type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' U.S. Department of Agriculture\n\n Office of Inspector General\n Southwest Region\n\n\n\n\n Audit Report\n\n\n\n\n Farm Service Agency\n Socially Disadvantaged Borrower\nForeclosures \xe2\x80\x93 Farm Program Loans\n\n\n\n\n Report No. 03601-49-Te\n June 2009\n\x0c UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE\n\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n Washington, D.C. 20250\n\n\nJune 8, 2009\n\n\n\nREPLY TO\nATTN OF: 03601-49-Te\n\nTO: Douglas J. Caruso\n Administrator\n Farm Service Agency\n\nTHROUGH: T. Mike McCann\n Director\n Operations Review and Analysis Staff\n\nFROM: Robert W. Young /s/\n Assistant Inspector General\n for Audit\n\nSUBJECT: Socially Disadvantaged Borrower Foreclosures \xe2\x80\x93 Farm Program Loans\n\n\nUnder the 2008 Farm Bill, Congress directed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to \xe2\x80\x95determine\nwhether decisions of the [Department of Agriculture (USDA)] to implement foreclosure proceedings\nwith respect to farmer program loans made under subtitle A, B, or C of the Consolidated Farm and Rural\nDevelopment Act \xe2\x80\xa6 to socially disadvantaged farmers or ranchers during the 5-year period preceding\n[June 18, 2008] were consistent and in conformity with the applicable laws (including regulations)\ngoverning loan foreclosures.\xe2\x80\x961, 2 Congress required that we report our findings no later than June 18,\n2009.\n\nFor purposes of FSA\xe2\x80\x98s farm loan programs, socially disadvantaged groups are women, African\nAmericans, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Pacific Islanders.3\nVarious lawsuits have been filed containing allegations that USDA discriminated against\n\n\n\n\n1\n Public Law 110-246, Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, title XIV, subtitle A, section 14002(b)(1), dated June 18, 2008.\n2\n Subtitles A, B, and C represent three types of direct loans\xe2\x80\x94farm ownership, farm operating, and emergency loans [Title 7, United States\nCode (U.S.C.), section1922; 7 U.S.C. 1941; and 7 U.S.C. 1961] administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). A socially disadvantaged\nfarmer or rancher is defined by statute as one who is a member of a socially disadvantaged group. A socially disadvantaged group is, in turn,\ndefined as a group whose members have been subjected to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice because of their identity as a member of a group\nwithout regard to their individual qualities [7 U.S.C. 2003(e)].\n3\n FSA Handbook 3-FLP, Direct Loanmaking, (Revision 1), dated December 31, 2007.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 2\n\n\nmembers of socially disadvantaged groups regarding farm loan programs, including but not\nlimited to allegations regarding loan making and/or loan servicing.4\n\nIn order to meet the mandated deadline of June 18, 2009, we limited our review to whether FSA\nfollowed its established process in servicing and foreclosing on loans to socially disadvantaged\nborrowers, and whether the agency\xe2\x80\x98s process was consistent and in conformity with applicable laws and\nregulations. We did not determine if borrowers were eligible for their loans, nor did we review FSA\xe2\x80\x98s\nloan making process.\n\nFor fiscal years (FY) 2003 through 2007, each year, on average, there were about 75,500 borrowers who\nhad direct loans\xe2\x80\x94of these, about 14,300 were socially disadvantaged. Of the 800 borrowers FSA\nforeclosed on during the same period,5 185 were socially disadvantaged. OIG selected a statistical\nsample of 146 borrowers\xe2\x80\x94socially disadvantaged and non-socially disadvantaged\xe2\x80\x94who were\nforeclosed on during this 5-year period. (See exhibit B for details concerning our sampling\nmethodology.)\n\nWe also expanded our review to include the loan restructure process, which is a part of loan servicing.\nWhen borrowers become delinquent on their payments or are otherwise financially distressed, they are\ngiven the opportunity to adjust their loans so they can continue making payments and are not forced to\nsell the property used to secure the loans. Since the opportunity to restructure a loan offers borrowers an\nalternative to foreclosure, we looked at restructured loans to determine if socially disadvantaged\nborrowers were treated similarly to non-socially disadvantaged borrowers. Of the 1,271 borrowers\nwhose loans were restructured from FYs 2003 through 2007, we reviewed a statistical sample of\n87 borrowers.6 (See exhibit B.)\n\nBased on our review, we found that FSA\xe2\x80\x98s foreclosure and restructure process was consistent and in\nconformity with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. We found that the process itself\nwas in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, and that FSA generally applied that process\nconsistently to individual borrowers. Moreover, when we compared how FSA restructured and\nforeclosed loans to socially disadvantaged and non-socially disadvantaged borrowers, we found that the\nborrowers were processed consistently.\n\nAlthough we did identify some instances where FSA was not technically in conformity with laws,\nregulations, policies, or procedures, the exceptions were not significant and were usually a matter of\ntiming. For example, we found a few cases in which a letter notifying borrowers that they were\ndelinquent was not timely sent out, but the letter was eventually sent before the next loan servicing\naction occurred. Moreover, we found that these exceptions affected non-socially disadvantaged\nborrowers as well as socially disadvantaged borrowers.\n\n\n\n4\n Timothy C. Pigford v. Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture, Civil Action No. 97-01978; George B. Keepseagle, et al. v. Tom Vilsack,\nSecretary of Agriculture, Civil Action No. 99-03119; Rosemary Love, et al. v. Tom Vilsack, Civil Docket No. 1:00-cv-02502 (JR), U.S. District\nCourt for the District of Columbia; Guadalupe Garcia, et al. v. Tom Vilsack, Civil Docket No. 1:00-cv-02445 (JR), U.S. District Court for the\nDistrict of Columbia; and In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation, Civil Misc. Docket No. 08-0511 (PLF), U.S. District Court for the\nDistrict of Columbia (Pigford II).\n5\n There were 800 borrowers foreclosed on in the contiguous 48 States during this time period. Eleven borrowers in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,\nand Guam were excluded from consideration due to the small number of borrowers and to audit resources. (Alaska [0 socially disadvantaged\nborrowers, 2 non-socially disadvantaged borrowers], Hawaii [3,2], Puerto Rico [3,0], Guam [1,0].)\n6\n We limited our sample of borrowers with restructured loans to those locations where we were already reviewing the 146 foreclosed borrowers.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 3\n\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nFSA\xe2\x80\x98s mission is to equitably serve all farmers, ranchers, and agricultural partners through the delivery\nof effective, efficient agricultural programs for all Americans. As part of that mission, FSA makes and\nguarantees loans to farmers and ranchers to purchase farmland and finance agricultural production.\n\nFSA makes and services direct farm loans including farm ownership, farm operating, and emergency\nloans. Farm ownership loans may be used to purchase or enlarge a farm or ranch, purchase easements or\nrights of way needed in the farm\xe2\x80\x98s operation, erect or improve buildings, implement soil and water\nconservation measures, and pay closing costs. Farm operating loans may be used to purchase livestock,\nincluding poultry, and farm equipment, or to pay annual farm operating expenses such as feed, seed,\nfuel, fertilizer, chemicals, and insurance. Emergency loans are used to help producers recover from\nproduction and physical losses due to drought, flooding, other natural disasters, or quarantine.\n\nWithin FSA, the process of making loans is distinct from the process of servicing loans\xe2\x80\x94loan making\nand loan servicing are handled by different divisions with different personnel. Restructure and\nforeclosure actions are part of loan servicing.\n\nWhen borrowers cannot make scheduled payments on their loans, or are otherwise financially distressed,\nFederal law provides a process by which the borrowers\xe2\x80\x98 loan accounts can be serviced to avoid\nforeclosure and liquidation.7 This process is known as restructuring the loan. Borrowers can be\nconsidered for restructure of their loan (i.e., rescheduling, reamortization, consolidation, deferral, or\nwrite-down of the amount owed) as long as the Government will receive an equal or greater net return\nthan it would realize through foreclosure.\n\nTo determine if a borrower\xe2\x80\x98s loan can be restructured, FSA uses loan servicing software called the Debt\nand Loan Restructuring System (DALR$). Based on financial information provided to FSA by the\nborrower, and entered into DALR$ by FSA, DALR$ performs debt and loan restructuring analysis on\ndistressed borrowers or delinquent Government loans to determine optimal debt restructuring\nalternatives. It then develops a restructuring plan that is advantageous to the Government and the\nborrower. If DALR$ indicates that a plan for restructuring the loan cannot be developed,\nState-sponsored mediation or a meeting of creditors is offered. If restructure is not possible after\nmediation, the borrower has the opportunity to purchase the debt at the current market value of the\nsecurity and any non-essential assets. The remainder of the debt is written off when the buyout is\naccomplished. If the borrower is unable to take advantage of the buyout option, FSA is required to\nproceed with foreclosure in an effort to recover as many tax dollars as possible.\n\nOBJECTIVE\n\nThe objective of the audit was to determine whether the Department\xe2\x80\x98s decisions to implement\nforeclosure proceedings with respect to socially disadvantaged borrowers were consistent and in\nconformity with the applicable laws and regulations governing loan foreclosures.\n\n\n\n\n7\n Public Law 100-233, Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, title VI, section 617, dated January 6, 1988.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 4\n\n\nSCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\nOur audit covered FSA direct farm ownership loans, direct farm operating loans, and direct emergency\nloans that had been restructured or had been foreclosed on from FYs 2003 through 2007. FSA provided\nthe foreclosure and restructure universe data. We refined the data to remove inaccuracies such as\nmultiple foreclosure sale dates and incorrect tax identification numbers and to exclude duplicates,\nthird-party foreclosures, and borrowers outside the audit scope.\n\nFor each year our audit covered (FYs 2003-2007), there were, on average, about 75,500 borrowers with\ndirect loans, about 14,300 of whom were socially disadvantaged. The foreclosure universe was defined\nas borrowers with FSA foreclosures. Of the 800 borrowers8 the agency foreclosed on during the same\nperiod, 185 were socially disadvantaged. The audit universe consisted of 356 foreclosed borrowers in the\n138 locations where there was at least one socially disadvantaged borrower.9 From this audit universe,\nwe sampled 146 borrowers at 60 locations using a two-stage sampling process. (See exhibit B.)\n\nOur audit also included a review of borrowers with restructured loans to determine if the restructure\nproceedings were consistent and in conformity with applicable laws and regulations. The audit\nrestructure universe was defined as borrowers whose loans were restructured during the same period\n(FYs 2003-2007) and who were in the same locations as the foreclosed borrowers in our audit universe.\nThis universe consisted of 1,271 borrowers, of whom 306 were socially disadvantaged farmers and\nranchers. From the 60 locations we were already visiting to review foreclosures, we sampled\n258 restructures. We reviewed restructures in the first 20 locations, but then halted our stop-or-go\nsampling after 87 restructures because we found that the number and significance of the exceptions were\nlow. (See exhibit B for more details on our sampling plan and analysis of results.)\n\nTo accomplish our audit objective, we interviewed FSA national and State office officials and analyzed\nsupporting documentation obtained from these offices as well as from the county offices. Specifically,\nwe:\n Determined the applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures for farm loan servicing;\n Confirmed the Office of the General Counsel\xe2\x80\x98s (OGC) role in reviewing FSA loan servicing\n regulations, policies, and procedures;\n Reviewed documentation related to national and State office oversight activities; and\n Became familiar with FSA\xe2\x80\x98s automated systems for farm loan servicing.\n\nFieldwork began in June 2008 and ended in March 2009. We performed file reviews of FSA\xe2\x80\x98s farm\nloan program records for selected borrowers and followed up with FSA State officials as deemed\nnecessary. In an effort to make the file reviews consistent among our review sites, we developed and\nused a pro forma document to conduct and record the results of our reviews of each of the borrower\nfiles. However, since the loan servicing actions may have begun as much as 20 years earlier, the FSA\nState officials we interviewed were often not aware of the circumstances surrounding the loan servicing\nactions. Since 1997, FSA has required all foreclosure cases to be reviewed and cleared by its civil rights\nstaff at the State offices.\n\n\n8\n There were 800 borrowers foreclosed on in the contiguous 48 States during this time period. Eleven borrowers in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,\nand Guam were excluded from consideration due to the small numbers and cost of travel. Loan servicing actions for many of the borrowers may\nhave begun prior to FY 2003 and, for some, as far back as 1988.\n9\n The audit universe of 356 borrowers contained 185 socially disadvantaged and 171 non-socially disadvantaged borrowers.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 5\n\n\nInitially, we planned to perform our fieldwork where each of the selected foreclosed borrower\xe2\x80\x98s files\nwere located. We made the decision to exclude from the sampling process the 11 borrowers from\nAlaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam due to audit resources and the small number of borrowers\nat those locations. Subsequently, we determined that, due to the number of individual locations we\nwould have needed to visit in order to review the selected borrowers\xe2\x80\x98 files, all the files would be\ntransferred to seven centralized sites. The review teams worked at FSA\xe2\x80\x98s State offices in Little Rock,\nArkansas; Alexandria, Louisiana; College Station, Texas; Jackson, Mississippi; Harrisburg,\nPennsylvania; Athens, Georgia; and Columbia, Missouri.10 The seven sites were chosen based on the\ngeneral locations of the files. (See exhibit C.)\n\nGiven the ongoing civil rights lawsuits, we interviewed attorneys from OIG\xe2\x80\x98s Office of Counsel, OGC,\nand the Department of Justice to determine how we should proceed if we needed to communicate with\nborrowers who were complainants in such lawsuits against USDA. Ultimately, however, we did not find\nit necessary to contact any borrowers during the audit.\n\nFor the foreclosures and the restructures in our sample, we also verified the data FSA employees entered\ninto the agency\xe2\x80\x98s DALR$ software, which is used to determine if a loan may be restructured. We\nverified this data because an input error could result in borrowers being foreclosed on when other\noptions were available. We found no significant discrepancies in the data entered into DALR$, and none\nof the identified data input errors affected the restructuring determinations. Since we found no\nsignificant data discrepancies and FSA had established appropriate oversight procedures, we are not\nreporting these discrepancies, nor are we making recommendations concerning DALR$ data entry.\n\nDALR$ was replaced by the Web-based eDALR$ program in April 2008, prior to the beginning of our\naudit. Since DALR$ was superseded, we did not perform a separate review of its application controls.\nWe did, however, perform a separate review of application controls over eDALR$. Our review was\ndesigned to determine if there were adequate controls over this Web-based servicing software. We found\nthat the software had adequate controls in place and was operated in accordance with National Institute\nof Standards and Technology guidance.\n\nWe conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing\nstandards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,\nappropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our\naudit objective. The evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions based on our\naudit objective.\n\nDETAILS\n\nOur review disclosed that the Department\xe2\x80\x98s foreclosure and restructure processes were generally\nconsistent and in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, and that socially disadvantaged and\nnon-socially disadvantaged borrowers were treated consistently when their loans were restructured or\nforeclosed. To reach this conclusion, we analyzed FSA\xe2\x80\x98s loan servicing process to identify critical points\nwhere an agency employee might not conform with law, regulation, policy, and procedure. We called\nthese critical points \xe2\x80\x95key events.\xe2\x80\x96 For the foreclosure process, we identified 28 such key events; for the\n10\n One socially disadvantaged borrower (foreclosure) file was unavailable during the time of our field visits. The file had been damaged by\nfloodwater and was being restored. The file was eventually sent for our review to the Bell County, Texas, FSA Office in Belton, Texas, which is\nphysically proximate to our Temple, Texas, field office.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 6\n\n\nrestructure process, we identified 10 key events.11 (See exhibit A for a complete descriptive list of key\nevents.)\n\n Foreclosures\n\n We selected a statistical sample of 60 counties with 146 borrowers having foreclosure actions,\n including 78 socially disadvantaged foreclosed borrowers and 68 non-socially disadvantaged\n borrowers. (See exhibit B.)\n\n For each of the 146 borrowers, we looked at the 28 key events where FSA might not conform to\n laws, regulations, policies, and procedures, either by not taking an action or by doing so outside\n an established time frame. Of the 4,088 total key events12 for these 146 borrowers, we found that\n FSA did not technically conform to laws, regulations, policies, and procedures only 31 times\n (26 borrowers). For instance, the agency did not send a notification to a borrower or sent it late.\n Not only was the rate of exception low, but for the two key events with more than three\n exceptions per event (events #1 and #10), analysis of the exceptions indicates we cannot\n conclude there is a significant difference between the socially disadvantaged and non-socially\n disadvantaged borrower groups. For 11 of the other 26 key events, the numbers of exceptions\n (1 to 3) were very low and were comparable between the two groups. (See exhibits A, B, and\n D.) In general, we found that the foreclosure process was in conformity with applicable laws and\n regulations and that FSA generally applied that process consistently to individual borrowers.\n\n Key Event #1: Did FSA send the primary notice of loan servicing by the 18th of the\n month?\n\n For key event #1, we determined whether FSA sent the primary loan servicing package\n to delinquent borrowers (90 days past due on payments) in a timely manner, which we\n defined as by the 18th of the month following the month in which the borrower becomes\n delinquent.13, 14 This event is key because it is the moment when FSA informs borrowers\n that they have become delinquent on their loan and notifies them of actions they can\n take to avoid foreclosure.\n\n For the 146 foreclosed borrowers in our sample, FSA did not timely send the servicing\n package to 9 borrowers (from 3 to 15 days late for 8 borrowers15), 5 of whom were\n socially disadvantaged. FSA officials agreed that these packages should have been sent\n\n\n\n11\n The foreclosure and the restructure processes share some of the same key events since these two processes are not mutually exclusive. Before\nFSA can foreclose on a borrower, the agency must first determine if a restructure is feasible.\n12\n 4,088 total key events equals 28 key events multiplied by 146 borrowers.\n13\n Title 7, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), chapter XVIII, part 1951, section 907(c), January 1, 2000, edition. Farmers Home Administration\nInstruction 1951-S, section 1951.907(c), dated March 14, 1997. (The regulation specifies that the servicing notification should be sent within\n15 days of receiving the Finance Office monthly status report. We allowed 3 additional days for county offices to receive the monthly status\nreport.)\n14\n FSA may also send the loan servicing package to borrowers that are in non-delinquent status such as current financially distressed.\n15\n One of the socially disadvantaged borrowers was notified 127 days late. Although FSA did send out a loan servicing package at the borrower\xe2\x80\x98s request\non February 19, 2002, after the borrower became financially distressed, FSA later did not timely send out the required loan servicing package when the\nborrower became delinquent. The notification of delinquency should have been sent out by November 18, 2002, but was not sent until March 25, 2003.\nThe file showed, however, that the agency was communicating with the borrower during this period. For example, FSA made at least two visits to the\nborrower\xe2\x80\x98s farm and was working with the borrower to restructure the borrower\xe2\x80\x98s loan.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 7\n\n\n out timely. Our analysis16 of these nine exceptions did not indicate that there were any\n statistically significant differences in treatment for socially disadvantaged borrowers\n compared with non-socially disadvantaged borrowers.\n\n Based on our sample, we can project these results onto the audit universe of borrowers\n on whom FSA foreclosed in FYs 2003 through 2007. We estimate that 6.2 percent of the\n socially disadvantaged borrower files (or 11 to 12 of 185) do not indicate the primary\n loan servicing packages were sent on time. Similarly, we estimate that 4.9 percent of the\n non-socially disadvantaged borrower files (or 8 to 9 of 171) do not indicate the packages\n were sent on time.\n\n Although FSA did not timely conform to this regulation and procedure for the nine\n borrowers, the agency did eventually send out the loan servicing packages and the\n borrowers were allowed the required amount of time before the next step in the\n foreclosure process was taken.\n\n Key Event #10: Did FSA send timely notification of its determination that the debt\n cannot be restructured?\n\n For key event #10, we determined whether FSA timely informed borrowers that their\n loans could not be restructured, which the agency should have done within 15 days after\n the decision was made.17 This event is key because it is the moment when FSA informs\n borrowers that the agency cannot restructure their loans and notifies them of the options\n available to them.\n\n For the 146 foreclosed borrowers in our sample, FSA did not timely send notification of\n its determination that a feasible plan could not be developed to restructure loans to\n 3 borrowers (from 17 to 56 days late), and did not send it at all to 2 borrowers. Of the\n five borrowers who did not timely receive their notification, four were socially\n disadvantaged.\n\n FSA officials agreed that these five notifications were not sent out or were not sent on\n time. However, from our analysis of these five exceptions, we cannot conclude there\n were any statistically significant differences in treatment for socially disadvantaged\n borrowers compared with non-socially disadvantaged borrowers.\n\n Based on our sample, we can project these results onto the audit universe of borrowers\n FSA foreclosed on from FYs 2003 through 2007. We estimate that 5.0 percent of the\n socially disadvantaged borrowers (9 to 10 of 185) were notified after 15 days. Similarly,\n we estimate that 1.2 percent of the non-socially disadvantaged borrowers (2 to 3 of 171)\n were notified after 15 days. Even though there is an absolute difference of 3.8 percent\n\n16\n We examined individual means and confidence intervals and performed a paired difference test. The paired difference test was applied to the\ndifference in the number of exceptions between socially disadvantaged and non-socially disadvantaged borrowers, paired by location. (See\nexhibit B.)\n17\n 7 CFR XVIII, part 1951, section 909(h)(3), January 1, 1989, edition. Generally, the regulations provide that, if the DALR$ calculations indicate\na feasible plan of operation cannot be developed, the servicing official will, within 15 days from the date of the determination that the borrower\xe2\x80\x98s\ndebt cannot be restructured as requested, send to the borrower by certified mail, return receipt requested, the \xe2\x80\x97\xe2\x80\x97Notification of Adverse Decision\nfor Primary Loan Servicing, Mediation or Meeting of Creditors and Other Options\xe2\x80\x96 and attach thereto a printout of the DALR$ calculations.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 8\n\n\n between the two values (5.0 percent and 1.2 percent), comparing the two groups with a\n \xe2\x80\x95paired difference test\xe2\x80\x9618 and a \xe2\x80\x95difference of the means test\xe2\x80\x9619 does not indicate a\n statistically significant difference between the socially disadvantaged and non-socially\n disadvantaged borrower groups in the handling of key event #10.\n\n Although FSA did not timely conform to this regulation and procedure for the five\n borrowers, the agency did eventually notify the borrowers that their loans could not be\n restructured.20\n\n Overall, we found that the number of exceptions in processing these foreclosures was small and\n that there was no statistically significant difference in treatment when foreclosing on socially\n disadvantaged farmers and ranchers compared to their non-socially disadvantaged peers. For\n 11 of the 28 key events where the exception rate was very low (1 to 3 exceptions), we could not\n draw meaningful conclusions comparing how socially disadvantaged farmers and their non-\n socially disadvantaged peers were treated based on such a small number of exceptions.21 (See\n exhibits A, B, and D, where all exceptions are discussed.) For all key events, these exceptions\n were not significant enough for us to conclude that the Department\xe2\x80\x98s decisions to implement\n foreclosure proceedings were not consistent and in conformity with applicable laws and\n regulations.\n\n Restructures\n\n Since the opportunity to restructure a loan offers borrowers an alternative to foreclosure, we\n looked at restructures to determine if socially disadvantaged borrowers were treated similarly to\n non-socially disadvantaged borrowers. Our review was intended to determine if restructure\n proceedings were consistent and in conformity with applicable laws and regulations.\n\n We reviewed a statistical sample including 87 borrowers who restructured their loans and\n determined that, for each borrower, there were 10 key events where FSA might not conform to\n law, regulation, policy, and procedure, either by not taking an action or by doing so outside an\n established time frame. Of the 870 key events for these 87 borrowers, we found that FSA did not\n technically conform with laws, regulations, policies, or procedures only 18 times\n (16 borrowers\xe2\x80\x944 socially disadvantaged, 12 non-socially disadvantaged). We consider this a\n very low exception rate. Each of the exceptions noted was related to the timeliness of FSA\xe2\x80\x98s\n actions. FSA officials agreed that the actions were not performed on time. (See exhibits A\n and E.)\n\n Based on our statistical analysis of the individual key events, we cannot conclude there is a\n difference in treatment between the socially disadvantaged and non-socially disadvantaged\n borrower groups. (See exhibit B.) Although FSA did not timely conform to regulations and\n procedures for the 16 borrowers, the agency did eventually take the required actions, and the\n borrowers\xe2\x80\x98 loans were restructured.\n18\n A paired difference test is applied to the difference in the number of exceptions between socially disadvantaged and non-socially disadvantaged\nborrowers, paired by location. (See exhibit B.)\n19\n We applied the \xe2\x80\x95difference of the means test\xe2\x80\x96 to the average exception rates of the two borrower groups. (See exhibit B.)\n20\n Two borrowers were not sent notification that they were not eligible for debt restructuring, but were subsequently notified of such adverse\ndecision at the next event in the foreclosure process.\n21\n For the remaining 15 events, no exceptions were noted.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 9\n\n\nOIG concluded that the Department\xe2\x80\x98s decisions to implement foreclosure proceedings with respect to\nsocially disadvantaged borrowers were generally consistent and in conformity with applicable laws and\nregulations. For the exceptions noted, our evidence does not indicate that socially disadvantaged farmers\nand ranchers are treated differently from their non-socially disadvantaged counterparts when their direct\nloans are considered for restructure, or are foreclosed. The noted exceptions involved timeliness issues,\nwhich were eventually corrected.\n\nWe are therefore making no recommendations at this time.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 10\n\n\n\nExhibit A \xe2\x80\x93 Key Events and Results\n Exhibit A \xe2\x80\x93 Page 1 of 1\n\n Foreclosure Restructure\n Exceptions Exceptions22\n Event Non- Non-\n No. Description of Key Event/Test SDA23 SDA SDA SDA\n 1 Did FSA send the notice of loan servicing availability by the 18th of the month? 5 4 1 3\n 2 Did FSA allow the borrower 60 days to submit an application for direct loan assistance? 0 0 0 1\n 3 In cases where the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s application for direct loan assistance was incomplete, did FSA follow up with the borrower? 0 0 0 0\n 4 Did FSA wait 60 days before sending the borrower the notice of intent to accelerate and notice of borrower\xe2\x80\x99s rights? 1 0 0 0\n If the borrower requested homestead protection after receiving the notice of intent to accelerate and notice of borrower\xe2\x80\x99s rights, did FSA send the borrower the\n 5 0 0 0 0\n notice of consideration for homestead protection?\n 6 Did FSA send the borrower an offer to restructure the debt within 60 days? 1 1 2 8\n 7 Did FSA allow the borrower 45 days to respond to the offer to restructure debt? 0 0 0 0\n 8 After appeal, did FSA allow the borrower another 45 days to accept the offer to restructure debt? 0 0 0 0\n 9 Did FSA process the debt restructure within 45 days? 1 0 1 1\n 10 Did FSA send the notice of adverse decision for primary loan servicing to the borrower within 15 days? 4 1 0 1\n 11 Did FSA allow the borrower 45 days to request mediation? 0 0\n 12 Did FSA send the borrower the notice of intent to accelerate and notice of borrower\xe2\x80\x99s rights? 0 0\n Did FSA send the borrower the notice of intent to accelerate and notice of borrower\xe2\x80\x99s rights when the borrower did not respond to or declined the offer to\n 13 0 0\n restructure debt?\n 14 Did FSA send the homestead protection notification when the borrower did not respond to the offer to restructure the debt or declined the offer? 0 0\n 15 Did FSA determine whether the borrower was eligible for homestead protection? 0 1\n 16 Did FSA accelerate the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s debt and foreclose on the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s security? 0 0\n 17 Did the county office complete and sign the loan servicing checklist? 0 2\n 18 Did the State office review and sign the loan servicing checklist? 1 2\n 19 Did the county office receive approval to accelerate the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s debt? 0 1\n 20 Did FSA send the acceleration notice (demand for payment) to the borrower? 1 0\n 21 Did the county office receive approval from the State office to liquidate or sell security? 0 0\n 22 Did FSA advertise the sale of the real estate being foreclosed? 0 1\n 23 Did FSA sell or account for the chattel (machinery, equipment, crops) security? 0 0\n In cases where FSA received notice the borrower filed bankruptcy before FSA sent the notice of loan servicing availability to the borrower, did FSA send\n 24 1 0\n correspondence to the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s attorney within 15 days of receiving the notification?\n 25 Did FSA allow the attorney 60 days to respond to correspondence? 0 0\n When FSA received notice the borrower filed bankruptcy after FSA had already sent the notice of loan servicing availability to the borrower, did FSA send\n 26 1 2\n correspondence to the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s attorney within 15 days of receiving the notification?\n 27 Did FSA proceed with acceleration (demand for payment) prior to liquidation (selling security)? 0 0\n 28 Did FSA handle unusual situations such as conservation contracts appropriately? 0 0\n 16 15 4 14\n 31 18\n\n\n\n\n22\n Generally speaking, events 11 \xe2\x80\x93 28 do not apply to restructures.\n23\n SDA = socially disadvantaged.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 11\n\n\nExhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Sampling Plan and Analysis of Results\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 1 of 10\n\nPurpose of the Sampling\n\nThe statistical sampling summarized here supported the audit of whether the Department\xe2\x80\x98s decisions to\nimplement foreclosure proceedings with respect to SDA borrowers were consistent and in conformity\nwith the applicable laws and regulations governing loan foreclosures.\n\nWe employed both two-stage and cluster sampling24 for selecting records for review. The measures\nevaluated were pass-fail attributes related to the performance of specific loan servicing actions. This\nexhibit summarizes our audit universe, sample design, and results.\n\nAudit Universe\n\nIn FYs 2003 through 2007, there were 811 borrowers with FSA loan foreclosures. Of those borrowers,\n11 were located in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam; these 4 States and territories were excluded\nfrom the audit. The remaining 800 borrowers had foreclosed loans serviced in 441 locations.25 Only\n138 locations contained at least 1 foreclosure involving a borrower FSA classified as part of an SDA\ngroup:\n Female,\n African American,\n Hispanic,\n Asian/Pacific Islander, or\n American Indian/Alaskan Native.\n\nWe focused on compliance in the servicing of SDA borrowers\xe2\x80\x98 loans (SDA loans) resulting in\nforeclosure. We defined the audit universe as those 138 locations that, based on FSA data, contained at\nleast 1 SDA loan foreclosure in the specified time period. To have a basis for comparison, we also\nexamined the servicing of non-SDA foreclosed loans. This universe of 138 locations contained 185 SDA\nborrowers and 171 non-SDA borrowers, as highlighted in the table below. We make no projections for\nlocations or borrowers outside of the defined universe.\n\n BORROWER CATEGORY LOCATIONS FORECLOSURES\n All 441 800\n SDA 185\n Non-SDA in an SDA 138\n 171\n Foreclosure Location\n Non-SDA not in an SDA\n 303 444\n Foreclosure Location\n\n\n\n\n24\n In a two-stage sample, large units (i.e., locations) are randomly selected first (primary-stage selection); then individual units (i.e., borrowers)\nare selected randomly from the selected larger units (secondary-stage selection). A cluster sample is a special case of two-stage sampling in\nwhich all of the individual units in the selected first stage units are selected.\n25\n Throughout this exhibit, we use \xe2\x80\x95location\xe2\x80\x96 to mean a State and county combination.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 12\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 2 of 10\n\nThe audit universe for loan restructuring was limited to the same SDA locations identified for the\nforeclosure testing. The universe of 138 locations included 1,271 borrowers with restructured loans in\nFYs 2003 through 2007.\n\n BORROWER CATEGORY LOCATIONS RESTRUCTURES\n All in an SDA Foreclosure\n 138 1,271\n Location\n SDA in an SDA Foreclosure\n 306\n Location\n 138\n Non-SDA in an SDA\n 965\n Foreclosure Location\n\nSample Design and Sample Size\n\nTo test compliance with loan servicing criteria, we designed a test of attributes, where each attribute\ncorresponded to a required servicing action, defined as \xe2\x80\x95key events\xe2\x80\x96 in this audit. During the audit,\nloan servicing records for these key events were reviewed and exceptions noted. An exception is any\nerror, deviation, or other measure of non-compliance with a particular criterion. Each borrower file\ncould contain one exception for each criterion applicable to the case. Therefore, a borrower file could\ncontain multiple exceptions, each related to a different criterion. Exceptions were assigned only if\nOIG determined a particular criterion applied to a particular borrower and the handling was\nnon-compliant. Where OIG determined a particular criterion did not apply to a particular borrower,\nthe record was considered compliant, i.e., no exception was assigned to that borrower/criterion\ncombination.\n\nWe had two categories of borrowers, SDA and non-SDA, as well as two categories of servicing actions,\nforeclosure and restructure, we wished to test. We chose a multi-stage sample design with location\nselected at the first stage. Borrowers were selected at the second stage.\n\nTo determine sample size, we began by assuming we would not encounter an exception rate exceeding\n30 percent on any tested criterion. While we had no prior information regarding the potential magnitude\nof exceptions for the criteria planned for testing, we had no reason to anticipate extremely high rates of\nnon-compliance. We desired a confidence level of 95 percent with a precision on the proportion not\ngreater than \xc2\xb18 percent for the 30 percent exception rate. In other words, if the observed exception rate\nwas in fact 30 percent, then the 95 percent confidence interval would be no wider than 22 percent to\n38 percent. Lower exception rates would result in narrower (tighter) confidence intervals.26 Using the\nparameters above, we calculated sample size for a simple random27 sample of borrowers from the SDA\nforeclosure universe of 185 and, using the standard formula for calculating sample size for a proportion\nfor simple random samples,28 arrived at a desired sample size of 75 SDA borrowers.\n\n\n26\n For example, a sample size sufficient to provide +/-8 percent precision on a 30 percent error rate would be expected to provide +/-4 percent\nprecision on a 5 percent error rate.\n27\n Also known as unrestricted random.\n28\n Sample size = [Np(1-p)] / [(N-1)(B/z)2 + p(1-p)], where: N = Universe size (185 borrowers); p = exception rate allowed for in planning (0.30);\nB = desired precision (0.08); z = 1.96 for 95 percent confidence level. We chose to calculate sample size based on borrowers and then to see how\nmany locations that generated, rather than calculating sample size based on locations, because we expressed the planned-for exception rate and\nthe desired precision in terms of percentage of borrowers rather than percentage of locations.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 13\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 3 of 10\n\nFor the key-event testing of foreclosures, we included all borrowers in the selected locations. Therefore,\nboth the SDA foreclosure group and the non-SDA foreclosure group were cluster samples.29\n\nTo determine the number of locations needed to generate the desired sample of 75 SDA borrowers, we\nfirst put the 138 locations into random order.30 Then, starting with the first location thus randomly\nselected, we progressed through the random list of locations accumulating the count of SDA borrowers\nin each location until the total reached or exceeded 75. This process produced a total of 60 locations,31\nwith 78 SDA borrowers on the FSA foreclosure listing.\n\nOf the 60 locations, 32 did not have any non-SDA borrowers; the remaining 28 locations contained a\ntotal of 68 non-SDA borrowers on the FSA listing.\n\nFor loan restructures, we determined there were 689 borrowers with restructured loans in the sample of\n60 locations. Some locations contained a large number of borrowers with restructured loans. Therefore,\nwe selected a random sample of six borrowers for each location that had more than six borrowers. SDA\nand non-SDA borrowers were not separated in advance for this selection of the six borrowers. For all\n60 selected locations, this generated a total of 258 borrowers to review, which proved to be prohibitive\nwithin the time frame allowed to perform the audit. Therefore, we approached the test of restructured\nloans as a stop-or-go sample, based on the number of exceptions found in the first 20 locations in the\nrandom sample. The first 20 locations included 213 borrowers; the two-stage selection process resulted\nin a sample of 87 randomly selected borrowers in those 20 locations.32\n\nBecause not all restructured loans were reviewed at a given location, this was a two-stage sample rather\nthan a cluster sample.\n\nResults\n\nOverall, the review found very few exceptions for the procedural key events tested. We show the raw\ntotals below to illustrate the generally low numbers of exceptions observed. We noted that just over half\nof the foreclosure key events with exceptions had broad applicability, while the remainder applied only\nto a few specific loans; for restructures, four out of the five events with exceptions were broadly\napplicable. For both foreclosures and restructures, the key events that were broadly applicable to SDA\nborrowers were the same as those for non-SDA borrowers. For many of the key events tested, we found\nno exceptions in either group, and we did not include those key events in the tables below.\n\n\n\n\n29\n A cluster sample is a special case of a two-stage sample. In a cluster sample all units (borrowers, in this audit) are selected in the second stage.\n30\n We used the Excel \xe2\x80\x95randbetween\xe2\x80\x96 function to select random numbers for each location.\n31\n We reached exactly 75 SDA borrowers at the fifty-seventh location selected. We chose to continue to the sixtieth random location, for a total\nof 78 SDA borrowers, to provide some coverage of other combinations of the unknown parameters.\n32\n We originally had 88 borrowers in the restructure sample. For 1 of the 88 borrowers, we received an incorrect file. We dropped the borrower\nfrom the sample, resulting in a sample of 87.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 14\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 4 of 10\n\n SDA Raw Data (from Non-SDA Raw Data\n review of 78 SDA (from review of 68 non-\n borrowers with SDA borrowers with\n foreclosures) foreclosures)\n Foreclosure Key Event Event Event\n Applied\n Exceptions Applied\n Exceptions\n 1: Did FSA send the notice of loan servicing availability by\n 68 5 56 4\n the 18th of the month?\n 4: Did FSA wait 60 days before sending the notice of intent\n 43 1 40 0\n to accelerate and notice of borrower\xe2\x80\x99s rights to the borrower?\n 6: Did FSA send the borrower an offer to restructure the debt\n 2 1 1 1\n within 60 days?\n 9: Did FSA process the debt restructure within 45 days? 1 1 0 0\n 10: Did FSA send the notice of adverse decision for primary\n 11 4 9 1\n loan servicing to the borrower within 15 days?\n 15: Did FSA determine whether the borrower was eligible for\n 15 0 12 1\n homestead protection?\n 17: Did the county office complete and sign the loan\n 66 0 55 2\n servicing checklist?\n 18: Did the State office review and sign the loan servicing\n 67 1 52 2\n checklist?\n 19: Did the county office receive approval to accelerate the\n 67 0 53 1\n borrower\xe2\x80\x99s debt?\n 20: Did FSA send the acceleration notice (demand for\n 63 1 56 0\n payment) to the borrower?\n 22: Did FSA advertise the sale of the real estate being\n 47 0 33 1\n foreclosed?\n 24: In cases where FSA received notice the borrower filed\n bankruptcy before FSA sent the notice of loan servicing\n availability to the borrower, did FSA send correspondence to 3 1 3 0\n the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s attorney within 15 days of receiving the\n notification?\n 26: When FSA received notice the borrower filed bankruptcy\n after FSA had already sent the notice of loan servicing\n availability to the borrower, did FSA send correspondence to 7 1 13 2\n the borrower\xe2\x80\x99s attorney within 15 days of receiving the\n notification?\n Totals for 13 Key Events with Exceptions 460 16 383 15\n\nIn aggregate, the 2 borrower groups were almost equal across the 28 foreclosure key events: for the\n78 SDA borrowers, we found 16 exceptions; for the 68 non-SDA borrowers, we found 15 exceptions.\n\n SDA Raw Data (from Non-SDA Raw Data (from\n review of 18 SDA review of 69 non-SDA\n borrowers with borrowers with\n restructures) restructures)\n Restructure Key Event Event Event\n Applied\n Exceptions Applied\n Exceptions\n 1: Did FSA send the notice of loan servicing availability\n by the 18th of the month?\n 11 1 35 3\n 2: Did FSA allow the borrower 60 days to submit an\n application for direct loan assistance?\n 16 0 61 1\n 6: Did FSA send the borrower an offer to restructure the\n debt within 60 days?\n 16 2 58 8\n 9: Did FSA process the debt restructure within 45 days? 16 1 58 1\n 10: Did FSA send the notice of adverse decision for\n primary loan servicing to the borrower within 15 days?\n 0 0 1 1\n Totals for 5 Key Events 59 4 213 14\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 15\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 5 of 10\n\nIn the restructures category, the raw total of 14 errors for 69 non-SDA borrowers appears considerably\nhigher than the 4 errors for 18 SDA borrowers; however, the SDA error rate is comparable to the\npercentage of SDA borrowers in the sample (18 SDA borrowers / 87 total borrowers = 0.21; 4 SDA\nexceptions / 18 total exceptions = 0.22).\n\nForeclosure Servicing Projections\n\nTo determine compliance with applicable laws and regulations, we projected these outcomes from the\nsample data to the audit universe. We first projected the averages and associated 95 percent confidence\nintervals for each key event. We used the cluster sample evaluation methodology33 for events with\nseveral errors. For events with three or fewer errors in the borrower category (SDA or non-SDA,\nindividually), we calculated upper error limits using the inverse beta function,34 due to the rare\noccurrence of exceptions. In addition, we compared the results for the two borrower groups. However,\nthe groups are not independent because the same locations are used for each. Therefore, we determined\nthe critical value and test statistics for the paired difference experiment,35 also called the random block\nexperiment, using the locations as the \xe2\x80\x95blocks.\xe2\x80\x96\n\nOf the foreclosure key events with exceptions, we typically found only one or two exceptions, and only\nfive foreclosure key events showed exceptions in both the SDA group and the non-SDA group. We\npresent below the projected proportions of both SDA and non-SDA borrowers with exceptions for the\ntwo foreclosure key events with more than three total exceptions.36 The results for these two key events\nillustrate two conditions of particular interest: (1) key event #1, with a total of nine exceptions, had the\ngreatest number of exceptions; (2) key event #10, had the largest observed difference in the number of\nexceptions between the SDA and non-SDA borrowers. All other key events had lower projected\nnumbers of exceptions in the audit universe and a smaller difference in the number of exceptions\nbetween the two groups. Therefore, these two key events represent the most extreme foreclosure\nservicing cases within the audit.\n\nForeclosure Servicing Key Event #1: Did FSA send the notice of loan servicing\navailability by the 18th of the month?\n\nKey event #1 had the largest number of exceptions in the sample, five in the SDA borrower group and\nfour in the non-SDA borrower group. The projected exception rates are 6.2 percent for the SDA group\nand 4.9 percent for the non-SDA group.37 The key event #1 projections below illustrate that, even\nthough the groups had several exceptions, the near-equality in the number of exceptions and in the\nnumber of borrowers per group produces point estimates and confidence intervals38 that are similar.\n33\n Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott, 1990, Elementary Survey Sampling, 4th edition, Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press. We used the unbiased method for two-\nstage sample, from chapter 9, with zero variation within the clusters.\n34\n We first used the EXCEL \xe2\x80\x95BETAINV\xe2\x80\x96 function to obtain results consistent with the binomial distribution. We then included finite population correction\nfactors consistent with the hypergeometric distribution.\n35\n McClave, Benson, Sincich, 1998, Statistics for Business and Economics, 7th edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.\n36\n The \xe2\x80\x95three total exceptions\xe2\x80\x96 refers to the combined total for SDA and non-SDA borrower groups.\n37\n These values do not match a simple computation of exceptions divided by borrowers because of the effects of the cluster sample. Specifically, the\nprojected 6.2 percent for the SDA case comes from: (5 exceptions) \xc3\xb7 (60 SDA locations in the sample) \xc3\x97 (138 SDA locations in the universe) \xc3\xb7 (185 SDA\nborrowers in the universe). The non-SDA value, 4.9 percent, comes from: (4 exceptions) \xc3\xb7 (28 sample locations that had non-SDA borrowers) x (59\nuniverse locations that had non-SDA borrowers) \xc3\xb7 (171 non-SDA borrowers in the universe).\n38\n The point estimate, reported as the single value representing the projected outcome resulting from the sample, is an average value that takes into account\nthe sample design factors. In this audit, the two-stage design is the source of the design factors. It is not any more likely an outcome than any other point in\nthe confidence interval. The confidence interval is the point estimate plus and minus the probability-based uncertainty value calculation from variation\namong the sampled borrowers and locations. All samples have inherent uncertainty. The width of the confidence interval is indicative of the variability\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 16\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 6 of 10\n\n\n\n Key Event #1: Confidence Interval (95 Percent\n Confidence Level; Lower Limits Constrained by\n Errors Observed in Sample)\n\n\n 2.3% 4.9% 9.3%\n\n\n\n\n 2.7% 6.2% 10.3%\n\n\n\n\n 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0%\n Proportion of Borrowers with Exceptions\n\n\n SDA [sample exceptions = 5] NON-SDA [sample exceptions = 4]\n\n\nThe asymmetry39 in the illustrated intervals occurs because the lower bounds shown are the \xe2\x80\x95observed\nminimum\xe2\x80\x96 bounds. These are calculated as the number of exceptions observed in the sample divided by\nthe number of borrowers in the audit universe for the corresponding borrower group (i.e., 5 SDA\nborrowers with exceptions / 185 borrowers in the SDA universe = 2.7 percent for SDA, and 4 non-SDA\nborrowers with exceptions / 171 borrowers in the non-SDA universe = 2.3 percent for non-SDA).40\nBecause the observed minimums are higher than the corresponding lower bounds of the 95 percent\nconfidence intervals (2.2 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively), we chose to show the observed values.\n\nBased on the sample results, we project that between 2.7 percent and 10.3 percent of the SDA\nforeclosure borrower files will not indicate that the package was sent timely, i.e., by the 18th of the\nmonth following the delinquency. Our point estimate is that 6.2 percent of the SDA borrower files will\nnot indicate that the package was sent timely. This point estimate equates to between 11 and 12 of the\n185 SDA foreclosure borrowers in the audit universe.\n\nBased on the sample results, we project that between 2.3 percent and 9.3 percent of the non-SDA\nforeclosure borrower files will not indicate that the package was sent timely, i.e., by the 18th of the\nmonth following the delinquency. Our point estimate is that 4.9 percent of the non-SDA borrower files\nwill not indicate that the package was sent timely. This point estimate equates to between 8 and 9 of the\n171 non-SDA foreclosure borrowers in the audit universe.\n\n\n\nassociated with the results obtained in the sample.\n39\n Confidence intervals without the constraint would be symmetrical around the point estimate.\n40\n The \xe2\x80\x95observed minimum \xe2\x80\x95is not affected by design factors. It is simply the lowest percent of borrowers with a loan servicing exception that is\npossible, based on the observed number of exceptions.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 17\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 7 of 10\n\nWith the complete overlap of the confidence intervals, we might conclude immediately that there is no\ndifference in the treatment of the two borrower groups for key event #1. Because the two samples are\nnot independent, however, we also test the null hypothesis that the averages of the two groups are equal\nusing a paired difference methodology. This test is applied to the difference in the number of exceptions\nbetween SDA and non-SDA borrowers, paired by location. We find that the test statistic value of\n0.40 does not exceed the critical value of 2.00, indicating that we have insufficient evidence to reject the\nnull hypothesis. In other words, we cannot say the handling of key event #1 was different between the\ntwo borrower groups.41\n\nForeclosure Servicing Key Event #10: Did FSA send timely notification of\ndetermination that the debt cannot be restructured?\n\nKey event #10 shows the only foreclosure event for which the difference in the number of exceptions\nbetween the two borrower groups was greater than two. Even with four exceptions for the SDA group\nand one exception for the non-SDA group, we still observed overlap between the 95 percent confidence\nintervals. As with key event #1, the lower bounds shown are the observed minimum values rather than\nthe lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval (for SDA, 2.2 percent observed versus\n0.5 percent for the confidence interval; for non-SDA, 0.6 percent observed versus -0.6 percent for the\nconfidence interval).42\n\n\n Key Event #10: Confidence Interval (95 Percent Confidence\n Level; Lower Limits Constrained by Errors Observed in Sample)\n\n\n\n 0.6% 1.2% 3.1%\n\n\n\n\n 2.2% 5.0% 9.5%\n\n\n\n\n 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0%\n\n Proportion of Borrowers with Exceptions\n\n SDA [sample exceptions = 4] NON-SDA [sample exceptions = 1]\n\n\nBased on the sample results, we project that between 2.2 percent and 9.5 percent of the SDA foreclosure\nborrower files will show that the required notification was not sent within 15 days of the determination\n\n41\n Conclusion is for level of significance (alpha) = 5 percent, or confidence level of 95 percent.\n42\n Calculated lower bounds can go negative. This is just the result of the variability found in the sample results compared to a low point estimate.\nA larger sample might have produced a tighter interval. We elected to show the observed minimum values, since they were higher than the\ncalculated lower bounds.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 18\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 8 of 10\n\nof a non-feasible plan. Our point estimate is that 5.0 percent of the SDA foreclosure borrower files will\nshow notification times exceeding 15 days. This point estimate equates to between 9 and 10 of the\n185 SDA foreclosure borrowers in the audit universe.\n\nBased on the sample results, we project that between 0.6 percent and 3.1 percent of the non-SDA\nforeclosure borrower files will show that the required notification was not sent within15 days of the\ndetermination of a non-feasible plan. Our point estimate is that 1.2 percent of the non-SDA borrower\nfiles will show notification times exceeding 15 days. This point estimate equates to between 2 and 3 of\nthe 171 non-SDA foreclosure borrowers in the audit universe.\n\nWhile the confidence intervals for key event #10 overlap, they do so much less than do the confidence\nintervals for key event #1. If these same results had come from independent samples, i.e., not using the\nsame locations, we might rely solely on the overlapping condition to indicate there is an inconclusive\nresult regarding any difference in the two groups. However, because the two samples are not\nindependent, we need to consider whether another test provides better information.\n\nTherefore, we test the null hypothesis that the averages of the two groups are equal using the paired\ndifference methodology, applied to the difference in the number of exceptions between SDA and\nnon-SDA borrower groups, paired by location. We find that the test statistic value of 1.51 does not\nexceed the critical value of 2.00, indicating that we have insufficient evidence to reject the null\nhypothesis. Based on this test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two groups were treated the same\nwith respect to this key event.43\n\nWe noted that this key event falls into the category of events that are not broadly applicable to borrowers\nin the foreclosure servicing sample. Both the number of exceptions and the number of loans to which the\nevent applies are very small. This results in conditional44 exception rates considerably higher than those\ncalculated as universe averages. Specifically, the SDA conditional exception rate, given that key\nevent #10 applied, is 36 percent, from 4 exceptions out of 11 loans. The corresponding non-SDA\nconditional exception rate is 11 percent, from one exception out of nine loans.45 Therefore, we tested for\na significant difference between the conditional exception rates.\n\nWe noted there were very few borrowers, in very few locations, to whom key event #10 applied. Also,\nthe applicability generally occurred in different locations for SDA compared to non-SDA borrowers.\nOnly 1 of the 17 locations to which this event applied had both SDA and non-SDA borrowers.\nTherefore, for the test of the conditional exception rates, we compared the SDA and non-SDA groups as\nthough they were independent. Using only these 17 locations, the test for a difference of the average\nexception rates yielded a test statistic of 1.63. The critical value for 15 degrees of freedom46 at the\nprimary stage is 2.131. Because 1.63 is less than 2.131, this test, too, indicates that we cannot say that\nthe handling of the two groups was different with respect to this key event.47\n\n43\n Conclusion is for level of significance (alpha) = 5 percent, or confidence level of 95 percent.\n44\n A conditional probability is the probability an event occurs given that some other event has already occurred. Here, the \xe2\x80\x95condition\xe2\x80\x96 is that the\nkey event applies to a borrower. The conditional probability of an exception is the probability of an exception given that the event applied to the\nborrower. This is an issue only for events with very low applicability, meaning, they did not apply to most borrowers.\n45\n The proportions adjusted to include the two-stage sample design factors are 29.8 percent for SDA and 4.9 percent for non-SDA.\n46\n Degrees of freedom for 10 SDA locations = 10 - 1 = 9. Degrees of freedom for 7 non-SDA locations = 7 - 1 = 6. Degrees of freedom for the\ndifference of the averages = 9 + 6 = 15 degrees of freedom.\n47\n Conclusion is for level of significance (alpha) = 5 percent, or confidence level of 95 percent.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 19\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 9 of 10\n\nIn summary, we are unable to establish a difference between the handling of SDA and non-SDA loan\nservicing actions for key event #10. Any effect on overall compliance from this event would be\nextremely small based on the very limited number of borrowers to which this event applies.\n\nRestructure Servicing Projections\n\nWe also projected the restructure results to the audit universe of 138 locations. The averages and\nassociated 95 percent confidence intervals for each borrower group and key event were determined\nusing a two-stage sample evaluation methodology.48 Because of audit deadlines, we limited our sample\nnumber of locations to the first 20 locations selected, based on initial indications that the error rates were\nlow. We later determined that error rates for a few key events were higher than initially thought, which\nresulted in poorer achieved precision than targeted at the sample design stage.\n\nAs we did with foreclosures, we show the restructure servicing results for the events reflecting more than\nthree exceptions in the raw data for the combined borrower groups. Therefore, we show results for key\nevents #1 and #6 in the table below. For key event #1, the SDA interval 0.3 percent to 7.3 percent is\nentirely contained within the non-SDA interval 0.3 percent to 12.8 percent. For key event #6, the\nnon-SDA interval 0.8 percent to 12.9 percent is completely contained within the SDA interval\n0.7 percent to 23.1 percent.\n\nWe include in the table below the results for the two borrower groups separately, based on the data\nacquired. We also include the combined results as a measure of overall compliance in servicing loan\nrestructures.\n\n Restructure Review Summary SDA Non-SDA Combined\n Number of borrowers in audit universe of\n 306 965 1271\n 138 locations\n Number in 60 locations selected 147 542 689\n Number in 20 locations selected 49 164 213\n Number in sample of 20 locations 18 69 87\n Key Event #1:\n Fraction with an\n 2.4% 5% 4.4%\n 49 exception\n Point Estimate\n Number with an\n 7 48 56\n exception\n\n 95 percent confidence Fraction with an\n 0.3% to 7.3% 0.3% to 12.8% 0.3% to 10.5%\n interval [lower limit exception\n constrained by observed Number with an\n 50 49\n minimum ] 1 to 22 3 to 123 4 to 133\n exception\n\n\n\n\n48\n Scheaffer, Mendenhall, and Ott, 1990, Elementary Survey Sampling, 4th edition, Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press.\n49\n Because of the two-stage sample design, SDA projections and non-SDA projections may not add to the combined projections.\n50\n Observed minimum equals number of errors observed in sample divided by number of borrowers in group in audit universe.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 20\n\n\n Exhibit B \xe2\x80\x93 Page 10 of 10\n\n\n Restructure Review Summary SDA Non-SDA Combined\n Key Event #6:\n Fraction with an\n 9.6% 6.8% 7.6%\n 49 exception\n Point Estimates\n Number with an\n 29 66 97\n exception\n 95 percent confidence Fraction with an\n interval [lower limit 0.7% to 23.1% 0.8% to 12.9% 2.2% to 13.0%\n exception\n constrained by observed\n minimum for SDA and Number with an\n 49 2 to 71 8 to 125 28 to 166\n Non-SDA columns] exception\n\n\n\nConclusion\n\nFor both SDA and non-SDA borrowers, we observed exceptions to loan servicing standards for both\nforeclosure and restructure events. However, based on the sample results, we find insufficient evidence\nto conclude that the SDA and non-SDA borrower groups were treated differently for either foreclosure\nor restructure events.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 21\n\n\nExhibit C \xe2\x80\x93 Review Sites\n Exhibit C \xe2\x80\x93 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n\n\n 25 States\n For Which\n Review Sites Borrower Files Foreclosure Restructure\n Were Borrower Borrower\n Reviewed Files Files\n Little Rock, Arkansas Arkansas 22 21\n\n Alexandria, Louisiana Louisiana 33 7\n\n College Station, Texas Texas 31 7\n\n Jackson, Mississippi Mississippi 12 0\n\n Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Maine 2 6\n Massachusetts 4 6\n New Jersey 4 5\n New York 5 0\n Vermont 1 3\n Virginia 1 0\n West Virginia 1 6\n 18 26\n\n Athens, Georgia Alabama 1 3\n Florida 5 0\n Georgia 1 0\n North Carolina 5 7\n South Carolina 4 0\n Tennessee 3 1\n 19 11\n\n Columbia, Missouri Michigan 2 6\n Ohio 1 0\n Wisconsin 2 0\n California 1 0\n Minnesota 1 6\n Missouri 1 4\n North Dakota 251 0\n Oklahoma 1 0\n 11 16\n Total 146 87\n\n\n\n\n51\n One socially disadvantaged borrower file was unavailable during the time of our field visit. The file had been damaged by floodwater and was\nbeing restored. The file was eventually sent for our review to the Bell County, Texas, FSA Office in Belton, Texas, which is physically proximate\nto our Temple, Texas, field office.\n\x0c Douglas J. Caruso 22\n\n\n Exhibit D \xe2\x80\x93 Results by State and County - Foreclosures\n Exhibit D \xe2\x80\x93 Page 1 of 2\n\n\n Borrowers\n\n\n\n\n Borrowers\n Non-SDA\n SDA\n\n\n SDA Exceptions by Event Number Non-SDA Exceptions by Event Number\n\nState County 1 4 6 9 10 18 20 24 26 1 6 10 15 17 18 19 22 26\n AL PICKENS 1 0\n AR BENTON 1 2\n AR CALHOUN 1 0\n AR CRITTENDEN 2 0\n AR HEMPSTEAD 1 1\n AR HOWARD 2 1 2\n AR LAWRENCE 1 1\n AR LEE 1 2 1\n AR LITTLE RIVER 1 1\n AR SEVIER 1 1\n AR WOODRUFF 1 0\n CA STANISLAUS 1 0\n FL DADE 1 2 1\n FL MARION 2 1 1 0\n GA IRWIN 1 0\n LA AVOYELLES 1 1 1\n LA CADDO 1 1 0\n LA EAST CARROLL 1 3\n LA OUACHITA 2 0\n LA RICHLAND 1 5 1\n LA ST. LANDRY 2 2 2\n WEST\n LA 7 2 7\n CARROLL\nME SOMERSET 1 1 1\nMA WORCESTER 2 2 1 1\nMI ALCONA 1 1 0\nMI BERRIEN 1 1 0\n WEST OTTER\nMN 1 0\n TAIL\nMS BOLIVAR 1 4\nMS PEARL RIVER 1 4\nMS YAZOO 1 1\nMO MISSISSIPPI 1 0\nNJ CUMBERLAND 1 3\nNY ST. LAWRENCE 2 1 3\nNC CUMBERLAND 1 0\nNC EDGECOMBE 1 0\nNC PASQUOTANK 1 0\nNC PERSON 1 1\nND SIOUX 2 1 0\nOH HURON 1 0\nOK PUSHMATAHA 1 0\nSC CLARENDON 1 0\nSC LEE 1 2\nTN DYER 1 0\nTN GILES 1 0\nTN ROBERTSON 1 0\n\x0c Douglas J. Caruso 23\n\n Exhibit D \xe2\x80\x93 Page 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n Borrowers\n\n\n\n\n Borrowers\n Non-SDA\n SDA\n SDA Exceptions by Event Number Non-SDA Exceptions by Event Number\n\nState County 1 4 6 9 10 18 20 24 26 1 6 10 15 17 18 19 22 26\n TX BAILEY 1 4 1\n TX DAWSON 3 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 1\n TX HENDERSON 1 0\n TX HUDSPETH 1 1\n TX JIM WELLS 1 1 0\n TX LEON 1 0\n TX LIMESTONE 1 0\n TX PECOS 2 0\n TX PRESIDIO 2 0\n TX UPTON 1 2\n TX ZAPATA 1 1 1 1\n VT WINDSOR 1 0\n VA BRUNSWICK 1 0\n WV MARSHALL 1 1 0\n WI OCONTO 1 1\n Totals 78 5 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 68 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2\n\nWe reviewed all 78 SDA and 68 non-SDA borrowers.\n\x0cDouglas J. Caruso 24\n\n\nExhibit E \xe2\x80\x93 Results by State and County - Restructures\n Exhibit E \xe2\x80\x93 Page 1 of 1\n\n\n SDA Exceptions by Non-SDA Exceptions by Event\n SDA Event Number Non-SDA Number\n State County Borrowers 1 6 9 Borrowers 1 2 6 9 10\n AL PICKENS 1 2 1\n AR HEMPSTEAD 2 1 4\n AR HOWARD 3 1 1\n AR LEE 3 3\n AR LITTLE RIVER 3 3 1\n LA OUACHITA 1\n LA ST. LANDRY 6 1\n ME SOMERSET, PT 2 4\n MA WORCESTER, PT 1 5 2\n MI ALCONA 1 1 5\n MN WEST OTTER TAIL 1 5\n MO MISSISSIPPI 1 3\n NJ CUMBERLAND 5\n NC EDGECOMBE 6\n NC PERSON 1 1 1\n TN DYER 1\n TX HUDSPETH 1 5 1\n TX LEON 1 1 0\n VT WINDSOR 1 1 2 1\n WV MARSHALL 6 1 2\n Totals 18 1 2 1 69 3 1 8 1 1\n\x0c\x0c'


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 13.6.2006
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
 355
 DEĊIŻJONI Nru 1/2005 TAL-KUNSILL TAL-MINISTRI AKP-KE
 tat-8 ta’ Marzu 2005
 dwar l-adozzjoni tar-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tal-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE
 (2005/297/KE)
 IL-KUNSILL TAL-MINISTRI AKP-KE,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim ta’ Sħubija AKP-KE ffirmat f’Kotonu fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2000, u b’mod partikolari, l-Artikolu 15(5) tiegħu,
 Billi
 (1)
 bid-Deċiżjoni Nru 1/2001 tat-30 ta’ Jannar 2001 il-Kumitat ta’ l-Ambaxxaturi AKP-KE adotta r-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tal-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE b’delega ta’ poter;
 (2)
 Billi ċerti emendi huma neċessarji biex jittieħed kont ta’ l-adeżjoni ta’ l-Istati Membri l-ġodda ma’ l-Unjoni Ewropea;
 (3)
 Billi fid-29 sessjoni tal-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE, li nżamm f’Gaborone, Botswana fis-6 ta’ Mejju 2004, ittieħdet id-deċiżjoni biex jiġu emendati r-Regoli ta’ Proċedura għaldaqstant;
 IDDEĊIEDA KIF ĠEJ:
 Artikolu 1
 Dati u postijiet tal-laqgħat
 1. Kif previst fl-Artikolu 15(1) tal-Ftehim ta’ Sħubija AKP-KE, minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejjaħ “il-Ftehim AKP-KE”, il-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE, minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejjaħ “il-Kunsill”, għandu normalment jiltaqa’ darba fis-sena, u kull meta meħtieġ fuq talba ta’ wieħed mill-partijiet.
 2. Il-Kunsill għandu jitlaqqa’ mill-President. Id-dati tal-laqgħat tiegħu għandhom ikunu stabbiliti bi qbil komuni bejn il-partijiet.
 3. Il-Kunsill għandu jiltaqa’ jew fejn is-soltu jinżammu l-laqgħat tal-Kunsill ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea jew fis-sede tas-Segretarjat tal-Grupp ta’ Stati AKP jew f’belt ta’ wieħed mill-Istati AKP, skond id-deċiżjoni meħuda mill-Kunsill.
 Artikolu 2
 Aġenda tal-laqgħat
 1. L-aġenda proviżorja għal kull laqgħa għandha titfassal mill-President. Din għandha tiġi kkomunikata lill-membri l-oħra tal-Kunsill mill-inqas 30 ġurnata qabel il-bidu tal-laqgħa. L-aġenda provviżorja għandha tikkonsisti f’dawk il-punti li l-President ikun irċieva talba għall-inklużjoni tagħhom mill-inqas 30 ġurnata qabel il-bidu tal-laqgħa.
 Il-punti li jidhru fuq l-aġenda provviżorja għandhom ikunu dawk li dwarhom tkun ġiet trasmessa dokumentazzjoni lis-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill fil-ħin biex tilħaq tintbagħat lill-membri tal-Kunsill u lill-membri tal-Kumitat ta’ l-Ambaxxaturi AKP-KE, minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejjaħ “il-Kumitat”, mill-inqas 21 ġurnata qabel il-bidu tal-laqgħa.
 2. L-aġenda għandha tiġi adottata mill-Kunsill fil-bidu ta’ kull laqgħa. F’każijiet urġenti l-Kunsill jista’ jiddeċiedi, fuq it-talba ta’ l-Istati AKP jew tal-Komunità, li jinkludi fuq l-aġenda punti li għalihom ma jkunux ġew osservati l-limiti taż-żmien stabbiliti fil-paragrafu 1.
 3. L-aġenda provviżorja tista’ tinqasam f’Parti A, Parti B u Parti Ċ.
 Il-punti mdaħħla f’Parti A għandhom ikunu dawk li jistgħu jiġu approvati mill-Kunsill mingħajr diskussjoni.
 Il-punti mdaħħla f’Parti B huma dawk il-kwistjonijiet li jeħtieġ li jiġu diskussi mill-Kunsill qabel jiġu approvati.
 Il-punti mdaħħla f’Parti Ċ għandhom jiġu diskussi fi skambju informali ta’ fehmiet.
 Artikolu 3
 Proċedimenti
 1. Skond l-Artikolu 15(3) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, il-Kunsill tal-Ministri għandu jieħu d-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu bi ftehim komuni tal-Partijiet.
 2. Il-proċedimenti tal-Kunsill għandhom ikunu validi biss jekk mill-inqas nofs il-membri tal-Kunsill ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea, membru tal-Kummissjoni tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej (minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejħa “il-Kummissjoni”) u żewġ terzi tal-membri li jirrappreżentaw il-Gvernijiet ta’ l-Istati AKP ikunu preżenti.
 3. Il-membri kollha tal-Kunsill li ma jkunux jistgħu jattendu jistgħu jkunu rappreżentati. F’dan il-każ dawn għandhom jinfurmaw lill-President u għandhom jindikaw il-persuna jew id-delegazzjoni awtorizzata biex tirrapreżentahom. Ir-rappreżentant għandu jeżerċita d-drittijiet kollha tal-membru li ma jistax jattendi.
 4. Il-membri tal-Kunsill jistgħu jkunu akkumpanjati minn konsulenti biex jassistuhom.
 5. Il-kompożizzjoni ta’ kull delegazzjoni għandha tiġi kkomunikata lill-President qabel il-bidu ta’ kull sessjoni.
 6. Rappreżentant tal-Bank Ewropew ta’ l-Investiment, minn hawn ‘il quddiem imsejjaħ “il-Bank”, għandu jkun preżenti għas-sessjonijiet tal-Kunsill meta kwistjonijiet mill-oqsma li jikkonċernaw il-Bank ikunu fuq l-aġenda.
 Artikolu 4
 Proċeduri bil-Miktub
 Il-Kunsill jista’ jiddeċiedi li jieħu deċiżjonijiet b’korrispondenza fuq kwistjonijiet urġenti. Approvazzjoni għal din il-proċedura tista’ tinkiseb waqt laqgħa tal-Kunsill jew fi ħdan il-Kumitat.
 Fl-istess ħin li tiġi deċiża din il-proċedura, jista’ jiġi stipulat limitu ta’ żmien li fih jeħtieġ li jingħataw ir-risposti. Meta jiskadi dan il-limitu ta’ żmien, il-President tal-Kunsill għandu jiddeċiedi, fuq bażi ta’ rapport miż-żewġ Segretarji tal-Kunsill, jekk, fid-dawl tar-risposti rċevuti, jistax jiġi kkunsidrat li ntlaħaq qbil komuni.
 Artikolu 5
 Kumitati u Gruppi ta’ Ħidma
 Il-Kunsill jista’ jwaqqaf kumitati jew gruppi ta’ ħidma biex iwettqu xogħol li hu jikkunsidra bħala meħtieġ, u b’mod partikolari biex jippreparaw il-proċedimenti tiegħu fejn xieraq f’oqsma ta’ kooperazzjoni jew aspetti speċifiċi tas-Sħubija.
 Is-superviżjoni tax-xogħol ta’ dawn il-kumitati u gruppi ta’ ħidma tista’ tiġi delegata lill-Kumitat.
 Artikolu 6
 Subgruppi Ministerjali
 Mingħajr preġudizzju għad-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ l-Artikolu 5, il-Kunsill jista’, matul il-laqgħat tiegħu, jiddelega t-tħejjija tal-proċedimenti u l-konklużjonijiet tiegħu dwar punti speċifiċi fuq l-aġenda lil subgruppi ta’ ministri komposti fuq bażi ta’ parità.
 Artikolu 7
 Kumitati Ministerjali
 1. Skond l-Artikolu 83 tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, qiegħed jiġi b’dan stabbilit il-Kumitat għall-Kooperazzjoni ta’ Finanzjament għall-Iżvilupp ta’ l-AKP-KE. Il-Kunsill għandu jadotta r-regoli ta’ proċedura għal dan il-Kumitat.
 2. Il-Kunsill għandu jeżamina kwistjonijiet dwar il-politika tal-kummerċ u rapporti mill-Kumitat Ministerjali Konġunt għall-Kummerċ AKP-KE stabbilit bl-Artikolu 38 tal-Ftehim AKP-KE..
 Artikolu 8
 Stati li jattendu bi status ta’ osservaturi
 1. Ir-Rappreżentanti ta’ l-Istati firmatarji tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, li, fid-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim ikunu għadhom ma temmewx il-proċeduri msemmija fl-Artikolu 93(1) u (2) tiegħu, jistgħu jattendu s-sessjonijiet tal-Kunsill bħala osservaturi. Jistgħu f’dan il-każ jiġu awtorizzati li jieħdu sehem fid-dibattiti tal-Kunsill.
 2. L-istess regola għandha tapplika għall-pajjiżi msemmija fl-Artikolu 93(6) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE.
 3. Il-Kunsill jista’ jawtorizza rappreżentanti ta’ pajjiż applikant għas-sħubija fil-Ftehim AKP-KE biex jieħdu sehem fil-proċedimenti tal-Kunsill bħala osservaturi.
 Artikolu 9
 Kunfidenzjalità u pubblikazzjonijiet uffiċjali
 1. Sakemm ma jkunx deċiż mod ieħor, il-laqgħat tal-Kunsill m’għandhomx ikunu pubbliċi. Aċċess għal-laqgħat tal-Kunsill għandu jirrikjedi pass.
 2. Mingħajr preġudizzju għal tali dispożizzjonijiet oħra applikabbli, id-deliberazzjonijiet tal-Kunsill għandhom ikunu koperti mill-obbligu ta’ segretezza professjonali, sakemm il-Kunsill ma jiddeċidix mod ieħor.
 3. Kull parti tista’ tiddeċiedi li tippubblika d-deċiżjonijiet, ir-riżoluzzjonijiet, ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet u l-opinjonijiet tal-Kunsill fil-pubblikazzjonijiet uffiċjali rispettivi tagħhom.
 Artikolu 10
 Djalogu ma’ atturi mhux governattivi
 1. Il-Kunsill jista’ jistieden rappreżentanti ekonomiċi u soċjali tas-soċjetà ċivili fl-Istati ta’ l-AKP u ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea biex jieħdu sehem fi skambju ta’ fehmiet fil-marġni tal-laqgħat ordinarji tiegħu bl-iskop li jinfurmahom u li jisma’ l-opinjonijiet u s-suġġerimenti tagħhom dwar punti fuq l-aġedna.
 2. L-iskambji ta’ fehmiet mar-rappreżentanti tas-soċjetà ċivili għandhom jiġu organizzati mis-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill. Dan jista’ jiddelega dan il-kompitu, bi ftehim mal-Kummissjoni, lil organizzazzjonijiet rappreżentattivi tas-soċjetà ċivili. B’mod partikolari, is-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill jista’ jiddelega xogħol konness ma’ skambji ta’ fehmiet ma’ rappreżentanti ekonomiċi u soċjali tas-soċjetà ċivili ta’ l-AKP u l-UE lill-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali tal-Komunitajiet Ewropej.
 3. Il-punti fuq l-aġenda li għandhom jiġu diskussi ma’ atturi mhux governattivi għandhom jiġu deċiżi mill-President, waqt li jaġixxi fuq proposta mis-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill. Dawn għandhom jiġu kkomunikati lill-membri l-oħra tal-Kunsill fl-istess ħin bħall-aġenda provviżorja għal kull laqgħa.
 Artikolu 11
 Organizzazzjonijiet Reġjonali u Sub-reġjonali
 Organizzazzjonijiet reġjonali u sub-reġjonali ta’ l-AKP jistgħu jkunu rappreżentati f’laqgħat tal-Kunsill u tal-Kumitat bħala osservaturi, soġġett għall-qbil minn qabel mill-Kunsill.
 Artikolu 12
 Komunikazzjonijiet u minuti tal-laqgħat
 1. Il-komunikazzjonijiet kollha previsti f’dawn ir-Regoli ta’ Proċedura għandhom jiġu trasmessi permezz tas-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill lir-rappreżentanti ta’ l-Istati AKP, lis-Segretarjat tal-Grupp ta’ Stati AKP, lir-Rappreżentanti Permanenti ta’ l-Istati Membri, lis-Segretarjat Ġenerali tal-Kunsill ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea u lill-Kummissjoni.
 Tali komunikazzjonijiet għandhom jintbagħatu wkoll lill-President tal-Bank meta dawn jikkonċernaw il-Bank.
 2. Għandhom jinżammu minuti ta’ kull laqgħa, li jinnutaw b’mod partikolari d-deċiżjonijiet meħuda mill-Kunsill.
 Wara l-approvazzjoni tagħhom mill-Kunsill, il-minuti għandhom jiġu ffirmati mill-President Attwali u miż-żewġ Segretarji tal-Kunsill u għandhom jinżammu fl-arkivji tal-Kunsill. Kopja tal-minuti għandha tintbagħat lid-destinatarji msemmija fil-paragrafu 1.
 Artikolu 13
 Dokumentazzjoni
 Sakemm ma jkunx deċiż mod ieħor, il-Kunsill għandu jmexxi d-deliberazzjonijiet tiegħu abbażi ta’ dokumenti mfassla bil-lingwi uffiċjali tal-partijiet.
 Artikolu 14
 Forma ta’ l-Atti
 1. Id-deċiżjonijiet, ir-riżoluzzjonijiet, ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet u l-opinjonijiet fis-sens ta’ l-Artikolu 15(3) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, għandhom jinqasmu f’artikoli.
 Dawn għandhom jiġu konklużi bil-formula “Magħmula fi ...”, “[data]”, bid-data tkun id-data ta’ l-adozzjoni tagħhom mill-Kunsill.
 2. Id-deċiżjonijiet fis-sens ta’ l-Artikolu 15(3) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, għandhom jiġu intitolati “Deċiżjoni”, segwiti b’numru tas-serje, data ta’ adozzjoni u deskrizzjoni tas-suġġett tagħhom.
 Id-deċiżjonijiet għandhom jispeċifikaw d-data li fiha għandhom jidħlu fis-seħħ. Huma għandhom jinkorporaw is-sentenza li ġejja: “L-Istati ta’ l-AKP, il-Komunità u l-Istati Membri tagħha għandhom jiġu mitluba, kull wieħed għalih, biex jieħdu l-passi neċessarji biex jimplimentaw din id-Deċiżjoni”.
 3. Ir-riżoluzzjonijiet, id-dikjarazzjonijiet, ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet u l-opinjonijiet fis-sens ta’ l-Artikolu 15(3) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, għandhom jiġu intitolati “Riżoluzzjoni”, “Dikjarazzjoni”, “Rakkomandazzjoni” jew “Opinjoni”, segwiti b’numru tas-serje, data ta’ adozzjoni u deskrizzjoni tas-suġġett tagħhom.
 4. Atti adottati mill-Kunsill għandhom jiġu ffirmati mill-President u għandhom jinżammu fl-arkivji tal-Kunsill.
 L-atti għandhom jiġu trasmessi, permezz taż-żewġ Segretarji tal-Kunsill, lid-destinatarji msemmija fl-Artikolu 12(1).
 Artikolu 15
 Presidenza
 Il-kariga ta’ President tal-Kunsill għandha tinżamm b’mod alternat kif gej:
 —
 mill-1 ta’ April sat-30 ta’ Settembru minn membru tal-Gvern ta’ Stat ta’ l-AKP,
 —
 mill-1 ta’ Ottubru sal-31 ta’ Marzu minn membru tal-Kunsill ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea.
 Artikolu 16
 Il-Kumitat
 1. Il-Kunsill jista’ jiddelega uħud mill-poteri tiegħu lill-Kumitat skond l-Artikolu 15(4) tal-Ftehim AKP-KE.
 2. Il-kondizzjonijiet li taħthom jiltaqa’ l-Kumitat għandhom ikunu stabbiliti fir-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tiegħu.
 3. Il-Kumitat għandu jkun responsabbli għat-tħejjijiet tal-laqgħat tal-Kunsill u għat-twettieq ta’ kwalunkwe mandat li l-Kunsill jista’ jafdalu.
 Artikolu 17
 Parteċipazzjoni fl-Assemblea Parlamentari Konġunta
 Meta l-Kunsill jattendi laqgħat ta’ l-Assemblea Parlamentari Konġunta għandu jkun rappreżentat mill-President tiegħu.
 F’każ li l-President ma jkunx jista’ jattendi, hu għandu jaħtar il-membru li jkun ser jieħu postu.
 Artikolu 18
 Konsistenza fil-politika Komunitarja u l-impatt fuq l-implimentazzjoni tal-Ftehim AKP-KE
 1. Meta l-Istati AKP jitolbu konsultazzjonijiet skond l-Artikolu 12 tal-Ftehim AKP-KE, dawn il-konsultazzjonijiet għandhom jinżammu fil-pront, bħala regola ġenerali fi żmien ħmistax-il jum mit-talba.
 2. Il-korp responsabbli jista’ jkun il-Kunsill, il-Kumitat, wieħed miż-żewġ Kumitati Ministerjali msemmija fl-Artikolu 7, jew Grupp ta’ Ħidma ad hoc.
 Artikolu 19
 Segretarjat
 Is-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill u tal-Kumitat, għandu jitmexxa b’mod konġunt minn żewġ Segretarji.
 Dawn iż-żewġ Segretarji għandhom jinħatru wara konsultazzjoni konġunta, wieħed mill-Istati ta’ l-AKP u l-ieħor mill-Komunità.
 Is-Segretarji għandhom iwettqu d-dmirijiet tagħhom b’indipendenza sħiħa bi ħsieb biss fl-interessi tal-Ftehim u la għandhom ifittxu u lanqas jieħdu struzzjonijiet minn xi Gvern, organizzazzjoni jew awtorità għajr il-Kunsill u l-Kumitat.
 Korrispondenza intenzjonata għall-Kunsill għandha tintbagħat lill-President tiegħu fis-sede tas-Segretarjat tal-Kunsill.
 Artikolu 20
 Id-Deċiżjoni preżenti tħassar u tissostitwixxi d-Deċiżjoni Nru 1/2001 tat-30 ta’ Jannar 2001 tal-Kumitat ta’ l-Ambaxxaturi AKP-KE dwar l-adozzjoni tar-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tal-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE.
 Magħmula fi Brussel, nhar it-8 ta’ Marzu 2005.
 Għall-Kunsill tal-Ministri AKP-KE
 Il-President
 J. ASSELBORN


type: wikipedia

text:
Житен е село в Североизточна България. То се намира в община Генерал Тошево, област Добрич.
 Културни и природни забележителности
 Трети ноември ще остане в историята на село Житен като ден за преклонение пред паметта на десетките отвлечени добруджанци през 1916 – 1918 г.
 На церемонията по тържественото откриване на мемориала „Неовършеният харман“ присъстват кметът на Добрич Детелина Николова и председателят на Общинския съвет Иван Мандев, зам.-кметът на община Генерал Тошево Георги Георгиев, зам.-кметът на община Добрич Пламен Ганчев, чийто корени са от с. Житен, зам.-кметът на община Добрич Надежда Петкова, главният секретар на община Генерал Тошево Вяра Дянкова, общински съветници, представители на общинска администрация, кметове и кметски наместници, както и много граждани, потомци на отвлечените по време на румънската окупация.
 Идеята за изграждането на „Неовършеният харман“ е обявена от инициатора Гено Генов по време на проведената на 2 септември 2006 г. земляческа среща в с. Житен. Тогава той предложи, а присъстващите в залата единодушно приеха да се изгради паметник на отвлечените 66 жители на селото, повечето от които никога не са се върнали в родния си край. Гено Генов подкрепи идеята си с първоначално дарение от 1000 лева. По-късно в изграждането на паметника със средства от бюджета се включиха община Генерал Тошево и 23 дарители от общината.
 Първата копка на паметника бе направена на 18 септември 2007 г. от кмета на общината Димитър Михайлов и инициатора Гено Генов. В основата на мемориала бе вградено послание към идните поколения, което ще бъде отворено през 2057 г.
 В словото си кметът на с. Житен Илия Добрев обясни, че мемориалът е по проект на арх. Пламен Касабов, а изпълнението бе възложено на строителната фирма „Сити трейд“ от Добрич с управител Михаил Божилов. Строителните дейности са финансирани от общинска администрация – Генерал Тошево.
 Мемориалният паметник е символ на прекършения живот и прекъснатата работа на 66 жители на с. Житен на възраст от 12 до 72 години, които са част от хилядите добруджанци с неизвестна съдба, отвлечени и незавърнали се от Молдова, оставили осиротяла челяд, недовършена селскостопанска работа и всичките си земни дела, каза Илия Добрев.
 В словото си зам.-кметът на община Генерал Тошево Георги Георгиев припомни изключително интересни исторически факти, които дълго бяха премълчавани, но трябва да се знаят от настоящите и идните поколения. Паметникът в с. Житен е свидетелство за нашата памет, за спомена ни за 40 000 добруджанци, чийто живот, младост и сили бяха отнети и чиято липса бе болезнено почувствана от техните близки, наследници и от цяла днешна Добруджа, подчерта в словото си г-н Георгиев.
 С развълнуван глас инициаторът за изграждането на мемориалния паметник и наследник на отвлечени жители на с. Житен Гено Генов благодари на всички, които са спомогнали да се увековечи паметта на пострадалите и загинали добруджанци.
 Трикольорната лента за откриването на мемориалния паметник прерязаха инициаторът за изграждането му Гено Генов, зам.-кметът на общината Георги Георгиев и кметът на селото Илия Добрев. Панихида в памет на отвлечените и освещаване на паметника отслужи отец Петър Димитров. С едноминутно мълчание и падане на колене бе почетена паметта на всички, които през 1916 – 1918 г. са отвлечени и не са се завърнали по родните си места.
 Венци и цветя на признателност бяха положени от името на общински съвет и общинска администрация в Генерал Тошево, община Добрич, кметството и читалището в с. Житен, Регионалния исторически музей в Добрич, Историческия музей в Генерал Тошево, Дружеството на краеведите, кметствата в селата Красен, Росица и Изворово, Общинския младежки съвет в Генерал Тошево, училището в Красен, читалищата в Кардам и Росица, Общинската структура на ДПС в Генерал Тошево и десетки граждани, потомци на отвлечените българи.
 Източници
 Външни препратки
 Статия за с. Житен в Официален сайт на Община Генерал Тошево
 Села в област Добрич
 Населени места в община Генерал Тошево


text:
2019-12-31 2019-12-09 2019-11-11 2019-10-14 2019-09-16 2019-05-13 2019-04-15 2019-03-11 2019-02-04 2018-12-04 2018-11-05 2018-09-24 2018-08-27 2018-06-04 2018-04-23 2018-02-19 2017-12-04 2017-11-13 2017-10-16 2017-09-04 2017-05-29 2017-04-10 13:00 - 15:15 Vandrarhemmet i Laholm
 1 Justering 2018
 2 Godkännande av föredragningslista 2018
 Klicka för att expandera eller komprimera 3 Friskvårdsgrupper för barn med fetmaproblematik i Laholms kommun
 Tina Jönsson, dietist, är inbjuden till nämndsmötet 27 augusti, för att ge en återrapportering om projektet kring Friskvårdsgrupper för barn med fetmaproblematik.
 Avtal om samarbete för att motverka barnfetma i Laholms kommun.pdf 2mb Ladda ner dokument
 Klicka för att expandera eller komprimera 4 Anmälan av fattat delegationsbeslut
 Fattade delegationsbeslut 2018-08-27.pdf 626kb Ladda ner dokument
 Klicka för att expandera eller komprimera 5 Revidering av Laholmsnämndens delegationsordning
 Dataskyddsförordningen eller GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) började gälla 25 maj 2018 inom hela EU. Dataskyddsförordningen ersätter den gamla Personuppgiftslagen (PuL). Dataskyddsförordningen gäller för alla myndigheter, företag och organisationer som behandlar personuppgifter. Inom Region Halland är Regionstyrelsen och nämnderna personuppgiftsansvariga inom sina egna områden men kan också ha ett gemensamt ansvar. Som en del i arbetet med GDPR behöver nämndens delegationsordning revideras.
 Delegationsordning, reviderad 180211.pdf 262kb Ladda ner dokument
 Revidering av Laholmsnämndens delegationsordning.pdf 220kb Ladda ner dokument
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 Genomförda aktiviteter 2018-06-05 - 2018-08-27
 Almedalsveckan, 4-7 juli - Eva
 Planerade aktiviteter 2018-08-28 - 2018-09-24
 Länspresidiet Falkenberg, 4 sep
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 Klicka för att expandera eller komprimera 7 Information från presidiet och tjänstemän
 Info om Felicias vikarie
 § 68 Kommunfullmäktige Laholm 2018-06-26 - Samverkansöverenskommelse Laholms kommun och Laholmsnämnden
 Utvecklingsdag oktober
 Konferens - Hur går det gör Halland? 26 oktober
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 Julbord sista nämndsmötet 3 december
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 § 185, Befolkningsstudie Hälsa på lika villkor.pdf 455kb Ladda ner dokument
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text:
 Pomembno pravno obvestilo
 |
 22003D0076
 Uradni list L 257 , 09/10/2003 str. 0025 - 0026
 Sklep Skupnega odbora EGPšt. 76/2003z dne 20. junija 2003o spremembi Priloge II (Tehnični predpisi, standardi, preizkušanje in certificiranje) k Sporazumu EGPSKUPNI ODBOR EGP JE -ob upoštevanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, kakor je bil spremenjen s Protokolom o prilagoditvi Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru, v nadaljnjem besedilu "Sporazum", in zlasti člena 98 Sporazuma,ob upoštevanju naslednjega:(1) Priloga II k Sporazumu je bila spremenjena s Sklepom Skupnega odbora EGP št. 32/2003 z dne 14. marca 2003 [1].(2) Direktivo 2002/45/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. junija 2002 o dvajseti spremembi Direktive Sveta 76/769/EGS v zvezi z omejitvami pri trženju in uporabi nekaterih nevarnih snovi in pripravkov (klorirani parafini s kratkimi verigami) [2] je treba vključiti v Sporazum.(3) Priporočilo Komisije 2002/575/ES z dne 4. julija 2002 o rezultatih ocene tveganj in strategije za obvladovanje tveganj za snovi: o-anisidin, 1,4-dioksan [3] je treba vključiti v Sporazum.(4) Priporočilo Komisije 2002/576/ES z dne 4. julija 2002 o rezultatih ocene tveganj za snovi: etil acetoacetat, 4-kloro-o-kresol, dimetildioktadecil amonijev klorid [4] je treba vključiti v Sporazum.(5) Direktivo Komisije 2002/62/ES z dne 9. julija 2002 o deveti prilagoditvi tehničnemu napredku Priloge I k Direktivi Sveta 76/769/EGS o približevanju zakonov in drugih predpisov držav članic v zvezi z omejitvami pri trženju in uporabi nekaterih nevarnih snovi in pripravkov (organokositrne spojine) [5], kakor je bila popravljena v UL L 203, 1.8.2002, str. 64, je treba vključiti v Sporazum -SKLENIL:Člen 1Poglavje XV Priloge II k Sporazumu se spremeni:1. v točki 4 (Direktiva Sveta 76/769/EGS) se dodata naslednji alinei:"— 32002 L 0045: Direktiva 2002/45/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. junija 2002 (UL L 177, 6.7.2002, str. 21),— 32002 L 0062: Direktiva Komisije 2002/62/ES z dne 9. julija 2002 (UL L 183, 12.7.2002, str. 58), kakor je bila popravljena v UL L 203, 1.8.2002, str. 64.";2. pod poglavjem"pravni akti, ki jih upoštevajo pogodbenice"se za točko 22 (Priporočilo Komisije 2002/755/ES) dodata naslednji točki:"23. 32002 H 0575: Priporočilo Komisije 2002/575/ES z dne 4. julija 2002 o rezultatih ocene tveganj in strategije za obvladovanje tveganj za snovi: o-anisidin, 1,4-dioksin (UL L 181, 11.7.2002, str. 29).24. 32002 H 0576: Priporočilo Komisije 2002/576/ES z dne 4. julija 2002 o rezultatih ocene tveganj za snovi: etil acetoacetat, 4-kloro-o-kresol, dimetildioktadecil amonijev klorid (UL L 181, 11.7.2002, str. 35)."Člen 2Besedila Direktiv 2002/45/ES in 2002/62/ES, kakor je bila popravljena v UL L 203, 1.8.2002, str. 64, in Priporočil 2002/575/ES in 2002/576/ES v islandskem in norveškem jeziku, ki se objavijo v Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije, so verodostojna.Člen 3Ta sklep začne veljati 21. junija 2003, pod pogojem, da so Skupnemu odboru EGP [6] predložena vsa uradna obvestila v skladu s členom 103(1) Sporazuma.Člen 4Ta sklep se objavi v sklopu EGP in v Dopolnilu EGP Uradnega lista Evropske unije.V Bruslju, 20. junija 2003Za Skupni odbor EGPPredsednikP. Westerlund[1] UL L 137, 5.6.2003, str. 32.[2] UL L 177, 6.7.2002, str. 21.[3] UL L 181, 11.7.2002, str. 29.[4] UL L 181, 11.7.2002, str. 35.[5] UL L 183, 12.7.2002, str. 58.[6] Ustavne zahteve niso sporočene.--------------------------------------------------


text:
 9.8.2007
 LV
 Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis
 L 209/60
 EEZ APVIENOTĀS KOMITEJAS LĒMUMS
 Nr. 33/2007
 (2007. gada 27. aprīlis),
 ar ko groza EEZ līguma XX pielikumu (Vide)
 EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,
 ņemot vērā Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līgumu, kurā grozījumi izdarīti ar Protokolu, ar ko pielāgo Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līgumu, turpmāk tekstā “Līgums”, un jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,
 tā kā:
 (1)
 Līguma XX pielikums ir grozīts ar EEZ Apvienotās komitejas 2006. gada 22. septembra Lēmumu Nr. 125/2006 (1).
 (2)
 Līgumā ir jāiekļauj Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2006. gada 15. februāra Direktīva 2006/11/EK par piesārņojumu, ko rada dažas bīstamas vielas, kuras novada Kopienas ūdens vidē (kodificēta versija) (2).
 (3)
 Direktīva 2006/11/EK atsauc Direktīvu 76/464/EEK (3), kas ir iekļauta Līgumā un tāpēc vēlāk atceļama saskaņā ar Līgumu,
 IR NOLĒMUSI ŠĀDI.
 1. pants
 Līguma XX pielikuma 4. punkta tekstu (Padomes Direktīva 76/464/EEK) aizstāj ar šādu:
 “32006 L 0011: Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2006. gada 15. februāra Direktīva 2006/11/EK par piesārņojumu, ko rada dažas bīstamas vielas, kuras novada Kopienas ūdens vidē (kodificēta versija) (OV L 64, 4.3.2006., 52. lpp.).
 Direktīvas noteikumi šā līguma nolūkos ir lasāmi ar šādu pielāgojumu:
 Šādu tekstu pievieno pēc 13. panta pirmās daļas:
 “II pielikuma B daļā noteikto termiņu Direktīvas 2000/60/EK transponēšanai valsts tiesību aktos nepiemēro un to aizstāj ar datumu, kad stājas spēkā EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmums, ar kuru Līgumā iekļauj Direktīvu 2000/60/EK.””
 2. pants
 Direktīvas 2006/11/EK teksti islandiešu un norvēģu valodā, ko publicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ papildinājumā, ir autentiski.
 3. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā 2007. gada 28. aprīlī, ja EEZ Apvienotajai komitejai ir iesniegti visi paziņojumi saskaņā ar Līguma 103. panta 1. punktu (4).
 4. pants
 Šo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un tā EEZ papildinājumā.
 Briselē, 2007. gada 27. aprīlī
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā –
 priekšsēdētājs
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) OV L 333, 30.11.2006., 55. lpp.
 (2) OV L 64, 4.3.2006., 52. lpp.
 (3) OV L 129, 18.5.1976., 23. lpp.
 (4) Konstitucionālās prasības nav norādītas.


type: caselaw

text:
 13.3.2017
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 C 78/29
 Решение на Общия съд от 2 февруари 2017 г. — Marcas Costa Brava/EUIPO — Excellent Brands JMI (Cremcaffé by Julius Meinl)
 (Дело T-691/15) (1)
 ((Марка на Европейския съюз - Производство по възражение - Заявка за фигуративна марка на Европейския съюз „Cremcaffé by Julius Meinl“ - По-ранна фигуративна марка на Европейския съюз „café crem“ - Относително основание за отказ - Липса на реално използване на по-ранната марка - Член 42, параграф 2 от Регламент (ЕО) No 207/2009))
 (2017/C 078/39)
 Език на производството: английски
 Страни
 Жалбоподател: Marcas Costa Brava, SL (Силс, Испания) (представители: E. Manresa Medina и J. Manresa Medina, avocats)
 Ответник: Служба на Европейския съюз за интелектуална собственост (представител: M. Fischer)
 Друга страна в производството пред апелативния състав на EUIPO, встъпила в производството пред Общия съд: Excellent Brands JMI Ltd (Баар, Швейцария) (представител: D. Majer, avocat)
 Предмет
 Жалба срещу решението на пети апелативен състав на EUIPO от 29 септември 2015 г. (преписка R 2756/2014-5) относно производство по възражение между Marcas Costa Brava и Excellent Brands JMI.
 Диспозитив
 1)
 Отхвърля жалбата.
 2)
 Осъжда Marcas Costa Brava, SL да заплати съдебните разноски.
 (1) ОВ C 48, 8.2.2016 г.


text:
 15.12.2016
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 341/66
 DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE
 No 167/2015
 of 11 June 2015
 amending Annex XX (Environment) to the EEA Agreement [2016/2202]
 THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,
 Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), and in particular Article 98 thereof,
 Whereas:
 (1)
 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/345 of 2 March 2015 amending Decisions 2009/563/EC, 2009/564/EC, 2009/578/EC, 2010/18/EC, 2011/263/EU, 2011/264/EU, 2011/382/EU and 2011/383/EU in order to prolong the validity of the ecological criteria for the award of the EU Ecolabel to certain products (1) is to be incorporated into the EEA Agreement.
 (2)
 Annex XX to the EEA Agreement should therefore be amended accordingly,
 HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
 Article 1
 Annex XX to the EEA Agreement shall be amended as follows:
 (1)
 the following indent is added in points 2e (Commission Decision 2011/264/EU), 2g (Commission Decision 2009/563/EC), 2h (Commission Decision 2011/263/EU), 2m (Commission Decision 2009/578/EC), 2p (Commission Decision 2009/564/EC) and 2zb (Commission Decision 2010/18/EC):
 ‘—
 32015 R 0345: Commission Decision (EU) 2015/345 of 2 March 2015 (OJ L 60, 4.3.2015, p. 39).’;
 (2)
 the following is added in points 2r (Commission Decision 2011/382/EU) and 2t (Commission Decision 2011/383/EU):
 ‘—
 32015 R 0345: Commission Decision (EU) 2015/345 of 2 March 2015 (OJ L 60, 4.3.2015, p. 39).’
 Article 2
 The text of Decision (EU) 2015/345 in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, to be published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be authentic.
 Article 3
 This Decision shall enter into force on 12 June 2015, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the EEA Agreement have been made (*1).
 Article 4
 This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of, and in the EEA Supplement to, the Official Journal of the European Union.
 Done at Brussels, 11 June 2015.
 For the EEA Joint Committee
 The President
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) OJ L 60, 4.3.2015, p. 39.
 (*1) No constitutional requirements indicated.