 dismiss as a grant of summary judgment, and we review the matter without
 deference for legal correctness.
 Id. at 241, 205 A.3d at 937 (citation omitted).
 Statutory Construction
 In Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 294-95,
 173 A.3d 549, 561-62 (2017), “we set forth the relevant rules of statutory construction[,]”
 stating:
 - 14 -
 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
 intent of the General Assembly.
 As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look
 first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.
 We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have
 meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is
 clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the
 General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according
 to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and
 express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In
 addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute
 to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly
 used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or
 limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either
 inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry
 as to legislative intent ends.
 If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not
 only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect
 in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under
 consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when
 there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.
 When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court
 is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the
 resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal.
 If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined from the statutory
 language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized
 indicia—among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title;
 how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the
 derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by
 authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments
 proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the
 relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.
 In construing a statute, we avoid a construction of the statute that is
 unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.
 In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context
 in which it appears. As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context,
 related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental
 issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only
 - 15 -
 are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the
 context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.
 (Citation omitted).
 Relevant Law
 Before discussing moving and relocation expenses pursuant to RP § 12-205(a), we
 set forth the following brief background on condemnation proceedings generally. As we
 explained in A & E N., LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 431 Md. 253, 260, 64 A.3d
 903, 907 (2013), “[a] condemnation action is the State’s exercise of the power of eminent
 domain[,]” which “is the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned
 property and convert it to public use[.]” (Cleaned up). Importantly, “the power to condemn
 is not absolute[,]” and “government entities may only take private property for public use
 and with a payment of just compensation to the affected property owner[, and] there must
 be some necessity for the taking.” Id. at 260, 64 A.3d at 908 (cleaned up). Determining
 the amount of just compensation “is the jury’s responsibility, unless all parties file a written
 election submitting the case to the court for determination[.]” Id. at 261, 64 A.3d at 908
 (cleaned up). An award constitutes just compensation “if it reflects the fair market value
 of the property.” Id. at 261, 64 A.3d at 908 (cleaned up).
 Notably, “just compensation for the taking of property is not the only type of
 compensation to which a condemnee may be entitled. Both federal and Maryland statutes
 provide for relocation assistance to persons affected by condemnation.” Id. at 262, 64 A.3d
 at 908-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). Subtitle 2 of Title 12 of the Real Property
 Article sets forth the various types of relocation assistance available in Maryland. RP §
 - 16 -
 12-205(a) “requires a ‘displacing agency’ to compensate a ‘displaced person’ for certain
 expenses incurred as a result of the displacing agency’s acquisition or written notice of
 intent to acquire the displaced person’s property.” Coll. Bowl, Inc. v. Mayor and City
 Council of Balt., 394 Md. 482, 485, 907 A.2d 153, 155 (2006). RP § 12-205(a) provides:
 Whenever a program or project undertaken by a displacing agency will result
 in the displacement of any person, the displacing agency shall make a
 payment to the displaced person, on proper application as approved by the
 displacing agency for:
 (1) Actual reasonable expenses in moving him[- or her]self, his [or
 her] family, business, farm operation, or other personal property;
 (2) Actual direct loss of tangible personal property as a result of
 moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation, but not
 exceeding an amount equal to the reasonable expenses that would
 have been required to relocate the personal property, as determined by
 the agency;
 (3) Actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement
 business or farm; and
 (4) Actual reasonable expenses necessary to reestablish a displaced
 farm, nonprofit organization, or small business at its new site as
 determined by the displacing agency, but not to exceed $60,000.
 This Court has recognized that “[t]he key issue with respect to [a plaintiff]’s
 entitlement to compensation under [RP § 12-205(a)] is whether it qualifies as a ‘displaced
 person.’” Coll. Bowl, 394 Md. at 486, 907 A.2d at 155. See also A & E N., 431 Md. at
 269, 64 A.3d at 913 (“[B]eing a ‘displaced person’ is a prerequisite in any relocation
 assistance case.”). In its entirety, RP § 12-201(e) defines “displaced person” as follows:
 (1) “Displaced person” means:
 (i) Any person who moves from real property, or moves his [or her]
 personal property from real property:
 - 17 -
 1. As a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or
 the acquisition of such real property in whole or in part by a
 displacing agency; or
 2. On which that person is a residential tenant or conducts a
 small business, a farm operation, or a nonprofit organization,
 in any case in which the head of the displacing agency
 determines that displacement is permanent, as a direct result of
 rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity as the
 lead agency may prescribe, undertaken by a displacing agency;
 and
 (ii) Solely for the purposes of [RP] §§ 12-205(a) and (b) [], any person
 who moves from real property, or moves his [or her] personal property
 from real property:
 1. As a direct result of written notice of intent to acquire or the
 acquisition of other real property, in whole or in part, on which
 such person conducts a business or farm operation, by a
 displacing agency; or
 2. As a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition, or other
 displacing activity as the lead agency may prescribe, of other
 real property on which such person conducts a business or a
 farm operation in any case in which the head of the displacing
 agency determines that displacement is permanent, by a
 displacing agency.
 (2) “Displaced person” does not include:
 (i) Except to the extent that this exclusion conflicts with federal
 financial participation requirements, any person who, on the open
 market, without threat of condemnation, sells his [or her] real property
 to a displacing agency;
 (ii) Unlawful occupants, or anyone occupying such dwelling for the
 purpose of obtaining assistance under this subtitle; or
 (iii) A person who leases from the displacing agency after the
 displacing agency takes title to the real property, or any person other
 than a person who was an occupant of such property at the time it was
 acquired who occupies the property on a rental basis for a short term
 - 18 -
 or period subject to termination when the property is needed for the
 program or project.
 RP § 12-201(f) defines “displacing agency” as follows:
 “Displacing agency” means any public or private agency or person carrying
 out:
 (1) A program or project with federal financial assistance;
 (2) A public works program or project with State financial assistance;
 or
 (3) Acquisition by eminent domain or by negotiation.
 In Coll. Bowl, 394 Md. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154, this Court held that summary
 judgment was properly granted in favor of the City and that “the City was not required to
 reimburse [the plaintiff] for relocation expenses[.]” The plaintiff, a sports apparel
 manufacturer, contended “that it lost its tenancy and was forced to relocate its business due
 to insistence by [the] City that [the plaintiff]’s landlord redevelop the building in which
 [the plaintiff]’s business was located and threats by the City to condemn the building if that
 was not done.” Id. at 483-84, 907 A.2d at 154. The plaintiff was a month-to-month
 commercial tenant in a building owned by the David and Annie E. Abrams Realty
 Corporation (“Abrams”). See id. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154. In 1997, Abrams entered into
 preliminary discussions with the City to explore development options; in 2000, Abrams
 obtained zoning approval to construct dwelling units in the building, including the space
 occupied by the plaintiff. See id. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154. In 2002, the City “began to
 press Abrams to commence acceptable redevelopment and, at various times thereafter,
 expressed the intent, in default thereof, to obtain authority to condemn the structure.” Id.
 - 19 -
 at 484, 907 A.2d at 154. In June 2002, a City Council bill was introduced that would have
 allowed the City to acquire various properties through condemnation, including Abrams’s
 building. See id. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154.
 In November 2002, while the bill was pending, Abrams notified the plaintiff of its
 intent to end the landlord-tenant relationship, and, in February 2003, Abrams gave written
 notice of termination of the plaintiff’s month-to-month lease, effective April 30, 2003. See
 id. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154. In March 2003, the plaintiff vacated the building and relocated
 its business. See id. at 484, 907 A.2d at 154. A year later, in March 2004, the bill was
 enacted, although the City did not exercise its authority to acquire the building. See id. at
 484-85, 907 A.2d at 154.
 In the meantime, in April 2003, after vacating the building, the plaintiff filed a
 complaint seeking, among other things, compensation for relocation expenses. See id. at
 485, 907 A.2d at 154. As to those claims, the trial court granted summary judgment in the
 City’s favor, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, “holding that, because [the
 plaintiff]’s tenancy was terminated by the landlord and not in response to any governmental
 action by the City, [the plaintiff] was not a ‘displaced person’ entitled to relocation
 compensation and its property interest had not been taken by the City.” Id. at 485, 907
 A.2d at 154-55.
 In this Court, we stated that, given the definition of “displaced person” in RP § 12-
 201(e) and given that the City never acquired the building,
 the critical question [was] whether [the plaintiff]’s displacement was a
 “direct result” of either a written notice of intent by the City to acquire the
 property or a determination by the head of the “displacing agency” that [the
 - 20 -
 plaintiff]’s displacement would be permanent as a direct result of
 rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity.
 Id. at 486, 907 A.2d at 155 (footnote omitted). We noted that, had Abrams taken no action,
 the City likely would have condemned the building after the bill was enacted, but the
 plaintiff “was actually forced to relocate and move its personal property because of the
 termination of its tenancy by Abrams[.]” Id. at 487, 907 A.2d at 156.
 As to whether Abrams was forced to terminate the plaintiff’s tenancy “because of
 conduct by the City that would suffice to make [the plaintiff] a ‘displaced person’ within
 the meaning of [RP] § 12-201(e)[,]” however, we ultimately determined that the plaintiff
 was not a displaced person. Id. at 487-88, 907 A.2d at 156. We explained:
 It is undisputed, of course, that the City never [] acquire[d] the
 property, either by condemnation or through negotiations conducted under
 the threat of condemnation. [The plaintiff]’s complaint is that the City
 effectively forced Abrams to terminate [its] lease by threatening, both orally
 and in writing, to condemn the property unless Abrams proceeded with
 redevelopment activities that would necessitate termination of the tenancy,
 and that the City had no authority to make such threats. Its argument, in this
 regard, is that the City had no authority to inform the property owner that
 eminent domain authority would be obtained and exercised unless the
 building was renewed. Whether the City [] possessed authority to make that
 threat is not the issue. The issue, in terms of compensation for relocation
 expenses, is, and remains, whether [the plaintiff]’s relocation was the “direct
 result” of conduct specified in [RP] § 12-201(e), authorized or unauthorized.
 It clearly was not.
 As we have observed, Abrams made some efforts on its own to
 renovate the building, including a successful pursuit of zoning authority to
 convert five floors of the building to residential use, and, in February, 2003,
 presumably in furtherance of those efforts, it terminated the month-to-month
 tenancy. That termination, by the landlord, occurred more than a year before
 [the bill] was enacted and thus more than a year before the City had any legal
 authority to acquire the building through the exercise of eminent domain.
 There is simply no evidence that termination of the tenancy was the “direct
 result” of a written notice by the City of its intent to acquire the property or
 - 21 -
 a determination by the head of a displacing agency that [the plaintiff]’s
 displacement was permanent as a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition,
 or other displacing activity.
 Id. at 487-88, 907 A.2d at 156 (cleaned up). We also concluded that there was no taking.
 See id. at 491, 907 A.2d at 158.
 Analysis
 Here, we hold that Wireless One is not a “displaced person,” as that term is defined
 in RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), because it voluntarily terminated its lease and abandoned its stall
 at the Market before action by Respondents or CSM to terminate the lease and before any
 redevelopment occurred. Wireless One left its stall at the Market on its own accord before
 any action by Respondents or CSM to terminate the lease, other than the advisement that
 it would not fit into the redevelopment plans for the Market and that it should pursue other
 options. Thus, Wireless One does not qualify as a “displaced person” under the plain
 language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), and it was not entitled to moving and relocation expenses
 under RP § 12-205(a). In addition to concluding that Wireless One is not a “displaced
 person” under the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), we hold that Wireless One is not
 a “displaced person” because it “lease[d] from the displacing agency after the displacing
 agency [took] title to the real property[.]” RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). Applying the plain and
 unambiguous language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)—that a person who leases from a
 displacing agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real property is not a
 displaced person—inescapably leads to the conclusion that Wireless One is not a displaced
 person. Although unnecessary to resort to a review of the legislative history, our holding
 concerning the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is fully supported by the legislative
 - 22 -
 history, and the legislative history does not compel a contrary interpretation. As such, we
 hold that Wireless One was not wrongfully denied moving and relocation expenses, and
 there was no unconstitutional taking.
 As an initial matter, Wireless One does not qualify as a displaced person under RP
 § 12-201(e)(1)(i) because it voluntarily terminated its lease and abandoned its stall at the
 Market before any action by Respondents or CSM to terminate the lease and before any
 redevelopment occurred. RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)1 provides that a “displaced person”
 includes “[a]ny person who moves from real property, or moves his [or her] personal
 property from real property[ a]s a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the
 acquisition of such real property in whole or in part by a displacing agency[.]” (Paragraph
 break omitted). Here, Wireless One did not allege in its complaint that it received written
 notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition from Respondents or any other written notice
 from Respondents of an intent to terminate Wireless One’s lease. And, Wireless One has
 not alleged that Respondents or CSM terminated the lease or otherwise notified Wireless
 One that it had to leave the Market by a certain date. Rather, in the complaint, Wireless
 One simply alleged that it was advised that it would not fit the plans for the redeveloped
 Market and that it “vacated the [M]arket on February 8, 2017.” In other words, Wireless
 One left its stall at the Market on its own accord before receiving a notice of intent or before
 any action by Respondents or CSM to terminate the lease, other than the mere advisement
 that it would not fit into the redevelopment plans for the Market.
 Nor does Wireless One qualify as a “displaced person” under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)2,
 which provides that a “displaced person” is “[a]ny person who moves from real property,
 - 23 -
 or moves his [or her] personal property from real property [o]n which that person . . .
 conducts a small business . . . as a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition, or other
 displacing activity . . . undertaken by a displacing agency[.]” In the complaint, Wireless
 One did not allege that rehabilitation or demolition of the Market had taken place, or that
 any other displacing activity had been undertaken—for example, notice of termination of
 the lease, the institution of eviction proceedings, or notice that it was required to vacate the
 Market by a certain date. Walking away from the lease after being advised that it did not
 fit the plans for redevelopment of the Market falls far short of moving “as a direct result of
 rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity” under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)2.
 In short, Wireless One voluntarily left the Market. No action had been taken by
 Respondents or CSM to terminate the lease.5 The plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i)
 is unambiguous in defining a “displaced person” and, under the circumstances of this case,
 given that Wireless One unilaterally terminated its lease, Wireless One does not meet the
 definition of a “displaced person.” This makes sense—a tenant cannot qualify as a
 “displaced person” who is entitled to moving and relocation expenses where the tenant
 voluntarily walks away from a lease without action by a displacing agency to acquire the
 property or without rehabilitation, demolition, or some other displacing activity causing
 5
 We note that, in his affidavit, attached to the motion to dismiss, Mirmiran averred
 that: Wireless One requested to terminate its lease and vacate the Market if it was not
 charged for February 2017 rent; management agreed, and Wireless One voluntarily vacated
 the premises; CSM did not terminate the lease or notify Wireless One that it had to leave
 by a certain date; and, as of the date of the affidavit, renovation of the Market had not yet
 commenced, and no leases of any of the tenants of the Market had been terminated due to
 the planned renovation.
 - 24 -
 the tenant to leave. As such, Wireless One does not qualify as a “displaced person” under
 the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), and was not entitled to moving and relocation
 expenses under RP § 12-205(a).6
 In addition to our holding that Wireless One is not a “displaced person” under the
 6
 In this case, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
 summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Wireless One was not a “displaced
 person” because Wireless One terminated its lease voluntarily and because of the
 exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). In its order, the circuit court set forth the standard of
 review applicable to motions to dismiss, ruled that Wireless One had failed to state a claim
 under RP § 12-205(a) or for an unconstitutional taking, granted the motion, and ordered
 that the complaint be dismissed. The record reflects that the circuit court granted
 Respondents’ motion to dismiss on the ground that Wireless One was not entitled to
 compensation for moving and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a) without
 converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment, or even mentioning the grant or
 denial of summary judgment. With respect to a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss,
 this Court has noted that “[i]n the interest of judicial efficiency, we may affirm the
 judgment of a trial court to grant a motion to dismiss on a different ground than that relied
 upon by the trial court, as long as the alternative ground is before the [c]ourt properly on
 the record.” Forster v. State, Office of Pub. Def., 426 Md. 565, 580-81, 45 A.3d 180, 189
 (2012) (citations omitted). Here, in its complaint, as to the reason for leaving the market,
 Wireless One alleged only that it had been told that it would not fit into the plans for
 redevelopment. Although Respondents alternatively requested summary judgment and
 attached Mirmiran’s affidavit, the four corners of the complaint failed to establish that
 Wireless One was a displaced person under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i). Hence, we may affirm
 the circuit court’s dismissal on this ground.
 To the extent that the circuit court considered materials outside of complaint, i.e.,
 Mirmiran’s affidavit, the circuit court’s order reflects that that consideration was as to the
 issue of the unconstitutional taking. After referencing Mirmiran’s affidavit, the circuit
 court concluded that Wireless One voluntarily abandoned its property affixed to the Market
 and had failed to state a claim for unconstitutional taking. Again, the circuit court did not
 convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. However, as to a trial
 court’s grant of summary judgment, we have stated that “[i]f we should reach a different
 conclusion than the circuit court on the basis on which it granted summary judgment, we
 ordinarily do not try to sustain the [trial] court’s decision on a different ground.” Young
 Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dustin Constr., Inc., 459 Md. 356, 383, 185 A.3d 170, 186 (2018)
 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, “[w]e may [] affirm summary judgment on a different
 ground if the trial court would have no discretion as to the particular issue.” Id. at 383, 185
 - 25 -
 plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i) because it abandoned the lease and the property on
 its own accord, Wireless One is not a “displaced person” because it “lease[d] from the
 displacing agency after the displacing agency [took] title to the real property[.]” RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii). The plain language of the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is
 unambiguous and clearly precludes Wireless One from qualifying as a “displaced person.”
 We begin by examining the language of the exemption. By its plain language, RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii) provides that a “displaced person” does not include “[a] person who leases
 from the displacing agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real property[.]”
 This language demonstrates that, where a displacing agency has taken title to real property,
 a person who leases from the displacing agency thereafter is not a displaced person. In
 short, the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is clear—a person who leases from the
 displacing agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real property is not a
 displaced person. We note that both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals
 determined that no ambiguity existed in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) because the plain meaning
 A.3d at 186 (citation omitted). In this case, if the record could be interpreted to mean that
 the circuit court granted summary judgment at all, we affirm on the ground that it based its
 decision on—namely, that the exemption of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applies and excludes
 Wireless One from being a “displaced person.” We also affirm on the basis raised by the
 Respondents in the circuit court, but not expressly relied on by the circuit court in
 determining whether Wireless One was a “displaced person”—namely, that Wireless One
 voluntarily terminated its lease and abandoned its stall at the Market. As to this issue,
 Wireless One based its claim on it being a “displaced person,” and yet pleaded facts that
 did not establish that it was a displaced person; as such, the circuit court could not have
 arrived at any conclusion other than that Wireless One was not a “displaced person” under
 the statute.
 - 26 -
 of the language of the statute is obvious.
 Here, it is undisputed that the Market was established by the City in 1847, and that
 it has been owned and operated by the City since its establishment. It was not until 2004,
 well after the City took title to the Market, that Wireless One entered into its lease. Put
 simply, it is undisputed that Wireless One acquired its lease after the City acquired title to
 the Market. Nothing in the management agreement between Respondents and CSM
 transferred title to the Market; rather, the management agreement simply authorized CSM
 to operate, manage, and redevelop the Market. As such, it is readily apparent that Wireless
 One leased its stall in the Market from the City after the City had taken title to the Market,
 and, therefore, the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applies, and Wireless One is
 not a “displaced person.”
 We are unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s attempt to inject ambiguity into the
 plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). In the amicus brief, the Attorney General
 contends:
 [The] statutory language [of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)] is not as clear as the City
 suggests. First, as Wireless One has argued before this Court, the City’s
 reading of the statute renders the second half of that clause superfluous. As
 a matter of law, any lease with a displacing agency would, by its nature, take
 effect only after the displacing agency has acquired the property. In that
 context, and given the provision’s focus on the date that the displacing
 agency “takes title” to the property, it is unclear whether the statute
 encompasses all leases no matter when (or for what purpose) the displacing
 agency may have acquired the property, or whether it applies only in
 circumstances where the displacing agency acquires a property for a program
 or project. The latter interpretation not only removes the superfluity in the
 first clause of [RP] § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), but it harmonizes and maintains
 consistency with the second clause of [RP] § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). Indeed, that
 second clause, which excludes from being a “displaced person” a person who
 occupies a property on a rental basis but who was not “an occupant of such
 - 27 -
 property at the time it was acquired,” is expressly tied to both the operative
 act of the acquisition of the property and the program or project for which
 the property was acquired.
 In a nutshell, the Attorney General seems to be saying that, if this Court adopts
 Respondents’ position, then no tenant could ever be a “displaced person” because the
 tenant would be leasing property after the displacing agency acquired title to the property,
 and the second clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) would be rendered superfluous. We
 disagree.
 We are wholly unpersuaded that RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is ambiguous. Rather, it is
 obvious that there are two separate, disjunctive clauses in that provision, separated by the
 word “or,” defining who is not a “displaced person.” In its entirety, RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)
 provides:
 “Displaced person” does not include: [] A person who leases from the
 displacing agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real property,
 or any person other than a person who was an occupant of such property at
 the time it was acquired who occupies the property on a rental basis for a
 short term or period subject to termination when the property is needed for
 the program or project.
 (Emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted). Under the first clause, a displaced person
 does not include a person who leases from a displacing agency after the displacing agency
 takes title to the property. As a completely separate example of a person who is not a
 displaced person, the second clause provides that a displaced person does not include any
 person other than someone who was an occupant of the property at the time it was acquired
 who occupies that property on a short-term rental basis or period subject to termination
 when the property is needed for a program or project. In other words, RP § 12-
 - 28 -
 201(e)(2)(iii) includes two separate descriptive clauses of persons who are not displaced
 persons, i.e., two separate clauses defining who is not a displaced person. The provision
 could not be clearer, and there is no ambiguity. Under the first clause of RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii), Wireless One is expressly excluded from being a displaced person.
 Adhering to the plain meaning of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) does not render either
 clause of the provision superfluous. The plain meaning of the first clause—i.e., that a
 displaced person does not include someone who leases from the displacing agency after
 the displacing agency takes title to the real property—does not mean that any and all lessees
 will be excluded as displaced persons. Rather, the first clause excludes as displaced
 persons only those who lease from the displacing agency after the displacing agency takes
 title to the real property, not all persons who lease from a displacing agency. As
 Respondents point out, “properties are routinely acquired subject to existing leasehold
 interests held by third parties.” (Citation omitted). For example, a displacing agency such
 as the City may acquire title to property through eminent domain that is subject to an
 existing lease. In that situation, where a displacing agency takes title to property that is
 subject to an existing lease, the lease would predate the agency’s taking, and the existing
 lessee would not be excluded as a displaced person by operation of the first clause of RP §
 12-201(e)(2)(iii); under that circumstance, the existing lessee may be entitled to moving
 and relocation expenses under RP § 12-205(a). The plain language of the first clause of
 RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) simply means that tenants who have leases in effect prior to the
 transfer of title to a displacing agency may qualify as displaced persons, whereas tenants
 who leased from the displacing agency after the displacing agency took title would not.
 - 29 -
 There is nothing ambiguous or superfluous about it. It just so happens that, in this instance,
 the Market was purchased by the City in 1847, well before Wireless One entered into its
 lease. It certainly cannot be said that every property that the City develops will have been
 owned since the 1800s or earlier, or that the first clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) precludes
 compensation for moving and relocation expenses in every case.7
 Nor does adhering to the plain meaning of the statute render the second clause
 7
 Similarly, our interpretation of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) would not affect relocation
 assistance for tenants of public housing, which is governed by a different statute. The
 Assisted Housing Preservation Act, Md. Code Ann., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. (2005, 2019
 Repl. Vol.) (“HS”) §§ 7-101 to 7-501, includes HS § 7-219 (Relocation During
 Rehabilitation), and “applies if a protected action involves substantial rehabilitation or
 reconstruction that does not allow continued occupancy of a unit because of danger to the
 health and safety of the household.” HS § 7-219(a). “Protected actions” include “the
 termination before expiration of or failure to exercise any stated renewal option under an
 agreement providing for project-based § 8 rental assistance for any units in an assisted
 project[.]” HS § 7-102(a)(2). “A property qualifies as an assisted project if . . . “a loan
 financing the property is insured or assisted under . . . the National Housing Act[ or] the
 Housing Act of 1949[.]” HS § 7-105(2)(i).
 Specifically, where “a protected action involves substantial rehabilitation or
 reconstruction that does not allow continued occupancy of a unit because of danger to the
 health and safety of the household[,]” HS § 7-219(a), HS § 7-219(d) requires payment of
 relocation expenses, stating:
 (1) The owner shall pay relocation expenses in accordance with [HS]
 § 7-212(b)(2) [] on or before the date when the designated household vacates
 the unit.
 (2) The owner shall also reimburse a designated household that
 returns to its unit under [HS § 7-219](c)(2) [] for its relocation expenses in
 accordance with [HS] § 7-212(b)[].
 In turn, HS § 7-212(b) names specific dollar amounts for relocation expenses, stating:
 Tenant protection assistance consists of:
 - 30 -
 superfluous. As we explained above, the second clause excludes from the definition of a
 displaced person those who occupy a property on a rental basis for either a short term or
 period subject to termination when the property is needed for the program or project. To
 be sure, as Respondents point out, “there may be overlap among tenants excluded by the
 first clause of [RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)] and those excluded by the second,” but “each clause
 covers factual scenarios that the other does not.” (Footnote omitted). Respondents provide
 the following examples. A tenant who enters into a multi-year lease—i.e., a long term, not
 a short term, lease—after the displacing agency took title would be excluded as a displaced
 person under the first clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), but not by the second clause. By
 contrast, a sublessee who leases on a month-to-month, i.e., short-term, basis from a
 leaseholder after a displacing agency took title would not be excluded as a displaced person
 under the first clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) because it is not leasing from the displacing
 (1) paying each assisted household $475 on or before the day that the
 assisted household vacates the unit;
 (2) reimbursing each assisted household for relocation expenses
 exceeding $475 and up to $950, actually and reasonably incurred; and
 (3) offering each assisted household that is current in its rent and has
 not violated any other material term of its lease, a lease extension for at least
 1 year from the giving of the notice of intent.
 Consistent with the statute described above, according to the Housing Authority of
 Baltimore City (“HABC”)’s website, if a resident has “to move out temporarily during
 construction or renovation[,] . . . HABC will help [the resident] move[, and] will provide
 [the resident] with a place to stay.” HABC, What You Should Know About The Rental
 Assistance Demonstration Program (RAD) Phase III at 1 (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.
 habc.org/media/1416/rad-phase-3-faqs-for-residents_82418.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q77M-
 UFHB].
 - 31 -
 agency, but the sublessee would be excluded under the second clause. In short, applying
 the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) as we do in this case does not render either
 clause of the provision meaningless or ambiguous.
 We are also unpersuaded that there is any ambiguity in the definition of “displacing
 agency” in RP § 12-201(f), as the Attorney General contends. RP § 12-201(f) defines a
 “displacing agency” as follows:
 “Displacing agency” means any public or private agency or person carrying
 out:
 (1) A program or project with federal financial assistance;
 (2) A public works program or project with State financial assistance;
 or
 (3) Acquisition by eminent domain or by negotiation.
 Under the plain meaning of RP § 12-201(f)(2), the City plainly qualifies as a displacing
 agency because it is a public agency carrying out a public works program or project with
 State financial assistance. There is simply no ambiguity in the application or definition of
 a “displacing agency.”
 Yet, both Wireless One and the Attorney General attempt to read into RP § 12-
 201(f) a meaning that its language simply does not support. Wireless One contends that
 the City did not become a “displacing agency” at the time the Market was established in
 1847 because it was not carrying out a public works project with State financial assistance
 at that time. Rather, according to Wireless One, the City did not become a “displacing
 agency” until it started to carry out the program of redeveloping the Market (which
 occurred after Wireless One entered into its lease), thus rendering inapplicable the
 - 32 -
 exemption in the first clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). The Attorney General adopts this
 rationale and contends that RP § 12-201(f) contains a “latent ambiguity,” arguing:
 [B]y using the present progressive tense in the phrase “carrying out,” the
 statutory language appears to suggest that an entity may be considered a
 “displacing agency” only insofar as it is then-actively and currently engaged
 in “carrying out” a “program or project” or “[a]cquisition by eminent domain
 or by negotiation.” This definition of “displacing agency” would thus
 exclude any entity that acquires (or has acquired) a property while not at that
 time engaging in these enumerated activities. And, in turn, interpreting the
 definition of “displacing agency” in that manner would have a significant
 and perhaps dispositive effect on the way [RP] § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) should be
 interpreted.
 (Second alteration in original). In other words, like Wireless One, the Attorney General
 posits that the definition of a “displacing agency” would exclude any entity that acquired
 a property while not engaging in the described activities of RP § 12-201(f), or, stated
 conversely, that an entity qualifies as a “displacing agency” only if it is actively carrying
 out a program or project.
 We disagree with the manner in which Wireless One and the Attorney General
 interpret the plain language of RP § 12-201(f). Both read words into the definition of a
 “displacing agency” that simply are not present in the statute. RP § 12-201(f) does not
 state that an agency becomes a “displacing agency” only when it is actively and currently
 engaged in carrying out a federal- or State-funded program or project or acquisition by
 eminent domain or by negotiation. Such a definition reads into the statute language that
 just does not exist, and nothing within the text of RP § 12-201(f) remotely suggests such
 an exclusion. Indeed, nothing in the plain language of RP § 12-201(f) includes a temporal
 element, such that whether an entity is a “displacing agency” is dependent on when the
 - 33 -
 entity took title to the property or began carrying out a program or project. As Respondents
 point out, “[a]n agency may be ‘carrying out’ a public works program with State financial
 assistance regardless of when the agency acquired the property involved[,]” and “[t]aking
 title to a property years (or centuries) prior to starting a public works program has no logical
 effect on whether an entity is now ‘carrying out’ such a program and therefore potentially
 a ‘displacing agency’ under the statute.” In sum, we discern no ambiguity in the definition
 of “displacing agency” as set forth in RP § 12-201(f).
 Because the plain language of RP § 12-201(e) and (f) could not be clearer and given
 our conclusion that there is no ambiguity in the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), our
 analysis could end at this point without resorting to a review of the legislative history. See
 Lillian C. Blentlinger, 456 Md. at 294, 173 A.2d at 562 (“When the statutory language is
 clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s
 intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday
 meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to
 the statute as it its written.” (Citation omitted)). Although there is no need to review the
 legislative history, we shall address the matter because the parties and the Attorney General
 have done so in some detail, and it may be desirable to clear up any confusion about the
 legislative history of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii). We observe that our holding concerning the
 plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is fully supported by the legislative history, and
 that the legislative history does not compel a contrary interpretation. Cf. id. at 309, 173
 A.3d at 570 (“Although the language of the statute is clear, a brief review of the legislative
 history of relevant statutory provisions provides a context for our holding and confirms our
 - 34 -
 interpretation of the statute.” (Cleaned up)). Indeed, our review of the legislative history
 leads to the conclusion that the bill that became, among other statutes, RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii), was intended to be similar to its federal counterpart.
 We begin by setting forth the party’s views of the relevant legislative history.
 Wireless One contends that the Relocation Expenses Act, RP §§ 12-201 to 12-212,8 was
 modeled after, and should be construed consistently with, its federal counterpart, the
 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (“the
 Uniform Relocation Assistance Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 to 4655. Similarly, the Attorney
 General contends that the legislative history of the Relocation Expenses Act “demonstrates
 a clear intent to make Maryland law consistent with the 1987 amendments (and the
 Uniform Relocation Assistance Act as a whole).” As such, Wireless One and the Attorney
 General argue that, RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) must be construed to be consistent with its
 federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii), which leads to the result that the exemption
 in the definition of “displaced person” for a “person who leases from the displacing agency
 after the displacing agency takes title to real property” applies only where the displacing
 agency has acquired a property for a program or project and the person’s lease begins after
 such acquisition.
 Respondents counter that the General Assembly enacted the definition of “displaced
 person” in RP § 12-201(e), including the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), knowing
 8
 Although the General Assembly has sometimes enacted statutes that set forth short
 titles of acts, it did not do so for RP §§ 12-201 to 12-212. That said, in A & E N., 431 Md.
 at 263, 64 A.3d at 909, this Court referred to RP §§ 12-201 to 12-212 as the “Relocation
 Expenses Act[.]” We do the same here.
 - 35 -
 that the definition was different from that in the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act.
 Respondents contend that, despite being aware of the language in the federal statute, “the
 General Assembly took a different approach in 1989 when delimiting the class of tenants
 who fall outside the definition of ‘displaced person.’” (Citations omitted). As such,
 according to Respondents, the General Assembly “deliberately drafted alternative
 language” from the federal statute, such that, under Maryland law, a tenant who leases
 property after the displacing agency took title is not a displaced person, notwithstanding
 whether the displacing agency had plans for rehabilitation at the time of acquisition. In
 short, Respondents argue that the General Assembly chose to distinguish the Maryland
 statute from the federal statute.
 Our review of the legislative history reveals the following. In 1970, Congress
 passed the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act “to standardize federal legislation regarding
 relocation assistance.” Alexander v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 441 U.S. 39, 49
 (1979). The purpose of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act was “to establish a uniform
 policy for the fair and equitable treatment of owners, tenants, and other persons displaced
 by the acquisition of real property in Federal and federally assisted programs” so “that such
 persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the
 benefit of the public as a whole.” Id. at 51 (cleaned up). As originally enacted, the Uniform
 Relocation Assistance Act defined a “displaced person” as
 any person who . . . moves from real property, or moves his [or her] personal
 property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such real
 property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written order of the
 acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken
 - 36 -
 by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance[.]
 Id. at 42 n.1 (citation omitted). Thus, as originally enacted, the Uniform Relocation
 Assistance Act provided relocation benefits only to those persons who were displaced as a
 result of government acquisition of property. See id. at 59 (“[T]he legislative history of
 the written order clause reveals no congressional intent to extend relocation benefits
 beyond the acquisition context.”). The Uniform Relocation Assistance Act also contained
 a provision that conditioned ongoing federal financial assistance upon the receipt of a
 State’s “satisfactory assurances” that “fair and reasonable relocation” assistance would be
 provided to displaced persons to the same extent as required by federal law. 42 U.S.C. §
 4630(1).
 The following year, in 1971, the General Assembly enacted the Relocation
 Expenses Act by passing House Bill 972. See 1971 Md. Laws 1318 (Ch. 628, H.B. 972).
 As part of its purpose statement, House Bill 972 provided: “WHEREAS, [the Uniform
 Relocation Assistance Act] changes the relocation assistance legislation now in effect at
 the Federal level and requires that in order to obtain maximum Federal funds, for the
 Federally-aided public projects, the State relocation assistance legislation must conform to
 the requirements of” that Act. Id. House Bill 972 further provided that it was “the
 legislative intention that persons who are displaced as a result of land acquisition . . . shall
 not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designated for the benefit of the
 public as a whole.” Id. at 1319. At that time, the Relocation Expenses Act defined a
 “displaced person” as
 any person who . . . moves from real property, or moves his [or her] personal
 - 37 -
 property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such property in
 whole or in part, or as the result of a written order of the acquiring agency to
 vacate real property for a public works program or project undertaken by the
 Condemning Authority.
 Id. The Relocation Expenses Act also provided:
 Each Condemning Authority may prescribe such rules, regulations[,] and
 procedures, consistent with the provisions of this subtitle and [the Uniform
 Relocation Assistance Act] and amendments thereof and rules and
 regulations issued pursuant thereto, as it deems necessary or appropriate to
 carry out the provisions of this subtitle and [the Uniform Relocation
 Assistance Act].
 Id. at 1323. In 1974, the Relocation Expenses Act was recodified at Md. Code Ann., Real
 Prop. (1974) §§ 12-201 to 12-212. See 1974 Md. Laws 416-30 (Ch. 12, S.B. 200).
 Years later, in 1987, Congress effectuated an expansion of the Uniform Relocation
 Assistance Act by adopting the current definition of a “displaced person,” codified at 42
 U.S.C. § 4601(6). See Pub. L. 100-17, Title IV, § 402. Under 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i),
 a “displaced person” includes not only those persons who move from property “as a direct
 result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of such real property in
 whole for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial
 assistance[,]” but also those who move “as a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition, or
 such other displacing activity as the lead agency may prescribe[.]” And, for the first time,
 the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act expressly excluded certain persons from the
 definition of a “displaced person,” including those persons who occupy the property
 unlawfully or for the sole purpose of obtaining assistance under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
 4601(6)(B)(i). Importantly, 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii) was also enacted and provides:
 The term “displaced person” does not include[] in any case in which the
 - 38 -
 displacing agency acquires property for a program or project, any person
 (other than a person who was an occupant of such property at the time it was
 acquired) who occupies such property on a rental basis for a short term or a
 period subject to termination when the property is needed for the program or
 project.
 Additionally, the 1987 amendments added a certification provision, 42 U.S.C. § 4604(a),
 which provides that
 the head of a Federal agency may discharge any of his [or her]
 responsibilities under this chapter by accepting a certification by a State
 agency that it will carry out such responsibility, if the head of the lead agency
 determines that such responsibility will be carried out in accordance with
 State laws which will accomplish the purpose and effect of this chapter.
 After the 1987 federal amendments, at the Governor’s direction, the Secretary of
 Transportation established a task force consisting of agencies that would be affected by the
 federal amendments. In the meantime, in a letter to the Governor dated December 16,
 1988, the Federal Highway Administrator sought to enlist the Governor’s “support for the
 passage in [Maryland] of a comprehensive statute to enable all State, local, and private
 entities receiving Federal funds to comply with the Uniform [Relocation Assistance] Act,
 as amended.” Letter from Robert E. Farris, Federal Highway Administrator, to William
 Donald Schaefer, Governor of Maryland (Dec. 16, 1988). In the letter, the Federal
 Highway Administrator advised that those statutory “assurances must be in place as of
 April 2, 1989[,]” and, if they were not,
 the Federal agency providing the financial assistance for any ongoing project
 must withhold funding for any acquisitions or displacement occurring on or
 after April 2, 1989, and further, shall not approve any new activity, project,
 - 39 -
 or program which will result in acquisition or displacement.
 Id.
 Ultimately, the interagency task force’s work culminated in House Bill 720, which
 was introduced during the 1989 legislative session. House Bill 720 was:
 FOR the purpose of generally revising State laws on relocation assistance
 and adopting federal requirements relating to uniform policies and
 procedures for relocation assistance when permanent displacement occurs as
 the result of land acquisition, demolition, rehabilitation, and other activities;
 providing for the uniform treatment of displaced persons; defining certain
 terms; altering certain payment limits; making this Act an emergency
 measure; and generally relating to relocation assistance and land acquisition
 policies in the State.
 1989 Md. Laws 1253 (Pt. 2, Ch. 10, H.B. 720). House Bill 720 amended the definition of
 a “displaced person” to “any person who moves from real property, or moves his [or her]
 personal property from real property” “as a direct result of a written notice of intent to
 acquire or the acquisition of such real property in whole or in part by a displacing
 agency[,]” or “as a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition, or other displacing activity as
 the lead agency may prescribe[.]” Id. at 1255.
 House Bill 720 also added a provision excluding certain persons from the definition
 of “displaced person,” including “any person who, on the open market, without threat of
 condemnation, sells his [or her] real property to a displacing agency[,]” as well as
 “unlawful occupants or anyone occupying such dwelling for the purpose of obtaining
 assistance under” the Relocation Expenses Act. Id. at 1256. Significantly, House Bill 720
 added the exemption currently codified at RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)—namely, that a
 - 40 -
 “displaced person” does not include:
 A person who leases from the displacing agency after the displacing agency
 takes title to the real property, or any person other than a person who was an
 occupant of such property at the time it was acquired who occupies the
 property on a rental basis for a short term or period subject to termination
 when the property is needed for the program or project.
 Id.
 The bill file for House Bill 720 indicates that the General Assembly intended the
 Relocation Expenses Act to be similar to its federal counterpart. For example, a document
 entitled “Analysis of House Bill 720” notes that House Bill 720 “is proposed to bring the
 Maryland statute into compliance with [the 1987 federal amendments] regarding relocation
 assistance programs and to provide enabling legislation in order that [S]tate and local
 displacing authorities may continue to qualify for federal aid funding.” The analysis noted
 that “[l]anguage in the State bill mirrors the federal law in many instances to [e]nsure
 similar intent and uniformity of both statutes.” The analysis also discussed the
 amendments to the various statutes. As to the amendments to Md. Code Ann., Real Prop.
 (1974, 1988 Repl. Vol.) § 12-201, the analysis stated, in pertinent part:
 The definition of “displaced person” is being expanded and modified to
 include permanent displacement resulting from rehabilitation and demolition
 and certain additional eligibilities for small businesses, farms[,] and
 residential tenants. Another notable change is [that] all public and private
 agencies and persons, (whether or not such entity has the power of eminent
 domain), using federal assistance in a project are required to comply with
 this act.
 And, House Bill 720’s Fiscal Note stated that the bill was introduced “in order to bring
 State law in compliance with federal regulations[.]”
 House Bill 720’s bill file also contains letters of support from various agencies and
 - 41 -
 groups that noted that House Bill 720 was necessary to comply with federal regulations.
 For example, in a letter to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee dated March 29,
 1989, the Maryland Association of Counties stated that it supported House Bill 720, and
 that it “underst[oo]d[] that this emergency piece of legislation [was] necessary to place the
 State in compliance with federal regulations pertaining to relocation assistance.” Letter
 from Raquel Sanudo, Md. Assoc. of Counties, Inc., to Sen. Jud. Proceedings Comm. (Mar.
 29, 1989). Similarly, in a letter to the Chair of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
 dated March 29, 1989, the Maryland Builders Association stated that it supported House
 Bill 720, and noted that the bill would “define the State laws and federal requirements
 allowing for uniform treatment of the displaced person. We believe that this improves the
 law.” Letter from Robert L. Mitchell, President, Md. Builders Ass’n, to Sen. Walter M.
 Baker, Chair, Sen. Jud. Proceedings Comm. (Mar. 29, 1989). In a letter to the Chair of the
 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee dated March 28, 1989, the Administrator of the
 Maryland State Highway Administration sought the Chair’s support to expedite House Bill
 720, which he characterized as bringing Maryland “into compliance with a federal
 mandate[.]” Letter from Hal Kassoff, Administrator, State Highway Admin., to Sen.
 Walter M. Baker, Chair, Sen. Jud. Proceedings Comm. (Mar. 28, 1989). And, in a
 memorandum dated March 28, 1989, the Secretary of Transportation advised that he
 supported House Bill 720, which “modifie[d] and expand[ed] the existing [S]tate law to
 comply with federal law and recommendations by providing a single law applicable to
 persons permanently displaced for public improvements.” Mem. from Md. Dep’t of
 - 42 -
 Transp., Office of the Sec’y, to Sen. Jud. Proceedings Comm. (Mar. 28, 1989).
 Interestingly, House Bill 720’s bill file also contains a document entitled “Title IV[,]
 Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987[,] 42 USC 4601[,]” that appears to be a
 three-page list identifying the various amendments to the Uniform Relocation Assistance
 Act. With respect to amendments to the definition of “displaced person” in the Uniform
 Relocation Assistance Act, the document states:
 Displaced person
 - Expands the definition to include displacement as a result of
 rehabilitation, demolition[,] and other activities when such
 displacement is permanent.
 - Includes any other person eligible under criteria established by head
 of lead agency.
 - Precludes eligibility for persons on unlawful occupancy.
 - Excludes any person who moves in after property is acquired.
 (Some capitalization omitted).
 House Bill 720 ultimately passed in the General Assembly, and went into effect on
 April 4, 1989, the date it was enacted. See 1989 Md. Laws 1268 (Pt. 2, Ch. 10, H.B. 720).
 The definition of a “displaced person” set forth in RP § 12-201(e) and its predecessors,
 including the exemption in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), has remained unchanged since that time.
 What can be gleaned from this legislative history is that, in amending the Relocation
 Expenses Act through House Bill 720, the General Assembly sought to comply with the
 1987 amendments to the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act and related regulations and
 intended the Relocation Expenses Act to be similar to its federal counterpart. The
 - 43 -
 legislative history reveals nothing more, and nothing less. With respect to the exemption
 in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), if the intent was to largely to comply with the language of 42
 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii), then the language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is quite similar to its
 federal counterpart.9
 In our view, RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is not inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. §
 4601(6)(B)(ii). From our perspective, in enacting RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), the General
 Assembly sought to give effect to what appears in 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii) to be the
 description of two types of persons who are not displaced persons. Namely, in the first
 part of 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii), in parentheses, Congress excluded as a “displaced
 person” persons “other than a person who was an occupant of such property at the time it
 was acquired[.]” This language is consistent with the first clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)
 that a “displaced person” does not include “[a] person who leases from the displacing
 agency after the displacing agency takes title to the real property[.]”10 In 42 U.S.C. §
 9
 It is plausible that, in enacting House Bill 720, the General Assembly pursued one
 of two possible alternatives. The first is that the drafters of House Bill 720 were provided
 with the amended Uniform Relocation Assistance Act and drafted a bill that was intended
 to be similar to the federal statute, which is dense and not easily decipherable. The second
 is that the drafters of House Bill 720 were provided with the amended Uniform Relocation
 Assistance Act and sought to draft a bill that was intended to be different from the federal
 statute, but that would be similar enough to pass muster, i.e., the General Assembly
 intended to enact a different, but close enough, statute to comport with the federal statute.
 This appears to be Respondents’ position. Certainly, had the General Assembly intended
 to draft a statute that departed and differed from the federal statute, the bill file would have
 contained information to that effect; but, the bill file does not contain such an indication.
 In our view, rather, the legislative history supports the first scenario—that the General
 Assembly intended to draft a bill that was similar to the federal statute.
 10
 The document in House Bill 720’s bill file that lists the amendments to 42 U.S.C.
 § 4601 states that one of the amendments to the definition of “displaced person” operated
 - 44 -
 4601(6)(B)(ii), Congress also excluded as a “displaced person” “in any case in which the
 displacing agency acquires property for a program or project, any person . . . who occupies
 such property on a rental basis for a short term or a period subject to termination when the
 property is needed for the program or project.” The second clause of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)
 encapsulates this exclusion, and provides that a “displaced person” does not include “any
 person other than a person who was an occupant of such property at the time it was acquired
 who occupies the property on a rental basis for a short term or period subject to termination
 when the property is needed for the program or project.” Put simply, the language of RP
 § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is consistent with, and similar, albeit not identical, to, the language of
 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii). As such, giving effect to the plain language of RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii) does not run afoul of, or otherwise render the exemption inconsistent with,
 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii).
 We disagree with Wireless One and the Attorney General that the language of 42
 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii) excludes a person from being a displaced person only if the person
 enters a lease after the displacing agency acquired the property for a specific program or
 project—i.e., not simply after a person enters a lease after the displacing agency takes title
 to the property. From a practical standpoint, this reading of 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii)
 does not make sense because, if a displacing agency was acquiring property for a specific
 to “exclude[] any person who moves in after property is acquired.” (Capitalization
 omitted). In other words, the document’s interpretation of the exemption included in
 parentheses in 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii) is the same as what became the first clause of
 RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii).
 - 45 -
 program or project, it likely would not be leasing to a tenant and then trying to put that
 tenant out as the program or project progresses.11 But more importantly, the plain language
 of neither 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii) nor RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) says this.
 Ultimately, the Relocation Expenses Act means what it says, and the language of
 RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) is plain and unambiguous on its face. Thus, resorting to a review of
 the legislative history is not necessary. Nonetheless, at bottom, the legislative history
 supports the view that the General Assembly intended the Relocation Expenses Act, as
 amended, to be similar to its federal counterpart, and that the exemption in RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii) is not inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(B)(ii). Applying the plain and
 unambiguous language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), without a foray into the statute’s
 legislative history, comports with our principles of sound statutory construction. In this
 instance, we apply the plain language of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii), with the legislative history
 not compelling a contrary result.
 To be sure, the purpose of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act and the
 Relocation Expenses Act is to provide certain benefits to displaced persons. That purpose
 is not undermined by our holding in this case—namely, that, Wireless One is not a
 “displaced person,” as defined in RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i), because it voluntarily terminated
 11
 In other words, the City decides what tenants it will lease to, and there would be
 no opportunity for a tenant to “game the system” by leasing a property after the agency
 acquires title with the tenant on notice of a redevelopment project unless the City
 acquiesced to the lease—which it would not if the tenant’s occupancy was not consistent
 with the planned redevelopment. In addition, RP § 12-201(e)(2)(ii) provides that a
 “displaced person” does not include anyone who occupies a dwelling for the purpose of
 obtaining moving and relocation expenses assistance.
 - 46 -
 its lease and, as described in RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii)’s exemption, because it leased from a
 displacing agency after the displacing agency took title to the property. The plain language
 of the exemption of RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii) does not result in any and all persons being
 excluded as displaced persons. The circumstances in this case lead to the conclusion,
 however, that Wireless One is both not a displaced person under RP § 12-201(e)(1)(i) and
 exempt from qualifying as a displaced person under RP § 12-201(e)(2)(iii).12
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
 APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY
 COSTS.
 12
 As a final matter, on brief, Wireless One acknowledges that its claim for
 “unconstitutional taking depends on whether the City wrongfully denied [it] moving and
 relocation expenses.” Because we determine that the City did not wrongfully deny
 Wireless One moving and relocation expenses, as Wireless One abandoned the lease and
 the property, and Wireless One is not a “displaced person” as it “lease[d] from the
 displacing agency after the displacing agency [took] title to the real property[,]” RP § 12-
 201(e)(2)(iii), we conclude that there was no unconstitutional taking.
 - 47 -
 Circuit Court for Baltimore City IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 Case No. 24-C-17-003125
 Argued: May 2, 2019
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 70
 September Term, 2018
 ______________________________________
 WIRELESS ONE, INC.
 v.
 MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
 BALTIMORE, ET AL.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 *Greene
 McDonald
 Watts
 Hotten
 Getty
 Booth,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J.,
 which Barbera, C.J., joins.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: August 23, 2019
 *Greene, J., now retired, participated in the
 hearing and conference of this case while an
 active member of this Court; after being recalled
 pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV,
 Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
 and adoption of this opinion.
 “Plain meaning,” like beauty, may be in the eye of the beholder. This case provides
 an example where a focus on one possible “plain meaning” of a statute, together with a
 blind eye to the statute’s history, leads to an interpretation that would undoubtedly astonish
 those who promoted and passed the statute.
 Background
 The facts are straightforward. Baltimore City has owned and operated Cross Street
 Market, in the heart of the Federal Hill neighborhood, since the 1840s. In 2004, Wireless
 One began renting a stall in the Market for its cellphone business. In 2016, the City entered
 into an agreement with a management company to operate and rehabilitate the Market.
 Wireless One apparently did not fit into the management company’s new vision for the
 Market and was informed that its lease would not be renewed. Wireless One vacated the
 premises and filed suit for relocation and moving expenses.
 The City filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.
 The Circuit Court granted judgment in favor of the City on the ground that Wireless One
 was not a “displaced person” entitled to relocation benefits under Maryland Code, Real
 Property Article (“RP”), §12-201 et seq. It reasoned that Wireless One fell within an
 exclusion under that statute for a person who leases from the “displacing agency” after the
 displacing agency takes title to the property. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on the
 same rationale. 239 Md. App. 687 (2018).
 The Alternative Holdings of the Majority Opinion
 The Majority Opinion holds that Wireless One is not a displaced person for two
 alternative reasons.1 It is possible that the first reason has merit, but it was not addressed
 by the Circuit Court, perhaps because there was a dispute over some of the underlying facts
 pertinent to that issue. In my view, the case should be remanded to the Circuit Court on
 that issue. The second rationale for the Majority Opinion was addressed by the Circuit
 Court, but in my view was decided incorrectly.
 Holding Based on Definition in RP §12-201(e)(1)
 First, the Majority Opinion holds that Wireless One voluntarily terminated its lease
 and abandoned its stall before any redevelopment occurred, and therefore did not fit the
 definition of a displaced person under RP §12-201(e)(1)(i) for that reason. See Majority
 slip op. at 23-25. This was the primary argument made in the City’s Motion to Dismiss or,
 in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. In making that argument, the City relied on an
 affidavit of a partner of its management company to the effect that Wireless One had left
 voluntarily in return for forgiveness of some of its rent liability. See Statement of Grounds
 and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary
 Judgment at pp. 2-4. In opposition, Wireless One submitted an affidavit of its owner
 asserting that the business had not left the Market voluntarily, but only “because I was told
 1
 The Majority Opinion also holds that there was no unconstitutional taking of
 Wireless One’s property. Majority slip op. at 47 n.12. (The Circuit Court held that
 Wireless One failed to state a claim in that regard). That holding is contingent on the
 Majority Opinion’s holdings concerning Wireless One’s eligibility for relocation benefits.
 -2-
 I had to leave.” The City’s reliance on alleged facts outside of the allegations of the
 complaint meant that the City was seeking, as its motion stated, summary judgment on this
 ground.2 See also Maryland Rule 2-322(c).
 In its ruling in this case, the Circuit Court acknowledged the City’s argument on this
 ground, but did not grant summary judgment for that reason. Instead, it dismissed the
 complaint on a different ground, to be discussed in greater detail below. Under the
 longstanding view of this Court, an appellate court ordinarily will not approve a grant of
 summary judgment on a ground different from that of the Circuit Court. See, e.g., Mathews
 v. Cassidy Turley Maryland, Inc., 435 Md. 584, 598-99 (2013); Henley v. Prince George’s
 County, 305 Md. 320, 333 (1986). Here, the Circuit Court never addressed the merits of
 this argument, much less determined whether the relevant facts were undisputed such that
 summary judgment was even feasible. If we think there might be merit in granting
 judgment on this ground, we should remand for the Circuit Court to consider it in the first
 instance.
 Holding Based on Exclusion in RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii)
 Second, the Majority Opinion holds that, pursuant to RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii),
 Wireless One is not a “displaced person” for purposes of the statute because the City
 acquired title to the Market before it entered into a lease in 2004 with Wireless One.
 2
 The Majority Opinion suggests that the affidavit submitted by the City was
 addressed to the issue of whether there was an unconstitutional taking. Majority slip op.
 at 25-26 & n.6. In fact, most of that affidavit, as well as the opposing affidavit of the owner
 of Wireless One, was directly addressed to whether the business had voluntarily departed
 from the Market – a key question for purposes of the City’s argument under RP §12-
 201(e)(1).
 -3-
 Majority slip op. at 25-47. This was the basis for the Circuit Court’s judgment in this case
 and thus is properly before us for consideration. The City argued, and the Majority Opinion
 now agrees, that Wireless One is not entitled to relocation assistance – essentially because
 its tenancy began after 1847. In so ruling, the Majority Opinion relies heavily on the
 purported plain meaning of the text of the statute. Wireless One counters that it is entitled
 to relocation assistance under the statute because a contrary reading would render RP §12-
 201(e)(2)(iii) inconsistent with a federal statute concerning relocation assistance – i.e., 42
 U.S.C. §4601(6)(B)(ii).
 The State was invited by the Court to submit an amicus brief in light of the fact that
 RP §12-201 et seq. concerns not only relocation assistance provided by the City but also
 that provided by the State and other local governments.3 The State provided an extensive
 analysis of the statute and its legislative history, which neither party had previously
 addressed in their briefs. Based on that analysis, the State reached a different conclusion
 than the City as to the breadth of the exclusion in RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii).
 In my view, the Majority Opinion’s analysis of RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii) is flawed. For
 the reasons explained below, I believe that the State’s construction of the statute is more
 reasonable and consistent with the text and its history.
 Origin of the Maryland Relocation Expenses Act
 The City concedes that Wireless One would be entitled to relocation benefits under
 a federal statute known as the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
 3
 See Maryland Constitution, Article V, §6 (Attorney General to be notified
 immediately of any case “in which the State ... has interest”).
 -4-
 Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §4601 et seq., if federal
 funds were involved in the redevelopment of the Market. But it argues that Wireless One
 is not entitled to those benefits under the State statute. However, as the history of the
 Maryland statute demonstrates, it was enacted to adopt the same standards as the federal
 statute and related regulations. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy
 of Eminent Domain, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 121-24 & n.130 (2006) (noting that the
 Maryland statute was intended to mirror the federal statute). The intertwined history of the
 federal and State statutes is instructive.
 In 1971, in an effort to standardize federal law concerning relocation assistance,
 Congress enacted the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 91-646. See
 Alexander v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 441 U.S. 39,
 49 (1979). Included in that statute was a provision that conditioned certain federal financial
 assistance on a state providing relocation assistance to persons displaced by government
 programs or projects to the same extent as federal law. Pub. L. No. 91-646, §210.
 In response to the federal law, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the
 Maryland Relocation Expenses Act. Chapter 628, Laws of Maryland 1971, now codified
 at RP §12-201 et seq. In the preamble to that law, the General Assembly specifically cited
 the federal statute and the need to ensure that “State relocation assistance legislation must
 conform to the requirements” of that statute. The preamble further declared the
 Legislature’s “intent to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment” of
 displaced persons. The law also contained a provision that directed agencies and local
 governments covered by the law to prescribe rules, regulations, and procedures consistent
 -5-
 with both the State statute and the federal statute – a provision that remains in the statute
 today. See RP §12-210; see also Maryland Code, Transportation Article, §8-501 et seq.
 (stating General Assembly’s intent that State agencies and political subdivisions comply
 with the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Act and “any rule or regulation adopted
 under” that Act).
 The initial iteration of the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Act had concerned
 persons displaced by the governmental acquisition of property. In 1987, Congress
 expanded the Act to include persons displaced by the rehabilitation or demolition of
 property with federal funding. Pub. L. No. 100-17, §402. The statute excluded certain
 categories of persons from those benefits, such as persons who occupied the property for
 the purpose of obtaining benefits under the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §4601(6)(B)(i). There
 is also an exclusion, in cases involving the acquisition of property, for persons who are not
 occupants at the time of acquisition. See 42 U.S.C. §4601(6)(B)(ii). Again, federal funding
 was made contingent on a state enacting an analogous state-law provision. Congress
 established a deadline of April 2, 1989 for states to comply.
 The legislative history of the 1987 amendments indicates that Congress intended
 “that state laws achieve the purpose and effect of the Act, particularly with respect to the
 definition of displaced person.” House Conf. Rep. No. 100-27, at 250 (reprinted in 1987
 U.S.C.C.A.N., v.2, at 234). The implementing regulations emphasized that the purpose of
 the new rules was “[t]o ensure that persons displaced as a direct result of Federal or
 federally-assisted projects are treated fairly, consistently, and equitably so that such
 displaced persons will not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of projects designed
 -6-
 for the benefit of the public as a whole.” 49 CFR 24.1(b). Federal funding is conditioned
 on state compliance with these provisions. 49 CFR 24.4(a)(1).
 Maryland again responded to the incentive provided in the federal law. An inter-
 agency task force was established in 1987 at the direction of the Governor, which resulted
 in the introduction of House Bill 720 at the 1989 session of the General Assembly. The
 purpose paragraph of that bill recited that it was intended to revise State laws on relocation
 assistance and “adopt[] federal requirements relating to uniform policies and procedures
 for relocation assistance when permanent displacement occurs as a result of land
 acquisition, demolition, rehabilitation, and other activities.”
 It is clear throughout the bill file for House Bill 720 that compliance with the federal
 standards, including with respect to the definition of “displaced person,” was the catalyst
 for the legislation. An analysis of House Bill 720 in the bill file notes that “several
 definitions [in RP §12-201] are being amended or revised to be consistent with those used
 in the federal legislation,” and “the definition of ‘displaced person’ is being expanded and
 modified to include permanent displacement resulting from rehabilitation and demolition
 and certain additional eligibilities for small businesses, farms and residential tenants.”
 The fiscal note for the bill stated that the legislation’s purpose was to make
 Maryland law compliant with federal regulations. Representatives of State agencies and
 local governments affected by the bill expressed the same understanding of the legislation.
 See, e.g., Memorandum from the Maryland Association of Counties concerning House Bill
 720 to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (March 29, 1989) (“this emergency
 piece of legislation is necessary to place the State in compliance with federal regulations
 -7-
 pertaining to relocation assistance.”); Letter from the Administrator of the Maryland State
 Highway Administration to the Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
 concerning House Bill 720 (March 28, 1989) (asking for bill’s passage to be expedited to
 bring Maryland “into compliance with a federal mandate[.]”). Nothing in the bill file
 suggests any intention to deviate from the federal standards in any respect.
 The General Assembly enacted House Bill 720 on an emergency basis with an
 effective date of April 4, 1989. Chapter 10, Laws of Maryland 1989. That law amended
 the definition of “displaced person” and included the language that now appears in RP §12-
 201(e)(2)(iii).
 Construing RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii) Consistently with the Federal Statute
 In holding that the slightly different language of the Maryland statute signals a
 significant departure from the federal statute on which it was based, the Majority Opinion
 asserts that “the plain meaning of the language of the statute is obvious” and that it “could
 not be clearer.” Majority slip. op. at 26-27, 29, 34. However, the key provision of the
 statute pertinent to this case seems to contain at least some ambiguity. It states:
 “Displaced person” does not include:
 A person who leases from the displacing agency after the displacing
 agency takes title to the real property, or any person other than a
 person who was an occupant of such property at the time it was
 acquired who occupies the property on a rental basis for a short term
 or period subject to termination when the property is needed for the
 program or project.
 RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii). As is evident, the phrase “displacing agency” appears twice in this
 provision. The statute elsewhere defines a “displacing agency” as “any public or private
 -8-
 person carrying out: (1) a program or project with federal financial assistance; (2) a public
 works program or project with State financial assistance; or (3) acquisition by eminent
 domain or negotiation.” RP §12-201(f). Notable in this definition is the use of present
 participle. The phrases “displacing agency” and “carrying out” both denote an actor
 currently effecting a displacement. Under this reading, Baltimore City did not become a
 “displacing agency” until it commenced the effort to rehabilitate the Market – a time at
 which Wireless One was already a tenant. In other words, a displaced cellphone business
 need not have had a market stall in 1847 to even be eligible for relocation assistance.
 The Majority Opinion argues that such an interpretation reads words into the statute
 that do not exist, claiming “nothing in the plain language of RP § 12-201(f) includes a
 temporal element.” Majority slip op. at 33. This is true only if one ignores the repeated
 use of the present participle in the sentence (“displacing agency” and “carrying out”). It is
 theoretically possible, on the face of the statute, that the Majority Opinion’s interpretation
 could be correct and that an agency that acquired its property decades ago would never be
 liable for relocation assistance. But this is not unambiguously clear from the text of the
 statute.
 There is a more significant issue with the Majority Opinion’s reading of the first
 clause of the provision (“A person who leases from the displacing agency after the
 displacing agency takes title to the real property”). If it means that no person who leases
 property from the government (after the government takes title to the property) can be
 eligible for relocation expenses, then very few tenants will be eligible for relocation
 expenses under Maryland law. Moreover, such a reading of the first clause renders
 -9-
 superfluous the second clause of the provision (“or any person other than a person who was
 an occupant of such property at the time it was acquired ...”). This Court has long
 explained that “whenever possible, the statute should be read so that no word, sentence,
 clause or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” See Whiting-Turner Contracting
 Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302 (2001).
 There is a different reasonable reading of the first clause. Large public works
 projects often suffer from time lags and delays for numerous reasons, including litigation.
 This means that existing facilities may continue to operate without change for months or
 years before a rehabilitation or demolition project begins (as has been the case with the
 Market project). As a result, someone might try to game the system by leasing a property
 after an agency acquires title for a project and then, even though fully on notice about the
 timeline of the project, demand compensation when the rehabilitation or demolition project
 eventually commences. The first clause of RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii) can be read as simply
 discouraging such behavior and thereby fulfilling the same function as 42 U.S.C.
 §4601(6)(B).
 In my view, this narrower reading of the first clause makes more sense. Importantly,
 it addresses a real concern without being overbroad, in a way that is completely consistent
 with the federal statute and regulations. The standards included in the federal statute were
 intended to counteract the “‘violent unfairness’ of tenants’ forced displacement” by
 government projects and the “substantial financial hardship” suffered by individuals
 displaced from their residences. Garnett, supra, 105 Mich. L. Rev. at 107, 121-23. The
 standards of the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Act apply, with some exceptions,
 - 10 -
 to public housing programs of the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.
 See https://perma.cc/GK8C-EDD3. There is no blanket exclusion under that law simply
 because a housing agency had title to a property before a tenant moved in. Under the
 Majority Opinion’s interpretation of the State statute, similar relocation assistance would
 not be available under the State statute on the happenstance that an agency owned a
 residential property before a tenancy began, even if the displacement occurred years or
 decades hence. As this Court has frequently said, “[o]ur interpretation should avoid
 illogical, absurd, or anomalous results.” Blackburn Ltd. Partnership v. Paul, 438 Md. 100,
 122 (2014).
 At the very least, the language of the exclusion from the definition of displaced
 person is ambiguous and that text should be considered in light of the legislative history of
 the statute and the parallel federal exclusion. As outlined above, the legislative history of
 the 1989 amendment that resulted in this language is quite clear on the Legislature’s intent.
 Accordingly, I would not decide this case on an interpretation of a particular “plain
 meaning” of RP §12-201(e)(2)(iii) that happens to be contrary to that intent.
 Chief Judge Barbera has advised that she joins this opinion.
 - 11 -