jurisdiction: US

text:
 233 Md. 288 (1964)
 196 A.2d 614
 BROWN
 v.
 STATE
 [No. 30, September Term, 1963.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided January 13, 1964.
 The cause was argued before BRUNE C.J., and HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HORNEY and SYBERT, JJ.
 Jerome F. Connell, with whom was Edwin A. Lechowicz on the brief, for appellant.
 Fred Oken, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Marvin H. Anderson and John A. Blondell, State's Attorney and Deputy State's Attorney, respectively, for Anne Arundel County, on the brief, for appellee.
 BRUNE, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County finding the appellant, James Dawson Brown, guilty of contempt by reason of his refusal to obey an order of that court to answer before the Grand Jury for Anne Arundel County certain questions which had been propounded to him before that body, and fining him $500.00 and sentencing him to jail until he should purge himself of contempt by answering the questions. He was released on bail pending this appeal.
 The questions which the appellant refused to answer were *292 propounded to him in the course of a grand jury investigation into the alleged bribery of a Trial Magistrate for Anne Arundel County "for the purpose of squelching or dismissing" a traffic charge against the appellant. Most of the questions pertained to a direct charge of bribery, but one pertained to conspiracy to bribe this official. The appellant's fundamental basis for refusing to answer was and is the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.[1] The State contends that the testimony of the appellant was compellable and that he was entitled to immunity in respect thereof under Section 23 of Article 27 of the Code (1957), enacted pursuant to Section 50 of Article 3 of the Maryland Constitution. The appellant contends: first, that the statutory immunity afforded is not broad enough to "abridge" the privilege against self-incrimination contained in Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights; and second, that the statutory immunity is not applicable to a proceeding before the grand jury. The State accepts the issues as tendered by the appellant, except that it substitutes "displace" for "abridge" in the first of them.
 Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights reads as follows:
 "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case."
 It is very similar in language to the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing that
 "No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
 The appellant relies on cases decided under the Fifth Amendment and urges that its interpretation should control the interpretation of Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights, but he *293 does not assert that the Fifth Amendment is itself applicable here.
 Section 50 of Article 3 of the Constitution of Maryland of 1867 provides in part:
 "It shall be the duty of the General Assembly * * * to provide by Law for the punishment * * * of any person, who shall bribe, or attempt to bribe, any Executive, or Judicial officer of the State of Maryland, or any member, or officer of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland * * *; and also to provide by law for the punishment, * * * of any of said officers, * * * who shall demand or receive any bribe, * * *; and, also, to provide by law for compelling any person, so bribing or attempting to bribe, or so demanding, or receiving a bribe, fee, reward, or testimonial, to testify against any person, or persons, who may have committed any of said offenses; provided, that any person, so compelled to testify, shall be exempted from trial or punishment for the offense, of which he may have been guilty."
 Section 23 of Article 27 of the Code (1957) enacted in compliance with the above requirements provides for the punishment of any person bribing or attempting to bribe public officers, including any judge, justice of the peace or other judicial officer of the State, and of any such officer demanding or accepting a bribe, fee, reward, or testimonial for the purpose of influencing his performance of his official duties or of neglecting or failing to perform the same. It then continues:
 "[A]ny person so bribing or attempting to bribe or so demanding or receiving a bribe shall be a competent witness, and compellable to testify against any person or persons who may have committed any of the aforesaid offenses; provided, that any person so compelled to testify on behalf of the State in any such case shall be exempt from prosecution, trial, and punishment for any such crime of which such person so testifying may have been guilty or a participant therein and about which he was so compelled to testify."
 *294 Both sides, of course, cite Section 23 of Article 27, supra, but neither refers to Section 39 of that Article, which deals with compelling testimony of participants in conspiracies to violate Section 23 (and certain other offenses).[2] Since one question here asked pertained in part to such a suggested conspiracy, we set forth below the pertinent part of this statute:
 "No person shall refuse to testify concerning the crime of conspiring to commit any of the offenses set forth in § 23 of this article, * * *, and any person shall be a competent witness and compellable to testify against any person or persons who may have conspired to commit any of the aforesaid offenses, provided that any person so compelled to testify in behalf of the State in any such case, shall be exempt from prosecution, trial and punishment for any and all such crimes and offenses of which such person so testifying may have been guilty or a participant or conspirator therein and about which he was so compelled to testify."
 The State contends with considerable force that Section 50 of Article 3 of the Constitution and Section 23 of Article 27 of *295 the Code (1957) have so completely occupied the field as to immunity from prosecution for offenses as to which testimony in bribery cases is compelled that Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights has no applicability in such cases. It relies on Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, holding that the Registry Act of 1865, passed pursuant to certain provisions of the Constitution of 1864 imposing a test oath and requiring persons seeking registration as voters to answer under oath questions pertaining to their loyalty to the United States, did not fall within what was then Article 23 of the Bill of Rights, and further, that if the voting privilege were within the contemplation of Article 23, it was withdrawn or excepted from its operation by the express provisions of the Constitution relating to voting. (23 Md. at 591.) See also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, at p. 459, holding that a specific constitutional provision prevails as a limitation upon a general principle set forth in the Declaration of Rights.
 Other states having constitutional immunity provisions similar to ours have held that they limit the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See State v. Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756; State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12; Commonwealth v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374, 389, 22 A. 641; Commonwealth v. Cameron, 229 Pa. 592, 79 A. 169; Commonwealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. 362, 90 A.2d 842; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 70 n. 13. It may be noted, however, that the Louisiana constitutional immunity provision involved in the Rodrigues and Dominguez cases is in terms self-executing and does more than establish a duty in the legislature to implement it. In addition, the self-incrimination provision of the Louisiana constitution, unlike Section 22 of our Declaration of Rights, contains the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this constitution." The self-incrimination provision of the Pennsylvania constitution is likewise self-executing, and it does not contain a clause relating to exceptions.
 Such a view also finds some support in the debates on the constitutional provision here involved. See Perlman, Debates of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1867, p. 286. One objection made to Section 50 of Article 3 was "that it violated the principle of the Declaration of Rights, which declares that *296 no man shall be compelled to give evidence against himself." A proposed amendment to strike the clause compelling persons offering bribes to testify against those receiving them was, however, defeated.
 We think that Section 23 of Article 27 of the Code (1957) undertakes to give in full the immunity contemplated by Section 50 of Article 3 of the Constitution, and in terms is somewhat broader, but is not beyond the constitutional authorization. We might rest our opinion on the ground that this statutory provision founded upon the constitutional mandate (as in Anderson v. Baker, supra) limits the scope of Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights, if there were any conflict between them.
 We think, however, that there is no real conflict between Article 22 of the Declaration of Rights and the statutory immunity here granted. The general rule (apart from a constitutional provision, whether self-executing or implemented by statute, which in terms or by implication limits the privilege against self-incrimination) is that in order to be valid, the immunity granted must be as broad as the privilege against self-incrimination which it supplants or displaces.
 Our Article 22 is in pari materia with the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution against self-incrimination, and it should, we think, receive a like construction. Adams v. State, 202 Md. 455, 460, 97 A.2d 281, reversed on another ground, 347 U.S. 179; Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 500, 35 A.2d 155; Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382, 51 A. 26.[3]
 Historically, at least, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, is the foundation of the general rule as to immunity statutes above stated, although in that case the particular Act involved was held not to grant a sufficiently broad immunity. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, the statute before the Supreme *297 Court was apparently drafted on the basis of the Counselman opinion, and provided that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing, concerning which he may testify." This was held by a divided Court sufficiently broad to displace the privilege accorded by the Fifth Amendment. The statute sustained in Brown has been taken as a model by many later state and federal statutes. See Model State Witness Immunity Act, 9 C Uniform Laws Ann. 186 (with the qualification that the immunity is to be no broader than the privilege) and the commentary on it in the 1952 Handbook of The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, pp. 256-57; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev.), § 2284. These statutes derive from a suggestion by the Supreme Court in the Counselman case that statutes thus drawn would be valid. The Counselman case and its statutory progeny have been criticized by the commentators, notably Wigmore and McCormick. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev.), at pp. 522-25 and n. 4; McCormick, Evidence, pp. 285-86. The commentators maintain that the court could easily have construed the Counselman statute as barring the indirect as well as the direct use of compelled testimony, and could have held that it barred the use of evidence obtained as a result of "leads" derived from compelled testimony.
 In our opinion an immunity statute, in order to be valid, need not be couched in precisely the same terms as that suggested in Counselman and upheld in Brown v. Walker, supra, if its effect is to grant protection as broad as that afforded by the privilege which it displaces. We think that such protection is afforded by the immunity granted by Section 23 of Article 27 of the Code (1957). The immunity thereby granted to the witness compelled to testify from "prosecution, trial, and punishment for any such crime of which such person so testifying may have been guilty or a participant therein and about which he was so compelled to testify" is a broad immunity. Since it bars "prosecution," it effectively bars the use of "leads" to convict the witness of the offense as to which he testifies, and it covers the offense of attempting to bribe as well as actual bribing. We further think that the broad language referring to "any *298 such crime of which" he "may have been guilty" may fairly be construed and should be construed as including conspiracy to violate the bribery law; but even if it were not, this gap in statutory protection would be closed by Section 39 of Article 27, supra.
 Brown v. Walker, supra, relies on a number of early state court cases upholding the validity of immunity statutes worded more narrowly than the statute here in suit. Reference was there made to cases upholding statutes limiting immunity from prosecution to "any offence committed at the time and place indicated", Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490, or limiting immunity from prosecution to "the offense with reference to which testimony was given," Ex Parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, or to "that bribery" testified to by the witness. People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. at pp. 602-05.
 Nor do subsequent Supreme Court decisions establish a total amnesty rule. The reference to "full and complete immunity against prosecution" in United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, should, we think, be read in the context of the earlier cases cited. The same may be said of the dictum in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 336. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437, the court observed that the Counselman statute had been invalidated because "it merely forbade the use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony. It was with this background that the 1893 statute, providing complete immunity from prosecution, was passed and that Brown v. Walker was argued and decided." (Emphasis added). See also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428. We think the references to a requirement of absolute immunity in this and other cases refer to immunity from prosecution as opposed to immunity merely from the later use as evidence of recorded testimony, and that as to the range of offenses, they do not require a greater protection than that the statute must bar prosecution for all offenses with regard to which the testimony of a witness may be compelled. As to other offenses, we think, the privilege is neither impaired nor supplanted.
 Numerous state cases arising after Counselman and Brown *299 v. Walker have upheld the validity of state statutes which confer a narrower immunity from prosecution than that conferred in the Brown case. See Doyle v. Hofstadter, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489; Commonwealth v. Collier, 181 Ky. 319, 204 S.W. 74; Flanary v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 775, 75 S.E. 289; Notes, 118 A.L.R. 602, 624; 53 A.L.R. 2d 1030, 1050. But compare State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla.); State v. Hennessey, 195 Ore. 355, 245 P.2d 875. It has been said of these cases by a notewriter that "any conflict among them is more illusory than real; for in those instances in which the courts have held the witness to be adequately protected by such an immunity, it has not appeared that by answering the question the witness would have revealed any offense other than that or those included in the immunity; whereas in cases holding such an immunity to be inadequate, the courts have been of opinion that answers to the questions would have exposed the witness to prosecution for offenses different from those covered by the immunity." 118 A.L.R. at p. 624.
 We find no merit in the appellant's contention that his answers to questions would expose him to prosecution for "unrelated crimes." The appellant does not specify the character of these unrelated crimes and we think that our holding that the statute immunizes him from prosecution for conspiracy to bribe as well as bribery and attempted bribery supplies him with all the safeguards to which he is entitled. "[T]he constitutional protection is confined to real danger and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599, 600." Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (Holmes, J.). "When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider and to decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the witness." Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364, see also The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 329, 330.
 The appellant does not claim that the failure of the immunity statute to protect against prosecution for federal offenses renders it defective. Such a claim would have no basis under present law. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371; Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487. Moreover, even if failure *300 to guarantee against federal incrimination would invalidate a state immunity statute and this claim were properly raised, we think that on the facts of this case the threat of federal prosecution for attempting to bribe a state trial magistrate to "fix" a traffic violation would be too remote to make the claim sustainable. We note that in Doyle v. Hofstadter, 257 N.Y. 244, 267, 177 N.E. 489, Judge Cardozo "put aside as remote and insubstantial the supposed peril of exposure to prosecution for the making of false tax returns to state or federal officers." We think that we may do the same here.
 We also find the appellant's claim that he was not obliged to give testimony at grand jury proceedings not to be sustainable. The statute provides that a person involved in the bribery "shall be a competent witness, and compellable to testify against any person or persons who may have committed any of the aforesaid offenses, * * * provided, that any person so compelled to testify in behalf of the State in any such case shall be exempt from prosecution. * * *." Code (1957), Article 27, Section 23. The statute contains no limiting phrases, unless "in any such case" is to be read as such. We think that it is not.
 McCormick, Evidence, § 123, states: "Despite the language of the Federal Fifth Amendment and many similar state provisions, purporting to limit the protection to criminal cases, it is clear that the privilege of a witness not to answer incriminating questions extends to all judicial or official hearings, investigations or inquiries where persons are called upon formally to give testimony. A witness has this protection accordingly in a * * * civil or criminal case, or in * * * an investigation or hearing by a grand jury * * *." See Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, and United States v. Monia, supra. In the latter case (317 U.S. at 427), Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the majority opinion and citing Counselman, stated flatly: "An investigation by a grand jury is a criminal case." The applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to a witness testifying before a grand jury was recognized by our predecessors in Gamble v. State, 164 Md. 50, 163 A. 859. In that case, in speaking of the appearance of the appellants-defendants before the grand jury this Court said (164 Md. at 52): "If they had thought they were in any danger of indictment, *301 they could have declined to testify on the ground that their evidence might incriminate them. * * * They might have been compelled to obey the summons, but no power could compel them, against their will, to give evidence which might result in their indictment for the offense then being investigated." We regard it as inconceivable that the Legislature could have intended to limit the immunity so as to make it unavailable as to testimony given before a grand jury. A contrary view might frustrate the plain intention of the constitutional provision and of the statutes relating to bribery by cutting off prosecution virtually at its inception. An indictment (or under provisions for the waiver of an indictment, an information) is a prerequisite to a trial.
 To avoid possible difficulty in the future, we think it advisable to comment upon a statement in Gamble (164 Md. at 53) to the effect that a grand jury investigation is not a "case" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This statement was not, in our view, necessary to the actual decision of the Gamble case,[4] and it was not, in our judgment, a correct statement of the law with regard to grand jury proceedings in the light of the views of the Supreme Court expressed in Counselman (1893) above referred to, which were, as we have also pointed out, subsequently reaffirmed in Monia (1943). The precise significance of this statement is not clear to us; but if it means, as we think it does, that the privilege against self-incrimination "in a criminal case" does not apply in grand jury proceedings, it seems irreconcilable with the very positive statement in the same opinion which we have quoted above that the appellants could have availed themselves of the privilege before the grand jury.
 The principal actual holding of Gamble was that the fact that the defendants had testified before the grand jury which subsequently indicted them, without asserting their privilege against self-incrimination, did not invalidate the indictment. This holding was in accord with Pick v. State, 143 Md. 192, *302 121 A. 918. We think that the opinion in Pick, by a passage quoted (at p. 198 of 143 Md.) from People v. Lauder, 82 Mich. 119, also clearly supports the view that the privilege is available to a witness called to testify before a grand jury. Any possible implication to the contrary which may be suggested by the reference to Pick in Gamble would not, in our estimation, be supportable.
 The appellant also asserts that even if immunity might be held to extend to grand jury proceedings under most state statutes, the plenary inquisitorial powers of Maryland grand juries, as established in such cases as Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 A. 547, dictate a different result here since, as he puts it, "The Grand Jury upon its own volition despite the promises of immunity by the State * * * [might] indict for the same matters for which the State claims to grant immunity." We may note that the possession of plenary powers by grand juries is not unique to Maryland; it is significant that the Supreme Court in holding an immunity statute applicable to grand jury proceedings in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67, made reference (at p. 63) to Blaney v. State, supra. See 201 U.S. at 63. Moreover, the short answer to appellant's fear of the grand jury was supplied in Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. at p. 608): "The same answer may be made to the suggestion that the witness is imperfectly protected by reason of the fact that he may still be prosecuted and put to the annoyance and expense of pleading his immunity by way of confession and avoidance. This is a detriment which the law does not recognize. There is a possibility that any citizen, however innocent, may be subjected to a civil or criminal prosecution, and put to the expense of defending himself, but unless such prosecution be malicious, he is remediless, except so far as a recovery of costs may partially indemnify him."
 Judgment affirmed, costs to be paid by the appellant.
 NOTES
 [1] At the last of three hearings in the trial court, he spoke of his privilege under the Fifth Amendment  meaning, doubtless, to the Constitution of the United States  but, as we later point out, he does not now assert any claim of violation of rights under that Amendment.
 [2] There are a number of other statutes in this State dealing with the compellability of testimony with regard to offenses and the grant of immunity to persons compelled to testify. The language is not uniform. Thus Code 1957, Article 27, § 540 (prevention of sabotage); Article 48 A, § 359 (infractions of the insurance laws); and Article 95A, § 12 (j) (unemployment insurance law), use the "transaction, matter or thing" language of the immunity statute upheld in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591. Code (1957), Article 101, § 8 (workmen's compensation law) refers even more broadly to "any act, transaction, matter or thing." On the other hand, Article 27, §§ 262 and 371 (gaming and lotteries), refer, in language similar to that of the statute in suit, to prosecutions for "any and all such" offenses. Article 27, § 400 (sale of liquor to minors), refers to offenses "under this section." Article 27, § 24 (bribery in connection with athletic contests), limits immunity to prosecutions for "the crime", while Article 81, § 359 (retail sales tax act) does not bar subsequent prosecutions at all, but forbids only the "use" of compelled testimony in "any subsequent prosecutions." Article 75, § 74, and Rule 628 (supplementary proceedings) refer to prosecutions "based upon such fraud."
 [3] The Fifth Amendment has not heretofore been held binding upon the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46. We note, however, that certiorari has been granted, 373 U.S. 948, to review Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744, which involves this matter.
 [4] We also note that this statement was made in reply to a contention of the appellants based on the Fifth Amendment. The opinion does not contain any discussion of the applicability of the Fifth Amendment. See note 3, supra.


type: wikipedia

text:
Maurane Mazars est une auteure de bande dessinée française née en 1991 à Toulon.
 Biographie
 Maurane Mazars est originaire de Toulon. Elle passe par l'école Estienne et elle intègre la Haute École d’art et de design de Genève (HEAD) où elle obtient en 2015 un Bachelor en communication visuelle, option image / récit. Après un an de pause, elle s'inscrit à la Haute École des arts du Rhin pour y suivre un Master en illustration.
 Fin 2015, elle présente un récit complet en noir et blanc, Acouphènes, par des sifflements aux oreilles. Le jury des Prix Rodolphe-Töpffer lui décerne le prix cantonal de la jeune bande dessinée. L'album est publié en 2017 par AGPI.
 Son projet de fin d'études à la Haute école des arts du Rhin porte sur un et aborde des thèmes comme le racisme, l'homosexualité, la « commercialisation » de la création. Le projet remporte en 2018 le prix Raymond Leblanc de la jeune création et il est publié par les éditions du Lombard en 2020 sous le titre Tanz !. L'album est favorablement accueilli dans plusieurs médias, comme Actua BD, BoDoï, Les Inrocks, La Capitale, BD Gest' et figure dans la sélection pour le fauve d'or au Festival d'Angoulême 2021.
 Œuvres
 Acouphènes, AGPI, 2015
 Tanz !, Le Lombard, 2020
 Récompenses
 2015 : prix cantonal de la jeune bande dessinée (Genève) (Prix Rodolphe-Töpffer) pour Acouphènes
 2018 : prix Raymond Leblanc (Bruxelles) pour Tanz !
 2021 : prix révélation au festival d'Angoulême 2021 pour Tanz!
 Notes et références
 Annexes
 Bibliographie
 .
 Liens externes
 Auteur français de bande dessinée
 Naissance en 1991
 Naissance à Toulon
 Auteur de bande dessinée formé à l'École supérieure des arts décoratifs de Strasbourg


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 26.11.2015
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 311/19
 DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALGS AFGØRELSE
 Nr. 268/2014
 af 12. december 2014
 om ændring af bilag II (Tekniske forskrifter, standarder, prøvning og certificering) til EØS-aftalen [2015/2135]
 DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG HAR —
 under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (»EØS-aftalen«), særlig artikel 98, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 895/2014 af 14. august 2014 om ændring af bilag XIV til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006 om registrering, vurdering og godkendelse af samt begrænsninger for kemikalier (REACH) (1) skal indarbejdes i aftalen.
 (2)
 Bilag II til EØS-aftalen bør derfor ændres —
 VEDTAGET DENNE AFGØRELSE:
 Artikel 1
 Følgende led tilføjes i punkt 12zc (Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006) i kapitel XV i bilag II til EØS-aftalen:
 »—
 32014 R 0895: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 895/2014 af 14. august 2014 (EUT L 244 af 19.8.2014, s. 6).«
 Artikel 2
 Den islandske og den norske udgave af forordning (EU) nr. 895/2014, der offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-tillæg, er begge autentiske.
 Artikel 3
 Denne afgørelse træder i kraft den 13. december 2014, forudsat at alle meddelelser er indgivet, jf. EØS-aftalens artikel 103, stk. 1 (2).
 Artikel 4
 Denne afgørelse offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-afsnit og EØS-tillæg.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 12. december 2014.
 På Det Blandede EØS-Udvalgs vegne
 Kurt JÄGER
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 244 af 19.8.2014, s. 6.
 (2) Ingen forfatningsmæssige krav angivet.


type: other

text:
5A_84/2014 10.07.2014
 5A_84/2014
 représentés par Mes Xavier Oberson et Nicolas
 Etat de Genève, administration fiscale
 procès-verbaux de séquestre, sûretés;
 recours contre la décision de la Chambre de surveillance des Offices des poursuites et faillites de la Cour de justice du canton de Genève du 16 janvier 2014.
 Le 18 décembre 2009, A.________ et B.________ se sont vus notifier par l'Administration fiscale genevoise des décisions de taxation pour les impôts cantonaux et communaux ainsi que pour l'impôt fédéral direct (IFD) relatifs aux exercices 2001 à 2005.
 Par écriture du 20 janvier 2010, ils ont recouru à la Commission cantonale de recours en matière administrative, devenue le Tribunal administratif de première instance le 1 er janvier 2011 (ci-après: TAPI).
 B.a. Le 9 avril 2010, l'Administration fiscale cantonale a formé à l'encontre de A.________ et B.________ quatre demandes de sûretés, valant ordonnances de séquestre au sens de l'art. 274 LP, fondées sur les art. 38 et 30 de la loi relative à la perception et aux garanties des impôts des personnes physiques et des personnes morales (LPGIP) ainsi que sur l'art. 169 de la loi fédérale sur l'impôt fédéral direct (LIFD), à savoir:
 - une première demande visant A.________ pour garantir le paiement de l'ICC relatif aux exercices 2000 à 2005, bordereau n o ccc (ordonnance de séquestre n o ddd);
 - une seconde demande pour garantir le paiement de l'IFD relatif aux exercices 2001 à 2005 ainsi que des rappels d'impôt (ordonnance de séquestre n oeee);
 - une première demande visant B.________ pour garantir le paiement de l'ICC relatif aux exercices 2000 à 2005, bordereau n o ccc, ainsi que les amendes notifiées au précité (ordonnance de séquestre n o fff);
 - une seconde demande pour garantir le paiement de l'IFD relatif aux exercices 2001 à 2005 ainsi que les rappels d'impôt et les amendes notifiées au précité (ordonnance de séquestre n o ggg).
 B.b. Ces ordonnances de séquestre, portant sur des avoirs bancaires et des parcelles sises à Genève, ont été exécutées par l'Office des poursuites le 12 avril 2010.
 Le 21 mai 2012, le TAPI a rejeté le recours interjeté par les époux le 20 janvier 2010 (supra, consid. A). Cette décision a fait l'objet d'un recours - toujours pendant - à la Chambre administrative de la Cour de justice.
 Le 11 juillet 2012, l'Administration fiscale cantonale a introduit quatre poursuites, portant les numéros hhh, iii, jjj et kkk, en validation des séquestres précités.
 Les commandements de payer y relatifs ont été notifiés par voie édictale le 12 avril 2013, en même temps que les procès-verbaux de séquestre dont la notification par voie postale avait échoué.
 Le 22 avril 2013, A.________ et B.________ ont déposé une plainte auprès de la Chambre de surveillance des Offices des poursuites et des faillites du canton de Genève (ci-après: la Chambre de surveillance). Ils ont conclu, principalement, à l'annulation des ordonnances de séquestre ainsi qu'à celle des procès-verbaux et des commandements de payer en validation, à la levée des séquestres, à ce qu'il soit ordonné au Registre foncier de radier les annotations sur les parcelles séquestrées et à ce que tous les frais relatifs aux séquestres et aux poursuites soient mis à la charge de l'Etat de Genève. Ils ont demandé, subsidiairement, la constatation que les poursuites n'ont pas validé les séquestres.
 Par décision du 16 janvier 2014, la Chambre de surveillance a déclaré irrecevable cette plainte en tant qu'elle est dirigée contre les ordonnances de séquestre notifiées par voie édictale le 12 avril 2013 et a écarté du dossier les écritures et pièces nouvelles produites par les plaignants le 8 novembre 2013. Elle l'a rejetée, dans la mesure de sa recevabilité, en tant qu'elle vise les procès-verbaux de séquestre et les commandements de payer en validation.
 Par écriture du 30 janvier 2014, A.________ et B.________ exercent " un recours en matière civile et recours constitutionnel subsidiaire " au Tribunal fédéral. Préalablement, ils demandent notamment que " les écritures et pièces nouvelles produites le 8 novembre 2013 soient déclarées faire partie intégrantes du dossier ". Ils concluent ensuite, principalement, à l'annulation des commandements de payer, des ordonnances de séquestre ainsi que des procès-verbaux, à la levée des séquestres ainsi qu'à la radiation des annotations des séquestres au registre foncier et, subsidiairement, au renvoi pour nouvelle décision dans le sens des considérants et à la constatation que les commandements de payer n'ont pas validé les séquestres.
 Par ordonnance du 18 février 2014, le Président de la II e Cour de droit civil du Tribunal fédéral a octroyé l'effet suspensif, en ce sens que les poursuites en validation des séquestres ne sont pas continuées pendant la procédure fédérale.
 Le Tribunal fédéral examine d'office la recevabilité du recours dont il est saisi (art. 29 al. 1 LTF; ATF 139 V 42 consid. 1 p. 44 et la jurisprudence citée).
 1.1. Déposé en temps utile (art. 100 al. 2 let. a LTF) contre une décision finale (art. 90 LTF; ATF 133 III 350 consid. 1.2 p. 351) prise par une autorité de surveillance en matière de poursuite pour dettes statuant en dernière (et unique) instance cantonale (art. 75 al. 1 LTF), le recours en matière civile est recevable, indépendamment de la valeur litigieuse (art. 74 al. 2 let. c LTF). Les plaignants ont qualité pour recourir (art. 76 al. 1 LTF).
 1.2. Contrairement à ce que semblent penser les recourants, la II e Cour de droit civil est compétente pour connaître de la violation de droits constitutionnels dans un recours en matière civile (art. 72 al. 2 let. a LTF), un tel moyen tombant sous le coup de l'art. 95 let. a LTF (ATF 133 III 446 consid. 3.1 p. 447; 134 II 124 consid. 3.3 in fine p. 133). Le recours constitutionnel subsidiaire n'entre pas en considération.
 2.1. Aux termes de l'art. 42 al. 1 LTF, le mémoire de recours doit notamment contenir - sous peine d'irrecevabilité (art. 108 al. 1 let. b LTF) - les motifs à l'appui des conclusions, lesquels doivent exposer succinctement en quoi l'acte attaqué viole le droit (art. 42 al. 2 LTF). Pour satisfaire à ces exigences, la partie recourante doit discuter les motifs de la décision entreprise et indiquer précisément en quoi elle estime que l'autorité précédente a méconnu le droit (ATF 133 II 249 consid. 1.4.2 p. 254; 133 IV 286 consid. 1.4 p. 287).
 Si elle se plaint plus particulièrement de la violation de droits fondamentaux ou du droit cantonal, elle doit respecter le principe d'allégation et indiquer précisément quelle disposition constitutionnelle ou légale a été violée en démontrant par une argumentation précise en quoi consiste la violation (art. 106 al. 2 LTF; ATF 134 I 83 consid. 3.2 p. 88 et les arrêts cités), les critiques de nature appellatoire étant irrecevables (ATF 133 III 589 consid. 2 p. 591/592).
 2.2. Vu ces exigences, lorsque les recourants reprochent à la Chambre de surveillance d'avoir ignoré certains arguments de leur recours à la Chambre administrative ou d'avoir omis de constater le " contenu pour le moins inexact des commandements de payer ", leur critique - appellatoire - est irrecevable.
 Les recourants reprochent à la Chambre de surveillance d'avoir écarté les pièces nouvelles produites le 8 novembre 2013. Ils y voient une violation de leur droit d'être entendus garanti par l'art. 6 par. 1 CEDH, l'art. 29 Cst. et les art. 41 ss de la loi genevoise, du 12 septembre 1985, sur la procédure administrative (LPA; RS/GE E 5 10), notamment l'art. 68 LPA.
 3.1. Le droit d'être entendu garanti par l'art. 29 al. 2 Cst. n'est violé que si l'autorité refuse d'administrer une preuve régulièrement offerte dans les formes et les délais prévus par la loi de procédure, et portant sur un fait pertinent pour l'appréciation juridique de la cause (ATF 131 I 153 consid. 3. p. 157; 127 I 54 consid. 2b p. 56; 124 I 241 consid. 2 p. 242).
 L'art. 6 par. 1 CEDH n'a pas de portée supérieure à celle de l'art. 29 al. 2 Cst. (cf. ATF 116 Ia 295 consid. 5a p. 302 et les arrêts cités).
 3.2. L'autorité cantonale a écarté les pièces litigieuses du dossier pour des motifs tenant au droit de procédure cantonal. Se référant à l'art. 65 al. 4 LPA en relation avec l'art. 9 al. 1 de la loi d'application de la loi fédérale sur la poursuite pour dettes et la faillite du 29 janvier 2010 (LaLP; RS/GE E 3 60), elle a considéré que, sauf autorisation expresse de la Chambre de surveillance et fixation d'un délai ad hoc, la plainte ne peut être complétée après son dépôt. Selon la jurisprudence cantonale (DCSO/324/2007 du 28 juin 2007 consid. 1b et DCSO/94/2012 du 8 mars 2012 consid. 1.3), cette règle, déduite de l'exigence de la forme écrite (art. 9 al. 1 LaLP; art. 64 al. 1 LPA) et du délai de forclusion pour déposer plainte (art. 17 al. 2 LP), entraînait l'irrecevabilité des conclusions et pièces nouvelles produites spontanément.
 Dans une motivation subsidiaire, elle a jugé que les pièces produites se rapportaient de toute façon à une question ne relevant pas de la compétence de la Chambre de surveillance.
 3.3. Nonobstant que les recourants n'attaquent pas ces deux motivations comme l'exige la jurisprudence (ATF 138 I 97 consid. 4.1.4 p. 100), ils ne démontrent pas que l'autorité cantonale aurait arbitrairement appliqué le droit de procédure. Ils se contentent d'opposer péremptoirement (cf. supra, consid. 2) que la recevabilité de leurs pièces nouvelles pourrait se fonder sur une application analogique de l'art. 229 al. 1 let. a CPC, qui va " dans le même sens que l'art. 59 al. 2 in fine du Code de procédure et de juridiction administrative fribourgeois (CPJA), selon lequel des faits et moyens de preuve nouveaux peuvent être apportés postérieurement au dernier échange d'écritures ou à la dernière audience d'instruction ", principe qui serait aussi ancré en droit administratif fédéral (art. 32 PA) et qui s'imposerait au nom de l'économie de procédure.
 En présence de pièces qui n'ont pas été régulièrement offertes selon le droit de procédure (cf. supra, consid. 3.1), on ne voit pas en quoi le refus de les administrer violerait par ailleurs le droit d'être entendu des recourants.
 Les recourants prétendent que, contrairement à ce que l'autorité cantonale a arbitrairement retenu, ils ont contesté le principe de leur assujettissement en Suisse dans leur recours du 20 janvier 2010 à la Commission cantonale de recours en matière administrative et que, dans un tel cas, selon la jurisprudence sur laquelle se fonde la décision cantonale, la poursuite en validation doit intervenir dans les dix jours dès la réception par l'administration fiscale du procès-verbal de séquestre, ce qui n'a pas été le cas en l'espèce. Les séquestres seraient ainsi caducs.
 4.1. La Chambre de surveillance a constaté que la procédure relative aux décisions de taxation notifiées aux recourants le 18 décembre 2009 et pendante devant la Chambre administrative de la Cour de justice devait être considérée comme une action en reconnaissance de dette, le principe même de l'assujettissement n'ayant pas été contesté. Dans leur recours du 20 janvier 2010 interjeté contre ces décisions, les intéressés avaient en effet conclu expressément à l'établissement de nouveaux bordereaux portant sur d'autres montants et remplaçant ceux querellés, sans remettre en cause le principe de leur assujettissement fiscal en Suisse. Ils n'avaient soulevé cette question qu'après le rejet de leur recours par jugement du 21 mai 2012, lorsqu'ils avaient porté la cause devant la Chambre administrative de la Cour de justice, procédure encore pendante. La Chambre de surveillance a dès lors considéré que, selon la jurisprudence (ATF 111 III 5), le délai de dix jours pour requérir les poursuites en validation des séquestres n'avait ainsi pas commencé à courir et que cela ne serait le cas qu'à la date de la notification aux plaignants de décisions de taxation définitives.
 4.2. Les recourants taxent d'arbitraire la constatation de l'arrêt cantonal selon laquelle, dans leur recours du 20 janvier 2010, ils ont conclu expressément à l'établissement de nouveaux bordereaux portant sur d'autres montants et remplaçant ceux querellés et n'ont pas contesté le principe de leur assujettissement fiscal. Ils se réfèrent notamment aux chiffres 1 à 9 de la partie en fait dudit recours et aux pièces citées à l'appui de ces allégations ainsi qu'au raisonnement de la partie en droit et à un " ch. 32 " du jugement du TAPI.
 4.3. Nonobstant que les recourants n'indiquent pas où pourrait se trouver le recours du 20 janvier 2010 dans les volumineuses annexes à son recours (cf. sous l'OJ, ATF 115 II 484 consid. 2a p. 486, confirmé par ex. à l'arrêt 4A_324/2012 du 24 septembre 2012 consid. 1.4), force est de constater que celui-ci, interjeté - selon l'arrêt entrepris - " contre les décisions de taxation du 18 décembre 2009 pour les impôts cantonaux et communaux ainsi que pour l'impôt fédéral direct relatifs aux exercices 2001 à 2005 " et enregistré sous le numéro de cause " ccc " ne figure pas au dossier. Le chargé des recourants fait certes état d'un " recours à la Commission cantonale de recours en matière administrative [...] du 27 octobre 2010 ". Celui-ci a toutefois été interjeté à l'encontre de la " décision du 30 septembre 2010 de l'Administration fiscale cantonale relative au bordereau pour l'impôt cantonal et communal (ICC) pour la période du 1 er janvier 2006 au 6 avril 2006 et la décision du 30 septembre 2010 [...] relative au bordereau pour l'impôt fédéral direct (IFD) pour la période du 1 er janvier 2006 au 6 avril 2006, décisions toutes deux notifiées le 30 septembre 2010 ".
 Pour le surplus, on ne voit pas ce que les recourants entendent tirer du chiffre 32 du jugement du TAPI du 21 mai 2012.
 Selon les recourants, la Chambre de surveillance serait tombée dans l'arbitraire en prétendant qu'ils n'ont jamais contesté leur assujettissement. Autant qu'il est recevable, ce grief est mal fondé. Au début de la page dix de sa décision, l'autorité cantonale a retenu que les recourants ont contesté leur assujettissement fiscal en Suisse, mais seulement au " stade " de leur recours à la Chambre administrative.
 Lorsque les recourants prétendent que la Chambre de surveillance aurait fait preuve de formalisme excessif dans son application de la jurisprudence en ne tenant pas compte de cette contestation " tardive ", ils semblent méconnaître que le formalisme excessif, qui est un aspect particulier du déni de justice prohibé par l'art. 29 al. 1 Cst., est réalisé lorsque la stricte application des règles de procédure ne se justifie par aucun intérêt digne de protection, devient une fin en soi, complique de manière insoutenable la mise en oeuvre du droit matériel ou entrave de manière inadmissible l'accès aux tribunaux (cf. ATF 135 I 6 consid. 2.1 p. 9). Or, ils ne démontrent pas en quoi tel serait le cas en l'espèce.
 Vu ce qui précède, le recours doit être rejeté dans la mesure de sa recevabilité. Les recourants, qui succombent, supporteront les frais de la procédure (art. 66 al. 1 et 5 LTF). Il n'y a pas lieu d'allouer de dépens.
 von Werdt Jordan


type: caselaw

text:
 267 Md. 82 (1972)
 296 A.2d 692
 THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION
 v.
 MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND ET AL.
 [No. 29, September Term, 1972.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided November 16, 1972.
 *83 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and LEVINE, JJ.
 James W. Tavel, with whom were Robert H. Levan and Sanford E. Wool on the brief, for appellant.
 Richard M. Millman, with whom were Harvey B. Bolton, Jr., and C. Edward Nicholson on the brief, for National Council of Senior Citizens et al., part of appellees. John B. Walsh, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, with whom were Richard S. McKernon, County Attorney, Alfred H. Carter, Deputy County Attorney, and William J. Chen, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, on the brief, for Montgomery County Board of Appeals, other appellee.
 LEVINE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 The parties to this appeal have apparently eschewed the suggestion in Montgomery Co. v. Met. District, 202 Md. 293, 96 A.2d 353 (1953), where, speaking for this Court, Chief Judge Sobeloff stated:
 "The Washington-Suburban area, whose rapid growth was already in process a quarter of a century ago, induced the Legislature to create the Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission and other bi-county agencies in the hope of assuring integrated planning and coordinated action in respect to public improvements in this expanding section of the State. Not only in the original enactment creating the Planning Commission, but in the various amendments made from time to time to this statute *84 and to laws dealing more directly with the authority of the two counties, one can clearly discern the legislative expectation that the counties and the Commission should function in harmonious cooperation." 202 Md. at 301-302 (emphasis added).
 Internecine strife, not unknown to Montgomery County, arises out of this effort by appellant Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission), to appeal a decision of the Montgomery County Board of Appeals (the Board of Appeals). The Commission, although of independent corporate existence, through the Montgomery County and Prince George's County Planning Boards which comprise it, functions as the planning arm of the respective county governments. It seeks to bring an appeal in which Montgomery County finds itself the appellee. The issue presented to us is whether the Commission has standing to appeal to the Circuit Court from a decision of the Board of Appeals which granted a special exception to the other appellee, the National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC), for the construction and operation of an eleemosynary and philanthropic institution for housing the elderly or handicapped.
 NCSC filed its application for the special exception pursuant to Section 111-37m-1 of the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance. Following extended hearings, during which many witnesses appeared in support of or in opposition to the special exception, the Board of Appeals granted the petition. A large number of the citizens who were unsuccessful protestants filed an appeal to the Circuit Court which was dismissed on the grounds that the Board of Appeals was not a proper appellee, as it had been captioned, and consequently that there was a total lack of a necessary party. We reversed that decision in Redden v. Montgomery County, 265 Md. 567, 290 A.2d 494 (1972).
 Prior to the hearings before it, the Board of Appeals *85 complied with Section 111-37m-1(6)[1] and sought the recommendation of the Montgomery County Planning Board (the Planning Board), whose five members, as we noted earlier, comprise the Montgomery County segment of the Commission. The Planning Board informed the Board of Appeals by letter that a majority of the Commissioners had voted to endorse its staff's recommendation that the petition be denied, a copy of the recommendation being attached to the letter.
 Later, at one of the hearings, Robert L. Paxson, employed by the Commission as Senior Planning and Zoning Analyst, appeared before the Board of Appeals on behalf of the Planning Board. Relevant excerpts from his testimony are quoted here:
 "Mr. Paxson: For the record my name is Robert L. Paxson, Jr. I am employed by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission as a Planning and Zoning Analyst. I appear here today to represent the Montgomery County Planning Board.
 * * *
 "Mr. Paxson: As you are aware, Section 111-37 m-1, 6, requires that the Montgomery County Board of Appeals contact the Planning Board and request a recommendation. Mr. O'Brien [Chairman of the Board] did this several months ago. And the Board took this up at a regularly scheduled meeting and has complied by furnishing you its recommendation. Its recommendation is for denial, as you know.
 "I would like to point out as you also know that both the Staff and the Board have recommended denial of the subject request. The Staff places its emphasis on the access problem as well *86 as the preservation of the scenic Potomac Palisades.
 * * *
 "Mr. Paxson: I am here to represent the Planning Board. They have instructed me to relate to the Board of Appeals, according to the sections of the ordinances, their feelings on this."
 After the granting of the special exception, the Commission noted an appeal from that decision to the Circuit Court.[2] In its petition on appeal to the Circuit Court, the Commission alleged, inter alia:
 "2. That on March 4, 1971, the Montgomery County Planning Board of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, as required by Section 111-37 m-1(g) [sic] of the Montgomery County Code, endorsed the report of its technical Staff and recommended that the application be denied....
 * * *
 "4. That the Montgomery County Planning Board, by its technical Staff, appeared and testified in opposition to the application during the hearings. .. ."
 Each of the appellees responded to the appeal by filing a "Motion Raising Preliminary Objection" in which they challenged the standing of the Commission to appeal. The Motions came on for hearing before Judge Moorman who, after carefully considering the Commission's arguments, ruled that it lacked "standing to appeal," and granted the Motions. The thrust of his decision was that the Commission was not aggrieved by the Board's decision, and hence had failed to bring itself within the ambit of Section 2-92 of the Montgomery County Code *87 which requires a person "to be aggrieved by the decision of the Board [of Appeals] and a party to the proceeding before it" in order to take an appeal to the Circuit Court from Board decisions. (Emphasis added).
 Before this Court, appellant contends it possessed standing to maintain the appeal on either of two alternative grounds. First, it argues that the appeal is authorized by Section 99 of ch. 780, Laws of Maryland of 1959, as amended (the Regional District Act). It provides:
 "99. Enforcement of building permit requirements.
 The construction, reconstruction, erection, structural alteration, or use of any building or other structure or the use of land or premises in violation of any of the provisions of this subtitle or of any of the provisions of any regulation enacted under this sub-title or of any decision made under this sub-title, is a misdemeanor. The willful issuance of a building, use or occupancy permit in violation of any such provision or decision is a misdemeanor. The County Council of Montgomery County, the County Commissioners of Prince George's County, or the prosecuting official of either of the counties may prosecute any such violation. In addition to all other remedies provided by law, said County Council and said County Commissioners, public officials of any municipality or political subdivision within the Regional District, or any neighboring property owner or occupant may institute injunction, mandamus, or other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent such unlawful construction, reconstruction, erection, alteration, or use. Any court of competent jurisdiction has jurisdiction to issue restraining orders and temporary or permanent injunctions or mandamus or other appropriate forms of remedy or relief." (emphasis added).
 *88 Appellant says it is a political subdivision and this appeal is an "appropriate action or proceeding" to prevent what it regards as a threatened "unlawful construction ... or use."
 Secondly, the appellant urges that its role before the Board of Appeals  carried out by the written communication and the testimony of Mr. Paxson  rose above the narrow participation envisioned by 111-37m-1(6), pursuant to which it was treated as if it amounted to no more than an ordinary witness giving testimony, and that instead it became an actual party to the proceeding. Furthermore, it contends, it was aggrieved by the Board's decision in a public sense as distinguished from the more conventional status of a nearby property-owner. Thus, it brought itself within the provisions of Section 2-92 and possessed the requisite standing to maintain the statutory right of appeal.
 (1)
 In its dependence upon Section 99 as authority for appellate status, the Commission has necessarily burdened itself with the rather formidable task of establishing that it is a "political subdivision" within the meaning of the statute. For this contention, the Commission relies heavily upon the following authorities where appeals, similar to that which it has attempted here, were pursued on the authority of statutory counterparts to Section 99: City of East Providence v. Shell Oil Co., 290 A.2d 915 (R.I. 1972); City Council of Peabody v. Board of Appeals of Peabody, 277 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 1971); Kline v. Board of Township Trustees of Chester Township, 233 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1968); Planning Board of Springfield v. Board of Appeals of Springfield, 154 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1958); Carr v. Board of Appeals of Medford, 134 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1956), and David v. Board of Appeals of Reading, 132 N.E.2d 386 (Mass. 1956). We believe that its reliance on those cases is misplaced. In each of those cases where the appeal was allowed, the appellant clearly fell within the language of the statute. Thus, in Springfield *89 and David, both supra, where the statute granted the right of appeal "to any municipal officer or board," appeals by city planning boards were upheld. Peabody and Carr, both supra, in which standing to appeal was rejected, do not help appellant's case for, in Peabody, where the appeal was brought by a city council, the statute read "any municipal officer or planning board," and in Carr, the appellant, a city councilman, was deemed to be neither "a municipal officer [n] or [a] board." In City of East Providence v. Shell Oil Company, supra, the appeal was brought by a city solicitor pursuant to a statute which expressly authorized appeals by a "city solicitor," and in Kline, supra, the appeal was brought by a "Board of Township Trustees," again, as expressly authorized by the statute.
 While it does not appear that we have been called upon to define the term "political subdivision" in any prior decision of this Court, it is clear that nothing contained in the Regional District Act or in more remote recesses of the Maryland Code lends support to the definition contended for by the appellant.
 Section 17 of the Regional District Act provides in relevant part:
 "The term `municipal corporation' in Article [XI-E] of the Constitution of Maryland does not embrace or include the Commission ... or the Maryland-Washington Regional District. The Commission... and the Regional District cannot be classified in any group of municipal corporations as required by Article [XI-E], and Article [XI-E] [has] no application to the Commission ... or to the Regional District."
 Article XI-E of the Constitution is entitled "Municipal Corporations," and it suffices to say, without quoting its many provisions, that, as used therein, the term "municipal corporations" has a geographical connotation with a political body representative of and governing its inhabitants, and that it does not mean a governmental *90 agency or commission, no matter how powerful or broad its functions may happen to be, and even, though it is endowed with corporate status that generally permits it to sue or be sued.
 Consistent with this view is Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66B § 1.00, "Zoning and Planning," which defines "local legislative body" to mean "the elected body of a political subdivision, whether known as county, commissioner, or city council, city, town, or village council, or similar terms."
 Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 89B § 21, "State Roads," distinguishes "political subdivisions" from commissions or agencies in providing that:
 "Any county, municipality, district, commission or any agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision of this State is hereby authorized and empowered . .. to transfer jurisdiction over ... publicly owned real or personal property ...."
 In the Maryland Civil Defense Act, codified as Code (1957, 1966 Repl. Vol.) Art. 16A § 3, "political subdivision" is defined as meaning "any county, municipal corporation, town, village or district."
 Although it is arguable that in a narrow sense, the Commission has aspects of a municipal corporation. See, e.g., Middleman v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, 232 Md. 285, 192 A.2d 782 (1963) and Neuenschwander v. Wash. San. Comm., 187 Md. 67, 48 A.2d 593 (1946) (where a sister agency which possesses powers and characteristics similar to those granted to appellant was held to be a municipal corporation), it clearly does not fit the popular concept of a municipal corporation such as that intended by Article XI-E of the Constitution. Thus, it is not of that species of municipal corporation which directly or indirectly meets any of the recognized statutory definitions of "political subdivision," referred to earlier.
 Our view that the appellant is not a "political subdivision" *91 within the language of Section 99 is in accord with cases decided in other jurisdictions. "Political subdivisions" have been generally defined in this way:
 "[T]hey embrace a certain territory and its inhabitants, organized for the public advantage and not in the interest of particular individuals or classes; that their chief design is the exercise of governmental functions; and that to the electors residing within each is to some extent committed the power of local government, to be wielded either mediately or immediately within their territory for the peculiar benefit of the people there residing." Muse v. Prescott School District, 233 Ark. 789, 349 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1961); Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Clayton, 226 Ark. 712, 292 S.W.2d 77, 79 (1956); Allison v. Corker, 67 N.J.L. 596, 52 A. 362, 365, 60 L.R.A. 564 (1902).
 In Bolen v. Board of Firemen, Policemen and Fire Alarm Operators' Trustees of San Antonio, Tex., 308 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), the court held that the Board, which had authority to manage pension funds, was not a political subdivision of the state, as it had none of the attributes associated with one:
 "A political subdivision contemplates: geographical area and boundaries, public elections, public officials, taxing power and a general public purpose or benefit." 308 S.W.2d at 905.
 Similarly, in Dugas v. Beauregard, 155 Conn. 573, 236 A.2d 87 (1967), the Supreme Court of Connecticut was called upon to determine whether from the purposes fulfilled by certain districts they were political, as well as geographical subdivisions. The court stated:
 "The attributes which are generally regarded as distinctive of a political subdivision are that it exists for the purpose of discharging some function of local government, that it has a prescribed *92 area, and that it possesses authority for subordinate self-government through officers selected by it." 236 A.2d at 89.
 This definition also appeared in Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W. Va. 531, 170 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1969).
 Thus, it has been held that a state highway commission is not a political subdivision, State ex rel. Highway Commission v. Hudspeth, Mo., 297 S.W.2d 510 (1957); Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Clayton, 226 Ark. 712, 292 S.W.2d 77 (1956); Wheat v. Platte City Ben. Assessment Special Road Dist. of Platte County, 330 Mo. 1245, 52 S.W.2d 856 (1932). A housing authority is not a political subdivision, Mount Vernon Housing Authority v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 21 A.D.2d 788, 250 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1964); Stegall v. Southwest Georgia Regional Housing Authority, 197 Ga. 571, 30 S.E.2d 196 (1944); Lloyd v. Twin Falls Housing Authority, 62 Idaho 592, 113 P.2d 1102 (1941). A city ward is not a political subdivision. Gibbany v. Ford, 29 N.M. 621, 225 P. 577 (1924). A board of regents of a state university is not a political subdivision, State ex rel. Miller v. State Board of Education, 56 Idaho 210, 52 P.2d 141 (1935).
 Nor was a board of public instruction, with powers similar to those exercised by appellant, found to be a political subdivision in Roberts v. Board of Public Instruction for Broward County, Fla., 112 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.1940). There, as in Kucera, supra, the court made a distinction between an agency of the state or county and a political subdivision of the state. In Richmond County Hospital Authority v. McClain, 112 Ga. App. 209, 144 S.E.2d 565 (1965), the court there held that a county hospital authority was not a political subdivision since it was without the characteristics generally inherent in the concept of a political subdivision such as the power to tax and elect officials and a political geographical area. In drawing a distinction between a political subdivision and an agent, the court stated:
 "The general rule is that an Authority, which *93 is an agency of one or more participating governmental units created by statute for the specific purpose of having delegated to it certain functions governmental in character, is not a political subdivision unless recited to be so in the pertinent Constitutional or statutory instruments creating it." 144 S.E.2d at 566.
 We have already seen that there is no such language in the Regional District Act.
 Application of the definitions quoted above leaves little room for doubt as to what type of governmental bodies constitute "political subdivisions." A county is a political subdivision of the state. Pitchess v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 2 C.A.3d 653, 83 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1969); County of Chester v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 420 Pa. 422, 218 A.2d 331, 332 (1966); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 449, 21 A.L.R. 3d 804 (1966); Parker v. Prince William County, 198 Va. 231, 93 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1956). Similarly, the general rule appears to be that cities are political subdivisions of a state, City of Phoenix v. Collar, Williams and White Engineering, Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 510, 472 P.2d 479, 483 (1970); City of Albuquerque v. Campbell, 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1960); City of Miami v. Lewis, 104 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1958). See Howard County v. Matthews, 146 Md. 553, 561, 127 A. 118 (1924). Also, in 72 C.J.S., Political-Politics, at 223, it is stated that: "Municipalities are political subdivisions of the state, and the term `political subdivision' is applied to cities, towns and villages...."
 Appellant possesses none of the characteristics which mark a "political subdivision," there being absent the geographical territory which the term connotes, as well as the other attributes suggested by the cases such as inhabitants exercising local government for the benefit of the residents within an area and the popular election of public officials who function for a general public purpose. While, concededly, we have found no case dealing with a zoning or planning commission, we are nevertheless *94 of the view that the appellant here is not a "political subdivision" within the meaning of Section 99 of the Regional District Act, and hence derived from it no standing to maintain an appeal.
 (2)
 The Commission's alternative ground for contending it has the right of appeal to the Circuit Court is Section 2-92 of the Montgomery County Code, 1965, as amended, under which it must show that it was "aggrieved by the decision of the Board [of Appeals] and a party to the proceeding before it[.]" (emphasis added). With respect to the latter requirement, the appellant argues that although "Section 111-37m-1(6) of the Zoning Ordinance provides for the Board of Appeals to request a recommendation from the Montgomery County Planning Board with respect to applications for special exceptions under Section 111-37m-1, the participation of the Commission in the proceedings on this application before the Board of Appeals constituted a far more active and interested role than that of merely complying with a request for a recommendation[,]" and such participation established the Commission as a party to the proceedings. In so contending, it relies upon Baxter v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 248 Md. 111, 235 A.2d 536 (1967) and DuBay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 213 A.2d 487 (1965).
 In DuBay, a number of appellants who opposed a zoning reclassification petition were confronted with a provision of the Baltimore County Code similar to 2-92. Speaking for this Court, Judge Horney stated that although "it is not necessary that a protestant testify before the administrative agency, it is incumbent on him, if he contemplates appealing an adverse decision, to, at least, have the record show that he was a party to the proceeding. Failing that he cannot maintain an appeal[.]" 240 Md. at 184 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Baxter, in a per curiam opinion, we repeated in part what we have quoted above from DuBay, and also stated:
 *95 "If the administrative body received in writing the name of the protestant as a protestant, this is sufficient to make him a party before the Board." 248 Md. at 113 (emphasis added).
 By its letter to the Board of Appeals and the testimony of its representative which we quoted earlier in this opinion, the Planning Board registered its disapproval of the petition. It is equally apparent from the letter and the testimony that its participation was solely the result of compliance with the statutory mandate imposed upon the Board of Appeals to solicit a recommendation from the Planning Board. Nowhere in the letter, nor at any point in the testimony, was there any statement to indicate other than that the Planning Board, as the county's planning arm, was merely furnishing its reasons for recommending denial of the petition. To interpret its role in the proceedings as being that of a party therein would logically suggest that it would be a party for appeal purposes in every proceeding in which the Board of Appeals is required to request its recommendation. Indeed, appellant's contention, if pursued to its logical conclusion, could mean that every planning expert testifying before the Board of Appeals might qualify as a party for appeal purposes.
 In any event, what is determinative of this issue here is that the Planning Board neither stated for the record "that [it appeared as] a party to the proceedings," nor that it wished to be regarded "as a protestant," Baxter and DuBay, both supra. Having failed to establish that it was "a party to the proceedings before the [Board of Appeals]," within the meaning of 2-92, it therefore lacked standing to appeal to the Circuit Court.
 In the view we have taken of this case, we need not reach the question of whether appellant was "aggrieved by the decision of the Board."
 Judgment affirmed; appellant to pay costs.
 NOTES
 [1] The Board [of Appeals] shall request a recommendation from the Montgomery County Planning Board with respect to the application not less than thirty-five (35) days prior to the date of the hearing on the special exception."
 [2] That the appeal was taken by the Commission and not the Planning Board is undoubtedly explained by the fact that Ch. 780, Laws of Maryland of 1959, which established the Planning Board, did not grant it the right to sue and be sued.


type: legislation

text:
 IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA
 Brussell, 8.4.2016
 COM(2016) 188 final
 2016/0103(NLE)
 Proposta għal
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUNSILL
 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir
 MEMORANDUM TA’ SPJEGAZZJONI
 1.KUNTEST TAL-PROPOSTA
 Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001
 1
 jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom għandhom ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri esterni tal-Istati Membri u dawk li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżenti minn dak ir-rekwiżit. Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 539/2001 huwa applikat mill-Istati Membri kollha, bl-eċċezzjoni tal-Irlanda u tar-Renju Unit.
 Ir-Regolament Nru 509/2014 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (UE)
 2
 emenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 539/2001 billi ttrasferixxa 19-il pajjiż għall-Anness II, li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżenti mir-rekwiżit tal-viża. Dawn id-19-il pajjiż huma: il-Kolombja, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, il-Gżejjer Marshall, il-Mikroneżja, Nauru, Palau, il-Perù, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent u l-Grenadini, Samoa, il-Gżejjer Solomon, Timor Leste, Tonga, Trinidad u Tobago, Tuvalu, l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda u Vanuatu. Ir-referenza għal kull wieħed minn dawn il-pajjiżi fl-Anness II hija akkumpanjata minn nota f’qiegħ il-paġna li tispeċifika li “l-eżenzjoni mill-ħtieġa ta’ viża għandha tapplika mid-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ ftehim dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża li għandu jiġi konkluż mal-Unjoni Ewropea”.
 Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 509/2014 ġie adottat fl-20 ta’ Mejju 2014 u daħal fis-seħħ fid-9 ta’ Ġunju 2014. F’Lulju 2014, il-Kummissjoni ppreżentat Rakkomandazzjoni lill-Kunsill biex jawtorizzaha tibda negozjati dwar ftehimiet ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża ma’ kull wieħed mis-17-il pajjiż segwenti: Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, il-Gżejjer Marshall, il-Mikroneżja, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent u l-Grenadini, Samoa, il-Gżejjer Solomon, Timor Leste, Tonga, Trinidad u Tobago, Tuvalu, l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda u Vanuatu
 3
 . Fid-9 ta’ Ottubru 2014, il-Kunsill indirizza direttivi ta’ negozjati lill-Kummissjoni.
 L-ewwel serje ta’ ftehimiet ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża ġew iffirmati fis-6 ta’ Mejju 2015 (l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda), fis-26 ta’ Mejju 2015 (Timor Leste) u fit-28 ta’ Mejju 2015 (Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent u l-Grenadini, Samoa, Trinidad u Tobago u Vanuatu) u japplikaw b’mod proviżorju mid-data tal-iffirmar sakemm jidħlu fis-seħħ. Il-Kunsill awtorizza l-iffirmar tat-tieni serje ta’ ftehimiet ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża ma’ Tonga (iffirmat fl-20 ta’ Novembru 2015), mal-Kolombja (iffirmat fit-2 ta’ Diċembru 2015), ma’ Kiribati (id-data tal-iffirmar għad trid tiġi stabbilita) u ma’ Palau (iffirmat fis-7 ta’ Diċembru 2015). Dawn l-erba’ ftehimiet japplikaw b’mod proviżorju mill-għada tad-data tal-iffirmar sakemm jidħlu fis-seħħ.
 In-negozjati mal-Gżejjer Marshall infetħu fis-17 ta’ Diċembru 2014 u ġew imwettqa permezz ta’ skambju ta’ ittri. Matul skambji ulterjuri ntlaħaq qbil dwar l-aspetti kollha. Il-ftehim ġie inizjalat permezz ta’ skambju ta’ ittri bejn in-negozjaturi ewlenin fil-11 ta’ Diċembru 2015 (il-Gżejjer Marshall) u fit-13 ta’ Jannar 2016 (l-Unjoni). L-Istati Membri ġew mgħarrfa waqt laqgħa tal-Grupp ta’ Ħidma dwar il-Viża tal-Kunsill li saret fit-18 ta’ Jannar 2016.
 2.IL-BAŻI ĠURIDIKA
 Min-naħa tal-Unjoni, il-bażi ġuridika għall-ftehim hija l-punt (a) tal-Artikolu 77(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (TFUE), flimkien mal-Artikolu 218 tiegħu.
 Il-proposta mehmuża tikkostitwixxi l-istrument ġuridiku għall-konklużjoni tal-ftehim. Il-Kunsill se jiddeċiedi b’maġġoranza kwalifikata wara l-iffirmar tal-ftehim, f’isem l-Unjoni, minn persuna nnominata mill-Presidenza tal-Kunsill u wara li jkun kiseb il-kunsens tal-Parlament Ewropew f’konformità mal-punt (a) tat-tieni sottoparagrafu tal-Artikolu 218(6) TFUE.
 3.L-EŻITU TAN-NEGOZJATI
 Il-Kummissjoni tikkunsidra li nkisbu l-objettivi stabbiliti mill-Kunsill fid-direttivi ta’ negozjati tiegħu u li l-abbozz ta’ ftehim għall-eżenzjoni mill-viża huwa aċċettabbli għall-Unjoni.
 Il-kontenut finali tiegħu jista’ jitqassar kif ġej:
 Skop
 Il-ftehim jipprovdi għal vjaġġar mingħajr viża għaċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni Ewropea u għaċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall meta jivvjaġġaw lejn it-territorju tal-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra għall-perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum.
 Sabiex jitħares it-trattament ugwali taċ-ċittadini kollha tal-UE, ġiet inkluża dispożizzjoni fil-ftehim li tiddikjara li l-Gżejjer Marshall jistgħu jissospendu jew itemmu l-ftehim biss fir-rigward tal-Istati Membri kollha tal-Unjoni Ewropea u li l-Unjoni tista’ wkoll tissospendi jew ittemm il-Ftehim fir-rigward tal-Istati Membri tagħha kollha.
 Is-sitwazzjoni speċifika tar-Renju Unit u tal-Irlanda hija riflessa fil-preambolu.
 Kamp ta’ applikazzjoni
 L-eżenzjoni mill-viża tkopri l-kategoriji kollha ta’ persuni (detenturi ta’ passaporti ordinarji, diplomatiċi, tas-servizz/uffiċjali jew speċjali) li jivvjaġġaw għal kull xorta ta’ skopijiet bl-eċċezzjoni tal-iskop tat-twettiq ta’ attività bi ħlas. Għal din il-kategorija tal-aħħar, kull Stat Membru kif ukoll il-Gżejjer Marshall jibqgħu liberi li jimponu r-rekwiżit tal-viża fuq iċ-ċittadini tal-Parti l-oħra f’konformità mal-liġi tal-Unjoni jew dik nazzjonali applikabbli. Sabiex tkun żgurata implimentazzjoni armonizzata, dikjarazzjoni konġunta hija mehmuża mal-Ftehim dwar l-interpretazzjoni tal-kategorija ta’ persuni li jivvjaġġaw għall-iskop li jwettqu attivitajiet bi ħlas.
 Tul ta’ żmien tas-soġġorn
 Il-ftehim jipprovdi għal vjaġġar mingħajr viża għaċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni Ewropea u għaċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall meta jivvjaġġaw lejn it-territorju tal-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra għall-perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum. Dikjarazzjoni konġunta dwar l-interpretazzjoni ta’ dan il-perjodu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum tinsab mehmuża mal-ftehim.
 Il-ftehim jikkunsidra s-sitwazzjoni tal-Istati Membri li għalissa ma japplikawx kompletament l-acquis ta’ Schengen. Sakemm ma jkunux parti miż-żona Schengen mingħajr fruntieri interni, l-eżenzjoni mill-viża tagħti dritt liċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall li jibqgħu għall-perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum fit-territorju ta’ kull wieħed minn dawk l-Istati Membri (attwalment il-Bulgarija, il-Kroazja, Ċipru u r-Rumanija), irrispettivament mill-perjodu kkalkulat għaż-żona Schengen kollha.
 Applikazzjoni territorjali
 Il-ftehim għandu dispożizzjonijiet relatati mal-applikazzjoni territorjali tiegħu: fil-każ ta’ Franza u n-Netherlands, l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għandha tintitola liċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall biex jibqgħu biss f’dawk it-territorji Ewropej tal-Istati Membri.
 Dikjarazzjonijiet
 Barra mid-dikjarazzjonijiet konġunti msemmija hawn fuq, żewġ dikjarazzjonijiet konġunti oħra huma mehmuża mal-ftehim:
 –dwar l-assoċjazzjoni tan-Norveġja, tal-Iżlanda, tal-Iżvizzera u tal-Liechtenstein mal-implimentazzjoni, mal-applikazzjoni u mal-iżvilupp tal-acquis ta’ Schengen;
 –dwar it-tixrid totali ta’ informazzjoni rigward il-kontenut u l-konsegwenzi tal-ftehim ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża u kwistjonijiet relatati, bħall-kundizzjonijiet għad-dħul fit-territorju.
 4.KONKLUŻJONI
 Fid-dawl tar-riżultati msemmija hawn fuq, il-Kummissjoni tipproponi li l-Kunsill japprova, wara li jikseb il-kunsens tal-Parlament Ewropew, il-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir.
 2016/0103 (NLE)
 Proposta għal
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUNSILL
 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir
 IL-KUNSILL TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA,
 Wara li kkunsidra t-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u b’mod partikolari l-punt (a) tal-Artikolu 77(2), flimkien mal-punt (a)(v) tat-tieni sottoparagrafu tal-Artikolu 218(6) tiegħu,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-kunsens tal-Parlament Ewropew
 4
 ,
 Billi:
 (1)Il-Kummissjoni nnegozjat Ftehim f’isem l-Unjoni Ewropea, mar-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir (“il-Ftehim”).
 (2)F’konformità mad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill (UE) 2015/[...], il-Ftehim ġie ffirmat u jiġi applikat fuq bażi proviżorja minn [...].
 (3)Il-Ftehim iwaqqaf Kumitat Konġunt tal-esperti għall-ġestjoni tal-Ftehim. F’dan il-Kumitat Konġunt, l-Unjoni għandha tkun irrappreżentata mill-Kummissjoni, li għandha tkun assistita mir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati Membri.
 (4)Din id-Deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi żvilupp tad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-acquis ta’ Schengen li r-Renju Unit ma jieħux sehem fihom, f’konformità mad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2000/365/KE
 5
 ; b’hekk ir-Renju Unit mhuwiex qiegħed jieħu sehem fl-adozzjoni ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni u mhuwiex marbut biha jew soġġett għall-applikazzjoni tagħha.
 (5)Din id-Deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi żvilupp tad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-acquis ta’ Schengen li l-Irlanda ma tieħux sehem fihom, f’konformità mad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2002/192/KE
 6
 ; Għalhekk l-Irlanda mhijiex qiegħda tieħu sehem fl-adozzjoni ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni u mhijiex marbuta biha jew soġġetta għall-applikazzjoni tagħha.
 (6)Il-Ftehim għandu jiġi approvat,
 ADOTTA DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI:
 Artikolu 1
 Il-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir huwa b’dan approvat f’isem l-Unjoni.
 Artikolu 2
 Il-President tal-Kunsill għandu jagħti, f’isem l-Unjoni, in-notifika prevista mill-Artikolu 8(1) tal-Ftehim
 7
 .
 Artikolu 3
 Il-Kummissjoni, assistita mir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati Membri, għandha tirrappreżenta lill-Unjoni fil-Kumitat Konġunt tal-esperti skont l-Artikolu 6 tal-Ftehim.
 Artikolu 4
 Din id-Deċiżjoni tidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-adozzjoni tagħha.
 Magħmul fi Brussell,
 Għall-Kunsill
 Il-President
 (1)
 Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001 tal-15 ta’ Marzu 2001 li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom għandhom ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri esterni u dawk li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżentati minn dik il-ħtieġa, ĠU L 81, 21.03.2001, p. 1
 (2)
 Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 509/2014 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Mejju 2014 li jemenda r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001 li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom għandhom ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri esterni u dawk li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżenti minn dik il-ħtieġa, ĠU L 149, 20.05.2014, p. 67
 (3)
 COM(2014) 467, 17.7.2014
 (4)
 Kunsens mogħti fi [...]
 (5)
 Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2000/365/KE tad-29 ta’ Mejju 2000 dwar it-talba tar-Renju Unit tal-Gran Brittanja u Irlanda ta’ Fuq biex jieħdu parti f’xi dispożizzjonijiet tal-acquis ta’ Schengen (ĠU L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43).
 (6)
 Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2002/192/KE tat-28 ta’ Frar 2002 rigward it-talba tal-Irlanda biex tieħu sehem f’xi dispożizzjonijiet tal-acquis ta’ Schengen (ĠU L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20).
 (7)
 Id-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim se tiġi ppubblikata f’Il Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea mis-Segretarjat Ġenerali tal-Kunsill.
 ---documentbreak---
 IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA
 Brussell, 8.4.2016
 COM(2016) 188 final
 ANNESS
 tal-
 Proposta għal Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill
 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir
 ANNESS
 tal-
 Proposta għal Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill
 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir
 FTEHIM
 bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir
 L-UNJONI EWROPEA, minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejħa “l-Unjoni” jew “l-UE”, u
 IR-REPUBBLIKA TAL-GŻEJJER MARSHALL, minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejħa “il-Gżejjer Marshall”,
 minn hawn ’il quddiem flimkien imsejħin il-“Partijiet Kontraenti”,
 BIL-ĦSIEB LI jiġu żviluppati ulterjorment relazzjonijiet amikevoli bejn il-Partijiet Kontraenti u bix-xewqa li jiġi ffaċilitat l-ivvjaġġar billi jiġi żgurat dħul u soġġorn qasir mingħajr viża għaċ-ċittadini tagħhom,
 WARA LI KKUNSIDRAW ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 509/2014 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Mejju 2014 li jemenda r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001 li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom għandhom ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri esterni u dawk iċ-ċittadini li huma eżenti minn dik il-ħtieġa
 1
 billi, inter alia, 19-il pajjiż terz, inklużi l-Gżejjer Marshall, ġew trasferiti għal-lista ta’ pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom huma eżenti mir-rekwiżit tal-viża għal soġġorni qosra fl-Istati Membri,
 FILWAQT LI HUMA KONXJI li l-Artikolu 1 tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 509/2014 jistipula li għal dawk id-19-il pajjiż, l-eżenzjoni mir-rekwiżit ta’ viża għandha tapplika mid-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ ftehim dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża li għandu jiġi konkluż mal-Unjoni,
 FILWAQT LI JIXTIEQU li jitħares il-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali taċ-ċittadini kollha tal-UE,
 FILWAQT LI JQISU li l-persuni li jivvjaġġaw bl-iskop li jwettqu attività bi ħlas matul is-soġġorn qasir tagħhom mhumiex koperti minn dan il-Ftehim u għalhekk għal dik il-kategorija r-regoli rilevanti tal-liġi tal-Unjoni u tal-liġi nazzjonali tal-Istati Membri u tal-liġi nazzjonali tal-Gżejjer Marshall dwar l-obbligu tal-viża jew l-eżenzjoni minnha u dwar l-aċċess għal impjieg jibqgħu japplikaw,
 FILWAQT LI JQISU l-Protokoll dwar il-pożizzjoni tar-Renju Unit u tal-Irlanda fir-rigward tal-ispazju ta’ libertà, sigurtà u ġustizzja u l-Protokoll dwar l-acquis ta’ Schengen integrat fil-qafas tal-Unjoni Ewropea, li jinsab anness mat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea u t-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u filwaqt li jikkonfermaw li d-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ dan il-Ftehim ma japplikawx għar-Renju Unit u għall-Irlanda,
 FTEHMU KIF ĠEJ:
 ARTIKOLU 1
 Skop
 Dan il-Ftehim jipprovdi għal vjaġġar mingħajr viża għaċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni u għaċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall meta jivvjaġġaw lejn it-territorju tal-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra għall-perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum.
 ARTIKOLU 2
 Definizzjonijiet
 Għall-finijiet ta’ dan il-Ftehim:
 (a)
 “Stat Membru” tfisser kwalunkwe Stat Membru tal-Unjoni, bl-eċċezzjoni tar-Renju Unit u tal-Irlanda;
 (b)
 “ċittadin tal-Unjoni” tfisser ċittadin ta’ Stat Membru kif definit fil-punt (a);
 (c)
 “ċittadin tal-Gżejjer Marshall” tfisser kull persuna li għandha ċ-ċittadinanza tal-Gżejjer Marshall;
 (d)
 “żona Schengen” tfisser iż-żona mingħajr fruntieri interni li tinkludi t-territorji tal-Istati Membri kif definit fil-punt (a) li japplikaw l-acquis ta’ Schengen b’mod sħiħ.
 ARTIKOLU 3
 Kamp ta’ applikazzjoni
 1.
 Iċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni li għandhom passaport ordinarju, diplomatiku, tas-servizz, uffiċjali jew speċjali, li hu validu u maħruġ minn Stat Membru, jistgħu jidħlu u jibqgħu mingħajr viża fit-territorju tal-Gżejjer Marshall għall-perjodu ta’ soġġorn kif definit fl-Artikolu 4(1).
 Iċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall li għandhom passaport ordinarju, diplomatiku, tas-servizz, uffiċjali jew speċjali, li hu validu u maħruġ mill-Gżejjer Marshall, jistgħu jidħlu u jibqgħu mingħajr viża fit-territorju tal-Istati Membri għall-perjodu ta’ soġġorn kif definit fl-Artikolu 4(2).
 2.
 Il-paragrafu 1 ta’ dan l-Artikolu ma japplikax għall-persuni li jivvjaġġaw bl-iskop li jwettqu attività bi ħlas.
 Għal din il-kategorija ta’ persuni, kull Stat Membru jista’ jiddeċiedi b’mod individwali li jimponi r-rekwiżit ta’ viża fuq iċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall jew li jirtirah f’konformità mal-Artikolu 4(3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001
 2
 .
 Għal din il-kategorija ta’ persuni, il-Gżejjer Marshall jistgħu jiddeċiedu dwar ir-rekwiżit ta’ viża jew l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għaċ-ċittadini ta’ kull Stat Membru b’mod individwali f’konformità mal-liġi nazzjonali tagħhom.
 3.
 L-eżenzjoni mill-viża prevista minn dan il-Ftehim tapplika mingħajr preġudizzju għal-liġijiet tal-Partijiet Kontraenti dwar il-kundizzjonijiet tad-dħul u tas-soġġorn qasir. L-Istati Membri u l-Gżejjer Marshall jirriżervaw id-dritt li jirrifjutaw id-dħul u s-soġġorn qasir fit-territorji tagħhom jekk waħda jew aktar minn dawn il-kundizzjonijiet ma tkunx issodisfata.
 4.
 L-eżenzjoni mill-viża tapplika irrispettivament mill-mezz ta’ trasport użat biex jinqasmu l-fruntieri tal-Partijiet Kontraenti.
 5.
 Kwistjonijiet mhux koperti minn dan il-Ftehim ikunu rregolati mil-liġi tal-Unjoni, mil-liġi nazzjonali tal-Istati Membri u mil-liġi nazzjonali tal-Gżejjer Marshall.
 ARTIKOLU 4
 Tul ta’ żmien tas-soġġorn
 1.
 Iċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni jistgħu jibqgħu fit-territorju tal-Gżejjer Marshall għal perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum.
 2.
 Iċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall jistgħu jibqgħu fit-territorju tal-Istati Membri li japplikaw l-acquis ta’ Schengen b’mod sħiħ għal perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum. Dan il-perjodu jiġi kkalkulat irrispettivament minn kwalunkwe soġġorn f’xi Stat Membru li għalissa ma japplikax l-acquis ta’ Schengen b’mod sħiħ.
 Iċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall jistgħu jibqgħu għal perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum fit-territorju ta’ kull Stat Membru li għadu ma japplikax l-acquis ta’ Schengen b’mod sħiħ, irrispettivament mill-perjodu ta’ soġġorn ikkalkulat għat-territorju tal-Istat Membru li japplika l-acquis ta’ Schengen b’mod sħiħ.
 3.
 Dan il-Ftehim ma jaffettwax il-possibbiltà għall-Gżejjer Marshall u għall-Istati Membri li jestendu l-perjodu ta’ soġġorn għal aktar minn 90 jum f’konformità mal-liġijiet nazzjonali rispettivi tagħhom u mal-liġi tal-Unjoni.
 ARTIKOLU 5
 Applikazzjoni territorjali
 1.
 Fir-rigward tar-Repubblika Franċiża, dan il-Ftehim japplika biss għat-territorju Ewropew tar-Repubblika Franċiża.
 2.
 Fir-rigward tar-Renju tan-Netherlands, dan il-Ftehim japplika biss għat-territorju Ewropew tar-Renju tan-Netherlands.
 ARTIKOLU 6
 Kumitat Konġunt għall-ġestjoni tal-Ftehim
 1.
 Il-Partijiet Kontraenti għandhom jistabbilixxu Kumitat Konġunt tal-esperti (minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejjaħ il-“Kumitat”), magħmul minn rappreżentanti tal-Unjoni u minn rappreżentanti tal-Gżejjer Marshall. L-Unjoni tkun irrappreżentata mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea.
 2.
 Il-Kumitat ikollu, inter alia, il-kompiti li ġejjin:
 (a)
 li jagħmel monitoraġġ tal-implimentazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim;
 (b)
 li jissuġġerixxi emendi jew żidiet għal dan il-Ftehim;
 (c)
 li jsolvi tilwimiet li jfeġġu mill-interpretazzjoni jew mill-applikazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim;
 3.
 Il-Kumitat għandu jitlaqqa’ kull meta jkun meħtieġ, wara li ssir rikjesta ta’ waħda mill-Partijiet Kontraenti.
 4.
 Il-Kumitat għandu jistabbilixxi r-regoli tal-proċedura tiegħu.
 ARTIKOLU 7
 Ir-relazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim ma’ ftehimiet bilaterali eżistenti ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża
 bejn l-Istati Membri u l-Gżejjer Marshall
 Dan il-Ftehim ikollu preċedenza fuq kwalunkwe ftehim jew arranġament bilaterali konkluż bejn l-Istati Membri individwali u l-Gżejjer Marshall, sa fejn dawn ikopru kwistjonijiet li jaqgħu fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tiegħu.
 ARTIKOLU 8
 Dispożizzjonijiet finali
 1.
 Dan il-Ftehim għandu jiġi ratifikat jew approvat mill-Partijiet Kontraenti f’konformità mal-proċeduri interni rispettivi tagħhom u jidħol fis-seħħ fl-ewwel jum tat-tieni xahar wara d-data tal-aħħar waħda miż-żewġ notifiki li permezz tagħhom il-Partijiet Kontraenti jinnotifikaw lil xulxin li dawk il-proċeduri jkunu tlestew.
 Dan il-Ftehim għandu jiġi applikat fuq bażi proviżorja mill-għada tad-data tal-iffirmar tiegħu.
 2.
 Dan il-Ftehim huwa konkluż għal perjodu indefinit, sakemm ma jiġix itterminat f’konformità mal-paragrafu 5.
 3.
 Dan il-Ftehim jista’ jiġi emendat bi ftehim bil-miktub tal-Partijiet Kontraenti. L-emendi jidħlu fis-seħħ wara li l-Partijiet Kontraenti jkunu nnotifikaw lil xulxin bit-tlestija tal-proċeduri interni tagħhom li huma meħtieġa għal dan l-iskop.
 4.
 Kull Parti Kontraenti tista’ tissospendi l-Ftehim kollu jew parti minnu, b’mod partikolari, għal raġunijiet ta’ ordni pubbliku, protezzjoni tas-sigurtà nazzjonali jew protezzjoni tas-saħħa pubblika, immigrazzjoni illegali jew hekk kif jerġa’ jiddaħħal l-obbligu tal-viża minn waħda mill-Partijiet Kontraenti. Id-deċiżjoni dwar is-sospensjoni għandha tiġi nnotifikata lill-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra mhux aktar tard minn xahrejn qabel id-dħul fis-seħħ ippjanat tagħha. Il-Parti Kontraenti li tkun issospendiet l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim għandha tgħarraf minnufih lill-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra f’każ li r-raġunijiet għas-sospensjoni ma jibqgħux jeżistu aktar u għandha tneħħi dik is-sospensjoni.
 5.
 Kull Parti Kontraenti tista’ tittermina dan il-Ftehim billi tinnotifika bil-miktub lill-Parti l-oħra. Dan il-Ftehim ma jibqax fis-seħħ 90 jum wara dan.
 6.
 Il-Gżejjer Marshall jistgħu jissospendu jew jitterminaw dan il-Ftehim biss fil-konfront tal-Istati Membri kollha.
 7.
 L-Unjoni tista’ tissospendi jew tittermina dan il-Ftehim biss fil-konfront tal-Istati Membri kollha tagħha.
 Magħmul f’żewġ kopji bil-Bulgaru, biċ-Ċek, bid-Daniż, bl-Estonjan, bil-Finlandiż, bil-Franċiż, bil-Ġermaniż, bil-Grieg, bl-Ingliż, bl-Ispanjol, bl-Iżvediż, bil-Kroat, bil-Latvjan, bil-Litwan, bil-Malti, bin-Netherlandiż, bil-Pollakk, bil-Portugiż, bir-Rumen, bis-Slovakk, bis-Sloven, bit-Taljan u bl-Ungeriż, b’kull test ikollu l-istess awtentiċità.
 DIKJARAZZJONI KONĠUNTA FIR-RIGWARD TAL-IŻLANDA, TAN-NORVEĠJA, TAL-IŻVIZZERA
 U TAL-LIECHTENSTEIN
 Il-Partijiet Kontraenti jirrimarkaw ir-relazzjoni mill-qrib bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u n-Norveġja, l-Iżlanda, l-Iżvizzera u l-Liechtenstein, b’mod partikolari bis-saħħa tal-Ftehimiet tat-18 ta’ Mejju 1999 u tas-26 ta’ Ottubru 2004 dwar l-assoċjazzjoni ta’ dawk il-pajjiżi mal-implimentazzjoni, mal-applikazzjoni u mal-iżvilupp tal-acquis ta’ Schengen.
 F’ċirkostanzi bħal dawn huwa mixtieq li l-awtoritajiet tan-Norveġja, tal-Iżlanda, tal-Iżvizzera u tal-Liechtenstein, min-naħa, u l-Gżejjer Marshall, min-naħa l-oħra, jikkonkludu, mingħajr dewmien, ftehimiet bilaterali dwar l-eżenzjoni mill-viża għal soġġorn qasir f’termini simili għal dawk ta’ dan il-Ftehim.
 DIKJARAZZJONI KONĠUNTA DWAR L-INTERPRETAZZJONI TAL-KATEGORIJA TA’ PERSUNI LI JIVVJAĠĠAW BL-ISKOP LI JWETTQU ATTIVITÀ BI ĦLAS
 KIF PREVIST MILL-ARTIKOLU 3(2) TA’ DAN IL-FTEHIM
 Bix-xewqa li tkun żgurata interpretazzjoni komuni, il-Partijiet Kontraenti jaqblu li, għall-finijiet ta’ dan il-Ftehim, il-kategorija ta’ persuni li jwettqu attività bi ħlas tkopri lill-persuni li jidħlu fit-territorju tal-Parti Kontraenti bl-għan li jkollhom impjieg bi qligħ jew iwettqu attività b’remunerazzjoni bħala impjegati jew fornituri ta’ servizz.
 Din il-kategorija ma għandhiex tkopri:
 –
 persuni tan-negozju, jiġifieri persuni li jivvjaġġaw bl-iskop ta’ deliberazzjoni ta’ negozju (mingħajr ma jkunu impjegati fil-pajjiż tal-Parti Kontraenti l-oħra),
 –
 persuni li jieħdu sehem fl-isport jew artisti tal-ispettaklu li jwettqu attività fuq bażi ad-hoc,
 –
 ġurnalisti mibgħuta mill-midja tal-pajjiż ta’ residenza tagħhom, u,
 –
 apprendisti intrakorporattivi.
 Il-monitoraġġ tal-implimentazzjoni ta’ din id-Dikjarazzjoni għandu jsir mill-Kumitat Konġunt fir-responsabbiltà tiegħu skont l-Artikolu 6 ta’ dan il-Ftehim, li jista’ jipproponi modifiki meta, abbażi tal-esperjenzi tal-Partijiet Kontraenti, jikkunsidrahom bħala meħtieġa.
 DIKJARAZZJONI KONĠUNTA DWAR L-INTERPRETAZZJONI TAL-PERJODU TA’ 90 JUM
 FI KWALUNKWE PERJODU TA’ 180 JUM KIF STIPULAT FL-ARTIKOLU 4 TA’ DAN IL-FTEHIM
 Il-Partijiet Kontraenti jifhmu li l-perjodu massimu ta’ 90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum kif previst fl-Artikolu 4 ta’ dan il-Ftehim ifisser soġġorn kontinwu jew bosta soġġorni konsekuttivi, li t-tul ta’ żmien totali tagħhom ma jaqbiżx id-90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum.
 Il-kunċett ta’ “kwalunkwe” jimplika l-applikazzjoni ta’ perjodu ta’ referenza “mobbli” ta’ 180 jum, billi titqies b’lura kull ġurnata tas-soġġorn fl-aħħar perjodu ta’ 180 jum, sabiex jiġi vverifikat jekk l-obbligu tad-90 jum fi kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 180 jum ikunx baqa’ jiġi ssodisfat. Inter alia, dan ifisser li assenza għal perjodu mhux interrott ta’ 90 jum tippermetti li jkun hemm soġġorn ġdid ta’ mhux aktar minn 90 jum.
 DIKJARAZZJONI KONĠUNTA DWAR L-INFURMAR TAĊ-ĊITTADINI
 DWAR IL-FTEHIM TA’ EŻENZJONI MILL-VIŻA
 Filwaqt li jirrikonoxxu l-importanza tat-trasparenza għaċ-ċittadini tal-Unjoni Ewropea u għaċ-ċittadini tal-Gżejjer Marshall, il-Partijiet Kontraenti jaqblu li jiżguraw it-tixrid totali tal-informazzjoni dwar il-kontenut u l-konsegwenzi tal-ftehim ta’ eżenzjoni mill-viża u kwistjonijiet relatati, bħall-kundizzjonijiet għad-dħul fit-territorju.
 _________________
 (1)
 ĠU L 149, 20.5.2014, p. 67
 (2)
 Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 539/2001 tal-15 ta’ Marzu 2001 li jelenka l-pajjiżi terzi li ċ-ċittadini tagħhom għandhom ikollhom viża fil-pussess tagħhom meta jaqsmu l-fruntieri esterni u dawk iċ-ċittadini li huma eżentati minn dik il-ħtieġa (ĠU L 81, 21.3.2001, p. 1).


text:
 1.7.2006
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 C 154/7
 Wniosek o wydanie orzeczenia w trybie prejudycjalnym złożony przez Commissione tributaria provinciale di Roma w dniu 27 marca 2006 r. — Leasys SpA przeciwko Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Roma 7
 (Sprawa C-165/06)
 (2006/C 154/14)
 Język postępowania: włoski
 Sąd krajowy
 Commissione tributaria provinciale di Roma
 Strony w postępowaniu przed sądem krajowym
 Strona skarżąca: Leasys SpA
 Strona pozwana: Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Roma 7
 Pytanie prejudycjalne
 Czy art. 33 dyrektywy 77/388/EWG (1) w wersji zmienionej dyrektywą 91/680/EWG (2) należy interpretować w ten sposób, że sprzeciwia się on objęciu regionalnym podatkiem od działalności produkcyjnej (IRAP) wartości produkcji netto wynikającej ze zwykłego wykonywania samodzielnej działalności skierowanej na produkcję lub wymianę towarów lub świadczenie usług?
 (1) Dz.U. L 145, str. 1.
 (2) Dz.U. L 376, str. 1.