text:
 Nr . L 61 / 2 Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 1 . 3 . 85
 BESLUIT Nr. 2 / 85
 VAN DE ACS—EEG-RAAD VAN MINISTERS
 van 22 februari 1985
 betreffende de overgangsmaatregelen die gelden vanaf 1 maart 1985
 HET ACS—EEG-COMITE VAN AMBASSADEURS , krachtens titel III , hoofdstuk 1 , dienen evenwel
 uiterlijk te worden ingediend op 31 oktober
 1985 ;
 Gelet op de tweede ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst, onder
 tekend te Lomé op 31 oktober 1979 , inzonderheid op d ) de bepalingen betreffende de investeringen , ver
 artikel 188 , lid 3 , vat in titel IV :
 e) de bepalingen betreffende de industriële samen
 Gelet op Besluit nr. 7 / 84 van de ACS—EEG-Raad van werking, vervat in titel V ;
 Ministers van 19 december 1984 tot overdracht van
 bevoegdheden aan het ACS—EEG-Comité van Ambas f) de bepalingen betreffende de samenwerking op
 sadeurs inzake de vaststelling van overgangsmaatregelen landbouwgebied , vervat in titel VI ;
 bij het verstrijken van de tweede ACS—EEG-Overeen
 komst ,
 g) de bepalingen inzake de financiële en technische
 samenwerking, vervat in titel VII ;
 Gelet op het op 31 oktober 1979 te Lomé ondertekende h ) de bepalingen betreffende de minst ontwikkelde,
 Akkoord betreffende de produkten die onder de de niet aan zee grenzende en de insulaire staten ,
 bevoegdheid van de Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen vervat in titel VIII ;
 en Staal vallen ,
 i ) de bepalingen betreffende betalingen en kapi
 taalverkeer, vestiging en diensten , vervat in
 Overwegende dat het noodzakelijk is , bij wijze titel IX ;
 van overgangsmaatregelen die gelden tot aan de inwer
 kingtreding van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst , j ) de algemene bepalingen en slotbepalingen , ver
 ondertekend te Lomé op 8 december 1984 , de vereiste vat in de artikelen 179 , 180 , 184 , 185 , 186 ,
 voorzieningen te treffen ten einde de geldigheidsduur 188 , lid 3 , 189 , 190 en 191 , en in Protocol
 van de desbetreffende bepalingen van de tweede nr . 3 ;
 ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst te verlengen ,
 2 . het op 31 oktober 1979 te Lomé ondertekende
 Akkoord betreffende de produkten die onder de
 bevoegheid van de Europese Gemeenschap voor
 BESLUIT : Kolen en Staal vallen .
 Artikel 1
 Artikel 2
 Na 28 februari 1985 en tot aan de inwerkingtreding van
 de nieuwe bepalingen ter zake blijven , behoudens ver Met ingang van 1 maart 1985 en tot aan de inwerking
 lenging in onderlinge overeenstemming , uiterlijk tot en treding van de nieuwe bepalingen ter zake , en uiterlijk
 met 28 februari 1986 de volgende bepalingen alsmede tot en met 28 februari 1986 , zijn , behoudens verlenging
 de ter uitvoering van deze bepalingen genomen besluiten in onderlinge overeenstemming , de bepalingen betref
 van toepassing:
 fende de samenwerking op handelsgebied vervat in
 titel I , hoofdstuk 1 , en hoofdstuk 2 , van de tweede
 1 . voor wat betreft de tweede ACS—EEG-Overeen ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst , alsmede die vervat in het
 komst : aan die Overeenkomst gehechte Protocol nr. 1 , van
 a ) de bepalingen inzake de commerciële samenwer toepassing tussen de Gemeenschap en iedere nieuwe
 ACS-Staat die de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst
 king, vervat in titel I en in Protocol nr. 1 , onder ondertekent .
 voorbehoud van artikel 4 van dit besluit;
 b ) de bepalingen betreffende het systeem voor de
 stabilisatie van de exportopbrengsten , vervat in
 Artikel 3
 titel II , hoofdstuk 1 , zulks behoudens artikel 8 ,
 tweede alinea , van dit besluit;
 De bepalingen betreffende de instellingen , vervat
 c) de bepalingen inzake mijnbouwprodukten , ver in de artikelen 22 , 23 , 24 en 25 van de derde
 vat in titel III ; de aanvragen om financiële steun ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst, de bepalingen vervat in het
 ---pagebreak--- 1 . 3 . 85 Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen Nr . L 61 / 3
 vierde deel van deze Overeenkomst en in het aan deze ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst wordt voortgezet onder de
 Overeenkomst gehechte Protocol nr . 2 , de bepalingen voorwaarden bepaald in die Overeenkomst.
 van artikel 284 van deze Overeenkomst betreffende de
 bij de toetreding van een Staat tot de Gemeenschap te Artikel 35 van de bovengenoemde Overeenkomst blijft
 volgen procedures , alsmede de bepalingen , vervat in de van toepassing , behalve voor wat betreft de geldigheids
 bijlagen I en IX van de Slotakte van deze Overeen duur , die tot aan de inwerkingtreding van de derde
 komst , zijn vervroegd van toepassing met ingang ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst wordt verlengd .
 van 1 maart 1985 , met uitzondering van lid 3 van bij
 lage IX en van de in bijlage XXXI opgenomen gemeen De in artikel 160 van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeen
 schappelijke verklaring ad artikel 2 van Protocol nr . 2 . komst opgenomen nieuwe bepalingen betreffende de
 wijze van berekening van de transfergrondslagen in Ecu
 Artikel 4
 worden vervroegd toegepast vanaf het toepassingsjaar
 1984 .
 De bepalingen met betrekking tot de procedure voor
 afwijking van de oorsprongregels , vervat in artikel 30 Artikel 9
 van Protocol nr . 1 van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeen
 komst , worden per 1 maart 1985 vervroegd toegepast . De tenuitvoerlegging van de financiële en technische
 samenwerking en van het systeem van steun voor mijn
 De op dit ogenblik reeds ingediende verzoeken worden bouwprojecten en -programma's uit hoofde van de
 evenwel behandeld volgens de procedure van de tweede tweede ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst wordt voortgezet
 ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst .
 onder de voorwaarden bepaald in die Overeenkomst.
 Artikel 5 Overeenkomstig artikel 137 , lid 3 , sub c), en in afwij
 king van artikel 154 van de tweede ACS—EEG-Over
 Het Comité voor Industriële Samenwerking is gemach eenkomst , is de Gemeenschap gemachtigd haar verbin
 tigd tot het uitoefenen van de nodige bevoegdheden ten tenissen uit hoofde van respectievelijk spoedhulp en
 einde de continuïteit in de werking van het Centrum risicodragend kapitaal tot aan de inwerkingtreding van
 de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst voort te zetten .
 voor Industriële Ontwikkeling tot aan de inwerkingtre
 ding van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst te verze
 keren , alsook tot het voorbereiden van de inwerkingtre Opdat het in artikel 51 , lid 2 , van de tweede
 ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst bedoelde besluit van de
 ding van de nieuwe bepalingen en met name tot de
 oprichting van de in artikel 73 van deze Overeenkomst Raad van Ministers betreffende de bestemming van
 bedoelde Raad van Bestuur . eventueel resterende gedeelten van het totaalbedrag van
 de speciale financieringsfaciliteit wordt genomen met
 volledige kennis van alle nodige gegevens , wordt
 Artikel 6 de in dat artikel bedoelde termijn verlengd tot en met
 28 februari 1986 . Voor aanvragen waarvoor het
 Onder het gezag van het Comité van Ambassadeurs onderzoek reeds aan de gang is , mag dit onderzoek
 oefent het subcomité voor samenwerking op het gebied worden voltooid .
 van landbouw- en plattelandsontwikkeling de nodige
 bevoegdheden uit ten einde de continuïteit in de werking
 van het Technisch Centrum voor Landbouwsamenwer Artikel 10
 king en Plattelandsontwikkeling tot aan de inwerking
 treding van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst te ver De ACS-Staten , de Lid-Staten en de Gemeenschap zijn ,
 zekeren , alsook tot het voorbereiden van de inwerking elk voor zich , verplicht de nodige maatregelen ter
 treding van nieuwe bepalingen en met name de oprich uitvoering van dit besluit te treffen .
 ting van het in artikel 37 , lid 6 , van deze Overeenkomst
 bedoelde Raadgevend Comité . Artikel 11
 Artikel 7 Dit besluit treedt in werking op 1 maart 1985 .
 Artikel 47 van de derde ACS—EEG-Overeenkomst
 inzake het Comité voor landbouwbasisprodukten wordt Gedaan te Brussel , 22 februari 1985 .
 toegepast vanaf 1 maart 1985 .
 Voor de ACS—EEG-Raad van Ministers
 Artikel 8 Het ACS—EEG-Comitê van Ambassadeurs
 De Voorzitter
 De tenuitvoerlegging van het systeem voor de stabilisa
 tie van de exportopbrengstén uit hoofde van de tweede P. CALAMIA


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
Dennis J. Kelly, Jr. v. George W. Duvall, Jr., et al., No. 26, September Term, 2014, Opinion
 by Adkins, J.
 TRUSTS AND ESTATES — WILLS — CONDITIONS PRECEDENT —
 SURVIVORSHIP: When a will contains a recitation of Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl.
 Vol.), § 4-401 of the Estates and Trusts Article, that provision does not act as a survivorship
 requirement to a legacy.
 TRUSTS AND ESTATES — WILLS — LAPSE — CONTRARY INTENT NOT
 EXPRESSED: When a Will contains no express language to the contrary but includes a
 recitation of Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 4-401 of the Estates and Trusts Article,
 the testator has not expressed a contrary intent sufficient to negate Maryland’s presumption
 against lapsed legacies, codified in Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 4-403 of the
 Estates and Trusts Article.
 Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
 Case No.: 02-C-12-170592
 Argued: November 7, 2014
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 26
 September Term, 2014
 DENNIS J. KELLY, JR.
 v.
 GEORGE W. DUVALL, JR., et al.
 Barbera, C.J.
 Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts,
 JJ.
 Opinion by Adkins, J.
 Battaglia and Watts, JJ., dissent
 Filed: January 27, 2015
 The common law is no stranger to familial disputes born of contested inheritance.
 In this case, we are asked to interpret a mother’s will and determine its relationship to
 Maryland’s statutory testamentary law. Specifically, we must ascertain whether the
 testator intended to create a condition precedent to her son’s inheritance, and if not, whether
 she intended to rebut the State’s statutory anti-lapse presumption.
 FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
 This case arises from two disputed provisions in the Last Will and Testament of
 Elizabeth Duvall (the “Will”), which Ms. Duvall executed on May 17, 2001. In part, the
 Will provides:
 ITEM III.
 If any of the legatee or beneficiary named or described under
 any provision of my Will does not survive me by a period of
 thirty (30) days, then all provisions of my Will shall take effect
 as if such legatee or beneficiary had, in fact, predeceased me.
 ITEM IV.
 A. Specific Bequests:
 (1) I hereby give, devise and bequeath that lot of
 ground and premises owned by me and
 located on and more commonly described as
 161 Mabel Lane, Severna Park, Anne
 Arundel County, Maryland 21146, and all
 household furnishing and contents therein,
 unto my son, DENNIS J. KELLY,
 absolutely.
 B. Rest and Residue:
 All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate
 and property, real, leasehold, personal or mixed,
 of all kinds, nature and description, and
 wheresoever situate, I do hereby give, devise and
 bequeath unto my children, GEORGE W.
 DUVALL, JR., ALFRED N. KELLY, DENNIS
 J. KELLY and DAVID M. KELLY, to share and
 share alike, in equal shares.
 Ms. Duvall’s death on April 16, 2011, and the death of her son, Dennis J. Kelly, Sr.,
 only weeks earlier set in motion this conflict over the proper disposition of her estate. On
 November 15, 2011, Respondents Alfred Kelly, David Kelly, and George Duvall filed a
 Petition for Construction of Ms. Duvall’s Will in the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel
 County, urging the court to “find that the Will leaves the assets of the estate to [Ms.
 Duvall’s] living children only.” Petitioner Dennis J. Kelly, Jr.—Kelly, Sr.’s heir—
 responded, contending that the house and its contents should pass to the estate of Kelly,
 Sr., and that his heirs are entitled to one-quarter of Ms. Duvall’s residuary estate.
 The Orphans’ Court ruled in favor of the surviving sons, concluding that “the Estate
 should be distributed to the three surviving children named in item IV” of Ms. Duvall’s
 Will. Kelly, Jr. appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which affirmed
 the judgment of the Orphans’ Court. It reasoned:
 The inclusion of Item III establishes intent on the part of the
 testator, Duvall, to require survivorship as a condition
 precedent to inheritance and that if any of the beneficiaries
 under her will predeceased her, their portion of the estate is
 distributed as if they were absent from the will.
 On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported
 opinion, concluding both that Item III imposed survivorship as a condition precedent to
 inheritance and that it manifested an intent to negate Maryland’s anti-lapse statute. Judge
 James A. Kenney, III dissented, disagreeing with both conclusions and suggesting that the
 disputed provisions do “nothing more than simply reflect the testator’s intent to avoid
 2
 multiple estates in accordance with the applicable statutes and [do] not impose a period of
 survivorship on any specific legacy provided for in the Will.” Kelly v. Duvall, No. 1688,
 Sept. Term, 2012, Slip Op. at 16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 28, 2013) (Kenney, J.,
 dissenting).
 We granted Kelly, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to answer the following
 questions:
 1. Whether the lower court erred in construing Item III in a
 manner inconsistent with Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl.
 Vol.), § 4-401 of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”) and
 finding that it imposed survivorship as a condition
 precedent to inheritance under the Will?
 2. Whether the lower court erred in construing Item III and
 Item IV as demonstrating the Testatrix’s contrary intent
 sufficient to overcome the presumption that Maryland’s
 anti-lapse statute, ET § 4-403 applies?
 Agreeing with Judge Kenney, we answer yes to both questions, and shall reverse the
 judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
 STANDARD OF REVIEW
 “[T]he findings of fact of an Orphans’ Court are entitled to a presumption of
 correctness.” N.Y. State Library Sch. Ass’n v. Atwater, 227 Md. 155, 157, 175 A.2d 592,
 593 (1961) (citation omitted). But “[t]he lower court’s interpretations of law enjoy no
 presumption of correctness on review: the appellate court must apply the law as it
 understands it to be.” Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 446 n.2, 505 A.2d 113,
 115 n.2 (1986) (citations omitted). “Thus, an appellate court, including this Court, must
 ascertain whether the conclusions of law made by a trial court in the first instance are
 3
 ‘legally correct . . . .’” Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 648, 919 A.2d 641, 645 (2007)
 (quoting Banks v. Pusey, 393 Md. 688, 697, 904 A.2d 448, 454 (2006)).
 DISCUSSION
 We are asked to determine whether Items III and IV of Ms. Duvall’s Will create a
 condition precedent of survivorship under Maryland’s testamentary law so that the legatee,
 Kelly, Sr.—and, by extension, his heir, Kelly, Jr.—may not inherit under the Will because
 he predeceased Ms. Duvall. In so doing, we assess Ms. Duvall’s Will in the context of ET
 § 4-401, which provides:
 A legatee, other than his spouse, who fails to survive the
 testator by 30 full days is considered to have predeceased the
 testator, unless the will of the testator expressly creates a
 presumption that the legatee is considered to survive the
 testator or requires that the legatee survives the testator for a
 stated period in order to take under the will and the legatee
 survives for the stated period.
 Specifically, we consider whether Items III and IV express an intent to negate Maryland’s
 anti-lapse statute, as codified in ET § 4-403. This provision states:
 (a) Death of legatee prior to testator. — Unless a contrary
 intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy may not lapse
 or fail because of the death of a legatee after the execution of
 the will but prior to the death of the testator if the legatee is:
 (1) Actually and specifically named as legatee;
 (2) Described or in any manner referred to,
 designated, or identified as legatee in the will; or
 (3) A member of a class in whose favor a legacy
 is made.
 (b) Effect of death of legatee. — A legacy described in
 subsection (a) of this section shall have the same effect and
 operation in law to direct the distribution of the property
 directly from the estate of the person who owned the property
 4
 to those persons who would have taken the property if the
 legatee had died, testate or intestate, owning the property.
 Petitioner urges us to read Item III as a mere restatement of ET § 4-401. In line with
 this reading, he argues that Item III indicates no intent to create a survivorship requirement.
 Thus, he reasons, Ms. Duvall’s expressed intent in the Will was to treat the inheritance of
 Kelly, Sr., who predeceased Ms. Duvall but was alive at the time of the Will’s execution,
 as a lapsed devise, saved by ET § 4-403. He asserts that no language in Items III or IV
 indicates an intent to negate the statutory presumption against lapsing.
 Respondents disagree, echoing the lower courts and contending that Ms. Duvall’s
 expressed intent in executing the Will was to distribute her estate among her living sons.
 They argue that Items III and IV must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Will to
 that end, creating a survivorship requirement. Furthermore, they contend that even in the
 absence of such a requirement, the Will expresses a contrary intent to the anti-lapse statute.
 As we stated in Pfeufer v. Cyphers:
 When construing a will, the paramount concern of the court is
 to ascertain and effectuate the testator’s expressed intent. In
 other words, the search is not for the testator’s presumed
 [intention] but for his expressed intention. Generally, that
 intent is gathered from the four corners of the will, with the
 words of the will given their plain meaning and import. Words
 having legal significance, however, will be construed in that
 sense unless the will clearly indicates otherwise.
 397 Md. at 649, 919 A.2d at 645 (emphasis and alteration in original) (internal quotation
 marks and citations omitted).
 5
 Survivorship Requirement
 We turn first to whether the Will expresses an intent to create a survivorship
 requirement as a condition precedent to inheritance. As a preliminary matter, Item IV
 contains no language to suggest this is the case. That provision specifically names Kelly,
 Sr. as the intended beneficiary of Ms. Duvall’s home and furnishings and identifies her
 four sons as residuary legatees. It recites: “I hereby give, devise and bequeath that lot of
 ground and premises owned by me and located on and more commonly described as 161
 Mabel Lane, Severna Park, Anne Arundel County, Maryland 21146, and all household
 furnishing and contents therein, unto my son, DENNIS J. KELLY, absolutely.” It does
 not—nor does any other language elsewhere in the Will—express a survivorship
 requirement.
 Nor does Item III express a requirement that Kelly, Sr. outlive Ms. Duvall. Indeed,
 we agree with Petitioner that Item III merely reflects ET § 4-401, which was crafted
 principally “to avoid multiple administration and taxation of estates.” Bratley v. Suburban
 Bank, 68 Md. App. 625, 630, 515 A.2d 236, 239 (1986) (citing Shale D. Stiller & Roger
 D. Redden, Statutory Reform in the Administration of Estates of Maryland Decedents,
 Minors, and Incompetents, 29 Md. L. Rev. 85 (1969)). Item III largely mirrors the first
 half of ET § 4-401, reciting that a legatee who fails to survive the testator by 30 days is
 considered to have predeceased her. Where ET § 4-401 reads, “[a] legatee, other than his
 spouse, who fails to survive the testator by 30 full days is considered to have predeceased
 the testator,” Item III recites, “[i]f any of the legatee or beneficiary named or described
 under any provision of my Will does not survive me by a period of thirty (30) days, then
 6
 all provisions of my Will shall take effect as if such legatee or beneficiary had, in fact,
 predeceased me.” The operative language of the two is indistinguishable. As Judge
 Kenney wrote in dissent, Item III “reflects the 30 day period of ET Art. § 4-401 during
 which if a legatee fails to survive the testator, the legatee ‘will be considered to have
 predeceased the testator.’” Kelly v. Duvall, No. 1688, Sept. Term, 2012, Slip Op. at 15
 (Kenney, J., dissenting).
 Because the Will closely tracks the statute’s language, we find the Henderson
 Commission Report’s analysis of ET § 4-401 instructive to our construction of Item III.1
 In its comment to ET § 4-401, the Henderson Commission offered four illustrations:
 i. “To A, if A survives the testator.” Under this type of
 bequest, A will have to survive the testator by at least 30
 full days in order to take the legacy.
 ii. “To A, if A survives the testator by 5 days or more.” Under
 this type of provision, if A survives the testator by five days
 or more but not by thirty days, A will be entitled to the
 legacy.
 iii. “To A, if A survives the testator, but if it cannot be
 determined whether A survives the testator, A shall be
 presumed to have survived the testator.” Under this
 provision, A would take the legacy.
 iv. “To A.” Under this provision, if A survives the testator by
 less than 30 days, A will be deemed to have predeceased
 the testator, and the provisions of Section 4-403 will
 determine whether the legacy has lapsed or not.
 1
 See Second Report of Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the
 Testamentary Law of Maryland, Article 93, Decedents’ Estates, at 53–54 (Dec. 5, 1968)
 (“Henderson Commission Report”). The Henderson Commission Report resulted from the
 work of a committee appointed by Governor Tawes in 1965. Id. at i. “The basic thrust of
 the Second Report is the restatement and recodification of the testamentary law.” Id.
 7
 Ms. Duvall devised her home in Item IV, which reads: “I hereby give, devise and bequeath
 [my home], and all household furnishing and contents therein, unto my son, DENNIS J.
 KELLY, absolutely.” This devise is the functional equivalent of the fourth example
 provided by the Henderson Commission. Item IV expresses no conditions and reflects no
 intent that Kelly, Sr. must outlive his mother to receive under the Will.
 Respondents ask this Court to look beyond the Will’s language, arguing that Ms.
 Duvall “included Item III because she wanted her modest estate to be enjoyed by those of
 her children who survived her. . . . In order to do so, she stated that all bequests were
 conditional on survivorship by a period of time, and if the person did not meet the condition
 the effect would be that the bequest was inoperative and would pass through the residuary
 clause to her own legatees.” We are confined, however, to the language of the Will, as the
 “intention to be sought for is not that which existed in the mind of the testator, but that
 which is expressed by the language of the will.” Curtis v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
 Balt., 178 Md. 360, 365–66, 13 A.2d 546, 548 (1940) (internal quotation marks and citation
 omitted). Ms. Duvall’s Will contains no language indicative of an intent to condition
 receipt of the legacy on survivorship.
 Because Item III is a mere restatement of ET § 4-401—which is not, itself, a
 survivorship requirement—and because Item IV operates merely as a simple devise, we
 conclude that Ms. Duvall’s Will did not impose a condition precedent of survivorship for
 8
 Kelly, Sr. to continue as legatee. Thus, we turn to ET § 4-403 to determine whether the
 legacy had lapsed.2
 Application Of The Anti-Lapse Statute
 As stated supra, ET § 4-403 provides that “[u]nless a contrary intent is expressly
 indicated in the will, a legacy may not lapse or fail because of the death of a legatee after
 the execution of the will but prior to the death of the testator if the legatee is [a]ctually and
 specifically named as legatee.” Kelly, Sr. was undoubtedly named as a legatee in Item IV.
 The question, then, is whether Ms. Duvall expressed an intent to negate Maryland’s anti-
 lapse statute.
 Maryland’s anti-lapse statute “has been liberally construed[ and] expresses a
 presumed intent of the testator. The presumption may be overcome by expression of a
 contrary intent in the will, but is supported by the presumption that the will was made in
 view of the statute.” Mayor of Balt. v. White, 189 Md. 571, 574–75, 56 A.2d 824, 826
 (1948) (citations omitted). Anti-lapse statutes apply “unless [a] testator’s intention to
 exclude its operation is shown with reasonable certainty.” William J. Bowe & Douglas H.
 Parker, Page on the Law of Wills, § 50.11, at 95–96 (2005). “Courts often say that in order
 to overcome the antilapse statute, a will must use ‘clear and plain language’ to this effect[.]”
 William M. McGovern, Sheldon F. Kurtz & David M. English, Wills, Trusts and Estates,
 2
 A lapsed devise—which results from a legatee dying after the execution of the will
 but prior to the testator’s death—is distinct from a void or inoperative legacy—which
 results from a legacy failing prior to execution of the will, such as when the legatee dies
 prior to the will’s execution. See William M. McGovern, Sheldon F. Kurtz & David M.
 English, Wills, Trusts and Estates, at 355–56 (4th ed. 2010).
 9
 at 360 (4th ed. 2010). One such example is “when the gift is to the legatee or devisee, ‘if
 he survives me.’” Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills, at 780 (2d ed.
 1953). Similar language may also suffice:
 If a will says “to Alice if she survives me, otherwise to Arthur,”
 Arthur takes rather than Alice’s issue, if Alice predeceases the
 testator. The same result has been reached if the devise is more
 cryptic, “to Alice and/or Arthur.” If the will simply says “to
 Alice if she survives me,” most courts would interpret this to
 mean the testator did not want the antilapse statute to apply,
 but the Uniform Probate Code disagrees.
 ***
 Recently the Code position was rejected in a code state where
 the testator had expressed a survivorship contingency multiple
 times. The court found that the frequent references to
 survivorship was sufficient to show an intent that the antilapse
 statute not apply.
 McGovern et al., supra at 359 (footnotes omitted). As these examples suggest, a contrary
 intent may be shown by express statement to that effect or by repeated references to
 survivorship.
 Such contrary intent is not present in Ms. Duvall’s will. As discussed supra, Item
 III is a mere restatement of ET § 4-401 and expresses no survivorship requirement or
 contrary intent. Nor does Item IV contain any language that suggests an intent to rebut ET
 § 4-403. That Item IV contains a residuary clause is not by itself sufficient to express
 contrary intent. Nor has this Court found any support for the proposition that the use of
 the word “absolutely” in Kelly, Sr.’s devise expresses an intent contrary to the anti-lapse
 statute. Indeed, the use of “absolutely” in this Will most likely expresses an intent to
 execute a fee simple devise. See, e.g., Barnett v. Barnett, 117 Md. 265, 268, 83 A. 160,
 10
 162 (1912) (“[T]he terms ‘absolute,’ or ‘absolute control,’ or ‘absolute disposal’ have a
 well-defined signification in testamentary law [and are used] to distinguish a qualified or
 conditional from a fee-simple estate[.]”).
 Respondents confuse the issues, conflating and distinguishing § 4-401 and § 4-403
 without consistency. They rely on Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 309 A.2d 476 (1973),
 to support the proposition that Ms. Duvall expressed a contrary intent to the anti-lapse
 statute, ET § 4-403. That case, however, dealt exclusively with ET § 4-401 and whether it
 applied retroactively. Id. at 678–79, 309 A.2d at 477–78.
 Nor does Rowe v. Rowe, 124 Md. App. 89, 720 A.2d 1225 (1998), upon which
 Respondents rely heavily, support the notion that Ms. Duvall’s Will clearly expressed a
 contrary intent. Indeed, in that case, the court found the legacy not to lapse, citing the
 absence of a specific survivorship provision, the specific identification of both legatees in
 the residuary clause, and the testator’s inaction after the death of a legatee. Id. at 100–02,
 720 A.2d at 1230–31. Here, the Will identifies Kelly, Sr. as the intended beneficiary of
 the property referred to in Item III. Without any evidence of a survivorship provision, our
 case law leads us to the conclusion that Ms. Duvall did not express an intent contrary to
 Maryland’s anti-lapse statute and that ET § 4-403 protects the devise from lapse.3
 3
 Regarding the proper disposition of the residuary of the estate, Item IV and its
 residuary clause identified the four sons individually, and not as a class, indicating “that
 she intended them to receive their legacies as individuals.” Rowe v. Rowe, 124 Md. App.
 89, 101, 720 A.2d 1225, 1231 (1998). Thus, Kelly, Jr. qualifies for one-quarter of the
 residuary of the estate.
 11
 CONCLUSION
 In conclusion, we hold that Item III of the Will only reinforces ET § 4-401 and is
 not a condition precedent of survivorship. Therefore, this devise must be considered in
 light of Maryland’s anti-lapse statute. Because there is no express indication of contrary
 intent, ET § 4-403 shields this devise from lapse, permitting Kelly, Jr. to inherit.
 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
 SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
 CASE REMANDED TO THAT
 COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
 REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT
 COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
 COUNTY TO VACATE ITS
 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
 RESPONDENTS AND TO ENTER
 JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH
 THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE
 PAID BY RESPONDENTS.
 12
 Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
 Case No. 02-C-12-170592
 Argued: November 7, 2014
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
 No. 26
 September Term, 2014
 ______________________________________
 DENNIS J. KELLY, JR.
 v.
 GEORGE W. DUVALL, JR., ET AL.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Harrell
 Battaglia
 Greene
 Adkins
 McDonald
 Watts,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Dissenting Opinion by Watts, J., which
 Battaglia, J., joins
 ______________________________________
 Filed: January 27, 2015
 Respectfully, I dissent. I would dismiss the case for certiorari having been
 improvidently granted because review is not “necessary to secure uniformity of decision,”
 nor are there “other special circumstances rendering it desirable and in the public interest
 that the decision be reviewed.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.)
 § 12-305. Alternatively, I affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
 This case boils down to effectuating the intent of Elizabeth Duvall (“Mrs. Duvall”),
 the testatrix, to have her four children inherit as expressed in her Last Will and Testament
 (“the Will”). The Will’s plain language makes clear that Mrs. Duvall wanted her four
 children—George W. Duvall, Jr., Alfred N. Kelly, David M. Kelly, and Dennis J. Kelly,
 Sr.—to inherit and that she did not intend to provide for any legatees beyond the four
 children. Indeed, neither Petitioner, Dennis J. Kelly Jr., a grandson whom Mrs. Duvall
 presumably knew when she executed the Will, nor any legatees beyond her four children
 are mentioned anywhere in the Will. In the Will, Mrs. Duvall expressly left her home and
 all of its contents to Dennis J. Kelly, Sr., and “g[a]ve, devise[d], and bequeath[ed]” “[a]ll
 the rest, residue and remainder of [her] estate and property” to her four children “to share
 and share alike, in equal shares.”
 In Item III, the Will states: “If any of the legatee or beneficiary named or described
 under any provision of my Will does not survive me by a period of thirty (30) days, then
 all provisions of my Will shall take effect as if such legatee or beneficiary had, in fact,
 predeceased me.” In other words, the Will conditioned inheritance on survivorship; i.e., a
 legatee must have survived Mrs. Duvall by more than thirty days to inherit. If not, then all
 other provisions of the Will would take effect. There is no language whatsoever in the Will
 providing for anyone or any legatee besides Mrs. Duvall’s four children if one of the
 children did not survive Mrs. Duvall for at least thirty days; i.e., other than the intent that
 Dennis J. Kelly, Sr. inherit Mrs. Duvall’s home and that her four children “share and share
 alike,” the Will is absolutely silent as to the disposition of Mrs. Duvall’s estate.
 Because the Will specifically conditions inheritance on the named legatees’
 survivorship, the bequest to Dennis J. Kelly, Sr., who predeceased Mrs. Duvall, is
 inoperative. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Smith, 26 Md. App. 204, 209, 337 A.2d 205, 208
 (1975) (“A legacy is ‘inoperative’ when it is ‘To A, if A survives the testator’, but in fact
 A does not survive the testator.”).
 Significantly, however, the Will does not mention the anti-lapse statute, Md. Code
 Ann., Est. & Trusts (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.) (“ET”) § 4-403,1 and does not evince any
 intent to have ET § 4-403 take effect upon any legatee’s death. Nonetheless, the Majority
 1
 For reference, ET § 4-403 provides, in relevant part:
 (a) Death of legatee prior to testator. — Unless a contrary intent is expressly
 indicated in the will, a legacy may not lapse or fail because of the death of a
 legatee after the execution of the will but prior to the death of the testator if
 the legatee is:
 (1) Actually and specifically named as legatee;
 (2) Described or in any manner referred to, designated, or identified
 as legatee in the will; or
 (3) A member of a class in whose favor a legacy is made.
 (b) Effect of death of legatee. — A legacy described in subsection (a) of this
 section shall have the same effect and operation in law to direct the
 distribution of the property directly from the estate of the person who owned
 the property to those persons who would have taken the property if the
 legatee had died, testate or intestate, owning the property.
 -2-
 determines that Item III “largely mirrors” the first half of ET § 4-4012 and that, because
 Item III “closely tracks” ET § 4-401’s language, Illustration iv of the Henderson
 Commission’s Report—which provides that ET § 4-403 “determine[s] whether the legacy
 has lapsed or not”—is instructive. Maj. Slip Op. at 6-7. I disagree. Because the Will’s
 language does not fully embody ET § 4-401 or even reference ET § 4-403 (the anti-lapse
 statute) and, most importantly, because a contrary intent is expressed, this case is, in my
 view, a poor vehicle for interpreting the Henderson Commission’s Report and its interplay
 with ET § 4-403. Here, in actuality, the Will’s language contradicts ET § 4-403 because it
 expressly conditions survivorship as a prerequisite to inheritance, i.e., named legatees who
 do not survive Mrs. Duvall do not inherit. As a result, the Will makes clear that Mrs.
 Duvall intended for her surviving children, and no one else, to inherit.
 Certainly, the opportunity for the Court to comment on the Henderson
 Commission’s Report will validly present itself in another case. Under these
 circumstances, however, I would not override Mrs. Duvall’s clear intent as expressed in
 the Will and read ET § 4-403 into the Will. Rather, I would dismiss or affirm the judgment
 2
 For reference, ET § 4-401 provides:
 A legatee, other than his spouse, who fails to survive the testator by 30 full
 days is considered to have predeceased the testator, unless the will of the
 testator expressly creates a presumption that the legatee is considered to
 survive the testator or requires that the legatee survives the testator for a
 stated period in order to take under the will and the legatee survives for the
 stated period.
 -3-
 of the Court of Special Appeals, and reach the just result for Mrs. Duvall and her children.
 For all of the reasons above, I, respectfully, dissent.
 Judge Battaglia has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.
 -4-


type: wikipedia

text:
 Biografia
 Conosciuta come l'Angelo bianco o l'eroina di Niscemi, Angela Basarocco nacque a Racalmuto nel 1914 e il 20 marzo 1935 entrò nell'ordine delle Suore della Sacra Famiglia di Spoleto col nome di suor Cecilia.
 Nello stesso anno, iniziò a lavorare presso l'ospedale civile di Niscemi, sotto la guida di padre Pietro Barilli, dedicandosi alla cura degli ammalati.
 La sua figura è passata alla storia per un gesto eroico compiuto tra l'11 e il 12 luglio 1943, durante lo sbarco in Sicilia degli alleati. In quei momenti concitati, la giovane suora era l'unica presenza rimasta in ospedale per assistere i soldati italiani, cui si aggiunsero anche 12 soldati tedeschi. All'arrivo delle truppe statunitensi, i militari tedeschi furono individuati e condannati subito a morte, con l'accusa di spionaggio, e nonostante l'appello di suor Cecilia alla solidarietà, vennero preparati per la fucilazione. Fu allora che la suora si pose tra il plotone di esecuzione e i condannati urlando: "'Sparate, sparate anche su di me, Iddio vi perdoni'". L'esecuzione fu fermata e i prigionieri tedeschi furono spediti a Caltagirone.
 Suor Cecilia continuò a lavorare presso lo stesso ospedale per quasi cinquant'anni, fino alla morte avvenuta il 20 ottobre 1986.
 Riconoscimenti
 Nel 1974, a trent'anni dallo sbarco americano in Sicilia, il comune di Gela ha consegnato a suor Cecilia una medaglia d'oro al valore civile per il suo gesto.
 Nel 1994 le fu intitolato l'ospedale di Niscemi; nel 2013 il suo nome è stato dato a una via di Racalmuto.
 Note
 Bibliografia
 Maria Trigila, Angela Basarocco, Suor Cecilia, in Siciliane : Dizionario biografico, Siracusa, E. Romeo, 2006, pp. 416-418. ISBN 88-7428-057-2
 Santi Correnti, Donne di Sicilia : la storia dell'Isola del sole scritta al femminile , Catania, Coppola, 2001, p. 111. ISBN 88-87432-57-0
 Voci correlate
 Sbarco in Sicilia
 Seconda guerra mondiale
 Collegamenti esterni


text:
Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja (LCK, , ) ir 1992. g. dibināta biedrība Latvijā, kas darbojas cilvēktiesību aizsardzības jomā, it sevišķi — mazākumtautību, cilvēku tiesiskā statusa, dzīvokļu tiesību jautājumos. Apvieno pārsvarā juristus un publicistus. Kā norāda pētījuma "Etnopolitika Latvijā" autori, bijušais Baltijas jūras valstu padomes demokrātisko institūciju un cilvēktiesību komisārs O. Espersens "vairākkārt apmeklējis LCK un savos spriedumos par Latviju izmanto galvenokārt šīs organizācijas materiālus".
 Vēsture
 1990. g. radās domubiedru grupa ar Vladimiru Bogdanovu un Tatjanu Ždanoku priekšgalā, un 1992. g. decembrī sāk sniegt bezmaksas tiesisko palīdzību iedzīvotājiem Rīgā. Šī darbība turpinās līdz mūsdienām.
 Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja no 1994. g. uztur Latvijas nepilsoņu un Latvijas pilsoņu tiesību atšķirību sarakstu.
 1995. g. LCK iestājas Cilvēktiesību līgu starptautiskajā federācijā (FIDH) un reģistrējas Latvijā. Pēc FIDH pieprasījuma komiteja sagatavo un iesniedz ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejā alternatīvo ziņojumu par Starptautiskā pakta par pilsoniskajām un politiskajām tiesībām ievērošanu Latvijā. Uzsākta apmeklētāju datubāzes, kurā ir dati par vairāk nekā 50 000 apmeklējumu, izveide.
 1996. g. izplatīts ziņojums "Cilvēktiesības un nepilsoņi Latvijā", kā arī 32 izraidīšanas, šķirot ģimenes, mēģinājumu analīze. Komitejas pārstāvji uzstājas ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejas mazākumtautību darba grupas sesijā.
 1997. g. LCK sāk atbalstīt starptautisko ogranizāciju pret rasismu un migrantu atbalstam UNITED. ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejai nosūtīts ziņojums par mazākumtautību stāvokli Latvijā. Ar Eiropas Padomes palīdzību radīta 48 sēriju sabiedrības integrācijai veltītā pārraide "Mēs - Mы" televīzijā.
 1998. g. Komiteja iesaistās Sabiedrisko organizāciju Koordinācijas padomes darbībā. Tika publicēts komentārs par EDSO Augstā komisāra mazākumtautību lietās rekomendāciju ievērošanu Latvijā. LCK pārstāvji uzstājas ANO Cilvēktiesibu komitejas mazākumtautību darba grupas sesijā.
 1999. g. ar Eiropas Padomes, USAID un "Freedom House" atbalstu sagatavota radiopārraižu sērija "Saprast" latviešu valodas apmācībai un televīzijas seriāls "Tas notika Rīgā".
 2000. g. komitejas līdzpriekšsēdētāji piedalās 3. Pasaules konferencē pret rasismu. Latvijas žurnālistiem tiek rīkots seminārs "Starptautiskie un reģionālie standarti minoritāšu jomā".
 2001. g. sadarbībā ar Zviedrijas Institūtu un Sorosa fondu Latvijā publicēti bukleti par naturalizācijas nosacījumiem un sociālo palīdzību Rīgā. Ar Eiropas Padomes palīdzību veidota TV pārraide "2+2" (latviešu un krievu preses žurnālistu diskusijas).
 2002. g. divās valodās publicēts rakstu cikls par Vispārējo konvenciju par nacionālo minoritāšu aizsardzību.
 2003. g. LCK sniedza ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejai komentārus par valdības ziņojumu par Starptautiskā pakta par pilsoniskajām un politiskajām tiesībām izpildi Latvijā.
 2005. g. sabiedrisko organizāciju pārveidoja par biedrību. EDSO apspriedē Varšavā par saistībām cilvēkdimensijā prezentēts ziņojums par situāciju Latvijā.
 2007. g. uzsāktas radiopārraižu «Имеем право» (Mums ir tiesības) un «Тема недели» (Nedēļas tēma) sērijas, kopā ar "Baltic Insight" veidots ziņojums par Vispārējās mazākumtautību aizsardzības konvencijas ievērošanu Latvijā. LCK iestājas ENAR un AEDH.
 2008. g. EDSO apspriedē Varšavā par saistībām cilvēkdimensijā prezentēts paziņojums par pilsonības problēmu Latvijā.
 Ievērojamākās publikācijas
 No 1999. līdz 2004. g. LCK izdeva elektronisko biļetenu angļu valodā "Minority Issues in Latvia" (pirms tam un vēlāk aktuālo notikumu apskates tika regulāri publicētas Latvijas presē).
 Izdotās grāmatas un brošūras:
 1999 — Human Rights and Minorities in Latvia
 2000 — Starptautiskie un reģionālie standarti minoritāšu tiesību jomā (arī krieviski)
 2002 — Нам 10 лет
 2002 — Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Latvia
 2003 — Mediju likumdošana, mazākumtautību jautājumi un Latvijas gadījuma izpēte
 2004 — Тенденции изменения правового статуса различных групп российских соотечественников, постоянно проживающих в Латвийской Республике
 2006 — Список различий в правах граждан и неграждан Латвии
 2007 — Неграждане Латвии
 2008 — Citizens of a Non-Existent State
 2009 — Проблемы прав национальных меньшинств в Латвии и Эстонии (sadarbībā ar Cilvēktiesību informācijas centru, Tallina; arī angliski)
 2010 — Как выживают русских
 2011 — Citizens of a Non-Existent State (2. izdevums)
 2012 — Citoyens d'un état non-existant
 2012 — 20 лет в борьбе за справедливость
 2012 — Правовое положение русскоязычного меньшинства в Латвии
 2013 — Latvijas pilsoņu un nepilsoņu tiesību atšķirību saraksts (arī krieviski)
 2015 — Mazākumtautību tiesiskais un faktiskais stāvoklis Latvijā pēc viņu aizstāvju datiem.
 2020 — Language policy of Latvia.
 LCK dalība lietu izskatīšanā starptautiskajās cilvēktiesību institūcijās
 Agafonova pret LR (par uzturēšanās atļauju) — ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejā — LR izsniedza uzturēšanās atļauju
 Ignatāne pret LR (par pasīvām vēlēšanu tiesībām) — ANO Cilvēktiesību komitejā (2001.g.) — viedoklis par labu Ignatānei
 Podkolzina pret LR (par pasīvām vēlēšanu tiesībām; pārstāvībā piedalījās arī britu advokāts V. Bourings) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā (2002.g.) — spriedums par labu Podkolzinai
 Rudova pret LR (par kasācijas tiesvedību) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā (2002.g.) — lēmums par labu LR
 Kuhareca pret LR (par uzvārda rakstību dokumentos) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā (2004.g.) — lēmums par labu LR
 Ždanoka pret LR (par pasīvām vēlēšanu tiesībām; pārstāvībā piedalījās britu advokāts V. Bourings) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā — 2004. g. spriedums par labu Ždanokai ir pārsūdzēts tiesas Lielajā palātā, kura 2006. g. taisīja gala spriedumu par labu LR.
 Ševanova pret LR (par uzturēšanās atļauju) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā — 2006. g. spriedums par labu Ševanovai ir pārsūdzēts tiesas Lielajā palātā, 2007. g. lieta izbeigta, atmaksājot Ševanovai tiesāšanās izdevumus.
 Mitina pret LR (par uzturēšanās atļauju) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā — 2002. g. lēmums daļā un 2006. g. gala lēmums par labu LR.
 Miholapa pret LR (par procesu ex parte; pārstāvībā piedalījās britu advokāts V. Bourings) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā (2007. g.) — spriedums par labu Miholapai.
 Andrejeva pret LR (par pensijas stāža aprēķināšanu un civillietas izskatīšanas kārtību) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā (2009. g.) — Lielās palātas spriedums par labu Andrejevai.
 Raihmans pret LR (par personvārda rakstību dokumentos) — ANO Cilvēktiesību komiteja (2010. g.) — viedoklis par labu Raihmanam.
 Petrova pret LR (par piekrišanu orgānu transplantācijai) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā — 2014. g. Palātas spriedums par labu Petrovai.
 Petropavlovskis pret LR (par vienlīdzīgu attieksmi naturalizācijas procesā) — Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesā — 2015. g. Palātas spriedums par labu LR.
 Atsauces
 Ārējās saites
 LCK mājaslapa
 Biļetena "Minority Issues in Latvia" arhīvs
 Uzziņa par LCK darbu 1992—1996
 Cilvēktiesību organizācijas Latvijā
 Sabiedriskās organizācijas


text:
Uskonnon alkuperästä on erilaisia käsityksiä. Uskonnollinen käyttäytyminen näyttäisi olevan ihmiselle lajityypillistä, sillä uskonnollisluonteisia uskomuksia (henkiin, jumaluuksiin, jne), rituaaleja ja uskontoon liittyviä tai siitä kumpuavia mitä erilaisimpia moraalikäsityksiä esiintyy eri ihmisryhmissä universaalisti alkaen metsästäjä-keräijöiden yhteisöistä ja päättyen suuriin sivilisaatioihin suurine maailmanuskontoineen. Uskonnollisen käyttäytyminen näyttäisi nykyisen tutkimuksen valossa kehittyneen neoliittisella aikakaudella. Uskonnon alkuperää, sen enempää kuin kysymystä sen mahdollisesta tai todennäköisestä evolutiivisesta tai kulttuurievolutiivisesta funktiosta ei kuitenkaan olla ratkaistu tavalla, josta vallitsisi tutkijoiden yksimielisyys. Erilaisia näkemyksiä on useita, ja teorioita ovat kehittäneet filosofit, yhteiskuntatieteilijät, psykologit, luonnontieteilijät (lähinnä biologit), historioitsijat ja kulttuurintutkijat.
 Klassikkoja
 Antiikin ajattelijat
 Roomalainen filosofi ja runoilija Lucretius kirjoitti noin vuonna 50 eaa. epikurolaisesta todellisuuskäsityksestä kertovan runoelman Maailmankaikkeudesta. Lucretius tunsi myötätuntoa niitä ihmisiä kohtaan, jotka eivät ymmärtäneet heidät synnyttäneen kaikkeuden toimintatapoja. Hän katsoi näiden tietämättömien ja kovaonnisten ihmisten tarvitsevan uskontoa selittämään alkuperänsä ja selittämään itselleen onnen ja onnettomuuden. Jumalauskon synnystä Lucretius kirjoittaa muun muassa seuraavaa:
 Lucretius mainitsee ihmisten nähneen unissaan jumalia ja sillä perusteella uskoneen jumaliin. Toiseksi hän mainitsee, että kun ihmiset eivät tunteneet ilmiöiden syitä, he selittivät tapahtumia jumalilla. Kolmanneksi hän mainitsee eräiden luonnon ilmiöiden synnyttämän pelon.
 Ksenofanes arvosteli uskoa ihmisen luomiin jumaliin:
 Sigmund Freud
 Psykoanalyysin perustaja Sigmund Freud piti uskonnollisia käsityksiä ”harhoina, ihmiskunnan vanhimpien, voimakkaimpien ja sitkeimpien toiveiden kuviteltuina toteutumina”. Uskonto on Freudin mukaan ihmismielen puolustuskeino pelottavia luonnonilmiöitä – maanjäristyksiä, tulvia, myrskyjä, sairautta ja kuolemaa – vastaan. ”Näissä voimissa luonto nousee meitä vastaan majesteettisena, julmana ja armottomana.” Ihmisen mielikuvitus muuntaa luonnonvoimat henkilöllisiksi, yliluonnollisiksi valloiksi.
 Juutalais-kristillisessä uskonnossa ihmiset heijastavat kaikkeuteen muiston isästä suurena suojelevana voimana. Lapsuudesta tutut kasvot ovat suurentuneet taivaassa äärettömiksi. Uskonto on ”ihmiskunnan universaali pakkoneuroosi”, josta päästää eroon, kun ihmiset vihdoin luonnontieteellisen tiedon avulla oppivat hahmottamaan todellisuuden ilman harhaluuloja.
 Freud antoi myös erityisen selityksen uskonnon synnylle käyttäen oidipuskompleksin käsitettä, mutta tätä selitystä ei yleensä hyväksytä. Monet Freudin arvostelijat ovat kuitenkin hyväksyneet hänen yleisnäkemyksensä, jonka mukaan usko on eräänlainen ”mielen kainalosauva” ja että se on kuvittelua.
 Carl Gustav Jung
 Sveitsiläinen psykiatri C. G. Jung esitti, että on olemassa arkkityyppejä, yleismaailmallisia piilotajunnan teemoja, jotka ilmenevät ihmisen mielessä. Arkkityypit sijaitsevat kollektiivisessa piilotajunnassa, ja ne tulevat esiin unissa ja myyteissä. Myyttiä Jung kuvasi jumalallisen elämän itsenäiseksi ilmenemiseksi ihmisessä.
 Émile Durkheim
 Ranskalainen sosiologi Émile Durkheim julkaisi vuonna 1912 teoksen Uskontoelämän alkeismuodot, jossa hän väitti, että jumala on yhteisöllisen ryhmän vertauskuva. Uskonnossa yhteisö Durkheimin mukaan palvoo itseään. Ihmisten palvomat jumalat ovat kuviteltuja olentoja, jotka yhteiskunta on tiedostamattomasti luonut välineiksi, joilla valvotaan yksilön ajattelua ja toimintaa. Durkheim näki uskonnon antavan yksilölle voimaa.
 Monilla ihmisillä on uskonnollinen tunne, jonka mukaan he ovat alaisina yliluonnollisille olennoille, jotka antavat heidän toiminnalleen käskyjä. Durkheimilaisen käsityksen mukaan he tuntevat tällöin yliluonnollisen mahdin sijaan heitä voimakkaamman luonnollisen yhteiskunnan voiman. Yksilön sisäänsä sulkeva yhteiskunta synnyttää jäsentensä mieliin ajatuksen jumalasta, joka on tosiasiassa heijastus yhteiskunnasta. Yhteiskunta kohdistaa Durkheimin mukaan jäseniinsä ehdottoman tottelevaisuuden vaatimuksen, ja tämä heijastuu ihmisten käsityksenä pyhistä asioista sekä jumalasta, joka koetaan pyhäksi asettamisen vaatimuksen lähteeksi. Alkukantaisissa yhteiskunnissa tämä tunne yhteisön vaatimuksesta ehdottomaan kuuliaisuuteen on Durkheimin mukaan hyvin voimakas. Heimon käsityksillä ja tavoilla on ehdoton valta yli yksilöiden. Myös kehittyneissä yhteiskunnissa tämä alkukantainen ykseyden tuntu palaa osittain henkiin esimerkiksi sodan aikana, jolloin tunne kansallisesta yhteenkuuluvuudesta saa yksilöihin lähes rajattoman vaikutusvallan.
 Jumala koetaan myös yksilön viimeiseksi avunantajaksi. Ihminen on Durkheimin käsityksen mukaan olemukseltaan yhteisöllinen, riippuvainen laumastaan ja onneton joutuessaan siitä eroon. Yhteisö on ihmisen henkisen elinvoiman tärkein lähde. Durkheimin mukaan yksilö vahvistuu suorittaessaan ryhmän toisten jäsenten kanssa samaa ryhmää yhdistävän uskonnon palvontamenoja. Esimerkiksi latinan sanan religio kantana on ligare, joka tarkoittaa sitomista tai yhteenliittämistä.
 Jumala on siis Durkheimin mielestä vertauskuva yhteiskunnalliselle todellisuudelle, tekijälle joka on ollut olemassa kauan ennen yksilöä ja joka säilyy kauan hänen jälkeensä. Yhteiskunnan luonnollinen paine muuttuu käsityksesi jumalan yliluonnollisesta läsnäolosta, koska ihmisen mielellä on yleinen taipumus luoda mielteitä ja vertauskuvia. Jumala on tämän käsityksen mukaan homo sapiens -eläimen luomus, jonka tarkoituksena on säilyttää tämän olennon yhteiskunnallinen olemassaolo.
 Karl Marx
 Saksalainen Ludwig Feuerbach katsoi, että ihminen palvoo jumalassa omaa itseään. Karl Marx kehitti Feuerbachin ajatuksia. Hegelin oikeusfilosofian kritiikin esipuheessaan (1843-1844) 25-vuotias Marx yhdisti uskonnon kaipuun ihmisten kokemaan kurjuuteen, josta valtaosa oletettavasti oli yhteiskunnallista sortoa. Marx arvioi uskontoa seuraavasti teoksessaan "Hegelin oikeusfilosofian kritiikki":
 Marxin näkemys uskonnon yhteydestä puutteeseen ja kurjuuteen tuntuu saavan tukea siitä nykypäivien ilmiöstä, että uskonnollisuus on vähentymässä moderneissa hyvinvointiyhteiskunnissa.
 Marxin virkettä "Se on kansan oopiumia" lainataan tavallisesti virheellisessä muodossa: "Uskonto on oopiumia kansalle".
 Nykyajan käsityksiä
 Metodologinen individualismi ja kognitiivinen uskontotiede
 Kognitiivinen uskontotiede tarkastelee uskontoa ihmisen mielen toimintana. Uskonto mielletään nimenomaan uskomusten joukoksi (vrt. Durkheimin tapa ymmärtää uskonto ensisijaisesti sosiaaliseksi ilmiöksi), ja kognitiivinen uskontotiede pyrkii selittämään uskonnollisten uskomusten vetovoiman ihmismieliin vetoamalla evoluution luomiin synnynnäisiin kognitiivisiin rakenteisiin. Uskonto käsitetään usein alkuperältään ikään kuin virukseksi tai loiseksi, joka vain pesiytyy siitä riippumatta kehittyneisiin ihmisaivoihin. Tunnetuimmat alan teoreetikot, esimerkiksi Pascal Boyer, ovat jyrkän metologisen individualismin kannattaja. On kuitenkin painotettava, etteivät kaikki kognitiiviset uskontotieteilijät jaa käsitystä, jonka mukaan uskonto olisi täysin ei-adaptiivinen, ja kognitiivista lähestymistapaa voidaan periaatteessa soveltaa myös sellaisten näkemysten yhteydessä, joiden mukaan uskonto on alkuperältään adaptiivinen.
 Pascal Boyer
 Uskontotieteilijä Pascal Boyerin mukaan ”Uskonto on kognitiivinen loinen, joka pesii aivoissa.” Boyerin mukaan ihmisen aivot pyrkivät tunnistamaan toimijuutta ja saattavat löytää tavoitteellisen toimijan myös sieltä, missä sellaista ei ole: esimerkiksi kuvitellaan, että yliluonnollinen olento ohjailee luonnon ilmiöitä. Toimijuuden tunnistaminen on evoluution aikaansaannos ja uskonnot tuon kyvyn sivutuotteita.
 Boyerin mukaan uskonnolliset käsitteet voidaan yksinkertaistaen selittää siten, että niiden arkiajattelun vastaiset piirteet loukkaavat ihmismielen muodostamien käsitysten ominaisuuksia. Arkiajattelua vastaamaton piirre voi olla esimerkiksi kuollut esi-isä, joka vaeltaa näkymättömänä ihmisten keskuudessa. Arkiajattelun vastaisuutta ei kuitenkaan saa olla liikaa, vaan juuri sopiva määrä, koska liian arkiajattelun vastaiset käsitykset ovat vaikeita käsitellä mielessä ja ne unohtuvat nopeasti. Sen sijaan sopivassa määrin arkiajattelun vastaiset käsitykset loisivat aivoissa. Boyerin mukaan uskonnossa on jotain, mikä saa sen välittymään sukupolvelta toiselle. Kyse on elinkelpoisten ajatusten siirrosta, jota on luonnehdittu meemin eli mielen viruksen käsitteen avulla. Boyer itse ei kuitenkaan ole varsinainen meemi-teoreetikko, vaan soveltaa Dan Sperberin kehittämää "representaatioiden epidemologiaksi" kutsumaa lähestymistapaa kulttuurieveoluutioon.
 Meemiteoria
 Meemiteoria on teoria kulttuurievoluutiosta, jonka avulla sen kannattajat yrittävät selittää myös uskonnon alkuperän. Tunnetuimpia meemiteoreetikoita ovat meemin käsitteen kehittäjä biologi Richard Dawkins, psykologi Susan Blackmore ja filosofi Daniel Dennett.
 Richard Dawkins
 Biologi ja tietokirjailija Richard Dawkins on pohtinut syitä siihen suunnattomaan voimavarojen tuhlaukseen, jota ihmisen uskonnot evoluution näkökulmasta näyttävät hänen mukaansa edustavan. Dawkins esittää käsityksensä vain eräänä mahdollisena oletuksena. Dawkins kuvailee asiaa seuraavasti. Eläimiin on luonnonvalinnan seurauksena jäänyt pääasiassa niitä ominaisuuksia, joista niille on hyötyä olemassaolon taistelussa selviämisessä. Muutenkin eläimet yleensä säästävät voimavaroja. Ihmiset ovat rakentaneet uskontojen vaikutuksesta valtavan määrän uskonnollisia rakennuksia, joista ei luonnonkehityksen näkökulmasta ole mitään hyötyä. Miljoonat ihmiset ovat kuolleet uskonsodissa ja uskonnollisissa vainoissa. Uskontojen vaikutuksesta ihmiset ovat kieltäytyneet seksuaalisuhteista ja alistuneet esimerkiksi luostareiden elämään.
 Dawkins pohtii erilaisia uskonnoille ehdotettuja kehitysopillisia selityksiä ja toteaa ne toteennäyttämättömiksi. Dawkinsin mielestä tähän asti asetetut kysymykset ovat vääriä. Jotta ymmärrettäisiin oikeiden kysymysten luonne, Dawkins ottaa esimerkiksi sen ilmiön, että hyönteiset pyörivät tulen ympärillä ja lentävät kohti omaa kuolemaansa. Selitys tähän ilmiöön on, että menneinä aikoina ihmisten tekemiä tulia ei ole ollut hyönteisiä harhauttamassa. Hyönteiset ovat lentäneet yöllä johonkin suuntaan käyttäen suunnistusvälineinä kaukana olevia valoja kuten kuuta ja tähtiä. Saman suunnistusmenetelmän soveltaminen lähellä olevaan kohteeseen aiheuttaa sen, että hyönteinen lentää kierteen muotoista rataa, ja jos kohde on tuli, hyönteinen tuhoutuu. Hyönteisen tuhoon johtava käyttäytyminen on uusissa olosuhteissa ilmenevä sivuvaikutus sellaisesta käyttäytymisestä, joka on tavallisissa olosuhteissa järkevää.
 Toisin kuin melkein kaikki muut eläimet, ihmiset välittävät kasaantuvaa kokemustietoa sukupolvelta toiselle. On ainakin lapsille eduksi, jos he tottelevat suuremmin kyselemättä kieltoa uida vedessä, jossa on krokotiileja. Luonnonvalinnan tuloksena ihmislapsen aivot ovat kehittyneet sellaisiksi, että ne oppivat kielen, ja ihmislapset luottavat aikuisten antamaan informaatioon. Eri alueilla eri ihmiset siirtävät jälkeläisilleen erilaisia kieliä ja erilaisia uskontoja. Dawkinsin mielestä uskonnot ovat hyönteisen tuleenlentämisen kaltaisia haitallisia sivuvaikutuksia, joilla ei ole evoluution näkökulmasta mitään merkitystä.
 Anthony C. Lunn ei ole Dawkinsin kanssa täysin samaa mieltä siitä, minkä ilmiön sivuvaikutuksia uskonnot ovat. Hän esittää, että ihmisellä on luonnonvalinnan ansiosta kehittynyt kyky etsiä ilmiöiden syitä ja uskontojen näennäisselitykset ovat tämän ominaisuuden sivuvaikutuksia.
 Uskonto adaptiivisena ilmiönä ja ryhmävalintateoriat
 Yksilökeskeinen lähestymistapa, mitä useimmat kognitiiviset uskontotieteilijät edustavat, ei ole kaikkien jakama lähtökohta, eikä sen edustamalla individualismilla ole perinteisesti ollut kovin voimakasta seuraajakuntaa uskonnon sosiologian piirissä, missä durkheimilainen käsitys uskonnosta adaptiivisena ilmiönä on ollut melko yleisesti hyväksytty jos kohta ei suinkaan kaikkien jakama käsitys. Klassinen durkheimlainen käsitys on 2000-luvulla noussut uudelleen pinnalle evoluutiobiologisen lähestymistavan piirissä, esimerkkinä vaikkapa Jonathan Haidt ja monet muut. Myös monet kognitiiviset uskontotieteilijät ovat kääntyneet puolustamaan ajatusta uskonnosta adaptiivisena ilmiönä. Meemiteoreetikoista Susan Blackmore on hylännyt aiemmin kannattamansa metologisen individualismin ja siihen liittyvän käsityksen uskonnosta pelkkänä aivo-viruksena. Kuten Blackmoren tapauksessa, myös yleisesti syynä näiden näkemysten kasvaneelle suosiolle on jatkuvasti lisääntynyt empiirinen ja kokeellinen tutkimus, joka näyttäisi sitä tukevan.
 David Sloan Wilson ja Richard Sosis
 2000-luvulla useat tutkijat ovat kiinnittäneet huomionsa uskonnollisten yhteisöiden poikkeukselliseen tiiviyteen ja pitkäikäisyyteen. Koska kyky yhteistoimintaan on evoluutiossa edullista, on tämä käynnistänyt useita tutkimusohjelmia uskonnon adaptiivisesta merkityksestä ihmisen evoluutiohistoriassa.
 Evoluutiobiologi David Sloan Wilson on esittänyt uskonnollisten yhteisöiden toimivan ryhmävalinnan yksiköinä, jotka menestyvät paremmin kuin muut ryhmät koska niiden oppijärjestelmät tyypillisesti rohkaisevat itsensä kieltämiseen ja tätä kautta yhteistoimintaan. Wilson katsoo, että satunnaisotos maailman uskonnoista osoittaa, että useimmat näistä motivoivat seuraajissaan adaptiivisia käytösmalleja.
 Antropologi Richard Sosis on testannut evoluutiopsykologian niin sanottua kalliiden signaalien hypoteesia jonka mukaan yksilön kelpoisuutta heikentävät rituaalivaatimukset ja uhraukset toimivat signaaleina sitoutumisesta ryhmän oppiin, ja auttavat erottelemaan vapaamatkustajat jotka hyödyntävät ryhmän voimavaroja mutta eivät itse osallistu niiden tuottamiseen. Tämän vuoksi Sosis on esittänyt taipumuksen uskonnolliseen käyttäytymiseen olevan evoluutiossa kehittynyt adaptiivinen kompleksi. Sosisin ja hänen kollegoidensa tutkimuksessa kävi ilmi, että 1700- ja 1800-luvulla Yhdysvalloissa toimineiden uskonnollisten utooppisten yhteisöiden elinikä korreloi niiden asettamien käytösvaatimusten kanssa, mutta ei-uskonnollisten yhteisöiden kohdalla tätä yhteyttä ei ollut. Uskonnolliset yhteisöt olivat myös huomattavasti pitkäikäisempiä kuin ei-uskonnolliset. Samoin Israelin kibbutzeista uskonnollisella pohjalla toimivat menestyvät taloudellisesti, erityisesti verrattuna ei-uskonnollisiin vastinpareihinsa, minkä Sosis selittää kokeellisissa tutkimuksissa ilmi käyneellä korkealla keskinäisellä luottamuksella erityisesti synagogassa päivittäin vierailevien miesten välillä. On tehty myös lukuisia muita tutkimuksia, joiden on katsottu tukeneen kalliiden signaalien hypoteesia osoittamalla uskonnon ja keskinäisen luottamuksen tai vahvemman yhteisöllisen järjestäytymisen välisen yhteyden.
 René Girard ja mimeettinen teoria
 Niin sanottu mimeettinen teoria yleisnimi teoreettiselle kokonaisuudelle, jota sen kehittäjä René Girard sovelsi selittäessään uskonnon alkuperää aluneperin vuonna 1971 ranskaksi julkaistussa teoksessaan Väkivalta ja pyhä. Meemiteoreetikoiden tavoin mutta heistä riippumatta Girard katsoi mukaan ihminen on olemuksellisesti toisia ihmisiä jäljittelevä eläin. Mutta toisin kuin meemiteoreetikot, Girard kiinnitti huomiota siihen, miten ihmiset jäljitellessään toisiaan jäljittelevät myös toinen toistensa haluja. Tämä johtaa halujen jatkuvaan suuntautumiseen samoihin kohteisiin, mikä taas johtaa konflikteihin. Girardin mukaan mimesis voi johtaa herkästi kriiseihin, joissa konflikti eskaloituu ryhmän jäsenten päätyessä mimeettisen halun kautta kaikki haluamaan objekteja, joita he eivät voi jakaa. Kriisi ratkeaisi siihen, että kaikki ryhmän jäsenet kääntyvät yhtä jäsentä vastaan ja murhaavat tämän "syntipukkina". Näin syntipukin murhaamisen kautta rauha palaisi yhteisöön. Lukuisissa toisistaan riippumattomissa kulttuureissa ja mytologioissa tavattava ihmisuhrin käytäntö on Girardin mukaan "alkumurhan" ritualisoitunutta toistoa.
 Girardin mukaan uskonto on adaptiivinen hyvin samankaltaisella tavalla kuin se oli Durkheimin mielestä, mutta Girardille väkivallan eskaloitumisen ehkäisy ryhmän sisällä näyttäisi olevan uskonnon tärkein tehtävä.
 Kuuluisia Girardin teorian kannattajia tai siihen ainakin suopeasti suhtautuvia ovat esimerkiksi Michel Serres, Roger Scruton ja Gianni Vattimo. Näistä ensiksi mainittu on jopa verrannut Girardia Charles Darwiniin.
 Katso myös
 Uskontotiede
 Lähteet
 Kirjallisuutta
 Aiheesta muualla
 Ilkka Pyysiäinen & Marc Hauser: The origins of religion: Evolved adaptation or by-product? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8.2.2010.
 Evoluutiopsykologia
 Ihmisen evoluutio
 Uskontoantropologia
 Uskontohistoria


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 12.1.2018
 COM(2018) 19 final
 2018/0004(NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional
 EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS
 1.Objeto da proposta
 A presente proposta diz respeito à decisão que estabelece a posição a adotar, em nome da União, na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (OACI) relativamente à adoção prevista de atos com efeitos jurídicos no domínio da aviação civil.
 2.Contexto da proposta
 2.1.Convenção de Chicago
 A Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (a seguir «OACI») foi criada pela Convenção sobre a Aviação Civil Internacional («Convenção de Chicago»), assinada em Chicago em 1944, que entrou em vigor em 4 de abril de 1947. Todos os EstadosMembros da União Europeia são partes contratantes da referida convenção e, por conseguinte, membros da OACI. A União não é parte contratante da Convenção de Chicago, embora tenha um estatuto de observador no âmbito da OACI.
 2.2.Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional
 A OACI adota normas internacionais no domínio da aviação civil, em especial em matéria de segurança da aviação, gestão do tráfego aéreo e navegação aérea, ambiente, proteção da aviação, desenvolvimento económico no setor dos transportes aéreos, direitos dos passageiros e princípio da facilitação. Estes temas são abrangidos pelas disposições do Tratado de Lisboa, sendo em grande medida da competência da União Europeia. Tanto quanto possível, a UE pretende assegurar a coerência com as normas internacionais no domínio da aviação civil.
 2.3.Atos com efeitos jurídicos na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional
 As orientações gerais da OACI em cada um dos domínios acima referidos são adotadas na Assembleia da OACI, por um período correspondente ao triénio até à seguinte Assembleia da OACI.
 Propõe-se que a posição da UE na OACI seja definida segundo uma abordagem em dois níveis. Uma decisão do Conselho estabelece os princípios e as orientações da posição da União numa base plurianual para cada triénio da OACI. Essa posição é posteriormente adaptada para efeitos de cada reunião do Conselho da OACI, mediante documentos oficiosos da Comissão, a discutir no organismo pertinente do Conselho da UE. Atualmente, esta abordagem é aplicada relativamente a outras organizações internacionais, nomeadamente no âmbito do Comité de Inspeção de Navios pelo Estado do Porto criado pelo Memorando de Acordo de Paris para a Inspeção de Navios pelo Estado do Porto
 1
 .
 3. Posição a adotar em nome da União
 A presente proposta tem por objetivo estabelecer a posição da União no âmbito da OACI, para o triénio em curso, que executa o programa de trabalho da OACI para o período de 2016-2019, em conformidade com as recomendações e conclusões da 39.a sessão da Assembleia da OACI.
 A Comissão propõe uma abordagem em dois níveis no domínio da pesca, devido às características do processo decisório no quadro da OACI. O Conselho da OACI é o órgão responsável pela adoção de atos com efeitos jurídicos na OACI. As regras internas da OACI fixam entre dez dias e 24 horas antes da sessão do Conselho da OACI (em função da natureza dos documentos) o prazo-limite para a apresentação de documentos pelos membros do Conselho da OACI, pelo Presidente do Conselho da OACI e pelo Secretário-Geral da OACI. Só então todas as propostas ficam disponíveis e a Comissão pode analisar a documentação com vista a preparar a posição da União sobre as questões da competência da UE para ser debatida no Conselho da OACI. O lapso de tempo entre a disponibilidade dos documentos e o início da sessão do Conselho da OACI não permite a preparação e a adoção de uma decisão do Conselho nos termos do artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia («TFUE»).
 Por conseguinte, propõe-se a adoção de uma decisão do Conselho com base no artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFEU a fim de definir a posição da UE relativamente ao triénio em curso e completá-la com os documentos oficiosos da Comissão destinados a cada sessão do Conselho da OACI.
 A presente proposta é coerente com as políticas da UE no domínio da aviação civil, em especial em matéria de segurança da aviação, gestão do tráfego aéreo e navegação aérea, ambiente, proteção da aviação, desenvolvimento económico no setor dos transportes aéreos, direitos dos passageiros e princípio da facilitação.
 4. Base jurídica
 4.1.Base jurídica processual
 4.1.1.Princípios
 O artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE prevê decisões que definam «as posições a tomar em nome da União numa instância criada por um acordo, quando essa instância for chamada a adotar atos que produzam efeitos jurídicos, com exceção dos atos que completem ou alterem o quadro institucional do acordo».
 O artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE aplica-se independentemente de a União ser membro do organismo ou parte no acordo em causa
 2
 .
 A noção de «atos que produzem efeitos jurídicos» engloba os atos que produzem efeitos jurídicos por força das normas de direito internacional que regulam o organismo em questão. Este conceito inclui ainda os instrumentos que não têm efeito vinculativo por força do direito internacional, mas que «tendem a influenciar de forma determinante o conteúdo da regulamentação adotada pelo legislador da UE».
 3
 4.1.2.Aplicação ao caso em apreço
 A OACI é um organismo criado por um acordo, nomeadamente a Convenção de Chicago.
 Os atos que a OACI é chamada a adotar constituem atos com efeitos jurídicos. Os atos previstos podem influenciar de forma determinante o conteúdo da legislação da UE no domínio da aviação civil. Tal deve-se ao facto de as normas adotadas pela OACI serem aplicáveis ao abrigo da Convenção de Chicago, exceto se um Estado Contratante comunicar diferenças à OACI (artigo 38.o da Convenção de Chicago). Acresce que, tanto quanto possível, a UE pretende assegurar a coerência com as normas internacionais no domínio da aviação civil.
 Os atos previstos não completam nem alteram o quadro institucional do acordo.
 A base jurídica processual da decisão proposta é, por conseguinte, o artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE.
 4.2.Base jurídica substantiva
 4.2.1.Princípios
 A base jurídica material para a adoção de uma decisão ao abrigo do artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE depende essencialmente do objetivo e do conteúdo do ato previsto em relação ao qual é adotada uma posição em nome da União. Se o ato previsto tiver duas finalidades ou duas componentes, e se uma dessas finalidades ou componentes for identificável como sendo principal e a outra como sendo apenas acessória, a decisão a adotar ao abrigo do artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE deve assentar numa única base jurídica material, nomeadamente a exigida pela finalidade ou pela componente principal ou preponderante.
 Se o ato previsto prosseguir simultaneamente diferentes finalidades ou tiver várias componentes, indissociavelmente ligadas sem que uma delas seja acessória em relação a outra, a base jurídica material de uma decisão a adotar ao abrigo do artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE terá de incluir, excecionalmente, as várias bases jurídicas correspondentes.
 4.2.2.Aplicação ao caso em apreço
 Os atos previstos prosseguem objetivos e tem componentes nos domínios da política comum de transportes e da política da União no domínio do ambiente. Estes aspetos dos atos previstos estão indissociavelmente ligados sem que um seja acessório em relação a outro.
 A base jurídica material da decisão proposta inclui, por conseguinte, as seguintes disposições: Artigos 100.o, n.o 2 e 191.o do TFUE.
 4.3.Conclusão
 A base jurídica da decisão proposta deve ser o artigo 78.o, n.o 2, do TFUE, em conjugação com o artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do TFUE.
 2018/0004 (NLE)
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO CONSELHO
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional
 O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 Tendo em conta o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, nomeadamente o artigo 100.o, n.o 2, e o artigo 191.o, em conjugação com o artigo 218.o, n.o 9,
 Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão Europeia,
 Considerando o seguinte:
 (1)Nos termos do artigo 47.o da Convenção sobre a Aviação Civil Internacional («Convenção de Chicago»), a Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional («OACI») pode adotar normas internacionais no domínio da aviação civil, em especial em matéria de segurança da aviação, gestão do tráfego aéreo e navegação aérea, ambiente, proteção da aviação, desenvolvimento económico no setor dos transportes aéreos, direitos dos passageiros e princípio da facilitação.
 (2)É conveniente estabelecer a posição a adotar, em nome da União, no âmbito da OACI,, na medida em que adota atos que são suscetíveis de influenciar decisivamente o teor da legislação da União no domínio da aviação civil.
 (3)Atendendo a que as regras internas da OACI e, em particular, as regras de procedimento do Conselho da OACI, tornam impossível estabelecer a posição a adotar, em nome da União, em conformidade com o artigo 218.o, n.o 9, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia em tempo oportuno, justifica-se, neste caso, estabelecer essa posição numa base plurianual, constituída por princípios orientadores e diretrizes, bem como um quadro para a sua especificação anual. Ao mesmo tempo, a maioria dos temas debatidos, no âmbito da OACI, dizem respeito a matérias abrangidas pelo programa de trabalho da OACI, conforme estabelecido pela sua Assembleia trienal. No caso particular da OACI, é, por conseguinte, possível estabelecer uma posição geral a adotar, em nome da União, no âmbito da OACI.
 (4)A posição da União deve ser definida em conformidade com os objetivos perseguidos pela União no âmbito da política comum de transportes e da política de ambiente da União, estabelecidas nos termos dos artigos 100.o, n.o 2 e 191.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia, a fim de promover uma energia segura, fiável, eficiente, eficaz, aberto e economicamente viáveis e respeitadores do sistema de transporte aéreo.
 (5)A Decisão (UE) 2016/915
 4
 do Conselho determina a posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no que diz respeito a um instrumento internacional a elaborar pelos órgãos da OACI com vista à aplicação, a partir de 2020, de uma medida única de âmbito mundial baseada no mercado, aplicável às emissões da aviação internacional, cujos elementos estão ainda em discussão no âmbito da OACI. A posição da União relativamente a esta rubrica deve ser exclusivamente regida pela Decisão (UE) 2016/915, mais específica, a este respeito, que a presente decisão.
 ADOTOU A PRESENTE DECISÃO:
 Artigo 1.o
 A posição a adotar, em nome da União, na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional («OACI»), quando essa instância for chamada a adotar decisões que produzam efeitos jurídicos consta do anexo I.
 Essa posição deve ser apreciada e, se for caso disso, revista pelo Conselho, mediante proposta da Comissão, nomeadamente para refletir os resultados da 40.a Assembleia da OACI.
 Artigo 2.o
 A especificação pormenorizada da posição a adotar em nome da União nas sessões do Conselho da OACI deve ser efetuada em conformidade com o anexo II.
 Artigo 3.o
 A posição a adotar, em nome da União, deve ser expressa pelos Estados-Membros, agindo conjuntamente no interesse da União, no âmbito dos órgãos da ICAO, e apoiada pela Comissão, em consonância com o estatuto de observador da União.
 Artigo 4.o
 A presente decisão aplica-se sem prejuízo do disposto na Decisão 98/2016/CE.
 Artigo 5.o
 Os Estados-Membros são os destinatários da presente decisão.
 Feito em Bruxelas, em
 Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 (1)
 Decisão (UE) 2016/381 do Conselho, de 14 de março de 2016, relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no Comité de Inspeção de Navios pelo Estado do Porto criado pelo Memorando de Acordo de Paris para a Inspeção de Navios pelo Estado do Porto; JO L 72 de 17.3.2016, p. 53.
 (2)
 Processo C-399/12 — Alemanha/Conselho (OIV), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, n.o 64.
 (3)
 Processo C-399/12, Alemanha/Conselho (OIV), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, n.os 61-64.
 (4)
 Decisão (UE) 2016/915 do Conselho, de 30 de maio de 2016, relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, no que diz respeito a um instrumento internacional a elaborar pelos órgãos da OACI com vista à aplicação, a partir de 2020, de uma medida única de âmbito mundial baseada no mercado, aplicável às emissões da aviação internacional; JO L 153 de 10.6.2016, p. 32.
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 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 12.1.2018
 COM(2018) 19 final
 ANEXOS
 da
 Proposta de Decisão do Conselho
 relativa à posição a adotar, em nome da União Europeia, na Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional
 ANEXO I
 POSIÇÃO A ADOTAR, EM NOME DA UNIÃO, NO ÂMBITO DA ORGANIZAÇÃO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL INTERNACIONAL
 Princípios orientadores
 No âmbito da Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional («OACI»), os Estados-Membros, agindo conjuntamente no interesse da União, devem:
 a)atuar em conformidade com os objetivos perseguidos pela União no âmbito da política de aviação, nomeadamente a promoção de um sistema de transportes aéreos seguro, protegido, eficiente, eficaz, aberto, economicamente viável e respeitador do ambiente;
 b)promover o desenvolvimento da cooperação regional e dos sistemas de aviação regional, e apoiar o seu reconhecimento pela OACI e os respetivos Estados contratantes, bem como a integração dos mesmos no quadro da OACI;
 c)promover o desenvolvimento de regras e políticas que garantam a segurança das operações de transportes aéreos e a realização de uma supervisão adequada das regras de segurança;
 d)promover o desenvolvimento e a implantação de sistemas de navegação aérea eficientes, eficazes e interoperáveis, em consonância com o Plano Mundial de Navegação Aérea e a modernização por blocos do sistema aeronáutico;
 e)promover o desenvolvimento de um sistema de transportes aéreos protegido contra atos de interferência ilícita;
 f)promover o desenvolvimento do transporte aéreo, fazendo com que os seus efeitos sobre o clima e o ambiente sejam limitados;
 g)promover normas ambientais e climáticas e apoiar uma ação reforçada no âmbito dos compromissos assumidos pela União ao abrigo do Acordo de Paris;
 h)promover o desenvolvimento de um ambiente em que o transporte aéreo internacional possa desenvolver-se num mercado mundial, liberalizado e aberto e global e continuar a crescer, sem comprometer a segurança, a proteção e o ambiente, garantindo simultaneamente o estabelecimento das salvaguardas pertinentes;
 i)promover o quadro mundial da OACI para a facilitação e apoiar a sua aplicação;
 j)continuar a apoiar, incluindo, se for caso disso, mediante assistência técnica e atividades destinadas ao reforço das capacidades, o desenvolvimento, em todos os Estados Contratantes da OACI, de um sistema mundial de transportes aéreos seguro, protegido, eficiente, eficaz, aberto, economicamente viável e respeitador do ambiente.
 Orientações
 Os Estados-Membros, agindo conjuntamente no interesse da União, devem envidar esforços para apoiar as seguintes ações pela OACI:
 1.
 Com vista ao desenvolvimento de regras e políticas que garantam a segurança das operações de transporte aéreo e a realização de uma supervisão adequada das regras de segurança;
 a)Apoiar o desenvolvimento e a aplicação do Plano Mundial de Navegação Aérea;
 b)Apoiar a melhoria contínua da segurança da aviação através de uma redução do número de acidentes e das vítimas mortais nas operações de transporte aéreo em todas as partes do mundo;
 c)Apoiar a elaboração e a aplicação de regulamentação, políticas e medidas necessárias para proteger os passageiros e a segurança dos voos;
 d)Apoiar o desenvolvimento e a aplicação de sistemas de segurança da aviação regional e outros quadros para a cooperação no domínio da segurança regional entre Estados-Membros, bem como uma melhor integração dos mesmos no contexto da OACI;
 2.
 Com vista ao desenvolvimento e à implantação eficiente, eficaz e interoperável e de sistemas de navegação aérea:
 a)Apoiar o desenvolvimento e a execução do Plano Mundial de Navegação Aérea e o respetivo processo de acompanhamento mediante indicadores de desempenho adequados;
 b)Apoiar uma maior harmonização das normas, a interoperabilidade mundial das novas tecnologias e dos novos sistemas e uma maior coordenação das atividades pertinentes na gestão do tráfego aéreo;
 c)Apoiar a elaboração e a aplicação de regulamentação, políticas e medidas no domínio da gestão do tráfego aéreo e dos serviços de navegação aérea;
 3.
 Com vista ao desenvolvimento de um sistema de transportes aéreos protegido contra atos de interferência ilícita:
 a)Apoiar o desenvolvimento e a aplicação do Plano Mundial de Navegação Aérea;
 b)Apoiar as iniciativas e a cooperação necessárias à prevenção de atos de interferência ilícita, incluindo atos terroristas;
 c)Apoiar as iniciativas e a cooperação necessárias para combater as ciberameaças à aviação civil;
 4.
 Com vista a assegurar um sistema de transportes aéreos respeitador do ambiente:
 a)Envidar esforços no sentido de limitar ou diminuir:
 - o número de pessoas afetadas por níveis significativos de ruído das aeronaves;
 - os efeitos das emissões da aviação na qualidade do ar local; bem como
 - os efeitos das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa da aviação no clima a nível mundial, em conformidade com os objetivos do Acordo de Paris;
 5.
 Com vista a assegurar o desenvolvimento económico dos transportes aéreos:
 a)Incentivar a liberalização do acesso ao mercado a um ritmo e de uma forma adequada às necessidades e circunstâncias;
 b)Apoiar os esforços tendentes a facilitar a liberalização da propriedade e do controlo das transportadoras aéreas, de uma forma coerente com as regras da União;
 c)Apoiar a elaboração e a aplicação de regulamentação, políticas e medidas destinadas a garantir a proteção dos consumidores;
 d)Apoiar a elaboração e a aplicação de regulamentação, políticas e medidas destinadas a prevenir a discriminação e a promover a concorrência leal entre transportadoras aéreas;
 e)Apoiar a elaboração e a aplicação de disposições de facilitação, com o objetivo de agilizar o desalfandegamento de aeronaves, passageiros e respetiva bagagem, carga e correio, mantendo simultaneamente a segurança e a eficiência das operações de transporte aéreo;
 6.
 Com vista a dar continuidade à promoção do quadro mundial da OACI para a facilitação em todos os Estados Contratantes da OACI, apoiar os elementos estratégicos do Programa de Identificação dos Viajantes da OACI:
 a)Aplicação e promoção das normas do documento de viagem de leitura ótica; Especificações e boas práticas, bem como emissão e controlo seguros de documentos de viagem;
 b)Aplicação e promoção de elementos de prova sólidos em matéria de processos de identificação, incluindo tecnologias de partilha de informações;
 7.
 Com vista a prosseguir o apoio ao desenvolvimento de sistema mundial de transportes aéreos seguro, protegido, eficiente, eficaz, aberto, economicamente viável e respeitador do ambiente em todos os Estados Contratantes da OACI:
 a)Apoiar a iniciativa No Country Left Behind (Nenhum país será esquecido);
 b)Apoiar o contributo da aviação para a Agenda 2030 das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável;
 c)Apoiar a continuação, se for caso disso, da assistência técnica e das atividades de reforço das capacidades.
 ANEXO II
 ESPECIFICAÇÃO ANUAL DA POSIÇÃO A ADOTAR, EM NOME DA UNIÃO, NO ÂMBITO DA ORGANIZAÇÃO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL INTERNACIONAL
 Antes de cada sessão do Conselho da Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional, são tomadas as medidas necessárias para que, em conformidade com os princípios e orientações constantes do anexo I, a posição a comunicar em nome da União tenha em conta todas as informações pertinentes, bem como quaisquer documentos a discutir que se insiram no âmbito de competência da União. Para o efeito, e com base nessas informações, é transmitido pelos serviços da Comissão ao Conselho, ou às suas instâncias preparatórias, um documento preparatório que especifica os pormenores da posição da União para análise e aprovação.