type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 27.6.2022
 GA
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 C 244/32
 Breithiúnas na Cúirte Ginearálta an 27 Aibreán 2022 – Numbi v an Chomhairle
 (Cás T-112/21) (1)
 (Comhbheartas eachtrach agus slándála - Bearta sriantacha a rinneadh i dtaca leis an staid i bPoblacht Dhaonlathach an Chongó - Reo na gcistí - Srianta le ligean isteach ar chríoch na mBallstát - Ainm an iarratasóra a choinneáil ar na liostaí de na daoine atá i gceist - An ceart chun éisteacht a fháil - Cruthúnas gur cuí na hainmneacha a chuimsiú agus a choinneáil ar na liostaí - Earráid fhollasach mheasúnaithe - Buanú na na gcúinsí fíorasacha agus dlíthiúla ba bhun le glacadh na mbeart sriantach)
 (2022/C 244/44)
 Teanga an cháis: an Fhraincis
 Páirtithe
 Iarratasóir: John Numbi (Kinshasa, Poblacht Dhaonlathach an Chongó) (ionadaithe: T. Bontinck, P. De Wolf, A. Guillerme agus T. Payan, Dlíodóirí)
 Cosantóir: Comhairle an Aontais Eorpaigh (ionadaithe: M.-C. Cadilhac agus H. Marcos Fraile, I gcáil Gníomhairí)
 Ábhar
 Lena chaingean faoi Airteagal 263 CFAE, iarrann an t-iarratasóir go ndéanfaí, sa chéad áit, Cinneadh (CBES) 2020/2033 ón gComhairle an 10 Nollaig 2020 lena leasaítear Cinneadh 2010/788/CBES a bhaineann le bearta sriantacha i gcoinne Phoblacht Dhaonlathach an Chongó (IO 2020 L 419, lch. 30), agus, siosa dara háit, Rialachán Cur Chun Feidhme (AE) 2020/2021 ón gComhairle an 10 Nollaig 2020 lena gcuirtear chun feidhme Airteagal 9 de Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1183/2005 lena bhforchuirtear bearta sriantacha sonracha áirithe a dhírítear i gcoinne daoine atá ag gníomhú de shárú ar an lánchosc arm i dtaca le Poblacht Dhaonlathach an Chongó, a mhéid a bhaineann na gníomhartha sin leis an iarratasóir, a chur ar neamhní.
 An chuid oibríochtúil
 1.
 Diúltaítear don chaingean;
 2.
 Ordaítear do John Numbi na costais a íoc.
 (1) IO C 128, 12.4.2021.


type: wikipedia

text:
Slovenská národná rada (skratka SNR) môže byť:
 vrcholný slovenský politický orgán počas revolúcie 18481849, ktorý angažoval slovenské povstanie, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1848 – 1849)
 nerealizovaný vrcholný slovenský politický orgán, ktorého založenie bolo pripravované v roku 1914, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1914)
 vrcholný slovenský politický orgán v rokoch 19181919, ktorý prijal Martinskú deklaráciu, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1918 – 1919)
 politický orgán v rokoch 19201922 v Krakove a Varšave, založený Františkom Jehličkom a Viktorom Dvortsákom, Slovenská národná rada (1920 – 1922)
 politický exilový orgán v novembri 1939januári 1940 v Paríži, založený skupinou slovenských politikov okolo Milana Hodžu ako opozičný orgán voči Československému národnému výboru vedeného Edvardom Benešom, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1939 – 1940)
 politický exilový orgán v decembri 1943septembri 1948 v Londýne, založený Petrom Prídavkom ako opozičný orgán voči Dočasnému štátnemu zriadeniu, nazývaný tiež Slovenská národná rada v Londýne, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1943 – 1948)
 vrcholný slovenský politický orgán založený v decembri 1943, ktorého funkcie a kompetencie sa postupne menili a v roku 1992 bol premenovaný na Národnú radu Slovenskej republiky, pozri Slovenská národná rada (1943 – 1992)
 Pozri aj
 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, súčasný zákonodarný orgán Slovenskej republiky
 Slovenská národná rada v zahraničí, politický exilový orgán v rokoch 1948 – 1960, založený v máji 1948 Karolom Sidorom, Konštantínom Čulenom a Jozefom Kirschbaumom v Ríme, v septembri 1948 zlúčený so SNR v Londýne
 Slovenská rada, politický orgán v Ženeve, založený Františkom Jehličkom a Viktorom Dvorčákom 10. júla 1933


text:
17.7.1999 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti C 204/7
 kuudennen neuvoston direktiivin 77/388/ETY (EYVL L 145, toksessa, 43,09 ecun suuruisine päivittäisine viivästyskorkoi-
 s. 1) 2 artiklan 1 kohdan, 5 artiklan 6 kohdan, 11 artiklan A neen 1.4.1988 lukien, sekä että SNUA Srl velvoitetaan suoritta-
 kohdan 3 alakohdan b alakohdan ja 27 artiklan tulkinnasta, maan sille aiheuttamistaan vahingoista korvauksena
 yhteisöjen tuomioistuin, toimien kokoonpanossa: presidentti 60 000 ecua, yhteisöjen tuomioistuin (viides jaosto), toimien
 G. C. Rodrı́guez Iglesias, jaostojen puheenjohtajat kokoonpanossa: jaoston puheenjohtaja J.-P. Puissochet (esitte-
 P. J. G. Kapteyn ja G. Hirsch (esittelevä tuomari) sekä tuomarit levä tuomari) sekä tuomarit P. Jann, C. Gulmann D. A. O.
 G. F. Mancini, J. C. Moitinho de Almeida, C. Gulmann, Edward ja L. Sevón, julkisasiamies: A. La Pergola, kirjaaja:
 D. A. O. Edward, L. Sevón ja M. Wathelet, julkisasiamies: johtava hallintovirkamies H. A. Rühl, on antanut 27.4.1999
 N. Fennelly, kirjaaja: johtava hallintovirkamies D. Louterman- tuomion, jonka tuomiolauselma on seuraava:
 Hubeau, on antanut 27.4.1999 tuomion, jonka tuomiolausel-
 ma on seuraava: 1) SNUA Srl velvoitetaan maksamaan Euroopan yhteisöjen komis-
 siolle 195 397 euroa korkoineen, jotka ovat suuruudeltaan
 1) Jäsenvaltioiden liikevaihtoverolainsäädännön yhdenmukaistami- 43,09 euroa päivässä 1.4.1988 lukien siihen asti kun velka on
 sesta – yhteinen arvonlisäverojärjestelmä: yhdenmukainen kokonaan maksettu,
 määräytymisperuste – 17 päivänä toukokuuta 1977 annetun
 kuudennen neuvoston direktiivin 77/388/ETY 11 artiklan 2) Kanne hylätään muilta osin,
 A kohdan 3 alakohdan b alakohtaa on tulkittava siten, että
 käsitteet hinnanalennus ja hyvitys eivät voi kattaa tavaroiden 3) SNUA Srl velvoitetaan korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 luovutuksen kokonaishinnan suuruista hinnanalennusta.
 (1) EYVL C 131, 26.4.1997.
 2) Kuudennen direktiivin 77/388/ETY 5 artiklan 6 kohtaa on
 tulkittava siten, että siinä tarkoitettuna vastikkeelliseen luovutuk-
 seen rinnastettavana luovutuksena on pidettävä sitä, että öljy-
 yhtiö ottaa tavaroita, jotka luovutetaan polttoaineen ostajalle
 sellaisia ostoseteleitä vastaan, joita hän on kansallisessa tuo-
 mioistuimessa käsiteltävänä olevassa asiassa kyseessä olevan
 myynninedistämiskampanjan kaltaisessa järjestelmässä saanut YHTEISÖJEN TUOMIOISTUIMEN TUOMIO
 ostamansa polttoainemäärän perusteella maksettuaan siitä huol-
 toasemalla täyden vähittäishinnan, kun nämä tavarat eivät ole (ensimmäinen jaosto)
 vähäarvoisia.
 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999,
 (1) EYVL C 108, 5.4.1997. asiassa C-405/97 (Finanzgericht Bremenin esittämä ennak-
 koratkaisupyyntö): Mövenpick Deutschland GmbH für
 das Gastgewerbe vastaan Hauptzollamt Bremen (1)
 (Yhdistetty nimikkeistö – Tariffinimike 0802 – Kuivatut ja
 murskatut saksanpähkinät, jotka on väliaikaisesti varastoitu
 YHTEISÖJEN TUOMIOISTUIMEN TUOMIO -24 °C:n lämpötilaan)
 (viides jaosto) (1999/C 204/13)
 27 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999, (Oikeudenkäyntikieli: saksa)
 asiassa C-69/97: Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio vastaan
 SNUA Srl(1) (Väliaikainen käännös; lopullinen käännös julkaistaan yhteisöjen
 tuomioistuimen oikeustapauskokoelmassa)
 (Välityslauseke – Sopimuksen täyttämättä jättäminen)
 Asiassa C-405/97, jonka Finanzgericht Bremen (Saksa) on
 saattanut EY:n perustamissopimuksen 177 artiklan nojalla
 (1999/C 204/12) yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen käsiteltäväksi saadakseen tässä kan-
 sallisessa tuomioistuimessa vireillä olevassa asiassa Mövenpick
 (Oikeudenkäyntikieli: italia) Deutschland GmbH für das Gastgewerbe vastaan Hauptzollamt
 Bremen, ennakkoratkaisun yhdistetyn nimikkeistön tariffini-
 mikkeen 0802 tulkinnasta, sellaisena kuin se on tariffi- ja
 (Väliaikainen käännös; lopullinen käännös julkaistaan yhteisöjen tilastonimikkeistöstä ja yhteisestä tullitariffista annetun neu-
 tuomioistuimen oikeustapauskokoelmassa) voston asetuksen (ETY) N:o 2658/87 liitteen I muuttamisesta
 10 päivänä elokuuta 1993 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (ETY)
 Asiassa C-69/97, Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio (asiamie- N:o 2551/93 (EYVL L 241, s. 1) liitteessä I, ja tietyistä yhteisön
 hinään Paolo Stancanelli ja Jean-Francis Pasquier, avustajanaan tullikoodeksista annetun neuvoston asetuksen (ETY) N:o
 Alberto dal Ferro) vastaan SNUA Srl, kotipaikka Pordenone 2913/92 soveltamista koskevista säännöksistä 2 päivänä hei-
 (Italia), edustajinaan asianajajat Andrea Guarino, Rooma, ja näkuuta 1993 annetun komission asetuksen (ETY) N:o
 Ezio Trampus, Trieste, prosessiosoite Luxemburgissa asianajo- 2454/93 (EYVL L 253, s. 1) 522 artiklan 3 kohdan pätevyy-
 toimisto Alain Lorang, 51 rue Albert 1er, jossa Euroopan destä, yhteisöjen tuomioistuin (ensimmäinen jaosto), toimien
 yhteisöjen komissio vaatii EY:n perustamissopimuksen 181 kokoonpanossa: jaoston puheenjohtaja P. Jann (esittelevä
 artiklan nojalla, että sille palautetaan 195 397 ecun suuruinen tuomari) sekä tuomarit D. A. O. Edward ja L. Sevón, julkisasia-
 ennakkomaksu, jonka se on suorittanut kiinteiden jätteiden mies: A. Saggio, kirjaaja: R. Grass, on antanut 28.4.1999
 keräysja kierrätysjärjestelmän toteuttamiseksi yksityisessä lai- tuomion, jonka tuomiolauselma on seuraava:
 ---pagebreak--- C 204/8 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti 17.7.1999
 Yhdistettyä nimikkeistöä, sellaisena kuin se on tariffi- ja tilastonimik- YHTEISÖJEN TUOMIOISTUIMEN TUOMIO
 keistöstä ja yhteisestä tullitariffista annetun neuvoston asetuksen
 (ETY) N:o 2658/87 liitteen I muuttamisesta 10 päivänä elokuuta
 1993 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (ETY) N:o 2551/93 liitteessä I, (ensimmäinen jaosto)
 on tulkittava siten, että kolmannesta maasta tuodut kuivatut ja
 murskatut saksanpähkinät, jotka on yhteisössä varastoitu -24 °C:n 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999,
 lämpötilaan ja jotka on lämpenemisen jälkeen tullattu niiden
 vapaaseen liikkeeseen luovuttamista varten, on luokiteltava tariffini-
 mikkeeseen 0802. asiassa C-250/98, Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio vastaan
 Ranskan tasavalta (1)
 ( 1) EYVL C 41, 7.2.1998.
 (Jäsenyysvelvoitteiden noudattamatta jättäminen – Direktii-
 vin 89/594/ETY täytäntöönpanon laiminlyönti)
 YHTEISÖJEN TUOMIOISTUIMEN TUOMIO
 (1999/C 204/15)
 (ensimmäinen jaosto)
 28 päivänä huhtikuuta 1999, (Oikeudenkäyntikieli: ranska)
 asiassa C-31/98, (Finanzgericht Münchenin ennakkorat-
 kaisupyyntö): Peter Luksch vastaan Hauptzollamt Wei- Asiassa C-250/98, Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio (asiamie-
 den (1) hinään Antonio Caeiro ja Bernard Mongin), kantajana, vastaan
 Ranskan tasavalta (asiamiehinään Kareen Rispal-Bellanger ja
 (Maatalous – Yhteiset markkinajärjestelyt – Hedelmät ja Anne de Bourgoing), vastaajana, jossa kantaja vaatii yhteisöjen
 vihannekset – Kolmansista maista peräisin olevien hapankir- tuomioistuinta toteamaan, että Ranskan tasavalta ei ole nou-
 sikoiden tuonti – Vähimmäishinnan ja tuontihinnan välistä dattanut lääkärin, yleissairaanhoidosta vastaavan sairaanhoita-
 erotusta vastaavan tasoitusmaksun periminen – Soveltami- jan, hammaslääkärin, eläinlääkärin ja kätilön tutkintotodistus-
 nen pilaantuneisiin tavaroihin) ten, todistusten ja muiden muodollista kelpoisuutta osoittavien
 (1999/C 204/14) asiakirjojen vastavuoroisesta tunnustamisesta annettujen direk-
 tiivien 75/362/ETY, 77/452/ETY, 78/686/ETY, 78/1026/ETY
 ja 80/154/ETY sekä lääkärin-, eläinlääkärin- ja kätilöntointa
 (Oikeudenkäyntikieli: saksa) koskevien lakien, asetusten ja hallinnollisten määräysten yh-
 teensovittamisesta annettujen direktiivien 75/363/ETY,
 (Väliaikainen käännös; lopullinen käännös julkaistaan yhteisöjen 78/1027/ETY ja 80/155/ETY muuttamisesta 30 päivänä loka-
 tuomioistuimen oikeustapauskokoelmassa) kuuta 1989 annetun neuvoston direktiivin 89/594/ETY (EYVL
 L 341, s. 19) mukaisia velvoitteitaan, koska se ei ole antanut
 Asiassa C-31/98, jonka Finanzgericht München (Saksa) on kaikkia kyseisen direktiivin noudattamisen edellyttämiä lakeja,
 saattanut EY:n perustamissopimuksen 177 artiklan nojalla asetuksia ja hallinnollisia määräyksiä, yhteisöjen tuomioistuin
 yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen käsiteltäväksi saadakseen tässä kan- (ensimmäinen jaosto), toimien kokoonpanossa: jaoston pu-
 sallisessa tuomioistuimessa vireillä olevassa asiassa Peter heenjohtaja P. Jann sekä tuomarit D. A. O. Edward (esittelevä
 Luksch vastaan Hauptzollamt Weiden, ennakkoratkaisun ha- tuomari) ja L. Sevón, julkisasiamies: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
 pankirsikoiden vähimmäistuontihinnasta 17 päivänä kesäkuu- kirjaaja: johtava hallintovirkamies R. Grass, on antanut
 ta 1994 annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1395/94 (EYVL 28.4.1999 tuomion, jonka tuomiolauselma on seuraava:
 L 152, s. 31) 1 artiklan tulkinnasta samoin kuin tariffi – ja
 tilastonimikkeistöstä ja yhteisestä tullitariffista 23 päivänä
 heinäkuuta 1987 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (ETY) 1) Ranskan tasavalta ei ole noudattanut lääkärin, yleissairaanhoi-
 N:o 2658/87 (EYVL L 256, s. l) liitteen I tulkinnasta, sellaisena dosta vastaavan sairaanhoitajan, hammaslääkärin, eläinlääkärin
 kuin viimeksi mainittu asetus on muutettuna 10 päivänä ja kätilön tutkintotodistusten, todistusten ja muiden muodollista
 elokuuta 1993 annetulla komission asetuksella (ETY) kelpoisuutta osoittavien asiakirjojen vastavuoroisesta tunnusta-
 N:o 2551/93 (EYVL L 241, s. l), ja erityisesti yhdistetyn misesta annettujen direktiivien 75/362/ETY, 77/452/ETY,
 nimikkeistön 8 ryhmän 1 huomautuksen tulkinnasta, yhteisö- 78/686/ETY, 78/1026/ETY ja 80/154/ETY sekä lääkärin-,
 jen tuomioistuin (ensimmäinen jaosto), toimien kokoonpa- eläinlääkärin- ja kätilöntointa koskevien lakien, asetusten ja
 nossa: jaoston puheenjohtaja P. Jann (esittelevä tuomari) sekä hallinnollisten määräysten yhteensovittamisesta annettujen direk-
 tuomarit D. A. O. Edward ja L. Sevón, julkisasiamies: P. Léger, tiivien 75/363/ETY, 78/1027/ETY ja 80/155/ETY muutta-
 kirjaaja: R. Grass, on antanut 28.4.1999 tuomion, jonka misesta 30 päivänä lokakuuta 1989 annetun neuvoston direktii-
 tuomiolauselma on seuraava: vin 89/594/ETY mukaisia velvoitteitaan, koska se ei ole antanut
 kaikkia kyseisen direktiivin noudattamisen edellyttämiä lakeja,
 Hapankirsikoiden vähimmäistuontihinnasta 17 päivänä kesäkuuta asetuksia ja hallinnollisia määräyksiä.
 1994 annetun komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1395/94 1 artiklaa
 on tulkittava siten, että tasoitusmaksua ei voida periä tapauksissa,
 2) Ranskan tasavalta velvoitetaan korvaamaan oikeudenkäynti-
 joissa hapankirsikat on luovutettu vapaaseen liikkeeseen yhteisössä
 alhaiseen hintaan silloin, kun alhainen hinta johtuu maahantuojan kulut.
 tahdosta tai tavaroiden alkuperästä täysin riippumattomista syistä,
 eli esimerkiksi hedelmien pitkälle edenneestä mutta ennalta arvaamat-
 tomasta pilaantumisesta. (1) EYVL C 278, 5.9.1998.
 (1) EYVL C 94, 28.3.1998.


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 31991D0120
 91/120/CEE: Décision du Conseil du 25 février 1991 concernant la conclusion de l'accord de coopération entre la Communauté économique européenne et le Royaume de Suède relatif à un plan européen de stimulation de la science économique (SPES)
 Journal officiel n° L 061 du 07/03/1991 p. 0019
 DÉCISION DU CONSEIL du 25 février 1991 concernant la conclusion de l'accord de coopération entre la Communauté économique européenne et le royaume de Suède relatif à un plan européen de stimulation de la science économique (Spes) (91/120/CEE)LE CONSEIL DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES,vu le traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne, et notamment son article 130 Q paragraphe 2,vu la proposition de la Commission (1),en coopération avec le Parlement européen (2),vu l'avis du Comité économique et social (3),considérant que, par la décision 89/118/CEE (4), le Conseil a adopté un plan européen de stimulation de la science économique (1989 à 1992); que l'article 5 de cette décision habilite la Commission à négocier des accords avec des pays tiers, en particulier avec les pays européens qui ont conclu des accords-cadres de coopération scientifique et technique avec la Communauté en vue de les associer intégralement ou partiellement au programme;considérant que, par la décision 87/177/CEE (5), le Conseil a approuvé au nom de la Communauté économique européenne la conclusion de l'accord-cadre de coopération scientifique et technique entre les Communautés européennes et, notamment, le royaume de Suède;considérant qu'il convient d'approuver l'accord de coopération entre la Communauté économique européenne et le royaume de Suède relatif à un plan européen de stimulation de la science économique (Spes),DÉCIDE: Article premierL'accord de coopération entre la Communauté économique européenne et le royaume de Suède relatif à un plan européen de stimulation de la science économique (Spes) est approuvé au nom de la Communauté économique européenne.Le texte de l'accord est joint à la présente décision. Article 2Le président du Conseil procède à la notification visée à l'article 10 de l'accord.Fait à Bruxelles, le 25 février 1991.Par le ConseilLe présidentJ.-C. JUNCKER(1) JO n° C 148 du 16. 6. 1990, p. 19.(2) JO n° C 284 du 12. 11. 1990, p. 74 et décision du 24 janvier 1991 (non encore parue au Journal officiel).(3) JO n° C 31 du 6. 2. 1991, p. 37.(4) JO n° L 44 du 16. 2. 1989, p. 43.(5) JO n° L 71 du 14. 3. 1987, p. 29.


text:
Vanishing Vision é o primeiro álbum da banda japonesa de heavy metal X Japan, então conhecida apenas como X, lançado em 14 de abril de 1998 pela Extasy Records. Ele inclui as primeiras versões de "Kurenai" e "Un-finished..." cujas novas versões apareceriam depois no álbum Blue Blood.
 Liderou a parada de álbuns independentes da Oricon (Indies Albums) e alcançou a posição 19 na parada principal (Oricon Albums Chart).
 Visão geral
 Vanishing Vision foi lançado em disco de vinil em 14 de abril de 1988 pelo próprio selo do líder e baterista Yoshiki, a Extasy Records. Uma prensagem limitada a cinco mil discos de imagem também foi feita, incluindo um disco flexível avulso de "Stab Me in the Back". Esta versão da música foi originalmente incluída no sampler da Victor Records fevereiro de 1987, Skull Thrash Zone Volume I e foi gravada com Pata como guitarrista suporte. Também é diferente da que mais tarde apareceu no terceiro álbum, Jealousy, de 1991. A letra desta versão de "Kurenai" é inteiramente em inglês, mais tarde ela apareceria principalmente em japonês no Blue Blood e seria lançada como seu single de estreia major, tornando-se uma das canções características do X Japan. hide revelou que esta era sua música favorita do X antes de se juntar à banda e ficou desapontado porque eles não quiseram a perfomar quando ele entrou, então teve que reclamar para que tocassem. Tanto Toshi quanto Taiji sentiram que ela possui toque muito japonês, com Taiji enfatizando que cada membro ajudou a organizá-lo.
 A banda embarcou em turnê extensivamente para divulgar o álbum, começando com a Vanishing Tour '88 Spring durante março e início de abril. A Vanishing Tour Vol.2 os levou a 20 localidades para 24 shows de junho a julho, enquanto a Turnê Burn Out '88 de outubro teve 12 apresentações em outubro.
 Vanishing Vision foi relançado em CD em 15 de outubro de 1989. Isso foi após o lançamento do segundo álbum da banda, Blue Blood, pela grande gravadora CBS/Sony. Uma versão em CD remasterizada digitalmente foi lançada em 13 de setembro de 2000 pela Warner Music Japan.
 Composição
 O título do álbum, Vanishing Vision, foi escolhido para significar que a banda estava trocando a imagem desavergonhada que havia adquirido para um novo começo. A arte da capa desenhada por Shiro Nishiguchi foi inspirada na faixa "Sadistic Desire", com participação de cada membro da banda.
 Yoshiki afirmou que "Vanishing Love", que tem quase metade de letras em japonês e metade em inglês, representa a fraqueza humana. Os outros membros ressaltaram que apesar de ser uma música rápida, as guitarras gêmeas e a melodia são mais importantes. "Phantom of Guilt" tem um ritmo de 16 batidas e a letra representa o conflito dentro do espírito humano, de acordo com Toshi. "Sadistic Desire" é uma canção da banda anterior de hide, Saver Tiger, originalmente chamada de "Sadistic Emotion". Yoshiki reescreveu sua letra, sobre sexo violento, inspirada no filme Veludo Azul de 1986. Excepcionalmente, para esta faixa Taiji tocou seu baixo com os dedos e ela contém uma espécie de solo de baixo. Uma versão alternativa da música apareceria mais tarde no single de X, "Silent Jealousy", de 1991.
 Taiji escreveu o ritmo de 16 batidas, a canção slap bass "Give Me the Pleasure" depois de assistir a uma reportagem sobre um assassinato. A faixa é incomum para o X por usar acordes menores com sétima e ter uma batida de tambor étnica que também usava instrumentos incomuns como os timbales e sinos de vaca. "I'll Kill You" é uma versão reformulada do single de estreia de 1985. Yoshiki explicou que a canção não é sobre matar pessoas como o título sugere, mas é uma canção de amor no estilo de um casal descontente. Yoshiki escreveu a letra de "Alive" para falar sobre a vida humana e a vida ou a morte em um sonho. A introdução contém um trecho do primeiro movimento da Sonata para piano n.o 14 de Ludwig van Beethoven. hide afirmou que os solos de guitarra dessa música contrastam com os outros do álbum porque são mais melódicos; como "uma guitarra chorando."
 Embora pareça uma canção de amor, Yoshiki afirmou que "Kurenai" é na verdade sobre "a luta do coração". Assim como o título sugere, "Un-finished..." é uma balada curta e incompleta que repentinamente é interrompida. Yoshiki apresentou a canção após o álbum ser concluído, sentindo que precisava de um tema final.
 Recepção
 Apesar de ser lançado por uma gravadora independente, vendeu mais de dez mil cópias, liderando a parada de álbuns indies da Oricon, Oricon Indies Albums. Todavia, também alcançou a décima nona posição na parada de álbuns principal da Oricon, Oricon Albums Chart, tornando-os a primeira banda independente a entrar na parada principal.
 Em 1990, com mais de 158.220 cópias vendidas, Vanishing Vision foi o 78o álbum mais vendido do ano e permaneceu nas paradas por 47 semanas. Até 1997, vendeu mais de 800.000 cópias.
 Faixas
 Todas as letras escritas por Yoshiki, exceto onde especificado.
 Músicos
 X
 Yoshiki - bateria e piano
 Toshi - vocais
 Hide - guitarra
 Pata - guitarra
 Taiji - baixo
 Produção
 Kinya Maekawa, Seiji Komura - direção
 Masanori Chinzei - engenheiro de gravação e engenheiro de mixagem
 Hikaru Sawamura - engenheiro de mixagem
 Akinori Yoshino - engenheiro assistente
 Norio Kaziki - fotografia
 Shiro Nishiguchi - design de manga
 NOBU - direção de arte e design (apenas em CD)
 Mitsukazu "Quincy" Tanaka - engenheiro de masterização digital (apenas em CD)
 Desempenho nas paradas
 Álbuns de X Japan
 Álbuns de power metal
 Álbuns de estreia de 1988
 Álbuns em língua japonesa


type: contracts

text:
 Σημαντική ανακοίνωση νομικού περιεχομένου
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 22006A1101(02)
 Πρωτόκολλο της συμφωνίας εταιρικής σχέσεως και συνεργασίας για τη σύναψη εταιρικής σχέσεως μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Κιργιστάν αφετέρου, ώστε να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση της Τσεχικής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας, της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λεττονίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λιθουανίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Ουγγαρίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Μάλτας, της Δημοκρατίας της Πολωνίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Σλοβενίας και της Σλοβακικής Δημοκρατίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 303 της 01/11/2006 σ. 0009 - 0012
 Πρωτόκολλοτης συμφωνίας εταιρικής σχέσεως και συνεργασίας για τη σύναψη εταιρικής σχέσεως μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Κιργιστάν αφετέρου, ώστε να ληφθεί υπόψη η προσχώρηση της Τσεχικής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Εσθονίας, της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λεττονίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Λιθουανίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Ουγγαρίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Μάλτας, της Δημοκρατίας της Πολωνίας, της Δημοκρατίας της Σλοβενίας και της Σλοβακικής Δημοκρατίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή ΈνωσηΤΟ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΒΕΛΓΙΟΥ,Η ΤΣΕΧΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,TO ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΔΑΝΙΑΣ,Η ΟΜΟΣΠΟΝΔΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΙΑΣ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΣΘΟΝΙΑΣ,Η ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,ΤΟ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΙΣΠΑΝΙΑΣ,Η ΓΑΛΛΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,Η ΙΡΛΑΝΔΙΑ,Η ΙΤΑΛΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,Η ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΛΕΤΤΟΝΙΑΣ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΛΙΘΟΥΑΝΙΑΣ,ΤΟ ΜΕΓΑΛΟ ΔΟΥΚΑΤΟ ΤΟΥ ΛΟΥΞΕΜΒΟΥΡΓΟΥ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΓΓΑΡΙΑΣ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΜΑΛΤΑΣ,ΤΟ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΩ ΧΩΡΩΝ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΥΣΤΡΙΑΣ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΩΝΙΑΣ,Η ΠΟΡΤΟΓΑΛΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΣΛΟΒΕΝΙΑΣ,Η ΣΛΟΒΑΚΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ,Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΦΙΝΛΑΝΔΙΑΣ,ΤΟ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΣΟΥΗΔΙΑΣ,ΤΟ ΗΝΩΜΕΝΟ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΗΣ ΒΡΕΤΑΝΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΒΟΡΕΙΑΣ ΙΡΛΑΝΔΙΑΣ,εφεξής τα "κράτη μέλη" που εκπροσωπούνται από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, καιΗ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΚΑΙ Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΑΤΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ,εφεξής οι "Κοινότητες" που εκπροσωπούνται από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, και την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή,αφενός,ΚΑΙ Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΚΙΡΓΙΣΤΑΝαφετέρου,ΕΧΟΝΤΑΣ ΥΠΟΨΗ την προσχώρηση της Τσεχικής Δημοκρατίας, της Εσθονίας, της Κύπρου, της Λεττονίας, της Λιθουανίας, της Ουγγαρίας, της Μάλτας, της Πολωνίας, της Σλοβενίας και της Σλοβακίας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση την 1η Μαΐου 2004,ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΣΑΝ ΤΑ ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΑ:Άρθρο 1Η Τσεχική Δημοκρατία, η Εσθονία, η Κύπρος, η Λεττονία, η Λιθουανία, η Ουγγαρία, η Μάλτα, η Πολωνία, η Σλοβενία και η Σλοβακία είναι μέρη της συμφωνίας εταιρικής σχέσεως και συνεργασίας, για τη σύναψη εταιρικής σχέσεως μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και των κρατών μελών τους αφενός, και της Δημοκρατίας του Κιργιστάν αφετέρου, που υπεγράφη στις Βρυξέλλες στις 9 Φεβρουαρίου 1995 (εφεξής η "συμφωνία") και υιοθετούν και λαμβάνουν υπόψη αντίστοιχα, κατά τον ίδιο τρόπο με τα άλλα κράτη μέλη, τα κείμενα της συμφωνίας, καθώς και τα έγγραφα που επισυνάπτονται σε αυτήν.Άρθρο 2Για να ληφθούν υπόψη οι πρόσφατες θεσμικές εξελίξεις στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, τα μέρη συμφωνούν ότι μετά τη λήξη της συνθήκης για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα, οι ισχύουσες διατάξεις της συμφωνίας που αναφέρονται στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα θεωρείται ότι αναφέρονται στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα που έχει αναλάβει όλα τα δικαιώματα και υποχρεώσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας Άνθρακα και Χάλυβα.Άρθρο 3Το παρόν πρωτόκολλο αποτελεί αναπόσπαστο μέρος της συμφωνίας.Άρθρο 41. Το παρόν πρωτόκολλο εγκρίνεται από τις Κοινότητες, από το Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξ ονόματος των κρατών μελών, και από τη Δημοκρατία του Κιργιστάν σύμφωνα με τις οικείες διαδικασίες.2. Τα μέρη κοινοποιούν αμοιβαία την ολοκλήρωση των αντιστοίχων διαδικασιών που αναφέρονται στην προηγούμενη παράγραφο. Τα έγγραφα έγκρισης κατατίθενται στη Γενική Γραμματεία του Συμβουλίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.Άρθρο 51. Το παρόν πρωτόκολλο τίθεται σε ισχύ την ίδια ημέρα με τη συνθήκη προσχώρησης του 2003, εφόσον όλα τα έγγραφα έγκρισης του παρόντος πρωτοκόλλου έχουν κατατεθεί πριν από αυτή την ημερομηνία.2. Εάν όλα τα έγγραφα έγκρισης του παρόντος πρωτοκόλλου δεν έχουν κατατεθεί πριν από την εν λόγω ημερομηνία, το παρόν πρωτόκολλο αρχίζει να ισχύει την πρώτη ημέρα του πρώτου μήνα μετά την ημερομηνία κατάθεσης του τελευταίου εγγράφου έγκρισης.3. Εάν όλα τα έγγραφα έγκρισης του παρόντος πρωτοκόλλου δεν έχουν κατατεθεί πριν από την 1η Μαΐου 2004, το παρόν πρωτόκολλο εφαρμόζεται προσωρινά με ισχύ από την 1η Μαΐου 2004.Άρθρο 6Τα κείμενα της συμφωνίας, η τελική πράξη και όλα τα έγγραφα που προσαρτώνται σε αυτήν καταρτίζονται στην τσεχική, εσθονική, ουγγρική, λεττονική, λιθουανική, μαλτέζικη, πολωνική, σλοβενική και σλοβακική γλώσσα.Τα εν λόγω κείμενα προσαρτώνται [1] στο παρόν πρωτόκολλο και είναι εξίσου αυθεντικά με τα κείμενα των άλλων γλωσσών στις οποίες καταρτίζονται η συμφωνία, η τελική πράξη και τα έγγραφα που προσαρτώνται σε αυτήν.Άρθρο 7Το παρόν πρωτόκολλο συντάσσεται σε δύο αντίτυπα στην αγγλική, γαλλική, γερμανική, δανική, ελληνική, εσθονική, ισπανική, ιταλική, λεττονική, λιθουανική, μαλτέζικη, ολλανδική, ουγγρική, πολωνική, πορτογαλική, σλοβενική, σλοβακική, σουηδική, τσεχική, φινλανδική και κιργιζιανή γλώσσα. Όλα τα κείμενα είναι εξίσου αυθεντικά.Hecho en Bruselas, el treinta de abril de dos mil cuatro.V Bruselu dne třicátého dubna dva tisíce čtyři.Udfærdiget i Bruxelles den tredivte april to tusind og fire.Geschehen zu Brüssel am dreißigsten April zweitausendundvier.Kahe tuhande neljanda aasta kolmekümnendal aprillil Brüsselis.Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις τριάντα Απριλίου δύο χιλιάδες τέσσερα.Done at Brussels on the thirtieth day of April in the year two thousand and four.Fait à Bruxelles, le trente avril deux mille quatre.Fatto a Bruxelles, addì trenta aprile duemilaquattro.Briselē, divi tūkstoši ceturtā gada trīsdesmitajā aprīlī.Priimta du tūkstančiai ketvirtų metų balandžio trisdešimtą dieną Briuselyje.Kelt Brüsszelben, a kétezer-negyedik év április havának tizenharmadik napján.Magħmul fi Brussel fit-tletin jum ta' April tas-sena elfejn u erbgħa.Gedaan te Brussel, de dertigste april tweeduizendvier.Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia trzynastego kwietnia roku dwa tysiące czwartego.Feito em Bruxelas, em trinta de Abril de dois mil e quatro.V Bruseli dňa tridsiateho apríla dvetisícštyri.V Bruslju, dne tridesetega aprila leta dva tisoč štiri.Tehty Brysselissä kolmantenakymmenentenä päivänä huhtikuuta vuonna kaksituhattaneljä.Som skedde i Bryssel den trettionde april tjugohundrafyra.Por los Estados miembrosZa členské státyFor medlemsstaterneFür die MitgliedstaatenLiikmesriikide nimelΓια τα κράτη μέληFor the Member StatesPour les États membresPer gli Stati membriDalībvalstu vārdāValstybių narių varduA tagállamok részérőlGħall-Istati MembriVoor de lidstatenW imieniu Państw CzłonkowskichPelos Estados-MembrosZa členské štátyZa države članiceJäsenvaltioiden puolestaPå medlemsstaternas vägnar+++++ TIFF ++++++++++ TIFF +++++Por las Comunidades EuropeasZa Evropská společenstvíFor De Europæiske FællesskaberFür die Europäischen GemeinschaftenEuroopa ühenduste nimelΓια τις Ευρωπαϊκές ΚοινότητεςFor the European CommunitiesPour les Communautés européennesPer le Comunità europeeEiropas Kopienu vārdāEuropos Bendrijų varduAz Európai Közösségek részérőlGħall-Komunitajiet EwropejVoor de Europese GemeenschappenW imieniu Wspólnot EuropejskichPelas Comunidades EuropeiasZa Európske spoločenstváZa Evropski skupnostiEuroopan yhteisöjen puolestaPå Europeiska gemenskapernas vägnar+++++ TIFF ++++++++++ TIFF ++++++++++ TIFF +++++Por la República de KirguistánZa Kyrgyzskou republikuFor Den Kirgisiske RepublikFür die Kirgisische RepublikKirgiisi Vabariigi nimelΓια τη Δημοκρατία τον ΚιργιστάνFor the Republic of KyrgyzstanPour la République du KirghizstanPer la Repubblica del KirghizistanKirgizstānas Republikas vārdāKirgizijos Respublikos varduKirgizisztán részérőlGħar-Repubblika tal-KirġizstanVoor de Republiek KirgizstanW imieniu Republiki KirgijskiejPela República do QuirguizistãoZa Kirgizskú republikuZa Kirgiško republikoKirgisian tasavallan puolestaPå Republiken Kirgizistans vägnar+++++ TIFF ++++++++++ TIFF +++++[1] Τα κείμενα της συμφωνίας στην τσεχική, την εσθονική, τη λεττονική, τη λιθουανική, την ουγγρική, τη μαλτέζικη, την πολωνική, τη σλοβακική και τη σλοβενική γλώσσα θα δημοσιευθούν σε ειδική έκδοση της Επίσημης Εφημερίδας σε μεταγενέστερη ημερομηνία.--------------------------------------------------


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text:
NJA 2015 s. 798 ( NJA 2015:73) | Lagen.nu
 Dermarome Stockholm Aktiebolag och Skin Concept i Stockholm AB (licenstagarna) väckte vid Stockholms tingsrätt talan mot Vivamondo Limited Hong Kong filial ( Vivamondo ) och yrkade att tingsrätten skulle förbjuda Vivamondo vid vite att i näringsverksamhet via internetsidan ”vivamondo.se” sälja, marknadsföra, importera och/eller föra ut vissa angivna varor under varumärkena DERMALOGICA, JANE IREDALE och DECLEOR, liksom att medverka till sådan användning av varumärkena i den mån varorna inte hade förts ut på marknaden inom Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet (EES) av respektive rättighetsinnehavare eller med dennes tillstånd.
 Som grund för sin talan anförde licenstagarna i huvudsak följande. International Dermal Institute Inc , Iredale Mineral Cosmetics Ltd och Laboratoires Decleor har genom registrering ensamrätt här i landet att i näringsverksamhet använda de i målet aktuella varumärkena. Vivamondo har gjort sig skyldig till varumärkesintrång, eller i vart fall medverkat till sådant intrång, genom att i näringsverksamhet bjuda ut till försäljning, föra ut på marknaden, lagra, importera och/eller marknadsföra varor under varumärkena utan att varorna dessförinnan förts ut på marknaden inom EES av respektive rättighetsinnehavare eller med dennes tillstånd. Licenstagarna har i egenskap av varumärkeslicenstagare rätt att föra talan mot varumärkesintrånget.
 Vivamondo bestred käromålet och yrkade i första hand att käromålet skulle avvisas. Som grund för avvisningsyrkandet anförde Vivamondo i huvudsak följande. Svensk domsrätt föreligger inte och Stockholms tingsrätt är fel forum. Moderbolaget, Vivamondo Limited , är ett utländskt företag med hemvist (säte) och postadress i Hongkong. Vivamondo Limited bedriver näthandel och säljer via sin butik på internet skönhetsprodukter. Vivamondo Limited bedriver all sin verksamhet i Hongkong och importerar inte varor till Sverige. Vivamondo Limited har registrerat filialen Vivamondo i Sverige, men Vivamondo bedriver inte den verksamhet som talan i målet avser och utgör inte ett självständigt rättssubjekt. Internetsidan ”vivamondo.se” kan inte likställas med ett fast driftställe. En sådan toppdomän kan i många länder, däribland Sverige, registreras utan krav på verksamhetsort. Licenstagarnas talan rör således Vivamondo Limiteds verksamhet och inte Vivamondos. En eventuell talan ska, med tillämpning av huvudregeln i 10 kap. 1 § RB, väckas där svaranden har sitt säte, dvs. i Hongkong.
 Med hänsyn till att Vivamondo , enligt uppgifterna från Bolagsverket, bedriver verksamhet i form av support och kundtjänst för internethandel samt försäljning bör Vivamondo Limiteds medkontrahenter i Sverige vilka ingår avtal med företaget genom dess internetsida ”vivamondo.se” kunna utgå från att de har att göra med dess svenska driftställe (jfr Bogdan, SvJT 1998 s. 825 och s. 831, Kan en Internethemsida utgöra ett driftställe vid bedömningen av svensk domsrätt och tillämplig lag?).
 Vivamondo Limited genom Vivamondo Limited Hong Kong filial ( Vivamondo ) överklagade i Svea hovrätt och yrkade att hovrätten skulle avvisa Skin Concept i Stockholm AB:s och Dermarome Stockholm Aktiebolags talan. Till stöd för sitt yrkande anförde Vivamondo i huvudsak följande. Vivamondo bedriver sin rörelse i Hongkong och inte genom filialen i Sverige. Rörelsen har aldrig bedrivits på någon annan plats. Vivamondo har säte i Hongkong. Där finns också servern för hemsidan vivamondo.se och domänen ägs av Vivamondo. I målet påstådda varumärkesintrång har således inte begåtts i Sverige. Svensk domstol är med anledning av detta inte behörig att pröva tvisten mellan parterna.
 Skin Concept och Dermarome är enligt egna uppgifter distributörer i Sverige med varumärkeslicens för varor under varumärket DERMALOGICA och JANE IREDALE respektive DECLEOR. Varumärkesinnehavarna har bekräftat rätten för licenshavarna att föra talan om intrång i de registrerade svenska nationella varumärkena, dock har varumärkesinnehavaren av varumärket JANE IREDALE, Iredale Mineral Cosmetics , Ltd., därvid hänvisat till registreringsnumret för gemenskapsvarumärket.
 För mål om intrång i ett gemenskapsvarumärke finns - om annat inte följer av Bryssel I-förordningen - bestämmelser om domstols internationella behörighet i Varumärkesförordningen. Förordningens domsrättsregler har det övergripande syftet att se till att det alltid finns en behörig domstol i någon av EU:s medlemsstater för prövning av bl.a. mål om intrång i ett gemenskapsvarumärke (se Maunsbach , Svensk domstols behörighet vid gränsöverskridande varumärkestvister - särskilt om Internetrelaterade intrång, 2005, s. 289). Skälet för detta är att ett gemenskapsvarumärke har en stark anknytning till EU och därmed prövas bäst av de utpekade domstolarna i medlemsstaterna (a.s.). Internationell domsrätt finns därför enligt förordningen även då svaranden inte har hemvist inom EU. Om svaranden inte har hemvist i någon medlemsstat ska, enligt artikel 97, talan väckas i den medlemsstat där svaranden har ett driftställe eller, om denne varken har hemvist eller driftställe i någon medlemsstat, i den medlemsstat i vilken käranden har sitt hemvist. Enligt artikel 98 är den medlemsstatens domstol då behörig i fråga om intrång som redan förekommer, eller som det finns risk för, inom medlemsstatens territorium.
 Varken i svensk varumärkeslagstiftning eller i svensk internationell processrättslig lagstiftning är frågan om svensk domstols internationella behörighet i mål om varumärkesintrång reglerad. Bestämmelserna i 10 kap. RB har när annan lagstiftning saknas ansetts kunna ge viss vägledning (se Fitger m.fl. , Rättegångsbalken, Zeteo , oktober 2012, inledningen till 10 kap.). De paragrafer i 10 kap. RB som aktualiseras i detta mål är 5 och 8 §§.
 1. Dermarome Stockholm Aktiebolag och Skin Concept i Stockholm AB, båda med hemvist i Sverige (licenstagarna), har i ansökan om stämning vid tingsrätten yrkat förbud för Vivamondo Limited genom Vivamondo Limited Hong Kong filial ( Vivamondo ) att, i näringsverksamhet via hemsidan vivamondo.se, sälja, marknadsföra, importera och/eller föra ut på svenska marknaden fem särskilt specificerade varor under varumärkena DERMALOGICA, JANE IREDALE och DECLEOR. Licenstagarna har som stöd för sin talan angett att Vivamondo bedriver, eller i vart fall medverkar till otillåten parallellimport, vilket utgör varumärkesintrång som ska förbjudas med stöd av 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen (2010:1877). Varumärkesinnehavarna har bekräftat behörigheten för licenstagarna att föra den i målet aktuella talan.
 2. Av utredningen har framgått att DERMALOGICA och DECLEOR är registrerade svenska nationella varumärken. Som hovrätten har anmärkt i sitt beslut, har inget annat framkommit än att det beträffande varumärket JANE IREDALE görs gällande intrång i det registrerade gemenskapsvarumärket.
 3. Vivamondo Limited Hong Kong filial, 516405-3497, är en i Sverige registrerad filial till det utländska företaget Vivamondo Limited med säte i Hongkong. Sedan Vivamondo framställt yrkande om avvisning av licenstagarnas talan på grund av bristande svensk internationell behörighet har underrätterna avslagit avvisningsyrkandet.
 4. Vivamondo har överklagat hovrättens beslut och huvudsakligen anfört att Vivamondo bedriver sin rörelse i Hongkong och inte genom filialen i Sverige varför svensk domstol saknar behörighet att pröva den aktuella tvisten. Frågan i målet är således om svensk domstol är behörig att pröva licenstagarnas vid tingsrätten väckta förbudstalan mot Vivamondo som är ett utländskt bolag med säte i Hongkong men med en i Sverige registrerad filial.
 5. I varumärkeslagen finns, för målet relevanta, bestämmelser om bl.a. regional varumärkeskonsumtion (1 kap. 12 § första stycket), nationell registrering av varumärken (2 kap), gemenskapsvarumärken (1 kap. 3 §), vitesförbud (8 kap. 3 §) och vissa bestämmelser om behörig reservdomstol, bl.a. vid tvister som rör gemenskapsvarumärken (10 kap. 6 §). Som underrätterna har anmärkt saknas i övrigt i svensk varumärkeslagstiftning, och i svensk internationell processrättslig lagstiftning, bestämmelser om svensk domstols internationella behörighet.
 6. Beräffande gemenskapsvarumärken anges i 10 kap. 6 § andra stycket varumärkeslagen, med hänvisning till rådets förordning (EG) nr 207/2009 om gemenskapsvarumärken, att talan ska väckas vid Stockholms tingsrätt. Som hovrätten funnit, framgår av nämnda förordning att tingsrätten är behörig att pröva förbudstalan avseende den del som avser gemenskapsvarumärket JANE IREDALE, i vart fall eftersom licenstagaren Skin Concept i Stockholm AB har sitt säte i Sverige (a. förordning artikel 97 och 98).
 7. I förhållandet mellan EU:s medlemsstater gäller även, såvitt är av intresse i detta mål, rådets förordning (EG) nr 44/2001 om domstols behörighet och om erkännande och verkställighet av domar på privaträttens område (Bryssel I-förordningen). I allt väsentligt likalydande regler finns också i 2007 års Luganokonvention. EU-domstolens tolkningsavgöranden rörande Bryssel I-förordningen och dess föregångare 1968 års Brysselkonvention ska beaktas även vid tolkningen av Luganokonventionen i de fall där bestämmelserna har samma lydelse, se exempelvis NJA 2012 s. 483, punkterna 12 och 13. Fortsättningsvis hänvisas endast till bestämmelserna i 2001 års Bryssel I-förordning.
 8. Vivamondo Limited har sitt säte i Hongkong, varför Bryssel-/Lugano-systemets regler inte är direkt tillämpliga i målet.
 9. I de situationer som det saknas en lagfäst domsrättsregel kan ledning sökas i de svenska forumreglerna i 10 kap. RB genom analogi. De regler som närmast är aktuella i detta mål är 10 kap. 5 § RB:s forumregel om fast driftställe och forum delicti -bestämmelsen i 8 § samma kapitel. Även behörighetsreglerna i Bryssel/Luganosystemets regelverk kan utgöra ett viktigt underlag vid bedömningen av om svensk domsrätt föreligger även i situationer när dessa regler inte är direkt tillämpliga, se NJA 1994 s. 81, jfr NJA 2007 s. 482.
 10. HD har ovan (punkt 6) funnit att svensk internationell behörighet föreligger för aktuell förbudstalan beträffande gemenskapsvarumärket JANE IREDALE. Beträffande de i Sverige registrerade nationella varumärkena DERMALOGICA och DECLEOR utgår HD i sin bedömning, precis som hovrätten, från att i första hand pröva om svensk internationell behörighet föreligger med stöd av betämmelser om forum delicti. Motsvarande regel i 10 kap 8 § RB återfinns i artikel 5.3 i Bryssel I-förordningen.
 11. Målet rör en förbudstalan enligt 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen. Frågan är om begreppet ”talan i anledning av skadegörande handling” i 10 kap. 8 § RB kan anses innefatta även en förbudstalan utan samband med talan om skadestånd på grund av varumärkesintrång. HD har i rättsfallet NJA 1936 s. 278 ansett att en talan om förbud mot användning av ett här i landet registrerat varumärke inte kunde tas upp till prövning eftersom det inte fanns något laga forum i Sverige. Avgörandet har ifrågasatts, se bl.a. Maunsbach, Svensk domstols behörighet vid gränsöverskridande varumärkestvister - särskilt om Internetrelaterade intrång, Lund 2005 (Maunsbach), s. 252.
 12. En motsvarande forum delicti -bestämmelse finns i artikel 5.3 i Bryssel I-förordningen. Om talan avser skadestånd utanför avtalsförhållanden får den enligt artikeln väckas vid den ort där skadan inträffade eller kan inträffa. Artikel 5.3 ger käranden ett val mellan domstolen där den skadegörande handlingen företagits och domstolen där den skadliga effekten uppkommit. I senare fall måste det röra sig om en omedelbar skada. Av rättsfallet NJA 2007 s. 287 framgår att den omedelbara skadan vid varumärkesintrång anses inträffa i skyddslandet, dvs. i det land där varumärkesrätten gäller på grund av registrering eller inarbetning. Artikel 5.3 i Bryssel I-förordningen omfattar enligt sin lydelse orten där skadan inträffade eller kan inträffa och förutsätter således inte att någon skada faktiskt har uppkommit (se bl.a. Maunsbach s. 136 ff. för bakgrundsbeskrivning och tolkningen av motsvarande bestämmelse i 1968 års Brysselkonvention som föregick Bryssel I-förordningen och där ledet ”kan inträffa” saknades, jfr även EU-domstolens dom den 1 oktober 2002 i mål C-167/00, Henkel).
 13. HD har i rättsfallet NJA 2012 s. 48, punkterna 17-21, närmare redovisat EU-domstolens preciseringar av vad som enligt artikel 5.3 Bryssel I-förordningen avses med den ort där skadan inträffade, bl.a. vid publikationer på en webbplats. Det målet handlade emellertid huvudsakligen om ideell skada. När det gäller ekonomisk skada på grund av immaterialrättsliga intrång på en webbsida kan EU-domstolens praxis sammanfattas så att domstolen i rättighetens skyddsland (se punkten 12) är behörig på grund av orten för skadans uppkomst att pröva en skadeståndstalan (förbudstalan) som grundar sig på innehållet på en webbsida som är åtkomlig från domstolens domskrets. Den domstolen är endast behörig att pröva den skada som inträffat (eller kan inträffa) inom den medlemsstat som den tillhör, se EU-domstolens dom den 22 januari 2015 i mål C-441/13, Pez Hejduk, jfr NJA 2012 s. 48.
 14. Licenshavarna för de i Sverige registrerade nationella varumärkena skulle således i enlighet med forum delicti-regeln i Bryssel I-förordningen kunna välja att väcka talan i svensk domstol.
 15. Ordalydelsen av 10 kap. 8 § RB medger inte i sig att den nu aktuella förbudstalan väcks i svensk domstol utan att bestämmelsen tolkas extensivt. I 2012 års rättsfall erinrade HD också om att domstolen när den prövar sin behörighet att ta upp ett käromål ska godta de omständigheter som käranden åberopar till stöd för behörigheten, om det inte redan av vad käranden anför eller av andra skäl är uppenbart att påståendena saknar grund, och hänvisade samtidigt till att denna påståendedoktrin även hade stöd i EU-domstolens praxis (a. rättsfall punkten 22). Licenstagarna har som stöd för sin talan angett att Vivamondo bedriver, eller i vart fall medverkar till otillåten parallellimport, vilket utgör varumärkesintrång som ska förbjudas med stöd av 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen. Licenstagarnas angivna grund för sin talan i målet talar i och för sig för en sådan tolkning av begreppet ”talan i anledning av en skadegörande handling”.
 16. EU-domstolen har på senare tid meddelat ett antal klargörande avgöranden beträffande forum delicti -bestämmelsen i Bryssel-/Luganoregleringen, bl.a. avseende intrång via webbsida. De frågeställningar som EU-domstolen har haft att överväga avser många gånger företeelser som inte var föremål för överväganden när regelverket i 10 kap. RB om domstols behörighet sjösattes i svensk rätt. Dessa avgöranden får anses ge uttryck för vad som är internationellt vedertagna principer i fråga om kompetenskonflikter mellan domstolar i olika länder och det ter sig naturligt att i detta fall göra en analogi med forum delicti-bestämmelsen i Bryssel-/Luganoregleringen. Det finns inte heller någon bestämmelse i 10 kap. RB som hindrar en sådan tolkning.
 17. Licenstagarna kan väcka sin talan i Sverige. Vivamondo har inte gjort någon invändning mot Stockholms tingsrätts nationella behörighet. Vivamondos överklagande ska således avslås.
 1. Dermarome Stockholm Aktiebolag och Skin Concept i Stockholm AB (licenstagarna) har hemvist i Sverige. De har vid tingsrätten yrkat förbud vid vite för Vivamondo Limited genom Vivamondo Limited Hong Kong filial ( Vivamondo ) att i näringsverksamhet via hemsidan vivamondo.se sälja, marknadsföra, importera eller föra ut på den svenska marknaden vissa angivna varor under varumärkena DERMALOGICA, JANE IREDALE och DECLEOR, liksom att medverka till sådan användning av varumärkena, i den mån varorna inte har förts ut på marknaden inom EES av rättighetshavaren själv eller med dennes tillstånd. Som grund för sin talan har de angett att Vivamondo bedriver, eller i vart fall medverkar till, otillåten parallellimport som utgör varumärkesintrång och som därför ska förbjudas med stöd av 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen ( 2010:1877).
 2. DERMALOGICA och DECLEOR är registrerade svenska nationella varumärken, medan JANE IREDALE är ett registrerat gemenskapsvarumärke.
 3. Vivamondo yrkade i tingsrätten att licenstagarnas talan skulle avvisas på grund av bristande svensk domsrätt. Enligt Vivamondo bedriver företaget näthandel via sin hemsida på internet. All verksamhet sker i Hongkong. Den i målet aktuella verksamheten bedrivs alltså inte genom filialen i Sverige. I Hongkong finns även servern för hemsidan vivamondo.se och domänen ägs av Vivamondo . I målet påstådda varumärkesintrång har således enligt Vivamondo inte begåtts i Sverige. Svensk domstol är därför enligt bolaget inte behörig att ta upp licenstagarnas talan till prövning.
 4. Tingsrätten avslog avvisningsyrkandet på den grunden att Vivamondo fick anses ha fast driftställe i Sverige och att tvisten hänförde sig till den vid driftstället bedrivna rörelsen. Det förelåg därför svensk domsrätt med analog tillämpning av 10 kap. 5 § RB. Med den bedömningen förklarade sig tingsrätten inte ha anledning att pröva om domsrätt dessutom förelåg med analog tillämpning av 10 kap. 8 § RB om forum vid utomobligatorisk skadeståndstalan.
 5. Vivamondo överklagade beslutet. Hovrätten har funnit att det beträffande de svenska nationella varumärkena ligger närmast till hands att i första hand pröva om 10 kap. 8 § RB ger stöd för svensk domstols behörighet. Eftersom förbudstalan syftar till att förhindra fortsatt påstått varumärkesintrång här i landet, får den bestämmelsen enligt hovrätten anses omfatta en sådan talan. Överklagandet har sålunda avslagits.
 6. Beträffande gemenskapsvarumärket har hovrätten funnit att svensk domsrätt föreligger enligt artikel 97, punkterna 1 och 2, i rådets förordning (EG) nr 207/2009 om gemenskapsvarumärken (varumärkesförordningen).
 7. Frågan om svensk domsrätt i ett mål som det aktuella är inte reglerad i nationell svensk lag. När svaranden har hemvist i Hongkong gäller inte heller rådets förordning (EG) nr 44/2001 av den 22 december 2000 om domstols behörighet och om erkännande och verkställighet av domar på privaträttens område (Bryssel I-förordningen), numera ersatt av 2012 års Bryssel I-förordning. Inte heller gäller konventionen den 30 oktober 2007 om domstols behörighet och om erkännande och verkställighet av domar på privaträttens område (2007 års Luganokonvention). Det finns inte heller i övrigt några bestämmelser som direkt reglerar frågan om svensk domstols behörighet i målet.
 8. I likhet med vad som gäller för övriga rättigheter inom det industriella rättsskyddet är ensamrätten till ett varumärke i princip nationellt begränsad. Registrering av ett varumärke enligt 2 kap. varumärkeslagen har sålunda verkan endast i Sverige och ensamrätten omfattar sådan användning av varumärket som kan anses ske här (se 1 kap. 10 § om ensamrättens innebörd).
 9. Av den territoriella begränsningen följer att det föreligger ett svenskt rättskipningsintresse och svensk domsrätt när det görs gällande ett svenskt varumärkesskydd. Svensk domstol är alltså behörig att pröva en talan där det påstås ha skett intrång i en ensamrätt som har förvärvats enligt varumärkeslagen (jfr NJA 2007 s. 287). Detsamma gäller i fråga om ett yrkande om vitesförbud enligt 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen, vars tillämpning förutsätter att det sker intrång i ett varumärke som är skyddat här.
 10. I rättsfallet NJA 1936 s. 278 väckte ett tyskt bolag talan vid svensk domstol om förbud för ett polskt bolag att använda ett varumärke i Sverige. HD uttalade att det inte förelåg någon omständighet som medförde att det polska företaget kunde åläggas att ingå i svaromål på den talan som det tyska bolaget hade väckt; förbudstalan avvisades därför. Vid tiden för det avgörandet fanns det emellertid inte i varumärkeslagen någon möjlighet att föra en sådan förbudstalan som det tyska bolaget väckte. Redan på grund härav kan avgörandet inte längre anses vägledande för frågan om svensk domsrätt i mål av det aktuella slaget.
 11. Frågan huruvida intrång sker i de svenska varumärkena DERMALOGICA och DECLEOR genom försäljning via hemsidan vivamondo.se ska inte prövas nu utan vid bedömningen av om det finns förutsättningar för vitesförbud enligt 8 kap. 3 § varumärkeslagen.
 12. Som hovrätten har funnit har svenska domstolar enligt varumärkesförordningen behörighet att pröva licenstagarnas förbudstalan såvitt gäller gemenskapsvarumärket JANE IREDALE.
 13. Svenska domstolar är alltså behöriga att pröva licenstagarnas förbudstalan. Vivamondo har inte ifrågasatt Stockholms tingsrätts behörighet för det fall svensk domsrätt skulle anses föreligga.
 14. Överklagandet ska alltså avslås.


text:
 26.1.2008
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 22/38
 Kanne 30.11.2007 — Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio v. Helleenien tasavalta
 (Asia C-541/07)
 (2008/C 22/67)
 Oikeudenkäyntikieli: kreikka
 Asianosaiset
 Kantaja: Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio (asiamies: M. Patakia)
 Vastaaja: Helleenien tasavalta
 Vaatimukset
 —
 On todettava, että Helleenien tasavalta ei ole noudattanut EY:n perustamissopimuksen 28 ja 30 artiklan mukaisia velvoitteitaan, koska sen on liikenneministerin 3.3.2004 tekemällä päätöksellä 12078/1343, sellaisena kuin sitä on tulkittu 28.7.2004 päivätyn, tieturvallisuus- ja ympäristöviraston lähettämän hallinnollisen yleiskirjeen 45007/4795 perusteella, kieltänyt sen, että ajoneuvojen ikkunoihin yleensä sijoitetaan kalvoja, joita valmistetaan tai/ja myydään laillisesti Euroopan unionin muiden jäsenvaltioiden markkinoilla.
 —
 Helleenien tasavalta on velvoitettava korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 Oikeudelliset perusteet ja pääasialliset perustelut
 1.
 Kantelun johdosta komissio on tutkinut Kreikan lainsäädäntöä, jossa kielletään ikkunaruutukalvojen sijoittaminen tuulilaseihin ja yleensä ajoneuvojen ikkunoihin.
 2.
 Komissio katsoo, että kyseinen kielto ei kuulu direktiivin 92/22/ETY, sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna direktiivillä 2001/92/EY, soveltamisalaan, ja että tätä kieltoa on tutkittava 28 ja 30 artiklan yhteydessä yhteisön tason yhdenmukaistamistoimien puuttuessa.
 3.
 Tämä kielto on tavaroiden vapaata liikkuvuutta koskevia määrällisiä rajoituksia vaikutukseltaan vastaava toimenpide, joka on ristiriidassa EY 28 artiklan määräysten kanssa, koska tämä kielto käytännössä estää myymästä Kreikassa tällaisia kalvoja, joita laillisesti valmistetaan muissa jäsenvaltioissa ja joita laillisesti liikkuu muissa jäsenvaltioissa.
 4.
 Komissio huomauttaa myös, että Kreikan viranomaiset eivät ole onnistuneet esittämään riittävästi näyttöä osoittaakseen, että kyseinen toimenpide on perusteltu ja samalla oikeasuhteinen.
 5.
 Komissio toteaa erityisesti, että ei ole näytetty toteen, että oli olemassa perusteita todeta tarkastuksia suoritettaessa, täyttävätkö kyseessä olevat kalvot tietyt vähimmäisvaatimukset Kreikan viranomaisten esittämällä tavalla.
 6.
 Niinpä komissio katsoo, että kyseessä oleva lainsäädäntö merkitsee EY 28 artiklan rikkomista, jota ei voida perustella EY 30 artiklalla eikä yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen oikeuskäytännössä tarkoitetuilla yleistä etua koskevilla pakottavilla syillä.


jurisdiction: US

text:
Charles E. Whitehurst died on January 30th, 1924, intestate. On February 7th, 1924, letters of administration upon his estate were granted by the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City to M. Morris Whitehurst and J. Herbert Whitehurst, brothers, and to Anna L. Whitehurst Taylor, mother, of the deceased, who duly qualified. On August 8th, 1924, Claire J. Ulrich Whitehurst, the alleged widow of the deceased, filed a petition alleging that she was the widow of the deceased and as such was entitled to administer his estate, and that the letters of administration theretofore granted had been improvidently granted and should be revoked. On September 3rd, 1924, the administrators filed an answer to said petition denying that the petitioner was the widow of the deceased, and asserting that he died unmarried. Pending *Page 612
 these proceedings in the orphans' court an alleged settlement was reached, and a deed was executed by the plaintiff herein to the said Anna L. Whitehurst Taylor on January 9th, 1925. In this deed there are recitals of the death, intestate, of the said Charles E. Whitehurst; and the claim of "Claire J. Ulrich" to be his widow and to have the right to share in his estate and to use his name; and the desire of the grantor to sell all of said rights "and particularly any right that she may now have or thereafter acquire as the alleged widow of Charles E. Whitehurst, in the estate of said Charles E. Whitehurst * * *"; and the willingness of said grantee to purchase the same; and in consideration of the premises and the sum of five dollars the grantor grants, conveys and releases to the grantee all the rights recited, and particularly all the right, title and interest in and to any part of the estate of Charles E. Whitehurst, and any claim or right of action against said estate as the alleged widow of said decedant. The deed is signed by the grantor in three different ways, viz: "Mrs. Claire J. Ulrich Whitehurst," "Mrs C.E.W.", "Claire J. Ulrich"; and it is "accepted for the estate of Charles E. Whitehurst, by M. Morris Whitehurst, administrator." On January 31st, 1925, the net estate, amounting to $271,716.48, was distributed to Mrs. Taylor. Subsequently, on October 17th, 1925, the bill of complaint in this case was filed by the alleged widow against Mrs. Taylor on the ground of fraud in procuring the said settlement. The defendant demurred to the bill, the demurrer was overruled, and on appeal to this court the ruling of the chancellor was affirmed.
 In the opinion of this court, reported in 151 Md. 621, the allegations of the bill are sufficiently set out. The answer of the defendant filed December 30th, 1926, denies the material allegations of the bill. On February 16th, 1927, the death of the defendant was suggested by the petition of her executors, and on March 3rd, 1927, the executors were substituted as parties defendant.
 The chancellor, after considering the many depositions *Page 613
 filed, and the mass of testimony taken before him, found against the validity of plaintiff's claim to be the widow of the decedent, and dismissed the bill. This appeal is from that decree.
 The two questions we have to decide are: (1) Was plaintiff the lawful wife of Charles E. Whitehurst? (2) If she is the widow of the decedent, did she effectually convey and release her interest in his estate by the deed of January 9th, 1925?
 The answer to the first question depends upon the genuineness of an alleged agreement between the plaintiff and the said Charles E. Whitehurst to become husband and wife on the night of April 9th, 1923, claimed by plaintiff to be evidenced by the writing of their names in a prayer book. The prayer book offered in evidence contains a ceremony for mixed marriages. (In this case the plaintiff was a Catholic and Whitehurst a Protestant.) At the part of the ceremony, page 449, where the man takes the woman to be his wife, appear the words "Charles" and "Claire," and on page 450, where the woman takes the man to be her husband, appear the words Claire and Charles. The contention of the appellant is that the names on page 449 were written by Charles, and those on page 450 were written by Claire.
 The chancellor, over objection, permitted the plaintiff to testify as to the alleged ceremony, on the theory that the suit was not against a "distributee as such" but was against Mrs. Taylor as assignee taking under the assignment executed by the plaintiff. We think this was error. Code, art. 35, sec. 3, provides: "In actions or proceedings by or against distributees of a decedent as such, in which * * * decrees may be rendered for or against them, * * * no party to the cause shall be allowed to testify as to any transaction had with or statement made by the * * * intestate." The right of the plaintiff to recover in this suit depended upon the existence vel non of a transaction alleged to have been had by her with the decedent, and upon her being a lawful distributee. She could sue only as a distributee. Her testimony, therefore, as to transactions with the decedent should have been excluded. We are therefore *Page 614
 left to the testimony of handwriting experts, to our own comparison of the handwriting in the prayer book, and to the testimony of Mrs. Anna Stevenson, a witness offered by plaintiff, but manifestly a hostile witness.
 The defendant's expert was sure, with a sureness characteristic of most experts, that none of the writing in the prayer book was done by Charles, but all was by Claire. The plaintiff's expert was more impressive, because he seemed to forget for whom he was testifying, or rather appeared to be indifferent to the effect of his testimony. He testified without reservation that the "Charles" on page 449 was written by the decedent, and that both names on page 450 were written by plaintiff. As to the "Claire" on page 449, he testified that on his first examination he was inclined to believe it was an imitation, for reasons which he stated, but on comparison with other admitted writings of this name by the decedent, he found the same defects as in the disputed writing, and, while he could not give a positive opinion, theoretically, he said, "taking that altogether, I have a pretty good notion, and I am strongly inclined to believe, that Mr. Whitehurst wrote that signature, and I can give a positive opinion if I knew what caused him to slow up in this writing." Here, speaking of presumptions, and evidently referring to a presumption as to what might have caused Charles to slow up in his writing, he added "my inference would not be worth two cents." This expression counsel for defendant, we think erroneously, interpreted to mean that his opinion as to who wrote the word "Claire" would be worthless. The impression made upon us by Mr. Farrar, plaintiff's expert, is strengthened by our own examination and comparison.
 In this connection the testimony of Mrs. Anna Stevenson is most important. She was obviously hostile, and seemed to testify reluctantly to anything that could be of advantage to plaintiff. Her testimony was taken in New York, and she testified in the presence and under the scrutiny of her husband and his father and mother, who refused to leave the room while she was testifying, although requested to do so. By reason of their unfriendly attitude plaintiff's counsel *Page 615
 declined to put them on the stand after having summoned them to testify for plaintiff, and they were subsequently used by defendants, under whose influence they evidently were.
 On the stand Mrs. Stevenson was shown a statement she had made in her own handwriting and testified, "I don't think there is anything there isn't true." When questioned in detail the only thing which she said did not happen as appeared in the statement was that she went with Claire to the station to meet Charles. The statement follows:
 "Saturday Claire sent telegram to come to New York. I called long distance and Claire said to come on to New York; she had something to tell me. I left Sunday morning, arrived in New York at 2 o'clock; Claire met me at station. Went to Martha Washington Hotel and Claire explained they were going to be married (she and Charles) on Monday evening. Monday eve at about 8 o'clock we went to Penna. Station to meet Charles, took taxi to hotel; Claire and Charles left me at hotel; had telephone call that evening, Claire asked if I was all right; had telephone call next morning from Charles, said Claire was fine and would be over shortly; Claire came at eleven o'clock and took me to breakfast; she had had breakfast; went shopping until time to meet Charles at Knickerbocker Grill about 1.30. Conversation at cafe was to effect Charles asked me as a lifelong friend of Claire what my opinion of their marriage was. I said to explain it. He said last night Claire and I were married by having a ceremony ourselves. I said, Didn't you go to church to be married? He said, `No,' I couldn't on account of my mother. Anna, he continued, you do not know my mother; she is a very jealous woman. I am tied down to her terribly; have to wait on her hand and foot. I didn't want publicity, but he said I consider Claire and I married before God. It would be impossible to be married any other way. I said I considered them married under those conditions. Left grill, went shopping; left for Lansdale 6 o'clock."
 (Signed) Anna Reeves Stevenson *Page 616
 The testimony shows that the Monday referred to in the above statement was Monday, April 9th, 1923.
 That statement not only makes it probable that the names were written by Charles and Claire respectively, but that they were written in connection with the ceremony referred to in the statement. Indeed, assuming, as we must, that statement to be true, it would be difficult to reach any other conclusion than that that was what Charles meant when he said "last night Claire and I were married by having a ceremony ourselves." Indeed Mrs. Stevenson testified that Whitehurst explained the marriage ceremony to her, although she said she could not remember what it was.
 It is argued by defendant's counsel that the statements made by Mrs. Stevenson about plaintiff and Whitehurst could be easily explained as efforts to prevent a friend of plaintiff from thinking her relations with Whitehurst were of a meretricious character. But there was no reason why Mrs. Stevenson should ever have discovered they were living together. Plaintiff was at the hotel, where up to that time she had been living, and Whitehurst was in Baltimore when Mrs. Stevenson arrived. Nothing would have been easier than for plaintiff and Whitehurst to have arranged to remain apart until after Mrs. Stevenson left. She was not in the habit of visiting plaintiff, and the ingenuity and craftiness with which plaintiff is credited by defendants could readily have found means of providing against discovery thereafter. It was not as if plaintiff had been taken unawares by this visit. According to Mrs. Stevenson, plaintiff invited her to come to New York for the very purpose of telling her she was about to be married.
 On the night of the alleged marriage, plaintiff and Whitehurst began their life together at the apartment, and from that time they continued to live together until his death the following January, he spending about four days in each week in Baltimore, where he had several theatres. During these absences she remained at the apartment and, in spite of all the efforts of defendants to find evidence to the contrary, there is not even a suspicion that she was other than *Page 617
 faithful to him, notwithstanding she was left alone so much of the time. There could be no better evidence that Mrs. Stevenson regarded them as married than the fact that some months later she and her mother spent a night with her at the apartment. Indeed there is no substantial evidence that her manner of living had ever been loose or immoral. It is significant that two of the men friends of Whitehurst, who had previously shared the apartment with him, never stayed there after the date of the alleged marriage, but surrendered their keys, although they had used them when Whitehurst had other women in the apartment.
 Much is attempted to be made by defendants of the fact that the prayer book was not shown any of the several lawyers who were from time to time retained by plaintiff until the last New York attorney was employed. But that loses any unfavorable significance when it is recalled that when she told Mr. Leach, of the Baltimore bar, her first attorney, about the book, he did not regard it as of any importance and spoke of it as fol-de-rol. Eisenberg, the next in order, was told about the book, but he, too, treated it as a matter of no immediate concern, and did not even mention it to Mr. Marbury, his associate in Baltimore. So far as Mr. Leach is concerned, it is not remarkable that a Maryland lawyer should have been unfamiliar with common law marriage, being accustomed here to the strict requirement of a religious ceremony. With so little encouragement it is not surprising that the book was not sooner exhibited. She evidently spoke of the prayer book very soon after Whitehurst's death to a Mrs. Genzberg, and referred to it when she spoke to a Mrs. Wells of a marriage certificate which she said Whitehurst had told her constituted a legal marriage, but which she had found was only a fake.
 A large array of witnesses were produced by defendants to testify that Whitehurst was regarded by his friends, and held himself out, as an unmarried man; that plaintiff was known and addressed as Miss Claire Ulrich, registered at hotels, and kept her bank account, in that name. But what else was to be expected if the marriage was to be kept secret? *Page 618
 Mrs. Stevenson was not the only witness who testified as to Charles' explanations of his reasons for secrecy.
 The story told by Padden, one of defendants' witnesses (if any credence is to be given to one whose testimony in general is inherently unreliable), of a dinner party, composed of Mr. and Mrs. Padden and Whitehurst and plaintiff, the night after the night of the alleged wedding is another instance. The Paddens were celebrating a wedding anniversary, and Whitehurst proposed a toast to Mr. and Mrs. Padden, "and Miss Ulrich stood up and said, `Well, drink to Mr. and Mrs. Whitehurst also'; and Mr. Whitehurst told her that never would there be a `Mrs. Whitehurst' except his mother, as long as his mother was in existence, and she was kind of hurt and got very panicky and nervous." That story was told for the purpose of showing a repudiation by Whitehurst of the idea of marriage between himself and plaintiff. But it could well be interpreted as an impulsive outburst of Mrs. Whitehurst, forgetting momentarily the necessity for secrecy. She would hardly have made such a bold suggestion without foundation.
 Several other witnesses, called by defendants, testified that Whitehurst had often said he would never marry so long as his mother lived.
 The marriage, however, was not kept entirely secret. We have spoken of the very full explanation made by both the plaintiff and Whitehurst to Mrs. Stevenson. He also introduced plaintiff to trades people, with whom she would come in contact, as Mrs. Whitehurst, notably to Mrs. Wells, to whom he said: "She is no longer Miss Ulrich, but Mrs. Whitehurst." The weight of the testimony, in our opinion, shows that she was known by the employees at the apartment as Mrs. Whitehurst until they came under the influence of defendants and their agents after the death of Whitehurst.
 The fact that Whitehurst wrote to plaintiff whenever he was away, even for a few days, would indicate that he regarded her as something more than a kept woman. True, some of these letters are coarse, but not more so than would be expected of the man defendants have made him out to *Page 619
 have been. There is also testimony that he indicated to some of his friends that plaintiff was his mistress; but that might mean nothing more than that he had not intended as a marriage the ceremony and relationship into which he had inveigled the plaintiff. We prefer, however, to believe that such representations were a part of the scheme of a coarse but not unkindly man to keep his marriage a secret, rather than that he was a conscienceless betrayer. But even if it be a fact he did not intend the ceremony which he went through to constitute a marriage, and attempted afterwards to repudiate the existence of such a status, such want of intent on his part would not make the ceremony a nullity if he induced plaintiff to believe it valid. As was said in Bissell v. Bissell, 55 Barb. 325, if a man, while endeavoring to accomplish a woman's seduction, blunders into matrimony, he has no one but himself to blame.
 Having reached the conclusion that the writing in the prayer-book was genuine, and that the ceremony was intended to constitute a contract per verba de presenti between the parties; that it was followed by cohabitation; that there was a definite and explicit declaration and acknowledgment of the marriage following the ceremony, and introduction to some, at least, of those with whom the parties came in contact in business and domestic relations, the question is: Did all of these things constitute a valid marriage under the law of New York? Our conclusion is that they more than met the requirement of that law, on the testimony of Mr. Matthews, a reputable New York lawyer, who testified as an expert for plaintiff, and whose opinion we think is supported by the New York decisions. He said: "The essentials of a valid marriage under the law of New York are, first, two parties competent to be married, a man and a woman otherwise competent to be married, and an agreement presently to become, and assume the obligations towards each other of, husband and wife." He further testified that neither repute nor cohabitation is necessary, once the agreement of marriage is established. Such a marriage is described, technically, as a marriage per verba de presenti. *Page 620
 Mr. Matthews is supported in his view by the author of a very full note to Grigsby v. Reib, L.R.A. 1915 E, note beginning at page 8, and by the author of the note to Peters v. Peters, 33 A.L.R., note beginning at page 27. In both these notes the New York authorities are collected, and it is definitely stated that New York is among the states which hold the view above stated; and Mr. Koegel in his book on Common Law Marriage, page 164, also includes New York among the states so holding. See also 2Kent, pages 86 and 87; Bishop on Marriage, Divorce andSeparation, secs. 317 et seq.
 It is not necessary, however, to go that far in this case, and, after a careful reading of Judge Hiscock's testimony, as an expert for defendants, we are of the opinion that the facts found by us would constitute marriage in New York even in his view. For we do not believe he meant to go so far as to say that in a case where there was satisfactory proof of an agreement per verba depresenti it would be necessary to prove not only repute, but an undivided repute. Undoubtedly that is necessary where the marriage is to be inferred solely from cohabitation and repute. To hold that undivided repute is necessary in a case such as the present one, would be to hold that the same character and amount of proof of repute is required to establish a marriage where an actual contract is proved, as would be necessary where there is no evidence of an actual contract, and it is sought to have a contract inferred from cohabitation and repute alone.
 Our conclusion is that the plaintiff was lawfully married to Charles E. Whitehurst, and that she is entitled to the widow's share in his estate, less the amount she has already received, unless the deed purporting to convey her interest is a valid instrument.
 Plaintiff claims that she was induced to execute the deed by misrepresentation and fraud. She is of course a competent witness as to what occurred in connection with the settlement.
 Her testimony is that the deed was brought by Ascher in Walsh's room and read by him to her in the presence of *Page 621
 Walsh, and in this she is corroborated by Walsh; that Ascher "told me that it recognized me as the widow, and he read it to me where it said that it did: `And to have the right to share in his estate and in his name.'" After that was done she agreed to sign and did sign one paper; that she first signed Mrs. Claire J. Ulrich Whitehurst; that Ascher then took the paper out of the room, and came back again and said "you better sign this again, — they want a different signature of yours; a different name"; that she then signed "Mrs. C.E.W.," and Ascher again took the paper out and came back and said "They want you to sign your stage name." Witness continued, "Then it occurred to me that I did not see why I was signing anything anyway because it was up to them to sign the paper, and so I had this paper and Mr. Ascher said to sign it again, and Mr. Walsh said, `You might as well do it, they want to make sure they have every name that you have ever had,' so I said, `Mr. Ascher, I do not see why I should sign my name, it is up to them to recognize me and not me to recognize myself,' and so then he said, `Well, give me the paper and I will take it out,' and I said, `No, you go out and get them to sign their own names on it or make them come in and sign it before I let them have my signature,' and then I decided there was something funny, and Mr. Ascher went out. He said `Give me the paper,' and I said, `No, I will tear it up before I give it to you,' and then Mr. Walsh sort of fussed about it. He said, `Well, I don't know that we better bother talking about it. This seems like a lot of trouble for nothing. I don't know why they want so many signatures.' Then Mr. Ascher went out and came back and said, `Well, they signed the paper,' and brought me the settlement agreement that I have with the notary typewritten on, and the name, the agreement and acknowledgment was accepted for the estate by Milton Whitehurst." That up to this time she had not seen Mr. Winslow at all; that after he gave her the paper that had their signatures on it, Walsh said he thought that was all right, and agreed with her that she should have it; that Ascher again left the room and upon his return said "Now, just sign `Claire J. Ulrich,' that is all they want, and *Page 622
 then they have all the names," and she replied "Well, all right"; that Ascher then told her, "It does not make any difference anyway, you have three different signatures and it acknowledges you and there cannot be any question about it, just sign it," and she signed again as requested; that Ascher asked her to come out and acknowledge the signature to Mr. Winslow; that Ascher introduced her to Winslow, and Winslow said "Do you acknowledge this paper?" and she replied, "Why, if it acknowledges me as the widow, that is all I want"; and Winslow replied, "Well, it does; you can read it."
 There is no substantial difference between her testimony and Ascher's as to what occurred at the time of the execution of the paper, except that Ascher denied that Winslow told her it acknowledged her as the widow. Winslow also denied that he said the paper acknowledged her as the widow.
 Referring to an interview that preceded the execution of the deed, Ascher denied that he told her he had arrived at an agreement which would recognize her as the widow of Charles E. Whitehurst, and said he told her they refused to accept her in the family. But there is no evidence that he said a word to undeceive her as to the effect of the written acceptance and acknowledgment by the administrator, nor did he deny that at that time he told her the deed recognized her. But even if he had denied it, we could not give such testimony much credence, in view of the fact that he permitted his client to remain in ignorance of the futility of the things she was insisting upon as conditions to her executing the deed, and actually obtained those meaningless concessions for her.
 Walsh's testimony corroborates plaintiff in regard to Ascher's reading the paper to her. He was asked: "Did he (Ascher) make any statement to her that it did, that is, the paper recognized or did not recognize her as the widow of Charles E. Whitehurst? A. He read something from it that stated that, I believe. Q. That stated what? A. Something about recognizing her as Mrs. Whitehurst."
 So it would appear that plaintiff was not alone in believing that Ascher was so representing the paper. But whether he did so represent it or not, or whether Winslow did or not, we *Page 623
 are satisfied plaintiff understood that the acceptance of the paper for the estate by one of the administrators in the manner it was done had that effect, and that both Ascher and Winslow knew she executed it with that understanding.
 In this connection it may be well to consider what bearing the quotation in appellees' brief from Smith v. Humphreys,104 Md. 290, and Smith v. Martin, 154 Md. 462, at page 476, has upon the facts of the present case. There it was said in substance that one who can read and who has average intelligence but asks the aid of a court of equity in getting rid of a document, which he did not read, on the ground of ignorance, should be required to establish a very clear case before receiving the assistance of the court. That clearly had reference to the amount of proof required in such a case, and does not apply to a case where the defendant's agent actually knew of the misapprehension of the plaintiff, and that she executed the deed under such misapprehension. Here the agent knew that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.
 Both Ascher and Winslow are lawyers, and they certainly knew that the noting on the deed, "Accepted for the estate of Charles E. Whitehurst," added nothing to the effect of the deed; and they knew equally well that plaintiff thought it was of importance; and neither of them did or said anything to enlighten her. Winslow admits that he knew it was meaningless, so far as any legal effect was concerned. He said: "I told Mr. Ascher it was meaningless and it did not do us any harm, and if it satisfied her in any way my client would do it." "Q. In addition to your having gotten Mr. Milton Whitehurst to do this meaningless act of signing or accepting for the estate of Whitehurst, even that did not satisfy her? A. No; she wanted the acknowledgment. Q. Was it by your advice that Mr. Milton Whitehurst responded to that and acknowledged it? A. I did not advise him to do it. I said it was all right for him to do it." Winslow further said "I thought she was temperamental, according to Mr. Ascher."
 But he must have known that the matter of recognition of her status as the widow of Whitehurst was important to plaintiff. *Page 624
 He and the Whitehursts knew that she was insisting on that, and that her Baltimore lawyers had made it a condition to any settlement. He testified: "I did not know that definitely, I heard there was some proposition she must be recognized." "Q. Mr. Herbert Whitehurst said he told you that in consequence of that he gave up trying to settle through Howard Bryant? A. I heard Dr. Whitehurst say Mr. Bryant was insisting on that." Winslow further admits that Ascher was trying in the negotiations immediately preceding the settlement to secure such recognition. Mr. Marbury testified that plaintiff's main desire was to be recognized as the widow; that she did not seem to care about the money.
 Eisenberg testified that she refused to consider an offer of $15,000, and Ascher knew this, because the offer is referred to in the agreement between Eisenberg, Marbury, Ascher, and plaintiff in regard to fee. Having this knowledge, Ascher must have known that plaintiff's alleged enthusiasm about the settlement, and her alleged desire to reward Walsh for the great service he had rendered her, were not based on the pecuniary results of the settlement, even if she knew that the amount paid was $16,000 instead of $11,000, which is questionable.
 We are not holding that Mrs. Taylor was charged with Ascher's knowledge. But she was bound by the knowledge of Winslow, her agent, and for what Winslow as a lawyer and intelligent man ought to have inferred from the conduct of Ascher.
 Our conclusion is that the deed should be declared a nullity, because Winslow knew that there was not a meeting of the minds of the parties, as to something he knew plaintiff regarded as an essential element of the contract. If the deed were permitted to stand, plaintiff would be deprived of, and defendants would acquire, a valuable interest in Whitehurst's estate, under a contract which did not in fact provide for the substantial, if not the most important, part of the consideration for which plaintiff thought she was parting with it, defendant's agent knowing at the time that she was acting under such misapprehension. This finding, we think, *Page 625
 is well within the principle of the decision in Brager v.Friedenwald, 128 Md. 8. It is not necessary to find that the motives of Ascher and Mrs. Taylor's agents were fraudulent. It is enough, and we find, that their conduct in the matter of the settlement amounted to fraud in law.
 There are a number of facts immediately connected with this transaction, and leading up to and following it, of a questionable character, which we have not found it necessary to discuss, or to make the basis of our decision.
 In accounting with the plaintiff the defendants should be credited with the sixteen thousand dollars paid to Ascher, her attorney. While the circumstances give rise to suspicion, we are unable to find as a fact from the record that Mrs. Taylor or her agents were parties to the improper disposition of any part of that fund.
 Decree reversed, and case remanded in order that a decree maybe passed in accordance with this opinion, with costs to theappellant.