text:
pon20022017 search P. Oskár Formánek SJ
 Začiatkom septembra 2015 uplynula storočnica od narodenia pátra Oskára Formánka. Nedožitých sto rokov nám dáva vhodnú príležitosť zastaviť sa pri jeho ľudskom a rehoľnom svedectve, ktoré najmä v čase neslobody bolo pre mnohých príkladným a inšpirujúcim na ich osobnej evanjeliovej ceste.P. Oskár Formánek sa narodil 7. septembra 1915 v Lysej pod Makytou ako najstarší z desiatich detí v roľníckej rodine. Po skončení ľudovej školy pokračoval v gymnaziálnych štúdiách v Trenčíne. Pre jeho účasť na Pribinových oslavách v Nitre ho v roku 1933 vylúčili z gymnázia. Miestny farár mu odporučil obrátiť sa na ružomberského preláta Andreja Hlinku a hľadať riešenie u neho. Po rozhovore s A. Hlinkom našiel východisko v tom, že 29. januára 1934 vstúpil do jezuitského noviciátu.V gymnaziálnych štúdiách pokračoval od septembra 1935 a v nasledujúcom roku ich zavŕšil maturitou v Kláštore pod Znievom. V septembri 1936 začal filozofické štúdiá na Teologickej fakulte v Innsbrucku. Po dvoch rokoch odchádza do Chorvátska, aby na Filozofickom inštitúte v Záhrebe dokončil štúdiá. V lete 1939 sa vracia do Ružomberka, kde pracuje v redakcii periodík Apoštolát a Naše novinky. Biskup Ján Vojtaššák zveril svoj malý seminár v Levoči do starostlivosti jezuitom. Do vyučovania gymnazistov sa zapojil aj Oskár Formánek a od jesene 1940 tam vyučoval latinčinu a zemepis. Po praktickej dvojročnej službe na gymnáziu začína v septembri 1942 teologické štúdiá na rehoľnom inštitúte v Banskej Bystrici. V závere teologických štúdií je 25. januára 1945 vysvätený za kňaza. Povojnové časy priniesli zvýšený počet povolaní a P. Oskár nastupuje od jesene 1946 do funkcie subministra v jezuitskom dome v Ružomberku, kde sa zúčastňuje aj na formácii školastikov v junioráte. V júli 1947 ho predstavení poslali dokončiť formáciu na ročný pobyt tretej probácie do belgického Wépion-Namuru. Po roku v zahraničí sa vrátil do jezuitského domu v Bratislave. Od júla 1949 je mu zverená úloha sócia v noviciáte v Ružomberku. Sóciom ostáva až do likvidácie mužských reholí v apríli 1950. S ostatnými jezuitmi bol najprv v jasovskom kláštore a po desiatich dňoch v Podolínci. Pre zdravotné ťažkosti musel odísť do nemocnice v Levoči. Odtiaľ v čase Vianoc 1950 tajne odchádza a potom sa ukrýva v rôznych rodinách v Ružomberku, v Ľubochni a od septembra 1952 v Trenčíne v rodine Adamovských. V tomto období formačne viedol skrytým spôsobom viacerých novicov a školastikov zamestnaných v civilných povolaniach. Pokúšal sa v skrytosti obnoviť noviciátsku formáciu a tajne začal prijímať záujemcov o rehoľný život. Na podnet P. Provinciála J. Srnu sa prestalo v tajnej formácii novicov po r. 1952 pokračovať. Dôvodom bolo najmä to, že rehoľa v päťdesiatych rokoch nevidela možnosť verejného pôsobenia na Slovensku a nechcela mladých kandidátov formovať bez širšej spoločenskej vízie. Manželia Július a Mária Adamovskí boli za poskytnuté útočište pátrovi Oskárovi 2. apríla 1955 zatknutí a Krajský súd v Žiline ich 5. júna 1956 potrestal na stratu slobody. Július bol odsúdený na dva a Mária na rok a pol. Rovnako za pomoc P. Oskárovi a ďalším členom rehole z Ružomberka bol odsúdený Ľudovít Novák z Ľubochne na tri roky straty slobody. Po odvolaní sa na vyšší súd do Prahy boli bez výroku súdu všetci prepustení 29. augusta 1956. O mesiac neskôr Krajský súd v Žiline rozhodol na verejnom zasadaní aplikovať na odsúdených manželov Adamovských a na Ľ. Nováka dodatočne amnestiu prezidenta republiky z 9. mája 1955. Zámer súdu, podľa Márie Adamovskej, mal dokázať obvinenému Oskárovi Formánkovi velezradu a usvedčiť ho svedeckými výpoveďami desiatok ľudí povolaných na výpovede najmä na výstrahu ostatným.
 V roku 1955 bolo postupne na Slovensku internovaných 10 jezuitov. Páter Oskár bol zatknutý 3. apríla 1955 a vo vyšetrovacej väzbe v Žiline obžalovaný z vlastizrady. Na jar 1956 sa začal skupinový súdny proces Srna a spol. Najvyšší súd v Prahe odsúdil 28. apríla 1956 pátra O. Formánka na 10 rokov väzenia nepodmienečne. Výkon trestu nastúpil do Nápravného zariadenia vo Valdiciach, kde bol internovaný až do mája 1960. Mnohým väzňom udelil amnestiu prezident republiky pri príležitosti pätnásteho výročia konca druhej svetovej vojny a medzi prepustenými bol aj P. Oskár.Po príchode do civilného života sa v júli 1960 zamestnal na Ústave geodézie a kartografie v Púchove. Tam pracoval až do mája 1965. Nato sa P. Formánek presťahoval do Prešova. V Prešove bol pol roka zamestnaný ako plánovač na Poľnohospodárskom stavebno-technickom rozvoji a od 1. januára 1966 v Poľnohospodárskych stavbách. Udalosti Pražskej jari v roku 1968 mu ponúkli možnosť zaradiť sa opäť do verejnej činnosti v Katolíckej cirkvi. Od októbra 1968 až do 30. septembra 1972 pôsobí v pastorácii vo farnosti Dóm sv. Mikuláša v Prešove. Jeho horlivú službu zastavil cirkevný tajomník, ktorý mu odňal štátny súhlas pre verejnú pastoráciu. V závere jeho kňazského pôsobenia v Prešove vzišlo u neho rozhodnutie prijať biskupské svätenie. V utajení mu ho v auguste 1972 vyslúžil bývalý spoluväzeň z Valdíc tajný biskup Félix Mária Dávidek. Zložité a napäté pomery, aké približujú z tohto obdobia listy P. Oskára, dávajú tušiť niečo z nejasných motívov pre rozhodnutie ku konsekrácii. Svätá stolica ohodnotí neskôr všetky svätenia Félixa M. Dávidka ako pochybné. Po odňatí štátneho súhlasu pre verejnú pastoráciu P. Oskár Formánek sa prechodne zamestnal v Kovospracujúcom podniku v Prešove ako skladník (1972); v ZVL v Prešove ako robotník (1973); vo Východoslovenských žriedlach ako administratívna sila (1973) a na Okresnom stavebnom bytovom družstve v Prešove ako skladník až do dôchodku (1976). Popri povolaní pracoval po roku 1968 prechodne v tíme prekladateľov liturgických kníh pre Spolok sv. Vojtecha. Preložil do slovenčiny rehoľné propriá z breviára, ako aj liturgické texty na sviatky a spomienky blahoslavených a svätých z rehole jezuitov. Prekladateľská práca pre Spolok sv. Vojtecha bola pre neho zdrojom radosti, ale aj napätia. Problémy sa vystupňovali v r. 1970, keď na osobitnom súdnom procese sa páter dožadoval priznania autorských práv za preložené liturgické texty. Súdny tribunál mu ich nepriznal a tlmočil mu, že v prípade liturgických modlitieb autorské práva nemá prekladateľ, ale Cirkev, ktorá ich zostavila. Tento súdny spor nebol pre neho posledným. V novembri 1978 mu Štb urobila domovú prehliadku a zhabala viac kníh i ďalších vecí, ktoré hodlala využiť pre plánovaný súdny proces s ním. Po domovej prehliadke nasledovali ešte ďalšie 4 výsluchy s obviňovaním z trestnej činnosti, z marenia dozoru štátu nad cirkvami a z poburovania. V októbri 1979 prokurátor podal na neho prvú žalobu a Okresný súd v Prešove ho spolu s Máriou Kožárovou 25. júna 1980 súdil za rozmnožovanie a rozširovanie ilegálnej literatúry aj podnecovanie laického apoštolátu. Tribunál ho potrestal odňatím slobody na 18 mesiacov s podmienkou na 4 roky a Márii Kožárovej súd vymeral trest na jeden rok s podmienkou na 3 roky.Po odvolaní sa na vyššiu súdnu inštanciu zrušil Krajský súd v Košiciach pôvodný rozsudok Okresného súdu a vrátil ho prokurátorovi na prešetrenie. V apríli 1982 okresný prokurátor v Prešove podal na pátra druhú žalobu pre poburovanie a marenie dozoru štátu nad cirkvami. Súd v Prešove ho 28. júla 1982 odsúdil na jeden rok väzenia s podmienkou na 2 roky a Máriu Kožárovú na pol roka s podmienkou na jeden rok. Súdna kauza bola zdĺhavá a o každom postupe súdu o pátrových odvolaniach sa na vyššiu inštanciu, alebo o jeho obhajobách na súdnych procesoch podrobne referovali samizdatové médiá i rozhlasové stanice v zahraničí. Pátra proces vyčerpal a zdravotne oslabil.V roku 1983 P. Oskár vyjavil provinciálnemu predstavenému P. A. Osvaldovi skutočnosť o prijatí biskupského svätenia v roku 1972. Podľa vyžiadaných inštrukcií z Generálnej kúrie SJ v Ríme mala táto záležitosť ostať v utajení, bez vyvíjania akýchkoľvek aktivít vyplývajúcich z biskupskej hodnosti P. Formánka. Páter bol v rokoch totality činný aj spisovateľsky. V podobe samizdatov sa šírili jeho diela Hľa žena, Podobenstvá Kristove, O eucharistii, Exegézy zo synoptických evanjelií. Jeho zápas so slovenskou justíciou ešte pokračoval vo vymáhaní zhabaných vecí z predchádzajúcej domovej prehliadky, až kým sa v roku 1985 nedočkal uspokojivého riešenia z Krajského súdu v Košiciach. Po telesnom a psychickom vyčerpaní dostáva v roku 1985 mozgovú príhodu a v r. 1987 porážku. Nasledujúce zdravotné komplikácie a infarkt z 21. júla 1991 znamenali pre neho posledné životné chvíle. Zaopatrený sviatosťami zomiera vo veku 76 rokov. Páter Oskár Formánek bol pochovaný na prešovskom cintoríne 24. júla 1991. новинки кинематографа


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 28.1.2012
 EL
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
 C 25/62
 Προσφυγή-αγωγή της 22ας Νοεμβρίου 2011 — Anbouba κατά Συμβουλίου
 (Υπόθεση T-592/11)
 (2012/C 25/118)
 Γλώσσα διαδικασίας: η γαλλική
 Διάδικοι
 Προσφεύγων-ενάγων: Issam Anbouba (Homs, Συρία) (εκπρόσωποι: M.-A. Bastin και J. M. Salva, δικηγόροι)
 Καθού-εναγόμενο: Συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
 Αιτήματα του προσφεύγοντος-ενάγοντος
 Ο προσφεύγων-ενάγων ζητεί από το Γενικό Δικαστήριο:
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 να κρίνει παραδεκτή την υπό κρίση προσφυγή-αγωγή στο σύνολό της,
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 να την κρίνει βάσιμη στο σύνολό της,
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 να επιτρέψει την συνένωση της υπό κρίση προσφυγής-αγωγής με το δικόγραφο Τ-563/11,
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 να αποφανθεί ότι οι προσβαλλόμενες πράξεις μπορούν να ακυρωθούν μερικώς καθώς οι ακυρωτέες πράξεις είναι αποσπαστές της πράξεως στο σύνολό της,
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 ως εκ τούτου,
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 να ακυρώσει εν μέρει την απόφαση 2011/685/ΚΕΠΠΑ, του Συμβουλίου, της 13ης Οκτωβρίου 2011 και του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) 1011/2011, του Συμβουλίου, της 13ης Οκτωβρίου 2011, απαλείφοντας οτιδήποτε αφορά την κρίση ότι ο Issam ANBOUBA υποστηρίζει το υφιστάμενο καθεστώς στη Συρία,
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 επικουρικώς, να ακυρώσει την απόφαση 2011/685/ΚΕΠΠΑ του Συμβουλίου, της 13ης Οκτωβρίου 2011 και του Κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1011/2011, του Συμβουλίου, της 13ης Οκτωβρίου 2011 σχετικά με περιοριστικά μέτρα λόγω της καταστάσεως στη Συρία,
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 όλως επικουρικώς, να κρίνει ότι οι εν λόγω αποφάσεις και κανονισμοί δεν τυγχάνουν εφαρμογής στον Issam ANBOUBA και να διατάξει την αφαίρεση του ονόματός του και από τον κατάλογο των προσώπων επί των οποίων εφαρμόζονται οι κυρώσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης,
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 να υποχρεώσει το Συμβούλιο να καταβάλει προσωρινώς ένα ευρώ προς αποκατάσταση της υλικής ζημίας και ικανοποίηση της ηθικής βλάβης που υπέστη εξαιτίας της κρίσεως ότι ο Issam ANBOUBA υποστηρίζει το υφιστάμενο καθεστώς στη Συρία·
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 να καταδικάσει το Συμβούλιο στο σύνολο των δικαστικών εξόδων.
 Λόγοι ακυρώσεως και κύρια επιχειρήματα
 Προς στήριξη της προσφυγής-αγωγής ο προσφεύγων-ενάγων προβάλλει δύο λόγους που είναι κατ’ ουσίαν πανομοιότυποι ή παρεμφερείς με αυτούς που προβλήθηκαν στο πλαίσιο της υποθέσεως T-563/11, Anbouba κατά Συμβουλίου.


jurisdiction: US

text:
This is a suit for divorce a vinculo matrimonii under the provisions of the so-called "Five Years Voluntary Separation Act" (Chapter 396, Acts 1937, Code, 1939, Art. 16, § 40). The basic allegation of the bill of complaint filed by the husband (appellee) is in the words of the statute, as follows: That the plaintiff and the defendant "have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without any cohabitation, for more than five consecutive years prior to the filing of this bill, and such separation is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation."
 The wife (appellant) answered the bill, denying this allegation and averring that, on the contrary, the plaintiff abandoned and deserted her on October 18, 1936. The answer also contains a petition for alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony and counsel fee, but these questions were not submitted for an order and the final decree is silent as to alimony. It does include the allowance of a counsel fee of $35 for defendant's solicitor. This appeal is from the decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, as prayed.
 The issue arising directly from the record in this case is whether or not the separation of these parties was mutually voluntary in its inception and continued as such for "five consecutive years," there being no dispute in the testimony that the separation is "beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation." *Page 394
 Since the passage of the Act in 1937, exactly five cases under its provisions have been passed upon by this court, in all of which a definition has been either given or reaffirmed of the word "voluntarily," within the meaning of the Act. These cases are, in order: Campbell, v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414, 116 A.L.R. 939; France v. Safe Deposit Trust Co.,176 Md. 306, 4 A.2d 717; Miller v. Miller, 178 Md. 12, 11 A.2d 630;Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924; Beck v. Beck,180 Md. 321, 24 A.2d 295.
 The definition as thus given is that the separation must be "mutually voluntary" and based upon an "agreement," for, as stated in the France case, supra, the word "voluntary" connotes an "agreement." This was reaffirmed in the recent Beck case,supra, and likewise in the preceding Kline case, in which the definition is paraphrased in these words: "In order that a separation of husband and wife can be regarded as voluntary within the meaning of the statute (Chapter 396, Acts of 1937, making voluntary separation for five years ground for divorce), there must be an agreement of the parties to live apart. "The word `voluntary' signifies willingness. When used in reference to an act of an individual, it means that he acted of his own free will; when used in reference to a common act of two or more persons affecting their common relationship, it means that they acted in willing concert in the doing of the act."
 The law applicable to this case is, therefore, clear and well defined. It is, in brief, that in order to entitle the plaintiff here to a divorce on this particular statutory ground, he must prove that the separation between him and the defendant, which took place on October 18, 1936, was mutually voluntary as of that date.
 To meet this burden of proof the plaintiff proceeded in his own testimony to base his whole case on an alleged agreement with the defendant on June 15, 1936, and not on what happened on the day of his departure in October *Page 395
 of that year. The test is, however, whether the separation was mutually voluntary at the time it occurred.
 In considering this case it is to be noted that the principals are an aged couple who were about seventy years old when they were married in September, 1933. At that time the plaintiff was a widower with eight adult children living, and she was a spinster. It was not long before their incompatibility became manifest and there was much "unpleasantness" between them. The first step toward a separation was taken in June, 1936, when, according to the husband, he suggested it. When asked by his counsel "Before you separated, did you have any talk about separating," he answered "Yes, it was June 15th." The plaintiff then proceeded to detail an alleged conversation between him and the defendant, in which he testified: "And I suggested, well, if you want to go back to Montgomery County, suppose we separate and you can go your way and I go mine, and she thought it would be all right."
 "Q. What did she say to that? A. She said `all right,' and I said `well, what do you want to do?,' and she said, `I can go in the old ladies home, if I can get in.' She didn't know whether she could get in, at that time, and I suggested that we live together for a couple of months, and eventually, by that time, perhaps she could get in, and that would bring it up to August 15th.
 "Q. When she married you, did she have a home in Montgomery County? A. Yes.
 "Q. I believe she sold that? A. She sold that.
 "Q. While she was married to you? A. Yes.
 "Q. On August 15th, what happened? A. On August 15th I asked her if she had any chance of getting in the old woman's home, and she never did give me any answer — never said yes or no, and I rather insisted on an answer, and she wouldn't say anything about it. That was her stand. On most of the questions I asked her in reference to herself, she never did give me any answer. *Page 396
 "Q. After August 15th, 1936, what happened? A. Well, on August 15th, after she wouldn't give me any answer, I said, `Well, we will continue on for a couple more months and maybe you can know what you want to do at that time — what you can do'."
 The plaintiff's testimony further shows that he then proceeded to make preparations of his own to leave, anyhow, in "a couple of months." This brought his deadline for leaving up to the middle of October, and every step that he took was based on the alleged agreement made with the defendant on June 15, 1936, which was, as he stated, a conditional agreement. This condition was that the wife could get in an old woman's home, which admittedly she had not been able to do by October 18, or any subsequent date.
 The plaintiff must, therefore, look to some other source to establish an agreement on the part of the defendant to the separation which took place on October 18, 1936. That is to say, he must prove that she was in "willing concert" with him in his act of leaving her at that time. The picture of facts presented by the record in this case, as of the day in question, is not one to commend itself to a court of equity at the suit of the plaintiff.
 This picture shows an elderly wife left alone and practically destitute by her husband, without any provision whatever having been made for her future maintenance. Insofar as he was concerned, his departure was but the consummation of a prepared program, announced by him several months prior thereto and based on the condition that the wife could get in an old woman's home. It is uncontradicted in the record that he told her in August he was going to leave in the middle of October, even though he could get no answer from her, he said, as to whether or not she had been able to arrange for admission to an old woman's home, or anywhere else. Then again, in October, just a few days before he left, his testimony is that he had made preparations to separate. When the day of departure came he had completed these *Page 397
 preparations and had sent for two of his married daughters to come for him. He gave her no money when he left, and when asked by his wife's counsel: "How did you expect her to live," he replied, "I expected her to go to an old woman's home after she said she was going to do it," — knowing that even that place of refuge was not available to her.
 When the husband moved out on that day the record shows that he abandoned his wife in the literal sense of that word, leaving her there alone, her future unprovided for, and with only a scant supply of fuel and bare necessities — all this without even inquiring what was to become of her after he left. It was in that condition that the defendant's cousin, Miss Jones, found her about dusk that afternoon when she visited the house in response to the wife's call of distress. As Miss Jones expressed it in her testimony: "Well, I went over there and she was very much upset, had been crying, and she told me Mr. Nichols had left and it was getting dusk and she could not turn on the light, so I went down stairs and someone had removed the fuse and put it on top of the fuse box, and I put it in and turned the switch and everything was all right, so I stayed with her about a couple of hours, and the only fire she had at that time was a fire in the kitchen stove.
 "Q. What fuel did you find there? A. She had sticks of wood in the cellar and no coal.
 "Q. What provisions? A. Precious little.
 "Q. Describe what you found, briefly what you found there? A. Some cold meat in the pan and some talk about potatoes but really I did not see any potatoes."
 The defendant, in this plight, stayed in the house alone for three weeks, and when asked: "Why did you stay in the house three weeks after he left," she replied, "Well, I stayed for as long as I could possibly stay, I had to stay some place and I was staying there thinking possibly something, I don't know what, might turn up, and I *Page 398
 stayed there to have a place to stay as long as I could stay, but I didn't have nothing to stay with, so I left."
 It was earnestly argued on behalf of the husband that, even if there were no prior agreement, the wife on the day of separation acquiesced in it by laying out her husband's clothes for him, making no protest against his leaving, and bidding him goodbye when he left. It must be borne in mind, however, that it was the husband who suggested and prepared for the separation and who announced definitely in August that he would leave the middle of October. He did not then ask his wife anything about agreeing to his leaving, he simply told her he was going. There was apparently nothing she could do about it. There was no use in protesting, she testified, and so she docilely complied with his request to lay out his clothes and when he and his daughters went off and left her alone, she "guesses" she did bid him goodbye.
 To say that under such circumstances the wife agreed to this so-called "separation," or that it was voluntary on her part, would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of the statute, as construed by this court. It would, likewise, be neither reasonable nor natural for a spouse to agree to be left alone, abandoned and unprovided for, which was precisely what happened to the wife in this case.
 From the facts and circumstances here, it is altogether likely that the plaintiff and the defendant would have voluntarily separated within the meaning of the statute, if some provision had been made for the defendant's future maintenance. The plaintiff, himself, names that as the condition for the alleged agreement of June 15, 1936, but with that condition admittedly unfulfilled, the whole theory of agreement, or "willing concert," is eliminated from the case.
 Still another circumstance tending to completely and effectually negative the suggestion that the separation was voluntary on the part of the defendant is that, within two months after the husband left in October, she filed *Page 399
 a suit for divorce against him, alleging abandonment and desertion. In that suit she also asked for alimony pendentelite, but the court denied this to her, and for some unexplained reason the case was not followed up. The record shows that it is still pending. However, the wife's very act in filing the suit at all, and filing it as promptly as she did, shows conclusively that these parties at that time were not "voluntarily living separate and apart," as prescribed by the statute.
 The separation took place October 18, 1936; the wife's suit charging abandonment was filed December 17, 1936; and the husband's suit under the "Five Years Voluntary Separation Act," was filed October 22, 1941. It is obvious, therefore, that the requirement of the statute that the separation must have been a voluntary one, and continued as such for "five consecutive years," was not complied with when the husband's suit was filed.
 This brings the pending case still closer within the reasoning and ruling in the Campbell case (174 Md. 229, 239, 198 A. 414), for there the ground on which this statute (Chapter 396, Acts of 1937) was held to apply was that the separation, originally involuntary as to the wife because of the husband's misconduct, eventually became voluntary as to both after a period of five consecutive years of acquiescence and after the wife had relied on the provisions of the original deed of separation. Here there is not only no deed or agreement of separation between the parties but at the very beginning of the period of "five consecutive years" the wife emphasized non-acquiescence on her part by filing a suit on the ground of abandonment. This direct contrast in the factual situation between the two cases serves to accentuate the court's ruling in the Campbell case and its applicability to the particular issue now before us. In the former case the statute applied because of the element of acquiescence throughout the prescribed period, while here it does not apply because of the lack of that very element. *Page 400
 Inasmuch as in the case now before us, the proof does not measure up to the requirements of the particular statute invoked, as repeatedly interpreted by this court, it follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce, and the decree of the chancellor must, therefore, be reversed.
 Decree reversed and bill of complaint dismissed, the appelleeto pay the costs.


type: other

text:
Forbrugerombudsmanden har fokus på internettet i 2014/Ny domænelov er trådt i kraft/Linking til ophavsretligt beskyttede værker/Brug af dedikeret metasøgemaskine på internettet/Ophavsretlig beskyttelse af Vola-køkkenarmatur - Moalem Weitemeyer Bendtsen
 Dato 27 mar. 2014
 I denne udgave af MWBe Updated – IPR & Teknologi ser vi blandt andet på den nye domænelov og en afgørelse fra EU-domstolen vedrørende linking til ophavsretligt beskyttede værker.
 Forbrugerombudsmanden har fokus på internettet i 2014
 Forbrugernes stigende aktivitet på internettet medfører, at Forbrugerombudsmanden i 2014 vil sætte fokus herpå.
 I indeværende år vil Forbrugerombudsmanden medvirke til, at forbrugerne sikres gode vilkår ved aktivitet på internettet. Følgende indsatsområder vil således få særlig opmærksomhed:
 Sager, hvor det er uklart, om der er indgået en aftale, eller hvad en aftale går ud på
 Overholdelse af retningslinjer for e-butikkers håndtering af betalinger
 Forbedring af forbrugernes mulighed for at tilbagekalde betalingsordrer hos bankerne
 Nye regler for net-handel
 [Læs mere om indsatsområderne her ]
 Ny domænelov er trådt i kraft
 Den 1. marts 2014 trådte den nye domænelov i kraft, og loven medfører en række ændringer for anvendelse og administration af internetdomæner under top level-domænet ”.dk”.
 Følgende ændringer vil især være mærkbare ved den nye domænelov:
 Reglen om god domæneskik har nu mere præg af at være en generalklausul, som dynamisk vil udvikle sig gennem afgørelser truffet af Klagenævnet for Domænenavne
 Administratoren af WHOIS-databasen, som indeholder oplysninger om registranters navne, adresser og telefonnummer, skal hemmeligholde oplysninger, der er undtaget fra offentlighed. Det er tillige et krav, at WHOIS-administratoren sikrer korrektheden af oplysninger i WHOIS-databasen. Denne del af den nye domænelov træder dog først i kraft den 1. marts 2015
 I dag administreres topdomænet ”.dk” af foreningen Dansk Internet Forum (DIFO) via selskabet DK Hostmaster, men med den nye domænelov kan administrationen heraf sendes i udbud. En høringsproces er sat i gang og løber til den 16. april 2014.
 [Læs den nye domænelov her ]
 Linking til ophavsretligt beskyttede værker
 EU-domstolen fastslår med afgørelsen C-466/12, at linking til ophavsretligt beskyttede værker ikke er i strid med Infosoc-direktivet.
 En række journalister anlagde en erstatningssag mod den svenske virksomhed Retriever. Retriever drev en internetside, som tilbød lister til sine kunder med klikbare links til artikler udgivet på andre internetsider. EU-domstolen skulle i denne forbindelse afgøre, om Retrievers linking til nyhedsartikler forfattet af journalisterne var en krænkelse af Infosoc-direktivet art. 3, stk. 1.
 Udgangspunktet for overføring af værker til almenheden er, at overførslen kræver accept fra indehaveren af ophavsretten. Dog følger det af fast retspraksis vedrørende begrebet ”overførsel til almenheden”, at værker, der allerede er udgivet, frit kan videreoverføres. Dette er imidlertid kun i det omfang, at det ikke sker til et nyt publikum.
 I den konkrete situation linkede Retriever til internetsider, der allerede var tilgængelige for enhver, hvorfor publikummet ikke ændredes og ifølge EU-domstolen dermed ikke var ”nyt”. Retriever havde derfor ikke krænket journalisternes ophavsrettigheder.
 Indehavere af hjemmesider kan frit linke til internetsider, der allerede er tilgængelige for almenheden. Det er dog vigtigt at bemærke, at i) værket, hvortil der linkes, lovligt skal være lagt op på internetsiden, og ii) publikummet skal ikke ændres – for eksempel er linking til indhold fra betalingssider eller lukkede fora således ikke tilladt.
 [Læs hele afgørelsen her ]
 Brug af dedikeret metasøgemaskine på internettet
 EU-domstolen har med sin dom C-202/12 truffet afgørelse om, at brugen af dedikerede metasøgemaskiner krænkede Databasedirektivet.
 To konkurrerende hjemmesider havde fået forelagt EU-domstolen en række principielle spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af Databasedirektivet art. 7 og sui generis-retten.
 En metasøgemaskine bruger andre hjemmesiders søgemaskiner, hvorefter den videresender brugernes anmodninger til de andre hjemmesider, gemmer resultaterne på sin egen server og sender resultaterne til brugerne, som var det metasøgemaskinens egne.
 Den ene part, Wegener, udbød via sin hjemmeside online-adgang til en samling annoncer for salg af brugte biler. Den anden part, Innoweb, udbød via sit websted en dedikeret metasøgemaskine til brug for søgning af brugte biler. Idet Innowebs metasøgemaskine benyttede sig af data fra blandt andet Wegeners søgemaskine, anlagde Wegener sag mod Innoweb, da Wegener påstod, at der skete en krænkelse af Databasedirektivet art. 7, hvorefter genanvendelse af andres databaser er forbudt.
 EU-domstolen har i flere sager anvendt en bred betegnelse for ”genanvendelse” og lagde til grund, at der i den konkrete situation også var tale om, at Innoweb genanvendte Wegeners data. Dette skyldtes, at slutbrugeren i det hele ville opnå samme søgefordele ved brug af den ene som den anden søgemaskine, hvorefter Wegener ville risikere at blive unddraget indtægter, herunder reklameindtægter og muligheden for at afskrive investeringsomkostninger. EU-domstolen traf derfor afgørelse om, at Innoweb havde krænket Wegeners sui generis-ret.
 I dansk ret har man set sager med lignende udfald, hvorfor det er vores vurdering, at indehavere af metasøgemaskiner skal være varsomme med brugen af andre søgemaskiners data.
 Ophavsretlig beskyttelse af Vola-køkkenarmatur
 Højesteret gav i januar 2014 Vola KV1-køkkenarmatur ophavsretlig beskyttelse, men de sagsøgte havde ikke krænket Vola, da deres produkter ikke var nærgående efterligninger.
 Ifølge Højesteret nyder køkkenarmaturet Vola KV1 ophavsretlig beskyttelse i sin egenskab af at være brugskunst grundet sin banebrydende cylinderform. Da armaturet er funktionsbestemt, omfatter beskyttelsen imidlertid kun meget nærgående efterligninger.
 Højesteret fandt, at køkkenarmaturerne Osier nr. 18087/18082 og BLANCO Finess adskilte sig fra Vola i en sådan grad, at de ikke kunne anses for nærgående efterligninger. Dette var begrundet med, at dimensioneringen, kompositionen, formen på de forskellige cylinderformede emner og betjeningsgrebet samt designudtrykket var forskellige. Højesteret lagde vægt på, at ovenstående særligt kom til udtryk under brug af armaturerne, og at det ellers særegne betjeningsgreb ved Vola var meget forskelligt fra de andre armaturer.
 Osier og BLANCO havde således ikke krænket Vola KV1.
 Højesterets dom er i overensstemmelse med tidligere retspraksis, da brugskunst alene nyder en snæver beskyttelse. Dette er begrundet med, at det er funktionsbestemt og ellers ville risikere ikke give plads til kreative nyskabelser.
 [Læs Højesteretsdommen her ]
 +45 33 77 90 25
 + 45 33 77 90 47


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
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 21998D1008(09)
 Απόφαση της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ αριθ. 9/98 της 6ης Μαρτίου 1998 για τροποποίηση του παραρτήματος II (τεχνικοί κανόνες, πρότυπα, δοκιμές και πιστοποίηση) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 272 της 08/10/1998 σ. 0013 - 0013
 ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΙΚΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΟΧ αριθ. 9/98 της 6ης Μαρτίου 1998 για τροποποίηση του παραρτήματος II (τεχνικοί κανόνες, πρότυπα, δοκιμές και πιστοποίηση) της συμφωνίας ΕΟΧ Η ΜΕΙΚΤΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΟΧ,Έχοντας υπόψη:τη συμφωνία για τον Ευρωπαϊκό Οικονομικό Χώρο, όπως τροποποιήθηκε από το πρωτόκολλο προσαρμογής της συμφωνίας για τον Ευρωπαϊκό Οικονομικό Χώρο, εφεξής καλούμενη «η συμφωνία», και ιδίως το άρθρο 98,Εκτιμώντας:ότι το παράρτημα II της συμφωνίας τροποποιήθηκε με την απόφαση αριθ. 92/97 της Μεικτής Επιτροπής του ΕΟΧ (1) 7ότι η οδηγία 97/10/ΕΚ της Επιτροπής για την τρίτη προσαρμογή στην τεχνική πρόοδο του παραρτήματος I της οδηγίας 76/769/ΕΟΚ του Συμβουλίου σχετικά με την προσέγγιση των νομοθετικών, κανονιστικών και διοικητικών διατάξεων των κρατών μελών που αφορούν περιορισμούς κυκλοφορίας στην αγορά και τη χρήση ορισμένων επικίνδυνων ουσιών και παρασκευασμάτων (CMR) (2), πρέπει να ενσωματωθεί στη συμφωνία,ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΖΕΙ:Άρθρο 1Στο σημείο 4 (οδηγία 76/769/ΕΟΚ του Συμβουλίου) του κεφαλαίου XV του παραρτήματος II της συμφωνίας, παρεμβάλλεται η ακόλουθη περίπτωση:«- 397 L 0010: οδηγία 97/10/ΕΚ της Επιτροπής, της 26ης Φεβρουαρίου 1997 (ΕΕ L 68 της 8.3.1997, σ. 24.»Άρθρο 2Τα κείμενα της οδηγίας 97/10/ΕΚ στην ισλανδική και νορβηγική γλώσσα, τα οποία επισυνάπτονται στις αντίστοιχες γλωσσικές αποδόσεις της παρούσας απόφασης, είναι αυθεντικά.Άρθρο 3Η παρούσα απόφαση αρχίζει να ισχύει στις 7 Μαρτίου 1998, υπό την προϋπόθεση ότι έχουν πραγματοποιηθεί προς τη Μεικτή Επιτροπή του ΕΟΧ όλες οι κοινοποιήσεις δυνάμει του άρθρου 103 παράγραφος 1 της συμφωνίας.Άρθρο 4Η παρούσα απόφαση δημοσιεύεται στο τμήμα ΕΟΚ και στο συμπλήρωμα ΕΟΧ της Επίσημης Εφημερίδας των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων.Βρυξέλλες, 6 Μαρτίου 1998.Για τη Μεικτή Επιτροπή του ΕΟΧΟ ΠρόεδροςF. BARBASO(1) ΕΕ L 193 της 9.7.1998, σ. 48.(2) ΕΕ L 68 της 8.3.1997, σ. 24.