type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 266 Md. 256 (1972)
 292 A.2d 86
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 v.
 SIEGEL
 [No. 8 (Adv.), September Term, 1972.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided July 3, 1972.
 *257 The cause was argued before BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ., and RALPH W. POWERS, Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, specially assigned.
 Clarence W. Sharp, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Edward F. Borgerding, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for appellant.
 H. Thomas Howell, with whom was Norman P. Ramsey on the brief, for appellee.
 DIGGES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This case points up the great problems both legal and moral that we must again ponder in the wake of mankind's continuing scientific advancement  an advancement that staggers the imagination with its potential for good but causes us pause for fear that we may create "Frankenstein's" monster[1] and be unable to channel its growth. This is not a new or even unique quandary but one which most recently came into sharp focus with the advent of the atomic age. Nuclear energy offers the promise of relief to a large portion of the earth's population by alleviating such pressing problems as famine and plague but it also portends the very real menace of total destruction because of the weaponry it has produced. The industrialization of most of the world, while offering a life style unparalleled in the history of civilization, has also polluted much of nature's beauty and threatens to contaminate the very air we breathe. This same dichotomy applies to the development of electronic equipment. The benefits accruing to society are innumerable but the possibility of abuse is considerable. The issue now before *258 this Court concerns electronic surveillance, more especially the wiretap.
 On October 26, 1969, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, Charles E. Moylan, "upon his own authority pursuant to Article 27, Section 125A and Article 35, Section 94, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition, as amended, and pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 [18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20]" petitioned the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City to authorize "the use of electronic, mechanical or other devices and equipment to intercept and record telephonic wire communications pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; Article 27, Section 125A, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition as amended; Article 35, Sections 92 through 99, Annotated Code of Maryland, 1957 edition as amended; and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." The application alleged that Maurice T. Siegel, appellee, and Robert London were conspiring to violate the lottery laws of this State, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 38, 356-58, and 360-67. Judge Charles D. Harris issued the requested order permitting the State Police to intercept specified telephone lines from 11:00 a.m. October 6, 1969 to 6:00 p.m. October 10, 1969, so as to gather evidence of the illegal activities. Following expiration of this original authorization, renewal orders were issued by Judge Harris on October 13 and again on November 5, 1969. All told the wires were tapped for a total of twenty-one days intercepting 1448 conversations.[2]
 *259 On the basis of this electronically acquired evidence, an indictment was returned on November 14, 1969, jointly charging Siegel, a member of the bar, and London with conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of the State.[3] The appellee filed a motion to suppress all the intercepted conversations and on November 30, 1970 Judge Harris (the initial issuing authority) so ordered. He based his decision on Siegel's claim, "That the indictment is founded upon the contents of telephonic and oral communications unlawfully intercepted by the State ... in violation of the Defendant's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968." From that ruling the State unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. (State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671 (1971).) We granted certiorari.
 Several issues are presented for our consideration but under our view of the case we need only discuss the following two:
 (i) Are the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act constitutional and properly implemented in Maryland by the provisions of Code (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol.), Art. 35, §§ 92-99, and Code (1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 125A-D?
 (ii) Were the wiretap orders of Judge Harris void for failure to comply with the provisions of Title III?
 CONSTITUTIONALITY
 To begin with it is necessary for us to determine whether Title III is in violation of the Fourth Amendment *260 of the Constitution of the United States.[4] Siegel contends that the Omnibus Crime Bill is facially unconstitutional because it fails "to prescribe adequate standards as to the duration, particularity, and judicial supervision of court-ordered wiretapping." In responding to this claim we must first observe that any statute which trespasses upon "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ..." must be viewed with a jaundiced eye. The right to privacy is not only a keystone to our legal philosophy but also one of the most cherished ideals of our form of democracy. It is a concept which should foster security in the minds of our citizenry and not foster anxiety that they will be subjected to excessive governmental intrusion.[5] Under the Constitution there is no place in this country for an unfettered police force such as terrorized Germany and Italy during the 1930's and 1940's and which runs rampant today in many other parts of the world. It would be intolerable for the spectre of recrimination to silence the dialogue and dissent which is so necessary to the lifeblood of our society. In these scientifically sophisticated times the distinct possibility of "Big Brotherism"[6] is apparent. We live in a world which has the capability not only to monitor our conversations, to "bug" our houses, but soon probably to delve into our innermost thoughts. To allow any of these things to occur without *261 the strictest of controls would utterly destroy the basis of this nation's existence.
 We recognize of course that the Fourth Amendment itself restricts the rights of which it speaks. Its guarantees are broad but not boundless. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 314, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972). In entirety it provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Supreme Court of the United States, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967), recently discussed the historical background of the Fourth Amendment. There, Mr. Justice Brennan stated for the Court:
 "We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the Amendment. It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect against invasions of `the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' from searches under indiscriminate, general authority. Protection of these interests was assured by prohibiting all `unreasonable' searches and seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe `the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' thereby interposing `a magistrate between the citizen and the police,' ..." Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
 The question now before us is whether the federal statute was drawn in conformity with these requirements.
 The long and undistinguished history of eavesdropping can undoubtedly be traced to man's earliest beginnings and at common law the practice was condemned as a *262 nuisance. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 1570, Ch. 13 (Lewis ed. 1897). Originally, the act was accomplished by someone listening "under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales...." Blackstone, supra. However, this crude methodology quickly became outmoded. On May 24, 1844, Samuel F.B. Morse telegraphed the rather prophetic message, "What hath God wrought", and from then on every advancement noted in telecommunications has been received by a like response in the ability to surreptitiously intercept. To combat this threat the first statute prohibiting wiretapping was passed as early as 1862 and since that time such laws have proliferated.[7] The Supreme Court heard its initial wiretap case in 1928, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 72 L. Ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928). There, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, for the Court, said:
 "The language of the [Fourth] Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.
 This court, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 ... declared:
 `The 4th Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.' * * *
 We think, therefore, that the wire tapping *263 here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment." Id. at 465-66.
 Subsequent to Olmstead, there were several other decisions involving wiretaps and "bugging" in which the Supreme Court adhered to its "no trespass" doctrine. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L. Ed. 1322, 62 S. Ct. 993 (1942); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 96 L. Ed. 1270, 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952). The earliest indication of change was in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961), where the Court held that "bugging" which involved a trespass, even though technical, violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the radical departure waited until 1967 for Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507. There, Mr. Justice Stewart stated for the majority: "We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the `trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353. In that opinion the Court also said:
 "Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any `technical trespass under ... local property law.' Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 739, 81 S. Ct. 679, 97 A.L.R. 2d 1277. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people  and not simply `areas'  against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
 Katz is but one of a trilogy of eavesdropping cases *264 the Supreme Court decided during 1966 and 1967 which we must now consider in determining the constitutionality of Title III. The other two are Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394, 87 S. Ct. 429 (1966) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967). Congress, in passing the Omnibus Crime Bill, unquestionably intended it as the offspring of this troika and they were faced with no small task. As Mr. Justice Clark observed for the Court in Berger:
 "It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements. If that be true then the `fruits' of eaves-dropping devices are barred under the Amendment. On the other hand this Court has in the past, under specific conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of eavesdropping devices." Id. at 63.
 We now address ourselves to whether Congress was successful in its battle. The constitutionality of Title III has not yet been adjudicated by the Supreme Court, although a number of lower federal courts have decided the issue.[8] But it is quite clear that wiretapping is permissible *265 under appropriate circumstances. Katz, supra; Berger, supra.
 In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, the Court held a state law unconstitutional because that "statute's blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is without adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures." Id. at 60. The Supreme Court found four basic faults with the New York act. First, "eavesdropping is authorized without requiring belief that any particular offense has been or is being committed; nor that the `property' sought, the conversations, be particularly described." Id. at 58-59. Secondly,
 "authorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period is equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.... Moreover, the statute permits, and there were authorized here, extensions of the original two-month period  presumably for two months each  on a mere showing that such extension is `in the public interest.' Apparently the original grounds on which the eavesdrop order was initially issued also form the basis of the renewal. This we believe insufficient without a showing of present probable cause for the continuance of the eavesdrop." Id. at 59.
 Thirdly, "the statute places no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seized. This is *266 left entirely in the discretion of the officer." Id. at 59-60. Finally,
 "the statute's procedure, necessarily because its success depends on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as do conventional warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing of special facts. On the contrary, it permits unconsented entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized. Nor does the statute provide for a return on the warrant thereby leaving full discretion in the officer as to the use of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties." Id. at 60.
 While Berger dealt with an overbroad statute, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, involved a wiretap that was invoked without judicial authorization. There, the Court stated: "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351 (citations omitted). The Court further said that the absence of physical penetration no longer "forecloses Fourth Amendment injury." And it discredited the premise that property interests are controlling as to whether the government has the right to search and seize. Id. at 353. The majority concluded that the wiretap was impermissible because it did not have judicial sanction. Even though the federal agents used restraint,
 "the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing *267 the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end." Id. at 356-57.
 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, was decided prior to either Berger or Katz, and was relied upon by each in significant measure. It was not a wiretap case but rather involved the tape recording of a conversation by one of its two participants. In permitting the evidence thus obtained, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, based the decision squarely on Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462, 83 S. Ct. 1381 (1963).[9] He said:
 "[I]n response to a detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice in the federal court, the judges of that court jointly authorized the use of a recording device for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the affidavit's allegations. As the district judges recognized, it was imperative to determine whether the integrity of their court was being undermined, and highly undesirable that *268 this determination should hinge on the inconclusive outcome of a testimonial contest between the only two people in the world who knew the truth  one an informer, the other a lawyer of previous good repute. There could hardly be a clearer example of `"the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is central to the Fourth Amendment"' as `a precondition of lawful electronic surveillance.'" Id. at 330.
 Both Katz and Berger interpreted this language to hold that " `the order authorizing the use of the electronic device' in Osborn `afforded similar protections to those ... of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence.' Through those protections, `no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.'" Katz, supra at 355, quoting from Berger, supra at 57.
 To be constitutional, it is clear that Title III must comply with the requirements set out by Katz, Osborn, and especially Berger; we conclude it does. Initially, the federal act corrects the chief failing in Katz  lack of judicial intervention. In that case, governmental surveillance was instituted without the necessity for a neutral magistrate to review an application and determine that there was probable cause warranting a wiretap. Section 2518 (1) (b) of the act, in apparent recognition of this omission, makes it necessary that the petition contain a full and complete set of the circumstances which justify the applicant's belief that the order should be issued. Similarly, in Katz, because there was no judicial supervision, the federal agents were not specifically limited in the extent of their search and were not compelled to notify a judicial authority in detail concerning the evidence seized. Title III definitely corrects this fault. By § 2518 (4), each order permitting surveillance must specify: the identity of the person, if known, whose conversations are to be intercepted; "the nature and location *269 of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted"; a particular description of the communication sought and the offense to which it relates; the identity of the agency authorized to intercept; and "the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained." Additionally, under § 2518 (8) (a) the issuing judge has the authority to control the disposition of the evidence after its acquisition.
 The four basic problem areas which the Supreme Court enumerated in Berger have also, in varying degrees, been corrected by the federal act. The initial difficulty with the New York statute was that it permitted surveillance without a showing of whether any particular offense had been or was being committed and it was not essential to specifically describe the conversations being sought. Title III overcomes this rather obvious defect by requiring in § 2518 (1) (b)
 "a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted...."
 Section 2518 (3) (a) and (b) makes it necessary for the judge prior to authorizing the interception, to determine probable cause exists that the individual "is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense", and "particular communications concerning *270 [the] offense will be obtained through [the] interception."
 The next pitfalls of Berger were the duration of the surveillance, the failure to prescribe a termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation was intercepted, and the ease of extension. Again, the Omnibus Crime Bill made strides to rectify these deficiencies. By § 2518 (5), "No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than thirty days." It is argued, by appellee as well as some legal authors,[10] that this thirty day provision is the weak link in Title III. However, even assuming that such is the case, the federal statute has a saving clause. The issuing judge may require under the provisions of § 2518 (6) information about "what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception." As to the procedure for extending the original intercept order, by § 2518 (5) it is only permitted upon an application made in accordance with the requirements necessary for the original petition and there must be "a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results." Section 2518 (1) (f). Probable cause must also be reestablished and the extension periods under § 2518 (5) "must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days." In addition, every order and extension, by virtue of § 2518 (5),
 "shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter...."
 *271 The final shortcoming in Berger concerned the notice requirement. There, while the need to maintain secrecy was recognized, the Supreme Court complained that no showing of exigent circumstances was made which could justify suspending the necessity of notice. The federal act also obviated this deficiency. Section 2518 (1) (c) stipulates that each application must include: "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous...." In Berger, the New York act made no provisions for a return on the warrant, "thereby leaving full discretion in the officer as to the use of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties." 388 U.S. 41 at 60. However, under § 2518 (8) (a) of the federal law, the recordings must be made available to the issuing judge to be "sealed under his directions." It seems quite apparent that the Crime Bill has not only answered the needs of Katz and Berger but has also extended beyond the scope of these cases. We have no difficulty in concluding the federal act is constitutional.
 Having determined that Title III is not violative of the Fourth Amendment, it is now necessary to evaluate whether it can be implemented in Maryland. It is abundantly clear that the federal act is not self-executing as applied to the states. Under § 2516 (2), the principal prosecuting attorney of any state or political subdivision, if "authorized by a statute of that State", may apply "to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing" the interception of wire or oral communications. (Emphasis added.) That section also states that the issuing judge may grant the order "in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute...." (Emphasis added.) However, while Title III requires an appropriate state act before it can be effectuated, under no circumstances is that law enforceable if it is less restrictive than the federal statute so that it grants the governing power more rights at the expense of its citizens. In this vein, § 2515 *272 mandates that evidence obtained by the interception of wire or oral communications, in violation of the Crime Bill, cannot be received in evidence in any court, federal or state. Of course, a state act which is more closely circumscribed than the federal law in granting eavesdrop authority is certainly permissible. Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 168-69, 151 A.2d 737 (1959).
 The Maryland statutes concerned with the interception of wire or oral communications are Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 125A-D, and Code (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol.), Art. 35, §§ 92-99. They provide that upon application from the proper state official, a judge of the circuit court of any county or of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City may issue an order allowing the interception. (In both articles the State's Attorney is competent to apply but while Art. 35, § 94 (a) permits such a petition from the Attorney General, a similar stipulation is not included in Art. 27, § 125A (b)). These provisions are "applicable State statute[s]" as envisioned under § 2516 (2) and whether each of their terms relating to the application or grant of an order is constitutional vel non is of no consequence. Once the hurdle of finding an applicable Maryland law authorizing interception is overcome, compliance must be had with whichever law is more constricting, be it federal or state.
 We find that not only is Title III constitutional, but it may be properly implemented in this State.
 APPLICATION
 The next and last issue we consider is whether the wiretap orders of Judge Harris are void for failure to comply with the provisions of Title III. As already noted the federal statute specifies that authorization to intercept shall remain in effect only so long as is necessary to achieve the objective, but in no event longer than thirty days. § 2518 (5). To help insure that this stipulation is adhered to, § 2518 (4) (e) requires that each order specify: "the period of time during which such interception *273 is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, under § 2518 (5), every order shall contain a provision that: the interception will commence "as soon as practicable"; and "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days." (Emphasis added.)
 The order which Judge Harris issued on October 6, 1969, authorizing the interception and recording of certain designated telephone lines did not contain any of these necessary statements which the act clearly directs. While the duration of the first order was only five days, well within the thirty day provision of Title III, the failure to specify that termination would occur "upon attainment of the authorized objective," left too much discretion in the hands of the state police. The two renewal orders did not correct any of these failings even though the court said in both of them it was "satisfied that the provisions of this Order herein set forth provide that the authorization to intercept ... will be conducted as soon as practicable and in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception...." At best this simply entreats the police to not abuse its discretion, at worst it is a mere gratuity having no real force; in either event it is not the mandate required by the act. However, even assuming that this language was a proper directive which complied with the Omnibus Crime Bill, all the orders are still void because the earliest authorization, which the subsequent renewals nursed upon, lacked such a statement. In effect the poisonous taint from the October 6 order pervaded all its successors.
 The State urges that no more than substantial compliance with the federal act is essential. In its brief it takes the rather cavalier attitude that: "The rote recitation *274 that the interception shall be executed as soon as practicable and in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subjected to interception has no real meaning so long as the authorizing court" scrutinizes the manner in which the surveillance was actually conducted. We cannot accept this rationalization. The statute sets up a strict procedure that must be followed and we will not abide any deviation, no matter how slight, from the prescribed path. This is in accord with two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Johnson v. State, 177 S.E.2d 699, 701, 226 Ga. 805 (1970), and Cross v. State, 171 S.E.2d 507, 511-12, 225 Ga. 760 (1969). In both of these cases the orders authorizing electronic surveillance omitted the exact stipulations of Title III that we have just discussed. In each situation the Georgia court said that inclusion of the statements was mandatory. See also Ansley v. State, 185 S.E.2d 562, 565, 124 Ga. App. 670 (1971), cert, denied, 1971. Since the surveillance here failed to meet certain preconditions designed to protect appellee's constitutional rights, the evidence that arose from it must be suppressed and therefore the order dismissing the indictment will have to be affirmed.
 Appellee raises several other arguments in an effort to suppress the intercepted evidence but in light of the views we have just expressed, those contentions do not merit a discussion.
 Order dismissing indictment affirmed.
 Costs to be paid by Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City.
 NOTES
 [1] Frankenstein, written in 1818 by Mary G.W. Shelley (1797-1851).
 [2] "According to the returns made to the court, interception under the order of 6 October began at 3:15 P.M. that day and continued uninterruptedly until 5:55 P.M. October 10th on all four of the telephone lines designated, resulting in the interception of 491 communications.
 Under the order of 13 October interception commenced at 11:50 P.M. on that day and continued uninterruptedly until 7:04 P.M. October 20th on three of the lines, resulting in the interception of 544 communications.
 Under the order of 5 November interception commenced on two of the lines at 10:15 A.M. on that day and continued uninterruptedly until 5:40 P.M. on November 12th, resulting in the interception of 413 communications." State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. 444, 465, 285 A.2d 671 (1971).
 [3] The State proceeded against London separately after Siegel suffered successive heart attacks. Judge Harold Grady, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, granted London's motion to suppress all the intercepted communications and no appeal was taken from that order. On August 17, 1970 the State entered a nolle prosequi as to that defendant. By court order the tapes of the various conversations were eventually delivered to London's attorney to be kept intact and under seal.
 [4] Appellee is only testing here the constitutionality of Title III under the Fourth Amendment.
 [5] Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), stated:
 "[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to privacy  his right to be let alone by other people  is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States."
 [6] The term originates from the book 1984, written in 1948 by George Orwell (1903-1950).
 [7] California passed the original law and by 1895 Illinois followed suit. Maryland enacted its first wiretapping statute in 1956. For a background discussion of this State's wiretap legislation see Manger v. State, 214 Md. 71, 133 A.2d 78 (1957).
 [8] These cases have held the statute constitutional: United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.1972); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Becker, 334 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Cantor, 328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), reversed on other grounds sub nom United States v. Robinson, (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 1972).
 Recently, in United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972) the statute was held unconstitutional. Many commentators have also raised serious questions about the constitutionality of the act. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 Mich. L. Rev. 455 (1969); Criminal Law Education and Research Center, Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping: The Law and Its Implications (1969). Also, Mr. Justice Douglas has indicated his belief that Title III is violative of the Fourth Amendment in his dissenting opinion to denial of a writ of certiorari in United States v. Cox, 406 U.S. 934, 32 L. Ed. 2d 136, 92 S. Ct. 1783 (1972).
 Last month, the Supreme Court, in United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972), discussed certain provisions of Title III. However, the Court specifically did not consider the constitutionality of that federal act.
 [9] In Lopez, the Supreme Court allowed into evidence the tape recorded conversations of an attempt to bribe a government agent.
 [10] Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 Mich. L. Rev. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169 (1969).


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Dôležité právne oznámenie
 |
 22006A0224(01)
 Dohoda vo forme výmeny listov medzi Európskym spoločenstvom a Čílskou republikou o zmenách a doplneniach Dohody o obchode s vínom, ktorá tvorí prílohu Dohody o pridružení medzi Európskym spoločenstvom a jeho členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Čílskou republikou na strane druhej
 Úradný vestník L 054 , 24/02/2006 S. 0024 - 0027
 Dohodavo forme výmeny listov medzi Európskym spoločenstvom a Čílskou republikou o zmenách a doplneniach Dohody o obchode s vínom, ktorá tvorí prílohu Dohody o pridružení medzi Európskym spoločenstvom a jeho členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Čílskou republikou na strane druhejA. List SpoločenstvaV BruseliVážený pán,mám tú česť odvolať sa na stretnutia spoločného výboru zriadeného v súlade s článkom 30 prílohy V k asociačnej dohode (dohoda o obchode s vínom). Spoločný výbor navrhuje, aby sa v dohode o obchode s vínom (ďalej len "príloha V") vykonali úpravy, s cieľom zohľadniť vývoj právnych predpisov od jej prijatia.Počas nedávneho zasadnutia spoločného výboru 13. až 14. júna 2005 v Madride, sa výbor dohodol na potrebe zmeny a doplnenia dodatkov, ako aj textu dohody s cieľom aktualizovať jej znenie. Mám preto tú česť navrhnúť, aby sa príloha V zmenila a doplnila, tak ako je uvedené v priloženom dodatku, s účinnosťou odo dňa podpisu.Bola by som Vám zaviazaná, keby ste mohli potvrdiť, že Vaša vláda súhlasí s obsahom tohto listu.Prijmite, prosím, výraz mojej najhlbšej úcty.V mene Európskeho spoločenstvaDodatokPríloha V sa týmto mení a dopĺňa takto:1. V článku 5 sa odsek 2 nahrádza takto:"2. Názvy uvedené v článku 6 sú výlučne vyhradené pre výrobky s pôvodom v zúčastnenej strane, na ktorú sa vzťahujú."2. Článok 7 sa mení a dopĺňa takto:a) Odsek 2 sa nahrádza takto:"2. Na základe čílskeho registra obchodných značiek z 10. júna 2002 sa obchodné značky uvedené v dodatku VI.A zrušia v prípade použitia na vnútornom trhu do 12 rokov a v prípade použitie na vývoz do piatich rokov odo dňa nadobudnutia platnosti tejto dohody."b) Za odsek 2 sa vkladá tento odsek:"2a Na základe čílskeho registra obchodných značiek z 10. júna 2002 sú obchodné označenia uvedené v dodatku VI. B. povolené podľa podmienok stanovených v tomto dodatku, výlučne pre použitie na vnútornom trhu a zrušia sa do 12 rokov odo dňa nadobudnutia platnosti tejto dohody."3. Článok 8 sa mení a dopĺňa takto:a) V odseku 5 sa písmeno b) nahrádza takto:"b) tam, kde je tradičný výraz alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV homonymné s názvom vína s pôvodom v nezúčastnených stranách, používa sa posledný uvedený názov na opis a prezentáciu vína iba v prípade, ak je takéto použitie uznané vo vnútroštátnych právnych predpisoch krajiny pôvodu a nepredstavuje nespravodlivú hospodársku súťaž a neuvádza spotrebiteľov do omylu v súvislosti s pôvodom, charakteristikou alebo kvalitou vína;".b) V odseku 5 sa písmeno c) vypúšťa.4. Článok 9 sa mení a dopĺňa takto:a) Písmeno a) sa nahrádza takto:"a) pokiaľ ide o víno s pôvodom v Spoločenstve, uvedené v dodatku III;".b) Písmeno b) sa nahrádza takto:"b) pokiaľ ide o víno s pôvodom v Čile, uvedené v dodatku IV."5. Článok 10 sa mení a dopĺňa takto:a) Odsek 1 sa nahrádza takto:"1. Registrácia obchodnej značky vína v zúčastnenej strane, ktorá je rovnaká alebo podobná alebo obsahuje tradičný výraz alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality inej zúčastnenej strany uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV sa zamietne, keďže takáto registrácia sa týka použitia tohto tradičného výrazu alebo doplňujúceho označenia kvality pri opise a prezentácii kategórie alebo kategórií vína, pre ktoré je tento tradičný výraz alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV."b) Odsek 2 sa nahrádza takto:"2. Odchylne od odseku 1 zamietnutie registrácie obchodnej značky vína v zúčastnenej strane, ktorá je rovnaká alebo podobná alebo obsahuje tradičný výraz alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality zúčastnenej strany uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV nebude povinné, ak sa takáto registrácia týka použitia tohto tradičného výrazu alebo doplňujúceho označenia kvality pri opise a prezentácii kategórie alebo kategórií vína, pre ktoré je uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV."c) Odsek 3 sa vypúšťa.6. Článok 11 sa mení a dopĺňa takto:a) Odsek 1 sa nahrádza takto:"1. Zúčastneným stranám nie sú na základe čílskeho registra obchodných značiek z 10. júna 2002 známe žiadne iné obchodné značky okrem tých, ktoré sú uvedené v článku 7 ods. 2 a 2a a v článku 10 ods. 4, ktoré by boli rovnaké alebo podobné alebo by obsahovali zemepisné označenia alebo tradičné výrazy alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality uvedené v článkoch 6 a 10 v uvedenom poradí."b) Odsek 2 sa nahrádza takto:"2. V zmysle odseku 1 nemôže žiadna zo zúčastnených strán zamietnuť právo na používanie obchodnej značky, ktoré je zahrnuté v čílskom registri obchodných značiek z 10. júna 2002, iných ako tých, ktoré sú uvedené v článku 7 ods. 2 a 2a a v článku 10 ods. 4, na základe toho, že takáto obchodná značka je rovnaká alebo podobná alebo obsahuje zemepisné označenia uvedené v dodatku I alebo II, alebo tradičné výrazy alebo doplňujúce označenie kvality uvedené v dodatku III alebo IV."7) V článku 30 sa odsek 3 nahrádza takto:"3. Spoločný výbor môže poskytovať odporúčania na podporu dosiahnutia cieľov tejto dohody. Vykonajú sa v súlade s rokovacím poriadkom pre zvláštne výbory."B. List Čílskej republikyV Santiagu de Chile/BruseliVážená pani,mám tú česť potvrdiť dnešným dátumom prijatie Vášho listu tohto znenia:"Mám tú česť odvolať sa na stretnutia spoločného výboru zriadeného v súlade s článkom 30 prílohy V k asociačnej dohode (dohoda o obchode s vínom). Spoločný výbor navrhuje, aby sa v dohode o obchode s vínom (ďalej len "príloha V") vykonali úpravy, s cieľom zohľadniť vývoj právnych predpisov od jej prijatia.Počas nedávneho zasadnutia spoločného výboru 13. až 14. júna 2005 v Madride, sa výbor dohodol na potrebe zmeny a doplnenia dodatkov, ako aj textu dohody s cieľom aktualizovať jej znenie. Mám preto tú česť navrhnúť, aby sa príloha V zmenila a doplnila, tak ako je uvedené v priloženom dodatku, s účinnosťou odo dňa podpisu.Bola by som Vám zaviazaná, keby ste mohli potvrdiť, že Vaša vláda súhlasí so znením tohto listu."Mám tú česť Vám oznámiť, že Čílska republika súhlasí s obsahom tohto listu.Prijmite, prosím, výraz mojej najhlbšej úcty.Za Čílsku republiku--------------------------------------------------


type: wikipedia

text:
Albert Van huffel (Gent, 20 januari 1877 - Tervuren, 17 maart 1935) was een Belgisch ontwerper en architect.
 Biografie
 Van huffel was van bescheiden afkomst. Zijn vader heette Vanhuffel, maar op de geboorteakte is de naam foutief ingeschreven als "Van huffel". Zonder naamsverandering blijft deze naam levenslang behouden.
 Van huffel volgde een opleiding aan de Kunstacademie van Gent (afgebroken in 1901). Tussen 1896 en 1912 bedreef hij verschillende ambachten: schilder, decorateur, meubelmaker, metser, glazenier. Tussen 1895 en 1904 had de groep Kunst en Kennis een belangrijke invloed op zijn werk. Hij was gefascineerd door de schoonheid van bloemmotieven. Zijn ontwerpen voor meubels, tapijten en borduurwerk reflecteren de overgang van art nouveau naar functionalisme. Door zelfstudie werkte hij zich op tot architect (zonder diploma), waardoor hij totaalontwerpen kon uitvoeren.
 In 1903 trad hij in dienst bij de Gentse bouwfirma Van Herreweghe & De Wilde. In 1912 werd hij zelfstandig architect. Vanaf 1914 werkte hij nauw samen met het Brusselse bedrijf L'Art Décoratif C. Dangotte, tussen 1918 tot 1921 werd hij ook aangesteld als artistiek directeur voor de interieurzaak. Hij zou de firma naar een artistiek niveau tillen dat het daarnaa nooit meer zou evenaren.
 In 1926 nodigde Henry van de Velde Van huffel uit om kunstnijverheid te doceren aan het La Cambre-instituut in Brussel.
 Werk
 Vanaf 1920 werd zijn tomeloze energie opgeslorpt door één reusachtig project: de Nationale Basiliek van het Heilig Hart in Koekelberg.
 Oorspronkelijk had dit een neogotisch gebouw moeten worden. Na het leggen van de funderingen was de bouw in de Eerste Wereldoorlog stilgevallen. Onder impuls van kardinaal Mercier kwam er een snelle doorstart, zij het dat men opteerde voor een moderner en goedkoper ontwerp. Na een onbevredigende ideeënwedstrijd stelde het opdrachtgevend comité verrassend de onbekende Van huffel aan om de basiliek te ontwerpen. Hij had slechts enkele huizen op zijn actief en nu werd hij belast met een van de grootste Belgische bouwprojecten ooit. Het zou hem bezighouden tot zijn dood in 1935. Hij kreeg Dom Sébastien Braun naast zich, de abt van de abdij van Maredsous, om hem bij te staan in de religieus-liturgische aspecten van het ontwerp. Hun samenwerking was intens en leidde tot de presentatie van een voldragen project op 17 november 1921. Het werd tegen veel weerstand in en met enkele aanpassingen goedgekeurd. Hij kreeg wel het verzoek een maquette op schaal 1/40 te maken. Daarmee won hij de Grand Prix de l’Architecture op de Wereldtentoonstelling van 1925 in Parijs. Door deze prijs en de steun van grote architecten als Victor Horta en Hendrik Berlage luwde het verzet. Zijn plannen werden definitief aanvaard en de bouw ging van start. De maquette is nog steeds te bezichtigen in de basiliek. Hij kreeg ook de bijstand van ingenieurarchitect Paul Rome voor de technische uitwerking.
 Na zijn overlijden werd zijn magnum opus in essentie volgens de oorspronkelijke plannen afgewerkt door Paul Rome. Zijn basiliek van Koekelberg werd het grootste art-deco-gebouw ter wereld.
 Externe links
 Fiche bij Inventaris Onroerend Erfgoed
 Ontwerptekeningen bij KIK
 Bibliografie
 Dom Sébastien BRAUN O.S.B., Albert Van Huffel. Architecte, auteur des plans de la Basilique national du Sacré-Coeur à Bruxelles, Brussel, Éditions de la Basilique, [1973], 41 p.
 Marc DUBOIS, Albert Van Huffel, 1877-1935, Gent, Snoeck-Ducaju, 1983.
 Marc DUBOIS, "Tussen Art Nouveau en Art Deco. Interieur Renson te Gent 1914-1915. Architect Albert Van huffel", in: De Woonstede, 1991, nr. 90, blz. 23-28
 Belgisch architect
 Belgisch glazenier
 Belgisch ontwerper


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 52004PC0553
 Ettepanek nõukogu otsus millega lubatakse Itaalial kohaldada meedet, mis kaldub kõrvale direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ kumuleeruvate käibemaksudega seotud liikmesriikide õigusaktide ühtlustamise kohta, artikli 2 lõikest 1 /* KOM/2004/0553 lõplik */
 Ettepanek NÕUKOGU OTSUS millega lubatakse Itaalial kohaldada meedet, mis kaldub kõrvale direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ kumuleeruvate käibemaksudega seotud liikmesriikide õigusaktide ühtlustamise kohta, artikli 2 lõikest 1(esitatud komisjoni poolt)SELETUSKIRI1. 17. mail 1977 vastuvõetud kuuenda nõukogu direktiivi (kumuleeruvate käibemaksudega seotud liikmesriikide õigusaktide ühtlustamise kohta - ühine käibemaksusüsteem: ühtne maksubaas [1]) artikli 30 kohaselt võib nõukogu komisjoni ettepaneku põhjal ühehäälselt anda liikmesriigile loa sõlmida kolmandate riikide või rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonidega leppeid, mis võivad sisaldada erandeid käesolevast direktiivist.[1] ELT L 145, 13.6.1977, lk 12. Komisjonile esitatud kirjas, mis saabus komisjoni peasekretariaati 24.03.2004, palus Itaalia valitsus luba sõlmida Šveitsiga kokkulepe, mis sisaldab direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikest 1 kõrvale kalduvaid sätteid.3. Kuuenda direktiivi artikli 30 lõike 2 kohaselt teatas komisjon teistele liikmesriikidele Itaalia valitsuse palvest kirjalikult 11.05.2004 ning 12.05.2004 teavitas komisjon Itaaliat kirjalikult sellest, et tal on kogu teave, mida vajab palve läbivaatamiseks.4. Direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikes 1 sätestatakse, et käibemaksuga maksustatakse kauba tarnimine või teenuste osutamine tasu eest riigi territooriumil maksukohustuslase poolt, kes sellena tegutseb.5. Itaalia poolt palutud erandi eesmärk on saada luba direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikest 1 kõrvale kalduvaid sätteid sisaldava kokkuleppe sõlmimiseks Šveitsiga ning taotleda käibemaksuvabastust Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaksule. Põhjuseid selleks on kaks. Esiteks on Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaksu käibemaksustamine 1. jaanuarist 2003 tekitanud perioodikaartide müügil konkurentsimoonutusi. Teiseks põhjustab käibemaksu osas toimuv laekumiste jaotus vastavalt riikide füüsilistele piiridele suuri halduskulusid, kuna laekumised arvutatakse ja jaotatakse vastavalt majanduskriteeriumitele, mis peegeldavad tunneli haldamis- ja hoolduskulude jaotust. Tunneli hoolduskulud ei puuduta mitte üksnes tunnelit ennast, vaid ka maanteed, mis ühendab Itaalia territooriumil asuvat tunneliosa Itaalia teedevõrguga.6. 27. detsembril 2002 vastu võetud Itaalia seaduse nr 289 (2003. aasta eelarve kohta) artikliga 21 tunnistati kehtetuks 26. oktoobri 1972. aasta presidendi dekreedi nr 633 (käibemaksu kehtestamise ja rakendamise kohta) artikli 9 lõige 11 (rahvusvahelised teenused ja rahvusvahelise kaubavahetusega seotud teenused), mis tingis Itaalia Gran San Bernardo tunnelikäitajate poolt sissenõutava teemaksu käibemaksustamise 1. jaanuarist 2003. Šveits pole teemaksule käibemaksu ega muud sarnast maksu kehtestanud. Vastavalt 1958. aastal Itaalia ja Šveitsi vahel enne ühise käibemaksusüsteemi kehtestamist sõlmitud konventsioonile ei saa kohustada Šveitsi rakendama ja sisse nõudma Itaalia poolt Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaksule kehtestatud käibemaksu. Seega põhjustas käibemaksu kehtestamine ainult Itaalia operaatori poolt kogutavale teemaksule kasutamismaksumuse erinevusi ning perioodikaartide müügil konkurentsimoonutusi. Tee kasutajad võivad perioodikaarte osta ükskõik kummas riigis ja nad teevad seda Šveitsis, kus see on odavam.7. Tunnel läbib rahvusvahelist piiri ning seda käitab Itaalia-Šveitsi ühisettevõte ja selle kaks operaatorettevõtet, kummaski riigis üks. Vastavalt territoriaalsuse põhimõttele peaks Itaalia käitaja nõudma käibemaksu (20%) ainult Itaalia pinnal asuva tunneliosa eest. Kuid vastavalt 1963. aastal operaatorite vahel sõlmitud ja siiani kohaldatavale õiguslikult siduvale kokkuleppele ei jagata teemaksu laekumisi võrdeliselt riikide füüsilise piiridega, vaid jagatakse vastavalt majanduslikele kriteeriumitele, mis peegeldavad tunneli haldus- ja hoolduskulude jaotust (57,5% Itaalia ja 42,5% Šveitsi ekspluatatsiooniettevõttele). Tunneli haldus- ja hoolduskulud hõlmavad ka tunnelini viiva maantee haldus- ja hoolduskulusid. See tähendab, et nende kriteeriumite alusel jagatavate ja jaotatavate tulude täpne summa selgub alles tagantjärele. Käibemaksu osas tuleb see territoriaalsuse põhimõtet peegeldava summa saamiseks ümber arvutada, ekstrapoleerides tunnelini viiva maanteeosa haldus- ja hoolduskulud. Selline tülikas tagantjärele arvutamine ja käibemaksu sissenõudmine põhjustab suuri halduskulusid ja see ei ole kooskõlas tarbimismaksu süsteemiga, mis nõuab, et käibemaks kehtestatakse ja nõutakse sisse kohe.8. Antud olukorras on ainsaks kohaseks lahenduseks lubada Itaalial sõlmida Šveitsiga kokkulepe, mille eesmärgiks on vabastada Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaks käibemaksust. Erand lubab Itaalial tühistada Itaalia ja Šveitsi vahel sõlmitud konventsiooni artikli 8, milles sätestatakse: "Les questions de douane, de police, monétaires, fiscals et socials soulevées par la construction et l'exploitation du tunnel feront l'objet d'accords particuliers entre le Gouvernement Italien et le Gouvernement Suisse", rakendamise suhtes tehtud reservatsioone. Erand lihtsustab Itaalia-Šveitsi ühisettevõtte ja selle kahe operaatorettevõtte tööd märkimisväärselt.9. Taotletav vabastus mõjutab käibemaksust laekuvaid Euroopa Ühenduste omavahendeid. Itaalia valitsus on arvutanud võimalikku mõju Itaalia operaatorettevõtte esitatud 2002. aasta aruande põhjal. 2002. aastal suleti remonditöödeks Monte Bianco tunnel ja selle tagajärjel suurenes liiklus Gran San Bernardo tunnelis. Seetõttu võib selle põhjal arvutatud summat pidada nn tippväärtuseks, mis järgnevatel aastatel on kindlasti palju väiksem. Ekspluatatsiooniettevõtte aruannetest selgub, et 2002. aastal oli maksustatav summa umbes 7,5 miljonit eurot. Itaalia valitsuse hinnangul vähenevad maksulaekumised seoses käibemaksuvabastusega umbes 1,5 miljonit eurot aastas. Itaalia valitsuse hinnangul osutatakse umbes veerand teenustest isikutele, kellel on sisendkäibemaksu mahaarvamise õigus, nii et maksustatav summa peaks seega olema pigem 5,625 miljonit eurot aastas ning erandist põhjustatud maksulaekumised vähenema 1,125 miljonit eurot. Alates 2004. aastast jääb omavahendite osas erandi tõttu ühenduse eelarvesse laekumata tulu väiksemaks kui 28 125 eurot, kui maksta seda 5,625 miljoni euro pealt vastavalt 24.-25. märtsi Berliini otsusele maksimaalse piirmääraga 0,5%. Seetõttu on oluline, et Itaalia Vabariik hindaks igal aastal käibemaksu laekumata jäänud tulu lõpptarbimise etapis ning lisaks käibemaksubaasi samaväärse kompensatsiooni, mis on osaks ühenduse omavahenditesse tehtavast panusest.Ettepanek NÕUKOGU OTSUS millega lubatakse Itaalial kohaldada meedet, mis kaldub kõrvale kumuleeruvaid käibemakse käsitlevate liikmesriikide õigusaktide ühtlustamist käsitleva kuuenda direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikest 1EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,võttes arvesse 17. mai 1977. aasta kuuendat nõukogu direktiivi [2] (77/388/EMÜ) kumuleeruvate käibemaksudega seotud liikmesriikide õigusaktide ühtlustamise kohta - ühine käibemaksusüsteem: ühtne maksubaas1, eriti selle artiklit 30,[2] ELT L 145, 13.6.1977, lk 1võttes arvesse komisjoni ettepanekut [3],[3] ELT L [...], [...], p. [...].ning arvestades järgmist::1) Komisjonile esitatud kirjas, mis saabus komisjoni peasekretariaati 24.03.2004, palus Itaalia valitsus luba sõlmida Šveitsiga kokkulepe, mis sisaldab direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikest 1 kõrvale kalduvaid sätteid.2) Põhjuseid selleks on kaks. Esiteks on Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaksu käibemaksustamine 1. jaanuarist 2003 viinud perioodikaartide müügi konkurentsi moonutamiseni. Teiseks põhjustab käibemaksu osas toimuv laekumiste jaotus vastavalt riikide füüsilistele piiridele suuri halduskulusid, kuna laekumised arvutatakse ja jaotatakse vastavalt majanduskriteeriumitele, mis peegeldavad tunneli haldamis- ja hoolduskulude jaotust. Tunneli hoolduskulud ei puuduta mitte üksnes tunnelit ennast, vaid ka maanteed, mis ühendab Itaalia territooriumil asuvat tunneliosa Itaalia teedevõrguga.3) 1. jaanuarist 2003 maksustas Gran San Bernardo tunneli Itaalia käitaja teemaksu käibemaksuga ja nõuab seda ka sisse. Šveits pole teemaksule käibemaksu ega muud sarnast maksu kehtestanud. Vastavalt 1958. aastal Itaalia ja Šveitsi vahel enne ühise käibemaksusüsteemi kehtestamist sõlmitud konventsioonile ei saa Šveitsi kohustada rakendama ja sisse nõudma Itaalia poolt Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaksule kehtestatud käibemaksu. Seega tingis käibemaksu kehtestamine ainult Itaalia operaatori poolt kogutavale teemaksule kasutamismaksumuse erinevuse ning perioodikaartide müügil konkurentsimoonutusi. Tee kasutajad võivad perioodikaarte osta ükskõik kummas riigis ja nad teevad seda Šveitsis, kus see on odavam.4) Tunnel läbib rahvusvahelist piiri ning seda käitab Itaalia-Šveitsi ühisettevõte ja selle kaks operaatorettevõtet, kummaski riigis üks. Vastavalt territoriaalsuse põhimõttele peaks Itaalia operaator nõudma käibemaksu ainult Itaalia pinnal asuva tunneliosa eest. Kuid vastavalt 1963. aastal operaatorite vahel sõlmitud ja siiani kohaldatavale õiguslikult siduvale kokkuleppele ei jagata teemaksu laekumisi võrdeliselt riikide füüsilise piiridega, vaid jagatakse vastavalt majanduslikele kriteeriumitele, mis peegeldavad tunneli haldus- ja hoolduskulude jaotust. Tunneli haldus- ja hoolduskulud hõlmavad ka tunnelini viiva maantee haldus- ja hoolduskulusid. See tähendab, et nende kriteeriumite alusel jagatav ja jaotatav täpne laekum selgub alles tagantjärele. Käibemaksu osas tuleb see territoriaalsuse põhimõtet peegeldava summa saamiseks ümber arvutada, ekstrapoleerides tunnelini viiva maanteeosa haldus- ja hoolduskulud. Selline tülikas tagantjärele arvutamine ja käibemaksu sissenõudmine põhjustab suuri halduskulusid. See ei ole kooskõlas tarbimismaksu süsteemiga, mille kohaselt kehtestatakse ja nõutakse käibemaks sisse kohe.5) Antud olukorras on ainsaks kohaseks lahenduseks lubada Itaalial sõlmida Šveitsiga kokkulepe, mille eesmärgiks on vabastada Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaks käibemaksust. Erand lihtsustab Itaalia-Šveitsi ühisettevõtte ja selle kahe operaatorettevõtte tööd märkimisväärselt.6) Taotletav vabastus mõjutab siiski käibemaksust laekuvaid Euroopa Ühenduste omavahendeid ning seetõttu on vaja rakendada kompenseerivaid meetmeid,ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:Artikkel 1Erandina direktiivi 77/388/EMÜ artikli 2 lõikest 1 lubatakse käesolevaga Itaalia valitsusel sõlmida Šveitsiga kokkulepe, mille eesmärgiks on vabastada Gran San Bernardo tunneli teemaks käibemaksust. Luba antakse tingimusel, et Itaalia Vabariik hindab igal aastal käibemaksust laekumata jäänud tulu lõpptarbimise etapis ning lisab käibemaksubaasile samaväärse kompensatsiooni, mis on osaks ühenduse omavahenditesse tehtavast panusest.Artikkel 2Käesolev otsus on adresseeritud Itaalia Vabariigile.Brüssel, [...]Nõukogu nimeleesistuja[...]


text:
 26.10.2012
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 C 326/1
 PROTOKOLL (nr 11)
 OM ARTIKEL 42 I FÖRDRAGET OM EUROPEISKA UNIONEN
 DE HÖGA FÖRDRAGSSLUTANDE PARTERNA,
 SOM BEAKTAR behovet av att fullt ut genomföra bestämmelserna i artikel 42.2 i fördraget om Europeiska unionen,
 SOM BEAKTAR att unionens politik i enlighet med artikel 42 inte ska påverka den särskilda karaktären hos vissa medlemsstaters säkerhets- och försvarspolitik och att den ska respektera de skyldigheter som vissa medlemsstater, som anser att deras gemensamma försvar förverkligas genom Nato, har enligt Nordatlantiska fördraget och vara förenlig med den gemensamma säkerhets- och försvarspolitik som har upprättats inom den ramen,
 HAR ENATS OM följande bestämmelser, som ska fogas till fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt.
 Europeiska unionen ska tillsammans med Västeuropeiska unionen utarbeta arrangemang för ett ökat ömsesidigt samarbete.


type: other

text:
Zákon o údajoch - platforma.slovensko.digital
 Zákon o údajoch
 jangondol December 4, 2017, 4:15pm #1
 V roku 2018 bude ÚPVII pripravovať Zákon o údajoch. Keďže sme mnohí z nás mali viaceré zaujímavé diskusie, či už osobne alebo cez e-maily, bolo by super mať aj na Platforme miesto, kde môžeme už teraz uvažovať nad tým, čo by bolo dobré v zákone podchytiť, či prebrať, ako by bolo dobré postaviť sa k niektorým témam.
 Ak chcete, @Lubor, @hanecak a ostatní, môžete svoje aktuálne poznámky o GDPR vs. Open Data, ale aj iné veci (trebárs odkazy na príbuznú legislatívu v iných krajinách, linky na články, odkazy na ďalšie dokumenty), vešať postupne rovno sem. Keď sa bude robiť draft zákona, môže toto vlákno slúžiť ako taký “poor man’s issue tracker”, aby sa na dôležité veci nezabudlo.
 Samotná príprava zákona by mala fungovať participatívne ako obvykle - Zákon o údajoch bol navyše vybraný ako “flagship projekt” ÚPVII v rámci participácie (úloha č. 43 súčasného Akčného plánu OGP). @Ivet_Fercikova bude dúfam spokojná...
 LP/2018/652 Návrh riadneho predbežného stanoviska k návrhu smernice o opakovanom použití informácií verejného sektora (prepracované znenie)
 hanecak December 4, 2017, 9:13pm #2
 Zhrniem teda, co sme si zatial pisali vramci vymeny know-how v BG, CR a SR:
 BG eGov Act, Article 15: “in case an information system processes personal data, it should still provide open data, but with the personal data either annonymized, or aggregated” (https://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2136995819, pomoze napr. Google Translate)
 odporuca sa agregacia (pred anonymizaciou) v pripade naozaj citlivych udajov (zdravotne zaznamy a pod.)
 ak ale nejaky zakon uklada povinnost zverejnit nejaky register cely ako je, tak sa zverejnuju aj osobne udaje
 CR: https://opendata.gov.cz/dokumenty:ochrana-osobních-údajů-a-gdpr : pekny dokument od Open Data teamu na MV CR (narodny kordinator Open Data pre CR)
 o.i. aj s peknym rozhodovacim diagramom
 a obodbne ako v BG, ak zakon uklada nejaky register zverejnit aj s osobnymi udajmi, tak sa zverejnuju
 Poznamka pomimo: GDPR samo o sebe nevyzera byt velkou zmenou z pohladu Open Data. Ako “velku zmenu” je to asi vnimane skor preto, ze az teraz sa zacne serioznejsie vymahat dodrzivanie regulacii (z ktorych mnohe existovali uz pred GDPR).
 Tot sumar mailov. Ale teraz mi teda chyba sumar v takej podobe, aby nejako nadvazoval na titulok vlakna. Nuz takto: V prvom rade ma buduci zakon o udajoch ujednotit “infozakon” so vsetkymi ostanymi zakonmi: o ochrane osobnych udajov, o Katastri, atd. Aby sa nestavalo, ze infozakon hovori zverenit a iny zakon tomu kladie prekazky.
 Lubor July 30, 2019, 12:08pm #3
 ÚPVII začalo pripravovať nový “Zákon o údajoch”. Je k tomu založená pracovná skupina, ktorá sa má stretávať raz týždenne. Riadi si to dátová kancelária.
 Už existuje určitý draft, bola k tomu prvá prezentácia: 1stretnutie_24072019.pptx (8.9 MB) (reálne obsah na str.5-8)
 Plán je postupovať nasledovne:
 “Malá verzia zákona”, ktorá by mala byť schválená vládou do 31.12.2019 (aj to však považujem za ... veľkú ambíciu)
 Potom legislatívny zámer “veľkého zákona”
 Potom celý veľký zákon
 Čiže teraz sa rieši tá “malá verzia”. Tá sa má týkať iba údajov spracúvaných verejnou správou a zrejme primárne osobných údajov. Pri témach čo sa majú riešiť sa spomínalo My Data a spracovanie údajov analytickými jednotkami. Nie je mi však jasné, či na toto treba nový zákon. Nový nápad je definícia “spracúvania údajov vo verejnom záujme”, sám som zvedavý čo to má byť.
 Draft zákona je tu: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZP7zvg0l-5isdNvd5ic1k8cExIXugVhWrwC4Ktr8l_A/edit?usp=sharing
 (hocikto tu môžete dávať komentáre, tento dokument sa priebežne mení)
 Ja si od začiatku tejto aktivity myslím, že “riešiť legislatívu” je fajn, ale nemali by sme teraz začať písaním paragrafov. Najskôr si povedzme témy na riešenie, čo vlastne chceme dosiahnuť, a potom zanalyzujme ich stav v už existujúcej legislatíve, keďže predpisov už je mrte aj teraz. Až na základe toho uvidíme či treba nový zákon, novelu, alebo možno aj nič...
 Lubor September 17, 2019, 2:12pm #4
 Aktuálny draft zákona:
 Zakon_o_udajoch_090919.docx (31.3 KB)
 03_dovodova_sprava_zákon o údajoch100919.docx (41.6 KB)
 Medzičasom prebehla predbežná informácia: https://www.slov-lex.sk/legislativne-procesy/SK/PI/2019/246 (S.D bol jediný subjekt čo aj k tomu niečo napísal ) a interné pripomienkové konanie na ÚPVII.
 Je to vcelku pokrok.
 Čo sa dnes na PS k tomu diskutovalo:
 asap začne MPK, dnes bolo posledné stretnutie PS k návrhu zákona pred MPK,
 nebude k tomu formálne hlasovanie PS, zákon je návrh ÚPVII,
 aj niektoré iné úrady ako ÚOŠS chcú mať analytické jednotky, špeciálne sa spomínalo mesto Bratislava, v tomto duchu trocha rozšírili okruh subjektov v zákone,
 otvorené údaje - Mis. spravodlivosti sa ozvalo, že v tomto návrhu sú aj nejaké veci k otvoreným údajom, ktoré však doteraz sú riešené v z.211/2000 (transpozícia smernice PSI), z čoho hrozí konflikt dvoch zákonov, sú za to, aby sa buď novelizoval z.211/2000, alebo celé OpenData sa vybrali do tohto zákona, s tým ja úplne súhlasím
 zvyšovanie kvality údajov: hoci dnes existujúce zákony predpokladajú že všetky registre/evidencie sú na 100% správne, ale
 s ÚOOÚ sa zložito diskutovalo, súčasné znenie im zatiaľ pripadá prijateľné, ale ešte to budú analyzovať - majú problém že by sa mohli osobné údaje príliš voľne používať
 sledujú čo robia iné krajiny a niektoré idú “radikálne dopredu” hoci im hrozia problémy “lebo GDPR” - v PS sú na toto rôzne názory, ja som za to ísť “na hranu” (takto sa to doslovne povedalo), teda pokiaľ ide o MyData, o ktorých sa tu bavíme už minimálne 4 roky
 IvanK September 18, 2019, 12:41pm #5
 udaje o fyzickych osobach su casto osobne udaje asi, nie ? ako potom tento zakon chce upraviť “práva fyzických osôb ...a povinnosti orgánov verejnej moci pri manipulácii s údajmi o fyzických osobách”, ked tu je GDPR ?
 Lubor October 4, 2019, 8:09pm #6
 Zákon o údajoch je v MPK, do 24.10.:
 https://www.slov-lex.sk/legislativne-procesy/SK/LP/2019/699
 Lubor October 4, 2019, 8:12pm #7
 @IvanK áno, o GDPR bola najväčšia diskusia pri príprave tohto zákona. Jasné že s ním musí byť zlučiteľný, ale to neznamená že žiadne iné pravidlá ako GDPR nemôžu existovať.
 Lubor October 28, 2019, 6:47am #8
 Takže za S.D som podal nasledovné pripomienky:
 Zakon o udajoch - pripomienky S.D.pdf
 K §3 písm. i)
 Obyčajná pripomienka
 Navrhujeme znenie písm.i) zmeniť na nasledovné: “i) dátovým kurátorom poverená osoba orgánu verejnej moc, ktorá vykonáva úlohy podľa tohto zákona”
 Úlohy dátového kurátora sú podrobne rozpísané v tomto zákone, nie je pteto potrebné špecifikovať ich opäť v definícii. Naopak, takáto definícia môže reálne obmedziť kompetencie dátového kurátora.
 K §5, ods.1, písm. a)
 Žiadame písm.a) vypustiť.
 Nie je dôvod, aby dátový kurátor mal prístup ku všetkým evidovaným údajom a ani to nie je nevyhnutne potrebné na výkon jeho činností. Štandardom dobrej praxe je, že v citlivých evidenciách nemá prístup “ku všetkým údajom” nikto. Ak takýto prístup dátový kurátor bude mať, vidíme v tom zásadné zvýšenie rizika neoprávneného prístupu k údajom, a to nielen ako vedomú činnosť dátového kurátora, ale napr. aj pokusmi o zneužitie jeho používateľského prístupu iným útočníkom.
 K §5 ods.2
 Žiadame do §5, ods.2 doplniť nové písm. g) s nasledovným znením: “g) zabezpečuje vykonanie povinností orgánu verejnej moci ktorým je poverený súvisiace s opakovaným použitím informácií podľa osobitného predpisu x)”, a poznámka pod čiarou x) znie: “§21b až §21l zákon č.211/2000”
 Keďže dátový kurátor má špecifické znalosti týkajúce sa údajov spracúvaných v “jeho” organizácii, je vhodné aby zabezpečoval aj činnosti súvisiace s opakovaným použitím údajov.
 Žiadame do §6 vložiť nové písm. f) s nasledovným znením: “f) sprístupňovať vo forme otvorených údajov informácie poskytované na opakované použitie údajov podľa osobitného predpisu x)”, poznámka pod čiarou x) je rovnaká ako v pripomienke k §5 ods.2. Doterajšie písm. f) až i) v §6 sa premenujú na písm. g) až j).
 Údaje, ktoré sú sprístupnené na opakovaného použitie v zmysle z.211/2000 je mimoriadne vhodné zverejniť aj ako otvorené údaje, čím bude efektívnejšie naplnený práve cieľ opakovaného použitia. Zároveň ak by v §6 zostala povinnosť publikovať otvorené údaje iba vo vzťahu k publikačnému minimu, s praxi by to znamenalo, že OVM budú zverejňovať ešte menej údajov ako v súčasnosti.
 K §7 ods.1
 Žiadame z definície mojich údajov v ods.1 vypusiť nasledovnú časť “ktoré boli zaradené medzi moje údaje zverejnením vo vestníku a sú prístupné pre fyzickú osobu alebo právnickú osobu cez aplikačné rozhranie v strojovo-spracovateľnom formáte”
 Z definície majú byť za moje údaje považované všetky údaje, ktoré spĺňajú definičné znaky v návrhu vyjadrené v ods.1 písm.a) až c). Ku všetkým týmto údajom sa majú vzťahovať práva FO/PO. Chápeme že nie všetky povinnosti uvedené v tomto zákone vo vzťahu o mojim údajom môžu OVM plniť hneď, preto bolo zavedené zverejňovanie vo vestníku. V súlade s touto logikou má byť obmedzenie vložené do časti týkajúcej sa povinnosti OVM, nie do definície.
 K §7 ods.1 písm.a) až c)
 Žiadame vytvoriť samostatné kategórie pre oblasť údajov podľa písm.a) a podľa písm.b) a c).
 Rozsah práv a povinností, ako aj vzťah FO/PO k údajov podľa písm.a) a podľa písm.b) a c) je rôzny.
 K §7 ods.1 písm.c)
 Žiadame z písm.c) vypustiť slová “v rámci elektronického výkonu verejnej moci”.
 Jednak podľa z.305/2013 sú všetky OVM povinné vykonávať verejnú moc elektronicky, t.j. predkladané znenie písm. c) je mätúce. Zároveň vynechaním “elektronickosti” nevzniká riziko nadmernej záťaže OVM ktoré snáď sú “neelektronizované”, keďže výkon povinností vo vzťahu o mojim údajom je viazaný na publikovanie vo vestníku.
 K §8 ods.1
 Žiadame v prvej vete ods.1 slová “o ktorej sa vedú moje údaje” nahradiť na “ktorej sa týkajú moje údaje”.
 Koncept Moje údaje sa vzťahuje na údaje ktoré sa týkajú určitej FO/PO, nielen o ktorej sa vedú. Špecificky v tomto prípade vidno nevhodnosť spoločného uvažovania “mojich údajov” v zmysle písm.a) až c) v §6 ods.1, keďže podľa písm.b) a c) už z definície vidno, že nemusí ísť o konanie v ktorom sa o vedú údaje o príslušnej FO/PO.
 K §8 ods.1 písm.c)
 Žiadame za slová “orgán verejnej moci” doplniť slová “a funkčné zaradenie jeho zamestnanca”.
 Dôležité je, aby v rámci konceptu moje údaje bolo vidno nielen “ktorý úrad”, ale aj rolu jeho zamestnanca, ktorý k údajom pristupoval.
 K §8 ods.2 písm.a)
 Žiadame slová "ktoré o fyzickej osobe alebo právnickej osobe vedie a k ich obsahu, cez aplikačné rozhranie " nahradiť na “ktoré sa fyzickej osoby alebo právnickej osoby týkajú a k ich obsahu v elektronickej forme, a to aj prostredníctvom verejne dostupného aplikačného rozhrania”.
 Nahradenie “ktoré sa o osobe vedú” za “ktoré sa osoby týkajú” viď. odôvodnenie k §8 ods.1 písm.c). Moje údaje majú byť prístupné nielen cez API, ale aj cez GUI, na čo je vhodné ponechať minimálne oprávnenie. Spojenie “verejne dostupné aplikačné rozhranie” je už definované v z.305/2013.
 K §8 ods.2 písm.c)
 Žiadame znenie písm.c) nahradiť nasledovným: “c) zaznamenávať v potrebnom rozsahu údaje na účely naplnenia práva fyzickej osoby alebo právnickej osoby podľa §8 ods.1 písm.c)”
 Nie je vhodné opisovať určitý rozsah údajov a oprávnenie duplicitne. Odpocúčame aj spôsob realizácie tohto ustanovenia vložiť do vyhlášky, ktorú podľa tohto zákona vydá ÚPVII.
 K §8 ods.2 písm.d)
 Žiadame vypusiť písm.d)
 Do vestníka má zaraďovať údaje ÚPVII, nie orgán verejnej moci. Ak zostane pôvodný mechanizmus, nebudú reálne vyhlásené žiadne moje údaje.
 K §8
 Navrhujeme vložiť do §8 nový ods.3 s nasledovným znením: “(3) Orgán verejnej moci začne plniť povinnosť podľa ods.2 písm.a) vo vzťahu k určitému typu mojich údajov najneskôr do 12 mesiacov od ich zverejnenia vo vestníku”
 Táto zmena je spojená so zmenou k §7 ods.1.
 K §9 písm.d)
 Žiadame písm d) zmeniť na nasledovné znenie: “d) zverejňuje vo vestníku typy mojich údajov vo vzťahu k §8 ods.3 postupom podľa §7 ods.2”
 Viď. zmeny v §8 ods.3 a §7 ods.1 a ods.2. Súčinnosť s OVM ktorý je správcom registra alebo evidencie údajov stačí vyriešiť vo vyhláške. Ak má byť nejaká povinná “dohoda” s OVM, žiadne moje údaje nebudú vyhlásené.
 K §11 ods.1
 V ods.1 navrhujeme slová “v podobe štruktúrovaných údajov, ktorá umožňuje ich ďalšie automatizované spracovanie” nahradiť za “ako otvorené údaje”
 Keď už tento zákon definuje otvorené údaje, je vhodné tento konštrukt aj používať.
 K celému zákomu
 Viaceré časti zákona podľa nášho názoru patria skôr do osobitných predpisov, v ktorých sa príslušné inštitúty definujú. Inter alia ide aj o §9 písm. b),c) ktoré patria skôr do zákona č.305/2013 alebo §10 písm.c) a d), ktoré patria skôr do zákona o ITVS.
 Lubor October 24, 2019, 11:15pm #9
 Pozrel som si, ako dopadlo podávanie pripomienok k tomuto zákonu v MPK. Predkladateľ bude zrejme dosť sklamaný.
 Čítanie pripomienok je veľmi poučné a prezrádza súčasnú mimoriadnu mizériu verejnej správy, minimálne v eGov. Zopár perál:
 hoci k tomuto mesiace bežala pracovná skupina, kde väčšina zástupcov úradov sedela ako voš pod chrastou, “zrazu” sa v MPK vyrojilo mrte pripomienok - spolu cca. 550, z toho mrte zásadných
 veľa úradov chce doplniť seba do výnimiek na koho sa zákon nevzťahuje, aby teda nič robiť nemuseli (ale sú tam aj oprávnené výnimky) - z klasík spomeňme ÚJDSR, alebo ÚGKK že celý kataster nehnuteľností má ísť zo zákona von, lebo “v ňou sú najmä osobné údaje” - pozdravujem zabrzdenú partiu na tomto úrade, to sa už ináč ani nedá nazvať
 ÚOOU, s ktorým sa veľa rokovalo a nakoniec vraj boli zo zákonom v pohode, dalo veľa zásadných pripomienok, vrátane návrhu na kompletné vyhodenie MyData zo zákona, pozri celý ich text prečo. Zjavne nechápu čo je to “záujem dotknutých osôb”. Pozdravujem @juraj.bardy a ostatných s prostoduchou predstavou ako sa dáta nakopírujú do digi.me a tam “si to človek bude riadiť”.
 ŠÚ SR “žiada stiahnuť predložený materiál návrhu zákona ... a vytvoriť medzirezortnú pracovnú skupinu zloženú ... vrátane ŠÚ SR...”. Skupina bola, na PS Lepšie údaje zástupca ŠÚ chodí. Prečo táto náhla amnézia?
 Ešte aj MV SR píše, že z RFO sa nedajú ľuďom posielať notifikácie pri zmene údajov, lebo “by to bolo mätúce”. Mám pocit že o iných svojich evidenciách (napr. vozidlá) nepíšu iba preto, lebo nepochopili na čo všetko sa MyData vzťahuje. Ich zástupca na PS obvykle aj chodí.
 Návrh zákona je minimálne na toto volebné obdobie zabitý.
 ObcanSK October 25, 2019, 9:03am #10
 Lubor, pekne vystihnutý komentár. Na tento proces je jediný bič a to zverejňovanie zápisníc z PS a stretnutí na úradoch, kde explicitne by sa malo potvrdzovať, že zástupca úradu nema pripomienky.
 Zároveň by mal takýto zákon určite prejsť aj osobnými konzultáciami, teda proces MPK pri zásadných pripomienkach bude pokračovať stretnutiami s úradmi, kde by sa to malo vysvetliť. A tieto zápisnice určite by sa mali zverejňovať, aby sa ukázal úprimný pohľad na to posunúť veci dopredu.
 Stačí na každom stretnutí dať otázky z GDPR a koľko ich to bude stáť, ak si to každý úrad bude robiť po svojom...
 Ja si myslím, že je to dosť zložitá téma a PS sú malé forum, kam chodia skôr technickejší ľudia, nie vecniari, ktorí dávajú ale zase pripomienky zvyčajne do MPK...
 Treba variť dalej a nevzdávať to, každá nová iterácia obohatená o zapracovanie relevantných pripomienok z úradov alebo zdôvodnenie, prečo nie, je lepšia ako predošlá
 robert.kuchar October 25, 2019, 10:28am #11
 Na tento proces je jediný bič
 nemyslim ze na toto je tento bic vhodny.
 Pomozu len 2 princípy: 1) osobna zodpovednosť a exemplarne tresty. 2) kvalitní ľudia na zodpovedné posty.
 vliv2 October 25, 2019, 11:05am #12
 aj svetovy mier by sa hodil
 skutocne problemy su spomenute vyssie, PS je casto obsadene ludmi “ktori maju cas” ergo menej kvalitnymi pripadne su to ludia co maju technicke zameranie ale nie su specialisti na temy mimo IT.
 MPK naopak zahrnie vsetkych a ti casto az vtedy zistia ze sa nieco deje. Ukazuje to skor ze niektore temy treba komunikovat a manazovat inak, proaktivne vtiahnut do rozhodovania inych ludi ako clenovia PS.
 A nie sa potom ex post cudovat ako to ze nechapu aky je to skvely navrh
 Hank October 25, 2019, 11:09am #13
 Tak vzhladom na harmonogram schodzi NR SR to bolo jasne uz ked tam nestihli vladou schvaleny navrh zakona dorucit do 27. 9. Teraz aj keby k tomu navrhu nedostali ani jednu pripomienku, tak by museli jedine lamat leg. pravidla a ist cez skratene konanie.
 Treba to brat ako prve kolo pripomienok k navrhu, ktory po volbach znova hodia na MPK.
 hanecak October 29, 2019, 11:09pm #14
 Robi sa, ale ... ved pozri, napr. pre PS1:
 https://wiki.vicepremier.gov.sk/#all-updates
 https://wiki.vicepremier.gov.sk/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=40272511
 https://metais.vicepremier.gov.sk/standardization/groupdetail/d571d0d0-870d-4da0-b68c-c7c0b8914e55?page=1&count=20&sorting[code]=desc
 https://metais.vicepremier.gov.sk/standardization/draftslist?page=1&count=20&filter[customSearch]=%7B%22draftInterpreter%22%3A%22%22%2C%22draftWorkGroup%22%3A%22%22%2C%22standardRequestState%22%3A%22%22%2C%22fromDate%22%3A%22%22%2C%22toDate%22%3A%22%22%2C%22fullText%22%3A%22%22%2C%22requestChannel%22%3A%22%22%7D&sorting[createdAt]=desc
 https://metais.vicepremier.gov.sk/standardization/voteslist?page=1&count=20&sorting[effectiveFrom]=desc
 (tam je nejaky cudny framework, ak by nesli deep-linky, tak treba tukat z hlavnej stranky “Standardizacia ... > Stand. proces > Komisia”, “... Pracovne skupiny”, “... Zoznam hlasovani”)
 kvalitní ľudia na zodpovedné posty.


text:
El secreto de la mansión, en inglés, Knife Edge es una película de suspenso británica de 2009 dirigida por Anthony Hickox y protagonizada por Natalie Press, Hugh Bonneville y Tamsin Egerton .
 Sinopsis
 Una exitosa corredora de bolsa de Wall Street regresa a Gran Bretaña con su familia, pero su nuevo hogar en el campo esconde un secreto inquietante. Su comprensión de este secreto se ve complicada por las dificultades de su esposo y la pérdida de su trabajo. Al tratar de ocultar esto, usa gaslighting para engañarla haciéndola creer que se está volviendo loca.
 Tobias, el nuevo amigo de su hijo Thomas, tiene el mismo nombre que el niño que fue asesinado en la casa hace 30 años. Este difícil y hábil desdoblamiento desdibuja lo que es verdad y lo que es ilusión.
 Producción
 Anthony Hickox dirigió el thriller y fue producido por Fiona Combe, Pippa Cross y Janette Day, por Seven Arts Films. Supuso el regreso de Hickox al género de terror. Este filmó la película en Londres y los condados de origen, Inglaterra, Reino Unido. Se basó en un guion de Fiona Combe, Anthony Hickox y Robb Squire.
 Lanzamiento
 Se estrenó el 19 de octubre de 2009 en el Reino Unido a través de Scanbox Entertainment y en Estados Unidos el 20 de abril de 2010.
 Banda sonora
 La partitura fue compuesta por el fundador de Sphere Studios, Guy Farley.
 Referencias
 Enlaces externos
 Películas de terror y suspenso de los años 2000
 Películas de 2009


text:
Segarcea este un oraș în județul Dolj, Oltenia, România.
 Numele orașului
 Originea cuvântului Segarcea provine din îmbinarea a doua cuvinte: "seges" = câmp, teren, pământ productiv în limba latina și "arcesitus" = cel cautat, cel dorit, cel visat. Prin combinarea acestor doua cuvinte s-a ajuns la forma "Segarcea", adică "Pământul dorit", sau "Pământul mult visat" de acei fugari care rătăciseră mult prin păduri. Semnificația cuvântului "Segarcea" ar putea fi, deci: sat îndepărtat, sat al oamenilor fugari, satul cel dorit, cel corespunzător dorințelor lor, având o poziție strategică și fiind înconjurat de terenuri roditoare. Prima forma a numelui localității întâlnită în documente a fost Segarcea. De-a lungul timpului localitatea a purtat diferite forme ale numelui Segarcea: Sigarcea, Sagarcea, Segarcea.
 Geografie
 Orașul Segarcea se află în zona de câmpie, la vest de Jiu, la de Craiova și la de Calafat.
 Condiții climatice
 Orașul Segarcea se încadrează într-o zona cu climat temperat-continental cu o temperatura medie anuală de 11oC, o temperatură minimă absolută de -30oC si o temperatura maxima absoluta de 41oC.
 Cantitatea medie a precipitațiilor este de circa 510mm/an. Cantitatea maximă de precipitații a fost la Segarcea de peste 770mm iar cea minimă de 255mm.
 Durata medie a intervalului de timp fără îngheț este de circa 220 de zile. Numărul zilelor de vară cu temperaturi mai mari de 25oC înregistrate în perioada 15 mai - 15 septembrie este de circa 75 de zile.
 Vântul dominant are direcția ENE-VSV.
 Ca rezultat al condițiilor geo-climatice, solul caracteristic este cernoziom-levigat, foarte favorabil dezvoltării agriculturii (cultura de vita de vie și culturi mari agricole).
 Economie
 Segarcea dispune de unități industriale din domeniul alimentar și chimic și este un puternic centru agricol (viticol). Pe primul loc, se află producerea vinului (zaibăr și vin alb). Este renumită prin podgoriile sale și crama Segarcea, care produce felurite soiuri de vin, dar mai ales "Coniacul de Segarcea".
 Istoric
 Descoperirea pe teritoriul localității Segarcea a unor obiecte: o moneda romană datând din timpul împăratului Hadrianus Augustus, doua fusaiole, un inel cu sigiliu ( o pasăre de o rară subtilitate realizata doar din sase liniuțe) un cap de zimbru pirogravat pe os (despre care profesorul arheolog C. Nicolaescu - Plopsor spunea că ar putea fi un unicat pentru țara noastră) - denota ca Segarcea a fost, indiscutabil, o veche asezare geto-dacica si o mare necropolă romană.
 Prima mențiune documentară despre existența unei moșii la Șegarcea este cea din actul din 10 iunie 1415, scris la Arges, în timpul domniei lui Mircea cel Bătrân. Prin acest document, domnitorul întărește unor boieri moșiile. Printre boierii care au semnat actul se găsește și un boier cu numele "Dragomir de la Segarcea". Existenta unei moșii Segarcea, presupune și existenta unei comunități umane care lucra pe aceasta moșie, comunitate care a format un sat ce a luat numele acestei moși. Bătrânii spun ca, la început, satul se găsea în punctul denumit Valea Oanii. Pe moșia Segarcea s-a afla un schit care, mai târziu s-a transformat în mănăstire. Legenda spune ca o boieroaica pe nume Sultanica ar fi construit pe locul de azi al mănăstirii o bisericuța de lemn pentru a atrage pe moșia să locuitorii din împrejurimi. Se presupune că și populația care-și ducea existenta în punctul Valea Oanii s-a mutat în jurul mănăstirii, pe moșia Segarcea, locul pe care este așezata astăzi, localitatea Segarcea.
 La 15 septembrie 1557 a fost emis la Târgoviște, de către cancelaria lui Pătrascu cel Bun, un document prin care este amintit și satul Șegarcea. Dacă în anul 1415 se amintea doar de existenta unei moșii cu numele de Șegarcea, iar în 1557 se amintește și de existenta unei localități cu numele de Șegarcea, se poate trage concluzia că satul ar fi putut lua ființa numai în acest interval de timp. Principala ocupație a locuitorilor acestor locuri era creșterea animalelor, în principal a oilor, dar și a cailor și a cornutelor. Până la sfârșitul secolului al XVII-lea pricipala cultura a fost meiul, iar odată cu introducerea porumbului în cultura, acesta a devenit pricipala plantă cultivată folosită alături de grâu, pentru alimentație dar și pentru hrana animalelor. Locuitorii acestor timpuri se ocupau și cu cultivarea vitei-de-vie.
 Către sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea, terenurile viticole se înmulțesc și ocupa suprafețe din ce în ce mai mari.În epoca fanariota, mai precis prin 1792 – se scrie în Anaforeaua Divanului - ca locuitorilor Segarcei si Garcenilor li se acorda dreptul să organizeze târguri și bâlciuri, unde puteau comercializa produsele cerealiere, viticole precum și produsele animaliere. La 1794, domnitorul Moruzzi acorda si Mănăstirii Segarcea dreptul de a ține bâlci pe moșia mănăstirii, în satul Segarcea.Locuitorii așezării Segarcea au fost rumâni ai domnitorilor sau boierilor, putând fi vânduți odată cu moșia și care aveau obligația principală față de stăpânul moșiei să lucreze pământul. Pământurile mănăstirii erau lucrate până la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea, de robii țigani.Mai târziu, în orânduirea capitalista, principala ramura a economiei era agricultura, pământul fiind lucrat de către clacași. Se cultivau grâul și porumbul, iar în jurul mănăstirii se aflau întinse livezi de pomi fructiferi și plantații de vii. În anul 1854, clăcașii din Segarcea s-au răsculat împotriva nedreptăților la care erau supuși de către administrația moșiei, amenințând cu spargerea satului. Prin reforma agrara din 1864, țăranii clacași din Segarcea sunt împroprietăriți și eliberați de sarcinile feudale. În Războiul de Independenta de la 1877, locuitorii din localitatea Segarcea și-au adus o importanta contribuție, fie prin participarea directa cu forțe omenești, fie prin aprovizionarea armatei cu hrana pentru ostași și furaje pentru cai. Este demn de amintit ca printre jertfele omenești ale acestui război se număra si ostașul Ion Mitrache, locuitor al Segarcei - primul ostaș roman căzut în luptele de la Rahova. Pe teritoriul localității s-a aflat și un depozit de colectare a alimentelor pentru armata. În urma participării la război, au fost împroprietărite peste 500 de familii de pe moșia Segarcea.
 În aceasta perioada se preconiza înființarea aici a unei comune, fapt ce nu s-a realizat deoarece, peste câțiva ani, în 1884 se va înființa Domeniul Coroanei Regale a României. Acest Domeniu a fost al doilea ca mărime, după cel de la Banloc - Timiș. Forța de munca pentru acest Domeniu era asigurata de locuitorii lipsiți de pământ sau cu pământ puțin din Segarcea și din satele vecine.
 La primul război mondial, locuitorii localității Segarcea și-au adus o contribuție însemnată, dând numeroase jertfe pe câmpul de lupta. Drept dovada a acestui fapt sta Monumentul Eroilor ridicat în cinstea celor și-au dat viata în perioada 1916-1919.
 În timpul celui de-al doilea război mondial dintre anii 1939-1945, la Segarcea a fost concentrata Divizia a XIV-a Infanterie-Instrucție, care în noaptea de 25-26 august 1944 a dus acțiuni energice pentru oprirea și dezarmarea ostașilor germani, luând prizonieri un număr de 42 ofițeri și ostași germani.
 Pe teritoriul orașului Segarcea, în punctul numit "Aeroport", în timpul războiului s-a aflat un post de radio-ascultare și observare aeriana german.
 Victoria asupra ocupantului german a adus schimbări radicale în viata localității Segarcea. Administrația Domeniului Coroanei a devenit proprietate de stat, transformată în IAS-ul Segarcea, care după Revoluția din decembrie 1989 a fost privatizat, devenind astăzi S.C. Cervina S.A. Segarcea. În anul 1945 a fost înființata Stațiunea de Mașini și Tractoare, s-au naționalizat moara de cereale, presa de ulei și depozitul de petrol.
 În anul 1949 s-a terminat construcția silozului de cereale care, astăzi poarta denumirea de S.C. Cerealcom S.A. Segarcea. Începând cu anul 1950, localitatea Segarcea devine centru de raion.
 După noua împărțire administrativă a României din 1968, ca urmare a dezvoltării sale anterioare, localitatea Segarcea capătă statutul de oraș. După aceasta data, Segarcea devine un puternic centru industrial, comercial, civic, cultural și important centru de tranziție rutiera.
 Demografie
 În anul 1965, Segarcea avea o populație de circa 8.550 locuitori, iar în anul 2011 orașul Segarcea avea 7.019 locuitori.
 Conform recensământului efectuat în 2011, populația orașului Segarcea se ridică la locuitori, în scădere față de recensământul anterior din 2002, când se înregistraseră de locuitori. Majoritatea locuitorilor sunt români (84,34%), cu o minoritate de romi (11,63%). Pentru 3,95% din populație, apartenența etnică nu este cunoscută.
 Din punct de vedere confesional, majoritatea locuitorilor sunt ortodocși (95,38%). Pentru 4,07% din populație, nu este cunoscută apartenența confesională.
 Politică și administrație
 Orașul Segarcea este administrat de un primar și un consiliu local compus din 15 consilieri. Primarul, , de la , este în funcție din . Începând cu alegerile locale din 2020, consiliul local are următoarea componență pe partide politice:
 În Segarcea se află Judecătoria Segarcea, Societatea Domeniul Coroanei, Spital, BRD, CEC ș. a.
 Învățământ
 Segarcea dispune de 1 liceu cu diferite profile: matematică-informatică, filologie, agricol, tehnologic, o școală și 3 grădinițe.
 Obiective turistice
 Mănăstirea Segarcea (sec. XVI - XIX); DJ-II-a-B-08368
 Biserica „Adormirea Maicii Domnului” (sec. XVII, ref.sec. XVIII; modificată 1903); DJ-II-m-B-08368.01
 Vezi și
 Domeniile Coroanei României
 Note
 Legături externe
 Primaria Segarcea
 Segarcea
 Segarcea
 Segarcea


text:
 28.4.2014
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 C 129/11
 Lūgums sniegt prejudiciālu nolēmumu, ko 2014. gada 17. janvārī iesniedza Bundespatentgericht (Vācija) – BGW Marketing- & Management–Service GmbH/Bodo Scholz
 (Lieta C-20/14)
 2014/C 129/14
 Tiesvedības valoda – vācu
 Iesniedzējtiesa
 Bundespatentgericht
 Pamatlietas puses
 Prasītāja: BGW Marketing- & Management–Service GmbH
 Atbildētājs: Bodo Scholz
 Prejudiciālais jautājums
 Vai Direktīvas 2008/95/EK (1) 4. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkts ir jāinterpretē tādējādi, ka identisku un līdzīgu preču un pakalpojumu gadījumā sajaukšanas iespēju no sabiedrības viedokļa var atzīt tad, ja atšķirtspējīga burtu virkne, kas veido agrāku, vidēji atšķirtspējīgu vārdisku/grafisku apzīmējumu, tiek iekļauta trešās personas jaunākā vārdiskā apzīmējumā tādā veidā, ka šai burtu virknei tiek pievienota ar to saistīta aprakstoša vārdu kombinācija, kas burtu virkni paskaidro kā aprakstošo vārdu saīsinājumu?
 (1) Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 22. oktobra Direktīva 2008/95/EK, ar ko tuvina dalībvalstu tiesību aktus attiecībā uz preču zīmēm (OV L 299, 25. lpp.).


text:
Armenska tajna armada za osvoboditev Armenije (ASALA, francosko Armée Secrète Arménienne de Libération de l’Arménie, angleško Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) je nekdanja teroristična skupina. Delovala je tudi pod imeni Orlyška skupina (The Orly Group) in Organizacija 3. oktober (3rd October Organization).
 Marksistično-leninistično teroristično skupino sta leta 1975 ustanovila Hagop Tarakčjan in Hagop Hagopjan, ki jo je tudi vodil. Njen namen je bil prisiliti turške oblasti, naj priznajo svojo vlogo v armenskem genocidu leta 1915 ter se oddolžijo preživelim oz. njihovim družinam in se odpovedo delu turškega ozemlja, kjer bi nastala avtonomna armenska država in se združila z Armensko SSR.
 Dejavnost skupine se je pričela z bombnimi napadi in atentati na turške cilje. Prvi bombni napad so izvedli na urad Svetovnega cerkvenega sveta (angl. World Council of Churches - WCC) v Bejrutu. Njihova prva smrtna žrtev, za katero so prevzeli odgovornost, je bil turški diplomat Oktay Cerit, ubit 16. februarja 1976 v Parizu. Skupinin manifest v 8 točkah je bil objavljen leta 1981.
 Najhujši bombni napad so izvedli 7. avgusta 1982, ko so na letališču v Ankari ubili 9 ljudi in jih 70 ranili. V bombnem napadu 15. julija 1983 na pariškem letališču Orly je bilo ubitih 8 in ranjenih več kot 50 ljudi. Po tem napadu se je skupina razcepila na »Nacionaliste« (ASALA-Militant) in »Ljudsko gibanje« (ASALA-Mouvement Révolutionnaire).
 V 80. letih je skupina dobivala pomoč iz Sirije in Libije, morda tudi iz Francije in Sovjetske zveze. Povezana je bila s Palestinsko osvobodilno organizacijo (PLO), Ljudsko fronto za osvoboditev Palestine (PFLP) in Splošnim poveljstvom PFLP (PFLP-GC). Izraelska zasedba Libanona leta 1982 je močno prizadela delo skupine. Preselila se je v Sirijo in se s tem oddaljila od PLO. Napetosti med skupinama so na koncu privedle do tega, da je PLO leta 1983 francoskim obveščevalnim službam izročila dokumente s podrobnostmi o Asalinih operativcih.
 Hagop Tarakčjan je že leta 1980 umrl za rakom, Hagop Hagopjan pa je bil 25. aprila 1988 ubit na svojem domu v Atenah. Skupina, kjer je prihajalo do notranjih razkolov, ni več udarila, je pa vzpostavila nekaj povezav z ravno tako protiturško Delavsko stranko Kurdistana (PKK).
 Glej tudi
 seznam terorističnih skupin
 Zunanje povezave
 Terrorwatch
 Stran na Geocities.com
 Zgodovina Armenije
 Komunistične teroristične skupine
 Nacionalistične teroristične skupine
 Ustanovitve leta 1975
 Ukinitve leta 1986