text:
 15.12.2014
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 448/15
 Cerere de decizie preliminară introdusă de Högsta domstolen (Suedia) la 20 octombrie 2014 – Canadian Oil Company Sweden AB, Anders Rantén/Riksåklagaren
 (Cauza C-472/14)
 (2014/C 448/19)
 Limba de procedură: suedeza
 Instanța de trimitere
 Högsta domstolen
 Părțile din procedura principală
 Reclamanți: Canadian Oil Company Sweden AB, Anders Rantén
 Pârât: Riksåklagaren
 Întrebările preliminare
 1)
 Este contrar dispoziţiilor Regulamentului REACH (1) faptul că, în temeiul legislației suedeze, persoana care, în cursul desfășurării unei activităţi comerciale, importă în Suedia un produs chimic în privinţa căruia există o obligaţie de înregistrare în temeiul acestui regulament are și obligaţia de notificare către Kemikalieinspektionen în scopul înregistrării în registrul produselor suedez?
 2)
 În cazul în care răspunsul la prima întrebare este negativ, obligaţia de notificare prevăzută de legislația suedeză este contrară articolului 34 TFUE, având în vedere excepţiile prevăzute la articolul 36 TFUE?
 (1) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1907/2006 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 18 decembrie 2006 privind înregistrarea, evaluarea, autorizarea și restricţionarea substanţelor chimice (REACH), de înfiinţare a Agenţiei Europene pentru Produse Chimice, de modificare a Directivei 1999/45/CE și de abrogare a Regulamentului (CEE) nr. 793/93 al Consiliului și a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1488/94 al Comisiei, precum și a Directivei 76/769/CEE a Consiliului și a Directivelor 91/155/CEE, 93/67/CEE, 93/105/CE și 2000/21/CE ale Comisiei (JO L 396, p. 1, Ediție specială, 13/vol. 60, p. 3, rectificare în JO 2009, L 36, p. 84).


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 27.9.2011
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 L 250/107
 BESCHLUSS DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS
 vom 10. Mai 2011
 betreffend die Entlastung zur Ausführung des Gesamthaushaltsplans der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009, Einzelplan IX — Europäischer Datenschutzbeauftragter
 (2011/563/EU)
 DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT,
 —
 unter Hinweis auf den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 (1),
 —
 in Kenntnis der endgültigen Jahresrechnung der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 (SEK(2010) 963 — C7-0219/2010) (2),
 —
 in Kenntnis des Jahresberichts des Europäischen Datenschutzbeauftragten an die Entlastungsbehörde über die internen Prüfungen im Jahr 2009,
 —
 in Kenntnis des Jahresberichts des Rechnungshofs über die Ausführung des Haushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 zusammen mit den Antworten der Organe (3),
 —
 in Kenntnis der vom Rechnungshof gemäß Artikel 287 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union vorgelegten Erklärung über die Zuverlässigkeit der Rechnungsführung sowie die Rechtmäßigkeit und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge (4),
 —
 gestützt auf Artikel 272 Absatz 10 und die Artikel 274, 275 und 276 des EG-Vertrags sowie Artikel 314 Absatz 10 und die Artikel 317, 318 und 319 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union,
 —
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 des Rates vom 25. Juni 2002 über die Haushaltsordnung für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (5), insbesondere auf die Artikel 50, 86, 145, 146 und 147,
 —
 gestützt auf Artikel 77 und Anlage VI seiner Geschäftsordnung,
 —
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Haushaltskontrollausschusses (A7-0117/2011),
 1.
 erteilt dem Europäischen Datenschutzbeauftragten Entlastung zur Ausführung seines Haushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2009;
 2.
 legt seine Bemerkungen in der nachstehenden Entschließung nieder;
 3.
 beauftragt seinen Präsidenten, diesen Beschluss sowie die als integraler Bestandteil dazugehörige Entschließung dem Rat, der Kommission, dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union, dem Rechnungshof, dem Europäischen Bürgerbeauftragten und dem Europäischen Datenschutzbeauftragten zu übermitteln und die Veröffentlichung im Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union (Reihe L) zu veranlassen.
 Der Präsident
 Jerzy BUZEK
 Der Generalsekretär
 Klaus WELLE
 (1) ABl. L 69 vom 13.3.2009.
 (2) ABl. C 308 vom 12.11.2010, S. 1.
 (3) ABl. C 303 vom 9.11.2010, S. 1.
 (4) ABl. C 308 vom 12.11.2010, S. 129.
 (5) ABl. L 248 vom 16.9.2002, S. 1.
 ENTSCHLIEßUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS
 vom 10. Mai 2011
 mit den Bemerkungen, die integraler Bestandteil seines Beschlusses betreffend die Entlastung zur Ausführung des Gesamthaushaltsplans der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009, Einzelplan IX — Europäischer Datenschutzbeauftragter, sind
 DAS EUROPÄISCHE PARLAMENT,
 —
 unter Hinweis auf den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 (1),
 —
 in Kenntnis der endgültigen Jahresrechnung der Europäischen Union für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 (SEK(2010) 963 — C7-0219/2010) (2),
 —
 in Kenntnis des Jahresberichts des Europäischen Datenschutzbeauftragten an die Entlastungsbehörde über die internen Prüfungen im Jahr 2009,
 —
 in Kenntnis des Jahresberichts des Rechnungshofs über die Ausführung des Haushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 zusammen mit den Antworten der Organe (3),
 —
 in Kenntnis der vom Rechnungshof gemäß Artikel 287 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union vorgelegten Erklärung über die Zuverlässigkeit der Rechnungsführung sowie die Rechtmäßigkeit und Ordnungsmäßigkeit der zugrunde liegenden Vorgänge (4),
 —
 gestützt auf Artikel 272 Absatz 10 und die Artikel 274, 275 und 276 des EG-Vertrags sowie Artikel 314 Absatz 10 und die Artikel 317, 318 und 319 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union,
 —
 gestützt auf die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 des Rates vom 25. Juni 2002 über die Haushaltsordnung für den Gesamthaushaltsplan der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (5), insbesondere auf die Artikel 50, 86, 145, 146 und 147,
 —
 gestützt auf Artikel 77 und Anlage VI seiner Geschäftsordnung,
 —
 in Kenntnis des Berichts des Haushaltskontrollausschusses (A7-0117/2011),
 1.
 stellt fest, dass der Europäische Datenschutzbeauftragte (EDSB) im Jahr 2009 Verpflichtungsermächtigungen von insgesamt 7 000 000 EUR (2008: 5 300 000 EUR (6)) zur Verfügung hatte und die Verwendungsrate 81,44 % betrug und damit unter dem Durchschnitt der anderen Organe (97,69 %) lag;
 2.
 stellt fest, dass der Rechnungshof im Zuge der Vorbereitung des Jahresberichts für das Haushaltsjahr 2009 eine eingehende Bewertung der Überwachungs- und Kontrollsysteme beim Gerichtshof, beim Europäischen Bürgerbeauftragten und beim EDSB durchgeführt hat, in deren Rahmen eine zusätzliche Stichprobe von Zahlungsvorgängen in Verbindung mit Personal- und sonstigen Verwaltungsausgaben untersucht wurde;
 3.
 stellt fest, dass die Prüfung des Rechnungshofs ergeben hat, dass in vier von zehn Fällen die dem EDSB vorliegenden Angaben nicht aktuell genug waren, um sicherzustellen, dass die im Statut der Beamten der Europäischen Union (7) vorgesehenen Zulagen den Bediensteten in Übereinstimmung mit den einschlägigen gemeinschaftlichen Rechtsvorschriften und nationalen Gesetzen gezahlt werden, wobei dadurch nach Ansicht des Rechnungshofs das Risiko entstehen könnte, dass Zahlungen nicht in korrekter Höhe oder rechtsgrundlos geleistet werden;
 4.
 unterstützt den Vorschlag des Rechnungshofs, dass die Bediensteten des EDSB dazu aufgefordert werden sollten, in angemessenen zeitlichen Abständen Dokumente zum Nachweis ihrer persönlichen Situation vorzulegen, und dass der EDSB sein System zur zeitnahen Überwachung und Überprüfung dieser Unterlagen verbessern sollte;
 5.
 nimmt Kenntnis von der Antwort des EDSB, dass der EDSB aufgrund der geringen Größe seiner Behörde bei der Bearbeitung der die Sozialzulagen betreffenden Vorgänge vom Amt für die Feststellung und Abwicklung individueller Ansprüche (PMO) unterstützt wird, dass das PMO die Informationen zu den Familien- und Kinderzulagen auf der Grundlage spezieller Formulare, die den betroffenen Mitarbeitern über den EDSB zugeschickt werden, einmal jährlich aktualisiert und dass die Sozialzulagen auf der Grundlage der mithilfe dieser Formulare eingeholten Informationen regelmäßig aktualisiert werden; begrüßt die Absicht des EDSB, ausgehend von der Empfehlung des Rechnungshofs die Überwachung der Informationen zu den Sozialzulagen zu verbessern, und fordert den EDSB auf, in seinem jährlichen Tätigkeitsbericht über die getroffenen Maßnahmen Bericht zu erstatten;
 6.
 nimmt Kenntnis von den Feststellungen des Rechnungshofs, dass der EDSB entgegen den Bestimmungen der Haushaltsordnung kein System für eine Ex-post-Überprüfung in den dafür in Betracht kommenden Fällen eingerichtet hatte und dass die vom EDSB erlassenen Normen für die interne Kontrolle keine Vorschrift enthielten, wonach Ausnahmen von den Standardfinanzverfahren ordnungsgemäß in einem zentralen Register zu verzeichnen sind;
 7.
 nimmt Kenntnis von der Antwort des EDSB, dass die vom EDSB vorgenommenen Transaktionen, einschließlich der Erstattung der von anderen Einrichtungen im Namen des EDSB abgewickelten Direktzahlungen, bereits Gegenstand einer Ex-ante-Kontrolle sind; begrüßt die Absicht des EDSB, in Anbetracht der Empfehlung des Rechnungshofs die Einführung eines Ex-post-Überprüfungsverfahrens ab dem Jahr 2011 zu prüfen, und fordert den EDSB auf, in seinem jährlichen Tätigkeitsbericht über die getroffenen Maßnahmen Bericht zu erstatten;
 8.
 akzeptiert und versteht den Standpunkt des EDSB, was die geringe Größe seiner Behörde und die Besonderheiten der gemeinsamen Bearbeitung von Vorgängen im Rahmen der verschiedenen Kooperations- und Dienstleistungsvereinbarungen betrifft; fordert den EDSB jedoch auf zu präzisieren, welche weitere interinstitutionelle Unterstützung er benötigen würde, um der Empfehlung des Rechnungshofs Folge leisten zu können, und anzugeben, bis wann dies erreicht werden könnte; begrüßt den Beschluss des EDSB, der Bemerkung des Rechnungshofs über die Normen für die interne Kontrolle nachzukommen, indem er ein zentrales Verzeichnis der registrierten Ausnahmen anlegt, und fordert den EDSB auf, in seinem jährlichen Tätigkeitsbericht über die erzielten Fortschritte Bericht zu erstatten;
 9.
 stellt fest, dass der Rechnungshof in seinem Jahresbericht darauf hingewiesen hat, dass die Prüfung in Bezug auf den EDSB zu keinen weiteren wesentlichen Bemerkungen Anlass gab;
 10.
 weist darauf hin, dass der EDSB aufgrund der geringen Größe seiner Behörde in administrativer Hinsicht mit einer Reihe von anderen Organen zusammenarbeitet, insbesondere mit den Dienststellen der Kommission (ADMIN, BUDG, EAC, IAS), dem Amt für Veröffentlichungen, den Dienststellen des Parlaments (Gebäude und Infrastruktur, Sicherheit, IT, Druckerei, Kommunikation usw.) und dem Übersetzungsdienst des Rates; spricht dem EDSB seine Anerkennung für die erfolgreiche Konsolidierung der Verwaltungszusammenarbeit aus;
 11.
 erinnert daran, dass die administrative Abwicklung aller Dienstreisen des EDSB auf der Grundlage der Vereinbarung über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit, die die Generalsekretäre der Kommission, des Parlaments und des Rates zusammen mit dem EDSB am 7. Dezember 2006 für weitere drei Jahre mit Wirkung vom 16. Januar 2007 unterzeichnet haben, vom Amt für die Feststellung und Abwicklung individueller Ansprüche der Kommission vorgenommen wird und dass der Bewertung zufolge (die de facto durch den Internen Prüfer der Kommission erfolgte, der auf der Grundlage der Vereinbarung über die Verwaltungszusammenarbeit als Interner Kontrolldienst des EDSB fungiert) die Funktionalität und Effizienz des internen Kontrollsystems angemessen ist und dieses hinreichende Gewähr für die Erreichung der Ziele des EDSB bietet;
 12.
 begrüßt, dass jedes Jahr eine Erklärung der finanziellen Interessen der gewählten Mitglieder der Einrichtung (des EDSB und des stellvertretenden EDSB) veröffentlicht wird, die relevante Informationen über bezahlte Stellen oder Tätigkeiten und erklärungspflichtige Berufstätigkeiten enthält;
 13.
 fordert den EDSB auf, in seinen nächsten jährlichen Tätigkeitsbericht (Haushaltsjahr 2010) ein Kapitel aufzunehmen, in dem er die im Laufe des Jahres im Anschluss an die Entlastungsbeschlüsse des Parlaments getroffenen Folgemaßnahmen darlegt.
 (1) ABl. L 69 vom 13.3.2009.
 (2) ABl. C 308 vom 12.11.2010, S. 1.
 (3) ABl. C 303 vom 9.11.2010, S. 1.
 (4) ABl. C 308 vom 12.11.2010, S. 129.
 (5) ABl. L 248 vom 16.9.2002, S. 1.
 (6) 2006: 4 100 000 EUR.
 (7) ABl. L 56 vom 4.3.1968, S. 1.


type: contracts

text:
 GA
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 C 202/283
 PRÓTACAL (Uimh. 14)
 MAIDIR LEIS AN nGRÚPA EURO
 TÁ NA hARDPHÁIRTITHE CONARTHACHA,
 ÓS MIAN LEO dálaí a chur chun cinn d'fhás eacnamaíoch níos láidre san Aontas Eorpach agus, chuige sin, comhordú níos buandlúithe na mbeartas eacnamaíoch sa limistéar euro a fhorbairt,
 ÓS FEASACH DÓIBH an gá atá ann forálacha speisialta a leagan síos d'agallamh feabhsaithe idir na Ballstáit a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu, go dtí go dtiocfaidh an euro chun bheith ina airgeadra do Bhallstáit uile an Aontais,
 TAR ÉIS COMHAONTÚ ar na forálacha seo a leanas, a chuirfear i gceangal leis an gConradh ar an Aontas Eorpach agus leis an gConradh ar Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh:
 Airteagal 1
 Tiocfaidh Airí na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu le chéile go neamhfhoirmiúil. Beidh na cruinnithe sin ann, nuair is gá, chun ceisteanna a phlé a bhaineann leis na freagrachtaí sonracha atá á roinnt acu maidir leis an airgeadra aonair. Glacfaidh an Coimisiún páirt sna cruinnithe sin. Tabharfar cuireadh don Bhanc Ceannais Eorpach páirt a ghlacadh sna cruinnithe sin a ullmhóidh ionadaithe Airí sin na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu atá freagrach as cúrsaí airgeadais agus ionadaí an Choimisiúin.
 Airteagal 2
 Toghfaidh Airí na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu uachtarán go ceann dhá bhliain go leith, trí thromlach na mBallstát sin.


text:
 1.12.2011
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 318/31
 РЕШЕНИЕ НА СЪВМЕСТНИЯ КОМИТЕТ НА ЕИП
 No 94/2011
 от 30 септември 2011 година
 за изменение на приложение I (Ветеринарни и фитосанитарни въпроси) към Споразумението за ЕИП
 СЪВМЕСТНИЯТ КОМИТЕТ НА ЕИП,
 като взе предвид Споразумението за Европейското икономическо пространство, изменено с Протокола за адаптиране на Споразумението за Европейското икономическо пространство, наричано по-нататък „Споразумението“, и по-специално член 98 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 Приложение I към Споразумението беше изменено с Решение на Съвместния комитет на ЕИП No 63/2011 от 1 юли 2011 г. (1).
 (2)
 Решение 2011/7/ЕС на Комисията от 7 януари 2011 г. за изменение на приложение XI към Директива 2003/85/ЕО на Съвета по отношение на списъка с лаборатории, оправомощени да работят с жив вирус на шап (2) следва да бъде включено в Споразумението.
 (3)
 Настоящото решение се отнася до законодателството относно живи животни, различни от риби и аквакултури. Законодателството във връзка с тези въпроси не се прилага за Исландия, съгласно посоченото в параграф 2 от уводната част на глава I от приложение I към Споразумението. Следователно настоящото решение не се прилага по отношение на Исландия.
 (4)
 Настоящото решение се отнася до законодателството относно ветеринарните въпроси. Законодателството във връзка с ветеринарните въпроси не се прилага за Лихтенщайн, докато приложението на споразумението между Европейската общност и Конфедерация Швейцария за търговия със селскостопански продукти не включи и Лихтенщайн, както е посочено в секторните адаптации към приложение I. Следователно настоящото решение не се прилага Лихтенщайн,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩОТО РЕШЕНИЕ:
 Член 1
 В приложение I, глава I, част 3.1 на Споразумението към точка 1a (Директива 2003/85/ЕО на Съвета) се добавя следното тире:
 „—
 32011 D 0007: Решение 2011/7/ЕС на Комисията от 7 януари 2011 г. (ОВ L 5, 8.1.2011 г., стр. 27).“
 Член 2
 Текстовете на Решение 2011/7/ЕС на норвежки език, които ще бъдат публикувани в притурката за ЕИП към Официален вестник на Европейския съюз, са автентични.
 Член 3
 Настоящото решение влиза в сила на 1 октомври 2011 г., при условие че всички нотификации, предвидени в член 103, параграф 1 от Споразумението, са внесени в Съвместния комитет на ЕИП (3).
 Член 4
 Настоящото решение се публикува в раздела за ЕИП и в притурката за ЕИП към Официален вестник на Европейския съюз.
 Съставено в Брюксел на 30 септември 2011 година.
 За Съвместния комитет на ЕИП
 Председател
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) ОВ L 262, 6.10.2011 г., стр.16.
 (2) ОВ L 5, 8.01.2011 г., стр. 27.
 (3) Без отбелязани конституционни изисквания.


type: wikipedia

text:
Chalkedonský koncil (8. října – 1. listopadu 451) byl čtvrtý ekumenický koncil, který zasedal v Chalkedonu v Bithýnii v Malé Asii. Jako závazný jej pro svou nauku považují katolická církev a pravoslaví. Koncil odsoudil Eutychův monofyzitismus a vyhlásil Chalkedonské vyznání víry, které vyznává plné lidství a plné božství Ježíše Krista, druhé osoby Nejsvětější Trojice. Koncil odmítají orientální církve.
 Dějinné pozadí
 Pozůstatky nestorianismu
 I poté, co Efezský koncil odsoudil nestoriánství, přetrvával konflikt mezi patriarchy Janem z Antiochie a Cyrilem z Alexandrie. Cyril tvrdil, že Jan zůstal nestoriánem, a Jan obviňoval Cyrila, že se stal přívržencem apollinarismu. Oba se snažili dojít ke smíru za prostřednictví berojského biskupa Acacia při jednání 12. dubna 433. Následujícího roku přistoupil k jejich formulaci i Theodorétos z Kyrrhu.
 V této době však byla přeložena do syrštiny díla dvou dávno zemřelých antiošských teologů, Diodora z Tarsu a Theodora z Mopsuestie, a jejich spisy napomohly novému rozkvětu hereze mezi Armény. Oba teologové byli intervencí konstantinopolského patriarchy Prokla odsouzeni na celém křesťanském Východě.
 Eutychovská kontroverze
 Asi dva roky po Cyrilově smrti roku 444 začal konstantinopolský mnich Eutychés učit mírně pozměněné christologické učení, aby zabránil novému šíření nestoriánství (jak zmiňuje ve svém listu papeži Lvu I. roku 448). Tvrdil o sobě, že je věrným žákem Cyrilovým, které prohlásilo za ortodoxní setkání roku 433.
 Cyril pak učil, že „existuje pouze jedna φύσις fýsis, totiž vtělení Boha-Slova“. Cyril chápal řecký pojem φύσις zřejmě ve smyslu odpovídajícím latinskému pojmu persona (osoba), zatímco řečtí filozofové by jej překládali do latiny slovem natura (přirozenost). Mnozí tak rozuměli Eutychovu učení v tom smyslu, že se pokouší o renesanci ariánství – Areios odmítal božství – božskou přirozenost – Ježíše, zatímco Eutychés odmítal jeho lidství, tj. lidskou přirozenost.
 Papež Lev I. se vyslovil v tom smyslu, že Eutychův omyl pramení spíše z nedostatku jeho nadání než ze zlé vůle. Jeho strana se v celém sporu snažila nezapojit se do sporu s protivníky, který neumožňoval, aby se ujasnilo, v čem došlo k nedorozumění. Eutychovo učení se rychle šířilo po celém křesťanském Východě.
 V listopadu 447 byl na místní synodě v Konstantinopoli Eutychés označen za heretika dorylajským biskupem Eusebiem, který žádal, aby byl sesazen ze svého úřadu. Flavianos z Konstantinopole však nehodlal otázku vzhledem k výborné Eutychově reputaci rozřešit, avšak nakonec byl Eutychés sesazen a označen za heretika. Císař Theodosius II. a alexandrijský biskup Dioskúros nepřijali rozhodnutí synody. Dioskúros uspořádal vlastní synodu, která vrátila Eutycha do jeho úřadu a císař svolal koncil do Efezu na rok 449 a pozval též papeže Lva I., který měl být zastoupen svými legáty.
 Latrocinium v Efezu
 Flavianos mezitím dospěl k názoru, že Eutychés zastává mylné učení, a zpravil o tom též papeže Lva I. Papež proto napsal koncilu list, v němž žádal přijetí svého stanoviska, avšak odsouzení Eutycha přenechal samotnému koncilu.
 Koncil svolaný Theodosiem II. se sešel 8. srpna 449 v počtu 130 biskupů a za předsednictví Dioskúra. Dioskúros zabránil papežským legátům, aby přečetli papežův list a císař zabránil, aby hlasoval kdokoli, kdo hlasoval o dva roky dříve pro Eutychovo sesazení. V důsledku toho se koncil rozhodl podpořit Eutycha a patriarchu Flaviana sesadil a odsoudil k exilu, krátce nato Flavianos zemřel. Papežským legátům se podařilo s papežovým listem Flavianovi uniknout. Při druhém zasedání koncilu, tentokrát již bez zastoupení legátů, bylo sesazeno několik dalších biskupů, včetně Iby z Edessy, Ireneje z Tyru (blízkého přítele Nestoriova), Domna z Antiochie a Theodoréta z Kyrrhu.
 Rozhodnutí tohoto koncilu vyhrotilo vztahy mezi Východem a Západem, takže hrozilo schizma; vždyť koncil se vyslovil přímo proti papežově prohlášení. Papež sám pak tento koncil nazval „synodou zlodějů“ – latrocinium – a odmítl přijmout její závěry.
 Průběh koncilu
 Situace se nadále zhoršovala: papež požadoval svolání nového koncilu a císař odmítl ustoupit, byť o píď. Avšak ke zvratu došlo úmrtím Theodosia II. a nástupem Marciana na císařský trůn, neboť Marcianus obhajoval nauku Flaviana a Lva.
 Císař souhlasil se svoláním nového koncilu, ale nikoli do Itálie, nýbrž opět na Východ. Papež však byl pozván, aby koncilu předsedal. Vyhoštění biskupové se mohli navrátit do svých diecézí a Flavianovo tělo bylo přeneseno do hlavního města a pohřbeno se všemi poctami.
 Koncil se původně měl sejít v Nikaji, avšak byl přesunut na poslední chvíli do Chalkedonu, kde začal 8. října 451. Papežský legát Paschanius byl vyslán, aby koncilu předsedal. Lev I. koncilu poslal dopis, který odsuzuje latrocinium a popisuje správnou nauku o Vtělení, kterou lze nalézt již v předchozím listu Flavianovi. Jednalo se o nejhojněji zastoupený koncil ve starověku, účastnilo se jej zhruba 600 biskupů. Paschanius odmítl hlasovací právo Dioskúrovi, který na předešlém koncilu exkomunikoval papeže.
 Marcianus si přál, aby koncil proběhl rychle a proto jej požádal, aby se vyslovil v otázce Vtělení dříve, než pokročí se samotným soudem. Koncilní Otcové však považovali za nezbytné shodnout se na novém znění vyznání víry a zároveň poukazovali na skutečnost, že jejich názor na dotyčnou nauku obsahuje již Lvův List Flavianovi (zvaný též Tomus). Po přečtení tohoto listu sami účastníci koncilu vzkřikli památné: „Ústy Lva promluvil Petr. To je ono, co věříme. Toto je víra apoštolů. Lev a Cyril učí tutéž věc.“
 Koncil pokračoval soudem nad Dioskúrem, ten však odmítl před koncil předstoupit. Jednohlasně byl odsouzen a jeho dekrety byly anulovány. Marcianus poslal tedy Dioskúra do exilu. Biskupové byli požádáni, aby podepsali svůj souhlas s naukou obsaženou v Tomu, ale skupina třinácti Egypťanů odmítla. Císař proto rozhodl, že má být sestaveno nové krédo a jeho text předložen koncilním Otcům. Nedošlo ke konsenzu a navrhovaný text se ani nedochoval.
 Paschanius hrozil, že se vrátí do Říma a svolá koncil tam. Marcianus jej podpořil s tím, že pokud se biskupové nedohodnou na dodatku ke krédu, bude nutné koncil přemístit. Tento dodatek byl posléze schválen, hovoří se v něm o spojení dvou přirozeností v jediné osobě Krista.
 Více viz Chalkedonské vyznání.
 Závěrečná ustanovení koncilu tvoří 28 kánonů. Biskupům byla svěřena pravomoc nad jejich diecézemi a směli zakládat a rušit vzniklé kláštery. Dále získali možnost svěřit svému zástupci (vikáři) starost o časné záležitosti a svolávat dvakrát ročně diecézní synodu. Kléru koncil zakázal přecházet libovolně z diecéze do diecéze a sloužit v armádě. Konstantinopol coby biskupské sídlo bylo deklarováno jako druhé co do významu hned po Římě. Proti tomuto poslednímu kánonu protestovali posléze papežští legáti, kteří jej odmítli podepsat.
 Důsledky koncilu
 Bezprostředním důsledkem koncilu bylo nové schisma. Biskupové, kterým nebyl jazyk papežova Tomu blízký, koncil odmítli a tvrdili, že nauka o dvou φύσεις, čili přirozenostech, je shodná s nestoriánstvím. Zde mají svůj počátek tzv. orientální církve, které až dodnes odmítají usnesení koncilu.
 V nedávných letech zintenzivnil dialog zvláště mezi katolickou církví a orientálními církvemi. Ve vzájemných diskusích se poukazuje především na skutečnost, že historický rozdíl v nauce je spíše terminologickým nedorozuměním než skutečnou roztržkou a několik orientálních církví tak znovu navázalo společenství buď s katolickými nebo pravoslavnými církvemi.
 Odkazy
 Související články
 Chalkedonské vyznání
 Monofyzitismus
 Seznam koncilů a synod
 Dyofyzitismus
 Externí odkazy
 Evagrius Scholasticus: Církevní dějiny
 Koncily
 451


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 Avis juridique important
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 21999D0513(03)
 Afgørelse truffet af Det Blandede EØS-udvalg nr. 67/98 af 4. juli 1998 om ændring af bilag VI (social sikring) til EØS-aftalen
 EF-Tidende nr. L 123 af 13/05/1999 s. 0062 - 0063
 AFGØRELSE TRUFFET AF DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALGNr. 67/98af 4. juli 1998om ændring af bilag VI (social sikring) til EØS-aftalenDET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG HAR -under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde som tilpasset ved protokollen om tilpasning af denne aftale, i det følgende benævnt "aftalen", særlig artikel 98, ogud fra følgende betragtninger:Bilag VI til aftalen blev ændret ved afgørelse nr. 24/98 truffet af Det Blandede EØS-Udvalg den 27. marts 1998(1);Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1290/97 af 27. juni 1997 om ændring af forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71 om anvendelse af de sociale sikringsordninger på arbejdstagere, selvstændige erhvervsdrivende og deres familiemedlemmer, der flytter inden for Fællesskabet, og forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72 om regler til gennemførelse af forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71(2) bør indarbejdes i aftalen;flere tilpasninger til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72 bør ajourføres -TRUFFET FØLGENDE AFGØRELSE:Artikel 1Under punkt 1 (Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71) i bilag VI til aftalen indsættes følgende før tilpasningerne: "og senere ændret ved:- 397 R 1290: Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1290/97 af 27. juni 1997 (EFT L 176 af 4.7.1997, s. 1)."Artikel 2Punkt 2 (Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 574/72) i bilag VI til aftalen ændres således:1) Følgende indsættes før tilpasningerne: "og senere ændret ved:- 397 R 1290: Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1290/97 af 27. juni 1997 (EFT L 176 af 4.7.1997, s. 1)."2) Teksten til tilpasning g), afsnit "153. NORGE-DET FORENEDE KONGERIGE" affattes således: "Brevveksling af 20. marts 1997 og 3. april 1997 vedrørende forordningens artikel 36, stk. 3 og artikel 63, stk. 3 (refusion eller gensidigt afkald på refusion af udgifter til naturalydelser), og gennemførelsesforordningens artikel 105 (gensidigt afkald på refusion af udgifter til administrativ kontrol og lægeundersøgelser)."3) Teksten til tilpasning m), afsnit "P. ISLAND" affattes således: "1. Med henblik på anvendelsen af forordningens artikel 13, stk. 2, litra d), artikel 14, stk. 1, litra a), artikel 14, stk. 2, litra b), artikel 14a, stk. 1, litra a), artikel 14a, stk. 2, artikel 14a, stk. 4, artikel 14b, stk. 1, artikel 14b, stk. 2, artikel 14b, stk. 4 og artikel 14c, litra a) og gennemførelsesforordningens artikel 11, artikel 11a, artikel 12a, stk. 2, litra a), artikel 12a, stk. 5, litra c) og artikel 12a, stk. 7, litra a):AlÞjóðadeild Tryggingastofnunar ríkisins (Statens Institut for Social Sikring, Den internationale afdeling), Reykjavik.2. Med henblik på anvendelsen af forordningens artikel 17:Heilbrigðis- og tryggingamálaráðuneytið (Ministeriet for Sundhed og Social Sikring), Reykjavik.3. Med henblik på anvendelsen af kapitel 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 og 8 i afsnit III i forordningen og de dertil knyttede bestemmelser i gennemførelsesforordningen:Tryggingastofnun ríkisins (Statens Institut for Social Sikring), Reykjavik.4. Med henblik på anvendelsen af kapitel 6 i afsnit III i forordningen og de dertil knyttede bestemmelser i gennemførelsesforordningen:Atvinnuleysistryggingasjoður, vinnumálaskrifstofan (Arbejdsløshedsforsikringskassen), Reykjavik.5. Med henblik på anvendelsen af kapitel 7 i afsnit III i forordningen og de dertil knyttede bestemmelser i gennemførelsesforordningen:Ríkisskattstjóri (Skattedirektoratet), Reykjavik."Artikel 3Teksterne til forordning (EF) nr. 1290/97 på islandsk og norsk, som er knyttet til de respektive sproglige udgaver af denne afgørelse, er autentiske.Artikel 4Denne afgørelse træder i kraft den 5. juli 1998, forudsat at Det Blandede EØS-udvalg har modtaget alle fornødne meddelelser i henhold til aftalens artikel 103, stk. 1.Artikel 5Denne afgørelse offentliggøres i EØS-afsnittet i og EØS-tillægget til De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende.Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 4. juli 1998.På Det Blandede EØS-udvalgs vegneF. BARBASOFormand(1) EFT L 310 af 19.11.1998, s. 4.(2) EFT L 176 af 4.7.1997, s. 1.


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CSM Bucuresti - Bietigheim | Ponturi Pariuri Handbal Liga Campionilor pentru 18 noiembrie 2018
 CSM Bucuresti - Bietigheim | Ponturi Pariuri Handbal Liga Campionilor
 Expertul Legalbet, Milan, va recomanda partida dintre CSM Bucuresti si Bietigheim , la o cota de 1.75.
 Duminica, de la ora 17:15, CSM Bucuresti primeste vizita celor de la Bietigheim, intr-un meci contand pentru etapa a 6-a din faza grupelor EHF Champions League. In tur, tigroaicele au pierdut in Germania la doua goluri diferenta, 28-30, iar cea mai buna marcatoare a partidei a fost Cristina Neague cu 9 reusite. Se anunta o partida cu multe goluri, iar rezultatul nu mai conteaza deloc.
 Incepand cu anul 2014 domina campionatul intern si daca investitiile vor continua, CSM Bucuresti poate cuceri multe trofee. In aceasta vara au fost aduse mai multe jucatoare cu exprienta, dar chiar si asa, actualul sezon n-a inceput prea bine. Tigroaicele au pierdut Super Cupa Romaniei contra celor de la Ramnicu Valcea. Moralul jucatoarelor n-a fost afectat, dar la scurt timp, Magnus Johansson a fost demis de pe banca tehnica. In locul lui a fost adus Dragan Dukic, cel care trebuie are ca obiectiv castigarea Ligii Campionilor. In Liga Natioanala, CSM Bucuresti se afla pe primul loc cu 27 de puncte, dar are un meci mai mult disputat, fata de ocupanta locului secund, Ramnicu Valcea. In Liga Campionilor situatia este foarte clara. Momentan ocupa locul secund cu 6 puncte si in cazul unei victorii, va urca pe primul loc. Acest lucru nu prea conteaza, deoarece in grupa principala se va califica tot cu 6 puncte. Majoritatea jucatoarelor se gandesc deja la Campionatul European si cel mai probabil in aceasta partida vor evolua si jucatoare care deobicei joaca mai putine minute.
 „Trebuie să fim mai atente în defensivă, pentru că nu o să putem în atac să dăm mereu peste 30 de goluri. Situaţia la club e dificilă acum, încă suferim, e clar că nu suntem la potenţial maxim. Nu ne simţim aşa cum ar trebui pe teren, de aceea e importantă să continuăm să câştigăm şi să jucăm tot mai bine", a spus Cristina Neagu.
 Liga Campionilor: CSM Bucuresti - Kristiansand 26-31
 Liga Nationala: CSM Bucuresti - Magura Cisnadiei 36-19
 Bietigheim: forma de moment, ultimele rezultate, statistici
 In urma cu doua sezoane a castigat campionatul intern si a jucat in finala Cupei EHF. In sezonul precedent s-a clasat doar pe locul secund, iar in Liga Campionilor a ajuns pana in grupele principale, unde a terminat pe locul 5. Actualul sezon l-a inceput destul de vreme, a fost nevoita sa joace in calificari, pentru a ajunge in grupele Ligii Campionilor. In Bundesliga, dupa primele 7 etape ocupa locul secund cu 14 puncte si doar din cauza golaverajului nu se afla pe cea mai inalta treapta a podiumului. Desi s-a intarit in aceasta vara, special pentru a trece de faza grupelor, intr-un final n-a reusit sa indeplineasca acest obiectiv. Dupa 5 etape se afla pe ultimul loc cu 3 puncte si indeferent de rezultatul obinut in aceasta partida, va termina pe locul patru. Etapa precedenta trebuia sa castige cu Kristiansand, dar a pierdut la 8 goluri, scor 26-34.
 Bundesliga: Blomberg-Lippe - Bietigheim 30-32
 Liga Campionilor: Ferencvaros - Bietigheim 33-30
 Bundesliga: Buxtehuder - Bietigheim 24-30
 CSM Bucuresti - Bietigheim: echipe probabile si jucatori indisponibili
 Mădălina Ion, Paula Ungureanu, Jelena Grubišić, Majda Mehmedović, Iulia Curea, Bianca Marin, Jovanka Radičević, Nathalie Hagman, Aneta Udriștioiu, Dragana Cvijić, Oana Manea, Cristina Neagu, Bianca Bazaliu, Sabina Jacobsen, Andrea Lekić, Elizabeth Omoregie, Amanda Kurtović, Barbara Lazović
 Valentyna Salamakha, Dinah Eckerle, Fie Woller, Kim Braun, Daniela Gustin, Angela Malestein, Antje Lauenroth, Luisa Schulze, Ines Ivancok, Kim Naidzinavicius, Maura Visser, Anna Loerper, Karolina Kudłacz-Gloc, Charris Rozemalen, Laura van der Heijden
 CSM Bucuresti - Bietigheim: rezultatele directe (h2h)
 14.10.2018 Bietigheim - CSM Bucuresti 30-28
 Cea mai buna marcatoare: Cristina Neague (9)
 CSM Bucuresti - Bietigheim: cote la pariuri si pronosticuri pariuri
 Conform casei de pariuri Unibet, CSM Bucuresti este favorita in aceasta partida. Acest meci, pentru ambele echipe este fara miza si din aceasta cauza, vor juca si jucatoare care au evoluat mai putin. Diferenta de valoare intre cele doua echipe este enorma si avand in vedere faptul ca CSM Bucuresti a jucat foarte bine in ultimul meci, cred ca va marca peste 30 de goluri.
 CSM Bucuresti peste 30.5 goluri


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 Anunţ juridic important
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 22005D0099
 Jurnalul Oficial L 306 , 24/11/2005 p. 0028 - 0029
 Decizia nr. 99/2005 a Comitetului mixt al SEEdin 8 iulie 2005de modificare a anexei II (Reglementări tehnice, standarde, încercări și certificare) la Acordul SEECOMITETUL MIXT AL SEE,având în vedere Acordul privind Spațiul Economic European, astfel cum a fost modificat prin Protocolul de adaptare a Acordului privind Spațiul Economic European, denumit în continuare "acordul", în special articolul 98,întrucât:(1) Anexa II la acord a fost modificată prin Decizia nr. 60/2005 a Comitetului mixt al SEE din 29 aprilie 2005 [1].(2) Regulamentul (CE) nr. 75/2005 al Comisiei din 18 ianuarie 2005 de modificare a anexelor I, II și III la Regulamentul (CEE) nr. 2377/90 al Consiliului de instituire a unei proceduri comunitare pentru stabilirea limitelor maxime ale reziduurilor de medicamente de uz veterinar în alimentele de origine animală în ceea ce privește moxidectina, acizii liniari alchil benzen sulfonici ale căror lanțuri alchil au o lungime de la C9 la C13, care conțin mai puțin de 2,5 % de lanțuri mai mari decât C13 și acetilisovaleriltilozina [2], trebuie să fie încorporat în acord,DECIDE:Articolul 1La capitolul XIII punctul 14 [Regulamentul (CEE) nr. 2377/90 al Consiliului] din anexa II la acord se adaugă următoarea liniuță:- "— 32005 R 0075: Regulamentul (CE) nr. 75/2005 al Comisiei din 18 ianuarie 2005 (JO L 15, 19.1.2005, p. 3)."Articolul 2Textele Regulamentului (CE) nr. 75/2005 în limbile islandeză și norvegiană, care urmează să fie publicate în Suplimentul SEE la Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, sunt autentice.Articolul 3Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare la 9 iulie 2005, cu condiția transmiterii prealabile a tuturor notificărilor prevăzute la articolul 103 alineatul (1) din acord către Comitetul mixt al SEE [***].Articolul 4Prezenta decizie se publică în Secțiunea SEE și în Suplimentul SEE ale Jurnalului Oficial al Uniunii Europene.Adoptată la Bruxelles, 8 iulie 2005.Pentru Comitetul mixt al SEEPreședinteleA.S.S. Prințul Nikolaus von Liechtenstein[1] JO L 239, 15.9.2005, p. 40.[2] JO L 15, 19.1.2005, p. 3.[***] Nu sunt indicate cerințe constituționale--------------------------------------------------


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 Avis juridique important
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 22001D0090
 ETA:n sekakomitean päätös N:o 90/2001, tehty 13 päivänä heinäkuuta 2001, ETA-sopimuksen liitteiden II (Tekniset määräykset, standardit, testaus ja varmentaminen) ja XX (Ympäristö) muuttamisesta
 Virallinen lehti nro L 251 , 20/09/2001 s. 0015 - 0016
 ETA:n sekakomitean päätösN:o 90/2001,tehty 13 päivänä heinäkuuta 2001,ETA-sopimuksen liitteiden II (Tekniset määräykset, standardit, testaus ja varmentaminen) ja XX (Ympäristö) muuttamisestaETA:N SEKAKOMITEA, jokaottaa huomioon Euroopan talousalueesta tehdyn sopimuksen, sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna Euroopan talousalueesta tehdyn sopimuksen tarkistamisesta tehdyllä pöytäkirjalla, jäljempänä "sopimus", ja erityisesti sen 98 artiklan,sekä katsoo seuraavaa:(1) Sopimuksen liite II muutettiin 24 päivänä syyskuuta 1999 tehdyllä ETA:n sekakomitean päätöksellä N:o 106/1999(1).(2) Sopimuksen liite XX muutettiin 19 päivänä kesäkuuta 2001 tehdyllä ETA:n sekakomitean päätöksellä N:o 80/2001(2).(3) Neuvoston direktiiviin 93/12/ETY(3) tehtyä mukautusta on tarpeen tarkistaa Itävallan tasavallan, Suomen tasavallan ja Ruotsin kuningaskunnan Euroopan unioniin liittymisen johdosta.(4) Bensiinin ja dieselpolttoaineiden laadusta ja neuvoston direktiivin 93/12/ETY muuttamisesta 13 päivänä lokakuuta 1998 annettu Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 98/70/EY(4) olisi otettava osaksi sopimusta.(5) Tiettyjen nestemäisten polttoaineiden rikkipitoisuuden vähentämisestä ja direktiivin 93/12/ETY muuttamisesta 26 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999 annettu neuvoston direktiivi 1999/32/EY(5) olisi otettava osaksi sopimusta.(6) Islanti saa jatkaa meriliikenteessä sellaisten kaasuöljyjen käyttöä, joiden rikkipitoisuus ylittää direktiivissä vahvistetut rajat,ON PÄÄTTÄNYT SEURAAVAA:1 artiklaMuutetaan sopimuksen liitteessä II olevan XVII luvun 6 kohta (neuvoston direktiivi 93/12/ETY) seuraavasti:1. Lisätään teksti seuraavasti: ", sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna seuraavilla:- 398 L 0070: Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 98/70/EY, annettu 13 päivänä lokakuuta 1998 (EYVL L 350, 28.12.1998, s. 58).- 399 L 0032: Neuvoston direktiivi 1999/32/EY, annettu 26 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999 (EYVL L 121, 11.5.1999, s. 13)(6)."2. Poistetaan mukautusteksti.2 artiklaLisätään sopimuksen liitteessä II olevan XVII luvun 6 kohdan (neuvoston direktiivi 93/12/ETY) jälkeen kohta seuraavasti: "6a. 398 L 0070: Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 98/70/EY, annettu 13 päivänä lokakuuta 1998, bensiinin ja dieselpolttoaineiden laadusta ja neuvoston direktiivin 93/12/ETY muuttamisesta (EYVL L 350, 28.12.1998, s. 58)."3 artiklaLisätään sopimuksen liitteessä XX olevan 21ac kohdan (Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 1999/94/EY) jälkeen kohta seuraavasti: "21ad. 399 L 0032: Neuvoston direktiivi 1999/32/EY, annettu 26 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999, tiettyjen nestemäisten polttoaineiden rikkipitoisuuden vähentämisestä ja direktiivin 93/12/ETY muuttamisesta (EYVL L 121, 11.5.1999, s. 13)(7).Tätä sopimusta sovellettaessa direktiiviä koskee seuraava mukautus:Lisätään 4 artiklan 2 kohtaan ilmaisun 'alueen' jälkeen ilmaisu 'Islanti koko sen alueen tai joidenkin sen osien osalta'."4 artiklaEuroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivin 98/70/EY ja neuvoston direktiivin 1999/32/EY islanniksi ja norjaksi laaditut tekstit, jotka julkaistaan Euroopan yhteisöjen virallisen lehden ETA-täydennysosassa, ovat todistusvoimaisia.5 artiklaTämä päätös tulee voimaan 14 päivänä heinäkuuta 2001, jos kaikki sopimuksen 103 artiklan 1 kohdan mukaiset ilmoitukset on tehty ETA:n sekakomitealle(8).6 artiklaTämä päätös julkaistaan Euroopan yhteisöjen virallisen lehden ETA-osastossa ja ETA-täydennysosassa.Tehty Brysselissä 13 päivänä heinäkuuta 2001.ETA:n sekakomitean puolestaPuheenjohtajaE. Bull(1) EYVL L 325, 21.12.2000, s. 11.(2) EYVL L 238, 6.9.2001, s. 31.(3) EYVL L 74, 27.3.1993, s. 81.(4) EYVL L 350, 28.12.1998, s. 58.(5) EYVL L 121, 11.5.1999, s. 13.(6) Direktiivi on lueteltu myös sopimuksen liitteessä XX olevassa 21ad kohdassa.(7) Direktiivi on lueteltu myös sopimuksen liitteessä II olevan XVII luvun 6 kohdassa.(8) Valtiosäännön asettamista vaatimuksista ei ole ilmoitettu.


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Yun Il-lok (hangul: 윤일록), född 7 mars 1992 i Gwangju, är en sydkoreansk fotbollsspelare som spelar för Ulsan Hyundai och för Sydkoreas landslag. Tidigare har han spelat för Yokohama F. Marinos och Montpellier.
 Karriär
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type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 308 Md. 69 (1986)
 517 A.2d 730
 LYNARD TUCKER
 v.
 FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.
 No. 32, September Term, 1986.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 November 24, 1986.
 Dennis F. O'Brien (White, Mindel, Clarke & Hill on the brief), Towson, for appellant.
 John J. Schneider (Clifford L. Hardwick, Hardwick, Tripoda & Harris, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
 Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ.
 MURPHY, Chief Judge.
 Under Article 48A, § 539(a) of the Maryland Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.), all motor vehicle liability insurance policies issued, sold, or delivered in this State after January 1, 1973 must contain personal injury protection (PIP) provisions affording minimal medical, hospital, lost income, and disability benefits to covered persons "injured in any motor vehicle accident." Among the individuals who may receive these benefits are:
 "the named insured and members of his family residing in his household ..., [and] other persons injured while occupying the insured motor vehicle as a guest or passenger, or while using it with the express or implied permission of the named insured ..., and pedestrians injured in an accident in which the insured motor vehicle is involved or individuals injured in, on, or alighting from any other vehicle operated by animal or muscular power in an accident in which an insured vehicle is involved." (Emphasis added.)
 The question presented in this case is whether an individual struck and injured by a car while sitting on a stool in a parking lot attendant's booth may be considered a "pedestrian" within the meaning of § 539 and thus eligible to receive PIP benefits.
 I.
 The case arose from a motor vehicle accident on February 11, 1982, in a garage where appellant Lynard Tucker was employed as a parking lot attendant. On the day of the accident, Tucker was sitting on a stool inside the attendant's booth when the booth was struck by an automobile driven by Barbara Eburg and insured by appellee Fireman's Fund Insurance. The insured's policy contained the required PIP coverage which Tucker sought to recover from Fireman's Fund.
 After the insurer denied his claim, Tucker sued Fireman's Fund in the District Court of Maryland. That court held that Tucker was not entitled to PIP benefits under the no-fault insurance provisions of § 539 because he was not a pedestrian when the accident occurred. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed. We granted certiorari to review the important issue raised in the case.
 II.
 Tucker argues that "pedestrian," as used in § 539, was intended by the General Assembly "to delineate between persons operating and/or occupying vehicles and those who are not." Tucker thus claims that he is within the class of persons protected under § 539. Fireman's Fund, on the other hand, argues that the legislature intended that the undefined term "pedestrian" in § 539 would be afforded the same meaning as that earlier enacted and contained in Code (1984 Repl.Vol.), § 11-145 of the Transportation Article, namely that "[p]edestrian means an individual afoot." To otherwise define the term "pedestrian" in § 539, the appellee suggests, was unnecessary. It maintains that the Transportation Article, which contains the motor vehicle laws of the State, and § 539 of the Insurance Code entitled "Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance  Required Primary Coverage" concern the same subject matter. Thus, it is argued that the two statutes should be construed harmoniously so that "pedestrian" would have the same meaning in both statutes. Moreover, Fireman's Fund urges that the common meaning of "pedestrian" is the same as the § 11-145 definition and should be applied in any event. Because Tucker was not "afoot" when he was injured, the appellee contends that he was not a pedestrian within the contemplation of § 539 and therefore was not entitled to PIP benefits.
 III.
 In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention. Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 816, 490 A.2d 1289 (1985); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347, 361, 456 A.2d 20 (1983); Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 388-89, 444 A.2d 1024 (1982); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091 (1979). The primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself. Auto. Trade Ass'n. v. Harold Folk Enter., 301 Md. 642, 653, 484 A.2d 612 (1984); Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 556, 451 A.2d 658 (1982); Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189, 448 A.2d 353 (1982); State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 495, 413 A.2d 557 (1980). When the legislature has not defined a term, it should ordinarily be given its usual and natural meaning. DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 717, 475 A.2d 454 (1984); Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788 (1979); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, supra, 285 Md. at 84, 400 A.2d 1091; Williams v. Loyola College, 257 Md. 316, 328, 263 A.2d 5 (1970). Of course, where statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation. State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137, 486 A.2d 174 (1985); Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 619, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
 "Pedestrian" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1664 (1971) as "a person who travels on foot," specifically as "one who walks for pleasure, sport, or exercise" and "one walking as distinguished from one travelling by car or cycle." Black's Law Dictionary 1019 (5th ed. 1979) similarly defines pedestrian as "[a] person traveling on foot." As already indicated, this definition is similar to that provided in § 11-145 of the Transportation Article.
 That a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context is well settled. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, 288 Md. 428, 433, 418 A.2d 1187 (1980); Ebert v. Millers Fire Ins. Co., 220 Md. 602, 610, 155 A.2d 484 (1959). We are by no means persuaded that in defining the term "pedestrian" in § 11-145 of the Transportation Article, the legislature necessarily intended that same explicit definition to be utilized in applying the later enacted provisions of § 539. Section 11-145 is part of Subtitle 1 ("Definitions") of Title 11 of the Transportation Article; that title defines numerous words, providing in § 11-101 that "[i]n the Maryland Vehicle Law, the following words [e.g., `Pedestrian'] have the meanings indicated, unless the context requires otherwise." Section 539 of the Insurance Code, setting forth statutorily mandated insurance coverages in motor vehicle liability policies, is not so related to the motor vehicle laws of the State as to compel a like construction of terms used in the two statutes.
 Nor do we think that a literal application of the word "pedestrian," in the context of its usage in § 539, was necessarily intended by the legislature in view of the unjust and unreasonable consequences that would obviously flow from such an interpretation. Construed literally, the term "pedestrian" would require an individual to be traveling on foot at the time of the accident contradistinguished from one who is, for example, seated or in a standing stationary position on a sidewalk adjacent to a road, when the accident occurred, or even a person struck by a motor vehicle while in a wheelchair next to the highway. Thus, under such a limited application, an individual seated on the steps of a building in front of a public highway who is struck by a motor vehicle would be unable to collect PIP benefits while another individual walking on the steps of the same building would be covered.
 We, of course, recognize the legislative right to draw lines distinguishing between covered and uncovered persons. We also recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961). In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. See Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 289 Md. 620, 426 A.2d 908 (1981); B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park, 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591 (1968); Sanza v. Md. Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 226 A.2d 317 (1967); Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 243 Md. 375, 221 A.2d 370 (1966).
 IV.
 Maryland is one of twenty-eight jurisdictions which have enacted no-fault insurance plans.[1] The primary purpose of § 539 is "to assure financial compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of a named insured or other persons entitled to PIP benefits." Pennsylvania Nat'l. Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 A.2d 734 (1980). See also Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., supra, 293 Md. at 393, 444 A.2d 1024 (purpose of the no-fault insurance subtitle is to put a limited amount of money in the hands of an injured individual under certain circumstances without regard to whether another person is liable for the injuries which the claimant sustained); Pfeffer v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters Ins. Co., 292 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1980) (purposes of no-fault statute include encouraging promptness of payment for medical treatment, prevention of overcompensation for minor injuries, and relief of the economic distress of uncompensated victims).
 The statutory delineation of persons covered by PIP benefits ranges from broad descriptions, e.g., "victims" or "injured persons," used by four jurisdictions[2] and in the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation's Act (UMVARA)[3] to more specific-type classifications of covered persons as in § 539 of the Maryland statute.
 Nine jurisdictions include pedestrians as covered individuals but unlike Maryland, these no-fault statutes generally define a pedestrian, as in New Jersey, to mean "any person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-2 (West Supp. 1986). See also Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-4-703(9) (1974); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-319(a)(1) (West 1985); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 33-34-2 (11) (1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.39-050(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 26-41-03.13 (1977); Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.800(7)(d) (1985); Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-301(7), -308 (1986); cf. Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 90, § 34A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985) ("pedestrian" includes "persons operating bicycles, tricycles and similar vehicles and persons upon horseback or in vehicles drawn by horses or other draft animals"). Five other states do not use the term "pedestrian" in their no-fault statutes but provide that nonoccupants of a motor vehicle are entitled to recover PIP benefits under certain circumstances. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 66-4014 (1980 and Supp. 1985); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.736(1) (West Supp. 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-3107(f) (1981); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1713(a)(4) (Supp. 1986); cf. Va.Code §§ 38.2-2201, -2202 (1986). Finally, five states, including Maryland, use pedestrian as a category of persons covered but do not define the term in the statute. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(d), (e) (1985); Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 294-4 (1985); N.Y.Ins.Law § 5102(j), § 5103(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.C.Code Ann. § 56-11-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
 V.
 Merely because the coverage provisions of § 539 are not couched in broad terms of "victims" or "injured persons," as in some state no-fault statutes, or that "pedestrian" is not explicitly defined, as in some other jurisdictions, in terms of persons not occupying, entering, or alighting from a motor or other covered vehicle, does not of itself mean that coverage for a "pedestrian" under § 539 was intended to be limited to persons injured only while actually traveling on foot. The purpose of § 539, as we earlier observed, is to award a measure of compensation "to victims of motor vehicle accidents" without regard to fault. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. v. Gartelman, supra, 288 Md. at 154, 416 A.2d 734. In view of that clear remedial purpose, see DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., supra, 299 Md. at 725, 475 A.2d 454, a liberal construction of the statute is required. Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 589, 420 A.2d 261 (1980). Considering the statutory scheme of § 539 in its entirety, and in light of its purpose  and in particular noting the use of the undefined term "pedestrian" in contrast to the all-encompassing coverage afforded persons injured while in a motor or other vehicle operated by animal or muscular power  we conclude that a doubt exists as to the precise meaning of the word "pedestrian" in § 539, a doubt that requires construction in effectuating the real legislative intention. In this regard, we think that the legislature, for coverage purposes, intended to include as a "pedestrian" under § 539 all persons not occupying, entering, or alighting from a motor or other covered vehicle without regard to whether, when struck, they were actually traveling on foot, standing in a stationary position, sitting, or, as here, within some structure.[4]
 In Braswell v. Burrus, 13 Md. App. 513, 517, 284 A.2d 41 (1971), the court, in applying the definition of a "pedestrian" in § 11-145 of the Transportation Article, concluded that "[i]n the context of the motor vehicle laws, a pedestrian is a person on foot, as distinguished from one in or on a vehicle, on or near a public highway or other place where the motor vehicle laws apply." Included within this definition, according to the court, were "police officers, maintenance workers, and perhaps others, whose work requires their presence on a highway." 13 Md. App. at 517, 284 A.2d 41. In Braswell, therefore, the determinative factor in defining the reach of the term "pedestrian" under § 11-145 was the proximity of the individual to motor vehicles on the highway. See also Gary Railways v. Dillon, 228 Ind. 558, 92 N.E.2d 720, 722 (1950) ("The legislature [in a statute concerning pedestrians' right of way at intersections] was trying to protect people traveling on foot in attempting to cross highways at proper crosswalks and the word `pedestrian' was used in its common meaning as a person not in a vehicle, but merely traveling on foot.").
 Other states have also expanded on the literal definition of pedestrian as used in vehicular and pedestrian traffic laws. Some courts have declined to give a literal meaning to the requirement of being actually "on foot." For example, in Eichinger v. Krouse, 105 N.J.L. 402, 144 A. 638 (1929), the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals stated:
 "While it is true that a pedestrian is ordinarily understood to be one who travels on foot, nevertheless the mere circumstance that he or she has attached to his or her feet roller skates, or ice skates, or walks on stilts, or uses crutches, or is without feet and propels himself or herself along by means of a chair or by some other mechanical device, does not clothe him or her, in a broad and general sense, with any other character than that of a pedestrian." 144 A. at 639.
 See also Jermane v. Forfar, 108 Cal. App. 2d 849, 240 P.2d 351 (1952); Pekter v. Price, 206 N.J. Super. 355, 502 A.2d 1157 (App.Div. 1985); Leopold v. Williams, 54 Ohio App. 540, 8 N.E.2d 476 (1936). But see Moon v. Weeks, 25 Md. App. 322, 334-35 n. 10, 333 A.2d 635 (1975) (child upon a sled on a street is not a "pedestrian" within the meaning of motor vehicle laws). Other courts have focused on the component of movement associated with being a pedestrian. In Garlin v. Thomas, 90 Ga. App. 835, 84 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1954), the court stated:
 "As [correctly] used in the charge [to the jury], pedestrian designates not merely a person traveling along the highway on foot. It is used to designate one class of persons as distinguished from other classes and is used to categorize that class in order that the rights and duties of one class in relation to the other classes may have a clear definition in law. As used, pedestrian includes all persons on the streets and highways on foot whether they be walking, standing still, or performing labor."
 In See v. Willett, 58 Wash.2d 39, 360 P.2d 592, 593 (1961), involving a definition of pedestrian identical to that in § 11-145 of the Maryland Transportation Article, the court determined that "the statutory definition of `pedestrian' is broad encugh to include persons standing upon the highway, as well as those traversing it." See also Peterson v. Continental Casualty Company, 25 Utah 2d 408, 483 P.2d 445, 446 (1971) ("To say that a pedestrian is not a pedestrian if he stops walking is disconsonant with realism and the common connotation of the term."). These cases illustrate that the components of movement and of being on foot implied in the literal definition of "pedestrian" have not been strictly applied within the context of motor vehicle laws.
 That the legislature intended the application of a similar rationale in its coverage of a "pedestrian" under § 539 is, we think, consistent with its real intention, even though arguably contrary to the literal meaning of the word. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Services, 283 Md. 677, 393 A.2d 181 (1978). We therefore hold that Tucker was entitled to recover PIP benefits under the facts of this case.
 JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY FOR THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT UPON PROOF OF DAMAGES. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
 NOTES
 [1] These jurisdictions are the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. In addition, Washington, through administrative regulation, has a no-fault plan in effect. Wash. Ins. Dept. Bulletin § 73-6 (1973). Three other states  Illinois, Nevada, and New Mexico  at one time also had no-fault plans in effect, but have since terminated them. See generally Dobbyn, "Genesis and Background  No-Fault Insurance," in 1 No-Fault and Uninsured Motorist Automobile Insurance §§ 4.00-.30[2] (B. Denkensohn ed. 1986).
 [2] Broad descriptions of individuals covered are used by the District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico. See D.C. Code Ann. § 35-2102(34) (Supp. 1986); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 500.3109(2), .3112 (West 1983 and Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 65B.44, .46 (West 1986); P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 9, § 2052(10) (1976).
 [3] See UMVARA §§ 2(a), 4(c)(2), (3), 14 U.L.A. 59, 61-62 (1972).
 [4] For cases involving no-fault statutes of other jurisdictions where persons were injured by a motor vehicle while inside a home or other structure, see Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo. 1984); Smith v. Simpson, 648 P.2d 677 (Colo.Ct.App. 1982); Olmstead v. Miller, 383 N.W.2d 817 (N.D. 1986); cf. Fox v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 314 Pa.Super. 559, 461 A.2d 299 (1983) (insured who was injured when she fell on her stairs while investigating the car that had crashed into her living room was a "victim" within the no-fault act because the injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle).