text:
 20.12.2008
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 327/11
 Valitus, jonka Lafarge SA on tehnyt 22.9.2008 yhteisöjen ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen asiassa T-54/03, Lafarge SA v. Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio, 8.7.2008 antamasta tuomiosta
 (Asia C-413/08 P)
 (2008/C 327/19)
 Oikeudenkäyntikieli: ranska
 Asianosaiset
 Valittaja: Lafarge SA (edustaja: asianajajat A. Winckler, F. Brunet, E. Paroche, H. Kanellopoulos)
 Muut osapuolet: Euroopan yhteisöjen komissio, Euroopan unionin neuvosto
 Vaatimukset
 —
 Euroopan yhteisöjen ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen asiassa T-54/03 8.7.2008 antama tuomio on kumottava ja ensimmäisessä oikeusasteessa esitetyt vaatimukset hyväksyen on EY:n perustamissopimuksen 229 artiklan, yhteisöjen tuomioistuimen perussäännön 61 artiklan ja neuvoston asetuksen N:o 17/62 (1) 17 artiklan, josta on tullut neuvoston asetuksen N:o 1/2003 (2) 31 artikla, 27.11.2002 tehty Euroopan komission päätös N:o 2005/471/EY (3) siltä osin kuin sillä määrätään kantajalle sakko
 —
 Toissijaisesti ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen asiassa T-54/03 8.7.2008 antama tuomio on kumottava osittain ja ensimmäisessä oikeusasteessa esitetyt vaatimukset hyväksyen komission kantajalle 27.11.2002 tehdyssä päätöksessä N:o 2005/471/EY määräämän sakon määrää on alennettava
 —
 Komissio on velvoitettava korvaamaan oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 Oikeudelliset perusteet ja pääasialliset perustelut
 Valittaja esittää kuusi perustetta valituksensa tueksi.
 Ensimmäisessä perusteessaan valittaja väittää ensisijaisesti, että ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuin on vääristellyt sen arvioitaviksi saatettuja tosiseikkoja katsoessaan, että komissio saattoi pätevästi perustaa rikkomisten olemassaolon viittaukseen, joka koski sellaista kilpailusääntöjen vastaisten menettelyjen kokonaisuutta, joka johti kilpailun rajoittamiseen ja kipsilevymarkkinoiden vakauttamiseen.
 Toisessa perusteessaan valittaja väittää, että todistustaakkaa koskevia sääntöjä, syyttömyysolettamaa koskevaa periaatetta ja siitä seuraavaa periaatetta in dubio pro reo on loukattu, koska ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuin katsoi, että komissio oli osoittanut valittajan osallistuneen yhteen monitahoiseen ja jatkettuun rikkomiseen, vaikkei rikkomisen olemassaolosta ja kestosta ollut esitetty minkäänlaisia todisteita.
 Kolmannessa perusteessaan valittaja väittää ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen loukanneen perusteluvelvollisuutta ja yhdenvertaisen kohtelun periaatetta siten, että se oli vahvistanut komission kannan katsomalla, että tietyt todisteet riittivät osoittamaan valittajan syyllistyneen rikkomiseen, vaikka näitä samoja todisteita oli pidetty riittämättöminä osoittamaan, että kilpaileva yritys oli syyllistynyt rikkomiseen.
 Neljännessä perusteessaan valittaja väittää ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen loukanneen suhteellisuusperiaatetta ja yhdenvertaisen kohtelun periaatetta, koska se ei ollut muuttanut langetetun sakon laskentapohjaa, jonka komissio oli vahvistanut ottamatta huomioon Lafargen liikevaihtoa ja sen markkinaosuuksia suhteessa sen kilpailijoiden vastaaviin.
 Viidennessä perusteessaan valittaja moittii ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuinta siitä, että se teki useita oikeudellisia virheitä ja jätti noudattamatta perusteluvelvollisuuttaan katsoessaan, että komissio menetteli perustellusti korottaessaan kantajalle määrättyä sakkoa rikkomisen uusimisen perusteella, vaikka tälle ei ollut oikeudellista perustaa eikä sellaista lainvoimaista määräystä, joilla tällaista korottamista olisi voitu perustella. Näin menetellessään ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuin loukkasi sekä yleistä periaatetta, jonka mukaan rangaistusten on perustuttava lakiin, että oikeusvarmuuden ja hyvän oikeudenkäytön periaatteita.
 Kuudennessa ja viimeisessä perusteessaan kantaja väittää vihdoin ensimmäisen oikeusasteen tuomioistuimen tehneen oikeudellisen virheen katsoessaan, että komissio menetteli perustellusti korottaessaan sakon laskentapohjaa varoittavan vaikutuksen vuoksi, vaikka sen olisi pitänyt ottaa huomioon viimeksi mainitun lopullinen määrä arvioidessaan, oliko sakon määrää asianmukaista korottaa tämän vaikutuksen vuoksi.
 (1) 6.2.1962 annettu neuvoston asetus N:o 17 (perustamissopimuksen 85 ja 86 artiklan ensimmäinen täytäntöönpanoasetus) (EYVL 13, s. 204).
 (2) Perustamissopimuksen 81 ja 82 artiklassa vahvistettujen kilpailusääntöjen täytäntöönpanosta 16.12.2002 annettu neuvoston asetus (EY) N:o 1/2003 (EYVL 2003, L 1, s. 1).
 (3) 27.10.2002 tehty komission päätös asiassa COMP/E-1/37.152 — kipsilevyt (EYVL 2005, L 166, s. 8).


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 10.6.2014
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 C 175/13
 Presuda Suda (šesto vijeće) od 10. travnja 2014. – Europska komisija protiv Mađarske
 (Predmet C-115/13) (1)
 ((Povreda obveze države članice - Trošarine na alkohol i alkoholna pića - Direktiva 92/83/EEZ - Određivanje stope trošarine - Proizvodnja po narudžbi etilnog alkohola u destileriji na koju se primjenjuje stopa trošarine jednaka 0 - Oslobođenje od trošarine za proizvodnju etilnog alkohola od strane privatnih osoba))
 2014/C 175/14
 Jezik postupka: mađarski
 Stranke
 Tužitelj: Europska komisija (zastupnici: C. Barslev i A. Sipos, agenti)
 Tuženik: Mađarska (zastupnici: M. Z. Fehér, K. Szíjjártó i K. Molnár, agenti)
 Predmet
 Povreda obveze države članice – Povreda članaka 19. do 21. Direktive Vijeća 92/83/EEZ od 19. listopada 1992. o usklađivanju struktura trošarina na alkohol i alkoholna pića (SL L 316, str. 21.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 9., svezak 2., str. 8.) u svezi s člankom 22. stavkom 7. iste direktive kao i s člankom 3. stavkom 1. Direktive Vijeća 92/84/EEZ od 19. listopada 1992. o usklađivanju stopa trošarina na alkohol i alkoholna pića (SL L 316, str. 29.) (SL, posebno izdanje na hrvatskom jeziku, poglavlje 9., svezak 2., str. 15.) – Određivanje trošarina – Proizvodnja po narudžbi etilnog alkohola u destileriji na koju se primjenjuje stopa trošarine jednaka 0 – Oslobođenje od trošarine za proizvodnju etilnog alkohola od strane privatnih osoba
 Izreka
 1.
 Donošenjem i primjenom propisa koji predviđaju da je, u uvjetima koje oni određuju, proizvodnja po narudžbi etilnog alkohola u destileriji na koju se primjenjuje stopa trošarine jednaka 0 i da je proizvodnja etilnog alkohola od strane privatnih osoba oslobođena od trošarine, Mađarska je povrijedila obveze koje ima na temelju članaka 19. do 21. Direktive Vijeća 92/83/EEZ od 19. listopada 1992. o usklađivanju struktura trošarina na alkohol i alkoholna pića, kako je izmijenjena Aktom o uvjetima pristupanja Bugarske i Rumunjske Uniji i prilagodbama Ugovorâ na kojima se temelji Europska unija u svezi s njezinim člankom 22. stavkom 7. kao i člankom 3. stavkom 1. Direktive Vijeća 92/84/EEZ od 19. listopada 1992. o usklađivanju stopa trošarina na alkohol i alkoholna pića.
 2.
 Mađarskoj se nalaže snošenje troškova.
 (1) SL C 129, 4.5.2013.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 292 Md. 319 (1982)
 438 A.2d 1330
 HELENA E. BLANCHFIELD
 v.
 LEWIS H. DENNIS
 [No. 46, September Term, 1981.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided January 5, 1981.
 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ.
 *320 Donald F. Oakley and Marvin Ellin, with whom were Jonathan Schochor and Ellin & Baker on the brief, for appellant.
 Amicus curiae brief and reply brief of Maryland Trial Lawyers' Association filed. Robert R. Michael and George W. Shadoan on the brief.
 H. Thomas Howell and John H. Mudd, with whom were Semmes, Bowen & Semmes on the brief, for appellee.
 DIGGES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 We here decide that, upon request, jurors in a personal injury case must be instructed that any damages they may award are not subject to state and federal income taxes.
 In this medical malpractice suit, instituted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, the jury determined respondent Dr. Lewis H. Dennis to be liable to petitioner Helena E. Blanchfield for misdiagnosing that she suffered from terminal bone cancer. Respondent, not contesting his liability, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals from the resulting judgment in favor of petitioner entered on the verdict in the amount of $400,000.[1] The intermediate appellate court, agreeing with the doctor's contention that the jury should have been informed of the tax exempt status of the award, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a retrial confined to the issue of damages. Dennis v. Blanchfield, 48 Md. App. 325, 428 A.2d 80 (1981).[2]
 Before turning to express our views concerning the legal issue here presented, we pause to relate the factual background of the case. The evidence indicates that in January, *321 1976, Mrs. Blanchfield noticed a problem with her vision while poring over income tax papers. The following month, after consulting several physicians, she entered Doctor's Hospital of Prince George's County for further evaluation of her eyesight difficulty. At the hospital, the patient was examined by Dr. Dennis who administered numerous laboratory tests. Following a stay of thirteen days, Mrs. Blanchfield was discharged without comment as to her medical condition but was told to report to Dr. Dennis' office in one week. The petitioner testified that when she visited respondent's office, "he sat me down ... [and] told me this time that I had multiple myeloma." In response to further query by his patient, the doctor explained that she suffered from a "terminal-type" bone cancer and that "[y]ou have maybe a month, maybe as long as a year to live."
 Faced with what she believed to be the shocking reality of her impending death, the petitioner, a 43 year old divorcee with four children, testified that she went "downhill very fast" and was "just thinking death on my mind all the time." She terminated her marriage plans and curtailed social contacts. Mrs. Blanchfield described the concern that she felt for her 13 year old daughter and explained that her elder son and daughter-in-law moved from their house to the Blanchfield home in order to care for their mother and to supervise the young daughter. Dr. Dennis, in an effort to slow the progress of petitioner's supposed cancer, started her on a program of chemotherapy beginning after the first office consultation in March, 1976. Mrs. Blanchfield testified that the drugs caused constant nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, weight gain and dryness in the eyes, nose and mouth, all of which left her in a progressively weaker condition. This creeping physical deterioration accentuated her belief that death was near. As a result of the drug side effects, petitioner was unable to work at her job as a supervisor of school bus drivers and she retired shortly after her treatments began.
 Although following a month of treatment the chemotherapy had been stopped due to the severity of its side effects, Mrs. Blanchfield continued to make weekly visits to *322 Dr. Dennis' office for laboratory tests. During the visit on August 3, 1976, the physician proposed that she undergo a liver biopsy to determine whether the phantom disease had spread to that organ. However, at the urging of her family, Mrs. Blanchfield, instead of undergoing the liver test, checked into the Sloan-Kettering Memorial Cancer Center in New York City for a second opinion. After being confined in this well known New York institution for 20 days of laboratory testing and examination, the petitioner was released and informed that, although she had experienced an apparent stress related vision problem, she did not have multiple myeloma, that she never had the disease, and that the chemotherapy should not have been administered. Claiming negligent diagnosis on the part of Dr. Dennis, Mrs. Blanchfield instituted this suit 10 months later.
 At the conclusion of a nine day trial in January, 1980, the court instructed the jury concerning the appropriate burden of proof, the legal definition of negligence, the proper measure of damages and the like. Certain aspects of these instructions form the basis of the controversy we are now asked to consider. Among them is the contention that the trial judge erroneously declined to inform the jury, as requested by respondent, that "[a]ny damages awarded to plaintiff are not income to her within the meaning of federal and state income tax laws, and no income tax will be owed or paid thereon."[3]
 *323 We turn now to examine the requested tax instruction and observe, preliminarily, that it was plainly a correct statement of the current tax law. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (2); Md. Code (1957, 1980 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 280(a).[4] The issue thus presented in this appeal is whether the failure to give the tax instruction constitutes reversible error.[5] In support of his contention that the trial court erred in this regard, Dr. Dennis relies primarily upon the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S. Ct. 755, 62 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980). In Liepelt, the Supreme Court, in an action tried in a state court pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Act *324 (FELA), held that it was error to refuse to give a tax instruction similar to that requested by Dr. Dennis in the case now before us. In concluding that juries in federally created actions must be informed that any sums awarded will not be taxed as income, the Supreme Court in Liepelt expressed the following view:
 "We take judicial notice of the `tax consciousness' of the American public. Yet, we also recognize, as did the court in Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), that few members of the general public are aware of the special statutory exception for personal injury awards contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
 `[T]here is always danger that today's tax-conscious juries may assume (mistakenly of course) that the judgment will be taxable and therefore make their verdict big enough so that plaintiff would get what they think he deserves after the imaginary tax is taken out of it.'" [444 U.S. at 497, 100 S. Ct. at 759, 62 L.Ed.2d at 695-96 (quoting Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3rd Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971), and II Harper & James, The Law of Torts § 25.12, at 1327-1328 (1956)).]
 Whether or not the assumption of jury tax consciousness is accurate in every case, the Liepelt Court concluded that:
 "[t]o put the matter simply, giving the instruction can do no harm, and it can certainly help by preventing the jury from inflating the award and thus over-compensating the plaintiff on the basis of an erroneous assumption that the judgment will be taxable." [444 U.S. at 498, 100 S. Ct. at 759 (quoting Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir.1975)).]
 The Liepelt ruling was recently clarified by the Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., U.S., 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2879-80 n. 17, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1981), where *325 the Court indicated that since "[n]one of the Court's reasoning [in Liepelt] was directed particularly at FELA," the holding "articulated a federal common law rule" of "general applicability." Although it represents the minority view, we are in general agreement with the position expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Liepelt, for undoubtedly taxes are such an indelible part of most citizens' experience that it is reasonable to assume that the average juror approaches his deliberative task with taxes in mind.[6]
 Those opposed to an instruction on the tax exempt nature of damage awards note that because the jury has already been fully directed as to how to calculate its verdict, further instruction is unnecessary since it must be assumed that the jury will strictly follow the law as it is explained to them. It is true that the jury in the usual negligence action is in effect directed neither to reward the plaintiff nor to punish the defendant, but rather to replace the plaintiff's losses. However, to the extent that erroneous tax considerations are allowed to creep into the deliberative process, this purpose of a damage award is frustrated:
 *326 Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the jury? We can think of none.[7] Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of the jury that the amount allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction would at once and for all purposes take the subject of income taxes out of the case. [Dempsey v. Thompson, supra, 251 S.W.2d at 45.]
 The effect of a brief cautionary instruction as requested in this case is simply to dissuade juries from improperly inflating an award because of a misconception that the taxing arm of the government will extract a portion of the verdict. Such an instruction, in our view, will neither complicate the case, confuse the jury, nor introduce irrelevant matters at trial. The instruction is brief and easily understood. It would not require the introduction of any additional evidence. "No reference to any IRS regulation or specific statute would be necessary. No tax expert would need be summoned as a witness. No tax tables would be hauled into the courtroom. No additional computations would be required." Domeracki v. Humble Oil Refining Co., supra, 443 F.2d at 1251. Consequently, given the manifest benefits of informing the jury of the true tax consequences of its verdict and the lack of complication that such an instruction would engender, we hold, in accord with Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, supra, that in personal injury actions, the trial court must, upon request, instruct the jury as to the federal and state income tax exclusion of personal injury awards. In making this ruling, we are cognizant that Liepelt promulgates a new federal procedural rule and does not control our decision here. See Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1096-97 (5th Cir.1980); Barnette v. Doyle, 622 *327 P.2d 1349, 1365-66 (Wyo. 1981). Nevertheless, we are convinced of the soundness of the federal decision in this regard, and, given the overlapping jurisdiction of the two court systems, see Md. Rule 313, we perceive some advantage in there being a uniform federal-state rule. Moreover, many of the state decisions which have disapproved of the tax instruction at issue in this case were rendered in actions based on the FELA. Thus, in the wake of Liepelt, these decisions are of questionable validity. See Flanigan v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 886 (8th Cir.1980).[8] Therefore, it was error for the trial court to refuse the requested instruction and we cannot say that it was harmless in the context of this case.
 Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and remanding the case to that Court for a new trial limited to the issue of damages modified so as to direct that the new trial on damages be conducted in accord with this opinion and, as so modified, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
 Costs to be paid by petitioner.
 Mandate to issue forthwith.
 NOTES
 [1] The original verdict returned by the jury in favor of Mrs. Blanchfield was in the amount of $800,000.00, but the trial judge (Levin, J.) observed that in five years on the bench "this is only the second case where my conscience has been shocked by the verdict of a jury" and reduced the award, by way of remittitur, to $400,000.00, which Mrs. Blanchfield accepted.
 [2] The court also determined that the panel should have been instructed to reduce to present value any damages for loss of future earning capacity. See note 3 infra.
 [3] In addition, respondent urges that because the court instructed the jury to "take into consideration any lessening of the earning capacity that [Mrs. Blanchfield] may be reasonably expected to sustain in the future," it was error not to direct the jury to reduce these damages, if any, to their present worth. In this regard, we note that in reply to respondent's request for a present value instruction, counsel for petitioner stated to the trial judge that "we haven't claimed any future loss, nor do I intend to argue [to the jury] any future loss of income.... And I don't intend to argue at all that this woman cannot work." Consequently, given the many types of future damage claims that can arise, and, in light of petitioner's disclaimer here, the uncertainty as to whether, and if so to what extent, such a claim will be presented at the new trial which we direct in this case, this complex issue is best left to a later date when it is more precisely framed for resolution by this Court. Moreover, we mention, without comment as to its necessity, that respondent did not proffer any evidentiary basis, expert or otherwise, to underpin his requested present value instruction.
 Respondent also complains that the trial judge, in making reference in the instructions to actuarial tables which showed that a woman of Mrs. Blanchfield's age has a life expectancy of 31.4 years, erred by giving conclusive effect to this evidence rather than noting that such figures serve only as general guides for the jury when measuring life expectancy. In our view, the judge did not give such binding effect to the actuarial evidence. The remark was part of an instruction wherein the court informed the panel that his comments concerning the facts "will be purely advisory." See Schwier v. Gray, 277 Md. 631, 637, 357 A.2d 100, 103-04 (1976) ("when considering the adequacy of jury instructions we will consider the charge as a whole and will not select our words, phrases or sentences which might, of themselves and out of context, appear to be misleading or inartful.").
 [4] Section 104 (a) of the federal Internal Revenue Code provides, in pertinent part, that "gross income does not include... the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness...." This State's income tax law, in section 280 (a), announces a doctrine of basic conformance to the federal tax scheme. See Katzenberg v. Comptroller, 263 Md. 189, 282 A.2d 465 (1971).
 [5] The matter of income taxes has generally concerned courts in two respects: (1) should juries be informed that damage awards are not subject to income taxes, and (2) when calculating damages for future lost wages, since a plaintiff actually enjoys only his net, after tax income, should future taxes be deducted from future wages when determining the proper amount of this award. Although a few courts have discussed these questions as though presenting one issue, see Highshew v. Kushto, 325 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956), different considerations apply to each, and, as the latter issue was not raised or briefed in this case, we express no view in this opinion concerning it. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., U.S., 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2879 n. 14, 69 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1981); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (3rd Cir.1971); cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613, 623 (1975). In this regard, without passing on the question, we note that the Court of Special Appeals in Lumber Terminals v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 373 A.2d 282 (1977), held that damages for loss of future wages are to be based upon a plaintiff's gross earnings or earning capacity and that income taxes should play no part in the calculation of the award. See also Note, Income Taxes and the Computation of Lost Future Earnings in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Cases, 29 Md. L. Rev. 177 (1969).
 [6] The state courts which have considered this issue have resolved it in different ways. Hall v. Chicago N.W.R. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955), represents the majority view that the incidence of income tax should not be mentioned at all. See the cases compiled in 63 A.L.R. 2d 1383 §§ 6(a-c) and the later case service. Other courts have adopted the position that giving the tax instruction is within the discretion of the trial court. E.g., Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700, 709 (1956); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Braz, 182 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. App. 1966); DeBose v. Trapani, 295 So. 2d 72, 75 (La. App. 1974) (compare Guerra v. Young Construction Co., 165 So. 2d 882, 887 (La. App. 1964); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); Maus v. N.Y., Chi., & St. Louis R. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956); Geris v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 277 Or. 381, 561 P.2d 174, 183 (1977); Behringer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1959). Two states, which considered this issue before Liepelt was decided by the United States Supreme Court, have determined that the tax instruction must be given if requested. See Abele v. Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. 1970); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613, 629 (1975) (wrongful death). Although the commentators also disagree among themselves, a substantial majority appear to favor giving an appropriately worded charge. See the compendium of law review articles in Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1249 n. 6 (3rd Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
 [7] It has been aptly noted that "plaintiff's attorneys oppose charges of this type because of a fear that the information so imparted will influence the jury to hold down the amount of their verdict." Anderson v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D. Calif. 1950).
 [8] We find four jurisdictions that have at least mentioned the Liepelt decision. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 403 N.E.2d 402, 407-08 (Mass. 1980), held that whether to give an accurate instruction concerning the taxability of an award is left to the discretion of the trial court. On the other hand, Wyoming's highest court, relying on pre-Liepelt FELA cases, has determined that the trial judge is not required to give the tax instruction. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1365-67 (Wyo. 1981). New Jersey has cited Liepelt as being in accord with that state's prior decision on this point. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 417 A.2d 15, 18 (1980). Finally, North Dakota postponed to a future date consideration of whether to apply the principles of Liepelt in that state. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 827-28 (N.D. 1980).


type: legislation

text:
 2.2.2011
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 L 28/14
 UITVOERINGSVERORDENING (EU) Nr. 83/2011 VAN DE RAAD
 van 31 januari 2011
 tot uitvoering van artikel 2, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 inzake specifieke beperkende maatregelen tegen bepaalde personen en entiteiten met het oog op de strijd tegen het terrorisme, en tot intrekking van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 610/2010
 DE RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE,
 Gezien Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 van de Raad van 27 december 2001 inzake specifieke beperkende maatregelen tegen bepaalde personen en entiteiten met het oog op de strijd tegen het terrorisme (1), en met name artikel 2, lid 3,
 Overwegende hetgeen volgt:
 (1)
 De Raad heeft op 12 juli 2010 Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 610/2010 vastgesteld tot uitvoering van artikel 2, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 (2) en tot opstelling van een bijgewerkte lijst van personen, groepen en entiteiten waarop Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 van toepassing is.
 (2)
 De Raad heeft aan alle personen, groepen en entiteiten waarvoor dit praktisch mogelijk was motiveringen verstrekt, waarin wordt toegelicht waarom zij in Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 610/2010 zijn opgenomen. Met betrekking tot één groep is in november 2010 een gewijzigde motivering verstrekt.
 (3)
 Via een in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie bekendgemaakte kennisgeving (3) heeft de Raad aan de in Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 610/2010 genoemde personen, groepen en entiteiten meegedeeld dat hij besloten heeft hen op de lijst te handhaven. Tevens heeft hij de betrokken personen, groepen en entiteiten meegedeeld dat het mogelijk is de Raad om de motivering voor hun plaatsing op de lijst te verzoeken voor zover deze niet reeds aan hen is meegedeeld. Voor vijf groepen is in november 2010 een gewijzigde motivering beschikbaar gesteld (4).
 (4)
 De Raad heeft een volledige evaluatie verricht van de lijst van personen, groepen en entiteiten waarop Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 van toepassing is, hetgeen ingevolge artikel 2, lid 3, van die verordening vereist is. Daarbij heeft hij rekening gehouden met de opmerkingen die door betrokkenen aan de Raad zijn voorgelegd.
 (5)
 Behoudens het aanhangige beroep in zaak T-348/07 heeft de Raad vastgesteld dat de in de bijlage bij deze verordening genoemde personen, groepen en entiteiten betrokken zijn geweest bij terroristische daden in de zin van artikel 1, leden 2 en 3, van Gemeenschappelijk Standpunt 2001/931/GBVB van de Raad van 27 december 2001 betreffende de toepassing van specifieke maatregelen ter bestrijding van het terrorisme (5), dat ten aanzien van hen een beslissing is genomen door een bevoegde instantie in de zin van artikel 1, lid 4, van dat gemeenschappelijk standpunt, en dat zij onderworpen moeten blijven aan de in Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 vastgestelde specifieke beperkende maatregelen.
 (6)
 Vanwege het aanhangige beroep in zaak T-348/07 heeft de Raad vastgesteld dat Besluit 2010/386/GBVB (6) van de Raad niet mag worden ingetrokken ten aanzien van één groep. De evaluatie van die groep is aan de gang.
 (7)
 De lijst van personen, groepen en entiteiten waarop Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 van toepassing is, moet dienovereenkomstig worden bijgewerkt,
 HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:
 Artikel 1
 De in artikel 2, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 2580/2001 bedoelde lijst wordt vervangen door de lijst in de bijlage bij deze verordening.
 Artikel 2
 Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 610/2010 wordt ingetrokken, behalve voor de groep die onder nr. 25 van deel 2 van de bijlage bij die verordening wordt vermeld.
 Artikel 3
 Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.
 Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.
 Gedaan te Brussel, 31 januari 2011.
 Voor de Raad
 De voorzitster
 C. ASHTON
 (1) PB L 344 van 28.12.2001, blz. 70.
 (2) PB L 178 van 13.7.2010, blz. 1.
 (3) PB C 188 van 13.7.2010, blz. 13.
 (4) PB C 316 van 20.11.2010, blz. 11.
 (5) PB L 344 van 28.12.2001, blz. 93.
 (6) PB L 178 van 13.7.2010, blz. 28.
 BIJLAGE
 LIJST VAN PERSONEN, GROEPEN EN ENTITEITEN ALS BEDOELD IN ARTIKEL 1
 1. Personen
 1.
 ABOU, Rabah Naami (alias Naami Hamza, alias Mihoubi Faycal, alias Fellah Ahmed, alias Dafri Rèmi Lahdi), geboren op 1.2.1966 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 2.
 ABOUD, Maisi (alias de Zwitserse Abderrahmane), geboren op 17.10.1964 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 3.
 AL-MUGHASSIL, Ahmad Ibrahim (alias ABU OMRAN; alias AL-MUGHASSIL, Ahmed Ibrahim), geboren op 26.6.1967 in Qatif-Bab al Shamal, Saudi-Arabië; Saudisch onderdaan
 4.
 AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, geboren in Al Ihsa, Saudi-Arabië; Saudisch onderdaan
 5.
 AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, geboren op 16.10.1966 in Tarut, Saudi-Arabië; Saudisch onderdaan
 6.
 ARIOUA, Kamel (alias Lamine Kamel), geboren op 18.8.1969 in Constantine (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 7.
 ASLI, Mohamed (alias Dahmane Mohamed), geboren op 13.5.1975 in Ain Taya (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 8.
 ASLI, Rabah, geboren op 13.5.1975 in Ain Taya (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 9.
 ATWA, Ali (alias BOUSLIM, Ammar Mansour; alias SALIM, Hassan Rostom), Libanon, geboren in 1960 in Libanon; Libanees onderdaan
 10.
 BOUYERI, Mohamed (alias Abu ZUBAIR; alias SOBIAR; alias Abu ZOUBAIR), geboren op 8.3.1978 in Amsterdam (Nederland) (lid van de „Hofstadgroep”)
 11.
 DARIB, Noureddine (alias Carreto, alias Zitoun Mourad), geboren op 1.2.1972 in Algerije (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 12.
 DJABALI, Abderrahmane (alias Touil), geboren op 1.6.1970 in Algerije (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 13.
 EL FATMI, Nouredine (alias Nouriddin EL FATMI; alias Nouriddine EL FATMI; alias Noureddine EL FATMI; alias Abu AL KA’E KA’E; alias Abu QAE QAE; alias FOUAD; alias FZAD; alias Nabil EL FATMI; alias Ben MOHAMMED; alias Ben Mohand BEN LARBI; alias Ben Driss Muhand IBN LARBI; alias Abu TAHAR; alias EGGIE), geboren op 15.8.1982 in Midar (Marokko); (Marokkaans) paspoort nr. N829139 (lid van de „Hofstadgroep”)
 14.
 EL-HOORIE, Ali Saed Bin Ali (alias AL-HOURI, Ali Saed Bin Ali; alias EL-HOURI, Ali Saed Bin Ali), geboren op 10.7.1965 of 11.7.1965 in El Dibabiya, Saudi-Arabië; Saudisch onderdaan
 15.
 FAHAS, Sofiane Yacine, geboren op 10.9.1971 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 16.
 IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (alias GARBAYA, Ahmed; alias SA-ID; alias SALWWAN, Samir), Libanon, geboren in 1963 in Libanon, Libanees onderdaan
 17.
 MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (alias ALI, Salem; alias BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah; alias HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith; alias WADOOD, Khalid Adbul) geboren op 14.4.1965 of 1.3.1964 in Pakistan, paspoort nr. 488555
 18.
 MOKTARI, Fateh (alias Ferdi Omar), geboren op 26.12.1974 in Hussein Dey (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 19.
 NOUARA, Farid, geboren op 25.11.1973 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 20.
 RESSOUS, Hoari (alias Hallasa Farid), geboren op 11.9.1968 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 21.
 SEDKAOUI, Noureddine (alias Nounou), geboren op 23.6.1963 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 22.
 SELMANI, Abdelghani (alias Gano), geboren op 14.6.1974 in Algiers (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 23.
 SENOUCI, Sofiane, geboren op 15.4.1971 in Hussein Dey (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 24.
 TINGUALI, Mohammed (alias Mouh di Kouba), geboren op 21.4.1964 in Blida (Algerije) (lid van al-Takfir en al-Hijra)
 25.
 WALTERS, Jason Theodore James (alias Abdullah; alias David), geboren op 6.3.1985 in Amersfoort (Nederland), (Nederlands) paspoort nr. NE8146378 (lid van de „Hofstadgroep”)
 2. Groepen en entiteiten
 1.
 Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), (alias Fatah Revolutionaire Raad; alias Arabische Revolutionaire Brigades; alias Zwarte September; alias Revolutionaire Organisatie van Socialistische Moslims)
 2.
 Al-Aqsa Martelarenbrigades
 3.
 Al-Aqsa e.V.
 4.
 Al-Takfir en al-Hijra
 5.
 Aum Shinrikyo (alias AUM; alias Aum Hoogste Waarheid; alias Aleph)
 6.
 Babbar Khalsa
 7.
 Communist Party of the Philippines, inclusief New People’s Army (NPA), Filipijnen
 8.
 Gama'a al-Islamiyya (alias Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya) (Islamitische Groep — IG)
 9.
 „İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi” — (IBDA C) (Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front)
 10.
 Hamas (inbegrepen Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem)
 11.
 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
 12.
 Hofstadgroep
 13.
 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
 14.
 International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
 15.
 Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)
 16.
 Koerdische Arbeiderspartij (PKK), (alias KADEK; alias KONGRA-GEL)
 17.
 Bevrijdingstijgers van Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
 18.
 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Nationaal Bevrijdingsleger)
 19.
 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (Palestijnse Islamitische Jihad)
 20.
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestina (PFLP) (Volksfront voor de bevrijding van Palestina)
 21.
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command (alias PFLP-General Command, PFLP-GC) (Volksfront voor de bevrijding van Palestina — Algemeen Commando)
 22.
 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (Revolutionaire Strijdkrachten van Colombia)
 23.
 Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP/C), (alias Devrimci Sol (Revolutionair Links); alias Dev Sol) (Revolutionair Volksbevrijdingsleger/front/partij)
 24.
 Sendero Luminoso (SL) (Lichtend Pad)
 25.
 Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK) (alias Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Koerdische Vrijheidsvalken); alias Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (Koerdische Vrijheidshaviken)
 26.
 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) (Verenigde Zelfverdedigingsgroepen van Colombia)