text:
Kui ees on koondamine 2 - Raamatupidaja
 Kui ees on koondamine 2
 08. september 2008 00:00
 Kui oma eelmises artiklis (vt esimene osa siin) rääkisin koondamise vajaduse tekkest ja koondamisest etteteatamisel, siis tänases artiklis peatuksime töötajaile meeldivamal teemal – koondamishüvitistel ning seletaksime lahti nn koondamise reeglid.
 Enamus töötajaid seostabki koondamise enda jaoks just hüvitise maksmisega. Teatakse ka üldjuhul seda, et mida pikem on töötaja tööstaaz ja lühem talle koondamisest etteteatamise aeg, seda suurem on rahaliselt välja makstav hüvitis. Põhimõtteliselt õige, mida ütleb aga meile selles osas seadus?
 Tulenevalt seadusest (TLS § 90 lg 1 p1) on tööandja kohustatud maksma töötajale töölepingu lõpetamisel koondamisega hüvitust järgmiselt:
 1) töötajale, kellel on pidevat tööstaaži selle tööandja juures kuni 5 aastat - kahe kuu keskmise palga ulatuses;
 2) töötajale, kellel on pidevat tööstaaži selle tööandja juures 5 - 10 aastat - kolme kuu keskmise palga ulatuses;
 3) töötajale, kellel on pidevat tööstaaži selle tööandja juures üle 10 aasta - nelja kuu keskmise palga ulatuses.
 Koondamishüvitise arvutamise aluseks on Vabariigi Valitsuse 15. augusti 2001. a määrusega nr 275 kinnitatud „Keskmise palga arvutamise kord“ (RTI, 29.08.2001, 71, 430), millise kohaselt keskmine palk arvutatakse üldjuhul arvutamise vajaduse tekke kuule eelnenud kuue kalendrikuu jooksul töötaja teenitud palga kogusummast. Ehk lahtiseletatult, kui töötaja koondatakse näiteks 01.oktoobrist (ühtlasi tema viimane tööpäev), siis töötaja koondamishüvitise arvutamise aluseks võetakse kuuekuuline periood 01.aprillist kuni 30.septembrini. Keskmise palga arvutamisel arvatakse palga koosseisu töötaja teenitud palgana käsitatavad summad – põhipalk, lisatasud, preemiad, arvesse ei võeta aga puhkusetasu, ravikindlustuse hüvitist ja teisi summasid, mida Palgaseaduse kohaselt ei käsitata palgana (näiteks: töötajale juubeliks makstud preemia).
 Tööandja on töötajate koondamisel tihtipeale valiku ees, keda tööle jätta ja kellega tööleping lõpetada, kusjuures on üsna loomulik, et tööandja on huvitatud just paremate töötajate tööle jätmisest. Selleks, et tööandjaid taolises otsustusprotsessis aidata on seadusandja ette näinud teatud kriteeriumid, millistega valiku tegemisel tuleb arvestada ehk nn koondamise reeglid.
 Põhilised neist on sätestatud töölepingu seadusega. Nii on TLS § 99 kohaselt töölepingu lõpetamisel koondamise tõttu töölejäämise eelisõigus eelkõige töötajate esindajal, seejärel töötajatel, kes töötavad selle tööandja juures põhikohaga. Põhikohaga töötavatest isikutest eelistatakse neid, kel on paremad tööalased näitajad.
 Nüüd kõigest lähemalt. Töötajate esindajatena ülalnimetatud seadusesätte mõttes käsitletakse kõiki neid töötajaid, kes on seaduse alusel valitud töötajaid esindama. Nendeks on:
 · töötajate esindusorganisatsiooni (ametiühingu) juhatuse liikmed;
 · usaldusisik, kes on valitud töötajate ühingu liikmete või ühingusse mittekuuluvate
 töötajate üldkoosolekul;
 · töökeskkonnavolinik;
 · töökeskkonnanõukogu liikmed.
 Töölepingu lõpetamine tööandja algatusel töötajaga, kes on valitud töötajate esindajaks, on tulenevalt TLS § 94 lõikest 1 lubatud töötaja volituste ajal ja ühe aasta jooksul pärast volituste lõppemist üksnes tööandja asukoha (elukoha) tööinspektori nõusolekul. Tööinspektori eesmärgiks vastava otsuse tegemisel on eelkõige välja selgitada, et tööleping töötajate esindajaga ei lõpetataks tulenevalt tema seaduslikust tegevusest töötajate huvide esindamisel
 Seega, tööandjal on lubatud töötajate esindajaga lõpetada tööleping koondamise tõttu üksnes tööinspektori eelneval kirjalikul nõusolekul. Töötajate esindajate tagatistest nendega töölepingu lõpetamisel vaata lähemalt ka selgitustes Tööinspektsiooni veebilehel:www.ti.ee.
 Põhikohaga töötaja mõiste oli aktuaalne aastaid tagasi, kui töösuhetes oli kasutusel veel töötajate kohakaaslus ning valiku tegemisel pidi tööandja isegi kohakaaslase parematele töötulemustele vaatamata eelistama põhikohaga töötajat.
 Töötaja töölejäämise eelisõiguse väljaselgitamisel peab tööandja töötajaid võrdlema ja hindama, lähtudes objektiivsetest tööalastest näitajatest, ning töölejätmisel eelistama neid, kes on edukamalt tööülesandeid täitnud, kel on suuremad erialased teadmised, oskused, vilumus ning kes on oma teadmisi ja oskusi tulemuslikumat kasutanud. Sellisele seisukohale on asunud ka Riigikohus oma kohtulahendites tsiviilasjades nr 3-2-1-18-00 (RT III 2000, 10, 113) ja nr 3-2-1-103-06 (RT III 2006, 41, 349).
 Kui võrdsete töönäitajatega töötajatehulgast on vaja veel teha valikuid, annab seadus (TLS § 99 lg 3) eelisõigus neile töötajaile, kes:
 1) on selle tööandja juures viimase süül saanud kutsehaiguse või töövigastuse;
 2) on kauem selle tööandja juures töötanud;
 3) täiendavad oma kutseoskusi ja teadmisi eriharidust andvas õppeasutuses;
 4) kellel on ülalpeetavaid.
 Eelnimetatud tingimused on võrdväärsed ning ei anna ühele töötajale õigust nõuda talle eelise seadmist põhjusel, et tal on pikem tööstaaz või et tal on alaealised lapsed. Loomulikult on tööandjal õigus valiku tegemisel täiendavalt arvestada ka muid seaduses sätestamata tingimusi, nagu töötaja hoolsus, initsiatiiv, lojaalsus, majanduslik olukord.
 Teatud töötajate koondamiseks on seadus neile ette näinud vastavad tagatised. Nimelt on alaealise koondamiseks tulenevalt TLS § 93 vajalik tööinspektori nõusolek Raseda ja alla kolmeaastase lapsega töötaja koondamine aga ei ole lubatud.
 Koondamise üks eripära on veel selles, et tööandjal on töötaja ees kohustused ka pärast töölepingu lõppemist. Nimelt on töötajal seadusest tulenevalt (TLS § 98 lg 3) õigus nõuda enda tööle võtmist kuue kuu jooksul pärast töölepingu koondamisega lõpetamist, kui tööandjal on tekkinud vabu töökohti. Tööandja on kohustatud võtma töötaja tööle, kui tal on selleks tööks vajalikud teadmised, oskused, võimed ja tervislik seisund.
 Samas märgib Riigikohtu tsiviilkolleegium oma kohtulahendisnr3-2-1-74-07 (RTIII, 28.06.2007, 26, 221), et TLS § 98 lg 3 ei kohusta töötajat tööle tagasi võtma igal juhul ja tingimusteta. Teatud põhjendatud juhtudel võib tööandja siiski keelduda töötajat tööle tagasi võtmast nimetatud alusel, näiteks kasvõi seetõttu, et vabale töökohale on kehtestatud sellised kvalifikatsiooninõuded, millele töötaja ei vasta. Igal juhul peab tööandja oma keeldumist töötaja tööle tagasi võtmiseks põhjendama.
 Leonid Siniavski
 Lääne Inspektsiooni
 URL: http://www.raamatupidaja.ee/uudised/2008/09/08/kui-ees-on-koondamine-2


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21996A0330(05)
 Abkommen in Form eines Briefwechsels zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und Kasachstan zur Änderung des Abkommens zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und Kasachstan über den Handel mit Textilwaren im Anschluß an den Beitritt der Republik Österreich, der Republik Finnland und des Königreichs Schweden zur Europäischen Union Nichtamtliche Übersetzung
 Amtsblatt Nr. L 081 vom 30/03/1996 S. 0098 - 0121
 AGREEMENT in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products to take into account the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union Letter from the Council of the European Union Sir,1. I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products initialled on 15 October 1993.2. In order to take into account the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union on 1 January 1995, the European Community considers that the following amendments should be made to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products:2.1. The following text is added after Article 5, paragraph 2:'For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 2 in the year 1995, the preceding year's total imports from all third countries shall be calculated on the basis of imports into the Community as constituted on 31 December 1994 and of imports into Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Trade between the Community, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, or between Austria, Finland, and Sweden shall be excluded from this total.`2.2. Article 14, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, second indent of Protocol A, Title IV should be amended as follows:'- two letters identifying the intended Member State of customs clearance as follows:AT = AustriaBL = BeneluxDE = Federal Republic of GermanyDK = DenmarkEL = GreeceES = SpainFI = FinlandFR = FranceGB = United KingdomIE = IrelandIT = ItalyPT = PortugalSE = Sweden`2.3. The Annex to Protocol A setting out the model of the certificate of origin is replaced by Appendix I to this letter.2.4. The Annex to Protocol A setting out model 1 of the export licence is replaced by Appendix II to this letter.2.5. The Annex to Protocol A setting out model 2 of the export licence is replaced by Appendix III to this letter.2.6. The Annex to Protocol B setting out the model of the certificate applicable to certain cottage industry and folklore products is replaced by Appendix IV to this letter.2.7. Notwithstanding the modifications referred to under points 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, during a transitional period that will end on 30 June 1995, the competent authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be authorized to continue issuing the forms that were in use in 1994.3. I should be obliged if you could kindly confirm the acceptance of your Government of the foregoing. Should this be the case, this Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the day on which the Parties have notified each other that the legal procedures necessary to this end have been completed. In the meantime, it shall be applied provisionally from 1 January 1995 on the conditions to be specified in an Exchange of Notes (see Appendix V).Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.For the Council of the European UnionAppendix I ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 2 (1) >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix II ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 7 (1): MODEL 1 >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix III ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 7 (3): MODEL 2 >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix IV ANNEX TO PROTOCOL B >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix V Exchange of Notes The Directorate-General for External Economic Relations of the Commission of the European Communities presents its compliments to the Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the European Communities and has the honour to refer to the Agreement on Trade in Textile Products between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the European Economic Community initialled on 15 October 1993 as amended by the Exchange of Letters initialled on 15 May 1995.The Directorate-General wishes to inform the Mission that whilst awaiting the completion of the necessary procedures for the conclusion and coming into force of the amended Agreement, the European Community is prepared to allow the provisions of the Agreement to apply de facto from 1 January 1995. This is on the understanding that either Party may at any time terminate this de facto application of the amended Agreement provided that one hundred and twenty days' notice is given.The Directorate-General for External Economic Relations would be grateful if the Mission would confirm its agreement to the foregoing.The Directorate-General for External Economic Relations of the Commission of the European Communities avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the European Communities the assurance of its highest consideration.Letter from the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan Sir,I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of . . . which reads as follows:'Sir,1. I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products initialled on 15 October 1993.2. In order to take into account the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union on 1 January 1995, the European Community considers that the following amendments should be made to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products:2.1. The following text is added after Article 5, paragraph 2:"For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 2 in the year 1995, the preceding year's total imports from all third countries shall be calculated on the basis of imports into the Community as constituted on 31 December 1994 and of imports into Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Trade between the Community, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, or between Austria, Finland, and Sweden shall be excluded from this total."2.2. Article 14, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2, second indent of Protocol A, Title IV should be amended as follows:"- two letters identifying the intended Member State of customs clearance as follows:AT = AustriaBL = BeneluxDE = Federal Republic of GermanyDK = DenmarkEL = GreeceES = SpainFI = FinlandFR = FranceGB = United KingdomIE = IrelandIT = ItalyPT = PortugalSE = Sweden"2.3. The Annex to Protocol A setting out the model of the certificate of origin is replaced by Appendix I to this letter.2.4. The Annex to Protocol A setting out model 1 of the export licence is replaced by Appendix II to this letter.2.5. The Annex to Protocol A setting out model 2 of the export licence is replaced by Appendix III to this letter.2.6. The Annex to Protocol B setting out the model of the certificate applicable to certain cottage industry and folklore products is replaced by Appendix IV to this letter.2.7. Notwithstanding the modifications referred to under points 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, during a transitional period that will end on 30 June 1995, the competent authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be authorized to continue issuing the forms that were in use in 1994.3. I should be obliged if you could kindly confirm the acceptance of your Government of the foregoing. Should this be the case, this Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the day on which the Parties have notified each other that the legal procedures necessary to this end have been completed. In the meantime, it shall be applied provisionally from 1 January 1995 on the conditions to be specified in an Exchange of Notes (see Appendix V).Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.`I have the honour to confirm that my Government is in agreement with the contents of your letter.Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.For the Government of the Republic of KazakhstanAppendix I ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 2 (1) >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix II ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 7 (1): MODEL 1 >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix III ANNEX TO PROTOCOL A, ARTICLE 7 (3): MODEL 2 >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix IV ANNEX TO PROTOCOL B >VERWEIS AUF EINEN FILM>Appendix V Exchange of Notes The Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the European Communities presents its compliments to the Directorate-General for External Economic Relations of the Commission of the European Communities and has the honour to refer to the Note of the Directorate-General of (date of Note Verbale) regarding the Agreement on Trade in Textile Products between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the European Economic Community initialled on 15 October 1993 as amended by the Exchange of Letters initialled on 15 May 1995.The Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the European Communities wishes to confirm to the Directorate-General that whilst awaiting the completion of the necessary procedures for the conclusion and coming into force of the adapted Agreement, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan is prepared to allow the provisions of the Agreement to apply de facto from 1 January 1995. This is on the understanding that either Party may at any time terminate this de facto application of the adapted Agreement provided that one hundred and twenty days' notice is given.The Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the European Communities avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Directorate General for External Economic Relations of the Commission of the European Communities the assurance of its highest consideration.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
Ruth S. Dyott died at the home of her brother-in-law, Maurice Dyott, at St. Michaels in Talbot County, Maryland, on Tuesday, June 27th, 1933, as the result of a painful and protracted illness. She left to survive her three brothers, Joseph A. Lambdin, since deceased, Charles H. Lambdin, and George H. Lambdin, and a sister, Harriet H. Robinson Dantzebecker.
 On the 26th day of the January preceding her death, she and Harriet H. Robinson Dantzebecker, herein called "Harriet Robinson," executed a trust agreement, herein called "Declaration No. 1," under which she delivered certain stocks, bonds, mortgages, and other securities to Harriet Robinson, to hold in trust to pay the net income therefrom to Ruth S. Dyott during her life and at her death to distribute them to certain named beneficiaries, among whom were Charles H. Lambdin, Joseph A. Lambdin, and Harriet Robinson. That instrument was in two parts. One part, called herein part "A," consisted of a declaration of trust signed and sealed by Harriet Robinson in which she declared that she had received the property and securities scheduled therein in trust for the uses and purposes set forth in the instrument, and each page of that part of the instrument was signed on the margin by Ruth S. Dyott. The second part, called herein part "B," which was attached to the first, and executed by Ruth S. Dyott, was in the following form: *Page 243
 "I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that I have delivered the above mentioned securities to the said Harriet H. Robinson for the purposes in said Declaration of Trust set forth, and I hereby authorize and empower her to do every act above named by me to transfer unto her all said securities above mentioned in the same manner as if I were present to execute the same, and this is her authority to do so, until otherwise directed.
 "As Witness my hand and seal this 26th day of January, 1933.
 "Ruth S. Dyott [Seal]
 "Witness to Signature:
 "C. Wilbur Stewart, M.D."
 Following the execution of that instrument, Mrs. Dyott requested the trustee to sell two bonds scheduled in the agreement, which was done. On May 11th of the same year, she addressed a letter to the trustee, in which she stated that in that transaction the trustee had carried out the donor's wishes, and relieved her of the duty of disposing of those bonds, saying in the concluding part of the letter: "The proceeds of sale are to be invested by you and by subsequent agreement we will arrange how this item is to be held and disposed of."
 On June 26th, 1933, Harriet Robinson executed a second deed or declaration of trust, herein called "declaration No. 2," the effect of which was to largely increase the gifts provided for her in the first trust agreement, and to diminish those provided for her brothers. The second trust instrument was identical in form with part A of the first agreement, but it contained no counterpart of the second or concluding part, but Mrs. Dyott signed her name at the end of it under the word "Test." She signed it at about 9 o'clock on the morning of Monday, June 26th, 1933, and she died between 2 and 3 o'clock on the following morning.
 On June 11th, 1934, Harriet H. Robinson Dantzebecker filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City an ex parte petition in which she set out in substance these facts, and *Page 244
 further stated that certain beneficiaries named in declaration No. 1 objected to the distribution of the estate under declaration No. 2, claiming that distribution should be made in accordance with the provisions of the first trust agreement. She prayed the court to assume jurisdiction of the trust estate, and to direct its distribution in "accordance with the `Declaration of Trust' dated the 26th day of June, 1933."
 Clara Lambdin, administratrix of Joseph A. Lambdin, and Charles H. Lambdin intervened in that proceeding and filed answers in which they set up these defenses: (1) That declaration No. 1 contained no power of revocation; (2) that Ruth Dyott did not direct any changes in that agreement; (3) that at the time trust agreement No. 2 was executed Ruth Dyott was mentally incapable of executing a valid deed or contract; and (4) that Harriet Robinson wrongfully without legal authority executed declaration No. 2.
 After testimony and a hearing on these issues, the court decreed: (1) That agreement No. 1 did contain a power of revocation; (2) that declaration No. 2 was the free and voluntary act of Ruth S. Dyott, done when she was mentally capable of executing a valid deed or contract with her knowledge and consent and not induced by any undue influence exercised upon her; (3) that the interest of Ruth S. Dyott in the trust estate terminated at her death except as to its distribution; and (4) that distribution should be made in accordance with the provisions of declaration No. 2.
 From that decree Charles H. Lambdin and Clara Lambdin, administratrix of Joseph A. Lambdin, have appealed to this court.
 In natural sequence the first question presented by the appeal is whether declaration No. 1 was revocable. In part B of declaration No. 1, the settlor did three things: (1) She expressly recognized the trusts created by part A; (2) she granted the trustee power to transfer "unto her" the securities mentioned in part A; and (3) she *Page 245
 reserved some power of direction over the trust estate by concluding part B with the formula "until otherwise directed." That phrase follows immediately the grant of power, and the appellants contend that it qualifies and limits that power, but has no other effect, and certainly does not amount to a reservation of a power of revocation. Such a construction is possible, but it would be both illogical and unreasonable. So long as the trust continued, the power of dealing with the trust property would be necessary to its proper administration by the trustee, and there is no apparent reason why the settlor should desire to reserve the right to revoke the power unless she reserved at the same time the right to revoke the trust. And as stated in Perry on Trusts and Trustees, (7th Ed.) sec. 104, n. 77: "It must be observed, however, that the absence of a power to revoke a voluntary settlement or trust is viewed by courts of equity as a circumstance of suspicion, and very slight evidence of mistake, misapprehension, or misunderstanding on the part of the settlor will be laid hold of to set aside the deed. Garnseyv. Mundy, 24 N.J. Eq, 243, reprinted in 13 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.) 345, with a learned note by Mr. Bispham, gives a very clear view of the law applicable to voluntary settlements without a power of revocation made under circumstances which may lead to the conclusion that the settlor did not intend to put the property entirely beyond his control, or that he acted unadvisedly or improvidently. See, also, Rhodes v. Bates, L.R. 1 Ch. 252;Leach v. Farr, 13 Am. Law Reg. 350 (N.S.); Villers v.Beaumont, 1 Vern, 99; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627; Petre v.Espinasse, 2 M. K. 496; Bill v. Cureton, 2 M. K. 511;Hastings v. Ord, 11 Sim. 205; Coutts v. Acworth, L.R. 8 Eq. 538; Phillips v. Mullings, L.R. 7 Ch. 244; Hall v. Hall, L.R. 8 Ch. 430; Toker v. Toker, 3 De G., J. S. 487; Evans v.Russell, 31 Leg. Int. 125."
 In view of the equivocal character of the language, it was proper to receive parol evidence, not to vary the instrument, but, by showing the circumstances attending *Page 246
 its execution and the position of the settlor at that time, to ascertain the sense in which the words were used, for, as said inFryer v. Patrick, 42 Md. 51, 54: "If a written instrument is certain and definite in its contents it is the best evidence of the intention and meaning of the parties, but where it is not so it cannot be questioned that extrinsic evidence may be resorted to in aid of its terms and provisions — not to contradict it, but to explain it." Stockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196, 207;McCreary v. McCreary, 5 G. J. 147, 157.
 Much time, ingenuity, and labor have been expended in applying Lord Bacon's rule, that latent ambiguities may be explained by parol evidence but that patent ambiguities may not. The basis of the rule is thought to be that where the doubt does not appear on the face of the instrument the introduction of parol evidence merely completes the instrument by identifying its object or its subject-matter, while where the doubt is patent and too uncertain for settled construction, to permit its meaning to be fixed by parol evidence would be not to construe the instrument under consideration but to create a new one.
 But while the inflexible and binding authority of that rule is generally recognized, there has been much confusion and some conflict as to the meaning to be given to the words "latent," "patent," and "ambiguity" in applying it to varying facts. 3Jones on Evidence, sec. 474. For, as was said by that author: "There are comparatively few cases in which a bare inspection of the instrument will show that no proper extrinsic evidence will afford any light on the construction of the writing. Hence the court cannot generally determine whether there is a patent ambiguity until extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances has been received." Id., sec. 455. And "where any doubt arises as to the true sense and meaning of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application under the surrounding circumstances, the sense and meaning of the language may be investigated and *Page 247
 ascertained by evidence dehors the instrument, for both reason and common sense agree that by no other means can the language of the instrument be made to speak the real mind of the party. In such a case parol evidence is admissible ex necessitate." 22C.J. 1199. Again it has been said: "It is certainly not true that an ambiguity appearing on the face of the paper, if that alone is looked to, cannot be explained by parol, and the rule laid down by Lord Bacon that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain a patent ambiguity has never been acted upon in its widest extent, for there are to be found in the reports many cases where, although the ambiguity was such as should undoubtedly be designated as patent, if that term is taken in its broad sense, the courts have admitted evidence to explain it, or to show the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the situation of the parties." 22 C.J. 1197. And cases authorizing parol evidence to show to what object or subject the language of written instruments was intended to apply, that the intent of the parties may prevail, are too numerous for convenient citation,McCreary v. McCreary, supra. For "when a question arises as to the general intention of the parties concerning which the instrument is not decisive, it has been held that proof of independent facts, collateral to the instrument, may be properly admitted," (Stockham v. Stockham, supra. See, also, Warfieldv. Booth, 33 Md. 63, 70; Myers v. Myers, 153 Md. 44, 48,137 A. 501; Kleiman v. Orion Knitting Mills, 139 Md. 550,115 A. 857; Ess-Arr Knitting Mills v. Fischer, 132 Md. 1, 8,103 A. 91; Phoenix Pad Mfg. Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 540, 544, 96 A. 762), as well as contemporaneous statements indicating the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the equivocal words, for in such a case statements so made are facts and part of the surrounding circumstances. 22 C.J. 1179, 1180; Wigmoreon Evidence, 2471, 2472; 10 R.C.L. 1076.
 When resort is had to the evidence as to the circumstances attending the transaction and the situation of the *Page 248
 settlor at that time, any doubt as to her belief that she had reserved the power at once disappears. She was a woman of more than ordinary intelligence. At the time she instructed her lawyer as to the preparation of declaration No. 1, she was on her way to a hospital for a serious operation, she was uncertain whether she would survive it, she did not want to make a will, but she did want to arrange her affairs so that she would enjoy the use of her property while she lived, and that it would then go to the persons she wished to have it. The phrase "otherwise directed" was not in the paper as first drawn, but was added by the draftsman after the first draft was read to Mrs. Robinson, and she had said: "Now is it all worked out so that my sister can change it at any time?" There was evidence that Mrs. Dyott went to the office of her lawyer to have some instrument drawn "that would be secret * * * and still have the same right to change it as you would a codicil in a will," and she talked over with him "what right she would have or control over it if she would let this deed go to Hattie," and her instructions to the lawyer were that she was "to have the right to change it at any time that she saw fit." The only reasonable inference permissible in these circumstances is that the phrase "until otherwise directed" was intended to apply to the whole instrument, and that it reserved to her an express power of revocation.
 The second question is whether she did in fact revoke declaration No. 1. She did not revoke it in express terms, but if declaration No. 2 is valid, it is so far inconsistent with declaration No. 1 as to amount to an implied revocation protanto. Declaration No. 1 was silent as to the manner of revocation, but "if the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust but does not specify any mode of revocation, the power can be exercised in any manner which sufficiently manifests the intention of the settlor to revoke the trust." Am. L. Inst.Restatement, Trusts, sec. 330, p. 992. And "if the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust but does not specify any mode of revocation, the power may be exercised by the execution and *Page 249
 delivery to the trustee of a new trust instrument declaring a trust different from that declared in the original trust instrument. If the settlor having such a power of revocation wishes to create a different trust, it is unnecessary formally to revoke the trust and to have the trust property reconveyed to him before creating the new trust; but he can revoke the old trust and create the new one in a single transaction." Id., p. 993; 65 C.J. 347. There is no doubt that declaration No. 2 contains important provisions inconsistent with those contained in declaration No. 1, and to that extent, if it is valid, it revoked the earlier instrument.
 The controlling question then is: Was declaration No. 2 a valid instrument? It may be observed that on its face and literally it does not purport to be the act of Ruth S. Dyott, but the act of Harriet H. Robinson. It begins with this statement: "This Declaration of Trust made by me, the undersigned, Harriet H. Robinson of St. Michaels, Talbot County, Maryland." It ends with this sentence: "In Witness Whereof I have signed my name and affixed my seal at St. Michaels, Talbot County, Maryland, this 26th day of June, 1933," and the signature and seal of Harriet H. Robinson. The fact that Mrs. Ruth S. Dyott was a party to it is nowhere stated in the instrument, and must be inferred, if at all, from the fact that she signed it under the signature of Anna J. Dyott, who signed it under the word "Test," obviously as a witness. No point was made of that circumstance, however, either in this or in the trial court, and if it clearly appears that in signing the paper Mrs. Ruth Dyott intended to adopt it as her act, her intention should not be defeated by any mere formal irregularity. The uncontradicted evidence is that the paper was intended to supersede declaration No. 1. It could have had no other possible purpose, nor was there any reason why Mrs. Ruth Dyott should have signed it except to signify that she knew its contents and adopted it as her act. The fact that her signature did not appear under that of Mrs. Robinson was immaterial.Elliott *Page 250 on Contracts, secs. 1318, 3890; Devlin on Deeds, secs. 31, 31A, note 4. The instrument was drawn at her request, and in accordance with her instructions; it was she who asked Anna Dyott to sign it as a witness; before signing it she read it over, and after reading it said to her friend E.L. Holland, who had carried her instructions to the lawyer who drew it and had brought it to her: "You know what I want done, and we have gone over it all." From those undisputed facts it must be inferred that when she signed the paper she intended to signify that it was her act as well as the act of Mrs. Robinson.
 But the appellants contend that, when she signed it, she was so wasted and enfeebled by disease, and so affected by drugs administered to her in the treatment of her illness, that she lacked the mental capacity to execute any valid deed or contract, and they say also that Mrs. Robinson stood in a confidential relation to Mrs. Ruth Dyott, that she received under declaration No. 2 a substantial increase over the provision for her benefit in declaration No. 1, and that for that reason declaration No. 2 is prima facie void.
 There can be no doubt that under any possible definition of the term, Mrs. Robinson did stand in a "confidential relation" to the settlor at the time declaration No. 2 was executed. Zimmerman v.Bitner, 79 Md. 115, 28 A. 820; Brown v. Mercantile Trust Deposit Co., 87 Md. 377, 390, 40 A. 256; 12 C.J. 421; Pomeroy,Eq. Jur. sec. 956; Kensett v. Safe Dep. Tr. Co.,116 Md. 526, 82 A. 981; Colburn v. Ellers, 160 Md. 104, 153 A. 14;Farmer v. O'Carroll, 162 Md. 431, 160 A. 12, 17.
 Where such a relation exists, the principle is firmly established that, while valid transactions between the parties are possible and in certain circumstances permissible, yet where the party occupying a position of dominion or superiority receives a benefit from the transaction, there is a presumption against its validity, and the beneficiary is under the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that there has been no abuse of the *Page 251
 confidence, that he has acted in good faith, and that the act by which he is benefited was the free, voluntary, and independent act of the other party to the relation, done with full knowledge of its purpose and effect. Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 957; Farmer v.O'Carroll, supra; Kensett v. Safe Dep. Tr. Co., supra; Colburnv. Ellers, supra. As was said in Farmer v. O'Carroll, supra:
 "To discharge this burden it must be made clear not simply that the donor, grantor, or contracting party knew the effect of his action, but that he, under no sort of undue influence, had either competent and disinterested advice, or had performed a not unreasonable act with knowledge of its nature and as the result of the free exercise of independent will. Zimmerman v Frushour,108 Md. 115, 126, 69 A. 796; Taylor v. Pivec, 149 Md. 526, 532,131 A. 757; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188, 194, 195; Inche Noriahv. Shaik Allie Bin Omar (1929) A.C. 127, 135 (P.C.); Bispham'sEquity (8th Ed.) sec. 237." Brown v. Mercantile Trust Co.,supra.
 In determining whether the beneficiary has met that burden, consideration must be given to the mental and physical condition of the benefactor at the time of the transaction. It therefore becomes necessary to review the evidence, which is brief and not necessarily conflicting, concerning that and all the other facts attending the transaction.
 Mrs. Ruth S. Dyott was the widow of Joseph Dyott, who died about five years before the trial of this case. They lived together in St. Michaels, where they conducted a general store. Prior to her husband's death, Mrs. Dyott was found to be suffering from cancer, for which she submitted to an operation. The operation brought temporary relief, but eventually the disease returned, and later, in addition to that dreadful affliction, she suffered from some disease of the gall bladder for which, early in 1933, another operation was found to be necessary. Because of her apprehension as to the result of that operation, she decided to make some disposition of her *Page 252
 property, but was unwilling, if any other satisfactory method could be adopted, to dispose of it by will. In that situation she applied to E.L. Holland, a business man residing in Baltimore, for advice. Holland had been a friend of her husband and her friend. He had been in the habit of visiting at frequent intervals Maurice Dyott, her brother-in-law, with whom she was then living. She had removed to Maurice Dyott's home about a year after her husband's death, and continued to live there until her own death. Shortly after she went to live with Maurice, her sister Harriet H. Robinson Dantzebecker, referred to in the record as Harriet Robinson, came to live with her to give her such attention as she needed, and she was living with her when the transactions under consideration occurred. The other members of the household then were Maurice Dyott, his wife, Anna, and their three children.
 When she consulted Mr. Holland, he suggested that she consult Mr. Eldridge Hood Young, a lawyer in Baltimore, who was his lawyer, and later Mrs. Dyott, Harriet, and Holland went to Young's office. On the visit Harriet carried a satchel in which were securities belonging to the estate. At the conference Mrs. Dyott discussed fully with Mr. Young the manner in which she wished to dispose of her property, and the nature and effect of the instrument which he suggested as a possible method of effecting her wishes, and of her desire to have the power to change the instrument at any time "she saw fit." She then went to the hospital, Mr. Young drew the paper, and when Mrs. Robinson and Holland came to the office he handed it to Mrs. Robinson to read. Before she executed it she asked Young if it was "all worked out so that her sister could change it at any time." He then added to it the words "until otherwise directed." She then executed it and it was handed to Holland, who took it to Mrs. Dyott at the hospital, and she also executed it. A summary of Mrs. Dyott's instruction was given in the following words by Mr. Young: "Mrs. Dyott instructed me to *Page 253
 prepare a paper or papers that would turn over to Mrs. Robinson, her sister, the different securities and property mentioned in it, so that she should have the beneficial enjoyment of it, and particularly the income during the life, and in the event of her death to go to the named beneficiaries with the right to change any of those beneficiaries any time during her life time."
 In the following May, Mrs. Robinson told Mr. Young that it had been necessary to sell some of the securities of the estate, and that her sister wanted to know whether she had to authorize their sale. Young then prepared, and Mrs. Dyott signed, the letter of May 11th.
 After her return from the hospital Mrs. Dyott's health grew steadily worse. Her sister Mary, for whom she had made some provision in declaration No. 1, died on the 20th of June about a week before her own death, and on the Friday preceding her death she asked Anna Dyott whether Mr. Holland was coming down on Saturday; that she wanted to talk over her affairs with him; that there needed to be some changes. Anna replied that she did not know, but later called Holland over the telephone, and he did come on the following day. He saw Mrs. Dyott Sunday, June 25th, and she had at that time a copy of declaration No. 1, and noted on it the changes she wanted made, spoke of them to Holland, and said "that she had been thinking of some changes in it any way and now that she had to make them." She gave the paper with the notations on it to Holland and said "she wanted to have it fixed," and he brought it to Young, who drew the second declaration of trust from the memorandum which Holland brought. Mrs. Anna Dyott was present when Mrs. Ruth Dyott discussed the changes and the memorandum with Holland, but it does not appear that Harriet was there; Holland said he thought she was not.
 After Young had drawn the second declaration, Holland returned to St. Michaels on Monday morning, June 26th, and gave it to her. She read it and asked Holland if he thought it was all right, and he replied that as far *Page 254
 as he knew it was, and "eventually Hattie (Mrs. Robinson) came in and signed it," and Mrs. Ruth Dyott and Mrs. Anna Dyott signed it in the manner stated supra. At twenty or twenty-five minutes after two o'clock on the following morning she died.
 At the time of her death she was suffering from cancer of the lungs, in the course of her illness she would have violent and exhausting coughing attacks, and her physical condition became steadily weaker as the disease progressed, although it appears that neither her physician nor the members of the household appeared to realize that the end was so near when she signed the paper on June 26th. There was no suggestion that she had any specific mental derangement at any time, and the only intimation of any want of mental capacity, except such as may have been inferred from her extreme weakness, is found in the testimony of Charles Lambdin, who saw her on June 25th, sat on her bed, and talked to her for twenty or twenty-five minutes. He said that he noticed a change in her physical and also her mental condition. There would be "momentary lapses" in her "sentences and talk," "just little lulls in her conversation," and he thought from her appearance that she was dying. He saw her again on Monday, and in the course of that visit she asked him, "When did you come down?" and when he replied: "Ruth, I came down yesterday." She said: "Oh my, I cannot get myself together this morning somehow."
 Clara Lambdin, widow of Joseph, saw her on the Thursday preceding her death, and Robert Preston Lambdin, a nephew, on the following day. In so far as it is repeated in the record, her conversations with both of these witnesses were natural and coherent, without the slightest suggestion of mental weakness or derangement, and the testimony of Anna Dyott and Maurice Dyott is that there was no apparent change in her condition until just before the end; at about 2 o'clock in the morning of her death she heard Maurice moving around and asked his wife: "Is Maurice going crabbing?" He heard her and came *Page 255
 in, and she asked him: "You are not going crabbing this morning?" He said no and sat down by the bed, and they talked together and she was, he said, "conscious right up to the last minute and knew everything." Holland, her friend, thought that she had "more brains than all the rest of the family put together." She went out in an automobile about a week before her death.
 From this evidence it cannot be said that when she executed declaration No. 2 Mrs. Ruth Dyott was not capable of executing a valid deed or contract, nor is there any tangible indication that in executing it she was influenced in any way by Mrs. Robinson, or that it represented anything but her own free and unbiased will. It does appear from the paper itself that Mrs. Robinson receives a much larger share of the estate under that declaration than under the former one, but the natural and reasonable explanation of that is Mrs. Dyott's love and affection for the sister, who served her day and night, and slept on a couch by her bed. It is true that what she gave to Harriet lessened the shares of her brothers, but the property was her own, and the law gave to her, and not to them, the right to dispose of it.
 She was enfeebled by the ravages of a painful and incurable disease, but the evidence shows that it had not impaired her mind, nor weakened her will. On the contrary, it permits no reasonable conclusion other than that when she executed declaration No. 2 she was in the full possession of her mental faculties, that she had full knowledge of its purpose and effect, and that it was her free and voluntary act. Such cases as Frushv. Green, 86 Md. 494, 39 A. 863, where the very purpose of the instrument was so unnatural and so inconsistent with the past conduct of the grantor as to afford strong evidence of undue influence, and where the evidence of the attending physician was explicit and unequivocal that the testator was utterly incapable of executing a valid deed or contract, have no application. But the case rather falls under the rule stated in Higgins v.Carlton, 28 Md. 115, that "neither age nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility *Page 256
 of body, will affect the capacity to make a will if sufficient intelligence remain."
 It follows that the appellee sufficiently met the burden placed upon her, and that the decree of the trial court should be affirmed.
 Decree affirmed with costs.


type: other

text:
VSRS Sklep X Ips 233/2014
 ECLI:SI:VSRS:2016:X.IPS.233.2014
 VS1015447
 Sodba UPRS I U 459/2013
 DAVKI - UPRAVNI SPOR - CIVILNO PROCESNO PRAVO
 dovoljena revizija - vrednost spora - preprodaja rabljenih vozil - davek na dodano vrednost - davek od dohodka iz dejavnosti - sporno dejansko stanje - neopravljena glavna obravnava - pogoji za zavrnitev izvedbe dokazov - vnaprejšnja dokazna ocena
 Po mnenju revizijskega sodišča iz razlogov za zavrnitev izvedbe dokazov izhaja, da je sodišče prve stopnje vnaprej predvidevalo, kakšen bi bil rezultat izvedbe predlaganih dokazov. Vnaprejšnja dokazna ocena je sprejemljiva le, če sodišče izčrpno in prepričljivo argumentira, zakaj predlagani dokaz ne bi vplival na odločitev: izhajati mora iz predpostavke, da bi predlagani dokazi uspeli (torej potrdili tezo predlagatelja), ne glede na to pa bi sodišče glede na prepričljivost ostalih dokazov odločilo enako (tako sodba Vrhovnega sodišča I Ips 1639/2010 z dne 9. 1. 2014). Ker svoje vnaprejšnje dokazne ocene sodišče prve stopnje tako ni utemeljilo, prav tako pa ni navedlo kakšnih drugih sprejemljivih razlogov za zavrnitev dokaznih predlogov, je kršilo revidentovo pravico do izvedbe glavne obravnave iz drugega odstavka 51. člena ZUS-1 oziroma njegovo pravico do izvajanja dokazov iz 22. člena Ustave RS.
 Reviziji se ugodi, sodba Upravnega sodišča Republike Slovenije I U 459/2013-7 z dne 1. 4. 2014 se razveljavi in se zadeva vrne temu sodišču v novo sojenje.
 Odločitev o stroških revizijskega postopka se pridrži za končno odločitev.
 1. Z izpodbijano sodbo je sodišče prve stopnje na podlagi prvega odstavka 63. člena Zakona o upravnem sporu (v nadaljevanju ZUS-1) kot neutemeljeno zavrnilo tožbo tožeče stranke (v nadaljevanju revident) zoper odločbo Davčne uprave Republike Slovenije, Davčnega urada Brežice, št. DT 0610-268/2009-48 (0303-21) z dne 28. 7. 2011. S to je navedeni organ po opravljenem postopku davčnega inšpekcijskega nadzora za leta 2007, 2008 in 2009 revidentu dodatno odmeril davek na dodano vrednost (v nadaljevanju DDV) v skupnem znesku 23.618,08 EUR in pripadajoče obresti (točke I.1, I.2 in I.3 izreka), akontacijo dohodnine od dohodkov iz dejavnosti v skupnem znesku 46.925,00 EUR in pripadajoče obresti (točke I.4, I.5 in I.6 izreka) ter obresti od premalo plačanih predhodnih akontacij davka od dohodkov iz dejavnosti (točke I.7, I.8 in I.9 izreka). Revidentovo pritožbo zoper prvostopenjsko davčno odločbo je Ministrstvo za finance zavrnilo kot neutemeljeno z odločbo, št. DT-499-16-258/2011 z dne 31. 1. 2013.
 2. V obrazložitvi svoje sodbe je prvostopenjsko sodišče pritrdilo odločitvi in razlogom davčnih organov, na katere se je v skladu z drugim odstavkom 71. člena ZUS-1 tudi sklicevalo, ne da bi jih posebej ponavljalo, tožbene ugovore pa je zavrnilo kot neutemeljene. Tudi po njegovi oceni se je revident v inšpiciranem obdobju ukvarjal s preprodajo rabljenih osebnih vozil, ki jih ni knjižil v svoje poslovne knjige in prikazal v svojih davčnih obračunih. Pravilno so bile uporabljene postopkovne določbe Zakona o davčnem postopku (v nadaljevanju ZDavP-2) ter materialne določbe Zakona o davku na dodano vrednost (v nadaljevanju ZDDV-1) in Zakona o dohodnini (v nadaljevanju ZDoh-2). Predlog za opravo glavne obravnave je zavrnilo, ker je ocenilo, da v zadevi dejstva in okoliščine niso sporna.
 3. Zoper sodbo sodišča prve stopnje je revident vložil revizijo, katere dovoljenost utemeljuje z vrednostnim kriterijem iz 1. točke drugega odstavka 83. člena ZUS-1. Uveljavlja napačno uporabo materialnega prava in kršitev določb postopka. Vrhovnemu sodišču predlaga, da izpodbijano sodbo spremeni tako, da tožbi ugodi, oziroma da izpodbijano sodbo razveljavi in vrne zadevo sodišču prve stopnje v novo sojenje, toženi stranki pa naloži plačilo stroškov postopka.
 4. V odgovoru tožena stranka predlaga zavrnitev revizije kot neutemeljene iz razlogov, navedenih v upravnih odločbah in izpodbijani sodbi.
 6. Revizija je dovoljena na podlagi 1. točke drugega odstavka 83. člena ZUS-1, ki določa, da je revizija dovoljena, če vrednost izpodbijanega dela dokončnega upravnega akta oziroma pravnomočne sodbe, če je sodišče odločalo meritorno, v zadevah, v katerih je pravica ali obveznost stranke izražena v denarni vrednosti, presega 20.000 EUR. Z odločbo, ki je izpodbijana v tem upravnem sporu, je bil namreč revidentu naložen v plačilo denarni znesek, ki presega navedeni mejni znesek za dovoljenost revizije.
 7. Iz prvostopenjske davčne odločbe izhaja, da je bil postopek zoper revidenta začet 10. 3. 2010, ko mu je bil vročen sklep o uvedbi davčnega inšpekcijskega nadzora za leti 2007 in 2008. Revidentu je bil 16. 3. 2011 vročen še sklep o razširitvi nadzora na leto 2009. Iz dejanskih ugotovitev tega postopka, ki so bile podlaga izpodbijane sodbe, nanje pa je vezano tudi revizijsko sodišče, izhaja, da je bil revident kot samostojni podjetnik v letih 2007 do 2010 udeležen pri preprodaji večjega števila rabljenih vozil. Neposredno na svoje ime je kupil ter kmalu nato prodal devet vozil v letu 2007, dve v letu 2008 in eno v letu 2009. Pri preprodaji rabljenih vozil pa je bil udeležen tudi posredno, ne da bi v svojem imenu nastopal kot njihov kupec oziroma prodajalec. V teh primerih je davčni organ sklepal na njegovo udeležbo pri preprodaji na podlagi okoliščin, da je za vozila v svojem imenu sklepal avtomobilska zavarovanja in prenašal bonuse zavarovanja iz enega na drugo vozilo. Njegovo udeležbo izkazujejo tudi posamezne druge listine, kot so vloge za homologacijo in vloge za izdajo začasne registrske tablice, na katerih je, čeprav ni bil vlagatelj teh listin, navedeno (dopisano) ime A. A. ter telefonska številka, ki pripada njegovemu podjetju. Na njegovo udeležbo kažejo tudi izjave nekaterih končnih kupcev vozil, ki so navajali, da jim je revident pomagal pri prevozih vozil s svojo vlečno prikolico in pri pridobitvi preizkusnih tablic. Revident je na tak posreden način sodeloval pri preprodaji dveh vozil v letu 2008, trinajstih v letu 2009 in štirih v letu 2010 (pri čemer prodaje po 31. 12. 2009 niso bile zajete s prvostopenjsko davčno odločbo). Pri preprodaji vozil je po ugotovitvah davčnega organ sicer sodeloval tudi revidentov sin, ki ima enako osebno ime in priimek kot revident in ki je bil v inšpiciranem obdobju zaposlen v revidentovem podjetju. Posamezna vračila zavarovalnih premij, do katerih je prihajalo zaradi predčasnih prekinitev zavarovanj ob prodaji vozila, so bila nakazana na bančni račun revidentovega sina.
 8. Revidentov ugovor, da je v obravnavanem primeru prišlo do kršitve tretjega odstavka 141. člena ZDavP-2, ki določa, da od dneva začetka davčnega inšpekcijskega nadzora, do izdaje odločbe ne sme preteči več kot devet mesecev, ni utemeljen. Vrhovno sodišče je že sprejelo stališče, da je ta rok instrukcijske in ne prekluzivne narave (sodba X Ips 216/2013 z dne 2.10.2014), zato njegova prekoračitev v obravnavanem primeru (postopek je bil začet 10. 3. 2010, odločba pa izdana 28. 7. 2011) ni vplivala na zakonitost odločbe.
 9. Po presoji revizijskega sodišča tudi ni utemeljen revidentov ugovor, da sodišče prve stopenj ni obrazloženo zavrnilo njegovega tožbenega ugovora glede časovnega obdobja, ki je bil predmet inšpekcijskega nadzora. V tožbi je ugovarjal, da bi „tožena stranka glede na veljavno zakonodajo lahko opravila inšpekcijski pregled največ za 36 mesecev, dejansko pa je pregled zajel obdobje štirih let“. Na to je sodišče prve stopnje odgovorilo (22. točka izpodbijane sodbe), da je bil inšpekcijski pregled opravljen za obdobja od 1. 1. 2007 do 31. 12. 2009, kar je v okviru tretjega odstavka 133. člena ZDavP-2, ki določa, da pri fizičnih osebah, ki opravljajo neodvisno samostojno dejavnost, obsega davčni inšpekcijski nadzor največ tri predhodna davčna obdobja, če gre za davčno obdobje, ki je enako koledarskemu oziroma poslovnemu letu, oziroma največ 36 mesecev, če gre za davčno obdobje, ki ni enako koledarskemu oziroma poslovnemu letu. Glede na skopo vsebino tožbenega ugovora, je takšna obrazložitev sodišča prve stopnje zadostna.
 10. Utemeljen pa je revidentov očitek v zvezi z neopravljeno glavno obravnavo, ki jo je predlagal in na njej želel dokazovati drugačno dejansko stanje. V zvezi s tem revizijsko sodišče ugotavlja, da je revident v tožbi, kot tudi sicer ves čas postopka, navajal, da je vse aktivnosti v zvezi s preprodajo vozil lahko izvajal „kvečjemu“ njegov sin A. A. ml., to trditev pa je tudi konkretiziral. Skliceval se je na to, da je večina kupcev vozil navedla, da so poslovali s sinom, sin je bil zaposlen v njegovem podjetju (v okviru katerega pa ni imel pooblastil za izvajanje takšnih aktivnosti) in je zato imel dostop do službenega telefona (katerega telefonska številka je navedenega na več listinah). Na sinov bančni račun so se izplačevali tudi viški oziroma vračila premij. Sodišču prve stopnje je zato predlagal, naj opravi glavno obravnavo, na kateri naj zasliši sina, pridobi mnenje grafologa, ki bi preveril podpise na zavarovalnih listinah, ter zasliši uslužbence zavarovalnic, ki bi lahko pojasnili, s kom so dejansko imeli kontakt. Revizija sodišču prve stopnje očita, da je neutemeljeno izdalo sodbo brez glavne obravnave, na kateri bi izvedlo dokaze, ki jih je predlagal v tožbi.
 11. Sodišče prve stopnje je v izpodbijani sodbi navedlo, da glavne obravnave ni opravilo, ker po njegovem mnenju relevantne okoliščine v obravnavani zadevi niso sporne. Pojasnilo je, da je revident v tožbi navajal, da je sporno dejansko stanje, a je ocenilo, da ne gre za to, da bi bila sporna dejstva in okoliščine, ki jih je davčni organ ugotovil v postopku, temveč se revident ne strinja s sklepanjem davčnega organa o pomenu teh dejstev in okoliščin (24. točka obrazložitve izpodbijane sodbe).
 12. Z navedenim razlogi se Vrhovno sodišče ne strinja. V obravnavni zadevi je sklepanje „o pomenu ugotovljenih dejstev in okoliščin“ mogoče razumeti le v smislu sklepanja o tem, kdo je opravljal dejavnost preprodaje vozil, torej o elementu dejanskega stanja, na katerega bo uporabljena pravna norma, ki določa nastanek davčne obveznosti in zavezanca za plačilo. Če se torej tožnik v upravnem sporu ne strinja s sklepanjem upravnega organa o pravno odločilnih dejstvih, pa je sodišče načeloma dolžno opraviti glavno obravnavo, saj prvi odstavek 59. člena ZUS-1 določa, da lahko sodišče odloči brez glavne obravnave (sojenje na seji), če dejansko stanje, ki je bilo podlaga za izdajo upravnega akta, med tožnikom in tožencem ni sporno.
 13. Na glavni obravnavi sodišče, kot določa drugi odstavek 51. člena ZUS-1, izvaja dokaze, kadar in kolikor je to potrebno za odločitev v upravnem sporu, pa dokazi niso bili že izvedeni v postopku izdaje izpodbijanega upravnega akta ali če druga dejstva kažejo na to, da jih je treba drugače presoditi, kot jih je presodil organ, ki je izdal izpodbijani upravni akt. Dikcija navedene določbe, da se dokazi izvajajo „kadar in kolikor je to potrebno za odločitev v upravnem sporu“, pomeni, da sodišče ni dolžno izvesti v tožbi predlaganih dokazov, hkrati pa temu postavlja tudi splošno omejitev. Konkretnejša pravila o tem, kdaj lahko sodišče dokazni predlog zavrne, so v sodni praksi (glej npr. sklep Vrhovnega sodišča X Ips 114/2013) že izoblikovana in so povezana z razlago 22. člena Ustave RS. V skladu s temi stališči sodišču ni treba izvajati dokazov, če so npr. nepravočasni, nepotrebni (ker je dejstvo že dokazano), nerelevantni (ker dejstvo, ki naj bi ga dokazovali, za odločitev ni pravno odločilno), neprimerni za ugotovitev določenega dejstva ali nesubstancirani (ker ne navede, katera konkretna dejstva naj se ugotovijo s predlaganim dokazom).
 14. Sodišče prve stopnje je revidentove dokazne predloge zavrnilo z obrazložitvijo (na str. 8 in 9 izpodbijane sodbe), da dokazni predlog za zaslišanje zaposlenih na zavarovalnicah (pri katerih so bila sporna vozila zavarovana na ime revidenta) ne more bistveno spremeniti drugih okoliščin, ki jih je ugotovil davčni organ (da je bil revident zavarovalec in zavarovanec pri posameznih vozilih). Postavitev grafologa, izpovedbe oseb, ki so sodelovale pri homologaciji in registraciji vozil ter revidentovih družinskih članov, pa po njegovem mnenju ob predhodno opisanih dokazih (o tem, da je revident v postopkih pri zavarovalnicah nastopal samostojno) ne morejo bistveno vplivati na odločitev. Izjava revidentovega sina pa po mnenju sodišča prve stopnje glede na listine ne more biti bistveno drugačna.
 15. Po mnenju revizijskega sodišča iz navedenega izhaja, da je sodišče prve stopnje vnaprej predvidevalo, kakšen bi bil rezultat izvedbe predlaganih dokazov. Vnaprejšnja dokazna ocena je sprejemljiva le, če sodišče izčrpno in prepričljivo argumentira, zakaj predlagani dokaz ne bi vplival na odločitev: izhajati mora iz predpostavke, da bi predlagani dokazi uspeli (torej potrdili tezo predlagatelja), ne glede na to pa bi sodišče glede na prepričljivost ostalih dokazov odločilo enako (tako sodba Vrhovnega sodišča I Ips 1639/2010 z dne 9. 1. 2014). Ker svoje vnaprejšnje dokazne ocene sodišče prve stopnje tako ni utemeljilo, prav tako pa ni navedlo kakšnih drugih sprejemljivih razlogov za zavrnitev dokaznih predlogov, je kršilo revidentovo pravico do izvedbe glavne obravnave iz drugega odstavka 51. člena ZUS-1 oziroma njegovo pravico do izvajanja dokazov iz 22. člena Ustave RS.
 16. Glede na navedeno se revizijskemu sodišču ni bilo treba opredeljevati še do revizijskega ugovora o kršitvi tretjega odstavka 68. člena ZDavP-2, to je o zatrjevani nezakonitosti metode, po kateri je davčni organ ocenil, kakšen je bil (povprečen) dobiček revidenta, ki ga je dosegel pri preprodaji posameznega vozila (ker je davčni organ pri določanju tega dobička upošteval zgolj račune iz transakcij, pri katerih je revident formalno nastopal kot kupec oziroma prodajalec, ni pa upošteval računov, kjer ni nastopal v takšni vlogi). Ob morebiti drugače ugotovljenem dejanskem stanju (da revident pri transakcijah, kjer formalno ni sodeloval kot kupec ali prodajalec, ni bil dejanski prodajalec vozil), bi ta ugovor postal nepomemben za odločitev.
 17. Glede na navedeno je Vrhovno sodišče zaradi bistvene kršitve določb postopka v upravnem sporu v smislu prve alineje prvega odstavka 85. člena ZUS-1 v zvezi z drugim odstavkom 75. člena ZUS-1 reviziji ugodilo, izpodbijano sodbo razveljavilo in vrnilo zadevo sodišču prve stopnje v novo sojenje (prvi odstavek 93. člena ZUS-1). V njem bo moralo oceniti, ali za izvedbo dokazov, ki jih je predlagal revident, obstajajo kakšni sprejemljivi zadržki, in to obrazložiti. Če bo ugotovilo, da takšnih zadržkov ni, jih bo moralo na glavni obravnavi izvesti.
 18. Izrek o stroških temelji na tretjem odstavku 165. člena Zakona o pravdnem postopku v zvezi s prvim odstavkom 22. člena ZUS-1.
 ZUS-1 člen 51, 51/2, 59, 59/1, 75, 75/2, 83, 83/2-1, 85, 85/1, 93, 93/1. ZDavP-2 člen 133, 133/3, 141, 141/3. URS člen 22.
 P2RvYy0yMDE1MDgxMTExMzkyNjg4


text:
 Avis juridique important
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 21994D1231(16)
 Décision n° 1/94 du Conseil d'association CE-Turquie, du 19 décembre 1994, relative à l'application de l'article 3 du protocole additionnel à l'accord d'Ankara aux marchandises obtenues dans les États membres de la Communauté
 Journal officiel n° L 356 du 31/12/1994 p. 0023 - 0023
 DÉCISION N° 1/94 DU CONSEIL D'ASSOCIATION CE-TURQUIE du 19 décembre 1994 relative à l'application de l'article 3 du protocole additionnel à l'accord d'Ankara aux marchandises obtenues dans les États membres de la Communauté (94/905/CE)LE CONSEIL D'ASSOCIATION CE-TURQUIE, vu l'accord créant une association entre la Communauté économique européenne et la Turquie, vu le protocole additionnel audit accord, et notamment son article 3, considérant que l'admission de marchandises obtenues dans la Communauté européenne dans les conditions visées à l'article 3 paragraphe 1 du protocole additionnel au bénéfice des dispositions du titre I, chapitre I, section I et du chapitre II dudit protocole, est subordonnée à la perception, dans l'État exportateur, d'un prélèvement compensateur dont le taux est fonction de la réduction tarifaire accordée à ces marchandises en Turquie; considérant que, lors de sa trente-quatrième réunion du 8 novembre 1993, le Conseil d'association CE-Turquie a, dans une résolution concernant l'union douanière, réitéré la détermination des deux parties de prendre, en temps opportun, les décisions d'application pour que l'union douanière soit effective en 1995; considérant que, le 1er janvier 1994, la Turquie a procédé à une nouvelle réduction des droits de douane pour les marchandises soumises au régime prévu à l'article 10 du protocole additionnel, qui a porté le taux total des réductions auxquelles la Turquie a procédé à 90 % sur la liste de douze ans et à 80 % sur la liste de vingt-deux ans; que, de ce fait, il convient de fixer à 90 pour la liste de douze ans et à 80 pour la liste de vingt-deux ans le pourcentage des droits du tarif douanier commun à prendre en considération pour la détermination du prélèvement compensateur à percevoir lors de l'exportation de la Communauté vers la Turquie; considérant que, pour les produits relevant du traité instituant la Communauté europénne du charbon et de l'acier, il convient de préciser que lesdits pourcentages s'appliquent aux droits du tarif unifié CECA, DÉCIDE: Article premier 1. À compter de la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente décision, le pourcentage des droits du tarif douanier commun à prendre en considération pour la détermination du prélèvement compensateur visé à l'article 3 du protocole additionnel est fixé pour les marchandises obtenues dans les États membres de la Communauté à 90 pour celles figurant sur la liste de douze ans et à 80 pour celles figurant sur la liste de vingt-deux ans. 2. Les pourcentages visés au paragraphe 1 seront augmentés dans les limites de réductions successives opérées par la Turquie. Le conseil d'association devra être informé des dates d'application des nouveaux pourcentages. Article 2 En ce qui concerne les marchandises dans la fabrication desquelles sont entrés des produits relevant de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, les pourcentages visés à l'article 1er s'appliquent aux droits de douane du tarif unifié CECA pour ces produits. Article 3 La présente décision entre en vigueur trois mois après son adoption. Fait à Bruxelles, le 19 décembre 1994. Par le Conseil d'association Le président K. KINKEL


text:
 18.11.2006
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 281/1
 Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 12. September 2006 (Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Oberlandesgerichts Oldenburg [Deutschland]) — Industrias Nucleares do Brasil SA, Siemens AG/UBS AG (C-123/04), Texas Utilities Electric Corporation (C-124/04)
 (Rechtssache C-123/04 und C-124/04) (1)
 (EAG-Vertrag - Versorgung - Eigentumsordnung - Anreicherung von Uran im Gebiet der Gemeinschaft durch einen Angehörigen eines dritten Staates)
 (2006/C 281/02)
 Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch
 Vorlegendes Gericht
 Oberlandesgericht Oldenburg
 Parteien des Ausgangsverfahrens
 Klägerinnen: Industrias Nucleares do Brasil SA, Siemens AG
 Beklagte: UBS AG (C-123/04), Texas Utilities Electric Corporation (C-124/04)
 Gegenstand
 Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Oberlandesgerichts Oldenburg — Auslegung der Artikel 73, 75, 86 und 87 EA — Durch ein Pfandrecht gesicherter Darlehensvertrag über die Überlassung von einem Unternehmen eines Drittstaats gehörendem Uran, das in der Gemeinschaft angereichert und gelagert wird
 Tenor
 1.
 Artikel 75 Absatz 1 EA ist dahin auszulegen, dass die darin genannten Begriffe „Aufbereitung, Umwandlung oder Formung“ auch die Anreicherung von Uran umfassen.
 2.
 Artikel 196 Buchstabe b EA ist dahin auszulegen, dass ein Unternehmen ohne Sitz in den Hoheitsgebieten der Mitgliedstaaten nicht im Sinne dieser Bestimmung seine Tätigkeit ganz oder teilweise in diesen Hoheitsgebieten ausübt, wenn es zu einem Unternehmen mit Sitz in den Hoheitsgebieten der Mitgliedstaaten eine Geschäftsbeziehung unterhält, die entweder die Anlieferung von Rohstoffen zur Herstellung von angereichertem Uran und den Bezug angereicherten Urans oder dessen Einlagerung zum Gegenstand hat.
 3.
 Artikel 75 Absatz 1 Buchstabe c EA ist dahin auszulegen, dass er nicht die stoffliche Identität der zur Aufbereitung, Umwandlung oder Formung angelieferten und der danach zurückgelieferten Stoffe voraussetzt und es genügt, wenn die ausgelieferten Stoffe den angelieferten Stoffen in Qualität und Menge entsprechen, auch wenn den ausgelieferten Stoffen gegebenenfalls keine angelieferten Stoffe zugeordnet werden können. Außerdem steht es der Anwendung von Artikel 75 Absatz 1 Buchstabe c EA nicht entgegen, wenn das verarbeitende Unternehmen mit der Anlieferung der Rohstoffe das Eigentum hieran erwirbt und das angereicherte Uran deshalb nach der Verarbeitung an die andere Vertragspartei zurückübereignen muss.
 4.
 Artikel 196 Buchstabe b EA ist dahin auszulegen, dass ein Unternehmen nicht einen Teil seiner Tätigkeit im Sinne dieser Bestimmung in den Hoheitsgebieten der Mitgliedstaaten ausübt, wenn es dort lagerndes angereichertes Uran veräußert oder erwirbt.
 5.
 Artikel 73 EA ist dahin auszulegen, dass er nicht auf Vereinbarungen anzuwenden ist, die im Gebiet der Gemeinschaft lagerndes angereichertes Uran zum Gegenstand haben und an denen ausschließlich Angehörige dritter Staaten beteiligt sind.
 (1) ABl. C 106 vom 30.4.2006.


type: legislation

text:
 Aviso jurídico importante
 |
 52006PC0315
 Propuesta de Decisión del Consejo por la que se establecen los criterios comunitarios aplicables a las medidas de erradicación y vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animales (versión codificada) /* COM/2006/0315 final - CNS 2006/0104 */
 [pic] | COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS |Bruselas, 20.6.2006COM(2006) 315 final2006/0104 (CNS)Propuesta deDECISIÓN DEL CONSEJOpor la que se establecen los criterios comunitarios aplicables a las medidas de erradicación y vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animales (versión codificada)(presentada por la Comisión)EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS1. En el contexto de "La Europa de los ciudadanos", la Comisión concede gran importancia a la simplificación y claridad del Derecho comunitario, que de esta forma resulta más accesible y comprensible para el ciudadano, abriéndole nuevas posibilidades y reconociéndole derechos concretos que puede invocar.Pero este objetivo no podrá lograrse mientras siga existiendo una gran cantidad de disposiciones que hayan sufrido diversas modificaciones, a menudo esenciales, y que se encuentren dispersas entre el acto original y los actos de modificación posteriores. Por tanto, es precisa una labor de investigación y comparación de numerosos actos con el fin de determinar las disposiciones en vigor.Así pues, la claridad y transparencia del Derecho comunitario dependen también de la codificación de una normativa que sufre frecuentes modificaciones.2. El 1 de abril de 1987, la Comisión decidió, pues, dar instrucciones[1] a sus servicios para que procedieran a la codificación de todos los actos legales, como máximo tras su décima modificación, subrayando que se trataba de una medida mínima, ya que, en aras de la claridad y de la fácil comprensión de la legislación comunitaria, debían procurar codificar los textos de su competencia con una periodicidad incluso mayor.3. Las Conclusiones de la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo de Edimburgo, en diciembre de 1992, confirmaron esta decisión[2], destacando la importancia de la codificación, que proporciona una seguridad jurídica respecto del Derecho aplicable en un determinado ámbito y momento.Dicha codificación debe llevarse a cabo respetando íntegramente el proceso legislativo comunitario normal.Dado que ninguna modificación sustantiva puede ser introducida en los actos objeto de codificación , el Parlamento Europeo, el Consejo y la Comisión convinieron, mediante un Acuerdo interinstitucional de 20 de diciembre de 1994, un método de trabajo acelerado para la rápida aprobación de los actos codificados.4. El objeto de la presente propuesta es proceder a la codificación de la Decisión 90/638/CEE del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 1990, por la que se establecen los criterios comunitarios aplicables a las medidas de erradicación y vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animales[3]. La nueva Decisión sustituirá a las que son objeto de la operación de codificación[4]. La propuesta respeta en su totalidad el contenido de los textos codificados y se limita, por tanto, a reagruparlos realizando en ellos únicamente las modificaciones formales que la propia operación de codificación requiere.5. La propuesta de codificación se ha elaborado sobre la base de una consolidación previa del texto de la Decisión 90/638/CEE y del acto modificador, efectuada, en todas las lenguas oficiales, a través del sistema informático de la Oficina de Publicaciones Oficiales de las Comunidades Europeas. En caso de cambio de numeración de los artículos, la correlación entre los números antiguos y los nuevos se ha hecho constar en una tabla de correspondencia que figura en el anexo V de la Decisión codificada.ê 90/638/CEE (adaptado)2006/0104 (CNS)Propuesta deDECISIÓN DEL CONSEJOpor la que se establecen los criterios comunitarios aplicables a las medidas de erradicación y vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animalesEL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA,Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea,Vista la Decisión 90/424/CEE del Consejo, de 26 de junio de 1990, sobre determinados gastos en el sector veterinario[5] y, en particular, el apartado 2 de su artículo 24,Vista la propuesta de la Comisión,Visto el dictamen del Parlamento Europeo[6],Visto el dictamen del Comité Económico y Social Europeo[7],Considerando lo siguiente:ê(1) La Decisión 90/638/CEE del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 1990, por la que se establecen los criterios comunitarios aplicables a las medidas de erradicación y vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animales[8], ha sido modificada[9] de forma sustancial. Conviene, en aras de una mayor racionalidad y claridad, proceder a la codificación de dicha Decisión.ê 90/638/CEE Considerando 2 (adaptado)(2) Ö Los Õ criterios Ö relativos a la participación financiera de la Comunidad en la erradicación, el control y la vigilancia de determinadas enfermedades de los animales Õ deben garantizar la eficacia de las medidas que se emprendan y permitir que los Estados miembros presenten a la Comisión programas destinados a lograr la erradicación rápida o la vigilancia adecuada de dichas enfermedades,ê 90/638/CEEHA ADOPTADO LA PRESENTE DECISIÓN:Artículo 1Para poder ser aprobados con arreglo a la medida contemplada en el apartado 1 del artículo 24 de la Decisión 90/424/CEE, los programas presentados por los Estados miembros a la Comisión deberán cumplir:a) respecto de los programas de erradicación, los criterios indicados en el anexo I;b) respecto de los programas de vigilancia, los criterios indicados en el anexo II;ê 92/65/CEE Punto 1) del apartado 5 del art. 10c) respecto de los programas de lucha contra la rabia, los criterios que se indican en el anexo III.êArtículo 2Queda derogada la Decisión 90/638/CEE.Las referencias a la Decisión derogada se entenderán hechas a la presente Decisión y se leerán con arreglo a la tabla de correspondencias que figura en el anexo V.ê 90/638/CEEArtículo 3Los destinatarios de la presente Decisión serán los Estados miembros.Hecho en Bruselas, elPor el ConsejoEl Presidente[...]ê 90/638/CEEANEXO ICriterios a los que deberán ajustarse los programas de erradicaciónLos programas de erradicación deberán incluir, como mínimo, lo siguiente:1) una descripción de la situación epidemiológica de la enfermedad;2) un análisis de los costes previstos y una estimación de los beneficios;3) la duración prevista del programa, así como el objetivo que deberá alcanzarse una vez realizado;4) la designación de la autoridad central responsable encargada del control y de la coordinación de los servicios competentes en la aplicación del programa;5) la descripción y delimitación de la zona geográfica y administrativa en la que vaya a aplicarse el programa;6) disposiciones que garanticen la obligatoriedad de la declaración de todos los casos sospechosos o confirmados o de todo foco de la enfermedad en la zona de que se trate;7) los procedimientos de control del programa y, en particular, las normas relativas a los desplazamientos de los animales susceptibles de estar afectados o contaminados por una enfermedad dada y a la inspección regular de las explotaciones o zonas afectadas;8) un sistema de registro de las explotaciones a las que se aplica el programa;9) medidas que permitan identificar el origen de los animales;10) las categorías en que podrán clasificarse las explotaciones o zonas y los objetivos para cada categoría, así como las condiciones que regirán el cambio de categoría de los animales y las consecuencias que deberán extraerse de la pérdida de la categoría que tuvieran;11) si es necesario, una definición de los métodos de análisis, pruebas y toma de muestras, según la enfermedad de que se trate;12) las medidas que deberán tomarse, en particular, en caso de que la inspección efectuada de conformidad con las disposiciones del programa dé resultado positivo. Estas medidas deben incluir todos los medios necesarios para la erradicación rápida de la enfermedad en función de los conocimientos sobre su epidemiología y de los métodos de profilaxis específicos, por ejemplo:a) el sacrificio de los animales afectados o contaminados o que se sospeche que están afectados o contaminados, con:- destrucción de las canales o su utilización, previo tratamiento, con fines que no sean la alimentación humana, a condición de que los tratamientos utilizados ofrezcan garantías suficientes en materia de protección para la salud humana y/o animal,- o utilización ulterior de las carnes, cuando ello no suponga peligro alguno para la salud humana.b) destrucción de todo producto que pueda transmitir la enfermedad o aplicación de un tratamiento para evitar que dicho producto pueda causar contaminación,c) un procedimiento de desinfección de las explotaciones infectadas,d) el tratamiento terapéutico y profilaxis escogidos,e) un procedimiento de repoblación con animales sanos de las explotaciones donde se hayan efectuado sacrificios,f) la creación de una zona de vigilancia alrededor de la explotación infectada;13) en caso necesario, las normas que establezcan una indemnización adecuada de los ganaderos, lo más rápidamente posible, en caso de sacrificio de los animales;14) el compromiso por parte de la autoridad mencionada en el punto 4 de informar periódicamente a los servicios de la Comisión de manera apropiada.____________ANEXO IICriterios a los que deberán ajustarse los programas de vigilanciaLos programas de vigilancia deberán incluir, como mínimo, lo siguiente:1) los criterios mencionados en los puntos 1 a 9, 12, 13 y 14 del anexo I;2) un sistema de pruebas de vigilancia basado en investigaciones serológicas, microbiológicas, patológicas o epidemiológicas, o en cualquier otro método apropiado para la enfermedad de que se trate;3) un sistema que permita determinar la ausencia de la enfermedad, teniendo en cuenta su epidemiología.____________ê 92/65/CEE Punto 2) del apartado 5 del art. 10ANEXO IIICriterios que deberán adoptarse para los programas contra la rabia:Los programas contra la rabia deberán incluir al menos:1) los criterios contemplados en los puntos 1 a 7 del anexo I;2) información detallada sobre la región o regiones en que tendrá lugar la inmunización oral de los zorros y sobre sus límites naturales. Esta(s) región(es) cubrirá(n) al menos 6 000 km2 o la totalidad del territorio de un Estado miembro y podrá(n) incluir zonas limítrofes de terceros países;3) información detallada sobre las vacunas propuestas, el sistema de distribución, la densidad y la frecuencia de colocación de los cebos;4) en su caso, todos los detalles, el coste y la finalidad de las medidas de conservación o protección de la flora y de la fauna emprendidas por organizaciones con fines lucrativos en el territorio cubierto por estos proyectos.____________éANEXO IVDecisión derogada con sus modificaciones sucesivasDecisión 90/638/CEE del Consejo (DO L 347 de 12.12.1990, p. 27) |Decisión 92/65/CEE del Consejo (DO L 268 de 14.9.1992, p. 54) | Únicamente el apartado 5 del artículo 10 |_____________ANEXO VTabla de correspondenciasDecisión 90/638/CEE | Presente Decisión |Artículo 1, primer, segundo y tercer guión | Artículo 1, letras a), b) y c) |__ | Artículo 2 |Artículo 2 | Artículo 3 |anexos I, II y III | anexos I, II y III |__ | anexos IV y V |_____________[1] COM(87) 868 PV.[2] Véase Parte A del anexo 3 de las Conclusiones.[3] Realizada en virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo - Codificación del acervo comunitario, COM(2001) 645 final.[4] Véase anexo IV de la presente propuesta.[5] DO L 224 de 18.8.1990, p. 19 Ö Decisión cuya última modificación la constituye la Directiva 2003/99/CEE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo (DO L 325 de 12.12.2003, p. 31) Õ.[6] DO C [...] de [...], p. [...].[7] DO C [...] de [...], p. [...].[8] DO L 347 de 12.12.1990, p. 27. Decisión modificada por la Directiva 92/65/CEE (DO L 268 de 14.9.1992, p. 54).[9] Véase anexo IV.


type: wikipedia

text:
Syntese betyder sammenføjning af flere elementer til en enhed, og har flere betydninger:
 Syntese (kemi) – den proces, som fører frem til dannelsen af en kemisk forbindelse
 Biosyntese – den mere specialiserede syntese af biomolekyler
 Organisk syntese – en meget vigtig proces indenfor den kemiske industri, herunder medicinalvirksomheder
 Syntesebiologi
 Syntese A/S - en dansk medicinalvirksomhed
 Frekvenssyntese - syntese som laver et rent elektrisk signal med en selvvalgt frekvens.
 Syntese (kognition) – den proces i den autonome bevidsthedsdannelse, hvor indoptagne informationer klassificeres og kobles som tematiske overopdelinger - eller som produktet af en tilsvarende villet proces, f.eks. som summen af en research i videnskab eller kunst.
 Syntese (dialektik) – den proces, hvormed man sammensætter brudstykker af viden og derved kommer frem til en ny erkendelse – eller om resultatet af samme proces.
 En sum og enhed af tese og antitese – et skema der findes hos Hegel og Marx
 Kunst- og kulturgruppen Syntese – kunstgruppe stiftet af Steen Krarup Jensen, Flemming Vincent og Per Johan Svendsen.
 Se også:
 Almagest – Megale Syntaxé, "den Store Sammenføjning".
 Syntetisk –


text:
Mystras jew Mistras (bil-Grieg: Μυστρᾶς/Μιστρᾶς), magħruf ukoll bħala Myzithras (Μυζηθρᾶς) fil-Ġrajja tal-Morea, huwa raħal iffortifikat u eks muniċipalità f’Laconia, il-Peloponnesos, il-Greċja. Ir-raħal antik ta’ Mystras jinsab fuq l-Għolja ta’ Taygetos, ħdejn Sparta tal-qedem, u kien il-belt kapitali tad-Despotat Biżantin tal-Morea fis-sekli 14 u 15. Mystras esperjenza perjodu ta’ prosperità u tkattir kulturali matul dak iż-żmien. Is-sit baqa’ diżabitat matul il-perjodu Ottoman, meta bi żball xi vjaġġaturi mill-Punent ħasbuha Sparta tal-qedem. Fis-snin 30 tas-seklu 19, ir-raħal ġie abbandunat u nbena r-raħal il-ġdid ta’ Sparti, bejn wieħed u ieħor xi tmien kilometri fil-Lvant.
 Mir-riforma tal-gvern lokali tal-2011, Mystras jagħmel parti mill-muniċipalità ta’ Sparti bħala unità muniċipali.
 Storja
 Lejn l-aħħar tal-1248, William II ta’ Villehardouin, il-mexxej tal-Prinċipat Frank ta’ Achaea, ħakem lil Monemvasia, l-aħħar qawwa Biżantina li kien għad fadal fil-Morea. Dan is-suċċess malajr ġie segwit bis-sottomissjoni tat-Tsakones fuq l-Għolja ta’ Parnon, tat-tribù Slavika tal-Melingoi tal-Għolja ta’ Taygetos, u tal-abitanti tal-peniżola ta’ Mani, u b’hekk kabbar is-setgħa tiegħu fuq il-Laconia bil-ħakma tal-peniżola kollha, li kienet bdiet fl-1205, wara r-Raba’ Kruċjata. Laconia ġiet inkorporata fil-Prinċipat, u l-prinċep żagħżugħ qatta’ x-xitwa tal-1248-1249 hemmhekk, iżur il-pajjiż u jagħżel is-siti għal fortifikazzjonijiet ġodda bħall-Grand Magne u Leuktron. Finalment, ħdejn ir-residenza tiegħu ta’ Lacedaemon (Sparta tal-qedem), fil-quċċata tal-Għolja ta’ Taygetos, huwa bejna l-fortizza li saret magħrufa bħala Mystras.
 F’Settembru 1259, William ta’ Villehardouin tilef il-Battalja ta’ Pelagonia u ġie maqbud flimkien ma’ ħafna min-nies nobbli tiegħu, mill-forzi tal-imperatur ta’ Niċea Mikiel VIII Palaiologos. Sentejn wara, in-Niċej reġgħu ħatfu lil Kostantinopli, temmew l-Imperu Latin u reġgħu wittew it-triq għall-Imperu Biżantin. F’dak il-punt, l-imperatur ikkonkluda ftehim mal-prinċep maqbud: William u niesu setgħu jinħelsu jekk jagħmel ġurament ta’ fedeltà u jċedi lil Monemvasia, lil Grand Magne, u lil Mystras. Hekk sar u t-territorji ġew ittrasferiti fl-1262, u b’hekk Mystras saret is-sede tal-gvernatur tat-territorji Biżantini fil-Morea. Inizjalment, dan il-gvernatur (kephale) kien jinbidel kull sena, iżda wara l-1308 bdew jinħatru għal mandati itwal. Kważi mill-ewwel, malli reġa’ lura fil-Morea, William ta’ Villehardouin irrinunzja l-ġurament tiegħu lill-imperatur, u faqqgħet gwerra bejn il-Biżantini u l-Franki. L-ewwel tentattivi Biżantini biex idgħajfu l-Prinċipat ta’ Achaea fallew fil-battalji ta’ Prinitsa u ta’ Makryplagi, iżda l-Biżantini kienu stabbiliti sew fil-Laconia. Il-gwerra saret endemika, u l-Biżantini bil-mod il-mod ħelsu mill-Franki. In-nuqqas ta’ sigurtà minħabba l-attakki u l-kontroattakki ħesrem wasslet biex l-abitanti ta’ Lacedaemon jabbandunaw mill-belt esposta tagħhom u jinsedjaw lil Mystras, f’raħal ġdid li nbena taħt il-fortizza.
 Mill-1348 sa meta l-Ottomani arrendew fil-31 ta’ Mejju 1460, ir-raħal ta’ Mystras kien ir-residenza ta’ Despota li kien il-mexxej tal-Morea Biżantina, magħrufa bħala d-“Despotat tal-Morea”. Din kienet epoka tad-deheb għar-raħal; skont l-Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ir-raħal ta’ Mystras “għadda minn rinaxximent kulturali notevoli, inkluż it-tagħlim ta’ Georgius Gemistus Pleton [..], u attira għadd ta’ artisti u arkitetti tal-ogħla kwalità”.
 L-affreski fil-Knisja u Monasteru ta’ Peribleptos, li jmorru lura għal bejn l-1348 u l-1380, huma rari ħafna u huma ta’ żmien l-aħħar ċiklu tal-Biżantini; għalhekk, huma kruċjali biex l-istudjużi jkunu jistgħu jifhmu l-arti Biżantina.
 Mystras kien ukoll l-aħħar ċentru ta’ studji tal-Biżantini; il-filosfu Neoplatonist Georgius Gemistus Pleton għex hemmhekk sa mewtu fl-1452. Hu u studjużi oħra bbażati f’Mystras influwenzaw ir-Rinaxximent Taljan, speċjalment wara li akkumpanja lill-imperatur Ġwanni VIII Palaiologos sa Firenze fl-1439.L-aħħar imperatur Biżantin, Kostantinu XI Palaiologos, kien despota f’Mystras qabel ma tela’ fuq it-tron. Demetrius Palaeologus, l-aħħar despota tal-Morea, arrenda u ta r-raħal lill-imperatur Ottoman Mehmed II fl-1460. Bħala Mezistre, ir-raħal kien is-sede ta’ sanjak Tork. Il-Venezjani okkupaw ir-raħal mill-1687 sal-1715, għalkemm l-Ottomani kellhom il-kontroll tar-raħal sal-1821 u sal-bidu tal-Gwerra Griega għall-Indipendenza. Ir-raħal ġie abbandunat taħt ir-Re Otto u minflok ġie popolat ir-raħal il-ġdid ta’ Sparti.
 Sit ta’ Wirt Dinji
 Fl-1989, il-fdalijiet, inkluż il-fortizza, il-palazz, il-knejjes u l-monasteri, tas-sit arkeoloġiku ta’ Mystras, ġew iddeżinjati bħala Sit ta’ Wirt Dinji tal-UNESCO.
 Il-valur universali straordinarju tas-sit ġie rrikonoxxut abbażi ta’ tliet kriterji tal-għażla tal-UNESCO: il-kriterju (ii) “Wirja ta’ skambju importanti ta’ valuri umani, tul perjodu ta’ żmien jew fi ħdan żona kulturali fid-dinja, dwar l-iżviluppi fl-arkitettura jew it-teknoloġija, l-arti monumentali, l-ippjanar tal-bliet jew id-disinn tal-pajsaġġ”; il-kriterju (iii) “Xhieda unika jew minn tal-inqas eċċezzjonali ta’ tradizzjoni kulturali jew ta’ ċivilizzazzjoni li għadha ħajja jew li għebet”; u l-kriterju (iv) “Eżempju straordinarju ta’ tip ta’ bini, ta’ grupp ta’ siti jew ta’ pajsaġġ arkitettoniku jew teknoloġiku li joħroġ fid-dieher stadju/i sinifikanti fl-istorja tal-bniedem”.
 Ġeografija
 Ir-raħal antik ta’ Mystras jinsab fuq l-Għolja ta’ Taygetos. Is-sit arkeoloġiku jinsab ferm iktar fil-għoli mill-villaġġ modern ta’ Mystras u mill-belt ta’ Sparti. Il-ħdura tal-madwar hija magħmula l-iktar minn siġar taż-żnuber u ċipressi. Fir-reġjun hemm ukoll xi xmajjar u lagi żgħar.
 Sottodiviżjonijiet
 L-unità muniċipali ta’ Mystras hija sottodiviża fil-komunitajiet li ġejjin:
 Agia Eirini
 Agios Ioannis Lakedaimonas
 Anavryti
 Barsinikos
 Longastra
 Magoula
 Mystras
 Paroreio
 Soustianoi
 Trypi
 Is-sede tal-muniċipalità ta’ Mystras tinsab f’Magoula.
 Popolazzjoni storika
 Nies notevoli
 Nies li twieldu f’Mystras
 Georgius Gemistus Pleton (magħruf l-iktar bħala Pleton) (1355-1452), filosfu u studjuż
 Manuel Kantakouzenos, l-ewwel despota tal-Morea
 Nies li ndifnu f’Mystras
 Ġwanni VI Kantakouzenos
 Manuel Kantakouzenos
 Georgius Gemistus Pleton
 Theodora Tocco
 Cleofe Malatesta
 Pjanta
 1. Daħla prinċipali;
 2. Metropoli;
 3. Knisja Evanġelista;
 4. Knisja ta’ San Teodoru;
 5. Hodigitria-Afendiko;
 6. Bieb ta’ Monemvasia;
 7. Knisja ta’ San Nikola;
 8. Palazz tad-despota u pjazza;
 9. Bieb ta’ Nauplia;
 10. Daħla ta’ fuq taċ-ċittadella;
 11. Knisja ta’ Hagia Sophia;
 12. Palazz żgħir;
 13. Ċittadella;
 14. Mavroporta;
 15. Pantanassa;
 16. Knisja tat-Tassjarki;
 17. Residenza ta’ Ġwanni Phrangopoulos;
 18. Monasteru ta’ Peribleptos;
 19. Knisja ta’ San Ġorġ;
 20. Dar Krevatas;
 21. Marmara (daħla);
 22. Aï-Yannakis;
 23. Dar Laskaris;
 24. Knisja ta’ San Kristofru;
 25. Fdalijiet;
 26. Knisja ta’ San Kyriaki.
 Referenzi
 Greċja
 Siti ta' Wirt Dinji
 Imperu Biżantin


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 12001C/PRO/04
 Tratado de Nice que altera o Tratado da União Europeia, os Tratados que instituem as Comunidades Europeias e alguns actos relativos a esses Tratados - Protocolos Anexos Ao Tratado Que Institui A Comunidade Europeia - Protocolo relativo ao artigo 67.O do Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia
 Jornal Oficial no 080 de 10/03/2001 p. 0069 - 0069
 Protocolo relativo ao artigo 67.o do Tratado que institui a Comunidade EuropeiaAS ALTAS PARTES CONTRATANTESACORDARAM na disposição seguinte, que vem anexa ao Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia:Artigo únicoA partir de 1 de Maio de 2004, o Conselho delibera por maioria qualificada, sob proposta da Comissão e após consulta ao Parlamento Europeu, para a adopção das medidas a que se refere o artigo 66.o do Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia.


text:
Knivmuslinger (Pharidae) er en familie af muslinger kendetegnet ved deres lange, tynde, knivbladformede skaller.
 Knivmuslingerne bliver størst i saltvand. Der er derfor store knivmuslinger i Nordsøen, mens knivmuslinger i de indre danske farvande, hvor vandet er mindre salt, er mindre.
 Danske arter
 I Danmark findes 5 arter:
 Amerikansk knivmusling (Ensis directus) er indslæbt til Europa med vandet i skibes ballasttanke. Den blev først observeret i Tyske Bugt i 1979, og arten trives nu bl.a. i Vadehavet, hvor den første gang blev observeret på Rømø i 1981.
 Buet knivmusling (Ensis magnus).
 Sværdskedemusling (Ensis ensis) lever på sandbund i Nordsøen, Kattegat og nordlige del af Bælthavet på dybder mellem 5 og 30 meter. Knivmuslingen kan blive op til 15 centimeter lang. De skaller, der bliver skyllet op på stranden, er sjældent længere end 8-9 centimeter, og de tynde skaller går let i stykker i brændingen.
 Barberknivmusling (Ensis siliqua).
 Lille knivmusling (Phaxas pellucidus) er almindelig på blød bund i fjorde som Limfjorden og Isefjorden samt i Bælthavet. Den er 3-4 centimeter lang.
 Kilder/Henvisninger
 Ad. S. Jensen og R. Spärck. Bløddyr II. Saltvandmuslinger. G.E.C. Gads Forlag. Danmarks Fauna. København 1934.
 Naturstyrelsen: Amerikansk knivmusling
 Bondesen, Poul. Danske Havmuslinger, (Natur og Museum, 23. Årg, Nr. 2), Århus 1984.
 Muslinger


text:
 7.7.2012
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 200/13
 Sentenza tal-Qorti Ġenerali tal-24 ta’ Mejju 2012 — JBF RAK vs Il-Kunsill
 (Kawża T-555/10) (1)
 (Sussidji - Importazzjonijiet ta’ ċerti tipi ta’ polyethylene terephthalate li joriġinaw mill-Iran, mill-Pakistan u mill-Emirati Għarab Magħquda - Dazju kumpensatorju definittiv u ġbir definittiv tad-dazju provviżorju - Artikolu 11(8), Artikolu 15(1) u Artikolu 30(5) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 597/2009 - Prinċipju ta’ amministrazzjoni tajba)
 2012/C 200/26
 Lingwa tal-kawża: l-Ingliż
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: JBF RAK LLC (Ras Al Khaimah, Emirati Għarab Magħquda) (rappreżentant: B. Servais, avukat)
 Konvenut: Il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea (rappreżentanti: B. Driessen, aġent, assistit minn G. Berrisch, avukat, u minn N. Chesaites, barrister)
 Intervenjenti insostenn tal-konvenut: Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea (rappreżentanti: H. van Vliet, M. França u G. Luengo, aġenti)
 Suġġett
 Talba għall-annullament tar-Regolament ta’ implimentazzjoni tal-Kunsill (UE) Nru 857/2010, tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2010, li jimponi dazju kumpensatorju definittiv u jiġbor b’mod definittiv id-dazju provviżorju impost fuq l-importazzjonijiet ta’ ċertu polyethylene terephthalate li joriġina mill-Iran, il-Pakistan u l-Emirati Għarab Magħquda (ĠU L 254, p. 10).
 Dispożittiv
 (1)
 Ir-rikors huwa miċħud
 (2)
 JBF RAK LLC għandha tbati l-ispejjeż tagħha kif ukoll dawk sostnuti mill-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 (3)
 Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea għandha tbati l-ispejjeż tagħha.
 (1) ĠU C 30, 29.01.2011.