type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 23.5.2022
 GA
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 C 207/37
 Caingean arna tabhairt an 4 Aibreán 2022 – Novartis v EUIPO – AstraZeneca (BREZTRI)
 (Cás T-175/22)
 (2022/C 207/70)
 Teanga inar taisceadh an t-iarratas: an Béarla
 Páirtithe
 Iarratasóir: Novartis AG (Basel, an Eilvéis) (ionadaí: A. Nordemann-Schiffel, dlíodóir)
 Cosantóir: Oifig Maoine Intleachtúla an Aontais Eorpaigh (EUIPO)
 Páirtí eile sna himeachtaí os comhair an Bhoird Achomhairc: AstraZeneca AB (Södertälje, an tSualainn)
 Sonraí na n-imeachtaí os comhair EUIPO
 Dílseánach an trádmhairc atá faoi chonspóid: Páirtí eile sna himeachtaí os comhair an Bhoird Achomhairc
 Trádmharc atá faoi chonspóid: Focalmharc Aontais Eorpaigh BREZTRI – Trádmharc de chuid an Aontais Eorpaigh Uimh. 17 816 687
 Nós Imeachta os comhair EUIPO: Imeachtaí freasúra
 Cinneadh atá faoi chonspóid: Cinneadh ón Dara Bord Achomhairc de EUIPO an 21 Eanáir 2022 i gCás R 737/2021-2
 An t-ordú atá á lorg
 Iarann an t-iarratasóir ar an gCúirt Ghinearálta:
 —
 an cinneadh atá faoi chonspóid a chur ar neamhní;
 —
 a ordú do EUIPO na costais a íoc.
 Sainchesiteanna dlí
 —
 Sárú ar Airteagal 27(3)(b) de Rialachán Tarmligthe (AE) 2017/1430 ón gCoimisiún.
 —
 Sárú ar Airteagal 60(1)(a) i gcomhar le hAirteagal 8(1)(b) de Rialachán (AE) 2017/1001 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 42 A.3d 1 (2012)
 425 Md. 417
 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
 v.
 Constance A. CAMUS.
 Misc. Docket AG No. 15, September Term, 2011.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 23, 2012.
 *2 Marianne J. Lee, Assistant Bar Counsel, (Glenn M. Grossman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.
 Melvin G. Bergman, Esquire, Greenbelt, MD, for Respondent.
 Argued before: BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD, JJ.
 McDONALD, J.
 The Attorney Grievance Commission (the "Commission") charged Constance A. Camus with violating numerous provisions of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct ("MLRPC"). The alleged violations all arose during Ms. Camus' representation of two clients in domestic relations matters. Pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-752(a) and 16-757, we referred the matter to Judge Pamela L. North of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to conduct a hearing and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.
 After a two-day hearing, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had committed all but one of the types of violations charged by the Commission, including violations of MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation); 1.2(a) (duty to abide by client decisions regarding objectives of representation); 1.3 (duty to act with reasonable diligence and promptness); 1.4(a),(b) (duty to inform and consult with client); 1.5(a),(d) (prohibition against unreasonable fees); 1.15(a),(d) (duty to keep safe funds of client or third parties); 1.16(d) (duty to protect client interests after termination of representation); 3.4(c) (duty to obey an obligation under rules of *3 a tribunal); 8.1(b) (duty to respond to lawful demand from disciplinary authority); 8.4(b) (prohibition against commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness); 8.4(c) (prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).[1]
 Although Ms. Camus did not dispute the findings of fact, she filed exceptions to Judge North's conclusions of law. This Court held a hearing to consider those exceptions and the appropriate sanction. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Ms. Camus committed the violations found by Judge North and that she must be disbarred.
 Background
 Ms. Camus was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1997. During the period relevant to this proceeding, she operated a solo practice focused on family law in Edgewater, Maryland. By her own testimony, she had a caseload of six to eight clients at that time. The alleged violations arose out of her representation of two of those clients.[2]
 The Martin Complaint
 After obtaining a protective order against her son's father, Robin D. Martin needed legal representation for a hearing in that case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. A mutual friend introduced her to Ms. Camus, who agreed to represent her at the hearing for a $2,000 fee, which was paid by the friend. At the hearing on July 13, 2009, Ms. Camus entered her appearance and negotiated a consent order.
 After the proceeding, Ms. Camus and Ms. Martin discussed Ms. Martin's pending custody action in the circuit court. Ms. Camus agreed to represent her in the custody action if Ms. Martin, who owned a cleaning service, would come to Ms. Camus' home once a week to clean and do other chores. This arrangement was not put in writing. From August 2009 until early January 2010, Ms. Martin went to Ms. Camus' home on most Fridays to clean and do chores.
 As the custody case proceeded, Ms. Martin continued to receive mailings directly from the court because Ms. Camus had not entered her appearance in the case, despite Ms. Martin's repeated requests that she do so. Because there was no attorney of record in the case, opposing counsel also sent notices and discovery requests directly to Ms. Martin. At an October 28, 2009, scheduling conference with the domestic relations master at which Ms. Camus appeared, she was given the opportunity to enter her appearance, but did not do so. The master recommended that Ms. Camus be directed to enter her appearance within 10 days, and the circuit court issued an order to that effect on November 2, 2009. Nevertheless, Ms. Camus never entered her appearance in the case. Judge North found that Ms. Camus' testimony that she simply forgot to enter her appearance was not credible, in light of the various requests by her client, her representations to opposing counsel, and the court order.
 *4 There were other instances of neglect. For example, although Ms. Camus discussed responses to discovery requests with both Ms. Martin and opposing counsel, she never completed or filed responses and never submitted discovery requests to the opposing party. When Ms. Martin told Ms. Camus that her son's father had violated the protective order, Ms. Camus took no action.[3] According to Ms. Martin, when she asked questions about the status of her case, Ms. Camus became angry and threatened to terminate the representation.
 When Ms. Camus did not attend a December 22, 2009, hearing concerning a violation of the consent order, Ms. Martin found another attorney to represent her. The substitute attorney called Ms. Camus to request the case file. Ms. Camus said the file could be picked up from her home, but did not have it ready when Ms. Martin attempted to retrieve it. In January 2010, Ms. Camus told Ms. Martin's mother that she was mailing the file to the new attorney, but never did so. Ms. Camus eventually provided Ms. Martin with a few documents, including business cards of police officers, discovery requests, a litigation timeline, and a witness list.
 On February 2, 2010, Ms. Martin filed a complaint against Ms. Camus with the Commission. After two requests by Bar Counsel, Ms. Camus eventually provided a belated written response to the complaint.
 The Eyles Complaint
 In June 2009, Donna Smith Eyles was in negotiations to settle her contested divorce. Dissatisfied with a proposed settlement recommended by her lawyer at the time, Ms. Eyles searched online for a new attorney and found Ms. Camus. After some preliminary research, Ms. Camus agreed that Ms. Eyles should not take the settlement and should, instead, challenge the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement. Ms. Eyles signed a retainer agreement on June 20, 2009, which set a rate of $250 per hour for Ms. Camus' services, and paid a $3,000 retainer. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Camus entered her appearance on behalf of Ms. Eyles and the divorce trial was scheduled for September 11, 2009.
 In July 2009, Ms. Camus told Ms. Eyles that she had spent considerable time researching the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and would require an additional $5,000 payment. Ms. Eyles sent the payment on July 23 and requested a billing statement. Ms. Camus did not respond to that request.
 In August 2009, Ms. Eyles, who had recently moved to Texas, contacted Ms. Camus for advice about a joint bank account that she had with her estranged husband. Ms. Camus advised Ms. Eyles to take the money out of the account and transfer it into Ms. Camus' trust account for safekeeping. On August 12, Ms. Eyles transferred $11,900 from the joint account to Ms. Camus' trust account. Ms. Eyles did not believe that the money would be used for legal fees.
 Around this time, Ms. Camus filed a motion to bifurcate the proceedings on the prenuptial agreement and the divorce. The circuit court granted the motion and scheduled a hearing on the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement for November 3, 2009, and the merits hearing for the divorce for January 28, 2010.
 On October 28, 2009, Ms. Camuswithout informing Ms. Eylesfiled a motion to continue the hearing on the prenuptial agreement and it was rescheduled for January *5 28, 2010. Although Ms. Eyles told Ms. Camus that she wished to proceed without further delay, Ms. Camus attempted in early 2010 to have the court further postpone the hearing. Those requests were denied.
 In preparation for the hearings, Ms. Camus encouraged Ms. Eyles to hire a forensic psychologist to testify as to Ms. Eyles' state of mind at the time she signed the prenuptial agreement.[4] Ms. Camus also thought it necessary to hire a forensic accountant to testify about the couple's financial assets and how they should be divided.[5] On January 22, 2010, Ms. Eyles called Ms. Camus to ask if she could pay the accountant's fee from the funds in the trust account. She was told then for the first time that Ms. Camus had taken those funds for legal fees. Although this use of the funds was contrary to Ms. Eyles' understanding, she did not challenge her lawyer, but made other arrangements to pay the accountant and shortly thereafter informed Ms. Camus that the accountant would be ready for the January 28 hearing on the prenuptial agreement.
 At that hearing, opposing counsel requested a continuance because of a family illness. The request was granted and the hearing was postponed until February 5. On February 2, against Ms. Eyles' wishes, Ms. Camus asked the court to reconsider its denial of her earlier request for a continuance. Although the forensic accountant was ready for the hearing, Ms. Camus told the court that the continuance was necessary because he was not prepared. The motion was granted and the hearing was rescheduled for April 6, 2010.
 According to Ms. Eyles, Ms. Camus was frequently late for court appearances. For example, on April 5, 2010, Ms. Camus was 40 minutes late to a hearing on a motion to compel. That hearing was most notable not for its delayed start, but for its bizarre conclusion, which prompted Ms. Eyles to seek a new lawyer. At the close of the proceeding, Ms. Camus was arrested by deputy sheriffs for reasons unrelated to the divorce action.[6] As Ms. Camus was removed from the courtroom, Ms. Eyles retrieved Ms. Camus' trial binder. She discovered that the binder contained only 25 pages of materials and did not include the pleadings discussed at the hearing or any other documents related to the motion at issue. This confirmed her belief that her lawyer had not been prepared to handle her case.[7] That night, Ms. Eyles called Ms. Camus to terminate the representation. The next day, the court rescheduled the hearing on the prenuptial agreement and the divorce trial for July and October 2010, respectively.
 Ms. Eyles soon retained new counsel. The successor counsel called Ms. Camus and asked for Ms. Eyles' files, which Ms. Camus agreed to send by May 3. The files, however, were never received. On May 7, Ms. Eyles wrote Ms. Camus and requested that her files be sent to the new attorney. In an e-mail reply, Ms. Camus stated that the files would not be released until Ms. Eyles paid her outstanding legal bills. As of that time, however, Ms. Camus had not *6 provided Ms. Eyles with a billing statement of any kind.
 Two days after Ms. Eyles had retained a new lawyer, Ms. Eyles filed a complaint with the Commission against Ms. Camus. Bar Counsel wrote Ms. Camus on May 25, requesting a response to the complaint. Before submitting her response, however, Ms. Camus, on June 13, sent Ms. Eyles a "final legal bill" totaling $100,096.48. The bill indicated that $19,900 had already been paid. The credited amounts included the initial $3,000 retainer fee, the $5,000 additional payment, and the $11,900 that Ms. Camus had taken from the trust accountresulting in a "balance owed" of $80,106.48.
 Ms. Camus had not sent periodic billing statements and, indeed, had not previously provided Ms. Eyles with any billing statements despite her requests. Ms. Eyles was shocked by the size of the bill and believed it had been sent in retaliation for her complaint to the Commission. In her testimony before Judge North, Ms. Camus conceded that she had not created the bill contemporaneously with the representation, but claimed that she had maintained time sheets and other records to support the charges. No exhibits were submitted to document those assertions.
 Two days after sending the bill to Ms. Eyles, Ms. Camus told Bar Counsel that she needed additional time to respond to Ms. Eyles' complaint because her dog had died. Bar Counsel extended the deadline to June 23, 2010. On that day, Ms. Camus again asked Bar Counsel for additional time, stating that her computer had been damaged in a storm. The response was ultimately filed on June 25.
 Seeking satisfaction of the $80,106.48 balance on her legal bill, Ms. Camus continued to resist efforts by Ms. Eyles and her new attorney to obtain the client file. On June 28, 2010, Ms. Camus wrote Ms. Eyles and asked if she still needed documents from her file. Ms. Eyles' new counsel replied the same day, again requesting the file in its entirety and instructing Ms. Camus not to contact Ms. Eyles directly. Ms. Camus later testified that she had been willing to allow the new counsel to copy some documents in the file, but had not been willing to give her the entire file.
 Ms. Eyles' new counsel was eventually able to obtain copies of the pleadings from opposing counsel. The successor attorney, who had significant experience over the span of two decades in family law matters involving military families,[8] determined that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable and did not understand why a forensic psychologist had been hired. On July 2, 2010, the parties reached a settlement that was less than the offer obtained by the counsel who had preceded Ms. Camus.[9] The expert opinions obtained by Ms. Camus were deemed unhelpful and were not used in the negotiation of the settlement.
 On July 20, 2010, Ms. Camus filed a Motion to Enforce Attorney's Lien against the funds due Ms. Eyles from the settlement. Some months later, the circuit court denied that motion, ruling that the lien was unenforceable because Ms. Camus' work did not aid the ultimate outcome of the case.
 Meanwhile, Bar Counsel continued to seek information from Ms. Camus about Ms. Eyles' complaint to the Commission. On July 14, 2010, Bar Counsel sent Ms. *7 Camus a letter inquiring as to the fees charged, her billing practices, and the management of Ms. Eyles' payments. A written response, with copies of supporting documents, was due within 10 days. Ms. Camus submitted her response on November 1, 2011, more than 15 months after it was requested and just two days prior to the hearing before Judge North on the complaints against her.
 The Hearing Judge's Conclusions of Law
 In a detailed analysis based on these facts, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated multiple rules of professional conduct. With respect to both clients, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.3 (duty to act with reasonable diligence and promptness), 1.4(a) (duty to inform and consult with the client), 1.4(b) (duty to enable the client to make informed decisions), 1.16(d) (duty to protect client interests after termination), and 8.4(d) (prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
 With respect to Ms. Martin alone, Judge North also concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.2(a) (duty to abide by client decisions regarding objectives of representation) and 3.4(c) (duty to obey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal). With respect to Ms. Eyles alone, Judge North concluded that Ms. Camus had violated MLRPC 1.1 (duty to provide competent representation), 1.5(a) (prohibition on unreasonable fees), 1.15(a) (duty to keep safe funds of client or third parties), 1.15(d) (duty to notify concerning funds or property received), 8.1(b) (duty to respond to lawful demands for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.4(b) (prohibition against commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness), and 8.4(c) (prohibition against conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).[10]
 Exceptions
 Ms. Camus did not except to Judge North's findings of fact. She did take issue with some inferences and conclusions of law made by Judge North, largely with respect to the Eyles complaint.
 Discussion
 We review the hearing judge's conclusions of law de novo pursuant to Rule 16-759(b)(1), in light of the exceptions filed by Ms. Camus.
 Violations Related to Representation of Robin Martin
 We agree that Ms. Camus committed the violations cited by Judge North related to her representation of Robin Martin. Many of these violations stem from Ms. Camus' failure to enter an appearance in the case after she was asked to do so by her client and after she was directed to do so by the court. For example, the failure to enter an appearance, together with her failure to carry out her undertakings with respect to discovery, was "prejudicial to the administration of justice" in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d), as it caused considerable confusion for opposing counsel, who was unable to rely on any of Ms. Camus' actions or statements in the case because she was not the attorney of record.
 Those failings also violated MLRPC 1.3 (lawyer to act with "reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client") and MLRPC 3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not... (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal ..."). The *8 failure to enter an appearance caused both opposing counsel and the circuit court to send notices and other filings directly to Ms. Martin. With this correspondence entirely bypassing Ms. Camus, she could hardly fulfill the obligations of MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), which required her to "keep the client reasonably informed about the status" of her case.
 Under MLRPC 1.2(a), it is professional misconduct to disregard a client's decisions about the objectives of the representation. Ms. Camus failed to further any of Ms. Martin's objectives, much less the simple objective that she take charge of the litigation. In her exceptions, Ms. Camus argues that Ms. Martin had an unattainable agenda, and contends that legitimate disagreements about her client's goals cannot be grounds for a violation of MLRPC 1.2(a). Whether Ms. Camus and Ms. Martin had a shared understanding of the aims of the representation, it was impossible for Ms. Camus to accommodate Ms. Martin's wishes in the case because Ms. Camus never entered her appearance. Moreover, by responding to Ms. Martin's questions with threats to terminate the representation, Ms. Camus violated both MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) and (3), under which an attorney must "promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." By not explaining to Ms. Martin the need for timely completion of opposing counsel's discovery requests, Ms. Camus failed to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation," a violation of MLRPC 1.4(b).
 Ms. Camus' mismanagement of the representation did not end when Ms. Martin retained new counsel. MLRPC 1.16(d) directs that "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as ... surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled[.]" After obtaining another attorney, Ms. Martin made multiple attempts to retrieve her file from Ms. Camus, but the file was never prepared for her. Although Ms. Camus eventually provided her with a few items related to her case, Ms. Martin's interests were not served by the provision of these limited documents or the delays in transmitting them.
 Violations Related to Representation of Donna Eyles
 We also agree that Ms. Camus committed the violations found by Judge North with respect to her representation of Donna Eyles.
 MLRPC 1.1 codifies the lawyer's duty to provide competent representation. In her exceptions, Ms. Camus argues that, contrary to the view of Judge North and the two other attorneys who represented Ms. Eyles, her decision to pursue a challenge to the prenuptial agreement was a justifiable approach to the divorce case. Ms. Camus characterizes it as a matter of professional judgment made in good faith, and argues that such a judgment should not later, with the benefit of hindsight, be scrutinized as a question of competence. In deciding whether she satisfied her duty to provide competent representation, however, we do not consider her litigation strategy in a vacuum. Viewed as a whole, Ms. Camus' representation of Ms. Eyles fell below the standard of a competent practitioner.
 The record demonstrates a general mishandling of Ms. Eyles' case. Ms. Camus was unready for multiple proceedings and forced to seek postponements[11]; when the *9 proceedings were held, she was often late and inadequately prepared.[12] Apart from scheduling and discovery, the only significant motion that she litigated in the case was a motion to enforce an attorney's lien on the divorce settlementa motion that the circuit court denied on the ground that her participation in the case had not contributed to the amount of the settlement.
 The representation was also marked by a failure to communicate with her client. For example, Ms. Camus failed to inform Ms. Eyles of court dates, and did not explain to her that documents given to the forensic psychologist would be discoverable by opposing counsel. Ms. Camus did not send Ms. Eyles a billing statement when she requested one; the only bill that she did send came on the heels of Ms. Eyles' complaint to the Commission. In her exceptions, Ms. Camus asserts that there was a reasonable (if imperfect) level of communication between her and her client, and describes the lack of billing information as a minor oversight. But the omissions found by Judge North in Ms. Camus' communications with her client demonstrate that Ms. Camus did not keep Ms. Eyles "reasonably informed" about the status of her case or "promptly comply with reasonable requests for information," as required by MLRPC 1.4(a). By not making the discovery procedures clear, Ms. Camus also failed to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation," as required by MLRPC 1.4(b).
 Judge North concluded that the bill for $100,096.48 that Ms. Camus sent Ms. Eyles in the wake of the client's complaint to the Commission violated MLRPC 1.5(a), which prohibits the charging of "an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." Taking exception to this conclusion, Ms. Camus argues that the Commission did not prove the fee to be unreasonable, while she herself provided slim support for the fee with respect to any of the eight factors listed in MLRPC 1.5(a). The available evidence demonstrates that the fee was unreasonable. Among the factors that may be considered under MLRPC 1.5(a) are "the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly." Much of the fee was attributed to Ms. Camus' decision to attack the prenuptial agreement. Judge North found that the amount of time that Ms. Camus claimed to have spent researching the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement was unnecessary given that she claimed family law as her primary area of practice, that disputes about prenuptial agreements are primarily questions of contract, and that this agreement was not particularly complex or novel.[13] Billing for unnecessary work is unreasonable.
 *10 MLRPC 1.5(a) also suggests consideration of "the amount involved and the results obtained"a factor that does not inure in favor of this bill, as the only results obtained by Ms. Camus were numerous continuances of the proceedings. The remaining factors of MLRPC 1.5(a) do not counsel a different conclusion. For example, MLRPC 1.5(a)(2) suggests consideration of whether the representation will "preclude other employment of the lawyer," but Ms. Camus' workload at the time was only six to eight cases. We agree with Judge North that Ms. Camus' $100,096.48 legal bill was unreasonable and a violation of MLRPC 1.5(a).
 The belated and unreasonable bill was not Ms. Camus' only regrettable decision regarding financial matters. On Ms. Camus' advice, Ms. Eyles transferred $11,900 from a bank account, held jointly with her estranged husband, into Ms. Camus' trust account for safekeeping. Ms. Camus did not notify Ms. Eyles' husband or his counsel that she had received the funds, thus violating MLRPC 1.15(d) ("Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person."). Ms. Camus later took the $11,900, in its entirety, for herself, purportedly for legal fees. She did this without informing Ms. Eyles or obtaining her permission, and without keeping any record of the transaction. In doing so, she disregarded her obligations under MLRPC 1.15(a) ("A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession ... separate from the lawyer's own property"). Ms. Camus portrays the dispute about the trust account funds as a genuine misunderstanding as to the purpose of the funds. She argues that, because her client had already given her $8,000 to cover requested legal fees without asking for a billing statement, she believed that she could draw from the $11,900 in the trust account without informing Ms. Eyles that she was doing so. The logic of this explanation escapes us.
 As was the case in her relationship with Ms. Martin, Ms. Camus' misconduct did not terminate with the termination of the attorney-client relationship. Under MLRPC 1. 16, Ms. Camus had a duty to protect Ms. Eyles' interests even after the termination of the representation. Ms. Camus refused to release files to Ms. Eyles' new attorney until her fees had been paid, even though she had not yet provided Ms. Eyles with a bill. Despite promising to turn the files over to the successor attorney, she never did so. In her exceptions, Ms. Camus conceded that she violated MLRPC 1.16 in failing to turn over Ms. Eyles' file to successor counsel, but asserts that she did not intend to injure the client by her inaction.
 In connection with the Commission's investigation of her conduct, Ms. Camus failed to provide timely answers to Bar Counsel's inquiries. She repeatedly missed deadlines and requested extensions during May and June 2010. Those delays were minor when compared to the more than 15 months that passed before Ms. Camus replied to Bar Counsel's July 14, 2010 inquiry about her representation of Ms. Eyles. This consistent inability to comply with reasonable deadlines set by Bar Counsel violated MLRPC 8.1(b), which states that a lawyer shall not "knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information" from a disciplinary authority.[14]
 *11 Finally, these numerous instances of misconduct also violated various sections of MLRPC 8.4. Wilful misuse of trust funds deposited in an attorney trust account is a criminal act. See Maryland Code, Business Occupations & Professions Article, § § 10-303, 10-606(b). In taking the $11,900 from the trust account for herselfwithout informing Ms. Eyles or receiving her authorizationMs. Camus "committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on [her] honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" and therefore violated MLRPC 8.4(b).[15] Such misappropriation is also "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" in violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). Furthermore, in requesting a continuance of the February 5 hearing on the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, Ms. Camus told the circuit court that extra time was needed because the forensic psychologist was unprepared. This was not true; the psychologist had indicated that he would be ready for the hearing and had, in fact, been prepared to testify on January 28. This false statement to the court also constituted "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." These actions by Ms. Camus may likewise be characterized as "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" under MLRPC 8.4(d).
 Sanction
 The Commission recommends that Ms. Camus be disbarred. The misconduct that most strongly merits this sanction is her misappropriation of the $11,900 that Ms. Eyles had transferred into her trust account. Such misconduct typically results in disbarment. "It has long been the rule in this State that absent compelling extenuating circumstances, misappropriation by an attorney is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vlahos, 369 Md. 183, 186, 798 A.2d 555, 556 (2002); see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 810 A.2d 996 (2002).
 Even if we were inclined to give Ms. Camus the benefit of the doubt with respect to the disposition of the $11,900, the record of this proceeding reveals a pattern of conduct marked by indifference toward and neglect of clients, disregard of a court order, cavalier treatment of trust funds, and an unreasonable and retaliatory bill. In one case, Ms. Camus, while receiving six months of free housekeeping for her services, did not take the rudimentary step of entering her appearance, despite direction from her client and the court. In the other case, Ms. Camus encouraged her client to transfer funds into a trust account for safekeeping, and then took those funds without the client's knowledge or consent. When the client terminated her services and contacted the disciplinary authority, Ms. Camus responded with a large bill and an attorney's lien. Ms. Camus was recklessly indifferent to one client and selfishly exploited the other.
 *12 Ms. Camus has proffered various circumstances in mitigation, including that she was overburdened by her caseload, had a thyroid illness, and has now changed her ways by forswearing family law for a practice focused on entertainment law. She contends that her failure to enter an appearance in Ms. Martin's case had a minimal practical impact, as she was present at all court proceedings that she was required to attend and opposing counsel understood her to be Ms. Martin's attorney. She maintains that any misconduct that did occur in her representation of either Ms. Martin or Ms. Eyles was unintentional.
 These considerations, however, are not compelling enough to overcome the seriousness of the misconduct, regardless of whether it was purposeful or simply irresponsible. Whatever sympathy we may have for the situation of the sole practitioner, our primary concern in this context is protection of the public.[16] On the record of this proceeding disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
 Exceptions overruled and Respondent is disbarred; it is so ordered; Respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by the Clerk of this Court, including costs for all transcripts, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-761, for which sum judgment is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission against Constance A. Camus; order to take effect upon filing.
 NOTES
 [1] The Commission also had alleged a violation of MLRPC 1.6(a) (duty to maintain confidentiality of information related to representation), but withdrew the charge at the hearing.
 [2] These facts are derived from Judge North's findings and the stipulated facts and documents submitted by the parties. No exceptions to the findings of fact have been filed, and we accept them as established for purposes of this proceeding. See Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2).
 [3] According to Ms. Camus, she viewed any further involvement in the protective order case following the consent order as a "pro bono" matter.
 [4] Ms. Eyles ultimately paid $15,000 herself for the services of the forensic psychologist.
 [5] Ms. Eyles first hired Dr. Tom Morin, who unexpectedly died on December 30, 2009. Ms. Camus then referred Ms. Eyles to a second forensic accountant, Dr. Joel Morse.
 [6] Ms. Camus' arrest was purportedly based on a bench warrant. No outstanding bench warrant was found, however, and Ms. Camus was released later that day. The record casts no further light on this event.
 [7] An attorney later retained by Ms. Eyles testified that the binder primarily contained articles about prenuptial agreements.
 [8] Military pensions were at the heart of the property dispute in Ms. Eyles' case.
 [9] The opposing party was apparently unwilling to match the earlier amount because of the substantial delays and expenses that had occurred in the interim.
 [10] Judge North ruled that, although Ms. Camus violated MLRPC 1.2(a) (duty to abide by client decisions regarding objectives of representation) with respect to Ms. Martin, she did not violate that rule with respect to Ms. Eyles.
 [11] Her pursuit of numerous continuances contrary to her client's wishes also violated MLRPC 1.3, which requires the lawyer to act with "reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client." In her exceptions, Ms. Camus disputes this conclusion, arguing that Ms. Eyles was not prejudiced by the continuances. Delays in litigation are not without impact on the client, as the commentary to the rule recognizes. See MLRPC 1.3, comment 3. In this case, for instance, Ms. Eyles was living in Texas, and the frequent continuances required her to travel repeatedly to Maryland at significant cost and inconvenience. Moreover, the delays resulted in steadily accumulating legal fees and expenses.
 [12] For example, Ms. Camus' trial binder for one hearing mainly contained articles about an unrelated issue, and lacked copies of the pleadings being considered at the hearing.
 [13] Both of Ms. Eyles' other attorneys in the case agreed that the prenuptial agreement would be enforceable.
 [14] In her exceptions, Ms. Camus contends that she did not "knowingly" fail to respond to Bar Counsel. In light of the clearly stated requests in Bar Counsel's July 14, 2010 letter, Judge North did not credit her testimony that she was "confused" by the Commission's process.
 [15] Although Judge North found that Ms. Camus violated MLRPC 8.4(b), she characterized Ms. Camus' conduct as "arguably criminal." It is not entirely clear whether the judge's use of a qualifying adverb was based on the fact that Ms. Camus had not been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offensewhich is not a prerequisite to a violation of MLRPC 8.4(b)or expressed a question as to whether Ms. Camus had the requisite criminal intentwhich is a necessary for a "criminal act." In any event, we believe that the requisite intent may be inferred from the record and agree that Ms. Camus violated MLRPC 8.4(b). See generally Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 198-99, 9 A.3d 37, 45-46 (2010).
 [16] E.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 570, 894 A.2d 518, 541 (2006).


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text:
Mål C-340/04: Carbotermo SpA och Consorzio Alisei mot Comune di Busto Arsizio och AGESP SpA. Domstolens dom (första avdelningen) den 11 maj 2006. | Norstedts Juridik
 Mål C-340/04
 Carbotermo SpA och Consorzio Alisei
 Comune di Busto Arsizio och AGESP SpA
 (begäran om förhandsavgörande från
 ”Direktiv 93/36/EEG – Upphandling av varor – Tilldelning utan anbudsinfordran – Tilldelning av kontrakt till ett bolag som delvis ägs av den upphandlande myndigheten”
 Förslag till avgörande av generaladvokat C. Stix-Hackl föredraget den 12 januari 2006
 Domstolens dom (första avdelningen) av den 11 maj 2006
 1. Tillnärmning av lagstiftning – Förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor – Direktiv 93/36 – Tillämpningsområde
 (Rådets direktiv 93/36)
 2. Tillnärmning av lagstiftning – Förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor – Direktiv 93/36 – Tillämpningsområde
 (Rådets direktiv 93/36 och 93/38, artikel 13)
 3. Tillnärmning av lagstiftning – Förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor – Direktiv 93/36 – Tillämpningsområde
 1. Det strider mot rådets direktiv 93/36 om samordning av förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor att direkt tilldela ett kontrakt, varav huvuddelen avser varor, till ett aktiebolag vars styrelse har omfattande förvaltningsbefogenheter som den kan utöva självständigt och vars aktiekapital, för närvarande, i sin helhet ägs av ett annat aktiebolag som i sin tur till huvuddelen ägs av den upphandlande myndigheten.
 Under sådana omständigheter är inte kravet för att direktiv 93/36 inte skall vara tillämpligt uppfyllt, enligt vilket den upphandlande myndigheten utövar en kontroll över det ifrågavarande bolaget motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning.
 Vid bedömningen av om detta krav är uppfyllt, skall samtliga relevanta lagbestämmelser och omständigheter beaktas. Av denna undersökning skall framgå att det bolag som tilldelats kontraktet är underställt en kontroll som gör det möjligt för den upphandlande myndigheten att påverka de beslut som fattas av nämnda bolag. Det skall vara fråga om en möjlighet att utöva en avgörande påverkan i fråga om såväl strategiska mål som bolagets viktiga beslut.
 Så är inte fallet då den kontroll som den upphandlande myndigheten utövar i princip motsvarar den som majoriteten av aktieägarna har enligt bolagsrätten, vilket i betydande mån begränsar kommunens möjlighet att påverka dessa bolags beslut. Vidare kan, då det inflytande som den upphandlande myndigheten eventuellt har utövas genom ett holdingbolag, förekomsten av detta mellanled försvaga den kontroll som den upphandlande myndigheten eventuellt utövar till följd av att den äger en del av aktiekapitalet.
 (se punkterna 36, 38–40 och 47 samt punkt 1 i domslutet)
 2. Artikel 13 i rådets direktiv 93/38 om samordning av upphandlingsförfarandet för enheter som har verksamhet inom vatten-, energi-, transport- och telekommunikationssektorerna skall inte tillämpas vid bedömningen av om kravet för att direktiv 93/36 om samordning av förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor inte skall anses tillämpligt är uppfyllt. I denna artikel föreskrivs att nämnda direktiv inte skall gälla för tjänstekontrakt som en upphandlande enhet tilldelar ett anknutet företag förutsatt att minst 80 procent av den genomsnittliga omsättningen för detta företag vad avser tjänster inom gemenskapen under de senaste tre åren härrör från tillhandahållandet av sådana tjänster till företag som de är anknutna till. Detta krav är endast uppfyllt om företaget huvudsakligen utövar verksamhet åt den myndighet eller de myndigheter som innehar det, och all annan verksamhet endast är av marginell karaktär.
 (se punkterna 57, 63 och 70 samt punkt 2 i domslutet)
 3. Vid bedömningen av om ett företag bedriver huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar det, i syfte att fastställa huruvida direktiv 93/36 om samordning av förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor är tillämpligt, skall all den verksamhet som detta företag bedriver inom ramen för en tilldelning som gjorts av den upphandlande myndigheten beaktas, oberoende av vem som betalar denna verksamhet – den upphandlande myndigheten själv eller de som använder de tillhandahållna tjänsterna. Det saknar härvid betydelse på vilket territorium verksamheten bedrivs.
 (se punkt 72 samt punkt 3 i domslutet)
 den 11 maj 2006 (*)
 I mål C-340/04,
 angående en begäran om förhandsavgörande enligt artikel 234 EG, som framställts av Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia (Italien), genom beslut av den 27 maj 2004 som inkom till domstolen den 9 augusti 2004, i målet
 Carbotermo SpA,
 Consorzio Alisei
 Comune di Busto Arsizio,
 AGESP SpA,
 Associazione Nazionale Imprese Gestione servizi tecnici integrati (AGESI),
 sammansatt av avdelningsordföranden P. Jann samt domarna K. Schiemann, N. Colneric, J.N. Cunha Rodrigues (referent) och E. Levits,
 generaladvokat: C. Stix-Hackl,
 efter det skriftliga förfarandet och förhandlingen den 10 november 2005,
 med beaktande av de skriftliga yttranden som avgetts av:
 – Carbotermo SpA, genom A. Sansone och P. Sansone, avvocati,
 – Consorzio Alisei, tillsammans med AGESI, genom B. Becchi och L. Grillo, avvocati,
 – Comune di Busto Arsizio, genom C. Caputo, avvocato,
 – AGESP SpA, genom A. Sciumè och D. Tassan Mazzocco, avvocati,
 – Italiens regering, genom I.M. Braguglia, i egenskap av ombud, biträdd av G. Fiengo, avvocato dello Stato,
 – Tysklands regering, genom W.‐D. Plessing, i egenskap av ombud,
 – Österrikes regering, genom M. Fruhmann, i egenskap av ombud,
 – Polens regering, genom T. Nowakowski, i egenskap av ombud,
 – Förenade kungarikets regering, genom M. Hoskins, i egenskap av ombud,
 – Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission, genom X. Lewis och D. Recchia, båda i egenskap av ombud,
 och efter att den 12 januari 2006 ha hört generaladvokatens förslag till avgörande,
 1 Begäran om förhandsavgörande avser tolkningen av rådets direktiv 93/36/EEG av den 14 juni 1993 om samordning av förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor (EGT L 199, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 6, volym 4, s. 126).
 2 Begäran har framställts i ett mål mellan, å ena sidan, företagen Carbotermo SpA (nedan kallat Carbotermo) och Consorzio Alisei och, å andra sidan, Comune di Busto Arsizio (nedan kallad kommunen Busto Arsizio) och företaget AGESP SpA (nedan kallat AGESP), avseende tilldelningen till sistnämnda företag av ett kontrakt avseende leverans av bränsle samt underhåll och anpassning till gällande bestämmelser och teknisk anpassning av värmesystemen i nämnda kommuns byggnader.
 3 I artikel 1 a och b i direktiv 93/36 föreskrivs följande:
 a) ’offentliga varuupphandlingskontrakt’: skrivna avtal med ekonomiska villkor mellan en leverantör (fysisk eller juridisk person) och en av de nedan under b angivna upphandlande myndigheterna, som omfattar köp, leasning, hyra eller hyrköp med eller utan köpoption av produkter. Leveransen kan vidare omfatta projektering och installation,
 b) ’upphandlande myndigheter’: statliga, regionala eller lokala myndigheter, organ som lyder under offentlig rätt, sammanslutningar bildade av en eller flera sådana myndigheter eller organ som lyder under offentlig rätt.
 ’Ett organ som lyder under offentlig rätt’ är varje organ:
 – som har tillkommit i det särskilda syftet att tillgodose allmänna intressen och inte har industriell eller kommersiell karaktär,
 – som är juridisk person,
 – som till större delen finansieras av staten eller regionala eller lokala myndigheter, eller av andra organ som lyder under offentlig rätt; eller som står under administrativ tillsyn av sådana organ; eller som har en administrativ, verkställande eller övervakande styrelse, där fler än hälften av medlemmarna utses av staten eller regionala eller lokala myndigheter, eller av andra organ som lyder under offentlig rätt.
 4 I artikel 6 i samma direktiv föreskrivs följande:
 ”1. Vid tilldelningen av offentliga varuupphandlingskontrakt skall de upphandlande myndigheterna tillämpa ... [öppet förfarande, selektivt förfarande och förhandlat förfarande], i de fall som räknas upp nedan.
 2. De upphandlande myndigheterna får tilldela varukontrakt i ett förhandlat förfarande om ...
 3. De upphandlande myndigheterna får upphandla sina varor genom förhandlat förfarande utan att dessförinnan publicera ett meddelande i följande fall:
 4. I alla andra fall skall de upphandlande myndigheterna upphandla sina varor genom öppet förfarande eller selektivt förfarande.”
 5 I artikel 1.3 i rådets direktiv 93/38/EEG av den 14 juni 1993 om samordning av upphandlingsförfarandet för enheter som har verksamhet inom vatten-, energi-, transport- och telekommunikationssektorerna (EGT L 199, s. 84; svensk specialutgåva, område 6, volym 4, s. 177), föreskrivs följande:
 3) Anknutna företag: företag vars årsräkenskaper konsolideras med den upphandlande enhetens enligt kraven i rådets sjunde direktiv 83/349/EEG av den 13 juni 1983, grundad på artikel 54.3 g i Europeiska gemenskapernas fördrag om koncernredovisning eller vad avser enheter som inte är underkastade detta direktiv, företag som den upphandlande enheten kan utöva ett bestämmande inflytande över, direkt eller indirekt, enligt artikel 2, eller som kan utöva ett bestämmande inflytande över den upphandlande enheten eller vilken tillsammans med den upphandlande enheten underkastas ett bestämmande inflytande från ett annat företag på grund av ett ägarförhållande, ekonomiskt engagemang eller regler som styr detta.”
 6 I artikel 13 i samma direktiv föreskrivs följande:
 ”1. Detta direktiv skall inte gälla för tjänstekontrakt som:
 a) en upphandlande enhet tilldelar ett anknutet företag,
 b) upphandlas för ett gemensamt projekt bestående av ett antal upphandlande enheter för verksamhet enligt artikel 2.2 som tilldelas en av de upphandlande enheterna eller ett företag som är anknutet till en av dessa upphandlande enheter,
 förutsatt att minst 80 % av den genomsnittliga omsättningen för detta företag vad avser tjänster inom gemenskapen under de senaste tre åren härrör från tillhandahållandet av sådana tjänster till företag som de är anknutna till.
 Då mer än ett företag som är anknutet till den upphandlande enheten tillhandahåller samma tjänster eller liknande tjänster skall den totala omsättning som härrör från tillhandahållande av tjänster från dessa företag tas med i beräkningen.
 2. De upphandlande enheterna skall på kommissionens begäran meddela följande information om tillämpningen av bestämmelserna i artikel 1:
 – Namn på de berörda företagen.
 – Art och värde på de berörda tjänstekontrakten.
 – Sådana bevis som kan bedömas nödvändiga av kommissionen på att sambandet mellan företagen som tilldelats kontraktet och den upphandlande enheten uppfyller kraven i denna artikel.”
 Italiensk rätt
 7 Genom dom nr 5316 av den 18 september 2003 beslutade Consiglio di Stato att en lokal myndighet var berättigad att tilldela ett varukontrakt till en leverantör utan anbudsinfordran då den lokala myndigheten utövade en kontroll över leverantören motsvarande den som den utövade över sin egen förvaltning, och leverantören bedrev huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som kontrollerade den.
 8 Carbotermo är ett företag som är specialiserat på leverans av energi och värmedrift till såväl offentliga som privata kunder.
 9 Consorzio Alisei är ett företag som tillhandahåller energiprodukter och tjänster avseende luftkonditionering och uppvärmning av byggnader.
 10 AGESP Holding SpA (nedan kallat AGESP Holding) är ett aktiebolag som bildades genom omvandling enligt beslut av den 24 september 1997 av Azienda per la Gestione dei Servizi Pubblici, ett särskilt företag som tillhörde kommunen Busto Arsizio. AGESP Holdings aktiekapital ägs för närvarande till 99,98 procent av kommunen Busto Arsizio. Övriga aktieägare är kommunerna Castellanza, Dairago, Fagnano Olona, Gorla Minore, Marnate och Olgiate Olona, vilka äger en aktie var.
 11 Enligt artikel 2 i AGESP Holdings stadgar ingår tillhandahållande av allmännyttiga tjänster inom sektorerna gas, vatten, miljöbedömningar, transporter, parkeringsplatser, offentliga badanläggningar, apotek, elektricitet, uppvärmning, begravningstjänster och trafiksignaler i bolagets verksamhetsföremål.
 12 I artikel 6 i AGESP Holdings stadgar föreskrivs följande:
 ”... Majoriteten av aktierna är förbehållna [kommunen Busto Arsizio].
 Utöver [kommunen Busto Arsizio] får andra lokala offentliga myndigheter (regioner, kommuner och sammanslutningar av dessa), ekonomiska och finansiella enheter, lokala organisationer och branschorganisationer samt privatpersoner som ansluter sig till de ändamål som uppställs i stadgarna ... ingå i bolaget.”
 13 I artikel 7 i samma stadgar anges följande:
 ”Ingen privat delägare får äga mer än 10 procent av bolagets totala kapital ...”.
 14 Enligt artikel 18 i AGESP Holdings stadgar skall bolaget ledas av en styrelse.
 15 I artikel 26 i nämnda stadgar föreskrivs följande:
 ”Styrelsen har vidsträckta befogenheter vad beträffar den löpande och den icke-löpande driften av bolaget, med möjlighet att vidta alla handlingar som den anser nödvändiga för att genomföra och förverkliga verksamhetsföremålet, med undantag endast av handlingar som enligt lag eller stadgarna är förbehållna bolagsstämman ...”.
 16 AGESP är ett aktiebolag som bildades den 12 juli 2000 av AGESP Holding och vars aktiekapital för närvarande ägs till 100 procent av AGESP Holding.
 17 Enligt artikel 3 i stadgarna för AGESP, i deras ändrade lydelse genom vilken det verksamhetsmål för bolaget som hade företetts för den hänskjutande domstolen utvidgades, har AGESP till syfte att utöva verksamhet som avser allmännyttiga tjänster inom sektorerna gas, vatten, miljöbedömningar, transporter, parkeringsplatser, elektricitet, uppvärmning, luftkonditionering, databehandling, telekommunikation, markförvaltning, belysning och tillhandahållande av olika tjänster till associerade bolag.
 18 I artikel 7 i AGESP:s stadgar föreskrivs följande:
 ”Ingen aktieägare, förutom aktiebolaget AGESP Holding som är majoritetsaktieägare, får äga mer än en tiondel av hela bolagskapitalet ...”.
 19 Enligt artikel 17 i nämnda stadgar skall AGESP ledas av en styrelse.
 20 I artikel 19 i samma stadgar föreskrivs följande:
 ”Styrelsen har vidsträckta och obegränsade befogenheter vad avser den löpande och den icke-löpande förvaltningen av bolaget.”
 21 Den 22 september 2003 offentliggjorde kommunen Busto Arsizio en anbudsinfordran avseende leverans av bränsle samt för underhåll och anpassning och teknisk anpassning av värmesystemen i kommunens byggnader. Upphandlingens värde uppgick till 8 450 000 euro jämte mervärdesskatt och var fördelad enligt följande: 5 700 000 euro för leverans av bränsle (varav 4/5 eldningsolja och 1/5 metan), 1 000 000 euro för underhåll av värmeanläggningar och 1 750 000 euro för anpassning till gällande bestämmelser och teknisk anpassning.
 22 Carbotermo ingav ett anbud den 22 november 2003. Consorzio Alisei hade förberett ett anbud men ingav det inte inom den föreskrivna fristen.
 23 Den 21 november 2003 beslutade kommunen Busto Arsizio, mot bakgrund av Consiglio di Statos dom nr 5316, vilken nämns i punkt 7 i förevarande dom, att avbryta anbudsförfarandet till den 10 december 2003.
 24 Genom beslut av den 10 december 2003 avbröt kommunen Busto Arsizio upphandlingsförfarandet och förbehöll sig möjligheten att senare tilldela AGESP kontraktet direkt.
 25 Genom beslut av den 18 december 2003 tilldelade kommunen Busto Arsizio det ifrågavarande kontraktet direkt till AGESP. Som motivering till beslutet angavs att AGESP uppfyllde de två krav som uppställs i gemenskapens rättspraxis och nationell rättspraxis för upphandling utan anbudsinfordran, nämligen att den lokala myndigheten utövar en kontroll över den upphandlande enheten motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning och att denna enhet bedriver huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar den. I ingressen till detta beslut bekräftas att det föreligger ett beroendeförhållande mellan AGESP och kommunen Busto Arsizio till följd av att sistnämnda kommun äger 99,98 procent av aktiekapitalet i AGESP Holding, vilken i sin tur äger 100 procent av aktiekapitalet i AGESP. I ingressen anges vidare att huvuddelen av AGESP:s omsättning härrör från verksamhet som det skall bedriva enligt kontrakt som det erhållit direkt från kommunen Busto Arsizio.
 26 Genom ett meddelande av den 23 januari 2004 utlyste AGESP en anbudsinfordran inom ramen för ett påskyndat förfarande avseende leverans av den ifrågavarande eldningsoljan och tilldelade detta kontrakt till företaget Pezzoli Petroli Srl den 27 februari 2004. Den 28 april, den 18 maj, den 30 juni och den 2 september 2004 tilldelade AGESP kontrakt till andra företag. Dessa kontrakt avsåg omvandling till metan, teknisk anpassning, anpassning till bestämmelser och installering av ett fjärrstyrt system för kontroll och förvaltning av olika kommunala värmesystem. Varken Carbotermo eller Consorzio Alisei ingick bland de företag som tilldelats kontrakt.
 27 Carbotermo och Consorzio Alisei överklagade vid Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia besluten att avbryta upphandlingsförfarandet och att tilldela AGESP det ifrågavarande kontraktet.
 28 De båda företagen gjorde vid denna domstol gällande att kraven för att direktiv 93/36 inte skall anses tillämpligt inte var uppfyllda i förevarande fall. AGESP kontrollerades inte heller av kommunen Busto Arsizio, eftersom denna kommun endast ägde AGESP genom ett holdingbolag i vilket den ägde 99,98 procent av aktierna och AGESP helt behöll den självständighet som ett privaträttsligt aktiebolag har. AGESP bedrev inte heller huvuddelen av sin verksamhet för kommunen Busto Arsizios räkning, eftersom mindre än 80 procent av AGESP:s omsättning härrör från verksamhet som den bedrev tillsammans med denna kommun. Detta kriterium skall användas analogt med artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38.
 29 Kommunen Busto Arsizio invände att det var tillåtet med direkt tilldelning i förevarande fall, eftersom AGESP kontrollerades av kommunen Busto Arsizio på grund av att denna kommun ägde aktiekapital i bolaget och eftersom AGESP bedrev huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med denna kommun. AGESP uppgav att mer än 28 procent av dess omsättning som härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits på kommunen Busto Arsizios mark avsåg tjänster som tillhandahölls direkt till kommunen och att omsättningen som härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits inom denna kommuns mark uppgick till 65,59 procent av AGESP:s totala omsättning.
 30 Det är mot denna bakgrund som Tribunale amministrativo per la Lombardia har beslutat att vilandeförklara målet och ställa följande tolkningsfrågor till domstolen:
 ”1. Är det förenligt med direktiv 93/36/EEG att direkt tilldela ett kontrakt avseende leverans av bränsle för värmesystem i byggnader som ägs av kommunen eller som kommunen ansvarar för och avseende drift och underhåll av dessa system (varav huvuddelen avser varor) till ett aktiebolag som, för närvarande, i sin helhet ägs av ett annat aktiebolag som i sin tur till huvuddelen (99,98 procent) ägs av den kommun som tilldelat kontraktet, med andra ord till ett bolag (AGESP) som inte ägs direkt av den offentliga myndigheten utan av ett annat bolag (AGESP Holding) som för närvarande ägs till 99,98 procent av den offentliga myndigheten?
 2. Skall artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 ... tillämpas för att fastställa huruvida ett företag som direkt tilldelats ett varukontrakt uppfyller kravet på att det skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar företaget och skall kravet anses vara uppfyllt när huvuddelen av ovannämnda företags omsättning härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits tillsammans med den offentliga myndighet som innehar företaget eller, alternativt, när omsättningen härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits huvudsakligen på myndighetens mark?”
 Bedömningen av tolkningsfrågorna
 31 Domstolen har redan fastställt att om ett offentligt kontrakt är avsett att omfatta såväl varor enligt definitionen i direktiv 93/36 som tjänster i den mening som avses i rådets direktiv 92/50/EEG av den 18 juni 1992 om samordning av förfarandena vid offentlig upphandling av tjänster (EGT L 209, s. 1; svensk specialutgåva, område 6, volym 3, s. 139), så skall bestämmelserna i direktiv 93/36 tillämpas om värdet av de varor som omfattas av kontraktet är högre än värdet av tjänsterna (dom av den 18 november 1999 i mål C-107/98, Teckal, REG 1999, s. I-8121, punkt 38). Ett kontrakt som det som är i fråga i målet vid den nationella domstolen, där värdet av varorna är högre än värdet av de tjänster som kontraktet avser, omfattas således av direktiv 93/36, vilket den hänskjutande domstolen för övrigt har konstaterat.
 32 För att ett avtal i den mening som avses i artikel 1 a i direktiv 93/36 skall anses föreligga krävs det att det finns en överenskommelse mellan två skilda personer (domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal, punkt 49).
 33 Enligt artikel 1 a i nämnda direktiv är det i princip tillräckligt att avtalet har slutits mellan, å ena sidan, en lokal myndighet, och, å andra sidan, en i förhållande till denna myndighet fristående juridisk person. Endast i det fallet att den lokala myndigheten, samtidigt, utövar en kontroll över den ifrågavarande juridiska personen motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning, och denna juridiska person bedriver huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den eller de myndigheter som innehar den, skulle något annat kunna gälla (domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal, punkt 50).
 34 Av beslutet om hänskjutande och handlingarna i målet framgår att den upphandlande myndigheten för närvarande äger 99,98 procent av aktiekapitalet i AGESP Holding, medan resterande 0,02 procent ägs av andra lokala eller regionala myndigheter. Enligt AGESP Holdings stadgar kan privata aktieägare äga kapital i detta bolag under två förutsättningar, nämligen att majoriteten av aktierna är förbehållna kommunen Busto Arsizio och att ingen privat delägare får äga mer än en tiondel av bolagets kapital.
 35 AGESP Holding äger i sin tur för närvarande 100 procent av aktiekapitalet i AGESP. Enligt det sistnämnda bolagets stadgar kan dess aktiekapital öppnas för privata aktieägare, dock med förbehållet att ingen aktieägare, förutom AGESP Holding, får inneha mer än en tiondel av bolagskapitalet.
 36 Vid bedömningen av om den upphandlande myndigheten utövar en kontroll motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning, skall samtliga relevanta lagbestämmelser och omständigheter beaktas. Av denna undersökning skall framgå att det bolag som tilldelats kontraktet är underställt en kontroll som gör det möjligt för den upphandlande myndigheten att påverka de beslut som fattas av nämnda bolag. Det skall vara fråga om en möjlighet att utöva en avgörande påverkan i fråga om såväl strategiska mål som bolagets viktiga beslut (se dom av den 13 oktober 2005 i mål C-458/03, Parking Brixen, REG 2005, s. I‐0000, punkt 65).
 37 Den omständigheten att den upphandlande myndigheten ensam eller tillsammans med andra offentliga myndigheter äger hela aktiekapitalet i det bolag som tilldelats kontraktet tyder som regel på, utan att vara av avgörande betydelse för bedömningen, att den upphandlande myndigheten utövar en kontroll över detta bolag motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning, i den mening som avses i punkt 50 i domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal.
 38 Av handlingarna i målet framgår att AGESP Holdings och AGESP:s stadgar ger styrelsen för vart och ett av dessa bolag långtgående befogenheter avseende den löpande och den icke-löpande förvaltningen. Enligt dessa stadgar förbehålls inte kommunen Busto Arsizio någon särskild kontrollbefogenhet eller rösträtt för att begränsa den handlingsfrihet som styrelserna har getts. Den kontroll som kommunen Busto Arsizio utövar över dessa två bolag motsvarar i princip den som majoriteten av aktieägarna har enligt bolagsrätten, vilket i betydande mån begränsar kommunens möjlighet att påverka dessa bolags beslut.
 39 Vidare utövas det inflytande som kommunen Busto Arsizio eventuellt har över AGESP:s beslut genom ett holdingbolag. Förekomsten av detta mellanled kan under omständigheterna i målet försvaga den kontroll som den upphandlande myndigheten eventuellt utövar till följd av att den äger en del av aktiekapitalet.
 40 Härav följer att under sådana omständigheter – med förbehåll för prövningen av dessa av den behöriga nationella domstolen, vilken är behörig att avgöra målet i sak – utövar inte den upphandlande myndigheten en kontroll över det ifrågavarande bolaget motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning.
 41 Enligt artikel 6 i direktiv 93/36 skall de upphandlande myndigheter som tilldelar offentliga kontrakt använda det öppna eller det selektiva förfarandet, om inte kontraktet omfattas av ett av undantagsfallen i den uttömmande uppräkningen i artikel 6.2 och 6.3. Det framgår inte av beslutet om hänskjutande att det kontrakt som är i fråga i målet vid den nationella domstolen omfattas av ett av de fallen.
 42 Härav följer att det strider mot direktiv 93/36 att direkt tilldela ett offentligt kontrakt under sådana omständigheter som dem i målet vid den nationella domstolen.
 43 Mot denna slutsats har den italienska regeringen invänt att den omständigheten att AGESP måste tillämpa ett offentligt upphandlingsförfarande för att förvärva den ifrågavarande eldningsoljan visar att kommunen Busto Arsizio, AGESP Holding och AGESP tillsammans skall anses utgöra ett enda ”organ som lyder under offentlig rätt”, i den mening som avses i artikel 1 b i direktiv 93/36, vilket är skyldigt att ingå offentliga varuupphandlingskontrakt i enlighet med de gemenskapsrättsliga och de nationella bestämmelserna på området.
 44 Detta argument kan inte godtas. Kommunen Busto Arsizio omfattas av begreppet ”lokal eller regional myndighet” och inte av begreppet ”ett organ som lyder under offentlig rätt” i den mening som avses i denna bestämmelse. Vidare har kommunen Busto Arsizio, AGESP Holding och AGESP var och en ställning som en självständig juridisk person.
 45 Såsom domstolen erinrade om i punkt 43 i domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal är för övrigt de enda tillåtna undantagen från tillämpningen av direktiv 93/36 de undantag som uttömmande och uttryckligen anges i denna bestämmelse.
 46 Direktiv 93/36 innehåller dock inte någon föreskrift som är jämförbar med artikel 6 i direktiv 92/50, som från sitt tillämpningsområde utesluter offentliga kontrakt som, på vissa villkor, tilldelats upphandlande myndigheter (domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal, punkt 44).
 47 Den första frågan skall således besvaras så att det strider mot direktiv 93/36 att direkt tilldela ett kontrakt avseende varor och tjänster, varav huvuddelen avser varor, till ett aktiebolag vars styrelse har omfattande förvaltningsbefogenheter som den kan utöva självständigt och vars aktiekapital, för närvarande, i sin helhet ägs av ett annat aktiebolag som i sin tur till huvuddelen ägs av den upphandlande myndigheten.
 48 Den andra frågan består av två delar.
 49 Den hänskjutande domstolen vill få klarhet i huruvida artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 skall tillämpas för att fastställa huruvida ett företag som direkt tilldelats ett varukontrakt uppfyller kravet på att det skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar företaget. Den hänskjutande domstolen undrar vidare huruvida detta krav skall anses vara uppfyllt när huvuddelen av ovannämnda företags omsättning härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits tillsammans med den offentliga myndighet som innehar företaget eller när omsättningen härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits huvudsakligen på myndighetens territorium.
 Den andra frågans första del
 50 Av beslutet om hänskjutande framgår att den ifrågavarande upphandlingen omfattas av direktiv 93/36.
 51 Det skall således utredas om det undantag som anges i artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 skall tillämpas analogt inom tillämpningsområdet för direktiv 93/36.
 52 Det undantag som föreskrivs i nämnda artikel 13 avser endast upphandling av tjänster, inte upphandling av varor.
 53 Artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 avser aktörer, särskilt samriskföretag och företag vars årsräkenskaper är konsoliderade, vilka fungerar på ett annat sätt än de upphandlande myndigheter som avses i direktiv 93/36.
 54 Vidare innehåller nämnda artikel en mekanism för att meddela kommissionen som i avsaknad av rättslig grund inte även kan anses gälla direktiv 93/36.
 55 Undantagen skall tolkas restriktivt. Härav följer att tillämpningen av artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 inte kan utvidgas till att även omfatta tillämpningsområdet för direktiv 93/36.
 56 Denna slutsats bekräftas av den omständigheten att gemenskapslagstiftaren då direktiven om offentlig upphandling omarbetades år 2004 behöll nämnda undantag i artikel 23 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/17/EG av den 31 mars 2004 om samordning av förfarandena vid upphandling på områdena vatten, energi, transporter och posttjänster (försörjningsdirektivet) (EUT L 134, s. 1), samtidigt som den valde att inte införa ett liknande undantag i direktiv 2004/18/EG, som ersatte direktiv 93/36.
 57 Av det ovan anförda följer att den andra frågans första del skall besvaras så att vid bedömningen av om kravet för att direktiv 93/36 inte skall anses tillämpligt är uppfyllt, nämligen att ett företag som direkt tilldelats ett varukontrakt skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar företaget, skall artikel 13 i direktiv 93/38 inte tillämpas.
 Den andra frågans andra del
 58 Domstolen erinrar om att huvudsyftet med de gemenskapsrättsliga bestämmelserna angående offentlig upphandling är fri rörlighet för varor och tjänster och att området öppnas upp för icke snedvriden konkurrens i alla medlemsstater (se, för ett liknande resonemang, domstolens dom av den 11 januari 2005 i det ovannämnda målet Stadt Halle och RPL Lochau, punkt 44).
 59 De krav som uppställs i domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal för att direktiv 93/36 inte skall anses tillämpligt på kontrakt som ingåtts mellan en lokal myndighet och en från denna myndighet fristående person, enligt vilka den lokala myndigheten, samtidigt, skall utöva en kontroll över den ifrågavarande juridiska personen motsvarande den som den utövar över sin egen förvaltning, och denna juridiska person skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den eller de myndigheter som innehar den, har särskilt till syfte att undvika att konkurrensen snedvrids.
 60 Kravet på att den ifrågavarande personen skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den eller de myndigheter som innehar den har särskilt till syfte att säkerställa att direktiv 93/36 är tillämpligt i det fall då ett företag som kontrolleras av en eller flera myndigheter är aktivt på marknaden och således kan konkurrera med andra företag.
 61 Ett företag berövas nämligen inte nödvändigtvis sin handlingsfrihet endast på grund av att de beslut som berör företaget kontrolleras av den myndighet som innehar det, om företaget fortfarande kan utöva en betydande del av sin ekonomiska verksamhet tillsammans med andra aktörer.
 62 Det krävs också att företagets tjänster huvudsakligen är avsedda enbart för denna myndighet. Med sådana begränsningar förefaller det berättigat att kraven i direktiv 93/36 inte gäller för detta företag, eftersom kraven motiveras av en strävan att behålla en konkurrens som det i detta fall inte längre finns skäl för.
 63 Vid tillämpningen av dessa principer kan det ifrågavarande företaget endast anses bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar den, i den mening som avses i det ovannämnda målet Teckal, om företaget huvudsakligen utövar verksamhet åt denna myndighet, och all annan verksamhet endast är av marginell karaktär.
 64 För att bedöma om så är fallet skall den behöriga domstolen beakta alla omständigheter i målet, såväl kvalitativa som kvantitativa.
 65 Vad beträffar frågan huruvida det i detta sammanhang endast skall tas hänsyn till den omsättning som härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits tillsammans med den övervakande myndigheten eller till den omsättning som härrör från verksamhet som bedrivits på denna myndighets territorium, skall den omsättning anses avgörande som härrör från verksamhet som det ifrågavarande företaget bedrivit enligt tilldelningsbeslut som antagits av den övervakande myndigheten, däribland den omsättning som härrör från verksamhet som det bedrivit tillsammans med användare vid genomförandet av sådana beslut.
 66 All den verksamhet som det företag som tilldelats kontraktet bedriver inom ramen för en tilldelning som gjorts av den upphandlande myndigheten skall nämligen beaktas, oavsett om mottagaren är den upphandlande myndigheten själv eller tjänsteanvändaren.
 67 Det saknar betydelse vem som betalar det ifrågavarande företaget, det vill säga oavsett om det är den myndighet som innehar det eller tredje parter som använder tjänster som tillhandahålls enligt koncessioner eller andra rättsförhållanden som upprättas av nämnda myndighet. Det saknar likaså betydelse på vilket territorium nämnda tjänster tillhandahålls.
 68 I den mån det aktuella tilldelade bolagets aktiekapital innehas indirekt av olika myndigheter kan det vara relevant att undersöka huruvida den verksamhet som skall beaktas är den som det bolag som tilldelats kontraktet bedriver tillsammans med samtliga myndigheter som innehar det eller endast den verksamhet som bedrivs tillsammans med den myndighet som i förevarande fall agerar som upphandlande myndighet.
 69 Det skall i detta avseende erinras om att domstolen har angett att den aktuella fristående juridiska personen skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med ”den eller de myndigheter som innehar den” (domen i det ovannämnda målet Teckal, punkt 50). Domstolen har således räknat med att det föreskrivna undantaget inte endast är tillämpligt då en enda myndighet innehar en sådan juridisk person utan även kan vara tillämpligt då det finns flera innehavare.
 70 I det fall då flera myndigheter innehar ett företag kan kravet avseende huvuddelen av dess verksamhet vara uppfyllt om detta företag utövar huvuddelen av sin verksamhet, inte nödvändigtvis tillsammans med en av dessa myndigheter, men tillsammans med samtliga dessa myndigheter.
 71 Den verksamhet som skall beaktas när ett företag innehas av flera myndigheter är följaktligen den som detta företag bedriver tillsammans med samtliga dessa myndigheter.
 72 Av det ovan anförda följer att den andra frågans andra del skall besvaras så att vid bedömningen av om ett företag bedriver huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar det, i syfte att fastställa huruvida direktiv 93/36 är tillämpligt, skall all den verksamhet som detta företag bedriver inom ramen för en tilldelning som gjorts av den upphandlande myndigheten beaktas, oberoende av vem som betalar denna verksamhet – den upphandlande myndigheten själv eller de som använder de tillhandahållna tjänsterna. Det saknar härvid betydelse på vilket territorium verksamheten bedrivs.
 73 Eftersom förfarandet i förhållande till parterna i målet vid den nationella domstolen utgör ett led i beredningen av samma mål, ankommer det på den nationella domstolen att besluta om rättegångskostnaderna. De kostnader för att avge yttranden till domstolen som andra än nämnda parter har haft är inte ersättningsgilla.
 1) Det strider mot rådets direktiv 93/36/EEG av den 14 juni 1993 om samordning av förfarandet vid offentlig upphandling av varor att direkt tilldela ett kontrakt avseende varor och tjänster, varav huvuddelen avser varor, till ett aktiebolag vars styrelse har omfattande förvaltningsbefogenheter som den kan utöva självständigt och vars aktiekapital, för närvarande, i sin helhet ägs av ett annat aktiebolag som i sin tur till huvuddelen ägs av den upphandlande myndigheten.
 2) Artikel 13 i rådets direktiv 93/38/EEG av den 14 juni 1993 om samordning av upphandlingsförfarandet för enheter som har verksamhet inom vatten-, energi-, transport- och telekommunikationssektorerna skall inte tillämpas vid bedömningen av om kravet för att direktiv 93/36 inte skall anses tillämpligt är uppfyllt, nämligen att ett företag som direkt tilldelats ett varukontrakt skall bedriva huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar företaget.
 3) Vid bedömningen av om ett företag bedriver huvuddelen av sin verksamhet tillsammans med den myndighet som innehar det, i syfte att fastställa huruvida direktiv 93/36 är tillämpligt, skall all den verksamhet som detta företag bedriver inom ramen för en tilldelning som gjorts av den upphandlande myndigheten beaktas, oberoende av vem som betalar denna verksamhet – den upphandlande myndigheten själv eller de som använder de tillhandahållna tjänsterna. Det saknar härvid betydelse på vilket territorium verksamheten bedrivs.


type: contracts

text:
 Avis juridique important
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 21981A1230(02)
 Αλιευτική συμφωνία μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητας και της κυβέρνησης του Καναδά - Δήλωση της Κοινότητας για το άρθρο ΧΙ της αλιευτικής συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητας και της κυβέρνησης του Καναδά
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα αριθ. L 379 της 31/12/1981 σ. 0054 - 0057 Φινλανδική ειδική έκδοση: Κεφάλαιο 11 τόμος 10 σ. 0083 Σουηδική ειδική έκδοση: Κεφάλαιο 11 τόμος 10 σ. 0083 Ισπανική ειδική έκδοση: Κεφάλαιο 04 τόμος 1 σ. 0212 Πορτογαλική ειδική έκδοση : Κεφάλαιο 04 τόμος 1 σ. 0212
 ΑΛΙΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ - μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητος και της κυβερνήσεως του ΚαναδάΗ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ,καλουμένη στο εξής «Κοινότης», καιΗ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΝΑΔΑ,ΥΠΕΝΘΥΜΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ τις στενές σχέσεις μεταξύ Κοινότητος και Καναδά, και ιδίως τη συμφωνία-πλαίσιο περί εμπορικής και οικονομικής συνεργασίας που υπεγράφη στην Οττάβα στις 6 Ιουλίου 1976 μεταξύ των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων και του Καναδά,ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΥΠΟΨΗ την κοινή επιθυμία να διασφαλισθεί η διατήρηση και η ορθολογική διαχείριση των ζώντων πόρων στα παράκτια ύδατά τους καθώς και το ενδιαφέρον τους για την ευημερία των παρακτίων κοινοτήτων και τη διατήρηση στα ύδατα αυτά, των ζώντων πόρων από τους οποίους εξαρτώνται οι εν λόγω κοινότητες,ΣΗΜΕΙΩΝΟΝΤΑΣ ότι η κυβέρνηση του Καναδά επεξέτεινε την διαδικασία της στους ζώντες πόρους των παρακτίων υδάτων εντός ορίου 200 ναυτικών μιλίων από την ακτή της και ασκεί εντός του ορίου αυτού κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα στην αναζήτηση, την εκμετάλλευση, τη διατήρηση και τη διαχείριση αυτών των πόρων ότι τα κράτη μέλη της Κοινότητος συμφώνησαν ότι τα όρια των αλιευτικών τους ζωνών (καλούμενα στο εξής «αλιευτική ζώνη της Κοινότητος») θα επεκταθούν μέχρι 200 ναυτικά μίλια από την ακτή, και ότι η αλιεία εντός των ορίων αυτών θα υπόκειται στην αλιευτική πολιτική της Κοινότητος,ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΥΠΟΨΗ την ανάγκη συντονισμού της διαχειρίσεως ορισμένων ζώντων πόρων οι οποίοι ευρίσκονται τόσο στα ύδατα που υπάγονται στην αλιευτική δικαιοδοσία του Καναδά όσο και στην αλιευτική ζώνη της Κοινότητος,ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΥΠΟΨΗ τις εργασίες της Τρίτης Συνδιασκέψεως των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για το Δίκαιο της θαλάσσης και την πρακτική των Κρατών για να συμμορφωθούν προς αυτές.ΥΠΟΓΡΑΜΜΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ ότι η άσκηση κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων από τα παράκτια κράτη εντός των περιοχών της δικαιοδοσίας τους στους ζώντες πόρους για την αναζήτηση, την εκμετάλλευση, τη διατήρηση και τη διαχείριση των πόρων αυτών να διεξάγεται σύμφωνα με τις αρχές του διεθνούς δικαίου,ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΑΣ ΥΠΟΨΗ το ενδιαφέρον που έχει έκαστο μέρος για την επέκταση των αλιευτικών δραστηριοτήτων του στην αλιευτική ζώνη του άλλου μέρους,ΕΠΙΘΥΜΩΝΤΑΣ να καθορισθούν οι όροι και οι προϋποθέσεις που έχουν σχέση με αλιεία κοινού ενδιαφέροντος,ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΣΑΝ ΤΑ ΕΞΗΣ:ρθρο ΙΤα δύο μέρη συνεργάζονται στενά σε θέματα που αφορούν την διατήρηση και την αξιοποίηση των ζώντων θαλασσίων πόρων. Λαμβάνουν τα κατάλληλα μέτρα για να διευκολύνουν την συνεργασία αυτή και έρχονται σε διαβουλεύσεις και συνεργασία στα πλαίσια διεθνών διαπραγματεύσεων και οργανισμών με σκοπό την επίτευξη κοινών αλιευτικών στόχων.ρθρο ΙΙ1.α) Η κυβέρνηση του Καναδά αναλαμβάνει την υποχρέωση να επιτρέπει την πρόσβαση σε σκάφη που φέρουν τη σημαία κρατών μελών της Κοινότητος για να αλιεύουν, εντός της περιοχής που ευρίσκεται στα ανοικτά της ανατολικής ακτής του Καναδά και υπάγεται μετά τις 31 Δεκεμβρίου 1976 στην αλιευτική δικαιοδοσία του Καναδά, μερίδια του συνόλου των επιτρεπομένων αλιευμάτων, τα οποία, ανάλογα με την περίπτωση, υπερβαίνουν τις αλιευτικές δυνατότητες του Καναδά, σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του παρόντος άρθρου.β) Η Κοινότητα αναλαμβάνει την υποχρέωση να επιτρέπει την πρόσβαση σε καναδικά σκάφη για να αλιεύουν εντός της αλιευτικής ζώνης της Κοινότητος μερίδια του συνόλου των επιτρεπομένων αλιευμάτων, τα οποία, ανάλογα με την περίπτωση, υπερβαίνουν τις αλιευτικές δυνατότητες της Κοινότητας, σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του παρόντος άρθρου.2. Κάθε μέρος καθορίζει ετησίως και για τα ύδατα της αλιευτικής του δικαιοδοσίας που αναφέρονται στην παράγραφο 1, με την επιφύλαξη προσαρμογής όπου αυτό είνάι αναγκαίο για να αντιμετωπισθούν απρόβλεπτες περιστάσεις:α) το σύνολο των επιτρεπομένων αλιευμάτων για μεμονωμένα αποθέματα ή σύνολα αποθεμάτων, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη διαθέσιμα επιστημονικά στοιχεία, την αλληλεξάρτηση των αποθεμάτων, τις εργασίες των αρμοδίων διεθνών οργανισμών και άλλους κρίσιμους παράγοντες β) τα χορηγηθέντα μερίδια αλιείας σε σχέση με τα αποθέματα αυτά καιγ) μετά τις κατάλληλες διαβουλεύσεις, τα κατάλληλα μερίδια, του πλεονάσματος των αποθεμάτων ή συνόλων αποθεμάτων και τις περιοχές εντός των οποίων μπορούν να αλιευθούν τα μερίδια αυτά.3. Κατά τον καθορισμό των μεριδίων και των περιοχών όπου μπορεί να πραγματοποιείται η αλιεία, κάθε μέρος λαμβάνει υπόψη μεταξύ άλλων:- τα συμφέροντά του,- την ποσότητα του πλεονάσματος του συνόλου επιτρεπομένων αλιευμάτων για τα σχετικά αποθέματα,- της αλιείας που γίνεται παραδοσιακά από σκάφη του άλλου μέρους,- την αμοιβαιότητα στην πρόσβαση,- άλλα πλεονεκτήματα που μπορεί να προκύπτουν από την συνεργασία που αναφέρεται στο άρθρο VIII.ρθρο ΙΙΙ1. Κάθε μέρος λαμβάνει τα κατάλληλα μέτρα για να υποχρεώσει τα σκάφη του να ασκούν τη δραστηριότητά τους συμμορφούμενα με τις διατάξεις της παρούσας συμφωνίας και με τα μέτρα που συμφωνούνται κατά καιρούς βάσει των διατάξεων της παρούσας συμφωνίας.2. Κάθε μέρος μπορεί να λαμβάνει εντός της περιοχής της αλιευτικής του δικαιοδοσίας μέτρα, σύμφωνα με το διεθνές δίκαιο, τα οποία είναι αναγκαία για να εξασφαλίσουν την συμμόρφωση των σκαφών του άλλου μέρους με τις διατάξεις της παρούσας συμφωνίας.3. Κάθε μέρος λαμβάνει εντός της περιοχής της αλιευτικής του δικαιοδοσίας τα αναγκαία μέτρα για την εφαρμογή των διατάξεων της παρούσας συμφωνίας, μεταξύ των οποίων μπορεί να περιλαμβάνεται και η έκδοση αδειών.4. Τα αλιευτικά σκάφη ενός μέρους συμμορφώνονται με τους νόμους που διέπουν τις αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες στην περιοχή της αλιευτικής δικαιοδοσίας του άλλου μέρους, όταν αυτά αλιεύουν στην περιοχή αυτή.5. Κάθε μέρος μπορεί να λάβει τα μέτρα τα οποία κρίνει ότι απαιτούνται για τη διατήρηση, την ορθολογικη διαχείριση και την ρύθμιση της αλιείας εντός της αλιευτικής του ζώνης, με την προϋπόθεση ότι τα μέτρα αυτά δεν λαμβάνονται για τον συγκεκριμένο σκοπό της παρεμποδίσεως των αλιευτικών σκαφών του άλλου μέρους από την αλιεία των μεριδίων που τους χορηγούνται σύμφωνα με την παρούσα συμφωνία.ρθρο IVΤα δύο μέρη συνεργάζονται, είτε επί διμερούς βάσεως, είτε μέσω των αρμοδίων διεθνών οργανισμών, για να διασφαλίσουν την σωστή διαχείριση και διατήρηση των αποθεμάτων που ευρίσκονται εντός των αλιευτικών ζωνών και των αποθεμάτων των σχετικών ειδών.Ιδιαίτερα, επιδιώκουν την εναρμόνιση των ρυθμιστικών μέτρων που εφαρμόζονται επί των αποθεμάτων αυτών, και προβαίνουν για τον σκοπό αυτό σε συχνές διαβουλεύσεις και ανταλλαγές σχετικών στατιστικών στοιχείων περί της αλιείας.ρθρο VΚάθε μέρος συνεργάζεται με το άλλο, με τον κατάλληλο τρόπο και υπό το φως της εξελίξεως των αλιευτικών τους σχέσεων σύμφωνα με το άρθρο ΙΙ, στον τομέα της επιστημονικής έρευνας που απαιτείται για τις ανάγκες της διαχειρίσεως, της διατηρήσεως και της χρήσεως των ζώντων πόρων στην περιοχή που ευρίσκεται στην αλιευτική δικαιοδοσία του άλλου μέρους. Για τους σκοπούς αυτούς, επιστήμονες και των δύο μερών προβαίνουν σε διαβουλεύσεις όσον αφορά αυτή την έρευνα καθώς και την ανάλυση και την ερμηνεία των αποτελεσμάτων που επιτυγχάνονται.ρθρο VI1.Με την επιφύλαξη της υπάρξεως των αναγκαίων εγκαταστάσεων καθώς και με την επιφύλαξη των αναγκών των δικών του σκαφών, κάθε μέρος επιτρέπει στα σκάφη που έχει εφοδιάσει με άδεια κατά την παρούσα συμφωνία, να εισέρχονται στους λιμένες του σύμφωνα με τους ισχύοντες νόμους, κανονισμούς και διοικητικές αποφάσεις για την αγορά δολωμάτων, εφοδίων ή εξαρτημάτων η για την πραγματοποίηση επισκευών ή για άλλους σκοπούς που καθορίζει το εν λόγω μέρος.2 Η άδεια αυτή καθίσταται αυτοδικαίως άκυρη γι κάθε σκάφος στο οποίο έχει χορηγηθεί άδεια σύμφωνα με την παρούσα συμφωνία όταν η εν λόγω άδεια ακυρωθεί ή λήξει, εκτός όταν πρόκειται για την είσοδο σε λιμένες για αγορά εφοδίων ή την πραγματοποίηση επισκευών απαραιτήτων για την έξοδο στη θάλασσα.3. Οι διατάξεις του παρόντος άρθρου δεν παραβλάπτουν την πρόσβαση σε λιμένες του ενός ή του άλλου μέρους σε περιπτώσεις κινδύνου, επειγουσών ιατρικών αναγκών ή ανωτέρας βίας.ρθρο VII1. Τα δύο μέρη βεβαιώνουν εκ νέου την δέσμευσή τους ως προς την συνεργασία που προβλέπεται στη σύμβαση περί της μελλοντικής πολυμερούς συνεργασίας στην αλιεία του βορειοδυτικού Ατλαντικού, της οποίας είναι συμβαλλόμενα μέρη, και ιδίως στο άρθρο ΧΙ παράγραφος 4 της συμβάσεως αυτής.2. Σε περίπτωση που οι αλιευτικές δραστηριότητες τρίτου μέρους δημιουργήσουν απειλή για τη διατήρηση των ζώντων πόρων των υδάτων που ευρίσκονται πέρα από τις περιοχές που αναφέρονται στο άρθρο ΙΙ ή γειτνιάζουν με αυτές, τα δύο μέρη συμφωνούν να αναλάβουν από κοινού δράση για την εξουδετέρωση της απειλής αυτής.ρθρο VIII1. Τα δύο μέρη ενθαρρύνουν την οικονομική και εμπορική συνεργασία στον τομέα της αλιείας.2. Προς τον σκοπό αυτό τα δύο μέρη αξιοποιούν ιδίως τις δυνατότητες που προσφέρει στον τομέα της αλιείας η συμφωνία-πλαίσιο του 1976 περί εμπορικής και οικονομικής συνεργασίας μεταξύ του Καναδά και των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, με στόχο την αμοιβαία βελτίωση των συνθηκών και των όρων των σχέσεων τους στον ίδιο τομέα.ρθρο ΙΧΤα δύο μέρη διεξάγουν κατά περιοδικά διαστήματα διμερείς διαβουλεύσεις σχετικά με την εξέλιξη της περαιτέρω συνεργασίας τους στην αλιεία, συμπεριλαμβανομένης και της συνεργασίας σε θέματα όπως το εμπόριο προϊόντων αλιείας, ανταλλαγές τεχνικών πληροφοριών και ειδικευμένου προσωπικού, βελτίωση της αξιοποιήσεως και της επεξεργασίας των αλιευμάτων και συμφωνίες για τη χρησιμοποίηση των λιμένων καθενός των μερών από αλιευτικά σκάφη του άλλου μέρους για την ναυτολόγηση ή απόλυση μελών του πληρώματος ή άλλων ατόμων και για άλλους λόγους που θα συμφωνηθούν.ρθρο Χ1. Τα δύο μέρη θα προβαίνουν κατά περιοδικά διαστήματα σε διαβουλεύσεις για ζητήματα σχετικά με την εφαρμογή της παρούσας συμφωνίας.2. Σε περίπτωση διαφοράς που αφορά την ερμηνεία ή την εφαρμογή της παρούσας συμφωνίας, η διαφορά αυτή θα αποτελέσει αντικείμενο διαβουλεύσεων μεταξύ των μερών.ρθρο ΧΙΗ παρούσα συμφωνία εφαρμόζεται, αφενός, στα εδάφη όπου ισχύει η συνθήκη περί ιδρύσεως της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητος και υπό τους όρους που καθορίζονται στη συνθήκη αυτή, και αφετέρου, στο έδαφος του Καναδά.ρθρο ΧΙΙ1. Κανένα τμήμα της συμφωνίας αυτής δεν παραβλάπτει πολυμερείς συμβάσεις στις οποίες είναι μέρη ο Καναδάς και η Κοινότης ή ο Καναδάς και οποιουδήποτε κράτος μέλος της Κοινότητος, ούτε τις απόψεις του ενός ή του άλλου μέρους σχετικά με οτιδήποτε αφορά το δίκαιο της θαλάσσης.2. Η παρούσα συμφωνία δεν παραβλάπτει τον καθορισμό των οικονομικών ή αλιευτικών ζωνών μεταξύ του Καναδά και κρατών μελών της Κοινότητος.ρθρο ΧΙΙΙΗ παρούσα συμφωνία γίνεται με την επιφύλαξη κάθε υφισταμένης αλιευτικής συμφωνίας μεταξύ κράτους μέλους της Κοινότητος και του Καναδά.ρθρο ΧΙVΤο παράρτημα της παρούσας συμφωνίας αποτελεί αναπόσπαστο τμήμα της.ρθρο XVΗ παρούσα συμφωνία αρχίζει να ισχύει από την ημερομηνία κατά την οποία τα μέρη προβαίνουν αμοιβαία στην κοινοποίηση ότι έχουν ολοκληρώσει τις προβλεπόμενες προς τούτο διαδικασίες.ρθρο XVIΤα μέρη έχουν δικαίωμα να καταγγείλουν την παρούσα συμφωνία μετά την 31η Δεκεμβρίου 1987, με την προϋπόθεση ότι η σχετική αναγγελία γίνεται δώδεκα τουλάχιστον μήνες πριν.Εις πίστωση των ανωτέρω, οι κάτωθι, δεόντως εξουσιοδοτημένοι προς τούτο, υπέγραψαν την παρούσα συμφωνία.Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις...,σε δύο αντίτυπα στην αγγλική, γαλλική, γερμανική, δανική, ελληνική, ιταλική και ολλανδική γλώσσα, και όλα τα κείμενα αυτά είναι εξίσου αυθεντικά.Για το Συμβούλιοτων Ευρωπαϊκών ΚοινοτήτωνΓια την Κυβέρνηση του ΚαναδάΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑΔήλωση της Κοινότητος για το άρθρο ΧΙ της αλιευτικής συμφωνίας μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητος και της Κυβερνήσεως του ΚαναδάΣύμφωνα με την επιθυμία που εξέφρασε η κυβέρνηση του Καναδά, η Κοινότης επιβεβαιώνει ότι θεωρεί πως το άρθρο ΧΙ της συμφωνίας, το οποίο περιλαμβάνει διατάξεις που περιέχονται κατά παράδοση σε συμφωνίες που συνάπτονται μεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Οικονομικής Κοινότητος και τρίτων χωρών, δεν έχει καμία συνέπεια ως προς το ζήτημα του νομικού καθεστώτος της οικονομικής ζώνης, το οποίο ευρίσκεται τώρα υπό συζήτηση στην τρίτη συνδιάσκεψη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για το Δίκαιο της Θαλάσσης.


type: wikipedia

text:
(1414) Jérôme – planetoida z pasa głównego asteroid okrążająca Słońce w ciągu 4 lat i 240 dni w średniej odległości 2,79 au. Została odkryta 12 lutego 1937 roku w Algiers Observatory w Algierze przez Louisa Boyera. Nazwa planetoidy pochodzi od Jérôme Boyera, ojca odkrywcy. Przed nadaniem nazwy planetoida nosiła oznaczenie tymczasowe (1414) 1937 CE.
 Zobacz też
 lista planetoid 1001–2000
 lista ponumerowanych planetoid
 Bibliografia
 Linki zewnętrzne
 Planetoidy pasa głównego
 Nazwane planetoidy
 Obiekty astronomiczne odkryte w 1937