type: legislation

text:
 16.9.2014
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 L 274/13
 REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (UE) NR. 976/2014 AL COMISIEI
 din 15 septembrie 2014
 de extindere a taxei antidumping definitive instituite prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 privind importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză la importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, ușor modificate, originare, de asemenea din Republica Populară Chineză
 COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,
 având în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,
 având în vedere Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1225/2009 al Consiliului din 30 noiembrie 2009 privind protecția împotriva importurilor care fac obiectul unui dumping din partea țărilor care nu sunt membre ale Comunității Europene (1) („regulamentul de bază”), în special articolul 13,
 întrucât:
 1. PROCEDURA
 1.1. Măsuri existente
 (1)
 În august 2011, Consiliul, prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 (2), a instituit o taxă antidumping definitivă între 48,4 % și 62,9 % privind importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime și cu greutatea mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, încadrate în prezent la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00 („produsele în cauză”) și originare din Republica Populară Chineză. Aceste măsuri vor fi menționate în continuare ca „măsuri în vigoare” și ancheta care a condus la măsurile în vigoare va fi menționată în continuare ca „anchetă inițială”.
 (2)
 În iulie 2012, ca urmare a unei anchete privind practicile de eludare în temeiul articolului 13 din regulamentul de bază, prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 672/2012 (3), Consiliul a extins taxa aplicabilă tuturor celorlalte societăți, de la măsurile în vigoare, la importurile de produse în cauză expediate din Malaysia, indiferent dacă au fost declarate ca originare din Malaysia sau nu.
 (3)
 În ianuarie 2013, ca urmare a unei anchete privind practicile de eludare în temeiul articolului 13 din regulamentul de bază, prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 21/2013 (4), Consiliul a extins taxa aplicabilă tuturor celorlalte societăți, de la măsurile în vigoare, la importurile de produse în cauză expediate din Taiwan și Thailanda, indiferent dacă au fost declarate ca originare din Taiwan și Thailanda sau nu.
 (4)
 În decembrie 2013, ca urmare a unei anchete privind practicile de eludare în temeiul articolului 13 din regulamentul de bază, prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1371/2013 (5), Consiliul a extins taxa aplicabilă tuturor celorlalte societăți, de la măsurile în vigoare, la importurile de produse în cauză expediate din India și Indonezia, indiferent dacă au fost declarate ca originare din India și Indonezia sau nu.
 1.2. Cererea
 (5)
 În noiembrie 2013, Comisia a primit, în temeiul articolului 13 alineatul (3) și al articolului 14 alineatul (5) din regulamentul de bază, o cerere de anchetă cu privire la eventualele practici de eludare a măsurilor antidumping care se aplică importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, prin importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, ușor modificate, originare din Republica Populară Chineză și de aplicare a unei proceduri de înregistrare a acestor importuri.
 (6)
 Cererea a fost prezentată de Saint-Gobain Adfors CZ s.r.o., Tolnatext Fonalfeldolgozo, Valmieras „Stikla Skiedra” AS și Vitrulan Technical Textiles GmbH, patru producători din Uniune de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă.
 (7)
 Cererea conținea suficiente elemente de probă prima facie conform cărora măsurile antidumping privind importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, sunt eludate prin importuri de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, ușor modificate, originare din RPC, care conțin mai multe „fire răsucite” decât „fire toarse” ca procent din greutate și care, prin urmare, au fost declarate la codul NC ex 7019 40 00, căruia nu i se aplică taxele.
 1.3. Deschiderea procedurii
 (8)
 Stabilind, după consultarea comitetului consultativ, că existau suficiente elemente de probă prima facie pentru inițierea unei anchete în temeiul articolului 13 alineatul (3) și al articolului 14 alineatul (5) din regulamentul de bază, Comisia a deschis o anchetă, prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1356/2013 (6) („regulament de deschidere”), privind eventualele practici de eludare a măsurilor antidumping aplicate importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, și, de asemenea, a îndrumat autoritățile vamale să înregistreze, începând din 19 decembrie 2013, importurile în Uniune de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu greutatea mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, încadrate în prezent la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 (coduri TARIC 7019400011, 7019400021 și 7019400050).
 1.4. Produsul în cauză și produsul care face obiectul anchetei
 (9)
 Produsul în cauză este același cu cel definit în ancheta inițială, și anume țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu greutatea mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, originare din Republica Populară Chineză (RPC), încadrate în prezent la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00, care conțin mai multe „fire toarse” decât „fire răsucite” ca procent din greutate.
 (10)
 Produsul care face obiectul anchetei, și anume produsul care s-ar fi utilizat pentru eludarea măsurilor inițiale, este același cu cel definit în considerentul 8, dar conține mai multe „fire răsucite” decât „fire toarse” ca procent din greutate.
 1.5. Ancheta și părțile vizate de anchetă
 (11)
 Comisia a informat oficial autoritățile din RPC după deschiderea anchetei și a transmis chestionare producătorilor exportatori din RPC și importatorilor din Uniune cunoscuți ca fiind vizați. Părților interesate li s-a oferit ocazia să se prezinte și să își facă cunoscut punctul de vedere, în scris, precum și să solicite o audiere în limita perioadei stipulate în regulamentul de deschidere. Toate părțile au fost informate că necooperarea ar putea duce la aplicarea articolului 18 din regulamentul de bază și la constatări care să se bazeze pe faptele disponibile.
 (12)
 Niciun producător chinez nu s-a prezentat și nu a solicitat o scutire de la orice extindere eventuală a taxelor actuale și nici nu a făcut vreo propunere în legătură cu ancheta.
 (13)
 Confederația Europeană a Prelucrătorilor de Mase Plastice a afirmat că își menține neutralitatea față de rezultatul anchetei. Alte părți interesate, precum importatorii și utilizatorii independenți, nu au făcut nicio propunere în legătură cu ancheta.
 (14)
 Comisia a efectuat vizite de verificare la spațiile producătorului reclamant cooperant din Uniune, Saint-Gobain Adfors CZ s.r.o., Republica Cehă.
 1.6. Ancheta și perioada de raportare
 (15)
 Perioada de anchetă s-a stabilit de la 1 aprilie 2010 la 30 septembrie 2013 („PA”) pentru a ancheta presupusa schimbare în structura comerțului. Perioada de raportare („PR”) s-a întins de la 1 octombrie 2012 la 30 septembrie 2013 pentru a ancheta dacă importurile s-au făcut la prețuri mai scăzute decât prețul neprejudiciabil stabilit în ancheta care a dus la măsurile existente.
 2. REZULTATELE ANCHETEI
 2.1. Considerații generale
 (16)
 În conformitate cu articolul 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază, evaluarea existenței unor eventuale practici de eludare s-a făcut prin analizarea în mod succesiv: 1. dacă a existat o schimbare în structura comerțului între RPC și Uniune; 2. dacă această schimbare a rezultat dintr-o practică, un proces sau o activitate pentru care există un motiv întemeiat insuficient sau nu există nicio justificare economică alta decât aceea a aplicării taxei; 3. dacă au existat elemente de probă pentru a dovedi existența unui prejudiciu sau compromiterea efectelor corective ale taxei în ceea ce privește prețurile și/sau cantitățile produsului care face obiectul anchetei; și 4. dacă au existat elemente de probă care să ateste existența dumpingului în raport cu valorile normale stabilite anterior pentru produsul similar, dacă este cazul în conformitate cu prevederile articolului 2 din regulamentul de bază.
 2.2. Modificarea ușoară și caracteristicile esențiale
 (17)
 Ancheta a demonstrat că produsul care face obiectul anchetei este reprezentat de țesăturile cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu greutatea mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, originare din RPC, care conțin mai multe „fire răsucite” decât „fire toarse” ca procent din greutate. „Firele răsucite” și „firele toarse” constau într-un montaj de unu sau mai multe fibre formate din filamente lungi (continue) de fibră de sticlă. În conformitate cu notele explicative la Sistemul armonizat, principala diferență între „fire răsucite” și „fire toarse” este aceea că montajul la primele este slab, cu fire răsucite puține sau deloc (mai puțin de 5 întoarceri pe metru), în timp ce montajul „firelor toarse” este mai răsucit, cu peste 5 întoarceri pe metru. Produsul presupus a eluda măsurile este în principiu același cu produsul în cauză, cu excepția faptului că el conține mai multe „fire răsucite” decât „fire toarse” ca procent din greutate și, prin urmare, poate fi în prezent declarat la codul NC ex 7019 40 00, căruia nu i se aplică taxe, în timp ce produsul în cauză conține mai multe „fire toarse” decât „fire răsucite” ca procent din greutate și care în prezent este încadrat la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00. În multe situații, diferența dintre cele două produse nu este vizibilă, iar codul corect poate să fie stabilit doar în urma examinărilor de laborator.
 (18)
 Ancheta nu a constatat nicio diferență de proces de producție între produsul care face obiectul anchetei și cel în cauză, cu excepția diferenței între proporția din greutate a „firelor răsucite” și a „firelor toarse” care se utilizează în fiecare produs. În plus, producătorul reclamant cooperant a confirmat că costul de producție al produsului care face obiectul anchetei în materie de materii prime este similar cu costul de producție al produsului în cauză, dar produsul care face obiectul anchetei necesită o perioadă de producție mai mare deoarece utilajul de producție trebuie să fie utilizat la o viteză mai redusă. Aceasta presupune că nu există niciun alt avantaj economic pentru producătorii exportatori în a produce produsul care face obiectul anchetei în afara aceluia de evitare a măsurilor în vigoare. În plus, s-a constatat că unii dintre utilizatorii produsului în cauză au trecut la produsul care face obiectul anchetei după aplicarea măsurilor provizorii impuse la 17 februarie 2011 prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 138/2011 al Comisiei (7), care presupune că pentru utilizatori nu există nicio diferență fundamentală între produsul în cauză și produsul care face obiectul anchetei.
 (19)
 Așa cum s-a menționat la considerentul 15 din regulamentul antidumping provizoriu, ambele produse pot avea diferite dimensiuni ale ochiurilor și diferite greutăți pe metru pătrat și se utilizează în principal ca materiale de consolidare în sectorul construcțiilor (izolație termică externă, consolidarea marmurei/podelelor, repararea pereților).
 (20)
 Niciunul dintre exportatorii chinezi sau dintre celelalte părți interesate nu a depus niciun material prin care să conteste aceste concluzii.
 (21)
 Ca atare, se concluzionează că produsul care face obiectul anchetei este doar ușor modificat în comparație cu produsul în cauză și este importat din unicul motiv economic de eludare a taxelor antidumping aplicabile.
 2.3. Schimbare în structura de comerț
 (22)
 Dat fiind că nu s-a beneficiat de cooperare din partea exportatorilor chinezi, constatările anchetei s-au stabilit pe baza informațiilor conținute în plângere, care au fost verificate în raport cu informații conținute în baza de date comercială Comext a Eurostat și au fost completate cu acestea.
 (23)
 Produsul în cauză este declarat la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00, iar produsul care face obiectul anchetei, la codul NC ex 7019 40 00. Toate aceste coduri NC sunt extinse și acoperă numeroase alte produse care sunt diferite de produsul în cauză și de produsul care face obiectul anchetei.
 (24)
 Ar trebui remarcat faptul că produsul care face obiectul anchetei este declarat la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 care acoperă și alte produse denumite „țesături din fibre de sticlă” utilizate în special de industria de prelucrare a maselor plastice pentru a produce articole compozite de înaltă tehnologie folosite în industria autovehiculelor, ambarcațiunilor, aeronavelor și turbinelor eoliene. Astfel, nu a existat nicio cale directă de a ancheta o eventuală schimbare în structura de comerț a produsului care face obiectul anchetei pe piața Uniunii. În schimb, a fost necesar să se facă uz de faptele disponibile.
 (25)
 În perioada 2010-2013, industria de prelucrare a maselor plastice din Uniune a suferit de pe urma închiderii fabricilor și a reducerii semnificative a capacității de producție, ca urmare a tendințelor negative pe termen lung de pe piață. Drept urmare, ar fi trebuit să se observe o scădere a importurilor de articole cu codul NC ex 7019 40 00, dar s-a constat contrariul, astfel cum se arată în tabelul 1. Doar în anul 2011 s-au redus aceste importuri, urmând o creștere a acestor importuri în anul 2012 și în perioada de raportare. Observarea acestei anomalii a indicat faptul că un alt motiv a cauzat creșterea importurilor de articole de la acest cod.
 Tabelul 1
 Evoluția importurilor de produs care face obiectul anchetei și de produs în cauză originare din RPC
 Importuri totale pe piața UE (m2)
 2010
 2011
 2012
 PR
 (1.10.2012-30.9.2013)
 Codul NC 7019 40 00
 (inclusiv produsul care face obiectul anchetei)
 118 702 857
 67 954 286
 109 676 429
 120 453 571
 Codurile NC 7019 51 00, 7019 59 00 supuse măsurilor (8)
 (inclusiv produsul în cauză)
 383 759 571
 195 440 571
 101 987 143
 77 862 714
 (26)
 Examinarea în detaliu a tendințelor pe piața Uniunii a relevant faptul că în patru state membre (Letonia, Țările de Jos, Slovacia și Slovenia) exista o creștere semnificativă a importurilor de articole de la codul NC 7019 40 00, care nu putea să fie explicată de cererea proprie a acestor țări, întrucât ele nu au o industrie de prelucrare a maselor plastice importantă. Pe parcursul PR, importurile de la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 în cele patru țări au reprezentat 32 % din toate importurile de la acest cod în Uniune.
 (27)
 Astfel cum se prezintă în tabelul 2, au existat doar puține importuri la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 în aceste patru țări înainte de aplicarea taxelor inițiale în 2011, iar la scurtă vreme după aplicarea măsurilor antidumping, în 2012 și în perioada de raportare, s-a înregistrat o creștere semnificativă a acestor importuri.
 (28)
 Creșterea importurilor prezentată în tabel indică o schimbare în structura de comerț care a apărut ca urmare a aplicării măsurilor antidumping.
 Tabelul 2
 Evoluția importurilor de produs care face obiectul anchetei, originar din RPC, în Țările de Jos, Slovacia, Slovenia și Letonia
 Importuri totale în Țările de Jos, Slovacia, Slovenia și Letonia (m2)
 2010
 2011
 2012
 PR
 (1.10.2012-30.9.2013)
 Codul NC 7019 40 00
 (inclusiv produsul care face obiectul anchetei)
 2 427 857
 6 934 285
 46 680 000
 39 018 571
 Codurile NC 7019 51 00, 7019 59 00 supuse măsurilor (9)
 (inclusiv produsul în cauză)
 59 469 857
 47 970 857
 14 711 285
 15 857 142
 Concluzia privind schimbarea structurii de comerț
 (29)
 Pe baza faptelor disponibile, se apreciază că creșterea per ansamblu a importurilor de produs care face obiectul anchetei după impunerea măsurilor antidumping, în paralel cu reducerea importurilor de produs în cauză, constituie o schimbare importantă în structura de comerț.
 2.4. Natura practicii de eludare și motivul întemeiat insuficient sau justificarea economică insuficientă
 (30)
 Articolul 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază prevede ca schimbarea în structura de comerț să provină dintr-o practică, un proces sau o activitate pentru care să existe un motiv întemeiat insuficient sau să nu existe o altă justificare economică în afara aplicării taxei antidumping.
 (31)
 Atât produsul în cauză, cât și produsul care face obiectul anchetei sunt utilizate mai ales ca materiale de consolidare în sectorul construcțiilor (izolație termică externă, consolidarea marmurei/podelelor, repararea pereților), iar utilizatorii finali ai ambelor produse sunt aceiași. Ușoara modificare a produsului care face obiectul anchetei nu conduce la nicio caracteristică fundamentală diferită în raport cu produsul în cauză. De asemenea, nu există nicio diferență de preț între aceste produse pe piața Uniunii.
 (32)
 Ancheta nu a relevat niciun alt motiv întemeiat sau justificare economică pentru importurile de produs care face obiectul anchetei în afara celui de eludare a achitării taxei antidumping în vigoare pentru importurile de produs în cauză.
 (33)
 Prin urmare, s-a concluzionat că, în absența oricărui alt motiv întemeiat suficient sau a oricărei alte justificări economice suficiente în sensul celei de a treia teze a articolului 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază, schimbarea în structura de comerț între RPC și Uniune s-a datorat aplicării măsurilor antidumping în vigoare.
 2.5. Compromiterea efectelor corective ale taxei antidumping în materie de prețuri și/sau cantități ale produsului similar
 (34)
 Pentru a evalua dacă importurile de produs care face obiectul anchetei au compromis, în ceea ce privește cantitățile și prețurile, efectele corective la măsurile în vigoare, s-au utilizat datele furnizate de reclamanți, care au fost verificate în raport cu informațiile cuprinse în data de baze comercială Comext a Eurostat și au fost completate cu acestea.
 (35)
 Creșterea importurilor de produs care face obiectul anchetei din RPC, cu începere de la data de aplicare a măsurilor provizorii, a fost semnificativă în materie de cantități.
 (36)
 Comparația între nivelul de eliminare a prejudiciului stabilit în regulamentul de deschidere și prețul mediu ponderat al exporturilor a arătat un nivel semnificativ de vânzări la un preț sub valoarea producției. Prin urmare, s-a concluzionat că efectele corective ale măsurilor în vigoare sunt compromise în ceea ce privește cantitățile și prețurile.
 2.6. Elemente de probă ale dumpingului în legătură cu valoarea normală stabilită anterior pentru produsul similar
 (37)
 În final, s-a examinat, în conformitate cu articolul 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază, dacă există elemente de probă ale dumpingului în legătură cu valoarea normală stabilită anterior în ancheta inițială.
 (38)
 În ancheta inițială, valoarea normală s-a stabilit pe baza prețurilor din Canada, care, în respectiva anchetă, s-a constatat a fi țara cu economie de piață adecvată analoagă RPC. În conformitate cu articolul 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază, s-a considerat adecvat să se utilizeze valoarea normală astfel cum a fost stabilită în ancheta inițială.
 (39)
 În lipsa cooperării din partea producătorilor chinezi ai produsului care face obiectul anchetei, prețurile de export ale produsului care face obiectul anchetei s-au bazat pe faptele disponibile, și anume pe prețul mediu de export al produsului care face obiectul anchetei pe parcursul perioadei de raportare, astfel cum este comunicat în Comext și reprodus în tabelul 3.
 (40)
 În ancheta inițială, Canada a fost utilizată ca țară analoagă. Valoarea normală care a fost utilizată pentru calculele marjei de dumping a produsului în cauză se încadrează între 0,168 EUR/m2 și 0,257 EUR/m2. Valoarea normală medie în ancheta inițială a fost de 0,193 EUR/m2.
 (41)
 În conformitate cu articolul 2 alineatele (11) și (12) din regulamentul de bază, dumpingul s-a stabilit prin compararea valorilor normale medii respective per tip de produs, așa cum s-au stabilit în regulamentul inițial, cu prețurile de export medii corespunzătoare ale produsului care face obiectul anchetei pe parcursul perioadei de raportare, exprimat ca procent din taxa neplătită aferentă prețului CIF la frontiera Uniunii. Această comparație a demonstrat existența dumpingului.
 Tabelul 3
 Prețurile de import medii (EUR/m2) pentru produsul care face obiectul anchetei declarat la codul NC ex 7019 40 00, originar din China
 Prețurile medii ale produsului care face obiectul anchetei declarat la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 (EUR/m2)
 2010
 2011
 2012
 PR
 (1.10.2012-30.9.2013)
 Prețul CIF (10) (toate statele membre)
 0,159
 0,173
 0,166
 0,147
 Prețul CIF (10) (Letonia, Țările de Jos, Slovacia și Slovenia)
 0,194
 0,104
 0,097
 0,061
 3. CERERI DE SCUTIRE
 (42)
 Întrucât nicio parte interesată nu s-a prezentat în urma deschiderii procedurii, nu s-a făcut nicio cerere de scutire de la eventuala extindere a măsurilor în conformitate cu articolul 13 alineatul (4) din regulamentul de bază.
 (43)
 Fără a aduce atingere articolului 11 alineatul (3) din regulamentul de bază, producătorii exportatori chinezi care nu s-au prezentat în această procedură și nu au exportat produsul care face obiectul anchetei în Uniune pe durata perioadei de raportare și care iau în considerare să depună o cerere de scutire de la taxa antidumping extinsă, în temeiul articolului 11 alineatul (4) și al articolului 13 alineatul (4) din regulamentul de bază, vor trebui să completeze un chestionar care să permită Comisiei să stabilească dacă se poate sau nu să se acorde o scutire. O astfel de scutire poate fi acordată după evaluarea situației pieței, a capacității de producție și a nivelului de utilizare a acestei capacități, a cumpărărilor și vânzărilor și a probabilității de continuare a practicilor pentru care există un motiv temeinic insuficient sau o justificare economică insuficientă, precum și elemente de probă privind dumpingul. Comisia, în mod normal, ar efectua și o vizită de control la fața locului. Cererea ar trebui să fie adresată Comisiei, cuprinzând toate informațiile relevante, în special orice modificare în activitățile societății legate de producție și vânzări.
 (44)
 Când se acordă o scutire, Comisia va propune, după consultarea comitetului consultativ, modificarea măsurilor extinse în vigoare, în mod corespunzător. Ulterior, orice scutire acordată va fi monitorizată pentru a se asigura conformitatea cu condițiile stipulate în aceasta.
 4. MĂSURI
 (45)
 În lumina constatărilor anterioare, s-a concluzionat că taxa definitivă antidumping impusă asupra importurilor de țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu greutatea mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, încadrate în prezent la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00, originare din RPC, a fost eludată prin importurile unui produs ușor modificat, încadrat în prezent la codul NC ex 7019 40 00, originar din RPC.
 (46)
 În conformitate cu prima teză a articolului 13 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază, măsurile antidumping în vigoare cu privire la importurile de produs în cauză, originar din RPC, ar trebui extinse la importurile de produs care face obiectul anchetei.
 (47)
 În temeiul articolului 13 alineatul (3) și al articolului 14 alineatul (5) din regulamentul de bază, care stipulează că orice măsură extinsă se aplică importurilor înregistrate începând cu data înregistrării, taxa antidumping ar trebui colectată pentru toate importurile în Uniune de țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiului mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu o greutate mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, originare din RPC și încadrate în prezent la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 (coduri TARIC 7019400011, 7019400021 și 7019400050), care au intrat în Uniune în temeiul înregistrării impuse prin regulamentul de deschidere.
 5. INFORMARE
 (48)
 Tuturor părților interesate li s-au comunicat faptele esențiale și considerațiile care au condus la concluziile de mai sus, iar ele au fost invitate să formuleze observații cu privire la acestea. Nu a fost prezentat niciun argument care să ducă la o modificare a constărilor.
 (49)
 Măsurile prevăzute de prezentul regulament sunt în conformitate cu avizul comitetului prevăzut la articolul 15 alineatul (1) din regulamentul de bază,
 ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:
 Articolul 1
 (1) Taxa antidumping definitivă instituită prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 privind importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu o greutate mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, încadrate în prezent la codurile NC ex 7019 51 00 și ex 7019 59 00, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, este extinsă prin prezentul document la importurile în Uniune de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu o greutate mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, încadrate în prezent la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 (coduri TARIC 7019400011, 7019400021 și 7019400050), originare din Republica Populară Chineză.
 (2) Nivelul taxei antidumping definitive aplicabile prețului net franco la frontiera Uniunii înainte de vămuire al produsului descris la alineatul (1) și fabricat de societățile de mai jos este:
 Societatea
 Taxa (%)
 Cod adițional TARIC
 Yuyao Mingda Fiberglass Co., Ltd
 62,9
 B006
 Grand Composite Co., Ltd și societatea afiliată Ningbo Grand Fiberglass Co., Ltd
 48,4
 B007
 Yuyao Feitian Fiberglass Co., Ltd
 60,7
 B122
 Societăți enumerate în anexa I la Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011
 57,7
 B008
 Toate celelalte societăți
 62,9
 B999
 (3) Aplicarea nivelurilor individuale ale taxei specificate pentru societățile menționate la alineatul (2) este condiționată de prezentarea către autoritățile vamale ale statelor membre a unei facturi comerciale valabile, care corespunde cerințelor stabilite în anexa II la Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011. În cazul în care nu se pune la dispoziție o astfel de factură, se aplică taxa aplicabilă tuturor celorlalte societăți.
 (4) În lipsa unor dispoziții contrare, se aplică dispozițiile în vigoare în materie de taxe vamale.
 Articolul 2
 Taxa este colectată pentru importurile înregistrate în conformitate cu articolul 2 din Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1356/2013 și cu articolul 13 alineatul (3) și articolul 14 alineatul (5) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1225/2009, în ceea ce privește importurile în Uniune de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, cu o dimensiune a ochiurilor mai mare de 1,8 mm atât în lungime, cât și în lățime, și cu o greutate mai mare de 35 g/m2, excluzând discurile din fibră de sticlă, încadrate în prezent la codul NC ex 7019 40 00 (coduri TARIC 7019400011, 7019400021 și 7019400050), originare din Republica Populară Chineză.
 Articolul 3
 Prin prezentul document, autoritățile vamale sunt îndrumate să întrerupă înregistrarea importurilor stabilită în conformitate cu articolul 2 din Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1356/2013.
 Articolul 4
 Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare în ziua următoare datei publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.
 Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.
 Adoptat la Bruxelles, 15 septembrie 2014.
 Pentru Comisie
 Președintele
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) JO L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.
 (2) Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 al Consiliului din 3 august 2011 de instituire a unei taxe antidumping definitive și de percepere definitivă a taxei provizorii instituite asupra importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză (JO L 204, 9.8.2011, p. 1).
 (3) Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 672/2012 al Consiliului din 16 iulie 2012 de extindere a taxei antidumping definitive instituite de Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 asupra importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză la importurile anumitor țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă expediate din Malaysia, indiferent dacă au fost sau nu declarate ca fiind originare din Malaysia (JO L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 1).
 (4) Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 21/2013 al Consiliului din 10 ianuarie 2013 de extindere a taxei antidumping definitive instituite prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 asupra importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză la importurile anumitor țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă expediate din Taiwan sau Thailanda, indiferent dacă au fost sau nu declarate ca fiind originare din Taiwan sau Thailanda (JO L 11, 16.1.2013, p. 1).
 (5) Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1371/2013 al Consiliului din 16 decembrie 2013 de extindere a taxei antidumping definitive instituite prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 privind importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză la importurile anumitor țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă expediate din India și Indonezia, indiferent dacă au fost sau nu declarate ca fiind originare din India și Indonezia (JO L 346, 20.12.2013, p. 20).
 (6) Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1356/2013 al Comisiei din 17 decembrie 2013 de deschidere a unei anchete privind eventuala eludare a măsurilor antidumping instituite prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 791/2011 al Consiliului cu privire la importurile de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză, prin intermediul unor importuri de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă, ușor modificate, originare din Republica Populară Chineză, și de înregistrare a acestor importuri (JO L 341, 18.12.2013, p. 43).
 (7) Regulamentul (UE) nr. 138/2011 al Comisiei din 16 februarie 2011 de instituire a unei taxe antidumping provizorii asupra importurilor de anumite țesături cu ochiuri deschise din fibră de sticlă originare din Republica Populară Chineză (JO L 43, 17.2.2011, p. 9).
 (8) În 2011, s-au aplicat măsuri provizorii la 18 februarie și măsuri definitive la 9 august.
 (9) În 2011, s-au aplicat măsuri provizorii la 18 februarie și măsuri definitive la 9 august.
 (10) Sursă: Comext.
 În Comext, volumul se raportează în tone metrice și se transformă în metri pătrați, în conformitate cu rata de transformare: 1 m2 = 0,14 kg.


type: wikipedia

text:
De Mahicanen, Mohicanen, Mohikanen, Mahican of Mohican zijn een indianenstam uit het noordoosten van Noord-Amerika.
 Van origine was het thuisland van de Mahican de vallei van de Hudsonrivier en besloeg het een gebied dat liep vanaf het Catskillgebergte in het noorden naar de zuidelijke punt van het Champlainmeer. In het westen werd het gebied ingesloten door de Shoharie en naar het oosten liep het gebied tot aan de top van het Berkshiregebergte in West-Massachusetts en van Noordwest-Connecticut naar het noorden tot aan de groene bergen van Zuid-Vermont. Omdat het alle Algonkintalige stammen tussen de rivier de Connecticut en de rivier de Hudson betrof, schatten sommigen het totale aantal Mahican rond 1600 op zo’n 35.000.
 Wanneer men zich echter beperkt tot de kernstammen van de Mahican-confederatie bij Albany, New York, waren het er ongeveer 8000. Rond 1672 waren er nog maar rond de 1000 van hen over. Tijdens het dieptepunt in 1796 leefden er nog maar 300 Stockbridge-indianen (laatsten der Mohikanen) samen met de Oneida en Brotherton in New York. Inclusief de Mahican die bij de Wyandot en Delaware in Ohio leefden, waren het er zo’n 600. Bij een volkstelling in 1910 waren er ongeveer 600 Stockbridge en Brotherton in Wisconsin.
 Drie jaar nadat de Indian Reorganization Act van kracht werd in 1934 werden de Stockbridge-indianen federaal erkend. Op dit moment leven er nog ongeveer 1600 stamleden in of bij hun reservaat ten westen van Green Bay. Er leven ook nog 1700 Brotherton-indianen (zonder federale erkenning) aan de oostzijde van de stad Lake Winnebago.
 Literatuur
 De laatste der Mohikanen, James Fenimore Cooper,
 Indiaans volk in de Verenigde Staten
 Geschiedenis van New York (staat)
 Geschiedenis van Vermont
 Geschiedenis van Massachusetts
 Geschiedenis van Connecticut


text:
Calvin Richard Klein (s. 19. marraskuuta 1942) on tunnettu yhdysvaltalainen muotisuunnittelija. Hänen nimeään kantaa myös vaateyritys, jonka hän perusti vuonna 1968.
 Klein tunnetaan minimalistisista vaatteistaan, ja hän oli esimerkiksi 1990-luvun minimalistisen trendin tunnettuja nimiä. Vaatteiden ja asusteiden lisäksi Calvin Klein on brändännyt nimensä parfyymeihin, joista tunnetuimmat lienevät unisex-parfyymit cK Be ja cK One. Tunnetuimmat Calvin Klein- brändit ovat muotia luova Calvin Klein Collection, valmisvaatteita tekevä Calvin Klein, urheiluvaatteisiin keskittyvä cK ja farmarihousuja tuottava Calvin Klein Jeans, sekä koruja ja kelloja luova Calvin Klein Watches & Jewelry. Calvin Klein Collectionin naisten muodin pääsuunnittelija on nykyään Francisco Costa ja miesten muodin pääsuunnittelija on Italo Zucchelli. Muodin lisäksi Calvin Klein valmistaa myös vuodevaatteita ja kodintarvikkeita.
 Calvin Klein opiskeli New Yorkin High School of Art and Designissa ja The Fashion Institute of Technologyssa, ennen kuin perusti oman merkkinsä vuonna 1968 yhteistyössä lapsuudentoveri Barry Schwartzin kanssa. Klein sai pian kokoelman miesten ja naisten takkeja myytäväksi Bonwit Teller -tavarataloon. Vuonna 1969 Klein poseerasi yhdysvaltalaisen Voguen kannessa, ja 1970-luvun alkuun mennessä Klein suunnitteli myös bleisereitä, alusvaatteita ja urheiluvaatteita naisille. Vuonna 1973 Klein vastaanotti Coty-palkinnon naistenvaatekokoelmansa takia, ja sai palkinnon myös kolmena seuraavana vuotena. 1970-luvun loppupuolella Kleinin yhtiön arvo oli kasvanut huomattavasti, ja Klein suunnitteli myös erilaisia asusteita sekä vuodevaatteita. Kleinin katsotaan myös olleen designer-farkkujen keksijä, sillä hänen 1970-luvulla lanseeraamansa merkkifarmarit olivat saavuttaneet merkittävän suosion, varsinkin teinitähti Brooke Shieldsin mainostettua niitä sloganeilla "Nothing comes between me and my Calvins" (”Mikään ei tule minun ja minun Calvineitteni väliin”) ja "I've got seven Calvins in my closet, and if they could talk, I'd be ruined" (”Minulla on seitsemät Calvinit kaapissani, ja jos ne voisivat puhua, olisin pulassa”). Provokatiiviset mainoskampanjat herättivät huomiota, ja tuosta kampanjasta lähtien Klein on käyttänyt kampanjoissaan alaikäisiä tai alaikäisten näköisia malleja yleensä seksuaalisissa kuvissa. Klein toi 1980-luvulla markkinoille alusvaatteita miehille ja naisille. Hänen luomansa miesten bokserit tulivat 1990-luvun mainoskampanjan myötä niin suosituiksi, että niitä alettiin kutsua pelkiksi ”Calvineiksi”.
 Calvin Klein kohtasi taloudellisia vaikeuksia, ja huhuttiin, että hänen olisi pitänyt myydä muotitalonsa. Vuonna 1992 Klein ajautui melkein konkurssiin, mutta kohosi yhdeksi 1990-luvun suosituimmista yhdysvaltalaisista muotisuunnittelijoista parfyymi- ja alusvaatemyyntinsä sekä urheiluvaatteita tuottavan sisarmerkki cK:n ansiosta. Vuonna 1993 Klein nimettiin Amerikan parhaaksi muotisuunnittelijaksi. 1990-luvun lopussa Klein harkitsi jälleen muoti-imperiuminsa myymistä, mutta asia ei edennyt. Calvin Klein Inc. myytiin vasta vuonna 2002 Phillips Van Heusen Corp.:ille 400 miljoonalla dollarilla, seuraavan viidentoista vuoden rojalteilla sekä 30 miljoonan dollarin arvolla osakkeita.
 Calvin Klein -parfyymit
 Calvin (miehille)
 Obsession (miehille ja naisille)
 Eternity (miehille ja naisille)
 Escape (miehille ja naisille)
 cK One (unisex)
 cK Be (unisex)
 Contradiction (miehille ja naisille)
 Crave (miehille)
 Eternity Purple Orchid (naisille)
 Eternity Moment (naisille)
 Obsession Night (miehille ja naisille)
 Euphoria (naisille ja miehille)
 Eternity Summer (miehille ja naisille)
 cK Electric (unisex)
 cK in2u (miehille ja naisille)
 Truth (miehille)
 cK Free (miehille)
 Calvin Kleinin entisiä/nykyisiä malleja
 Gisele Bündchen
 Justin Chambers
 Travis Fimmel
 Eva Herzigová
 Scarlett Johansson
 Suvi Koponen
 Doutzen Kroes
 Ashton Kutcher
 Angela Lindvall
 Fredrik Ljungberg
 Shirley Manson
 Kate Moss
 Marcus Schenkenberg
 David Silveria
 Ian Somerhalder
 Natalia Vodianova
 Mark Wahlberg
 Antonio Sabato Jr.
 Brooke Shields
 Christy Turlington
 Kendall Jenner
 Justin Bieber
 Lähteet
 Aiheesta muualla
 Phillips Van Heusenin omistaman Kleinin muotitalon sivusto
 Arkisto Calvin Klein-mainoksista
 Calvin Klein-alusvaatteiden virallinen sivusto
 Yhdysvaltalaiset muotisuunnittelijat
 Vaatemerkit
 Amerikanjuutalaiset
 Vuonna 1942 syntyneet
 Elävät henkilöt


text:
Lone er et pigenavn, som er en nyere dansk kortform af Abelone, Magdelone.
 Kendte personer med navnet
 Lone Aburas, dansk forfatter.
 Lone Dybkjær, dansk radikal politiker.
 Lone Frank, dansk videnskabsjournalist, forfatter og ph.d. i neurobiologi.
 Lone Hansen, dansk direktør for Team Danmark.
 Lone Helmer, dansk skuespiller.
 Lone Hertz, dansk skuespiller.
 Lone Kellermann, dansk sanger og skuespiller.
 Lone Lindorff, dansk skuespillerinde og billedkunstner.
 Lone Luther, dansk skuespiller.
 Lone Scherfig, dansk filminstruktør.
 Navnet anvendt i fiktion
 Ang.: Lone er en dansk film fra 1970 instrueret af Franz Ernst.
 "Kære Lone" er en sang af Shu-bi-dua på albummet Shu-bi-dua 13 fra 1992.
 Lone er en figur i filmen Send mere slik fra 2001, spillet af Marie Katrine Rasch.
 Pigenavne


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 16.11.2013
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 C 336/21
 Rješenje Općeg suda od 9. rujna 2013. — Telefónica protiv Komisije
 (Predmet T-430/11) (1)
 (Tužba za poništenje - Sustav potpora koji omogućuje poreznu amortizaciju financijskog ugleda (goodwill) kod stjecanja inozemnih udjela - Odluka kojom se sustav potpora proglašava nespojivim s unutarnjim tržištem te se ne nalaže povrat potpora - Akt koji sadrži provedbene mjere - Nepostojanje osobnog interesa - Nepostojanje svojstva stvarnog korisnika sustava potpora - Nepostojanje obveze povrata - Nedopuštenost)
 2013/C 336/45
 Jezik postupka: španjolski
 Stranke
 Tužitelj: Telefónica, SA (Madrid, Španjolska) (zastupnici: J. Ruiz Calzado, M. Núñez Müller i J. Domínguez Pérez, odvjetnici)
 Tuženik: Europska komisija (zastupnici: R. Lyal, C. Urraca Caviedes i P. Němečková, agenti)
 Predmet
 Zahtjev za djelomično poništenje Odluke Komisije 2011/282/EU od 12. siječnja 2011. o poreznoj amortizaciji financijskog ugleda (goodwill) kod stjecanja inozemnih udjela br. C 45/07 (prijašnji NN 51/07, prijašnji CP 9/07) koju primjenjuje Španjolska (SL L 135, str. 1.).
 Izreka
 1.
 Tužba se odbacuje.
 2.
 Nalaže se Telefónica, SA snošenje troškova.
 (1) SL C 282,24.9.2011.


text:
 16.10.2017
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 C 347/45
 Skarga wniesiona w dniu 18 sierpnia 2017 r. – CheapFlights International/EUIPO – Momondo Group (Cheapflights)
 (Sprawa T-565/17)
 (2017/C 347/59)
 Język skargi: angielski
 Strony
 Strona skarżąca: CheapFlights International Ltd (Speenoge, Irlandia) (przedstawiciele: adwokaci A. von Mühlendahl i H. Hartwig)
 Strona pozwana: Urząd Unii Europejskiej ds. Własności Intelektualnej (EUIPO)
 Druga strona w postępowaniu przed izbą odwoławczą: Momondo Group Ltd (Londyn, Zjednoczone Królestwo)
 Dane dotyczące postępowania przed EUIPO
 Zgłaszający: Momondo Group Ltd
 Sporny znak towarowy: Graficzny unijny znak towarowy zawierający element słowny „Cheapflights” – zgłoszenie nr 3 485 349
 Postępowanie przed EUIPO: Postępowanie w sprawie sprzeciwu
 Zaskarżona decyzja: Decyzja Wielkiej Izby Odwoławczej EUIPO z dnia 1 czerwca 2017 r. w sprawie R 1893/2011-G
 Żądania
 Strona skarżąca wnosi do Sądu o:
 —
 stwierdzenie nieważności zaskarżonej decyzji;
 —
 obciążenie kosztami postępowania EUIPO i Momondo Group Limited, w przypadku gdyby wstąpiła ona do postępowania w charakterze interwenienta.
 Podniesione zarzuty
 —
 Naruszenie art. 64 ust. 6 rozporządzenia nr 207/2009;
 —
 Naruszenie art. 75 rozporządzenia nr 207/2009;
 —
 Naruszenie art. 8 ust. 3 rozporządzenia Komisji (WE) nr 216/96;
 —
 Zaskarżona decyzja pełna jest stwierdzeń, które kwestionują lub bezpośrednio negują ważność znaków skarżącego. Zaskarżona decyzja działa na szkodę dla interesów skarżącego jako właściciela ważnie zarejestrowanego znaku towarów znaku towarowego, które to interesy nie są nawet objęte zakresem właściwości pozwanego.


text:
 30.8.2008
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 223/38
 15. juulil 2008 esitatud hagi — Euroopa Ühenduste Komisjon versus Rootsi Kuningriik
 (Kohtuasi C-322/08)
 (2008/C 223/63)
 Kohtumenetluse keel: rootsi
 Pooled
 Hageja: Euroopa Ühenduste Komisjon (esindajad: M. Condou-Durande ja J. Enegren)
 Kostja: Rootsi Kuningriik
 Hageja nõuded
 —
 Tuvastada, et nõukogu 29. aprilli 2004. aasta direktiivi 2004/83/EÜ (1) järgimiseks vajalike õigusnormide vastuvõtmata jätmisega või vähemalt komisjoni sellest teavitamata jätmisega rikkus Rootsi Kuningriik oma kõnealusest direktiivist tulenevaid kohustusi;
 —
 mõista kohtukulud välja Rootsi Kuningriigilt.
 Väited ja peamised argumendid
 Direktiivi ülevõtmiseks ettenähtud tähtaeg lõppes 10. oktoobril 2006.
 (1) Miinimumnõuete kohta, mida kolmandate riikide kodanikud ja kodakondsuseta isikud peavad täitma, et saada pagulase või muul põhjusel rahvusvahelist kaitset vajava isiku staatus, ja antava kaitse sisu kohta (ELT L 304, 30.9.2004, lk 12, eestikeelne eriväljaanne 19/07, lk 96).


text:
26.9.2009
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 233/3
 Sag anlagt den 18. juni 2009 — Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber mod Republikken Polen
 (Sag C-223/09)
 2009/C 233/03
 Processprog: polsk
 Parter
 Sagsøger: Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber (ved O. Beynet og M. Kaduczak, som befuldmægtigede)
 Sagsøgt: Republikken Polen
 Sagsøgerens påstande
 —
 Det fastslås, at Republikken Polen har tilsidesat sine forpligtelser i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2005/89/EF af 18. januar 2006 om foranstaltninger til fremme af elforsyningssikkerhed og infrastrukturinvesteringer (1), idet det ikke har vedtaget de love og administrative bestemmelser, der er nødvendige for at efterkomme direktivet eller under alle omstændigheder ikke har underrettet Kommissionen herom.
 —
 Republikken Polen tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger.
 Søgsmålsgrunde og væsentligste argumenter
 Fristen for gennemførelse af direktivet udløb den 24. februar 2008. På tidspunktet for indgivelsen af denne stævning havde sagsøgte imidlertid endnu ikke truffet de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at gennemføre direktivet eller under alle omstændigheder ikke underrettet Kommissionen herom.
 (1) EUT L 33, s. 22.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 277 Md. 343 (1976)
 354 A.2d 781
 MONTGOMERY COUNTY COUNCIL OF SUPPORTING SERVICES EMPLOYEES, INC.
 v.
 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY ET AL.
 [No. 120, September Term, 1975.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided April 7, 1976.
 *345 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and[*] O'DONNELL, JJ.
 Marvin E. Preis and Thomas P. Powers, with whom were Steven M. Cooper and Douglas J. Adams on the brief, for appellant.
 Robert S. Bourbon for appellees.
 LEVINE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissing a petition for injunctive relief filed by appellant, the Montgomery County Council of Supporting Services Employees, Inc. (MCCSSE), bargaining agent for the noncertificated employees of the Board of Education of Montgomery County (the School Board), appellee herein. In its bill of complaint, MCCSSE sought to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between it and the School Board. See Western Md. Dairy v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 23 A.2d 660 (1942). Additionally, MCCSSE sought to enjoin the disbursement of funds for increases in pay under a plan adopted by the School Board. MCCSSE alleged a failure of the School Board to engage with it in good faith negotiations respecting the allocation of funds appropriated by the Montgomery County Council for cost-of-living increases in wages and salaries, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and Maryland Code (1957, 1975 Repl. Vol.) Art. 77, § 160A (j).
 *346 The circuit court (Mitchell, J.) found that the School Board had negotiated in good faith with MCCSSE and therefore denied the requested relief. An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals followed, but we granted a writ of certiorari prior to consideration by that court. Because we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the circuit court, we shall affirm.
 The employees of the School Board are represented by two unions. The teachers and administrative staff are represented by the Montgomery County Education Association (MCEA), and the supporting services personnel are represented by MCCSSE. In 1974 MCCSSE, as bargaining agent for the supporting services personnel, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the School Board. The term of the agreement being two years, there was included a cost-of-living escalator clause to be applied to rates of pay in the second year. The escalator clause called for a percentage annual increase in the various pay schedules based on a formula taking into account changes in the consumer price index. An identical clause was also made part of the agreement between the School Board and MCEA, apparently as a result of an arbitration decision providing that a percentage increase, as opposed to an increase in a flat dollar amount, should be applied to all employees of the School Board. The application of the formula, all parties agree, would have produced a 10.1% increase in the salary schedules beginning July 1, 1975.
 This case was precipitated by the failure of the Montgomery County Council (the Council) to appropriate the amount necessary to fund the full 10.1% increase. Although the School Board sought full funding in its budget request, after numerous meetings the Council settled on a lesser sum. By Resolution No. 8-218, the Council appropriated an amount for a cost-of-living adjustment equal "to $750 per manyear in the various [county] budgets ... the distribution of this cost of living allowance to be determined by the agencies according to their procedures." The term "manyear" is a term of art meaning, with respect to the *347 Board of Education, a full-time position of employment. The amount requested by the School Board for full funding of the 10.1% increase for all of its employees was approximately $19.6 million. The total amount actually appropriated by the Council, determined by multiplying $750 by the number of full-time positions with the School Board, was about $9.1 million. The School Board, pursuant to the authority vested in it by Resolution No. 8-218 to determine the distribution of the amount appropriated and by Art. 77, § 160A (l) to render the final determination as to matters subject to negotiation, after several negotiating sessions with MCCSSE, granted a 5.46% increase in all of its salary schedules, thus using the entire amount appropriated for that purpose. MCCSSE then instituted this action.
 The authority of the Council to appropriate any amount which in the exercise of its discretion it deems proper, including an amount insufficient to fund contractual pay increases, is unquestioned. Indeed, this contingency is anticipated in § 160A of Article 77, which provides:
 "(j) Funding negotiated agreements ... If the fiscal authority does not approve sufficient funds to implement the negotiated agreement, the public school employer is required to renegotiate the funds allocated for such purposes by the fiscal authority with the employee organization prior to making a final determination...."
 To the same effect, Article V, § 13 of the collective bargaining agreement provides:
 "If the Montgomery County Council, in the new exercise of its fiscal authority under the law, reduces the budget recommendations of the Board of Education, and such action makes it necessary for the Board to reduce one or more items that have been negotiated, such items and all other negotiated items that are dependent upon budget funding shall be subject to renegotiation...."
 *348 First, MCCSSE argues on appeal that its members are entitled, at a minimum, to the equivalent of $750 per employee. It contends that wages and salaries for supporting services personnel constitute a separate budget category for purposes of legislative funding, and that the effect of Resolution No. 8-218 was to appropriate to the supporting services "category" an amount equal to $750 times the number of supporting services positions, about $3.6 million. Because the supporting services employees earn on the average an amount somewhat less than that earned by the professional employees, only about $2.5 million would be distributed in the form of pay increases to supporting services personnel under the 5.46% plan adopted by the School Board. Allocation to supporting services wages and salaries of the $3.6 million sought by the MCCSSE would result in an average increase of 7.9% in the supporting services schedules, and an increase for professional employees averaging somewhat less than the 5.46% which, under the School Board plan, all employees would receive.
 There is no merit in the argument of MCCSSE. Section 117 (e) of Article 77 provides in part that "[a]ll revenues received by each county board of education shall be expended by them in accordance with the major categories of its annual budget as provided for by this section." There is in § 117, however, no category for wages and salaries of supporting services personnel. Rather, supporting services positions are provided for in several of the major budget categories. Indeed, a great number of those positions is included in Category 2, "Instructional salaries," which also includes the bulk of the professional positions. Section 117 (e) specifically provides that funds may be freely transferred within the major categories by the boards of education.
 Moreover, § 117 (e) further provides that transfers between major categories may be made "with the approval of the ... county council." The Council, in its Resolution No. 8-218, allowed "the distribution of this cost of living allowance to be determined by the agencies." Thus, the necessary authority for intercategory transfer of funds was provided in the funding resolution itself.
 *349 MCCSSE next contends that the School Board violated § 160A (j) of Art. 77 and Article V, § 13 of the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to negotiate in fact over the distribution of the funds appropriated. The basis for this contention is the refusal of the School Board to accept the position taken by MCCSSE that negotiation must start with the $750-per-employee figure. As discussed above, however, the School Board was under no obligation to begin negotiations at that or any other figure. Therefore, its refusal to accept the $750 figure as a minimum did not constitute a refusal in fact to negotiate.
 But the thrust of the MCCSSE argument is that the School Board refused to negotiate in good faith. Subsection h of § 160A specifically provides that with respect to negotiations relating to salaries, wages, hours and working conditions, the term "negotiate" includes the duty to confer in good faith. Likewise, the duty to confer in good faith may also be fairly implied with respect to the contractual obligation, contained in Article V, § 13 of the collective bargaining agreement, to renegotiate items subject to reduced funding. The federal cases applying §§ 8 (a) (5) and 8 (b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) and (b) (3), are particularly instructive in this regard, though their lesson must be tempered with a recognition of the fact that those decisions were reached in the posture of review of administrative rulings.[1]
 The requirement of good faith is a subjective measure which can be applied only in light of the totality of the circumstances. It is not required that the parties reach agreement; nor is it even necessary that concessions be made. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 45, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. *350 denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); National Labor Rel. Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir.1943). Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, the cases suggest that a "desire to reach agreement" constitutes good faith bargaining, and conversely that a "desire not to reach an agreement" is bad faith; condemned is a "predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position," and required is "a serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground." See N.L.R.B. v. General Electric Company, 418 F.2d 736, 761-62 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
 The difficulty, as noted in the General Electric case, is in trying to legislate a state of mind. The task in applying the good faith standard is to distinguish, upon the facts of each case, between a party genuinely participating in negotiations, listening to and evaluating proposals made by the other side and attempting to explain its own position, with a willingness to persuade and be persuaded, and a party merely "going through the motions" with a "predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position." See Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 154-55, 76 S. Ct. 753, 100 L. Ed. 1027 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Singer Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 119 F.2d 131, 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir.1941). The rationale for requiring good faith negotiations, despite the difficulties in enforcement, was succinctly stated in Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1412 (1958):
 "Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed position either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths and weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the parties hit upon some novel compromise of an issue which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained by giving each side a better picture of the strength of the other's convictions."
 *351 Application of the good faith standard is further complicated in this case by at least two additional factors. First, unlike the private employer, the School Board here necessarily enters into negotiations with a limited amount of money with which to bargain. Lacking independent taxing authority, it could only spend the amount appropriated by the County Council. And secondly, the School Board has been given the statutory duty to make the final determination in these matters, Code (1957, 1975 Repl. Vol.) Art. 77, § 160A (l), a duty also recognized in the collective bargaining agreement, Article V, § 12, which provides:
 "The Montgomery County Board of Education shall render the final determination as to all matters which have been the subject of negotiation, but this final determination shall be subject to other provisions of this Agreement concerning the fiscal relationship between the public school employer and the Montgomery County Council."
 See San Juan Teachers Ass'n v. San Juan Unified School Dist., 44 Cal. App. 3d 232, 118 Cal. Rptr. 662, 673 (1974).
 An examination of the facts in this case reveals ample evidence to support the determination of the circuit court that the School Board negotiated in good faith with MCCSSE. After the action by the County Council, a series of five meetings was held during a one-month period in which negotiators for the parties discussed the distribution of the funds. At no time did School Board negotiators refuse to meet with MCCSSE.
 Much is made of the fact that the School Board never budged from its initial offer. Indeed, School Board representatives repeatedly referred to the 5.46% plan as "the only way to go." As already noted, however, it is not bad faith to adhere to a position genuinely and sincerely held. N.L.R.B. v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir.1964); N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir.1960). Here the School Board distributed all of the funds made available to it. The final allocation was made on the same basis as that made in the contracts between the *352 School Board and the two bargaining units, MCEA and MCCSSE, arrived at through arbitration. To take the position, as the School Board did, that the only fair way to allocate the appropriated funds was on an equal percentage basis to all of its employees is clearly not so unreasonable as to constitute evidence of bad faith, i.e., a desire not to reach an agreement. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., supra, 205 F.2d at 134. On the contrary, these facts strongly support the inference that the School Board's insistence was pursuant to a sincerely held belief in the equity of its position.
 Furthermore, numerous concessions were made by the School Board, albeit in areas other than direct pay increases. MCCSSE was evidently offered such inducements as a shorter work year, increases in life insurance coverage, and an upgrading of the employee benefit plan including improved dental coverage, a new visual care plan and a prescription drug plan. The School Board also offered to convert the 5.46% increase to an equivalent flat $541-per-employee increase for supporting services personnel. The fact that the School Board offer was submitted to a vote of the MCCSSE membership is some evidence that it was more than mere window dressing.
 There is no evidence that the School Board failed to give careful consideration to the proposals put forth by MCCSSE. In fact, the evidence tends to show that the School Board carefully evaluated a proposal that various cuts be made elsewhere in the School Board budget to release funds for a further pay increase, a proposal that was rejected by the School Board as being detrimental to the educational needs of the students. The only other significant proposal put forth by MCCSSE was the $750-per-employee demand which, for reasons already discussed, was likewise ultimately rejected.
 Indeed, MCCSSE never wavered from its position, taken at the commencement of negotiations, that the minimum acceptable amount was a $750-per-employee allocation or its equivalent. Throughout the negotiations, MCCSSE asserted its "right" to such an amount. This adamant insistence by *353 MCCSSE on its position is no less evidence of a refusal to negotiate in good faith than was the insistence of the School Board on the plan it proposed.
 Several specific acts of the School Board are proffered as circumstantial evidence from which a finding of bad faith should have been inferred by the circuit court. We find these arguments unpersuasive.
 On May 21, the date of the first meeting of the parties, the School Board issued a press release explaining the action of the County Council and outlining its position with respect to the distribution of funds. Article V, § 5 of the collective bargaining agreement specifically prohibited the disclosure of "the specific content of any given proposal" and required consultation in advance with respect to the content of all press and public communications. It is argued that such public posturing in advance of negotiations is evidence of a mind closed to counterproposals. Further, the danger generally in publicizing a position is that it may tend to lock the party into that position because a concession would tend to compromise its pride and reputation for truthfulness. See N.L.R.B. v. General Electric Company, supra, 418 F.2d at 764 (concurring opinion). In sum, the taking of public positions in advance of negotiations is not conducive to reaching agreement. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, supra at 1436.
 The press release in the instant case, however, was not of a type designed to undermine the negotiating process. The proposals of the School Board were announced in the release as recommendations only. It was carefully noted that "[t]he next step in the renegotiation process is expected to be counterproposals from the employee organizations, after study of the Board's recommendation ... [that] will be the subject of further bargaining sessions." When the MCCSSE negotiators registered objection to the release, School Board representatives attempted to have it withdrawn, but were unsuccessful, apparently as the result of an inadvertent premature release. Therefore, though the release was technically in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and may have been evidence of bad faith, we cannot *354 conclude that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in its finding of overall good faith in the totality of the circumstances.
 MCCSSE also argues that the School Board acted in bad faith in failing to inform the MCCSSE negotiators of the possibility of transferring funds between major budget categories to provide additional money for salary increases. The authority for such transfers, with approval of the County Council, is provided in Article 77, § 117 (e) of the Code. MCCSSE asserts that this failure to apprise them of facts they deem essential to these negotiations constituted strong evidence of bad faith.
 Under certain circumstances, the failure to supply pertinent information may warrant a finding of bad faith bargaining. Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra, 351 U.S. at 152-53; N.L.R.B. v. United Brass Works, Inc., 287 F.2d 689, 696 (4th Cir.1961). Such a finding, however, is not warranted here. The School Board did not claim that it was prohibited from making intercategory transfers. MCCSSE cannot claim, then, that its negotiators were misled. And while the refusal to provide pertinent information requested by a party may constitute bad faith, N.L.R.B. v. General Electric Company, supra, 418 F.2d at 749-53, where, as here, there has been no request for information, such a claim of bad faith is greatly attenuated. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the MCCSSE negotiators were in any way prejudiced by the alleged failure of the School Board to enlighten them as to this matter, which is plainly set out in the Maryland Code. Proposals put forth by MCCSSE calling for cuts in other areas of the budget seem clearly to have contemplated such transfers. It might well be inferred that the School Board was operating under the assumption that MCCSSE knew of the explicit statutory authority for intercategory transfers.
 Finally, it is argued that the School Board acted in bad faith when it unilaterally instituted a 5.46% wage increase after the final meeting on June 17. Generally, the unilateral institution by an employer of a change in conditions of employment under negotiation constitutes bad faith. Labor *355 Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 82 S. Ct. 1107, 8 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1962); Labor Board v. Crompton Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 223, 69 S. Ct. 960, 93 L. Ed. 1320 (1949). Such action is tantamount to a refusal to bargain since the bargaining process is, in effect, thereby abandoned. See May Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U.S. 376, 385, 66 S. Ct. 203, 90 L. Ed. 145 (1945). It is not bad faith, however, to initiate a program already offered to the union once negotiations have reached an impasse. Labor Board v. Crompton Mills, supra, 337 U.S. at 224; Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, supra at 1423.
 In the instant case, it was one of the MCCSSE negotiators who declared on June 4, at the next to last meeting, that the negotiations were at an impasse. At the final meeting on June 17, negotiators for the School Board offered to meet again with representatives of MCCSSE, but their offer was declined. At this point, the School Board undoubtedly was entitled to initiate its own plan, that plan having already been offered to MCCSSE. To hold otherwise would be to give the union the power to thwart any change in a matter subject to negotiation. The negotiations having reached an impasse, it was not an act of bad faith for the School Board to implement a 5.46% increase in the rates of pay without the agreement of MCCSSE.
 We hold there was sufficient evidence to support the finding by the circuit court of good faith on the part of the School Board in its negotiations with MCCSSE over cost-of-living increases in wages and salaries in fiscal year 1975 under the collective bargaining agreement.
 Judgment affirmed; appellant to pay costs.
 NOTES
 [*] Reporter's Note: O'Donnell, J., participated in the hearing of the case and in the conference in regard to its decision, but died prior to the adoption of the opinion by the Court.
 [1] Section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d), specifically imposes a duty to confer in good faith. It should be noted, perhaps, that the National Labor Relations Board has deemed several types of conduct to be per se violations of the NLRA. See Labor Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43, 82 S. Ct. 1107, 8 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1962). Such inflexible rules are not appropriate in this context. Rather, such conduct is only evidence of subjective bad faith of the parties.


text:
30 ianuarie este a 30-a zi a calendarului gregorian.
 Evenimente
 1561: A apărut „Tetraevanghelul”, prima carte românească tipărită de diaconul Coresi.
 1648: Războiul de Optzeci de Ani – se semnează Tratatul de la Münster și Osnabrück care duce la sfârșitul conflictului dintre Țările de Jos și Spania.
 1649: Regele Carol I al Angliei este executat la Whitehall, Londra.
 1695: Constantin Brâncoveanu primește ca recompensă pentru serviciile făcute Curții din Viena, titlul de „principe al Imperiului".
 1835: În prima tentativă de asasinat împotriva unui președinte al Statelor Unite, Richard Lawrence încearcă să-l împuște pe președintele Andrew Jackson, dar eșuează și este imobilizat de mulțime, inclusiv câțiva congresmeni, precum și de Jackson însuși.
 1889: Arhiducele Prințul Rudolf al Austriei, moștenitor al tronului Austro-Ungariei, este găsit mort împreună cu amanta lui, baroneasa Marie Vetsera la Mayerling.
 1920: România și Cehoslovacia stabilesc relații diplomatice la nivel de legație.
 1933: Adolf Hitler este numit în funcția de Cancelar al Germaniei.
 1948: După asasinarea lui Mahatma Gandhi în casa sa, prim-ministrul Indiei, Jawaharlal Nehru, vorbește națiunii, spunând „Lumina s-a stins din viețile noastre”. Data asasinatului este marcată drept „Ziua Martirilor” în India.
 1969: Are loc ultimul spectacol public al trupei The Beatles, pe acoperișul Records Apple, din Londra. Concertul improvizat este întrerupt de poliție.
 1972: „Bloody Sunday"/ Duminica Sângeroasă – Trupele britanice au ucis 13 catolici la o adunare din Londonderry (Irlanda de Nord).
 1991: „Grupul celor 24" hotărăște să includă România între țările est-europene beneficiare de asistența în cadrul programului PHARE, program inițiat în 1989 și având în vedere ajutorarea prin credite și asistență tehnico-economică a fostelor țări socialiste.
 1992: La Praga are loc reuniunea Consiliului de Miniștri ai CSCE (Conferința pentru Securitate și Cooperare în Europa – din 1994 se numește Organizația pentru Securitate și Cooperare în Europa, OSCE). Se adoptă „Documentul de la Praga privind dezvoltarea pe viitor a instituțiilor și structurilor CSCE” și „Declarația Consiliului CSCE cu privire la neproliferare și transferul de arme” .
 1995: Întâlnirea dintre Mircea Snegur, președintele Republicii Moldova, și Bill Clinton, președinte al SUA, prima de acest fel, consacrată în principal ajutorului american destinat dezvoltării economiei de piață și reformelor politice din Republica Moldova.
 Nașteri
 1621: Gheorghe Rákóczi al II-lea, principe al Transilvaniei (d. 1660)
 1781: Adelbert von Chamisso, scriitor german (d. 1838)
 1832: Infanta Luisa Fernanda, Ducesă de Montpensier (d. 1897)
 1841: Félix Faure, politician francez (d. 1899)
 1871: Gheorghe Brăescu, prozator român (d. 1949)
 1882: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, cel de-al 32-lea președinte al SUA (d. 1945)
 1885: Iuliu Hossu, episcop unit român, membru de onoare al Academiei Române, cardinal (d. 1970)
 1894: Țarul Boris al III-lea al Bulgariei (d. 1943)
 1902: Ion Călugăru (Benjamin Croitoru), prozator român
 1927: Olof Palme, politician suedez (d. 1986)
 1930: Gene Hackman, actor american
 1935: Elsa Martinelli, actriță italiană (d. 2017)
 1936: Valentin Plătăreanu, actor româno-german (d. 2019)
 1937: Vanessa Redgrave, actriță britanică
 1937: Boris Spasski, jucător rus de șah
 1941: Dick Cheney, Vice-președinte al Statelor Unite
 1949: Ștefan Velniciuc, actor și profesor român
 1951: Phil Collins, muzician britanic (Genesis și Brand X)
 1952: Silvia Marcovici, violonistă evreică de origine română
 1961: Laura Grunberg, scriitoare română
 1962: Regele Abdullah al II-lea al Iordaniei
 1968: Filip al VI-lea al Spaniei, rege al Spaniei
 1985: Ximena Duque, actriță columbiană
 Decese
 1649: Regele Carol I al Angliei (n. 1600)
 1730: Țarul Petru al II-lea al Rusiei (n. 1715)
 1867: Împăratul Kōmei, al 121-lea împărat al Japoniei (n. 1831)
 1889: Prințul Rudolf al Austriei (n. 1858)
 1892: Pierre Andrieu, pictor francez (n. 1821)
 1897: Constantin Gogu, matematician și astronom român, membru corespondent al Academiei Române (n. 1854)
 1926: Bucura Dumbravă, prozatoare română, prima femeie care ajunge pe Vârful Omul
 1927: Constantin Cantacuzino-Pașcanu, om politic român (n. 1856)
 1928: Johannes Fibiger, medic danez, laureat Nobel (n. 1867)
 1951: Ferdinand Porsche, constructor german de automobile (n. 1875)
 1963: Francis Poulenc, compozitor francez (n. 1899)
 1989: Alfonso, Duce de Anjou și Cádiz, pretendent spaniol la tronul Franței (n. 1936)
 1991: John Bardeen, fizician american, laureat Nobel (n. 1908)
 1991: John McIntire, actor american (n. 1907)
 1993: Alexandra a Iugoslaviei, soția regelui Petru al II-lea al Iugoslaviei (n. 1921)
 1994: Pierre Boulle, autor francez (n. 1912)
 2007: Gheorghe Crăciun, scriitor român (n. 1950)
 2008: Vintilă Corbul, scriitor român (n. 1916)
 2014: Marioara Murărescu, realizatoare TV (n. 1947)
 2015: Jeliu Jelev, politician bulgar, fost președinte al Bulgariei (n. 1935)
 Sărbători
 Sfinții Trei Ierarhi Vasile, Grigore și Ioan; Sf. Ipolit, ep. Romei (calendarul ortodox și greco-catolic)
 Ziua internațională pentru nonviolență în școală
 SUA: National Popcorn Day
 Ziua mondială de luptă împotriva leprei
 Note
 ! 30
 ! 01 30


type: other

text:
Niet-fiscale maatregelen | In- en Uitvoer
 GS2022
 Antidumping - hulpstukken voor buisleidingen uit de Volksrepubliek China (onderzoek) (2)
 In PbEU L 65 van 3 maart 2004 is Verordening (EG) nr. 396/2004 gepubliceerd,
 tot opening van een onderzoek naar de mogelijke ontduiking van de
 antidumpingmaatregelen die werden ingesteld bij Verordening (EG) nr. 964/2003 van de
 Raad ten aanzien van bepaalde hulpstukken voor buisleidingen, van ijzer of staal, van
 oorsprong uit onder meer de Volksrepubliek China door verzending van deze hulpstukken
 voor buisleidingen, van ijzer of staal, vanuit Indonesië, al dan niet aangegeven als
 van oorsprong uit Indonesië, en tot registratie van deze invoer.
 Antidumping - bepaalde delen van rijwielen uit de Volksrepubliek China
 In PbEU C 54 van 2 maart 2004 is een bericht gepubliceerd tot aanpassing van
 de lijst van onderzochte partijen met betrekking tot de vrijstelling van het
 uitgebreide antidumpingrecht op de invoer van bepaalde delen van rijwielen van
 oorsprong uit de Volksrepubliek China.
 Herverdeling kwantitatieve maxima voor China
 Er zijn bepalingen vastgesteld voor de herverdeling van de niet-benutte hoeveelheden
 van de kwantitatieve contingenten die in 2003 van toepassing waren op bepaalde
 producten uit China. Aanvragen voor een invoervergunning kunnen tot en met 10 maart
 2004 om 15.00 uur (plaatselijke tijd te Brussel) worden ingediend bij de bevoegde
 instanties in de lidstaten.
 Zaaizaad van tuin- en veldbonen
 Het in de handel brengen in de Gemeenschap van zaaizaad van zomerrassen van tuin- en
 veldbonen (Vicia faba L.) dat inzake de minimumkiemkracht niet voldoet aan bepaalde
 eisen was onder voorwaarden toegestaan tot en met 15 februari 2004; deze toestemming
 is verlengd tot en met 31 maart 2004.
 Maatregelen in verband met vogelgriep in de Verenigde Staten
 Vanwege de uitbraak van aviaire influenza in de Verenigde Staten van Amerika is met
 onmiddellijke ingang de invoer van levend pluimvee, loopvogels, gekweekt en vrij
 vederwild en broedeieren van deze soorten uit de Verenigde Staten opgeschort. De
 invoer van andere vogels dan pluimvee, met inbegrip van gezelschapsvogels onder
 begeleiding van hun eigenaar, uit de Verenigde Staten van Amerika in de Gemeenschap
 is eveneens opgeschort. De invoer in de Gemeenschap vanuit de Verenigde Staten van
 vers vlees van pluimvee, loopvogels, gekweekt en vrij vederwild, vleesbereidingen en
 vleesproducten van of met vlees van die soorten dat verkregen is van vogels die na 27
 januari 2004 zijn geslacht, en van consumptie-eieren worden opgeschort. De invoer van
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text:
 685 A.2d 1176 (1996)
 344 Md. 143
 Frances Diana SHEPPARD
 v.
 STATE of Maryland.
 No. 10 Sept. Term, 1996.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 December 12, 1996.
 Nancy S. Foster, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.
 Kathryn Grill Graeff, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and RAKER, JJ.
 CHASANOW, Judge.
 The issue in the instant case is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by requiring, as a condition of probation, that a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol not operate a motor vehicle for the full three-year term of probation, even if the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) restores her driver's license.
 I.
 The facts in the instant case are not in dispute. The appellant, Frances Diana Sheppard, was convicted pursuant to Maryland Code (1977,1992 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article, § 21-902(b)[1] of two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. One offense occurred on August 23, 1994 and the other on March 6, 1995. A sentencing hearing was held, and Sheppard's attorney proffered that Sheppard had recently undergone triple-bypass, open-heart surgery, that she was suffering from anxiety and stress as the result of the recent murder of her son by an unidentified drug dealer, and that she was now in a counseling and alcohol treatment program. In allocution Sheppard stated:
 "I'm not working now. I have no driver's license. And I live in Ocean Pines. I just don't have access to public transportation. And I've been under so much stress that I've tried to get my life together. I want to go back to work [as a registered nurse] more than anything."
 The trial judge was also informed that Sheppard had two prior offenses, each of which occurred over ten years before the two instant offenses. Those prior offenses resulted in a probation before judgment for driving under the influence in 1982 and a conviction for driving under the influence in 1983.
 For each of her new driving under the influence convictions, the court imposed a one-year-concurrent sentence, with all but 60 days suspended and a five-hundred-dollar fine. The court also placed Sheppard on supervised probation for three years. In addition, the court imposed several conditions *1177 including "alcohol counselling as may be directed by her probation officer, ... mandatory attendance at AA at least four times weekly," random urinalysis, and the requirement that she "not ... possess or consume any alcoholic beverages." As an additional condition of probation, the court stated: "I'm going to order her to not operate a motor vehicle while on probation. * * * Even if the [M]otor [V]ehicle [A]dministration gives you back your license, you cannot drive, because my order says you can't."
 Sheppard appealed her sentence to the Court of Special Appeals raising the single issue: "May a trial judge lawfully order a defendant, in a driving under the influence case, as a condition of probation, to abstain from driving a motor vehicle for the three year term of probation?" This Court, on its own motion, issued a writ of certiorari to review the case prior to decision by the Court of Special Appeals. We hold that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the trial judge abused his discretion in ordering, as a condition of probation, that Sheppard not operate a motor vehicle even if the MVA returns her driver's license.
 II.
 A judge has very broad discretion when imposing conditions of probation "and may make such orders and impose such terms as to ... conduct ... as may be deemed proper...." Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 639(a). A judge, however, does not have unlimited discretion in fashioning conditions of probation. A condition of probation may be found to be unduly restrictive and unreasonable. For example, the suspension of a sentence on the condition that the defendant, who had been found guilty of assault with intent to murder, return to Puerto Rico and remain there for at least a ten-year period has been held to be an abuse of discretion and void. Bird v. State, 231 Md. 432,190 A.2d 804 (1963).
 Courts are divided on whether a judge may, as a condition of probation, prohibit a licensed driver from operating a motor vehicle during the period of probation. Some states have upheld such conditions of probation. For example, in City of Detroit v. Del Rio, 10 Mich.App. 617, 157 N.W.2d 324 (1968), the Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld a no-driving condition of probation and rejected the argument that the Michigan vehicle code provides the exclusive procedure for revocation and suspension of licenses. The court noted that the vehicle code did not specifically state that it would be the exclusive procedure for revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses and that, in any event, the purposes of the vehicle code were not intended to be identical to those of the criminal code. Del Rio, 157 N.W.2d at 326. The court explained that the purpose of suspension or revocation of licenses under the vehicle code is traffic safety. Id. The purposes of the criminal law, by contrast, "may coincide with the public aim of traffic safety," but there are other purposes as well. Id. Thus, the court rejected the argument that the vehicle code preempts a court's power to prohibit the operation of a motor vehicle as a condition of probation. Id.; accord Brock v. State, 165 Ga.App. 150, 299 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1983)(finding that statute giving Department of Public Safety authority to revoke or suspend drivers' licenses did "not purport to deprive a court ... of the authority to suspend a driver's license as a condition of probation"); see also Fearn v. Zolin, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1756, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 316 (1992)(adopting view that administrative suspension of licenses, civil in nature, and licensure restriction pursuant to probation, criminal in nature, operate independently of each other).
 The issue before this Court implicates both preemption and separation of powers. Did the legislature, although establishing detailed MVA administrative hearing procedures, detailed administrative license suspension and revocation penalties, and detailed procedures for restoration of driving privileges, intend that the courts also have virtually unrestricted authority over the driving privileges of those people on probation? Some states have upheld a condition of probation that a defendant not drive a motor vehicle by finding express legislative delegation of authority to a sentencing judge to restrict driving privileges. Clearly, if the legislature believed it was warranted, it could have empowered the *1178 trial courts to impose, as a condition of probation, suspension of driving privileges in cases involving motor vehicle violations. Cf. State v. Seaman, 237 Neb. 916, 468 N.W.2d 121, 122 (1991)(statute requires, as a condition of probation for third-offense of driving while intoxicated, that the court order a defendant not to drive for at least a period of one year); Blair v. State, 554 So. 2d 1226 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990)(Florida statute authorizes the sentencing court to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to revoke for a period of up to two years a driver's license of an individual convicted of possession of cocaine); but see People v. Goldberg, 45 Cal. App. 3d 601, 119 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617 (1975)(Under the Vehicle Code, "a court cannot, even as a condition of probation, restrict a defendant's right to drive a motor vehicle for more than the period prescribed by the applicable sections of the ... Code.").
 In Towers v. State, 92 Md.App. 183, 607 A.2d 105 (1992), a pharmacist who pled guilty to distributing Dilaudid was placed on probation with the special condition that the defendant not work in a pharmacy without the court's permission, even if the defendant's suspended pharmacy license was reinstated by the State Board of Pharmacy. The issue before the Court of Special Appeals was the validity of that condition of probation. Judge Wilner, writing for the court, identified the issue as follows:
 "The issue here is essentially one of separation of powerswhether, in particular, the commitment of a specific area of regulation by the [l]egislature to an Executive Branch agency serves as an implied, but nonetheless effective, circumscription on an otherwise extensive Judicial power. We are dealing with overlapping circles of authority that are statutorily based, and it is therefore to the respective statutes that we must first turn.
 Md.Code [A]rt. 27, § 641A(a) provides that, upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence `and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.' This authority, as so expressed, is obviously very broad, but it is not unlimited. As we indicated in Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26[, 31-32] (1973), `[w]hatever latitude the statutes repose in the trial judge, it remains, of course, fundamental that conditions of probation must be reasonable and have a rational basis.' See also Bird v. State, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804 (1963)...."
 Towers, 92 Md.App. at 189-90, 607 A.2d at 108. In finding that the condition of probation violated the separation of powers, the Court of Special Appeals quoted from U.S. v. Sterber, 846 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.1988): "`[B]ecause New York [law] sets forth well-defined procedures to determine whether revocation of Sterber's [ ] license is an appropriate sanction and provides Sterber with a meaningful opportunity to contest the imposition of such a sanction, we hold that the special condition of probation was improper....'"
 Towers, 92 Md.App. at 193, 607 A.2d at 110 (quoting Sterber, 846 F.2d at 842-43). Because the licensing and regulation of pharmacists is committed to the State Board of Pharmacy, see Md.Code (1981, 1994 Repl. Vol.), Health Occupations Art., §§ 12-205, 12-301(a), the Court of Special Appeals held in Towers that "the [l]egislature has left [the decision to restore Towers' pharmacy license] to the State Pharmacy Board, not [to] the Circuit Court for Caroline County." Towers, 92 Md.App. at 194, 607 A.2d at 110. By analogy, in the instant case, the legislature has left the decision to suspend one's driving privileges to the MVA and not to the Circuit Court for Worcester County.
 The Transportation Article provides a comprehensive set of statutes regulating motor vehicles and persons who drive motor vehicles in the state of Maryland. Section 12-104(b)(1) of that Article authorizes the MVA to "adopt rules and regulations to carry out ... [t]hose provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law that relate to or are administered and enforced by the [MVA]...." The Transportation Article includes statutes delineating when a person can receive a license, see §§ 16-102 through 16-114.1, and when that license can be suspended, cancelled, or revoked, see §§ 16-201 through 16-208.1.
 *1179 The Article also sets forth the various penalties for certain driving offenses as well as time limitations on the suspension of a license. §§ 27-101 through 27-109; 16-205, 16-205.1, 16-206, 16-208. Under the specific terms of the Transportation Article, "[w]hen issued and signed, a driver's license authorizes the licensee to drive any vehicle of the type or class specified on it, subject to any restrictions endorsed on the license." § 16-111(d)(2).
 The legislature has also established a very detailed statutory scheme governing driver's license suspension, revocation and reinstatement. In addition to conferring upon the MVA the power to impose such sanctions, the legislature has limited the duration of license suspensions, as well as established detailed procedures for the reinstatement of revoked licenses.
 § 16-404(c)(2). Section 16-208(a) provides that "the Administration may not suspend a license or privilege to drive for a period of more than 1 year." The exceptions to this one-year limitation are set forth with particularity in such provisions as §§ 16-208(a)(2), which permits the MVA to "suspend for an indefinite period the license or privilege of any individual who cannot drive safely because of his physical or mental condition;" and 16-404(c)(2), which authorizes various periods of suspension for the accumulation of points based on repeated convictions for violations of drinking and driving laws. Section 16-404(c)(2) is particularly significant in that it authorizes the MVA to suspend the license of a driver against whom a designated number of points has been assessed for violations of §§ 21-902(b) or (c) (driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs). The legislature has restricted the duration of such suspensions as follows:
 "(i) For a first conviction, not more than 6 months;
 (ii) For a second conviction at least 5 years after the date of the first conviction, not more than 9 months;
 (iii) For a second conviction less than 5 years after the date of the first conviction or for a third conviction, not more than 12 months; and
 (iv) For a fourth or subsequent conviction, not more than 24 months."
 Section 16-205(c) further provides that the MVA may:
 "suspend for not more than 120 days the license of any person who, within a 3-year period, is convicted under § 21-902(b) or (c) of this article of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person cannot drive a motor vehicle safely and who was previously convicted of a violation under [§ 21-902(a), § 21-902(b), § 21-902(c), or § 21-902(d) ]."
 The Transportation Article thus sets forth in detail the circumstances under which license suspensions are warranted, as well as the permissible duration of such suspensions. Significantly, the suspension periods prescribed by the legislature under this detailed statutory scheme are substantially shorter than the suspension imposed by the judge in this case.
 Additionally, the legislature has established procedures for reinstating the license of a person whose driving privileges have been revoked, including those licenses revoked for alcohol-related driving incidents. § 16-208(b). Upon revocation, the driver's license must be surrendered to the MVA. § 16-210(a). An individual whose license has been revoked for the first time may apply for reinstatement at any time after the MVA receives the revoked license. § 16-208(b)(2)(i). The MVA may not grant reinstatement, however, until six months after it has received the revoked license. § 16-208(b)(2)(ii). For a second revocation, the individual may apply for reinstatement at any time after one year from the date of surrender and receipt of the license, and in the case of a third revocation, application for reinstatement may be filed at any time after eighteen months from the date of surrender and receipt of the license. § 16-208(b)(3)(i),(4)(i). For revocations resulting from certain serious violations, including "three or more ... alcohol-related or drug related driving incidents," the MVA may *1180 grant an application for reinstatement "only if, after an investigation of an individual's habits and driving ability, the [MVA] is satisfied it will be safe to reinstate the license or privilege...." § 16-208(b)(6)(ii)(3). The Transportation Article thus establishes specific procedural safeguards in an administrative license revocation that are denied the individual whose license is revoked through a probation order. Furthermore, if Ms. Sheppard had her license revoked by the MVA for three or more alcohol related incidents, she would be subject to periods of suspension and revocation substantially shorter than that imposed by the judge, but she would only be eligible for reinstatement if there was an investigation and MVA determined that it was safe to reinstate her license.
 The legislature expressly has given courts limited authority to order the MVA to initiate a period of suspension in connection with the disposition of specified juvenile cases. Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-820(d)(1)(i) provides that a juvenile court may order the MVA to suspend a child's driving privileges "for a specified period of not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days." Section 16-206(b) of the Transportation Article in turn authorizes the MVA "to suspend the driving privileges of a child for the [amount of] time specified by [a] court" in a juvenile court order issued pursuant to Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-820(d). Similar authority is not vested in the courts in other contexts, such as where the court is fashioning conditions of probation.
 There is not a great deal of difference between the violation of the separation of powers doctrine that occurred in the instant case and that which took place in Smith v. State, 80 Md.App. 371, 563 A.2d 1129 (1989). In Smith, after the defendant had entered a guilty plea to the charge of child abuse, the court sentenced Smith and imposed as a condition of probation "that Smith not seek custody of her children unless she first obtained permission from the judge." Smith, 80 Md.App. at 373, 563 A.2d at 1130. In vacating this condition of Smith's probation, the Court of Special Appeals held:
 "Jurisdiction over the children rests with the Juvenile Court of Baltimore City. In accordance with the statutory procedures, the children were placed under the care of DSS, who then placed the children with relatives. The authority to determine whether and under what circumstances Smith's child or children will be returned to her rests in the Juvenile Court. Since the trial judge was without jurisdiction to decide custody directly, he is seeking to do indirectly that which he cannot do directly, i.e., nevertheless control custody of the children insofar as their mother, Kim Smith, is concerned." (Footnote omitted).
 Smith, 80 Md.App. at 374, 563 A.2d at 1130. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the judge had "inject[ed] himself into a matter that the [l]egislature has decided best rests in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." Smith, 80 Md.App. at 376, 563 A.2d at 1131.
 In In Re David K., 48 Md.App. 714, 429 A.2d 313 (1981), the defendant, a juvenile, was found delinquent for driving while intoxicated. As a part of its disposition, the juvenile court suspended David's privilege to operate a motor vehicle. Addressing the defendant's challenge to the juvenile court's authority to suspend David's driving privileges, Judge Wilner, writing for the court, stated:
 "In accordance with statutory criteria (§§ 16-103, 16-103.1), MVA is empowered to issue learners' permits (§ 16-105), accept applications for licenses (§§ 16-106, 16-107), examine applicants (§§ 16-110, 16-111), and issue the appropriate licenses (§§ 16-111, 16-113, 16-114). Section 16-111(d)[2] expressly provides that `[w]hen issued and signed, a driver's license authorizes the licensee to drive any vehicle of the type or class specified on it, subject to any restrictions endorsed on the license.' (Emphasis supplied).
 What MVA giveth, MVA may taketh away; but only for specific statutorily prescribed reasons and only in accordance with statutorily prescribed procedures and limitations.
 *1181 * * *
 The action of the juvenile court in this case was quite obviously not in harmony with the statutory scheme. It suspended appellant's driving privileges without purporting to suspend his license, which is inconsistent with § 16-111(d), supra. It ordered an indefinite suspension, which is inconsistent with the specific time limits on suspensions set by § 16-208(a) of Transportation Article. And, equally important, it has placed appellant in a status of which MVA is completely unaware. If a juvenile court had that authority (and exercised it in the manner done here), the integrity of MVA's records would soon be placed in serious jeopardy. It could never be entirely certain of the actual driving status of its licensees under twenty-one years of age.
 Given the clear thrust of the overall statutory scheme of regulation, we conclude that a juvenile court has no present authority directly to suspend a child's driving privileges upon a finding of delinquency. That is a power committed by statute exclusively to MVA." (Footnote omitted).
 In Re David K., 48 Md.App. at 723-25, 429 A.2d at 318-19. The Court of Special Appeals did, however, note in dicta that "[w]e have no doubt that such restraint could have been directly effected as part of a probation ordera voluntary agreement by appellant to surrender for a time his privilege to drive as a condition of probation." In Re David K., 48 Md.App. at 721-22, 429 A.2d at 317 (emphasis in original). We need not decide if the condition imposed in the instant case could be valid if freely and voluntarily consented to by Sheppard because there was no consent, and a timely appeal of the condition of probation was noted.[2]
 The Transportation Article clearly and specifically sets the MVA administrative hearing procedures, suspension and revocation penalties, as well as manner of restoration of driving privileges for those convicted of driving under the influence. This specific statutory scheme of regulation delegated to the executive branch controls over the general statute authorizing a court to impose conditions of probation.
 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WORCESTER COUNTY WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE CONDITION OF PROBATION WHICH PROHIBITS THE PETITIONER FROM DRIVING FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. COSTS TO BE PAID BY WORCESTER COUNTY.
 NOTES
 [1] All sections infra, unless otherwise indicated, refer to Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1996 Supp.), Transportation Article.
 [2] To the extent that language in Kursch v. State, 55 Md.App. 103, 460 A.2d 639 (1983) is inconsistent with our holding today, that language is expressly disapproved.