text:
 7.8.2019
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 207/3
 FORDÍTÁS
 MEGÁLLAPODÁS
 Az Európai Unió és a Jordán Hásimita Királyság között a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak az Európai Unió válságkezelési műveleteiben való részvétele kereteinek meghatározásáról
 AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ (a továbbiakban: az Unió vagy az EU),
 egyrészről, valamint
 A JORDÁN HÁSIMITA KIRÁLYSÁG,
 másrészről,
 a továbbiakban együttesen: a Felek,
 MIVEL:
 (1)
 Az Unió közös biztonság- és védelempolitikájának keretében válságkezelési műveleteket indíthat, amelyek magukban foglalhatják többek között – az Európai Unió Tanácsának (a továbbiakban: a Tanács) határozata alapján – az Európai Unióról szóló szerződés 42. cikkének (1) bekezdésében és 43. cikkének (1) bekezdésében meghatározott feladatokat.
 A KÖVETKEZŐKBEN ÁLLAPODTAK MEG:
 I. SZAKASZ
 ÁLTALÁNOS RENDELKEZÉSEK
 1. cikk
 A részvételre vonatkozó határozatok
 (1) Az Unió arra vonatkozó határozatát követően, hogy felkéri a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot egy uniós válságkezelési műveletben való részvételre, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság e megállapodás végrehajtása keretében tájékoztatja az Uniót a részvételre vonatkozóan az illetékes hatósága által hozott határozatról és egyben a felajánlott hozzájárulásáról.
 (2) Az Unió a felajánlott hozzájárulás értékelését a Jordán Hásimita Királysággal egyeztetve végzi el.
 (3) Az Unió a lehető leghamarabb értesíti a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot a művelet közös költségeihez való várható hozzájárulásról annak érdekében, hogy segítséget nyújtson a Jordán Hásimita Királyság számára a felajánlásának kidolgozásához.
 (4) Az Unió írásban közli a Jordán Hásimita Királysággal a tervezett hozzájárulás értékelésének eredményét és a hozzájárulásra vonatkozó határozatát annak érdekében, hogy e megállapodás rendelkezéseivel összhangban biztosítsa a Jordán Hásimita Királyság részvételét.
 (5) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság által az (1) bekezdés szerint tett felajánlás és annak az Unió általi, (4) bekezdés szerinti elfogadása képezi e megállapodás alkalmazásának alapját az egyes konkrét válságkezelési műveletek vonatkozásában.
 (6) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság saját kezdeményezésére vagy az Uniótól kapott felkérés alapján, a Felek közötti konzultációkat követően bármikor visszaléphet – teljesen vagy részben – az uniós válságkezelési műveletben való részvételtől.
 2. cikk
 Keretrendszer
 (1) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság e megállapodás rendelkezéseivel és bármely egyéb előírt végrehajtási rendelkezéssel összhangban csatlakozik ahhoz a vonatkozó tanácsi határozathoz, amellyel a Tanács arról határoz, hogy az Unió válságkezelési műveletet hajt végre, valamint bármely egyéb olyan határozathoz, amellyel a Tanács az uniós válságkezelési művelet kiterjesztéséről határoz.
 (2) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság valamely uniós válságkezelési művelethez való hozzájárulása nem sértheti az Unió döntéshozatali autonómiáját.
 3. cikk
 A Jordán Hásimita Királyság állományának és haderejének jogállása
 (1) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság által valamely uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez kirendelt állomány és/vagy valamely uniós katonai válságkezelési művelethez általa biztosított haderők jogállására az Unió és a művelet végrehajtásának helyszínéül szolgáló állam(ok) közötti, a haderők/a misszió jogállásáról szóló vonatkozó megállapodást kell alkalmazni – amennyiben kötöttek ilyen megállapodást –, vagy az Unió és a művelet végrehajtásának helyszínéül szolgáló állam(ok) közötti bármely egyéb rendelkezést. Erről a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot tájékoztatni kell.
 (2) Az uniós válságkezelési művelet helyszínéül szolgáló állam(ok) területén kívül található parancsnokságokhoz vagy parancsnoki alakulatokhoz kirendelt állomány jogállására az érintett parancsnokság vagy parancsnoki alakulat és a Jordán Hásimita Királyság illetékes hatóságai közötti megállapodásokat kell alkalmazni.
 (3) Az (1) bekezdésben említett, a haderők/a misszió jogállásáról szóló megállapodás sérelme nélkül, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság joghatóságot gyakorol az uniós válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő állománya vonatkozásában. Amennyiben a Jordán Hásimita Királyság hadereje az Unió egy tagállamának hajóján vagy légi járművén hajt végre műveletet, az érintett uniós tagállam a meglévő és/vagy jövőbeli megállapodások függvényében, továbbá saját törvényeinek és rendeleteinek, valamint a nemzetközi jognak megfelelően joghatóságot gyakorolhat.
 (4) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság felel az adott uniós válságkezelési műveletben való részvétellel kapcsolatos bármely, a saját állományától érkező vagy azzal kapcsolatos követelés kielégítéséért, valamint az állománya bármely tagjával szembeni – különösen jogi vagy fegyelmi – eljárások megindításáért, saját törvényeivel és rendeleteivel összhangban.
 (5) A Felek megállapodnak abban, hogy a szerződéses követelések kivételével lemondanak minden olyan követelésükről, amely bármelyik fél tulajdonát képező vagy bármely fél által működtetett eszközöket ért kárral, veszteséggel vagy azok megsemmisülésével, továbbá bármely fél állománya tagjainak sérülésével vagy halálával kapcsolatos, amennyiben azok az e megállapodás szerinti tevékenységekhez kapcsolódó hivatali feladatok ellátásából erednek, kivéve a súlyos gondatlanság és a szándékos kötelezettségszegés eseteit.
 (6) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság vállalja, hogy e megállapodás aláírásával egy időben nyilatkozatot tesz arra vonatkozóan, hogy bármely, az uniós válságkezelési műveletben vele együtt részt vevő állammal szembeni követeléséről lemond.
 (7) Az Unió vállalja, hogy tagállamai e megállapodás aláírásakor a követelésekről való lemondásról szóló nyilatkozatot tesznek a Jordán Hásimita Királyság uniós válságkezelési műveletekben való jövőbeli részvétele esetére.
 4. cikk
 Minősített adatok
 (1) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság megteszi az ahhoz szükséges intézkedéseket, hogy az EU-minősített adatok az azok védelmére vonatkozóan a 2013/488/EU tanácsi határozatban (1) foglalt tanácsi biztonsági szabályoknak megfelelő, valamint az illetékes hatóságok – többek között uniós katonai válságkezelési művelet esetén az EU műveleti parancsnoka vagy uniós polgári válságkezelési művelet esetén az uniós polgári műveleti parancsnok – által kibocsátott további iránymutatásoknak megfelelő védelemben részesüljenek.
 (2) Amennyiben a Felek között megállapodás jött létre a minősített adatok cseréjére vonatkozó biztonsági eljárásokat illetően, a megállapodás rendelkezéseit az adott uniós válságkezelési művelettel összefüggésben alkalmazni kell.
 II. SZAKASZ
 AZ UNIÓS POLGÁRI VÁLSÁGKEZELÉSI MŰVELETEKBEN VALÓ RÉSZVÉTELRE VONATKOZÓ RENDELKEZÉSEK
 5. cikk
 Az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletekhez kirendelt állomány
 (1) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság biztosítja, hogy:
 a)
 az egy uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez kirendelt állománya a következőkkel összhangban végezze feladatát:
 i.
 a 2. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett vonatkozó tanácsi határozat és annak későbbi módosításai;
 ii.
 a műveleti terv;
 iii.
 az alkalmazandó végrehajtási intézkedések;
 iv.
 az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletekre alkalmazandó szakpolitikák,
 b)
 kellő időben tájékoztatja a polgári műveleti parancsnokot az uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez való hozzájárulásában bekövetkezett bármely változásról.
 (2) Egy uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által kirendelt állomány tagjainak orvosi vizsgálaton kell átesniük és meg kell kapniuk a védőoltásokat, továbbá az állomány tagjainak rendelkezniük kell az illetékes hatóság által kiállított igazolással arról, hogy a megbízatás teljesítéséhez szükséges megfelelő egészségügyi állapotban vannak, amely igazolást be is kell mutatniuk.
 (3) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság által kirendelt állomány a feladatait kizárólag az uniós polgári válságkezelési művelet érdekeinek szem előtt tartásával végzi, és ezen érdekeknek megfelelő viselkedést tanúsít, amíg az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletekre alkalmazandó szakpolitikák keretében meghatározott legmagasabb szintű magatartási normáknak megfelelően cselekszik.
 6. cikk
 A parancsnoki lánc
 (1) Az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletekben résztvevő állomány egésze teljes mértékben saját nemzeti hatóságainak parancsnoksága alatt áll.
 (2) A nemzeti hatóságok átruházzák a műveleti irányítást az Unió polgári műveleti parancsnokára.
 (3) A polgári műveleti parancsnok vállalja a felelősséget az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletért, és stratégiai szinten gyakorolja annak vezetését és irányítását.
 (4) A misszióvezető vállalja a felelősséget az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletért, gyakorolja annak a műveleti területen történő vezetését és irányítását, továbbá ellátja a napi irányítással járó feladatokat.
 (5) A 2. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett jogi eszközökkel összhangban a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot a művelet napi irányítása tekintetében ugyanolyan jogok illetik meg és ugyanolyan kötelezettségek terhelik, mint a műveletben részt vevő uniós tagállamokat.
 (6) Az uniós polgári válságkezelési művelet állományát érintő fegyelmi kérdésekben a misszióvezető illetékes. A fegyelmi eljárást szükség esetén az érintett nemzeti hatóság indítja meg.
 (7) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság a műveletben részt vevő nemzeti kontingensének képviseletére nemzeti kontingens-képviselőt (a továbbiakban: az NKK) nevez ki. Az NKK a nemzeti ügyekről jelentést tesz a misszióvezetőnek, továbbá felel a Jordán Hásimita Királyság kontingensének napi szintű fegyelméért.
 (8) A művelet befejezéséről szóló döntést az Unió a Jordán Hásimita Királysággal folytatott konzultációt követően hozza meg, amennyiben a Jordán Hásimita Királyság a művelet befejezésének időpontjában még mindig hozzájárul az uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez.
 7. cikk
 Pénzügyi szempontok
 (1) A 8. cikk sérelme nélkül, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság viseli az uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletben való részvételével kapcsolatos minden költséget, a művelet működési költségvetésében meghatározott működési költségek kivételével. Erre a célra egy uniós tagállam vagy egy harmadik fél kétoldalú támogatást nyújthat a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak egy uniós polgári válságkezelési műveletben való részvételéhez.
 (2) A művelet végrehajtásának helyszínéül szolgáló állam(ok)ból származó természetes személyek halála, sérülése, illetve a természetes vagy a jogi személyek vesztesége vagy kára esetén a Jordán Hásimita Királyság esetleges felelősségével és az általa fizetendő kártérítéssel kapcsolatos kérdésekre a 3. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett, a misszió jogállásáról szóló, alkalmazandó megállapodásban foglalt feltételek vagy bármely egyéb, alkalmazandó alternatív rendelkezés az irányadó.
 8. cikk
 Hozzájárulás a működési költségvetéshez
 (1) E cikk (4) bekezdésének függvényében, valamint az 1. cikk (5) bekezdésétől eltérve, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság hozzájárul az érintett uniós polgári válságkezelési művelet működési költségvetésének finanszírozásához.
 (2) Az (1) bekezdésben említett hozzájárulást az alábbi két számítási módszer közül azzal kell kiszámítani, amelyik kisebb összeget eredményez:
 a)
 a működési költségvetésre vonatkozó referenciaösszeg arányos része, amelyet a Jordán Hásimita Királyság bruttó nemzeti jövedelmének a művelet működési költségvetéséhez hozzájáruló valamennyi állam teljes bruttó nemzeti jövedelméhez viszonyított aránya alapján számítanak ki;
 b)
 a működési költségvetés referenciaösszegének arányos része, amelyet a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak a műveletben részt vevő állománya létszámának a műveletben részt vevő minden államból származó állomány teljes létszámához viszonyított aránya alapján számítanak ki.
 (3) Az (1) és a (2) bekezdéstől eltérve, a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak nem kell hozzájárulnia az Unió tagállamainak állománya részére fizetett napidíj finanszírozásához.
 (4) Az (1) bekezdéstől eltérve az Unió főszabályként mentesíti a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot egy adott uniós polgári válságkezelési művelethez való pénzügyi hozzájárulás alól, amennyiben:
 a)
 az Unió úgy határoz, hogy a Jordán Hásimita Királyság jelentős, ezen művelet szempontjából létfontosságú hozzájárulást biztosít; vagy
 b)
 a Jordán Hásimita Királyság egy főre jutó bruttó nemzeti jövedelme nem haladja meg az Unió bármely tagállamának egy főre jutó bruttó nemzeti jövedelmét.
 (5) Az (1) bekezdés függvényében a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által az uniós polgári válságkezelési művelet működési költségvetéséhez nyújtott hozzájárulások befizetésére vonatkozó megállapodásokat a Felek illetékes hatóságainak kell aláírniuk, és e megállapodásoknak többek között az alábbi rendelkezéseket kell tartalmazniuk:
 a)
 az érintett pénzügyi hozzájárulás összege;
 b)
 a pénzügyi hozzájárulás befizetésével kapcsolatos rendelkezések; és
 c)
 a számviteli ellenőrzési eljárás.
 III. SZAKASZ
 AZ UNIÓS KATONAI VÁLSÁGKEZELÉSI MŰVELETEKBEN VALÓ RÉSZVÉTELRE VONATKOZÓ RENDELKEZÉSEK
 9. cikk
 Részvétel uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletben
 (1) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság biztosítja, hogy a valamelyik uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő hadereje és állománya a következőkkel összhangban végezze a feladatát:
 a)
 a 2. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett vonatkozó tanácsi határozat és annak későbbi módosításai;
 b)
 a műveleti terv;
 c)
 az alkalmazandó végrehajtási intézkedések; és
 d)
 az uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletekre alkalmazandó szakpolitikák.
 (2) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság a műveletben való részvételében bekövetkezett bármely változásról kellő időben tájékoztatja az uniós műveleti parancsnokot.
 (3) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság által kirendelt állomány a feladatait kizárólag az uniós katonai válságkezelési művelet érdekeinek szem előtt tartásával végzi, és ezen érdekeknek megfelelő viselkedést tanúsít, amíg az uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletekre alkalmazandó szakpolitikák keretében meghatározott legmagasabb szintű magatartási normáknak megfelelően cselekszik.
 10. cikk
 A parancsnoki lánc
 (1) Az uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő haderő és állomány egésze teljes mértékben saját nemzeti hatóságainak parancsnoksága alatt áll.
 (2) A nemzeti hatóságok a haderejük és az állományuk műveleti és harcászati vezetését és/vagy irányítását átadják az uniós műveleti parancsnoknak, aki jogosult a hatáskörét átruházni.
 (3) A 2. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett jogi eszközökkel összhangban a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot a művelet napi irányítása tekintetében ugyanolyan jogok illetik meg és ugyanolyan kötelezettségek terhelik, mint a műveletben részt vevő uniós tagállamokat.
 (4) Az uniós műveleti parancsnok – a Jordán Hásimita Királysággal folytatott konzultációt követően – bármikor kérheti a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által nyújtott hozzájárulás visszavonását.
 (5) A Jordán Hásimita Királyság az uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő nemzeti kontingensének képviseletére magas rangú katonai képviselőt (a továbbiakban: az MKK) nevez ki. Az MKK a műveletet érintő valamennyi kérdésben konzultál az EU-erők parancsnokával, továbbá felel a Jordán Hásimita Királyság kontingensének napi szintű fegyelméért.
 11. cikk
 Pénzügyi szempontok
 (1) E megállapodás 12. cikkének sérelme nélkül a Jordán Hásimita Királyság viseli a műveletben való részvételével kapcsolatos valamennyi költséget, azon költségek kivételével, amelyek az e megállapodás 2. cikkének (1) bekezdésében említett jogi eszközök, valamint a (KKBP) 2015/528 tanácsi határozat (2) értelmében közös finanszírozásban részesülnek. E célra egy uniós tagállam vagy egy harmadik fél kétoldalú támogatást nyújthat a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak egy uniós katonai válságkezelési műveletben való részvételéhez.
 (2) A művelet végrehajtásának helyszínéül szolgáló állam(ok)ból származó természetes személyek halála, sérülése, illetve természetes vagy jogi személyek vesztesége vagy kára esetén a Jordán Hásimita Királyság esetleges felelősségével és az általa fizetendő kártérítéssel kapcsolatos kérdésekre a 3. cikk (1) bekezdésében említett, a fegyveres erők jogállásáról szóló, alkalmazandó megállapodásban foglalt feltételek vagy bármely egyéb, alkalmazandó alternatív rendelkezés az irányadó.
 12. cikk
 Hozzájárulás a közös költségekhez
 (1) E cikk (3) bekezdésének függvényében, valamint az 1. cikk (5) bekezdésétől eltérve, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság hozzájárul az érintett uniós katonai válságkezelési művelet közös költségeinek finanszírozásához.
 (2) Az (1) bekezdésben említett hozzájárulást az alábbi két számítási módszer közül azzal kell kiszámítani, amelyik kisebb összeget eredményez:
 a)
 a közös költségek arányos része, amelyet a Jordán Hásimita Királyság bruttó nemzeti jövedelmének a művelet közös költségeihez hozzájáruló valamennyi állam teljes bruttó nemzeti jövedelméhez viszonyított aránya alapján számítanak ki;
 b)
 a közös költségek arányos része, amelyet a Jordán Hásimita Királyságnak a műveletben részt vevő állománya létszámának a műveletben részt vevő valamennyi államból származó állomány teljes létszámához viszonyított aránya alapján számítanak ki.
 Amennyiben a b) pontban említett számítási mód kerül alkalmazásra, és a Jordán Hásimita Királyság kizárólag a műveleti parancsnokság vagy a kötelékparancsnokság számára biztosít állományt, úgy az alkalmazandó arányszám a Jordán Hásimita Királyság állományának az érintett parancsnokság állományának teljes létszámához viszonyított aránya. Egyéb esetekben a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által biztosított állománynak a művelet állományának teljes létszámához viszonyított aránya alkalmazandó.
 (3) Az (1) bekezdéstől eltérve az Unió főszabályként mentesíti a Jordán Hásimita Királyságot egy adott uniós katonai válságkezelési művelethez való pénzügyi hozzájárulás alól, amennyiben:
 a)
 az Unió úgy határoz, hogy a Jordán Hásimita Királyság jelentős, a művelet szempontjából létfontosságú hozzájárulást biztosít; vagy
 b)
 a Jordán Hásimita Királyság egy főre jutó bruttó nemzeti jövedelme nem haladja meg az Unió bármely tagállamának egy főre jutó bruttó nemzeti jövedelmét.
 (4) Az (1) bekezdés függvényében a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által a közös költségekhez nyújtott hozzájárulások befizetésére vonatkozó megállapodásokat a Felek illetékes hatóságainak kell megkötniük, és e megállapodásoknak többek között az alábbi rendelkezéseket kell tartalmaznia:
 a)
 az érintett pénzügyi hozzájárulás összege;
 b)
 a pénzügyi hozzájárulás befizetésével kapcsolatos rendelkezések; és
 c)
 a számviteli ellenőrzési eljárás.
 IV. SZAKASZ
 ZÁRÓ RENDELKEZÉSEK
 13. cikk
 A megállapodás végrehajtására vonatkozó rendelkezések
 A 8. cikk (5) bekezdésének és a 12. cikk (4) bekezdésének sérelme nélkül az e megállapodás végrehajtása során szükséges bármely technikai vagy igazgatási megállapodást a Felek illetékes hatóságai között kell megkötni.
 14. cikk
 Illetékes hatóságok
 E megállapodás alkalmazásában a Jordán Hásimita Királyság illetékes hatósága a Jordán Fegyveres Erők, kivéve, ha a Jordán Hásimita Királyság másképp értesíti az Uniót.
 15. cikk
 A megállapodás szerinti kötelezettségek nem teljesítése
 Amennyiben valamelyik fél nem teljesíti az e megállapodás szerinti kötelezettségeit, úgy a másik fél ezt a megállapodást egy hónapos határidővel írásban felmondhatja.
 16. cikk
 A jogviták rendezése
 Az e megállapodás értelmezésével vagy alkalmazásával kapcsolatos vitákat a Felek egymás között, diplomáciai úton rendezik.
 17. cikk
 Hatálybalépés, időtartam és megszűnés
 (1) Ez a megállapodás az azt követő első hónap első napján lép hatályba, hogy a Felek kölcsönösen értesítették egymást a megállapodás hatálybalépéséhez szükséges belső jogi eljárások befejezéséről.
 (2) Ezt a megállapodást 2021. augusztus 1-jéig, és ezt követően legalább minden harmadik évben felül kell vizsgálni.
 (3) Ezt a megállapodást a Felek között létrejött kölcsönös írásbeli megállapodással lehet módosítani. A módosítások az (1) bekezdésben említett eljárással összhangban lépnek hatályba.
 (4) Ezt a megállapodást a másik félhez intézett írásos felmondó nyilatkozat útján bármelyik fél felmondhatja. A felmondás az előzetes értesítés másik fél által történő kézhezvételétől számított hat hónap elteltével lép hatályba.
 FENTIEK HITELÉÜL a Felek által kellően felhatalmazott alulírottak aláírták ezt a megállapodást.
 Készült Luxembourgban, 2019. június 17. napján két példányban, angol és arab nyelven, amely szövegek mindegyike egyaránt hiteles. Eltérő értelmezés esetén az angol nyelvű szöveg az irányadó.
 az Európai Unió részéről
 a Jordán Hásimita Királyság részéről
 (1) A Tanács 2013/488/EU határozata (2013. szeptember 23.) az EU-minősített adatok védelmét szolgáló biztonsági szabályokról (HL L 274., 2013.10.15., 1. o.).
 (2) A Tanács (KKBP) 2015/528 határozata (2015. március 27.) az Európai Unió katonai vagy védelmi vonatkozású műveletei közös költségei finanszírozása igazgatási mechanizmusának (ATHENA) létrehozásáról és a 2011/871/KKBP határozat hatályon kívül helyezéséről (HL L 84., 2015.3.28., 39. o.).
 A JORDÁN HÁSIMITA KIRÁLYSÁG RÉSZVÉTELÉVEL ZAJLÓ UNIÓS VÁLSÁGKEZELÉSI MŰVELETRŐL SZÓLÓ TANÁCSI HATÁROZATOT ALKALMAZÓ UNIÓS TAGÁLLAMOK NYILATKOZATA A KÖVETELÉSEIKRŐL VALÓ LEMONDÁSRÓL
 „A Jordán Hásimita Királyság részvételével zajló uniós válságkezelési műveletről szóló tanácsi határozatot alkalmazó uniós tagállamok a belső jogrendjük által megengedett mértékben, lehetőségük szerint igyekeznek lemondani a Jordán Hásimita Királysággal szemben – állományuk tagjainak sérülése, halála, vagy a tulajdonukat képező és az uniós válságkezelési művelet által használt bármely eszközt ért kár vagy veszteség kapcsán – felmerülő követelésekről, amennyiben az ilyen sérülést, halált, kárt vagy veszteséget:
 —
 a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által valamely uniós válságkezelési művelethez biztosított állomány tagja az uniós válságkezelési művelettel kapcsolatos hivatali kötelessége teljesítése során okozta, kivéve a súlyos gondatlanság vagy szándékos kötelezettségszegés esetét, vagy
 —
 bármely, a Jordán Hásimita Királyság tulajdonát képező eszköz használata okozta, amennyiben az adott eszközt a művelettel kapcsolatban használták, kivéve az uniós válságkezelési művelethez a Jordán Hásimita Királyság által biztosított állomány ezen eszközt használó tagjának súlyos gondatlansága vagy szándékos kötelezettségszegése eseteit.”.
 A JORDÁN HÁSIMITA KIRÁLYSÁG NYILATKOZATA AZ UNIÓS VÁLSÁGKEZELÉSI MŰVELETBEN RÉSZT VEVŐ BÁRMELY ÁLLAMMAL SZEMBENI KÖVETELÉSÉRŐL VALÓ LEMONDÁSRÓL
 „A valamely uniós válságkezelési műveletben részvételt vállaló Jordán Hásimita Királyság a belső jogrendje által megengedett mértékben, lehetőség szerint igyekszik lemondani az uniós válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő bármely állammal szemben – állománya tagjainak sérülése, halála vagy a tulajdonát képező és az uniós válságkezelési művelet által használt bármely eszközt ért kár vagy veszteség kapcsán – felmerülő követelésekről, amennyiben az ilyen sérülést, halált, kárt vagy veszteséget:
 —
 az állomány tagja az uniós válságkezelési művelettel kapcsolatos hivatali kötelességének teljesítése során okozta, kivéve a súlyos gondatlanság vagy szándékos kötelezettségszegés eseteit, vagy
 —
 bármely, az uniós válságkezelési műveletben részt vevő állam tulajdonát képező eszköz használata okozta, amennyiben az adott eszközt a művelettel kapcsolatban használták, kivéve az uniós válságkezelési művelet állománya ezen eszközt használó tagjának a súlyos gondatlansága vagy szándékos kötelezettségszegése eseteit.”


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 15.2.2014
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 45/35
 Kanne 4.11.2013 — Real Express v. SMHV — MIP Metro (real)
 (Asia T-580/13)
 2014/C 45/61
 Kannekirjelmän kieli: englanti
 Asianosaiset
 Kantaja: Real Express Srl (Bukarest, Romania) (edustaja: asianajaja C. Anitoae)
 Vastaaja: sisämarkkinoiden harmonisointivirasto (tavaramerkit ja mallit)
 Vastapuoli valituslautakunnassa: MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG (Düsseldorf, Saksa)
 Vaatimukset
 Kantaja vaatii unionin yleistä tuomioistuinta
 —
 kumoamaan sisämarkkinoiden harmonisointiviraston (tavaramerkit ja mallit) neljännen valituslautakunnan 16.9.2013 asiassa R 1519/2012-4 tekemän ratkaisun
 —
 velvoittamaan vastaajan ja väliintulijan korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 Oikeudelliset perusteet ja pääasialliset perustelut
 Yhteisön tavaramerkin hakija: Vastapuoli valituslautakunnassa
 Haettu yhteisön tavaramerkki: Sini-punainen kuviomerkki, johon sisältyy sanaosa ”real” luokkiin 3 ja 35 kuuluvia tavaroita ja palveluja varten — yhteisön tavaramerkiksi rekisteröintiä koskeva hakemus nro 9 512 609
 Sen tavaramerkin tai merkin haltija, johon väitemenettelyssä on vedottu: Kantaja
 Tavaramerkki tai merkki, johon väitemenettelyssä on vedottu: Romanialaiset tavaramerkit nro 38 089 ja 80 065
 Väiteosaston ratkaisu: Väite hylättiin kokonaisuudessaan.
 Valituslautakunnan ratkaisu: Valitus hylättiin.
 Kanneperusteet: Yhteisön tavaramerkistä annetun asetuksen 8 artiklan 1 kohdan b alakohdan rikkominen.


type: contracts

text:
 31.10.2013
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 291/6
 DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALGS AFGØRELSE
 Nr. 55/2013
 af 3. maj 2013
 om ændring af bilag I (Dyre- og plantesundhed) og bilag II (Tekniske forskrifter, standarder, prøvning og certificering) til EØS-aftalen
 DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG HAR —
 under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (»EØS-aftalen«), særlig artikel 98, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 om berigtigelse af forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011 om ændring af bilag VII til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 882/2004 og Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 180/2008 og forordning (EF) nr. 737/2008 for så vidt angår lister over og navne på EU-referencelaboratorier (1) skal indarbejdes i EØS-aftalen.
 (2)
 Denne afgørelse vedrører lovgivning om levende dyr, bortset fra fisk og akvakulturdyr. Lovgivning om disse emner gælder ikke for Island, jf. punkt 2 i indledningen til kapitel I i bilag I til EØS-aftalen. Den del af denne afgørelse, som vedrører kapitel I i bilag I gælder derfor ikke for Island.
 (3)
 Denne afgørelse vedrører lovgivning om veterinæranliggender. Lovgivning om veterinæranliggender gælder ikke for Liechtenstein, så længe aftalen mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og Det Schweiziske Forbund om handel med landbrugsprodukter også gælder for Liechtenstein, jf. sektortilpasningerne i bilag I til EØS-aftalen. Denne afgørelse gælder derfor ikke for Liechtenstein.
 (4)
 Bilag I og II til EØS-aftalen bør derfor ændres —
 VEDTAGET DENNE AFGØRELSE:
 Artikel 1
 I bilag I til aftalen foretages følgende ændringer:
 1)
 Følgende indsættes i det sjette led (Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011) i punkt 11 (Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 882/2004) i del 1.1 i kapitel 1:
 », som ændret ved:
 —
 32011 R 0880: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 (EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8).«
 2)
 Følgende indsættes i det første led (Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011) i punkt 41 (Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 737/2008) i del 3.2 i kapitel 1:
 », som ændret ved:
 —
 32011 R 0880: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 (EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8).«
 3)
 Følgende indsættes i det første led (Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011) i punkt 90 (Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 180/2008) i del 4.2 i kapitel 1:
 », som ændret ved:
 —
 32011 R 0880: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 (EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8).«
 4)
 Følgende indsættes i det fjerde led (Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011) i punkt 31j (Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 882/2004) i kapitel II:
 », som ændret ved:
 —
 32011 R 0880: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 (EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8).«
 Artikel 2
 Følgende indsættes i det fjerde led (Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 208/2011) i punkt 54zzzi (Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 882/2004) i kapitel XII i bilag II til EØS-aftalen:
 », som ændret ved:
 —
 32011 R 0880: Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011 af 2. september 2011 (EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8).«
 Artikel 3
 Den islandske og den norske udgave af forordning (EU) nr. 880/2011, der offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-tillæg, er begge autentiske.
 Artikel 4
 Denne afgørelse træder i kraft den 4. maj 2013, forudsat at alle meddelelser er indgivet til Det Blandede EØS-udvalg, jf. EØS-aftalens artikel 103, stk. 1 (2).
 Artikel 5
 Denne afgørelse offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-afsnit og EØS-tillæg.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 3. maj 2013.
 På Det Blandede EØS-udvalgs vegne
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 228 af 3.9.2011, s. 8.
 (2) Ingen forfatningsmæssige krav angivet.


type: wikipedia

text:
Kolejowa wieża wodna w Goleniowie – zabytkowa wieża ciśnień, powstała w 1912 z czerwonej cegły, z szachulcową głowicą, stoi w pobliżu dworca PKP w Goleniowie. Do dziś dostarcza wodę budynkom dworcowym.
 Historia
 Wieża została zbudowana w 1912 roku, aby zaopatrywać w wodę parowozy. W 1991 roku został wykonany remont, gdyż wieża była w bardzo złym stanie technicznym bo na początku lat 70. zawaliła się jedna ze ścian osłaniających zbiornik.
 Podczas remontu wymieniono dach, odbudowano i odnowiono ściany elewacji, a drewniane elementy konstrukcji zaimpregnowano.
 Opis
 Trzon wieży został wymurowany z czerwonej cegły i jest zwieńczony głowicą o płaskiej podstawie. Drewniany szkielet ściany osłonowej zbiornika został pomalowany na czarno, a murowane wypełnienie otynkowano i pobielono.
 Przypisy
 Goleniów
 Obiekty budowlane w Goleniowie


type: other

text:
POLÍTICA DE PARTICIPAÇÃO DE IRREGULARIDADES DO GRUPO CRÉDITO AGRÍCOLA INTRODUÇÃO - PDF Download grátis
 Download "POLÍTICA DE PARTICIPAÇÃO DE IRREGULARIDADES DO GRUPO CRÉDITO AGRÍCOLA INTRODUÇÃO"
 1 POLÍTICA DE PARTICIPAÇÃO DE IRREGULARIDADES DO GRUPO CRÉDITO AGRÍCOLA INTRODUÇÃO As sucessivas alterações legislativas iniciadas com a aprovação pela União Europeia da Directiva no 2013/36/UE, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (IV Directiva de Requisitos de Capital) e do Regulamento 575/2013, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (I Regulamento de Requisitos de Capital) determinaram a necessidade das Instituições de Crédito procederem a alterações profundas em diversas áreas da sua actividade e da sua organização, incluindo o governo interno. Resulta dos referidos diplomas, bem como da legislação e regulamentação nacional promulgada na sua senda e das Orientações emitidas pela Autoridade Bancária Europeia (EBA), designadamente pela EBA/GL/2017/11 sobre Governo Interno que se torna fundamental criar, manter e aplicar políticas de alerta e de efectivação de participação de qualquer irregularidade ao disposto na lei e, especificamente, ao disposto no Regulamento de Requisitos de Capital, bem como a criação de canais independentes e autónomos de comunicação que previnam e regulem a possibilidade de poderem ser, livremente, efectuadas denúncias internas e/ou externas sobre o Governo das Instituições, conferindo a cada uma dessas denúncias um tratamento confidencial, reservado e de assunção, quando pretendido, do anonimato, a fim de proteger o denunciante de toda e qualquer eventual retaliação. Nos termos do disposto no Artigo 116o-AA no Regime Geral das Instituições de Crédito e das Sociedades Financeiras, as Instituições devem implementar os meios específicos, independentes e autónomos adequados de recepção, tratamento e arquivo das participações de irregularidades graves relacionadas com a sua administração, organização contabilística e fiscalização interna e de indícios sérios de infracções a deveres previstos no presente Regime Geral ou no Regulamento (EU) 575/2013, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 26 de Junho, sendo que os meios ( ) garantem a confidencialidade das participações recebidas e a protecção dos dados pessoais do denunciante e do suspeito da prática da infracção, nos termos da Lei no 67/98, de 26 de Outubro. Deste modo, e analisadas as normas, orientações e princípios indicados, cumpre aprovar o presente documento escrito que, consagrando a Política de Participação de Irregularidades, visa: 1. Consagrar, em sede de política, os meios específicos, independentes e autónomos adequados à recepção pelo órgão de fiscalização de toda e qualquer participação de irregularidade; 2. Assegurar a existência e disponibilização de forma acessível aos canais de comunicação e de participação de irregularidades a todos os Colaboradores, a todos os Associados e a terceiros externos à Instituição; 3. Assegurar a possibilidade do exercício destas participações no mais absoluto anonimato, bem como, caso seja solicitado e seja exequível, a possibilidade de se acusar a recepção da participação e de comunicar o resultado apurado, após a sua averiguação; 4. Estabelecer os mecanismos e processos de tratamento dessas participações, designadamente as Estruturas que podem ser encarregues pelo órgão de fiscalização para efectuar a sua análise, averiguação e elaboração do adequado e fundamentado relatório contendo as conclusões; 1
 2 5. Assegurar a existência de um processo de averiguações ou de investigação de cada participação e de um contínuo acompanhamento, designadamente do órgão de fiscalização, com o fito de obter e ter, em tempo útil um resultado; 6. Assegurar que as participações reais ou potenciais são avaliadas e comunicadas ao superior hierárquico e, se necessário, às Autoridades Competentes, em face da natureza e conteúdo da participação; 7. Criar processos e responsáveis pelo arquivo em suporte papel ou suporte duradouro das participações de irregularidades, em condições adequadas a dar cumprimento ao disposto na lei, mormente em sede de possibilitar uma adequada e sempre que solicitada supervisão do Regulador, sem perder de vista o requisito essencial do anonimato do(s) participante(s) e participado(s); 8. Assegurar que as participações recebidas não consubstanciarão procedimentos de natureza disciplinar, civil, criminal ou qualquer outro, contra o denunciante, salvo se as participações forem deliberada e manifestamente infundadas; 9. Assegurar a existência de um relatório anual que será reportado ao Banco de Portugal contendo a descrição dos meios específicos de recepção, tratamento e arquivo das participações recebidas e com a indicação sumária do conteúdo da participação e do respectivo processamento. Assim, atentas as funções de orientação das suas Associadas que incumbem à Caixa Central nos termos do artigo 75o do Regime Jurídico do Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, considerados ainda os poderes conferidos à mesma pelo artigo 69o do mesmo diploma e pelos artigos 3o, no 3, alínea e), e 41o, no 1, alínea f), e no 2 dos seus Estatutos, bem como a posição ocupada pela mesma Caixa Central no seio do Grupo Crédito Agrícola, recolhido o parecer do Conselho Geral e de Supervisão, o Conselho de Administração Executivo da Caixa Central aprova a presente Política de Participação de Irregularidades do Grupo Crédito Agrícola. 1. Objecto da Política 1.1 A presente Política tem por objecto dar cumprimento ao disposto na legislação e regulamentação nacional e europeia em matéria de participação de irregularidades (whistleblowing), designadamente: a) No Regime Geral das Instituições de Crédito e Sociedades Financeiras; b) Nas Orientações da Autoridade Bancária Europeia no EBA/GL/2017/11, sobre Governo Interno. 1.2 O disposto na presente Política não prejudica as normas legais e regulamentares em vigor acerca de participações de tipos específicos de irregularidades, como sucede com participação de irregularidades em sede de (i) Prevenção de Branqueamento de Capitais e de Financiamento ao Terrorismo, de (ii) Prevenção de Conflitos de Interesses ou de (iii) Código de Ética e Conduta, as quais, aliás, dispõem no Crédito Agrícola das suas específicas Políticas e canais de comunicação. 2
 3 2. Definições 2.1. As expressões infra, sempre que utilizadas na presente Política, terão os significados que a seguir se indicam: a) Associado: Cooperador de cada uma das Cooperativas que integram o SICAM; b) Auditoria: A pessoa ou equipa inserida em estrutura interna de Auditoria das Instituições ou em estrutura externa; c) Auditoria Externa: A pessoa ou Estrutura externa que seja incumbida de efectuar o processo de averiguações e elaborar o relatório, podendo incluir auditoria forense ou auditoria técnica; d) Auditoria Interna: A pessoa ou Estrutura que exerce a função de Auditoria Interna na Instituição; e) CAE: Conselho de Administração Executivo da Caixa Central; f) Caixa Central: Caixa Central Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, CRL; g) Caixas Agrícolas: As Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo Associadas da Caixa Central e que integram, em conjunto com esta, o SICAM; h) CGS: Conselho Geral e de Supervisão da Caixa Central; i) Grupo Crédito Agrícola: Grupo financeiro constituído pela Caixa Central, pelas Caixas Agrícolas, suas Associadas e pelas Empresas Participadas; j) Colaborador: pessoas singulares que exerçam funções nas Instituições ao abrigo de contrato de trabalho ou de contrato de prestação de serviços, incluindo os membros de Órgãos Sociais e de Órgãos Estatutários e Regulamentares; k) Empresa Participada: as entidades pertencentes ao Grupo Crédito Agrícola que não sejam Instituições de Crédito, independentemente da sua forma jurídica, considerando-se como pertencentes ao Grupo Crédito Agrícola as entidades relativamente às quais a maioria do capital ou dos direitos de voto seja detida, directa ou indirectamente, por uma ou mais das referidas Instituições de Crédito; l) Direcção de Compliance: a Estrutura da Caixa Central que tem como missão, nesta Política, ser a entidade competente pela recepção, triagem e encaminhamento das Participações; m) Instituição: pessoas colectivas sujeitas à presente Política, designadamente a Caixa Central, as Caixas Agrícolas Associadas, as Empresas Participadas, os Agrupamentos Complementares de Empresas; n) Órgão de Administração: o órgão colectivo que detém a gestão efectiva, assim se entendendo a administração ou a gerência, de cada uma das Instituições; o) Órgão de Fiscalização: o órgão colectivo de fiscalização de cada uma das Instituições, sendo que na Caixa Central é o CGS, na generalidade das Caixas Agrícolas é o Conselho Fiscal e nas Empresas Participadas pode ser o Conselho Fiscal ou Conselho Geral e de Supervisão, consoante a escolha estatutária; p) Participação: Comunicação de irregularidade grave definida no ponto 2.2. desta Política; q) Política: a presente Política de Participação de Irregularidades; 3
 4 r) Processo de Averiguações: procedimento de estudo, análise, pesquisa e recolha de prova que confirme ou infirme uma Participação elaborado pela Auditoria e que incluirá um relatório final conclusivo; s) RGICSF: o Regime Geral das Instituições de Crédito e Sociedades Financeiras; t) RJCAM: o Regime Jurídico do Crédito Agrícola Mútuo; u) SICAM: o Sistema Integrado do Crédito Agrícola Mútuo; v) Sócio: Qualquer pessoa singular ou colectiva que seja sócio de qualquer uma das Empresas Participadas São, para efeitos da presente Política, irregularidades graves decorrentes de actos ou omissões, dolosos ou negligentes, relacionados, directa ou indirectamente, com a administração, a organização contabilística e a fiscalização interna das Instituições que, de forma, grave sejam susceptíveis, de violar o disposto na lei, designadamente no RGICSF e no Regulamento (EU) 575/2013, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 26 de Junho e nos demais Regulamentos e Normativos em vigor e/ou de colocar em causa o património dos Clientes e/ou dos Associados e/ou dos Sócios e/ou de causar qualquer dano, ainda que meramente reputacional, a cada uma das Instituições e/ou ao SICAM ou ao Grupo Crédito Agrícola Estão excluídas do âmbito desta Política, as reclamações relacionadas com a prestação de serviços bancários e de atendimento do público em geral, as quais são tramitadas através do Gabinete de Provedoria do Cliente, do Livro de Reclamações, das reclamações directas para o Banco de Portugal, através, designadamente do Portal do Cliente Bancário, bem como através do acesso a qualquer uma das entidades de Resolução Alternativa de Litígios (RAL). 3. Direito e dever de Participar 3.1. Podem participar irregularidades graves os Associados, os Sócios, os Colaboradores e/ou qualquer pessoa externa à Instituição, seja ou não sua Cliente, sem que tal dependa da existência de prova das irregularidades participadas Todas as pessoas, singulares ou colectivas, que tenham conhecimento de uma irregularidade grave, têm o direito e o dever de a participar Os Colaboradores das Instituições que exerçam funções nas áreas de auditoria, de compliance e de gestão de riscos, que tomem conhecimento de qualquer irregularidade grave, têm o especial dever de a participar, ainda que não disponham de todos os elementos de prova para tanto, cabendo, posteriormente, aos responsáveis pela averiguação carrear para o processo a sustentação da participação, caso ela exista O Participante pode solicitar que da sua Participação seja dado conhecimento a quaisquer responsáveis, incluindo ao órgão de administração. 4
 5 4. Canais de participação de Irregularidades 4.1. As Participações podem ser efectuadas através do canal de comunicação autónomo, independente e específico, existente no sítio da internet do Crédito Agrícola, acedível em Poderão também as irregularidades graves ser participadas através do envio de mensagem de correio electrónico para a caixa de correio com o endereço a qual está criada e é mantida exclusivamente para receber este tipo de participações e à qual só acede a Direcção de Compliance As irregularidades graves poderão também ser participadas, directamente, ao Órgão de Fiscalização, através de comunicação escrita a ele dirigida ou e ele entregue. 5. Confidencialidade, Anonimato e Não Retaliação 5.1. Todas as participações serão tratadas na mais absoluta confidencialidade, quer quanto ao Participante, quer quanto ao(s) Participado(s) e à matéria de facto em que assente a Participação Será assegurado o anonimato do Participante, se a sua participação for submetida através da caixa de texto existente na página de internet do Crédito Agrícola a que se refere o artigo 4.1. e se o Participante se abstiver de se identificar Se o Participante, ao efectuar a solicitação a que se refere o artigo 3.4, pedir que seja assegurado o seu anonimato, atento o expresso no número anterior, tal só poderá ser absolutamente garantido, se a Participação for submetida através do canal a que se refere o artigo 4.1., o que lhe será comunicado, antes de se cumprir a sua solicitação Salvo se as Participações forem manifesta e deliberadamente infundadas, o que é declarado pelo órgão de fiscalização, as participações não podem, por si só, servir de fundamento à instauração de procedimentos disciplinares, processos crime ou processos civis e/ou de qualquer natureza contra o Participante. 6. Recepção e registo de Participação 6.1. As Participações de irregularidades que sejam submetidas através dos canais identificados nos artigos 4.1. e 4.2. serão recebidas, registadas e tratadas, em sede de saneamento e apreciação prévia, pela Direcção de Compliance A Direcção de Compliance fará a triagem das Participações recebidas, designadamente em sede de apurar se se tratam de efectivas Participações de Irregularidades em sede desta Política, ou antes Reclamação de Clientes, sugestões de Ética e Conduta, Participação de Irregularidades em sede de Prevenção de Branqueamento de Capitais e 5
 6 Financiamento ao Terrorismo, encaminhando as Mensagens e Participações para os canais adequados Sempre que o Participante se tenha identificado e indicado um meio de comunicação, a Direcção de Compliance avisará o Participante da recepção da Participação e do seu registo e/ou eventual encaminhamento Tratando-se de Participação de Irregularidade grave que deva ser tratada à luz do disposto nesta Política, a Direcção de Compliance, encaminhá-la-á: Sendo uma Participação de irregularidade grave relativa a CCAM ou a Empresa Participada, para o Órgão de Fiscalização da CCAM ou da Empresa Participada, consoante o caso, e, em qualquer circunstância, para o CGS; Sendo uma participação de irregularidade grave relativa à Caixa Central, para o CGS; 6.5. O Órgão de Fiscalização encaminhará as Participações que receba directamente, nos termos previstos no artigo 4.3., para a Direcção de Compliance, designadamente através de mensagem de correio electrónico para o endereço identificado no artigo 4.2, a fim de que seja efectuado o seu registo e tratamento referido supra no artigo 6.1., seguindo-se o previsto nos artigos 6.2. a 6.4., salvo se, pelo teor e/ou natureza da Participação, o Órgão de Fiscalização possa deliberar, de imediato, nos termos previstos no artigo 7 infra, caso em que se limitará a dar conhecimento à Direcção de Compliance, para que seja efectuado o necessário registo. 7. Tratamento de Participação 7.1. Uma vez recebida a Participação, dimanada pela Direcção de Compliance, o Órgão de Fiscalização analisa-a e delibera: a) Arquivar a Participação, quando seja manifesta a falta de fundamento; b) Iniciar Processo de Averiguações, quando seja manifesta a necessidade de prova suplementar que confirme ou infirme a Participação O Processo de Averiguações deve ser conduzido pela Auditoria Interna da Instituição ou por equipa de Auditoria Externa, decisão que cabe ao Órgão de Fiscalização A decisão de se optar pelo recurso à Auditoria Interna ou Externa deve ser sempre fundamentada com base na natureza da matéria objecto da Participação, da gravidade e dificuldade técnica dos temas tratados e/ou da identidade e função do(s) Participado(s) A Auditoria pode solicitar, no âmbito do Processo de Averiguações, o apoio de qualquer estrutura da Instituição, que não pode invocar qualquer dever de sigilo, de confidencialidade e /ou de reserva, para omitir a sua colaboração. 6
 7 7.5. Compete ao Órgão de Fiscalização efectuar o acompanhamento do processo de averiguações de qualquer Participação e solicitar o seu ponto de situação à Auditoria, podendo sugerir medidas e procedimentos a ser adoptados Após a conclusão do Processo de Averiguações, a Auditoria elabora um relatório circunstanciado em que descreve o teor da Participação e as diligências por si efectuadas e as provas recolhidas Caso o relatório conclua pela existência de irregularidade grave, compete à Auditoria incluir no relatório a sua proposta quanto a medidas a serem adoptadas com vista à correcção, à sanação, à eliminação ou à mitigação da irregularidade cometida e/ou existente, bem como as entidades internas ou externas a quem deva ser dado conhecimento do relatório Caso o relatório conclua pela inexistência da irregularidade, a Auditoria conclui, propondo, o seu arquivamento O Relatório de Averiguações é enviado pela Auditora para o Órgão de Fiscalização Compete ao Órgão de Fiscalização em face do teor do relatório e das suas conclusões deliberar: a) Sobre o arquivamento da Participação, quando assim o relatório promova; b) Sobre as medidas a ser adoptadas em face da verificação da prática da Irregularidade grave e pela sua comunicação às hierarquias, incluindo ao Órgão de Administração, sempre que necessário, e, quando se justifique, às autoridades externas que sejam tidas por convenientes, designadamente órgãos de justiça e polícia criminal e às autoridades de supervisão Caso o Participante se tenha identificado e disponibilizado um meio de contacto, o Órgão de Fiscalização determinará que lhe sejam comunicadas as conclusões e as decisões tomadas na sequência da sua Participação. 8. Comunicação e Arquivo 8.1. Todas as decisões do Órgão de Fiscalização sobre Participações são comunicadas à Direcção de Compliance que se encarregará de efectuar o devido registo A comunicação a que se refere a alínea b) do artigo compete ao Órgão de Fiscalização Após ter efectuado as comunicações a que se referem os dois pontos anteriores, o Órgão de Fiscalização enviará a Participação, os despachos sobre a mesma e o, eventual relatório de averiguações, e despachos finais, para arquivo Sem prejuízo do disposto no artigo 8.6 infra, todas as Instituições disporão do seu arquivo próprio para dar cumprimento ao disposto no número anterior, assegurando as 7
 8 condições de confidencialidade e de segurança do anonimato a que se refere o artigo 5, arquivando em papel ou outro suporte que permita a reprodução integral e inalterada da informação, pelo prazo de cinco anos, sendo, neste particular, aplicável o disposto no artigo 120o do RGICSF Compete ao Órgão de Administração da Instituição indicar qual a estrutura competente e responsável por assegurar o arquivo da documentação e as respectivas condições a que se referem os dois números anteriores, sendo que, em regra, tal caberá à estrutura encarregada de processar e tramitar o arquivo de documentação da Instituição A Direcção Compliance disporá de um arquivo em suporte digital de toda a documentação atinente às Participações que, por si, tenham sido registadas nos termos do disposto no artigo Relatório Anual A Direcção de Compliance elaborará, anualmente, o relatório a que se refere o no 7 do Artigo 116o-AA e enviá-lo-á para o Banco de Portugal. 10. Competência para a definição, alteração ou revogação da Política O CAE é exclusivamente competente para a aprovação, alteração ou revogação da presente Política, sem prejuízo da competência consultiva do CGS da referida Instituição. 11. Competência para a fiscalização do cumprimento da Política 11.1 O cumprimento da presente Política será fiscalizado em cada Instituição pelos seus respectivos Órgãos de Administração e de Fiscalização Incumbe a cada um dos Membros dos Órgãos de Administração e de Fiscalização de cada Instituição, individualmente, praticar todos os actos necessários para, consoante os casos, impedir, detectar e comunicar ao respectivo órgão qualquer situação de não aplicação da presente Política As funções de controlo de cada Instituição, assim se entendendo as estruturas de compliance e de auditoria, deverão igualmente fiscalizar o cumprimento da Política no exercício das suas actividades próprias, reportando as desconformidades com que se deparem nos termos que se encontrem estabelecidos para cada uma delas A Caixa Central, na sua qualidade de organismo central do SICAM, dotado de poderes e funções de orientação e fiscalização das suas Associadas, e atenta a posição por si ocupada no seio do Grupo Crédito Agrícola, fiscalizará o cumprimento da presente Política pelas restantes Instituições através do CAE e do CGS e da Direcção de Compliance, da Direcção de Auditoria e, no caso das Caixas Agrícolas, também pela 8
 9 Direcção de Acompanhamento e Supervisão, podendo aplicar as sanções a que alude infra o artigo O disposto no presente artigo não prejudica os poderes, deveres ou responsabilidades relativos à fiscalização do cumprimento da presente Política que nesta estejam especialmente previstos. 12. Carácter vinculativo e regime sancionatório 12.1 A presente Política é vinculativa para todas as Instituições As Empresas Participadas que estejam igualmente obrigadas a aprovar Política de Participação de Irregularidades, mas de natureza semelhante, nos termos de normas legais ou regulamentares aplicáveis, devem assegurar na sua elaboração, aprovação e aplicação o cumprimento de normas em coerência e integração com a presente Política As Empresas Participadas a que se refere o número anterior, terão de enviar para a Caixa Central, antes da sua aprovação nos órgãos próprios, a Política de Participação de Irregularidades que pretendam ver aprovada para a sua Instituição e obter a expressa anuência da Caixa Central para a sua adopção O incumprimento por parte de cada uma das Instituições de qualquer norma da presente Política será sancionada nos termos previstos nos Estatutos da Caixa Central para a violação dos normativos vinculativos da Caixa Central A aplicação de sanções será precedida do procedimento estabelecido nos Estatutos da Caixa Central e no normativo sancionatório em cada momento em vigor. 13. Entrada em vigor A presente Política entra em vigor na data da sua publicação na página da intranet do Grupo Crédito Agrícola (CAIS), procedendo-se à sua divulgação na página de internet do Crédito Agrícola. 9
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text:
 23.7.2018
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 185/3
 AGREEMENT
 in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and New Zealand pursuant to Article XXIV:6 and Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions in the schedule of the Republic of Croatia in the course of its accession to the European Union
 A. Letter from the Union
 Sir,
 Following negotiations under Article XXIV:6 and Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of the Schedule of the Republic of Croatia in the course of its accession to the European Union, I have the honour to propose the following:
 The European Union shall incorporate in its schedule, for the customs territory of the EU 28, the concessions contained in the schedule of the EU 27 with the following modifications:
 Add 1 875 tonnes to the EU tariff rate quota ‘Meat of bovine animals, frozen – Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen’, tariff item numbers 0202 and 0206.29.91, maintaining the present in quota rate of 20 %. The new tariff rate quota shall be 54 875 tonnes;
 Add 135 tonnes (carcass weight) to the allocation for New Zealand under the EU tariff rate quota ‘Meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen’, tariff item number 0204, maintaining the present in-quota rate of 0 %. The new tariff rate quota allocation to New Zealand shall be 228 389 tonnes.
 The European Union and New Zealand shall notify each other of the completion of their internal procedures for the entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force 14 days after the date of receipt of the latest notification.
 I should be obliged if you would confirm that your Government is in agreement with the above. I have the honour to propose that, if the above is acceptable to your Government, this letter and your confirmation shall together constitute an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and New Zealand.
 Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
 Съставено в Брюксел на
 Hecho en Bruselas, el
 V Bruselu dne
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den
 Geschehen zu Brüssel am
 Brüssel,
 Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις
 Done at Brussels,
 Fait à Bruxelles, le
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu
 Fatto a Bruxelles, addì
 Briselē,
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Kelt Brüsszelben,
 Magħmul fi Brussell,
 Gedaan te Brussel,
 Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia
 Feito em Bruxelas,
 Întocmit la Bruxelles,
 V Bruseli
 V Bruslju,
 Tehty Brysselissä
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den
 За Европейския съюз
 Рог la Unión Europea
 Za Evropskou unii
 For Den Europæiske Union
 Für die Europäische Union
 Euroopa Liidu nimel
 Για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
 For the European Union
 Pour l'Union européenne
 Za Europsku uniju
 Per l'Unione europea
 Eiropas Savienības vārdā –
 Europos Sąjungos vardu
 Az Európai Unió részéről
 Għall-Unjoni Ewropea
 Voor de Europese Unie
 W imieniu Unii Europejskiej
 Pela União Europeia
 Pentru Uniunea Europeană
 Za Európsku úniu
 Za Evropsko unijo
 Euroopan unionin puolesta
 För Europeiska unionen
 B. Letter from New Zealand
 Sir,
 I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of today's date which reads as follows:
 ‘Following negotiations under Article XXIV:6 and Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of the Schedule of the Republic of Croatia in the course of its accession to the European Union, I have the honour to propose the following:
 The European Union shall incorporate in its schedule, for the customs territory of the EU 28, the concessions contained in the schedule of the EU 27 with the following modifications:
 Add 1 875 tonnes to the EU tariff rate quota “Meat of bovine animals, frozen – Edible offal of bovine animals, frozen”, tariff item numbers 0202 and 0206.29.91, maintaining the present in-quota rate of 20 %. The new tariff rate quota shall be 54 875 tonnes;
 Add 135 tonnes (carcass weight) to the allocation for New Zealand under the EU tariff rate quota “Meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen”, tariff item number 0204, maintaining the present in-quota rate of 0 %. The new tariff rate quota allocation to New Zealand shall be 228 389 tonnes.
 The European Union and New Zealand shall notify each other of the completion of their internal procedures for the entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force 14 days after the date of receipt of the latest notification.
 I should be obliged if you would confirm that your Government is in agreement with the above. I have the honour to propose that, if the above is acceptable to your Government, this letter and your confirmation shall together constitute an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and New Zealand.’.
 I am able to inform you that my Government is in agreement with the contents of your letter.
 Съставено в Брюксел на
 Hecho en Bruselas, el
 V Bruselu dne
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den
 Geschehen zu Brüssel am
 Brüssel,
 Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις
 Done at Brussels,
 Fait à Bruxelles, le
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu
 Fatto a Bruxelles, addì
 Briselē,
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Kelt Brüsszelben,
 Magħmul fi Brussell,
 Gedaan te Brussel,
 Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia
 Feito em Bruxelas,
 Întocmit la Bruxelles,
 V Bruseli
 V Bruslju,
 Tehty Brysselissä
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den
 For New Zealand
 За Нова Зеландия
 Por Nueva Zelanda
 Za Nový Zéland
 På New Zealands vegne
 Für Neuseeland
 Uus-Meremaa nimel
 Για τη Νέα Ζηλανδία
 Pour la Nouvelle-Zélande
 Za Novi Zeland
 Per la Nuova Zelanda
 Jaunzēlandes vārdā
 Naujosios Zelandijos vardu
 Új-Zéland részéről
 Għal New Zealand
 Voor Nieuw-Zeeland
 W imieniu Nowej Zelandii
 Pela Nova Zelândia
 Pentru Noua Zeelandă
 Za Nový Zéland
 Za Novo Zelandijo
 Uuden-Seelannin puolesta
 För Nya Zeeland


text:
 29.9.2012
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 295/27
 2012 m. liepos 19 d. pareikštas ieškinys byloje Hut.com prieš VRDT — Intersport France (THE HUT)
 (Byla T-330/12)
 2012/C 295/48
 Kalba, kuria surašytas ieškinys: anglų
 Šalys
 Ieškovė: The Hut.com Ltd (Nortvičas, Jungtinė Karalystė), atstovaujama baristerio S. Malynicz
 Atsakovė: Vidaus rinkos derinimo tarnyba (prekių ženklams ir pramoniniam dizainui)
 Kita procedūros Apeliacinėje taryboje šalis: Intersport France (Longjumeau, Prancūzija)
 Reikalavimai
 —
 Panaikinti 2012 m. balandžio 27 d. Vidaus rinkos derinimo tarnybos (prekių ženklams ir pramoniniam dizainui) antrosios apeliacinės tarybos sprendimą byloje R 814/2011-2.
 —
 Nurodyti atsakovei ir kitai procedūros Apeliacinėje taryboje šaliai padengti savo ir ieškovės bylinėjimosi išlaidas.
 Ieškinio pagrindai ir pagrindiniai argumentai
 Bendrijos prekių ženklo paraišką pateikęs asmuo: ieškovė
 Prašomas įregistruoti Bendrijos prekių ženklas: žodinis ženklas THE HUT 35 klasės prekėms ir paslaugoms — Bendrijos prekių ženklo paraiška Nr. 8394091
 Prekių ženklo ar žymens, kuriuo remtasi per protesto procedūrą, savininkas: kita procedūros Apeliacinėje taryboje šalis
 Prekių ženklas ar žymuo, kuriuo remiamasi: Prancūzijos žodinis prekių ženklas LA HUTTE 3, 5, 18, 22, 25 ir 28 klasių prekėms
 Protestų skyriaus sprendimas: atmesti visą protestą
 Apeliacinės tarybos sprendimas: iš dalies panaikinti skundžiamą sprendimą
 Ieškinio pagrindai: Tarybos reglamento Nr. 207/2009 8 straipsnio 1 dalies b punkto pažeidimas


jurisdiction: US

text: b'ER-B-99-03\n\n\n\n\n AUDIT\n REPORT\n\n WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH\n RIVER COMPANY\xe2\x80\x99S HEALTH\n BENEFIT PLAN\n\n\n\n\n JANUARY 1999\n\n\n\n\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES\n\x0c DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY\n Washington, DC 20585\n January 25, 1999\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE MANAGER, SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE\n\nFROM: Terry L. Brendlinger, Manager\n Eastern Regional Audit Office\n Office of Inspector General\n\nSUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on "Westinghouse Savannah River Company\'s\n Health Benefit Plan"\n\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nWestinghouse Savannah River Company (Westinghouse) manages and operates the Savannah River\nSite, located in Aiken, South Carolina, for the U.S. Department of Energy (Department).\nWestinghouse was self-insured for health benefits and contracted with Aetna Insurance to administer\nthe plan (service payments to providers) from Calendar Year (CY) 1989 through 1996.\nWestinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s administrative service contract with Aetna Insurance expired on December 31, 1996.\nWestinghouse chose Blue Cross/Blue Shield of South Carolina (BC/BS) to administer its health plan,\neffective January 1, 1997.\n\nAfter the contract was awarded to BC/BS, 47 health care providers in the Aiken area submitted their\nresignations as preferred providers for BC/BS. The health care providers complained that the fees\nreceived from BC/BS were less than they were previously paid through Aetna Insurance. As a result,\nWestinghouse instructed BC/BS to negotiate a modified fee schedule for all the health care providers\nin the Aiken area.\n\nThe audit objective was to determine whether the health benefit costs incurred by Westinghouse\nunder the BC/BS contract were necessary and reasonable.\n\n\nRESULTS OF AUDIT\n\nA portion of Westinghouse\'s 1997 and 1998 health benefit costs were unnecessary and unreasonable.\nWestinghouse instructed BC/BS to pay health care providers in the Aiken area at higher rates than\nBC/BS paid its other preferred providers in South Carolina. This condition existed because\nWestinghouse did not want its employees to be inconvenienced and it wanted to protect the Aiken\nRegional Medical Centers from financial difficulty. As a result of the higher rates paid to Aiken area\nhealth care providers, the Department will incur unnecessary and unreasonable costs of about\n$1.7 million over a 3-year period. We recommended that the Manager, Savannah River Operations\nOffice (1) recoup health benefit costs that are incurred under Westinghouse\'s contract with BC/BS\nand determined to be unallowable by the Contracting Officer, and (2) limit future reimbursements for\nhealth benefits to the standard BC/BS rates.\n\x0c -2-\n\n\n MANAGEMENT REACTION\n\n Management did not concur with the finding or Recommendation 1. Management did not consider\n any of the health benefit costs paid by Westinghouse to be unnecessary or unreasonable. Management\n did concur with Recommendation 2, however, stating that reimbursements for health benefits will be\n limited to the standard BC/BS rates and agreements in South Carolina and Georgia beginning\n January 1, 2000.\n\n\n\n\nPage 10\n\x0cWESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY\'S HEALTH\nBENEFIT PLAN\n\n\nTABLE OF\nCONTENTS\n\n\n\n Overview\n\n Introduction and Objective .........................................................1\n\n Conclusions and Observations.................................................. 2\n\n\n Rates Paid to Aiken-Area Health Care Providers\n\n Details of Finding ......................................................................3\n\n Recommendations and Comments ...........................................5\n\n\n Appendix\n\n Scope and Methodology ............................................................8\n\x0cOverview\n\nINTRODUCTION AND Westinghouse manages and operates the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Savannah River\nOBJECTIVE Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina and Augusta, Georgia.\n Westinghouse was self-insured for health benefits and contracted with\n Aetna Insurance to administer the plan from CY 1989 through CY 1996.\n In early 1996, the Operations Office and Westinghouse agreed to solicit\n competitive bids for the administration of its health benefit plan in an\n effort to reduce overall costs.\n\n Westinghouse chose BC/BS to administer its health plan, effective\n January 1, 1997. This selection was based on three factors: (1) the\n administrative fee charged by BC/BS was lower than other vendors;\n (2) the discount negotiated by BC/BS with the health care providers was\n higher than other vendors who responded; and (3) the number of health\n care providers in the Aiken/Augusta area within BC/BS\xe2\x80\x99s established\n health care network equaled or exceeded other vendors. Westinghouse\n estimated that the new contract reduced overall cost by $8.5 million\n during CY 1997.\n\n Westinghouse employees use the medical services of doctors and\n hospitals located in the Aiken/Augusta area which includes Aiken\n County, South Carolina and Richmond County, Georgia. There are\n 5 hospitals and over 700 health care providers which are BC/BS\n preferred providers in these 2 counties. In Richmond County, the\n BC/BS network contains 4 of the 5 hospitals and over 600 medical\n personnel.\n\n After the contract was awarded, 47 health care providers in the Aiken\n area submitted their resignations as preferred providers for BC/BS. The\n health care providers complained that the fees received from\n BC/BS were less than they were previously paid through Aetna\n Insurance.\n\n In December 1996, Westinghouse instructed BC/BS to negotiate a\n modified fee schedule for all the health care providers in the Aiken area.\n BC/BS negotiated a modified fee schedule for Westinghouse not to\n exceed Aetna\xe2\x80\x99s 1996 fee levels, declining over a 3-year period. The\n 1997 fees for all procedures were set at BC/BS 1996 levels plus 20\n percent, not to exceed Aetna\xe2\x80\x99s 1996 payment level. The 1998 fees were\n set at BC/BS 1996 fee levels plus 15 percent. Finally, the 1999 fees\n were set at BC/BS 1996 levels plus 10 percent.\n\n\n\n\nPage 1 Westinghouse Savannah River\n Company\'s Health Benefit Plan\n\x0c The audit objective was to determine whether the health benefit costs\n incurred by Westinghouse under the BC/BS contract were necessary and\n reasonable.\nCONCLUSIONS AND\n A portion of Westinghouse\'s 1997 and 1998 health benefit costs were\nOBSERVATIONS\n unnecessary and unreasonable. Westinghouse instructed BC/BS to pay\n health care providers in the Aiken area at higher rates than BC/BS paid\n its other preferred providers in South Carolina. This condition existed\n because Westinghouse did not want its employees to be inconvenienced\n and it wanted to protect the Aiken Regional Medical Centers from\n financial difficulty. As a result of the higher rates paid to Aiken-area\n health care providers, the Department will incur, over a 3-year period,\n about $1.7 million in health benefit costs that are unnecessary and\n unreasonable.\n\n The audit identified an issue that management should consider when\n preparing its yearend assurance memorandum on internal controls.\n\n\n\n\n ________(Signed)______\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\n\n\nPage 2 Westinghouse Savannah River\n Company\'s Health Benefit Plan\n\x0cRATES PAID TO AIKEN-AREA HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS\n\n\nCost Increases Were Westinghouse authorized BC/BS to pay additional fees to Aiken-area\nUnnecessary and health care providers that were neither necessary nor reasonable. The\nUnreasonable additional fees were unnecessary because all the medical services could\n have been obtained from BC/BS health care providers at preferred rates.\n Other health care providers in the BC/BS preferred provider network\n within the service area were able to provide all of the specialized types\n of medical services that the 47 resigning health care providers could\n have provided. The withdrawal of the 47 health care providers would\n not have prevented Westinghouse employees from obtaining needed\n medical services within the service area.\n\n The additional costs were unreasonable because they exceeded the rates\n that BC/BS paid other health care providers in the area. Westinghouse\n selected BC/BS as its health care administrator partly based on its\n expertise at establishing reasonable compensation rates for health care\n providers. BC/BS defined reasonable compensation for the health care\n providers in its preferred provider network in South Carolina. All health\n care providers in the BC/BS preferred provider network, except for the\n 47 who submitted their resignations, agreed to accept those rates as\n reasonable compensation for their services.\n\nWestinghouse Did Not Westinghouse agreed to pay higher rates to Aiken-area health care\nWant Its Employees to providers because it did not want its employees to pay more for health\nbe Inconvenienced care providers\' services, and it did not want employees to spend\n additional time away from work while traveling outside Aiken for\n medical care.\n\n Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s Benefits Administration Division was concerned that if\n enough health care providers resigned from the BC/BS preferred\n provider network, some specialties might not be practiced by BC/BS\n preferred providers within the service area. That could cause some\n employees to use specialists outside the network, who might charge the\n employees amounts that exceed BC/BS rates. If so, the employees\n might be required to pay the health care providers for the difference\n between the BC/BS rate and the billed amount. However, the 16\n specialties practiced by the 47 health care providers who submitted their\n resignations were readily available in the Aiken/Augusta area. All of the\n specialties were practiced by BC/BS preferred health care providers in\n the Augusta area. Also, seven of the specialties were practiced by other\n BC/BS preferred health care providers in the Aiken area.\n\n\n\n\nPage 3 Details of Finding\n\x0c Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s Benefits Administration Division was also concerned\n that its employees might spend more time away from work if they\n traveled to Augusta for medical care. However, the difference in\n commuting time is negligible. For example, it takes about 27 minutes\n to commute from the A area of the Savannah River Site to the Aiken\n Regional Medical Centers. It takes only 3 minutes more to commute\n to a BC/BS preferred provider hospital in Augusta, Georgia.\n Nevertheless, several Aiken employees\' spouses and family members\n would have to travel about 20 extra miles to and from Augusta for\n medical care.\n\n In addition to the concern for employees, Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s Benefits\nWestinghouse Was\n Administration Division was also concerned about the financial\nConcerned About the\n viability of the Aiken Regional Medical Centers. If a significant\nAiken Regional Medical\n number of the physicians on the Aiken Regional Medical Centers\'\nCenters staff stopped participating in the BC/BS preferred provider network,\n more of Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s employees would be admitted for treatment\n to other preferred provider hospitals. This potential reduction in\n patient admissions might reduce Aiken Regional Medical Centers\'\n revenues to the point where it was economically threatened.\n\n However, of the 47 health care providers who submitted their\n resignations from the BC/BS preferred provider program, 7 were\n nurse anesthetists, 3 were pathologists, and 3 were anesthesiologists.\n These 13 health care providers did not admit patients; therefore, the\n Aiken Regional Medical Centers were not dependent upon them for\n admissions. The patients who would have been admitted by the\n remaining 34 health care providers who threatened to resign might\n still have been admitted to the Aiken Regional Medical Centers,\n regardless of the health care providers\' status in the BC/BS plan.\n Therefore, we believe any potential impact on the Aiken Regional\n Medical Centers would have been minimal.\n\n As a result of the higher rates paid to Aiken-area health care\nDepartment Will Incur providers, the Department will incur, over a 3-year period, about $1.7\n$1.7 Million in million in health benefit costs that are unnecessary and unreasonable.\nUnnecessary Costs Had Westinghouse not intervened, agreeing to pay higher rates to\n Aiken-area preferred providers, some Westinghouse employees and\n their families would have obtained medical care from out-of-network\n physicians or from preferred providers outside the Aiken area. In\n either of these scenarios, the cost of health benefits for those\n employees and their families could have increased. Our estimate of\n\n\nPage 4 Details of Finding\n\x0c unnecessary costs includes the additional cost to the Department\n assuming the worst-case scenario, wherein all patients of the health care\n providers who submitted their resignations would have obtained their\n medical services from non-network providers.\n\n We recommend that the Manager, Savannah River Operations Office (1)\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n recoup health benefit costs that are incurred under Westinghouse\'s\n contract with BC/BS and determined to be unallowable by the\n Contracting Officer, and (2) limit future reimbursements for health\n benefits to the standard BC/BS rates.\n\n Management did not concur with the finding or Recommendation 1.\nMANAGEMENT REACTION\n Management did not consider any of the health benefit costs paid by\n Westinghouse to be unnecessary or unreasonable. Management did\n concur with Recommendation 2, however, stating that reimbursements\n for health benefits would be limited to the standard BC/BS rates and\n agreements in South Carolina and Georgia beginning January 1, 2000.\n\n Management stated that the reason it did not concur with the finding or\n Recommendation 1 was because neither the Department nor\n Westinghouse foresaw the consequences of BC/BS implementing its\n standard reimbursement schedule with the Aiken doctors. Management\n stated that the reasonableness of a cost under Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s contract is\n governed by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.201-3. The FAR\n provides, \xe2\x80\x9ca cost is reasonable if, in its nature and amount, it does not\n exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct\n of competitive business\xe2\x80\xa6 What is reasonable depends upon a variety of\n considerations and circumstances, including\xe2\x80\xa6 (3) The contractor\xe2\x80\x99s\n responsibilities to the Government, other customers, the owners of the\n business, employees and the public at large\xe2\x80\xa6 \xe2\x80\x9d Conversely, for a cost to\n be unallowable, it must fail these tests. In this particular case, it is\n extremely difficult to conclude Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s actions were\n unreasonable and unallowable. After considering the state of morale of\n its employees, the adverse community impact which had already resulted\n from the downsizing activities of the site, the impending threat of more\n downsizing activities, the dollars the Department had spent to help\n mitigate the downsizing impacts on the local community through its\n Worker and Community Transition Program, and that Westinghouse had\n inadvertently created a situation in the entire community, Westinghouse\n decided to intervene.\n The withdrawal of the doctors from the BC/BS network not only\n\n\n\nPage 5 Recommendations and Comments\n\x0c affected the finances and morale of Westinghouse employees, it also\n adversely affected the employees (and their families) of all other local\n companies who were BC/BS subscribers (including even Savannah\n River Federal employees who were BC/BS subscribers.) The\n Westinghouse selection of BC/BS as its administrator eventually led to\n the Aiken Regional Medical Centers ceasing to be part of the BC/BS\n network for BC/BS members other than Westinghouse employees.\n What started as an effort by Westinghouse to save administrative\n processing costs for health benefits ultimately generated a situation\n impacting the entire local community.\n\n Additionally, management stated that it could not find fault with the\n actions taken by Westinghouse to resolve problems related to the\n implementation of the BC/BS standard reimbursement schedule under\n the circumstances that existed at the time and the totality of the issues\n involved. Management stated that the morale of Westinghouse\n employees was at an all time low. The threat of layoffs in early 1997\n was a high probability, and over 300 managerial positions were being\n competed among Westinghouse\'s employees and employees of the new\n companies involved in the contract. Also, Westinghouse had advised\n its employees that their health care contributions would increase\n effective January 1, 1997.\n\n Finally, management stated that it would advise Westinghouse to\n formally engage the Department whenever actions are required in\n relation to unusual or precedent setting situations, or whenever the\n issue is likely to generate significant Congressional, employee, or public\n interest. Management stated that the BC/BS situation would clearly\n have met these criteria.\n\n We recognize that Westinghouse did not expect 47 health care\n providers to submit their resignations from the BC/BS preferred\nAUDITOR COMMENTS provider network, and that employee morale was probably low at the\n time the BC/BS contract was awarded. Nevertheless, Westinghouse\n should not have intervened in the resolution process between BC/BS\n and its preferred providers. The resignation of 7 percent of the BC/BS\n providers in the Aiken/Augusta area would have affected only a small\n number of Westinghouse employees, many of whom would have\n chosen other preferred providers in the area. We consider the cost to\n be unreasonable because, in our opinion, a prudent person in a\n competitive business would not have intervened and directed BC/BS to\n meet the 47 providers\' demands.\n When Westinghouse selected BC/BS as its administrative service\n contractor, it should have known that the new contract would\nPage 6 Recommendations and Comments\n\x0c significantly reduce reimbursements to health care providers in the area.\n The BC/BS provided Westinghouse with its current standard rates\n during contract negotiations. Westinghouse should have determined\n that the BC/BS rates were significantly lower than those used under the\n Aetna Insurance contract.\n\n We agree that Westinghouse should formally engage the Department\n whenever similar actions are determined to be required in the future.\n Had Westinghouse fully engaged the Department in the BC/BS case,\n we believe the Department would have prevented Westinghouse from\n intervening in the determination of preferred provider reimbursement\n rates.\n\n We consider management\xe2\x80\x99s intention to limit future reimbursements\n for health benefit costs to the standard rates set by BC/BS to be\n responsive to Recommendation 2.\n\n\n\n\nPage 7 Recommendations and Comments\n\x0cAppendix\n\nSCOPE The audit was performed from July 23, 1998, through October 2, 1998,\n at the Savannah River Site and the offices of BC/BS in Columbia, South\n Carolina.\n\nMETHODOLOGY To accomplish the audit objective, we:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed Federal regulations governing reasonable and allowable\n costs;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed the Department\'s contract with Westinghouse;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Visited BC/BS to determine health care providers\' fees in the\n Aiken-area;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluated Westinghouse\'s payments for services provided by health\n care providers in the Aiken-area for CY 1997; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determined the increases in health care providers\' fees paid under the\n modified agreement in CY 1997 and estimated the amount of\n unnecessary costs to be paid under the modified agreement in\n CYs 1998 and 1999.\n\n\n The audit was performed in accordance with generally accepted\n Government auditing standards for performance audits and included\n tests of internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations to the\n extent necessary to satisfy the audit objective. Accordingly, we assessed\n Westinghouse\xe2\x80\x99s internal controls over the increased charges. Because\n our review was limited, it would not necessarily have disclosed all\n internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of the\n audit.\n\n We relied on computer-generated data provided by BC/BS regarding\n fees for services provided by Aiken-area health care providers. We did\n not evaluate general and application controls for the BC/BS database.\n Our estimate of unnecessary costs is qualified, accordingly.\n\n\n\n\nPage 8 Scope and Methodology\n\x0c IG Report No.: ER-B-99-03\n\n CUSTOMER RESPONSE FORM\n\n\nThe Office of Inspector General has a continuing interest in improving the usefulness of its products. We\nwish to make our reports as responsive as possible to our customers\' requirements, and, therefore, ask that\nyou consider sharing your thoughts with us. On the back of this form, you may suggest improvements to\nenhance the effectiveness of future reports. Please include answers to the following questions if they are\napplicable to you:\n\n1. What additional background information about the selection, scheduling, scope, or procedures of the\n audit would have been helpful to the reader in understanding this report?\n\n2. What additional information related to findings and recommendations could have been included in this\n report to assist management in implementing corrective actions?\n\n3. What format, stylistic, or organizational changes might have made this report\'s overall message more\n clear to the reader?\n\n4. What additional actions could the Office of Inspector General have taken on the issues discussed in this\n report which would have been helpful?\n\nPlease include your name and telephone number so that we may contact you should we have any questions\nabout your comments.\n\nName _____________________________ Date __________________________\n\nTelephone _________________________ Organization ____________________\n\nWhen you have completed this form, you may telefax it to the Office of Inspector General at (202) 586-\n0948, or you may mail it to:\n\n Office of Inspector General (IG-1)\n Department of Energy\n Washington, DC 20585\n\n ATTN: Customer Relations\n\nIf you wish to discuss this report or your comments with a staff member of the Office of Inspector General,\nplease contact Wilma Slaughter at (202) 586-1924.\n\x0cThe Office of Inspector General wants to make the distribution of its reports as customer friendly and cost\n effective as possible. Therefore, this report will be available electronically through the Internet at the\n following alternative address:\n\n\n Department of Energy Human Resources and Administration Home Page\n http://www.hr.doe.gov/ig\n\n Your comments would be appreciated and can be provided on the\n Customer Response Form attached to the report.\n\n This report can be obtained from the\n U.S. Department of Energy\n Office of Scientific and Technical Information\n P.O. Box 62\n Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831\n\x0c'


text:
 9.2.2015
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 C 46/60
 Beroep ingesteld op 12 december 2014 — BPC Lux 2 e.a./Commissie
 (Zaak T-812/14)
 (2015/C 046/78)
 Procestaal: Engels
 Partijen
 Verzoekende partijen: BPC Lux 2 Sàrl (Senningerberg, Luxemburg), BPC UKI LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), Bennett Offshore Restructuring Fund, Inc. (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), Bennett Restructuring Fund LP (Wilmington, Verenigde Staten), Queen Street Fund Ltd (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), BTG Pactual Global Emerging Markets and Macro Master Fund LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), BTG Pactual Absolute Return II Master Fund LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), CSS LLC (Chicago, Verenigde Staten), Beltway Strategic Opportunities Fund LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), EJF Debt Opportunities Master Fund LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), EJF DO Fund (Cayman) LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), TP Lux HoldCo (Luxemburg, Luxemburg), VR Global Partners LP (George Town, Kaaimaneilanden), Absalon II Ltd (Dublin, Ierland), CenturyLink, Inc. Defined Benefit Master Trust (Denver, Verenigde Staten), City of New York Group Trust (New York, Verenigde Staten), Dignity Health (San Francisco, Verenigde Staten), GoldenTree Asset Management Lux Sàrl (Luxemburg, Luxemburg), GoldenTree High Yield Value Fund Offshore 110 Two Ltd (Dublin, Ierland), San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association (San Bernardino, Verenigde Staten) (vertegenwoordigers: J. Webber en M. Steenson, solicitors, en P. Fajardo, advocaat)
 Verwerende partij: Europese Commissie
 Conclusies
 —
 nietigverklaring van het besluit van de Commissie van 3 augustus 2014 in procedure SA.39250 om geen bezwaar te maken tegen een door Portugal aangemelde maatregel tot herstructurering van Banco Espirito Santo S.A. (BES), en
 —
 verwijzing van de Commissie in de kosten.
 Middelen en voornaamste argumenten
 Ter ondersteuning van hun beroep voeren verzoeksters twee middelen aan.
 1.
 Eerste middel: de Commissie heeft blijk gegeven van een onjuiste rechtsopvatting, beoordelingsfouten gemaakt en vormvoorwaarden geschonden door kennelijk na te laten het nulscenario te beoordelen, meer bepaald wat de beschikbaarheid van privékapitaal betreft dat tot de herstructurering van BES kon bijdragen.
 —
 De Commissie heeft een hele reeks vereisten van de bankenmededeling geschonden door de volgende vragen helemaal niet te onderzoeken, of door haar beoordeling dienaangaande niet te motiveren: a) Was de steun beperkt tot het noodzakelijke minimum? b) Is er maximaal gebruikgemaakt van privékapitaal? c) Gold er een uitzondering op het vereiste dat houders van achtergestelde schuld ten volle bijdragen, op grond van het feit dat dit een invloed zou hebben op de financiële stabiliteit en onevenredig zou zijn? d) Is het beginsel in acht genomen dat geen enkele crediteur slechter af mag zijn?
 —
 De Commissie heeft het nulscenario niet onderzocht en is daardoor uitgegaan van de onjuiste feitelijke veronderstelling dat het enige alternatief voor de aangemelde maatregelen bestond in de liquidatie van BES. Zij heeft geen rekening gehouden met de bewijzen waaruit bleek dat nieuw privékapitaal beschikbaar was, waardoor de voor de aangemelde staatssteun vereiste staatssteun had kunnen worden verminderd.
 —
 De Commissie diende de formele onderzoeksprocedure in te leiden op grond van artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU. Door dat niet te doen, heeft zij inbreuk gemaakt op de procedurele rechten die verzoeksters aan deze bepaling ontlenen.
 2.
 Tweede middel: de Commissie heeft de procedurele rechten van verzoeksters geschonden door geen formele onderzoeksprocedure in te leiden.
 —
 De aanmelding deed, objectief beschouwd, aanzienlijke beoordelingsproblemen rijzen, zowel in feite als in rechte.
 —
 Het voorafgaande onderzoek door de Commissie, dat één zondag in beslag nam, kan niet volledig en toereikend geweest zijn, gelet op het belang en de complexiteit van het voorwerp van het onderzoek.
 —
 De Commissie had redenen om aan te nemen dat de informatie waarover zij beschikte, wel eens onbetrouwbaar kon zijn of minstens diende te worden geverifieerd voordat zij als betrouwbaar kon worden bestempeld.
 —
 De Commissie heeft geen rekening gehouden met de punten 50 tot en met 53 van de bankenmededeling, die voorzien in een reddings- en herstructureringsproces in twee fasen voor spoedeisende situaties zoals die van BES.
 —
 De Commissie was verplicht om een formeel onderzoek in te leiden. Doordat zij dat niet heeft gedaan, hebben verzoeksters niet als belanghebbenden aan de procedure kunnen deelnemen, waardoor de hun bij artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU verleende procedurele rechten zijn geschonden.


text:
 30.12.2006
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 C 326/60
 Recurso interpuesto el 6 de noviembre de 2006 — UniCredito Italiano/OAMI — Union Investment Privatfonds (Uniweb)
 (Asunto T-303/06)
 (2006/C 326/130)
 Lengua de procedimiento: italiano
 Partes
 Demandante: UniCredito Italiano S.p.A. (Génova, Italia) (representantes: G. Floridia y R. Floridia, abogados)
 Demandada: Oficina de Armonización del Mercado Interior (Marcas, Dibujos y Modelos)
 Otra parte en el procedimiento ante la Sala de Recurso: Union Investment Privatfonds GmbH
 Pretensiones de la parte demandante
 —
 Que se anule la resolución de la Segunda Sala de Recurso de la OAMI de 5 de septiembre de 2006, adoptada en el procedimiento acumulado R 196/2005-2 y R 211/2005-2, relativo a la oposición no B490971 contra la solicitud de la marca comunitaria no 2.236.164.
 Motivos y principales alegaciones
 Solicitante de la marca comunitaria: la demandante.
 Marca comunitaria solicitada: marca denominativa «UNIWEB» (solicitud de registro no 2.236.164), para servicios de las clases 35, 36 y 42.
 Titular de la marca o signo invocados en el procedimiento de oposición: Union Investment Privatfonds GmbH, anteriormente Union Investment Gesellschaft GmbH.
 Marca o signo invocados en el procedimiento de oposición: Marcas denominativas alemanas «UNIFONDS» (no 991.995) y «UNIRAK» (no 991.997) y marca figurativa alemana «UNIZINS» (no 2.016.954) para distinguir la inversión de fondos en el sentido de la clase 36.
 Resolución de la División de Oposición: Estimación parcial de la oposición, en la medida en que se reconoce un riesgo de confusión «en relación únicamente con los servicios considerados similares».
 Resolución de la Sala de Recurso: Desestimación del recurso.
 Motivos invocados: La resolución impugnada aplicó erróneamente la teoría de la tutela ampliada de las llamadas marcas de serie, elaborada por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia en la sentencia de 23 de febrero de 2006, en el asunto T-194/03, Bainbridge, ya que non concurren los dos presupuestos necesarios a estos efectos: a) que el elemento común de la serie de marcas anteriores sea distintivo; b) que el público de referencia use y perciba las marcas anteriores como representativas de una multiplicidad de productos y/o servicios.


text:
The Fame hu l-ewwel album tal-artista Amerikana Lady Gaga. Dan ħareġ taħt id-ditta Interscope Records nhar id-19 ta' Awwissu, 2008. It-tema prinċipali wara l-kanzunetti ta' dan l-album hija fuq kif kulħadd jista' jħossu famuż bħal xi ċelebrità. Għal dan l-album Gaga ħadmet ma' diversi produtturi fosthom RedOne, Martin Kierszenbaum, u Rob Fusari. L-ispirazzjoni għal dawn il-kanzunetti hi ġejja mill-ammirazzjoni u l-imħabba li Gaga tħoss lejn il-fama in ġenerali, u titkellem fuq l-intriċċi tal-ħajja ta' sinjuri u famużi, kif tidher f'għajnejha.
 L-album irċieva kritika pożittiva, bi kritiċi jqabblu l-abbilitajiet vokali ta' Gaga ma' dawk ta' Gwen Stefani. L-album wasal sal-ewwel post f'pajjiżi bħar-Renju Unit, il-Kanada, l-Awstrija, il-Ġermanja, l-Iżvizzera u l-Irlanda. Ġewwa l-Istati Uniti l-album tela' sat-tieni post fil-Billboard 200 u fil-quċċata tal-klassifika Dance/Electronic Albums tal-istess Billboard. Madwar id-dinja, l-album biegħ iktar minn 12-il miljun kopja.
 L-ewwel żewġ kanzunetti minn The Fame, "Just Dance" u "Poker Face", kienu t-tnejn suċċess internazzjonali, b'"Just Dance" tkun fl-ewwel post tal-klassifiki mużikali f'sitt pajjiżi, fosthom fil-Billboard Hot 100 ġewwa l-Istati Uniti. "Poker Face" irnexxielha wkoll tmur fl-ewwel post fi kważi kull suq mużikali, u għal Gaga din kienet it-tieni darba in fila li kellha kanzunetta fl-ewwel post tal-klassifika Hot 100. Gaga ippromwoviet dan l-album billi kantat f'numru ta' esebizzjonijiet, fosthom fil-famuż tour The Fame Ball Tour.
 Nhar it-2 ta' Diċembru, 2009, The Fame ġie nominat għal sitt Grammy Awards u b'"Poker Face" rebħet il-premju ta' Best Dance Recording. Barra minn hekk, fit-52 edizzjoni tal-Grammy Awards, l-album ġie nominat għall-Album of the Year u rebaħ il-premju tal-Best Electronic/Dance Album.
 Albums ta' Lady Gaga
 Albums tal-2008
 Albums debuttanti