type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 241 Md. 599 (1966)
 217 A.2d 367
 JONES
 v.
 STATE
 [No. 495, September Term, 1965.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 8, 1966.
 The cause was argued before PRESCOTT, C.J., and HAMMOND, HORNEY, OPPENHEIMER and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
 Elsbeth Levy Bothe for appellant.
 Donald Needle, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, and Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
 PRESCOTT, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 Appellant, charged in two pending indictments with armed robbery, has appealed a denial by a trial judge of the Criminal Court of Baltimore to grant his motion to dismiss, which alleged he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
 The State has moved to dismiss the appeal, alleging that no final judgment has been entered in the trial court; hence the *601 appeal is premature. Following the previous holding of this Court in Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, the motion will be over-ruled.
 Appellant bases his claim of a denial of a speedy trial on an agreed statement of facts, which, in outline, follows. He was arrested on January 8, 1965 (all dates hereafter will be in 1965, unless otherwise noted), and since has been continuously confined in jail. On January 29, the Grand Jury returned 3 indictments against him and 2 co-defendants (whose names are Goode and Sample), charging contemporaneous armed robberies of 3 alleged victims. He was arraigned on March 5, pled not guilty, and reserved his right to a jury trial. Goode was arraigned on March 31, and, after pleading insanity, was transferred to the State hospital for pre-trial medical examination.
 The 3 indictments against appellant, together with 10 others against Goode (with co-defendants other than appellant) were "specially assigned" to Donald Needle, Esq., then an Assistant State's Attorney, for prosecution. As a result, the scheduling of trials on these indictments was not handled through the usual procedures of the State's Attorney's office, but through arrangements with Mr. Needle.
 On March 29, counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Bothe (formerly Miss Elsbeth Levy), wrote a letter to Mr. Needle, in which, after complaining about the appellant "being forced to attend line-ups and being refused permission to consult with" counsel, she stated: "Jones has been awaiting trial since early January. Since the cases in which he is charged were assigned specially to you, I assume I should discuss a trial date with you * * *. I believe it should be soon. I intend to file a motion for severance of Jones' trial from that of his co-defendants. Please get in touch with me on the above."
 Mr. Needle replied by letter, as of March 31, in which, inter alia, he stated: "I intend to set these cases for trial in the very near future. If possible, I would like to discuss the cases with you before trial. * * *. Sorry that you have had trouble trying to contact me, but I have been extremely tied up in Court work * * *."
 Early in April, appellant's counsel called at the office of Mr. Needle to discuss a trial date. He took the position that appellant *602 should not be accorded a separate trial, and telephoned the Hospital to urge that the examination of Goode be expedited. Earlier, on February 17 and March 15, the other co-defendant, Sample, had filed preliminary motions. Mrs. Bothe objected to the delay and requested that a trial date be set, but this was not done.
 A written notice requesting a severance was filed by Mrs. Bothe on April 30, and she sent a copy thereof to Mr. Needle together with the following letter:
 "April 30, 1965
 "Dear Donald:
 Enclosed herewith is Motion for Separate Trial in the above, original of which is also being mailed this date to the Clerk's office.
 "I learned today that [Sample] is demanding his counsel's withdrawal from the case, and that Judge Sklar is probably going to appoint new counsel for Sample. Inasmuch as Jones has been awaiting trial nearly four months because of one, and now perhaps also the other co-defendant's delays, it would seem that his trial should proceed separately for that reason.
 "I have a case in on Tuesday morning (May 4th), and want to try to see Judge Sklar sometime that day with reference to Jones' severance and speedy trial. Would you call me Monday, and say when it would be convenient for you to go with me to his chambers.
 (Miss) Elsbeth Levy [Bothe]"
 Appellant's counsel was unsuccessful in arranging the suggested meeting between counsel for the parties and the Court, but met with the trial judge, in the absence of the Assistant State's Attorney, sometime during the week preceding May 24. On May 24, she wrote to Judge Sklar:
 "May 24, 1965
 "Dear Judge Sklar:
 "You may recall that I talked with you last week with reference to the above named defendant's Motion for Severance on his co-indictments with defendants Abraham Goode and Hayes Sample.
 *603 "I pointed out to you at that time, that Jones had been incarcerated awaiting trial since the first week in January, 1965; that one of the co-defendants (Goode) had been referred to Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital for pre-trial mental examination which had not been completed; that the other (Sample) had requested a change of lawyers which was delaying his trial preparations; and that the State was refusing to set a trial date for Jones, despite my persistent requests on his behalf, until the others were ready to be tried with him. Jones has been ready for many weeks.
 "I also asked that you grant a severance on the basis that Jones could not receive a fair trial in the event that incriminatory statements of the co-defendants were admitted. All parties have asked or reserved their rights to be tried before a jury, and it is difficult to conceive that a jury would disregard the Court's admonition to ignore their application to Jones who has consistently denied his guilt.
 "You suggested that I ask the Assistant State's Attorney handling the cases, Mr. Needle, to see you last week, and that I might prepare a memorandum of law on the subject of Jones' right to severance. I have made several attempts to convey your suggestion to Mr. Needle, both by leaving telephone messages for him, and by trying to find him in his office. I have not been able to contact Mr. Needle, and we still have no trial date separate or apart."
 * * *
 "I do not feel it is necessary to thoroughly explore this defendant's absolute right to a separate trial as this, in any event, seems to be his only remedy to the right of a speedy trial. I feel that the State should, at this point, be compelled to try Jones promptly, or to dismiss the indictments against him for want of prosecution. He has been in jail and ready for trial for nearly five months!
 "In the event that Jones' case is not set for trial *604 within one week, I will move for its dismissal, and trust that you will take appropriate action. I hope that you will see fit to order a prompt and separate trial for this man, and that it will not be necessary to afford him his rights.
 Yours respectfully,
 (Miss) Elsbeth Levy [Bothe]"
 Although there was no written response to the above letter, in early June, the indictments were set for trial, as to appellant alone, the trial date being June 16, before Judge Sklar and a jury, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The trial date was agreed upon by counsel for the appellant and the State.
 During the last weeks of June, the State's Attorney's office had scheduled an unprecedented number of cases for trial in an effort to clean up a large backlog of untried cases prior to the summer recess.
 Both parties had summoned witnesses, and were prepared to proceed with trial on June 16. However, the appellant's case was not reached, due to a pending jury trial which was held over from the preceding day and continued on into the following day. Because of the extraordinarily heavy dockets during this period in the Criminal Courts of Baltimore, appellant's case was not reset for a jury trial before the end of the term. On this subject, Mr. Needle wrote to Mrs. Bothe.
 "June 24, 1965
 "Dear Miss Levy:
 "Confirming our telephone conversation of yesterday, please be advised that I will be out of town from June 25, 1965, to July 10, 1965, attending military summer encampment in Savannah, Georgia, and therefore will be unable during that time to prosecute the above-captioned cases which have been specially assigned to me.
 "As you know, the above cases were set on the docket for trial, before Judge Albert Sklar and a jury on June 16, 1965, but unavoidably could not be reached because of another pending jury trial.
 "It is my understanding that there will be no juries *605 available after next week, during the summer recess. Furthermore, it will be physically impossible for any Assistant State's Attorney to try these cases with a jury next week because of the already overcrowded trial dockets.
 "If you desire to have the cases tried next week non-jury, Mr. A. Samuel Peregoff of this office will be happy to accommodate you and has consented to prosecute them at my request. Also, I will be happy to try the cases non-jury after my return from military duty and will, if necessary, come in during my vacation period during the summer to accommodate you.
 "If your client wants to be tried by a jury, however, there seems to be no alternative but to set a trial in September when jurors will be available.
 "Please contact either myself or Mr. Peregoff concerning this matter. Kindest personal regards.
 Yours very truly,
 /s/ Donald Needle"
 On June 23, co-defendant Goode (who had been released from the Hospital on May 17) was tried on a single statement of facts on all three indictments  Nos. 212, 211 and 210  by Judge Sklar sitting without a jury. He was found guilty on all indictments, and sentenced to a total of twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary with referral to Patuxent Institution. Some of the other cases against Goode remain open.
 On June 28, applicant filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Baltimore City Court, reciting the fact of his detention without trial since January 8, and that:
 "Petitioner is now advised that his case cannot be re-set for trial before a jury before September, 1965, and that he must either elect to proceed before the Court, as he does not desire to do, or remain incarcerated for this additional time which will then total nine months awaiting trial.
 "Petitioner believes, under the above facts, that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial by an impartial *606 jury (Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 21), and therefore demands his immediate release from the custody of the Respondent."
 Hearing was held in open court before Judge Sklar on June 30, and the petition was denied. The court suggested that the parties might be able to procure a jury during the summer recess, in which case the court could preside at a trial during the first two weeks of August.
 Appellant's counsel and the State's Attorney endeavored through the office of the Jury Commissioner, to procure a jury during the summer recess, but this could not be arranged. In late August, appellant's case was set for trial before a jury on September 15, one of the first days on which a jury panel would be available at the new term. On September 15th, appellant orally moved for dismissal of the prosecution because of his failure to have received a speedy trial. The motion was heard and denied by Judge Sklar, and the case then proceeded to trial.
 The State called only Indictment No. 212 to which appellant neither concurred nor objected.
 At the trial, the State offered evidence to the effect that Goode, and Sample, and a man who "looked like" appellant, acting in unison, had accosted one Laird Marshall (alleged victim in Indictment 212), Tyrone Johnson (alleged victim in Indictment 211), and Robert Spence (alleged victim in Indictment 210) who were walking along a street in Baltimore, when they were accosted by 3 men. At gunpoint, they were forced to go to a vacant lot, where Marshall's and Johnson's wallets, with their contents, and Spence's coat were taken from them. The affair took about 10 minutes, and the victims notified the police as soon as the culprits left them. A jury was selected, and trial on that indictment proceeded, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" as to Indictment 212. Upon the return of the verdict, appellant, in open Court, immediately requested that the State call Indictments 210 and 211 for trial. The State declined to do so, because a full schedule of cases had been set for trial in the Court which were waiting to be heard. The following week, Mr. Needle advised Mrs. Bothe that the State intended to bring appellant to trial on one or both of the remaining indictments, and *607 the earliest date another jury trial could be scheduled was October 21, after a new jury panel would be available.
 On October 8, appellant filed a motion to dismiss Indictments 210 and 211 on the ground, inter alia, that the State had by to afford him a speedy trial, which motion was answered by the State on October 11. This was the first written motion to dismiss the Indictments filed by appellant.
 On October 11, this Court decided the case of Schowgurow v. State, finding that Maryland indictments, including those pending against appellant, were defective. On October 20, appellant, in proper person, filed a motion to dismiss Indictments Nos. 210 and 211 under the doctrine of the Schowgurow case. Due to possible implications of the Schowgurow case, all criminal jury trials, and most criminal trials were temporarily suspended in the Criminal Courts of Baltimore. Appellant could not have been tried before a jury as scheduled for October 21. On that day, however, Judge Sklar held a hearing on both of appellant's motions to dismiss  that here appealed, and that made in proper person pursuant to Schowgurow. The decision was held sub curia.
 On November 2, appellant was re-indicted by a properly constituted Grand Jury in Indictments Nos. 4856 and 4857, which indictments are substantially identical to Indictments Nos. 210 and 211. On November 9, appellant was called for arraignment before Judge Sodaro, on Indictments 4856 and 4857. Motion to dismiss Indictments Nos. 210 and 211 was granted (on the Schowgurow grounds). Appellant entered no plea to Indictments Nos. 4856 and 4857, but filed a motion to consolidate and transfer the open proceedings under Indictments Nos. 210 and 211 to Indictments Nos. 4856 and 4857, and moved to dismiss the latter indictments on the previous grounds, i.e., failure of speedy trial, double jeopardy and res judicata.
 The motion to consolidate was granted November 17, and on November 18, Judge Sklar filed an order denying the motion to dismiss from which this appeal is brought.
 Trials on Indictments Nos. 4856 and 4857 were set by the State's Attorney's office for December 10. Postponement was granted at appellant's request, pending disposition of this appeal.
 *608 There is little difficulty in stating the law relating to the alleged denial of a speedy trial; however, there is considerable difficulty, at times, in applying that law to the circumstances of a particular case. This right to a "speedy trial" is guaranteed to all who are accused of crime by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, both of which are self executing. Harris v. State, supra. Since there is no definition of the term in the Constitutions, and the varied circumstances surrounding particular cases are innumerable, and, for the main part, unforeseeable, the term has properly been held to be a relative one, with the determination of the question as to whether or not an accused has been denied a speedy trial depending upon the facts of each particular case. State v. Murdock, 235 Md. 116. 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 467 (4), states the general rule thus:
 "A speedy trial is, in general, one had as soon as the prosecution, with reasonable diligence, can prepare for it; a trial according to fixed rules, free from capricious and oppressive delays, but the time within which it must be had to satisfy the guaranty depends on the circumstances."
 Compare United States v. Ewell, 34 U.S.L. Week 4154 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1966). And the right is universally recognized as one that may be waived. State v. Murdock, supra.
 Having these principles in mind, we restate the facts in more narrative form. They show that after appellant had been incarcerated for nearly 3 months his counsel called this fact to the attention of Mr. Needle, and requested an early trial date. His response stated, "I intend to set these cases for trial in the very near future." However, about 2 months later, after additional requests of defense counsel to the prosecution for a trial date, we find defense counsel conferring with, and thereafter writing to, the trial judge, calling to his attention that appellant had been confined in jail awaiting trial for "nearly five months," and asking for a speedy trial. A trial date was set for June 16, but a case which had been begun the preceding day and continued for trial into the 16th, was given precedence over appellant's trial date, and he was not then tried. At this point, *609 the stipulation says, "because of the extraordinary heavy dockets during this period in the Criminal Courts * * *, it was not possible to reset appellant's case for a jury trial before the end of the term." (This necessitated, according to the State, the cases going over to the next jury term after the summer recess). We are unable to understand why this was true, or constitutionally permissible under the circumstances, if true; but more will be said concerning the same later.
 It should be noted that Mr. Needle, in his letter of June 24, which, of course, was after the 16th, stated "there will be no juries available after next week," inferentially showing that juries were available and in court for some 2 1/2 to 3 weeks after the 16th, but no jury-trial date had been offered appellant after his trial was not reached on the 16th. On the contrary, his counsel was informed that he could only receive a prompt trial, by relinquishing his right to a trial by jury (which is considered a very precious one by most of the citizens of the United States), and, if he failed to waive this right, he would have to remain confined for an additional 2 to 2 1/2 months before trial. His requested relief by way of petition for a writ of habeas corpus of June 28 was unavailing, as was his counsel's attempt to obtain a jury "during the summer recess." Finally, the cases against appellant were set for jury trial on September 15, at which time his counsel moved for dismissal of the indictments for failure of prosecution thereof speedily. The motion was denied and the State called for trial only Indictment 212. After a trial, at which evidence covering all 3 indictments was received, the jury rendered a verdict of "not guilty." Appellant's counsel immediately requested trial on the other 2 indictments. This request was denied, counsel being informed that appellant would not be tried until on, or after, October 21, at which time a new jury panel would have been selected. This entailed, at least, another month's delay. On October 8, appellant filed a written motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. This motion was heard on October 21, and held sub curia by the trial judge.
 In the meantime, on October 11, our decision in Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, relating to the constitutional composition of juries whose members were required to signify a belief in the existence of God, was decided. On October 20, appellant, *610 in proper person, moved to dismiss the indictments under the holdings of that case. On November 2, appellant was re-indicted. It will, therefore, be noted that the potential delay in bringing appellant to trial occasioned by Schowgurow was the period between October 21 and November 2 (with an allowance of a short time thereafter to set as the trial date). However, we shall eliminate any question relative to Schowgurow by considering whether the motion to dismiss heard by Judge Sklar on October 21 should have been granted, for it is evident, in the absence of subsequent waiver, if that motion should have been granted, the subsequent one resulting in this appeal, likewise, should have been granted.
 We feel constrained to hold that appellant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The right is afforded to everyone, without regard to guilt or innocence. Of course, appellant was not entitled to demand an immediate trial, and he does not so contend. The prosecution was entitled to any reasonably needed time for preparation for trial, and also any reasonably needed time to conform with the trial court's calendar of criminal cases in the actual trial of the cases. On the other hand, when the State indicts a person for crime, it must be ready to afford him a trial, when he requests the same, without undue delay, or cease the prosecution.
 There is, of course, no question of waiver involved herein; the appellant and his counsel made repeated efforts to bring the cases to trial. Shortly after his being indicted, there were several preliminary motions filed by co-defendants, but none of them was of a complex nature. The State was entitled to a reasonable delay in having these cleared. But beginning in the latter part of April, we might say almost continuous efforts both to the prosecutor and the trial judge, were made to get the cases tried. No question of unavailability of State's witnesses, or lack of time for preparation by the State, was involved. The only reason he was not tried on June 16 was that another case was started on the preceding day and carried over to June 16. By this time, appellant's cases called for special attention. Of course, everyone realizes the importance of the trial judges' having every reasonable control over, and latitude in, fixing trial dates for cases to be tried before them. However, they must heed the mandates of the constitution relative thereto, as everyone else *611 must. At this stage of the proceedings, the court had a man before it, who had been incarcerated for over 5 months and had made repeated requests, both to the prosecutor and the trial judge, for a recognition of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The State was prepared for trial and so was the accused. Under these circumstances the prosecutor and the trial judge should have arranged for a very prompt jury trial thereafter. As this Court stated in Harris v. State, supra, "while the State's Attorneys usually prepare criminal dockets, and assign dates for trial of cases, yet the judge can always take control and order a case assigned for trial." See also State v. Smith, 89 A.2d 404 (N.J.).
 This was not done, and the only excuses offered were that the prosecutor would be away, for a time, on summer military encampment, overcrowded trial dockets, and the lack of a jury during summer recess of the courts, the appellant being informed that the earliest date upon which he could obtain a jury trial would be September 15, some 3 months later. The above excuses, under the attendant circumstances, were not valid ones in our judgment. As we said above, when the State indicts a defendant, it must, after his request, try him without undue delay. No attempt was made to show the status of any of the other defendants whose cases had been set on the "overcrowded trial dockets," or that any of such defendants had been pleading for an early trial date. Also, it seems unusual to say that a jury could not be obtained during the "summer recess." We know of no reason why a jury could not have been empanelled, even if the court were required to summons salesmen. Had appellant's cases been promptly set for jury trial after June 16 (even though it entailed taking another case out of the assignment), or had a jury been empanelled shortly thereafter and the cases tried, a saving of some 3 months' time would have resulted.[1]
 *612 However, appellant's oft-repeated demands were not successful, and he was not brought to trial until September 15, when he was acquitted of one of the charges. Even after this acquittal, he was again denied the right to go to trial on the other 2 indictments until a new jury was obtained, which involved another month's delay. (Had this trial occurred shortly after the State was prepared to proceed with trial, let us say in May or June, the short time consumed in awaiting a new jury would have been unobjectionable.)
 When Judge Sklar heard the motion to dismiss on October 21, appellant had been incarcerated for some 9 1/2 months. After reviewing the facts as we have set them out above, we cannot say that appellant's proposed trials were "speedy" in a constitutional sense. They were not held "as soon as the prosecution, with reasonable diligence [was] prepared for [them]." On the contrary, October 21 was long after the State was adequately prepared for the prosecution, and the delays were not caused by sound, necessary or legitimate reasons, but were occasioned more to meet the convenience of individuals. We, therefore, hold that Judge Sklar should have granted the motion to dismiss heard on October 21, 1965; hence the order appealed from herein must be reversed, and the case remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
 Our holding above, renders it unnecessary to consider appellant's other contentions.
 Appellee's motion denied; order reversed and case remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
 NOTES
 [1] Although an agreed Statement of Facts has been accepted and applied by the Court of Appeals, the Court has since been informed by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City that it has always been the practice to hold the last Jury in June to the second Monday in September, the same being subject to call throughout the entire summer, and that, in fact, such juries have, from time to time, been brought in during the summer months for the trial of cases.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21994A0103(67)
 Accord sur l'Espace économique européen - Annexe XVII - Propriété intellectuelle - Liste prévue à l'article 65 paragraphe 2
 Journal officiel n° L 001 du 03/01/1994 p. 0482 - 0483
 ANNEXE XVIIPROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE Liste prévue à l'article 65 paragraphe 2INTRODUCTIONLorsque les actes auxquels il est fait référence dans la présente annexe contiennent des notions ou font référence à des procédures propres à l'ordre juridique communautaire, telles que: - les préambules, - les destinataires des actes communautaires, - les références aux territoires ou aux langues de la CE, - les références aux droits et obligations réciproques des États membres de la CE, de leurs entités publiques, de leurs entreprises ou de leurs particuliers, et- les références aux procédures d'information et de notification, le protocole 1 concernant les adaptations horizontales est applicable, sauf disposition contraire de la présente annexe. ACTES AUXQUELS IL EST FAIT RÉFÉRENCE1. 387 L 0054: directive 87/54/CEE du Conseil, du 16 décembre 1986, concernant la protection juridique des topographies de produits semi-conducteurs (JO n° L 24 du 27.1.1987, p. 36). Aux fins du présent accord, la directive est adaptée comme suit: a) à l'article 1er paragraphe 1 point c), la référence à «l'article 223 paragraphe 1 point b) du traité» est remplacée par une référence à «l'article 123 de l'accord EEE»; b) à l'article 3, les paragraphes 6, 7 et 8 ne sont pas applicables; c) à l'article 5, le paragraphe 5 est remplacé par le texte suivant: «Le droit exclusif d'autoriser ou d'interdire les actes énoncés au paragraphe 1 point b) n'est pas applicable aux actes commis après que la topographie ou le produit semi-conducteur a été mis sur le marché dans une partie contractante par la personne habilitée à autoriser sa commercialisation ou avec son consentement.». 2. 390 D 0510: première décision (90/510/CEE) du Conseil, du 9 octobre 1990, concernant l'extension de la protection juridique des topographies de produits semi-conducteurs aux personnes de certains pays ou territoires (JO n° L 285 du 17.10.1990, p. 29). Aux fins du présent accord, la décision est adaptée comme suit: a) dans l'annexe, les références à l'Autriche et à la Suède sont supprimées; b) en outre, la disposition suivante est applicable: lorsqu'un pays ou un territoire énuméré dans l'annexe n'accorde pas aux personnes d'une partie contractante la même protection que celle qui est prévue dans la décision, les parties contractantes mettent tout en oeuvre pour que cette protection soit accordée par le pays ou le territoire considéré aux personnes de la partie contractante en cause au plus tard un an après la date d'entrée en vigueur du présent accord. 3. a) 390 D 0511: deuxième décision (90/511/CEE) du Conseil, du 9 octobre 1990, concernant l'extension de la protection juridique des topographies des produits semi-conducteurs aux personnes de certains pays ou territoires (JO n° L 285 du 17.10.1990, p. 31). b) 390 D 0541: décision 90/541/CEE de la Commission, du 26 octobre 1990, en application de la décision 90/511/CEE du Conseil déterminant les pays dont les sociétés ou autres personnes juridiques bénéficient de la protection juridique des topographies des produits semi-conducteurs (JO n° L 307 du 7.11.1990, p. 21). Outre ces deux décisions, la disposition suivante est applicable: les États de l'AELE s'engagent à adopter, aux fins du présent accord, la décision 90/511/CEE du Conseil et les décisions arrêtées par la Commission en application de ladite décision du Conseil, si l'application desdits actes est prolongée au-delà du 31 décembre 1992. Les modifications ou remplacements subséquents sont adoptés avant l'entrée en vigueur du présent accord. 4. 389 L 0104: première directive (89/104/CEE) du Conseil, du 21 décembre 1988, rapprochant les législations des États membres sur les marques (JO n° L 40 du 11.2.1989, p. 1). Aux fins du présent accord, la directive est adaptée comme suit: a) à l'article 3 paragraphe 2, la législation en matière de droit des marques vise la législation en matière de droit des marques applicable sur le territoire d'une partie contractante; b) à l'article 4 paragraphe 2 point a) i), point b) et paragraphe 3 et aux articles 9 et 14, les dispositions relatives à la marque communautaire ne sont pas applicables aux États de l'AELE, à moins que la marque communautaire ne leur soit étendue; c) à l'article 7, le paragraphe 1 est remplacé par le texte suivant: «Le droit conféré par la marque ne permet pas à son titulaire d'interdire l'usage de celle-ci pour des produits qui ont été mis dans le commerce, sur le territoire d'une partie contractante, sous cette marque par le titulaire ou avec son consentement.». 5. 391 L 0250: directive 91/250/CEE du Conseil, du 14 mai 1991, concernant la protection juridique des programmes d'ordinateur (JO n° L 122 du 17.5.1991, p. 42). Aux fins du présent accord, la directive est adaptée comme suit: à l'article 4, le point c) est remplacé par le texte suivant: «toute forme de distribution, y compris la location, au public de l'original ou de copies d'un programme d'ordinateur. La première vente d'une copie d'un programme d'ordinateur, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, par le titulaire du droit ou avec son consentement épuise le droit de distribution de cette copie sur le territoire des parties contractantes, à l'exception du droit de contrôler les locations ultérieures du programme d'ordinateur ou d'une copie de celui-ci.».


text:
 21.3.2009
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 69/19
 Rechtsmittel der Powerserv Personalservice GmbH, ehemals Manpower Personalservice GmbH gegen das Urteil des Gerichts Erster Instanz (Fünfte Kammer) vom 15. Oktober 2008 in der Rechtssache T-405/05, Powerserv Personalservice GmbH gegen Harmonisierungsamt für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle), eingelegt am 16. Dezember 2008
 (Rechtssache C-553/08 P)
 (2009/C 69/35)
 Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch
 Verfahrensbeteiligte
 Rechtsmittelführerin: Powerserv Personalservice GmbH, ehemals Manpower Personalservice GmbH (Prozessbevollmächtigte: B. Kuchar, Rechtsanwältin)
 Andere Verfahrensbeteiligte: Harmonisierungsamt für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle), Manpower Inc.
 Anträge
 —
 Der Gerichtshof möge die angefochtene Entscheidung des Gerichts erster Instanz vom 15. Oktober 2008, T-405/05, aufheben und die Marke CTM 76059 für alle Waren und Dienstleistungen für nichtig erklären.
 —
 Die angefochtene Entscheidung des Gerichts erster Instanz vom 15. Oktober 2008, T-405/05, insoweit aufheben als es in den nicht erfolgten Nachweis der erlangten Unterscheidungskraft der CTM 76059 betrifft und das Verfahren zurückverweisen.
 —
 In jedem Fall möge der Gerichtshof dem HABM und der CTM-Inhaberin die eigenen Kosten und den Ersatz der Kosten der klagenden Partei in dem Verfahren vor der Beschwerdekammer des HABM, dem Gericht erster Instanz und dem Gerichtshof auferlegen.
 Rechtsmittelgründe und wesentliche Argumente
 Das vorliegende Rechtsmittel richtet sich gegen das Urteil des Gerichts erster Instanz, mit dem die Klage der Rechtsmittelführerin abgewiesen wurde, die Entscheidung der Vierten Beschwerdekammer des Harmonisierungsamts für den Binnenmarkt (im Folgenden: HABM) vom 22. Juli 2005 über die Nichtigerklärung der Gemeinschaftsmarke „MANPOWER“ aufzuheben. Das Gericht habe entschieden, dass die Gemeinschaftsmarke „MANPOWER“ für die eingetragenen Waren und Dienstleistungen nur im Vereinigten Königreich, in Irland, in Deutschland und in Österreich beschreibend sei und die Entscheidung der Beschwerdekammer bewilligt, wonach die in Frage stehende Marke in den Mitgliedsstaaten, in denen sie beschreibend ist, durch ihre Benutzung Unterscheidungskraft erworben habe.
 Als Rechtsmittelgründe werden die Verletzung der Art. 51 Abs. 1 Buchst. a und Art. 51 Abs. 2 in Verbindung mit Art. 7 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und Art. 7 Abs. 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 40/94 des Rates vom 20. Dezember 1993 über die Gemeinschaftsmarke geltend gemacht.
 Entgegen der Ansicht des Gerichts sei das Zeichen „MANPOWER“ — wie von der Beschwerdekammer des HABM richtig beurteilt worden sei — auch in den Niederlanden, in Schweden, in Dänemark und in Finnland sowie darüber hinaus in allen übrigen Mitgliedsstaaten, die der Gemeinschaft vor dem 1. Mai 2004 angehörten, beschreibend. Hätte das Gericht die Tatsache gewürdigt, dass gemäß einer Statistik der Europäischen Kommission 47 % der in Frage stehenden Personen in der Gemeinschaft Englisch sprechen, so hätte es den Schluss ziehen müssen, dass die Wortmarke „MANPOWER“ außer in Deutschland und Österreich noch in weiteren EU-Staaten, insbesondere in den Niederlanden, in Schweden, in Finnland und in Dänemark, beschreibend sei. Auch hinsichtlich der anderen, der Gemeinschaft vor dem 1. Mai 2004 angehörigen Staaten verkenne das Gericht, dass der relevante Teil der Gesamtbevölkerung aufgrund seiner Pflichtschulausbildung in jedem dieser Mitgliedsstaaten über ausreichende Englischkenntnisse verfüge, um Basisvokabular, wie die Wörter „MAN“ und „POWER“, ihrem Sinngehalt nach zu erfassen und somit auch das Wort „MANPOWER“ als beschreibend in Bezug auf die Waren und Dienstleistungen der Markeninhaberin zu erkennen. Das Gericht liefere aber nicht nur keine Begründung dafür, weshalb der Bevölkerung außerhalb des Vereinigten Königreichs und Irlands selbst Grundkenntnisse der englischen Sprache abgesprochen werden müssten, sondern es setze sich zudem in Widerspruch zu seiner bisherigen Rechtsprechung, wonach auch der Gesamtbevölkerung außerhalb des Vereinigten Königreichs und Irlands gewisse Grundkenntnisse der englischen Sprache im Zusammenhang mit der Wahrnehmung einer Marke zugebilligt werden.
 Im Zusammenhang mit dem Nachweis der durch Benutzung erlangten Unterscheidungskraft sei dem Gericht insofern ein Rechtsfehler unterlaufen, dass es das maßgebliche Publikum im Vergleich zu der Entscheidung der Beschwerdekammer erweitert habe, ohne die vorliegenden Beweismittel der erlangten Unterscheidungskraft neu zu bewerten. Selbst wenn man dem Gericht darin folgt, dass der Nachweis der Verkehrsgeltung lediglich hinsichtlich des Vereinigten Königreichs, Irlands, Deutschlands und Österreichs zu erbringen sei, hätte es angesichts der erweiterten Verkehrskreise die Entscheidung der Beschwerdekammer in diesem Punk aufheben und das Verfahren an die Beschwerdekammer zurückverweisen müssen. Das Gericht habe auch rechtsfehlerhaft die Ansicht der Beschwerdekammer über einen „Spillover-Effekt“ der etwaigen Verkehrsgeltung der in Frage stehenden Wortmarke vom Vereinigten Königreich auf Irland bestätigt, obwohl ein „Überschwappen“ der Verkehrsgeltung einer Marke weder von einem Mitgliedsstaat auf einen anderen, noch von einer Ware oder Dienstleistung auf eine andere Ware oder Dienstleistung angenommen werden könne.


type: legislation

text:
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 8.1.2020.
 COM(2019) 614 final/2
 2019/0270(NLE)
 This document replaces COM(2019) 614 final of 28.11.2019.Change of the sensitivity level, deletion of the marking "LIMITED".
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje treba zauzeti u ime Europske unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e u pogledu donošenja popisa arbitara na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma
 OBRAZLOŽENJE
 1.Predmet prijedloga
 Ovaj se prijedlog odnosi na odluku o utvrđivanju stajališta koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e radi donošenja popisa arbitara za poglavlje 29. tog sporazuma.
 2.Kontekst prijedloga
 Sveobuhvatni gospodarski i trgovinski sporazum (CETA) između Kanade, s jedne strane, i Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s druge strane („Sporazum”) potpisan je 30. listopada 2016. U skladu s Odlukom Vijeća (EU) 2017/38 dijelovi Sporazuma privremeno se primjenjuju od 21. rujna 2017.
 Člankom 26.1. Sporazuma osniva se Zajednički odbor CETA-e, koji je sastavljen od predstavnika obiju stranaka. Zajednički odbor CETA-e ovlašten je uzajamnom suglasnošću donositi odluke o svim pitanjima predviđenima Sporazumom.
 Poglavlje 29. primjenjuje se na sve sporove koji se odnose na tumačenje ili primjenu odredbi Sporazuma osim ako je Sporazumom predviđeno drukčije.
 Na temelju članka 29.8. stavka 1. Zajednički odbor CETA-e utvrđuje popis od najmanje 15 osoba koje su voljne i sposobne biti arbitri u sporovima na temelju poglavlja 29. („predviđeni akt”). Popis se sastoji od tri zasebna popisa: po jednog popisa za svaku stranku i jednog popisa za osobe koje nisu državljani nijedne od stranaka, a koje će obavljati dužnost predsjednikâ.
 3.Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije
 Stranke su pripremile nacrt popisa arbitara koji ispunjava zahtjeve iz članka 29.8.
 Odluku o utvrđivanju popisa arbitara trebao je donijeti Zajednički odbor CETA-e na svojem prvom sastanku, a sada ju je potrebno donijeti što je prije moguće kako bi se u potpunosti provelo poglavlje 29. Sporazuma, koje se odnosi na rješavanje sporova.
 4.Pravna osnova
 4.1.Postupovna pravna osnova
 4.1.1.Načela
 Člankom 218. stavkom 9. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije (UFEU) predviđeno je donošenje odluka kojima se utvrđuju „stajališta koja u ime Unije treba donijeti tijelo osnovano na temelju sporazuma kada je to tijelo pozvano donositi akte koji proizvode pravne učinke, uz iznimku akata kojima se dopunjuje ili mijenja institucionalni okvir sporazuma”.
 Pojam „akti koji proizvode pravne učinke” obuhvaća akte koji proizvode pravne učinke na temelju pravila međunarodnog prava koja se primjenjuju na predmetno tijelo. Obuhvaća i instrumente koji nemaju obvezujući učinak na temelju međunarodnog prava, ali „presudno utječu na sadržaj propisa koje donese zakonodavac Unije”
 1
 .
 4.1.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 Zajednički odbor CETA-e tijelo je osnovano sporazumom, konkretno Sveobuhvatnim gospodarskim i trgovinskim sporazumom između Kanade, s jedne strane, i Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s druge strane.
 Predviđeni akt je akt koji proizvodi pravne učinke. Prema međunarodnom pravu predviđeni akt bit će obvezujući u skladu s člankom 26.3. stavkom 2. Sporazuma.
 Predviđenim aktom ne dopunjuje se i ne mijenja institucionalni okvir Sporazuma.
 Stoga je postupovna pravna osnova predložene odluke članak 218. stavak 9. UFEU-a.
 4.2.Materijalnopravna osnova
 4.2.1.Načela
 Materijalnopravna osnova odluke na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a prije svega ovisi o cilju i sadržaju predviđenog akta o kojem se zauzima stajalište u ime Unije. Ako predviđeni akt ima dva cilja ili elementa te ako se može utvrditi da je jedan od tih dvaju ciljeva ili elemenata glavni, a drugi samo sporedan, odluka na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a mora se temeljiti na samo jednoj materijalnopravnoj osnovi, to jest onoj koju zahtijeva glavni ili prevladavajući cilj ili element.
 4.2.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 Glavni cilj i sadržaj predviđenog akta odnose se na zajedničku trgovinsku politiku.
 Stoga je materijalnopravna osnova predložene odluke članak 207. UFEU-a.
 4.3.Zaključak
 Pravna osnova predložene odluke trebao bi biti članak 207. UFEU-a u vezi s člankom 218. stavkom 9. UFEU-a.
 2019/0270 (NLE)
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje treba zauzeti u ime Europske unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e u pogledu donošenja popisa arbitara na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma
 VIJEĆE EUROPSKE UNIJE,
 uzimajući u obzir Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije, a posebno njegov članak 207. stavak 4. prvi podstavak, u vezi s njegovim člankom 218. stavkom 9.,
 uzimajući u obzir prijedlog Europske komisije,
 budući da:
 (1)Sveobuhvatni gospodarski i trgovinski sporazum (CETA) između Kanade, s jedne strane, i Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s druge strane („Sporazum”) potpisan je 30. listopada 2016.
 (2)U skladu s Odlukom Vijeća (EU) 2017/38
 2
 dijelovi Sporazuma privremeno se primjenjuju od 21. rujna 2017.
 (3)Člankom 29.8. stavkom 1. Sporazuma predviđeno je da Zajednički odbor CETA-e utvrđuje popis od najmanje 15 osoba koje su voljne i sposobne biti arbitri.
 (4)Budući da će predviđena odluka biti obvezujuća za Uniju, primjereno je utvrditi stajalište koje treba zauzeti ime Unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e,
 DONIJELO JE OVU ODLUKU:
 Članak 1.
 Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e osnovanom na temelju Sveobuhvatnog gospodarskog i trgovinskog sporazuma između Kanade, s jedne strane, i Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s druge strane, u pogledu donošenja popisa arbitara na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma temelji se na nacrtu odluke Zajedničkog odbora CETA-e priloženom ovoj Odluci.
 Članak 2.
 Ova je Odluka upućena Komisiji.
 Članak 3.
 Nakon donošenja odluka Zajedničkog odbora CETA-e objavljuje se u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu,
 Za Vijeće
 Predsjednik
 (1)
 Presuda Suda od 7. listopada 2014., Njemačka protiv Vijeća, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, točke od 61. do 64.
 (2)
 SL L 11, 14.1.2017., str. 1080.
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 8.1.2020.
 COM(2019) 614 final/2
 This document replaces COM(2019) 614 final of 28.11.2019.Change of the sensitivity level, deletion of the marking "LIMITED".
 PRILOG
 Prijedlogu odluke Vijeća
 o stajalištu koje treba zauzeti u ime Europske unije u Zajedničkom odboru CETA-e u pogledu donošenja popisa arbitara na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma
 PRIVITAK
 ODLUKA br. [X /2019]
 ZAJEDNIČKOG ODBORA CETA-e
 od xxx
 o utvrđivanju popisa arbitara
 na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma
 ZAJEDNIČKI ODBOR CETA-e,
 uzimajući u obzir Sveobuhvatni gospodarski i trgovinski sporazum (CETA) između Kanade, s jedne strane, i Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s druge strane („Sporazum”), a posebno njegov članak 29.8.,
 budući da:
 (1)U skladu s člankom 30.7. stavkom 3. Sporazuma dijelovi Sporazuma privremeno se primjenjuju od 21. rujna 2017.;
 (2)Na temelju članka 29.8. stavka 1. Sporazuma Zajednički odbor CETA-e utvrđuje popis od najmanje 15 osoba koje su voljne i sposobne biti arbitri. Taj se popis sastoji od tri zasebna popisa: po jednog popisa za svaku stranku i jednog popisa za osobe koje nisu državljani nijedne od stranaka, a koje će obavljati dužnost predsjednikâ.
 ODLUČIO JE:
 1.Utvrđuje se popis arbitara za potrebe članka 29.8. Sporazuma kako je naveden u Prilogu.
 2.Ova Odluka proizvodi učinke od datuma na koji je donese Zajednički odbor CETA-e.
 Sastavljeno u ... dana...
 Za Zajednički odbor CETA-e
 Prilog Odluci br. [X/2019] Zajedničkog odbora CETA-e
 Popis arbitara utvrđen na temelju članka 29.8. Sporazuma
 Popis za Kanadu:
 1.Serge Fréchette
 2.Valerie Hughes
 3.Matthew Kronby
 4.Debra Steger
 5.J. Christopher Thomas
 6.Cherise Valles
 Popis za EU:
 1.Claudio Dordi
 2.Michael Hahn
 3.Pieter Jan Kuijper
 4.Hélène Ruiz Fabri
 5.Peter Van den Bossche
 Popis predsjednikâ:
 1.James Bacchus
 2.Christian Häberli
 3.Daniel Moulis
 4.David Unterhalter
 5.Seung Wha Chang


type: wikipedia

text:
Argentína, dlhý tvar Argentínska republika, je štát na juhu Južnej Ameriky s dlhým pobrežím Atlantiku. Na severe hraničí s Bolíviou () a Paraguajom (), na východe s Brazíliou () a Uruguajom () a na západe s Čile ().
 Pôvod názvu
 Meno krajiny je odvodené z latinského argentum – striebro, pretože keď sa prví Európania, stroskotanci z nevydarenej expedície vedenej Juanom Diazom de Solis, stretli s domorodými obyvateľmi, dostali od nich do daru predmety vyrobené zo striebra.
 Dejiny
 Kým do krajiny prenikli Európania, žili v severozápadnej oblasti Ánd významné kultúrne národy, ktoré obývali sídliská podobné mestám. Na juhu žili spoločenstvá zberačov a lovcov. Okolo roku 1480 obsadili rozsiahle časti Inkovia.
 V roku 1516 pristáli pri ústí La Platy Španieli. Najskôr patrilo územie Argentíny k španielskemu miestokráľovstvu Peru. Od roku 1536 Španieli kolonizovali územie a pôvodných obyvateľov Arakuáncov a Patagóncov takmer vyhubili.
 V roku 1776 bolo zriadené Laplatské miestokráľovstvo, ktoré zahŕňalo územie Argentíny, Bolívie, Paraguaja a Uruguaja. V roku 1810 bol zosadený vicekráľ. V roku 1816 bola vyhlásená nezávislosť Spojených laplatských provincií, tak vznikol za diktatúry Juana Manuela de Rosas jednotný štát. V roku 1819 sa Argentína stala federatívnym štátom. V roku 1880 bola pričlenená Patagónia.
 Veľkou hospodárskou krízou na konci 20. rokov 20. storočia sa skončilo obdobie veľkého rozkvetu argentínskej ekonomiky. V nasledujúcich rokoch prevzali vládu konzervatívni vlastníci pôdy a vojenské kruhy, a na čele štátu sa striedali civilné vlády s vojenskými. Za reformného politika sa považoval dlhú dobu dvakrát zvolený Juan Domingo Perón, po ktorom získala meno politika peronizmu. Za svoju veľkú popularitu vďačil aj veľkej podpore herečky Evy Duarteovej, ktorá sa stala jeho manželkou. Po jej smrti (1952) opozícia katolíckej cirkvi a odklon armády, ako aj nepriateľstvo USA napokon spôsobili v septembri 1955 jeho pád.
 Porážka v krátkej vojne so Spojeným kráľovstvom o Falklandy v apríli 1982 urýchlila pád vojenskej junty.
 V októbri 1983 sa po dlhej dobe opäť konali slobodné prezidentské voľby. Počas demokratizačného procesu sa dostávali na svetlo mocenské prostriedky vojenskej vlády: mučenia, vraždy, masové popravy a stratégia strácania ľudí, ktorým padlo za obeť okolo 7000 Argentínčanov. Niekoľko hlavných predstaviteľov vojenského režimu bolo v roku 1985 odsúdených k dlhoročnému väzeniu.
 V roku 1989 sa dostali perónisti opäť k moci prezidentom Carlosom Menemom. Vo voľbách 26. októbra 1997 stratila Menemova Justicialistická strana absolútnu väčšinu, napriek tomu zostala najsilnejšou stranou v parlamente.
 Styky s Česko-Slovenskom nadviazala Argentína oficiálne r. 1920. Česko-slovenské veľvyslanectvo v Buenos Aires však začalo svoju činnosť až v r. 1929. Diplomatické styky boli prerušené v r. 1939. Za druhej svetovej vojny pracoval v Argentíne dôverník čs. vlády v londýnskom exile. Diplomatické styky boli obnovené v apríli 1945 a v marci 1964 boli vyslanectvá oboch krajín povýšené na veľvyslanectvá.
 Politika
 Argentínska ústava z roku 1853, revidovaná roku 1994, rozdeľuje moc na výkonnú, zákonodarnú a súdnu, na národnej a regionálnej úrovni. Prezident a viceprezident sú volení priamo, na dobu 4 rokov. Obaja môžu byť zvolení iba na 2 po sebe nasledujúce volebné obdobia. Prezident vymenúva vládu, je tak súčasne predsedom vlády.
 Argentínsky parlament má dve komory: Snemovňu poslancov s 257 členmi a senát so 72 členmi. Od roku 2001 sú senátori volení priamo, za každú provinciu traja. Volebné obdobie senátorov trvá 6 rokov. Jedna tretina senátu je obmieňaná každých 6 rokov. Snemovňa poslancov je volená priamo na 4 roky pomerným systémom. Každé dva roky je obmieňaná polovica snemovne.
 Kultúra a umenie
 Začiatky pôvodného indiánskeho umenia na území dnešnej Argentíny siahajú do rokov okolo 1000 – 1300. Ide vcelku o horské, skalné umenie, umenie ríše peruánskych Inkov.
 Argentínu zasiahla v podobe barrealskej kultúry i kultúra diagická. Príznačné sú pre ňu skalné mestečká a pevnosti, urnové cintoríny.
 Keď sa dostali do Argentíny Španieli, domáce umenie sa dostalo pod vplyv španielskeho baroka, po roku 1816 ho vystriedal taliansky a francúzsky vplyv. Až v poslednej tretine 19. storočia vidno úsilie o vlastné národné umenie. Poprednými zjavmi a učiteľmi prvej národnej argentínskej umeleckej generácie boli Eduardo Sivori a Eduardo Schiaffino i jeden z priekopníkov argentínskej krajinárskej a portrétnej maľby Prilidiano Pueyrredón. V sochárstve má podobný význam Lucio Correa Morales. V roku 1929 založil Raúl Soldi tzv. avantgardnú školu, ktorá znamenala začiatok veľkorysého rozvoja moderného umenia, najmä kubizmu, surrealizmu a abstrakcionizmu. Toto hnutie vyvolalo aj oživenie a skvalitnenie realistických umeleckých tendencií v argentínskom umení. Grafika zažila obdobie vrcholného rozmachu v 30. rokoch po založení skupiny Boedo. V 30. rokoch začalo hľadať nové cesty aj argentínske sochárstvo, pričom je zjavný najmä silný vplyv Antoine Bourdella. V architektúre je prevládajúcou tendenciou konštruktivizmus.
 Argentínska literatúra sa začala formovať ako samostatná literatúra až v čase bojov za nezávislosť, v prvých desaťročiach 19. storočia. Osobitosťou argentínskej poézie 19. storočia je tzv. gaučovská alebo pastierska poézia, vychádzajúca z ľudovej poézie. Vynikol v nej najmä José Hernández. Jeho meno je späté so slávnou básnickou skladbou Martin Fierro, ktorej ústrednou postavou je gaučo so svojimi zvykmi, strasťami i radosťami. Koncom storočia bola poéma Martin Fierro taká slávna, že aj negramotní vedeli celé jej časti naspamäť.
 Argentínska próza nadobúda svoju vlastnú tvár postupne a až začiatkom 20. storočia možno hovoriť o významných autoroch z tejto oblasti v rámci španielskoamerického a svetového kontextu. Takými sú Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Güiraldes, Roberto Arlt a najmä Jorge Luis Borges, ktorého považujú za jedného z najväčších autorov píšucich po španielsky. K popredným literárnym zjavom argentínskej súčasnosti patrí prozaik Ernesto Sábato. Upozornil na seba v roku 1948 románom Tunel samoty a dokázal, že je spisovateľom mimoriadnych umeleckých kvalít najmä románom O hrdinoch a hroboch. Ďalším významným predstaviteľom argentínskej literatúry konca 20. storočia bol Julio Cortázar.
 Príroda
 Na území Argentíny vystupuje päť výrazne odlišných krajinných oblastí – západné pohraničie zaberajú Andy s rozsiahlym predhorím, ktoré má charakter skalnatej púšte, na severnej časti sú horúce stepi, savany a lesy argentínskej časti oblasti Gran Chaco, južne od nej sa takmer na štvrtine územia Argentíny rozprestiera oblasť pámp so subtropickým, suchým podnebím, nížinná, miestami močaristá oblasť medzi riekami Paraná a Uruguaj, patrí k hlavným poľnohospodárskym územiam Argentíny, a napokon južnú časť Argentíny, asi od 38° južnej šírky zaberá suchá Patagónia.
 Vysoké a známe hory
 V argentínskych Andách je veľké množstvo vrchov s výškou nad . Medzi nimi je aj najvyšší vrch Ameriky, Aconcagua s takmer výškou a najvyššia sopka na zemi, Ojos del Salado s výškou takmer . V nasledujúcom zozname sú uvedené všetky šesťtisícovky a niekoľko menších, ale známych vrchov.
 Významné rieky
 V argentínskej hydrológii dominujú prítoky Rio de la Plata. Jej povodie obsahuje približne . Asi tretina z toho leží v Argentíne, zvyšok v Bolívii, Brazílii, Paraguaji a Uruguaji. Prítoky rieky Rio de la Plata sú Paraná a Uruguaj.
 La Plata (Río de la Plata, vyústenie riek Paraná a Uruguaj do Atlantiku)
 Paraguaj, , /s (vlieva sa do Paraná)
 Salado, , /s (vlieva sa do Paraná)
 Paraná, , /s (vlieva sa do Río de la Plata)
 Bermejo-Desaguadero-Salado, , /s
 Uruguaj, , /s (vlieva sa do Río de la Plata)
 Bermejo-Teuco, , /s (vlieva sa do rieky Paraguay)
 Colorado, , /s (vlieva sa do Atlantiku)
 Pilcomayo, , /s (vlieva sa do rieky Paraguaj)
 Chubut, , /s (vlieva sa do Atlantiku)
 Salado (Buenos Aires), , /s (vlieva sa do Atlantiku)
 Negro, , /s (vlieva sa do Atlantiku)
 San Juan, , /s
 Mendoza, , /s
 Veľké jazerá
 Najvýznamnejším je jazero Laguna Mar Chiquita v provincii Córdoba ako aj jazerá Lago Argentino a Lago Viedma obe ležiace v Prírodnej rezervácii Los Glaciares, ktoré sú v Zozname svetového dedičstva UNESCO. Tam sa nachádza aj ľadovec Perito Moreno.
 Laguna Mar Chiquita, (veľkosť je dosť kolísavá)
 Lago Argentino,
 Lago Viedma,
 Lago Buenos Aires, (argentínska časť, celá plocha: )
 Colhue Huapi,
 Nahuel Huapi,
 Ostrovy
 Najväčším ostrovom je Ohňová zem, o ktorý sa Argentína (provincia Tierra del Fuego) delí s Čile. Okrem toho významné sú Malvíny, ktoré si Argentína nárokuje, ale sú pod britskou správou. Obsadenie ostrovov Argentínou 2. apríla 1982 inicializovalo falklandskú vojnu, ktorá trvala až do 14. júna 1982 a skončila sa prehrou Argentíny.
 Ohňová zem (argentínska časť ostrova):
 Malvíny (Falklandy) (Argentína si nárokuje od Spojeného kráľovstva: Isla Soledad a Gran Malvina )
 Južná Georgia a Južné Sandwichove ostrovy (Argentína si nárokuje od Spojeného kráľovstva): San Pedro (Južná Georgia, ), Jorge (Južné Sandwichove ostrovy, ), Blanco (Južné Sandwichove ostrovy, ), Saunders (Južné Sandwichove ostrovy, )
 Isla de los Estados:
 Orcadas (Argentína si nárokuje no spadajú pod Antarktickú dohodu): Coronacion () a Laurie ()
 Trinidad (provincia Buenos Aires):
 Bermejo (provincia Buenos Aires):
 Nerastné bohatstvo
 Cenné nerasty a rudy sa nachádzajú v Argentíne len v malých množstvách. Sú to: striebro, meď, olovo, zinok, železo, cín, volfrám, sľuda a vápenec. Hospodársky významnejšia je ropa a výskyt zemného plynu v mori, pri pobreží.
 Klimatické pomery
 Na území Argentíny sa nachádzajú temer všetky klimatické pásma. Od tropického na krajnom severovýchode a subtropického na ostatnom severe, cez rozsiahle mierne klimatické pásmo až po chladné na juhu a v oblasti Ánd.
 Na severozápade Argentíny je v oblasti Ánd suché pásmo s jedným krátkym obdobím dažďov v lete. Tu sa tiež nachádza vysokohorská púšť Puna, ktorej západná časť patrí k oblastiam s najmenším množstvom zrážok na svete, ako aj neúrodná step Monte na úpätí Ánd v provinciách Mendoza, San Juan a La Rioja. Výnimkou sú subtropické lesy v provinciách Tucumán, Salta a Jujuy, v lete extrémne vlhké, v zime ale relatívne suché. Gran Chaco na centrálnom severe je síce o niečo vlhkejšie, ale vodné zrážky sa tu koncentrujú taktiež iba na leto. Severovýchod ako aj región pámp je celý rok oveľa vlhkejší, pri čom najvyššie množstvo zrážok v subtropickom dažďovom lese spadne v provincii Misiones.
 Na juhu (Patagónia) naopak: na západe v oblasti Ánd je podnebie stále mierne a vlhké a na východe patagónskeho výčnelku chladné a suché. Tento región ovplyvňuje pravidelný juhozápadný vietor, nazývaný Pampero.
 Úplne odlišné je podnebie v Ohňovej zemi, kde teplotné rozdiely medzi letom a zimou sú nepatrné. Podnebie je tam chladné s relatívne vysokým množstvom zrážok.
 Flóra a fauna
 Zalesnených je asi dvanásť percent územia krajiny. Navyše veľmi rozdielne klimatické pásma Argentíny samozrejme majú veľký vplyv na rozmanitosť rastlinného a živočíšneho sveta.
 Flóra
 V teplých a vlhkých tropických a subtropických dažďových lesoch na severe rastú tropické rastliny, ako ružové stromy (Dalbergia), guajakové stromy (Guaiacum officinale), palisander (Jacaranda mimosifolia) a stromy kebračo (Schinopsis lorentzii), z ktorých sa získava tanín (trieslovina pre garbiarstvo) a tiež palmy.
 Gran Chaco má suchomilné krovinaté stepi s porastmi drevín algarrobo (hlavne Prosopis alba a Prosopis nigra) a v menšej miere sa tu vyskytuje tiež kebračo.
 Pampy sú porastené rozsiahlymi trávovými porastmi s trávami rodov Setaria, Bromus, Stipa, Eragrostis a menšími oblasťami výskytu krovinatých drevín, ako sú napr. akácie (Acacia). Na základe veľmi jemných, kvalitných pôd sú pampy poľnohospodársky využívané na pestovanie temer všetkých druhov obilnín a pôvodné rastlinstvo je vytláčané.
 Patagónia leží už v tieni Ánd a je to neúrodná a najrozsiahlejšia oblasť bez stromov. Tu dominujú ako v pampe tiež trávy (najmä Festuca, Stipa, Poa, Trisetum a rod Agropyrum), rastlinstvo je ale prispôsobené podstatne suchším podmienkam. Rastú tu rôzne suchomilné krovinaté porasty. Pôda je kamenistá, nevhodná na obrábanie, preto sú trávnaté pláne využívané ako pastviny.
 V predhorí Ánd a na Ohňovej zemi sa nachádzajú rozsiahle Ihličnaté porasty so smrekmi (rodu Picea), cyprami (Cypressus), borovicami (Pinus), cédrami (Cedrus) a iné. Blízko čilskej hranice rastie pabuk (Nothofagus). Hranica vegetácie leží približne vo výške . V suchých, severných vyšších polohách Ánd sa nachádza suchá vyprahnutá polopúšť porastená rôznymi druhmi kaktusov (Cactaceae) a tŕnistých krovín.
 Kvet stromu ceibos nazývajú „národným kvetom“ a je symbolom krajiny.
 Fauna
 Na tropickom severe je živočíšny svet najrozmanitejší. Nachádzajú sa tu rôzne druhy opíc, jaguár (Panthera onca), puma americká (Panthera concolor), ocelot veľký (Leopardus pardalis), medvedíky (Proycon), mravčiare, pekari pásavý (Tayassu tajacu), kapybara močiarna (Hydrochoeris hydrochoeris) tiež tapír (Tapirus terrestris) a rôzne plazy ako hady a aligátory, napr. kajman okuliarnatý (Caiman crocodilus). Z operencov sa tam nachádzajú kolibríky, plameniak červený a papagáje. V riekach je okrem mnohých druhov rýb možné nájsť tiež obávané pirane.
 Na pampách žije pásavec veľký (Priodontes giganteus), pekari pásavý (Tayassu tajacu), vlk hrivnatý (Chrysocyon brachyurus), jaguár (Panthera onca) alebo jeleník močiarny (Blastocerus dichotomus), líška pampová (Pseudalopex griseus) a mačka pampová (Felis colocolo), puma americká (Felis concolor), nandu pampový (Rhea americana), nandu Darwinov (Rhea pennata), rôzne dravé vtáky ako sokoly ale i volavky.
 Na nehostinných územiach Ánd sa vyskytuje divá lama huanako (Lama guanicoe) a lama vikuňa (Lama vicugna), ako aj Kondor veľký (Vultur gryphus). Dravci sú puma a andský šakal. Pri soľnom jazere sa vyskytujú množstvá sťahovavých vtákov ako napr. plameniak červený (Phoenicopterus ruber).
 V Patagónii a Ohňovej zemi je živočíšny svet trošku chudobnejší. Žije tu tiež puma, skunk patagónsky (Conepatus humboldti), nandu (Rheae) a lamy, pudu (Pudu pudu – je malý jeleň južných Ánd). Na Ohňovej zemi hniezdi kormorán. Na patagónskom pobreží sa nachádzajú kolónie tučniaka magelanovho a kolónie Juhoamerického levovca medvedieho (Arctocephalus australis) a tuleň hrivnatý (Otaria flavescens).
 Pobrežné vody Argentíny sú bohaté na ryby. Najmä sardinky, makrely, delfíny a množstvo iných rýb.
 pozri aj Zoznam národných parkov v Argentíne.
 Obyvateľstvo
 Argentína má asi 44,96 milióna obyvateľov (odhad sa zakladá na sčítaní ľudu z 2019.
 Približne 87 % obyvateľov žije v mestách s viac ako 2 000 obyvateľmi, z čoho 11,5 milióna pripadá na aglomeráciu Gran Buenos Aires. Táto má hustotu obyvateľstva 2 989 obyvateľov/km2.
 Mesto a celá provincia Buenos Aires majú spolu 16,6 milióna, provincie Córdoba a Santa Fe každá asi 3 milióny obyvateľov, takže v týchto troch, v centrálnej časti zeme ležiacich provinciách, žije spolu viac ako 60 % obyvateľov krajiny.
 Zostávajúce, vzdialenejšie časti krajiny sú osídlené naproti tomu veľmi riedko, predovšetkým na suchom juhu, kde pripadajú na kilometer štvorcový iba asi traja obyvatelia.
 Potomkovia Európanov a Indiáni
 Viac ako 70 % obyvateľstva, podľa oficiálnej štatistiky, sú potomkovia európskych prisťahovalcov, z toho asi 36 % talianskych, asi 29 % španielskych a asi 3 – 4 % nemeckých. V oblasti Buenos Aires ako aj v provincii Chaco a Misiones hrá dôležitú úlohu tiež poľská menšina, ide o potomkov poľských vysťahovalcov z 20-tych rokov 20. storočia. V Buenos Aires existuje taktiež mnoho prisťahovalcov chorvátskeho pôvodu.
 Do začiatku 90-tych rokov štatistiky uvádzali podiel potomkov domácich indiánov pod 10 %. Podľa nových zistení je ale ich podiel omnoho vyšší. Štúdia Univerzity Buenos Aires skúmala DNA jednej vzorky Argentínčanov a zistila že: 56 % všetkých Argentínčanov má prinajmenšom jedného indiánskeho predka. Tento rozdiel pochádza údajne z toho, že Indiáni predtým boli silne diskriminovaní, a preto sa mnohí vydávali za belochov.
 Domorodá populácia
 Iba menšina Argentíncov sú potomkami celkovo 30 indiánskych rodov, alebo kmeňov, ktoré pred príchodom Španielov žili na tomto území. Toto vyplýva jednak z toho, že Argentína pred kolonizáciou bola hustejšie zaľudnená iba na severozápade, a jednak z toho, že tunajší Indiáni boli Španielmi a neskôr Argentíncami vo veľkej miere vyhubení. Štátny Indiánsky inštitút INADI odhaduje počet Indiánov na asi 1 milión, ďalšia indiánska organizácia AIRA (Asociation de Indígenas de la República Argentina) odhaduje ich na viac ako 1,5 milióna.
 Prieskumom, ktorý vykonal INDEC v roku 2001, bolo zistené, že asi 2,8 % všetkých argentínskych domácností má aspoň jedného indiánskeho člena. Toto percento sa prirodzene líši podľa polohy provincie. Tak v provincii Jujuy je podiel s 10,5 % najväčší. Najmenší podiel je v provincii Corrientes s 1,0 %, v hlavnom meste Buenos Aires dosahuje 2,3 % (prameň: ). Podľa vyššie uvedenej genetickej štúdie má však až 5,6 % obyvateľov čisto indiánsky pôvod.
 Najväčšie skupiny sú Collovia v Jujuy a Salta, kmeň Mapuče (Araukánci) v Neuquén a Río Negro, ako aj Vichiovia (Wichi) a Tobaovia v Chaco a vo Formose. Len menšina Indiánov žije na svojom, pôvodne osídlenom území, veľa sa ich presídlilo do veľkomiest, kde často žijú v chudobných podmienkach ako zle platení robotníci. Tak existuje v Rosariu samostatná štvrť, kde žijú iba Indiáni z kmeňa Toba, to isté platí o Kollasoch v San Salvador de Jujuy a San Miguel de Tucumán. Od 80-tych rokov sa zvyšuje národnostné povedomie v týchto minoritách, tradičná kultúra sa začína cielene zachovávať a šíriť, aj pomocou rozhlasu a škôl.
 Cudzinci, prisťahovalectvo a vysťahovalectvo
 Asi desať percent obyvateľstva sú cudzinci. Dnes prichádzajú do Argentíny predovšetkým ľudia zo susedných krajín, Bolívie, Paraguaja a Uruguaja ako aj z Peru a predtým v dobe Pinochetovej diktatúry tiež z Čile, ale na základe redemokratizácie a medzitým vyššej životnej úrovne v susednej krajine v predchádzajúcich 4 rokoch, naopak, Argentínci odchádzajú do Čile. Dovedna prichádza asi 68 % prisťahovalcov z amerických štátov. Približne dve percentá všetkých prisťahovalcov prichádza z Ázie (hlavne Kórejčanov).
 Od 90-tych rokov prichádza stále viac prisťahovalcov z Európy, prichádzajú hlavne pre neporušenú prírodu. Na rozdiel od ostatných prisťahovalcov majú už najčastejšie zabezpečenú ekonomickú nezávislosť alebo sú dôchodcovia, pokúšajúc sa presťahovaním zvýšiť svoju kvalitu života. Oni reprezentujú približne 28 % cudzincov.
 Od Argentínskej krízy medzi rokmi 1998 a 2002 sa zväčšila emigračná vlna. Argentínčania odchádzali do Európy a Severnej Ameriky, a v menšej miere tiež do Brazílie a Čile. Táto emigračná vlna má ale ďalekosiahle dôsledky, na jej základe sa relatívne zrýchlilo zotavenie argentínskej ekonomiky.
 Slováci v Argentíne
 Podľa dostupných údajov žije v Argentíne jedna z najpočetnejších slovenských vysťahovaleckých komunít. Do Argentíny v minulosti odišlo približne 30 až 40 000 ľudí slovenského a českého pôvodu. Keďže v súčasnosti ide už o niekoľké generácie rodených Argentínčanov (ktorí už neovládajú slovenský jazyk), nedá sa presne stanoviť súčasný počet slovenských krajanov v Argentíne. Odhaduje sa však, že v súčasnosti sa k slovenským koreňom aktívne hlási asi 2 000 občanov Argentíny. Aktívne slovenské komunity žijú v hlavnom meste Buenos Aires, provincii Buenos Aires (hlavne v meste Berisso) a v provincii Chaco (hlavne v meste Presidencia Roque Sáenz Peña).
 Podľa argentínskeho ministerstva zahraničných vecí a náboženstva je slovenská komunita v krajine najväčšia z pomedzi španielsko-hovoriacich krajín a tretia najväčšia na americkom kontinente.
 Prvý Slovák v Argentíne mal byť maliar František Kováč, ktorý sa do Argentíny prisťahoval už v roku 1912. Prvá doložená vysťahovalecká vlna Slovákov do Argentíny sa datuje do obdobia po prvej svetovej vojne, kedy Spojené štáty a Kanada obmedzili možnosť migrácie (predovšetkým obdobie 1925-1935). Naopak Argentína lákala prisťahovalcov ponukou možnosti získať pôdu v neosídlených oblastiach, keďže mala snahu kolonizovať ďalšie časti štátu. V tomto období prichádzali hlavne roľníci a robotníci, ktorí v Argentíne hľadali lepší život. Priamo zo Slovenska prichádzali hlavne muži za prácou. Naopak celé slovenské rodiny prichádzali z tzv. Dolnej zeme (Maďarsko, Srbsko, či Rumunsko). Dolnozemskí Slováci tak tvorili pomerne početnú skupinu slovenských prisťahovalcov, ktorí sa taktiež v tejto dobe sťahovali do Argentíny. Iba v meste Buenos Aires žilo v tom čase približne 10 000 Slovákov. V tom čase určitú dobu v Argentíne žil aj spisovateľ Martin Kukučín.
 Druhá vysťahovalecká vlna do Argentíny sa začala v období počas, resp. po druhej svetovej vojne. Išlo hlavne o politických disidentov a ľudí židovského pôvodu (ktorí utekali pred perzekúciou). Po vojne začali prichádzať ľudia spojení s režimom Slovenského štátu. Medzi najznámejších vysťahovalcov spojených s kultúrnym a spoločenským životom tohto obdobia patria Jozef Cíger Hronský, Gorazd Zvonický, Koloman Kolomi Geraldini, či Rudolf Dilong. Pred hrozbou súdnych procesov sem ušli aj bývalí politickí predstavitelia Slovenského štátu ako Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Alojz Macek, Štefan Polakovič, či Štefan Haššík. Táto vlna sa od prvej líšila, keďže túto tvorili vzdelanejší ľudia, kým prvú vlnu tvorili predovšetkým roľníci a robotníci.
 Väčšina slovenských krajanov sa postupne úplne asimilovala, keďže potomkovia Slovákov už neovládajú slovenský jazyk. Súčasné slovenské orgány vykonávajú nepravidelne rôzne kultúrne aktivity v snahe podporiť krajanov a prezentovať slovenskú kultúru a tradície v Argentíne. Slováci sa pri svojich aktivitách dodnes združujú a stretávajú v piatich krajanských spolkoch, z toho dva sú zmiešané česko-slovenské spolky. Údaje z roku 2001 udávajú, že v Argentíne žilo v tomto roku približne 30 000 ľudí slovenského pôvodu.
 Osobnosti
 Z Argentíny pochádza súčasný (od roku 2013 doteraz) pápež František.
 Z Argentíny pochádza súčasne najslávnejší futbalista na svete Lionel Messi
 Administratívne rozdelenie
 23 provincií (provincia, pl. provincias) a 1 autonómne mesto (federálna oblasť Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires):
 Zaujímavosti
 Tango
 Tango, národná hudba a tanec Argentíny, vzniklo na perifériách Buenos Aires. Hudba a vzrušujúci tanečný prejav, ktorý ju sprevádza, odráža náladu pracujúceho ľudu, a tak je melódia niekedy veselá, častejšie však smutná. Tango sa hráva na bandoneóne. Je to druh ťahacej harmoniky sprevádzanej pianom a husľami.
 Buenos Aires
 Tretina Argentínčanov žije v hlavnom meste Buenos Aires. Toto veľkomesto patrí medzi najväčšie mestá na južnej pologuli. Mesto založili Španieli roku 1536 ako prístav na rieke Río de la Plata. Jeho obyvatelia sa stále nazývajú porteňos, ľudia z prístavu. Buenos Aires je dômyselne postavené mesto so širokými ulicami, metrom a luxusnými obchodmi. Je obchodným centrom krajiny a väčšina argentínskeho tovaru sa expeduje z jeho prístavu.
 Médiá
 Argentínčania si môžu vybrať z 220 druhov denníkov, z ktorých La Prensa, La Nación a Clarín majú najväčší náklad v Južnej Amerike. Väčšina z nich vychádza v španielčine, ale pomerne dosť sa vydávajú aj v nemeckom, anglickom a francúzskom jazyku. Argentínska ústava zaručuje slobodu tlače, ale počas vojenskej diktatúry boli noviny a televízia tvrdo cenzurované.
 Gaučovia na pampách
 Argentínsky gaučo, ktorý je taký známy ako americký kovboj, brázdi trávnaté pampy už tristo rokov. Názov gaučo pochádza z juhoamerického výrazu pre slovo vydedenec, pretože gaučovia vždy dávali prednosť životu mimo zákonov miest. Muži pracujú na rozsiahlych rančoch, estancias, robia ploty a ohrady pre zvieratá, starajú sa o kone a dávajú pozor na obrovské stáda dobytka. Húževnatí, samostatní a slobodní gaučovia sa stali legendárnymi hrdinami a národným symbolom Argentíny.
 Referencie
 Iné projekty
 Členovia OSN
 Štáty v Južnej Amerike