type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 906 A.2d 347 (2006)
 394 Md. 331
 Zachary Shawn FOWLER
 v.
 MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.
 No. 111, September Term, 2005.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 August 30, 2006.
 *349 Leonard R. Stamm (Andrew Hayduk, Goldstein & Stamm, P.A., on brief), Greenbelt, for petitioner.
 Robert C. Cain, II, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
 *350 HARRELL, J.
 We consider here whether, during a driver license suspension hearing conducted under § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.),[1] an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), faced with conflicting evidence in the form of an arresting police officer's written certification in a DR-15 Advice of Rights form and testimony from the arrested driver, may deny the driver's motion to subpoena the officer where the driver disputes that he was fully advised by the officer of the consequence for refusing to take a chemical breath test.[2]
 I.
 On 12 June 2004, Zachary Shawn Fowler, Petitioner, was stopped by a Howard County police officer for making an unsafe lane change. The arresting officer, noticing a strong odor of alcohol, asked Fowler to perform certain field sobriety tests. Fowler performed poorly on these tests. The officer then asked Fowler to submit to a preliminary breath test ("PBT").[3] Fowler refused. Based on his performance on the field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Fowler for drunk driving and transported him to the police station.
 At the police station, the officer provided Fowler with a DR-15 Advice of Rights form. The use of this form is intended, first, to advise the arrested driver of the consequences of refusing or failing a chemical breath test and, second, to certify that the officer complied with the statute's advice of rights requirement.[4] The form includes the following language to ensure the driver's receipt of the required advice of rights:
 Read Before Signing:
 I, the undersigned driver, acknowledge that I have been read or I have read the above stated Advice of Rights as certified by the police officer. I understand that this requested test is in addition to any preliminary tests that were taken.
 Both Fowler and the arresting officer signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form. The officer completed also a DR-15A form, which contained his sworn statement that he had reasonable grounds to stop Fowler and that Fowler refused a chemical breath test at the station after being fully advised of the applicable sanctions, as provided in the DR-15 Advice of Rights form.
 Separate from the criminal charges for drunk driving, Fowler was charged also with refusing to take a chemical alcohol concentration breath test in violation of § 16-205.1. Section 16-205.1 imposes a mandatory license suspension upon an individual, suspected of driving under the *351 influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test or submits to a test and registers a blood alcohol concentration result in excess of 0.08.[5] In accordance with § 16-205.1(f)(1), Fowler requested a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") to contest his license suspension. Fowler filed also a motion requesting a subpoena for the arresting officer, in compliance with the Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") 11.11.03.07, to question the officer in an effort to support his claim that he was not advised fully of the administrative sanctions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration chemical breath test. The subpoena request proffered that the officer would testify "that the officer did not fully advise [Fowler] of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for submitting to or refusing a test" and "that legally improper and misleading advice was given." Fowler deferred a decision on his subpoena request to the ALJ conducting his suspension hearing. See COMAR 11.11.03.07D.
 At his hearing before the ALJ, Fowler disputed that he was fully advised of his rights. Specifically, he contended that while the officer advised him that his license would be suspended for 120 days if he refused to take a breath test, the officer did so only at the scene of the arrest, but not at the police station. Moreover, Fowler argued that when he was provided the DR-15 Advice of Rights form at the station the officer informed him that his license was being suspended because Fowler already had refused to take the test, which Fowler believed referred to the PBT.[6] Fowler stated that he was never offered a second test, the chemical breath test, at the station. He believed that by signing the DR-15 form he was merely *352 acknowledging his refusal of the PBT requested by the officer on the street and, therefore, he did not knowingly refuse a chemical breath test at the station. While Fowler conceded that he was given the DR-15 form to read and sign, he stated that he merely "skimmed over it" before signing it. He testified as well that the officer did not read it to him. Fowler asserted that if the arresting officer were subpoenaed, the officer would testify consistently with Fowler's version.[7]
 After hearing Fowler's proffer of what the arresting officer would testify to, the ALJ denied Fowler's subpoena request. In his oral ruling, the ALJ stated:
 First off, I'm going to find that the licensee was fully advised. I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he was fully advised and it's bolstered by the testimony of the licensee wh[o] was told to read it and he skimmed over it. And I don't see the need to call the officer to cross examine him. There's no indication the PBT was relied on or not relied on in this case.
 * * *
 My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I don't see the need to call the officer to clarify anything. . . .
 The ALJ suspended Fowler's license for 120 days, but modified the sentence to only five days of suspension on the condition that he participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for one year.
 Fowler sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which affirmed relying upon this Court's decision in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995). The Circuit Court concluded that the ALJ properly exercised his discretion by resolving the conflicting evidence of Fowler's testimony and the officer's certification on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form. Noting that Fowler had an opportunity to read the DR-15 form, the court found there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision that Fowler was informed of his rights. Specifically, the Circuit Court emphasized that under Karwacki, "[t]he ALJ was under no obligation to believe Petitioner over the officer's sworn statement." Thus, because the ALJ found the police officer's sworn statement credible, the Circuit Court determined that the ALJ properly rejected Fowler's request to subpoena the arresting officer.
 Fowler filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. We granted Fowler's petition to consider whether the ALJ, faced with the officer's certification on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form and Fowler's conflicting testimony, properly denied Fowler's request to subpoena the arresting officer.[8]Fowler v. MVA, 390 Md. 500, 889 A.2d 418 (2006).
 II.
 Under § 10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), a reviewing court may reverse or modify an administrative decision of a state agency if it:
 *353 (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
 A final administrative decision or order shall contain "separate statements of: (i) the findings of fact; (ii) the conclusions of law; and (iii) the order." Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 10-221(b)(1). As this Court has noted, for a reviewing court to perform properly its examination function, an administrative decision must contain factual findings on all the material issues of a case and a clear, explicit statement of the agency's rationale. Harford County v. Earl E. Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991). A fully explained administrative decision also fulfills another purpose; it recognizes the "fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision . . . ." Id.
 When evaluating an administrative agency's decision,[9] a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that exercised properly by the agency, especially where the expertise of the agency is employed in reaching its decision. See Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). "It is well-settled in this State that it is the function of an administrative agency to make factual findings and to draw inferences from the facts found." Karwacki, 340 Md. at 280, 666 A.2d at 515. As such, a court's role in reviewing an agency's factual determinations is particularly narrow, limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision. See Banks, 354 Md. at 67-68, 729 A.2d at 380; United Parcel v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). In defining substantial evidence, we have stated that it requires "relevant evidence [that a] reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Caucus v. Maryland Securities, 320 Md. 313, 324, 577 A.2d 783, 788 (1990); see also Liberty Nursing v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 330 Md. 433, 443, 624 A.2d 941, 946 (1993) (stating that "if reasoning minds could reasonably reach the conclusion reached by the agency from the facts in the record, then it is based upon substantial evidence, and the court has no power to reject that conclusion"). An agency decision is presumed to be valid on its face. Liberty Nursing, 330 Md. at 443, 624 A.2d at 946. Thus, where the dispute concerns a factual matter and substantial evidence supports an agency or administrative decision, we affirm. Id.
 A reviewing court is not under similar restraint when evaluating administrative decisions premised on erroneous conclusions of law. See id.(clarifying that when an issue before an agency is one of law, no deference is appropriate and the scope of review is much broader than when reviewing factual determinations); People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine, 316 Md. 491, 497, 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989). Despite this broader scope of review, we have noted that "with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative *354 agency." MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57, 821 A.2d 62, 73 (2003) (quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381). Thus, a reviewing court may give considerable weight to the agency's interpretation of its own statutes. Id.
 III.
 Section 16-205.1 imposes mandatory license suspension for an individual, suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol, who either refuses to take a chemical breath test or submits to a test and registers a result in excess of the legal maximum of 0.08 alcohol concentration.[10] To encourage drivers to submit to a chemical breath test, the statute imposes harsher sanctions for refusing to submit to the test than for failing the test. See § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i); Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 206, 630 A.2d 753, 756 (1993) (stating that the strict penalty for refusing to take a breath test "is designed to encourage licensees to take, rather than to refuse" alcohol concentration breath tests). The statute, however, specifically requires officers to advise drivers of the sanctions to ensure that arrested drivers may make fully informed decisions. See § 16-205.1(b)(1) and (2). A driver whose license has been suspended under § 16-205.1 may request a hearing before the MVA on certain limited issues, including whether the driver was "fully advised."[11]See § 16-205.1(f)(1).
 In Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration, supra, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764, this Court examined the options an ALJ considers when a driver, during a § 16-205.1 hearing, files a motion for a subpoena request. Forman, charged with a violation of § 16-205.1 for refusing a chemical breath test, requested both an administrative hearing to contest her suspension and a subpoena to compel the arresting officer to testify at her hearing. Forman, 332 Md. at 208, 630 A.2d at 757. The decision of the subpoena request was deferred to the ALJ at the hearing. Forman, 332 Md. at 209, 630 A.2d at 757. During the hearing, Forman asserted that, although she had read and signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form, she was confused and misled by the officer's statements which suggested that suspension may not be mandatory. Forman, 332 Md. at 208-11, 630 A.2d at 758-59. She contended also that she was induced by the officer to refuse the test, an action contrary to the language of the statute and the intent of the Legislature. Id. Forman stated that the officer promised to return her to a friend's home if she refused the test, but told her he would take her to the police station if she took and failed the test. Forman, 332 Md. at 210, 630 A.2d at 758. The ALJ denied Forman's motion for a subpoena request. Forman, 332 Md. at 211, 630 A.2d at 759.
 Finding that the ALJ failed to resolve the critical issue raised by Forman concerning her advice of rights, we reversed the Circuit Court's judgment affirming the ALJ's decision denying the subpoena request. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. In doing so, we set forth the following analytical framework *355 for ALJs when considering subpoena requests:
 [W]hen faced with a licensee's proffer and subpoena request, an ALJ has three distinct choices: (1) accept the proffer's contents as true, and indicate this acceptance; (2) reach no conclusion regarding the truth of the proffer (essentially suspending judgment) and issue the subpoena; or (3) reject the proffer and subpoena request entirely, and provide a valid explanation of the rejection.
 Id.
 Additionally, in Forman, we emphasized the need for an individual to receive a full and accurate advice of rights under the implied consent statute. Forman, 332 Md. at 212-19, 630 A.2d at 759-63. We stated that it is imperative that a "person detained for drunk driving . . . be capable of making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test." Forman, 332 Md. at 218, 630 A.2d at 762. This is because an individual's driver's license is an important property interest that may be vital to his or her ability to function in society on a daily basis. See Forman, 332 Md. at 214, 630 A.2d at 760. Importantly, we clarified that "`[f]ully advised' [under § 16-205.1(f)(8)(i)(3)] means not only advised initially, but the detaining officer must also take care not to subsequently confuse or mislead the driver as to his or her rights under the statute." Forman, 332 Md. at 217, 630 A.2d at 762 (Emphasis in original). Likewise, we cautioned that due process demands that the State "not mislead the defendant or construct road blocks, thus unduly burdening [the defendant's] decision-making." Forman, 332 Md. at 215, 630 A.2d at 761 (quoting Hare v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 326 Md. 296, 304, 604 A.2d 914, 918 (1992)).
 Two years after Forman, in Motor Vehicle Administration v. Karwacki, supra, 340 Md. at 288-89, 666 A.2d at 519, we reaffirmed the three-option framework enunciated in Forman. Karwacki, charged under § 16-205.1, argued, like Forman, that he was not fully advised under the statute. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 279, 666 A.2d at 515. Specifically, as a repeat offender, Karwacki contended that the arresting officer only advised him that his license would be suspended for 120 days and did not inform him of the increased term of suspension for a second offense. Id. Faced with conflicting evidence from Karwacki's testimony and the officer's certification on the DR-15 form, the ALJ concluded that the certification was more credible than the driver's drunken recollection and suspended his license. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 278, 666 A.2d at 514. Affirming the decision, we noted that "the ALJ was under no obligation to believe [Karwacki]" over the prima facie evidence of the DR-15 form. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520.
 In contrast to Forman, however, the petitioner in Karwacki did not file a motion for a subpoena request for the charging officer.[12]Id. Consequently, the ALJ *356 was left to consider only the evidence in front of him: the DR-15 certification form and the petitioner's conflicting testimony. Id. As we noted, by not subpoenaing the arresting officer, Karwacki "presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice." Id. Because a signed DR-15 form serves as prima facie evidence to demonstrate that the driver refused the chemical breath test, we recognized that the ALJ exercised properly his discretion to resolve the conflicting evidence against the driver. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283, 289, 666 A.2d at 516, 520. We ultimately affirmed the ALJ's determination that Karwacki's contradictory statements were not sufficient to rebut the documentary evidence. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520.
 IV.
 At his suspension hearing, Fowler filed a motion requesting a subpoena for the arresting officer; therefore, we shall analyze his case according to the principles applied in Forman. As we noted, supra, where a motion for a subpoena request has been filed, an ALJ is faced with three options. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. First, an ALJ may accept explicitly the entire proffer, denying the subpoena request. Id. The ALJ then assesses all the evidence before him or her, including the proffer. Id. Under this option, an ALJ determines if the proffer, assumed to be true in its entirety, is sufficient to rebut any conflicting evidence. Second, an ALJ may reject the proffer as a whole, also denying the subpoena request; however, the ALJ must provide additionally a valid explanation for the rejection. Id. As we have noted, this option "enables the ALJ to dispose of frivolous or otherwise improper subpoena requests." Id.; see also Maryland Code (1974, 1982 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 10-213(d) (allowing agencies to exclude evidence that is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious at administrative hearings). Finally, an ALJ, uncertain of the accuracy of the driver's proffer, may grant the subpoena request. Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. This action effectively suspends judgment on the merits of determining whether to suspend the driver's license in order to allow the ALJ to hear additional testimony. Id.
 In the present case, while it is clear that the ALJ denied the subpoena request, the rationale or basis for his decision are not apparent. After hearing Fowler's testimony and proffer, the ALJ stated:
 First off, I'm going to find that the licensee was fully advised. I conclude primarily from the certification of the officer that he was fully advised and it's bolstered by the testimony of the licensee wh[o] was told to read it and he skimmed over it. And I don't see the need to call the officer to cross examine him. There's no indication the PBT was relied on or not relied on in this case.
 * * *
 My finding is he was fully advised, and the other finding is I don't see the need to call the officer to clarify anything.. . .
 Under Forman, an ALJ's decision either to deny or grant the subpoena request must be clearly indicated. Forman, 332 *357 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. Specifically, we emphasized that "the ALJ may only avoid issuing the subpoena when he or she explicitly accepts the proffer or rejects the proffer and provides a basis for this rejection." Id. The record in the present case yields no specific or explicit statement indicating whether the ALJ accepted or rejected Fowler's proffered testimony. Thus, as a reviewing court, we are unable to perform our function because the ALJ did not state clearly his decision or enunciate fully his rationale for denying Fowler's subpoena request.
 A.
 For example, one might infer from the ALJ's language, see supra, that he attempted to proceed under Forman by rejecting Fowler's proffer along with his subpoena request. The crux of Fowler's argument centers on his assertion that he was not offered a second test at the police station and his belief that the DR-15 form merely acknowledged his refusal of the PBT. The ALJ's statement regarding the PBT may be read as a rejection of that proffered testimony. Yet, assuming that the ALJ intended to reject the proffer and deny the request, he did not proceed correctly under Forman.
 First, the ALJ did not explain the reasons for his rejection. He concluded only that Fowler was fully advised and that there was no need for the subpoena. Under the Forman framework, however, an ALJ who rejects the proffer of a driver and denies a subpoena request must also "provide a valid explanation of the rejection." Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. A valid explanation should include making clear the ALJ's decision to reject the proffer; it should not require a reviewing court to draw inferences. A valid explanation also should provide a "basis for rejection" by explaining the reasons behind the ALJ's decision; it should not merely announce a conclusion.
 The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol), State Government Article, and COMAR set forth reasons for denying a subpoena request. Section 10-213 of the Administrative Procedure Act governs the admission and exclusion of evidence at administrative hearings and allows agencies to exclude evidence that is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 10-213(d). This language is mimicked in the MVA's regulation pertaining to § 16-205.1 proceedings and subpoena requests. See COMAR 11.11.03.07. While the decision of whether to issue a subpoena is within the ALJ's discretion, COMAR 11.11.03.07C provides circumstances that warrant the denial of a subpoena request: "[a] request may be refused if the testimony or evidence to be offered: (1) is immaterial, irrelevant or unduly repetitious; or (2) does not pertain to a genuine issue in the contested case." Here, the ALJ stated that he did not "see the need to call the police officer to cross-examine him," but failed to detail the circumstances purportedly justifying this rejection.
 Moreover, the option of rejecting the proffer and denying the subpoena request is inappropriate given the factual circumstances in the present case. In Forman, we observed that this option "enables the ALJ to dispose of frivolous or otherwise improper subpoena requests." Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. In the present case, Fowler proffered that the police officer did not fully advise him of the consequences of refusing a breath test, as required under § 16-205.1; also, he claimed he was misled by the officer's statements and the previous administration of a PBT. This proffer presents a *358 genuine factual dispute for the ALJ to resolve. As we noted in Forman, "evidence pertaining to negation of the advice of rights or inducement to refuse the alcohol concentration test is neither incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious." Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765; see also § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(3) (listing "[w]hether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised" as one of the issues that may be raised in the hearing); Forman, 332 Md. at 223-24, 630 A.2d at 765 (concluding that proffered evidence as to "whether Forman was properly and fully advised of the administrative sanctions" directly pertained to a genuine issue). It is important also that Fowler's claim be resolved clearly, in light of the different statutory consequences of refusing a chemical breath test versus a PBT,[13] particularly because "[r]efusal to submit to a preliminary breath test [does] not constitute a violation of § 16-205.1." § 16-205.2(d). If the ALJ decides Fowler was not offered a breath test other than the PBT requested on the street prior to his arrest, Fowler cannot be convicted of a violation of § 16-205.1.
 Finally, the ALJ appears to have engaged in a credibility assessment in forming his opinion about Fowler's contentions regarding the PBT. Under Forman, however, none of the options provide for an ALJ to make a credibility determination when ruling on a subpoena request. Rather, the ALJ must either accept explicitly the proffer in its entirety or reject the stated proffer in whole, without assessing its validity in either case; otherwise, the ALJ must issue the subpoena to hear additional testimony.
 In Karwacki, this Court highlighted the ability generally of an ALJ to make credibility assessments. See Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283-84, 666 A.2d at 517. We noted that frequently "the resolution of conflicting evidence and inconsistent inferences involves making credibility determinations." Karwacki, 340 Md. at 284, 666 A.2d at 517. The ALJ in Karwacki, however, was faced with a confined set of conflicting evidencethat of the DR-15 form and the driver's contrary testimony due to the petitioner having not filed a motion for a subpoena request. Consequently, we concluded the ALJ properly engaged in a credibility determination finding that the officer's sworn certification in the DR-15 form was more credible. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 514. Where an ALJ is forced to consider only the factual evidence before him, as in Karwacki, this assessment is within the ALJ's province to resolve. In the present case, however, the ALJ, who concluded that Fowler did not rely as he claimed on the circumstances surrounding the advisement regarding the PBT, in fact seemed to reject Fowler's proffer by making a credibility assessment that Fowler did not rely on his refusal of the PBT in signing the DR-15 form. This credibility assessment is not permitted under Forman.
 B.
 Under yet another scenario, one might infer that the ALJ proceeded under the Forman framework by accepting Fowler's proffer, but still denied his subpoena request. When accepting an individual's proffer, the ALJ treats it as a proven fact and, consequently, there is no need to summon the officer to corroborate *359 or clarify the information. See Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765. Therefore, the ALJ's statement that there was no need to summon the officer could be viewed as an implicit acceptance of Fowler's proffer and an implicit weighing of the evidence of the proffer against the officer's certification. This requires a substantial inferential leap, however, one that we are not prepared to take on this record. Even if we were prepared to do so, under this Forman option, an ALJ is required to "explicitly accept[] the proffer." Forman, 332 Md. at 222, 630 A.2d at 764. The record does not indicate that this was done.
 Because we are remanding the present case for further proceedings, we pause to highlight how an ALJ might proceed under this option. Accepting the proffer of the driver as to what the certifying officer's testimony would be does not imply automatically that the driver's proffer will be sufficient to exonerate him, or to overcome the prima facie evidence of the DR-15 form. Instead, the ALJ first accepts the proffer as if it were proven true. By accepting the proffer of the certifying officer's testimony as truth there is no need to subpoena the officer to reiterate these facts. Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765. After accepting explicitly the proffer, the ALJ next assesses the proffer against other competing evidence to determine if the evidence is sufficient to overcome other conflicting evidence. The DR-15 Advice of Rights form constitutes prima facie evidence of a test refusal. Prima facie evidence is "good and sufficient on its face . . . to establish a given fact," unless contradicted. Karwacki, 340 Md. at 283, 666 A.2d at 516-17 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th Ed.1990)). Thus, the ALJ must exercise his or her discretion and determine if a driver's proffer as to what the certifying officer would testify overcomes sufficiently the prima facie evidence of the form.
 V.
 The importance of clear, explicit administrative agency decisions cannot be over-emphasized. "[I]t is appropriate to point out, as we have in previous opinions, not only the importance but the necessity that administrative agencies resolve all significant conflicts in the evidence and then chronicle, in the record, full, complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law." State Comm'n on Human Rel. v. Malakoff, 273 Md. 214, 229, 329 A.2d 8,17 (1974). Administrative law judges must fully explain their decisions so that this Court and others may perform the function of review accurately and effectively. Harford County, 322 Md. at 505, 588 A.2d at 778. Such explanation is not only for the sake of judicial economy, but also ensures that the parties understand fully an agency's decisions. See id.
 Upon remand, the option to reject both the proffer and the subpoena request is not viable, given the need to resolve the material factual issue raised by Fowler's proffer. Two options remain. The ALJ may accept explicitly the proffer, denying the subpoena request, and proceed as described, supra. Otherwise, the ALJ may choose to issue the subpoena. This option should be executed if the ALJ harbors reservations as to the accuracy or credibility of Fowler's proffer. See Forman, 332 Md. at 224, 630 A.2d at 765. While we recognize that the General Assembly elected specifically to make the DR-15 form prima facie evidence to avoid an unnecessary burden on the police force,[14] we do *360 not think the Legislature intended to preclude an officer from being called to testify at a suspension hearing when a key factual issue is in dispute, particularly where the issue involves an individual's advice of his or her rights under the law.
 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.
 NOTES
 [1] All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are hereafter to the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.).
 [2] A chemical breath test is "[a] test of a person's breath or of 1 specimen of a person's blood to determine alcohol concentration." § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iv)(1). While a person may not be compelled to take a chemical breath test, refusal to take a test results in automatic suspension of the person's driver's license. See § 16-205.1(b)(1).
 [3] A preliminary breath test ("PBT") may be requested by a police officer, without making an arrest and prior to issuing a citation, in order to "guide [] the police officer in deciding whether an arrest should be made." § 16-205.2(a) and (c). However, the State may not use the results of a PBT in a court action. § 16-205.2(c).
 [4] Under § 16-205.1(b)(2), an officer who believes that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol is required to "(i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken; [and] (iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test. . . ."
 [5] Section 16-205.1(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
 Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented . . . to take a [chemical breath] test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol. . . .
 Section 16-205.1(b)(1)(i) describes the mandatory license suspension scheme:
 (i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
 1. For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing:
 A. For a first offense, suspend the driver's license for 45 days; or
 B. For a second offense or subsequent offense, suspend the driver's license for 90 days; or
 2. For a test refusal:
 A. For a first offense, suspend the driver's license for 120 days; or
 B. For a second offense or subsequent offense, suspend the driver's license for 1 year.
 [6] The following excerpt is from Fowler's testimony at the suspension hearing:
 [Fowler's Attorney]: Did he ever tell you that if you did not take the test at the station that your license would be suspended for 120 days?
 [Fowler]: Well, he told me that on the street.
 [Fowler's Attorney]: What did he say on the street?
 [Fowler]: He told me that if Ihe actually told me when I was actuallyon the street he told me that if I didn't take the test he would take me to the station. When I got to the station after waiting there for an extensive period of time he brought me into the room and gave me papers to actually look at and read, and told me that because I didn't take the test my license was going to be suspended and it was his prerogative whether to detain me that night or not to, so he decided not to.
 [Fowler's Attorney]: Did he ever distinguish between the test that you refused on the street, did he ever explain to you that it was a separate test that he wanted you to take at the station?
 [Fowler]: No. . . .
 [7] The ALJ entered both the DR-15 Advice of Rights form and the DR-15A form as evidence for the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA").
 [8] Fowler submitted the following question in his petition:
 Whether an ALJ in a driver license suspension hearing must apply the rule of Forman v. MVA, [332 Md. 201, 630 A.2d 753 (1993),] rather than MVA v. Karwacki, [340 Md. 271, 666 A.2d 511 (1995),] where there is a dispute on a genuine issue of fact and the licensee has properly requested a subpoena for the witness?
 [9] In this case, the MVA is the relevant administrative agency. The MVA delegated authority to conduct hearings and render final decisions in contested matters, such as Fowler's case, to the Office of Administrative Hearings. See Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR") 11.11.02.07.
 [10] This section has been referred to as "Maryland's `implied consent' and `administrative per se' law against drunk driving" because it provides for "swift administrative action" to suspend suspected drunk drivers' licenses, in addition to criminal penalties that may also be imposed. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 344 n. 1, 643 A.2d 442, 442 n. 1, (1994); see generally Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 460-62, 597 A.2d 939, 941-43 (1991) (recounting the history leading to the passage of § 16-205.1).
 [11] Section 16-205.1(f)(7)(i) sets forth the six issues that may be raised at a hearing under § 16-205.1(f).
 [12] In Karwacki, we noted, on numerous occasions, the absence of a subpoena request. For instance, in identifying the issue, we described it as "whether, at a probable cause hearing, held pursuant to [§ 16-205.1(f)(7)], an administrative law judge may give greater credit to the sworn written statement of an absent police officer, who was not subpoenaed by either party, than to the conflicting testimony of the motorist." Karwacki, 340 Md. at 273, 666 A.2d at 512 (Emphasis added). Later, in distinguishing Forman, we noted it was not controlling because in Karwacki's case "[he] did not subpoena the arresting officer, and consequently, did not proffer what the officer's testimony would have been had he been called to testify." Karwacki, 340 Md. at 287, 666 A.2d at 519 (Emphasis added). Further, in summarizing our holding, we stated that "by not subpoenaing the arresting officer and offering only his sworn testimony, directly conflicting the arresting officer's sworn statement on a critical point, [Karwacki] presented the ALJ with an all or nothing choice." Karwacki, 340 Md. at 289, 666 A.2d at 520 (Emphasis added). The ALJ was therefore entitled to, and did, resolve the factual dispute in favor of the prima facie evidence of the DR-15 certification. Id. The ALJ was "under no obligation to believe the respondent. Nor, in the absence of a request to do so, was he obliged to even consider whether to subpoena the arresting officer." Id. (Emphasis added).
 [13] Section16-205.2 governs the administration of a preliminary breath test ("PBT"). While the results of a preliminary breath test serve as a guide for the officer to determine if arrest is necessary, there is no mandatory license suspension for a test failure or refusal to take a PBT. See § 16-205.2(c).
 [14] See § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii); see also MVA v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 51, 821 A.2d 62, 70 (2003) (recounting the legislative history behind § 16-205.1 and concluding that the "Legislature refused to adopt [statutory] amendments which would have allowed a driver to compel attendance of the police officer . . . at the hearings and, instead, retained the nature of an administrative per se hearing as one where `a sworn statement is prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16-205.1'").


type: wikipedia

text:
Kalcija sulfāts (CaSO4) ir balta, kristāliska viela, kas slikti šķīst ūdenī. Tas ir galvenais minerāla ģipša komponents. Kalcija sulfāts var veidot vairākus kristālhidrātus.
 CaSO4 - anhidrīts, dabā sastopams reti, jo hidratējas
 CaSO4·0,5H2O - pushidrāts, galvenā celtniecības ģipša sastāvdaļa
 CaSO4·2H2O - dihidrāts, galvenā ģipšakmens sastāvdaļa
 Pushidrāts piesaista ūdeni, veidojot dihidrātu. Dihidrātu karsējot līdz ~160 °C, tas veido pushidrātu.
 Kalcija sulfātu var iegūt no kalcija hidroksīda un sērskābes, tas veidojas kā blakusprodukts, attīrot dūmgāzes no sēra dioksīda (vispirms veidojas kalcija sulfīts, kas viegli oksidējas par kalcija sulfātu).
 Kalcija sulfātu izmanto arī kā pārtikas piedevu E516.
 Skatīt arī
 Ģipsis
 Selenīts (minerāls)
 Kalcijs
 Sulfāti
 Pārtikas piedevas


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 30.7.2020.
 COM(2020) 344 final
 2020/0159(NLE)
 Prijedlog
 UREDBE VIJEĆA
 o izmjeni Uredbe (EU) 2020/123 u pogledu određenih ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. u vodama Unije i vodama izvan Unije
 OBRAZLOŽENJE
 1.KONTEKST PRIJEDLOGA
 •Razlozi i ciljevi prijedloga
 Uredbom Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 utvrđene su ribolovne mogućnosti za 2020. za određene riblje stokove i skupine ribljih stokova koje se primjenjuju u vodama Unije te, za plovila Unije, u određenim vodama izvan Unije. Te se ribolovne mogućnosti obično mijenjaju nekoliko puta tijekom razdoblja u kojem su na snazi.
 •Dosljednost s postojećim odredbama politike u tom području
 Predložene mjere u skladu su s ciljevima i pravilima zajedničke ribarstvene politike i Unijine politike održivog razvoja.
 •Dosljednost u odnosu na druge politike Unije
 Predložene su mjere u skladu s drugim politikama Unije, u prvom redu s politikama u području zaštite okoliša.
 2.PRAVNA OSNOVA, SUPSIDIJARNOST I PROPORCIONALNOST
 •Pravna osnova
 Pravna je osnova ovog prijedloga članak 43. stavak 3. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije.
 Obveze Unije povezane s održivim iskorištavanjem živih vodenih resursa proizlaze iz obveza utvrđenih u članku 2. Uredbe o ZRP-u.
 •Supsidijarnost (za neisključivu nadležnost)
 Prijedlog je u isključivoj nadležnosti Unije kako je navedeno u članku 3. stavku 1. točki (d) Ugovora. Načelo supsidijarnosti stoga se ne primjenjuje.
 •Proporcionalnost
 Prijedlog je u skladu s načelom proporcionalnosti jer je ZRP jedna od zajedničkih politika. U skladu s člankom 43. stavkom 3. Ugovora Vijeće donosi mjere o utvrđivanju i raspodjeli ribolovnih mogućnosti.
 •Odabir instrumenta
 Predloženi instrument: uredba.
 3.REZULTATI EX POST EVALUACIJA, SAVJETOVANJA S DIONICIMA I PROCJENA UČINKA
 •Ex post evaluacije/provjere primjerenosti postojećeg zakonodavstva
 Nije primjenjivo.
 •Savjetovanja s dionicima
 U Prijedlogu i pri utvrđivanju ribolovnih mogućnosti uzeta su u obzir mišljenja dionika, savjetodavnih vijeća, nacionalnih uprava, organizacija ribara i nevladinih organizacija prikupljena tijekom godine.
 •Prikupljanje i primjena stručnog znanja
 Prijedlog se temelji na znanstvenim savjetima
 1
 Međunarodnog vijeća za istraživanje mora (ICES) te Znanstvenog, tehničkog i gospodarskog odbora za ribarstvo (STECF).
 •Procjena učinka
 Područje primjene uredbe o ribolovnim mogućnostima određeno je člankom 43. stavkom 3. Ugovora.
 •Primjerenost i pojednostavnjenje propisa
 Nije primjenjivo.
 •Temeljna prava
 Nije primjenjivo.
 4.UTJECAJ NA PRORAČUN
 Predložene mjere neće imati utjecaj na proračun.
 5.DRUGI ELEMENTI
 •Detaljno obrazloženje posebnih odredaba prijedloga
 Predloženim izmjenama Uredba Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 izmijenila bi se kako je opisano u nastavku.
 Inćun na potpodručjima 9 i 10
 Inćun (Engraulis encrasicolus) na potpodručjima ICES-a 9 i 10 te u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1 kratkoživuća je vrsta za koju se istraživanja dovršavaju u svibnju. Ukupni dopušteni ulov (TAC) utvrđuje se za razdoblje od 1. srpnja do 30. lipnja iduće godine. Time se osigurava da ribolovne mogućnosti budu utemeljene na najboljoj mogućoj procjeni godišnjeg novačenja te kratkoživuće vrste.
 U Uredbi Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 TAC za inćuna na potpodručjima ICES-a 9 i 10 te u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1, s primjenjivošću od 1. srpnja 2020. do 30. lipnja 2021., utvrđen je na nulu dok se čekao novi znanstveni savjet. U drugoj izmjeni ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. utvrđen je privremeni TAC od 4 018 tona do 30. rujna 2020. kako bi se omogućio nastavak ribolova. Znanstveni savjet objavljen je 18. lipnja 2020. TAC za razdoblje od 1. srpnja 2020. trebalo bi stoga izmijeniti u skladu s najnovijim znanstvenim savjetima ICES-a.
 Pristup ribolovu ugotice pučinke u vodama Farskih Otoka
 U prihvaćenom zapisniku sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Farskih Otoka i Unije za 2020. stranke su se usuglasile da će jedna drugoj dodijeliti pristup svojim vodama radi ribolova ugotice pučinke (Micromesistius poutassou) u vodama Unije i međunarodnim vodama u zonama 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d, 8e, 12 i 14, uz ograničenje od 37 500 tona za svaku. Posebnim je uvjetom količina ugotice pučinke koju države članice smiju uloviti iz vlastitih kvota u vodama Farskih Otoka ograničena na određeni postotak ukupnog udjela Unije. Taj bi postotak trebao odgovarati omjeru između prava Unije na pristup koji iznosi 37 500 tona i ukupnog udjela Unije koji iznosi 326 484 tona. To odgovara postotku od 11,4 %, koliko države članice smiju uloviti iz vlastitih kvota u vodama Farskih Otoka. Taj je postotak trenutačno utvrđen na 7 % te bi ga trebalo na odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 Pristup ribolovu ugotice pučinke u vodama Unije
 U prihvaćenom zapisniku sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Norveške i Unije o ad hoc aranžmanima za 2020. za upravljanje ugoticom pučinkom i atlantsko-skandinavskom haringom koja se mrijesti u proljeće stranke su se usuglasile da će jedna drugoj odobriti ribolov 190 809 tona ugotice pučinke u svojim vodama. Posebnim je uvjetom pristup Norveške ribolovu u vodama Unije u zoni 4a ograničen na 40 000 tona (u skladu s prihvaćenim zapisnikom sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Norveške i Unije za 2020.). Ograničenje ulova u zoni 4a odgovara 21 % ukupne pristupne kvote Norveške u vodama Unije u zonama 2, 4a, 5, u zoni 6 sjeverno od 56° 30' S i u zoni 7 zapadno od 12° Z. Taj je postotak trenutačno utvrđen na 18 % te bi ga trebalo na odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 Ribolovne mogućnosti za kapelana u grenlandskim vodama
 Protokolom uz Sporazum o partnerstvu u ribarstvu između Europske unije i Grenlanda predviđeno je da Unija dobije 7,7 % ukupnog dopuštenog ulova kapelana (Mallotus villosus) koji će se loviti u grenlandskim vodama na potpodručjima ICES-a 5 i 14. Na temelju ICES-ova savjeta u kojem se predlaže količina od 169 520 tona te u skladu s Protokolom o ribarstvu između Europske unije i Grenlanda, Grenland je 12. lipnja 2020. Uniji ponudio pravo na ulov 13 053 tona kapelana. Ribolovna sezona za taj TAC počinje 20. lipnja 2020. i završava 15. travnja 2021. U Uredbi Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 TAC za kapelana utvrđen je na nulu za razdoblje od 20. lipnja 2019. do 30. travnja 2020. te bi ga stoga trebalo na odgovarajući način izmijeniti za razdoblje od 20. lipnja 2019. do 15. travnja 2021.
 Savjetovanje s Ujedinjenom Kraljevinom
 Budući da ovu Uredbu treba donijeti tijekom prijelaznog razdoblja predviđenog Sporazumom o povlačenju Ujedinjene Kraljevine Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske iz Europske unije i Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju, Komisija će se savjetovati s Ujedinjenom Kraljevinom u skladu s člankom 130. stavkom 1. tog sporazuma.
 2020/0159 (NLE)
 Prijedlog
 UREDBE VIJEĆA
 o izmjeni Uredbe (EU) 2020/123 u pogledu određenih ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. u vodama Unije i vodama izvan Unije
 VIJEĆE EUROPSKE UNIJE,
 uzimajući u obzir Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije, a posebno njegov članak 43. stavak 3.,
 uzimajući u obzir prijedlog Europske komisije,
 budući da:
 (1)Uredbom Vijeća (EU) 2020/123
 2
 1 utvrđene su ribolovne mogućnosti za 2020. za određene riblje stokove i skupine ribljih stokova koje se primjenjuju u vodama Unije te, za plovila Unije, u određenim vodama izvan Unije.
 (2)U Uredbi (EU) 2020/123 ukupni dopušteni ulov (TAC) inćuna (Engraulis encrasicolus) na potpodručjima ICES-a 9 i 10 te u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1 utvrđen je na nulu. U drugoj izmjeni
 3
 Uredbe Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 utvrđen je privremeni TAC kako bi se omogućio nastavak ribolova. Inćun je kratkoživuća vrsta, a odgovarajući znanstveni savjet objavljen je 18. lipnja 2020. Ograničenja ulova za inćune na potpodručjima ICES-a 9 i 10 te u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1 sada bi trebalo izmijeniti u skladu s najnovijim znanstvenim savjetom Međunarodnog vijeća za istraživanje mora (ICES) te ih utvrditi na 15 699 tona.
 (3)U prihvaćenom zapisniku sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Farskih Otoka i Unije za 2020. stranke su se usuglasile da će jedna drugoj dodijeliti pristup svojim vodama radi ribolova ugotice pučinke (Micromesistius poutassou) u vodama Unije i međunarodnim vodama u zonama 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d, 8e, 12 i 14, uz ograničenje od 37 500 tona. Posebnim je uvjetom u tablici TAC-ova Uniji dodijeljen pristup vodama Farskih Otoka i ograničena, u obliku postotka ukupnog udjela Unije, količina ugotice pučinke koju države članice smiju uloviti iz vlastitih kvota u vodama Farskih Otoka. Taj bi postotak trebao odgovarati omjeru između prava Unije na pristup u iznosu od 37 500 tona i ukupnog udjela Unije u iznosu od 326 484 tona ugotice pučinke. To odgovara postotku od 11,4 %, koliko države članice smiju uloviti iz vlastitih kvota u vodama Farskih Otoka. Taj je postotak trenutačno utvrđen na 7 % te bi ga trebalo na odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 (4)U prihvaćenom zapisniku sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Norveške i Unije o ad hoc aranžmanima za 2020. za upravljanje ugoticom pučinkom (Micromesistius poutassou) i atlantsko-skandinavskom haringom koja se mrijesti u proljeće stranke su se usuglasile da će jedna drugoj odobriti ribolov 190 809 tona ugotice pučinke u svojim vodama. U tablici TAC-ova za ugoticu pučinku kojom se Norveškoj odobrava pristup tom ribolovu u vodama Unije u zonama 2, 4a, 5, u zoni 6 sjeverno od 56° 30' S i u zoni 7 zapadno od 12° Z, posebnim je uvjetom ograničen ulov u zoni 4a na najviše 40 000 tona (u skladu s prihvaćenim zapisnikom sa savjetovanja o ribarstvu između Norveške i Unije za 2020.). To ograničenje ulova u zoni 4a odgovara postotku od 21 % ukupne pristupne kvote Norveške. Taj postotak trenutačno je utvrđen na 18 % te bi ga trebalo na odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 (5)Sporazumom o partnerstvu u ribarstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i Vlade Danske i Lokalne vlade Grenlanda, s druge strane
 4
 te Protokolom
 5
 uz navedeni sporazum predviđeno je da Unija dobije 7,7 % ukupnog dopuštenog ulova kapelana (Mallotus villosus) koji će se loviti u grenlandskim vodama na potpodručjima ICES-a 5. i 14. U skladu s navedenim protokolom Grenland je 12. lipnja 2020. Uniji ponudio pravo na ulov 13 053 tona kapelana koji će se loviti u razdoblju od 20. lipnja 2020. do 15. travnja 2021. Tablicu ribolovnih mogućnosti za kapelana trebalo bi stoga a odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 (6)Uredbu (EU) 2020/123 trebalo bi stoga na odgovarajući način izmijeniti.
 (7)Ograničenja ulova predviđena Uredbom (EU) 2020/123 primjenjuju se od 1. siječnja 2020. za ugoticu pučinku u vodama Unije u zonama 2, 4a, 5, u zoni 6 sjeverno od 56° 30' S i u zoni 7 zapadno od 12° Z, od 20. lipnja 2020. za kapelana u grenlandskim vodama na potpodručjima ICES-a 5 i 14, a od 1. srpnja 2020. za inćuna na potpodručjima ICES-a 9 i 10 i u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1. Odredbe o ograničenjima ulova uvedene ovom Uredbom trebale bi stoga stupiti na snagu što prije retroaktivno se primjenjivati za ugoticu pučinku od 1. siječnja 2020., za kapelana od 20. lipnja 2020., a za inćuna od 1. srpnja 2020. Takva retroaktivna primjena ne utječe na načela pravne sigurnosti i zaštite opravdanih očekivanja jer dotične ribolovne mogućnosti još nisu iscrpljene.
 (8)S Ujedinjenom Kraljevinom provedeno je savjetovanje u skladu s člankom 130. stavkom 1. Sporazuma o povlačenju Ujedinjene Kraljevine Velike Britanije i Sjeverne Irske iz Europske unije i Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju,
 DONIJELO JE OVU UREDBU:
 Članak 1.
 Izmjena Uredbe (EU) 2020/123
 Prilozi I.A i I.B Uredbi (EU) 2020/123 mijenjaju se kako slijedi:
 (1)Prilog I.A mijenja se kako slijedi:
 (a)tablica ribolovnih mogućnosti za inćuna u zonama 9 i 10 te u vodama Unije u zoni CECAF-a 34.1.1. zamjenjuje se sljedećim:
 „
 Vrsta:
 Inćun
 Zona:
 9 i 10; vode Unije na području CECAF-a 34.1.1
 Engraulis encrasicolus
 (ANE/9/3411)
 Španjolska
 7 494
 (1)
 Zaštitni TAC
 Portugal
 8 175
 (1)
 Unija
 15 669
 (1)
 TAC
 15 669
 (1)
 (1)
 Kvota se smije loviti samo od 1. srpnja 2020. do 30. lipnja 2021.
 ”;
 (b)u tablici ribolovnih mogućnosti za ugoticu pučinku (Micromesistius poutassou) u vodama Unije i međunarodnim vodama u zonama 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d, 8e, 12 i 14, bilješka 1. zamjenjuje se sljedećim:
 „1. Poseban uvjet: unutar ukupne količine za pristup od 37 500 tona za Uniju, države članice smiju izloviti do sljedećeg postotka svojih kvota u vodama Farskih Otoka (WHB/*05-F.): 11,4 %.”;
 (c)u tablici ribolovnih mogućnosti za ugoticu pučinku (Micromesistius poutassou) u vodama Unije u zonama 2, 4a, 5, u zoni 6 sjeverno od 56° 30' S i u zoni 7 zapadno od 12° Z, bilješka 2 zamjenjuje se sljedećim:
 „2. Poseban uvjet: ulov u zoni 4a ne smije premašiti sljedeći iznos (WHB/*04A-C): 40 000
 To ograničenje ulova u zoni 4a odgovara sljedećem postotku pristupne kvote Norveške:
 21 %”;
 (2)u Prilogu I.B tablica s ribolovnim mogućnostima za kapelana u grenlandskim vodama u zonama 5 i 14 zamjenjuje se sljedećim:
 „
 Vrsta:
 Kapelan
 Zona:
 grenlandske vode u zonama 5 i 14
 Mallotus villosus
 (CAP/514GRN)
 Danska
 2 595
 Analitički TAC
 Njemačka
 113
 Ne primjenjuje se članak 3. Uredbe (EZ) br. 847/96.
 Švedska
 186
 Ne primjenjuje se članak 4. Uredbe (EZ) br. 847/96.
 Ujedinjena Kraljevina
 24
 Sve države članice
 134
 (1)
 Unija
 3 053
 (2)
 Norveška
 10 000
 (2)
 TAC
 Nije relevantno.
 (1)
 Danska, Njemačka, Švedska i Ujedinjena Kraljevina mogu pristupiti kvoti koja se odnosi na „sve države članice” samo nakon što iscrpe vlastitu kvotu. Međutim države članice s više od 10 % kvote Unije uopće ne smiju pristupiti kvoti koja se odnosi na „sve države članice”.
 (2)
 Za razdoblje ribolova od 20. lipnja 2020. do 15. travnja 2021.
 ”.
 Članak 2.
 Stupanje na snagu i primjena
 Ova Uredba stupa na snagu sljedećeg dana od dana objave u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Članak 1. stavak 1. točka (a) primjenjuje se od 1. srpnja 2020., a točke (b) i (c) primjenjuju se od 1. siječnja 2020.
 Članak 1.stavak 2. primjenjuje se od 20. lipnja 2020.
 Ova je Uredba u cijelosti obvezujuća i izravno se primjenjuje u svim državama članicama.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu,
 Za Vijeće
 Predsjednik
 (1)
 http://www.ices.dk/community/advisory-process/Pages/Latest-advice.aspx
 (2)
 1
 Uredba Vijeća (EU) 2020/123 od 27. siječnja 2020. o utvrđivanju ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. za određene riblje stokove i skupine ribljih stokova koje se primjenjuju u vodama Unije te, za ribarska plovila Unije, u određenim vodama izvan Unije (SL L 25, 30.1.2020., str. 1.).
 (3)
 Uredba Vijeća (EU) 2020/900 od 25. lipnja 2020. o izmjeni Uredbe (EU) 2019/1838 u pogledu određenih ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. u Baltičkome moru i o izmjeni Uredbe (EU) 2020/123 u pogledu određenih ribolovnih mogućnosti za 2020. u vodama Unije i vodama izvan Unije SL L 207, 30.6.2020., str. 4.–14.
 (4)
 SL L 172, 30.6.2007., str. 4.
 (5)
 Protokol o utvrđivanju ribolovnih mogućnosti i financijskog doprinosa predviđenih Sporazumom o partnerstvu u ribarstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i Vlade Danske i Lokalne vlade Grenlanda, s druge strane (SL L 305, 21.11.2015., str. 3.).


text:
Karin Schneider (nascida em 1970) é uma artista estadunidense e brasileira. Ela nasceu no Brasil.
 Schneider vive e trabalha em Nova York desde outubro de 1996. Em 1997, Schneider e o artista Nicolás Guagnini criaram uma empresa de cinema experimental chamada Union Gaucha Productions. Seu primeiro filme Phantom Limb, feito em 1997, é um documentário de ficção, de tem 30 minutos de 16 mm, que traça através de analogias formais a história da arte concreta da Argentina e do Brasil, do neoconcretismo do Brasil e do unicismo da Polônia.
 A obra de Schneider tem um forte impulso lúdico e às vezes convida o público a inverter a lógica do objeto de arte trazendo funcionalidade a ele. Seus modelos de arquitetura foram transformados de forma crítica em aparatos domésticos, suas pinturas a óleo tornaram-se exposições para projeções. Sempre há um programa inserido em suas instalações para conectar a obra com o presente e com a realidade fora do espaço expositivo.
 Bibliografia
 Links externos
 Site CAGE, administrado pela artista
 Pessoas vivas
 Nascidos em 1970


text:
 8.9.2014
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 303/31
 Преюдициално запитване от Cour d'appel de Mons. (Белгия), постъпило на 9 юли 2014 г. — État belge/Nathalie De Fruytier
 (Дело C-334/14)
 2014/C 303/39
 Език на производството: френски
 Запитваща юрисдикция
 Cour d'appel de Mons
 Страни в главното производство
 Въззивник: État belge
 Въззиваем: Nathalie De Fruytier
 Преюдициални въпроси
 1)
 Изключва ли член 13, A, [параграф] 1, [букви] б) и в) от Шеста директива ДДС (1) транспортирането на проби и органи за целите на медицински изследвания или медицинска помощ, или лечение, извършено от самостоятелно заето трето лице, чиито услуги се включват във възстановяваните от системата за социална сигурност суми на клиники и лаборатории, да бъде освободено от ДДС като дейност, тясно свързана с услуги от медицинско естество, тоест такива, чиято цел е диагностицирането, помощта, и доколкото е възможно, лечението на заболявания или здравни аномалии?
 2)
 Може ли дейността по транспортирането на проби и органи за целите на медицински изследвания или медицинска помощ или лечение, извършено от самостоятелно заето трето лице, чиито услуги се включват във възстановяваните от системата за социална сигурност суми на клиники и лаборатории с цел извършване на медицински изследвания, да се ползва от освобождаване от данък в съответствие с член 13, A, [параграф] 1, [букви] б) и в) от Шеста директива ДДС?
 3)
 Понятието за надлежно признати заведения с подобно предназначение по член 13, А, параграф 1, буква б) от Шеста директива трябва ли да се тълкува в смисъл, че включва частноправни дружества, чиито услуги се състоят в транспортирането на човешки проби за целите на изследвания, необходими за постигане на преследваните терапевтични цели от болничните и други медицински заведения?
 (1) Шеста директива 77/388/ЕИО на Съвета от 17 май 1977 година относно хармонизиране на законодателствата на държавите членки относно данъците върху оборота — обща система на данъка върху добавената стойност: единна данъчна основа (ОВ L 145, стр. 1).


type: contracts

text:
N° L 338 / 10 Journal officiel des Communautés européennes 29 . 11 . 86
 PROTOCOLE ADDITIONNEL
 à l'accord entre la Communauté économique européenne et la républiqe d'Indonésie sur le commerce
 des produits textiles , faisant suite à l'adhésion du royaume d'Espagne et de la République portugaise à
 la Communauté
 LE CONSEIL DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES ,
 d'une part ,
 LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D'INDONÉSIE ,
 d'autre part ,
 VU l'adhésion du royaume d'Espagne et de la République portugaise aux Communautés européennes , intervenue
 le 1 er janvier 1986 ,
 VU l'accord entre la Communauté économique européenne et la république d'Indonésie sur le commerce des
 produits textiles , paraphé le 25 novembre 1982 , ci-après dénommé « accord »,
 ONT DÉCIDÉ de déterminer d'un commun accord les ajustements et mesures transitoires à introduire dans
 l'accord en raison de l'adhésion du royaume d'Espagne et de la République portugaise à la Communauté
 économique européenne et
 DE CONCLURE LE PRÉSENT PROTOCOLE :
 Article premier Allemagne 28,5% ,
 Bénélux 10,5% ,
 L'accord , tel que modifié par le présent protocole , y compris France 18,5% ,
 ses annexes et ses protocoles , le procès-verbal approuvé et Italie 15,0% ,
 l'échange de lettres qui en font partie intégrante , est rédigé en Danemark 3,0% ,
 langues espagnole et portugaise , ces textes faisant foi au
 Irlande 1,0% ,
 même titre que les textes initiaux .
 Royaume-Uni 23,5% ,
 Grèce 2,0% ,
 Article 2 Espagne 7,5% ,
 Portugal 1,5% .»
 L'accord est modifié comme suit.
 1 ) Les limites fixées à l'annexe II sont portées aux niveaux 4 ) Le paragraphe suivant est ajouté à l'article 8 :
 indiqués dans l'annexe du présent protocole .
 « 12 . Pour la fixation , en 1986 , des limites quantita
 2 ) Le paragraphe suivant est inséré à l'article 8 : tives communautaires ou des limites quantitatives régio
 «2 bis. Pour l'application , en 1986 , des dispositions nales autres que pour l'Espagne et le Portugal , si les
 du paragraphe 2 , le volume total des importations de la chiffres calculés sur la base de l'article 8 paragraphe 2 bis
 Communauté effectuées au cours de l'année précédente ne sont pas disponibles ou sont inférieurs à ceux résultant
 en provenance de tous les pays tiers est calculé sur la base de l'application des règles en vigueur avant l'élargisse
 des importations de la Communauté dans sa composi ment, ces dernières demeurent applicables à titre excep
 tion au 31 décembre 1985 , ainsi que des importations de tionnel .
 l'Espagne et du Portugal . Sont exclus de ce volume les
 échanges entre la Communauté et l'Espagne et le Portu Pour la fixation des limites régionales pour l'Espagne et le
 gal , ainsi qu'entre l'Espagne et le Portugal .» Portugal , si les chiffres relatifs à l'année 1985 ne sont pas
 disponibles , le volume total des importations est calculé
 3 ) Le texte du protocole C est remplacé par le texte de la même manière que celle prévue au paragraphe 2 bis,
 suivant : mais sur la base des importations réalisées en 1984 ».
 « Conformément à l'article 8 paragraphe 6 de l'accord ,
 une limite quantitative peut être fixée au niveau régional 5 ) Le texte suivant est ajouté à l'article 14 paragraphe 2 du
 lorsque les importations d'un produit déterminé dans une protocole A , sous le titre «deux lettres pour l'identifica
 région de la Communauté dépassent , par rapport aux tion du pays de destination comme suit :»
 quantités déterminées dans les conditions prévues aux
 paragraphes 2 et 2 bis dudit article 8 , le pourcentage «ES — Espagne ,
 suivant affecté à ces régions : PT — Portugal ».
 ---pagebreak--- 29 . 11 . 86 Journal officiel des Communautés européennes N° L 338 / 11
 Article 3 2. Le présent protocole est applicable à partir du 1 er jan
 vier 1986 et demeure en vigueur pendant la durée de validité
 L'annexe du présent protocole fait partie intégrante de de l'accord entre la Communauté économique européenne et
 celui-ci . Le présent protocole fait partie intégrante de la république d'Indonésie sur le commerce des produits
 l'accord . textiles .
 Article 4 Article S
 1. Le présent protocole entre en vigueur le premier jour du Le présent protocole est rédigé en double exemplaire en
 mois suivant la date à laquelle les parties contractantes se langues allemande , anglaise , danoise , espagnole , française ,
 notifient l'accomplissement des procédures nécessaires à cet grecque , italienne , néerlandaise , portugaise et bahasa indo
 effet . nesia chacun de ces textes faisant également foi .
 ---pagebreak--- N° L 338 / 12 Journal officiel des Communautés européennes 29 . 11 . 86
 ANNEXE
 Limites
 Désignation des marchandises quantitatives
 Catégorie Unité
 communautaires
 en 1986
 6 Pantalons tissés 1 000 pièces 4 403
 7 Chemisiers tissés et de bonneterie 1 000 pièces 3 688
 8 Chemises tissées 1 000 pièces 6 034


text:
 Avis juridique important
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 32000L0002
 Directive 2000/2/CE de la Commission, du 14 janvier 2000, portant adaptation au progrès technique de la directive 75/322/CEE du Conseil relative à la suppression des parasites radioélectriques produits par les moteurs à allumage commandé équipant les tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues et de la directive 74/150/CEE du Conseil relative à la réception des tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues (Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)
 Journal officiel n° L 021 du 26/01/2000 p. 0023 - 0031
 DIRECTIVE 2000/2/CE DE LA COMMISSIONdu 14 janvier 2000portant adaptation au progrès technique de la directive 75/322/CEE du Conseil relative à la suppression des parasites radioélectriques produits par les moteurs à allumage commandé équipant les tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues et de la directive 74/150/CEE du Conseil relative à la réception des tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES,vu le traité instituant la Communauté européenne,vu la directive 74/150/CEE du Conseil du 4 mars 1974 concernant le rapprochement des législations des États membres relatives à la réception des tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues(1), modifiée en dernieur lieu par la directive 97/54/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil(2), et notamment son article 11,vu la directive 75/322/CEE du Conseil du 20 mai 1975 concernant le rapprochement des législation des États membres relatives à la suppression des parasites radioélectriques produits par les moteurs à allumage commandé équipant les tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers à roues(3), modifiée en dernier lieu par la directive 97/54/CE, et notamment son article 5,considérant ce qui suit:(1) la directive 75/322/CEE est l'une des directives particulières de la procédure de réception CE par type établie dans le cadre de la directive 74/150/CEE; par conséquent, les dispositions de la directive 74/150/CEE applicables aux systèmes, aux composants et aux entités techniques s'appliquent à ladite directive;(2) la directive 75/322/CEE contient les premières mesures visant à garantir une compatibilité électromagnétique élémentaire en ce qui concerne les parasites radioélectriques et, depuis lors, avec les progrès techniques, la complexité et la diversité des équipements électriques et électroniques se sont accrues;(3) pour tenir compte de la préoccupation croissante en matière de développements technologiques dans le matériel électrique et électronique et de la nécessité de s'assurer de la compatibilité générale des différents matériels électriques et électroniques, la directive 89/336/CEE du Conseil(4), modifiée en dernier lieu par la directive 93/68/CEE(5), a fixé des dispositions générales concernant la compatibilité électromagnétique pour tout produit non couvert par une directive spécifique;(4) en vertu du principe établi par la directive 89/336/CEE, les dispositions générales de ladite directive ne s'appliquent pas ou cessent de s'appliquer pour les appareils couverts par des directives spécifiques dans la mesure où les exigences de protection prévues dans ladite directive sont harmonisées;(5) la directive 75/322/CEE doit devenir une de ces directives spécifiques;(6) l'adaptation au progrès technique a été réalisée dans le cas des véhicules à moteur par la directive 95/54/CE de la Commission(6) relative à la suppression des parasites radioélectriques produits par les moteurs à allumage commandé équipant les véhicules à moteur. Il convient à présent d'adopter des exigences équivalentes de suppression des parasites radioélectriques produits par les moteurs équipant les tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers, en établissant une directive spécifique dans le cadre de la procédure de réception par type prévoyant que la réception est accordée par une autorité nationale désignée sur la base d'exigences techniques harmonisées;(7) il est nécessaire que les exigences techniques relatives aux parasites radioélectriques (compatibilité électromagnétique) des véhicules, de leurs composants et de leurs systèmes soient uniquement régies, à partir du 1er octobre 2001, par les dispositions de la directive 75/322/CEE;(8) les mesures prévues à la présente directive sont conformes à l'avis du comité pour l'adaptation au progrès technique institué par l'article 12 de la directive 74/150/CEE,A ARRÊTÉ LA PRÉSENTE DIRECTIVE:Article premierLa directive 75/322/CEE est modifiée comme suit:1) Le titre est remplacé par le texte suivant: "Directive 75/322/CEE du Conseil du 20 mai 1975 relative à la suppression des parasites radioélectriques (compatibilité électromagnétique) produits par les tracteurs agricoles ou forestiers."2) L'article 1er et l'article 2 sont remplacés par le texte suivant: "Article premierAux fins de la présente directive, on entend par 'véhicule' les tracteurs au sens de la directive 74/150/CEE.Article 2Aucun État membre ne peut refuser d'accorder la réception CE par type ou la réception de portée nationale à un type de véhicule, de système, de composant ou d'entité technique, pour des motifs liés à la compatibilité électromagnétique, si les exigences de la présente directive sont satisfaites."3) L'article 3 est supprimé.4) L'article 4 est remplacé par le texte suivant: "Article 4La présente directive constitue une directive spécifique aux fins de l'article 2, paragraphe 2, de la directive 89/336/CEE du Conseil(7), à compter du 1er octobre 2001."5) Les annexes sont remplacées par les annexes I à IX de la directive 95/54/CE avec les amendements repris à l'annexe de la présente directive.Article 21. À partir du 1er janvier 2001, les États membres ne peuvent pas, pour des motifs liés à la compatibilité électromagnétique:- refuser d'accorder la réception CE par type ou la réception de portée nationale à un type de véhicule,- refuser d'accorder la réception CE par type de composant ou d'entité technique à un composant ou à une entité technique,- interdire l'immatriculation, la vente ou la mise en service de véhicules,- interdire la vente ou l'utilisation de composants ou d'entités techniquessi ces véhicules, composants ou entités techniques sont conformes aux exigences de la directive 75/322/CEE, telle que modifiée par la présente directive.2. À partir du 1er octobre 2002, les États membres:- ne peuvent plus accorder la réception CE par type de véhicule, la réception CE par type de composant ou d'entité techniqueet- peuvent refuser la réception de portée nationaleà un type de véhicule, de composant ou d'entité technique, si les exigences de la directive 75/322/CEE, telle que modifiée par la présente directive, ne sont pas satisfaites.3. Le paragraphe 2 n'est pas applicable aux types de véhicules auxquels une réception a été accordée avant le 1er octobre 2002 en vertu de la directive 77/537/CEE du Conseil(8) ni, le cas échéant, aux extensions ultérieures de ces réceptions.4. À partir du 1er octobre 2008, les États membres:- considèrent que les certificats de conformité qui accompagnent les véhicules neufs, conformément aux dispositions de la directive 74/150/CEE, ne sont plus valables aux fins de l'article 7, paragraphe 1, de ladite directiveet- peuvent refuser la vente et la mise en service de sous-ensembles électriques ou électroniques neufs en tant que composants ou entités techniquessi les exigences de la présente directive ne sont pas satisfaites.5. Sans préjudice des paragraphes 2 et 4, dans le cas de pièces détachées, les États membres continuent à accorder la réception CE par type et à autoriser la vente et la mise en service de composants ou entités techniques destinés à des types de véhicules auxquels la réception a été accordée avant le 1er octobre 2002 en vertu de la directive 75/322/CEE ou de la directive 77/537/CEE avec, le cas échéant, une extension ultérieure.Article 3À l'annexe I, point 3.17 et à l'annexe II, point 2.4, de la directive 74/150/CEE, l'expression "antiparasitage" est remplacée par "compatibilité électromagnétique".Article 41. Les États membres mettent en vigueur les dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives nécessaires pour se conformer à la présente directive au plus tard le 31 décembre 2000. Ils en informent immédiatement la Commission.Lorsque les États membres adoptent ces dispositions, celles-ci contiennent une référence à la présente directive ou sont accompagnées d'une telle référence lors de leur publication officielle. Les modalités de cette référence sont arrêtées par les États membres.2. Les États membres communiquent à la Commission le texte des dispositions essentielles de droit national qu'ils adoptent dans le domaine régi par la présente directive.Article 5La présente directive entre en vigueur le vingtième jour suivant celui de sa publication au Journal officiel des Communautés européennes.Article 6Les États membres sont destinataires de la présente directive.Fait à Bruxelles, le 14 janvier 2000.Par la CommissionErkki LIIKANENMembre de la Commission(1) JO L 84 du 28.3.1974, p. 10.(2) JO L 277 du 10.10.1997, p. 24.(3) JO L 147 du 9.6.1975, p. 28.(4) JO L 139 du 23.5.1989, p. 19.(5) JO L 220 du 30.8.1993, p. 1.(6) JO L 266 du 8.11.1995, p. 1.(7) JO L 139 du 23.5.1989, p. 19.(8) JO L 220 du 29.8.1977, p. 38.ANNEXEAux fins de la présente directive, les annexes I, II.A, II.B, III.A, III.B, IV et VI de la directive 95/54/CE sont modifiées comme suit:1. Annexe I1.1. Le point 1.1 est rédigé comme suit: "La présente directive s'applique à la compatibilité électromagnétique des véhicules couverts par l'article 1er. Elle s'applique également aux entités techniques électriques ou électroniques destinées à équiper les véhicules."1.2. Au point 2.1.10: "l'article 2 de la directive 70/156/CEE" est remplacé par "l'article 9 bis de la directive 74/150/CEE".1.3. Aux points 3.1.1 et 3.2.1: "l'article 3, paragraphe 4, de la directive 70/156/CEE" est remplacé par "l'article 9 bis de la directive 74/150/CEE".1.4. Aux points 4.2.1.1 et 4.2.2.1. "l'article 4, paragraphe 3 et si nécessaire, à l'article 4, paragraphe 4, de la directive 70/156/CEE" est remplacé par "l'article 4 de la directive 74/150/CEE".1.5. Au point 4.3.1: "l'article 5 de la directive 70/156/CEE" est remplacé par "l'article 6 de la directive 74/150/CEE".1.6. Au point 5.2:1.6.1. Les onze tirets sont remplacés par la phrase suivante: "1 pour l'Allemagne; 2 pour la France; 3 pour l'Italie; 4 pour les Pays-Bas; 5 pour la Suède; 6 pour la Belgique; 9 pour l'Espagne; 11 pour le Royaume-Uni; 12 pour l'Autriche; 13 pour le Luxembourg; 17 pour la Finlande; 18 pour le Danemark; 21 pour le Portugal; 23 pour la Grèce; 24 pour l'Irlande."1.6.2. "la directive 72/245/CEE" est remplacée par "la directive 75/322/CEE".1.7. Les points 7.1 et 7.3 sont supprimés.2. Annexe II A2.1. Le titre est remplacé par: "Fiche de renseignements n°... selon l'annexe I de la directive 74/150/CEE se rapportant à la réception CE par type d'un véhicule concernant la compatibilité électromagnétique (directive 75/322/CEE) conformément au dernier amendement par la directive 2000/2/CE".2.2. La note de bas de page (*) est supprimée.3. Annexe II B3.1. Le titre est remplacé par: "Fiche de renseignements n°... se rapportant à la réception CE par type d'un sous-ensemble électrique/électronique concernant la compatibilité électromagnétique (directive 75/322/CEE) conformément au dernier amendement par la directive 2000/2/CE".4. Annexe III A4.1. Le titre est remplacé par: "CERTIFICAT DE RÉCEPTION CE PAR TYPE".4.2. Au premier paragraphe: "la directive 72/245/CEE" est remplacée par "la directive 75/322/CEE".4.3. Au point 0.4:4.3.1. "Catégorie du véhicule (3)" est remplacé par "Véhicule".4.3.2. La note 3 de bas de page est supprimée.4.4. Le titre de l'appendice est remplacé par: "Appendice au certificat de réception CE par type n°... concernant la réception d'un type de véhicule selon la directive 75/322/CEE conformément au dernier amendement par la directive 2000/2/CE".5. Annexe III B5.1. Le titre est remplacé par: "CERTIFICAT DE RÉCEPTION CE PAR TYPE".5.2. Au premier paragraphe: "la directive 72/245/CEE" est remplacée par "la directive 75/322/CEE".5.3. Au point 0.4:5.3.1. "Catégorie du véhicule (3)" est remplacé par "Véhicule".5.3.2. La note 3 de bas de page est supprimée.5.4. Le titre de l'appendice est remplacé par: "Appendice au certificat de réception CE par type n°... concernant la réception d'un sous-ensemble électrique ou électronique selon la directive 75/322/CEE conformément au dernier amendement par la directive 2000/2/CE".6. Annexe IV6.1. Le premier paragraphe du point 1.3 est modifié comme suit: "Cet essai est destiné à la mesure du rayonnement électromagnétique à large bande émis par les systèmes d'allumage par étincelle et par les moteurs électriques (moteur de traction électrique, moteurs des systèmes de chauffage ou de dégivrage, pompes à carburant, pompes hydrauliques etc.), équipant en permanence le véhicule".6.2. Le paragraphe 5.3 est complété comme suit: "et en alignement avec le centre du véhicule, défini comme étant le point situé sur l'axe principal du véhicule et à mi-distance entre les centres des essieux avant et arrière du véhicule".6.3. Dans l'appendice 1, les figures 1 et 2 sont remplacées par les figures 1 et 2 suivantes: >PIC FILE= "L_2000021FR.002801.EPS">>PIC FILE= "L_2000021FR.002901.EPS">>PIC FILE= "L_2000021FR.002902.EPS">7. Annexe VI7.1. Le paragraphe 4.1.1 est modifié comme suit: "Le moteur entraînera normalement les roues motrices à une vitesse constante correspondant aux trois quarts de la vitesse maximale du véhicule si aucune raison technique n'amène le constructeur à choisir une autre vitesse. Le moteur du véhicule doit être chargé avec le couple adéquat. Le cas échéant, les arbres de transmission pourront être débrayés (par exemple pour les véhicules à plus de deux essieux) pour autant que les arbres n'alimentent pas un composant émetteur d'interférence."7.2. Le paragraphe 5.4.1.4 est modifié comme suit: "5.4.1.4. Pour une illumination avant, soit:- 1,0 +- 0,2 m à l'intérieur du véhicule, mesuré à partir du point d'intersection du pare-brise et du capot moteur (point C de l'appendice 1 de la présente annexe) soit- 0,2 +- 0,2 m à partir du centre de l'axe de l'essieu avant du tracteur, mesuré en direction du centre du tracteur (point D de l'appendice 2 de la présente annexe)selon que le résultat se rapproche le plus d'un point de référence de l'antenne.".7.3. Un nouveau point 5.4.1.5 est introduit avec les dispositions suivantes: "5.4.1.5. Pour une illumination arrière, soit:- 1,0 +- 0,2 m à l' intérieur du véhicule, mesuré à partir du point d'intersection du pare-brise et du capot moteur (point C de l'appendice 1 de la présente annexe) soit- 0,2 +- 0,2 m à partir du centre de l'axe de l'essieu arrière du tracteur, mesuré en direction du centre du tracteur (point D de l'appendice 2 de la présente annexe)selon que le résultat se rapproche le plus d'un point de référence de l'antenne.".7.4. Les appendices 1 et 2 deviennent: "Appendice 1>PIC FILE= "L_2000021FR.003002.EPS">Appendice 2>PIC FILE= "L_2000021FR.003102.EPS">"7.5. L'appendice 3 est supprimé.7.6. L'appendice 4 devient l'appendice 3.


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 Důležité právní upozornění
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 52006PC0116
 Návrh nařízení Rady o glukose a laktose (Kodifikované znění) /* KOM/2006/0116 konecném znení - CNS 2006/0003 */
 [pic] | KOMISE EVROPSKÝCH SPOLEČENSTVÍ |V Bruselu dne 14.3.2006KOM(2006)116 v konečném znění2006/0038(CNS)NávrhNAŘÍZENÍ RADYo glukose a laktose (Kodifikované znění)(předložená Komisí)DŮVODOVÁ ZPRÁVA1. V souvislosti s konceptem „Evropa občanů“ přikládá Komise značnou důležitost zjednodušení a přehlednějšímu uspořádání práva Společenství, aby se stalo srozumitelnějším a přístupnějším pro řadového občana, který pak může lépe uplatňovat jednotlivá práva, která mu přiznává.Tohoto cíle nelze dosáhnout, dokud zůstanou jednotlivá ustanovení, která byla často několikrát podstatným způsobem změněna, roztroušena jak v původním předpisu, tak v pozdějších novelách. Je nutno proto vynaložit notné úsilí při vyhledávání a porovnávání jednotlivých předpisů, aby bylo lze nalézt právě platná ustanovení.Z tohoto důvodu je rovněž kodifikace často měněné právní úpravy nutná pro zachování její srozumitelnosti a průhlednosti.2. Komise proto svým rozhodnutím ze dne 1. dubna 1987[1] uložila svým útvarům, aby přistoupily ke kodifikaci jakéhokoli právního aktu nejpozději po jeho desáté změně, přičemž zdůraznila, že se jedná o minimální pravidlo a jednotlivé útvary by se měly v zájmu srozumitelnosti a přehlednosti předpisů Společenství snažit kodifikovat akty, za něž nesou odpovědnost, i v kratších intervalech.3. Závěry předsednictví Evropské rady z Edinburku (prosinec 1992) toto potvrdily[2] a zdůraznily význam kodifikace , neboť skýtá právní jistotu ohledně otázky, která právní norma se v určitém okamžiku použije na daný právní vztah.Kodifikace musí proběhnout v plném souladu s obvyklým legislativním postupem Společenství.S ohledem na skutečnost, že v aktech podrobených kodifikaci nemohou být prováděny žádné podstatné změny, se Evropský parlament, Rada a Komise dohodly prostřednictvím interinstitucionální dohody ze dne 20. prosince 1994 na zkráceném postupu pro rychlé přijímání kodifikovaných aktů.4. Účelem tohoto návrhu je provedení kodifikace nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2730/75 ze dne 29. října 1975 o glukose a laktose[3]. Nařízení nahradí různé akty, které jsou do něj začleněny[4]; zcela zachovává jejich obsah, a omezuje se tak pouze na jejich spojení a zapracování pouze takových formálních změn , které vyžaduje samotná kodifikace.5. Tento kodifikační návrh byl vypracován na základě předchozího konsolidovaného znění nařízení (EHS) č. 2730/75 a jeho následných změn vyhotoveného ve všech úředních jazycích Úřadem pro úřední tisky Evropských společenství pomocí systému na zpracování dat . V případech, že bylo změněno číslování článků, je vztah mezi dřívějším a novým číslováním představen ve srovnávací tabulce uvedené v příloze II kodifikovaného nařízení.ê 2730/75 (přizpůsobený)2006/0038(CNS)NávrhNAŘÍZENÍ RADYo glukose a laktose (Kodifikované znění)RADA EVROPSKÉ UNIE,s ohledem na Smlouvu o založení Evropského společenství, a zejména na článek Ö 308 Õ této smlouvy,s ohledem na návrh Komise,s ohledem na stanovisko Evropského parlamentu[5],s ohledem na stanovisko Evropského hospodářského a sociálního výboru[6],vzhledem k těmto důvodům:ê(1) Nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2730/75 ze dne 29. října 1975 o glukose a laktose[7] bylo několikrát podstatně změněno[8]. Z důvodu srozumitelnosti a přehlednosti by mělo být uvedené nařízení kodifikováno.ê 2730/75 bod odůvodnění 1 (přizpůsobený)(2) Ö Nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2658/87 ze dne 23. července 1987 o celní a statistické nomenklatuře a o společném celním sazebníku[9] stanovuje zahrnutí Õ glukosy, glukosového sirupu, laktosy a laktosového sirupu do jedné položky a chemicky čisté glukosy a laktosy do jiné položky, aby se předešlo praktickým celním obtížím.ê 2730/75 bod odůvodnění 2 (přizpůsobený)(3) Glukosa spadá do položek Ö 1702 30 91, 1702 30 99 a 1702 40 90 kombinované nomenklatury Õ a laktosa do položky Ö 1702 19 00 kombinované nomenklatury Õ , obě jsou uvedeny v příloze Ö I Õ Smlouvy a vztahuje se na ně proto režim obchodu se třetími zeměmi stanovený v rámci společných organizací trhů, zatímco chemicky čistá glukosa a laktosa nejsou uvedeny v příloze Ö I Õ Smlouvy a vztahuje se na ně režim cel, takže hospodářský dopad může být značně odlišný.ê 2730/75 bod odůvodnění 3 (přizpůsobený)(4) Z této situace vznikají obtíže, které jsou ještě větší proto, že dotyčné produkty, bez ohledu na stupeň jejich čistoty, pocházejí ze stejného základního produktu. Kritériem pro sazební zařazení jako produkty chemicky čisté a jako jiné produkty je stupeň čistoty 99 %. Ö Jinak Õ produkty s mírně vyšším nebo mírně nižším stupněm čistoty mohou mít stejné hospodářské využití; že proto tedy při uplatňování různých režimů dochází k narušení hospodářské soutěže, zejména citlivé na možnou záměnu.ê 2730/75 bod odůvodnění 4 (přizpůsobený)(5) Jediným řešením těchto obtíží je podřídit tyto produkty stejnému hospodářskému režimu bez ohledu na stupeň jejich čistoty, anebo v míře, která se bude jevit dostatečná, sladit režimy stanovené pro obě skupiny produktů.ê 2730/75 bod odůvodnění 5 (přizpůsobený)(6) Smlouva nestanoví ve zvláštních ustanoveních pravomoc nezbytnou k tomuto účelu; že za těchto okolností by měla být potřebná opatření přijata na základě článku Ö 308 Õ Smlouvy. Ö Jinak Õ nejvhodnějším opatřením je rozšířit na chemicky čistou glukosu režim stanovený pro ostatní druhy glukosy v nařízení Rady (ES) č. Ö 1784/2003 Õ ze dne Ö 29. září 2003 Õ o společné organizaci trhu s obilovinami[10] a na chemicky čistou laktosu rozšířit režim stanovený pro ostatní druhy laktosy v nařízení Rady (ES) č. Ö 1255/1999 Õ ze dne Ö 17. května 1999 Õ o společné organizace trhu s mlékem a mléčnými výrobky[11],ê 2730/75PŘIJALA TOTO NAŘÍZENÍ:ê 222/88 čl. 7 bod 1 (přizpůsobený)Článek 1Režim stanovený nařízením (ES) č. Ö 1784/2003 Õ a prováděcími opatřeními k tomuto nařízení pro glukosu a glukosový sirup podpoložek 1702 30 91, 1702 30 99, a 1702 40 90 kombinované nomenklatury se rozšiřuje na glukosu a glukosový sirup podpoložek 1702 30 51 a 1702 30 59 kombinované nomenklatury.ê 222/88 čl. 7 bod 2 (přizpůsobený)è1 2931/95 čl. 2, druhá odrážkaè2 2931/95 čl. 2, první odrážkaČlánek 2Režim stanovený nařízením (ES) č. Ö 1255/1999 Õ a prováděcími opatřeními k tomuto nařízení pro laktosu a laktosový sirup podpoložky è1 1702 19 00 ç kombinované nomenklatury se rozšiřuje na laktosu a laktosový sirup podpoložky è2 1702 11 00 ç kombinované nomenklatury.ê 222/88 čl. 7 bod 3 (přizpůsobený)è1 2931/95 čl. 2, druhá odrážkaè2 2931/95 čl. 2, první odrážkaČlánek 3Pokud bude režim stanovený pro glukosu a glukosový sirup podpoložek 1702 30 91, 1702 30 99 Ö , Õ 1702 40 90, jakož i pro laktosu a laktosový sirup podpoložky è1 1702 19 00 ç kombinované nomenklatury změněn na základě článku Ö 37 Õ Smlouvy nebo postupy stanovenými k provedení uvedeného článku, rozšiřují se tyto změny na glukosu a glukosový sirup podpoložek 1702 30 51 Ö , Õ 1702 30 59, případně na laktosu a laktosový sirup podpoložky è2 1702 11 00 ç kombinované nomenklatury, pokud nebudou týmiž postupy přijata jiná opatření umožňující harmonizaci režimu pro tyto produkty s režimem stanoveným pro výše uvedené produkty.êČlánek 4Nařízení (EHS) č. 2730/75 se zrušuje.Odkazy na zrušené nařízení se považují za odkazy na toto nařízení v souladu se srovnávací tabulkou obsaženou v příloze II.ê 2730/75 (přizpůsobený)Článek 5Toto nařízení vstupuje v platnost Ö dvacátým dnem po jeho vyhlášení v Úředním věstníku Evropské unie Õ .ê 2730/75Toto nařízení je závazné v celém rozsahu a přímo použitelné ve všech členských státech.V Bruselu dneZa RadupředsedaéPŘÍLOHA IZrušené nařízení a jeho následné změnyNařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2730/75 (Úř. věst. L 281, 1.11.1975, s. 20) |Nařízení Komise (EHS) č. 222/88 (Úř. věst. L 28, 1.2.1988, s. 1) | pouze čl. 7 |Nařízení Komise (ES) č. 2931/95 (Úř. věst. L 307, 20.12.1995, s. 10) | pouze čl. 2 |______________PŘÍLOHA IISROVNÁVACÍ TABULKANařízení (EHS) č. 2730/75 | Toto nařízení |Článek 1 | Článek 1 |Článek 2 | Článek 2 |Článek 3 | Článek 3 |Článek 4 | ________ |________ | Článek 4 |Článek 5 | Článek 5 |________ | Příloha I |________ | Příloha II |______________[1] KOM(87) 868 PV.[2] Viz část A příloha 3 uvedených závěrů.[3] Prováděno v souladu se sdělením Komise Evropskému parlamentu a Radě – Kodifikace acquis communautaire , KOM(2001) 645 v konečném znění.[4] Viz příloha I tohoto návrhu.[5] Úř. věst. C , , s. .[6] Úř. věst. C , , s. .[7] Úř. věst. L 281, 1.11.1975, s. 20. Nařízení naposledy pozměněné nařízením Komise (ES) č. 2931/95 (Úř. věst. L 307, 20.12.1995, s. 10).[8] Viz příloha I.[9] Úř. věst. L 256, 7.9.1987, s. 1. Nařízení naposledy pozměněné nařízením (ES) č. 2175/2005 (Úř. věst. L 347, 30.12.2005, s. 9).[10] Ö Úř. věst. L 270, 21.10.2003, s. 78. Nařízení ve znění nařízení Komise (ES) č. 1154/2005 (Úř. věst. L 187, 19.7.2005, s. 11).Õ[11] Ö Úř. věst. L 160, 26.6.1999, s. 48. Nařízení naposledy pozměněné nařízením (ES) č. 1913/2005 (Úř. věst. L 307, 25.11.2005, s. 2). Õ