text:
Pravieši islāmā ir personas, kurām islāmā piešķirts tituls nabi (no arābu valodas — 'pravietis', dsk. anbijā). Praviešus Dievs sūtījis katrai tautai un katrs pravietis (izņemot Muhamedu) sūtīts noteiktai tautai ar vēstījumu, bet Muhameds saņēmis vēstījumu visai pasaulei.
 Islāma pravieša jēdziens ir plašāks nekā kristiešu vai jūdu pravietis, jo islāmā pastāv atšķirība starp rasûl (ziņnesis) un nabi (pravietis). Abi ir saņēmuši Dieva atklāsmes, bet tikai ziņnesis ir tas, kuram Dievs ir nodevis ziņu sludināšanai kādai tautai un nodrošinājis viņam veiksmi. Dažus praviešus islāmā īpaši izceļ, jo viņi Korānā nosaukti vārdā.
 Visi pravieši bija saņēmuši „vahi” (Dieva atklāsme) un tie pravieši, kas bija saņēmuši „šariā” (dzīves likumi) un tos apkopojuši vienā grāmatā, arī sauc par ziņnešiem.
 Islāma praviešu iedalījums
 Pirmais islāma pravietis ir Âdems (Ādams) un pēdējais — Muhameds, jo viņam pieder tituls „Praviešu zīmogs”. Isa (Jēzus), tāpat kā kristiešiem, arī musulmaņiem ir pravietis, kas dzimis jaunavai Merjamai (Marija) un viņu uzskata par tādu pat pravieti, kā pārējos. Islāmā īpaši tiek izcelti pieci pravieši:
 Nûhs (Noass);
 Ibrahims (Abrahāms);
 Mûsa (Mozus);
 Isa (Jēzus);
 Muhameds.
 Pirmo četru praviešu dzīves gaitas īpaši bieži tiek aprakstītas Korānā un visbiežāk pieminētais no viņiem ir Mûsa.
 Islāma praviešu uzskaitījums
 Âdams ir pirmais islāma pravietis un pirmais cilvēks, ko radījis Dievs, iedvešot dzīvību pēc 40 dienu stāvēšanas. Âdams ir nozīmīgs tēls arī kristietībā un jūdaismā un pasaulē ļoti plaši ir pazīstams stāsts par Âdamu un Ievu.
 Idris (Ēnohs) dzīvoja lielā trūkuma laikā, kad Dievs bija sodījis cilvēkus par to, ka tie Viņu aizmirsuši. Idris sāka piesaukt Dieva vārdu, lai iegūtu atkal Viņa labvēlību.
 Nûhs (Noa) ir pazīstams ar lielajiem plūdiem un ar monoteisma sludināšanu. Islāmā uzskata, ka Nûha uzticība Dievam bija galvenais iemesls tam, ka viņu izvēlējās šķirsta pagatavošanai, kurā paglābās radības, kas turpināja dzīvi uz zemes. Atšķirībā no kristiešiem un jūdiem, islāmā netiek uzskatīts, ka lielie plūdi bija visas pasaules mērogā.
 Huds, kam veltīta 11. sûra, bija viens no pieciem, kas izdzīvoja pēc Dieva uzsūtītā negaisa. Huds nav minēts Vecajā derībā.
 Salehs izdzīvoja, kad Dievs viņam lika pamest savu tamudu cilti, lai paglābtos no spēcīgās zemestrīces, ko Viņš sūtīja, lai sodītu cilvēkus par īpašā kamieļa nogalināšanu.
 Ibrahims (Abrahāms) ir viens no zināmākajiem islāma praviešiem, jo Mekā uzcēla Kābu un no viņa pēctečiem cēlusies cilts, kurā piedzima pēdējais pravietis Muhameds. Ibrahimu piemin arī „Eid al-Adha” gadadienā par to, ka Dieva vārdā viņš gandrīz upurēja savu dēlu Ismailu (Išmaēls). Ibrahims ir pirmais pravietis, kas ticīgos nosauc par musulmaņiem, resp. par Dievam padevīgajiem.
 Lûts (Lots, arī Luts vai Lats) islāmā zināms ar savu sludināšanu Sodomā un Gomorā pret homoseksuālismu. Islāmā uzskata par nepatiesu Vecajā derībā teikto par Lûta seksuālajām attiecībām ar savām meitām, kā rezultātā viņām no sava tēva esot piedzimuši dēli.
 Ismails (Išmaēls) bija Ibrahima pirmdzimtais un ir ievērojams ar to, ka viņu gandrīz upurēja. Sirodams ar māti Hagaru ūdens meklējumos Mekas apkaimē, uzgāja Zamzama aku, kas darbojas arī mūsdienās.
 Ishaks (Īzāks) bija Ibrahima otrais dēls un kļuva par pravieti Kānaāna zemē. Kopā ar brāli Ismailu turpināja sludināšanu kā islāma pravieši.
 Jakubs (Jēkabs) bija Ishaka dēls un turpināja viena Dieva sludināšanu, kā bija darījuši viņa vectēvs un tēvs.
 Jûsufs (Jāzeps) bija Jakuba dēls un kļuva par Ēģiptes faraona padomnieku, jo tas ticēja Jûsufa sapnim par Ēģiptes saimniecības uzplaukumu. Lielāko daļu sava mūža viņš pavadīja šķirti no savas ģimenes, jo citi brāļi, būdami greizsirdīgi par viņa veiksmi, iestāstīja tēvam Jakubam, ka Jûsufs esot miris.
 Eijûbs (Ījabs) tika dāsni apdāvināts par savu pacietību un uzticību Dievam, kad 18 gadus viņam bija jāizcieš slimības. Viņam tika dots jaunības avots, kas izdziedēja jebkādas kaites.
 Shoaibs (Jetrus) arī bija Ibrahima pēctecis un islāmā uzskata, ka viņam Dievs licis vadīt Midjanas un Ajkā ciltīs netālu no Sīnaja kalna. Kad šīs apkaimes cilvēki vairs neuzklausīja Dieva brīdinājumus, Dievs sagrāva neticīgo ciematus. Daži vēsturnieki norāda, ka šis nav tas pats Shoaibs, kurš minēts Vecajā derībā kā tēvs Ciporai, kuru vēlāk apprecēja Mûsa (Mozus).
 Mûsa (Mozus) Korānā tiek minēts visvairāk no visiem praviešiem un viņš ir īpaši svarīgs sakarā ar Tevrata (Tora) atklāsmi Israēla ļaudīm. Korānā tiek atklāts, ka Mûsa ieguva saikni ar Dievu uzreiz pēc tam, kad bija izpildījis visus rīkojumus pie Sīnaja kalna. Pēc tam, kad Ēģiptes faraons neņēma vērā viņa apgalvojumus par Dieva varenību, Mûsa atbrīvoja paverdzinātos ebrejus un četrdesmit gadus vadīja viņus tuksnesī uz Svēto zemi. Vēlāk, citā gājienā uz Sīnaja kalnu, Mûsam tika atklāts Tevrats (Tora) un Desmit baušļi. Savā nāves dienā viņš esot izvēlējies mirt, lai būtu tuvāk Dievam, nevis, lai turpinātu dzīvot.
 Hâruns (Ārons) bija sava jaunākā brāļa Mûsa palīgs un viņam arī bija uzdevums paglābt Israēla ļaudis no Ēģiptes faraona. Hâruns bieži runāja Mûsa vietā, kad pēdējam bija kādi šķēršļi pašam runāt.
 Dâvuds (Dāvids) ir pravietis, kuram Dievs atklāja Zaburu (psalmi). Viņš ir arī slavens ar Goliāta uzvarēšanu, bet islāmā tiek noliegts Vecajā derībā rakstītais, ka Dāvids licis nogalināt Ūriju, lai apprecētu viņa sievu (Otrā Samuēla 11:25—27).
 Sülejmans (Zālamans) bija Dâvuda dēls un no tā bija daudz mācījies. Sülejmanam Dievs bija devis varu pār visām radībām, tai skaitā pār džiniem. Sülejmans bija slavens ar savu godīgumu un taisnīgumu un valdīja valstī, kas aptvēra Arābijas dienvidus.
 Iljass (Elija) bija Hâruna pēctecis un valdīja Arābijas dienvidos pēc Sülejmana valsts sabrukuma. Iljass centās pārliecināt pussalas ļaudis ticēt vienīgajam Dievam, bet kad cilvēki novērsās, viņus sodīja ar ilgstošu trūkumu un badu.
 Eljesa, arī al-Jasa (Eliša vai Elīsa) turpināja valdīt pār Israēla tautām pēc Iljasa nāves. Viņš centās pārliecināt valdniekus par Dieva varenību, bet viņu apsūdzēja maģijā un padzina.
 Jûnuss (Jons) saņēma Dieva rīkojumu palīdzēt Ninevehas cilvēkiem pieņemt Dievu, bet tie atteicās pakļauties Dievam.
 Zekerijja (Zaharija) bija Sülejmana pēctecis un Isa (Jēzus) mātes Merjamas (Marija) patrons. Korānā teikts, ka viņš esot lūdzis Dievam dēlu, jo viņa sievai nevarēja būt bērnu. Dievs viņa lūgšanas uzklausīja un uz laiku atņēma viņa sievai neauglību, lai varētu Zekerijjam dāvāt dēlu Jahju (Jānis Kristītājs).
 Jahja (Jānis Kristītājs) savā dzīvē esot spējis noturēt iespaidīgas ceremonijas, lai sludinātu Ibrahima (Abrahāma) ticību.
 Isa (Jēzus) ir viens no svarīgākajiem islāma praviešiem un tiek saukts par Isa al-Masîh (Mesija Jēzus) un ticis sūtīts vadīt Israēla tautas. Korānā skaidri norādīts, ka Isa nav Dieva dēls, bet ir ziņnesis un pravietis. Ar Dieva svētību Isa paveica vairākus brīnumus un islāmā uzskata, ka viņš neesot dzēris alkoholu. Musulmaņi uzskata, ka Isa netika sists krustā, lai tā nomirtu. Korānā teikts, ka Isa ir augšāmcēlies pie Dieva, bet viņa vietā esot sists krustā kāds cits (4:157).
 Muhameds ir pēdējais, noslēdzošais „Praviešu zīmogs” un viņam tika nodots vēstījums visai pasaulei un pēc viņa nāves tika noteikti Pieci islāma pīlāri. Viņa musulmaņu valdnieka varu mantoja vairāki kalifi līdz IX gadsmitam, kad 1924. gadā Turcijas Lielā Nacionālā asambleja atcēla kalifātu un nodeva funkciju izpildi Turcijas Valsts reliģijas pārvaldei (ministrijai).


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 7.8.2017
 ES
 Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea
 C 256/11
 Petición de decisión prejudicial planteada por el Županijski Sud u Zagrebu (Croacia) el 18 de mayo de 2017 — Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta/AY
 (Asunto C-268/17)
 (2017/C 256/08)
 Lengua de procedimiento: croata
 Órgano jurisdiccional remitente
 Županijski Sud u Zagrebu
 Partes en el procedimiento principal
 Parte acusadora: Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta
 Parte acusada: AY
 Cuestiones prejudiciales
 1)
 ¿Debe interpretarse el artículo 4, número 3, de la Decisión Marco 2002/584/JAI en el sentido de que el hecho de no iniciar diligencias penales por la infracción objeto de una orden de detención europea o de poner fin a dichas diligencias atañe únicamente a la infracción objeto de la orden de detención europea o bien debe entenderse dicha disposición en el sentido de que la renuncia o el abandono de las diligencias penales debe atañer también a la persona buscada en calidad de sospechoso o acusado en el marco de las referidas diligencias?
 2)
 ¿Puede un Estado miembro, en virtud del artículo 4, número 3, de la Decisión Marco 2002/584/JAI, negarse a ejecutar una orden de detención europea emitida cuando la autoridad judicial del otro Estado miembro ha decidido o bien no iniciar diligencias penales por la infracción objeto de la orden de detención europea, o bien poner fin a dichas diligencias, en el supuesto de que, en el marco de las referidas diligencias, la persona buscada tuviese la condición de testigo y no de sospechoso o acusado?
 3)
 ¿La decisión de poner fin a una investigación en cuyo marco la persona buscada no tenía la condición de sospechoso, sino que fue oída como testigo, constituye, para los otros Estados miembros, un motivo para no dar curso a la orden de detención europea emitida, de conformidad con el artículo 3, número 2, de la Decisión Marco 2002/584/JAI?
 4)
 ¿Cuál es la articulación entre el motivo obligatorio de denegación de entrega previsto en el artículo 3, número 2, de la Decisión Marco en el caso en que «de la información de que disponga la autoridad judicial de ejecución se desprenda que la persona buscada ha sido juzgada definitivamente por los mismos hechos por un Estado miembro» y el motivo facultativo de denegación de entrega previsto en el artículo 4, número 3, de la Decisión marco en el caso en que «sobre la persona buscada pese en un Estado miembro otra resolución definitiva por los mismos hechos que obstaculice el posterior ejercicio de diligencias penales»?
 5)
 ¿Debe interpretarse el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Decisión Marco 2002/584/JAI en el sentido de que el Estado de ejecución está obligado a adoptar una decisión sobre toda orden de detención europea que se le transmita, y ello también cuando ya haya adoptado una decisión acerca de una orden de detención europea precedente emitida por la otra autoridad judicial contra la misma persona buscada en el marco del mismo procedimiento penal y la nueva orden de detención europea se emita como consecuencia de un cambio de circunstancias en el Estado de emisión de la orden de detención europea (decisión de remisión — apertura del procedimiento penal, criterio más estricto por lo que respecta a los indicios de la comisión de la infracción, nueva autoridad judicial/órgano jurisdiccional competente)?


text:
 31.3.2012
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 98/27
 Rikors ippreżentat fit-13 ta’ Frar 2012 — Oil Turbo Compressor vs Il-Kunsill
 (Kawża T-63/12)
 2012/C 98/44
 Lingwa tal-kawża: il-Ġermaniż
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: Oil Turbo Compressor Co. (kumpannija privata b’responsabbiltà limitata) (Teheran, l-Iran) (rappreżentant: K. Kleinschmidt, avukat)
 Konvenut: Il-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 Talbiet
 Ir-rikorrenti titlob li l-Qorti Ġenerali jogħġobha:
 —
 tannulla d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2011/783/PESK, tal-1 ta’ Diċembru 2011, li temenda d-Deċiżjoni 2010/413/PESK dwar miżuri restrittivi kontra l-Iran (1), sa fejn din tikkonċerna lir-rikorrenti;
 —
 tadotta miżura ta’ organizzazzjoni tal-proċedura skont l-Artikolu 64 tar-Regoli tal-Proċedura tal-Qorti Ġenerali sabiex tordna lill-konvenut jikkomunika d-dokumenti kollha li huma relatati mad-deċiżjoni kkontestata, sa fejn dawn jikkonċernaw lir-rikorrenti; u
 —
 tikundanna lill-konvenut għall-ispejjeż.
 Motivi u argumenti prinċipali
 Insostenn tar-rikors tagħha, ir-rikorrenti essenzjalment tinvoka l-motivi li ġejjin.
 (1)
 L-ewwel motiv: evalwazzjoni manifestament żbaljata tal-fatti li fuqhom hija bbażata d-deċiżjoni
 Fil-kuntest ta’ dan il-motiv, ir-rikorrenti ssostni li d-deċiżjoni kkontestata hija bbażata fuq punti ta’ fatt żbaljati. Dan huwa partikolarment minnu fir-rigward tal-punt 48 tal-Anness I tad-deċiżjoni kkontestata adottata mill-konvenut, li jiddikjara li r-rikorrenti hija fergħa ta’ Sakhte Turbopomp va Kompressor (SATAK) (magħrufa bħala Turbo Compressor Manufacturer, TCMFG), kumpannija indikata mill-UE. Ir-rikorrenti ma hijiex involuta, direttament jew indirettament, permezz ta’ kumpannija li għandha sehem fiha, f’attivitajiet nukleari b’riskju ta’ proliferazzjoni u/jew fl-iżvilupp ta’ sistemi ta’ twassil tal-armi nukleari jew sistemi oħra ta’ armi. Għalhekk ma hemm l-ebda fatt li jiġġustifika d-deċiżjoni tal-konvenut u l-anqas il-ħsara li dan jikkawża għad-drittijiet fundamentali tar-rikorrenti li huma ggarantiti mill-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea (iktar ’il quddiem il-“Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali”).
 F’dan ir-rigward, ir-rikorrenti tinvoka li l-konvenut ikkawżalha ħsara għal-libertà tagħha ta’ impriża ggarantita fl-Artikolu 16 tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, u tad-dritt li tgawdi u tiddisponi fl-Unjoni Ewropea mill-proprjetà tal-beni tagħha li tkun akkwistat legalment, dritt iggarantit fl-Artikolu 17 tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, kif ukoll tad-drittijiet li jirriżultaw mill-Artikolu 20 u mill-Artikolu 21 tal-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali, ta’ trattament ugwali u ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni.
 (2)
 It-tieni motiv: ksur tad-dritt tar-rikorrenti għal smigħ xieraq u għal protezzjoni ġudizzjarja effettiva
 Fil-kuntest ta’ dan il-motiv, ir-rikorrenti ssostni li l-motiv imsemmi fil-punt 48 tal-Anness I tad-deċiżjoni kkontestata huwa wisq ġenerali u ma jiġġustifikax fih innifsu l-ħsara enormi lid-drittijiet fundamentali tagħha. Il-konvenut ma jindikax il-punti ta’ fatt u l-provi li allegatament huma fil-pussess tiegħu. Ir-rikorrenti wkoll lanqas ma taf bl-ebda punt ta’ fatt u/jew ta’ prova li jista’ jiġġustifika d-deċiżjoni kkontestata.
 (3)
 It-tielet motiv: ksur tal-prinċipju ta’ proporzjonalità
 Ir-rikorrenti ssostni wkoll li d-deċiżjoni kkontestata tikser il-prinċipju ta’ proporzjonalità, peress li l-inklużjoni tagħha fl-Anness II tad-Deċiżjoni 2010/413/PESK ma hijiex raġonevolment proporzjonata mal-għan tad-deċiżjoni, li jikkonsisti f’li tiġi ostakolata kull attività nukleari b’riskju ta’ proliferazzjoni kif ukoll il-kummerċ u/jew l-iżvilupp ta’ sistemi ta’ twassil tal-armi nukleari jew sistemi oħra ta’ armi fir-Repubblika Iżlamika tal-Iran. Il-konvenut ma jindikax li l-esklużjoni tar-rikorrenti mill-kummerċ ekonomiku mal-Unjoni Ewropea hija adegwata sabiex jintlaħaq l-għan imfittex. Barra minn hekk, ir-rikorrenti tikkunsidra li l-konvenut manifestament astjena milli jevalwa l-impatt enormi fuq id-drittijiet fundamentali tagħha meta mqabbel mal-għan allegatament imfittex.
 (4)
 Ir-raba’ motiv: ksur tad-dritt għal smigħ
 F’dan il-kuntest, huwa allegat li l-konvenut naqas milli jagħti raġunijiet suffiċjenti għat-tniżżil tar-rikorrenti fil-lista fl-Anness II tad-Deċiżjoni 2010/413/PESK. Għalhekk il-konvenut kiser l-obbligu tiegħu li jispjega lir-rikorrenti r-raġunijiet speċifiċi u konkreti li jiġġustifikaw id-deċiżjoni kkontestata. Ir-rikorrenti tikkunsidra li d-deċiżjoni kkontestata ma ġietx innotifikata lilha u li hija lanqas biss instemgħat waqt seduta. Ir-rikorrenti żżid li t-talba tagħha ta’ aċċess għall-fajl inkwistjoni qatt ma ntlaqgħet mill-konvenut.
 (1) Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2011/783/PESK, tal-1 ta’ Diċembru 2011, li temenda d-Deċiżjoni 2010/413/PESK dwar miżuri restrittivi kontra l-Iran (ĠU L 319, p. 71).


text:
 11.9.2004
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 C 228/3
 ROZSUDOK SÚDNEHO DVORA
 (druhá komora)
 z 15. júla 2004
 vo veciach C-37/02 a C-38/02 (návrh na začatie konania o prejudiciálnej otázke podaný Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto): Di Lenardo Adriano Srl a Dilexport Srl proti Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero (1)
 (Banány - Spoločná organizácia trhu - Nariadenie (ES) č. 896/2001 - Spoločný systém obchodu s tretími krajinami - Prvotný dovoz - Platnosť - Ochrana legitímnej dôvery - Retroaktivita - Výkonná právomoc)
 (2004/C 228/06)
 Jazyk konania: taliančina
 V spojených veciach C-37/02 a C-38/02, podaných Súdnemu dvoru v súlade s článkom 234 ES Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto (Taliansko) na začatie konania o prejudiciálnej otázke, ktorá vyplynula zo sporu prejednávaného pred týmto vnútroštátnym súdom medzi Di Lenardo Adriano Srl (C-37/02) a Dilexport Srl (C-38/02) a Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, týkajúcich sa prejudiciálneho rozhodnutia o platnosti článkov 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 a 31 nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 896/2001 zo 7. mája 2001 ustanovujúceho podrobné pravidlá pre uplatňovanie nariadenia rady (EHS) č. 404/93 týkajúceho sa opatrení pri dovoze banánov do spoločenstva (Ú. v. ES L 126, s. 6), Súdny dvor (druhá komora), v zložení: predseda C. W. A. Timmermans, sudcovia J.-P. Puissochet a R. Schintgen (sudca-spravodajca), F. Macken a N. Colneric, generálny advokát: C. Stix-Hackl, tajomník: L. Hewlett, hlavný administrátor, vyhlásil dňa 15. júla 2004 rozsudok, ktorého výrok znie:
 Skúmanie prejudiciálnych otázok neodhalilo žiadnu skutočnosť spôsobilú ovplyvniť platnosť článkov 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 c) a 31 nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 896/2001 zo 7. mája 2001 ustanovujúceho podrobné pravidlá pre uplatňovanie nariadenia Rady (EHS) č. 404/93 týkajúceho sa opatrení pri dovoze banánov do spoločenstva.
 (1) Ú. v. ES C 97 z 20.4.2002


text:
 14.3.2016
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 C 98/16
 Arrest van het Hof (Tweede kamer) van 21 januari 2016 (verzoek om een prejudiciële beslissing ingediend door de Markkinaoikeus — Finland) — Viiniverla Oy/Sosiaali- ja terveysalan lupa- ja valvontavirasto
 (Zaak C-75/15) (1)
 ([Prejudiciële verwijzing - Bescherming van geografische aanduidingen van gedistilleerde dranken - Verordening (EG) nr. 110/2008 - Artikel 16, onder b) - Voorstelling - In Finland geproduceerde en onder de benaming „Verlados” verhandelde appelcider-eau-de-vie - Beschermde geografische aanduiding „Calvados”])
 (2016/C 098/20)
 Procestaal: Fins
 Verwijzende rechter
 Markkinaoikeus
 Partijen in het hoofdgeding
 Verzoekende partij: Viiniverla Oy
 Verwerende partij: Sosiaali- ja terveysalan lupa- ja valvontavirasto
 Dictum
 1)
 Artikel 16, onder b), van verordening (EG) nr. 110/2008 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 15 januari 2008 betreffende de definitie, de aanduiding, de presentatie, de etikettering en de bescherming van geografische aanduidingen van gedistilleerde dranken en tot intrekking van verordening (EG) nr. 1576/89 van de Raad, moet aldus worden uitgelegd dat de nationale rechter voor de vaststelling of sprake is van een „voorstelling” in de zin van die bepaling, dient uit te gaan van de waarneming van een normaal geïnformeerde en redelijk omzichtige en oplettende gemiddelde consument, waarbij dit laatste begrip moet worden opgevat als betrekking hebbend op Europese consumenten en niet slechts op consumenten van de lidstaat waarin het product wordt vervaardigd dat de beschermde geografische aanduiding voor de geest roept.
 2)
 Artikel 16, onder b), van verordening nr. 110/2008 moet aldus worden uitgelegd dat de verwijzende rechter voor de beoordeling of de benaming „Verlados” in geval van vergelijkbare producten een „voorstelling” in de zin van die bepaling oproept van de beschermde geografische aanduiding „Calvados”, rekening dient te houden met de fonetische en visuele gelijkenis tussen die benamingen, alsmede met eventuele gegevens die erop wijzen dat die gelijkenis niet berust op toeval, om op die manier na te gaan of de normaal geïnformeerde en redelijk omzichtige en oplettende gemiddelde Europese consument, bij het zien van de naam van een product, als referentiebeeld het product waarvoor de beschermde geografische aanduiding geldt, voor de geest zal komen.
 3)
 Artikel 16, onder b), van verordening nr. 110/2008 moet aldus worden uitgelegd dat het gebruik van een benaming dat in de zin van die bepaling als „voorstelling” van een in bijlage III bij die verordening opgenomen geografische aanduiding is aangemerkt, ook dan niet kan worden toegestaan wanneer er geen risico van verwarring bestaat.
 (1) PB C 138 van 27.4.2015.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 274 Md. 193 (1975)
 334 A.2d 89
 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND
 v.
 COLGAN
 [No. 143, September Term, 1974.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 11, 1975.
 *195 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE. ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.
 R. Roger Drechsler, with whom were Lord, Whip, Coughlan & Green on the brief, for appellant.
 Joseph F. McBride, with whom were Hooten, Fiege & McBride on the brief, for appellee.
 SINGLEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 The issue in this case is the constitutionality of Chapter 695 of the Laws of 1971, effective 1 July 1971, which added a new section 64A (the Act) to Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1970 Cum. Supp.) Art. 101 (Workmen's Compensation). The title of the Act was as follows:
 "AN ACT to add a new Section 64A to Article 101 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Supplement), title `Workmen's Compensation,' to follow immediately after Section 64 thereof, to provide that there is a presumption of compensable occupational disease in cases of certain fire fighters sustaining temporary or total disability or death under certain conditions, and to provide that benefits may also be payable under a retirement system under certain conditions."
 The text of the Act read:
 "Any condition or impairment of health of any paid municipal, county, airport authority or fire control district fire fighter caused by lung diseases, heart diseases, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to be compensable under this article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment.
 "Notwithstanding any provision of this article any paid fire fighter whose compensable claim results from a condition or impairment of health *196 caused by lung diseases, heart diseases or hypertension and has been suffered in the line of duty shall receive such benefits as are provided for in this article in addition to such benefits as he may be entitled to under the retirement system in which said fire fighter was a participant at the time of his claim. The benefits received under this article however, shall be adjusted so that the total of all weekly benefits shall not exceed one hundred percent of the weekly salary which was paid to said fire fighter.[1]
 On 9 September 1971, Colin C. Colgan, a paid fire fighter employed by the Department of Fire Protection of Prince George's County, Maryland filed with Workmen's Compensation Commission a claim for compensation as a consequence of a heart attack sustained two days earlier. After a hearing and rehearing, the Commission disallowed Colgan's claim, but properly declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act.
 On appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, an order was entered holding the Act to be unconstitutional and affirming the action of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. That court's finding of unconstitutionality was in substance posited upon the variance between the title of the Act, which referred to "a presumption of compensable occupational disease" and the body of the Act which, without referring to "occupational disease" made injuries caused by lung disease, heart disease or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death presumptively "compensable."
 Colgan appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded the case "for consideration as for an occupational disease," Colgan v. Board of County Comm'rs, 21 Md. App. 331, 320 A. *197 2d 82 (1974). We granted certiorari in order that we might review the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
 Prince George's County (the County), the petitioner here, would have us reverse the Court of Special Appeals for four reasons:
 (i) The Act violates Constitution of Maryland Art. III, § 29;
 (ii) The Act comes within the accidental injury provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law;
 (iii) The Act violates the equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the United States; and,
 (iv) The Act is unconstitutionally vague.
 (i)
 Validity Under the Maryland Constitution
 Judge Menchine, speaking for the Court of Special Appeals, described the background of this issue:
 "Article III, Section 29 of the Constitution of Maryland [1867] reads as follows:
 `The style of all Laws of this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland:" and all Laws shall be passed by original bill; and every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its title, or section only; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its title, to grant powers, or confer rights which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act; and it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in amending any article, or section of the Code of Laws of this State, to enact the same, as the said article, or section would read when amended. And whenever the *198 General Assembly shall enact any Public General Law, not amendatory of any section, or article in the said Code, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact the same, in articles and sections, in the same manner, as the Code is arranged, and to provide for the publication of all additions and alterations, which may be made to the said Code.'
 "[The Act] came into being as Chapter 695 of the [Laws] of 1971. In the course of its passage through the Legislature, both the title and the body of the Bill ... were amended. As introduced, the title of the bill had provided, inter alia, that its purpose was to `establish certain medical conditions where the death or disability of a fire fighter is presumed to be accidental and as a result of his employment.' ... An amendment to the title of the bill struck out the above quoted language and declared that its purpose was to `provide that there is a presumption of compensable occupational disease in cases of certain fire fighters sustaining temporary or total disability or death under certain conditions.' ...
 "The body of the bill at introduction had contained the words: `presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the course of his employment.'.. . By amendment in the course of passage the above quoted language was stricken and the following words substituted: `presumed to be compensable under this Article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment.'[2]" [Emphasis in original.]
 "2. Other amendments to the Bill and Title have no bearing upon the issue here presented."
 Our decisions in Clinton Vol. Fire Dep't v. Board, 259 Md. 456, 270 A.2d 778 (1970), and Shipley v. State, 201 Md. 96, 93 *199 A.2d 67 (1952) are dispositive of this issue. In Clinton, supra, at 472, we said:
 "If the challenged provisions in the body of the statute are germane to the subject described in the title so that a person reading the title could be fairly advised of the subject matter, then the title will be deemed to have complied with the constitutional requirement."
 Earlier, in Shipley, supra, at 102, the standard to be applied in evaluating challenges to the constitutionality of a statute was set forth:
 "... [T]his Court has consistently held, with the great weight of authority in this country, that the purpose of Article 3, Section 29, of the Constitution is sufficiently fulfilled if the title of the legislation fairly advises the Legislature and the public, of the real nature and subject matter of the legislation sought to be enacted. In testing whether the title of a statute conforms to this constitutional requirement the courts are disposed to uphold rather than to defeat the constitutionality of a statute, and to hold that it cannot be declared unconstitutional unless it plainly contravenes the constitutional provision. A reasonable doubt in favor of its constitutionality is enough to uphold it."
 We adopt the conclusion reached by Judge Menchine for the Court of Special Appeals:
 "In the subject case there is no repugnancy between title and body of the act. The body of the act provides that certain conditions may be `compensated under this Article [101].' The title of the act in no way conflicts with that purpose. The title simply makes clear that the act should be interpreted as granting such benefits in accordance with the provisions of that article as they relate to occupational diseases."
 *200 (ii)
 The Act Comes Within the Accidental Injury Provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
 Petitioner seeks to support this contention with the assertion that "Sec. 64A is placed following the provision dealing with accidental injury [Sec. 64] rather than following the provisions dealing with occupational diseases beginning with Sec. 22...." We cannot accept this proposition.
 Sections 64 and 64A both appear under the subheading entitled "Miscellaneous." While it is true that section 64A does not follow the provisions dealing with occupational diseases, it cannot be said that section 64A is so placed as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that its subject matter is limited to accidental injury. Although both sections deal with presumptions to be engaged in when applying the Workmen's Compensation statute and although section 64A directly follows section 64, section 64A is not a subsection of section 64. Added subsequent to the original statute, section 64A is an independent section; the designation "A" is only for placement purposes within the Article, and does not signify a complete subordination of the latter section to the prior.
 Further evidence that this section does not deal with accidental injury is made clear by its title. Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 298 A.2d 413 (1973) and Shipley v. State, supra, 201 Md. 96, are controlling in this regard.
 In Mass Transit Administration v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., supra, we said at pages 695-96:
 "That the title of an act is relevant to ascertainment of its [the Legislature's] intent and purpose is well settled...."
 In Shipley, supra, our predecessors said at page 103:
 "A title which is descriptive to some extent must go *201 far to fix the understanding of its purpose among legislators and interested members of the public. `Bills are sometimes read, especially the first time, by their titles only, and the titles only are spread upon the journal.' Stiefel v. Maryland Institution for the Blind, 61 Md. 144, 148 [1884]. And it is the main purpose of the constitutional provision to prevent enactment under a misconception by reason of a misdescriptive title. `The object of the requirement of the Constitution is that legislators and the public may be informed by the title of the general nature of the provisions proposed to be enacted.' Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 624, 632, 86 A. 233, 235 [1912]. It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict...."
 We repeat here what was said in (i), supra, quoting from the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals:
 "The title simply makes clear that the act should be interpreted as granting such benefits in accordance with the provisions of that article as they relate to occupational diseases."
 (iii)
 Equal Protection
 We turn again to the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, which dealt with this contention:
 "Statutes conferring benefits upon firemen and fire fighters generally, have been sustained as a natural and reasonable classification within constitutional limits. In Grosse Pointe Fire Fighters Association v. Village of Grosse Pointe, 6 N.W.2d 725 (S.Ct. Mich. 1942), a statute authorizing grant of holiday time exceeding the allowance *202 to other municipal employees was sustained. [That] Court said at page 726:
 `[The statute] applies in a statewide sense to every Michigan municipality, which maintains an organized paid or part paid fire department. A law of this type obviously need not apply, and probably in a practical sense could not be made to apply, indiscriminately to all employers or to all adult male employees. But the legislature may enact a law which is applicable to a specified class or classes of employers or employees, provided the classification is sustainable in reason. Particularly is this true of the State's power to regulate the affairs of its governmental units. We cannot say the statutory provision under consideration is invalid as being "special" or local legislation or that it is "capricious and unreasonable class legislation." It applies in a state-wide manner to all "municipalities which maintain or may hereafter maintain an organized paid or part paid fire department."'
 "In Sullivan v. City of Omaha, 21 N.W.2d 510 (S.Ct. Neb. 1946), the constitutionality of a statute conferring special pension benefits to firemen was sustained, the Court saying at page 512: `We think that appellees as firemen in a metropolitan city constitute a reasonable classification of persons for purposes of legislation concerning them.' See also: Iben v. Borough of Monaca, 43 A.2d 425 (Superior Court of Pa. 1945); Geary v. Retirement Board, 231 A.2d 743 (S.Ct. Pa. 1967).
 "Fourteen states have enacted legislation by which the disability or death of fire fighters or police, or both, caused by lung or heart disease is presumed to be employment connected.[3]
 "3. [These states appear in Colgan v. Board of *203 County Comm'rs, 21 Md. App. 331, 339-40, 320 A.2d 82, 87 (1974).]
 "The constitutionality of such statutes has been put in issue in appellate litigation in three states.[4]
 "4. Similar statutes have been applied by appellate courts in cases where the constitutional issue apparently was not raised. See: Cichecki v. Hamtramck Police Department, 170 N.W.2d 58 (S.Ct. Mich. 1969); and Sperbeck v. Dept. of Industry, 174 N.W.2d 546 (S.Ct. Wisc. 1970). In Sperbeck, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin used language reasonably implying that the Court gave consideration to the constitutional aspects of such legislation, when it said at page 549:
 "The legislature  faced with the decision of whether to enact sec. 891.45, Stats.  decided to create the presumption and as already stated, it acted reasonably in doing so. Evidence which only attacks the rationale of the statute, without exposing the cause of death of a particular claimant, does nothing more than question the wisdom of the legislature. As the trial court stated, "If the Legislature has acted unwisely upon the basis of insufficient information, the remedy is to go back to the Legislature."'
 "Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 1 N.W.2d 378 (S.Ct. Minn. 1941) thus disposed of the issue at page 380:
 `Relator contends that the 1939 amendment as applied to this case is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions and the prohibition against special legislation found in the State Constitution. Legislation in its very *204 nature involves classification, and a statute will be held unconstitutional on that ground only where the class it necessarily establishes has no substantial basis in fact. Much is left to the sound discretion of the legislature. The apparent high percentage of occurrence of coronary sclerosis among firemen demonstrates that the legislature was not arbitrary in providing for them as a class. Relator asserts that other occupations were shown to be susceptible to coronary sclerosis. The legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. As has been said, it may `proceed cautiously, step by step,' and `if an evil is specially experienced in a particular branch of business' it is not necessary that the prohibition `should be couched in all-embracing terms.'" The statute is undoubtedly constitutional.' [Internal citations omitted.]
 * * *
 "North Carolina reached a contrary constitutional conclusion. In Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 66 S.E.2d 22 (S.Ct. N.C. 1951) the statute had provided inter alia that coronary thrombosis and other heart ailments should be deemed compensable occupational diseases as to active members of city fire departments. The statute was held to violate Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of North Carolina which provides that:
 `No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.'
 The Court said at page 26:
 `The defendant's challenge is well taken. In *205 reality, the statute seeks to confer upon firemen a special privilege not accorded other municipal employees, nor to employees in private industry. It places on the taxpayers a burden which the Constitution declares it was not intended for them to bear. * * *'
 "We note that the North Carolina decision was bottomed upon a State Constitution differing materially from our own and bearing no reasonable analogy to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Declaration of Rights of Maryland, on the other hand, is equated with that amendment. [Horace Mann League v. Board, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).] Thus, in ruling upon constitutional attacks on statutes passed under the police power, Maryland Courts had used much the same reasoning as did the Court in Kellerman, supra.
 "We apply here what was said in Clark v. Tawes, 187 Md. 195, 201, 49 A.2d 463, 466 [1946]:
 `* * * This is a reasonable classification which the Legislature has an entire right to make. It is not for us to say whether it is the best classification or not. It is a matter within the discretion of the Legislature which it can exercise without judicial hindrance.'
 "Only when the distinctions and classifications made by statute are without reasonable foundation is there a legislative departure from its constitutional powers. Celanese Corp. v. Davis, 186 Md. 463, 473, 47 A.2d 379, 384 [1946].
 "In the subject statute the legislature has seen fit to grant to fire fighters a presumption that a disability arising from lung and heart diseases was suffered in the line of duty and as a result of their employment. There is general public knowledge that fire fighters, in the course of their daily activities, are exposed to inhalation of smoke or *206 noxious fumes and are subjected to unusual stresses and strains. An adequate constitutional base exists here.
 "Suggested constitutional impediments grounded upon absence of due process and denial of equal protection of the laws require rejection in the light of Allied American Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 [1959]. As to `due process' the Court said at [219 Md. 617, 150 A.2d 427-28]:
 `The due process clause does not * * * inhibit a state from insisting that all contract and property rights are held subject to the fair exercise of the police power. Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558, 58 L. Ed. 721. The exercise of the power is fair when the purpose is a proper public one and the means employed bear a real and substantial relation to the end sought and are not arbitrary or oppressive. The Supreme Court said in Erie R.R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 700, 58 L. Ed. 1155: "It is hardly necessary to say that cost and inconvenience (different words, probably, for the same thing) would have to be very great before they could become an element in the consideration of the right of a State to exert its reserved power or its police power." There are many holdings that enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation passed in the legitimate exercise of the police power is not a taking without payment of just compensation. N.O. Public Service v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 687, 74 L. Ed. 1115; Chicago, Burlington & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255, 41 L. Ed. 979; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110, 55 L. Ed. 112; Capital Transit Co. v. Bosley, supra, at page 514 of 191 Md.
 *207 `Most governmental regulations of business necessarily cause inconvenience, effort and financial burdens for which no compensation is, or need be, paid. These uncompensated efforts are a part of the cost of participating in the complications of modern life and society. They may reduce the net return of the enterprise but, of itself, that brings about no constitutional weakness in the legislation that demands them. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 96 L. Ed. 469.'
 As to `equal protection' the Court said at [219 Md. 623, 150 A.2d 431]:
 `We * * * pass to consideration of equal protection. Generally, one who attacks a regulation under the police power on the ground that it violates due process adds a claim that it is a denial of equal protection, and, although the scope of the two clauses is not coterminous, usually his case stands or falls on the strength or weakness of his due process argument. Except where discrimination on the basis of race or nationality is shown, few police power regulations have been found unconstitutional on the ground of denial of equal protection, which may be what prompted the Supreme Court to call the equal protection clause the "usual last resort of constitutional arguments." The appellants can fare no better, we think, than do most on this point.
 `The constitutional need for equal protection does not shackle the legislature. It has the widest discretion in classifying those who are to be regulated and taxed. Only if the grouping is without any reasonable basis, and so entirely arbitrary, is it forbidden. Abstract symmetry or mathematical nicety are not requisites. The selection need not depend on scientific or *208 marked differences in things or persons or their relations. If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed. The burden is on him who assails a classification to show that it does not rest on any reasonable basis.'
 "In King Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Thompson, 248 Md. 682, 238 A.2d 231 [1968], the statute introducing a `serious disability'[5] concept into the workmen's compensation law was attacked upon constitutional grounds. We find apposite to the subject case what was said in King at [248 Md. 689, 238 A.2d 234-35]:
 `The third contention that the act violated the respective due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions is * * * the claim that the method chosen for determining who is to be included within the category is unreasonable.
 `Since compensation laws like other laws are presumed to be constitutional and are construed in such way as will carry out the objectives of their enactment, the burden of showing the unreasonableness of a classification is on the party attacking it.'
 We find no such showing here.
 "5. Ch. 322, Laws of 1965."
 Finally, as Colgan points out, not only may the Legislature properly determine that fire fighters are exposed to health hazards not shared by other government employees, but it may also rationally determine that full-time fire fighters are subject to greater hazards than unpaid fire fighters: volunteers and those whose principal duties do not involve fighting fires.
 *209 (iv)
 Vagueness
 Here, the principal thrust of the County's argument is that the Act's use of the word "compensable," which is not defined in Code, Art. 101, makes the Act unconstitutionally vague. We do not agree. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 545 (2d ed. 1944) defines "compensable" as "That is to be compensated or entitles to compensation." Clearly, the Act addressed itself to compensable disease, which is as meaningful, in the workmen's compensation context, as compensable injury. Moreover, except in rare instances, it is only a criminal statute which may be attacked for vagueness, Maryland-Nat'l Cap. Park & Planning Comm'n v. Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 559, [Maryland-Nat. Cap. P. & P.C. v. Mayor & C. of Rockville,] 325 A.2d 748, 753-54 (1974). The Act would survive such a challenge, if it were applicable.
 In Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board, 233 Md. 249, 196 A.2d 621 (1964), where Anne Arundel County's Sunday closing law was attacked as unconstitutionally vague, our predecessors said:
 "[W]e do not find the statute vague or indefinite in a constitutional sense. It is unnecessary to elaborate upon this point in great detail. The Act is couched in plain and simple language, which may be easily understood by persons of ordinary intelligence. This is all that is required of a statute in order to prevent it from being vague and indefinite in a constitutional sense." (citing cases) 233 Md. at 264.
 More recently in Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 298 A.2d 427 (1973), the test for vagueness was similarly stated:
 "But the imperfect drafting of § 534H does not compel a holding that the statute is vague and indefinite in a constitutional case.... On the *210 contrary ... we think that, as written it is sufficiently explicit to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to ascertain with a fair degree of precision what it prohibits and what conduct on his part will render him liable to its penalties; it does not, therefore, affront the constitutional guaranties of due process." (citing cases) 267 Md. at 514-15.
 We think the Act before us meets this test. The County's other queries can be met by regarding the Act as an extension of the benefits provided by statute for occupational disease and by harmonizing it with those provisions of Article 101.
 Finally, the parties hold contrary views as regards the nature of the presumption raised by the Act. The County says that it is a rebuttable presumption of fact; Colgan, that it is a rebuttable presumption of law. Following on the heels of Section 64 of Article 101, which provides that the presumptions set forth in that section are to be presumed "in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary," it seems obvious that the use of the phrase "shall be presumed" in the Act, without contrary qualification, should be read in the same fashion. Consequently, the presumption, although rebuttable, is one of fact. See American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 390-91, 97 A. 999, 1001-02 (1916); 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence §§ 161-165, at 195-204 (1967); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 115-117, at 196-212 (1964).
 Order of Court of Special Appeals reversing order of Circuit Court for Prince George's County and ordering remand of case to Workmen's Compensation Commission affirmed; costs to be paid by petitioner.
 NOTES
 [1] By Chapter 281 of the Laws of 1972, Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol., 1971 Cum. Supp.) Art. 101, § 64A was amended to include any paid state, municipal, county or airport authority police officer. Note also that Code, Art. 101, § 67 (6) has been amended by Chapter 671, § 1 of the Laws of 1973.


text:
 23.11.2013
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 344/50
 Eelotsusetaotlus, mille on esitanud Administrativen sad Varna (Bulgaaria) 23. septembril 2013 — Levent Redzheb Yumer versus Direktor na Teritorialna direktsia na NAP — Varna
 (Kohtuasi C-505/13)
 2013/C 344/87
 Kohtumenetluse keel: bulgaaria
 Eelotsusetaotluse esitanud kohus
 Administrativen sad Varna
 Põhikohtuasja pooled
 Kaebaja: Levent Redzheb Yumer
 Vastustaja: Teritorialna direktsia na NAP — Varna
 Eelotsuse küsimused
 1.
 Kas Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 2 ja Euroopa Liidu põhiõiguste harta artiklite 20 ja 21 kohaselt on lubatud see, kui ainult ühel isikute kategoorial — Zakon za danak varhu dobavenata stoynost'i (käibemaksuseadus, edaspidi „ZDDS”) kohaselt registreeritud füüsilistel isikutel — ei ole põllumajanduse valdkonnas tegevuse korral seadusega tunnustatud õigust maksuvähendusele?
 2.
 Kas Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli 2 ja Euroopa Liidu põhiõiguste harta artiklite 20 ja 21 kohaselt on lubatud see, kui sama liiki tegevuse jaoks on ette nähtud erinevad maksumäärad olenevalt selle tegevuse teostamise õiguslikust vormist ja ZDDSi kohasest registreerimisest?
 3.
 Kas õiguskindluse, tõhususe ja proportsionaalsuse põhimõtetega on vastuolus selliste siseriiklike meetmete kehtestamine, mille tulemusel ei võimaldata ZDDSi kohaselt ja põllumajandustootjana registreeritud füüsilistele isikutele maksuvähendust, mis on ette nähtud füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjatele ja juriidilistele isikutele, kuigi nad on täitnud seadusest tulenevat kohustust arvestada oma maksustatav tulu ja arvutada iga-aastane maksustatav summa nagu füüsilisest isikust ettevõtjad?


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 51999PC0264
 Proposta de Regulamento (CE) do Conselho que altera o Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96, relativo à abertura e modo de gestão de contingentes pautais comunitários autónomos para certos produtos agrícolas e industriais /* COM/99/0264 final */
 Proposta de REGULAMENTO (CE) DO CONSELHO que altera o Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96, relativo à abertura e modo de gestão de contingentes pautais comunitários autónomos para certos produtos agrícolas e industriais(apresentada pela Comissão)EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS1. Na sequência de pedidos formulados por diversos Estados-membros, os serviços da Comissão, em colaboração com os peritos nacionais competentes, decidiram analisar se seria oportuno aumentar os contingentes pautais para certos produtos industriais.2. Esta análise, efectuada no âmbito da reunião do grupo "Economia pautal", permitiu verificar que a solução de aumento dos contingentes pautais para os produtos referidos na presente proposta de regulamento poderia ser aceite pelos Estados-membros, sem provocar perturbações nos mercados desses produtos.Tal constitui o objecto da proposta de regulamento em anexo.Proposta de REGULAMENTO (CE) DO CONSELHO que altera o Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96, relativo à abertura e modo de gestão de contingentes pautais comunitários autónomos para certos produtos agrícolas e industriaisO CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 26o,Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão,(1) Considerando que, através do seu Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96 (1), o Conselho abriu contingentes pautais comunitários para determinados produtos agrícolas e industriais; que é conveniente assegurar, nas condições mais favoráveis possíveis, a satisfação das necessidades de abastecimento da Comunidade no que se refere aos produtos em questão; que, por conseguinte, é adequado abrir contingentes pautais comunitários de direitos reduzidos ou nulos nos volumes adequados, aumentar a quantidade e prorrogar a validade de determinados contingentes pautais existentes, sem perturbar os mercados desses produtos;(1) JO L 345 de 31.12.1996, p. 1. Regulamento com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n° 2780/98 (JO L 347 de 23.12.1998, p. 5).(2) Considerando que, por conseguinte, o referido Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96 deve ser alterado,ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO:Artigo 1Relativamente ao período de contingentamento compreendido entre 1 de Janeiro e 31 de Dezembro de 1999, o Anexo I do Regulamento (CE) n° 2505/96 é alterado do seguinte modo:- o volume de contingentamento do contingente pautal cujo número de ordem é 09.2887 passa a ser de 400 toneladas,- o volume de contingentamento do contingente pautal cujo número de ordem é 09.2942 passa a ser de 3.000 toneladas,- o volume de contingentamento do contingente pautal cujo número de ordem é 09.2966 passa a ser de 12.000 toneladas.Artigo 2oO presente regulamento entra em vigor no sétimo dia seguinte ao da sua publicação no Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias.É aplicável a partir de 1 de Janeiro de 1999.O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente aplicável em todos os Estados-membros.Feito em Bruxelas, em Pelo Conselho O PresidenteFICHA FINANCEIRA1. DESIGNAÇÃO DA ACÇÃORegulamento (CE) que altera o Regulamento (CE) no 2505/96, relativo à abertura e modo de gestão de contingentes pautais comunitários autónomos para certos produtos agrícolas e industriais.2. RUBRICA(S) ORÇAMENTAL(IS) IMPLICADA(S)Cap. 12, artigo 120o3. BASE JURÍDICAartigo 26o do Tratado4. DESCRIÇÃO DA ACÇÃO4.1 Objectivo geral da acçãoAssegurar a satisfação, em condições favoráveis, das necessidades da indústria transformadora comunitária.5. INCIDÊNCIA FINANCEIRA5.1 Modo de cálculo do custo total da acção (relação entre os custos unitários e o custo total)Nota: O quadro a seguir apresentado apenas indica os produtos deste regulamento que possuem incidência financeira.>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>Total das perdas das receitas em relação ao período de contingentamento precedente: + 562.535 EUR.6. DISPOSIÇÕES ANTI-FRAUDE PREVISTASDeterminadas disposições relativas à gestão dos contingentes pautais prevêem as medidas necessárias de prevenção e de protecção contra as fraudes e irregularidades.


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Orlando Zapata Tamayo (Santiago de Cuba, 15 de mayo de 1967 - La Habana, 23 de febrero de 2010) fue un albañil y fontanero cubano vinculado a la disidencia política al régimen de su país. Alcanzó relevancia tras protagonizar una huelga de hambre de 86 días mientras se encontraba encarcelado, que le condujo a su fallecimiento. Amnistía Internacional le consideró un preso de conciencia. Sin embargo, los medios oficiales del régimen cubano señalaron que Zapata tenía un largo historial de delincuencia común previo a su actividad política, aunque medios de prensa internacional informaron en su momento de que en Cuba era habitual vivir de la ilegalidad, lo que convertía a muchos ciudadanos en delincuentes.
 Según la madre de Zapata, este habría iniciado la huelga de hambre en protesta por sus condiciones de encarcelamiento, lo que fue recogido por numerosos medios de comunicación extranjeros. Para el canciller cubano, la muerte de Zapata habría sido responsabilidad de los Estados Unidos. La prensa cubana informó que Zapata había iniciado la misma para solicitar en su celda comodidades de las que no disponían otros reclusos, como un teléfono personal, un televisor y una cocina, lo que a su vez también fue negado por la disidencia. Su muerte produjo gran repercusión mediática, entre otras razones, por ser el primer opositor fallecido en una cárcel cubana desde 1972, cuando murió Pedro Luis Boitel también en huelga de hambre. Los partidarios del gobierno cubano lo consideraron un delincuente convertido en mártir, mientras que los opositores lo convirtieron en un símbolo para la disidencia, adquiriendo gran relevancia.
 Biografía
 Juventud
 Orlando Zapata era el segundo hijo de una familia de cinco hermanos asentada en Banes, donde vivía con su madre, lavandera de profesión, y su padrastro. Buscando un futuro mejor, emigró a La Habana, donde entró en contacto con el exprisionero político Enri Saumell Peña, con quien se inició en el activismo político. Fue miembro del Movimiento Alternativa Republicana.
 Según declaró el gobierno cubano tras su muerte, había sido encarcelado como preso común varias veces por delitos como violación de domicilio, lesiones menos graves, estafa, lesiones y tenencia de arma blanca y heridas y fractura de cráneo, con el empleo de un machete, a otro ciudadano cubano; alteración del orden y desórdenes públicos, entre 1988 y 2002, entre otras causas no vinculadas a la política, delitos solo conocidos en el exterior tras su fallecimiento. Esta versión fue desmentida por la disidencia cubana, y considerada propaganda por la misma.
 Arresto
 Fue detenido el 6 de diciembre de 2002 por agentes del Departamento de la Seguridad del Estado (DSE), acusado de desacato, por lo que fue encarcelado durante más de tres meses. El 20 de marzo de 2003, 13 días después de ser liberado, fue arrestado por segunda vez durante la represión de la Primavera Negra, que llevó a 75 disidentes a la cárcel, entre los que también se encontraban Raúl Rivero y Martha Beatriz Roque, y enviado a la prisión Kilo 8 de Camagüey.
 En el momento de su detención, estaba participando en una huelga de hambre organizada por la Asamblea para Promover la Sociedad Civil, que tendría lugar en la casa de Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello. Esta huelga obedecía a la petición de liberación de varios compañeros. Fue acusado de desacato, desorden público y desobediencia civil, y condenado a 36 años de prisión después de varios procesos judiciales. Amnistía Internacional lo reconoció como un prisionero de conciencia.
 Huelga de hambre y muerte
 Entre el 2 y el 3 de diciembre de 2009, Zapata comenzó una huelga de hambre como una protesta contra el gobierno cubano, por haberle sido negada la elección del uniforme blanco que visten los disidentes, así como para denunciar las condiciones de vida de otros prisioneros. Según el Directorio Democrático Cubano, las autoridades penitenciarias le negaron el agua durante 18 días, lo que le llevó a un deterioro de su salud e insuficiencia renal, aunque hubiera sido imposible que una persona sobreviviera ese tiempo sin ingerir líquidos.
 Zapata insistió en la huelga de hambre y fue ingresado en el Hospital de Camagüey, en una fecha no especificada, donde se le administraron líquidos por vía intravenosa contra su voluntad. El 16 de febrero de 2010 su estado empeoró, y fue trasladado al Hospital Hermanos Ameijeiras de La Habana, donde falleció el 23 de febrero, aproximadamente a las 13:00, hora de Cuba.
 Su entierro, llevado a cabo el 25 de febrero en la localidad de Banes, se desarrolló sin incidentes, ya que el municipio fue tomado por unos 1000 agentes policiales, que controlaron todos los accesos, no permitiendo la entrada a la ciudad de opositores ni de curiosos.
 Reacciones
 Zapata fue el primer preso muerto durante una huelga de hambre desde la muerte en 1972 de Pedro Luis Boitel, por lo que el hecho alcanzó gran repercusión. Su nombre alcanzó gran relevancia y fue incluido en la lista de mártires de la disidencia cubana, e incluso la Comisión Europea condenó el suceso, pidiendo al gobierno cubano una mejora en la situación de los derechos humanos.
 Tras el fallecimiento de Zapata el gobierno cubano hizo pública la que manifestó era su hoja penal, según el cual habría sido procesado varias veces desde 1993 acusado de delitos como lesiones, estafa y alteración del orden público, además de afirmar que el fallecido llevaba a cabo la huelga de hambre para solicitar en su celda comodidades de las que no disponían otros reclusos. La disidente Martha Beatriz Roque señaló a la prensa que estas informaciones respondían a una estrategia del gobierno cubano para desprestigiar la imagen de Zapata. Otro célebre disidente cubano, el periodista Guillermo Fariñas, inició una huelga de hambre al día siguiente de la muerte de Zapata, reclamando la liberación de 26 presos políticos enfermos.
 El 1 de marzo siguiente, la televisión estatal cubana emitió un video grabado con cámara oculta, donde la madre de Zapata, Regina Tamayo, agradecía las atenciones de los diferentes doctores que lo atendieron durante la enfermedad que le costó la vida. No obstante, Regina había declarado unos días antes a los medios de comunicación que su hijo había sido torturado, considerando su muerte un crimen premeditado.
 Este suceso suscitó un importante debate mediático a nivel internacional, entre los que consideraron a Zapata un activista demócrata que murió por la libertad del pueblo cubano, avalado por la gran mayoría de medios de comunicación occidentales; o un delincuente común asalariado de la disidencia cubana según la versión del gobierno cubano y otros medios de comunicación.
 Reacciones de condena al gobierno de Cuba
 El 11 de marzo, la Unión Europea aprobó, por 509 votos contra 30, una resolución en la que, textualmente "condenaba enérgicamente la muerte evitable y cruel", de Zapata, haciendo un llamado a la "liberación inmediata e incondicional de todos los presos políticos" y afirmando que los disidentes cubanos eran encarcelados "por sus ideales y su actividad política pacífica". La cámara europea se opuso, asimismo, a la normalización de las relaciones con Cuba. La Asamblea Nacional de Cuba se apresuró a calificar esta condena como "sucio debate" que "manipula sentimientos, tergiversa hechos, esgrime mentiras y oculta realidades".
 En el ámbito latinoamericano, el gobierno de Chile mostró su repulsa por lo sucedido. El presidente Sebastián Piñera expresó "la más enérgica condena a las circunstancias en que murió un disidente y un preso de conciencia" en Cuba. El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, a través de su Departamento de Estado, condenó la muerte de Zapata en un comunicado, así como "el injusto encarcelmiento de más de 200 prisioneros políticos en Cuba que deben ser liberados inmediatamente".
 La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos también condenó la muerte del disidente, además de confirmar que tenía información de que "el señor Zapata Tamayo habría sido sometido a tortura y tratos inhumanos en la prisión Kilo 8". Otras organizaciones que condenaron el comportamiento de Cuba en este suceso fueron Amnistía Internacional y Reporteros sin Fronteras, cuyo secretario general afirmó que "aquellos mismos que combatían la dictadura en su país, no encuentran aparentemente nada que decir sobre lo que le pasa a Cuba desde hace 50 años".
 Reacciones de apoyo al gobierno de Cuba
 Los presidentes de Brasil y otros estados latinoamericanos manifestaron su apoyo al gobierno de Cuba en el caso Tamayo. También cuestionaron la credibilidad en temas de derechos humanos de Europa y Estados Unidos, a los que acusaron de mala fe en sus críticas.
 El presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, declaró en rueda de prensa que no se puede juzgar a un país por la actitud de un ciudadano que se declara en huelga de hambre. "Yo pienso que la huelga de hambre no puede ser utilizada como un pretexto de derechos humanos para liberar a las personas. Imagine si todos los bandidos que están presos en São Paulo entraran en huelga de hambre y pidieran libertad", expresó el líder brasileño. Lula subrayó la doble moral de Washington y Bruselas en el caso.
 Los presidentes de Uruguay y Bolivia, José Mujica y Evo Morales, respectivamente, cuestionados sobre el tema en una conferencia de prensa, defendieron la autonomía de Cuba y abogaron porque los problemas del país sean resueltos por los propios cubanos sin intromisiones externas. Morales citó fuentes cubanas según las cuales Zapata había sido "cinco veces encarcelado por razones delincuenciales" y dijo que el caso "es un problema interno de Cuba, pero se hace un escándalo internacional." También criticó las reacciones de Europa y Estados Unidos.
 El presidente de Ecuador, Rafael Correa, apoyó la postura del Gobierno cubano sobre Orlando Zapata. Correa manifestó no dudar de que Zapata era un delincuente común, y calificó de "propaganda inmensa" las críticas internacionales a Cuba. "Cuba es un país soberano y nosotros siempre estaremos dispuestos a intermediar por resolver conflictos, más aún humanitarios. Trataremos de interceder por todos, pero así como hablamos de los supuestos presos políticos en Cuba, por qué no hablamos de los cinco presos en Miami", dijo Correa en relación con los cubanos presos desde hace 12 años.
 Véase también
 Primavera Negra de Cuba
 Derechos humanos en Cuba
 Disidentes cubanos
 Yoani Sánchez
 Referencias
 Enlaces externos
 Nacidos en Santiago de Cuba
 Fallecidos en La Habana
 Disidentes de Cuba
 Activistas de Cuba
 Fallecidos por huelga de hambre