text:
 5.12.2015
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 L 321/17
 REGOLAMENTO DI ESECUZIONE (UE) 2015/2257 DELLA COMMISSIONE
 del 4 dicembre 2015
 recante iscrizione di una denominazione nel registro delle specialità tradizionali garantite [Кайсерован врат Тракия (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) (STG)]
 LA COMMISSIONE EUROPEA,
 visto il trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea,
 visto il regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 21 novembre 2012, sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari (1), in particolare l'articolo 52, paragrafo 3, lettera a),
 considerando quanto segue:
 (1)
 A norma dell'articolo 50, paragrafo 2, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, la domanda di registrazione della denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) presentata dalla Bulgaria è stata pubblicata nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 (2).
 (2)
 L'11 giugno 2014 la Commissione ha ricevuto una notifica di opposizione da parte della Camera di commercio di Kayseri (Turchia), cui ha fatto seguito una dichiarazione di opposizione motivata inviata via email il 14 agosto 2014. L'articolo 51, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 stabilisce che la notifica di opposizione deve essere seguita da una dichiarazione di opposizione motivata entro due mesi. La dichiarazione di opposizione motivata è pervenuta oltre il termine di due mesi. Pertanto, la Commissione considera irricevibile l'opposizione della Camera di commercio di Kayseri (Turchia).
 (3)
 Il 12 giugno 2014 la Grecia ha inviato una notifica di opposizione corredata di una dichiarazione di opposizione motivata. Nell'opposizione, fondata sull'articolo 21, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, si affermava che in parte della regione Tracia appartenente alla Grecia, la registrazione della denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) avrebbe pregiudicato il diritto dei produttori greci di utilizzare il nome geografico «Θράκη» (Tracia). Per diversi prodotti a base di carne è legittimamente utilizzata la designazione «Tracia» nelle denominazioni di vendita.
 (4)
 La Commissione ha esaminato l'opposizione della Grecia e l'ha ritenuta ricevibile ai sensi dell'articolo 21, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012. Con lettera del 10 ottobre 2014 la Commissione ha pertanto invitato le parti interessate ad avviare idonee consultazioni al fine di giungere a un accordo conformemente alle rispettive procedure interne.
 (5)
 La Bulgaria e la Grecia hanno raggiunto un accordo, che è stato notificato alla Commissione il 5 maggio 2015.
 (6)
 Nella misura in cui è conforme alle disposizioni del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 e ad altre normative dell'UE, il contenuto dell'accordo concluso tra la Bulgaria e la Grecia può essere preso in considerazione.
 (7)
 Alla luce dell'articolo 18, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, al fine di distinguere i prodotti che condividono un nome analogo e onde evitare ogni rischio di indurre in errore il consumatore sulla provenienza del prodotto, la Bulgaria e la Grecia hanno convenuto che la denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) sia accompagnata dall'affermazione «fatto secondo la tradizione della Bulgaria».
 (8)
 Le parti hanno altresì convenuto che il presente regolamento contenga la precisazione secondo cui l'uso del nome geografico «Tracia» non deve essere riservato al «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya).
 (9)
 Alla luce di quanto precede, la Commissione ritiene che la denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) dovrebbe essere accompagnata dall'affermazione «fatto secondo la tradizione della Bulgaria».
 (10)
 Inoltre, è opportuno precisare che, fatto salvo l'articolo 24, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, la registrazione della denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) fatto secondo la tradizione della Bulgaria non impedisce ai produttori di utilizzare il nome geografico «Tracia», comprese le sue traduzioni, nell'etichettatura o nelle presentazioni all'interno del territorio dell'Unione europea, conformemente al diritto dell'UE e in particolare al regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (3) relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli alimenti ai consumatori,
 HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO:
 Articolo 1
 La denominazione «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya) (STG) è registrata.
 La denominazione di cui al primo comma identifica un prodotto della classe 1.2. Prodotti a base di carne (cotti, salati, affumicati ecc.) di cui all'allegato XI del regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 668/2014 della Commissione (4).
 Articolo 2
 La denominazione di cui all'articolo 1 è accompagnata dall'affermazione «fatto secondo la tradizione della Bulgaria». Il disciplinare consolidato figura nell'allegato del presente regolamento.
 Articolo 3
 Il nome geografico «Tracia», comprese le sue traduzioni, può continuare ad essere usato nell'etichettatura o nelle presentazioni all'interno del territorio dell'Unione, a condizione che siano rispettati i principi e le norme applicabili nell'ordinamento giuridico dell'Unione.
 Articolo 4
 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il ventesimo giorno successivo alla pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea.
 Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 4 dicembre 2015
 Per la Commissione
 Il presidente
 Jean-Claude JUNCKER
 (1) GU L 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.
 (2) GU C 75 del 14.3.2014, pag. 16.
 (3) Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2011, relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004 della Commissione (GU L 304 del 22.11.2011, pag. 18).
 (4) Regolamento di esecuzione (UE) n. 668/2014 della Commissione, del 13 giugno 2014, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari (GU L 179 del 19.6.2014, pag. 36).
 ALLEGATO
 DOMANDA DI REGISTRAZIONE DI UNA SPECIALITÀ TRADIZIONALE GARANTITA (STG)
 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 509/2006 DEL CONSIGLIO (1)
 «КАЙСЕРОВАН ВРАТ ТРАКИЯ» (KAYSEROVAN VRAT TRAKIYA)
 N. CE: BG-TSG-0007-01018 — 23.7.2012
 1. Nome e indirizzo dell'associazione richiedente
 Nome dell'associazione o organizzazione (se pertinente): Associazione «Tradicionni surovo-susheni mesni produkti» Stssmp (Prodotti tradizionali a base di carne essiccata cruda)
 —
 Indirizzo: bul. Shipchenski prohod, n. 240, scala A, app. 6, III piano, Sofia 1111
 —
 Tel. +359 29712671
 —
 Fax +359 29733069
 —
 Indirizzo di posta elettronica: office@amb-bg.com
 2. Stato membro o paese terzo
 Repubblica di Bulgaria
 3. Specifica di prodotto
 3.1. Nome (nomi) da registrare [articolo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione
 (2)
 ]
 «Кайсерован врат Тракия» (Kayserovan vrat Trakiya)
 La denominazione è accompagnata dall'affermazione «fatto secondo la tradizione della Bulgaria».
 3.2. Indicare se il nome
 ☒
 è specifico di per sé
 ☐
 indica la natura specifica del prodotto agricolo o alimentare
 La denominazione «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» compare per la prima volta nel 1980 nel documento normativo per la sua produzione, la norma settoriale 18-71996-80, elaborata da due scienziati bulgari, Dzhevizov e Kiseva. Il prodotto è diventato rapidamente popolare e viene tradizionalmente fabbricato con questo nome in tutto il paese da trent'anni. La denominazione è già in sé specifica in quanto contiene i principali elementi costitutivi del prodotto descritti al punto 3.6.
 3.3. Indicare se è richiesta la riserva del nome a norma dell'articolo 13, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006
 ☒
 Registrazione con riserva del nome
 ☐
 Registrazione senza l'uso riservato del nome
 3.4. Tipo di prodotto
 Classe 1.2: Prodotti a base di carne (cotti, salati, affumicati ecc.)
 3.5. Descrizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare che reca il nome indicato al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]
 Il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» è una specialità a base di carne cruda e stagionata non sminuzzata. Si prepara con carne fresca disossata del collo di maiale che viene pressata più volte durante la stagionatura e cosparsa di «kayserov», una miscela composta di spezie naturali e vino bianco. Può essere consumato direttamente da tutti i gruppi di consumatori.
 Caratteristiche fisiche — Forma e dimensioni
 —
 Forma cilindrica allungata e appiattita con uno spessore di 3-4 cm.
 Caratteristiche chimiche
 —
 contenuto di acqua non superiore al 40,0 % della massa totale,
 —
 contenuto di sale da cucina non superiore al 5,0 % della massa totale,
 —
 nitriti (quantità residua nel prodotto finito): non superiore a 50 mg/kg,
 —
 рН non inferiore a 5,4.
 Caratteristiche organolettiche
 Aspetto esterno e colore
 —
 La superficie, ricoperta con la miscela «kayserov» color rosso-marrone, è ben essiccata con una crosta nettamente percettibile.
 Superficie di taglio
 —
 Il tessuto muscolare è color rosso fresco, i grassi sono color rosa pallido e lo spessore non è superiore a 1 cm.
 Consistenza: densa ed elastica.
 Gusto e odore: caratteristico, piacevole, moderatamente salato, con un gusto pronunciato conferito dalle spezie aggiunte, senza sapori estranei.
 Il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» può essere venduto intero, tagliato a pezzi o a fette, in un imballaggio sotto vuoto, avvolto nel cellophane oppure confezionato in atmosfera protettiva.
 3.6. Descrizione del metodo di ottenimento del prodotto agricolo o alimentare che reca il nome indicato al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]
 Per preparare il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» occorrono i seguenti ingredienti:
 carne: collo di maiale: 100 kg;
 miscuglio di salatura per 100 kg di collo di maiale: 3,35 kg di sale da cucina, 40 g di antiossidante — acido ascorbico (E300), 100 g di nitrato di potassio (E252) o 85 g di nitrato di sodio (E251), 500 g di zucchero cristallizzato raffinato;
 miscela «kayserov» per 100 kg di collo di maiale:
 —
 4,0 kg di pepe nero,
 —
 3,0 kg di semi di fieno greco,
 —
 2,0 kg di aglio,
 —
 12,0 l di vino bianco;
 spago/fili di canapa.
 Metodo di ottenimento
 Per preparare il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» si usa carne fresca proveniente dal collo di maiale maturo con un pH compreso tra 5,6 e 6,2. La carne viene disossata facendo attenzione a non danneggiare l'integrità delle fasce muscolari. Il limite si situa, nella parte anteriore, tra l'osso occipitale e la prima vertebra cervicale e, nella parte posteriore, tra la quinta e la sesta vertebra toracica e sotto il quinto spazio intercostale. Il limite inferiore attraversa le prime cinque costole — taglio orizzontale. La carne disossata viene ripulita dalle parti sanguinolente e messa in forma. I colli di maiale messi in forma sono collocati in appositi recipienti puliti per la salatura. Il miscuglio di sale da cucina, acido ascorbico, nitrato di potassio o nitrato di sodio e zucchero cristallizzato raffinato viene preparato a mano o a macchina. Per la maturazione i colli salati vengono collocati l'uno accanto all'altro in contenitori in plastica o acciaio inossidabile in celle frigorifere ad una temperatura compresa tra 0 e 4 °C. Dopo 3 o 4 giorni, sono ricollocati in ordine inverso, scambiando i posti tra quelli che si trovavano sopra e quelli che si trovavano sotto, e sono lasciati per almeno altri 10 giorni nelle stesse condizioni fino a una completa e omogenea salatura. Ciascuno dei colli salati viene agganciato a travi di legno o profilati di metallo collocati in carrelli per salumi di acciaio inossidabile. I singoli pezzi non possono entrare in contatto l'uno con l'altro. Dopo 24 ore trascorse nel carrello per l'essiccazione a una temperatura non superiore ai 12 °C, i pezzi vengono posti a essiccare in condizioni naturali o con aria condizionata con la possibilità di regolare la temperatura e l'umidità. La stagionatura avviene a una temperatura compresa tra i 12 e i 17 °C e a un'umidità pari al 70-85 %. Durante la stagionatura e la maturazione si pressa più volte il prodotto. La pressatura dura tra 12 e 24 ore. La prima pressatura avviene quando i pezzi sono leggermente essiccati e al tatto si percepisce una crosta sottile in superficie. Prima di sottoporli a pressatura occorre dividere i pezzi sulla base del loro spessore. Il processo generale di stagionatura prosegue fino all'ottenimento di una consistenza densa e elastica e di un contenuto d'acqua non superiore al 40 % della massa totale. Dopo l'ultima pressatura i pezzi di carne vengono cosparsi di miscela «kayserov», composta da spezie, acqua e vino bianco, sulla base della ricetta, e poi schiacciati in modo da ottenere uno strato dello spessore di 2-3 mm. Vengono poi appesi per la stagionatura, che dura finché la miscela «kayserov» non si sia ben asciugata e formi una crosta. I semi di fieno greco devono essere preliminarmente macinati e lasciati ad ammorbidire in acqua fredda per 24 ore.
 3.7. Specificità del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]
 — Caratteristiche di gusto e di aroma del prodotto
 Le materie prime, scelte e selezionate con cura — carne fresca di collo di maiale e miscela «kayserov» —, conferiscono al prodotto «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» un gusto e un aroma inimitabili.
 Per produrre il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» tradizionale non si utilizzano fermenti batterici (lieviti) né regolatori del pH e ciò lo distingue dai prodotti realizzati con l'aiuto delle nuove tecnologie.
 — Forma appiattita specifica del prodotto
 La tipica forma del prodotto viene ottenuta con ripetute pressature durante il processo di stagionatura.
 3.8. Carattere tradizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]
 Il «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» appartiene al gruppo di specialità a base di carne di maiale cruda non sminuzzata, stagionata e pressata. Fa parte del ricco assortimento di prodotti della carne, realizzati da diversi decenni in Bulgaria. La sua produzione artigianale in Bulgaria avviene da oltre trent'anni.
 Informazioni storiche sulla tecnologia e la ricetta per la produzione del «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» sono contenute nel documento normativo relativo ai requisiti dei prodotti ON 18-71996-80: Pastarma «Plovdiv», Pastarma «Rodopa», «Kayserovan svinski vrat Trakiya», Natsionalen agraro-promishlen sayuz (NAPS), Sofia, 1980. La tecnologia è descritta nell'Istruzione tecnica n. 326 del 20 ottobre 1980 per la produzione delle pastarma «Plovdiv» e «Rodopa» e «Kayserovan svinski vrat Trakiya», Natsionalen agraro-promishlen sayuz (NAPS), Sofia, 1980, elaborata dagli scienziati bulgari Dzhevizov e Kiseva di Plovdiv.
 Il metodo tradizionale nel corso della stagionatura del «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» esige il rispetto di determinati parametri (temperatura e umidità). Inoltre, vengono utilizzate presse per salumi in legno conformemente alla deroga di cui all'articolo 10, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 853/2004 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio (3). Tutti questi elementi creano condizioni naturali favorevoli allo sviluppo della microflora desiderata durante la stagionatura. La tecnica di pressatura conferisce al prodotto la sua caratteristica forma appiattita e le tradizionali caratteristiche di gusto rimaste immutate fino ad oggi.
 3.9. Requisiti minimi e procedure di controllo della specificità del prodotto [articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]
 I controlli effettuati durante e dopo il processo di produzione del «Kayserovan vrat Trakiya» comprendono i seguenti aspetti:
 —
 la conformità delle materie prime della carne utilizzate con il punto 3.6 del disciplinare,
 —
 il rispetto delle proporzioni indicate nella ricetta per le materie prime della carne e il miscuglio di salatura. Il controllo viene effettuato durante la dosatura del miscuglio di salatura e il suo mescolamento con le materie prime della carne dal momento che la quantità delle materie prime e degli additivi deve essere conforme ai requisiti della ricetta,
 —
 il rispetto del processo tecnologico di produzione durante la salatura dei pezzi di carne messi in forma, conformemente al punto 3.6,
 —
 il controllo della temperatura e dell'umidità durante il processo di essiccazione e stagionatura del prodotto e il controllo visivo del prodotto,
 —
 il rispetto delle proporzioni indicate nella ricetta per le materie prime della carne e la miscela «kayserov». Il controllo viene effettuato durante la dosatura della miscela «kayserov» e il suo mescolamento con le materie prime della carne dal momento che la quantità delle materie prime e delle spezie deve essere conforme ai requisiti della ricetta,
 —
 il controllo dei seguenti aspetti del vino bianco utilizzato per la miscela «kayserov»: limpidezza, tempo di conservazione e quantità utilizzate conformemente alla ricetta di cui al punto 3.6,
 —
 rispetto dei requisiti per quanto riguarda l'aspetto esteriore e il colore mediante un controllo visivo del prodotto che permette di stabilire se la miscela «kayserov» ha aderito bene alla superficie del prodotto,
 —
 conformità con i requisiti relativi alla superficie di taglio, alla consistenza, all'aroma e al sapore mediante un'analisi sensoriale del prodotto finito,
 —
 rispetto dei parametri fisico-chimici richiesti per il prodotto finito, conformemente al punto 3.5 del disciplinare mediante metodi di laboratorio convalidati.
 I parametri di cui sopra devono essere controllati una volta all'anno. Qualora venga constatato il mancato rispetto di una delle fasi, la frequenza dei controlli diventa semestrale.
 4. Organi o enti responsabili del controllo del disciplinare del prodotto
 4.1. Nome e indirizzo
 Nome: Q Certificazioni S.r.l.
 Indirizzo: Villa Parigini, loc. Basciano, 53035 Monteriggioni (SI), Italia;
 Bulgaria, 4000 Plovdiv n. 42a, Ulitsa Leonardo da Vinci
 Tel./Fax +359 32649228
 Tel. cellulare: +359 897901680
 Indirizzo di posta elettronica: office@qci.bg
 ☐ pubblico
 ☒ privato
 4.2. Compiti specifici dell'organo o ente
 L'organismo di controllo di cui al punto 4.1 effettua i controlli connessi alla verifica del rispetto di tutti i criteri stabiliti dal disciplinare.
 (1) Regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2006, relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari (GU L 93 del 31.3.2006, pag. 1). Regolamento sostituito dal regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012.
 (2) Regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione, del 18 ottobre 2007, recante modalità di applicazione del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari (GU L 275 del 19.10.2007, pag. 3).
 (3) Regolamento (CE) n. 853/2004 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 29 aprile 2004, che stabilisce norme specifiche in materia di igiene per gli alimenti di origine animale (GU L 139 del 30.4.2004, pag. 55).


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 698 A.2d 1106 (1997)
 347 Md. 90
 Joseph N. SCHALLER, Trustee et al.
 v.
 CASTLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.
 No. 102, Sept. Term, 1996.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 August 27, 1997.
 *1107 Stephen J. Hughes (J. Preston Turner, Treanor, Pope & Hughes, on brief), Towson, for Petitioners.
 Walter C. Martz, II (Martz & Martz, P.A.; William R. Nicklas, Jr., Doherty, Nicklas & Prete, P.A., on brief), Frederick, for Respondents.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, RAKER and WILNER, JJ.
 RODOWSKY, Judge.
 Former Maryland Rule of Procedure, Rule W72.d, relating to the foreclosure of mortgages, provided:
 "A foreclosure action shall not be docketed, unless, at the time of docketing, there has been filed under oath by the mortgagee, his agent or attorney, a statement of the mortgage debt remaining due and payable, or a certificate that, as of the time of docketing, a statement has been served upon the owner of the equity of redemption. If the statement of mortgage debt is not filed, the mortgagee shall, upon written request immediately furnish a copy of the statement of the mortgage debt to any other holder of a lien on the mortgaged property."[1]
 In the foreclosure case now before us a first mortgage lender filed a statement of mortgage debt on docketing, but, months after the sale had been ratified, increased it tenfold. If effectively amended, the statement of mortgage debt obliterated a surplus that would have been distributed to junior lienors. We must decide the consequences of the lender's noncompliance with the requirement for filing an accurate statement of the mortgage debt upon docketing a foreclosure.
 The petitioners, Joseph N. Schaller et al., are substitute trustees acting for the benefit of the Bank of Baltimore (the Bank) under a deed of trust dated April 28, 1989, and recorded May 3, 1989, from Castle Development Corporation (Castle) covering certain realty in Frederick County, Maryland. This deed of trust secured a revolving line of credit of up to $600,000. Castle, and related companies, were engaged in homebuilding in Frederick County, Maryland and in the Winchester, Virginia area, and the Bank made a number of mortgage loans to Castle entities, some of which were secured by realty in Virginia and others of which were secured by realty in Frederick County, Maryland.
 On December 22, 1992, Castle, its related companies, and their individual guarantors agreed with the Bank to modify and extend the various loans, including that secured by the deed of trust of April 28, 1989 (the Loan). Their agreement, as described in the Loan modification recorded January 1, 1993, contained cross-collateralization and cross-default provisions
 "so that a default under the Loan or any of the Cross-Collateralized Loans would constitute a default under the Loan as well as all of the Cross-Collateralized Loans and further that a default under the Loan or any of the Cross-Collateralized Loans *1108 would entitle the [Bank] to exercise its remedies against the collateral securing the Loan as well as the collateral securing the Cross-Collateralized Loans."
 The borrowers defaulted, and the Bank instituted a number of foreclosure proceedings in Frederick County, Maryland and in Virginia. Our concern on this appeal is with the foreclosure of the Loan deed of trust, instituted as Civil No. 93-1044 in the Circuit Court for Frederick County on June 24, 1993. The statement of indebtedness filed on that date represented the outstanding principal balance to be $38,980 which, with interest and late fees, totaled $39,479.85 as of March 3, 1993. Per diem interest was $8.12. It appears that this statement of mortgage debt reflected the amount carried on the books of the Bank as the balance outstanding on the Loan as it had initially been made. The statement did not give effect to the cross-collateralization and cross-default provisions of the modification agreement. The Bank asserts that the total outstanding indebtedness owed by all Castle entities as a result of acceleration on default exceeded $6 million.
 At the time of foreclosure the Loan deed of trust encumbered only two homesites, Lots 460 and 209 in Mount Airy. The former, in the Audubon Terrace North subdivision, was improved by a substantially completed two-story, cedar-sided dwelling containing three bedrooms and two and one-half baths. Lot 209, in the Eaglehead Summerfield subdivision, was improved by a completed two-story, vinyl-sided, colonial-style dwelling containing four bedrooms and two and one-half baths. At the sale held on July 12, 1993, Lot 209 brought $185,000 and Lot 460 brought $130,000. An attorney for one of Castle's subcontractor/material supplier creditors attended the sale but did not participate, inasmuch as the sale produced a surplus well in excess of the mortgage debt set forth on the statement filed by the Bank.
 The sale of Lot 209 was ratified in September 1993 and the sale of Lot 460 was ratified in April 1994. Lienors, or purported lienors, on the two properties whose liens were junior to the Bank's cross-collateralized lien filed claims against the surplus in the foreclosure proceeding. The largest of these claims, $158,557.35, sought by an excavating contractor, Shook Excavating & Hauling, Inc., was disallowed in the audit on the ground that that claimant's judgment was not obtained until after the foreclosure sale had taken place. That claimant, however, successfully excepted to the auditor's report and obtained a remand by the circuit court to the auditor for consideration of that claimant's contention that it had perfected a lien prior to the sale by a prejudgment attachment. That issue is not before us, and the record does not reflect whether or how it was resolved. In a report filed July 28, 1994, the auditor recommended disbursement to the Bank based on its original statement of mortgage debt reflecting unpaid principal of $38,980, full payment to junior lienors whose claims were allowed, and a balance in the hands of the trustees in excess of $190,000, subject to order of the court.
 On July 27, 1994, the Bank had filed an "Amended Statement of Indebtedness" that referred to the cross-collateralization feature of the Loan and claimed the outstanding principal balance to be $400,000. Based on the amended statement of mortgage debt, the auditor immediately filed an amended account that reported a deficiency of over $95,000 to the Bank. The junior lienors excepted to the auditor's report.
 At the hearing on the exceptions no testimony was taken, and a few undisputed exhibits were introduced. The argument focused on concepts of estoppel and laches. The junior lienors in essence argued that they had been induced by the original statement of mortgage debt to take no action to protect their interests, inasmuch as it appeared that, because there would be a surplus, they need only file claims and await a distribution in full satisfaction of their claims. They argued that they might have bought in the property, or challenged ratification of the sale, or sought a marshaling of assets. The Bank argued that there was no evidence of prejudice to the junior lienors, submitting that, if the mortgage debt had been correctly stated when foreclosure of the Loan commenced, the junior lienors would have to have paid in excess of $400,000 in order to acquire the *1109 properties and then would have to resell the properties at a still higher price in order to obtain any payment on their liens. The Bank urged the circuit court to find, based on the economics of the circumstances, that the junior lienors would not have acted differently than they in fact acted if the amount of debt on the amended statement had been the amount originally filed.[2]
 In a written opinion the circuit court initially addressed whether amendment was permitted, concluded that any right to amendment was not unfettered, and then addressed whether permitting amendment would be equitable. The circuit court reasoned that the junior lienors had been prejudiced by the amendment inasmuch "as they were denied the opportunity to even consider whether to attempt to cover their liens." (Emphasis added). Even if the representation in the statement of mortgage debt was not intended to deceive, the junior lienors, said the court, had relied on it to their detriment. Under principles of estoppel or laches, the court held that it would be inequitable for the Bank to assert its rights. Consequently, the court directed that the original statement of mortgage debt be used in preparation of the auditor's report.
 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, essentially adopting the circuit court's analysis. Schaller v. Castle Dev. Corp., 111 Md. App. 40, 680 A.2d 528 (1996). We granted the Bank's petition for certiorari.
 The problem presented by the instant matter is determining the consequences of the Bank's failure to comply with former Rule W72.d. Where, as here, the consequences of noncompliance are not prescribed by the rule, or by a statute, a court "may determine the consequences of the noncompliance in light of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule." Maryland Rule 1-201(a). We turn first to the history of Rule W72.d in order to discern its purpose.
 I
 Provision for a statement of mortgage debt can be traced to Chapter 181 of the Acts of 1833. The statute, originally applicable only in Baltimore City, authorized foreclosure by assent to a decree.[3] Under the 1833 statute the affidavit was to be filed after the decree for sale but before the sale was made. See Hays v. Dorsey, 5 Md. 99, 101-02 (1853). Failure to file the statement of mortgage debt was not a ground for voiding a sale that had been ratified. See Connaughton v. Bernard, 84 Md. 577, 594, 36 A. 265, 268 (1897). If the omission of the affidavit were raised prior to the ratification of the sale, however, the sale could be set aside at the instance of the purchaser, even if the mortgagor consented to the earlier omission. See Gatchell v. Presstman, 5 Md. 161, 163-64 (1853).
 Cases also arose under the 1833 statute in which the mortgagor sought to disrupt the foreclosure by arguing that the statement of *1110 mortgage debt that had been filed overstated the amount owed. In Schaefer v. Amicable Permanent Land & Loan Co., 47 Md. 126 (1877), this Court refused to arrest a foreclosure sale on that ground, saying: "The account filed by the mortgagee, purporting to show the sum due, is not conclusive upon the mortgagor, and in case the property should be sold, it will be open to her to contest it...." Id. at 128. See also Maryland Permanent Land & Bldg. Soc'y v. Smith, 41 Md. 516, 522 (1875) ("If the statement is erroneous in not showing the true balance due upon the mortgage, it is open to correction, when the account may be stated by the auditor; but furnishes no reason for setting aside the sale."); Pacific Mortgage & Inv. Group, Ltd. v. LaGuerre, 81 Md.App. 28, 566 A.2d 780 (1989) (error for circuit court to enjoin foreclosure by finding overstatement of interest due in statement of mortgage debt; amount of interest for determination on audit); H. Ginsberg & I. Ginsberg, Mortgages & Other Liens in Maryland 400 (1936).
 The requirement that the statement of mortgage debt be filed when the foreclosure action was instituted (as contrasted with filing anytime prior to sale) was introduced by the original Special Proceedings Rules adopted on July 17, 1958, and effective January 1, 1959. Former Rule 1391c.3(c) provided:
 "A foreclosure action shall not be docketed unless, at the time of docketing, there has been filed under oath by the mortgagee, his agent or attorney, a statement of the amount of the mortgage debt remaining due and payable. The failure to file such a statement, however, shall not in itself invalidate a foreclosure sale."[4]
 The proposed original Special Proceedings Rules were published for comment. See Tentative Draft, Maryland Rules of Procedure, Chapters 1000 through 1300 (Sept. 1957).[5] The tentative draft presented proposed Rule 1391c.3(c) basically in the form in which it was adopted.[6] One comment received by the Rules Committee suggested that the statement of mortgage debt be filed before sale, together with the bond, so that the mortgagee could compute interest to the day of sale and also include liens and charges revealed by record searches and by information received. A Rules Committee subcommittee dealing with the mortgage foreclosure rules recommended that the proposed rule not be changed, saying:
 "The Rules Committee decided to change the existing law and require the filing of the statement upon docketing of the case to enable the mortgagor to determine the exact amount claimed. Insofar as items arising after the filing of the statement are concerned, the mortgagee can, of course, file a supplemental statement. The interest to the day of sale can be computed by the auditor. Liens claimed by third parties, such as tax claims, are not part of the mortgage debt properly speaking and should not be included in the statement. Parties claiming such liens can file separate petitions in the foreclosure suit."
 Undated memorandum on file in the Rules Committee offices and headed, "COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS RE RULES 1391-1395: FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES WHICH MAY BE FORECLOSED BY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS," at 1. Although a publicly filed statement of mortgage debt would be available to all interested persons, it appears that the primary concern underlying the requirement was to advise the mortgagor at filing of the exact amount of the mortgage indebtedness. This would facilitate any possible refinancing, give the opportunity to the mortgagor to stimulate the interest of others in buying the property, and warn the mortgagor of the possible magnitude of a deficiency judgment.
 *1111 This Court on September 15, 1961, adopted the Twentieth Report of the Rules Committee, renumbering and revising the Special Proceedings Rules effective January 1, 1962. Former Rule 1391c.3(c) became Rule W72.c.3. The rule was also modified to permit, as an alternative to filing the statement of mortgage debt in the court records, sending the statement to the mortgagor and certifying in the court records that the statement had been served. As a companion to that change, the rule required furnishing the statement of the mortgage debt, if not filed in court, to a lienholder.[7] Former Rule W72.c.3 was renumbered and restyled as Rule W72.d by order of this Court of June 16, 1975, effective July 1, 1975.[8] The version of the rule, as amended effective July 1, 1975, is the version in effect at the time of the proceedings in the case before us, and its text appears at the introduction of this opinion.
 The provisions in the amended rule addressing lienholders seem primarily intended to make available to lienholders the same information which they could have gotten from the public record prior to the creation of the option whereby the mortgage lender need not file a statement of mortgage debt in the court records. Lienholders' interests in the exact mortgage debt seemingly include preparation of a possible bid and stimulation of interest in the sale. Phrased another way, the interest of junior lienors in an accurate statement of the mortgage debt is not limited to a possible challenge of the amount of the mortgage debt at the time of the audit.
 II
 A further component in determining the appropriate consequences under Rule 1-201(a) for a violation of a rule of procedure is the resulting prejudice. The nature and degree of the prejudice is closely related to the purpose of the requirement. For example, in Gaetano v. Calvert County, 310 Md. 121, 527 A.2d 46 (1987), we held that a circuit court had abused its discretion by dismissing an administrative appeal because the appellant failed to file a memorandum within the time required by former Rule B12. The purpose of the rule was to furnish the adversary adequate time to prepare, but the circuit court had dismissed even though "the appellants' late filing of their memorandum did not undermine [the] purpose [of the rule] one whit." Id. at 126, 527 A.2d at 48. See also Department of Econ. & Employment Dev. v. Hager, 96 Md.App. 362, 374-76, 625 A.2d 342, 348-49 (1993) (holding that circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for default and motion to strike appellee's untimely filed memorandum because appellant was not prejudiced by the late filing). In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 601 A.2d 1107 (1992), and In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 527 A.2d 35 (1987), each considered whether juvenile petitions should be dismissed as a consequence of the failure by the State to comply with time limits prescribed by rule or statute. Although the immediate purpose of the requirements that were violated was arguably to benefit the juvenile, dismissal of the petitions was inconsistent with the overall purpose of the juvenile statutes that are designed to provide treatment and rehabilitation. In re Keith G., 325 Md. at 544, 601 A.2d at 1110; In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 106, 527 A.2d at 38.
 More analogous to the problem presented here is Hood v. State, 334 Md. 52, 637 A.2d 1208 (1994). There, in the middle of a jury trial in a prosecution for first degree murder, *1112 the presiding circuit judge became ill. A second judge was substituted who presided to the conclusion, a conviction. Maryland Rule 4-361(b) permits substitution of trial judges but requires the substitute judge to certify "that he or she has become familiar with the record of the trial." In Hood the substitute judge did not make the certification, although that judge mentioned on the record that there had been a discussion concerning the case with the judge who previously had presided. We held that gaining familiarity with the record ordinarily would require the substitute judge "to read, or to have read to him or her, a written transcript of the previous proceedings, or in the case of an audio or video record, to listen to the prior proceedings." Hood, 334 Md. at 58, 637 A.2d at 1211 (footnote omitted). Although it was clear that that had not been done, the question of whether any prejudice resulted to the convicted defendant was not so clear. We recognized that, although the defendant had been deprived of the right to a substitute judge who was familiar with the record, "it may be very difficult for a defendant to demonstrate prejudice." Id. at 62, 637 A.2d at 1213. Under those circumstances we held that there is a presumption of prejudice and that the burden is on the State to rebut that presumption. Id. In a criminal case, the burden on the State is to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless, id., a burden that we held the State had not met in Hood.
 A similar approach should be applied in determining the consequences of the violation of former Rule W72.d in the instant matter. Here, the Bank did not undertake to reflect more accurately in the statement of mortgage debt the actual amount secured by the Loan deed of trust until after the sale had been conducted, the sale had been ratified, and that judgment of ratification had become final and unappealable. Consequently, to determine whether there was prejudice to the junior lienors requires attempting to reconstruct what would have happened had the statement of mortgage debt reflected an outstanding principal balance of $400,000.[9] Under these circumstances, it is appropriate for the party whose rule violation created the problem to bear the burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted from the rule violation.
 III
 In the instant matter the circuit court essentially applied a rule of per se prejudice to the junior lienors. In concluding that they were prejudiced, based on the deprivation of an "opportunity" to bid at the foreclosure sale, the circuit court applied a rule that prohibits the increase of the stated principal balance in all cases at a time when it is too late to reschedule the sale of, or to resell, the property. There does not seem to be a need for so stringent a prohibition against upwards amendment of the principal balance. First, such a prohibition operates much like a forfeiture on the facts before us. Here, the Bank has the first lien and is owed a principal balance of at least $400,000 that is secured by that first lien. Prohibiting recognition of the actual mortgage debt gives liens that are junior to the first lien a priority over the first lien as to all net-of-costs sales proceeds that are not applied to satisfy an unpaid principal balance of $38,980, with interest and late charges on that amount. We should not confuse assuaging disappointed expectations with vindicating legal rights. Second, ordinarily there is no advantage to be gained by a lender in deliberately understating the amount of mortgage debt at the time foreclosure is instituted, so that there is no need for a strict deterrent. In the rare case in which a lender deliberately seeks an improper advantage by understating the mortgage debt, the rule that we have adopted, by requiring the foreclosing lender to prove that the party objecting to the increase has not been prejudiced, should accommodate a just resolution of the controversy.
 *1113 Accordingly, we shall direct that this case be remanded to the circuit court for a factual determination as to whether the Bank met its burden of proving that there was no prejudice in fact to the junior lienors. In that connection the circuit court may, in its discretion, permit the introduction of additional evidence by any party.
 The Bank urges this Court to rule as a matter of law that there is no prejudice. The argument asks us to conclude that the foreclosure sale price could never have exceeded the total of the costs of sale, a principal mortgage balance of $400,000, and interest and late fees on that principal balance. The Bank bases this argument on apparent arms-length contracts of sale for the two lots that Castle had entered into prior to the foreclosure. A purchaser had contracted to buy Lot 209 for $195,000, and that same person bought in the same property at foreclosure for $185,000. A purchaser had contracted to pay $157,900 for Lot 460 with a fully completed dwelling, and that property sold at foreclosure in a substantially completed state at $130,000. It is not, however, the appellate function to make first level factual determinations concerning market value where the inferences are debated and debatable.
 A further factual complication is that the junior lienors have argued this case as if all of their claims were those of one party whose single claim enjoyed a second priority. Actually, the allowed claims became liens on the Castle property at different times. Consequently, if the circuit court determines that the Bank has failed to prove that no claimant would have bought in the two lots for an amount in excess of $400,000, plus interest, late fees, and costs, then the court will have to determine whether the Bank has proven that the property would not resell at a profit sufficient to satisfy one or more or all of the junior lienors based on the priorities and amounts of their judgments, as set forth in the table below. (The table reflects only the principal amounts of the liens, without interest.).
 CREDITOR DATE JUDGMENT CUMULATIVE
 AMOUNT AMOUNT
 Great Eastern March 3, 1993 $17,998.29 $0 to $17,998.29
 Concrete, Inc.-
 Mechanic's lien
 Wickes Lumber Co. March 12, 1993 $11,708.34 $17,998.30 to
 -Mechanic's $29,706.63
 Wetnight Electric, March 26, 1993 $1,428.00 $29,706.64 to
 Inc.-Mechanic's $31,134.63
 lien [10]
 Walter W. King March 26, 1993 $2,506.01 $31,134.64 to
 Plumbing & Heating $33,640.64
 Contractor, Inc.
 -Mechanic's lien
 Walter W. King June 2, 1993 $1,549.00 $33,640.65 to
 Plumbing & Heating $35,189.64
 Contractor, Inc.-
 Judgment creditor
 Century Floors, Inc. June 24, 1993 $27,175.00 $35,189.65 to
 -Judgment creditor $62,364.64
 In addition, if the claim of Shook Excavating & Hauling, Inc. is allowed as a lien, the appropriate amount and priority of that lien would have to be considered in the prejudice determination.
 The junior lienors assert that they were prejudiced because they could have required a marshaling of the Castle assets if they had been accurately advised, as required by Rule W72.d, of the mortgage debt. We do not think that marshaling could apply here. Chancellor Bland in Watkins v. Worthington, 2 Bland 509 (1830), gave two illustrations of situations in which equity would require marshaling. These were *1114 "where a creditor has his debt secured by a lien or mortgage upon two funds, and another has an interest in only one of the funds, he may compel the one whose debt is secured by both, to resort to the other, so far as it may be necessary, to satisfy both claims....
 "And where there are two different sets of parties, and one set may resort to both funds, and the other only to one, the party who may have recourse to both, may be compelled to resort to the one fund, which cannot be reached by the other, so as to leave enough for both."
 Id. at 532 (citations omitted). Here, even if we assume, arguendo, that the marshaling doctrine would treat Castle-related entities as the debtor of the junior lienors, the other funds, that is, the other foreclosure sales, produced deficiencies as to the Bank's respective claims. In any event, "the securities or assets can never be marshalled to the prejudice of the creditor; or so as to suspend or put in peril his claim; or upon any other terms than giving him entire satisfaction." Id. Here, the debt from Castle to the Bank, secured by the Loan deed of trust, was at least $400,000, but the junior lienors' "marshaling" argument would give the Bank less than the satisfaction to which it was entitled under its admitted first lien.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A MANDATE VACATING THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AND REMANDING THIS CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE OPINION OF THIS COURT. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.
 NOTES
 [1] Under the revision of the Special Proceedings Rules effective January 1, 1997, Rule 14-204 is the comparable rule to former Rule W72.
 [2] The $400,000 of principal indebtedness stated in the amended statement is a round figure selected simply to eliminate any surplus and without concern for a deficiency judgment. The Bank represents that the total proceeds from all of the foreclosure sales were under $4 million, resulting in an overall deficiency in excess of $2 million. These figures, however, include the deficiency on loans that were assigned to a third party just prior to the foreclosure sales. Although the Bank maintains that it owns any claim to a deficiency under the loans assigned to the third party, for purposes of arguing the instant matter the Bank limits its justification of the $400,000 amended statement of mortgage debt to the deficiency resulting from the foreclosures of the Virginia properties. The Virginia loans were not sold. The equivalent of audit reports from the Virginia foreclosures are exhibits in the instant matter, and they support the Bank's position that the deficiency on the Virginia sales was $453,669.84.
 [3] In relevant part Chapter 181 of the Acts of 1833 provided:
 "That the said Trustee ... may after the arrival of the period limited by the said decree for the said sale, sell agreeably to the terms of said decree, the said mortgaged property ... the mortgagees ... before such sale, and after the arrival of the period aforesaid verifying by their oath ... a statement of the amount of said mortgage claim remaining due, and filing such statement in the court ... and such sales and the conveyances thereupon shall have the same effect, if finally ratified by the court ... as if the same had been made under decrees between the proper parties in relation to the mortgages, and in the usual course of the said courts."
 [4] The last sentence of former Rule 1391c.3(c) later became Maryland Rule W72.f. ("The jurisdiction of the court over the mortgaged property shall attach upon the docketing of an action... with or without the statement or certificate required by [Rule W72.d]."). The provision is now Maryland Rule 14-203(c).
 [5] This publication was a seventy-nine page, paper covered volume, the cover of which was grey in color. It was known as the "Gray Book" in tribute to Honorable John B. Gray, Jr., the then Chairman of the Rules Committee.
 [6] On adoption the words, "and payable," were added after "due."
 [7] Former Rule W72.c.3, effective January 1, 1962, read as follows:
 "A foreclosure action shall not be docketed, unless, at the time of docketing, there has been filed under oath by the mortgagee, his agent or attorney, a statement of the mortgage debt remaining due and payable, or a certificate that such a statement as of the time of docketing has been served upon the owner of the equity of redemption. The failure to file such a statement or certificate, however, at the time of docketing, shall not in itself invalidate a foreclosure sale; but no sale shall be ratified until the statement is filed in the proceedings. Upon request, in writing, the mortgagee shall also immediately furnish such statement of the mortgage debt, if not filed in court, to any other holder of a lien on the mortgaged property."
 9B Maryland Code (1957, 1963 Repl.Vol.), Rule W72.c.3.
 [8] The provision that failure to file a statement of mortgage debt was not jurisdictional was at that time transferred to Rule W72.f.
 [9] Of course, if the total obligation of all Castle entities that was secured by the Loan deed of trust under the cross-collateralization effected by the modification agreement had been used in the statement of mortgage debt initially filed, that statement could have been in excess of $6 million. We use $400,000 for purposes of the analysis to be performed in this case because that is what the Bank claimed when it amended.
 [10] There is no legal significance intended in listing the Wetnight lien ahead of the King lien.


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 11.9.2004
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 228/33
 Tožba Komisije Evropskih skupnosti proti Velikemu vojvodstvu Luksemburg, vložena dne 27. julija 2004
 (Zadeva C-320/04)
 (2004/C 228/69)
 Komisija Evropskih skupnosti, ki jo zastopa D. Martin, zastopnik, z naslovom za vročanje v Luksemburgu, je dne 27. julija 2004 na Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti vložila tožbo proti Velikemu vojvodstvu Luksemburg.
 Komisija Evropskih skupnosti Sodišču predlaga, da:
 —
 ugotovi, da s tem, da ni sprejelo potrebnih zakonskih, podzakonskih in upravnih predpisov za uskladitev z Direktivo Sveta 2000/43/ES z dne 29. 6. 2000 o izvajanju načela enakega obravnavanja oseb ne glede na raso ali narodnost (1) Veliko vojvodstvo Luksemburg ni izpolnilo obveznosti iz te direktive;
 —
 Velikemu vojvodstvu Luksemburg naloži plačilo stroškov.
 Tožbeni razlogi in bistvene navedbe
 Rok določen za prenos direktive je potekel dne 19. julija 2003.
 (1) UL L 180, 19.7.2000, str. 22.


text:
16.6.2001 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 173/19
 1) Uma regulamentação de um Estado-Membro, que, por um lado, artigo 49.o CE) e 260.o do Tratado CE (actual artigo 50.o
 obriga as empresas privadas de fornecimento de electricidade a CE), o Tribunal de Justiça (Quinta Secção), composto por:
 comprar a electricidade produzida na sua zona de fornecimento D. A. O. Edward (relator), exercendo funções de presidente da
 a partir de fontes de energia renováveis a preços mı́nimos Quinta Secção, J.-P. Puissochet e L. Sevón, juı́zes, advogado-
 superiores ao valor económico real deste tipo de electricidade e, -geral: S. Alber, secretário: H. A. Rühl, administrador principal,
 por outro, reparte o encargo financeiro resultante desta obri- proferiu, em 15 de Março de 2001, um acórdão cuja parte
 gação entre as referidas empresas de fornecimento de electrici- decisória é a seguinte:
 dade e os exploradores privados das redes de electricidade
 situadas a montante, não constitui um auxı́lio de Estado na
 acepção do artigo 92.o, n.o 1, do Tratado. Os artigos 59.o do Tratado CE (que passou, após alteração, a
 artigo 49.o CE) e 60.o do Tratado CE (actual artigo 50.o CE) não se
 opõem a que um Estado-Membro obrigue uma empresa estabelecida
 2) Na fase actual do direito comunitário relativo ao mercado da
 noutro Estado-Membro que efectue uma prestação de serviços no
 electricidade, uma regulamentação como a da Stromeinspei-
 território do primeiro Estado-Membro a pagar aos seus trabalhadores
 sungsgesetz alterada não é incompatı́vel com o artigo 30.o do
 a remuneração mı́nima estabelecida pelas normas nacionais desse
 Tratado CE (que passou, após alteração, a artigo 28.o CE).
 Estado. A aplicação de tais regras pode, contudo, revelar-se despropor-
 cionada quando se trate de assalariados de uma empresa estabelecida
 (1) JO C 397, de 19.12.1998. numa região fronteiriça que sejam conduzidos a efectuar, a tempo
 parcial e durante breves perı́odos, uma parte do respectivo trabalho
 no território de um ou até mesmo vários Estados-Membros que não
 o de estabelecimento da empresa. Incumbe, em consequência, às
 autoridades competentes do Estado-Membro de acolhimento determi-
 nar se e em que medida a aplicação de uma regulamentação nacional
 que imponha um salário mı́nimo a tal empresa é necessária e
 proporcionada para garantir a protecção dos trabalhadores em causa.
 ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL
 (1) JO C 209, de 4.7.1998.
 (Quinta Secção)
 de 15 de Março de 2001
 no processo C-165/98 (pedido de decisão prejudicial
 apresentado pelo Tribunal correctionnel d’Arlon): André
 Mazzoleni contra Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL (1)
 ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL
 («Livre prestação de serviços — Afectação temporária de
 trabalhadores para execução de um contrato — Directiva (Quinta Secção)
 96/71/CE — Salário mı́nimo garantido»)
 de 15 de Março de 2001
 (2001/C 173/32)
 no processo C-265/99: Comissão das Comunidades Euro-
 peias contra República Francesa (1)
 (Lı́ngua do processo: francês)
 [«Incumprimento de Estado — Artigo 95.o do Tratado (que
 passou, após alteração, a artigo 90.o CE) — Imposto sobre
 (Tradução provisória; a tradução definitiva será publicada na veı́culos a motor»]
 «Colectânea da Jurisprudência»)
 (2001/C 173/33)
 No processo C-165/98, que tem por objecto um pedido
 dirigido ao Tribunal de Justiça, nos termos do artigo 177.o do
 Tratado CE (actual artigo 234.o CE), pelo Tribunal correction-
 nel d’Arlon (Bélgica), destinado a obter, no processo penal (Lı́ngua do processo: francês)
 pendente neste órgão jurisdicional contra André Mazzoleni e
 Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, civilmente responsável,
 com intervenção de: Éric Guillaume e o., uma decisão a tı́tulo (Tradução provisória; a tradução definitiva será publicada na
 prejudicial sobre a interpretação da Directiva 96/71/CE do «Colectânea da Jurisprudência»)
 Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho de 16 de Dezembro de
 1996 relativa ao destacamento de trabalhadores no âmbito de
 uma prestação de serviços (JO L 18, p. 1), bem como dos No processo C-265/99, Comissão das Comunidades Europeias
 artigos 50.o do Tratado CE (que passou, após alteração, a (agentes: E. Traversa e H. Michard) contra República Francesa
 ---pagebreak--- C 173/20 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 16.6.2001
 (agentes: K. Rispal-Bellanger e S. Seam), que tem por objecto a ACÓRDÃO DO TRIBUNAL
 declaração de que:
 (Terceira Secção)
 — ao manter em vigor e aplicar uma regulamentação que
 prevê a aplicação de uma fórmula de cálculo da potência de 15 de Março de 2001
 administrativa desfavorável aos veı́culos equipados com
 caixa manual de seis velocidades bem como com caixa
 automática de cinco velocidades, que produz efeitos no processo C-83/00: Comissão das Comunidades Euro-
 discriminatórios e proteccionistas quanto aos veı́culos peias contra Reino dos Paı́ses Baixos (1)
 fabricados noutros Estados-Membros relativamente aos
 veı́culos nacionais similares ou concorrentes, e
 («Incumprimento de Estado — Não transposição da Directiva
 97/24/CE — Elementos ou caracterı́sticas dos veı́culos a
 motor de duas ou três rodas»)
 — ao manter em vigor disposições que limitam o factor K
 no cálculo da potência fiscal dos veı́culos homologados (2001/C 173/34)
 isoladamente entre 1 de Janeiro de 1978 e 12 de
 Janeiro de 1988 e considerados equivalentes a um tipo
 homologado com uma potência real superior a 100 kW,
 (Lı́ngua do processo: neerlandês)
 a República Francesa não cumpriu com as obrigações que lhe (Tradução provisória: a tradução definitiva será publicada na
 incumbem por força do artigo 95.o do Tratado CE (que passou, «Colectânea da Jurisprudência»)
 após alteração, a artigo 90.o CE), o Tribunal de Justiça (Quinta
 Secção), composto por: A. La Pergola, presidente de secção,
 M. Wathelet (relator), D. A. O. Edward, P. Jann e L. Sevón, No processo C-83/00, Comissão das Comunidades Europeias
 juı́zes, advogado-geral: S. Alber secretário: L. Hewlett, proferiu, (agente: C. van der Hauwaert) contra Reino dos Paı́ses Baixos
 em 15 de Março de 2001, um acórdão cuja parte decisória é a (agentes: M. A. Fierstra e J. van Bakel), que tem por objecto
 seguinte: obter a declaração de que, ao não adoptar, no prazo fixado,
 as disposições legislativas, regulamentares e administrativas
 necessárias para dar cumprimento à Directiva 97/24/CE do
 Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 17 de Junho de
 1) Ao manter em vigor e aplicar uma regulamentação que prevê a 1997, relativa a determinados elementos ou caracterı́sticas dos
 aplicação de uma fórmula de cálculo da potência administrativa veı́culos a motor de duas ou três rodas (JO L 226, p. 1), o
 desfavorável aos veı́culos equipados com caixa manual de Reino dos Paı́ses Baixos não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe
 seis velocidades bem como com caixa automática de cinco incumbem por força do Tratado CE, o Tribunal de Justiça
 velocidades, que produz efeitos discriminatórios e proteccionistas (Terceira Secção), composto por: C. Gulmann, presidente de
 quanto aos veı́culos fabricados noutros Estados-Membros relati- secção, F. Macken e J. N. Cunha Rodrigues (relator), juı́zes,
 vamente aos veı́culos nacionais similares, a República Francesa advogado-geral: S. Alber, secretário: R. Grass, proferiu em
 não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do 15 de Março de 2001 um acórdão cuja parte decisória é a
 artigo 95.o, primeiro parágrafo, do Tratado CE (que passou, seguinte:
 após alteração, a artigo 90.o, primeiro parágrafo, CE).
 1) Ao não adoptar, no prazo fixado, as disposições legislativas,
 regulamentares e administrativas necessárias para dar cumpri-
 mento à Directiva 97/24/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do
 2) A República Francesa é condenada nas despesas. Conselho, de 17 de Junho de 1997, relativa a determinados
 elementos ou caracterı́sticas dos veı́culos a motor de duas ou
 três rodas, o Reino dos Paı́ses Baixos não cumpriu as obrigações
 que lhe incumbem por força do Tratado CE.
 (1) JO C 281, de 2.10.1999. 2) O Reino dos Paı́ses Baixos é condenado nas despesas.
 (1) JO C 176, de 24.6.2000.


text:
9.10.2017
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea
 C 338/17
 Ricorso proposto il 7 agosto 2017 — OCU e a./CRU
 (Causa T-512/17)
 (2017/C 338/18)
 Lingua processuale: lo spagnolo
 Parti
 Ricorrenti: Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU) (Madrid, Spagna) e 37 altri ricorrenti
 Convenuto: Comitato di risoluzione unico
 Conclusioni
 I ricorrenti chiedono che il Tribunale voglia:
 —
 annullare la decisione impugnata;
 —
 dichiarare l’illegittimità e l’inapplicabilità degli articoli 18 e 29 del regolamento (UE) n. 806/2014;
 —
 condannare il Comitato di risoluzione unico alle spese.
 Motivi e principali argomenti
 Il presente ricorso è diretto avverso la decisione SRB/EES/2017/08 del Comitato di risoluzione unico, del 7 giugno 2017, relativa all’adozione del piano di risoluzione del Banco Popular Español, S.A.
 I motivi e i principali argomenti sono simili a quelli addotti nelle cause T-478/17, Mutualidad de la Abogacía e Hermandad Nacional de Arquitectos Superiores y Químicos/Comitato di risoluzione unico, T-481/17, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno e SFL/Comitato di risoluzione unico, T-482/17, Comercial Vascongada Recalde/Commissione e Comitato di risoluzione unico, T-483/17, García Suárez e a./Commissione e Comitato di risoluzione unico, T-484/17, Fidesban e a./Comitato di risoluzione unico, T-497/17, Sánchez del Valle e Calatrava Real State 2015/Commissione e Comitato di risoluzione unico, nonché T-498/17, Pablo Álvarez de Linera Granda/Commissione e Comitato di risoluzione unico.


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 31982R3624
 Verordening (EEG) nr. 3624/82 van de Raad van 21 december 1982 betreffende de toepassing van Besluit nr. 1/82 van het Gemengd Comité EEG-Portugal tot wijziging, met betrekking tot post 84.59, van lijst A gehecht aan Protocol nr. 3 betreffende de definitie van het begrip ,,produkten van oorsprong' ' en de methoden van administratieve samenwerking
 Publicatieblad Nr. L 382 van 31/12/1982 blz. 0027 - 0027
 ++++VERORDENING ( EEG ) Nr . 3624/82 VAN DE RAAD van 21 december 1982 betreffende de toepassing van Besluit nr . 1/82 van het Gemengd Comité EEG-Portugal tot wijziging , met betrekking tot post 84.59 , van lijst A gehecht aan Protocol nr . 3 betreffende de definitie van het begrip " produkten van oorsprong " en de methoden van administratieve samenwerking DE RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN , Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap , inzonderheid op artikel 113 , Gezien het voorstel van de Commissie , Overwegende dat de Overeenkomst tussen de Europese Economische Gemeenschap en de Republiek Portugal ( 1 ) op 22 juli 1972 is ondertekend en op 1 januari 1973 in werking is getreden ; Overwegende dat het Gemengd Comité op grond van artikel 28 van Protocol nr . 3 betreffende de definitie van het begrip " produkten van oorsprong " en de methoden van administratieve samenwerking , dat een integrerend deel van de Overeenkomst uitmaakt , Besluit nr . 1/82 tot wijziging , met betrekking tot post 84.59 , van de aan genoemd Protocol gehechte lijst A heeft vastgesteld ; Overwegende dat dit besluit in de Gemeenschap dient te worden toegepast , HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD : Artikel 1 Voor de toepassing van de Overeenkomst tussen de Europese Economische Gemeenschap en de Republiek Portugal is Besluit nr . 1/82 van het Gemengd Comité van toepassing in de Gemeenschap . Artikel 2 Deze verordening treedt in werking op de derde dag volgende op die van haar bekendmaking in het Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen . Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke Lid-Staat . Gedaan te Brussel , 21 december 1982 . Voor de Raad De Voorzitter O . MOELLER ( 1 ) PB nr . L 301 van 31 . 12 . 1972 , blz . 165 . BESLUIT Nr . 1/82 VAN HET GEMENGD COMITE van 23 november 1982 tot wijziging , met betrekking tot post 84.59 , van lijst A gehecht aan Protocol nr . 3 betreffende de definitie van het begrip " produkten van oorsprong " en de methoden van administratieve samenwerking HET GEMENGD COMITE , Gelet op de Overeenkomst tussen de Europese Economische Gemeenschap en de Republiek Portugal , die op 22 juli 1972 te Brussel werd ondertekend , Gelet op Protocol nr . 3 betreffende de definitie van het begrip " produkten van oorsprong " en de methoden van administratieve samenwerking , hierna te noemen Protocol nr . 3 , inzonderheid op artikel 28 , Overwegende dat de voetnoot waarbij ten aanzien van kernsplijtstofelementen een uitzondering wordt gemaakt op de regel betreffende de oorsprong die van toepassing is op hoofdstuk 84 van de IDR-nomenclatuur en die is opgenomen in lijst A van Protocol nr . 3 , slechts geldig is tot en met 31 december 1984 ; dat splijtstofelementen van post 84.59 vervaardigd van in de Gemeenschap verrijkt uranium dat niet van oorsprong is vooralsnog niet voldoen aan de basiseisen van de regels betreffende de oorsprong die van toepassing zijn op hoofdstuk 84 en er waarchijnlijk niet binnen afzienbare tijd aan zullen voldoen ; dat het daarom noodzakelijk is de geldigheidsduur van de uitzonderingsbepaling met een nieuwe termijn te verlengen ; Overwegende dat in de splijtstofindustrie geruime tijd voordat met de leveringen wordt begonnen langlopende contracten worden gesloten ; dat het wenselijk is de rechtszekerheid te waarborgen in dit opzicht ; dat het derhalve dienstig is de geldigheidsduur van de uitzonderingsbepaling reeds nu te verlengen , BESLUIT : Artikel 1 De voetnoot die thans met betrekking tot post 84.59 is opgenomen in de aan Protocol nr . 3 gehechte lijst A wordt gelezen als volgt : " Deze bepalingen zijn niet van toepassing op splijtstofelementen van post 84.59 tot en met 31 december 1988 . " . Artikel 2 Dit besluit treedt in werking op 1 oktober 1982 . Gedaan te Brussel , 23 november 1982 . Voor het Gemengd Comité De Voorzitter Ernani RODRIGUES LOPES