type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
On the fifth of July, 1911, Charles E. Rieman of Baltimore County, Maryland, filed in the Orphans' Court of said county a petition in which he stated that his mother, Annie Lowe Rieman, of said county, died on the third of March, 1911, leaving as her only heirs at law and next of kin two daughters, namely, Mary Isabel Thom, of Baltimore City, and Charlotte Rieman McIntosh, of Baltimore County, and three sons, Carlton Alexander Rieman, of Baltimore County, the petitioner and Perlee L. Rieman, who has been adjudicated non compos and whose trustee and committee is the petitioner. The petition further averred that the petitioner *Page 156
 and his two sisters and his said brother, Carlton Alexander Rieman, some days after the death of his mother made diligent search among her papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether she left a will, and that they found the will hereinafter referred to among her private papers; that upon examination of the same in the presence of his said brother and sisters and George R. Willis, Esq., an attorney at law of Baltimore City, he discovered that "the face of the paper contained evidence of the erasure, or attempted erasure of the first item of the will;" that subsequently Mr. Willis informed the petitioner and his said brother and sisters that the deceased had told him that she had erased the "First Item," and had given him her reasons for so doing. The petition then stated that said will when found was in a sealed envelope in which was also enclosed a letter addressed by the deceased to Mr. Willis; that the will and letter had been in the possession of the petitioner ever since the envelope containing them had been found, and were "in the same condition in which they were when so found," and that he presented them, with said petition, to the Court for such action as might be proper to be taken in connection with the probate of said will or instrument of writing.
 By agreement of counsel representing all persons interested in the estate and The Safe Deposit Trust Company of Baltimore, appointed trustee by said will, said trustee, after notice to the heirs of law and next of kin of the deceased, on the thirteenth of July, 1911, presented and propounded the will for probate in said Orphans' Court, and thereupon Mrs. Thom and Mrs. McIntosh filed in said Court their petition charging that the deceased had erased the first item of the will; that her said act operated as a cancellation and revocation of said item and of the whole will, and that she intended that it should so operate, and praying that said will be by said Court declared cancelled and revoked, and that said trustee, the said Charles E. Rieman, trustee and committee for Perlee Lowe Rieman, and Carlton Alexander Rieman and Charles E. Rieman, named as executors of the *Page 157
 will, be required to answer, etc. This petition was answered by The Safe Deposit and Trust Company, trustee, denying that the will or any part of it had been revoked. The answer of Charles E. Rieman and Carlton Alexander Rieman, executors, states that they do not admit that the deceased "attempted to erase, believed she had erased and did erase the first item in said" will, or that her act in connection "with the alleged erasure of said first item, operated as a cancellation and revocation of said first item, and of said" will, and that they require proof thereof by the petitioner, while the answer of Charles E. Rieman, trustee and committee, "neither admits nor denies" the alleged revocation of the will. A replication was filed by the petitioners, evidence was produced before the Orphans' Court, and, by agreement of counsel, was subsequently written by the stenographer and filed in the case. On the 18th of July, 1911, the Orphans' Court passed an order adjudging that the will had been cancelled and revoked by the deceased, and that probate of the same be refused, and, on the same day, passed a further order granting letters of administration on the estate of the deceased to Charles E. Rieman and Carlton Alexander Rieman. It is from these orders that The Safe Deposit Trust Company, trustee, has appealed.
 In order to arrive at the real intention of the deceased, and to determine the effect to be given to the alleged act of revocation, it will be necessary to keep in view the provisions of the will in question. After providing for the payment of her just debts and funeral expenses, it proceeds:
 "Item: I give and bequeath unto each of my children, that is to say: Mary Isabel Thom, Carlton Alexander Rieman, Charles E. Rieman and Charlotte Rieman McIntosh, the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000)."
 "Item: I give and bequeath unto the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, in trust for the use of my son Perlee Lowe Rieman, the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) to be held by the said trustee for and during the term of his natural life and subject to the same limitations *Page 158
 hereinafter expressed of that part of the rest and residue of my estate which I have given unto the said trustee for the use and benefit of my said son, Perlee Lowe Rieman."
 By the third item the deceased gives to Mary Ann Donovan, nurse of her deceased daughter, provided she was living at the death of the deceased, the sum of $250. By the fourth item she gives to each of certain servants $100, and to certain other servants each the sum of $25, and by the fifth item she gives to her two daughters all her wearing apparel, jewelry, laces, toilet silver, contents of her wardrobe, writing desks and store rooms. The sixth item is as follows:
 "Item: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of my estate hereinafter called my `trust estate' unto the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, in special trust and confidence, with the powers and to and for the uses and purposes following, that is to say: With full power and authority to invest all moneys which it may receive in permanent or transient investments, ground rents, annuities, stocks, bonds, mortgages or other good and safe income-producing securities, as may to it seem most advantageous to those interested in the rest and residue of my estate, and my said trustee is further authorized and empowered at all times during the continuance of said trust, for the purpose of re-investment to sell any of the securities or investments so made or to change any investments left by me or which may be procured by it and to re-invest the proceeds of any sale or sales upon the trusts herein declared, and in turn to sell or change any of the investments thus made by it, submitting, however, in the administration of this trust all of its acts so to be done with reference to the management of the trust estate to some Court of competent jurisdiction for its approval. And my trustee is further directed to pay unto each of my four children: Mary Isabel Thom, Carlton Alexander Rieman, Charles E. Rieman and Charlotte Rieman McIntosh, in quarterly installments, one-fifth (1/5) part of the net income of the rest and residue of my estate, such payments to be continued to be made to each of my said four children for and *Page 159
 during the full end and term of his or her natural life, and to pay the other one-fifth (1/5) part of the net income of the said rest and residue of my estate to the committee or trustee of my son Perlee Lowe Rieman, for and during the term of his natural life.
 In the event of any one of my five children above named, departing this life, I direct my said trustee to divide my estate into five equal parts, having reference to quantity and values and to transfer, pay and deliver one of said five parts unto the child or children of such deceased child of mine, share and share alike per stirpes and not per capita. In the event of any of my five children departing this life without issue living at the time of his or her death, then shall a portion of my trust estate so set apart for the use of the child so dying, be by my trustee divided equally among my children, the child or children of any deceased child of mine to take his, her or their parents's shareper stirpes and not per capita. The share of each of my children living at the time of this division, shall be held by my trustee for the use of my children respectively, for life, with the same limitations over, as is herein imposed upon the original shares of my children respectively."
 Then follows a suggestion to the trustee in reference to the sale of certain unimproved real estate in Dayton, Ohio; and by the remaining and last item Carlton Alexander Rieman and Charles E. Rieman are appointed executors.
 The will is dated March 11th, 1907, and the evidence produced by the Safe Deposit and Trust Company, trustee, shows that it was duly executed by the deceased on that date, and that it remained in the possession of Mr. Willis until the 29th of June, 1909, when, at her request, he mailed it to her address in Baltimore County. It was found after her death in her desk, with some instructions to Mr. Willis, in an envelope which was sealed and addressed to him.
 From an inspection of the original will, which was produced at the argument of the case in this Court, it appears that the names of the four children of the deceased in the first item *Page 160
 have been rubbed and that some of the letters making up these names have been relined or retraced with a lead pencil. The words "each of my children" in the same item appear to have been rubbed also, but no part of said item has the appearance of having been entirely rubbed out, erased or rendered illegible.
 It appears from the evidence produced by the petitioners, appellees, that on the 20th of April, 1910, Mr. Willis called to see Mrs. Rieman at her home in Baltimore City in regard to some changes she desired to make in her will, and that she then told him that she desired to divide the whole of her estate into five equal parts, that "she did not want any distinction among her children; wanted to have them all alike," and that she wanted her two sons, Carlton A. and Charles E. Rieman, and her two daughters, to have their parts absolutely, but she wanted the share of her son who was non compos to be held in trust for him for life; that she did not want the shares of her sons, Carlton and Charles, and her two daughters held in trust, as is provided in the will in question, and gave as her reason for desiring to make this change that at the death of Mrs. Thom and Mrs. McIntosh their children will come into possession of quite large estates under their grandfather's will, and that she wanted her daughters to have what she was going to leave them subject to their control absolutely. Mr. Willis says that Mrs. Rieman called at his office on the 25th of April and on the 16th of June, 1910, when they talked over the proposed changes in her will, and that on the 28th of June, 1910, she called again "and gave me instructions to prepare the will giving these four children I have named their shares absolutely and the other one-fifth to be in trust for the other son. She said to me further: There are some specific legacies, money legacies, I want to give and I will write the names out for you and the amounts I want to give. I remember, in particular one was an indebtedness she wanted to release. All right I said; I was ready to prepare the will just as soon as I got the information with reference to the legacy. She died *Page 161
 before she sent me the memorandum, and in this envelope which was found after her death in my presence and which was handed to me by her son Charles and by me opened, was this memorandum, addressed to me.
 "MR. WILLIS:
 My legatees are my cousin, Mrs. Nellie Lowe Johnston, Mrs. Gabriel Johnston, Washington, D.C., the sum of $2,000.00, and the debt of $3,000.00 be forgiven her if it is not paid at my death.
 To Lucilla Rieman, Mary Rieman, Clara Rieman, Mildred Rieman,
 all daughters of Henry Rieman, of Hawksworth, near Easton, Eastern Shore of Maryland, the sum of $250.00 apiece. To Miss Mary Hutchinson Warfield, 700 N. Howard street, Baltimore, the sum of $500.00. To Mrs. Mary Willoughby Osterhaus, wife of Capt. Hugo Osterhaus, U.S.N., the sum of $500.
 ANNIE L. RIEMAN."
 Mr. Willis also states: "At the last interview, which was on the 28th of June, she told me, in commenting upon the change that she was going to make, giving the children I have named one-fifth absolutely, that she had rubbed out a provision in her will whereby she had given to each of the children I have named $5,000 absolutely, because, she said, that is no use now because if they are going to get one-fifth of the whole of the estate there is no use of giving them $10,000 absolutely. I told her that she ought not to rub anything out of the will because that was not a proper thing to do, to erase a will or to attempt to change it in that manner."
 The Safe Deposit and Trust Company, trustee, objected to this evidence adduced by the petitioners, and filed a motion to strike it out, but the Court below overruled the motion.
 Under the provision of section 318 of Article 93 of the Code a will may be revoked "by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, *Page 162
 cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same, by the testator himself or in his presence, and by his direction and consent;" and the right of a testator under this section of the Code to revoke a clause of his will without destroying or invalidating the remaining clauses, provided he does not thereby enlarge the estate of any one who takes under the will, or change the character of the remaining provisions, was distinctly recognized in Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478, and affirmed in the case of Home of the Aged v. Bantz, 107 Md. 543. In the latter case this Court, upon the authorities there cited, also adopts the rule that where a will was in the custody of the testator and upon his death is found among his private papers, cancelled or obliterated, it is presumed that it was so cancelled or obliterated by the testator and that he did it animo revocandi,
 and quotes the statement in Redfield on Wills, 307, that, "The rule of evidence in the ecclesiastical Courts in regard to presumptive revocations from the absence or mutilation of the will seems to be that if the will is traced into the testator's possession or custody and is there found mutilated in any of the ways pointed out in the statute for revocation or is not found at all it will be presumed that the testator destroyed or mutilated it animo revocandi; but if it was last in the custody of another it is incumbent upon the party asserting the revocation to show the will again in the testator's custody or that it was mutilated or destroyed by his direction."
 If, therefore, in the case at bar the first item of the will had been cancelled or obliterated, the will having been in the custody of Mrs. Rieman, and having been found after her death among her private papers, the presumption would have been that it was done by her and that she intended thereby to revoke that clause of her will, unless it could be said, which, however, we must not be understood as saying, that there is such an intimate or interdependent relation between that clause and the other portions of the will as to give rise to the presumption that she intended to revoke the whole will. Home of the Aged v. Bantz,supra. But, as we have said, *Page 163
 from an inspection of the original will, it appears that parts of the first item were only rubbed and then some of the letters were retraced by lead pencil, and that no part of the clause was entirely obliterated or rendered illegible. We have been unable to find any case in which it was held that a will found in such a condition among the papers of the deceased must be presumed to have been revoked by him. The ground upon which the presumption of revocation rests, where the will was in the custody of a testator and is found cancelled, etc., is that there is no other way to account for its condition. Revocation requires an act, sufficient under the provisions of the Code, and an intention to revoke, and while, where the intention is clear, slight acts of cancellation or obliteration may be sufficient to constitute a revocation, an intention to revoke can not be presumed from acts that are in themselves incomplete and inconclusive, and that are as readily accounted for in some other way. In the case ofEschbach v. Collins, supra, the Court said: "It is not necessary that the words erased should be wholly illegible, but the act of the testator must be such as to clearly indicate an intention to expunge the whole clause, so that it will no longer constitute a sub-division of the will," and this was repeated inHome of the Aged v. Bantz, supra. These cases furnish an instance of attempted alteration and of a revocation by cancellation where, of course, the parts cancelled need not be entirely erased or rendered illegible, but even in those cases the Court was careful to say that cancellation must be such as to clearly indicate an intention to revoke. Here, as appears from the face of the will, the act itself is incomplete, not in the sense that the clause was not entirely rubbed out or obliterated, but in the sense that that which was begun was not finished and was abandoned. Such an act is clearly too indefinite, too incomplete to form the foundation of a presumption that the testatrix intended thereby to revoke an instrument which she had executed with so much formality. She may have commenced to rub out the first clause of her will with the view of revoking it, and then, before completing *Page 164
 what she intended to do, changed her mind and retraced the letters rubbed, and that is what is suggested by the appearance of the will. In 1 Jarman on Wills, 157 (6th ed.), it is said: "But it is clear, that if a testator is arrested in his design of destroying the will, by the remonstrance or interference of a third person, or by his own voluntary change of purpose, and thus leaves unfinished the work of destruction which he had commenced, the will is unrevoked." In the case of Doe v. Perbes, 3 B.
 Ald. 489 (106 Eng. Rep. Full Reprint, 740), the testator, urged by sudden impulse of passion against one of the devisees, undertook to cancel his will by tearing, and after tearing it twice through, was pursuaded by one present, before he completed his purpose, to desist, and he then, after putting the pieces of the will together, said: "It is well it was no worse," it was held that the will remained unrevoked. In the case of In reWood's Will, 11 N.Y.S. 757, 32 N.Y. State Reporter, 286, it appeared that the signature of the testatrix had been erased by drawing diagonal lines over the same, and then the lines and the name were nearly erased, and her name carefully rewritten in her own handwriting with a different colored ink. The Court, in disposing of the case, said: "I am asked by the contestants to presume as a matter of law that the erasure was made animorevocandi with intent to revoke and destroy the will and that the act was sufficient to accomplish the intent. If the will had been found in her safe carefully preserved among the valuable papers of the testatrix, with her signature erased, it would have been a fair and reasonable presumption that she erased the signature animo revocandi, and it would then be lacking in one of the statutory requirements of a valid will — the signature of the decedent at the end thereof; but when found with the signature carefully restored, no such presumption arises. In the absence of all proof how can I find that it was made with the intent to revoke, when the instrument was preserved by her with her signature carefully restored? An intention to revoke a will not fully consummated is no revocation (Doe v. Perbes, *Page 165
 3 Barn. Ald. 489). The cancellation of a will does not necessarily involve its revocation. The cancelling itself is an equivocal act and in order to operate as a revocation must be done animo revocandi. (2 Whart. Ev., sec. 900; Dan v.Brown, 4 Cow. 483, 490.) It may be that Mrs. Wood drew the lines through her name with the intention of revoking the will, but immediately, and before the act was completed, changed her mind, erased the marks and restored her signature. To sustain the theory of the learned counsel for the contestant, I must find that the erasure was made by the testatrix herself, understandingly, freely and voluntarily, with no other purpose than to destroy her will, and that it was done at sometime previous to the act of re-writing her name; and this finding is asked for in the absence of proof and with the burden resting upon the contestants to establish the fact of revocation." We have quoted at some length from the opinion in that case because it shows that the Court was dealing with much the same state of facts as confronts us in this case, when considering the question whether a revocation can be presumed from the condition of the will. It is said in Schouler on Wills and Administration, sec. 390: "Where the testator arrests his own design before the act is completed, a revocation does not take place," and in 1 Redfieldon Wills, star page 307, it is stated that: "Where the testator is arrested in his purpose, and changes his determination to revoke his will, before the act is completed, by which he designed to express his intention," his act does not amount to a revocation. If where the act, by which the testator designed to accomplish a revocation and to evidence his intention to do so, is not completed by him but is abandoned, a revocation is not effected, it would seem to follow that where the condition of the will indicates that the act of obliterating was abandoned before completion, and that the testatrix restored the letters or words partially rubbed out or erased, there can be no presumption that the will was revoked. *Page 166
 For these reasons there is no presumption in this case because of the condition in which the will was found, that Mrs. Rieman intended to revoke either the first item or the whole will, and this brings us to the consideration of the other evidence in the case, which was objected to by the appellant.
 Assuming, without deciding, that all of it was admissible, we do not think it is sufficient to sustain the contention of the appellees. When taken in connection with the will itself, it demonstrates two things, first, that Mrs. Rieman had no idea of dying intestate; and, second, that it was her fixed and settled purpose throughout to make equal provision for her five children, and to so leave the share of her son Perlee that after his death it would go to her other children and their descendants. Therefore an intention to revoke her will or the first item of it, by rubbing parts of that item, would be inconsistent with her clearly established desire to make the provisions mentioned, unless it was done with the further purpose of accomplishing them by another will. The evidence shows that she was, from the 20th of April until sometime after her last interview with Mr. Willis on the 28th of June, 1910, anxious to make a change in her will, and the appellees rely upon her statement to Mr. Willis that she had rubbed out the provision in her will giving four of her children each $10,000, and the condition of the will, to show that she had prior to that statement obliterated the clause referred to with the intention of destroying the will. Of course, if she rubbed the first item to the extent indicated with the intention that that slight rubbing should operate as a revocation, she could not afterwards re-establish the will by retracing the letters rubbed. But the fact that when the will was found after her death in an envelope with additional instructions for a new will the words or letters that had been rubbed were retraced, would indicate that she did not, in the first instance, intend the rubbing to effect a revocation, for if she had deliberately revoked the will, and intended to make a new one, there was no reason why she should retrace what *Page 167
 she had partly erased. If, on the other hand, she did not intend,by the rubbing of the first item, to revoke the will, it was but natural, when told by her trusted advisor that it was not the proper thing to do, that she should attempt to rectify it, pending the execution of a new will containing the changes she desired to make, and which she knew would effect a revocation of the old. It is clear that she could not have intended, by the slight rubbing of the first item, to revoke the whole will, and her settled purpose, apparent from the evidence, to make equal provision for her children, precludes the idea that she intended to revoke the first item, for that, if it could have been accomplished, would have resulted in giving to her son Perlee more than he would otherwise have received, and in an unequal distribution of her estate. The only reasonable conclusion from all the evidence is that having determined to change her will so as to give to her two daughters and her two sons, Carlton A. and Charles E. Rieman, absolute estates in their shares, Mrs. Rieman partly rubbed out or erased the item giving each of them $10,000, not with the intention of thereby
 destroying the will or that clause, but as a means and for the purpose of indicating to her attorney, who was to prepare the new will, that that clause or item was to be left out of the will she was about to make, and that she did not intend that the rubbing should have any significence independent of and apart from the making of a new will. This view is confirmed by her statement to Mr. Willis, as her reason for rubbing out the first item, that if the children referred to "are going to get one-fifth of the whole estate, there is no use giving them $10,000 absolutely."
 This conclusion is not at all in conflict with the case ofSemmes v. Semmes et al., 7 H. J. 388, where it is stated by CHIEF JUSTICE BUCHANAN that if a will is deliberately cancelled, without accident or mistake, it will operate as a revocation, although the party may at the time have intended to make another will, and afterwards failed to do it. The same view is expressed in 1 Redfield on Wills, star page 308 (4th ed.), where the author says: "But if a testator destroys *Page 168
 a will upon the mere general purpose of thereafter making another, it will not hinder the revocation becoming effectual, because he dies without carrying such purpose of making a new will into effect.
 Where, however, what was done was not intended to have any effect apart from and independent of the making of a new instrument, it cannot operate as a revocation of the existing will, for the manifest reason, as distinctly recognized inSemmes v. Semmes, supra, that unless the act relied on was done animo revocandi, it does not amount to a revocation. A similar principle is clearly stated and applied in the case ofMcIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 71, where the Court says: "The mere fact that the testator intended to make a new will, or made one which failed of effect, will not alone, in every case, prevent a cancellation or obliteration of a will from operating as a revocation. If it is clear that the cancellation and the making of a new will were parts of one scheme, and the revocation of the old will was so related to the making of the new as to be dependent upon it, then if the new will be not made, or if made is invalid, the old will though cancelled, should be given effect, if its contents can be ascertained in any legal way. But if the old will is once revoked — if the act of revocation is completed, — as if the will be totally destroyed by burning and the like, or if any other act is done which evidences an unmistakable intention to revoke, though the will be not totally destroyed, the fact that the testator intended to make a new will, or made one which can not take effect, counts for nothing." This rule is also stated in 1 Williams on Ex. (7th ed.), 200; 1Jarman on Wills (6th ed.), 154, and in 30 Ency. of Law, 633 (2nd ed.), where many cases are cited in support of the text. Here all that the evidence shows is that what was done must have been done for the sole purpose of indicating to the attorney of the deceased that the item slightly rubbed was not to be included in the new will, and we are not, therefore, required to go to the extent of the authorities last cited. *Page 169
 We have carefully considered the very able arguments of counsel, and have examined the authorities cited, but are unable to reach the conclusion that Mrs. Rieman intended to destroy the will in question. The case of Bell v. Fothergill, and others, Vol. 2 Law Reports, Probate Div. 148, cited by the appellees, and which resembles in some respects the case at bar, LORD PENZANCE, speaking of the condition of the will, said: "The signature had been cut clean out, above, below and cross-ways, apparently by a pair of scissors, but the paper so cut out had been placed in its position again, and gummed there." Under such circumstances, the Court held that the will had been revoked. We can not give to the slight rubbing in the case at bar the effect of such a decisive act as that described.
 It follows from what has been said that the orders appealed from must be reversed.
 Orders reversed, with costs, and case remanded. *Page 170


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 27.2.2014
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 L 58/20
 EEZ APVIENOTĀS KOMITEJAS LĒMUMS
 Nr. 166/2013
 (2013. gada 8. oktobris),
 ar ko groza EEZ līguma II pielikumu (Tehniskie noteikumi, standarti, testēšana un sertifikācija)
 EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,
 ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu (“EEZ līgums”) un jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,
 tā kā:
 (1)
 EEZ līgumā jāiekļauj Komisijas 2013. gada 13. februāra Regula (ES) Nr. 126/2013, ar ko groza XVII pielikumu Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulai (EK) Nr. 1907/2006, kas attiecas uz ķimikāliju reģistrēšanu, vērtēšanu, licencēšanu un ierobežošanu (REACH) (1).
 (2)
 Tādēļ būtu attiecīgi jāgroza EEZ līguma II pielikums,
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 EEZ līguma II pielikuma XV nodaļas 12.zc punktam (Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regula (EK) Nr. 1907/2006) pievieno šādu ievilkumu:
 “—
 32013 R 0126: Komisijas 2013. gada 13. februāra Regulu (ES) Nr. 126/2013 (OV L 43, 14.2.2013., 24. lpp.).”
 2. pants
 Regulas (ES) Nr. 126/2013 teksts islandiešu un norvēģu valodā, kas jāpublicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ papildinājumā, ir autentisks.
 3. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā 2013. gada 9. oktobrī, ja ir iesniegti visi paziņojumi saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 103. panta 1. punktu (2).
 4. pants
 Šo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un tā EEZ papildinājumā.
 Briselē, 2013. gada 8. oktobrī
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā –
 priekšsēdētājs
 Thórir IBSEN
 (1) OV L 43, 14.2.2013., 24. lpp.
 (2) Konstitucionālās prasības nav norādītas.


type: legislation

text:
 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2021 05 20
 COM(2021) 243 final
 2021/0125(NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl pozicijos, kurios Sąjunga turi laikytis Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos Pasauliniame transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forume, dėl siūlomų taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų ir siūlomų Bendrųjų techninių reglamentų Nr. 4 ir Nr. 9 pakeitimų
 AIŠKINAMASIS MEMORANDUMAS
 1.PASIŪLYMO DALYKAS
 Šis pasiūlymas teikiamas dėl sprendimo, kuriuo nustatoma pozicija, kurios turi būti laikomasi Sąjungos vardu Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos Pasauliniame transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forume (WP.29), atsižvelgiant į tai, kad numatoma priimti galiojančių JT taisyklių ir JT bendrųjų techninių reglamentų pakeitimus.
 2.PASIŪLYMO APLINKYBĖS
 2.1.1958 m. Susitarimas ir 1998 m. Susitarimas
 Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos (toliau – JT EEK) susitarimu dėl suvienodintų techninių normų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse, ir pagal tas normas suteiktų patvirtinimų abipusio pripažinimo sąlygų (toliau – Pataisytas 1958 m. susitarimas), ir Susitarimu dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse (toliau – Paralelus susitarimas), siekiama parengti suderintus reikalavimus, kuriais siekiama pašalinti technines kliūtis JT EEK susitariančiųjų šalių prekybai motorinėmis transporto priemonėmis ir užtikrinti aukštą tokių transporto priemonių saugos ir aplinkos apsaugos lygį. Susitarimai ES atžvilgiu įsigaliojo atitinkamai 1998 m. kovo 24 d. ir 2000 m. vasario 15 d. Juos abu administruoja JT EEK Pasaulinis transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forumas (29 straipsnio darbo grupė arba WP.29 grupė).
 2.2. Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos (JT EEK) Pasaulinis transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forumas. 29 straipsnio darbo grupė arba WP. 29
 WP.29 grupė suteikia išskirtinę galimybę pasauliniu lygiu derinti transporto priemones reglamentuojančias taisykles. WP.29 grupė yra nuolatinė Jungtinių Tautų institucinės struktūros darbo grupė, turinti apibrėžtus įgaliojimus ir darbo tvarkos taisykles. Ji veikia kaip pasaulinis forumas, kuriame atvirai diskutuojama apie motorines transporto priemones reglamentuojančias taisykles ir Pataisyto 1958 m. susitarimo bei Paralelaus susitarimo įgyvendinimą. Bet kuri Jungtinių Tautų valstybė narė ir bet kuri regioninė ekonominės integracijos organizacija, įkurta Jungtinių Tautų valstybių narių, gali visapusiškai dalyvauti WP.29 grupės veikloje ir tapti WP.29 grupės administruojamų susitarimų dėl transporto priemonių susitariančiąja šalimi. Europos Sąjunga yra šių susitarimų šalis
 1
 .
 JT EEK WP.29 grupės posėdžiai rengiami tris kartus per metus, t. y. kovo, birželio ir lapkričio mėn. Per kiekvieną posėdžių sesiją, siekiant atsižvelgti į technikos pažangą, gali būti priimama naujų JT taisyklių, naujų JT bendrųjų techninių reglamentų (JT BTR), galiojančių JT taisyklių bei nutarimų pagal Pataisytą 1958 m. susitarimą pakeitimų ir galiojančių JT bendrųjų techninių reglamentų bei nutarimų pagal Paralelų susitarimą pakeitimų. Prieš kiekvieną WP.29 grupės posėdį šiuos pakeitimus pirmiausia aptaria specialių pagalbinių WP.29 grupės organų techniniai ekspertai.
 Vėliau vyksta balsavimas WP.29 grupėje, t. y. sprendimai priimami kvalifikuota visų dalyvaujančių susitariančiųjų šalių, balsuojančių už pasiūlymus pagal Pataisytą 1958 m. susitarimą, balsų dauguma ir balsuojant visų dalyvaujančių susitariančiųjų šalių, balsuojančių už pasiūlymus pagal Paralelų susitarimą, susitarimu.
 Pozicija, kurios turi būti laikomasi Sąjungos vardu, dėl naujų taisyklių ir BTR, jų pakeitimų, papildymų ir klaidų ištaisymų bei rezoliucijų prieš kiekvieną WP.29 grupės sesiją nustatoma Tarybos sprendimu pagal SESV 218 straipsnio 9 dalį.
 2.3. Numatomas WP.29 grupės aktas
 2021 m. birželio 22–24 d. WP.29 184-ojoje sesijoje gali priimti pasiūlymus dėl JT taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų ir pasiūlymus dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų Nr. 4 ir 9 pakeitimų.
 3. POZICIJA, KURIOS TURI BŪTI LAIKOMASI SĄJUNGOS VARDU
 WP 29 sistema stiprinamas tarptautinis transporto priemonių standartų derinimas. 1958 m. Susitarimas yra labai svarbus siekiant šio tikslo, nes ES gamintojai gali laikytis bendrų tipo patvirtinimo taisyklių žinodami, kad jų gaminiai bus pripažinti atitinkančiais susitariančiųjų šalių nacionalinės teisės aktus. Pavyzdžiui, pagal šią sistemą buvo sudarytos sąlygos Reglamentu (EB) Nr. 661/2009 dėl variklinių transporto priemonių bendrosios saugos panaikinti daugiau kaip 50 ES direktyvų ir jas pakeisti pagal 1958 m. Susitarimą parengtomis atitinkamomis taisyklėmis.
 Panašaus požiūrio laikomasi ir Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos Reglamente (ES) 2018/858
 2
 , kuriuo nustatomos visų naujų transporto priemonių, sistemų, komponentų ir atskirų techninių mazgų tipo patvirtinimo ir pateikimo rinkai administracinės nuostatos ir techniniai reikalavimai. Vadovaujantis tuo reglamentu pagal Pataisytą 1958 m. susitarimą priimtos taisyklės (toliau – JT taisyklės) buvo įtrauktos į ES tipo patvirtinimo sistemą kaip tipo patvirtinimo reikalavimai arba kaip Sąjungos teisės aktų alternatyvos.
 Kai tik WP.29 grupė priima JT taisyklių pakeitimų arba naujų JT taisyklių pasiūlymus ir apie šiuos teisės aktus JT EEK vykdomasis sekretorius praneša susitariančiosioms šalims, o sprendimą blokuojančią mažumą sudarančios susitariančiosios šalys nepateikia prieštaravimų, teisės aktai, praėjus šešiems mėnesiams, galiausiai gali įsigalioti ir būti perkelti į galiojančius kiekvienos susitariančiosios šalies taikytinus nacionalinės teisės aktus. ES perkėlimo į nacionalinės teisės aktus procedūra užbaigiama šių teisės aktų paskelbimu ES oficialiajame leidinyje.
 Todėl būtina apibrėžti Sąjungos poziciją dėl šių aktų:
 –JT taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų, susijusių su nuostatų dėl sunkiasvorių transporto priemonių stabdžių, M1 ir N1 kategorijų transporto priemonių stabdžių, matomų teršalų ir slėginio uždegimo variklių galios matavimo, keleivinių automobilių ir jų priekabų padangų, motociklų skleidžiamo triukšmo, sunkiasvorių transporto priemonių slėginio uždegimo ir kibirkštinio uždegimo (SND ir SGD) variklių išmetamųjų teršalų, vairavimo sistemų, M1 ir N1 transporto priemonių išmetamųjų teršalų, šoninio susidūrimo, išmetamo CO2 kiekio / degalų sąnaudų, lengvųjų automobilių atsarginių ratų, patobulintų vaikų apsaugos sistemų, vandeniliu ir kuro elementais varomos transporto priemonės, priekinio susidūrimo, daugiausia dėmesio skiriant apsaugos sistemoms, ir automatizuotos eismo juostų sekimo sistemos atnaujinimu, pasiūlymų;
 –pasiūlymų dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų (JT BTR) Nr. 4 ir 9 pakeitimų, susijusių su pasauliniu mastu suderinta sunkiasvorių transporto priemonių sertifikavimo procedūra ir pėsčiųjų sauga,
 pateiktų balsavimui 2021 m. birželio mėn. WP.29 grupės sesijoje, vyksiančioje 2021 m. birželio 22–24 d. Be to, būtina apibrėžti Sąjungos poziciją dėl:
 –pasiūlymo dėl naujo automatizuoto vairavimo vertinimo ir (arba) bandymo metodo (NATM) pagrindinio dokumento;
 –pasiūlymo dėl leidimo parengti naują JT BTR dėl dviračių ir triračių motorinių transporto priemonių papildomo apdorojimo įtaisų patvarumo.
 Sąjunga turėtų pritarti minėtiesiems teisės aktams, nes jie atitinka Sąjungos vidaus rinkos politikos priemones, susijusias su automobilių pramone, ir dera su Sąjungos transporto, klimato ir energetikos politika.
 Visi šie teisės aktai daro itin teigiamą poveikį ES automobilių pramonės konkurencingumui ir tarptautinei prekybai. Nubalsavus už šiuos teisės aktus, visoje Sąjungoje būtų skatinama technologijų pažanga, išnaudojami masto ekonomijos privalumai, užkertamas kelias vidaus rinkos susiskaidymui ir užtikrinamas vienodas automobilių standartų taikymas.
 Pasiūlymas dėl JT taisyklės Nr. 79
 3
 (vairavimo sistemos) nėra parengtas balsavimui 2021 m. birželio mėn. WP 29 posėdyje ir jį reikia toliau svarstyti atitinkamuose specialiuose pagalbiniuose WP.29 organuose.
 Rengiant šį pasiūlymą nepriklausomo tyrimo neprireikė. Tačiau šį pasiūlymą peržiūrės Motorinių transporto priemonių techninis komitetas.
 4.TEISINIS PAGRINDAS
 4.1.
 Procedūrinis teisinis pagrindas
 4.1.1.
 Principai
 Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo (SESV) 218 straipsnio 9 dalyje numatyti sprendimai, kuriais „nustatomos pozicijos, kurios Sąjungos vardu priimamos susitarimu įsteigtame organe, kai tam organui reikia priimti teisinę galią turinčius aktus, išskyrus aktus, papildančius arba pakeičiančius susitarimo institucinę struktūrą“.
 Sąvoka „teisinę galią turintys aktai“ apima aktus, turinčius teisinę galią pagal aptariamą organą reglamentuojančias tarptautinės teisės normas. Ji taip pat apima priemones, kurios nėra privalomos pagal tarptautinę teisę, tačiau „gali stipriai paveikti Sąjungos teisės akto leidėjo priimamų teisės aktų [...] turinį“
 4
 .
 4.1.2.
 Taikymas aptariamuoju atveju
 WP.29 grupė yra organas, kurio veikloje dalyvaujančios JT EEK susitariančiosios šalys nagrinėja Pataisyto 1958 m. susitarimo ir Paralelaus susitarimo įgyvendinimo klausimus.
 Aktai, kuriuos turi priimti WP.29 grupė, turi teisinę galią.
 Numatomame akte nurodytos JT taisyklės bus privalomos Sąjungai ir kartu su JT bendraisiais techniniais reglamentais ir rezoliucijomis galės iš esmės įtakoti ES teisės aktų, susijusių su transporto priemonių tipo patvirtinimu, turinį.
 Numatomais aktais susitarimo institucinė struktūra nepapildoma ir nekeičiama.
 Todėl siūlomo sprendimo procedūrinis teisinis pagrindas yra SESV 218 straipsnio 9 dalis.
 4.2.
 Materialinis teisinis pagrindas
 4.2.1.
 Principai
 Sprendimo pagal SESV 218 straipsnio 9 dalį materialinis teisinis pagrindas pirmiausia priklauso nuo numatomo akto, dėl kurio Sąjungos vardu nustatoma pozicija, tikslo ir turinio. Jeigu numatomu aktu siekiama dviejų tikslų arba jį sudaro dvi dalys ir jeigu vieną iš tų tikslų ar dalių galima laikyti pagrindiniu tikslu arba pagrindine dalimi, o kita dalis ar kiti tikslai yra tik papildomi, sprendimas pagal SESV 218 straipsnio 9 dalį turi būti grindžiamas tik vienu materialiniu teisiniu pagrindu – tuo, kurio reikalauja pagrindinis ar svarbesnis tikslas arba dalis.
 4.2.2. Taikymas aptariamuoju atveju
 Pagrindinis numatomo akto tikslas ir turinys yra susiję su teisės aktų suderinimu. Todėl siūlomo sprendimo materialinis teisinis pagrindas yra SESV 114 straipsnis.
 4.3.
 Išvada
 Siūlomo sprendimo teisinis pagrindas turėtų būti SESV 114 straipsnis kartu su 218 straipsnio 9 dalimi.
 2021/0125 (NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl pozicijos, kurios Sąjunga turi laikytis Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos Pasauliniame transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forume, dėl siūlomų taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų ir siūlomų Bendrųjų techninių reglamentų Nr. 4 ir Nr. 9 pakeitimų
 EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS TARYBA,
 atsižvelgdama į Sutartį dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo, ypač į jos 114 straipsnį kartu su 218 straipsnio 9 dalimi,
 atsižvelgdama į Europos Komisijos pasiūlymą,
 kadangi:
 (1)Tarybos sprendimu 97/836/EB
 5
 Sąjunga prisijungė prie Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos (JT EEK) susitarimo dėl suvienodintų techninių normų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse, ir pagal tas normas suteiktų patvirtinimų abipusio pripažinimo sąlygų (toliau – Pataisytas 1958 m. susitarimas). Pataisytas 1958 m. susitarimas įsigaliojo 1998 m. kovo 24 d.;
 (2)Tarybos sprendimu 2000/125/EB
 6
 Sąjunga prisijungė prie Susitarimo dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse (toliau – Paralelus susitarimas). Paralelus susitarimas įsigaliojo 2000 m. vasario 15 d.;
 (3)Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamente (ES) 2018/858
 7
 nustatomos visų naujų transporto priemonių, sistemų, komponentų ir atskirų techninių mazgų tipo patvirtinimo ir pateikimo rinkai administracinės nuostatos ir techniniai reikalavimai. Vadovaujantis tuo reglamentu pagal Pataisytą 1958 m. susitarimą priimtos taisyklės (toliau – JT taisyklės) buvo įtrauktos į ES tipo patvirtinimo sistemą kaip tipo patvirtinimo reikalavimai arba kaip Sąjungos teisės aktų alternatyvos;
 (4)pagal Pataisyto 1958 m. susitarimo 1 straipsnį ir Paralelaus susitarimo 6 straipsnį JT EEK Pasaulinis transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forumas (JT EEK WP.29) gali priimti JT taisyklių, JT bendrųjų techninių reglamentų (JT BTR) ir JT rezoliucijų pakeitimų pasiūlymus ir naujų JT taisyklių, JT BTR ir JT rezoliucijų dėl transporto priemonių patvirtinimo pasiūlymus. Be to, pagal tas nuostatas JT EEK WP.29 gali priimti pasiūlymus dėl JT BTR pakeitimų parengimo įgaliojimų arba dėl naujų JT BTR parengimo ir gali priimti pasiūlymus dėl JT BTR įgaliojimų pratęsimo;
 (5)2021 m. birželio 22–24 d. JTEEK WP.29 Pasaulinio forumo 184-ojoje sesijoje gali priimti pasiūlymus dėl JT taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų ir pasiūlymus dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų Nr. 4 ir 9 pakeitimų;
 (6)tikslinga nustatyti poziciją dėl tų pasiūlymų priėmimo, kurios Sąjungos vardu turi būti laikomasi JT EEK WP.29 grupėje, kadangi JT taisyklės Sąjungai bus privalomos ir kartu su JT bendraisiais techniniais reglamentais gali iš esmės įtakoti Sąjungos teisės aktų, susijusių su transporto priemonių tipo patvirtinimu, turinį;
 (7)atsižvelgiant į įgytą patirtį ir technologijų plėtrą, reikia pakeisti, pataisyti ar papildyti su tam tikrais elementais ar savybėmis, kuriems taikomos JT EEK taisyklės Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157, susijusius reikalavimus;
 (8)be to, reikia iš dalies pakeisti JT BTR Nr. 4 ir 9 tam tikras nuostatas;
 PRIĖMĖ ŠĮ SPRENDIMĄ:
 1 straipsnis
 Pozicija, kurios Sąjungos vardu turi būti laikomasi per 2021 m. birželio 22–24 d. rengiamą JT EEK Pasaulinio transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forumo 184-ą sesiją, yra balsuoti už pasiūlymus, išvardytus šio sprendimo priede.
 2 straipsnis
 Šis sprendimas skirtas Komisijai.
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Tarybos vardu
 Pirmininkas
 (1)
 1997 m. lapkričio 27 d. Tarybos sprendimas 97/836/EB dėl Europos bendrijos prisijungimo prie Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonominės komisijos susitarimo dėl suvienodintų techninių normų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse, ir pagal tas normas suteiktų patvirtinimų abipusio pripažinimo sąlygų (pataisytas 1958 m. susitarimas) (OL L 346, 1997 12 17, p. 78).2000 m. sausio 31 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2000/125/EB dėl Susitarimo dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse (Paralelus susitarimas), patvirtinimo (OL L 35, 2000 2 10, p. 12).
 (2)
 2018 m. gegužės 30 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) 2018/858 dėl motorinių transporto priemonių ir jų priekabų bei tokioms transporto priemonėms skirtų sistemų, komponentų ir atskirų techninių mazgų patvirtinimo ir rinkos priežiūros, kuriuo iš dalies keičiami reglamentai (EB) Nr. 715/2007 ir (EB) Nr. 595/2009 bei panaikinama Direktyva 2007/46/EB (OL L 151, 2018 6 14, p. 1).
 (3)
 JT taisyklės Nr. 79 naujos 04 serijos pakeitimų pasiūlymas
 (4)
 2014 m. spalio 7 d. Teisingumo Teismo sprendimas Vokietija prieš Tarybą, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, 61–64 punktai.
 (5)
 1997 m. lapkričio 27 d. Tarybos sprendimas 97/836/EB dėl Europos bendrijos prisijungimo prie Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonominės komisijos susitarimo dėl suvienodintų techninių normų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse, ir pagal tas normas suteiktų patvirtinimų abipusio pripažinimo sąlygų (pataisytas 1958 m. susitarimas) (OL L 346, 1997 12 17, p. 78).
 (6)
 2000 m. sausio 31 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2000/125/EB dėl Susitarimo dėl bendrųjų techninių reglamentų priėmimo ratinėms transporto priemonėms, įrangai ir dalims, kurios gali būti montuojamos ir (arba) naudojamos ratinėse transporto priemonėse (Paralelus susitarimas), patvirtinimo (OL L 35, 2000 2 10, p. 12).
 (7)
 2018 m. gegužės 30 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentas (ES) 2018/858 dėl motorinių transporto priemonių ir jų priekabų bei tokioms transporto priemonėms skirtų sistemų, komponentų ir atskirų techninių mazgų patvirtinimo ir rinkos priežiūros, kuriuo iš dalies keičiami reglamentai (EB) Nr. 715/2007 ir (EB) Nr. 595/2009 bei panaikinama Direktyva 2007/46/EB (OL L 151, 2018 6 14, p. 1).
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2021 05 20
 COM(2021) 243 final
 PRIEDAS
 prie
 Pasiūlymo dėl Tarybos sprendimo
 dėl pozicijos, kurios Sąjunga turi laikytis Jungtinių Tautų Europos ekonomikos komisijos Pasauliniame transporto priemonių reglamentų derinimo forume, dėl siūlomų taisyklių Nr. 13, 13-H, 24, 30, 41, 49, 79, 83, 95, 101, 124, 129, 134, 137 ir 157 pakeitimų ir siūlomų Bendrųjų techninių reglamentų Nr. 4 ir Nr. 9 pakeitimų
 PRIEDAS
 Taisyklė Nr.
 Darbotvarkės klausimas
 Dokumento nuoroda
 1
 13
 JT taisyklės Nr. 13 (sunkiasvorių transporto priemonių stabdžiai) 11 serijos pakeitimų 1 klaidų ištaisymo pasiūlymas (tik rusų kalba)
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2020/84
 13-H
 JT taisyklės Nr. 13-H 01 serijos pakeitimų 3 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/73
 24
 JT taisyklės Nr. 24 03 serijos pakeitimų 6 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/67
 30
 JT taisyklės Nr. 30 02 serijos pakeitimų 24 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/75
 41
 JT taisyklės Nr. 41 05 serijos pakeitimų 1 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/76
 41
 JT taisyklės Nr. 41 04 serijos pakeitimų 10 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/77
 49
 JT taisyklės Nr. 49 naujos 07 serijos pakeitimų pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/66
 79
 JT taisyklės Nr. 79 03 serijos pakeitimų 5 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/72
 83
 JT taisyklės Nr. 83 05 serijos pakeitimų 14 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/68
 83
 JT taisyklės Nr. 83 06 serijos pakeitimų 16 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/69
 83
 JT taisyklės Nr. 83 07 serijos pakeitimų 13 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/70
 95
 JT taisyklės Nr. 95 05 serijos pakeitimų 1 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/62
 101
 JT taisyklės Nr. 101 01 serijos pakeitimų 10 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/71
 124
 JT taisyklės Nr. 124 3 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/78
 129
 JT taisyklės Nr. 129 03 serijos pakeitimų 5 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/63
 134
 JT taisyklės Nr. 134 naujos 01 serijos pakeitimų pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/65
 137
 JT taisyklės Nr. 137 02 serijos pakeitimų 1 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/64
 157
 JT taisyklės Nr. 157 2 papildymo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/74
 BTR Nr.
 Darbotvarkės klausimas
 Dokumento nuoroda
 4
 JT BTR Nr. 4 4 pakeitimo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/79, ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/80
 9
 JT BTR Nr. 9 3 pakeitimo pasiūlymas
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/53,
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/54
 Kita
 Darbotvarkės klausimas
 Dokumento nuoroda
 Pagrindinis dokumentas
 Naujas automatizuoto vairavimo vertinimo ir (arba) bandymo metodas (NATM)
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/61
 Leidimas
 Pasiūlymas dėl prašymo leisti parengti naują JT BTR dėl dviračių ir triračių motorinių transporto priemonių papildomo apdorojimo įtaisų patvarumo
 ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2021/81
 (1)
 Visus šioje lentelėje nurodytus dokumentus galima rasti adresu:
 https://unece.org/transport/events/wp29-world-forum-harmonization-vehicle-regulations-184th-session