type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 30.8.2008
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 C 223/55
 Recurso interpuesto el 7 de julio de 2008 — Becker Flugfunkwerk/OAMI — Harman Becker Automotive Systems (BECKER AVIONIC SYSTEMS)
 (Asunto T-263/08)
 (2008/C 223/98)
 Lengua en la que ha sido redactado el recurso: inglés
 Partes
 Demandante: Becker Flugfunkwerk GmbH (Rheinmünster, Alemania) (representante: O. Griebenow, abogado)
 Demandada: Oficina de Armonización del Mercado Interior (Marcas, Dibujos y Modelos)
 Otra parte en el procedimiento ante la Sala de Recurso: Harman Becker Automotive Systems GmbH (Karlsbad, Alemania)
 Pretensiones de la parte demandante
 —
 Que se anule la resolución de la Primera Sala de Recurso de la Oficina de Armonización del Mercado Interior (Marcas, Dibujos y Modelos) de 10 de abril de 2008 en el asunto R 398/2007-1.
 —
 Que se desestime la oposición no B 484.503 referente a la solicitud de marca comunitaria no 1.829.563.
 Motivos y principales alegaciones
 Solicitante de la marca comunitaria: La demandante.
 Marca comunitaria solicitada: La marca figurativa «BECKER AVIONIC SYSTEMS» para productos de la clase 9, solicitud no 1.829.563.
 Titular de la marca o del signo invocados en oposición: La otra parte en el procedimiento ante la Sala de Recurso.
 Marca o signo invocados en oposición: Marca denominativa británica no 1.258.929 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 9; marca figurativa alemana no 1.039.843 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 9; marca figurativa alemana no 1.016.927 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 37; marca denominativa finesa no 116.880 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 9; marca denominativa griega no 82.339 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 9; marca denominativa internacional no 473.178 «BECKER», para productos de la clase 9.
 Resolución de la División de Oposición: Estimación de la oposición por lo que atañe a todos los productos de que se trata.
 Resolución de la Sala de Recurso: Desestimación del recurso.
 Motivos invocados: Infracción del artículo 8, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 40/94 del Consejo, en la medida en que no existe riesgo alguno de confusión entre las marcas en conflicto.


text:
 2.8.2008
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 197/32
 2008. június 9-én benyújtott kereset – Paul Alfons Rehbein kontra OHIM – Hervé Dias Martinho és Manuel Dias Martinho (Outburst)
 (T-214/08. sz. ügy)
 (2008/C 197/56)
 A keresetlevél nyelve: angol
 Felek
 Felperes: Paul Alfons Rehbein (GmbH & Co.) KG (Glinde, Németország) (képviselő: T. E. Lampel ügyvéd)
 Alperes: Belső Piaci Harmonizációs Hivatal (védjegyek és formatervezési minták)
 A többi fél a fellebbezési tanács előtti eljárásban: Hervé Dias Martinho és Manuel Dias Martinho (La Plessis Trévise, Franciaország)
 Kereseti kérelmek
 —
 Az Elsőfokú Bíróság helyezze hatályon kívül a Belső Piaci Harmonizációs Hivatal (védjegyek és formatervezési minták) második fellebbezési tanácsának 2008. március 13-i határozatát (R 1261/2007-2. sz. ügy); és
 —
 az Elsőfokú Bíróság az alperest kötelezze a felmerült költségek viselésére.
 Jogalapok és fontosabb érvek
 A közösségi védjegy bejelentője: a többi fél a fellebbezési tanács előtti eljárásban.
 Az érintett közösségi védjegy: az „Outburst” ábrás védjegy a 16., 18. és 25. osztályba tartozó áruk vonatkozásában – 4 318 333. sz. védjegybejelentés.
 A felszólalási eljárásban hivatkozott védjegy vagy megjelölés jogosultja: a felperes.
 A hivatkozott védjegy vagy megjelölés: a 25. osztályba tartozó áruk tekintetében lajtromozott nemzeti szóvédjegy (Németország) – lajstromszám: 399 40 713.
 A felszólalási osztály határozata: a felszólalási osztály a felszólalást teljes egészében elutasította.
 A fellebbezési tanács határozata: a fellebbezési tanács a fellebbezést elutasította.
 Jogalapok: A 40/94 tanácsi rendelet 43. cikke (2) és (3) bekezdésének megsértése, mivel a korábbi nemzeti védjegyet ténylegesen használták az árujegyzékben szereplő árukkal, illetve szolgáltatásokkal kapcsolatban; az említett rendelet a 76. cikke (1) bekezdése f) pontjának megsértése, mivel a fellebbezési tanács hibát követett el azzal, hogy nem vette tekintetbe a felperes ügyvezető igazgatójának eskü alatt tett nyilatkozatát; az említett rendelet 74. cikke (2) bekezdésének és a 2868/95 tanácsi rendelet (1) 22. szabálya (1) és (2) bekezdésének megsértése, mivel a felszólalási eljárás fellebbezési szakaszában benyújtott további bizonyítékok elfogadhatóak és azokat tekintetbe kell venni a felszólalás alapjául szolgáló védjegy vizsgálata során; a felperes meghallgatáshoz való jogának sérelme, mivel a fellebbezési tanácsnak tekintetbe kellett volna vennie a használatra vonatkozó, határidőn túl benyújtott bizonyítékot.
 (1) A közösségi védjegyről szóló 40/94/EK tanácsi rendelet végrehajtásáról szóló, 1995. december 13-i 2868/95/EK tanácsi irányelv (HL 1995., L 303. 1. o., magyar nyelvű különkiadás 17. fejezet, 1. kötet, 189. o.).


type: wikipedia

text:
1549 m. buvo nekeliamieji metai, prasidedantys šeštadienį pagal Grigaliaus kalendorių.
 Lietuvoje
 Gimtadieniai
 Rugpjūčio 2 d. – Mikalojus Kristupas Radvila Našlaitėlis, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės didikas, Abiejų Tautų Respublikos valstybės ir karinis veikėjas, kartografas (m. 1616 m.).
 Nedatuota
 Jonas Stanislovaitis Kęsgaila, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės didikas, valstybės veikėjas (m. 1594 m.).
 Stanislovas Kiška, Lietuvos Didžiosios kunigaikštystės valstybės veikėjas, vienas turtingiausių Lietuvos didikų (m. 1619 m.).
 Teodoras Frederikas Tiškevičius Logoiskis, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės bajoras, didikas, Lelijos herbo grafas, valstybės ir karinis veikėjas (m. 1621 m.).
 Mirtys
 Gegužės 28 d. – Aleksandras Chodkevičius, Lietuvos Didžiosios kunigaikštystės valstybės veikėjas (g. 1475 m.).
 Lapkričio 1 d. – Johanesas Brysmanas, vokiečių protestantų teologas, daktaras, bažnyčios reformatorius, Prūsijos, Mažosios Lietuvos ir Livonijos pamokslininkas, pranciškonas (g. 1488 m.).
 Nedatuota
 Mykolas Tiškevičius, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės bajoras, didikas, valstybės ir karinis veikėjas (g. 1499 m.).
 Pasaulyje
 Gimtadieniai
 Kovo 11 d. – Chuanas de Salsedas, ispanų keliautojas ir karvedys. Vadinamas paskutiniu konkistadoru (m. 1576 m.).
 Mirtys
 Nedatuota
 Abu Alabas Achmadas ibn Mahometas, nuo 1526 – 1545 m. ir 1547 – 1549 m. Vatasidų dinastijos Maroko sultonas.
 Neaprašyti
 Lapkričio 10 d. – Popiežius Paulius III (g. 1468 m.), popiežiaus pareigas ėjo nuo 1534 m. spalio 13 d.
 Nuorodos
 1549 m.


jurisdiction: US

text:
The appeal in this case must be dismissed because no final judgment has been entered; but inasmuch as the record can again be brought here after the rendition of such a judgment if the merits of the controversy are not now disposed of, we will consider and determine the merits before passing an order of dismissal.
 On December 9th, 1904, an action of debt was brought by the appellee against the appellant in the Baltimore City Court on a certain writing obligatory which was filed with the declaration. It appears from the declaration and the papers forming part of it, that the Maryland Stamping Company was indebted to the Second National Bank of Baltimore on a promissory note for eleven hundred dollars falling due November second, 1904, and that the appellant, the appellee and three other persons were endorsers on that note. It further appears that on October 29th of the same year, the appellant and three other endorsers of the note just mentioned wrote to the appellee and signed and sealed the following instrument which is the cause of action in the pending controversy, viz.:
 October 29th, 1904.
 "Mr. James W. Bates,
 "The note of the Maryland Stamping Company for $1,100 held by the Second National Bank will fall due on November 2d 1904.
 "We request you as one of the endorsers to pay the said note at maturity, hereby waiving protest, and agree to refund the said amount to you in accordance with agreement of January 2d 1904, in the proportion of our holdings of stock as shown by the following table: *Page 346
 Stock Per ct. 2nd Natl. Bank
 James W. Bates $ 5,000.00 12.00 $ 133.10
 Abraham Sharp 1,500.00 3.63 39.93
 Ernest Sharp 7,925.00 19.18 210.98
 John R. Korb 21,900.00 52.99 582.89
 John B. Stansbury 5,000.00 12.00 133.10
 __________ ______ _________
 $41,325.00 100.00 $1,100.00
 "We severally agree to pay you the amounts of our respective shares, as above within 30 days from November 2d 1904, with interest from that date.
 "Should any endorser fail to pay his share within said period of 30 days the share of the one so failing to pay is to be prorated among the solvent endorsers, each contributing with you a proportionately increased share, and such increase to be paid within ten days after the expiration of said thirty days.
 John Korb, (Seal.) John B. Stansbury, (Seal.) Abraham Sharp, (Seal.) Ernest Sharp, (Seal.)"
 It further appears that the appellee, to whom the above paper was addressed, paid to the Second National Bank the eleven hundred dollar note upon its maturity as he had been requested by the other endorsers to do. He now demands from the appellant the sum of two hundred and ten dollars and ninety-eight cents, being the amount which the latter agreed by the above quoted instrument to repay to the appellee.
 To the declaration the appellant demurred; the demurrer was overruled and upon his declining to plead over, a judgment by default was entered against him, and thereupon he took this appeal though the judgment by default had not been extended in dollars and cents.
 The grounds of demurrer are, first, that the writing obligatory referred to in the narr. and above transcribed, does not constitute a valid completed contract; secondly, that the facts alleged in the declaration do not form, by operation of law, a valid contract by offer and acceptance; and thirdly, that the suit was prematurely brought. We do not think any of these grounds can be maintained. *Page 347
 No precise form of words is necessary to create a bond or obligation; and, therefore, any memorandum in writing under seal, whereby a debt is acknowledged to be owing, will obligate the party to pay; for it is said that any words which prove a man to be a debtor, if they be under seal, will charge him with the payment of the money. Cover v. Stem, Ex., 67 Md. 451, and cases there cited. The argument of the appellant, however, is, that the paper-writing though under seal is merely an offer to pay and therefore not an obligation to pay, and that it did not and could not become binding as a writing obligatory until accepted by the appellee by an instrument under seal. We do not so interpret it. The paper embodied the several and distinct obligation of each of the signatories to pay a definite and ascertained sum at a specified time upon the happening of a named condition. It therefore constituted a perfectly valid writing obligatory, and required no formal acceptance under seal on the part of the appellee to give it legal efficacy. By the proper construction of the paper it was to become binding on the parties to it when the appellee actually paid the eleven hundred dollar note to the bank. It was to be operative as soon as the contingency happened. By its express terms it was designed to be binding and in reality was binding, when that event did occur, and therefore nothing but the happening of the contingency was required to definitely fix the liability of the parties who signed it. An acceptance under the seal of the appellee would not have fastened any obligation on the appellant to pay the sum sued for in this action, because the promise to pay was not founded or made dependent on such an acceptance, but was based solely upon the condition that the appellee would satisfy the note at its maturity; and the writing obligatory "would become operative as soon as that contingency happened, and not before." King v.Warfield, 67 Md. 249. In the case of Boyd and Ricketts v.Kienzle et al., 46 Md. 294, a bond signed by twelve persons bound them to pay the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars each, "making in all the sum of thirty thousand dollars," for the purchase of hops and malt which one Peter Schneider *Page 348
 might buy for the use of the Baltimore County Brewing, Malting and Distilling Company. No payee was named in the bond. The appellant furnished to the brewing company hops and malt and then sued all the makers of the bond jointly. It was not pretended that the bond was not valid, and the only question considered by the Court was whether the obligation was the joint or theseveral undertaking of the obligors whose seals were affixed thereto. The liability of the makers was contingent until some one actually sold to Schneider hops and malt for the brewery, and after such a sale had been made the liability of the obligors became fixed to the vendors to the extent of the several undertaking assumed by each one of the twelve persons who signed and sealed the paper.
 It is wholly immaterial whether the facts set forth in the declaration now before us form by operation of law a valid contract by offer and acceptance, because the right of the appellee to recover in this action does not depend upon any contract evidenced in that way. His right of action is founded on the written paper which is complete in itself and which, as we have already observed, fixed by its own terms the liability of each signer as soon as the extrinsic event — the payment of the note — occurred. The money due on the eleven hundred dollar note was paid to the Second National Bank by the appellee and thirty days having expired after the date of that payment and before the suit was brought, the right of the appellee to recover cannot be questioned or disputed.
 The second clause of the writing sued on covered the contingency of some of the endorsers failing to pay to the appellee their ratable proportions within thirty days after the second of November, 1904. If that event had happened, ten days additional time was given to the solvent endorsers to repay to the appellee their proportions of such delinquent's share. This suit, however, was not brought to recover any portion of such a share but only to compel the appellant to pay the specific sum he undertook primarily to pay. Thirty days elapsed between the second of November, the date upon which the appellee paid the eleven hundred dollar note to the Second *Page 349
 National Bank, and the ninth of December, when this suit was instituted; and hence the suit was not prematurely brought.
 No final judgment has been entered in this case. The judgment by default does no more than establish the right of the appellee — the plaintiff below — to recover something. The amount which he is entitled to recover remains yet to be ascertained. Green v.Hamilton, 16 Md. 317. The judgment by default is merely interlocutory and is not a lien until the amount is ascertained.Davidson v. Myers, 24 Md. 538. No execution can be issued upon the judgment by default. It cannot be superseded, and it possesses none of the attributes or qualities of a final judgment. From such a judgment no appeal will lie. The motion to dismiss must, therefore, prevail and it is so ordered.
 Appeal dismissed with costs.
 (Decided December 6th, 1905.)


text:
C. Hazeltine Basshor, a stockholder and vice-president of the Thomas C. Basshor Company, on the 23rd day of November, 1912, filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, his bill against said company on behalf of himself and such other stockholders as might unite therein and contribute to the cost thereof.
 The bill alleges that the assets of the company (consisting in part of a warehouse known as No. 28 Light street), are approximately of the value of $270,000; that a part of it, is "probably subject to considerable depreciation if disposed of at forced sale." That the indebtedness of said firm, including a judgment or decree recently entered against the defendant for the sum of $21,000, in favor of Edward C. Carrington, Jr., receiver for the Hammond Ice Company, is approximately $130,000.
 The bill charges "that notwithstanding the fact that the defendant company is not insolvent and the value of its assets is greater than the amount of its debts, it is unable, by reason of the fact that it is not able to realize immediately upon its open accounts, to pay forthwith the amount of said decree; and that if said Carrington, as such receiver, should be permitted to seize, under an execution, an amount of the assets of the defendant sufficient to yield at sheriff's sale the amount of said decree, the great loss almost inevitably resulting therefrom would cause irreparable damage to the creditors of the defendant, other than said judgment creditor, and to the stockholders of the defendant and might even impair its existing solvency," and alleges that "the only manner of preserving the assets of the defendant corporation or of preventing their value from being depleted and destroyed in large *Page 604
 measure, is that a receiver or receivers be appointed to take possession and charge of all the assets of the defendant, and to continue the operation of said plant," under the guidance and direction of the Court, for a limited time to be fixed by it.
 The prayer of the bill asks for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of all the property of the defendant corporation and to continue the operation of its business until sold or otherwise disposed of under order of the Court, and likewise for an injunction.
 On the same day the bill was filed, the defendant, the Thomas C. Basshor Company, filed its answer admitting the allegations of the bill and consenting to the passage of a decree as prayed, to which, on the same day, a general replication was filed. Upon the bill, answer and replication the Court below passed an order appointing one J. Albert Hughes receiver, with power to take charge and possession of the goods, wares, merchandise, books, papers and effects of said corporation and to collect its outstanding indebtedness, and continue its business. The order also commanded the officers and agents of the defendant corporation to yield up and deliver to the receiver the above mentioned personal property, and directed that an injunction be issued as prayed in the bill.
 Subsequently, on the 2nd day of December, 1912, the appellant, the Pennsylvania Boiler Works, and the H.W. Johns-Manville Company and the Maryland Rubber Company, filed their petition alleging that they were creditors of said company, and that the said bill filed by C. Hazeltine Basshor did not confer upon the Court jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, because, first, it does not contain any prayer for the dissolution of the defendant corporation; "and second, that it does not clearly allege that said corporation is insolvent, in that it is unable to pay its debts as they mature." They also allege therein that the decree
 passed upon said bill and answer "is insufficient in that, first,it does not include the real estate owned by the defendantcorporation; *Page 605
 and second, in that it makes no provision for the equitabledistribution of the assets among the creditors; and, third, it provides for a continuance of the business by the receiver." The petition then charges that in view of such alleged defects in the bill and the decree, they with the other creditors of the corporation "are not properly protected by the proceedings as it now stands," and ask that an order be passed making them parties plaintiff and permitting them to file a supplemental bill of complaint. Upon this petition, an order was passed, whereby the petitioners were made parties to the proceedings as prayed, and were granted permission to file a supplemental bill of complaint.
 On the following day, December 3rd, the plaintiff, C. Hazeltine Basshor, filed his petition alleging that the prayer of the bill asked that a decree be passed appointing a receiver, with power to take charge and possession of all the property of thedefendant corporation, but when granted the decree conferred power and authority upon the receiver to take charge and possession only of the goods, wares and merchandise of the defendant corporation and not of the real estate and leasehold property of the corporation mentioned in the bill.
 This omission, the petition alleges, was due to a clerical error only, and it asks that the decree be amended by expressly conferring upon the receiver, therein named, power and authority to take possession and charge of all the property and assets of said corporation, "real, personal and mixed, of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situated."
 Upon this petition an order was passed December 3rd amending the decree as prayed, and conferring upon the receiver hitherto appointed power and authority to take charge of all the property and assets of the defendant corporation, real, personal and mixed, etc.
 On the 12th day of December a further order was passed requiring the receiver to give notice to all persons having claims against the defendant company to file their claims in said Court at the time therein named. *Page 606
 Subsequent to the filing of the last-named order, the appellant, the Pennsylvania Boiler Works, with others, said in the order, to be creditors of the defendant company, who had merely filed their claims in response to the said notice given by the receiver, appealed to this Court from the said orders or decrees of November 23rd and December 3rd, 1912.
 The first of the orders appealed from, the one appointing the receiver and granting the injunction, was passed before the above-mentioned petition of the Pennsylvania Boiler Works and others was filed, and the other order, an amendment to the original order relieving it of at least one of the defects complained of in the petition, was passed after the petition was filed.
 The petition alleged that upon the facts contained in the bill no jurisdiction was conferred upon the Court of Equity to grant the relief asked for. It was to supply these omissions that the Pennsylvania Boiler Works and its co-petitioners asked to be made parties plaintiff, with the right to file a supplemental bill supplying such omissions. This right although granted them, was never exercised by the Pennsylvania Boiler Works or any of its co-petitioners, nor did it or any of them ever ask that the order appointing the receiver and granting the injunction be rescinded, but the Pennsylvania Boiler Works with the other appellants herein named appealed from the original and amended orders passed upon the bill.
 In as much as the Pennsylvania Boiler Works and its co-petitioners filed no supplemental bill, so far as the record discloses, the only bill filed in the case is the original bill filed by C. Hazeltine Basshor, to which the appellant, the Pennsylvania Boiler Works, upon its own petition, has been made a party plaintiff. Therefore by this appeal the Pennsylvania Boiler Works is placed in the position or attitude of appealing from an order granting the relief asked for by its bill of complaint. It is clear to us upon the facts stated, that the right to appeal from these orders is not lodged in the appellant, the Pennsylvania Boiler Works. *Page 607
 The other appellants who have appealed from the orders mentioned, are, in the order for appeal, said to be creditors of the defendant company who have filed their claims in these proceedings. It is not disclosed elsewhere in the record that these appellants, the Harry D.B. Clapp Company, the Model Stoker Company, the Southern Engineering Company, and the Edro Richardson Brass Company, are creditors, or that they have filed their claims in these proceedings. These facts are only learned from the recitals in the order for appeal. But let us assume they are creditors and that they have filed their claims in these proceedings. Have they the right to appeal from the orders appealed from?
 Like the Pennsylvania Boiler Works, they did not ask the Court below to rescind the order appointing the receiver and granting the injunction. Nor did they in any way make known to said Court their objection to the orders appealed from, but simply filed their claims in these proceedings, in response to the notice of the receiver, in order to participate in the distribution of the estate in the hands of the receiver, and to this extent they recognized the validity of the appointment of such receiver and became parties plaintiffs to the bill and like the Pennsylvania Boiler Works they are not allowed to appeal from the orders appealed from.
 It being unnecessary, we will not consider the other grounds of the motion to dismiss the appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
 Appeal dismissed, with costs to the appellees. *Page 608


text:
12.11.2005
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 C 281/33
 Ricorso presentato il 19 settembre 2005 — Generalitat Valenciana/Commissione delle Comunità europee
 (Causa T-357/05)
 (2005/C 281/60)
 Lingua processuale: lo spagnolo
 Parti
 Ricorrente: Generalitat Valenciana (Valencia, Spagna) (Rappresentante: avv. José Vicente Sánchez-Tarazaga Marcelino)
 Convenuta: Commissione delle Comunità europee
 Conclusioni della ricorrente
 —
 Annullamento della decisione della Commissione 27 giugno 2005, C(2005) 1867 def., relativa alla riduzione degli aiuti concessi a carico del Fondo di Coesione, per quanto riguarda il gruppo di progetti n. 97/11/61/028.
 Motivi e principali argomenti
 Il ricorso in esame trae origine dalla decisione della Commissione 5 dicembre 1997, C(97) 3882, in forza della quale il progetto n. 97/11/61/028, realizzato in Spagna e denominato «progetto di raccolta e smaltimento delle acque reflue nel litorale mediterraneo della Comunità autonoma di Valencia» (progetto generale, comprensivo di dodici diversi progetti), ha ricevuto un aiuto pari a EUR 75 011 715 a carico del Fondo di coesione. Tale importo iniziale è stato successivamente aumentato ad EUR 92 742 913.
 Svolgendo una revisione contabile, la Commissione ha individuato una serie di irregolarità nel procedimento di aggiudicazione seguito, soprattutto l'utilizzo dell'esperienza quale criterio di aggiudicazione e l'utilizzo del metodo del prezzo medio quale procedimento di valutazione del prezzo offerto. Nella decisione impugnata, che riduce di EUR 2 217 537 l'aiuto complessivo concesso, la ricorrente ritiene che siano stati violati gli artt. 18 e 30 della direttiva del Consiglio 14 giugno 1993, 93/37, che coordina le procedure di aggiudicazione degli appalti pubblici di lavori (1), e 2 del Regolamento finanziario delle Comunità europee del 21 dicembre 1977.
 A sostegno del suo ricorso la ricorrente fa valere:
 —
 che la normativa comunitaria menziona espressamente l'esperienza come criterio di selezione e che, anche se non la cita espressamente nell'elenco dei possibili criteri di applicazione, si comprende facilmente che tale elenco è meramente esemplificativo, non esaustivo, e non implica l'esclusione del possibile utilizzo dell'esperienza come ulteriore criterio di aggiudicazione del contratto. Tale conclusione è confermata dalla stessa giurisprudenza comunitaria.
 —
 che, in ogni caso, è chiaro come non si possa considerare che l'inclusione dell'esperienza tra i criteri di aggiudicazione nelle condizioni di contrattazione costituisca una violazione grave e manifesta come quelle individuate dalla normativa e dalla giurisprudenza comunitarie quali fonti di responsabilità.
 —
 che l'applicazione del metodo del «prezzo medio» quale meccanismo di ponderazione del criterio del prezzo, non è vietata espressamente dalla normativa comunitaria e che la giurisprudenza si è opposta a tale criterio solo quando è l'unico criterio impiegato, e non qualora concorra con altri criteri.
 La ricorrente lamenta altresì la violazione dei principi della certezza del diritto, del legittimo affidamento, dell'irretroattività e della proporzionalità.
 (1) GUCE L 199, del 9 agosto 1993, pag. 54.


type: contracts

text:
 26.11.2015
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 L 311/52
 DECISIONE DEL COMITATO MISTO SEE
 N. 297/2014
 del 12 dicembre 2014
 che modifica l’allegato XXI (Statistiche) dell’accordo SEE [2015/2164]
 IL COMITATO MISTO SEE,
 visto l’accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo («l’accordo SEE»), in particolare l’articolo 98,
 considerando quanto segue:
 (1)
 Occorre integrare nell’accordo SEE il regolamento (UE) n. 68/2014 della Commissione, del 27 gennaio 2014, recante modifica, in seguito all’adesione della Croazia all’Unione europea, del regolamento (UE) n. 141/2013 che attua il regolamento (CE) n. 1338/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo alle statistiche comunitarie in materia di sanità pubblica e di salute e sicurezza sul luogo di lavoro per quanto riguarda le statistiche basate sull’indagine europea sulla salute (EHIS) (1).
 (2)
 È opportuno pertanto modificare di conseguenza l’allegato XXI dell’accordo SEE,
 HA ADOTTATO LA PRESENTE DECISIONE:
 Articolo 1
 Al punto 18z4 [regolamento (UE) n. 141/2013 della Commissione] dell’allegato XXI dell’accordo SEE è aggiunto quanto segue:
 «, modificato da:
 —
 32014 R 0068: Regolamento (UE) n. 68/2014 della Commissione, del 27 gennaio 2014 (GU L 23 del 28.1.2014, pag. 9).»
 Articolo 2
 I testi del regolamento (UE) n. 68/2014 nelle lingue islandese e norvegese, da pubblicare nel supplemento SEE della Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea, fanno fede.
 Articolo 3
 La presente decisione entra in vigore il 13 dicembre 2014, a condizione che siano pervenute tutte le notifiche previste dall’articolo 103, paragrafo 1, dell’accordo SEE (2).
 Articolo 4
 La presente decisione è pubblicata nella sezione SEE e nel supplemento SEE della Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.
 Fatto a Bruxelles, il 12 dicembre 2014
 Per il Comitato misto SEE
 Il presidente
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) GU L 23 del 28.1.2014, pag. 9.
 (2) Non è stata comunicata l’esistenza di obblighi costituzionali.


type: legislation

text:
 24.2.2022
 FR
 Journal officiel de l’Union européenne
 L 43/64
 DIRECTIVE DÉLÉGUÉE (UE) 2022/287 DE LA COMMISSION
 du 13 décembre 2021
 modifiant, aux fins de son adaptation au progrès scientifique et technique, l’annexe III de la directive 2011/65/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil en ce qui concerne une exemption relative au mercure dans les lampes fluorescentes destinées à d’autres usages généraux d’éclairage et usages spéciaux
 (Texte présentant de l’intérêt pour l’EEE)
 LA COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE,
 vu le traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne,
 vu la directive 2011/65/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 8 juin 2011 relative à la limitation de l’utilisation de certaines substances dangereuses dans les équipements électriques et électroniques (1), et notamment son article 5, paragraphe 1, point a),
 considérant ce qui suit:
 (1)
 En vertu de la directive 2011/65/UE, les États membres sont tenus de veiller à ce que les équipements électriques et électroniques mis sur le marché ne contiennent pas les substances dangereuses énumérées à l’annexe II de ladite directive. Cette restriction ne s’applique pas aux applications faisant l’objet d’une exemption qui sont énumérées à l’annexe III de ladite directive.
 (2)
 Les catégories d’équipements électriques et électroniques auxquelles s’applique la directive 2011/65/UE sont énumérées à l’annexe I de ladite directive.
 (3)
 Le mercure fait partie des substances soumises à limitations énumérées à l’annexe II de la directive 2011/65/UE.
 (4)
 Par la décision 2010/571/UE (2), la Commission a accordé, entre autres, une exemption à l’utilisation de mercure dans les lampes fluorescentes linéaires destinées à d’autres usages généraux d’éclairage et usages spéciaux (par exemple, lampes à induction) (ci-après l’«exemption»), qui figure désormais en tant qu’exemption 2 b) 4) dans l’annexe III de la directive 2011/65/UE. La date d’expiration de l’exemption était fixée au 21 juillet 2016, conformément à l’article 5, paragraphe 2, deuxième alinéa, point a), de ladite directive.
 (5)
 L’exemption couvre un groupe non homogène de lampes de formes, technologies, applications et finalités différentes. Le mercure est utilisé dans le tube à décharge, qui est essentiel pour convertir l’énergie électrique en lumière.
 (6)
 La Commission a reçu une demande de renouvellement de l’exemption (ci-après la «demande de renouvellement») le 15 janvier 2015, soit dans le délai prévu à l’article 5, paragraphe 5, de la directive 2011/65/UE; cette demande a été actualisée le 20 janvier 2020 au moyen d’une demande de renouvellement supplémentaire. Conformément à l’article 5, paragraphe 5, de ladite directive, l’exemption reste valable jusqu’à ce qu’une décision relative à la demande de renouvellement ait été prise.
 (7)
 L’évaluation de la demande de renouvellement, qui a tenu compte de la disponibilité de produits de substitution et de l’incidence socio-économique de la substitution, a abouti à la conclusion que le remplacement ou l’élimination du mercure dans les applications concernées était actuellement techniquement impraticable. L’évaluation a comporté des consultations des parties intéressées, conformément à l’article 5, paragraphe 7, de la directive 2011/65/UE. Les commentaires reçus au cours de ces consultations ont été mis à la disposition du public sur un site web prévu à cet effet.
 (8)
 L’exemption est compatible avec le règlement (CE) no 1907/2006 du Parlement européen et du Conseil (3) et ne diminue donc pas la protection de l’environnement et de la santé que celui-ci confère.
 (9)
 Il convient donc d’accorder le renouvellement de l’exemption en tenant compte de l’objectif général qui consiste à ce que les exemptions à la limitation accordées pour certains matériaux ou composants spécifiques aient une portée et une durée limitées, de manière à ce que les substances dangereuses soient progressivement éliminées des EEE.
 (10)
 Afin de permettre une réévaluation en temps opportun de la disponibilité de lampes exemptes de mercure capables de remplacer la grande variété de types de lampes couverts par l’exemption, il y a lieu d’accorder le renouvellement de l’exemption pour une période limitée de trois ans. Toutefois, pour des catégories particulières de lampes, à savoir les lampes émettant de la lumière dans le spectre invisible [nouvel alinéa 2 b) 4)-II de l’annexe III] et les lampes de secours [nouvel alinéa 2 b) 4)-III de l’annexe III], des informations suffisantes montrent que la substitution est techniquement impraticable au cours des prochaines années et, pour ces catégories de lampes, une période de validité de cinq ans serait justifiée, conformément à l’article 5, paragraphe 2, premier alinéa, de la directive 2011/65/UE. Au vu du résultat des efforts actuellement déployés pour trouver un produit de substitution fiable, la durée de validité de cette exemption n’est pas susceptible d’avoir des effets négatifs sur l’innovation.
 (11)
 Il y a donc lieu de modifier la directive 2011/65/UE en conséquence,
 A ADOPTÉ LA PRÉSENTE DIRECTIVE:
 Article premier
 L’annexe III de la directive 2011/65/UE est modifiée conformément à l’annexe de la présente directive.
 Article 2
 1. Les États membres adoptent et publient, au plus tard le 30 septembre 2022, les dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives nécessaires pour se conformer à la présente directive. Ils communiquent immédiatement à la Commission le texte de ces dispositions.
 Ils appliquent ces dispositions à partir du 1er octobre 2022.
 Lorsque les États membres adoptent ces dispositions, celles-ci contiennent une référence à la présente directive ou sont accompagnées d’une telle référence lors de leur publication officielle. Les modalités de cette référence sont arrêtées par les États membres.
 2. Les États membres communiquent à la Commission le texte des dispositions essentielles de droit interne qu’ils adoptent dans le domaine couvert par la présente directive.
 Article 3
 La présente directive entre en vigueur le vingtième jour suivant celui de sa publication au Journal officiel de l’Union européenne.
 Article 4
 Les États membres sont destinataires de la présente directive.
 Fait à Bruxelles, le 13 décembre 2021.
 Par la Commission
 La présidente
 Ursula VON DER LEYEN
 (1) JO L 174 du 1.7.2011, p. 88.
 (2) Décision 2010/571/UE de la Commission du 24 septembre 2010 modifiant, aux fins de son adaptation au progrès scientifique et technique, l’annexe de la directive 2002/95/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil en ce qui concerne les exemptions relatives aux applications utilisant du plomb, du mercure, du cadmium, du chrome hexavalent, des polybromobiphényles ou des polybromodiphényléthers (JO L 251 du 25.9.2010, p. 28).
 (3) Règlement (CE) no 1907/2006 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 18 décembre 2006 concernant l’enregistrement, l’évaluation et l’autorisation des substances chimiques, ainsi que les restrictions applicables à ces substances (REACH), instituant une agence européenne des produits chimiques, modifiant la directive 1999/45/CE et abrogeant le règlement (CEE) no 793/93 du Conseil et le règlement (CE) no 1488/94 de la Commission ainsi que la directive 76/769/CEE du Conseil et les directives 91/155/CEE, 93/67/CEE, 93/105/CE et 2000/21/CE de la Commission (JO L 396 du 30.12.2006, p. 1).
 ANNEXE
 À l’annexe III de la directive 2011/65/UE, l’entrée 2 b) 4) est remplacée par le texte suivant:
 Exemption
 Champ d’application et dates d’applicabilité
 «2 b) 4)-I
 pour les lampes destinées à d’autres usages généraux d’éclairage et usages spéciaux (par exemple, lampes à induction): 15 mg
 Expire le 24 février 2025
 2 b) 4)-II
 pour les lampes émettant principalement de la lumière dans le spectre ultraviolet: 15 mg
 Expire le 24 février 2027
 2 b) 4)-III
 pour les lampes de secours: 15 mg
 Expire le 24 février 2027»


text:
Ruby è un linguaggio di programmazione interpretato open source completamente a oggetti. Nato nel 1995 come progetto personale del giapponese Yukihiro Matsumoto (spesso chiamato semplicemente Matz), prende spunto da altri linguaggi come Perl, SmallTalk, Eiffel, Ada e Lisp con lo scopo di bilanciare con cura i paradigmi di programmazione funzionale e imperativa.
 Il successo di framework come Ruby on Rails ha aiutato la diffusione di Ruby soprattutto nello sviluppo di applicazioni web. Risulta attualmente nei primi dieci posti dei linguaggi maggiormente popolari e utilizzati nel mondo secondo vari indici di misurazione specifica, come per esempio TIOBE.
 Sistemi operativi
 L'interprete di Ruby è disponibile per i seguenti sistemi operativi:
 La maggior parte dei sistemi basati su Unix
 DOS
 Microsoft Windows 95/98/2000/2003/NT/XP/Vista/7/8/8.1/10
 macOS
 BeOS
 Amiga OS
 Acorn RISC OS
 OS/2
 Syllable
 PlayStation Portable
 Android
 Potrebbero esistere port per altri sistemi operativi. Esiste inoltre JRuby, un'implementazione Java dell'interprete.
 Caratteristiche principali
 Ruby, pur essendo un linguaggio ad oggetti, presenta alcune caratteristiche tipiche dei paradigmi imperativo e funzionale.
 Il paradigma ad oggetti di Ruby è puro, come quello di Smalltalk, ossia ogni componente del linguaggio, dalle costanti numeriche alle classi, è un oggetto, e come tale può possedere metodi. Tuttavia a differenza dei linguaggi come C++ e derivati gli oggetti in Ruby sono qualcosa di molto più dinamico, in quanto è possibile aggiungere o modificare metodi in run-time. Perciò Il tipo di un oggetto non è definito tanto dalla classe che lo ha istanziato, quanto dall'insieme dei metodi che possiede, o, secondo la terminologia abitualmente utilizzata per i linguaggi stile Smalltalk, dei messaggi a cui sa rispondere.
 In Ruby, dunque, è fondamentale il duck typing (dall'inglese if it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck: "se sembra un'anatra e fa il verso di un'anatra, dev'essere un'anatra"), ovvero il principio secondo il quale il comportamento di una funzione sui suoi argomenti non deve essere determinato dal tipo di questi (come accade in C++ e altri linguaggi staticamente tipizzati), bensì da quali messaggi essi sono in grado di gestire.
 Un'altra caratteristica fondamentale di Ruby è costituita dai cosiddetti blocchi, che sono sostanzialmente delle chiusure (ovvero funzioni dotate di ambiente), che consentono di sostituire i cicli espliciti, frequenti nei linguaggi a basso livello, con l'utilizzo di iteratori, celando all'esterno i meccanismi interni del ciclo in questione.
 Esempi
 Hello world
 Il seguente esempio scrive sul terminale di output il testo "Hello world".
 puts "Hello World"
 Classi e metodi
 Ecco un programma semanticamente identico al precedente, ma che si avvale del paradigma a oggetti di Ruby.
 class Greeter
 attr_reader :recipient
 def initialize(recipient)
 @recipient = recipient
 end
 def greet
 puts "Hello #{recipient}"
 end
 end
 greeter = Greeter.new("world")
 greeter.greet
 Duck typing
 La funzione definita qui di seguito agisce diversamente a seconda dei messaggi a cui il suo argomento risponde.
 def text_of(widget)
 if widget.respond_to? :caption
 widget.caption
 elsif widget.respond_to? :text
 widget.text
 else
 raise "no text associated to widget #{widget}"
 end
 end
 Blocchi e iteratori
 I cicli in Ruby sono generalmente eseguiti mediante iteratori, a cui viene passato un blocco, sotto forma di codice compreso fra le parole chiave do e end, come illustrato nel seguente esempio,
 5.times do
 puts "Hello world"
 end
 in cui il metodo times dell'oggetto "numero 5" si preoccupa di eseguire il giusto numero di volte (5, per l'appunto) il codice indicato.
 Nella definizione di un iteratore, si usa la parola chiave yield.
 class Integer
 def times_header_and_footer
 puts "-- BEGIN --"
 times do
 yield
 end
 puts "-- END --"
 end
 end
 5.times_header_and_footer do
 puts "Hello world"
 end
 Si noti come la classe Integer (una classe predefinita) sia stata riaperta per l'aggiunta di un metodo. L'output dello script è
 -- BEGIN --
 Hello world
 Hello world
 Hello world
 Hello world
 Hello world
 -- END --
 Commenti
 Commenti su riga singola o su più righe
 # Questo è un commento
 =begin
 Questo è
 un commento
 su più righe
 =end
 Notare che nei commenti disposti su più righe, =begin e =end devono trovarsi all'inizio della riga, senza alcuna indentazione.
 Note
 Voci correlate
 Yukihiro Matsumoto
 Ruby on Rails
 Rgss
 Python
 Altri progetti
 Collegamenti esterni
 The little Book of Ruby Rapida introduzione al linguaggio
 Linguaggi di scripting
 Linguaggi di programmazione orientati agli oggetti