jurisdiction: US

text:
 297 Md. 235 (1983)
 465 A.2d 1126
 MARTIN FRANCIS SCOTT
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 [No. 116, September Term, 1981 and No. 75, September Term, 1982.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided September 19, 1983.
 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.
 George E. Burns, Jr., and John L. Kopolow, Assistant Public Defenders, with whom were Alan H. Murrell, Public *236 Defender, and Julia D. Haskins, Assistant Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.
 Jillyn K. Schulze, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
 DAVIDSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH and RODOWSKY, JJ., dissent. MURPHY, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion at page 253 infra, in which SMITH and RODOWSKY, JJ., join.
 On 1 October 1981, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore (now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City), a jury convicted the appellant, Martin Francis Scott (accused), insofar as here relevant, of premeditated murder. After the jury determined that the appropriate sentence was death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. This appeal followed.
 On appeal, the accused does not contend that the trial court committed error during the guilt phase of the trial. The accused asserts, however, that the trial court committed numerous prejudicial errors in the course of the sentencing proceeding. More particularly, he asserts that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence intended to show that the accused had committed two unrelated murders with which he had been charged but for which there had been no conviction.[1] Because we find that the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting that evidence, we shall vacate the death sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing proceeding. Under these circumstances, no other questions need be considered.
 Here the record shows that at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the accused was convicted of the premeditated murder of Glenn Harrod, a cashier at a McDonald's Restaurant, a crime committed on 25 November 1980 during the course of an armed robbery. At the *237 sentencing proceeding, in his opening statement, the State's Attorney said:
 "[T]he State openly admit[s] that there is a mitigating circumstance in this case.... [W]e are admitting ... that Martin Scott has not previously been convicted of a crime of violence."
 Thus, the State conceded that the accused had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence.
 The State then proffered evidence to show that on 12 November 1980, during the course of an armed robbery, the accused killed John Hiotis, the owner of the Gyros Restaurant, and that on 26 November 1980, during the course of an armed robbery, the accused killed Jung Ju So, an employee of the Shurefine Market. The accused objected to the admission of the proffered evidence. After hearing testimony out of the presence of the jury relating to the two unrelated murders, the trial court determined that the evidence was "relevant and probative" and that the "evidence of the [accused's] conduct in those [two unrelated murders] establishes his participation beyond any reasonable doubt." The trial court concluded that even though there was no conviction, the evidence was admissible under Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413 (c) (1) (v).
 Thereafter, both direct and circumstantial evidence was presented to the jury to show that the accused had committed the two unrelated murders. With respect to the 12 November murder of Hiotis, the evidence consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness who made a positive in-court identification of the accused and the testimony of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a friend, to each of whom the accused had confessed. With respect to the 26 November murder of Jung Ju So, the evidence consisted of the testimony of two eyewitnesses, each of whom made positive in-court identifications of the accused, the testimony of a psychologist to whom the accused had confessed, and the testimony of a fingerprint expert that the accused's fingerprint was found at the scene of the crime. In addition, *238 evidence relating to the accused's background, character, and mental state at the time of the Harrod murder was adduced.
 After the accused completed closing argument, the State, in closing argument, emphasized the significance of the two unrelated murders. More particularly, the State said in pertinent part:
 "What is more important than the mitigating circumstance, if any, which you find ... why it's the two other murders.... Because what you do is this: Here's how you do it.
 ...
 "You first decide if there's an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt to a moral certainty. Then you find if there's any mitigating circumstances to the standard of preponderance of the evidence. The tipping of the scale, and then against any and all mitigating circumstances you find, you balance the other two murders.
 ...
 "Now, what could be more of a proper thing to take into consideration in balancing against any and all mitigating circumstances than the fact Mr. Scott killed two fellow human beings in cold blood?
 ...
 "If they had all eight mitigating circumstances and you balance that against the facts that the [accused] committed two other murders, if you find that it is relevant and probative to consider that fact, then you lump that all together, and you analyze that in your mind. You say, okay. He's got number 8, number 4, and let's see, he killed two other people. All right. In my mind the mitigating circumstances aren't worth anything because how important can it be that he was perhaps substantially impaired, which is only one *239 factor. It's not that he's guilty or innocent. It's not life or death if a mitigating circumstance exists. You could have every single mitigating circumstance. You could balance that with two other murders.
 "Then you'd say, okay. I weigh that all together. Just to give you some kind of an idea, let's say my one aggravating circumstance is worth a hundred points or any figure you want to use. Now, we have given them three mitigating circumstances. They add up to a hundred points, but when I think about he killed two other people, good God! What's more important?
 "That wipes out all of the mitigating circumstances. They are not worth a hill of beans. They are worth nothing even though I find they exist. They are of no consequence compared to the two other murders, and when you balance that result against the one aggravating circumstance, I wouldn't care if he had all eight.
 ...
 You have heard the testimony of the other two murders. We say other two murders. You all have heard the testimony. You know there's two people who are dead besides Glen Harrod. They are just not two other murders. They are two other people.
 ...
 They are dead. They are dead. You don't know what their trials were, what their upbringings were like, what they had to go through, what they left behind, who mourns for them, who grieves for them, who misses them. People that have nightmares over their deaths.
 ...
 You just don't know about those people because the *240 person on trial is the person who gets the focus of all your attention. Meanwhile, these people are snuffed out like you would step on a match that was burning your finger. They are just going. You just don't know about them, and we sit there and talk about murders.
 "These are people. These are real, live people who were absolute innocents. They were innocents. They were innocent persons who died.
 ...
 "They are dead.
 ...
 "That's what I mean when I say to you two murders. What does it mean to you? What are we here for? This is a murder case. These people are gone. You didn't kill them. He did (indicating.)
 "What does that mean to you? When is outrage appropriate if not in a situation like this?
 ...
 "You must stand up. You must be heard from. You must tell people. You must tell everyone that no, you can't bring back John Hiotis, you can't bring back Glenn Harrod. You can't bring back Jung Ju So.
 ...
 We ask you to do your duty in this case. To speak for your fellow citizens and say when somebody goes out and slaughters three other living human beings, we want something done about it. We are outraged. We want to scream and shout. We want to tell people we won't stand it any more." (Emphasis added).
 At the conclusion of closing argument, after instructing the jury with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court further instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows:
 *241 "Now, let me point out or say that the State has introduced evidence of two other murders and armed robberies, one at Gyros Carry-Out and the other at the Shurefine Market for which the [accused] had been charged but with respect to which he has not yet been tried.
 ...
 If you find that the evidence of the other untried crimes is relevant and probative, you should not use it in determining the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or the existence of mitigating circumstances by preponderance of the evidence. Rather, it may be considered by you as bearing on the character of the [accused] in your assessment of the weight to be given to mitigating circumstances in the final balancing process.
 ...
 "Let me further point out with respect to section three, in balancing the various factors, you are not involved in a mere counting process. The number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances you find to have been proved is not necessarily determinative in this balancing process. Rather, you should decide what weight and quality each factor deserves and apply your reasoned judgment as to whether this situation calls for life imprisonment or whether it requires an imposition of death in light of the balancing of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances which you find to have been proved."
 On 5 November 1981, the jury found only one aggravating circumstance  that the accused had "committed the [Harrod] murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery." The jury found two mitigating circumstances  first, that the accused "previously ... has not been found *242 guilty of a crime of violence," and second, that "[t]he murder was committed while the [accused's mental] capacity ... was substantially impaired...." The jury then found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstance, and determined that the accused should be sentenced to death. On 6 November 1981, the trial court imposed the death sentence.
 This case presents the question whether, under Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413 (c) (1), evidence is admissible at a sentencing proceeding to show that an accused convicted of premeditated murder has committed other unrelated crimes for which the accused has not been convicted or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. Section 413 (c) (1) provides:
 "The following type of evidence is admissible in this proceeding:
 "(i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance listed in subsection (g);[[2]]
 "(ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to § 412 (b);
 "(iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing procedures;
 "(iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not admissible; and
 *243 "(v) Any other evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements." (Emphasis added).
 The accused contends that under § 413 (c)(1)(i) and § 413 (c) (1) (iii), admissible evidence of unrelated crimes is restricted to evidence of prior convictions, pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere. The accused maintains that consequently the evidence of the two unrelated murders was inadmissible here because, although charged with both, the accused had not been convicted of either. The State, relying upon Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), contends that the evidence was admissible under § 413 (c) (1)(v).
 In Johnson, this Court considered the question whether, under § 413 (c)(1)(v), evidence is admissible at a sentencing proceeding to show that an accused, convicted of premeditated murder, has committed other unrelated crimes for which the accused has not been convicted. There, a jury convicted Johnson of first degree murder. At the sentencing proceeding, the trial court, over Johnson's objection, permitted the State to read to the jury Johnson's explicit confession to an unrelated murder with which Johnson had been charged, but of which he had not been convicted. In dicta, a majority of this Court said:
 "[E]vidence of criminal conduct for which a defendant has not been convicted is clearly admissible for sentencing purposes when that task is performed by a judge in a case not involving a section 413 death penalty proceeding. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480-87, 425 A.2d 632, 642-46 (1981); Purnell v. State, 241 Md. 582, 217 A.2d 298 (1965). We only a few months ago stated in Logan v. State that:
 `[i]n considering what is proper punishment, it is now well-settled in this State that a judge is not limited to reviewing past conduct whose occurrence has been judicially established, but may view "reliable evidence of conduct which *244 may be opprobrious although not criminal, as well as details and circumstances of criminal conduct for which the person has not been tried...."[Logan v. State, supra, 289 Md. at 481, 425 A.2d at 643 (citations omitted).]'
 "There is no reason in principle why this concept of sentencing should not apply in a section 413 death penalty proceeding even though the sentencing authority can, by election of the defendant, be reposed in either judge or jury. We observe nothing in the enactment which in any way contradicts this view, and in fact, a fair reading of the statute, particularly section 413 (c), embraces it.
 ...
 In our view, part (v) in unambiguous terms authorizes the trial court to admit into evidence before the sentencing jury identical information concerning a defendant's criminal conduct as would normally be considered by the judge if he were imposing sentence in a non-death penalty case. As is true in all other criminal causes, the sentencing authority in a death penalty case should be presented with a full range of relevant information so as to fashion a particular penalty in accord with `the prevalent modern penal philosophy of individualized punishment.' Logan v. State, supra, 289 Md. at 481, 425 A.2d at 643. The task that the sentencer must perform in this regard is thus basically no different from that carried out daily by trial judges in other types of cases. Therefore, evidence of a convicted person's confession to prior criminal conduct, voluntarily made, may be admitted at sentencing pursuant to section 413 (c) (1) (v) if the court deems it to be of probative value and relevant to sentence, `provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements' and challenge their voluntariness." Johnson, 292 Md. at 441-43, 439 A.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added).
 *245 Thus, this Court indicated that under § 413 (c) (1) (v) under certain circumstances certain evidence of unrelated crimes of which the accused has not been convicted is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case.
 Johnson, however, is not dispositive here. In Johnson, the accused's sole contention was that evidence of an unrelated murder with which he had been charged but for which he had not been convicted was inadmissible because it "`was unrelated to any aggravating factor' contained in the statute, and, moreover, rebutted nothing" with respect to any mitigating circumstance. Johnson, 292 Md. at 441, 439 A.2d at 562. The accused, however, did not there contend that under § 413 (c) (1) (i) and § 413 (c) (1) (iii) admissible evidence of unrelated crimes was restricted to evidence of prior convictions, pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere and consequently that the evidence of the unrelated murder was inadmissible because, although charged with the murder, the accused had not been convicted. Thus, while in Johnson, this Court considered the scope of § 413 (c) (1) (v), it did so without considering the questions of the scope of § 413 (c) (1) (i) and of § 413 (c) (1) (iii) and their interrelationship with § 413 (c) (1) (v). Those questions will be considered here.
 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the actual intent of the Legislature. The primary source from which to determine the intention of the Legislature is the language of the statute itself. In determining whether the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the isolated section to be construed. Rather, in determining the meaning of a particular provision or section, even where its language appears to be clear and unambiguous, it is necessary to examine that provision or section in context. If the statutory language of the particular provision or section in its context is ambiguous, the statute must be examined as a whole and the interrelationship or connection between all of its parts considered. The statute should then be construed so that all of its parts are given effect and harmonized if possible, and should not be construed so as to render any language surplusage *246 or meaningless. Moreover, if the statutory language is ambiguous, the statute is to be construed reasonably and with reference to the purpose to be accomplished. In order to determine the statute's purpose, a court may consider the statute's legislative history. Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 556, 451 A.2d 658, 662 (1982); State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 429, 435 A.2d 764, 767 (1981); Comptroller of the Treasury v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 538, 404 A.2d 1045, 1052 (1979); Employment Sec. Admin. v. Weimer, 285 Md. 96, 103, 400 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1979).
 Section 413 (c) (1) establishes a statutory scheme designed to delineate and circumscribe the type of evidence admissible in sentencing proceedings in death penalty cases. Thus, § 413 (c) (1) (i) provides that certain evidence relating to mitigating circumstances is admissible; § 413 (c) (1) (ii) provides that under certain circumstances certain evidence relating to aggravating circumstances is admissible; § 413 (c) (1) (iii) provides that three types of evidence relating to other crimes allegedly committed by an accused are admissible; and § 413 (c) (1) (iv) provides that presentence investigation reports are admissible, but specifically precludes recommendations as to sentence. The language of all of these provisions collectively unambiguously restricts the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what generally is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case.
 More particularly, § 413 (c) (1) (i) provides that evidence relating to any mitigating circumstances listed in § 413 (g) is admissible. Article 27, § 413 (g) (1) specifically enumerates as a mitigating circumstance the fact that:
 "The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence."
 *247 This specific enumeration restricts the type of evidence relating to other crimes that is admissible to evidence of crimes of violence for which there has been a conviction. Thus, § 413 (c) (1) (i) establishes a more stringent standard of relevance for the admission of evidence relating to other crimes in a death penalty case than is applied in a nondeath penalty case. That section establishes that a lack of a conviction of a crime of violence is a mitigating circumstance to be taken into account and given some weight. It precludes, in a death penalty case, the admission of evidence of crimes of violence for which there have been no convictions, evidence that may well result in the mitigating circumstance of the absence of prior convictions being outweighed or, in essence, "wiped out" or eliminated. As a result, § 413 (c) (1) (i) serves the purpose of moderating the significantly prejudicial nature of evidence of unrelated crimes in the face of the unique severity of the death penalty.
 Additionally, § 413 (c) (1) (iii) provides that three types of evidence relating to other crimes allegedly committed by an accused  evidence of convictions, pleas of guilty, and pleas of nolo contendere  are admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case. This specific enumeration restricts the type of evidence relating to other crimes that is admissible to evidence of crimes for which there has been a conviction. Thus, § 413 (c) (1) (iii) establishes a more stringent standard of reliability for the admission of such evidence in a death penalty case than is applied in a nondeath penalty case. It precludes, in a death penalty case, any but the most reliable type of evidence of unrelated crimes  a conviction. Additionally, § 413 (c) (1) (iii) precludes, in a death penalty case, inflammatory detailed evidence of the underlying facts and circumstances surrounding unrelated crimes. As a result, § 413 (c) (1) (iii), like § 413 (c) (1) (i), serves the purpose of moderating the significantly prejudicial nature of evidence of unrelated crimes in the face of the unique severity of the death penalty.
 The language of § 413 (c) (1) (v), providing that under certain circumstances "any other evidence" is admissible, *248 cannot be construed as authorizing evidence of unrelated crimes to be admitted in a death penalty case, even where there has been no conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Such a construction would render the unambiguous language of § 413 (c) (1) (i), establishing that a lack of a conviction of a crime of violence is a mitigating circumstance to be taken into account and given some weight, surplusage or meaningless. Because the admission of evidence of crimes for which there have been no convictions may well result in the mitigating circumstance of the absence of prior convictions being outweighed or, in essence, "wiped out" or eliminated, its admission is not consonant with, and indeed defeats the restrictive purpose of § 413 (c) (1) (i). Moreover, if the phrase "any other evidence" contained in § 413 (c) (1) (v) authorizes evidence of unrelated crimes to be admitted, even though there has been no conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere, then the unambiguous language of § 413 (c) (1) (iii), restricting the type of evidence of other crimes to convictions and pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, would be surplusage or meaningless. Manifestly, the admission of evidence of crimes of which there have been no convictions is antithetical to the restrictive purpose of § 413 (c) (1).
 If all parts of § 413 (c) (1) are to be given effect and harmonized and no part is to be rendered surplusage or meaningless, § 413 (c) (1) (v) must be read in conjunction with § 413 (c) (1) (i) and § 413 (c) (1) (iii). When read as a whole, § 413 (c) (1) must be construed as precluding the admission of evidence relating to other crimes for which there has not been a conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
 Such a construction is consonant with the legislative history of the Act. The language of § 413 (c) (1) had its origin in, and was virtually identical in pertinent part to, H.B. No. 785, introduced 26 January 1977, and S.B. No. 374, introduced 25 January 1977. These administration bills were proposed for the purpose of repealing then existing statutes that had mandated that the death penalty be imposed upon *249 conviction of certain crimes, providing that the punishment for conviction of first degree murder should be life imprisonment or capital punishment, and requiring a separate sentencing proceeding upon conviction of first degree murder. Additionally, the purpose clause of each of these bills expressly stated that one of their purposes was "providing for the evidentiary character of the sentencing proceeding [in a death penalty case]."
 This portion of the purpose clause, when coupled with the unambiguous language of § 413 (c) (1) (i)-(iv) restricting the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case, establishes that these two bills were intended to provide a sentencing proceeding in which the type of admissible evidence was more circumscribed than in a nondeath penalty case. The restrictive purpose is exemplified in the legislative history of § 413 (c) (1) (i) and § 413 (g) (1). The scope of those sections relating to mitigating factors, as drafted, was specifically addressed in a memorandum dated 11 August 1976 to the Governor's Chief Legislative Officer. There, it was said:
 "There were several alternatives available with respect to the lack of any past criminal record as a mitigating factor. The factor recommended by the Model Penal Code and enacted in Florida is `no significant history of prior criminal activity.' The draft incorporates a more specific factor of lack of culpable participation in a `crime of violence.' The fact that a defendant has a `significant' history of convictions for shoplifting should not have a bearing on the decision by a jury, or judge, to recommend a sentence of death. Therefore, the draft limits the type of past criminal activity to that which is relevant to the decision in a murder case." (Citations omitted.)
 Thus, the purpose of the draft of § 413 (c) (1) (i) was to impose a more stringent standard of relevance for the admission of evidence relating to other crimes in a death *250 penalty case than is applied in a nondeath penalty case by restricting the type of evidence relating to other crimes that was admissible to evidence of crimes of violence.
 The draft additionally incorporated another specific factor of lack of culpable participation. Not only did the unrelated crime have to be a crime of violence, but it also had to be a crime of which the accused had been convicted. Thus, the purpose of the draft of § 413 (c) (1) (i) was to restrict the type of evidence relating to other crimes that was admissible not only to evidence of crimes of violence, but also to crimes of violence for which there had been a conviction. With respect to mitigating factors, evidence of an unrelated crime of violence for which there was no conviction was irrelevant and inadmissible.
 The question whether the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case should be more circumscribed than in a nondeath penalty case was squarely presented by the introduction of S.B. No. 106 on 12 January 1977. Unlike H.B. No. 785 and S.B. No. 374, the purpose clause of S.B. No. 106 contained no reference to "providing for the evidentiary character of the sentencing proceeding" in a death penalty case. Moreover, § 413 (b) of S.B. No. 106 provided in pertinent part:
 "In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and may include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in this section."
 Thus, the purpose of this portion of § 413 (b) of S.B. No. 106 was to provide a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case in which the type of evidence admissible would be unrestricted and identical to that generally admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case.
 The General Assembly rejected H.B. No. 785 and S.B. No. 374, and enacted S.B. No. 106, effective 1 July 1977. On 26 May 1977, S.B. No. 106 was vetoed by the Governor. The veto, however, was not premised on the fact that under S.B. *251 No. 106 the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case would be unrestricted and identical to that generally admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case.
 Thereafter, on 11 January 1978, S.B. No. 374, an administration bill, was introduced. That bill, in pertinent part, was virtually identical to H.B. No. 785 and S.B. No. 374 that the General Assembly had rejected in 1977. The restrictive purpose of § 413 (c) (1) (i)-(iv) was again exemplified by an accompanying memorandum dated 14 December 1977 from the Governor's Chief Legislative Officer to the General Assembly that indicated, with respect to mitigating factors, that evidence of an unrelated crime of violence for which there was no conviction was inadmissible. That memorandum stated in pertinent part:
 "There were several alternatives available with respect to the lack of any past criminal record as a mitigating factor. The factor recommended by the Model Penal Code and enacted in Florida is `no significant history of prior criminal activity.' The draft incorporates a more specific factor of lack of culpable participation in a `crime of violence.' The fact that a defendant has a `significant' history of convictions for shoplifting or gambling should not have a bearing on the decision by a jury, or judge, to recommend a sentence of death. Therefore, the draft limits the type of past criminal activity to that which should be relevant to the decision in a murder case."
 Thus, the General Assembly was aware that § 413 (c) (1) (i) imposed a more stringent standard of relevance for the admission of evidence relating to other crimes in a death penalty case than is applied in a nondeath penalty case by restricting the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what is generally admissible in a nondeath penalty case.
 *252 The General Assembly enacted S.B. No. 374, effective 1 July 1978. In so doing, the General Assembly delineated "the evidentiary character of the sentencing proceeding" in a death penalty case as one in which the type of evidence admissible is restricted to something less inclusive than that generally admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case. Thus, the statute's legislative history supports the construction of § 413 (c) (1) as precluding the admission of evidence relating to other crimes for which there has not been a conviction, plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
 Additionally, such a construction is reasonable and consonant with § 413 (c) (1)'s specific purpose of providing a sentencing proceeding in which, in the face of the unique severity of the death penalty, the type of admissible evidence is more circumscribed than in a nondeath penalty case. It is also consonant with the constraint expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 397, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2807 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.) that:
 "[J]uries and judges can no longer be permitted to make the sentencing determination in the same manner they have in the past."
 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1982).
 Here, the State conceded the existence of a mitigating factor  that the accused had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted evidence of two unrelated murders for which there were neither convictions nor pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Under § 413 (c) (1), this evidence was inadmissible. The admission of this evidence exposed the jury to inflammatory detailed testimony concerning the underlying facts and circumstances surrounding the two unrelated crimes. More important, in light of the State's closing argument and the trial court's instructions, the admission of this evidence may well have resulted in the mitigating circumstance of the *253 absence of prior convictions being outweighed or, in essence, "wiped out" or eliminated. Because this inadmissible evidence was significantly prejudicial to the accused, its admission constituted reversible error. Courts in some jurisdictions that have considered similar questions under varying circumstances and for varying reasons have reached the same result. E.g., Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1257 (Ala. 1979); Perry v. State, 395 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1980); State v. McCormick, 272 Ind. 272, 278, 397 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1979). But see, e.g., People v. Easley, 33 Cal. 3d 65, 87, 654 P.2d 1272, 1288, 187 Cal. Rptr. 745, 760-61 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 118, 283 A.2d 58, 68-69 (1971); Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex.Crim. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031, 101 S. Ct. 3022 (1981). Under the circumstances here, we shall vacate the death sentence and remand the case for a further sentencing proceeding.
 Judgment affirmed, except as to the imposition of the death sentence.
 Death sentence vacated.
 Case remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new sentencing proceeding.
 Costs to be paid by Baltimore City.
 Murphy, C.J., dissenting:
 The Court today adopts a strained interpretation of Maryland's death penalty statute and thereby nullifies the death penalty imposed on Martin Francis Scott by a sentencing jury of his peers. There are at least three reasons why the introduction of Scott's confessions to (and other probative evidence of his participation in) the murders of two other persons was not improper. First, in Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), we decided the precise issue raised here in favor of admissibility, and that case should be accorded controlling precedential significance. Second, the language of the statute is clear and fully supports the admission of this evidence. There is absolutely no *254 ambiguity in the statute that would justify the Court's futile search for legislative history to support its statutory interpretation. Finally, the evidence was properly admitted to assist the jury in evaluating the force of a concededly mitigating circumstance raised by the appellant, i.e., that he had not previously been convicted of a crime of violence.[1] For these reasons, I most emphatically dissent.
 I.
 The Court's decision today flatly contradicts our Johnson decision in both letter and spirit. That case extended the established principle in non-capital cases that the sentencer may view reliable evidence of criminal conduct for which a person has not yet been tried:
 "There is no reason in principle why this concept of sentencing should not apply in a section 413 death penalty proceeding even though the sentencing authority can, by election of the defendant, be reposed in either judge or jury. We observe nothing in the enactment which in any way contradicts this view, and in fact, a fair reading of the statute, particularly section 413 (c), embraces it." 292 Md. at 442, 439 A.2d at 563.
 Beyond the absence of conflict within the statute itself, positive reasons were given for extending the rule:
 "In our view, part (v) in unambiguous terms authorizes the trial court to admit into evidence before the sentencing jury identical information concerning a defendant's criminal conduct as would normally be considered by the judge if he were imposing sentence in a non-death penalty case. As is true in all other criminal causes, the sentencing *255 authority in a death penalty case should be presented with a full range of relevant information so as to fashion a particular penalty in accord with `the prevalent modern penal philosophy of individualized punishment.' Logan v. State, [289 Md. 460, 481, 425 A.2d 632, 643 (1981)]. The task that the sentencer must perform in this regard is thus basically no different from that carried out daily by trial judges in other types of cases. Therefore, evidence of a convicted person's confession to prior criminal conduct, voluntarily made, may be admitted at sentencing pursuant to section 413 (c) (v) if the court deems it to be of probative value and relevant to sentence, `provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements' and challenge their voluntariness. Those jurisdictions which have addressed the question here presented are in substantial accord with this view." 292 Md. at 442-43, 439 A.2d at 563.
 As we noted in Johnson, the Supreme Court has endorsed these principles in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941 (1976) ("What is essential is that the [sentencing] jury [in a death penalty case] have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.");[2] and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976) ("[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.").
 *256 Although the Court notes that the question presented here is virtually identical to that decided in Johnson, it does not find that case dispositive, characterizing the discussion of the issue there as "dicta." Such a characterization is misleading at best. Where a point has been raised or argued by the parties, and the court decides the question with a view to settle the law, what is said is not dicta. All that is necessary to render a decision of this Court authoritative on any point decided is to show that there was an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged. Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 488-89 (1854). Accord, McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 257, 104 A. 540, 543-44 (1918); Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 499-500, 52 A. 601 (1902), aff'd 193 U.S. 11 (1904); Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 261 (1867). It does not lessen the authority of the opinion if the case was decided on another ground, U. Rwys. & E. Co. v. M. & C.C. of Balto., 121 Md. 552, 558, 88 A. 617, 620 (1913); Carstairs v. Cochran, supra, or if the opinion was for the guidance of the trial court on retrial, as in Johnson. See State Roads Comm. v. Johnson, 222 Md. 493, 499, 161 A.2d 444, 448 (1960). It is not necessary for the point to have been directly presented or fully argued in the former case, as long as it was at least indirectly raised or was directly involved in the issues argued. State Roads Comm. v. Johnson, supra; Michael v. Morey, supra. Thus, the Court's distinction that the precise formulation of the argument here was not presented in Johnson is simply not relevant, since the critical inquiry is whether the issue was raised and decided in the earlier case, not whether argument on the issue covered the same points. In Johnson, we held that nothing in the statute (necessarily including § 413 (c) (1) (i) and (iii)) contradicts the position that probative evidence of criminal activity short of criminal conviction may be made available to the sentencing jury. By failing to acknowledge the authority of Johnson, the Court avoids the necessity of showing that that case was incorrectly decided. Rather than overruling Johnson, the Court simply ignores it and treats the issue as one of first impression. The trial court's careful jury instructions here complied fully with Johnson in *257 directing the proper use of this evidence by the jury. When we have so recently and clearly interpreted a statute, and the interpretation has been relied on by the trial courts of Maryland, it is inappropriate and detrimental to the public perception of the judicial process to engage in such a sudden reversal of position, absent some compelling need not here present.
 The Court notes that some jurisdictions considering "similar questions under varying circumstances and for varying reasons" have reached the same result as the majority does here. The Court's qualifying phrases are well advised. Two of the cases relied upon excluded evidence of "pending charges," rather than evidence of confessions and/or eyewitness testimony, as in the present case and in Johnson. See Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1979); Perry v. State, 395 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1980). The remaining case found a constitutional basis for refusing to allow evidence of criminal activity to serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance to support imposition of the death penalty. See State v. McCormick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979) (statutory aggravating circumstance violates Due Process). The Court here does not base its decision on constitutional grounds, nor has the challenged evidence been used to prove the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Cf. Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.1981). In short, the cases cited by the majority are at best weakly relevant. The support is further undercut and offset by cases holding to the contrary, cases consistent with the result reached in Johnson. See, e.g., People v. Easley, 33 Cal. 3d 65, 654 P.2d 1272, 187 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1982); People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981); Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 (1981); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc). See also United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938); People v. Morse, 70 Cal. 2d 711, 452 P.2d 607, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) *258 (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971) (pre-Furman cases).
 II.
 The Court's disregard for the authority of Johnson would be somewhat mitigated if the result it reached was supported by sound reasoning. It is not. In examining the language of § 413, the Court begins with an unsupported assumption about the purpose of the statute, and then proceeds to use that assumption to interpret the statute in a way that supports the original assumption. The bootstrapping process begins with the assertion that § 413 (c) (1) "establishes a statutory scheme designed to delimit and circumscribe the type of evidence admissible in sentencing proceedings in death penalty cases." After identifying the categories of evidence made admissible by § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv), the Court proclaims: "The language of these provisions collectively unambiguously restricts the type of evidence admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a death penalty case to something less inclusive than what generally is admissible in a sentencing proceeding in a nondeath penalty case." The obvious flaw in the Court's reasoning is that this analysis excludes § 413 (c) (1) (v), the very provision at issue here. By dismembering the statute and ignoring the provision nominally being construed, the Court finds that § 413 (c) (1) strictly limits admissible evidence to narrow, enumerated categories. Therefore, since (1) § 413 (c) (1) (i) makes evidence relating to a mitigating circumstance admissible, (2) one of the mitigating circumstances, § 413 (g) (1) is the absence of a conviction of a crime of violence, and (3) evidence of a crime of violence short of that listed in the mitigating circumstance might tend to "wipe out" the weight given to the mitigating circumstance, the Court concludes that such evidence is inadmissible as not being within the "limits" of § 413 (g) (1) and § 413 (c) (1) (i). Using similar logic, § 413 (c) (1) (iii) is interpreted as "restrict[ing] the type of evidence relating to other crimes that is admissible to evidence of other crimes for which there has been a conviction."
 *259 Only after examining the "context" of the statute being construed in isolation and drawing its conclusions, does the Court turn to the statute itself. Although acknowledging that the plain and unambiguous language of § 413 (c) (1) (v) provides that under certain circumstances "any other evidence" is admissible, the Court nonetheless finds that if evidence short of a conviction is admitted, § 413 (c) (1) (i) and (iii), as interpreted, "would be surplusage or meaningless." Although the Court does not acknowledge it, the rationale used to reach its conclusion would in fact render § 413 (c) (1) (v) "surplusage or meaningless," since no evidence outside the narrow categories created in § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) would be admissible.
 The Court's reasoning is a textbook illustration why a statute must be construed in context rather than isolated as the Court does here, and the provisions harmonized rather than needlessly set in conflict. When the full text of § 413 (c) (1) is examined,[3] it is patently evident that § 413 (c) (1) (i) through (iv) delineates categories of evidence that are to be admissible per se in a sentencing hearing. Section 413 (c) (1) (v) completes the picture by providing for the admissibility of other evidence, but only if the court finds that it has probative value and is relevant to sentence, and further that *260 the defendant has been accorded a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence. As with other proffers of evidence, if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant, the court may in its discretion exclude it. Thus, the subsections of § 413 (c) (1) define types of evidence which are or may be admissible, and provide standards to guide that process. With one exception, § 413 (c) (1) does not exclude evidence. That exception is § 413 (c) (1) (iv), which explicitly excludes sentence recommendations contained in admissible presentence investigation reports. The basis for the exclusion is apparently the accepted principle that opinions of other persons as to the ultimate decision before the sentencer should not be received in evidence. Indeed, the language of § 413 (c) (1) (v) stands in open rebuttal to the Court's assumption as to the purpose of the section. By supplementing the specifically enumerated categories of admissible evidence, § 413 (c) (1) (v) assures that all possible relevant information will be before the sentencer. Thus construed, there is no ambiguity or conflict within the statute.[4]
 *261 Having created a spurious ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court seeks support for its view in the legislative history of the Act, citing language of bills rejected by the Legislature or vetoed by the Governor. The only arguably relevant history cited is a letter from the Governor's Chief Legislative Officer to the General Assembly concerning the bill which eventually was enacted. In a discussion of the scope of a mitigating circumstance (§ 413 (g) (1)), the letter notes that, rather than limiting the mitigating circumstance to a defendant with no significant history of prior criminal activity, "the draft limits the type of past criminal activity [which would preclude finding the mitigating circumstance] to that which is relevant to the decision in a murder case [i.e. a crime of violence]." In other words, in the absence of a conviction of a crime of violence, the defendant must be accorded the benefit of the mitigating circumstance listed in § 413 (g) (1). As we held in Johnson, supra, this is so even where there is reliable evidence of a crime of violence committed by the defendant for which he has not yet been convicted. However, there is, very simply, nothing in the legislative history of the death penalty statute to indicate that the legislature intended to exclude this type of evidence from the sentencing authority's consideration.
 III.
 Aside from questions of stare decisis or the proper interpretation of § 413 (c) (1), the challenged evidence was properly admitted as relating to a mitigating circumstance advanced by the defendant  the absence of a conviction for a crime of violence. The State conceded, as it had to, that the defendant had not, as of the trial date, been convicted of such a crime. However, the State was entitled to present evidence relating to the mitigating circumstance to aid the sentencing jury in interpreting and evaluating the circumstance *262 in its decision-making process. See, e.g., Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972). The mitigating value of the circumstances derives from the inference that the murder was an isolated event rather than the culmination of a series of other violent crimes committed by the defendant. Here, reliable evidence of two other murders, one before and one after the instant crime, is of obvious value in properly weighing the mitigating circumstance. That the evidence may convince the sentencer that the circumstance should be afforded little mitigating weight does not render it inadmissible; indeed, that is the purpose for its introduction. The sentencing authority must be guided by the aggravating and mitigating factors, but may not be limited to an uninformed or arithmetic balancing of these factors. The Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to a death sentence based in part on the sentencer's use of personal experiences in weighing the statutory factors. In upholding the sentence, the Court opined:
 "We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires that the sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors. But to attempt to separate the sentencer's decision from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that. It is entirely fitting for the moral, factual, and legal judgment of judges and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing. We expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in their own way and to the best of their ability. As long as that discretion is guided in a constitutionally adequate way, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and as long as the decision is not so wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment cannot and should not demand more." Barclay v. Florida, U.S. [33 Crim. L. Rptr. 3292, 3295 (filed July 6, 1983)].
 The Court today unwisely places a set of blinders on the sentencing authority which severely limits its access to *263 relevant and probative evidence so vitally necessary in discharging its sentencing function. For the reasons stated, I cannot subscribe to the Court's decision in this case.
 Judges Smith and Rodowsky have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.
 NOTES
 [1] Throughout this opinion, the word "conviction" includes a conviction, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, unless otherwise indicated.
 [2] Art. 27, § 413 (g) provides in pertinent part:
 "[T]he court or jury ... shall ... consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following mitigating circumstances exist:
 "(1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence."
 [1] Another mitigating circumstance upon which such evidence may impact is set forth in § 413 (g) (7), viz, that "[i]t is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
 [2] Jurek is instructive as to the scope of relevant information properly admissible in the sentencing proceeding. In that case, the Supreme Court quoted with approval from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion to the effect that the jury "could consider the range and severity of [the defendant's] prior criminal conduct" in addition to "whether [he] had a significant criminal record." 428 U.S. at 272-73.
 [3] "(c) Evidence; argument; instructions.  (1) The following type of evidence is admissible in this proceeding:
 (i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance listed in subsection (g);
 (ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to § 412 (b);
 (iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing procedures;
 (iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not admissible; and
 (v) Any other evidence that the Court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements."
 Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413 (c) (1).
 [4] The provisions of the Maryland statute are somewhat more detailed than those contained in the Model Penal Code's death penalty provisions, but similar broad language is used for the admissibility of other types of evidence:
 "In addition, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence."
 Model Penal Code, § 210.6 (2), 10 Uniform Laws Annotated (1974).
 "In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence."
 Id. (alternative § 210.6 (2)).
 See generally, id. (1983 Supp.), Model Sentencing and Convictions Act, § 3-109 (1) ("If appropriate for the offense, aggravating factors, if not themselves necessary elements of the offense, may include ... the defendant has a recent history of convictions or criminal behavior.").


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
21.10.2000 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas C 302/15
 La tasa a tanto alzado percibida de conformidad con la mente artı́culo 90 del Tratado CE), constituye, en cual-
 Directiva 64/433/CEE (1) del Consejo de 26 de junio de 1964, quier caso, un acto con relevancia externa, que produce
 inmediatamente efectos jurı́dicos perjudiciales para sus
 a) en la versión resultante de la Directiva 89/662/CEE(2) de destinatarios. Desde este punto de vista, está claro que los
 11 de diciembre de 1989 Estados miembros y los sujetos interesados pueden
 impugnar las decisiones de la Comisión de calificar
 b) en la versión resultante de la Directiva 91/497/CEE(3) de
 determinadas medidas como «ayudas nuevas» en el sen-
 29 de julio de 1991,
 tido del artı́culo 92 del Tratado CE (actualmente artı́cul-
 aplicable, con arreglo a la Directiva 88/409/CEE (4) del Consejo o 87 CE, tras su modificación) e iniciar el procedimiento
 de 15 de junio de 1988, por la inspección de carnes frescas previsto en el artı́culo 88 CE, apartado 2 (anteriormente
 destinadas al mercado nacional, artı́culo 93, apartado 2, del Tratado CE), cuando conside-
 ren que las medidas de que se trate son «ayudas existentes»
 ¿comprende asimismo, con arreglo a que deben valorarse en un marco procedimental diferente,
 establecido en el artı́culo 88 CE, apartado 1 [anterior-
 a) la Directiva 85/73/CEE (5) del Consejo de 29 de enero de mente artı́culo 93, apartado 1, del Tratado CE].
 1985, en relación con la Decisión 88/408/CEE (6) del
 Consejo de 15 de junio de 1988 2) La República Italiana indica que la Comisión cometió un
 error manifiesto al determinar la base jurı́dica adecuada
 b) la Directiva 85/73/CEE del Consejo, en la versión resul- para la valoración de la compatibilidad de las normas
 tante de la Directiva 93/118/CEE (7) del Consejo de 22 de nacionales controvertidas con el Derecho comunitario:
 diciembre de 1993, en efecto, deberı́a haber realizado y finalizado su propio
 análisis únicamente en función de las normas especı́ficas
 los gastos de realización de los análisis de la carne fresca de de la Directiva postal. En el presente caso, esta falta de
 porcino destinados a detectar la presencia de triquinas? base jurı́dica condujo a un vicio sustancial de forma y
 una utilización de procedimiento inadecuado evidentes,
 ( 1) DO 1964 L 121, p. 2012; EE 03/01, p. 101. en la medida en que se inició un procedimiento conforme
 ( 2) DO 1989 L 395, p. 13. al artı́culo 86 CE, apartado 3, cuando una eventual cen-
 ( 3) DO 1991 L 268, p. 69. sura de la incorrecta adaptación del Derecho interno a la
 ( 4) DO 1988 L 194, p. 28. Directiva postal deberı́a haberse efectuado en el marco
 ( 5) DO 1985 L 32, p. 14; EE 03/33, p. 152.
 procedimental establecido en el artı́culo 226 CE (anterior-
 ( 6) DO 1988 L 194, p. 24.
 ( 7) DO 1993 L 340, p. 15. mente artı́culo 169 del Tratado).
 Al actuar ası́, la Comisión infringió también el artı́culo
 86 CE, apartado 3, que no podı́a aplicarse en el presente
 asunto, ası́ como el artı́culo 226 CE, por no haberlo
 aplicado, actuando de este modo de forma equivocada.
 Recurso interpuesto el 20 de julio de 2000 contra la Finalmente, debe observarse que la elección efectuada por
 Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas por la República la Comisión en favor de un procedimiento distinto del
 Italiana exigido por el artı́culo 226 del Tratado no se basa siquiera
 en una mı́nima motivación, tanto más necesaria si se
 (Asunto C-286/00) tienen en cuenta las graves consecuencias que dicha
 elección produce.
 (2000/C 302/28)
 En el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas se ha
 presentado el 20 de julio de 2000 un recurso contra la
 Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas formulado por la
 República Italiana, representada por el Profesor Umberto
 Petición de decisión prejudicial presentada mediante reso-
 Leanza, en calidad de Agente, asistido por Ivo M. Braguglia y
 lución del Bundesverwaltungsgericht, de fecha 27 de abril
 Francesca Quadri, avvocati dello Stato, que designa como
 de 2000, en el asunto entre Fleischversorgung Neuss
 domicilio en Luxemburgo la sede de la Embajada de Italia, rue
 GmbH und Co. KG y Landrat des Kreises Neuss
 Marie-Adélaïde, 5.
 La demandante solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que: (Asunto C-288/00)
 — Anule el escrito de requerimiento de la Comisión no SG (2000/C 302/29)
 (2000) — D/103687, de fecha 16 de mayo de 2000.
 Al Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas le ha
 — Condene en costas a la demandada. sido sometida una petición de decisión prejudicial mediante
 resolución del Bundesverwaltungsgericht, dictada el 27 de abril
 Motivos y principales alegaciones de 2000, en el asunto entre Fleischversorgung Neuss GmbH
 und Co. KG y Landrat des Kreises Neuss, y recibida en la
 1) La República Italiana señala que el acto de requerimiento, Secretarı́a del Tribunal de Justicia el 21 de julio de 2000. El
 aun siendo previo a una eventual Decisión adoptada Bundesverwaltungsgericht solicita al Tribunal de Justicia que
 posteriormente con arreglo al artı́culo 86 CE (anterior- se pronuncie sobre la siguiente cuestión:
 ---pagebreak--- C 302/16 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 21.10.2000
 La tasa a tanto alzado percibida de conformidad con la Petición de decisión prejudicial presentada mediante reso-
 Directiva 64/433/CEE (1) del Consejo de 26 de junio de 1964, lución de la Corte suprema di Cassazione (Sezione terza
 en la versión resultante de la Directiva 89/662/CEE (2) de 11 de civile), de fecha 18 de abril de 2000, en el asunto entre
 diciembre de 1989, aplicable, con arreglo a la Directiva Prefetto provincia di Cuneo y Carbone Silvano NQ
 88/409/CEE (3) del Consejo de 15 de junio de 1988, por la amministratore unico soc. «Expo Casa Manta Srl»
 inspección de carnes frescas destinadas al mercado nacional,
 ¿comprende asimismo, con arreglo a la Directiva 85/73/CEE (4) (Asunto C-296/00)
 del Consejo de 29 de enero de 1985, en relación con la
 Decisión 88/408/CEE (5) del Consejo de 15 de junio de 1988, (2000/C 302/31)
 los costes de un análisis bacteriológico que debe realizarse en
 casos concretos? Al Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas le ha
 sido sometida una petición de decisión prejudicial mediante
 ( 1) DO 1964 L 121, p. 2012; EE 03/01, p. 101. resolución de la Corte suprema di Cassazione (Sezione terza
 ( 2) DO 1989 L 395, p. 13. civile), dictada el 18 de abril de 2000, en el asunto entre
 ( 3) DO 1988 L 194, p. 28. Prefetto provincia di Cuneo y Carbone Silvano NQ amministra-
 ( 4) DO 1985 L 32, p. 14; EE 03/33, p. 152. tore unico soc. «Expo Casa Manta Srl», y recibida en la
 ( 5) DO 1988 L 194, p. 24.
 Secretarı́a del Tribunal de Justicia el 1 de agosto de 2000. La
 Corte suprema di Cassazione (Sezione terza civile) solicita al
 Tribunal de Justicia que se pronuncie sobre la siguiente
 cuestión:
 Petición de decisión prejudicial presentada mediante reso- ¿Está comprendida en el ámbito de aplicación de los Reglamen-
 lución del Bundesgerichtshof, de fecha 27 de abril de tos comunitarios no 519/94 (1) y 3285/94 (2), relativos al
 2000, en el asunto entre Davidoff & Cie. SA y Zino régimen común aplicable a las importaciones de determinados
 Davidoff SA y GOFKID Ltd paı́ses terceros, una normativa nacional que exige la homologa-
 (Asunto C-292/00) ción previa de aparatos telefónicos sin hilos (cordless) proce-
 dentes de paı́ses terceros exclusivamente para su comercializa-
 (2000/C 302/30) ción, pero que no la exige para su importación?
 Al Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas le ha (1) DO L 67 de 10.03.1994, p. 89.
 sido sometida una petición de decisión prejudicial mediante (2) DO L 349 de 31.12.1994, p. 53.
 resolución del Bundesgerichtshof, dictada el 27 de abril de
 2000, en el asunto entre Davidoff & Cie. SA. y Zino Davidoff
 SA y GOFKID Ltd, y recibida en la Secretarı́a del Tribunal de
 Justicia el 31 de julio de 2000. El Bundesgerichtshof solicita al
 Tribunal de Justicia que se pronuncie sobre las siguientes
 cuestiones:
 Petición de decisión prejudicial presentada mediante reso-
 1. ¿Deben interpretarse (o, en su caso, aplicarse análoga- lución del Tribunal Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio,
 mente) los artı́culos 4, apartado 4, letra a), y 5, apar- de fecha 31 de mayo y 6 de julio de 2000, en el asunto
 tado 2, de la Primera Directiva 89/104/CEE relativa a la entre M. Balestreri y L. Maura, por un lado, y la Regione
 aproximación de las legislaciones de los Estados miem- Lombardia, por otro
 bros en materia de marcas, de 21 de diciembre de
 1988 (1), en el sentido de que facultan a los Estados
 (Asunto C-303/00)
 miembros para conceder la protección más amplia de las
 marcas de renombre también en los casos en que la marca
 posterior se utilice o vaya a utilizarse para productos o (2000/C 302/32)
 servicios que sean idénticos o similares a aquellos para
 los cuales está registrada la marca anterior? Al Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas le ha
 sido sometida una petición de decisión prejudicial mediante
 2. ¿Los artı́culos 4, apartado 4, letra a), y 5, apartado 2, de resolución del Tribunal Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio,
 la Directiva sobre marcas regulan de forma exhaustiva la de fecha 31 de mayo y 6 de julio de 2000, en el asunto entre
 admisibilidad de una protección más amplia de las marcas M. Balestreri y L. Maura, por un lado, y la Regione Lombardia,
 de renombre conforme al Derecho nacional por los por otro, y recibida en la Secretarı́a del Tribunal de Justicia el
 motivos que se mencionan en esas disposiciones (aprove- 8 de agosto de 2000. El Tribunal Amministrativo Regionale
 chamiento o perjuicio, indebido y desleal, del carácter per il Lazio pide al Tribunal de Justicia que se pronuncie sobre
 distintivo o del renombre de la marca anterior), o las siguientes cuestiones:
 permiten una normativa nacional complementaria de
 protección de marcas de renombre frente a signos 1. Las disposiciones de los artı́culos 1, 4, 6 y 7 del
 posteriores que se utilicen o vayan a utilizarse para Reglamento (CEE) no 3950/92 (1) del Consejo, de 28 de
 productos o servicios idénticos o similares? diciembre de 1992, y de los artı́culos 3 y 4 del Regla-
 mento (CEE) no 536/93 (2) de la Comisión, de 9 de marzo
 (1) DO 1989, L 40, p. 1. de 1993, ¿pueden interpretarse en el sentido de que los
 plazos para la asignación de las cuotas, y, por ende, para
 la aplicación de las compensaciones y de las tasas, pueden


type: wikipedia

text:
Kušānu valsts jeb Kušānu impērija (baktriešu: Κυϸανο, Kuṣāṇ Rājavaṃśa; ap 1.—3. gadsimtu) bija lielvalsts, kas savas varenības zenītā (105—250) aptvēra mūsdienu Tadžikistānas, Afganistānas, Pakistānas un Ziemeļindijas teritoriju. Valstij bija sakari ar Romas impēriju, Indiju, Seno Persiju (Sasanīdu impēriju) un Seno Ķīnu. Kušānu valdīšanas laikā tika atvērti iepriekš partiešu bloķētie jūras un sauszemes tirdzniecības ceļi starp Romu un Āziju. Šajā laikā sāka veidoties Zīda ceļš no Ķīnas cauri kušānu teritorijai uz ziemeļiem no Hindukuša.
 Vēsture
 Tautu, kas nodibināja šo valsti ķīnieši sauca par „juečži” (貴霜), bet rietumos tie kļuva pazīstami kā kušāni. Precīza kušānu etniskā izcelsme nav zināma — vien tas, ka viņi nāca no Kaukāza un, iespējams, runāja kādā no indoirāņu valodām.
 Ap 135. gadu p.m.ē. kušāni ieņēma Grieķu Baktrijas valsti mūsdienu Afganistānas ziemeļos (Baktriju un Sogdiānu), bet nākamajā gadsimtā Kučulas Kadfisa vadībā tie ieņēma Gandharu (Indas baseinu) un nodibināja Kušānu valsti. Par valsts galvaspilsētām kalpoja Kapisa (pie mūsdienu Kabulas) un Pušklavati (pie mūsdienu Pešāvaras). Paši kušāni savas valodas pierakstam pieņēma grieķu alfabētu un sāka kalt grieķu parauga monētas. Vairums kušānu bija zoroastrieši, tomēr laika gaitā pamazām pieņēma budismu.
 Sabrukums
 Sākot no 3. gadsimta Kušānu valsts sadalījās sīkākās daļās. Kušānu valsts beigas tiek uzskatītas par hellēnisma ietekmes beigām Indijā.
 Atsauces
 Ārējās saites
 Bijušās valstis
 Indijas vēsture
 Bijušās valstis Centrālāzijā
 Afganistānas vēsture
 Pakistānas vēsture


text:
 21.9.2015
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 311/55
 Valitus, jonka Tautien ehkäisyn ja valvonnan eurooppalainen keskus (ECDC) on tehnyt 14.7.2015 virkamiestuomioistuimen yhdistetyissä asioissa F-159/12 ja F-161/12, CJ v. ECDC, 29.4.2015 antamasta tuomiosta
 (Asia T-395/15 P)
 (2015/C 311/60)
 Oikeudenkäyntikieli: englanti
 Asianosaiset
 Valittaja: Tautien ehkäisyn ja valvonnan eurooppalainen keskus (ECDC) (edustajat: asiamiehet J. Mannheim ja A. Daume sekä asianajajat D. Waelbroeck ja A. Duron)
 Muu osapuoli: CJ (Agios Stefanos, Kreikka)
 Vaatimukset
 Valittaja vaatii unionin yleistä tuomioistuinta
 —
 kumoamaan virkamiestuomioistuimen yhdistetyissä asioissa F-159/12 ja F-161/12 29.4.2015 antaman tuomion valituksessa esitetyn vaatimuksen osalta ja
 —
 velvoittamaan vastaajan korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 Oikeudelliset perusteet ja pääasialliset perustelut
 Valituksensa tueksi valittaja vetoaa kahteen valitusperusteeseen.
 1)
 Ensimmäinen valitusperuste, jonka mukaan virkamiestuomioistuin teki oikeudellisen virheen kuulemisoikeuden laajuuden osalta.
 —
 Vetoamatta mihinkään oikeuskäytäntöön tai esittämättä erityisiä perusteluja virkamiestuomioistuin tulkitsi kuulemisoikeuden laajuutta laajentavasti siten, että se soveltuu paitsi yksityishenkilöä vastaan esitettyihin väitteisiin, myös tämän yksityishenkilön käyttäytymisen väitettyihin seurauksiin. Lisäksi virkamiestuomioistuimen näkemys kuulemisoikeuden laajuudesta on ristiriidassa sen valituksenalaisessa tuomiossa esittämien toteamusten kanssa.
 2)
 Toinen valitusperuste, jonka mukaan virkamiestuomioistuin teki oikeudellisen virheen toteamuksessaan, joka seurasi sen arviointia, olisiko menettely voinut johtaa eri lopputulokseen, jos tätä väitettyä virhettä ei olisi tehty.
 —
 Koska virkamiestuomioistuin oli todennut, että kantajan ja vastaajan välinen luottamus oli peruuttamattomasti mennyt, väitetyn virheen puuttuminen ei olisi johtanut eri lopputulokseen.


text:
 8.12.2012
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 379/13
 2012 m. rugpjūčio 27 d.Raad van State (Nyderlandai) pateiktas prašymas priimti prejudicinį sprendimą byloje A.M. van der Ham, A.H. van der Ham-Reijersen van Buuren prieš College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland
 (Byla C-396/12)
 2012/C 379/21
 Proceso kalba: olandų
 Prašymą priimti prejudicinį sprendimą pateikęs teismas
 Raad van State
 Šalys pagrindinėje byloje
 Apeliantai: A.M. van der Ham, A.H. van der Ham-Reijersen van Buuren
 Kita proceso šalis: College van Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland
 Prejudiciniai klausimai
 1.
 Kaip turi būti suprantama sąvoka „sąmoningai padarytas pažeidimas“ („tyčinis pažeidimas“), kuri įtvirtinta 2005 m. rugsėjo 20 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1698/2005 (1) dėl Europos žemės ūkio fondo kaimo plėtrai (EŽŪFKP) paramos kaimo plėtrai <...>, iš dalies pakeisto 2009 m. sausio 19 d. Tarybos reglamentu (EB) Nr. 74/2009 (2), 51 straipsnio 1 dalyje, 2006 m. gruodžio 7 d. Komisijos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1975/2006 (3), nustatančio išsamias Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1698/2005 kontrolės procedūrų įgyvendinimo ir kompleksinio paramos susiejimo įgyvendinimo taisykles, susijusias su paramos kaimo plėtrai priemonėmis <...>, 23 straipsnyje ir 2004 m. balandžio 21 d. Komisijos reglamento (EB) Nr. 796/2004 (4), nustatančio išsamias kompleksinio paramos susiejimo, moduliavimo ir integruotos administravimo ir kontrolės sistemos, numatytų Tarybos reglamente (EB) Nr. 1782/2003, nustatančiame bendrąsias tiesioginės paramos schemų pagal bendrąją žemės ūkio politiką taisykles ir nustatančiame tam tikras paramos schemas ūkininkams, įgyvendinimo taisykles <...>, 67 straipsnio 1 dalyje; ar yra toks pažeidimas, jei pažeidžiama seniai nusistovėjusi politika, kaip ji suprantama pagal nacionalinių Beleidsregels normenkader randvoorwaarden Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid 8 straipsnio 2 dalies c punktą?
 2.
 Ar pagal Europos Sąjungos teisę draudžiama, kad valstybėje narėje būtų pripažinta, jog nuostata pažeidžiama „sąmoningai“, kaip nurodyta minėtuose reglamentuose, jau tuo atveju, jei yra viena ar kelios šių aplinkybių:
 a)
 neįvykdyto atitinkamo kompleksinio paramos susiejimo reikalavimo atveju jau daroma prielaida, jog yra tyčia;
 b)
 atitinkamas kompleksinis paramos susiejimo reikalavimas yra sudėtinis;
 c)
 tai susiję su seniai nusistovėjusia politika;
 d)
 yra aktyvus veikimas arba sąmoningas neveikimas;
 e)
 ūkininkas jau buvo informuotas apie trūkumus vykdant atitinkamą kompleksinio paramos susiejimo reikalavimą;
 f)
 dėl kompleksinio paramos susiejimo reikalavimo nesilaikymo masto jau daroma prielaida, jog yra tyčia?
 3.
 Ar gali būti paramos gavėjui priskiriamas „sąmoningai padarytas pažeidimas“ („tyčinis pažeidimas“), kai tretysis asmuo darbus atlieka ūkininko nurodymu?
 (1) OL L 277, p. 1.
 (2) OL L 30, p. 100.
 (3) OL L 368, p. 74.
 (4) OL L 141, p. 18; 2004 m. specialusis leidimas lietuvių k., 3 sk., 44 t., p. 243.


text:
 17.10.2016
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 C 383/18
 Žaloba podaná dne 16. srpna 2016 – Galletas Gullón v. EUIPO – Hug (GULLON DARVIDA)
 (Věc T-456/16)
 (2016/C 383/25)
 Jazyk, ve kterém byla podána žaloba: angličtina
 Účastníci řízení
 Žalobkyně: Galletas Gullón, SA (Aguilar de Campoo, Španělsko) (zástupkyně: M. Escudero Pérez, advokátka)
 Žalovaný: Úřad Evropské unie pro duševní vlastnictví (EUIPO)
 Další účastnice řízení před odvolacím senátem: Hug AG (Malters, Švýcarsko)
 Údaje týkající se řízení před EUIPO
 Přihlašovatelka sporné ochranné známky: žalobkyně
 Sporná ochranná známka: slovní ochranná známka Evropské unie „GULLON DARVIDA“ – Přihláška č. 11 705 738
 Řízení před EUIPO: námitkové řízení
 Napadené rozhodnutí: rozhodnutí čtvrtého odvolacího senátu EUIPO ze dne 13. června 2016 ve věci R 773/2015-4
 Návrhová žádání
 Žalobkyně navrhuje, aby Tribunál:
 —
 napadené rozhodnutí zrušil;
 —
 uložil EUIPO a další účastnici řízení, vstoupí-li do tohoto řízení, náhradu nákladů řízení.
 Dovolávaný žalobní důvod
 —
 Porušení čl. 8 odst. 1 písm. b) nařízení č. 207/2009.


type: other

text:
Højesteret Dom i bankTrelleborg-gruppesøgsmålet
 Dom i bankTrelleborg-gruppesøgsmålet
 Sagerne 356/2010 og 28/2011
 Afsagt den 27. januar 2012 i
 Sag 356/2010
 Fonden for bankTrelleborg
 Sag 28/2011
 Højesteret har afsagt dom i sagen om retsstillingen for de tidligere minoritetsaktionærer i bankTrelleborg, som i 2008 fik tvangsindløst deres aktier i forbindelse med bankens fusion med Sydbank A/S.
 Sagens hovedspørgsmål for Højesteret var, om minoritetsaktionærernes aktier i bankTrelleborg A/S ved tvangsindløsningen i januar 2008 var mere værd end det beløb på 93,27 kr. pr. aktier på nominelt 20 kr., som de har modtaget. I sagen var der desuden spørgsmål om forståelsen af § 144 i lov om finansiel virksomhed, hvorefter det bl.a. er en betingelse for, at en banks bestyrelse kan beslutte, at en hovedaktionær kan tvangsindløse minoritetsaktionærernes aktier, at hovedaktionæren ejer mere end 70 % af aktiekapitalen.
 Højesteret tiltrådte, at bankTrelleborg i januar 2008, da bestyrelsen traf beslutning om tvangsindløsning, var nødlidende, og at banken havde måttet lukke, hvis aftalen vedrørende fusion med Sydbank A/S ikke var blevet indgået, før banken skulle åbne om mandagen den 21. januar 2008. Det må antages, at aktionærerne i så fald ville have stået med værdiløse aktier. Højesteret udtalte, at aktionærerne, uanset om lovens betingelser for tvangsindløsning af minoritetsaktionærernes aktier var opfyldt eller ej, var berettiget til et vederlag for aktierne, som svarede til deres værdi fastsat ud fra handelsværdien. Højesteret fandt, at der ikke var noget grundlag for at antage, at aktiernes handelsværdi var højere end det beløb på 93,27 kr., som er blevet betalt til aktionærerne. Hovedaktionæren og Sydbank A/S blev derfor frifundet for minoritetsaktionærernes betalingskrav. Der var ikke under sagen krav om tilbageførsel af de tvangsindløste aktier, men alene om betaling for aktierne.
 Højesterets fandt, at tvangsindløsningen af minorietsaktionærernes aktier ikke var lovlig, idet 70 %-kravet ikke var opfyldt. Dette havde dog som nævnt ingen betydning for aktionærernes økonomiske krav. (Dissens).
 Sidst opdateret: 27-01-2012


text:
7.6.2003 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union C 135/17
 Ein solcher Drittstaatsangehöriger müsse keinen eigenständi- Die Klägerin beantragt,
 gen Rechtfertigungsgrund für die Einreise in das und den
 Aufenthalt im Hoheitsgebiet nachweisen. Sein Recht ergebe 1. festzustellen, dass das Königreich Spanien dadurch gegen
 sich — von Gemeinschaftsrechts wegen — aus dem Recht des seine Verpflichtungen aus den Artikeln 43 und 49 des
 Gemeinschaftsbürgers, so dass es eine Einschränkung nicht EG-Vertrags verstoßen hat, dass es in die Leistungs-
 nur seines (abgeleiteten) Rechts, sondern auch des primären beschreibungen mehrerer Ausschreibungen des Instituto
 Rechts des Gemeinschaftsbürgers darstelle, wenn er verpflich- Nacional de la Salud für die Leistung von häuslichen
 tet werde, vor der Einreise in das nationale Hoheitsgebiet Atemtherapiediensten Zulassungs-, Bewertungs- und
 formale Voraussetzungen zu erfüllen. Stichentscheidungskriterien aufgenommen hat, die sich
 darauf beziehen, dass im Zeitpunkt der Einreichung des
 Angebots im spanischen Hoheitsgebiet oder im Umkreis
 Die Kommission weist ferner darauf hin, dass der Mitgliedstaat von 1 000 km über bestimmte eigene Einrichtungen
 nach dem allgemeinen System der Gemeinschaftsregelung verfügt wird, Geschäftsräume für die Betreuung der
 über die Erteilung von Aufenthaltserlaubnissen, insbesondere Allgemeinheit an bestimmten Orten vorgehalten werden
 nach Artikel 5 der Richtlinie 64/221, die Entscheidung über oder die genannte Dienstleistung in diesem Zeitpunkt
 die Aufenthaltserlaubnis binnen kürzester Frist, spätestens bereits erbracht wird;
 innerhalb von sechs Monaten nach der Antragstellung, treffen
 müsse, wobei diese Höchstdauer natürlich nur gerechtfertigt 2. dem Königreich Spanien die Kosten des Verfahrens
 sei, wenn bei der Prüfung des Antrags Gründe der öffentlichen aufzuerlegen.
 Ordnung eine Rolle spielten.
 Klagegründe und wesentliche Argumente
 ( 1) des Rates vom 15. Oktober 1968 zur Aufhebung der Reise- und
 Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für Arbeitnehmer der Mitgliedstaaten
 und ihre Familienangehörigen innerhalb der Gemeinschaft (ABl. Die Kommission ist der Ansicht, dass die Bedingungen der
 L 257 vom 19.10.1968, S. 13). Ausschreibungen, die Gegenstand der vorliegenden Rechts-
 ( 2) des Rates vom 21. Mai 1973 zur Aufhebung der Reise- und sache sind, diskriminierend seien und dass sie weder durch
 Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für Staatsangehörige der Mitgliedstaa-
 ten innerhalb der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet der Niederlassung
 einen zwingenden Grund des Allgemeininteresses gerechtfer-
 und des Dienstleistungsverkehrs (ABl. L 172 vom 28.6.1973, tigt seien noch den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit beach-
 S. 14). teten.
 ( 3) des Rates vom 28. Juni 1990 über das Aufenthaltsrecht der aus
 dem Erwerbsleben ausgeschiedenen Arbeitnehmer und selbständig
 Erwerbstätigen (ABl. L 180 vom 13.7.1990, S. 28).
 ( 4) des Rates vom 25. Februar 1964 zur Koordinierung der Sonder-
 vorschriften für die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von Ausländern,
 soweit sie aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung, Sicherheit oder
 Gesundheit gerechtfertigt sind (ABl. Nr. 56 vom 4.4.1964, S. 850).
 Rechtsmittel des Herrn Jan Pflugradt gegen den Beschluss
 des Gerichts erster Instanz der Europäischen Gemein-
 schaften (Fünfte Kammer) vom 11. Februar 2003 in der
 Rechtssache T-83/02, Jan Pflugradt gegen Europäische
 Zentralbank, eingelegt am 7. April 2003
 (Rechtssache C-159/03 P)
 Klage der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (2003/C 135/25)
 gegen das Königreich Spanien, eingereicht am 7. April
 2003
 Herr Jan Pflugradt hat am 7. April 2003 beim Gerichtshof
 (Rechtssache C-158/03) der Europäischen Gemeinschaften Rechtsmittel gegen den
 Beschluss des Gerichts erster Instanz der Europäischen Ge-
 meinschaften (Fünfte Kammer) vom 11. Februar 2003 in
 (2003/C 135/24) der Rechtssache T-83/02, Jan Pflugradt gegen Europäische
 Zentralbank eingelegt. Prozessbevolmächtigter des Rechtsmit-
 telführers ist Rechtsanwalt Dr. Norbert Pflüger, Kaiserstraße
 44, D-60329 Frankfurt am Main, mit Zustellungsanschrift in
 Luxemburg.
 Die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften hat am
 7. April 2003 eine Klage gegen das Königreich Spanien beim
 Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eingereicht. Der Rechtsmittelführer beantragt, unter Aufhebung des mit
 Bevollmächtigte der Klägerin sind Gregorio Valero Jordana dem Rechtsmittel angegriffenen Beschlusses:
 und Klaus Wiedner, Juristischer Dienst der Kommission,
 Zustellungsanschrift in Luxemburg. 1. die Klage für zulässig zu erklären;
 ---pagebreak--- C 135/18 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union 7.6.2003
 2. die Abmahnung der Rechtsmittelgegnerin („EZB“) vom Ersuchen um Vorabentscheidung, vorgelegt mit Entschei-
 28.02.2002 aufzuheben; dung der Commission de conciliation et d’expertise doua-
 nière (Frankreich) vom 18. März 2003 in dem Rechtsstreit
 Administration des douanes gegen Sociétés CAFOM und
 3. der EZB die Kosten des Verfahrens aufzuerlegen. SAMSUNG Electronics France
 (Rechtssache C-161/03)
 Rechtsmittelgründe und wesentliche Argumente
 (2003/C 135/26)
 Das Gericht erster Instanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
 habe verkannt, dass es sich bei der angefochtenen Handlung
 um eine beschwerende Maßnahme handele, gegen die gemäß
 Art. 42 Absatz 1 der Conditions of Employment for Staff of
 the EZB der Rechtsweg gegeben sei.
 Die Commission de conciliation et d’expertise douanière
 (Frankreich) ersucht den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Ge-
 meinschaften mit Entscheidung vom 18. März 2003, bei der
 Entgegen den Feststellungen des angefochtenen Beschlusses Kanzlei des Gerichtshofes eingegangen am 8. April 2003, in
 erschöpfe sich die angefochtene Handlung nicht darin, eine dem Rechtsstreit Administration des douanes gegen Sociétés
 Vorbereitungshandlung in einem mehrphasigen Verfahren CAFOM und SAMSUNG Electronics France um Vorabentschei-
 darzustellen, an dessen Ende eine Kündigung möglich sei. dung über folgende Fragen:
 Vielmehr bewirke die angefochtene Handlung eine unmittelba-
 re und sofortige Verletzung a) des allgemeinen Persönlichkeits-
 rechts und b) der datenschutzrechtlichen Rechtsstellung des
 1. Ist Artikel 27 des Protokolls Nr. 4 im Anhang des
 Klägers.
 Abkommens EG—Ungarn vom 13. März 1993 dahin
 auszulegen, dass die Behörden des Einfuhrstaats die
 in diesem Abkommen vorgesehene Präferenzregelung
 a) Erstens sei das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht des Klägers
 anwenden müssen, wenn sich die von ihnen zu bestimm-
 unmittelbar und sofort beeinträchtigt, weil die EZB den
 ten präzisen Sachverhalten, von denen die Anwendung
 Kläger nicht zeitnah mit den Vorwürfen konfrontiert
 dieser Regelung abhängt, befragten Behörden des Aus-
 habe, die sie zum Gegenstand der Missbilligung gemacht
 fuhrstaats auf die Angabe beschränken, dass die Erzeug-
 habe. Dem Kläger sei damit die Möglichkeit abgeschnitten
 nisse, auf die sich die von diesen Behörden ausgestellten
 worden, auf die Vorwürfe zu reagieren und diese unver-
 Ursprungsbescheinigungen beziehen, die Voraussetzun-
 züglich klarzustellen. Zweitens beruhe die Missbilligung
 gen für die Anwendung dieser Regelung erfüllen?
 auf unzutreffenden Tatsachenbehauptungen und verletze
 dadurch das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht unmittelbar
 und sofort.
 2. Ist eine Antwort der Behörden des Ausfuhrstaats, die
 nach Ablauf der in Artikel 27 Absatz 7 des Abkommens
 b) Das Gericht erster Instanz habe in dem angefochtenen genannten Frist von zehn Monaten gegeben wird, bei
 Beschluss die unmittelbare und sofortige Verletzung der Entscheidung darüber zu berücksichtigen, ob die
 der datenschutzrechtlichen Rechtsposition des Klägers fraglichen Waren in den Genuss der Präferenzregelung
 verkannt. Der Anspruch des Klägers, vor Erhebung ihn kommen können?
 betreffender personenbezogener Daten über die Zweck-
 setzung der Datenerhebung informiert zu werden, werde
 durch die angefochtene Handlung verletzt.
 3. Kann man aus Artikel 27 Absatz 2 des Abkommens
 schließen, dass im Fall einer von den Behörden des
 Einfuhrstaats mehr als zwei Jahre nach den streitigen
 Vorgängen gestellten Kontrollanfrage die Tatsache, dass
 Das Gericht erster Instanz habe insbesondere verkannt, dass es den Behörden des Ausfuhrstaats unmöglich ist, diese
 diese Rechtsverletzung selbst dann nicht ausgeräumt wird, Kontrolle durchzuführen, weil sie die erforderlichen Un-
 wenn am Ende des Verfahrens gemäß Art. 2.2.5 der European terlagen nicht aufbewahrt haben, dazu führen muss, dass
 Central Bank Staff Rules auf eine Kündigung seitens der EZB die Waren in den Genuss der Präferenzregelung kommen?
 verzichtet würde.


text:
 7.12.2013
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 359/9
 Üldkohtu 23. oktoobri 2013. aasta otsus — Bode Chemie versus Siseturu Ühtlustamise Amet — Laros (sterilina)
 (Kohtuasi T-114/12) (1)
 (Ühenduse kaubamärk - Vastulausemenetlus - Ühenduse kujutismärgi sterilina taotlus - Varasemad ühenduse sõna- ja kujutismärgid STERILLIUM ja BODE Sterillium - Suhteline keeldumispõhjus - Segiajamise tõenäosuse puudumine - Määruse (EÜ) nr 207/2009 artikli 8 lõike 1 punkt b)
 2013/C 359/15
 Kohtumenetluse keel: prantsuse
 Pooled
 Hageja: Bode Chemie GmbH (Hamburg, Saksamaa) (esindaja: advokaat N. Aicher)
 Kostja: Siseturu Ühtlustamise Amet (kaubamärgid ja tööstusdisainilahendused) (esindaja: V. Melgar)
 Teine menetluspool apellatsioonikojas, menetlusse astuja Üldkohtus: Laros Srl (Cremone, Itaalia) (esindaja: advokaat F. Caricato)
 Ese
 Hagi Siseturu Ühtlustamise Ameti neljanda apellatsioonikoja 16. jaanuari 2012. aasta otsuse peale asjas R 2423/2010-4, mis käsitleb Bode Chemie GmbH ja Laros Srl vahelist vastulausemenetlust.
 Resolutsioon
 1.
 Jätta hagi rahuldamata.
 2.
 Mõista Bode Chemie GmbH-lt välja kohtukulud, sealhulgas Laros Srl-i vältimatud kulud seoses Siseturu Ühtlustamise Ameti (kaubamärgid ja tööstusdisainilahendused) apellatsioonikoja menetlusega.
 (1) ELT C 165, 9.6.2012.


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22001A0911(01)
 Συμφωνία μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες της Αποστολής Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΑΕΕΕ) στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 241 της 11/09/2001 σ. 0002 - 0004
 ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΗΣυμφωνίαμεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες της Αποστολής Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (ΑΕΕΕ) στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της ΜακεδονίαςΗ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΝΩΣΗ,αφενός,καιΗ ΠΡΩΗΝ ΓΙΟΥΓΚΟΣΛΑΒΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ,στο εξής αποκαλούμενη,"η φιλοξενούσα χώρα", αφετέρου,από κοινού αποκαλούμενες στο εξής "τα συμμετέχοντα μέρη",Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη:- την προσφορά της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και των κρατών μελών της να διοργανώσουν Αποστολή Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας (ΑΕΕΚ) στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας και την προσωρινή αποδοχή της προσφοράς αυτής από την φιλοξενούσα χώρα στις 24 Μαρτίου 1998,- την παρουσία επιτηρητών της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας/Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας από το 1998,- την υιοθέτηση από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, της 22ας Δεκεμβρίου 2000, της κοινής δράσης 2000/811/ΚΕΠΠΑ για την Αποστολή Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, με την οποία η ΑΕΕΚ μετατρέπεται σε ΑΕΕΕ, ως όργανο της Κοινής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής και Πολιτικής Ασφαλείας (ΚΕΠΠΑ) της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, βασιζόμενο σε προηγούμενες πρωτοβουλίες για να συμβάλει στην ουσιαστική χάραξη της πολιτικής της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για τα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια,- τη σύναψη, στις 9 Απριλίου 2001, στο Λουξεμβούργο, μιας Συμφωνίας Σταθεροποίησης και Σύνδεσης μεταξύ της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας και των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους,- την αναγνώριση της ανεξαρτησίας, της κυριαρχίας και της εδαφικής ακεραιότητας της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας και της έντονης επιθυμίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης να συμβάλει στην περαιτέρω ενίσχυση της ειρήνης και της σταθερότητας στην περιοχή,ΚΑΤΕΛΗΞΑΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΗ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ:Άρθρο IΕντολή1. Η Αποστολή Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, στο εξής αποκαλούμενη "ΑΕΕΕ", η οποία, προηγουμένως, είχε εγκατασταθεί στην περιοχή ως Αποστολή Επιτήρησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας (ΑΕΕΚ) με έδρα, επί του παρόντος, στο Σεράγεβο, ιδρύει Γραφείο της Αποστολής στα Σκόπια και αλλού, όπως, ενδεχομένως, αποφασισθεί από τον Αρχηγό της Αποστολής, σε συνεννόηση και συμφωνία με την φιλοξενούσα χώρα, προκειμένου να συμβάλει στην ουσιαστική χάραξη της πολιτικής της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για τα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια.Η ΑΕΕΕ, ειδικότερα:α) παρακολουθεί την εξέλιξη της πολιτικής κατάστασης και τις εξελίξεις στον τομέα της ασφάλειας στην περιοχή της αρμοδιότητάς της,β) δίνει ιδιαίτερη προσοχή στον έλεγχο των συνόρων, στα διεθνοτικά ζητήματα και στην επάνοδο των προσφύγων,γ) υποβάλλει αναλυτικές εκθέσεις με βάση τις οδηγίες που λαμβάνει,δ) συμβάλει στην έγκαιρη προειδοποίηση του Συμβουλίου και την οικοδόμηση εμπιστοσύνης, στο πλαίσιο της πολιτικής για σταθεροποίηση που ασκεί στην περιοχή η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση,ε) παρέχει τακτικά στη φιλοξενούσα χώρα σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες της ΑΕΕΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένων πληροφοριών επί ανθρωπιστικών θεμάτων, εάν προβλέπεται από τις οδηγίες της.2. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα παρέχει στην ΑΕΕΕ όλες τις πληροφορίες και επεκτείνει την πλήρη συνεργασία, εφόσον χρειάζεται, για την επίτευξη των στόχων της ΑΕΕΕ. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα είναι δυνατόν να διορίσει αξιωματικό-σύνδεσμο από τα αρμόδια υπουργεία στην ΑΕΕΕ.Άρθρο IIΚαθεστώς1. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα λαμβάνει όλα τα απαραίτητα μέτρα για την προστασία και την ασφάλεια της AEEE και των μελών της. Όλες οι συγκεκριμένες διατάξεις, που προτείνονται από την φιλοξενούσα χώρα, συμφωνούνται, πριν από την εφαρμογή τους, με τον Αρχηγό της Αποστολής.2. Για τη διεξαγωγή των δραστηριοτήτων της, η AEEE και το προσωπικό της διαθέτουν, πέραν των μέσων μεταφοράς και του εξοπλισμού, την απαραίτητη για την εκτέλεση της εντολής της Αποστολής ελευθερία κινήσεων.3. Κατά την εκτέλεση των δραστηριοτήτων του, το προσωπικό της AEEE συνοδεύεται από διερμηνέα και, κατόπιν αιτήματος της AEEE, από αξιωματικό συνοδείας που διορίζεται από την φιλοξενούσα χώρα.4. Η AEEE αναρτά τη σημαία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στα γραφεία της Αποστολής στα Σκόπια και σε κάθε άλλη περίπτωση που αποφασίζεται από τον Αρχηγό της Αποστολής.5. Τα οχήματα και άλλα μεταφορικά μέσα της AEEE φέρουν ειδικό διακριτικό σήμα της Αποστολής, το οποίο κοινοποιείται στις αρμόδιες αρχές.Άρθρο IIIΣύνθεση1. Ο Αρχηγός της AEEE, έχει διοριστεί από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Κάθε Αρχηγός της Αποστολής στο μέλλον διορίζεται με τον ίδιο τρόπο.2. Το λοιπό προσωπικό της AEEE αποσπάται από τα κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Του ανατίθενται συγκεκριμένα καθήκοντα από τον Αρχηγό της Αποστολής, υπό την εξουσία του Γενικού Γραμματέα/Ύπατου Εκπροσώπου. Η Νορβηγία και η Σλοβακία, οι οποίες συμμετέχουν στην AEEE κατά τη στιγμή της παρούσας συμφωνίας, μπορούν επίσης να διορίζουν προσωπικό στην AEEE και, ως εκ τούτου, να αποτελούν, μαζί με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και τα κράτη μέλη της, αποστέλλοντα μέρη.3. Τα αλλοδαπά μέλη του προσωπικού της AEEE αποκαλούνται "επιτηρητές".4. Οι κυβερνήσεις των αποστελλόντων μερών διορίζουν επιτηρητές στην AEEE.5. Ο Αρχηγός της Αποστολής καθορίζει τον αριθμό των επιτηρητών βάσει της παρούσας συμφωνίας, σε συνεννόηση και συμφωνία με την φιλοξενούσα χώρα.6. Οι επιτηρητές δεν αναλαμβάνουν καμία δράση ή δραστηριότητα ασυμβίβαστη με τον αμερόληπτο χαρακτήρα των καθηκόντων τους και τηρούν τους νόμους της φιλοξενούσας χώρας, με την επιφύλαξη των διατάξεων που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο VIII.7. Η AEEE είναι δυνατόν να επικουρείται από διοικητικό και τεχνικό προσωπικό των αποστελλόντων μερών. Τα μέλη του διοικητικού και τεχνικού προσωπικού της AEEE έχουν το ίδιο καθεστώς με αυτό του οποίου τυγχάνουν, σύμφωνα με τη Σύμβαση της Βιέννης περί διπλωματικών σχέσεων, οι διοικητικοί και τεχνικοί υπάλληλοι αποστελλόντων μερών που απασχολούνται σε πρεσβείες.8. Η AEEE μπορεί να προσλαμβάνει επιτόπου επικουρικό προσωπικό, οσάκις χρειάζεται. Μετά από σχετικό αίτημα του Αρχηγού της Αποστολής, η φιλοξενούσα χώρα διευκολύνει την πρόσληψη ειδικευμένων τοπικών υπαλλήλων από την AEEE. Το επικουρικό προσωπικό της AEEE έχει το ίδιο καθεστώς με εκείνο του οποίου τυγχάνουν, σύμφωνα με τη Σύμβαση της Βιέννης περί διπλωματικών σχέσεων, οι τοπικοί υπάλληλοι που απασχολούνται σε πρεσβείες.Άρθρο IVΟπλοφορία και περιβολή1. Οι επιτηρητές δεν επιτρέπεται να οπλοφορούν.2. Οι επιτηρητές κυκλοφορούν με λευκή πολιτική περιβολή, φέρουν όμως διακριτικά της AEEE.Άρθρο VΕυθύνη1. Η AEEE ενεργεί στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας υπό την ευθύνη του Αρχηγού της Αποστολής.2. Ο Αρχηγός της Αποστολής υποβάλλει, τακτικά, μέσω του Γενικού Γραμματέα/Ύπατου Εκπροσώπου, έκθεση στο Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες και τις διαπιστώσεις της AEEE.3. Στο πλαίσιο της εντολής που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο I, παράγραφος 1, τα καθήκοντα της AEEE καθορίζονται από τον Γενικό Γραμματέα/Ύπατο Εκπρόσωπο σε στενή συνεργασία με την Προεδρία, σύμφωνα με την πολιτική που ακολουθείται από το Συμβούλιο όσον αφορά τα Δυτικά Βαλκάνια.4. Ο Αρχηγός της Αποστολής ενημερώνει τακτικά την φιλοξενούσα χώρα για τις δραστηριότητες της ΑΕΕΕ.Άρθρο VIΜετακινήσεις και μεταφορές1. Τα οχήματα και άλλα μέσα μεταφοράς της ΑΕΕΕ δεν υπόκεινται σε υποχρεωτική καταχώρηση ή εγγραφή ενώ όλα τα οχήματα είναι ασφαλισμένα έναντι τρίτων.2. H ΑΕΕΕ μπορεί να χρησιμοποιεί δρόμους, αεροδρόμια και άλλα έργα υποδομής χωρίς να καταβάλλει διόδια, τέλη ή άλλες επιβαρύνσεις.3. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα διευκολύνει τις μετακινήσεις των ιδίων οχημάτων και άλλων μεταφορικών μέσων της ΑΕΕΕ.Άρθρο VIIΕπικοινωνίες1. Το προσωπικό της ΑΕΕΕ, για την άσκηση των δραστηριοτήτων του, καθώς και για την επικοινωνία με τους διπλωματικούς και προξενικούς αντιπροσώπους των αποστελλόντων μερών, έχει πρόσβαση, με τα συνήθη ισχύοντα τέλη, στους κατάλληλους εξοπλισμούς τηλεπικοινωνιών της φιλοξενούσας χώρας.2. Η ΑΕΕΕ δικαιούται να προβαίνει, άνευ περιορισμών, σε επικοινωνίες με δικούς της ασυρμάτους (συμπεριλαμβανομένων των δορυφορικών, κινητών και φορητών ασυρμάτων), τηλέφωνα, τηλέγραφους, συσκευές τηλεομοιοτυπίας ή οποιαδήποτε άλλα μέσα. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα παρέχει, μετά την υπογραφή της παρούσας συμφωνίας, τις συχνότητες που μπορούν να χρησιμοποιούνται για τις ραδιοεπικοινωνίες.Άρθρο VIIIΠρονόμια και ασυλίες1. Στην ΑΕΕΕ χορηγείται το καθεστώς της διπλωματικής αποστολής.2. Οι επιτηρητές έχουν, κατά τη διάρκεια της αποστολής τους, τα προνόμια και τις ασυλίες διπλωματικών υπαλλήλων, σύμφωνα με τη Σύμβαση της Βιέννης περί διπλωματικών σχέσεων.3. Τα γραφεία της Αποστολής στα Σκόπια, τα άλλα γραφεία και όλα τα μεταφορικά μέσα της ΑΕΕΕ είναι απαραβίαστα.4. Τα προνόμια και οι ασυλίες που προβλέπονται από το παρόν άρθρο χορηγούνται στους επιτηρητές κατά τη διάρκεια της αποστολής τους, και μετά, όσον αφορά πράξεις που διενεργήθηκαν προηγουμένως κατά τη διάρκεια της αποστολής τους.5. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα διευκολύνει όλες τις μετακινήσεις του Αρχηγού της Αποστολής και του προσωπικού της ΑΕΕΕ. Η ΑΕΕΕ παρέχει στην φιλοξενούσα χώρα κατάλογο των μελών της ΑΕΕΕ και την πληροφορεί εκ των προτέρων για την άφιξη και την αναχώρηση προσωπικού της ΑΕΕΕ. Το προσωπικό της AEEE φέρει το εθνικό διαβατήριό του καθώς και δελτίο ταυτότητας της AEEE.6. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα αναγνωρίζει το δικαίωμα των αποστελλόντων μερών και της AEEE να εισάγουν ατελώς ή άνευ άλλων περιορισμών, εξοπλισμό, προμήθειες, εφόδια και άλλα αγαθά που απαιτούνται για την αποκλειστική και επίσημη χρήση της AEEE. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα αναγνωρίζει επίσης το δικαίωμα αγοράς τέτοιων ειδών στο έδαφός της καθώς και την εξαγωγή ή άλλως πως διάθεση τέτοιου εξοπλισμού, προμηθειών, εφοδίων και άλλων αγαθών που έχουν αγορασθεί ή εισαχθεί κατ' αυτόν τον τρόπο. Η φιλοξενούσα χώρα αναγνωρίζει επίσης το δικαίωμα των επιτηρητών να αγοράζουν και/ή να εισάγουν ατελώς ή άνευ άλλων περιορισμών καθώς και να εξάγουν τα είδη που απαιτούνται για την προσωπική τους χρήση.Άρθρο IXΚατοικίες και πρακτικές ρυθμίσειςΗ Κυβέρνηση της Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβικής Δημοκρατίας της Μακεδονίας συμφωνεί, εφόσον της ζητηθεί, να επικουρεί την AEEE στην εξεύρεση κατάλληλων χώρων για γραφεία και κατοικίες. Τα συμμετέχοντα μέρη αποφασίζουν σχετικά με άλλες διατάξεις όσον αφορά τα προνόμια και τις ασυλίες καθώς και σχετικά με πρακτικές ρυθμίσεις, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της επείγουσας ιατρικής περίθαλψης και των εκκενώσεων εκτάκτου ανάγκης καθώς και των απαιτήσεων ταξιδιωτικών εγγράφων.Άρθρο XΈναρξη ισχύοςΗ παρούσα συμφωνία αρχίζει να ισχύει από την υπογραφή της. Οι διατάξεις της εφαρμόζονται από την φιλοξενούσα χώρα στην AEEE προσωρινά από την ημερομηνία της μονογράφησής της, έως ότου τεθεί σε ισχύ από την υπογραφή της. Η παρούσα συμφωνία παραμένει σε ισχύ καθόσον διάστημα το ένα από τα συμμετέχοντα μέρη δεν έχει κοινοποιήσει στο άλλο, δύο μήνες ενωρίτερα, την πρόθεσή του να ζητήσει την παύση των δραστηριοτήτων που αναφέρονται σ' αυτήν.Έγινε στα Σκόπια την 31η Αυγούστου 2001 και συνετάχθη στην αγγλική σε τέσσερα αντίτυπα.Για την Ευρωπαϊκή ΈνωσηΓια την πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβική Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας