text:
Indická filozofia je výrazná zložka indickej kultúry, jedna z najbohatších národných filozofií; prevažne náboženská filozofia; tvorí charakteristický útvar podobne ako filozofia západná, filozofia čínska, filozofia arabská. Nikdy sa úplne nevydelila z celku náboženských predstáv Indov.
 Indická filozofia je staršia ako čínska filozofia, ktorú ovplyvňovala prostredníctvom budhizmu. Opačným smerom k pôsobeniu nedochádzalo.
 V indickej filozofii sa neuskutočnil prechod od mýtu k logu tak, ako tomu bolo v gréckej filozofii. Filozofické úvahy neviedli k vzniku politických a vedeckých učení. Pre Indiu bolo charakteristické, že filozofické smery sa rozvíjali spolu s náboženstvom. Základná periodizácia indickej filozofie:
 1. Staroveká indická filozofia
 Védske obdobie (15. storočie pred Kr. - 9. storočie pred Kr.)
 Neortodoxné systémy (vyvíjali sa súbežne, 800 pred Kr. - 1000 po Kr.)
 Ortodoxné systémy (vyvíjali sa súbežne, 800 pred Kr. - 1000 po Kr.)
 2. Poklasická indická filozofia (10. storočie - 18. storočie)
 3. Súčasná indická filozofia (19. storočie - súčasnosť)
 Staroveká indická filozofia
 Védske obdobie
 Názov od slova védy (najstaršie zachované písomné správy 1500500 pred Kr.), je to súbor spisov neznámych autorov (za autora véd sa považuje Vjása), ktorý obsahoval náboženské, mýtické, ale aj filozofické otázky, rôzne rituály a obradné predpisy, mali kánonický charakter – kánon = príkaz, niečo čo sa má striktne dodržiavať. Védy boli príručkami indických kňazov, v ktorých boli zahrnuté nespochybniteľné pravdy. Obsahovo boli védy šesťkrát rozsiahlejšie ako kresťanská Biblia.
 Védy sa skladajú zo štyroch častí:
 Mantry
 Brahmány
 Aranjáky
 Upanišády
 Mantry – sú to hymny a modlitby. Predstavujú najrannejšie obdobie, obdobie osláv bohov.
 Brahmány – zaklínadlá a obetovania, predstavujú obdobie obetnej mystiky, ktoré spadá do obdobia vzniku kastovného systému.
 Štyri základné kasty – varny:
 brahmáni – najvyššia vrstva – kňazi s privilegovaných postavením v spoločnosti
 kšatrijovia – kasta bojovníkov, panovníkov, ktorý mali v rukách svetskú moc
 vajšijovia – kasta obchodníkov
 šudrovia a pariovia – remeselníci, roľníci, chovatelia dobytka, najnižšia kasta
 Brahmáni – kňazi dodržiavali náboženské rituály, ich prítomnosť bola nenahraditeľná pri všetkých životných udalostiach. Nikdy sa neusilovali o získanie svetskej vlády, alebo moci a ani sa nikdy nesnažili vytvoriť nejakú cirkevnú organizáciu – hierarchizovanú cirkev. Ich náboženstvo voláme Brahmanizmus, ktorý hlása tri základné cnosti:
 absolútna poslušnosť Brahmovi, stvoriteľovi a vládcovi
 dodržiavanie obradov predpísaných danej kaste
 dodržiavanie a plnenie si náboženských povinností = dharma
 Tieto tri cnosti tvoria karmu, ktorá vedie k lepšiemu prevteleniu a k splynutiu s najvyššou svetovou dušou, s brahmou. Ak človek nedodržiava tieto cnosti, vedie to k prevteleniu do podoby nižších foriem života.
 Aranjaky – texty pre pustovníkov
 Upanišády – myšlienky rôznych mužov, ktorí „sedia blízko majstra“, ktoré nie sú všeobecne dostupné. Sú to akési tajné náuky. Sú filozofickým výkladom véd:
 Život je prinášanie obetí, čiže život je strasť.
 Učenie o reinkarnácii – život je utrpenie, duša je neustále vystavovaná kolobehu striedania narodenia a smrti (ide o prevteľovanie duše podľa zákona karmy, odplaty). Aby bola duša spasená a aby našla pokoj, je potrebné, aby sa človek vzdal túžob, vôle k životu a aby nastúpil cestu askézy = odriekania. Askéza je cestou k vyslobodeniu sa z reinkarnácie.
 Učenie o brahme a átmane. Brahma predstavuje svetovú dušu a Átman individuálnu dušu. Brahma bola spočiatku považovaná za modlitbu, svetovú dušu, univerzálny princíp, ktorý tvorí základ všetkého. Áthman pôvodne predstavoval dych. Predstavuje ľudské ja, individualnu dušu. Átman je Brahma v nás. Ak chceme poznať svet, musíme najprv poznať samých seba. Poznanie sveta je obsiahnuté hlboko v nás.
 Neortodoxné systémy povédskeho obdobia
 Sú to filozofické smery, ktoré odmietajú tradíciu véd a hlavne odmietajú kastovné delenie spoločnosti.
 Škola čárváka (Lókájata)
 Džinizmus
 Budhizmus
 Škola čárváka
 Vznikla v období, keď v Indii rodový systém vystriedal štát a keď sa popri kaste brahmánov a kšatrijov vytvára aj kasta vajšijov. Táto škola uznávala iba hmotu, ktorá sa skladá zo štyroch elementov (oheň, voda, zem, vzduch). Vedomie považovala za protiklad hmoty, je to vlastnosť materiálneho tela. Hovorila, že átman (duša), Boh a posmrtný život sú len klam. Na tomto svete sme len raz, pobývame tu len chvíľku a preto si život treba užívať. Utrpenie a bolesť nemožno odstrániť, no možno ich obmedziť na minimum a rozkoš a slasť možno maximalizovať. Nemala dlhé trvanie, ani výrazne neovplyvnila indické myslenie. Jej význam spočíva v tom, že podnietila vznik ďalších smerov – džinizmu a budhizmu.
 Džinizmus
 Zakladateľom je Mahávíra (Džina = vykupiteľ) v 6. st. pred Kr.
 Džinizmus tvrdí, že existuje duša a hmota a že človek je spojením tela a duše. Telo a karma sú materiálne, duše sú nehmotné. Čiastočky hmoty sa neustále zmiešavajú s dušou. V džinizme sa preto duša potrebuje oslobodiť od „materiálnych nánosov“, ktoré sú tvorené dôsledkami ľudských činov a negatívnych emócií a ktoré vedú k znovuzrodeniu. Cestu k vyslobodeniu z kolobehu znovuzrodenia (spáse) vidí v askéze. Askézu dosiahne duša vtedy, keď sa bude správať podľa prísnych etických príkazov, napr. nezabíjať nič živé, nebrať, čo nie je dávané, neklamať, zriecť sa svetských radostí a rozkoší. Dnes vyznáva džinizmus asi 6 miliónov ľudí.
 Budhizmus
 Náboženstvo založil princ Siddhárta Gautama, budha = prebudený, osvietený, čiže ten, kto ukazoval ľuďom cestu k spaseniu.
 Odmieta náuky upanišád a učenie o brahme a átmane, pretože je to abstraktné a tým pádom aj zbytočné pre ľudí. Svoje učenie sa snaží sprístupniť širším vrstvám. Budhizmus zavrhuje kastový systém, zakazuje obetovanie bohom, učí trpezlivosti a že zlu sa nemáme brániť násilím.
 Podstatou je učenie o štyroch vznešených pravdách:
 Život je plný utrpenia.
 Existuje príčina vzniku utrpenia.
 Existuje zánik utrpenia.
 Existuje možnosť odstrániť utrpenie.
 Podľa budhizmu možno odstrániť strasť a utrpenie nie v posmrtnom živote, ale v pozemskom, a to prostredníctvom nirvány = stavu úplného pokoja, oslobodenia sa od všetkého, čo prináša bolesť a utrpenie. Je to mravný zákon sveta.
 Budhizmus je ateistické náboženstvo spásy a pokory, vyzdvihuje vieru v mravný zákon sveta – karmanový princíp.
 Budha sformuloval aj príkazy praktickej etiky:
 Nekonaj zlo.
 Vyhýbaj sa klamstvu.
 Vyhýbaj sa krádeži.
 Vyhýbaj sa zmysovým pôžitkom.
 Vyhýbaj sa alkoholu.
 Po smrti Budhu sa jeho nasledovníci sformovali do dvoch prúdov, skupín:
 mahájána – začali uctievať Budhu ako boha, začali vytvárať štruktúru cirkvi, sú v kláštoroch a chrámoch.
 hínajána – Budhu naďalej považujú za človeka a nie za boha.
 V súčasnosti je budhizmus rozšírený a populárny aj v Európe a Amerike, nie v klasickej podobe, ale v podobe zenového budhizmu (meditačný budhizmus).
 Rozšírenie: juhovýchodná Ázia, Čína, Japonsko, Tibet.
 Ortodoxné systémy povédskeho obdobia
 Uznávali autoritu véd a svoju filozofiu budovali na princípe brahmanizmu. Sú to pravoverné systémy a majú hlbšiu náboženskú orientáciu/tendenciu. Uznávali kastovný systém.
 Patrí sem: Védanta, Mímánsa, Njája, Vaišéšika, Sánkhja, Jóga.
 Jóga
 Predstavuje cestu k oslobodeniu, k spaseniu od utrpenia. Je to cesta sebaovládania, disciplíny a sústredenia. Jóga pozná svojho osobného Boha a viera v tohto osobného Boha je podmienkou k úspešnej praktickej činnosti, meditácii, koncentrácii, smerujúcej k spaseniu, k oslobodeniu sa od utrpenia.
 Njája
 V učení Njája hrala veľkú úlohu logika a gnozeológia. Njája sútry boli zapísané v 2. storočí. Podľa učenia Njája jestvuje hmotný vesmír, ktorý sa skladá z atómov, tvoriacich svojimi kombináciami všetky predmety. Okrem toho vo vesmíre jestvuje nespočetné množstvo duší, ktoré jestvujú buď samy osebe, alebo sú spojené s hmotnými atómami. Najvyššia duša, boh Íšvara, vytvára kombinácie atómov a vyvoláva spojenie duší s atómami, alebo oslobodenie duší od atómov.
 Mímánsa
 Védanta
 Vaišéšika
 Sánkhja
 Poklasická indická filozofia
 Súčasná indická filozofia
 Štúdium indickej filozofie
 Štúdium indickej filozofie musí rešpektovať dôležitú zvláštnosť, že tzv. klasické systémy (daršana) majú mnohostoročnú históriu ešte predtým, než poznáme prvých filozofov menom, a často až do klasickej doby nemáme ani žiadny spoľahlivý text. Nemôžeme teda o nich pojednávať rovnakým spôsobom, ako sme zvyknutí z dejín európskej filozofie, kde vykladáme názory jednotlivých filozofov a môžeme ich ľahko porovnávať a pozorovať dráhy myšlienkového pohybu. V Indii musíme asi až tak do polovice prvého tisícročia n. l. postupovať pri klasických systémoch inak. Musíme ukázať ich viac-menej záverečnú klasickú podobu a musíme sa pokúsiť spätne rekonštruovať cestu, po ktorej sa k nej dospelo. Táto rekonštrukcia, ktorá je niekedy dôležitejšia, než sama ustrnutá klasická podoba systému, je vždy do značnej miery probabilistická a rozhodne ju nemôžeme spájať s nejakými historickými mysliteľskými osobnosťami, ktoré zostávajú navždy skryté. (Len nesmieme zabúdať, že pri budhistickej filozofii môžeme sledovať jednotlivých filozofov už od prvých storočí letopočtu, ak nie už aj skôr.) Pritom obdobie, v ktorom sa určitá filozofia vyvíjala, presahuje desiatky generácií. Napríklad pri vaišéšikovom systéme sa odhaduje doba jeho anonymného vývoja najmenej na 8 storočí. Pri sánkhji to bolo ešte viac.
 Vo väčšine prác o dejinách indickej filozofie sa nijaký pokus o rekonštrukciu filozofického vývinu nerobí a predvádzajú sa systémy v podobe už dosť strnulej, až dokonca upadnutej, a nivelizované do značnej miery vplyvom mentálnej klímy 5. – 6. stor. po Kr., kedy sa systémy po prvý raz začínajú vynárať z anonymity. Táto klíma bola klímou prudkého boja s ateistickým budhistickým ultraidealizmom vidžňánavády a súčasne masového a masívneho nástupu teizmu.
 Literatúra
 (21997. )
 Dejiny filozofie
 Náboženstvo a teológia


type: wikipedia

text:
До̀йранци е село в Южна България, община Ардино, област Кърджали.
 География
 Село Дойранци се намира в най-източната част на Западните Родопи, на около 2 км западно от границата им с Източните Родопи, на около 16 km северозападно от Кърджали и 15 km север-североизточно от Ардино.
 Близко до Дойранци се намират връх Бездивен (1139,9 m) – северозападно на около 2 km, село Ненково – на север-североизток на около 3 km, река Боровица – източно на около 2 km, река Арда и началото на язовир Кърджали – южно на около 3 km, село Аврамово – югозападно на около 3 km и село Русалско (кметство) – западно на около 5 km. Дойранци е разположено на надморска височина около 730 m по билото на дълго и тясно разклонение в най-източната част на рида Каракулас, спускащо се на североизток до река Боровица – на около 1,6 km южно от крайречното село Ненково – откъдето започва пътеката, която води до Дойранци.
 История
 Селото – тогава с име Дойранлар – е в България от 1912 г. Преименувано е на Дойранци с министерска заповед No 3775, обнародвана на 7 декември 1934 г.
 Към 31 декември 1934 г. село Дойранци се състои от махалите Желязковци (Демир оглар), Подградец (Хасар алтъ̀), Рибари (Балъкчилар) и Саево (Хорозлар).
 Религии
 Изповядваната в село Дойранци религия е ислям.
 Обществени институции
 Молитвеният дом в село Дойранци е джамия.
 Източници и бележки
 Външни препратки
 Села в област Кърджали
 Населени места в община Ардино


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Anunţ juridic important
 |
 21996D0919(05)
 Jurnalul Oficial L 237 , 19/09/1996 p. 0044 - 0044 ediţie specială în limba cehă capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 ediţie specială în limba estonă capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 ediţie specială în limba maghiară capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 ediţie specială în limba lituaniană capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 LV.ES capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 MT.ES capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 PL.ES capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 SK.ES capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54 ediţie specială în limba slovenă capitol 11 volum 02 p. 54 - 54
 Decizia nr. 35/96 a Comitetului mixt al SEEdin 5 iunie 1996de modificare a anexei XX (Mediul) la Acordul SEECOMITETUL MIXT AL SEE,având în vedere Acordul privind Spațiul Economic European, astfel cum a fost modificat prin Protocolul de adaptare a Acordului privind Spațiul Economic European, denumit în continuare "acordul", în special articolul 98,întrucât anexa XX la acord a fost modificată prin Decizia nr. 75/95 a Comitetului mixt al SEE [1];întrucât Decizia 95/365/CE a Comisiei din 25 iulie 1995 de stabilire a criteriilor ecologice de acordare a etichetei ecologice comunitare detergenților de rufe [2] se încorporează în acord,DECIDE:Articolul 1După punctul 2ee (Decizia 94/925/CE a Comisiei) din anexa XX la acord, se inserează următorul punct:"2ef. 395 D 0365: Decizia 95/365/CE a Comisiei din 25 iulie 1995 de stabilire a criteriilor ecologice de acordare a etichetei ecologice comunitare detergenților de rufe (JO L 217, 13.9.1995, p. 14)."Articolul 2Textele Deciziei 95/365/CE în limbile islandeză și norvegiană, anexate la versiunile în limbile respective ale prezentei decizii, sunt autentice.Articolul 3Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare la 6 iunie 1996, cu condiția să se fi efectuat notificările prevăzute la articolul 103 alineatul (1) din acord către Comitetul mixt al SEE.Articolul 4Prezenta decizie se publică în secțiunea SEE și în suplimentul SEE ale Jurnalului Oficial al Comunităților Europene.Adoptată la Bruxelles, 5 iunie 1996.Pentru Comitetul mixt al SEEPreședinteleP. Benavides[1] JO L 57, 7.3.1996, p. 41.[2] JO L 217, 13.9.1995, p. 14.--------------------------------------------------


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 234 Md. 89 (1964)
 198 A.2d 82
 AUSTIN ET AL.
 v.
 UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD
 [No. 240, September Term, 1963.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 9, 1964.
 The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and MARBURY, JJ.
 William Graham Boyce, Jr., with whom were J. Thomas Clark and Musgrave, Preston & Boyce on the brief, for the appellants.
 *92 Gerard Wm. Wittstadt, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, on the brief, for the appellee.
 HENDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This appeal is from an order by Judge Cullen declaring that the appellee was not obligated to make payment on any judgment had against Millard Murray, the driver of a car owned by John Robinson, Jr. The appellants were injured in a collision between this car and their own on September 13, 1959. The order also absolved National Indemnity Company from making payments for either Murray or Robinson. The court's first ruling was based on a finding that the appellants had not exhausted their remedy against Robinson, and that this relieved the Fund from liability.
 The facts are quite complicated and necessitate a rather full statement. The accident in question occurred in Queen Anne's County. Murray had no policy of liability insurance but Robinson had one with National Indemnity Company, covering the owner and anyone operating the vehicle named therein with the permission of the owner. Robinson and Murray were residents of Baltimore City; the Austins were residents of Queen Anne's County. Robinson notified National of the accident and it made an offer of settlement in the sum of $6,000.00 which was declined. Suits were filed in Queen Anne's County on July 25, 1960, alleging negligence on the part of both Robinson and Murray. It was not alleged that Murray was the agent or servant of Robinson or engaged in any business for him. It seems to be conceded that Robinson had simply loaned his car to Murray and was not in the car at the time of the accident. But it was alleged that Robinson was negligent in permitting Murray to operate his car in that he "knew or should have known at that time that the defendant, Millard Murray, was a careless driver and did use intoxicating beverages."
 Process in the suits was served on Robinson and he forwarded the declarations and summons to National. It filed general issue pleas on his behalf and interrogatories that were answered by the three Austins. In those answers they asserted that *93 Robinson knew that Murray "would indulge in intoxicating beverages, for he as well as the said Millard Murray had indulged in the same on many previous occasions, and he knew that this trip was a party occasion." Murray was served with process some two months later but did not forward his declarations and summons to National, and it filed no plea on his behalf. It had notice that he was a potential party, of course, through the declarations forwarded by Robinson, claiming joint liability. On November 9, 1960, counsel for the appellants dismissed their suits against Robinson, took default judgments against Murray and had them extended after inquisition in the total amount of $11,500.
 On November 16, 1960, counsel for the Austins made demand for payment on National, and on November 22, 1960, threatened suit. On December 8, 1960, counsel for National orally disclaimed liability on the ground that Murray had not cooperated as required by the policy. Formal notice of disclaimer, however, was not filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles until April, 1961. On December 28, 1960, demand was made by letter upon the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, followed by the formal execution of the claim on forms supplied by the Fund.
 The default judgments obtained in Queen Anne's County were filed in Baltimore City and attachments against National issued thereon. On February 16, 1962, Judge Foster dismissed the attachments, after hearing, and ruled that National was relieved of its obligations under the policy because of Murray's non-cooperation. The appellants entered an appeal to this Court which was later dismissed.
 On March 27, 1962, the appellants filed in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County applications for payment of the default judgments from the Fund. Counsel for the Fund answered contending that it had no notice of the default judgments and hence was not liable, under Code (1957), Art. 66 1/2, sec. 164, and further that notice of the disclaimer by National was not given within 30 days, the time required by law. With Murray's express consent, and the consent of the Austins, the default judgments were stricken out on June 12, 1962. Counsel for the Fund, who was also representing Murray at the time, moved *94 for dismissal on the ground of improper venue. The motion was granted. On July 16, 1962, the Austins filed suit against Murray in Baltimore City. On August 20, 1962, the present suit for declaratory judgment was filed against the Austins, Robinson and Murray, and National Indemnity Company. The latter moved for summary judgment.
 There is no merit in the suggestion that timely notice of the disclaimer was not given. Judge Cullen found that the notice was timely and his finding is not challenged on appeal. On the other hand, we find no merit in the appellant's contention that the Fund was estopped from bringing the suit for declaratory relief. The argument seems to be based on the conduct of the appellee in consenting to the striking of the default judgments in Queen Anne's County. But we think the recitals in Judge Keating's opinion indicate that the judgments were stricken because he found that the Fund was legally entitled to defend the action and would not otherwise be liable. His requirement that Murray consent was because Murray might be subjected to the risk of a larger judgment.
 If the Attorney General had a change of heart and, instead of assisting in the prosecution of the appeal from Judge Foster's ruling, decided to disclaim on behalf of the Fund, we think he was entitled to do so. In a letter dated June 6, 1962, prior to the striking of the judgments, the Attorney General definitely stated that it should not be assumed that the Fund would honor the claims if the judgments were stricken or the appeal dismissed. It seems clear, also, that when the appellants failed to prosecute their appeal Judge Foster's ruling became final, so far as National was concerned. Even if Judge Foster were wrong in holding as he did without a showing of prejudice, cf. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 12, the Fund cannot revive the claim. Assurance Corporation v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 285. The Fund argued in the court below that National's disclaimer was invalid and that its potential liability to Murray relieved the Fund. But Judge Cullen held otherwise and there was no cross-appeal. Judge Cullen also ruled that a disclaimer placed Murray in the same position as an uninsured motorist, citing Code (1957), Art. 66 1/2, sec. 154. This holding is likewise not challenged on appeal.
 *95 This brings us to the nub of the case. Judge Cullen held that in dismissing the suit against Robinson the appellants had failed to exhaust an available remedy. Code (1957), Art. 66 1/2, sec. 160, provides for an order against the Fund if the court is satisfied, upon hearing, that "the applicant has fully pursued and exhausted all remedies available to him for recovering the amounts referred to in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of § 162 by commencing action against all such persons against whom the applicant might reasonably be considered as having a cause of action in respect of such damages and prosecuting every such action in good faith to judgment and taking all reasonable steps available to him to collect on every judgment so obtained." Sec. 162 (b) (3) speaks of amounts that the applicant "in the opinion of the court, is likely to receive * * * for damages * * * arising out of the same accident."
 The appellee points to the declaration and interrogatories asserting liability on the part of Robinson for lending his car to a known careless driver and user of alcoholic beverages. The sufficiency of these allegations was not tested by demurrer. But if we assume, without deciding, that they state a cause of action they are still merely allegations and not proof. It was shown that Murray was not charged with drunken driving at the time of the accident in question. He was simply found guilty of failure to yield the right of way. There was no evidence that he had had anything to drink at that time. If Murray had not imbibed prior to the accident, and drinking was not a contributing cause of the accident, it is difficult to see how Robinson's knowledge that Murray had inbibed on previous occasions could be material. It is not alleged or shown that Murray had ever driven while intoxicated, and he had no record of a conviction for that offense. The only two convictions prior to the accident were for exceeding the speed limit on two occasions about a year apart, for each of which he was fined $10.00. This is hardly sufficient to establish such habitual recklessness as to make the lender liable.
 The attorney who drew the declaration admitted that he had not made a thorough investigation of the allegations he made. He said he relied on what his clients told him. But he testified they learned from an unidentified physician that the charges (presumably *96 the drinking) could not be supported. He testified he dismissed the case against Robinson because "I never expected to collect on it" and "I didn't think I could get a judgment on it anyway." It may be that the attorney's conduct was reprehensible in making charges he could not support. Still it does not tend to establish that a remedy against Robinson was "available" to his clients or that they were "likely to receive" damages from that source. The proof simply does not measure up, even if we assume that the burden to show reasonable diligence and good faith is upon the claimants and not on the Fund.
 The appellee relies upon a New Jersey decision in the Superior Court, Gray v. Tice, 145 A.2d 353. That case simply held, however, that a settlement made in good faith did not relieve the Fund on the ground asserted, that the claim had not been prosecuted "to judgment." A case more closely in point is Wormack v. Howard, 162 A.2d 846 (N.J. Supr. Ct.). It was there held that where the claimant merely accepted the disclaimer of an insurance carrier on the ground of lack of cooperation, without attempting to execute upon a default judgment, and without further investigation, its lack of diligence barred recovery against the Fund. But that is not the situation in the instant case. We find nothing in the cases to suggest that failure to press a groundless claim would support a finding of lack of diligence or good faith.
 For these reasons we think the order declaring that the Fund is not obligated to pay any judgment that may be obtained against Murray must be reversed but that the declaration as to National should stand.
 Order reversed in part and affirmed in part, costs to be paid by the appellee.


text:
 16.5.2022
 GA
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 C 198/35
 Caingean arna tabhairt an 11 Márta 2022 – Deckers Outdoor v EUIPO – Chunxian (TULEUGG)
 (Cás T-135/22)
 (2022/C 198/75)
 Teanga inar taisceadh an t-iarratas: an Béarla
 Páirtithe
 Iarratasóir: Deckers Outdoor Corp. (Goleta, California, Stáit Aontaithe Mheiriceá) (ionadaithe: A. Improda agus C. Brega, Dlíodóirí)
 Cosantóir: Oifig Maoine Intleachtúla an Aontais Eorpaigh (EUIPO)
 Páirtí eile sna himeachtaí os comhair an Bhoird Achomhairc: Guo Chunxian (Mengzhou, an tSín)
 Sonraí na n-imeachtaí os comhair EUIPO
 Iarratasóir an trádmhairc faoi cheist: Páirtí eile sna himeachtaí os comhair an Bhoird Achomhairc
 Trádmharc atá faoi cheist: Iarratas ar fhocalmharc de chuid an Aontais Eorpaigh TULEUGG – Iarratas ar chlárú Uimh. 18 156 704
 Nós imeachta os comhair EUIPO: Imeachtaí freasúra
 Cinneadh atá faoi chonspóid: Cinneadh ón gCúigiú Bord Achomhairc de EUIPO an 17 Nollaig 2021 i gCás R 412/2021-5
 An t-ordú atá á lorg
 Iarrann an t-iarratasóir ar an gCúirt Ghinearálta:
 —
 an cinneadh atá faoi chonspóid a chur ar neamhní agus ar ceal;
 —
 agus mar thoradh ar sin, diúltú don iarratas ar chlárú Uimh. 18 156 704 don trádmharc TULEUGG;
 —
 a ordú do EUIPO agus/nó don Uasal Chunxian na costais dlí a bhaineann leis na himeachtaí reatha, chomh maith leis na cinn sin a bhaineann le himeachtaí roimhe seo os comhair an Rannáin Freasúra agus an Cúigiú Bord Achomhairc a íoc.
 Saincheisteanna dlí arna maíomh
 —
 Sárú ar Airteagal 8(1)(b) de Rialachán (AE) 2017/1001 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle;
 —
 Sárú ar Airteagal 8(5) de Rialachán (AE) 2017/1001 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle.