type: caselaw

text:
William Rounds, et al. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, et al.,
 No. 19, September Term 2014, Opinion by Greene, J.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT – NOTICE REQUIREMENT – CJP
 § 5-304
 Generally, the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (the “LGTCA”)
 applies to constitutional and non-constitutional based claims for unliquidated damages
 resulting from the tortious acts or omissions by local governments or their employees
 committed within the scope of employment.
 JOINDER – NECESSARY PARTIES
 To excuse non-joinder of necessary parties, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the non-
 joined party clearly had knowledge of the pending litigation, and (2) the non-joined party
 must have purposefully declined to join the litigation, despite the non-joined party’s ability
 to join. In a case involving an easement dispute, adjacent landowners are necessary parties
 and a mere allegation by the plaintiffs that the adjacent landowners will not dispute the
 outcome of litigation is insufficient to excuse their participation in the lawsuit.
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – DISCOVERY RULE – INQUIRY NOTICE
 In applying the discovery rule, the court’s inquiry must focus on when the plaintiff
 discovered certain facts which would be sufficient to provide notice of the injury. When a
 statute of limitations defense is raised at the motion to dismiss stage, review is limited to the
 facts as alleged in the complaint. Where a plaintiff specifically alleged the date on which
 they became aware of their injury, such date falls within the applicable statute of limitations,
 and allegations of the complaint do not demonstrate the plaintiff’s knowledge of facts which
 would provide notice of the injury at any earlier date, granting the motion to dismiss on
 statute of limitations grounds is improper.
 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – TOLLING – 28 U.S.C. § 1367
 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) serves to toll the statute of limitations for state law claims that were
 initially filed in federal court, but were subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
 statute tolls only those claims that were expressly asserted in the initial federal court case.
 Therefore, the statute of limitations will not be tolled for a newly asserted claim in state
 court.
 Circuit Court for Montgomery County
 Case No. 350954
 Argued: November 12, 2014
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 19
 September Term, 2014
 _____________________________________
 WILLIAM ROUNDS, et al.
 v.
 MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK
 AND PLANNING COMMISSION, et al.
 _____________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 McAuliffe, John F. (Retired, Specially
 Assigned),
 JJ.
 ___________________________________
 Opinion by Greene, J.
 ___________________________________
 Filed: January 29, 2015
 At its core, this lawsuit concerns the existence of a historic “Farm Road,” the origins
 of which date back well over a century. While the history of Farm Road may lie in antiquity,
 it has become the focal point of much contention in the past decade. Indeed, Farm Road has
 been the subject of several lawsuits, in both the state and federal courts of Maryland,1 an
 independent investigation,2 and numerous news reports and articles.3 The instant case,
 arising out of an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, requires this Court to consider the
 procedural difficulties which have otherwise prevented Petitioners from reaching some
 resolution on the merits of their suit.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 Parties Involved
 Petitioners, William Rounds, Marvin Gaither, Clifton Lee, James Bell, Bernice
 1
 See Awkard v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, RWT-08-1562, 2011
 WL 2896005 (D. Md. July 15, 2011); Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 40 A.3d 435 (2012);
 Nouvet v. Arey, et al., case no. 255120V, 2006 WL 6041009 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2006) aff’d
 No. 1832 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 16, 2009).
 2
 See B REGMAN, B ERBERT, S CHWARTZ & G ILDAY, LLC, R EPORT OF INVESTIGATION
 FOR THE M ONTGOMERY C OUNTY P LANNING B OARD M ARYLAND-N ATIONAL C APITAL P ARK
 AND PLANNING COMMISSION (D ec. 5, 2013) available at
 http://ww w .m ontgom eryplanningboard.org/department/new s_releases/documents/
 dellabrooke_final_report.pdf. This report, authored by Douglas Bregman with the assistance
 of Kevin Barker, among others, provides an exceptional analysis of many of the substantive
 issues underlying this matter. See id.
 3
 See, e.g., Bill Turque, Nothing Improper Found in Road Fight, The Washington
 Post, Dec. 12, 2013, at B03; WUSA9, Police Called to Sandy Spring’s Farm Road (Oct. 24,
 2013) available at http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/2013/12/18/4102725/.
 Martin, and Robert4 and Michelle Awkard, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
 County against Respondents, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission
 (the “Commission”), Macris, Hendricks, and Glascock, P.A. (“MHG”), Douglas Riggs
 (“Riggs”), Warren Brown (“Brown”), Paul and Sara Arey (the “Areys”), Charles and Marilyn
 Mess (the “Messes”), Audrey Hill, and Milton Johnson, seeking declaratory, compensatory,
 statutory, and punitive relief. Petitioners request that this Court review the Circuit Court’s
 decision, and the intermediate appellate court’s judgment to affirm the dismissal of the
 Amended Complaint against the Respondents.
 Factual Background
 According to their Amended Complaint, Petitioners own properties located along
 Farm Road and a “10 Foot Right-of-Way” (collectively the “Farm Road”), which together
 provide the only means of access to Petitioners’ properties. The properties are located on a
 tract of land in Sandy Spring, Maryland, bordered roughly by Goldmine Road to the north,
 Brooke Road to the south, and Chandlee Mill Road to the east. Petitioners allege that Farm
 Road runs north and south between Goldmine Road and Brooke Road through the center of
 the tract.
 Petitioners aver that Respondent Brown began developing the “Dellabrooke”
 subdivision along with “Dellabrooke Forest” (collectively the “Dellabrooke subdivisions”)
 4
 Robert Awkard passed away prior to this Court’s grant of the Petition for Writ of
 Certiorari.
 2
 on the northern end of Farm Road in 1994. During this development, Brown is alleged to
 have eliminated Farm Road’s access to Goldmine Road in the north, as well as created a
 “fictional” conservation easement5 to be included in subdivision plans that were to be
 submitted to the Commission. In preparation of the documents for submission, Brown
 retained MHG to complete land surveying work. Riggs was the MHG surveyor primarily
 responsible for this work. Acting at the direction of Brown, Riggs is alleged to have falsely
 omitted Farm Road from surveying documents as well as included a “fictional” conservation
 easement, which resulted in the Commission’s deletion of Farm Road from state property
 maps. These documents–namely Plat 21707 for the Dellabrooke subdivision–were approved
 by the Commission on August 3, 2000.
 The Areys purchased a portion of the fictional easement in order to develop the
 property in 2003. Prior to their purchase, the Areys allegedly worked with Brown in order
 to eliminate Farm Road’s northern access to Goldmine Road as well as eliminate Farm Road
 in its entirety. In doing so the Areys would increase the value of the property they
 subsequently purchased from Brown.
 Apart from the Commission’s approval of the fraudulent Dellabrooke subdivision
 plans, Petitioners contend that the Commission has improperly refused to issue addresses to
 5
 Petitioners contend that Brown did not adhere to the requirements of establishing a
 conservation easement. The alleged purpose behind the creation of the “fictional” easement
 was to “increase the number of allowable subdivision lots,” which would increase profits.
 3
 the Farm Road properties, despite having issued addresses to these properties previously.6
 Upon learning that their addresses were no longer recognized, Petitioners made several
 attempts to receive recognition of their addresses.7 Mr. Rounds visited the Commission on
 November 7, 2007, after having been unable to meet with a member of the Commission the
 previous day. The Commission, however, refused to issue Petitioners addresses noting that
 there were errors on a 1966 Tax Map upon which Mr. Rounds had relied. The Commission
 directed Mr. Rounds to the Maryland Department of Planning (“MDP”) in order to have the
 1966 Tax Map corrected if he sought addresses. Following the Commission’s suggestion,
 Mr. Rounds met with the MDP, which ultimately issued a letter to the Commission on
 November 14, 2007, confirming that the map had been corrected “to reflect the ‘Farm Road’
 and parcel locations.” Upon returning to the Commission, Mr. Rounds, accompanied by Mr.
 Gaither, was once again unable to obtain addresses. While Petitioners contend the
 Commission originally denied Petitioners’ request on November 7, 2007, citing errors in the
 1966 Tax Map, the Commission “now claims that it cannot issue [] addresses because
 6
 According to Petitioners’ Brief before this Court, the Commission ultimately issued
 Petitioners addresses during the pendency of litigation. Pet’rs’ Br. 9 n.7 (“On July 18, while
 the [Petitioners’] direct appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Commission
 issued addresses to [Petitioners], but refused to recognize the existence of Farm Road.
 Despite now having addresses, the Landowners have not obtained the full relief sought in this
 case because the failure to recognize the existence of Farm Road has prevented them from
 using and enjoying their properties had the Commission maintained or provided addresses
 in 2007.”).
 7
 To be clear, only Petitioners Rounds and Gaither are noted as meeting with the
 Commission. Furthermore, only Rounds is noted as having requested an address.
 4
 [Petitioners] have not presented documentation proving their right to access their property.”
 As part of the Commission’s allegedly “ever-changing, ad hoc” reasoning, Petitioners
 contend that the Commission now explains that it is unable to issue addresses as a result of
 the neighboring landowners’ failure to agree as to the existence or location of Farm Road.
 In an effort to resolve the dispute, the then acting Montgomery County Executive
 issued a letter to the Commission urging the Commission to recognize Farm Road.8 The
 letter states, in relevant part:
 Over the past several months, I have received extensive correspondence and
 inquires about the Farm Road. . . . I hope that you are able to recognize the
 Farm Road as the private right-of-way that it seems to be and provide the
 property owners with their rightful recognition.
 Petitioners allege that the Commission, citing to the reasons noted above, did not waver in
 its decision to refuse to issue Petitioners addresses.
 Following their failed attempts at obtaining addresses, Petitioners determined the
 present suit was necessary and, in an effort to comply with the notice requirement of the
 Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), Md. Code (1987, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2014
 Supp.), § 5-301 et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), sent notice of
 8
 The Amended Complaint does not indicate who contacted the County Executive.
 Nor does the Complaint indicate when contact was made. Rather, the Amended Complaint
 indicates that the County Executive, in response to inquiries he received “over the past
 several months,” sent the Commission a letter concerning Farm Road in February of 2008.
 To be sure, the letter from the County Executive does not indicate who the aggrieved
 landowners may be, nor does it speak to any future litigation.
 5
 their claim on June 10, 2008 and July 21, 2008.9
 Procedural Background
 On June 16, 2008, Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the
 District of Maryland. Subsequently, Petitioners’ suit was dismissed on July 15, 2011 for
 failure to exhaust state remedies. Awkard v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
 Comm’n, RWT-08-1562, 2011 WL 2896005 (D. Md. July 15, 2011).
 Petitioners filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on
 August 11, 2011. The Amended Complaint, filed on October 17, 2011, includes the
 following claims as to the Commission: Count I (substantive due process violation), Count
 II (procedural due process violation), Count III (regulatory taking violation), and Count IV
 (declaratory judgment that the Commission exceeded its authority)10 (collectively the “state
 9
 The June 10, 2008 letter was sent on behalf of Petitioners Robert and Michelle
 Awkard, Bernice Martin, James Bell, Clifton Lee, and Marvin Gaither, collectively
 represented by Temple Law Offices at the time. The June letter was addressed to the County
 Executive as well as the Commission. The July 21, 2008 letter was sent on behalf of
 Petitioner William Rounds, represented by McDermott Will & Emory LLP at the time. The
 July letter was addressed to the County Executive. We note that CJP § 5-304(c)(4) requires
 that notice be given “to the corporate authorities of the defendant local government.” In the
 present case, there is no contention that the County Executive is the “corporate authority” of
 the Commission.
 10
 Although Count IV is titled “Declaratory Judgment,” Petitioners seek unliquidated
 damages. Petitioners did not ask the court explicitly in Count IV to declare Petitioners’ rights
 or interests in Farm Road. Nor did Petitioners ask the court to enjoin the Commission from
 acting in a certain manner. To be certain, our decision in the present case does not imply that
 the LGTCA applies to declaratory actions; indeed, such a holding would be contrary to the
 language of the statute. Count IV, however, seeks compensatory, statutory, and punitive
 damages. Therefore, Count IV (unlike Counts V-XI which request a declaration as to
 (continued...)
 6
 constitutional counts”). As to all Respondents, Petitioners assert Counts V-XI (declaratory
 judgment that Petitioners have an easement to use Farm Road) (collectively the “easement
 claims”). With respect to the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown, and the Areys, the
 Amended Complaint contains Count XII (wrongful interference), and Count XIII (slander
 of title). The Respondents moved separately to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The
 Circuit Court granted the motions to dismiss as follows:
 (1) Counts I-IV (the state constitutional counts), with prejudice, against the
 Commission for failure to give proper notice under the LGTCA;
 (2) Counts V-XI (the easement claims), without prejudice, as to the
 Commission, the Areys, the Messes, Hill, and Johnson, for failure to
 join necessary parties;
 (3) Counts V-XI (the easement claims), with prejudice, as to MHG, Riggs,
 and Brown, as none owned property adjacent to Farm Road and were,
 therefore, not interested parties; and
 (4) Counts XII and XIII, with prejudice, as to the Commission, MHG,
 Riggs, Brown, and the Areys, as time-barred, or alternatively, with
 respects to MHG and Riggs, because no duty was owed to Petitioners.11
 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the
 10
 (...continued)
 Petitioners’ interests in Farm Road) falls under the purview of the LGTCA.
 11
 There is no indication in the Circuit Court’s order as to why Counts XII and XIII
 were disposed of on statute of limitations grounds and not the LGTCA notice requirement
 grounds as against the Commission. Counts XII and XIII both seek unliquidated damages
 against the Commission, among others. Therefore, the LGTCA would apply to the extent
 those counts were brought against the Commission. Indeed, the Commission, in its motion
 to dismiss, requested that the state constitutional counts and Counts XII-XIII be dismissed
 as a result of Petitioners’ failure to comply with the LGTCA.
 7
 action. Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 214 Md. App. 90, 75 A.3d
 987 (2013). We subsequently granted Petitioners’ certiorari request, Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l
 Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 436 Md. 327, 81 A.3d 457 (2013), to answer the
 following questions, which we have rephrased for clarity:
 (1) Are Petitioners, in seeking redress from alleged local government
 violations of the state constitution, required to comply with the strict notice
 requirements of the LGTCA?
 (2) Did the Court of Special Appeals properly uphold the trial court’s dismissal
 of Petitioners’ easement claims for a failure to join necessary parties, despite
 Petitioners’ contention that “adjacent property owners have agreed not to
 contest the relief sought”?
 (3) Did the Court of Special Appeals err in its factual determination that the
 Petitioners failed to file Counts XII and XIII within the Statute of Limitations?
 For the reasons stated below, we answer each of the questions in the affirmative.
 DISCUSSION
 I. Standard of Review
 This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for legal correctness. Patton v.
 Wells Fargo Financial Md., Inc., 437 Md. 83, 95, 85 A.3d 167, 173 (2014); Heavenly Days
 Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs., Inc., 433 Md. 558, 568, 72 A.3d 199, 204-
 05 (2013). As we noted previously,
 On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must assume the
 truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-
 pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all
 inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only
 if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to
 the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief
 8
 may be granted. We must confine our review of the universe of facts pertinent
 to the court’s analysis of the motion to the four corners of the complaint and
 its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.
 Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 193, 43 A.3d 1029, 1033 (2012) (quoting
 Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d 200, 207 (2011)).
 II. COUNTS I-IV
 The intermediate appellate court upheld the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Counts I-IV
 against the Commission on the grounds that Petitioners failed to comply with the LGTCA
 notice requirement, CJP § 5-304.12 Petitioners challenge the reasoning of the courts below
 and argue that the LGTCA notice requirement is inapplicable to violations of the state
 constitution. As discussed in greater detail below, we hold that, generally, the LGTCA
 notice requirement applies to both state constitutional and non-constitutional tort claims for
 unliquidated damages.13 Moreover, we hold that the Circuit Court was well within its
 12
 The Court of Special Appeals limited its holding to suits brought against the
 Commission. See Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 107 n.10, 75 A.3d at 997 n.10 (“We do not
 decide whether the LGTCA notice requirement would apply where a plaintiff sues a different
 local government for a state constitutional tort.”) (emphasis added).
 13
 We note that a cause of action for damages may not lie for all violations of the state
 constitution. See Dipino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 50 n.7, 729 A.2d 354, 371 n.7 (1999) (“We
 do not mean in any way to suggest that an action for damages lies for the violation of all
 provisions of the Constitution or Declaration of Rights; it may or may not, but that is not
 before us in this case.”) (emphasis in original). Where a cause of action for damages exists
 and a plaintiff seeks unliquidated damages for the “tortious acts or omissions” of a local
 government and/or employee acting within the scope of employment, however, the LGTCA
 notice requirement applies.
 As in the present case, where a local government has been sued for violations of
 citizens’ constitutional rights, under Maryland common law “there is ordinarily no local
 (continued...)
 9
 discretion to conclude that no good cause existed to excuse Petitioners’ failure to comply
 with the notice requirement.
 At the outset, we emphasize what is not before us in the present case. Petitioners
 have not argued, before this Court, that they actually complied with the notice requirement
 of the LGTCA. Moreover, although raised in the Circuit Court below, no issue has been
 raised by Petitioners as to whether they have substantially complied with the notice
 requirement of the LGTCA. Instead, this Court is asked to resolve whether Petitioners, in
 bringing an action against the Commission for alleged violations of the state constitution,
 were required to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. With respect to whether
 Petitioners have demonstrated good cause to excuse their failure to comply, we limit our
 review to whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion in finding that no good cause
 existed.
 Statutory Scheme
 A brief overview of the LGTCA itself is appropriate. As this Court previously
 explained in Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, 291, 587 A.2d 485, 488 (1991):
 The Local Government Tort Claims Act was passed in response to a perceived
 13
 (...continued)
 government immunity.” Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 102, 660 A.2d 447, 463 (1995)
 (citations omitted) and cases cited therein. As we explained in Dipino, “sitting atop [the
 principles of immunity] is [the] LGTCA.” 354 Md. at 49, 729 A.2d at 370. As discussed
 infra, where a plaintiff maintains an action against a local government or its employees (i.e.
 where the local government has no immunity), the LGTCA affects the allocation of financial
 liability between the local government and its employees.
 10
 insurance crisis plaguing counties, municipalities and their employees. The
 legislative history of the Act reflects the General Assembly’s concern for the
 impact of increased law suits on the incentive of public employees and
 officials to do their jobs to the best of their abilities.
 In order to address these concerns, the LGTCA, among other things, acts to limit the
 designated local governments’14 financial liability as well as to provide the employees of
 local governments certain protections from damages.
 Where an employee of a local government is sued, the LGTCA affords the employee
 limited protections. First, the Act provides that “[e]ach local government shall provide for
 its employees a legal defense in any action that alleged damages resulting from tortious acts
 or omissions committed . . . within the scope of employment.” CJP § 5-302(a). Second,
 where a plaintiff prevails on his or her claim, the LGTCA provides that “a person may not
 execute against an employee on a judgment rendered for tortious acts or omission committed
 . . . within the scope of employment [and without malice].” CJP § 5-302(b). Instead, the
 14
 The LGTCA applies to “local governments” as defined in CJP § 5-301. While this
 includes governmental entities perhaps colloquially thought of as “local governments,” such
 as Montgomery County or Prince George’s County, § 5-301 also includes in its scope
 governmental entities such as the Commission, the Baltimore City Police Department, the
 Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, and the Enoch Pratt Free Library. See Balt.
 Police Dep’t v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 322, 780 A.2d 410, 433-34 (2001) (explaining
 that the definition of “local government” under the LGTCA includes entities, “many of
 which are not local governments for purposes other than the LGTCA. (For example, the
 LGTCA includes among local governments the Maryland–National Capital Park and
 Planning Commission; the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission; the Enoch Pratt Free
 Library or Board of Trustees of the Enoch Pratt Free Library; Housing Authorities created
 under Article 44A of the Maryland Code; the Baltimore Metropolitan Council, and the
 Howard County Mental Health Authority.)”).
 11
 “local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages
 resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of
 employment[.]” CJP § 5-303(b)(1). If the employee acts with malice, however, “[a]n
 employee shall be fully liable” and “the local government may seek indemnification for any
 sums it is required to pay[.]” CJP § 5-302(b). In other words, the employee would be liable
 for any amount in excess of the local government’s liability, which is limited by CJP § 5-303.
 The effect of the LGTCA is to “provide a remedy for those injured by local government
 officers and employees, acting without malice in the scope of their employment, while
 ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government
 ultimately responsible for the public officials’ acts.” Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 108, 660
 A.2d 447, 466 (1995).
 With respect to only these protections, the LGTCA makes clear that “[a] local
 government may not assert governmental or sovereign immunity to avoid the duty to defend
 or indemnify an employee[.]” CJP § 5-303(b)(2). Apart from this limited waiver of
 immunity, the LGTCA does not waive any preexisting immunity against suit held by the local
 government or its employees. Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 679-80 n.5, 25 A.3d
 122, 128 n.5 (2011) (“First, the LGTCA does not waive the limited immunity enjoyed by
 local governments[.] . . . Second, the LGTCA does not waive any immunity enjoyed by
 ‘public officials’ and other similar representatives of local government against potential tort
 claimants.”).
 12
 Under the LGTCA, the liability of the local government is limited and “may not
 exceed $200,000 per an individual claim, and $500,000 per total claims[.]” CJP § 5-303(a).
 This cap limits the local government’s liability in both a suit brought directly against the
 governmental entity itself and in a suit brought against the employee, where the
 governmental entity must provide indemnification. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Marcas, L.L.C.,
 415 Md. 676, 684, 4 A.3d 946, 951 (2010) (explaining that “the General Assembly enacted
 . . . an emergency measure ‘clarifying that the monetary limits on the liability of a local
 government under the [LGTCA] apply to claims against local governments when named as
 defendants’”). As part of the limitation on liability, CJP § 5-303(c)(1) notes that “[a] local
 government may not be liable for punitive damages.”
 Finally, the LGTCA provides the procedural prerequisites to bringing a cause of
 action against a local government or its employees. The LGTCA’s notice requirement
 provides, in part, that “an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local
 government or its employees unless [] notice of the claim . . . is given within 180 days after
 the injury.”15 CJP § 5-304(b)(1). The failure to give notice, however, does not operate as an
 absolute barrier to a plaintiff’s claims provided the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure
 to give the required notice and the defendant has not been prejudiced by the failure. CJP §
 5-304(d) (“[U]nless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced
 15
 The only actions which may “be brought against a local government” are those
 which exist apart from the LGTCA. The LGTCA does not authorize a new cause of action;
 rather, it affects the liability of a local government and its employees.
 13
 by lack of required notice, upon motion and for good cause shown the court may entertain
 the suit even though the required notice was not given.”). The notice requirement applies to
 tort actions brought against the local government directly as well as those brought against an
 employee. See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 391, 754 A.2d 379, 386 (2000) (“The
 plain language of § 5-304 of the LGTCA indicates a legislative intent to make the notice
 requirement broadly applicable to tort actions brought directly against local governments.”).
 We note that the enactment of the LGTCA did not serve to create a cause of action
 against the local governments or their employees. Put simply, “[t]he only actions which can
 be brought directly against a local government are those authorized by law which is separate
 and distinct from the LGTCA.” Maynard, 359 Md. at 394, 754 A.2d at 388 (emphasis
 added). The LGTCA does not create a cause of action against the local government.
 Hansen, 420 Md. at 682 n.7, 25 A.3d at 130 n.7 (explaining that “under the LGTCA, a
 plaintiff may not sue directly a local government for many kinds of alleged tort violations.
 A plaintiff could bring against those governments, however, claims that were available prior
 to the adoption of the LGTCA”); Maynard, 359 Md. at 394, 754 A.2d at 388; Holloway-
 Johnson v. Beall, __ Md. App. __ , 103 A.3d 720 (2014); Balt. Police Dep’t v. Cherkes, 140
 Md. App. 282, 318, 780 A.2d 410, 431 (2001) (“On several occasions, the Maryland
 appellate courts . . . have held that the [LGTCA] neither authorizes a direct action against a
 local government nor waives the common law governmental immunity of an entity
 designated as a local government.”); Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 112 Md. App. 526,
 14
 552, 685 A.2d 884, 897 (1996) (noting that the LGTCA “does not provide a method for
 directly suing the County or other local governments”). Rather, the LGTCA’s enactment
 affects the financial liability of a defendant local government or employee in a tort action.
 Does the LGTCA Notice Requirement Apply to State Constitutional Claims?
 In this case, the Circuit Court, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, concluded that
 the notice requirement of the LGTCA must be satisfied in order to bring a state constitutional
 claim for unliquidated damages16 and that Petitioners’ failure to comply with the LGTCA
 notice requirement warranted dismissal of Counts I-IV of the Amended Complaint, alleging
 various violations of the state constitution. Petitioners ask this Court to conclude that the
 LGTCA is inapplicable to claims alleging violations of the state constitution. We hold that,
 generally, the LGTCA may be properly applied to claims seeking redress for government
 violations of the state constitution where unliquidated damages are sought.17
 16
 Compare Blick v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 113 Md. 487, 490-91, 77 A. 844,
 845 (1910) (“Unliquidated damages are such as rest in opinion only, and must be ascertained
 by a jury. They are damages which cannot be ascertained by computation or calculation; as,
 for instance, damages for not using a farm in a workmanlike manner, for not skillfully
 amputating a limb, for unskillfully working raw material into a finished fabric, and other
 cases of like character where no data are given for computation or any mode of calculation.”)
 (citations and quotations omitted), with Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 661, 332 A.2d 651,
 660 (1975) (“We have defined ‘liquidated damage’ as a ‘‘specific sum of money . . .
 expressly stipulated by the parties to a . . . contract as the amount of damages to be recovered
 by either party for a breach of the agreement by the other.’’”) (citations omitted).
 17
 In its motion to dismiss, the Commission characterized Counts I-IV (as well as
 Counts XII and XIII) as causes of action for unliquidated damages. Petitioners have not
 argued, before any court in the instant case, that this characterization is incorrect; indeed,
 Petitioners appear to accept that they have elected to pursue these allegations in tort. We
 (continued...)
 15
 Under CJP § 5-304, a plaintiff is required to send notice to the local government
 within 180 days of an injury as a condition precedent to bringing an action for unliquidated
 damages. “It is a longstanding principle of Maryland jurisprudence that the LGTCA notice
 provision is a condition precedent to maintaining an action directly against a local
 government or its employees.” Hansen, 420 Md. at 682, 25 A.3d at 130. See also Prince
 George’s Cnty. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 467, 19 A.3d 859, 869 (2011); Rios v. Montgomery
 Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 127, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005); Mitchell v. Housing Auth., 200 Md. App.
 176, 191, 26 A.3d 1012, 1021 (2011). As we have previously stated, the purpose of the notice
 requirement is “to apprise a local government of its possible liability at a time when it could
 conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of
 the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of
 17
 (...continued)
 note that the aforementioned counts do seek unliquidated damages as Petitioners simply
 request “compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages” with respect these counts.
 We note that, although Petitioners title Count III as a “Regulatory Taking” the
 allegations under Count III contain a prayer for “compensatory, statutory, and punitive”
 relief. Therefore, this allegation is subject to the LGTCA because Count III seeks
 unliquidated damages for the alleged wrongful conduct of the Commission and sounds in
 tort. To the extent Count III could be based upon a theory of inverse condemnation, we do
 not wish to give the impression that a taking in the constitutional sense would implicate the
 provisions of the LGTCA. Indeed, we recognize that applying the LGTCA to a
 constitutionally based taking could conflict with a vested right to just compensation (i.e.
 where the value of plaintiff’s property exceeded the cap on the local government’s liability).
 This issue, however, is not before us. We are asked to consider whether Petitioners, in
 bringing a cause of action for alleged government violations of the constitution seeking
 unliquidated damages, were required to comply with the notice requirement of the LGTCA.
 16
 the injury and its responsibility in connection with it.” Longtin, 419 Md. at 466, 19 A.3d at
 869 (citation omitted). See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90, 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting
 Bartens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626, 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39
 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the
 LGTCA was “to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious
 claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or
 county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own
 investigation”).
 Nothing in the statute’s language or its legislative history indicates that the General
 Assembly intended to exclude any category of tortious conduct committed by a local
 government or its employees, from the scope of the LGTCA notice requirement. As we have
 previously indicated, “[t]his Court has been most reluctant to recognize exceptions in a
 statute when there is no basis for the exceptions in the statutory language.” Lee v. Cline, 384
 Md. 245, 256, 863 A.2d 297, 304 (2004). Our conclusion that the notice requirement
 ordinarily applies to state constitutional claims for damages is amply supported by our
 caselaw. See Dehn Motor Sales, LLC v. Schultz, 439 Md. 460, 96 A.3d 221 (2014)
 (upholding trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s state
 constitutional tort claims for failure to comply with LGTCA notice requirements); Hansen,
 420 Md. at 682 n.7, 25 A.3d at 130 n.7 (“Whether the [notice] requirement applies to
 constitutional claims, which plaintiffs may bring directly against local governments, remains
 17
 uncertain. We have intimated as much, however.”); Longtin, 419 Md. at 521, 19 A.3d at 902
 (2011) (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (“[W]e recognize, at least implicitly,
 that the LGTCA procedural requirements (e.g., notice) apply also to constitutional tort
 claims.”); Maynard, 359 Md. at 391, 754 A.2d at 386 (“The plain language of § 5-304 of the
 LGTCA indicates a legislative intent to make the notice requirement broadly applicable to
 tort actions brought directly against local governments[.]”); Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n.19, 660
 A.2d at 466 n.19 (“Nevertheless, there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional
 torts. In fact, there is no exception in the statutory language for any category of tort.”);
 Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 458, 688 A.2d 448, 457 (1997) (“The
 statute does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional or constitutional and
 nonconstitutional torts[.]”).
 We most recently upheld the application of the notice requirement to state
 constitutional claims in Dehn Motor Sales, LLC v. Schultz, 439 Md. 460, 96 A.3d 221 (2014).
 In Dehn Motor Sales, the plaintiff, Dehn, filed claims against two police officers of the
 Baltimore City Police Department, among others, alleging state constitutional violations
 arising out of the towing of vehicles from Dehn’s property. 439 Md. at 468-69, 96 A.3d at
 226-27. After the completion of discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment
 arguing, in part, that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement of the
 LGTCA. Dehn Motor Sales, 439 Md. at 472, 96 A.3d at 228. The trial court granted the
 officers’ motion “conclud[ing] that the State constitutional claims were barred by the
 18
 [LGTCA].” Dehn Motor Sales, 439 Md. at 475, 96 A.3d at 230. On appeal, this Court was
 asked to consider whether the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice
 requirement. By affirming the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff had not
 demonstrated substantial compliance, this Court implicitly concluded that the notice
 requirement was properly applied to the plaintiff’s state constitutional claims. Dehn Motor
 Sales, 439 Md. at 487, 96 A.3d at 238. Having found no indication in the plain language of
 the statute or in our caselaw that the notice requirement is inapplicable to actions alleging
 violations of the state constitution, we decline to restrict the statute in the manner suggested
 by Petitioners.
 Good Cause to Excuse Compliance with the LGTCA Notice Provision
 The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners failed to
 demonstrate good cause to excuse their failure to comply timely and fully with the notice
 requirement. As discussed above, an action may proceed despite a failure to comply strictly
 with the LGTCA notice requirement where the plaintiff has substantially complied with or,
 alternatively, demonstrates good cause to excuse the failure to comply with the notice
 requirement. Housing Auth. v. Woodland, 438 Md. 415, 428-30, 92 A.3d 379, 386-88
 (2014); Longtin, 419 Md. at 467, 19 A.3d at 869. Petitioners do not dispute that notice was
 given outside of the 180-day period proscribed by the LGTCA, nor do they argue substantial
 compliance with the notice requirement before this Court. Rather, Petitioners aver that the
 Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals have improperly concluded that Petitioners
 19
 failed to show good cause. As explained below, we affirm the Circuit Court and the Court
 of Special Appeals’s judgment to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and IV against the Commission.
 Where a plaintiff fails to comply with the notice requirement, it is the plaintiff’s
 burden to demonstrate “good cause.” If the local government defendant is unable to
 “affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice . . . the
 court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given.” CJP § 5-304.
 As we explained in Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 271, 761 A.2d 56, 63 (2000), “[t]he test
 for whether good cause exists . . . is ‘whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that
 degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same
 or similar circumstances.’” (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]his ‘good cause’ exception
 leaves the courts some discretion in enforcing the notice requirement, and allows a court, in
 certain circumstances, to avoid an unjust result.” Longtin, 419 Md. at 467, 19 A.3d at 869-70.
 Cognizant of this discretionary authority, we confine our review to determining whether the
 trial court abused its discretion in making its good cause determination. Woodland, 438 Md.
 at 434-35, 92 A.3d at 390.
 After conducting a hearing, the Circuit Court concluded as a matter of law that
 Petitioners failed to present any evidence establishing good cause. This judgment was
 upheld by the Court of Special Appeals. In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, the
 intermediate appellate court “reject[ed] [Petitioners’] contention that they prosecuted their
 claims with the degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised
 20
 under the same or similar circumstances.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 107, 75 A.3d at 997.
 The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that, according to the Amended Complaint,
 Petitioners took no action between November 2007–the date Petitioners allege they became
 aware of the Commission’s wrongful acts–and June 2008–the date Petitioners sent the first
 notice letter–apart from apparently contacting the County Executive, who wrote a letter
 urging the Commission to issue addresses for Farm Road. Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 107-08,
 75 A.3d at 997. The intermediate appellate court concluded that “persuading one
 officeholder to write one letter–and taking no further action [in a seven-month span]–does
 not amount to the degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have
 exercised.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 108, 75 A.3d at 997. Moreover, the Court of Special
 Appeals rejected any notion that the delay in sending notice was caused by the Commission’s
 allegedly misleading representations. Id. Petitioners failed to explain how this contributed
 to a delay after they became aware of the alleged misconduct.
 Petitioners challenge the reasoning of the courts below and conclude that they “clearly
 provided proof of a good cause waiver.” In support of their position, Petitioners argue that
 the Commission has not been prejudiced by their failure to send timely notice. Petitioners
 also contend that they sought “non-adversarial remedies” pointing to the involvement of the
 County Executive.
 On the basis of the record before us, we are unable to conclude that the Circuit Court
 abused its discretion. Similar to the Court of Special Appeals, we are unable to conclude that
 21
 the sole act of some unidentified person soliciting the assistance of the County Executive in
 the span of time between the alleged injury date (November 2007) and the notice dates (June
 10, 2008 and July 21, 2008) unequivocally constitutes good cause. Petitioners present no
 reason for the delay in sending notice after learning of the injury. In other words, it was not
 unreasonable for the trial court to have concluded that this conduct fails to amount to good
 cause. Therefore, having found no abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb the trial court’s
 determination.
 III. COUNTS V – XI
 In Counts V–XI of the Amended Complaint, Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment
 that they have an easement with respect to Farm Road against all named defendants: the
 Commission, Brown, MHG, Riggs, the Areys, the Messes, Hill, and Johnson. The Amended
 Complaint also includes the assertion that not every person owning property adjacent to Farm
 Road had been joined; however, Petitioners assert that the “other adjacent property owners
 have agreed not to contest the relief sought herein.” The Circuit Court dismissed Counts
 V–XI without prejudice for failure to join necessary parties.18 The Court of Special Appeals
 affirmed, because “the record leaves unclear who is directly interested in the case, much less
 whether the directly interested people know of the case.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 112, 75
 A.3d at 1000 (emphasis in original). We agree.
 18
 The Circuit Court dismissed Counts V-XI with prejudice as to Brown, MHG and
 Riggs, however, because those defendants do not have any property interest in the subject
 areas and, therefore, are not interested parties.
 22
 The Court of Special Appeals offered three reasons for its conclusion: (1) Petitioners
 failed to name the other interested property owners; (2) Petitioners failed to specify the
 number of other property owners; and (3) Petitioners attempted to waive the presence of
 other property owners by alleging that they would not contest the relief sought, which
 Petitioners cannot themselves do. Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 111-12, 75 A.3d at 999-1000
 (quoting LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Reeves, 173 Md. App. 392, 402, 919 A.2d 738, 744 (2007))
 (“The failure to join a necessary party constitutes a defect in the proceedings that cannot be
 waived by the parties.”). The intermediate appellate court also rejected Petitioners’ argument
 that the court should merely accept their allegation that others “agreed not to contest the
 relief sought” to mean that they knew about the lawsuit and specifically declined to
 participate, which would satisfy an exception to compulsory joinder that we announced in
 City of Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., 398 Md. 657, 703-04, 922 A.2d 509, 537 (2007).
 Joinder
 Counts V–XI were brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, CJP § 3-405(a),
 which provides that “[i]f declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any interest
 which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party.” Md. Rule 2-211 further
 provides that:
 Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who is subject to service of
 process shall be joined as a party in the action if in the person’s absence (1)
 complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
 disposition of the action may impair or impede the person’s ability to protect
 a claimed interest relating to the subject of the action or may leave persons
 23
 already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent
 obligations by reason of the person’s claimed interest.
 We have long held that the “general rule [is] that ordinarily, in an action for a declaratory
 judgment, all persons interested in the declaration are necessary parties.” Williams v. Moore,
 215 Md. 181, 185, 137 A.2d 193, 196 (1957). Similar to this case, Williams involved a
 declaratory judgment action regarding an easement. In that case, at least two other property
 owners had an interest in the purported easement, because their properties abutted the
 easement, but were not named in the suit. This Court held that without all adjacent property
 owners (who could be affected by the declaratory judgment regarding the easement), the case
 had to be dismissed. Williams, 215 Md. at 186, 137 A.2d at 197. In other words, the failure
 to join necessary parties was “fatal.” Id.
 We have recognized an exception to the joinder requirement, relevant here.
 “‘[P]ersons who are directly interested in a suit, and have knowledge of its pendency, and
 refuse or neglect to appear and avail themselves of their rights, are concluded by the
 proceedings as effectually as if they were named in the record.’” MIE Properties, Inc., 398
 Md. at 703, 922 A.2d at 537 (quoting Bodnar v. Brinsfield, 60 Md. App. 524, 532, 483 A.2d
 1290, 1295 (1984)). In MIE Properties, we stated further that “we identify as the controlling
 principles the non-joined party’s knowledge of the litigation affecting its interest and its
 ability to join that litigation, but failure to do so.” 398 Md. at 704, 922 A.2d at 537
 (emphasis in original). Therefore, to excuse non-joinder of necessary parties, Petitioners
 must demonstrate, without resorting to self-serving hearsay declarations, that (1) the non-
 24
 joined party clearly had knowledge of the pending litigation, and (2) the non-joined party
 must have purposefully declined to join the litigation, despite the party’s ability to join.
 Petitioners in this case have not demonstrated sufficient facts to excuse the participation of
 the “other adjacent property owners.”
 Petitioners would have us conclude that their statement in the Amended Complaint,
 that “other adjacent property owners have agreed not to contest the relief sought herein,” is
 sufficient to demonstrate that the “other adjacent property owners” had express knowledge
 of the litigation as well as the ability to join the suit and failure to do so. We decline to do
 so. Petitioners’ conclusory statement implying knowledge of all interested landowners is
 grossly insufficient. As stated by COSA, “[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, although a
 court assumes the truth of a complaint’s factual allegations, the court (1) does not consider
 ‘bald assertions [or] conclusory statements[,]’ Forster [v. State], 426 Md. [565,] 604, 45 A.3d
 180[, 203 (2012)] (citation omitted); and (2) construes against the plaintiff ‘[a]ny . . .
 uncertainty in the [complaint’s factual] allegations[.]’ Shenker [v. Laureate Educ., Inc.], 411
 Md. [317,] 335, 983 A.2d 408[, 418 (2009)].” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 111-12, 75 A.3d at
 1000. Moreover, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s view that Petitioners failed
 to provide names or even the number of additional landowners who would be potentially
 affected by a declaratory judgment regarding an easement over Farm Road. In this case,
 Petitioners clearly failed to establish that the non-joined parties met the MIE exception.
 25
 Because Counts V–XI were dismissed without prejudice, a remand of Counts V–XI to allow
 Petitioners to join the necessary adjacent landowners is proper.
 IV. COUNTS XII AND XIII
 Petitioners assert Counts XII (“wrongful interference with easement rights”) and XIII
 (“slander of title”) of their Amended Complaint against the Commission, MHG, Riggs,
 Brown, and the Areys. On Respondents’ motions, the Circuit Court dismissed Counts XII
 and XIII, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that judgment, on the grounds that the
 causes of action were time-barred pursuant to CJP § 5-101 (“A civil action at law shall be
 filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides
 a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.”) and CJP § 5-105
 (“An action for assault, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it
 accrues.”), respectively. For the reasons we shall explain further in this opinion, we affirm,
 but for different reasons, the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that dismissal was proper
 as to Count XII. We shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment as to Count XIII,
 however, and conclude that dismissal of that count was premature at this stage of the
 litigation.
 Relevant Lower Court Proceedings
 Petitioners’ Count XII alleges “wrongful interference with easement rights” against
 the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown, and the Areys. Petitioners specifically allege that
 they “have and enjoy an easement with respect to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way[,
 26
 and that Respondents] intentionally and purposefully obstructed [Petitioners’] easement and
 interfered with their reasonable enjoyment of their easement rights.” It is undisputed that
 Brown and the Areys owned and developed properties to the north of Petitioners’ properties,
 and that at some point during the development of the Dellabrooke subdivisions, “northern
 access” to Farm Road was eliminated. Accordingly, we can deduce that Count XII arises out
 of the elimination of Petitioners’ alleged easement on the northern side of Petitioners’
 properties.
 Count XIII alleges “slander of title” against the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown,
 and the Areys. In Count XIII, Petitioners allege that “[Respondents] deliberately ignored
 public records referring to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way, and intentionally
 omitted references to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way in creating development
 documents and submitting those documents to the Commission[,]” which were subsequently
 improperly approved by the Commission. By submitting false documents, Petitioners allege,
 Respondents “falsely stated and/or agreed to the intentional false publication of, or
 knowingly facilitated the false publication of, the title history of the land for the area
 covering Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way.” In addition, Petitioners allege that, by
 knowingly approving the false documents, the Commission “falsely stated the title history
 of the land for the area covering Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way and, in doing so,
 maliciously published false words.” Thus, like Count XII, Count XIII arises out of the
 27
 activities surrounding the development and elimination of the alleged easement to the north
 of Petitioners’ properties.
 In their preliminary motions to dismiss pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322, Respondents
 contend that Counts XII and XIII should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds,
 because, where Petitioners admitted that “access to Goldmine Road was cut off either in
 1994 or 2000[,]” and “[i]f [Petitioners] relied on the alleged Farm Road as the sole means
 of northward access to Gold Mine Road, then they would have clearly known of an injury
 upon any attempt to go north on Farm Road through the Dellabrooke subdivision.” The
 Circuit Court granted the motion, concluding that Petitioners “were on inquiry notice, at the
 very least, of the alleged harm because the conservation easement was approved by the
 Commission in 1994 and then Plat 21707 was approved by the Commission August 3, 2000.
 Furthermore, [Petitioners] in their Amended Complaint state that northern access to Farm
 Road was eliminated in 1994, inferring that [Petitioners] may have possessed more than just
 inquiry notice.”
 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that Petitioners
 had at least “inquiry notice” of their claims by 2003 at the latest, and, therefore, the June
 2008 filing in federal court was untimely. Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 115-17, 75 A.3d at
 1002-03. Noting that Petitioners “[did] not allege the date on which Brown allegedly
 ‘eliminated the northern access to Farm Road,’” the court determined that “the Amended
 Complaint implies that Brown’s alleged elimination of northern access to Farm Road
 28
 occurred sometime in or before 2003.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 115, 75 A.3d at 1002.
 Based on that determination, the court therefore “assume[d] that Brown’s alleged elimination
 of northern access to Farm Road occurred sometime in or before 2003 (when the Areys
 allegedly bought the 69 acres).” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 116, 75 A.3d at 1002.
 In conducting its statute of limitations analysis, the Court of Special Appeals relied
 in part on its prior opinion in Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 40 A.3d 435 (2007), which
 involved the same original property and basic facts regarding the development of
 Dellabrooke and the alleged elimination of Farm Road. In that case, Bacon, the appellant
 landowner, brought suit on June 9, 2006 against the Commission, the development group,
 and other property owners asserting his entitlement to an easement over Farm Road, which
 he alleged ran across property he purchased on October 1, 2002. Bacon, 203 Md. App. at
 618, 40 A.3d at 442-43. Bacon “alleged that Farm Road’s access to Gold Mine Road ‘was
 permanently cut’ in 1994, with the initial approval of Brown’s subdivisions, and that
 northward access of Farm Road to Gold Mine Road was prohibited, in 2001, with approval
 of the Dellabrooke subdivisions and the ‘recordation of Plat 21707.’” Bacon, 203 Md. App.
 at 619, 40 A.3d at 443. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissed Bacon’s
 claims, in part, as time-barred. The Court of Special Appeals held that, based on the above
 allegations, Bacon “had knowledge of facts sufficient to constitute, at least, inquiry notice”
 and that by making such allegations, Bacon “acknowledged that he ‘reasonably should have
 known’ or with diligent investigation could have known at the time he purchased the property
 29
 that he could not use Farm Road to access Gold Mine Road.” Bacon, 203 Md. App. at 660-
 61, 40 A.3d at 468. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that his claim
 accrued when he took title to the property on October 1, 2002. Bacon, 203 Md. App. at 663,
 40 A.3d at 469.
 As in Bacon, the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case concluded that the
 alleged elimination of Farm Road provided Petitioners with “inquiry notice that their ability
 to access Farm road was in danger.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 116, 75 A.3d at 1002. In the
 alternative, the court concluded that Petitioners were placed on inquiry notice when the
 Commission approved Plat 21707 on August 3, 2000. Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 116-17, 75
 A.3d at 1002. The court noted, however, that the Bacon decision “depended on the fact
 that—independent of what was in the plaintiff’s chain of title—the plaintiff was on inquiry
 notice because of the alleged elimination of northern access to Farm Road.” Rounds, 214
 Md. App. at 116 n.17, 75 A.3d at 1002 n.17. Therefore, the court concluded, “after Brown’s
 alleged elimination of northern access to Farm Road—as well as the Commission’s approval
 of Plat 21707—[Petitioners] should have discovered their injury through the exercise of due
 diligence.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 116-17, 75 A.3d at 1003 (citation and quotation
 omitted). In other words, the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion relied on inferences or
 assumptions that Petitioners had knowledge of facts that should have put them on inquiry
 notice. For the reasons explained below, we shall conclude that such inferences and
 30
 conclusions were not clear from the allegations of fact on the face of the Amended
 Complaint.
 Parties’ Contentions
 Petitioners ultimately rely on the discovery rule to contend that they did not discover,
 and had no reason to know of, their injury until the denial of addresses by the Commission
 in November 2007. Specifically, Petitioners insist that it was not until the Commission
 denied their request for addresses that “it came to light that [Respondents], working together,
 effectively erased Farm Road and its ten-foot right-of-way from the books, providing the
 Commission with an unfounded justification to deny [Petitioners] residential addresses.” In
 other words, Petitioners maintain that their claims accrued in November 2007. Respondents
 argue that Petitioners had at least inquiry notice, if not actual notice, of any possible claim
 by 2003 at the latest, based not on chain-of-title notice but “by virtue of the open
 development of Dellabrooke since 1994” and the undisputed elimination of northern access
 to Farm Road. Respondents MHG and Riggs note that the Court of Special Appeals in
 Bacon looked at the “totality of the facts, including the development of Dellabrooke,
 undisputed obstruction of the road, recording of the initial plat in 1994 and the recording of
 Record Plat 21707 [in] 2001.” Like in Bacon, Respondents contend, all of those facts as
 alleged by Petitioners in this case, when taken together, demonstrate sufficient notice that any
 right to use Farm Road was being challenged at some point prior to 2003.
 Statute of Limitations
 31
 For any statute of limitations analysis, the operative date is the date that a claim
 accrues. Generally, a claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers the actionable harm. The
 “discovery rule” is an exception to this general rule, and operates to “toll[] the accrual date
 of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury, or
 should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence.” Poole v. Coakley &
 Williams Const., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 131, 31 A.3d 212, 236 (2011) (quotation omitted).
 Simply put, the discovery rule provides that a “cause of action accrues when the claimant in
 fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong.” Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md.
 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (holding the discovery rule to be generally applicable).
 For purposes of the discovery rule, depending on the circumstances, “inquiry notice” is
 sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. “[I]nquiry notice ‘means having knowledge
 of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiffs to
 undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to
 knowledge of the alleged [cause of action].’” Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 408
 Md. 539, 562, 971 A.2d 214, 228 (2009) (quoting O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 302, 503
 A.2d 1313, 1324 (1986)). In other words, under the discovery rule, “notice of facts . . . is the
 trigger for commencement of the limitations period.” Halle Dev., Inc., 305 Md. at 565, 971
 A.2d at 229. Thus, unlike the general rule, which depends on when the injury occurred,
 32
 when we apply the discovery rule, the focus is on when the plaintiff discovered facts which
 provide notice of the injury.19
 In this case, Respondents raised the statute of limitations defense in a preliminary
 motion to dismiss pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322. It is well settled that “a motion to dismiss
 ordinarily should not be granted by a trial court based on the assertion that the cause of action
 is barred by the statute of limitations unless it is clear from the facts and allegations on the
 face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run.” Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the
 Environment, 434 Md. 623, 641, 76 A.3d 1076, 1086 (2013). See also Antigua Condo. Ass’n
 v. Melba Investors Atl., Inc., 307 Md. 700, 711 n.5, 517 A.2d 75, 80 n.5 (1986) (noting that
 “if correct, the defense of limitations clearly appeared from the face of the complaint and the
 defense could properly be raised by a motion to dismiss under Md. Rule 2–322(b).”); Desser
 v. Woods, 266 Md. 696, 703, 296 A.2d 586, 591 (1972) (“It is well settled that the defenses
 of the bar of the statute of limitations and of laches may only be availed of by demurrer to
 a bill of complaint when they appear on the face of the bill of complaint, itself, and other
 matters not so appearing cannot be considered in determining whether or not these defenses
 are a bar to the alleged cause of action.”). Accordingly, our review is limited “to the universe
 19
 Essentially, the Court of Special Appeals concluded in this case that Petitioners
 were on “inquiry notice” of their claims at the time that northern access to Farm Road was
 allegedly eliminated (i.e., sometime between 1994 and 2003). In reaching this conclusion,
 the intermediate appellate court did not rely on or specify any facts or allegations relating to
 when Petitioners knew that northen access to Farm Road had been eliminated, or knew of
 facts which would cause a reasonable person to conduct further investigation, which would
 have revealed the elimination of northern access to Farm Road. Rather, the Court of Special
 Appeals focused on when Petitioners alleged that the elimination (the injury) occurred.
 33
 of the facts and allegations contained in [the Amended Complaint]” and all reasonable
 inferences drawn in the light most favorable to Petitioners. Litz, 434 Md. at 642, 76 A.3d
 at1087.
 The allegations relevant to Counts XII and XIII contained in Petitioners’ Amended
 Complaint read as follows:
 1. Farm Road runs in a north-south direction through the center of the Gilpin
 Tract. It begins at Goldmine Road to the north and runs south to Brooke Road.
 2. Use of Farm Road continued until such time as residents were openly
 discouraged and then prevented from traversing the northern portion of Farm
 Road that traversed the Dellabrooke property.
 3. [Plaintiffs’] Properties sit directly along Farm Road, which has provided the
 only means of ingress and egress to those properties for more than one hundred
 years.
 4. “In or around 1994, Defendant Brown, a real estate developer, began
 developing the area around Farm Road into subdivisions of luxury, single-
 family homes. . . . Development and sale of lots as the subdivision continued
 through the late 1990s and 2000s.”
 5. “As part of his development efforts, Brown eliminated the northern access
 to Farm Road from Goldmine Road. In addition, Brown created a fictional
 “conservation easement” . . . and included it in subdivision plans submitted to
 the Commission.”
 6. “Plat 21707 which the Commission approved on August 3, 2000, falsely
 omits any reference to Farm Road or to the 10 Foot Right-of-Way. Moreover,
 Plat 21707 includes the fictional ‘conservation easement’ over parts of Farm
 Road.”
 7. “In or around 2003, the Areys purchased 69 acres of the fictional
 ‘conservation easement’ . . . from Brown for purposes of developing the
 property.”
 34
 8. “On information and belief, defendants the Areys, even before their
 purchase of the 69 acres, worked behind the scenes with Brown to develop
 ‘Dellabrooke’ and ‘Dellabrook Forest,’ to cut off the northern access to Farm
 Road, and to eliminate Farm Road entirely[.]”
 9. “Brown, the Areys and MHG were able to take advantage of the dense
 forest surround [sic] the northern part of Farm Road to keep Plaintiffs from
 knowing about their elimination of Farm Road.”
 10. “As a result of the Commission’s knowingly wrongful approval of
 Brown’s, MHG’s and Riggs’s false submissions, (1) the ‘Dellabrooke’
 subdivision was built over the northern entrance to Farm Road, severing the
 road’s access point from Goldmine Road, and (2) a fictional conservation
 easement was recorded in the Commission’s records that overlay parts of Farm
 Road, further severing the Plaintiffs’ access to Goldmine Road.”
 11. “Only upon [Mr. Rounds’] November 2007 attempts to obtain addresses
 from the Commission did Plaintiffs learn of Defendants’ wrongful acts.”
 Absent from these factual allegations is the date on which Petitioners became aware
 of the elimination of northern access to Farm Road.20 Indeed, Petitioners claimed that they
 did not become aware of their injury or “[Respondents’] wrongful acts” until 2007. In
 addition, we note that the allegations do not describe how the alleged elimination of Farm
 Road occurred (much less whether the elimination involved any physical barrier that was in
 plain view of Petitioners, which might have put them on notice of their injury). Likewise,
 there is no allegation regarding any notice to Petitioners regarding the Commission’s
 20
 One would normally expect this issue to be explored if a motion for summary
 judgment were filed and considered. In this case, however, the issues are raised by a motion
 to dismiss and thus our review is limited to the four corners of the Amended Complaint and
 any reasonable and permissible inferences drawn from the allegations in a light most
 favorable to the non-moving party.
 35
 recording of Plat 21707.21 What is clear is that the allegations contained in the Amended
 Complaint, to which our review is limited, do not include any facts known by Petitioners,
 prior to 2007, which would have put them on notice, inquiry or otherwise, of their claims
 relating to the elimination of northern access to Farm Road.
 “We have held consistently that ‘the question of accrual in § 5-101 is left to judicial
 determination,’ unless the determination rests on the resolution of disputed facts regarding
 discovery of the wrong.” Poole, 423 Md. at 131, 31 A.2d at 236 (quoting Frederick Rd. Ltd.
 P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000)). Accordingly, where
 it is unclear from the facts and allegations on the face of the Amended Complaint what
 Petitioners knew and when they knew it, the question of accrual rests on a determination of
 fact. This is a question appropriate for the fact finder, not the appellate court. See Litz, 434
 Md. at 641, 76 A.3d at 1086 (“When it is necessary to make a factual determination to
 identify the date of accrual, however, those factual determinations are generally made by the
 trier of fact, and not decided by the court as a matter of law.”). Based on our review of the
 21
 We also reject the Court of Special Appeals’s alternative conclusion that “the
 Commission’s approval of Plat 21707 on August 3, 2000, put [Petitioners] on inquiry notice
 that their ability to access Farm Road was in danger.” Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 116, 75 A.3d
 at 1002. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not explain under what theory the
 recording of Plat 21707 would provide notice to Petitioners, we point out for sake of
 completeness that “constructive notice from the land records, in and of itself, does not
 constitute the requisite knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put the plaintiff on
 inquiry.” Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 638, 431 A.2d 677, 681 (1981) (Rodowsky,
 J., concurring). Moreover, we reiterate our conclusion in Poffenberger that “the discovery
 rule contemplates actual knowledge – that is express cognition, or awareness implied from
 knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on
 inquiry[.]” 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681 (majority opinion).
 36
 Amended Complaint, we conclude that Petitioners alleged facts sufficient to survive a
 preliminary motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. Therefore, dismissal was premature.
 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
 The Circuit Court also concluded that, even if the date of accrual was not until
 November 2007, Count XII (“wrongful elimination of easement rights”) was time-barred in
 any event because Count XII was not included in the initial federal court case. Rather, Count
 XII was first made a part of the state court complaint filed in 2011, more than three years
 after the latest possible accrual date. The Circuit Court declined to accept Petitioners’
 argument that Count XII would relate back to the initial filing in federal court because,
 although it was a different legal theory, it arose out of the same facts. Although the Court
 of Special Appeals did not address this question, because it held that both claims were time-
 barred based on the date of accrual, when the trial court gives an alternate ground for a
 conclusion, it is reasonable for the appellate court to review it for legal correctness. See
 Bailiff v. Woolman, 169 Md. App. 646, 653, 906 A.2d 409, 414 (2006) (“We still must satisfy
 ourselves . . . that the alternative holding is indeed the one that . . . would legally constitute
 a freestanding basis in support of the trial court’s decision.”) (internal quotation marks
 omitted). Therefore, we shall provide guidance on this point in anticipation of remand.
 The Circuit Court concluded that “since [Petitioners] did not specifically assert a
 claim for wrongful interference in the federal district court case, the statute of limitations will
 not date back to or be tolled from the filing of the district court case.” This conclusion was
 37
 based on the Circuit Court’s interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
 (“supplemental jurisdiction”). We have explained:
 [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(d) serves to suspend the running of a State statute of
 limitations from the time the State-law claim is filed in U.S. District Court
 until 30 days after (1) a final judgment is entered by the U.S. District Court
 dismissing the pendant State-law claims, or (2) if an appeal is noted from that
 judgment, issuance of an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals dismissing the
 appeal or a mandate affirming the dismissal of those claims by the District
 Court.
 Turner v. Knight, 406 Md. 167, 189, 957 A.2d 984, 996 (2008). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
 provides:
 The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for
 any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same
 time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
 while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed
 unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
 The Circuit Court in this case concluded that “‘[a]sserted’ under § 1367(d) is not read
 broadly to include state law claims not expressly asserted in the federal complaint, despite
 the fact that the state complaint may contain the same facts.” At least one other state court
 has agreed with this conclusion. In Rester v. McWane, Inc., 962 So. 2d 183 (Ala. 2007),
 cited by the Circuit Court in this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that “[u]nder 28
 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for state-law claims is tolled only when a party
 seeks to refile in the state court the same state-law claims the party asserted in the federal
 court.” 962 So. 2d at 186. United States District Courts have held similarly. See In re
 Vertrue Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d 703, 721 (N.D. Ohio 2010) aff’d sub
 38
 nom. In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[O]nly
 those state law claims actually asserted in [the federal case] are subject to statutory tolling
 [under § 1367(d).]”).
 Petitioners rely on a Kansas appellate court case in support of their position.
 Specifically, they point to where the Kansas Court of Appeals stated that where “[p]laintiffs
 filed their petition . . . within the 30-day window created by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) . . . any
 theories of state law liability fairly within the notice provided to Brown County in the federal
 complaint should be treated as timely for limitations purposes.” Estate of Belden v. Brown
 Cnty., 261 P.3d 943, 975 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). The Kansas case is inapposite, however.
 The plaintiffs in Belden first filed suit in federal court alleging both constitutional and state-
 law claims against Brown County, through its board of commissioners, individual
 commissioners, the county sheriff, and several jail employees, resulting from the death of
 Belden while he was incarcerated in a county jail. Id. at 950. Following dismissal by the
 federal court, the plaintiffs refiled their state-law claims in a new case in state court within
 the 30 day time period provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Id. at 975. In the state court, the
 county argued that it could not be held vicariously liable based on the statute of limitations,
 because the “[p]laintiffs did not include a specific assertion of vicarious liability in their
 federal court complaint.” Id. at 974. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the county
 “fail[ed] on its statute of limitations argument because [p]laintiffs’ federal complaint
 provided sufficient notice to the [c]ounty that it faced vicarious liability for the alleged
 39
 negligence of various Sheriff’s Department employees.” Id. at 975. The court specifically
 rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that a vicarious liability theory would “relate back” to the
 filing of the federal case. Id. at 974. Thus, the court’s conclusion rested on the fact that the
 plaintiffs had adequately asserted claims for liability against the county as an employer, even
 though in the original federal complaint the plaintiffs had not used the words “respondeat
 superior” or “vicarious liability.” Id. at 974-75.
 Unlike the Kansas case, where the plaintiffs simply refined their state law claims, the
 Petitioners in this case asserted an entirely new cause of action for wrongful interference with
 easement rights. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), “in order to benefit from tolling, the claim must
 have been expressly asserted in federal court.” In re Vertrue Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
 712 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22 (holding that “only the state law claims . . . which were expressly
 alleged [in the prior federal suit] may be tolled”). Accordingly, where Petitioners failed to
 assert a claim for wrongful interference with easement rights in their federal suit, and did not
 file their state suit including the wrongful interference claim until more than four years after
 the latest possible accrual date, that claim is barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore
 affirm the dismissal of Count XII.
 MHG & Riggs
 As an alternate ground for dismissing Counts XII and XIII against MHG and Riggs,
 the Circuit Court concluded that MHG and Riggs owed no duty of care to Petitioners and
 therefore could not be liable to Petitioners for their wrongful interference with easement
 40
 rights or slander of title claims. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not address this
 issue, because it affirmed dismissal of Counts XII and XIII on other grounds, as we stated
 above, we shall review the alternate ground for the trial court’s decision to provide guidance
 in anticipation of remand. As we have affirmed the dismissal of Count XII on the basis of
 limitations, we shall focus solely on Count XIII (“slander of title”).
 In reaching its decision, the Circuit Court relied on Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Assocs.,
 Inc., 57 Md. App. 467, 470 A.2d 838 (1984). In Carlotta, the plaintiffs brought suit against
 adjacent landowners for continuing trespass, and against the adjacent landowners’ surveyor
 for aiding and abetting the landowners “by negligently preparing an erroneous survey plat
 of the disputed property boundary.” 57 Md. App. at 469, 470 A.2d at 838. The trial court
 sustained the surveyor’s demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. Carlotta, 57 Md.
 App. at 469, 470 A.2d at 838-39. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that “a
 surveyor of a disputed boundary line does not owe a duty of care to a non-reliant third party
 adjacent landowner.” Carlotta, 57 Md. App. at 472, 470 A.2d at 840.
 Carlotta is inapposite to the instant case, however, because it involved a claim
 sounding in negligence, in which the plaintiff was required to prove the predicate duty of
 care. See also Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md. App. 606, 664, 40 A.3d 435, 470 (2012) (quoting Doe
 v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407, 414, 879 A.2d 1088, 1092 (2005)) (“There can
 be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty
 that one person owes to another.”). Conversely, in this case, Petitioners’ Count XIII alleges
 41
 an action for intentional slander of title. Petitioners have alleged no duty of care or any
 breach thereof on the part of Respondents, and there is no contention by Respondents that
 duty of care or breach thereof is an element of a claim for slander of title.
 As we have stated, our review at the motion to dismiss stage is limited to whether
 Petitioners pled sufficient facts to support a claim. To support a claim for slander of title, a
 plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show (1) a false statement, (2) that the false statement
 was communicated to someone else (publication), (3) malice, and (4) special damages. See
 Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 607-09, 291 A.2d 37, 49 (1972) (quoting Prosser, Law of
 Torts (4th ed. 1971)). See also Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 298 Md. 611, 625,
 471 A.2d 735, 742 (1984) (“Special damages are those which result in a pecuniary loss
 directly or immediately from the conduct of third persons.”). In the Amended Complaint,
 Petitioners allege that MHG and Riggs engaged in wrongful and intentional conduct, which
 subsequently caused them injury. Essentially, Petitioners in this case allege that MHG and
 Riggs were involved with Brown and the Areys in a scheme to erase Farm Road. Petitioners
 specifically set forth facts related to the alleged falsity of the survey documents, and that
 MHG and Riggs had knowledge of the falsity when the documents were created and
 submitted to the Commission. Petitioners allege that the false survey documents were
 submitted to and approved by the Commission, and filed in the land records. Finally,
 Petitioners allege that the publication of the false surveys has affected the marketability of
 their title, such that they have been unable to list their properties for sale, thus alleging
 42
 pecuniary damages. We conclude that these allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to
 dismiss on grounds that MHG and Riggs owed no duty of care to Petitioners.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
 AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
 CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
 DIRECTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE
 CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
 FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
 THIS OPINION. THE PARTIES TO ABIDE THEIR
 COSTS.
 43


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN
 Bryssel den 26.11.2020
 COM(2020) 759 final
 2020/0336(NLE)
 Förslag till
 RÅDETS BESLUT
 om den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i transportgemenskapens regionala styrkommitté vad gäller antagandet av transportgemenskapens budget för 2021
 MOTIVERING
 1.Fråga som behandlas i förslaget
 Detta förslag avser beslutet om fastställande av den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar i den regionala styrkommitté som inrättas genom fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap (nedan kallat fördraget om en transportgemenskap) i anslutning till det planerade antagandet av ett beslut om en budget för transportgemenskapen för 2021.
 2.Bakgrund till förslaget
 2.1.Fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap
 Fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap (nedan kallat avtalet) syftar till att skapa en transportgemenskap som omfattar vägtransporter, järnväg, inre vattenvägar och sjöfart, liksom att utveckla transportnätet mellan Europeiska unionen och de sydösteuropeiska parterna. Avtalet trädde i kraft den 1 maj 2019.
 Europeiska unionen är part i avtalet
 1
 .
 2.2.Den regionala styrkommittén
 Den regionala styrkommittén inrättas genom artikel 24 i avtalet. Den ansvarar för förvaltningen av avtalet och säkerställer att det genomförs på korrekt sätt. För detta ändamål utfärdar den rekommendationer och fattar beslut i de ärenden som anges i avtalet. Den regionala styrkommittén
 a)förbereder arbetet i ministerrådet,
 b)fattar beslut om inrättande av tekniska kommittéer,
 c)vidtar, när det gäller EU:s nyligen antagna akter, lämpliga åtgärder, framför allt genom översynen av bilaga I till avtalet,
 d)utnämner det ständiga sekretariatets direktör efter samråd med ministerrådet,
 e)får utse en eller flera biträdande direktörer för det ständiga sekretariatet,
 f)fastställer bestämmelserna för det ständiga sekretariatet,
 g)får, genom ett beslut, granska nivån på budgetanslagen,
 h)antar transportgemenskapens årliga budget,
 i)antar ett beslut som fastställer förfarandet för genomförandet av budgeten och för redovisning och revision av konton och för tillsyn,
 j)fattar beslut i tvister som lagts fram av de fördragsslutande parterna,
 k)antar allmänna principer på området för tillgång till handlingar, med avseende på handlingar hos organ som inrättats genom, eller i enlighet med, avtalet,
 l)antar årliga rapporter till ministerrådet om genomförandet av det övergripande nätet,
 m)fastställer, med avseende på vissa unionsakter, tidsfrister och metoder för de sydösteuropeiska parternas införlivande.
 Den regionala styrkommittén består av en företrädare och en suppleant från var och en av de fördragsslutande parterna. Alla EU-medlemsstater ska kunna delta som observatörer.
 Den regionala styrkommittén fattar beslut enhälligt.
 2.3.Den planerade akten för den regionala styrkommittén
 Under 2021, vid sin första session/sitt första möte, ska den regionala styrkommittén anta ett beslut om transportgemenskapens budget för 2021 (nedan kallad den planerade akten).
 Syftet med den planerade akten är att fastställa transportgemenskapens årliga budget för 2021.
 Den planerade akten kommer att vara bindande för parterna i enlighet med artikel 25.1 i avtalet där följande anges: ”Ett beslut i den regionala styrkommittén ska vara bindande för de fördragsslutande parterna. Om ett beslut i den regionala styrkommittén omfattar krav på att en fördragsslutande part ska vidta åtgärder, ska parten vidta de åtgärder som är nödvändiga och underrätta den regionala styrkommittén om detta.”.
 3.Den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar
 Bidraget till transportgemenskapens budget anges i bilaga V till avtalet. Unionens andel uppgår till 80 % av budgeten, medan återstående 20 % ska tillhandahållas av parterna på västra Balkan.
 För 2020 uppgick budgeten till totalt 3 miljoner euro varav 2,4 miljoner euro (80 %) kom från EU och 0,6 miljoner euro från parterna på västra Balkan.
 För 2021 föreslås budgeten öka till 3,525 miljoner euro, av vilka 0,225 miljoner euro kommer att föras över från budgeten för 2020. 80 % av de nya anslagen ska komma från EU (2,640 miljoner euro)
 2
 och de återstående 20 % av de nya anslagen (0,66 miljoner euro) från de sydösteuropeiska parterna.
 Detta belopp ska täcka de löpande kostnaderna för det ständiga sekretariatet och anordnandet av mötena i transportgemenskapens olika organ. Den föreslagna ökningen motiveras av den kommande rekryteringen av ytterligare personal, de planerade tätare mötena i de tekniska kommittéerna, inköpet av it-utrustning och programvara samt de planerade tätare resorna för direktören och tjänstemännen vid det ständiga sekretariatet. 2021 förväntas bli det första året då det ständiga sekretariatet har normal verksamhet, med all ledningspersonal och annan personal på plats, samt den viktigaste administrativa ramen i kraft. Enligt bilaga I till huvudkontorsavtalet mellan transportgemenskapen och värdlandet Serbien ska Serbien tillhandahålla det permanenta sekretariatets kontorslokaler och en del av den utrustning och de tjänster som är kopplade till kontoren (möbler, säkerhet, elektricitet, vatten och städning) kostnadsfritt.
 Antagandet av detta beslut av den regionala styrkommittén är nödvändigt för genomförandet av avtalet och för det ständiga sekretariatets verksamhet.
 4.Rättslig grund
 4.1.Förfarandemässig rättslig grund
 4.1.1.Principer
 I artikel 218.9 i fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (nedan kallat EUF-fördraget) föreskrivs att beslut ska antas ”om fastställande av vilka ståndpunkter som på unionens vägnar ska intas i ett organ som inrättas genom ett avtal, om detta organ ska anta akter med rättslig verkan, med undantag av sådana akter som kompletterar eller ändrar avtalets institutionella ram.”.
 Begreppet ”akter med rättslig verkan” omfattar akter som har rättslig verkan med stöd av de regler i internationell rätt som tillämpas på organet i fråga. Det omfattar även instrument som inte har bindande verkan enligt internationell rätt, men som är ”ägnade att på ett avgörande sätt påverka innehållet i de bestämmelser som antas av unionslagstiftaren”
 3
 .
 4.1.2.Tillämpning i det aktuella fallet
 Tillämpning i det aktuella fallet
 Den regionala styrkommittén är ett organ som inrättas genom ett avtal, nämligen fördraget om en transportgemenskap.
 Den akt som ska antas av den regionala styrkommittén utgör en akt med rättslig verkan. I enlighet med artikel 35 i fördraget om en transportgemenskap har den regionala styrkommittén befogenhet att anta transportgemenskapens budget och detta beslut är bindande för parterna i fördraget om en transportgemenskap. På grund av sin natur och till följd av den internationella rätt som reglerar den regionala styrkommittén, innehåller denna akt inslag som påverkar den rättsliga ställningen för parterna i fördraget om en transportgemenskap och därmed även för unionen. Den måste därför anses ha rättslig verkan. Den planerade akten varken kompletterar eller ändrar den institutionella ramen för fördraget om en transportgemenskap. Den förfarandemässiga rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet är därför artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget.
 4.2.Materiell rättslig grund
 4.2.1.Principer
 Den materiella rättsliga grunden för ett beslut enligt artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget är främst beroende av syftet med och innehållet i den planerade akt avseende vilken en ståndpunkt intas på unionens vägnar. Om den planerade akten har två syften eller två beståndsdelar av vilka det ena syftet eller den ena beståndsdelen kan identifieras som det eller den huvudsakliga, medan det eller den andra endast är av underordnad betydelse, måste det beslut som antas enligt artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget ha en enda materiell rättslig grund, nämligen den som krävs med hänsyn till det huvudsakliga eller avgörande syftet eller den huvudsakliga eller avgörande beståndsdelen.
 4.2.2.Tillämpning i det aktuella fallet
 Den planerade akten är nödvändig för att fördraget om en transportgemenskap ska fungera väl. Fördraget om en transportgemenskap eftersträvar i sin tur flera syften och har beståndsdelar på området väg, järnväg och inre vattenvägar, vilka är transportslag som omfattas av artikel 91 i EUF-fördraget, samt på området sjötransport, ett transportslag som omfattas av artikel 100.2 i EUF-fördraget. Till följd av sin övergripande natur berör den planerade akten alla dessa aspekter. Alla dessa aspekter är oskiljaktigt förbundna med varandra, utan att den ena är underordnad i förhållande till den andra.
 Den materiella rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet omfattar därför följande bestämmelser: artiklarna 91 och 100.2 i EUF-fördraget.
 4.3.Slutsats
 Den rättsliga grunden för det föreslagna beslutet bör vara artiklarna 91 och 100.2 jämförda med artikel 218.9 i EUF-fördraget.
 5.Offentliggörande av den planerade akten
 I enlighet med artikel 25.2 i fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap ska den regionala styrkommitténs beslut offentliggöras i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
 2020/0336 (NLE)
 Förslag till
 RÅDETS BESLUT
 om den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i transportgemenskapens regionala styrkommitté vad gäller antagandet av transportgemenskapens budget för 2021
 EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT
 med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt, särskilt artiklarna 91 och 100.2 jämförda med artikel 218.9,
 med beaktande av Europeiska kommissionens förslag, och
 av följande skäl:
 1)Fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap (nedan kallat fördraget om en transportgemenskap) undertecknades av unionen i enlighet med rådets beslut (EU) 2017/1937
 4
 . Det godkändes på Europeiska unionens vägnar den 4 mars 2019 genom rådets beslut (EU) 2019/392
 5
 . Det trädde i kraft den 1 maj 2019.
 2)Enligt artikel 35 i avtalet ska transportgemenskapens regionala styrkommitté (nedan kallad styrkommittén) varje år anta transportgemenskapens budget. Enligt samma bestämmelse har styrkommittén befogenhet att anta beslut som specificerar förfarandet för genomförandet av budgeten.
 3)Styrkommittén ska vid sitt möte i december 2020 anta ett beslut om transportgemenskapens budget för 2021, eller om punkten inte behandlas under detta möte kommer antagandet att planeras för nästa möte.
 4)Transportgemenskapens föreslagna budget för 2021 är nödvändig för att transportgemenskapens organ ska fungera väl. Den täcker kostnader för personal, resor, it-utrustning och programvara samt löpande utgifter för t.ex. studier, tekniskt stöd och anordnande av konferenser och möten.
 5)Det är lämpligt att fastställa den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar i styrkommittén, eftersom ett sådant beslut är nödvändigt för att transportgemenskapens ständiga sekretariat ska kunna fullgöra sin funktion och kommer att ha rättslig verkan gentemot unionen.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Den ståndpunkt som ska intas på unionens vägnar i transportgemenskapens regionala styrkommitté vad gäller transportgemenskapens budget för 2021 ska grundas på det utkast till beslut av den regionala styrkommittén som åtföljer det här beslutet.
 Artikel 2
 Detta beslut riktar sig till kommissionen.
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den
 På rådets vägnar
 Ordförande
 (1)
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2017/1937 av den 11 juli 2017 om undertecknande på Europeiska unionens vägnar och om provisorisk tillämpning av fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap, EUT L 278, 27.10.2017, s. 1.
 (2)
 Kommissionens genomförandebeslut av den 25 juli 2020, C(2020) 4356.
 (3)
 Domstolens dom av den 7 oktober 2014, Tyskland/rådet, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, punkt 61.
 (4)
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2017/1937 av den 11 juli 2017 om undertecknande på Europeiska unionens vägnar och om provisorisk tillämpning av fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap (EUT L 278, 27.10.2017, s. 1).
 (5)
 Rådets beslut (EU) 2019/392 av den 4 mars 2019 om ingående på Europeiska unionens vägnar av fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap.
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN
 Bryssel den 26.11.2020
 COM(2020) 759 final
 BILAGA
 till
 förslag till rådets beslut
 om den ståndpunkt som ska intas på Europeiska unionens vägnar i transportgemenskapens regionala styrkommitté vad gäller antagandet av transportgemenskapens budget för 2021
 BILAGA I
 UTKAST TILL
 BESLUT nr / 2020
 AV TRANSPORTGEMENSKAPENS REGIONALA STYRKOMMITTÉ
 av den...
 om antagande av transportgemenskapens budget för år 2021
 TRANSPORTGEMENSKAPENS REGIONALA STYRKOMMITTÉ BESLUTAT FÖLJANDE
 med beaktande av fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap, särskilt artiklarna 24.1 och 35.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Transportgemenskapens budget för år 2021, som åtföljer detta beslut, antas härmed.
 Artikel 2
 (1)I enlighet med artikel 10.1 i de finansiella reglerna och revisionsförfarandena för transportgemenskapen får anslag i en viss budgetpost i 2021 års budget användas för ändamål som hänför sig till en annan budgetpost, upp till ett totalt belopp på 10 % av anslagen i den tidigare budgetposten. Detta ska inte gälla för budgetposten för personalresurser.
 (2)Anslag som överförts för att täcka åtaganden som undertecknats i slutet av 2020 såsom anges i den bifogade budgeten ska inte berättiga till det utnyttjande som avses i första stycket. De ska inte beaktas vid fastställandet av det högsta belopp som motsvarar den gräns på 10 % som anges där.
 Artikel 3
 (3)Anslag för vilka inga åtaganden gjorts vid utgången av budgetåren 2019 och 2020 ska förfalla och betalas tillbaka till parterna i enlighet med de procentsatser som fastställs i bilaga V till fördraget om upprättande av en transportgemenskap och de faktiska bidrag som betalats.
 Utfärdat i ... den ... 2020
 På den regionala styrkommitténs vägnar
 Ordförande
 TRANSPORTGEMENSKAPENS BUDGET FÖR ÅR 2021
 Budgetrubrik
 Belopp
 (euro)
 1.Ständiga sekretariatet
 1.1. Personalresurser
 1 465 706
 1.2. Resekostnader
 237 600
 1.3. Kontorskostnader, utrustning och programvara
 403 080
 -Varav nya anslag
 308 080
 -Varav överförda budgetanslag motsvarande åtaganden som undertecknats i slutet av 2020 för vilka betalningar ska göras under 2021
 95 000
 1
 1.4. Övriga kostnader och tjänster, inklusive följande:
 - Utkontrakterade tjänster och andra tjänster (revision, synlighet, personalutbildning, bankavgifter)
 - Möte & Konferenskostnader
 - Kostnader för informationsteknik och kommunikation
 - Rekryteringskostnader
 262 890
 1.5. STUDIER, tekniskt stöd för att stödja genomförandet av EU:s regelverk och handlingsplaner
 690 000
 -Varav nya anslag
 560 000
 -Varav överförda budgetanslag motsvarande åtaganden som undertecknats i slutet av 2020 för vilka betalningar ska göras under 2021
 130 000
 2
 2.Ministerrådet
 2.1. Möte & Konferenskostnader
 60 000
 3.Den regionala styrkommittén
 3.1. Möte & Konferenskostnader
 25 450
 4.Tekniska kommittéer
 4.1. Möte & Konferenskostnader
 114 100
 5.Socialt forum
 5.1. Möte & Konferenskostnader
 16 300
 Reserv (cirka 8 % av de nya anslagen)
 249 874
 Totala nya anslag
 3 300 000
 Totala överförda anslag från 2020
 225 000
 3
 Sammanlagt totalt
 3 525 000
 4
 EU-bidrag (80 % av de nya anslagen)
 2 640 000
 Sydösteuropeiska parters bidrag (20 % av de nya anslagen, i bilaga V till fördraget om en transportgemenskap anges fördelningen per land)
 660 000
 (1)
 Vägledande belopp: upphandlingsförfaranden pågår för programvara för videokonferenser och redovisning/personalfrågor, kontrakt förväntas undertecknas i december 2020.
 (2)
 Vägledande belopp: upphandlingsförfaranden pågår för tekniskt bistånd avseende ett transportobservatorium, kontrakt förväntas undertecknas i december 2020.
 (3)
 Vägledande belopp, slutligt belopp ska bekräftas i december 2020 efter avslutandet av motsvarande upphandlingsförfaranden och undertecknande av kontrakt.
 (4)
 Vägledande belopp, slutligt belopp ska bekräftas när det totala överförda beloppet från 2020 kommer att vara känt.