type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22001A0911(01)
 Accordo tra l'Unione europea e l'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia sulle attività della missione di vigilanza dell'Unione europea (EUMM) nell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia
 Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 241 del 11/09/2001 pag. 0002 - 0004
 TRADUZIONEAccordotra l'Unione europea e l'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia sulle attività della missione di vigilanza dell'Unione europea (EUMM) nell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di MacedoniaL'UNIONE EUROPEA,da una parte,eL'EX REPUBBLICA JUGOSLAVA DI MACEDONIA,in appresso denominata "Parte ospitante",dall'altra,in appresso insieme denominate "Parti partecipanti",tenuto conto- dell'offerta della Comunità europea e dei suoi Stati membri di organizzare una missione di vigilanza della Comunità europea (ECMM) nell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia e dell'accettazione provvisoria di tale offerta da parte del Paese ospitante il 24 marzo 1998,- della presenza di osservatori della Comunità europea/Unione europea nell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia del 1998,- dell'adozione da parte del Consiglio dell'Unione europea, il 22 dicembre 2000, dell'azione comune 2000/811/PESC relativa alla missione di vigilanza dell'Unione europea, che trasforma la missione di vigilanza della Comunità europea (ECMM) in missione di vigilanza dell'Unione europea (EUMM), quale strumento di politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell'Unione europea (PESC), basandosi sulle iniziative precedenti, per contribuire alla definizione efficace della politica dell'Unione europea nei confronti dei Balcani occidentali,- della conclusione a Lussemburgo, il 9 aprile 2001, di un accordo di stabilizzazione e di associazione tra le Comunità europee e i loro Stati membri, da una parte, e l'ex Repubblica iugoslava di Macedonia, dall'altra,- del riconoscimento dell'indipendenza, della sovranità e dell'integrità territoriale dell'ex Repubblica iugoslava di Macedonia e del forte desiderio dell'Unione europea di contribuire ad un ulteriore rafforzamento della pace e della stabilità nella regione,HANNO RAGGIUNTO IL SEGUENTE ACCORDO:Articolo IMandato1. La missione di vigilanza dell'Unione europea, in appresso EUMM, in precedenza istituita nella regione quale missione di vigilanza della Comunità europea (ECMM), con quartier generale attualmente a Sarajevo, istituisce un ufficio della missione a Skopje e in altri luoghi, su eventuale decisione del Capo missione in consultazione e d'intesa con la Parte ospitante, al fine di contribuire alla definizione efficace della politica dell'Unione europea nei confronti dei Balcani occidentali.L'EUMM ha in particolare il compito di:a) vigilare sugli sviluppi politici e di sicurezza nella zona di sua competenza;b) prestare una particolare attenzione al controllo delle frontiere, alle questioni interetniche e al rientro dei rifugiati;c) fornire relazioni analitiche sulla base dei compiti ad essa assegnati;d) contribuire all'allarme tempestivo del Consiglio e all'instaurazione di un clima di fiducia nel quadro della politica di stabilizzazione condotta dall'Unione europea nella regione;e) fornire regolarmente informazioni alla Parte ospitante sulle proprie attività, ivi comprese, se i compiti dell'EUMM lo prevedono, informazioni sui problemi di carattere umanitario.2. La Parte ospitante fornisce all'EUMM tutte le informazioni ed estende la piena cooperazione nella misura necessaria per conseguire gli obiettivi dell'EUMM. Essa nomina un ufficiale di collegamento, proveniente dai competenti ministeri, presso l'EUMM.Articolo IIStatuto1. La Parte ospitante prende tutte le misure necessarie per la protezione, l'incolumità e la sicurezza dell'EUMM e dei suoi membri. Tutti i provvedimenti specifici, proposti dalla Parte ospitante, sono concordati con il Capo missione prima dell'attuazione.2. Per lo svolgimento delle proprie attività, l'EUMM e il relativo personale hanno, assieme ai mezzi di trasporto e alle attrezzature, la libertà di circolazione necessaria per espletare il mandato della missione.3. Nell'esecuzione delle proprie attività, il personale dell'EUMM può essere accompagnato da un interprete e, su richiesta dell'EUMM, da un ufficiale di scorta nominato dalla Parte ospitante.4. L'EUMM può esporre la bandiera dell'Unione europea sull'ufficio della missione a Skopje, e in altre circostanze su decisione del Capo missione.5. I veicoli e gli altri mezzi di trasporto dell'EUMM recano un contrassegno di identificazione distintivo della missione, che viene notificato alle autorità pertinenti.Articolo IIIComposizione1. Il Capo missione dell'EUMM è stato nominato dal Consiglio dell'Unione europea. Eventuali futuri Capi missione sono parimenti nominati dal Consiglio.2. Gli altri membri del personale dell'EUMM sono distaccati dagli Stati membri dell'Unione europea. Essi sono assegnati a incarichi specifici dal Capo missione sotto l'autorità del Segretario generale/Alto Rappresentante. La Norvegia e la Slovacchia, che partecipano all'EUMM al momento del presente accordo, possono altresì nominare membri del personale presso l'EUMM e pertanto essere, assieme all'Unione europea e ai suoi Stati membri, Parti mandanti.3. I membri stranieri del personale dell'EUMM sono chiamati osservatori.4. I Governi delle Parti mandanti nominano gli osservatori presso l'EUMM.5. Il Capo missione determina il numero di osservatori in base al presente accordo, in consultazione e d'intesa con la Parte ospitante.6. Gli osservatori non intraprendono alcuna azione o attività incompatibile con la natura imparziale dei loro doveri e rispettano le leggi della Parte ospitante, fatte salve le norme di cui all'articolo VIII.7. L'EUMM può avvalersi dell'assistenza di personale amministrativo e tecnico proveniente dalle Parti mandanti. I membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico dell'EUMM godono di uno status equivalente a quello del personale amministrativo e tecnico proveniente dalle Parti mandanti impiegato nelle ambasciate, in conformità della Convenzione di Vienna sulle relazioni diplomatiche.8. L'EUMM può assumere in loco personale ausiliario, se necessario. Su richiesta del Capo missione, la Parte ospitante facilita l'assunzione di agenti locali qualificati da parte dell'EUMM. Il personale ausiliario dell'EUMM gode di uno status equivalente a quello degli agenti locali impiegati nelle ambasciate, in conformità della Convenzione di Vienna sulle relazioni diplomatiche.Articolo IVArmi e abiti1. Gli osservatori non possono portare armi.2. Gli osservatori indossano abiti civili bianchi recanti il contrassegno di identificazione distintivo dell'EUMM.Articolo VConcatenamento delle responsabilità1. L'EUMM nell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia opera sotto la responsabilità del Capo missione.2. Il Capo missione riferisce regolarmente al Consiglio dell'Unione europea, per il tramite del Segretario generale/Alto Rappresentante, sulle attività e sui risultati dell'EUMM.3. Nell'ambito del mandato di cui all'articolo 1, paragrafo 1, i compiti dell'EUMM sono definiti dal Segretario generale/Alto Rappresentante in stretto coordinamento con la Presidenza, in linea con la politica adottata dal Consiglio riguardo ai Balcani occidentali.4. Il Capo missione informa periodicamente la Parte ospitante delle attività dell'EUMM.Articolo VIViaggio e trasporto1. I veicoli e gli altri mezzi di trasporto dell'EUMM non sono soggetti all'immatricolazione obbligatoria o al rilascio di autorizzazioni e tutti i veicoli sono coperti dall'assicurazione sulla responsabilità civile.2. L'EUMM può utilizzare strade, basi aeree ed altre infrastrutture senza pagare diritti, pedaggi o altre tasse.3. La Parte ospitante facilita all'EUMM l'utilizzazione dei suoi veicoli e altri mezzi di trasporto.Articolo VIIComunicazioni1. Il personale dell'EUMM ha accesso, alle tariffe normalmente prevalenti, a idonee attrezzature di telecomunicazione della Parte ospitante ai fini delle proprie attività, incluse le comunicazioni con le rappresentanze diplomatiche e consolari delle Parti mandanti.2. L'EUMM ha diritto a comunicazioni illimitate con le proprie radio (incluse radio satellitari, mobili e portatili), telefoni, telegrafi, fax o qualsiasi altro mezzo. La Parte ospitante comunica, dopo la firma del presente accordo, le frequenze su cui possono trasmettere le radio.Articolo VIIIPrivilegi e immunità1. All'EUMM viene concesso lo status di missione diplomatica.2. Agli osservatori sono concessi, durante la loro missione, i privilegi e le immunità degli agenti diplomatici, conformemente alla Convenzione di Vienna sulle relazioni diplomatiche.3. L'Ufficio della missione a Skopje, gli altri uffici e tutti i mezzi di trasporto dell'EUMM sono inviolabili.4. I privilegi e le immunità previsti nel presente articolo sono concessi agli osservatori durante la loro missione e, in seguito, per gli atti precedentemente compiuti nel corso della missione.5. La Parte ospitante facilita gli spostamenti del Capo missione e del personale dell'EUMM. L'EUMM fornisce alla Parte ospitante un elenco dei membri dell'EUMM e la informa in anticipo dell'arrivo e della partenza del personale dell'EUMM. Il personale dell'EUMM porta il proprio passaporto nazionale, nonché una carta d'identità dell'EUMM.6. La Parte ospitante riconosce il diritto delle Parti mandanti e dell'EUMM di importare, in esenzione da dazi o altre restrizioni, attrezzature, vettovaglie, forniture e altri beni necessari all'uso esclusivo e ufficiale dell'EUMM. La Parte ospitante riconosce altresì il loro diritto di acquistare tali articoli nel territorio della stessa Parte ospitante nonché di esportare o di disporre diversamente di tali attrezzature, vettovaglie, forniture e altri beni acquistati o importati secondo dette modalità. La Parte ospitante riconosce altresì il diritto degli osservatori di acquistare e/o importare in esenzione da dazi o altre restrizioni gli articoli necessari all'uso personale nonché di esportare tali articoli.Articolo IXSistemazione e disposizioni praticheIl Governo dell'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia accetta, su richiesta, di assistere l'EUMM nella ricerca di uffici e di una sistemazione adeguati. Le Parti partecipanti decidono in merito ad altre disposizioni concernenti i privilegi e le immunità nonché a disposizioni pratiche, inclusa l'assistenza sanitaria urgente, l'evacuazione in caso di emergenza e i requisiti concernenti la documentazione di viaggio.Articolo XEntrata in vigoreIl presente accordo entra in vigore alla data della firma. Le sue disposizioni sono applicate dalla Parte ospitante all'EUMM in via provvisoria dalla data della sigla fino all'entrata in vigore al momento della firma. Esso resterà in vigore fino a quando una delle Parti partecipanti non notificherà all'altra, con due mesi di anticipo, che intende chiedere di porre fine alle attività ivi menzionate.Fatto a Skopje, addì 31 agosto 2001, in lingua inglese in quattro copie.Per l'Unione europeaPer l'ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia


text:
 22.6.2017
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 L 161/25
 ROZHODNUTÍ SMÍŠENÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 248/2015
 ze dne 30. října 2015,
 kterým se mění příloha II (Technické předpisy, normy, zkoušení a certifikace) Dohody o EHP [2017/1037]
 SMÍŠENÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 s ohledem na Dohodu o Evropském hospodářském prostoru (dále jen „Dohoda o EHP“), a zejména na článek 98 této dohody,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1)
 Nařízení Komise (EU) 2015/1102 ze dne 8. července 2015, kterým se mění příloha I nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1334/2008, pokud jde o odstranění některých aromatických látek ze seznamu Unie (1), má být začleněno do Dohody o EHP.
 (2)
 Toto rozhodnutí se týká právních předpisů o potravinách. Jak je uvedeno v úvodu kapitoly XII přílohy II Dohody o EHP, právní předpisy o potravinách se nepoužijí na Lichtenštejnsko po celou dobu, po niž je na Lichtenštejnsko rozšířena působnost Dohody mezi Evropským společenstvím a Švýcarskou konfederací o obchodu se zemědělskými produkty. Toto rozhodnutí se tudíž na Lichtenštejnsko nevztahuje.
 (3)
 Příloha II Dohody o EHP by proto měla být odpovídajícím způsobem změněna,
 PŘIJAL TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 V bodě 54zzzzs (nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1334/2008) kapitoly XII přílohy II Dohody o EHP se doplňuje nová odrážka, která zní:
 „—
 32015 R 1102: nařízení Komise (EU) 2015/1102 ze dne 8. července 2015 (Úř. věst. L 181, 9.7.2015, s. 54).“
 Článek 2
 Znění nařízení (EU) 2015/1102 v islandském a norském jazyce, která mají být zveřejněna v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie, jsou platná.
 Článek 3
 Toto rozhodnutí vstupuje v platnost dnem 1. listopadu 2015 za předpokladu, že jsou učiněna veškerá oznámení podle čl. 103 odst. 1 Dohody o EHP (*1).
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí bude zveřejněno v oddíle EHP a v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie.
 V Bruselu dne 30. října 2015.
 Za Smíšený výbor EHP
 předsedkyně
 Oda SLETNES
 (1) Úř. věst. L 181, 9.7.2015, s. 54.
 (*1) Nebyly oznámeny žádné ústavní požadavky.


type: wikipedia

text:
 Rijeke
 Hrvatska
 Bistrica (pritoka Dobre), desna pritoka Dobre
 BiH
 Bistrica (Livanjsko polje), zajedno sa Žabljakom čini Plovuču (Livno)
 Bistrica (pritoka Drine), lijeva pritoka Drine
 Bistrica (pritoka Gomjenice), desna pritoka Gomjenice
 Bistrica (pritoka Paljanske Miljacke), lijeva pritoka Paljanske Miljacke
 Bistrička rika (ponegdje i Bistrica), desna pritoka Vrbasa (kod Uskoplja)
 Bugarska
 Pirinska Bistrica
 Sandanska Bistrica
 Grčka
 Bistrica
 Kosovo
 Dečanska Bistrica, desna pritoka Bijelog Drima
 Prizrenska Bistrica, lijeva pritoka Bijelog Drima
 Pećka Bistrica, lijeva pritoka Bijelog Drima
 Slovenija
 Bistrica (pritoka Ložnice), rijeka u Sloveniji, pritoka Ložnice (pritoka Dravinje)
 Srbija
 Bistrica (pritoka Lima), pritoka Lima
 Naselja
 Hrvatska
 Bistrica (Slatina), naselje grada Slatina
 Marija Bistrica, naselje i općina u Krapinsko-zagorskoj županiji
 Zlatar Bistrica, naselje i općina u Krapinsko-zagorskoj županiji
 BiH
 Bistrica (Banja Luka, BiH), naselje u općini Banja Luka
 Bistrica (Bosanska Gradiška, BiH), naselje u općini Bosanska Gradiška
 Bistrica (Fojnica, BiH), selo u općini Fojnica
 Bistrica (Jajce, BiH), naselje u općini Jajce
 Bistrica (Prijedor, BiH), naselje u općini Prijedor
 Bistrica (Uskoplje, BiH), naselje u općini Uskoplje
 Bistrica (Zenica, BiH), naselje u općini Zenica
 Bistrica (Žepče, BiH), naselje u općini Žepče
 Crna Gora
 Bistrica (Mojkovac, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Mojkovac
 Slovenija
 Bistrica (Črnomelj, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Črnomelj
 Bistrica (Dole pri Litiji, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Dole pri Litiji
 Bistrica (Kozje, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Kozje
 Bistrica (Litija, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Litija
 Bistrica (Naklo, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Naklo
 Bistrica (Šentrupert, Crna Gora), naselje u općini Šentrupert
 Vidi i:
 Bistriţa
 nl:Bistriţa
 ro:Bistrița (dezambiguizare)


text:
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (julkisen avaimen järjestelmä, julkisen avaimen infrastruktuuri, kuvaavammin julkisten avainten hallintajärjestelmä) on järjestely, joka vastaa julkisen avaimen salausjärjestelmien yhteen perushaasteeseen: miten luottaa vapaasti levitetyn julkisen avaimen aitouteen. Julkisen avaimen menetelmiä voi kyllä käyttää ilmankin PKI-järjestelyä. PKI on terminä peräisin X.509-standardista (). PKI-järjestelmissä luotettava taho ("varmentaja") allekirjoittaa digitaalisesti julkisen avaimen tunnistetietoineen, jolloin allekirjoitettua avainta lisätietoineen ("varmenne") voidaan jakaa, ja sen vastaanottajat voivat teoriassa varmistua allekirjoituksen teknisen oikeellisuuden ja allekirjoittavan tahon luotettavuuden perusteella, että vastaanotetun avaimen tunnistetiedot ovat oikeat.
 PKI-termejä
 Varmennetta () verrataan usein henkilötodistukseen, vaikka vertaus on harhaanjohtava. Henkilötodistus on vain asianomaisen itsensä hallussa, kun taas varmennetta monistetaan ja jaellaan vapaasti ja varmennetta voi käyttää myös salaukseen ilman tunnistamista. Salaaja tarvitsee vastaanottajan julkisen avaimen, ja tunnistava taho tarvitsee tunnistettavan tahon julkisen avaimen. PKI/X.509-standardin ajatuksen mukaan avain saadaan molemmissa tapauksissa varmenteena. Se voidaan hankkia joko erikseen etukäteen, tai saada osana protokollaa yhteyttä avatessa. Yleisimmistä tietoturvajärjestelmistä esimerkiksi SSL/TLS ja S/MIME käyttävät aina X.509-varmenteita ja IPSec voi käyttää niitä. PGP on tunnettu julkisen avaimen sovellus, jolla on oma, X.509-standardista poikkeava avainmuotonsa ja varmennefilosofiansa.
 Varmentaja (, CA) on taho, joka myöntää varmenteita. Varmentajan tehtävä on selvittää, onko varmenteen hakija todella se, joka väittää olevansa. Suomen valtion virallisen PKI:n varmentajana toimii Väestörekisterikeskus. He ovat delegoineet varmenteita hakevien käyttäjien henkilöllisyyden todentamisen poliisille. Jos haet nykyään henkilökorttia, täytyy sinun todentaa henkilöllisyytesi poliisiasemalla, jolloin saat sirullisen kortin varmenteineen. Väestörekisterikeskus allekirjoittaa varmenteen, jossa nimesi on. Maailmalla tunnettuja varmentajia ovat esimerkiksi sellaiset yritykset kuin Thawte, Verisign tai Entrust. Kymmenien tunnettujen varmentajien allekirjoitukset kelpaavat automaattisesti esimerkiksi Microsoft-tuotteille tai Mozilla-selaimelle; nämä ohjelmat suostuvat käyttämään tällaisessa varmenteessa olevaa julkista avainta ilman varoitusta. Kyseisillä yrityksillä on intressi todentaa varmenteiden hakijoiden henkilöllisyys mahdollisimman hyvin, tai heidän maineensa luotettavana firmana katoaa. Kuitenkin 2011–2012 on paljastunut useita varmenteiden myöntäjiin kohdistuneita tietomurtoja. Yksittäisiä varmenteita voi perua; toisaalta selaimet eivät usein välitä, vaikka sulkulistojen tarkastus epäonnistuu. Kokonaisen varmentajan varmenteen peruutus on käytännössä mahdotonta, koska tämä vaikuttaisi kaikkiin sen asiakkaisiin.
 Digitaalinen allekirjoitus tai "sähköinen allekirjoitus" on PKI-allekirjoitus, jossa tietyn viestin sisältö allekirjoitetaan. Allekirjoitus voidaan yhdistää tiettyyn varmenteeseen ja varmistua siitä, että viestiä ei ole muutettu. Myös varmenteen myöntäjän täytyy olla luotettu, tai vaarana on, että allekirjoitus viittaa henkilöllisyyteen, joka oli väärennetty jo varmenteeseen. Paljolti jälkimmäisestä vaatimuksesta on syntynyt esim. EU:n määrittelemä "laatuvarmentajan" ja "laatuvarmenteen" käsite.
 PKI-kritiikkiä
 PKI ideana on peräisin ajalta ennen Internetiä, mutta kovasta yrityksestä huolimatta PKI-markkinat ovat hyvin pienet. Suurin osa luottamuksellisesta viestinnästä, mukaan lukien kaupankäynti verkoissa, tapahtuu joko ilman PKI:tä tai sitä hyvin pinnallisesti soveltaen, lähinnä vain SSL-palvelinvarmenteen muodossa. PKI-järjestelmiin on kuitenkin investoitu huomattavia summia. Useimmat PKI-hankkeet ovat kuitenkin olleet melko vaatimattomia menestyksiä. Syiksi on mainittu mm. julkisen avaimen teknologian käsitteellinen vaikeus, X.509-standardin puutteet ja epämääräisyys ja siten yhteensopivuusongelmat sekä teknologian, liike-elämän, juridiikan ja politiikan sekoittuminen hankalasti varmenteiden luottamussuhteissa.
 Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto arvostelee Suomen valtion varmennehankkeita:
 Vastaava tarkastusvirasto GAO sanoo Yhdysvalloissa:
 Uudessa-Seelannissa:
 Katso myös
 ElGamal
 PGP
 RSA
 Lähteet
 Aiheesta muualla
 Everything you Never Wanted to Know about PKI but were Forced to Find Out (PDF)
 PKI Considered Harmful
 Salakirjoitustekniikka
 Seulonnan keskeiset artikkelit
 Internet


text:
Eleanor Catton (London, 24 de setembro de 1985) é uma escritora neozelandesa.
 Nascida no Canadá, cresceu em Christchurch, para onde se mudou com sua família aos 6 anos de idade. Aos 28 anos, tornou-se a autora mais jovem a ganhar o Prêmio Man Booker, com seu segundo romance, The Luminaries (2013).
 Obras
 2008 - O ensaio - no original The Rehearsal (Reagan Arthur Books)
 Prêmio Betty Trask, Amazon.ca First Novel Award, NZSA Hubert Church Best First Book Award for Fiction
 2013 - Os Luminares - no original The Luminaries (Granta)
 Escritores da Nova Zelândia


text:
La riforma del lavoro Fornero, formalmente legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92, è una legge della Repubblica Italiana proposta dal Ministro del lavoro e delle politiche sociali Elsa Fornero durante il governo Monti, per riformare il mercato del lavoro.
 Storia
 La legge è stata approvata definitivamente il 27 giugno 2012 dalla maggioranza di governo (PdL, PD, UdC, e FLI): significativa è stata però la posizione del PdL, in cui quasi la metà dei deputati (87 su 209) ha fatto mancare il voto alla riforma, tra contrari, astenuti, e assenti.
 La riforma Fornero è stata in seguito in gran parte modificata, nell'ambito del Jobs Act del governo Renzi dal decreto legge 20 marzo 2014, n. 34 ("decreto Poletti"), approvato dal governo Renzi il 20 marzo 2014.
 Contenuto
 La norma afferma anzitutto l'utilizzo del contratto di lavoro a tempo indeterminato forma comune di rapporto di lavoro, definito dalla legge stessa “contratto dominante”; tra le novità introdotte ci sono: nuove norme sui rapporti di lavoro subordinato e parasubordinato, modifiche allo Statuto dei lavoratori per rendere più facili licenziamenti individuali per motivi economici, modifiche ai contratti dei collaboratori e alla durata dei lavoratori a termine, una stretta sull'abuso delle partite IVA, un nuovo sistema di ammortizzatori sociali.
 Critiche
 La riforma Fornero del mercato del lavoro è stata oggetto di numerose critiche da parte di partiti di opposizione, sindacati e forze della sinistra extraparlamentare, soprattutto per quanto riguarda le modifiche all'articolo 18 dello Statuto dei Lavoratori. Secondo i contestatori tale norma avrebbe reso più facili i licenziamenti.
 Per il ripristino dell'articolo 18 originario Italia dei Valori, Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, Rifondazione Comunista, Comunisti Italiani, Federazione dei Verdi e Fiom hanno raccolto le firme per un referendum abrogativo che non ha però mai avuto luogo a causa dello scioglimento anticipato delle Camere da parte dell'allora presidente della Repubblica Giorgio Napolitano.
 Note
 Voci correlate
 Decreto Poletti
 Elsa Fornero
 Governo Monti
 Riforma delle pensioni Fornero
 Collegamenti esterni
 Diritto del lavoro
 Leggi dello stato italiano
 Storia economica dell'Italia


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 724 A.2d 34 (1999)
 352 Md. 645
 FRIENDS OF THE RIDGE et al.
 v.
 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY.
 No. 76, Sept. Term, 1998.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 February 11, 1999.
 *35 J. Carroll Holzer, Towson, for petitioners.
 John H. Zink, III (Patricia A. Malone, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, on brief), Towson, for respondent.
 Argued before ELDRIDGE, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, ROBERT L. KARWACKI (retired, specially assigned), and JOSEPH F. MURPHY, Jr. (specially assigned), JJ.
 CATHELL, Judge.
 In this case, Pamela and Carl Follo and Friends of the Ridge et al., petitioners, appeal the affirmance by the Court of Special Appeals[1] of the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which upheld the granting of a variance from side yard setback requirements to Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, respondent. Petitioners present three issues for our review, which we rearrange:
 [1]. Whether the Court of Special Appeals' preference given to utility companies in this zoning case conflicts with this Court's decision in Kahl vs. Consolidated Gas and Electric, 191 Md. 249 [60 A.2d 754] (1949[1948])[.]
 [2]. Whether in the absence of statutory authority, an electric utility company's status, vel non, as a utility, may be used to justify a zoning variance, generally, and the prerequisite of "uniqueness" specifically[.]
 3. Whether the evidence relied on by the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case was sufficient to support a variance, both as to the uniqueness and practical difficulty, and whether its decision conflicts with the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Cromwell vs. Ward, 102 Md.App. 691 [651 A.2d 424] (1995)[.]
 We shall not directly address the questions presented.[2] We shall direct that this case be remanded to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals (Board) with instructions to enter an order that no variance was needed in the case sub judice.[3]
 Under the ordinance at issue here, and indeed in most ordinances of which we are aware, unless the ordinance's language specifically and clearly prohibits it, an owner of *36 contiguous parcels of real property, such as respondent, is free to combine them into larger and fewer parcels without violating the zoning code. In this case we are concerned only with the zoning ordinance. We first shall recite the facts and conclude by furnishing the reasons for holding that no variance was necessary in the present case.
 FACTS
 Respondent, at all times pertinent to the case at bar has operated a facility called the "Ivy Hill Substation," which is situated on one of the parcels it owns near the intersection of Falls and Ridge Roads in Baltimore County, Maryland. The site, and all of the relevant surrounding area, is zoned RC-5. Under that classification, public utility facilities are permitted as special exceptions if they comply with the requirements of the Baltimore County zoning ordinance. Respondent, anticipating a need for additional capacity in the region, proposed to increase the capacity at the Ivy Hill Substation. In order to do so, respondent was required to apply for a special exception to operate an enlarged facility. Respondent applied for and obtained a special exception. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners did not challenge the granting of the special exception. Accordingly, the granting of the special exception is no longer at issue.
 The new, enlarged substation was planned to extend onto a contiguous parcel from the original site of the existing substation. The original substation was situated on a 0.4 acre parcel. Subsequently, respondents acquired an adjacent 1.5 acre parcel and, during the proceedings at the administrative level, acquired another 0.9 acre adjoining parcel. The record reflects that all three parcels are contiguous with each other. Petitioners assert in their brief that because the parcels never were "legally combined," the Baltimore County ordinance required respondent to obtain a variance to use the three parcels as one parcel. Respondent asserts that it since has caused the three lots to be combined by a resubdivision. Petitioner alleges that this was done improperly. If, in fact, it was done improperly, that is a matter for another day.[4] We are concerned here only with the applicability of the zoning ordinance's variance provisions and not Baltimore County subdivision regulations.
 RESOLUTION
 We again note that in this case we are concerned only with the issue of the variance. The primary concern of the Board, however, was the simultaneously considered special exception request. The grant of that special exception is not before us. The Board originally found that the variance provisions, section 307.1, did not apply to respondent's request. The Board, for reasons we shall discuss, was correct in that finding.[5]*37 Nonetheless, apparently assuming it was required to address the variance issue because respondent filed a petition requesting a variance, the Board granted the petition. Because no variance was required, we direct the Court of Special Appeals to remand this matter to the circuit court for it to remand to the Board. The Board shall render a finding, consistent with its initial finding, that no variance is required for respondent to utilize the entire parcel for its proposal, so long as setback requirements are met from the exterior property lines of respondent's combined parcel.
 DISCUSSION
 Zoning ordinances, including Baltimore County's ordinances, do not create lots. Zoning does not create parcels of real property. What zoning ordinances normally do, with respect to residential districts, is establish dimensional minimums, such as minimal lot, parcel or tract size, yard sizes (the distance between buildings and property lines), and the height of structures. In addition, such ordinances specify the number of residential units that may be placed upon the area of a tract or parcel (density), ancillary requirements such as parking minimums, bathroom minimums, and square footage minimums of buildings. Additionally, zoning ordinances can, to some extent, regulate uses of property, as distinct from dimensional requirements.[6]
 Baltimore County's ordinance, like most zoning ordinances, does not define lots to include only lots delineated on plats in approved subdivisions. Section 101 defines "corner lot," "lot depth," "through lot" and then defines "interior lot" simply as "[a] lot other than a corner or through lot." It generically defines "lot of record," as "[a] parcel of land with boundaries as recorded in the land records of Baltimore County on the same date as the effective date of the zoning regulation which governs the use, subdivision or other condition thereof." Id. (emphasis added). The term "lots" as used in ordinances generally means parcels or tracts of land. In other words, when setbacks in respective districts are established, they generally apply to all tracts, parcels or pieces of land within the district, as indicated in the Baltimore County ordinance's definition of "setback." See id.
 Generally, and in Baltimore County, the title or purpose clauses of zoning ordinances express concern with undersized parcels or lots, not with parcels that exceed the minimum dimensional requirements of the ordinances. The ordinance at issue here, in section 1A04.1(A)(1), which deals with Resource Conservation Zones (in the case sub judice, an "R.C.5" (Rural-Residential Zone)), states in its "legislative findings" clause:
 It is found that:
 ....
 c. In some cases lot sizes are inadequate to assure long-term adequacy of on-lot sewer and water systems;
 *38 d. That unless measures are implemented to assure more rational growth patterns, including adequate lot size, undue financial hardships will be placed on Baltimore County and the life, safety and general welfare of the citizens of the county will be adversely affected. [Emphasis added.]
 The "purpose" clause provides, in relevant part:
 B. Purpose. The R.C.5 zoning classification is established, pursuant to the legislative findings above, in order to:
 ....
 4. Provide a minimum lot size which is sufficient to provide adequate area for the proper functioning of on-lot sewer and water systems.[7]
 Id. (emphasis added).
 Efforts throughout the country, including Baltimore County, have been to restrict undersize parcels, not oversized parcels. These efforts have resulted in the creation and evolution in zoning of the doctrine of merger, which, in zoning cases, generally prohibits the use of individual substandard parcels if contiguous parcels have been, at any relevant time, in the same ownership and at the time of that ownership, the combined parcel was not substandard.[8] In other words, if several contiguous parcels, each of which do not comply with present zoning, are in single ownership and, as combined, the single parcel is usable without violating zoning provisions, one of the separate, nonconforming parcels may not then or thereafter be considered nonconforming, nor may a variance be granted for that separate parcel. Some cases discuss automatic merger, but most require that the intent of the owner to merge the parcels be expressed, though little evidence of that intent is required. As far as we can discern, the zoning doctrine of lot merger has never been applied in any jurisdiction to limit the creation of parcels that exceed minimum dimensional requirements; merger has been applied only to prohibit the later creation of undersized parcels. This, perhaps, is due to the general lack of objection to large parcels.[9] A discussion, however, of how the doctrine of merger applies conversely to the present case may help emphasize that, in the context described above, merger occurs without the need for official subdivision or conveyancing. It is accepted automatically in some jurisdictions or, most often, with minimum proof of the owner's intent in other jurisdictions and always without the necessity of official action. We see no reason why a doctrine that seeks to prevent the proliferation or use of nonconforming, undersized lots by holding that they have been combined or merged into a larger parcel should not, as far as zoning is concerned, be applied properly to permit the creation, through the combining by use of a larger parcel from already conforming smaller parcels, without the necessity of official action or conveyancing.
 One of the seminal cases discussing the doctrine of merger with respect to zoning is the New Jersey case of Loechner v. Campoli, 49 N.J. 504, 231 A.2d 553 (1967). In 1936, Mrs. Loechner and her late husband acquired lots numbered 186 through 188 on a surveyor's map or plat. Each lot was twenty-five feet wide by one hundred feet in depth. Prior to 1952, the Loechners erected a single house on the three lots. In 1952, Rudolph Loechner acquired two adjoining lots, numbered 189 and 190. These new lots remained vacant. When Rudolph Loechner died, he devised lots 189 and 190 to his wife. Accordingly, upon his death, his wife owned all five lots, 186 through 190, and the house that had been erected on lots 186, 187, and 188.
 Mrs. Loechner subsequently contracted to sell lots 189 and 190 to Anthony Villani. *39 Villani applied for a variance to build on his two lots, neglecting to mention that he had purchased the lots from an owner who had owned all five lots at one time. Although he obtained a variance, he was denied a building permit on grounds that subdivision approval was required because the five lots, when in common ownership, had merged into one parcel and the subsequent off-conveyance of the two lots to Villani was, in fact, a resubdivision of more parcels from a lesser number of parcels (one tract composed of the five lots). Mrs. Loechner took the position that resubdivison was unnecessary because all five lots were shown on the map or plat when she and her husband acquired the lots.
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that "[t]he acquisition of title by plaintiff to Lots 189 and 190 which were contiguous to Lots 186-188 created one parcel or tract of land consisting of five separate lots." Id. at 508, 231 A.2d at 555. Explaining that a state statute defined subdivision as "division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two or more lots," id. at 509, 231 A.2d at 555, the court discussed the meaning of the word "lot" in that context, noting that it retained its traditional meaning as a parcel or tract of land:
 The word "lot" as used in the Subdivision Act must be read in context with the words "tract or parcel of land" in order to ascertain its meaning. Consistent with recognized principles of statutory construction "lot" takes its meaning from the other two words with which it is associated. Martell v. Lane, 22 N.J. 110, 123 A.2d 541 (1956); Salz v. State House Commission, 18 N.J. 106, 112 A.2d 716 (1955); State v. Murzda, 116 N.J.L. 219, 183 A. 305 (E. & A. 1936); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4908 (3d ed. 1443). Thus considered "lot" is synonymous with "tract or parcel." The phrase "lot, tract or parcel of land" has traditionally been used to connote any portion or piece of realty. N.J.S.A. 40:551.2 contemplates supervision of the division of a large tract or parcel of land into two or more smaller tracts or parcels. The Subdivision Act is not concerned with the manner in which land is described for conveyancing purposes but rather with what use is made thereof.
 Id. at 510-11, 231 A.2d at 556-57.
 Much the same can be said for zoning. Zoning is concerned with dimensions and uses of land or structures, not with any particular description "lot," "parcel," or "tract" applicable to or necessary for conveyancing. Conveyancing is a separate area of law involving the transfer of property between buyers and sellers that generally is not directly connected with government regulations and restrictions on the use of property through the zoning power. In zoning, the term lot normally is generic and used interchangeably to describe parcels, tracts, pieces or sections of land.[10] After Loechner, the doctrine of merger continued to evolve. It was described more concisely in Somol v. Board of Adjustment, 277 N.J.Super. 220, 228, 649 A.2d 422, 426 (1994): "[S]eparate undersized but contiguous lots fronting on the same street in single ownership ordinarily merge into one lot and conveyance of a portion will require subdivision and variance approval." (Emphasis added.) As is evident, the doctrine is designed to limit the creation of undersized parcels by presuming that merger can occur when contiguous lots exist in common ownership. As we have indicated, some jurisdictions presume merger automatically; in most jurisdictions, however, there must be some evidence of the owner's intent to merge. In the present case, respondent asserts a right to combine the contiguous parcels and to use them as a single parcel. Therefore, to the extent the doctrine is held to apply in this State under these converse circumstances, *40 the existence of merger is admitted in the case sub judice.
 In Iannucci v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 25 Conn.App. 85, 592 A.2d 970 (1991), the applicant submitted a variance application to reposition a house entirely on one lot. At the time of the application, the house was built on two lots, with the attached porch on one lot and the main body of the house on the other. The purpose of the variance was to allow the property owner to build a new house on the vacated lot. The zoning body denied the variance, finding that "`when a portion of the dwelling on lot two was constructed over the property line, lots one and two were effectively combined.'" Id. at 87, 592 A.2d at 971. The Connecticut Appellate Court held:
 Contiguous land owned by the same person does not necessarily constitute a single lot. A merger can occur, however, if the owner of contiguous parcels of land intends to form one tract. The owner's intent "may be inferred from his conduct with respect to the land and the use which he makes of it." Intent is an inference of fact and "is not reviewable unless it was one which the trier could not reasonably make."
 ... [B]oth lots were purchased by the plaintiff's parents. A portion of the dwelling was later constructed over the property line.... It was reasonable for the [administrative agency] to infer that the actions of the plaintiff's parents effectively merged the lots. Once these lots were merged, they could not thereafter be redivided into two separate lots [without complying with the subdivision process].
 The plaintiff's assertion that the lots remain separate because they appear separately on the original subdivision plan is not persuasive. A reference to multiple lots "from a map filed in the land records does not compel a finding of an absence of merger.... Such a conclusion conflicts with the basic proposition that in a determination of the factual issue of merger, the intent of the property owners must be ascertained and that no single factor is dispositive."
 Id. at 89-90, 592 A.2d at 972-73 (citations omitted) (some quotations marks omitted). In Appeal of Gregor, 156 Pa. Commw. 418, 423-24, 627 A.2d 308, 310-11 (1993), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court said:
 Under the doctrine of merger of estate[s] in land, a lesser estate is merged into a greater estate whenever both estates meet in the same person. This doctrine has no application, however, to zoning law and the construction of a zoning ordinance where, as here, the term "merger" is used to describe the effect of a zoning ordinance on lots held in common ownership and is related to the issue of the physical merger of adjoining lots....
 ... The burden is placed upon the party who asserts a physical merger to establish the landowner's intent to integrate the adjoining lots into one large parcel. [Citations omitted.]
 See also Skelley v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 569 A.2d 1054, 1056 (R.I.1990) ("The concept of merger of contiguous nonconforming lots in common ownership as an appropriate method to combine nonconforming lots is gaining increased recognition.").
 We shall hold that a landowner who clearly desires to combine or merge several parcels or lots of land into one larger parcel may do so. One way he or she may do so is to integrate or utilize the contiguous lots in the service of a single structure or project, as respondent proposes in the instant case.[11] Although this is not the general application of the doctrine of merger as it relates to zoning, we perceive no rational objection to applying the same principles to the circumstances of this case, resulting in a larger parcel. For title purposes, the platted lot lines may remain, but by operation of law a single parcel emerges for zoning purposes.
 *41 At least three of our sister jurisdictions appear to have moved in the same direction. For example, the New Jersey Superior Court in Bridge v. Neptune Township Zoning Board, 233 N.J.Super. 587, 592-93, 595, 559 A.2d 855, 858, 859 (1989), discussed merger where a house had been constructed so it extended across the property lines of two parcels in common ownership:
 The pivotal question is whether lot 686 retained its identity as a separate and distinct parcel for land use regulation purposes. Integral to that issue is the distinction, for land subdivision regulation purposes, between (1) the assembling in common ownership of two contiguous non-conforming lots both of which front on existing streets where the owner constructs a single-family residential dwelling so as to cover all or part of both lots, and (2) such similarly assembled lots where one or both of the lots remains entirely vacant. In the latter instance, the lots may retain their identity, but in the former instance, the lots lose their identity and merge into a single parcel.
 ....
 When a person acquires ownership of contiguous non-conforming lots that are delineated as separate tracts on any map, and then builds a single-family structure so that it overlaps both lots, the lots merge into a single tract and are subject to the [Municipal Land Use Law] and its restrictions for future subdivision purposes as long as the structure remains on any part of both lots. Lot 686 cannot recover its separate identity so long as a portion of the house remains where it is....
 In Molic v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 18 Conn.App. 159, 163-65, 556 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (1989), which did not involve the zoning doctrine of merger, the court, upholding an agency's finding that no merger had occurred where a swimming pool had been constructed across two parcels of land, nonetheless stated:
 The plaintiffs claimed that all of the property ... had been merged by use and intent into one parcel, and that the 1984 map that showed three lots was an unapproved subdivision....
 An owner of contiguous parcels of land may merge those parcels to form one tract if he desires to do so. An intent on the part of the owner to do so may be inferred from his conduct with respect to the land and the use which he makes of it.... Intent is a question of fact.
 The plaintiffs have cited no authority... for the proposition that an owner must be deemed to have merged contiguous lots. The one exception we have found ... is that ... some zoning regulations ... may require, either expressly or implicitly, that under certain conditions a nonconforming lot merges with contiguous land owned by the same owner [the zoning concept of the doctrine of merger]. This is an understandable requirement because it furthers the general zoning purpose of eliminating nonconforming lots....
 ....
 ... Contiguous land all owned by the same person does not necessarily constitute a single lot. [Emphasis added.] [Citations omitted.] [Footnote omitted.]
 Although Molic describes the general merger of parcels as being fact-based by not recognizing automatic merger, it appears to accept that the owner may combine contiguous tracts if he or she intends to do so.
 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, although addressing the doctrine of merger in a case involving zoning nonconformity, stated, without objection to the construction of structures across parcel boundaries, that:
 This is not to say, however, that once two adjoining lots are shown to be in "single and separate ownership" at the time of the relevant zoning ordinance, these lots must always be developed as two separate parcels. For example, a landowner who has acquired two adjoining lots after the passage of a zoning ordinance which rendered one or both of the lots undersized may use both lots in such a manner so as to integrate both lots into one large tract (explicitly demonstrated by building a house which straddles the common border).
 Township of Middletown v. Middletown Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 120 Pa. Commw. 238, 245, 548 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1988).
 *42 We are especially cognizant that in those jurisdictions that have expressly or impliedly recognized the doctrine of merger in zoning cases, none has required a formal re-subdivision as an element of merger. In fact, they generally reject both attempts to resubdivide into substandard parcels after a merger into a larger parcel has occurred and attempts to obtain variances from the nonconformity of the original parcels after a merger has created a larger conforming parcel. In those cases in which the erection of structures across borders have raised merger issues, none of the cases we have examined ever question the right of property owners of multiple contiguous parcels to treat them as one parcel. These courts generally assume that it is permissible and not in violation of zoning principles.
 Moreover, the construction of structures extending over more than one parcel or lot would not, in our view, affect the boundary lines (or lot lines) of the two parcels. They remain in place until a deed of conveyance or a new subdivision (generally defined as the creation of more parcels from fewer parcels) is created.[12] Perhaps even more important is the implication of the definition of "setback" contained in Baltimore County Zoning Regulations, section 101:
 The required minimum horizontal distance between the building line (as defined in Section 101) and the related front, side or rear property line. [Emphasis added.]
 Building line is defined as "[t]he line established by law beyond which a building shall not extend." Id. When the ordinance refers to "lot" lines with respect to setbacks, it refers to lot lines generically, i.e., property lines. The ordinance's setback provisions are met when the various "yard" requirements exist between buildings and property lines.
 There is no claim that any structures in the case at bar extend, or will extend, into any required "yards" or setbacks from the exterior property lines of the entire parcel now owned by respondent. It thus does not need a variance. As a result, we remand to the Court of Special Appeals and order it to remand this case to the trial court so it may return this matter to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals with instructions to render a finding, consistent with its initial finding, that no setback variance from "interior lot lines" is required in the case sub judice. The appropriate method created by Baltimore County to address the enlargement of this substation was by way of the special exception provisions. As we have noted, the grant of the special exception was not presented as a question in the certiorari petition.
 Respondent, insofar as the variance issues raised in this appeal are concerned, is entitled by right to construct the enlargement of the Ivy Hill Substation on its entire parcel without regard to the original "lot lines" that initially separated the three individual parcels, which now make up the larger combined parcel.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; THAT PORTION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS' *43 JUDGMENT RELATING TO THE VARIANCE IS VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT RELATING TO THE VARIANCE AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE BOARD OF APPEALS FOR A DECISION CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONERS.
 NOTES
 [1] Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 120 Md.App. 444, 707 A.2d 866 (1998).
 [2] We note that Respondent argues that the provisions of the ordinance applicable to variances ("where special circumstances or conditions exist that are peculiar to the land or structure which is the subject of the variance request") should be read to indicate that a structure intended to be built once a variance is granted could itself be so unusual as to satisfy the uniqueness requirement of the statute. Under this argument, respondent contends that, given the characteristics of the equipment respondent proposes to erect and for which it seeks a variance, combined with the necessity that the equipment be within a certain distance of each other, its situation creates "peculiar or unusual circumstances relating to the substation structures which are the subject of the variance." Our failure to address this issue should not be construed as our approval or acceptance of that approach. We are reluctant to say that a proposition we are not resolving is wrong. Accordingly, we shall instead describe it as of doubtful logical force.
 [3] This is consistent with the Board's initial finding that no variance was necessary. The Board apparently felt it was required to address the variance issue because respondent filed a variance petition. Respondent may have filed the variance request because opponents to the project asserted that a variance was necessary.
 [4] We often have held that subdivision is not zoning. In most jurisdictions, including Baltimore County, subdivision regulations are enacted and codified separately. We did state in our recent case of Wesley Chapel Bluemount Ass'n v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125, 699 A.2d 434 (1997), that planning and subdivision matters were in the nature of zoning for the purposes of the State Open Meetings Act. That opinion was based on our perception that the Legislature intended planning and subdivision processes to be considered as zoning under that Act. See generally id. Our opinion on that matter in that case was meant to apply only to Open Meetings Act concerns, and was not meant to be of general application changing, as Judge Eldridge discussed in his dissent, the holdings of "numerous opinions of this Court which have drawn a sharp distinction between `planning' and `zoning.' The approval or disapproval of a development plan is simply not a `zoning matter.'" Id. at 151, 699 A.2d at 447. The holding in Wesley Chapel is limited to the context of the Open Meetings Act.
 [5] The Board discussed the variance request, stating, in relevant part:
 [Respondent] finally must meet the tests under Section 307.1 in pursuing variance from lot line setbacks, said lot lines existing between tracts owned by [respondent]. George Gavrelis clearly points out in his testimony that Section 306 of the BCZR speaks to lot area regulations for erecting substations. [Respondent] seeks a variance under 307.1 from BCZR 1A04.3B.3 which requires a 50-foot setback from any lot line other than a street line. The Board finds as a fact that Section 306 applies in this case and that the application for a variance under 307.1 may be treated as moot. [Respondent] recognizes that its placement of electric utility structures on the subject site, straddling interior lot lines and certainly within otherwise required setbacks, may be construed under 1A04.3B.3 as a principal building, and is therefore requesting such variance. The Board is compelled to address the issue of 307.1 pursuant to the Petition. [Emphasis added.]
 [6] When variance issues are involved, some cases regarding setbacks or height restrictions refer to them as "dimensional" variances, see Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 523-26, 621 A.2d 476, 479-81 (1993), and some as "deviational" variances. See Sako v. Delsesto, 688 A.2d 1296, 1298 (R.I.1997). In Maryland, they are commonly referred to as "yard" variances, distinguishing them from "use" variances, but on occasion have been referred to as "dimensional" variances. See Easter v. Mayor of Baltimore, 195 Md. 395, 401, 73 A.2d 491, 493 (1950) ("Use variances are doubtless more serious than dimensional changes, but that is only a matter of degree."). The proof required, however, assuming the uniqueness of a subject property, can be much greater with respect to use variances when the terms "practical difficulties" and "unwarranted [undue, unusual or unreasonable] hardship" are framed in the disjunctive, "practical difficulties or unwarranted hardship." We noted in Zengerle v. Board of County Commissioners, 262 Md. 1, 21, 276 A.2d 646, 656 (1971): "a use variance is customarily concerned with unusual [unwarranted] hardship where the land cannot yield a reasonable return without a variance whereas an area variance is primarily concerned with practical difficulties." Although the phrase "reasonable return" has all but disappeared from the vocabulary of zoning, except to the extent the term "reasonable investment backed expectations," has crept into "takings" jurisprudence, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978) and its progeny, the distinction between yard and use variances consistently has been applied through the selective application of the practical difficulty/unwarranted hardship terminology.
 [7] We will address the combining of three smaller parcels into one larger parcel by respondent, infra. That the purpose of this section is to require adequately sized lots or parcels of land will prove especially relevant in that context.
 [8] We are unaware of any Maryland cases adopting the zoning doctrine of merger.
 [9] There are social concerns that raising minimum parcel or lot size or raising minimum square footage requirements can result in exclusionary zoning that may, in some circumstances, be invalid. Exclusionary zoning issues have not been raised in the case at bar.
 [10] In an earlier case, Hutzler v. Mayor of Baltimore, 207 Md. 424, 429, 114 A.2d 608, 611 (1955), which involved a parcel of land 200 feet by 380 feet, we noted that the statute at issue defined a "lot as `... a parcel of land now or hereafter laid out and occupied by one building and the accessory buildings or uses customarily or necessarily incident to it, including such open spaces as are required by this ordinance.'" (Omission in original.) In Hertelendy v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 554, 568-69, 226 A.2d 672, 681 (1967), we noted, without comment, that an ordinance's variance provisions addressed "parcels of property" and then, without making any distinction, described the parcel of property as "Lot 23-B."
 [11] An owner of contiguous parcels who erects a structure in what would ordinarily be a setback of one of the individual parcels might, under this doctrine, although we do not now decide it, also cause a combination of lots thus restricting the future alienability of the unbuilt upon parcel because the conveyance of that parcel would cause the property upon which the structure is built to be in violation of the ordinance. Such an owner would also risk being forced to bring that parcel into conformity by removing the structure from the setback.
 [12] The Baltimore County Zoning Regulations in its general definitions section defines subdivision as:
 The division of any tract or parcel of land, including frontage along an existing street or highway, into two or more lots, plots or other divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of building development for rental or sale, and including all changes in street or lot [parcel, tract] lines; provided, however, that this definition of a subdivision shall not include divisions of land for agricultural purposes. [Emphasis added.]
 The Baltimore County Planning, Zoning and Subdivision Control statute, in Article I, Section 26-1 defines subdivision as:
 Subdivision means the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two (2) or more lots, sites, or other divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development.... Subdivision also includes resubdivision and, where appropriate to the context, relates to the process and subdividing or to the lands or territory divided.
 Clearly, respondent was combining, not dividing, parcels and not combining them for purposes of rental or sale. It was not creating more parcels from less parcels, at least until pressured to seek subdivision, an issue not before us, or was it seeking to make any "dimensional" changes, or to change parcel or "lot" lines. Nor has it changed the boundaries of its total parcel. As we have said, unless otherwise indicated, "lot" as used in zoning or subdivision definition is the equivalent of "parcel" or "tract."


text:
(14715) 2000 CD71 es un asteroide perteneciente al cinturón de asteroides, región del sistema solar que se encuentra entre las órbitas de Marte y Júpiter.
 Fue descubierto el 7 de febrero de 2000 por el equipo del LINEAR desde el Laboratorio Lincoln, Socorro, Nuevo Mexico.
 Designación y nombre
 Designado provisionalmente como 2000 CD71
 Características orbitales
 (14715) 2000 CD71 está situado a una distancia media del Sol de 3,168 ua, pudiendo alejarse hasta 3,335 ua y acercarse hasta 3,002 ua. Su excentricidad es 0,053 y la inclinación orbital 8,207 grados. Emplea 2060,18 días en completar una órbita alrededor del Sol.
 Pertenece a la familia de asteroides de (490) Veritas.
 Los próximos acercamientos a la órbita de Júpiter ocurrirán el 13 de octubre de 2060, el 17 de junio de 2071 y el 10 de febrero de 2082.
 Características físicas
 La magnitud absoluta de (14715) 2000 CD71 es 13,27. Tiene 12,829 km de diámetro y su albedo se estima en 0,074.
 Véase también
 Lista de asteroides del (14701) al (14800)
 Cuerpo menor del sistema solar
 Referencias
 Enlaces externos
 Modelo en 3D de algunos asteroides
 Circunstancias de Descubrimiento: Planetas Menores Numerados
 Asteroides del cinturón principal
 Objetos astronómicos descubiertos por el Linear
 Objetos astronómicos descubiertos en 2000
 Objetos astronómicos descubiertos desde el Laboratorio Lincoln
 Wikiproyecto:Asteroides/Artículos de asteroides


text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 22003X0327(02)
 Abschluss einer Vereinbarung mit der Republik Zypern über die Teilnahme am Programm Kultur 2000
 Amtsblatt Nr. C 075 vom 27/03/2003 S. 0004 - 0004
 Abschluss einer Vereinbarung mit der Republik Zypern über die Teilnahme am Programm Kultur 2000(2003/C 75/05)Am 11. März 2003 wurde die Vereinbarung zwischen der Europäischen Kommission - im Namen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft - und der Regierung der Republik Zypern über die Teilnahme am Programm Kultur 2000 unterzeichnet.Der vollständige Wortlaut der Vereinbarung auf Englisch ist auf der folgenden Website zu finden:http://europa.eu.int/comm/ culture/eac/index_en.html


text:
Is ceoltóir Sasanach é Steven Patrick Morrissey (Morrissey ar a dtugtar de ghnáth) a rugadh i nDavyhulme, Manchain ar an 22 Bealtaine 1959, mac le tuismitheoirí Éireannacha. Tháinig sé ar mbéal an phobail sna hoctóidí, nuair a bhí sé ina phríomhscríbhneoir agus amhránaí don ghrúpa rac malartach The Smiths. Bhí an-rath ar an ngrúpa i Sasana ach bhris siad suas i 1987 agus lean Morrissey ar aghaidh gan iad. Deirtear go rialta go raibh sé cheann de na daoine is tábhachtaí i bhforbairt an rac malartach ag an am seo. Is duine follasach é chomh maith agus bíonn a thuairimí conspóideach go minic maidir le cearta ainmhí agus ciníochas, i measc nithe eile.
 I 2008, sheol Morrissey a cheirnín Greatest Hits.
 Tús a shaoil
 Rugadh agus tógadh Morrissey i Manchain. Is as Baile Átha Cliath iad a thuismitheoirí, Peter Morrissey agus Elizabeth Dwyer. Chuaigh siad ar imirce sular rugadh Steven i 1959.
 Nuair a bhí sé óg, thosaigh Morrissey ag éisteacht le hamhránaithe baineann cosúil le Dusty Springfield, Sandie Shaw, Marianne Faithfull and Timi Yuro. Chomh maith leis sin, bhí suim aige i sraithscéal teilifíse 'kitchen sink', scannáin réalaíoch, an t-aisteoir James Dean agus na scríbhneoirí Oscar Wilde and Shelagh Delaney. Chomh maith leis sin, tharla na "Moors Murders" ag an tráth seo: ghoid, bhraith gnéasach agus mharaigh Ian Brady and Myra Hindley thriúr páistí agus beirt déagóirí ó Manchain idir mí Iúil 1963 agus Deireadh Fómhair 1965. Mar sin, tháinig tráma mhór ar an Morrissey óg ag an am seo toisc go raibh eagla air.
 Nuair a bhí sé ina dhéagóir, bhí sé láidir agus ní chuir na buachaillí dána Morrissey ar a thóin. É sin ráite, bhí uaigneas agus dúlagar air agus thug na dochtúirí leigheas speisialta dó. Lean sé caitheamh aimsire seo ar aghaidh i rith a shaoil faraor. D'fhreastail sé St. Mary's Secondary Modern School agus Stretford Technical School, agus fuair sé torthaí de na trí "O-Levels" (Béarla Litríocht san áireamh). Ina dhiaidh sin, d'oibrigh sé le Oifig na gCoimisinéirí Ioncaim ar feadh tamall ach ní aontaítear leis an post seo leis agus chuaigh sé ar an "dole".
 Dúirt Morrissey le déanaí go raibh dada aige le linn a óige ach popcheoil: bhí sé fite fuaite leis. Scríobhadh sé litreacha chuig na irisí ceoil (NME, Melody Maker agus araile) go rialta agus labhair sé a intinn i gcónaí. Chuaigh sé chuig na ceolchoirmeacha freisin, T-Rex ag an gcéad dul síos i 1972.
 Dioscliosta
 Viva Hate (1988)
 Bona Drag (1990)
 Kill Uncle (1991)
 Your Arsenal (1992)
 Beethoven Was Deaf (1993)
 Vauxhall and I (1994)
 Southpaw Grammar (1995)
 World of Morrissey (1995)
 Maladjusted (1997)
 The Best of Morrissey (1997)
 My Early Burglary Years (1998)
 The CD Singles '88-91''' (2000)
 The CD Singles '91-95' (2000)
 ¡The Best Of! (2001)
 You Are the Quarry (2004)
 Live at Earls Courts (2005)
 Ringleader of the Tormentors (2006)
 Greatest Hits (2008)
 Years of Refusal (2009)
 Swords (2009)
 The Very Best of Morrissey (2011)
 World Peace Is None of Your Business (2014)
 Low in High School (2017)
 This is Morrissey (2018)
 California Son (2019)
 I Am Not A Dog On A Chain (2020)
 Bonfire of Teenagers Leabharliosta
 Autobiography (2013)
 List of the Lost'' (2015)
 Tagairtí
 Ceoltóirí Sasanacha
 Daoine as Manchain
 Daoine a rugadh i 1959
 Pobal Éireannach na Breataine
 Daoine beo


text:
 26.5.2012
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 C 151/16
 Žádost o rozhodnutí o předběžné otázce podaná Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Nizozemsko) dne 29. února 2012 — Staat der Nederlanden v. Delta NV
 (Věc C-107/12)
 2012/C 151/28
 Jednací jazyk: nizozemština
 Předkládající soud
 Hoge Raad der Nederlanden
 Účastníci původního řízení
 Žalobce: Staat der Nederlanden
 Žalovaná: Delta NV
 Předběžné otázky
 1)
 Musí být článek 345 SFEU vykládán v tom smyslu, že pod pojem „úprava vlastnictví uplatňovaná v členských státech“ spadá rovněž úprava absolutního zákazu privatizace ve smyslu vyhlášky o akciích provozovatelů soustavy ve spojení s článkem 93 zákona o elektřině z roku 1998 a článkem 85 zákona o plynu, dotčená v projednávaném případě, podle které mohou být podíly na provozovateli soustavy převáděny jen výlučně v rámci státní sféry?
 2)
 V případě kladné odpovědi na otázku I, má toto za důsledek, že pravidla týkající se volného pohybu kapitálu nejsou použitelná na zákaz skupiny a na zákaz vedlejších činností nebo přinejmenším, že zákaz skupiny a zákaz vedlejších činností nemají být zkoumány s ohledem na pravidla týkající se volného pohybu kapitálu?
 3)
 Jsou cíle, které sleduje rovněž Won (Wet onafhankelijk netbeheer; zákon o nezávislém provozu soustavy) a které směřují k tomu, aby se prostřednictvím boje proti křížovým dotacím v širokém smyslu (včetně výměny strategických informací) zajistila transparence trhu s energií a zabránilo narušení hospodářské soutěže, čistě hospodářskými zájmy a nebo mohou být považovány rovněž za zájmy, které nemají hospodářskou povahu v tom smyslu, že mohou podle okolností představovat jakožto naléhavé důvody obecného zájmu odůvodnění pro omezení volného pohybu kapitálu?