type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' \x18\xc2\x90\xc2\x85\xc2\x8e\xc2\x83\xc2\x95\xc2\x95\xc2\x8b\xcf\x90\xc2\x8b\xc2\x87\xc2\x86 \x16\xc2\x97\xc2\x8f\xc2\x8f\xc2\x83\xc2\x94\xc2\x9b\n\xc2\x91\xc2\x88 \x0c\xc2\x90\xc2\x88\xc2\x91\xc2\x94\xc2\x8f\xc2\x83\xc2\x96\xc2\x8b\xc2\x91\xc2\x90 \x0b\xc2\x83\xc2\x90\xc2\x86\xc2\x8e\xc2\x8b\xc2\x90\xc2\x89 \xc2\x83\xc2\x90\xc2\x86 \x16\xc2\x8a\xc2\x83\xc2\x94\xc2\x8b\xc2\x90\xc2\x89\n \x13\xc2\x94\xc2\x8b\xc2\x91\xc2\x94 \xc2\x96\xc2\x91 \xc2\x96\xc2\x8a\xc2\x87 \x04\xc2\x92\xc2\x94\xc2\x8b\xc2\x8e \xcd\xb3\xcd\xb7\xc7\xa1 \xcd\xb4\xcd\xb2\xcd\xb3\xcd\xb5\n\x05\x12\x16\x17\x12\x11 \x10\x04\x15\x04\x17\x0b\x12\x11 \x05\x12\x10\x05\x0c\x11\n\x16\n\n\n\n\n Prepared by the Inspectors General of the:\n \x0c\x11\x17\x08\x0f\x0f\x0c\n\x08\x11\x06\x08 \x06\x12\x10\x10\x18\x11\x0c\x17\x1c\n \x06\x08\x11\x17\x15 \x04\x0f \x0c\x11\x17\x08\x0f\x0f\x0c\n\x08\x11\x06\x08 \x04\n\x08\x11\x06\x1c\n \x07\x08\x13\x04\x15\x17\x10\x08\x11\x17 \x12\t \r\x18\x16\x17\x0c\x06\x08\n \x07\x08\x13\x04\x15\x17\x10\x08\x11\x17 \x12\t \x0b\x12\x10\x08\x0f\x04\x11\x07 \x16\x08\x06\x18\x15\x0c\x17\x1c\n\n\n\n\n 10 APRIL 2014\n\x0cNOTE: This report is an unclassified summary of a 168-page classified report that was also issued today, 10 April 2014, by the Inspectors General for\nthe Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security. Redactions in this document\nare the result of classification and sensitivity designations we received from agencies and departments that provided information to the OIGs for this\nreview. As to several of these classification and sensitivity designations, the OIGs disagreed with the bases asserted. We are requesting that the\nrelevant entities reconsider those designations so that we can unredact those portions and make this information available to the public.\n\n I. INTRODUCTION\n\n On April 15, 2013, two pressure cooker bombs placed near the finish\n line of the Boston Marathon detonated within seconds of each other, killing\n three and injuring more than two hundred people. Law enforcement\n officials identified brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as primary\n suspects in the bombings. After an extensive search for the then-\n unidentified suspects, law enforcement officials encountered Tamerlan and\n Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in Watertown, Massachusetts. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was\n shot during the encounter and was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.\n Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who fled the scene, was apprehended the following day\n and remains in federal custody.\n\n A decade earlier, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev immigrated to the\n United States from Kyrgyzstan with their parents Anzor Tsarnaev and\n Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. Anzor Tsarnaev, an ethnic Chechen, his wife Zubeidat\n Tsarnaeva, and their son Dzhokhar Tsarnaev arrived in the United States\n from Kyrgyzstan in 2002. They applied for and received an immigration\n benefit. The elder son, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and his sisters, Bella and Ailina\n Tsarnaeva, arrived in the United States in 2003 and also received an\n immigration benefit. In the years that followed, all six family members\n became Lawful Permanent Residents of the United States.\n\n Two years before the Boston Marathon bombings, Tamerlan Tsarnaev\n and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva came to the attention of the Federal Bureau of\n Investigation (FBI) based on information received from the Russian Federal\n Security Service (FSB). In March 2011, the FBI received information from\n the FSB alleging that Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva were\n adherents of radical Islam and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing to\n travel to Russia to join unspecified underground groups in Dagestan and\n Chechnya. The FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force in Boston (Boston JTTF)\n conducted an assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev to determine whether he\n posed a threat to national security and closed the assessment three months\n later having found no link or \xe2\x80\x9cnexus\xe2\x80\x9d to terrorism.\n\n In September 2011, the FSB provided the Central Intelligence Agency\n (CIA) information on Tamerlan Tsarnaev that was substantively identical to\n the information the FSB had provided to the FBI in March 2011. In October\n 2011, the CIA provided information obtained from the FSB to the the\n National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for watchlisting purposes, and to\n the FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of\n State for their information. Upon NCTC\xe2\x80\x99s receipt of the information,\n Tamerlan Tsarnaev was added to the terrorist watchlist.\n\n 1\n\x0c Three months later, Tamerlan Tsarnaev traveled to Russia, as the lead\ninformation stated he was preparing to do. However, Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s travel to\nRussia did not prompt additional investigative steps to determine whether\nhe posed a threat to national security.\n\n By April 19, 2013, after the Tsarnaev brothers were identified as\nsuspects in the bombings, the FBI reviewed its records and determined that\nin early 2011 it had received lead information from the FSB about Tamerlan\nTsarnaev, had conducted an assessment of him, and had closed the\nassessment after finding no link or \xe2\x80\x9cnexus\xe2\x80\x9d to terrorism. In the days that\nfollowed, Members of Congress asked questions of the Director of the FBI,\nthe Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and other government officials\nabout the handling of information concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to\nthe bombings. The Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, with\nthe support of the DNI, determined that the Inspectors General of the\nIntelligence Community, the CIA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and DHS\nwould conduct a coordinated review of the handling and sharing of\ninformation available to the U.S. government prior to the Boston Marathon\nbombings. The Inspectors General issued a public announcement of a\ncoordinated, independent review on April 30, 2013.\n\n\nII. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE REVIEW\n\n As outlined in a May 21, 2013, memorandum from the participating\nInspectors General, the objectives of this review were to determine:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The extent of the information available to the U.S. government\n concerning the relevant individuals and events preceding the\n Boston Marathon bombings;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate,\n and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information\n sharing, policies, regulations, and U.S. laws; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that\n impact the ability to detect potential threats to national\n security.\n\n In furtherance of these objectives, the Offices of Inspector General\n(OIGs) sought to develop a chronology of the events leading up to the\nbombings based on information that was known to the U.S. government\nprior to April 15, 2013. We also sought to identify what additional\ninformation existed and may have been available to the U.S. government\nbefore the bombings. In considering whether information that existed prior\nto the bombings was \xe2\x80\x9cavailable\xe2\x80\x9d to the U.S. government, the OIGs took into\naccount the limited facts known to U.S. government agencies prior to the\n\n 2\n\x0cbombings and the extent of the government\xe2\x80\x99s authority under prevailing\nlegal standards to access that information. As a result, the scope of this\nreview included not only information that was in the possession of the U.S.\ngovernment prior to the bombings, but also information that existed during\nthat time and that the federal government reasonably could have been\nexpected to have known before the bombings.\n\n While some of the information relevant to our review was developed\nafter the bombings, the OIGs were mindful of the sensitive nature of the\nongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions related to the bombings,\nand were careful to ensure that the review would not interfere with these\nactivities. We carefully tailored our requests for information and interviews\nto focus on information available before the bombings and, where\nappropriate, coordinated with the U.S. Attorney\xe2\x80\x99s Office conducting the\nprosecution of alleged bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. 1\n\n We focused our review on the entities that were the most likely to\nhave had information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the bombings \xe2\x80\x93 the\nFBI, the CIA, DHS, and NCTC, which maintains the U.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s\ndatabase of classified identifying and substantive derogatory information on\nknown or suspected terrorists. We also requested other federal agencies to\nidentify relevant information they may have had prior to the bombings.\nThese agencies included the Department of Defense (including the National\nSecurity Agency (NSA)), Department of State, Department of the Treasury,\nDepartment of Energy, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.\n\n The review was conducted by four teams from the OIGs of the DOJ,\nCIA, DHS, and the Intelligence Community (IC). The OIGs reviewed\nthousands of documents and interviewed more than 160 individuals,\nincluding senior CIA, FBI, DHS, and NCTC officials. While the review teams\nshared relevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly in\ninterviews of certain officials, each OIG was responsible for evaluating the\nactions of, and information available to, its respective agencies.\nAdditionally, each OIG conducted or directed its component agencies to\nconduct database searches to identify relevant pre-bombing information.\n\n As described in more detail in the classified report, the DOJ OIG\xe2\x80\x99s\naccess to certain information was significantly delayed at the outset of the\nreview by disagreements with FBI officials over whether certain requests fell\noutside the scope of the review or could cause harm to the criminal\n\n 1 The initial lead information from the FSB in March 2011 focused on Tamerlan\nTsarnaev, and to a lesser extent his mother Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. Accordingly, the FBI and\nother agencies did not investigate Dzhokhar Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s possible nexus to terrorism before\nthe bombings, and the OIGs did not review what if any investigative steps could have been\ntaken with respect to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.\n\n\n 3\n\x0cinvestigation. Only after many months of discussions were these issues\nresolved, and time that otherwise could have been devoted to completing\nthis review was instead spent on resolving these matters.\n\n\nIII. ROLES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE AGENCIES INVOLVED\n IN THE REVIEW\n\n A. Executive Order 12333\n\n The roles and responsibilities of the intelligence elements of the FBI,\nDHS, CIA, and NCTC are broadly set forth in Executive Order (E.O.) 12333,\nas amended. Originally signed in 1981, and amended several times since,\nE.O. 12333 placed restrictions on intelligence collection activities engaged in\nby Executive Branch agencies, including the FBI, CIA, and NCTC, while also\nseeking to foster \xe2\x80\x9cfull and free exchange of information\xe2\x80\x9d among these\nagencies. Among other purposes, E.O. 12333, as amended, is intended to\nenhance \xe2\x80\x9cthe acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the\ndetection and countering of international terrorist activities.\xe2\x80\x9d To further this\npurpose, E.O. 12333 provides the basic jurisdictional framework for the\nvarious roles and responsibilities of the Executive Branch agencies and\ndepartments that comprise the Intelligence Community.\n\n Under E.O. 12333, the FBI has primary responsibility to \xe2\x80\x9ccoordinate\nthe clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human\nsources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities\ninside the United States.\xe2\x80\x9d The CIA has primary responsibility to coordinate\nintelligence gathering activities outside the United States. In addition, E.O.\n12333 authorizes the NSA to \xe2\x80\x9c[c]ollect (including through clandestine\nmeans), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence\ninformation and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence\npurposes to support national and departmental missions[.]\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n B. FBI\n\n The FBI\xe2\x80\x99s domestic operations are governed by the Attorney General\nGuidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AG Guidelines) and implemented\nthrough the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG).\nThe AG Guidelines and the DIOG authorize three levels of investigation to\naddress a potential threat to national security: (1) an assessment, which\nrequires an authorized purpose but does not require any particular factual\npredication; (2) a preliminary investigation, which requires information or\nan allegation of a possible threat to national security; and (3) a full\ninvestigation, which requires an articulable factual basis of a possible threat\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0cto national security. 2 The AG Guidelines established these different levels of\ninvestigation to provide FBI personnel with flexibility to adapt the\ninvestigative methods used to the nature of both the matter under\ninvestigation and the information supporting the need for investigation.\nThis flexibility includes the option of choosing a lower level of investigation,\neven when the predication for a higher level of investigation is met, if FBI\npersonnel determine the matter can be resolved through less intrusive\nmethods.\n\n Both the AG Guidelines and the DIOG emphasize the core principles\nthat FBI investigations must be undertaken for an authorized purpose and\nshould be carried out by the least intrusive method feasible under the\ncircumstances of the investigation. According to the DIOG, the threshold\nrequirement that all investigative activities be conducted for an \xe2\x80\x9cauthorized\npurpose\xe2\x80\x9d is a safeguard intended to ensure that FBI employees respect the\nConstitutional rights of Americans. Thus, both the AG Guidelines and the\nDIOG make clear that no investigation may be conducted for the sole\npurpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the\nlawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the\nUnited States.\n\n As the federal government\xe2\x80\x99s lead domestic counterterrorism agency,\nthe FBI played a critical role in investigating the lead information from the\nFSB and determining whether Tamerlan Tsarnaev had a nexus to terrorism\nor posed a threat to the national security in 2011, two years prior to the\nApril 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombings. This lead information was\ninvestigated by the FBI through the Boston JTTF. Representatives from the\nDHS, CIA, and other federal, state, and local agencies work directly with\nFBI-led JTTFs across the country, including in Boston.\n\n C. CIA\n\n In addition to E.O. 12333, the National Security Act of 1947, as\namended, governs the ability of the CIA to engage in intelligence activities.\nThe National Security Act provides the basic statutory authority for the\nCIA\xe2\x80\x99s intelligence activities, while prohibiting the Agency from exercising\neither law enforcement or domestic security functions. Section 104A of the\nAct authorizes the Director of the CIA to provide \xe2\x80\x9coverall direction for and\ncoordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United\n\n\n 2 Each level of investigation allows the FBI to use increasingly intrusive\ninvestigative methods. For example, the FBI is limited to relatively unintrusive methods\nsuch as consensual interviews and database checks in an assessment, while it may use\nmore intrusive methods such as obtaining judicial search warrants and FISA orders to\nconduct electronic surveillance in a full investigation.\n\n\n 5\n\x0cStates through human sources by elements of the intelligence community\nauthorized to undertake such collection.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n D. DHS\n\n The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, created the DHS\nand established the Department\xe2\x80\x99s primary mission to prevent terrorist\nattacks in the United States and to carry out the functions of the entities\ntransferred to the Department, which included the Immigration and\nNaturalization Service (INS) and the Transportation Security Administration\n(TSA). 3 Multiple components within the DHS execute its mission. Those\ninvolved in this review include:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which\n oversees and adjudicates immigration benefits;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which vets people\n and goods entering and exiting the United States; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 TSA, which secures U.S. transportation systems.\n\n E. NCTC\n\n In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)\ncodified the establishment of the NCTC as part of the Office of the Director\nof National Intelligence. 4 The primary missions of the NCTC that pertain to\nthis review are to:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Serve as the primary organization of the federal government for\n analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired\n pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (except intelligence\n pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic\n counterterrorism);\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Ensure that . . . agencies have access to and receive intelligence\n needed to accomplish their assigned activities; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Serve as the \xe2\x80\x9ccentral and shared knowledge bank on known and\n suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as\n\n\n\n\n 3 See 6 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 203; Transfer of INS functions at 6 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7\xc2\xa7 202, 251 et al.\n 4 IRTPA of 2004, \xc2\xa7 1021 (Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3672 (Dec. 17, 2004)),\ncodified at 50 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 3056(a). President Bush initially established NCTC by E.O. 13354,\non August 27, 2004. E.O. 13354 was rescinded by E.O. 13470 in July 2008 because IRTPA\ncodified the establishment of NCTC.\n\n\n 6\n\x0c their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts\n and support.\xe2\x80\x9d 5\n\n F. Memoranda of Understanding\n\n The federal agencies that handled information concerning relevant\nindividuals and events prior to the bombings frequently have intersecting\nand sometimes overlapping responsibilities in conducting counterterrorism\nactivities. The relationships between and among these agencies are\ngoverned by memoranda of understanding (MOU). Of particular relevance\nto this review are the relationships between the FBI, CIA, and DHS, as well\nas the relationship between the FBI and the NSA, and the NCTC\xe2\x80\x99s\nrelationships throughout the Intelligence Community.\n\n\nIV. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS\n\n In this section, we summarize the chronology of events relating to the\nU.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s knowledge of and interactions with Tamerlan Tsarnaev,\nmembers of his family, and other associates before the bombings. Many of\nthe activities and events that occurred during the period discussed below\ncannot be included in this unclassified summary.\n\n Tsarnaev Family Background\n\n Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev immigrated to the United\nStates from Kyrgyzstan with their parents Anzor Tsarnaev and Zubeidat\nTsarnaeva. Anzor Tsarnaev, an ethnic Chechen, his wife Zubeidat\nTsarnaeva, and their son Dzhokhar Tsarnaev arrived in the United States\nfrom Kyrgyzstan in 2002. They applied for and received an immigration\nbenefit. The elder son, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and his sisters, Bella and Ailina\nTsarnaeva, arrived in the United States in 2003, and also received an\nimmigration benefit. In the years that followed, all six family members\nbecame Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) of the United States.\n\n Receipt of Information from the Russian Government\n\n In 2011, two years before the Boston Marathon bombings, Tamerlan\nTsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva came to the attention of the FBI based on\ninformation received from the FSB. In March 2011, the FBI Legal Attach\xc3\xa9\n(LEGAT) in Moscow received a memorandum in Russian from the FSB\nregarding Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. According to the\nEnglish translation used by the FBI, the memorandum alleged that both\nwere adherents of radical Islam, and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing\n\n 5 Summarized from National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 235), Section 119.\n\n\n 7\n\x0cto travel to Russia to join unspecified \xe2\x80\x9cbandit underground groups\xe2\x80\x9d in\nDagestan and Chechnya and had considered changing his last name to\n\xe2\x80\x9cTsarni.\xe2\x80\x9d The Russian authorities provided personal information about both\nTamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, including their telephone\nnumbers and e-mail addresses, and requested that the FBI provide the FSB\nwith specific information about them, including possible travel by Tsarnaev\nto Russia. Importantly, the memorandum included two incorrect dates of\nbirth (October 21, 1987 or 1988) for Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and the English\ntranslation used by the FBI transliterated their last names as Tsarnayev\nand Tsarnayeva, respectively. 6\n\n On March 9, 2011, the LEGAT in Moscow sent a letter to the FSB\nacknowledging receipt of the information and requesting that it keep the FBI\ninformed of any details it developed on Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat\nTsarnaeva. The LEGAT also sent the translated memorandum to the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s\nCounterterrorism Division (CTD) and the FBI Boston Field Division with\nleads to both components \xe2\x80\x9cto take any investigative steps deemed\nappropriate and provide [LEGAT] Moscow with any information derived, for\ndissemination to the [FSB].\xe2\x80\x9d According to available information, the LEGAT\ndid not coordinate with or notify the CIA in March 2011 after receiving the\nlead information concerning Tsarnaev.\n\n Opening and Conduct of the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s Assessment\n\n The Boston JTTF subsequently conducted an assessment of Tamerlan\nTsarnaev to determine whether he posed a threat to national security. The\nFBI Special Agent (CT Agent) who handled the assessment memorialized the\nsteps he took in the assessment in an incident report maintained in the\nFBI\xe2\x80\x99s Guardian system, which is the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s threat tracking and management\nsystem for counterterrorism assessments.\n\n The CT Agent conducted database searches, reviewed references to\nTsarnaev and his family in closed FBI counterterrorism cases, performed\n\xe2\x80\x9cdrive-bys\xe2\x80\x9d of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s residence, made an on-site visit to his former\ncollege, and interviewed Tsarnaev and his parents. Based on information\nfrom database searches, the CT Agent determined that Tamerlan Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\nlast name was spelled \xe2\x80\x9cTsarnaev,\xe2\x80\x9d and that his correct date of birth was\nOctober 21, 1986, information that differed from the lead memorandum\nfrom the FSB. During the assessment, the CT Agent asked a CBP officer on\n\n\n\n\n 6 After reviewing a draft of the report, the FBI commented that there is no standard\n\ntransliteration of names from Cyrillic to Roman characters.\n\n\n 8\n\x0cthe Boston JTIF to create a - i n TECS (the "JTIF TECS record"),\nwhich included the correct name and date of birth. 7\n\n The DOJ OIG determined that the CT Agent did not take certain steps\nduring the assessment, including contacting local law enforcement, visiting\nthe mosque that Tsamaev attended, and conducting interviews of\nTsamaev\'s wife, a former girlfriend he had been arrested for assaulting in\n2009, or friends and associates. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he did\nnot find sufficient derogatory information to justify taking these additional\nsteps.\n\n The DOJ OIG also determined that the CT Agent did not attempt to\nelicit certain information during interviews of Tsarnaev and his parents,\nincluding information about Tsarnaev\'s plans to travel to Russia, changes in\nlifestyle, or knowledge of and sympathy for militant separatists in Chechnya\nand Dagestan. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he did not know he\ndid not ask about to travel toRus\n\n\n\n\n Additionally, the DOJ OIG determined that the CT Agent did not use\nevery relevant search term known or available at the time to query the\ndatabases that were searched, nor did he conduct searches of several major\nFBI systems, including certain telephone databases and databases that\ninclude information collected under authority of the Foreign Intelligence\nSurveillance Act (FISA). However, searches of FBI databases conducted at\nthe direction of the DOJ OIG during this review produced little information\nbeyond that identified by the CT Agent during the assessment, with the\nexception of additional travel-related data for Zubeidat Tsamaeva.\n\n The FBI, through its Office of General Counsel, stated that it was not\naware of any documents shared with state and local law enforcement prior\nto the bombings but that representatives of these agencies would have had\naccess to the CT Agent\'s assessment in the Guardian system during this\n\n\n 7 TECS is a system used to, among ot her things, provide advance notice of\nint ernational travel and vet intemat ional t ravelers a t \xc2\xb7 and ot her port s of ent ry.\n\n 8 Redactions in t his document are the result of classification and sensitivity\ndesignations we received from agencies and departments t hat provided information t o t he\nOIGs for this review. As to several of these classification and sensitivity designations, the\nOIGs disagreed with the bases asserted. We are requesting that the relevant entities\nreconsider t hose designat ions so that we can unredact those port ions and make t his\ninformation available to the public.\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cperiod. 9 Since the bombings, the FBI has taken steps to encourage greater\naccess to FBI systems by state and local detailees to JTTFs, as well as to\nfacilitate the sharing of JTTF information with detailees\xe2\x80\x99 home agencies.\n\n Closing of the Assessment and Letters to the Russian Government\n\n The FBI closed the assessment on June 24, 2011, having found no\nlink or nexus between Tamerlan Tsarnaev and terrorism. The CT Agent\xe2\x80\x99s\nsupervisor (CT Supervisor) told the DOJ OIG that by indicating in the\nGuardian system that the assessment found no nexus to terrorism he\nmeant that the assessment found no nexus to terrorism from the time the\nassessment was opened to the time it was closed. He said that if after he\nclosed the assessment the FBI received information from a foreign\ngovernment suggesting a positive nexus, he would have reopened the\nassessment.\n\n The CT Supervisor told the DOJ OIG that he discussed the\nassessment with the CT Agent before the CT Supervisor decided to close it\nin order to determine whether any additional steps should be taken. He\nstated that he decided to send a letter to the FSB in an effort to obtain\nfurther information about Tsarnaev. In the disposition note in Guardian,\nthe CT Supervisor stated that the FBI would prepare a letter for the LEGAT\noffice in Moscow to disseminate to the FSB. The CT Supervisor told the\nDOJ OIG that he probably instructed the CT Agent to draft the letter to the\nFSB to request additional derogatory information about Tsarnaev because\nthe information in the original lead information \xe2\x80\x9cwasn\xe2\x80\x99t enough.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n Accordingly, after the closing of the assessment, the LEGAT sent two\nletters to the FSB: one dated August 8, 2011, which stated that a review of\nFBI databases revealed no derogatory information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev\nand erroneously characterized him as a former prosecutor in Kyrgyzstan;\nand one dated October 7, 2011, which corrected the earlier error and\nprovided information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva\ndeveloped during the assessment. Both letters requested that the FSB\nprovide additional information in its possession regarding Tsarnaev. The\nDOJ and CIA OIGs determined that the Assistant Legal Attach\xc3\xa9 coordinated\nthe August 8, 2011, letter with the CIA and documented this coordination,\n\n 9 During the time period relevant to this review, DHS had detailed intelligence\nofficers to each of the Massachusetts fusion centers in compliance with the Homeland\nSecurity Act, 6 U.S.C. \xc2\xa7 124h(b)(5). The DHS OIG determined that the DHS intelligence\nofficers at the fusion centers did not receive any documents or other information\nconcerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the bombings, either from the FBI or from DHS\npersonnel on the Boston JTTF. Other than access to the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s e-Guardian database, the\nFBI and DHS do not have an MOU or other agreement to provide fusion centers with access\nto JTTF information.\n\n\n 10\n\x0cpursuant to an MOU between the two agencies. The DOJ and CIA OIGs did\nnot find similar documentation that the LEGAT coordinated the October 7,\n2011, letter with the CIA.\n\n The DOJ OIG found no documentation or other information that the\nFSB responded to either letter prior to the bombings.\n\n Inclusion of Tsamaev on the Terrorist Watchlist\n\n The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), known as the terrorist\nwatchlist, is the U.S. govemment\'s central repository of records on known or\nsuspected terrorists. The TSDB receives records from a classified database\nmaintained by NCTC known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart\nEnvironment (TIDE), and exports information to various unclassified\ndownstream databases, including TECS.\n\n In September 20 11, the FSB provided the CIA information on\nTamerlan Tsamaev that the OIGs determined was substantively identical to\nthe information the FSB had provided the FBI in March 2011. On October\n19,2011, the CIA provided information obtained from the FSB to the NCTC\nfor watchlisting purposes, and to the FBI, DHS, and the Department of\nState for their information. Upon receipt of the information, NCTC\nestablished a record for Tamerlan Tsarnaev in TIDE. Although there was\ninsufficient derogatory information to establish reasonable suspicion that\nTsamaev was a known or ected he was watchlisted\n\n\n ..... ..,..,~,....~~ govemment, the \'\'Tsarnayev" spelling of his\nlast name, and a possible name variant. Tsarnaev\'s watchlist records were\nincluded in CBP\'s TECS database as four separate records. 1o Significant\ndifferences existed between the four watchlist-derived TECS records and the\nJTTF TECS record, which had been created during the FBI\'s assessment of\nTsamaev. Most notable were discrepancies in the spelling of his last name\nand his date of birth.\n\n At the same time, the NCTC referred Tsarnaev\'s record to the Foreign\nTerrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), an FBI-led task force that works to\n\n 10 The four entries were based on combinations of each last name variant and dat es\nof birth ( 1987 and 1988). Tsarnaev\'s watchlist record also was entered into t he Department\nof S t a t e Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) , used to perform name checks on\npassport and visa applicants, and, from December 2011 until March 2013, t he\nTransportation Security Administration (TSA) E-Select ee list, used for pre-flight t ravel\nscreening. Under the practices in place during t hat time, theE-Selectee list included t hose\nadmitted under the except ion used for Tsarnaev. Records watchlisted under t he exception\nused for Tsarnaev subsequently were deemed ineligible for export to TSA and were removed.\n\n\n 11\n\x0cidentify known or suspected intemational terrorists operating in the United\nStates. In December 2011, an FTTTF analyst reviewed Tsamaev\'s\ninformation, conducted database searches, and determined that the Boston\nJTTF previously had conducted an assessment of Tsamaev based on the\nsame information from the Russian govemment. The FTTTF analyst also\nnoted that the FBI LEGAT office in Moscow maintained an open case file on\nTsamaev.\n\n Tsamaev\'s Travel to Russia\n On January 21, 2012, Tamerlan Tsarnaev traveled to Russia on an\ninternational flight from New York to Moscow. CBP received passenger data\nfor Tsarnaev from the airline before his travel and vetted it\n U.U.JL~~~ TECS. 1 1\n\n\n\n\n The information available to the DHS and DOJ OIGs does not\nconclusively establish whether the CBP Officer notified the FBI CT Agent\nabout Tsarnaev\'s impending travel after being alerted to his travel.\nSearches of the CBP Officer\'s and CT Agent\'s e-mail records provided to the\nDHS and DOJ OIGs did not produce any evidence that such notification\noccurred by e-mail communication. Further, during separate interviews,\nthe CBP Officer and the CT Agent each said that he had no specific\nrecollection of whether the CBP Officer passed the travel information to the\nCT Agent.\n\n However, available information indicates that the CBP Officer most\nlikely notified the CT Agent of Tsarnaev\'s impending travel. The CBP Officer\ntold the DHS OIG that his usual process when he received a travel\nnotification was to retrieve the TECS record and then inform the agent who\nrequested the e-mail, orally, or by passing a "sticky note." 13 The\n\n 11 CBP receives advance airline passenger data prior t o a flight\'s departure from or\nto the United States and checks that data repeatedly.\n\n\n\n\n 1 3 At the time of Tsarnaev\'s travel to Russia, CBP and FBI policies did not specify\n\nthe means by which such notifications should occur. CBP has since changed its t ravel\nnot ificat ion policy to require not ification to the FBI case agent by e-mail.\n\n\n 12\n\x0cCBP Officer said that he believes he followed his usual process in this\ninstance and that the CT Agent would have told him that the lead was\nclosed and that there was no interest in Tsarnaev\'s travel. The DHS OIG\nreviewed this CBP Officer\'s TECS usage on the days preceding Tsamaev\'s\noutbound travel and confirmed that the CBP Officer accessed Tsarnaev\'s\nJTTF TECS record on the same day he was alerted of Tsarnaev\'s travel.\nAlthough this does not conclusively establish that the CBP Officer also\nnotified the CT Agent ofTsamaev\'s outbound travel, the DHS OIG\nconcluded that this confirmation demonstrates the CBP Officer took action\nconsistent with his usual process in response to the system alert. Further,\nthe CT Agent stated that the CBP Officer reliably passed along travel\ninformation conceming other subjects in the past, and he had no reason to\ndoubt the CBP Officer\'s statements that he believes he passed the\nnotification ofTsamaev\'s travel to the CT Agent in January 20 12.\n\n\n\n\n Tsamaev was identified as a potential subject of interest for CBP at\nJFK Intemational Airport. On the evening of January 21, 2012, when\nTsamaev\'s flight was departing, he was a low priority relative to the other\npassengers of potential concern. As a result, CBP did not review his record\nor conduct an outbound inspection of him before he departed.\n\n March 2012 JTTF TECS Record\n\n The CBP Officer who created the original JTTF TECS record\nconfigured the record to be visible to CBP officers when they conduct initial\ninspection of intemational travelers arriving in the United States, known as\nprimary inspection. The CBP Officer included instructions in the JTTF\nTECS record that CBP conduct a more intensive inspection of Tsamaev,\nknown as secondary inspection.\n\n TECS records are set to display during primary inspections for a\ncertain period of time. At the end of this period, the CBP officer may change\nthe display status of the JTTF TECS record to be visible during primary\ninspection for as long as the individual continues to be of interest and\nmerits additional scrutiny.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0c In March 2012, the record\'s display status changed so that it would\nnot display to CBP personnel during primary inspection. Neither the CBP\nOfficer nor the CT Agent recalled discussions about retaining the record to\nbe visible during primary inspection. However, the CBP Officer told DHS\nOIG that his standard practice is to review the relevant record in TECS and\nto speak with the relevant case agent to determine whether the record\'s\nsubject still is of interest. Additionally, DHS OIG reviewed the CBP Officer\'s\nTECS usage and confirmed that he accessed the JTTF TECS record three\ndays after the display status changed. DHS OIG determined that although\nthis does not conclusively establish that the CBP Officer notified the CT\nAgent of the record\'s change in status, it suggests that the CBP Officer took\naction consistent with his usual process to determine whether to change the\nrecord\'s display status.\n\n Tsamaev\'s Return to the United States\n On July 17, 2012, Tsarnaev retumed to the United States on an\ninternational flight from Moscow to New York. CBP received tJa.~~\xc2\xb7:oJ.J.J>;vJ.\nfor Tsarnaev from the airline\n\n\n\n\n The DHS and DOJ OIGs were unable to determine whether the CBP\nOfficer alerted the CT Agent about Tsarnaev\'s inbound travel. The CBP\nOfficer told the DHS OIG that he did not remember receiving the alert or his\nactions in response to it, and the CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that he had no\nrecollection of any discussions with the CBP Officer about the return\nnotification. Moreover, the DHS and DOJ OIGs did not locate an e-mail\ncommunication from the CBP Officer to the CT Agent. DHS OIG reviewed\nthe CBP Officer\'s TECS usage, and confirmed that the CBP Officer accessed\nTsamaev\'s JTTF TECS record a few hours after Tsarnaev\'s flight landed at\nJFK Intemational Airport.\n\n Due to differences in CBP procedures and the display status of the\nrecord, Tsarnaev was not identified as a potential subject of interest for CBP\nat JFK International Airport. As a result, Tsarnaev was not directed to\nsecondary inspection. The CBP officer who conducted the primary\ninspection of Tsarnaev said he could not recall his encounter with Tsarnaev.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0cA CBP review of the officer\xe2\x80\x99s activity indicates that the officer scanned\nTsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s Alien Registration Card into the computer system used during\nprimary inspection. The card was valid, and as a result, CBP took\nTsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s picture, collected his fingerprints, confirmed his identity, and\nadmitted him into the United States based on his LPR status.\n\n Significance of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s Travel\n\n FBI officials disagreed about the significance of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s travel to\nRussia and whether it should have resulted in further investigative action.\nThe CT Agent said that the travel would not have been significant because\nthe assessment was closed and the FBI already had asked the Russians for\nadditional derogatory information. When asked whether he would have\nconsidered taking further investigative steps had he learned of the travel at\nthe time, the CT Agent said that he would not have done anything\ndifferently.\n\n However, other FBI officials stated that the information would have\nbeen important to the FBI. The CT Supervisor told the DOJ OIG that he\nwas unaware of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s travel to Russia until after the bombings, and\nthat he would have expected the CT Agent to tell him in January 2012\nabout the TECS hit indicating that Tsarnaev was about to travel to Russia. 15\nHe said that had he known about the travel, he probably would have\nreopened the assessment, interviewed Tsarnaev upon his departure from\nthe United States, informed the LEGAT of the travel so that a determination\ncould have been made about notifying the Russian government, and worked\nwith the LEGAT to request information from the Russian government about\nTsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s activities in Russia. The CT Supervisor also stated that \xe2\x80\x9cthere is\na very good chance\xe2\x80\x9d that the FBI would have interviewed Tsarnaev again\nupon his return from Russia had it known about the travel, but that this\nwould have depended on what was learned from the Russians and from any\nsecondary inspection during Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s travel.\n\n Similarly, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) in charge of\nthe Boston JTTF during the period of the assessment expressed the belief to\nthe DOJ OIG that if someone had \xe2\x80\x9cpinged\xe2\x80\x9d the CT Agent about Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\ntravel, it would have \xe2\x80\x9cchanged everything.\xe2\x80\x9d 16 She also expressed the belief\n\n 15 The CT Agent said he did not recall having a practice of notifying his supervisor\n\nof travel notifications in closed assessments.\n 16 We note, however, that the ASAC told the DOJ OIG that she was not made aware\nuntil after the Boston Marathon bombings of the Tsarnaev lead information or the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s\nassessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The ASAC said that an assessment generally did not\nreach her attention unless it qualified as a sensitive investigative matter under the AG\nGuidelines. The FBI did not designate the Tsarnaev assessment as a sensitive investigative\nmatter.\n\n\n 15\n\x0cthat had the Boston JTI\'F known that Tsarnaev traveled to Russia, and that\nhe went to an area known to be a training ground for extremists, it would\nhave worked with the Moscow LEGAT to obtain additional information.\nAdditionally, she said that she believes the FBI would have opened a second\nassessment and interviewed Tsarnaev about why he went to Russia.\n\n The FBI LEGAT in Moscow between May 2011 and October 2012 told\nthe DOJ OIG that he was not aware of Tsarnaev\'s travel to Russia at the\ntime and did not believe that any U.S. agency at the Moscow Embassy was\naware of the travel. The LEGAT characterized the travel as "huge" and said\nthat had this information been brought to his attention, he would have\nreported the information to CTD and the Boston Field Division for them to\ntake any actions they deemed appropriate. He said that the "normal course\nof events" based on past cases would have been for the FBI to reopen the\nGuardian assessment and seek additional information from the FSB\nregarding Tsarnaev\'s activities while in Russia.\n\n Tsamaev\'s Naturalization Application\n\n Tamerlan Tsarnaev signed an application for naturalization on August\n28, 2012. The USCIS National Benefits Center (NBC), which conducts\nbackground checks to determine whether an applicant meets the\nrequirements for naturalization, received the application on September 24,\n2012. As part of its background checks, NBC searched TECS and identified\nthe JTTF TECS record entered during the assessment, and also requested\nfmgerprint and additional information from the FBI. Based on the\ninformation , the NBC transferred Tsarnaev\'s application for\nadditional reVIew.\n\n On October 22, 2012, an Immigration Services Officer (ISO) sent an e-\nmail to the CT Agent listed in the JTTF TECS record explaining that\nTsarnaev had filed an application for naturalization and asking whether\nTsarnaev represented a national security concern. The CT Agent\nsubsequently searched the FBI\'s case management database and replied on\nOctober 23, 2012, to the ISO, "There is no national security concern related\nto [Tamerlan Tsarnaev] and nothing that I know of that should preclude\nissuance of whatever is being applied for." The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG\n\n\n\n\n 17 The DHS OIG also reviewed the USCIS adjudications of the nationalization\napplications of the three other family members who applied, Anzor Tsarnaev, Dzhokhar\nTsamaev, and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. Their files did not contain significant derogatory\ninformation. USCIS naturalized the three family members.\n\n\n 16\n\x0cthat he did not recall whether he searched public sources before replying to\nthis e-mail. 18\n\n The ISO also contacted the USCIS liaison on the Boston JTTF. The\nliaison told the DHS OIG that when he received the ISO\xe2\x80\x99s e-mail, he\nconducted database searches and met with the CT Agent. He said that he\nand the CT Agent discussed the records from the assessment of Tsarnaev,\nincluding the original information provided by the FSB. The liaison said\nthat he told the CT Agent that barring any derogatory information from this\ncase or another source, Tsarnaev likely was eligible for citizenship, and that\nhe recalled that the CT Agent had no opposition to Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\nnaturalization. The CT Agent told the DOJ OIG that it was a \xe2\x80\x9cgood bet\xe2\x80\x9d he\ndiscussed Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s naturalization application with the liaison but did not\nhave a specific recollection of what they discussed.\n\n On October 26, 2012, the liaison sent an e-mail to the ISO stating\nthat there was no current or prior investigation for Tsarnaev, and \xe2\x80\x9cthere is\nno derogatory information related to national security that would adversely\naffect the subject\xe2\x80\x99s eligibility for the immigration benefit being sought at this\ntime.\xe2\x80\x9d Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s application then was returned to the queue for normal\nprocessing. USCIS personnel subsequently conducted database searches\nfor Tamerlan Tsarnaev on multiple separate dates and found no derogatory\nrecords. DHS OIG determined that USCIS personnel did not use all\navailable aliases when conducting these searches, failing to query for the\nterm \xe2\x80\x9cTamer Tsarnayev.\xe2\x80\x9d However, the DHS OIG concluded that had USCIS\nchecked this alias, it would not have produced additional information.\n\n In late November 2012, in response to a USCIS information request,\nthe FBI conducted a database search and drafted a memorandum stating\nthat there was no derogatory information about Tsarnaev. On December 3,\n2012, the FBI returned additional information results showing Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\narrest for assault and battery of his former girlfriend in July 2009. USCIS\nthen requested court records to confirm that the arrest did not result in a\nconviction, which it did not receive before the April 15, 2013, bombings.\n\n A USCIS officer interviewed Tsarnaev on January 23, 2013, but did\nnot adjudicate his naturalization after the interview because USCIS had not\nreceived the court records relating to his 2009 arrest. As a result,\nTsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s naturalization application remained pending on April 15, 2013.\nThe USCIS officer told the DHS OIG that had the court records been\n\n\n\n 18 The FBI has no procedures for processing such requests for information about\nthe subjects of closed investigations or assessments that are submitted to the FBI in\nconnection with naturalization applications.\n\n\n 17\n\x0cprocessed before this date, he would have had no grounds to deny the\napplication, and Tsamaev would have become a naturalized citizen.\n\n\nV. INFORMATION OBTAINED OR FIRST ACCESSED AND\n REVIEWED AFTER THE BOMBINGS\n\n The OIG teams examined information that existed prior to the\nbombings but was not obtained or first accessed and reviewed until after the\n . This information included certain\n\n arnaev\n U.U, vU.U.vU.\n\n\npursue J amaev former girlfriend describing\nTsamaev\'s shift toward radical Islam between 2006 and 2009, descriptions\nfrom multiple sources ofTsarnaev\'s activities while in Russia in 2012, and\nTsamaev\'s collection and sharing of jihadi-themed videos and other\nextremist materials beginning at least a year prior to the bombings.\n\n January 2011 Communications\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0c Interview of Tsamaev\'s Wife and Former Girlfriend\n After the bombings the FBI interviewed Tsarnaev\'s former girlfriend\nand his wife, Katherine Tsarnaeva. The former girlfriend provided\ninformation about changes in Tsarnaev\'s behavior and appearance between\n2006 and 2009 his interest in videos about Islam.\n\n\n\n wife were available to be interviewed during the 201 1\nassessment, but that it can never be known whether they would have\nprovided the same information to the FBI about Tsarnaev at any time before\nTsamaev had been identified as a perpetrator of the Boston Marathon\nbombings while he was still alive and, in the case of Tsarnaev\'s wife, while\nhe was married to her.\n\n Tsamaev\'s Travel to Russia\n Tsamaev traveled to Russia on January 21, 2012, and retumed to the\nUnited States on July 17, 2012. The DOJ OIG found that no information\nwas available in the FBI\'s primary data systems prior to the bombings about\nTsamaev\'s activities in Russia, and sought to determine what additional\ninformation existed about Tsarnaev\'s activities during this period and\nwhether this information was available to the FBI before the bombings.\n\n The DOJ OIG\'s review of materials provided by the FBI showed that\nafter the bombings the FBI obtained information about Tsamaev\'s activities\nduring this period primarily from three sources: the FSB, witness\ninterviews, and analyses of computer media from Tsarnaev\'s home obtained\nthrough a method only available in a full investigation. These materials\nshowed that Tsarnaev spoke of jihad prior to traveling to Russia, and that\nhe shared extremist articles and videos while he was in Russia.\n\n Computer Media and Electronic Communications\n The OIGs reviewed analyses of relevant information learned from\nexploiting the electronic media and communications of Tsamaev and his\nassociates after the bombings. The FBI\'s analysis was based in part on\nother government agency information showing that Tsarnaev created a\nYouTube account on August 17, 20 12, and began posting the first of several\njihadi-themed videos in approximately October 2012. The FBI\'s analysis\nwas based in part on open source research and analysis conducted by other\nU.S. govemment agencies shortly after the bombings showing that\nTsamaev\'s YouTube account was created with the profile name "Tamerlan\nTsamaev." After reviewing a draft of this report, the FBI commented that\nTsamaev\'s YouTube display name changed from "muazseyfullah" to\n\n 19\n\x0c"Tamerlan Tsarnaev" on or about February 12, 2013, and suggested that\ntherefore Tsarnaev\'s YouTube account could not be located using the search\nterm "Tamerlan Tsarnaev" before that date.2o The DOJ OIG concluded that\nbecause another govemment agency was able to locate Tsamaev\'s YouTube\naccount through open source research shortly after the bombings, the FBI\nlikely would have been able to locate this information through open source\nresearch between February 12 and April15, 2013. The DOJ OIG could not\ndetermine whether open source queries prior to that date would have\nrevealed Tsamaev to be the individual who posted this material.\n\n An FBI analysis of electronic media showed that the computers used\nby Tsamaev contained a substantial amount of jihadist articles and videos,\nincluding material written by or associated with U.S.-born radical Islamic\ncleric Anwar al-Aulaqi. On one such computer, the FBI found at least seven\nissues of Inspire, an on-line English language magazine created by al-\nAulaqi. One issue of this magazine contained an article entitled, "Make a\nBomb in the Kitchen of your Mom," which included instructions for building\nthe explosive devices used in the Boston Marathon bombings.\n\n Information learned through the exploitation of the Tsarnaev\'s\ncomputers was obtained through a method that may only be used in the\ncourse of a full investigation, which the FBI did not open until after the\nbombings.\n\n NSA Information\n\n The DOJ OIG, in coordination with the IC IG, reviewed information\nthat the NSA produced in response to a request from the IC IG. Included in\nthis duction was information from 2012\n\n\n\n\n 2o In response to a DOJ OIG request for information support ing this statement, the\nFBI produced a heavily redacted 3-page excerpt from an unclassified March 19, 2014, EC\nanalyzing information t hat included information about Tsarnaev\'s YouTube account. The\nunredact ed portion of the EC s t ated that YouTube e-mail messages sent to Tsarnaev\'s\nGoogle e-mail account were addressed to "muazseyfullah" prior to February 12, 2013, and\nto "Tamerlan Tsarnaev" beginning on February 14, 2013. The FBI redacted ot her\ninformation in the EC about Tsarnaev\'s YouTube and Google e-mail accounts.\n\n\n 20\n\x0cVI. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS\n\n Based on all the information gathered during our coordinated review,\nwe believe that the FBI, CIA, DHS, and NCTC generally shared information\nand followed procedures appropriately. We identified a few areas where\nbroader information sharing between agencies may have been required,\nsuch as FBI coordination with the CIA after receiving the lead information in\nMarch 2011, or where broader information sharing in the future should be\nconsidered, such as greater sharing of threat information with state and\nlocal partners. We also identified a factual question that could not be\nconclusively resolved concerning whether the notification of Tsarnaev\'s\ntravel to Russia was shared with the FBI CT Agent who conducted the\nassessment.\n\n With respect to the FBI\'s pre-bombing investigation, we concluded\nthat the FBI made investigative judgments based on information known at\nthe time and that were within the legal framework goveming its ability to\ngather intelligence and conduct investigations, in this case of U.S. persons.\nWe believe it is impossible to know what would have happened had different\njudgments been made. With respect to post-assessment activities, we\nbelieve that Tsarnaev\'s travel to Russia in 2012 was significant in view of\nthe FSB lead information and warranted further investigative action.\n\n Each participating OIG reached specific conclusions regarding actions\ntaken or not taken by its component agencies. We briefly summarize our\nmost significant conclusions below.\n\n The FBI\'s Assessment of Tamerlan Tsamaev\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The AG Guidelines and the DIOG give flexibility to FBI\n personnel to choose a lower level of investigation, even when the\n factual predication for a higher level of investigation is met, if\n FBI personnel determine the matter can be resolved through\n less intrusive methods. Given the limited information available\n to the Boston JTTF in March 20 11 conceming Tamerlan\n Tsamaev, the DOJ OIG concluded that the FBI CT Supervisor\n and CT Agent\'s decision to open the investigation at the\n assessment level was an application of the least intrusive\n method principle within their investigative discretion.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Because the lead from the FSB included information about\n Zubeidat Tsamaeva, the DOJ OIG believes that the CT\n\n 21\n\x0c Supervisor and CT Agent should have given greater\n consideration to opening an assessment on her. However, given\n that the bulk of the derogatory information in the lead arguably\n focused on Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the DOJ OIG concluded that it\n was within their discretion not to open an assessment on\n Zubeidat Tsarnaeva and instead to conduct limited database\n queries using her name and other relevant identifiers.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The DOJ OIG concluded that additional investigative steps\n would have resulted in a more thorough assessment, including\n conducting additional database searches, asking questions of\n Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his parents to elicit information about\n any plans Tsarnaev may have had to travel to Russia, and\n interviewing Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s former girlfriend and wife. However, the\n DOJ OIG determined that the additional database searches\n would not have revealed any information that was not already\n known to the CT Agent conducting the assessment. In addition,\n the DOJ OIG found that it is impossible to know what the\n former girlfriend and wife would have told the FBI in 2011\n before the Boston Marathon bombings and while Tamerlan\n Tsarnaev was still alive. Therefore, it cannot be known whether\n these additional interviews would have yielded additional\n information relevant to the FSB lead information.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The DOJ OIG found that since the Boston Marathon bombings\n the FBI has taken steps to encourage state and local partners\n on JTTFs to review the Guardian system and share relevant\n threat information with their home agencies. The DOJ OIG\n agrees with the steps the FBI has taken and recommends that\n the FBI take additional steps to share threat information with\n state and local partners more proactively.\n\nTamerlan Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s Travel to Russia\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The DOJ and DHS OIGs found that there is a factual question\n regarding whether the DHS CBP Officer on the Boston JTTF,\n after receiving advance notification of the travel, informed the\n FBI CT Agent who conducted the assessment about Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\n flight to Russia. The OIGs believe that the CT Agent most likely\n did receive notice of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s outbound flight but we were\n unable to determine this fact conclusively because there was no\n written confirmation that the CBP Officer had conveyed this\n information to the CT Agent. For the same reason, the DOJ and\n DHS OIGs could not determine conclusively whether the CBP\n Officer informed the CT Agent of Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s return flight from\n Russia.\n\n\n 22\n\x0c\x0cInformation Sharing and Coordination Between the FBI and CIA\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The DOJ and CIA OIGs found that the FBI LEGAT in Moscow\n did not coordinate with the CIA in March 2011, pursuant to the\n Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and the CIA,\n after receiving the lead information from the FSB concerning\n Tamerlan Tsarnaev. However, we also concluded that the CIA\xe2\x80\x99s\n involvement in March 2011 likely would not have provided the\n FBI with information that could have been helpful to the Boston\n JTTF\xe2\x80\x99s assessment of Tamerlan Tsarnaev.\n\nFTTTF and NCTC\xe2\x80\x99s handling of information about Tsarnaev\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The DOJ OIG examined the FTTTF\xe2\x80\x99s handling of the referral of\n Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s record from NCTC, including the FTTTF\xe2\x80\x99s decision\n not to provide information about the fact of the closed FBI\n assessment of Tsarnaev to NCTC. The DOJ OIG determined\n that FTTTF practice at that time did not require the provision of\n information directly to NCTC. Additionally, the DOJ OIG\n concluded that had the fact of the closed assessment been\n shared with NCTC, this information may have led to Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\n removal from the watchlist.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 NCTC had in its possession the CIA\xe2\x80\x99s nomination of Tsarnaev to\n TIDE, the TIDE record derived from that nomination, and travel\n data from DHS regarding Tamerlan \xe2\x80\x9cTaarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s\xe2\x80\x9d outbound flight\n to Russia in January 2012.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The IC IG determined that Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s nomination to TIDE was\n at a lower priority than those that are ordinarily enhanced. The\n IC IG expects NCTC\xe2\x80\x99s new practice of seeking to enhance all\n U.S. person watchlisted information in TIDE will reduce the\n level of unmatched records for those persons in the future.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 On April 3, 2012, NCTC received information from DHS about\n Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s January 21, 2012, outbound travel. The data did\n not correctly identify Tsarnaev as a U.S. person. Based on the\n information received from DHS, NCTC retained the document in\n accordance with procedures. Had the data accurately identified\n Tsarnaev as a lawful permanent resident (a U.S. person), NCTC\n would have been required to delete his travel information within\n 180 days unless it was determined to constitute terrorism\n information.\n\nAdjudication of Immigration Benefits for Tamerlan Tsarnaev\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS OIG examined the INS\xe2\x80\x99s adjudication of immigration\n benefits for the Tsarnaev family members in 2002 and 2003, as\n\n 24\n\x0c well as the USCIS\xe2\x80\x99s adjustment of their status to lawful\n permanent resident (LPR) in 2006 and 2007. The DHS OIG\n concluded that the USCIS granted these benefits in accordance\n with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and agency\n policy and procedures.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS OIG examined the USCIS\xe2\x80\x99s adjudication of Tamerlan\n Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s 2012 application for naturalization and concluded\n that, with one exception, the USCIS conducted the\n naturalization processes in accordance with the requirements of\n the INA and the USCIS policies and procedures. 21 The one\n exception was that the USCIS did not check one alias, \xe2\x80\x9cTamer\n Tsarnayev.\xe2\x80\x9d However, the DHS OIG determined that had the\n USCIS checked this alias, it would not have found the TECS\n entries derived from Tsarnaev\xe2\x80\x99s watchlist record.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DHS OIG found that the USCIS acted appropriately by\n contacting Boston JTTF members and receiving information\n that Tsarnaev did not pose a national security concern.\n Additionally, the ISO who interviewed Tsarnaev followed USCIS\n processes and policies by delaying adjudication of his\n naturalization application until the court records dismissing\n criminal allegations were obtained.\n\n\nVII. RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n In light of our findings and conclusions summarized above, the\nparticipating OIGs found no basis to make broad recommendations for\nchanges in information handling or sharing. We nonetheless identified\nsome areas in which existing policies or practices could be clarified or\nimproved. Accordingly, we make the following recommendations:\n\n 1. The DOJ and DHS OIGs recommend that the FBI and DHS\n clarify the circumstances under which JTTF personnel may\n change the display status of a TECS record, particularly in\n closed cases.\n\n 2. The DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI consider sharing threat\n information with state and local partners more proactively and\n uniformly by establishing a procedure for notifying state and\n local representatives on JTTFs when it conducts a\n\n\n 21 The DHS OIG also found that the USCIS adhered to statutes, policies, and\nprocedures when it granted naturalization to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Anzor Tsarnaev, and\nZubeidat Tsarnaeva.\n\n\n 25\n\x0ccounterterrorism assessment of a subject residing in or having\na nexus to a representative\xe2\x80\x99s area of responsibility. Such a\nprocedure would allow state and local representatives to JTTFs\nthe opportunity to share potentially relevant information with\nthe FBI.\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\x0c IC IG FORUM\n Unclassified Summary\nOf Information Handling and Sharing\n Prior to the April 15, 2013\n BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS\n\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMENTS\n\x0c U.S. Department of Homeland Security\n Washington, D.C. 20528\n\n\n Homeland\n Security\n April 9, 2014\n\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: John Roth\n Inspector General\n\nFROM: Jim H. Crumpacker\n Director \\\n ~\xc2\xb7 l ~---t-\n Departmental GAO-OI \xc2\xb7 Liaison Office\n\nSUBJECT: OIG Draft Report: "A Review of the Handling and Sharing of\n Information Prior to the April15, 2013 Boston Marathon\n Bombings" (OIG Project No. 13-146)\n\n\nThank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department of\nHomeland Security (DHS) appreciates the Office oflnspector General\'s (OIG\'s) work, and that of its\nnational security community partners, in planning and conducting this review and issuing this report.\n\nDHS has built close relationships with partners in communities across the Nation and improved\nits support to them, actions that will continue to make America stronger and more resilient to\ntetTorist attacks, and threats and hazards of all kinds. DHS works with first responders, law\nenforcement, individuals, private sector partners, and communities across the country to reduce\nvulnerabilities and enhance preparedness while strengthening emergency response capabilities at\nthe Federal, State, local, tribal and tenitoriallevels. While America is stronger and more\nresilient as a result of effmts over the past decade to build robust national capabilities, the Boston\nMarathon bombings serve as a reminder that threats fi:om tenorism persist and continue to\nevolve.\n\nSince the Boston attack, DHS, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), and National\nCmmtertenorism Center (NCTC) have expanded infmmation sharing with state and local\nofficials about potential threats. DHS also sent updated guidance to officers at the Joint\nTenorism Task Force (JTTF) to improve on our strong foundation of collaboration with the FBI.\nAdditionally, DHS also continues to work closely with federal prutners to screen and vet\ndomestic and intemational travelers, visa applicants and other persons of interest to identify\npotential threats.\n\nDHS 1s pleased to note OIG\' s recognition that the Deprutment and its external prutners generally\nshru\xc2\xb7ed information and followed procedures appropriately. For example, as stated in the draft\nreport, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) followed the appropriate policy and procedures\nduring the outbound and inbound vetting ofTamerlan Tsarnaev\'s (Tsarnaev\'s) travel.\n\x0cCBP continuously strives to improve its processes while ensuring that information provided is\naccurate and verified. For example, CBP established a "formalized notification procedure" to\nensure documentable communication in the fast-paced environment of the JTTF.\n\nThe draft report contained one recommendation directed to DHS with which the Department\nconcurs. Specifically, OIG recommended that:\n\nRecommendation: The Federal Bureau oflnvestigation and DHS clarify the circumstances\nunder which Joint Tenorism Task Force personnel may change the display status of a TECS\nrecord, particularly in closed cases. \xc2\xb7\n\nResponse: Concur. CBP will coordinate with FBI counterparts to determine what additional\nTECS record guidance is needed for JTTF personnel and how best to disseminate that guidance,\nas appropriate. Estimated Completion Date: September 30, 2014.\n\nThe events in Boston have highlighted how close coordination among Federal, State, and local\nofficials is critical in the immediate aftermath and response to tenorist attacks and reinforces the\nprinciple and value of whole community contributions, including from the general public. Both\nthe work leading up to the Boston Marathon and the quick action following the event\ndemonstrate the significant progress that has been made over the past eleven years.\n\nAgain, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical\ncomments were previously provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you\nhave any questions. We look forward to working with you in the future.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\x0c U.S. Department of Justice\n\n Federal Bureau of Investigation\n\n\n\n\nOffice of the Director Washington, D.C. 20535\n\n April 7, 2014\n\n\nThe Honorable Michael E. Horowitz The Honorable I. Charles McCullough, III\nInspector General Inspector General of the Intelligence Community\nUnited States Department of Justice Washington D.C. 20511\nWashington, D.C. 20530-0001\n\nThe Honorable David B. Buckley The Honorable John Roth\nInspector General Inspector General\nCentral Intelligence Agency United States Department of Homeland Security\nWashington, D.C. 20505 Washington, DC 20528-0305\n\nDear Inspectors General:\n\n The FBI appreciates your thorough review of the handling and sharing of information prior\nto the Aprill5, 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Of course, we continue to remember all who\nwere harmed in those terrible events. But whenever a tragedy occurs, we owe it to the victims\nand the American people to look back and see what lessons we can learn. It\'s not just a useful\nexercise; it\'s an essential one.\n\n Here, your review confirmed that when Russian authorities provided limited information\nto the FBI about Tamerlan Tsamaev and his mother in 2011, the FBI acted appropriately. The\nFBI\'s Boston field office took responsible investigative steps and, as you recognized, generally\nshared information and followed procedures appropriately. We also concur with your\nrecommendations. In fact, we have already taken steps to ensure that all threat information is\nproactively and uniformly shared with the state and local partners whose support is so critical to\nthe success of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.\n\n FBI agents and analysts throughout the world, together with our law enforcement and\nintelligence partners, work day in and day out to protect the homeland, using all available tools\nconsistent with our Constitution, laws and policies. They have to make critical judgments in real\ntime, almost always with imperfect information, and often in dangerous circumstances. I am\nproud of the work that the Boston field office did in this case, before the bombings as well as\nafter them, and I am proud of all the people of the FBI who have made the safety of the\nAmerican people their life\'s mission.\n\n Sincerely,\n\n\n\n James B. Corney\n Director\n\n\n FBI / DOJ\n\x0c DIRECTOR\n NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER\n Washington DC 20505\n\n\n\n NCTC-2014-0383\n\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR: I. Charles McCullough III\n Inspector General of the Intelligence Community\n\nSUBJECT: A Review of the Handling and Sharing of Information Prior to the\n April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings\n\n\n Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on your report on the Boston\nmarathon bombings. As indicated in the report, NCTC has conducted its own center-wide\nreview of related activities and relevant issues pertaining to the bombings, as is our standard\npractice following any significant terrorism event. Although our review did not reveal any\ninformation that would have led to discovery of the marathon plotting or attacks prior to their\noccurrence, we identified actions and enhancements that will refine our current and future\ncapabilities, processes, and procedures. We are also continuing to monitor our progress with\nregular updates among our leadership team and will continue to work with your office going\nforward.\n\n\n\n\nMatthew G. Olsen\n\x0c'


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type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 15.12.2014
 PT
 Jornal Oficial da União Europeia
 C 448/24
 Despacho do Tribunal Geral de 16 de outubro de 2014 — Nikolaou/Comissão e BCE
 (Processo T-331/13) (1)
 ((«Recurso de anulação - Programa de apoio à estabilidade de Chipre - Declaração do Eurogrupo relativa à reestruturação do setor bancário em Chipre - Designação errada da recorrida na petição inicial - Inadmissibilidade»))
 (2014/C 448/32)
 Língua do processo: grego
 Partes
 Recorrentes: Marinos Nikolaou (Strovolos, Chipre) (representantes: E. Efstathiou, K. Efstathiou e K. Liasidou, advogados)
 Recorridos: Comissão Europeia (representantes: B. Smulders, J.-P. Keppenne e M. Konstantinidis, agentes) e Banco Central Europeu (BCE) (representantes: A. Sáinz de Vicuña Barroso, N. Lenihan e F. Athanasiou, agentes, assistidos por W. Bussian, W. Devroe e D. Arts, advogados)
 Objeto
 Pedido de anulação da declaração do Eurogrupo de 25 de março de 2013 relativa, nomeadamente, à reestruturação do setor bancário em Chipre.
 Dispositivo
 1)
 O recurso é julgado inadmissível.
 2)
 Marinos Nikolaou é condenado a suportar, para além das suas próprias despesas, as despesas efetuadas pela Comissão Europeia e pelo Banco Central Europeu (BCE).
 (1) JO C 252, de 31.8.2013.