type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b'SIGAR\n Mr Special Inspector General for\n Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR 14-85 Audit Report\n\n\n\n Afghan Mobile Strike Force Vehicles: Contractor\n Met Requirements, but Long-Term Operation\n and Maintenance Remain a Concern\n\n\n\n\n JULY\n 2014\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles\n\x0c July 2014\n\n\n\nSIGAR\n Afghan Mobile Strike Force Vehicles: Contractor Met Requirements,\n but Long-Term Operation and Maintenance Remain a Concern\n\n\n SIGAR 14-85 Audit Report\nSpecial Inspector General for\n WHAT SIGAR FOUND\nAfghanistan Reconstruction\n Textron produced 634 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFVs) and provided\nWHAT SIGAR REVIEWED initial operator and maintenance training to the Afghan Mobile Strike\n Force (MSF) at the Armor Branch School in Kabul, in accordance with\nTo improve the Afghan National Army\xe2\x80\x99s (ANA) contract requirements. SIGAR found that all of these vehicles were\neffectiveness, the NATO Training Mission- properly documented and transferred to the Department of Defense\nAfghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security (DOD). In addition, as of March 25, 2014, DOD had transferred 419\nTransition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) MSFVs to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and could account for the\ndecided that the ANA should have a Mobile remaining 215 vehicles, 204 of which will eventually be transferred to the\nStrike Force (MSF) to provide a mechanized ANA and 11 of which DOD will retain as test vehicles. Textron also met\ninfantry force that is rapidly deployable with other contract requirements such as receiving and inspecting MSFVs\nintegral firepower, protection, and mobility upon arrival in Afghanistan; providing initial spare parts, tools, equipment\nsupport. To meet this requirement, the Army and weapons installation; and maintaining training vehicles.\nContracting Command-Warren (ACC-WRN) Textron, however, was not always able to provide Mobile Strike Force\nawarded two contracts to Textron Marine & (MSF) field training and maintenance services for which it was being paid.\nLand Systems (Textron), a U.S. firm. This was primarily due to the limited number of International Security\nObligations on these contracts have totaled Assistance Force Joint Command personnel assigned to provide security\n$661.3 million for 634 Mobile Strike Force as called for under the contract. In addition, although all four deployed\nVehicles (MSFV), spare parts, maintenance, kandaks received their 60-day initial supply of vehicle spare parts, only\nand training. The MSF consists of two one MSF kandak assigned to the 2nd Brigade received any spare parts\nbrigades\xe2\x80\x94the 1st Brigade in Kabul containing from the comprehensive 1-year supply maintained at the brigade level.\nfour kandaks\xe2\x80\x94an ANA unit similar in size to a Due to shortfalls in contract funding, the Army Contracting Command-\nU.S. battalion\xe2\x80\x94and 2nd Brigade in Kandahar Warren (ACC-WRN) delayed ordering these parts--including replacement\ncontaining three kandaks. engines and drive shafts--which take about a year to manufacture and\n deliver. As a result, for example, another MSF kandak assigned to the 2nd\nThe objectives of this audit were to (1) Brigade had no spare parts beyond the initial 60-day supply for the 9\ndetermine the extent to which Textron has months that it received coalition and contractor support. Coalition\nmet its contractual obligations to produce, advisors noted that the absence of spare parts resulted in a steady\ndeliver, train, and provide field support for deterioration of the MSF kandak\xe2\x80\x99s ability to conduct missions. We\nthe ANA MSFVs; (2) evaluate the requested information on MSFV operational readiness rates, but this\neffectiveness of U.S. government oversight in information is not maintained by the brigades, kandaks, or NTM-A.\nthe procurement, delivery, training, and\nmaintenance of MSFVs for the ANA; and SIGAR also found that DOD exercised limited oversight of Textron\n(3) determine the extent to which the ANA activities at MSF brigades and kandaks. ACC-WRN assigned a contracting\nhas the capacity to operate and maintain its officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative (COR) to oversee and monitor Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\ncurrent and planned fleet of MSFVs. performance in Afghanistan. However, the COR was not always physically\n located in Afghanistan, which limited the COR\xe2\x80\x99s ability to visit MSF\nWHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS brigades and kandaks to observe Textron\xe2\x80\x99s work. The Product Manager\n for Allied Tactical Vehicles\xe2\x80\x94a U.S. Army group of acquisition personnel\nTo ensure that Textron is adequately responsible for the life cycle management of tactical vehicle fleets\xe2\x80\x94\nsupported in its implementation of the MSFV assigned associates to help the COR oversee and monitor Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\ncontracts and that appropriate contract performance. The associate in Afghanistan arrived in Kabul in January\noversight is provided, SIGAR recommends 2014, but, as of April 2014, had been unable to reach sites outside of\nthat the Executive Director, ACC-WRN, and Kabul. For example, the associate attempted to travel to the 2nd MSF\nthe Commander, International Security Brigade in Kandahar on multiple occasions, but the flights were always\nAssistance Force Joint Command, (1) review cancelled for unknown reasons. According to NATO Training Mission-\n\n\n For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.\n\x0cGunner, Turret, and Ambulance Variants of the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle\nSource: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan\n\n\nAfghanistan (NTM-A) officials, oversight personnel rarely conducted\n the requirements for contractor support\nsite inspections beyond Kabul, even though kandaks are deployed to\n at the MSF brigades and kandaks, taking\nother provinces such as Zabul and Helmand. On April 22, 2014, ACC-\n into account the level of security support\nWRN reported that a COR was assigned to Kabul. Although this\n available, and modify the contract to\nprovides for oversight of activities in Kabul, it does not ensure that\n reflect realistic capabilities for oversight,\nsomeone will provide oversight of Textron\xe2\x80\x99s activities at MSF\n and determine which actions are needed\nbrigades and kandaks outside of Kabul.\n to conduct proper oversight of\nAlthough the ANA has received the majority of its MSFVs, the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s maintenance and training; and (2) assign\nability to independently operate and maintain them has been oversight responsibilities to government\naffected by training and spare parts problems. Each initial personnel working with Textron at the\ncrewmember receives 8 weeks of basic operator MSFV training at brigades and kandaks and have them\nthe Armor Branch School in Kabul, but only in one of the three report to the contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s\npositions\xe2\x80\x94driver, gunner, or vehicle commander. As a result, if for representative.\nany reason an MSFV loses a crewmember, the vehicle may not\n To improve the long-term sustainability of\noperate at its full potential until that crewmember is replaced.\n MSF operations, SIGAR recommends that\nCoalition advisors noted that replacement crewmembers are\n the Commanding General, NTM-A,\nnormally selected from field units and come to the force without any\n (3) work with the ANA to provide post-\nMSFV experience. While MSF brigades and kandaks located near\n Armor Branch School operator training.\nKabul can send replacements to the Armor Branch School, it is less\nfeasible for those outside of Kabul to do so. Coalition advisors at the In their comments, both ACC-WRN and\n3rd MSF Kandak in Kandahar stated that getting inexperienced CSTC-A concurred with recommendations\nreplacements has lowered mission capable rates for the kandak. As one and two. NTM-A did not comment on\na result, the advisors created a training program to address the recommendation one and did not concur\nissue, but other kandaks do not have a similar program. with recommendation two, stating that it\n could not justify permanently assigning\nLastly, difficulties in distributing spare parts using the ANA logistics\n DOD personnel to the MSF brigade and\nsystem raise concerns about the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to sustain MSFVs. As\n kandak levels where, for example, at the\npart of its contract with ACC-WRN, Textron organizes and inventories\n kandak level there are as few as three to\nMSFV spare parts arriving in Afghanistan before they are sent to the\n five contractor personnel. Instead, NTM-A\nANA. Textron assists the ANA in sending parts to the two MSF\n stated that government personnel\nbrigades, which in turn are responsible for distributing the parts to\n located in Kabul could travel to the sites\ntheir respective kandaks. The continued drawdown of coalition\n to provide oversight. However, as\npersonnel in Afghanistan means that neither coalition forces nor\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s draft report noted, government\nTextron will have the resources to continue to provide the level of\n personnel made multiple attempts to\nlogistics support services the MSF has relied on to date. Instead, the\n travel to these locations but were unable\nMSF will rely on the ANA logistics system for ordering and receiving\n to do so. SIGAR therefore maintains that\nspare parts, which SIGAR and other oversight agencies have\n the recommendation is valid. NTM-A\npreviously reported on as having deficiencies. For example, SIGAR\n concurred with recommendation three.\nreported in October 2013 on the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s limited ability to manage\nvehicle spare parts.\n\n\n\nFor more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.\n\x0cJuly 21, 2014\n\n\nThe Honorable Charles T. Hagel\nSecretary of Defense\n\nGeneral Lloyd J. Austin III\nCommander, U.S. Central Command\n\nGeneral Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.\nCommander, U.S. Forces\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan, and\n Commander, International Security Assistance Force\n\nLieutenant General Joseph Anderson\nCommander, International Security Assistance Force\n Joint Command\n\nMajor General Kevin R. Wendel\nCommanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\n Ministerial Advisory Group\n\nBrigadier General Simon C. Hetherington (Canada)\nCommander, NATO Training Mission\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan\n\nMr. Kenneth P. Bousquet\nExecutive Director, Army Contracting Command-Warren\n\n\nThis report discusses the results of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit to determine if Textron Marine & Land\nSystems (Textron) met its contractual obligations to produce, deliver, and provide field support\nfor the Afghan National Army (ANA) Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), and the steps the\nDepartment of Defense (DOD) has taken to oversee this effort. The report also discusses the\nextent to which the ANA has the capacity to operate and maintain its current and planned fleet\nof MSFVs. SIGAR recommends that the Executive Director, Army Contacting Command-Warren\n(ACC-WRN), and the Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command,\n(1) review the requirements for contractor support at the MSF brigades and kandaks, taking\ninto account the level of security support available, and modify the contract to reflect the\nrealistic capabilities for oversight, and determine which actions are needed to conduct proper\noversight of maintenance and training; and (2) assign oversight responsibilities to government\npersonnel working with Textron at brigades and kandaks and have them report to the\ncontracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative. The report also recommends that the Commanding\nGeneral, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), (3) work with the ANA to provide post-\nArmor Branch School operator training.\nWe received written comments on a draft of this report from Army Materiel Command, which\nincluded comments from ACC-WRN. We also received written comments from U.S. Forces-\nAfghanistan, which included comments from the Combined Security Transition Command-\nAfghanistan (CSTC-A) and NTM-A. ACC-WRN concurred with recommendations one and two.\n\x0cCSTC-A also concurred with recommendations one and two. NTM-A did not comment on\nrecommendation one and did not concur with recommendation two, stating that it could not\njustify permanently assigning DOD personnel to the MSF brigade and kandak levels where, for\nexample, at the kandak level there are as few as three to five contractor personnel. Instead,\nNTM-A stated that government personnel located in Kabul could travel to the sites to provide\noversight. However, as our draft report noted, government personnel made multiple attempts\nto travel to these locations but were unable to do so due to flight cancellations. Therefore, we\nmaintain that the recommendation is valid. NTM-A concurred with recommendation three.\nArmy Materiel Command\xe2\x80\x99s letter with comments from ACC-WRN and U.S. Forces\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\nletter with comments from CSTC-A and NTM-A, along with our responses, have been\nreproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. The Product Manager for Allied Tactical\nVehicles provided technical comments which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate.\nSIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110\xe2\x80\x90181, as amended, and\nthe Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with generally accepted\ngovernment auditing standards.\n\n\n\n\nJohn F. Sopko\nSpecial Inspector General\n for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\x0c TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nBackground .................................................................................................................................................................. 2\xc2\xa0\nTextron Met Vehicle Delivery and Initial Training Requirements, but Limited Security Support and Spare Parts\nHindered Its Ability to Conduct Field Maintenance and Training .............................................................................. 6\xc2\xa0\n\nDOD Can Account for All MSFVs, but Its Oversight of Textron\xe2\x80\x99s Support to Fielded MSFVs Is Limited .................. 8\xc2\xa0\nANA\xe2\x80\x99s Capacity to Independently Operate and Maintain the Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Is Affected by a Lack\nof Training and Problems with Obtaining Spare Parts ............................................................................................... 9\xc2\xa0\n\nConclusion.................................................................................................................................................................. 11\xc2\xa0\nRecommendations .................................................................................................................................................... 12\xc2\xa0\n\nAgency Comments ..................................................................................................................................................... 12\xc2\xa0\nAppendix I - Scope and Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 14\xc2\xa0\nAppendix II - Comments from Army Materiel Command.......................................................................................... 16\xc2\xa0\nAppendix III - Comments from U.S. Forces\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan ......................................................................................... 20\xc2\xa0\nAppendix IV - Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................... 25\xc2\xa0\n\n\nTABLES\n\nTable 1 - Textron Contracts as of March 17, 2014 ................................................................................................... 3\xc2\xa0\n\n\nFIGURES\n\nFigure 1 - MSF Organization and Deployment Status as of April 2014 .................................................................... 5\xc2\xa0\n\n\nPHOTOS\n\nPhoto 1 - Gunner, Turret, and Ambulance Variants of the MSFV.............................................................................. 2\xc2\xa0\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page i\n\x0cABBREVIATIONS\n\n ACC-WRN Army Contracting Command-Warren\n ANA Afghan National Army\n COR Contracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative\n\n CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan\n DOD Department of Defense\n IJC International Security Assistance Force Joint Command\n MOD Ministry of Defense\n MSF Mobile Strike Force\n MSFV Mobile Strike Force Vehicle\n\n NTM-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan\n PdM-ATV Product Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles\n Textron Textron Marine & Land Systems\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page ii\n\x0cA key objective of coalition efforts in Afghanistan is to bolster the Afghan government\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to provide for\nits own security by equipping and training the Afghan National Security Forces, which consist of the Afghan\nNational Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police. As of April 2014, Congress appropriated $57.33 billion for\nthe Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to equip, train, base, and sustain Afghan military and police. The\nCombined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Ministerial Advisory Group (CSTC-A) in Kabul, Afghanistan,\nis the Department of Defense (DOD) entity responsible for planning, programming, and implementing efforts to\nequip and train the ANA. In addition, the NATO Training Mission\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan (NTM-A) conducts training and\ncapacity building in coordination with CSTC-A.1\n\nTo improve the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s effectiveness, NTM-A/CSTC-A determined that the ANA should have a Mobile Strike Force\n(MSF) equipped with vehicles that have a high-survivability and quick-reaction capability to navigate in both\nrugged terrain and urban environments. According to its concept of operations, the MSF\xe2\x80\x99s mission is to provide\na mechanized infantry force capable of the full range of tactical actions that is rapidly deployable at the kandak\nlevel, with integral firepower, protection, and mobility support, to reinforce formation operations.2 After a review\nprocess and market research involving multiple DOD components, the Textron Mobile Strike Force Vehicle\n(MSFV) was identified as the only vehicle that could meet the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s operational capability and meet CSTC-A\nand ANA requirements including the need for delivery to begin by December 2012. In 2011, Army Contracting\nCommand-Warren (ACC-WRN) awarded the first of two contracts, together valued at $661.3 million, to Textron\nMarine & Land Systems (Textron), a U.S. firm, to produce 634 MSFVs and provide spare parts, maintenance,\nand training\xe2\x80\x94616 MSFVs were produced to mission capable standards and 18 were test vehicles. Of the 18\ntest vehicles, 7 were later refurbished to be mission capable. Thus, the ANA is expected to receive 623 MSFVs.\nThe MSFVs would be distributed to two brigades\xe2\x80\x94the 1st MSF Brigade, headquartered in Kabul with an\nauthorized strength of four kandaks, and the 2nd MSF Brigade, headquartered in Kandahar with an authorized\nstrength of three kandaks. As of March 2014, more than 400 MSFVs had been delivered to the ANA and, as of\nApril 2014, the ANA had fielded both brigades and four of the seven kandaks that would be receiving MSFVs.3\n\nThe objectives of this audit were to (1) determine the extent to which Textron has met its contractual\nobligations to produce, deliver, train, and provide field support for the ANA MSFVs; (2) evaluate the\neffectiveness of U.S. government oversight in the procurement, delivery, training, and maintenance of MSFVs\nfor the ANA; and (3) determine the extent to which the ANA has the capacity to operate and maintain its current\nand planned fleet of MSFVs.\n\nTo accomplish these objectives, we obtained data and met with officials from NTM-A, CSTC-A, ACC-WRN, the\nProduct Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles (PdM-ATV)\xe2\x80\x94a U.S. Army group of acquisition personnel responsible\nfor the life cycle management of tactical vehicle fleets\xe2\x80\x94Textron, the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s MSF, and the Afghan Ministry of\nDefense (MOD). We also reviewed relevant MSFV receiving and transfer documents, and analyzed the two\ncontracts requiring Textron to provide vehicles, spare parts, maintenance, and training. We conducted our work\nfrom July 2013 through May 2014 in Washington, D.C., and at coalition and ANA sites in Kabul, Helmand,\nKandahar, and Zabul provinces, Afghanistan, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing\nstandards. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.\n\n\n\n\n1Between November 2009 and October 2013, NTM-A/CSTC-A was a single command with CSTC-A representing the U.S.\ncomponent, and NTM-A representing the coalition component. In October 2013, NTM-A/CSTC-A was divided into two\nseparate commands: NTM-A and CSTC-A. For purposes of this report, we refer to actions taken by the previous single\ncommand as NTM-A/CSTC-A. For actions following the split, we use the individual command as appropriate.\n2 Kandak is an ANA unit similar in size to a U.S. battalion, or approximately 700 soldiers.\n3 The MSF will eventually have an eighth kandak for its Special Operaton Forces. However, because the specific details of\nhow these forces operate are classified and the special operations kandak has not yet been fielded, this kandak was not\nincluded in the scope of our review.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 1\n\x0cBACKGROUND\n\nIn September 2007, CSTC-A identified a need to improve the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s ground vehicle capabilities. At the time, the\nANA vehicle fleet included mostly light tactical vehicles\xe2\x80\x94primarily Ford Ranger pickup trucks. In June 2010,\nNTM-A/CSTC-A decided to improve the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s capacity by procuring Armored Security Vehicles for the MSF.4 The\ncommand wanted vehicles that could withstand mine blasts and small arms fire, drive long distances over\nrough terrain, navigate tight urban environments, overpower and neutralize or destroy a variety of targets at up\nto 2,000 meters, and be compatible with U.S. government-furnished equipment currently provided to the ANA.\nRecognizing that the ANA would eventually need to operate and maintain these vehicles on its own, NTM-\nA/CSTC-A also sought simplicity in design. It submitted these requirements to the Defense Security\nCooperation Agency, which subsequently tasked the Center for Army Analysis to select the best vehicle.5 The\nTextron MSFV was identified as the only vehicle that could meet the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s operational capability and be\ndelivered in the required time.6 Currently, the MSF has three MSFV variants available for its use\xe2\x80\x94one equipped\nwith an overhead gunner\xe2\x80\x99s protection kit and armed with a 50-caliber machine gun, one equipped with a turret\nand armed with a 50-caliber machine gun and a 40-millimeter Mk-19 grenade launcher, and one outfitted as\nan ambulance. Photo 1 shows the gunner, turret, and ambulance variants.\n\n\n\nPhoto 1 - Gunner, Turret, and Ambulance Variants of the MSFV\n\n\n\n\nSource: NTM-A\n\n\nMobile Strike Force Contracts\nTextron\xe2\x80\x99s two contracts to provide MSFVs, spare parts, maintenance, and training together are valued at\n$661.3 million. The first contract, W56HZV-11-C-0114, was awarded on January 21, 2011, and required\nTextron to produce 499 MSFVs, including test vehicles and initial production vehicles. This contract also\n\n\n\n\n4 The Mobile Strike Force was originally called the \xe2\x80\x9cQuick Reaction Force.\xe2\x80\x9d The name was changed in mid-2011.\n5 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is a DOD component that manages security cooperation programs, including\nForeign Military Sales and associated programs. It provides financial and policy guidance for government-to-government\ntransfers of defense articles, training, and services under a variety of authorities. The Center for Army Analysis is a DOD\ncomponent that conducts analysis of Army forces and systems within the context of joint and combined warfighting.\n6\n \xc2\xa0Textron\'s MSFV is derived from the M1117 Guardian Armored Security Vehicle and Armored Personnel Carrier,\nmanufactured by Textron for use by the U.S. Army\'s Military Police Corps and other military police units in Iraq, Bulgaria, and\nColumbia. The M1117 serves as a more heavily protected and armed alternative to the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose\nWheeled Vehicle. The MSFV platform (originally known as the Medium Armored Security Vehicle) differs from the M1117 in\nthat it has been configured with enhanced survivability capability, giving it improved blast protection to Mine-Resistant,\nAmbush-Protected levels. The MSFV also has an extended hull design that provides increased interior space and allows for\nadditional seating configuration.\xc2\xa0\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 2\n\x0cincluded provisions for tools, spares parts, maintenance, \xe2\x80\x9cde-processing\xe2\x80\x9d support,7 and training (to include\ntraining materials and aids). The second contract, W56HZV-13-C-0170, was awarded in February 2013 for the\npurchase of 135 additional vehicles. The Defense Contract Management Agency administered the two\ncontracts with the program office, PdM-ATV providing program management support. Table 1 presents the\ncontract numbers, the amounts obligated, number of MSFVs provided, and a brief description of the contracts\xe2\x80\x99\nscope.\n\nTable 1 - Textron Contracts as of March 17, 2014\n\nContract Number Obligated ($ Number of Scope\n in millions)a MSFVs\n\nW56HZV-11-C-0114 $547.9 499 \xef\x82\xb7 Phase I (from January 21, 2011 to May 26, 2011) required\n Textron to supply the government with 18 test MSFVs, 41\n MSFVs, and associated personnel, tools, and spare parts.\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Phase II (from May 26, 2011 to December 31, 2014)\n required Textron to deliver 440 MSFVs, training materials,\n tools, spare parts, and field service support personnel in\n Afghanistan for maintenance, de-processing, and training.\n\nW56HZV-13-C-0170 $113.4 135 Purchased additional MSFVs.\n\nTotal $661.3 634\n\nSource: SIGAR review of Textron contracts W56HZV-11-C-0114 and W56HZV-13-C-0170.\nNote: a Dollars rounded to the hundred thousand.\n\nAs table 1 shows, contract W56HZV-11-C-0114 is divided into two phases. Phase I began on January 21,\n2011, and covered pre-production testing of the MSFV platform and the associated personnel, tools, and spare\nparts. During this phase, Textron produced 18 test MSFVs and 41 MSFVs.8 Phase II began on May 26, 2011,\nand required Textron to deliver an additional 440 MSFVs. In addition to the production and delivery of MSFVs,\nPhase II of the contract requires Textron to provide each of the seven MSF kandaks an initial 60-day supply of\nspare parts for preventative maintenance and basic repairs, a comprehensive 1-year supply of spare parts to\nrepair normal wear and tear, and enough spare parts to repair vehicles damaged in transit to Afghanistan or\nduring training activities at the Armor Branch School.\nAdditionally, under the first contract, ACC-WRN exercised options that require Textron to provide tools, training\nmanuals in Dari and English, and field service representative support in Kabul and at the brigades and\nkandaks. The contract specifies that this field service representative support includes vehicle fielding, de-\nprocessing activities, training at the Armor Branch School (including direct training to ANA personnel, \xe2\x80\x9ctrain the\ntrainer\xe2\x80\x9d classes for ANA instructors, and advising support for coalition and ANA instructors), maintenance\n\n\n7 De-processing activities include receiving and off-loading MSFVs upon arrival in Afghanistan; unpacking, inspecting, and\n\ninventorying MSFV equipment; documenting and repairing damage to the vehicles incurred during the shipment process;\nreplacing any missing equipment; installing weapons, intercoms, and communications systems (including government\nfurnished equipment); and performing pre-operational checks of the vehicles before they are transferred to the ANA.\n8 W56HZV-11-C-0114 required Textron to produce and submit 18 test vehicles for live fire survivability, performance, and\n\ndurability testing. The contract did not require test vehicles be manufactured to \xe2\x80\x9cfully mission capable\xe2\x80\x9d standards. Fully\nmission capable is defined in the contract as "all component and systems operate as designed." Once testing was\ncompleted, the contract required Textron to initially produce 41 MSFVs, which were manufactured to fully mission capable\nstandards. After the government completed a final inspection of these 41 MSFVs, the vehicles were shipped to Afghanistan\nfor use by the ANA and the MSFV platform was moved into the mass production stage, represented in the contract as\nPhase II. Textron was also required to refurbish seven of the test MSFVs to fully mission capable standards, for use by the\nANA.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 3\n\x0csupport for MSFVs damaged during training activities, and kandak-level maintenance and maintenance\ntraining.9 Textron is also required to provide weekly status reports to PdM-ATV detailing MSFV de-processing\nstatus. The first contract is currently scheduled to end on December 31, 2014.\n\n\nDelivery and Acceptance of Vehicles\nTextron began delivering vehicles to DOD in May 2011. The Defense Contract Management Agency, the entity\nresponsible for administering the procurement process, accepted the vehicles on behalf of the U.S.\ngovernment using a DD Form 250.10 Once an MSFV passes government inspection at the Defense Contract\nManagement Agency in Dallas, Texas, the vehicle is sent to Afghanistan where it arrives at the MSFV staging\nsite in Pol-e-Charki, Afghanistan.\nCSTC-A acts as the receiving authority for the MSFVs arriving in Afghanistan and coordinates the paperwork\nand vehicle tracking. According to the contract, Textron is responsible for de-processing and preparing the\nMSFVs for the ANA. Textron is also responsible for repairing any damage sustained during transit. As each MSF\nkandak completes training and begins preparing for deployment, CSTC-A formally transfers custody, title, and\nresponsibility for that kandak\xe2\x80\x99s vehicles to the ANA. CSTC-A and ANA personnel sign a transfer and receipt\ndocument, MOD Form 9, for each vehicle to acknowledge this official transfer of ownership.11\n\n\n\n\n9 Textron\xe2\x80\x99s main de-processing facility is located across from the Armor Branch School outside of Pol-e-Charki. This facility\n\nis where the contractors receive, inspect, inventory, de-process, and deliver to the ANA the MSFVs, tools, and spare parts\npackages contracted by the U.S. government. Textron contractors also have classrooms and repair facilities within the\nArmor Branch School, where they conduct field level maintenance classes and repair vehicles damaged during driver\ntraining.\n10While ACC-WRN is the contracting office that awarded the contracts, the Defense Contract Management Agency is\nresponsible for contract administration. The Agency uses DD Form 250\xe2\x94\x80\xe2\x80\x9cMaterial Inspection and Receiving Report\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x94\x80 to\ndocument the point at which the U.S. government takes title of a particular good, such as a vehicle.\n11 The MOD Form 9 documents the formal vehicle transfer from the U.S. government to the Afghan government.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 4\n\x0cMSF Structure and Training\n\nWhile the ANA owns the MSFVs, the MSF has its own organizational structure within the ANA and reports\nseparately to the MOD. The MSF consists of two brigades\xe2\x80\x94the 1st MSF Brigade in Kabul and 2nd MSF Brigade in\nKandahar. As of April 2014, the 1st MSF Brigade had received one of its four planned kandaks and the 2nd MSF\nBrigade had received all three of its planned kandaks (see figure 1). While the MSF kandaks report to brigades\nin Kabul and Kandahar, MOD can task them to operate anywhere in the country. With MOD approval, these\nkandaks are employed to support the operations of a particular ANA Corps, which control military operations in\n a particular region. For a MSF\n kandak to be tasked with a\nFigure 1 - MSF Organization and Deployment Status as of April 2014\n particular mission, a regional Corps\n coordinates with the appropriate\n MSF brigade, and then sends a\n request to MOD Operations for MSF\n support. MOD Operations either\n approves or rejects the request and\n notifies the MSF brigade. If\n approved, the MSF brigade tasks\n the MSF kandak to conduct the\n mission. Each mission has a\n specified task and a specified\n duration.\n According to the MSF concept of\n operations, the MSF kandaks would\n receive a total of 406 vehicles, 58\n for each of the seven MSF\n kandaks\xe2\x80\x9431 in the turret variant,\n 24 in the gunner variant, and 3 in\n the ambulance variant. The two\n MSF brigades headquarters were\n each allotted 6 MSFVs, for a total of\n 12 vehicles. In addition, there were\n 21 training vehicles, and 56 \xe2\x80\x9cfloat\xe2\x80\x9d\n vehicles for training and to replace\n vehicles damaged beyond repair\nSource: SIGAR review of NTM-A records.\n during operations.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 5\n\x0cTEXTRON MET VEHICLE DELIVERY AND INITIAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, BUT\nLIMITED SECURITY SUPPORT AND SPARE PARTS HINDERED ITS ABILITY TO\nCONDUCT FIELD MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING\n\nTextron Met Contractual Obligations to Produce and Deliver MSFVs and Provide\nInitial Training\nDOD documents showed that as of March 25, 2014,Textron had produced all 634 MSFVs required under its\ntwo contracts with ACC-WRN\xe2\x80\x94616 regular production and 18 test MSFVs\xe2\x80\x94and provided initial training at the\nArmor Branch School in accordance with the contract requirements. In addition, Textron had finished\nrefurbishing 7 of the 18 test MSFVs for use by the ANA in accordance with contract W56HZV-11-C-0114,\nmodification 23. NTM-A and PdM-ATV officials stated that Textron also met other contractual requirements\nsuch as conducting de-processing and advising activities at the Armor Branch School; providing spare parts,\ntools, equipment and weapons installation; maintaining training vehicles; and providing training. The Office of\nthe Secretary of Defense (Policy) provided us with documentation showing that Textron supplied training\nmaterials in Dari and English. Lastly, PdM-ATV officials gave us 4 months of Textron weekly status reports\ncovering the period September 9, 2013, to January 12, 2014, showing that Textron continually provided\nmaintenance, de-processing, and instruction services at the Armor Branch School.\nWe also visited the Armor Branch School in Pol-e-Charki (just outside Kabul) on October 14, 2013, and January\n15, 2014. During these visits, Textron showed us its classroom facilities and the damaged training vehicles it\nwas repairing. At the de-processing site located across from the school, contractors opened shipping\ncontainers and showed us how they were assembling packages of field tools, sustainment tools, and spare\nparts. In addition to speaking with Textron at the Armor Branch School, we interviewed ANA instructors who\nhave been trained and mentored by Textron. These ANA instructors stated that they had a good working\nrelationship with the Textron contractors and that Textron\xe2\x80\x99s continued assistance has been greatly\nappreciated.\n\n\nInability to get to Brigades and Kandaks\xe2\x80\x94Because of Security Concerns\xe2\x80\x94Limited\nTextron\xe2\x80\x99s Ability to Fully Conduct Required Field Maintenance and Training\nTextron has been unable to provide required maintenance and training services to the brigades and kandaks\ndue to security concerns. The first contract required Textron to provide three maintenance and training field\nsupport teams to rotate at the seven MSF kandaks expected to be deployed in the field. Textron\xe2\x80\x99s field support\nteams need security protection to do their work, and DOD is responsible for providing it. Coalition advisors or\nsecurity forces, under the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) provide security to\nTextron field support teams.\nTextron contractor support personnel reside at the same facility as the coalition advisors or security forces and\ntravel with them on their convoys to the MSF brigade headquarters or kandaks. Once at the MSF brigade\nheadquarters or kandak, each Textron contractor is supposed to be protected by at least two coalition advisors\nor security forces when conducting vehicle maintenance or interacting with small groups of ANA personnel.\nWhen interacting with larger groups of ANA personnel, as when conducting maintenance classes, contractor\npersonnel are supposed to be protected by five coalition advisors or security forces.\nTextron\xe2\x80\x99s contract does not specify how often contractors should visit the brigades and kandaks for\nmaintenance and training. However, Textron\xe2\x80\x99s MSFV project manager stated that its field service\nrepresentatives should provide these services 6 days a week to prevent vehicles from falling into disrepair, and\nto provide MSF mechanics the greatest opportunity to retain and improve their skills. In January 2014, NTM-A\nand Textron officials acknowledged that two of the four kandaks that have been deployed to date were not\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 6\n\x0creceiving adequate levels of maintenance and training because of limited security support. Specifically, the 2nd\nMSF Kandak based in Qalat experienced a 3-month period in which coalition advisors were not available to\nprovide security support to Textron. Consequently, Textron could not conduct field maintenance and training.\nEven after coalition advisors arrived, the kandak went several more months when it received Textron-provided\nmaintenance and training only once every 1 to 2 weeks due to the limited availability of coalition security\nforces. Similarly, at the 3rd MSF Kandak based in Shorabak, Textron did not receive the necessary security\nsupport from the coalition advisors or security forces, which limited its ability to conduct maintenance and\ntraining. According to the Textron program manager, the situation at 3rd MSF Kandak improved when a new\nteam of coalition advisors arrived in 2013 and made supporting the contractors a higher priority.\nAccording to coalition commanders advising ANA brigades and kandaks, they are not able to provide the level\nof support necessary for Textron to fulfill all of its duties to MSF brigades and kandaks because they have a\nlimited number of coalition advisors and security forces. According to these commanders, most teams\nassigned at either the ANA brigade or kandak level have an average of 18 members to provide security for\nTextron, amongst other duties. They also stated that the primary role of the coalition advisors is to advise and\nassist Afghan security forces and not to provide security support for contractors. While the advisors say that\nthey generally can bring contractor personnel in their convoys to the MSF brigade headquarters and kandaks,\nthey do not have the resources to provide constant security for contractor personnel.\n\n\nSpare Parts Delivery Delays Limited Textron\xe2\x80\x99s Ability to Conduct Field Maintenance\nand Training\nInitial delays in ordering MSFV spare parts, delivery challenges, and an immature ANA logistics system limited\nTextron\xe2\x80\x99s ability to conduct MSFV field maintenance and ANA maintenance training for the first four MSF\nkandaks that received MSFVs. According to coalition and Textron personnel, as of January 2014, all four\ndeployed kandaks had received an initial 60-day complement of spare parts upon completing training at the\nArmor Branch School. However, contractor representatives stated that some of the 60-day packages lacked\nthe full planned complement of spare parts due to problems importing some spare parts into Afghanistan.\nMoreover, the standard 60-day initial spare parts package contains a limited supply of the items and\ncomponents needed for routine maintenance and basic repairs. Other key items and components, such as\nreplacement engines and drive shafts, are only included in the comprehensive, 1-year spare parts packages\nsent through the ANA logistics system. According to coalition advisors, after an MSF kandak deploys and\nbegins to conduct missions, spare parts from the 1-year supply become necessary for repairing battle damage\nas well as operational wear and tear. During our fieldwork in January 2014, only the 3rd MSF Kandak in\nHelmand had received any additional spare parts from the brigade\xe2\x80\x99s comprehensive 1-year supply. The\nremaining three kandaks had not received any additional spare parts from their brigades, despite the fact that\nsome of the kandaks had long since exhausted their initial 60-day supply.12 For example, the 2nd MSF Kandak\nwas without spare parts for the 9 months it received coalition advisor and contractor support, and, according to\ncoalition advisors, the lack of spare parts resulted in a steady deterioration of the 2nd MSF Kandak\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\nconduct missions. We requested information on MSFV operational readiness rates, but this information is not\nmaintained by the brigades, kandaks or NTM-A.\nUnder the first contract (W56HZV-11-C-0114), ACC-WRN is responsible for ordering an initial 60-day and also\nthe comprehensive 1-year supply of spare parts for the MSF. According to Textron and PdM-ATV officials, under\nnormal circumstances it takes approximately 1 year to manufacture and deliver large quantities of spare parts\nfor the MSFV. However, due to shortfalls in contract funding, ACC-WRN was not able to order these spare parts\nuntil March 2012, only 3 months before the 1st MSF Kandak was fielded. According to PdM-ATV, even if the\n\n\n12At the time of our fieldwork in January 2014, the 4th MSF Kandak had just completed its training at the Armor Branch\nSchool and was in the process of deploying to Kandahar, so it did not yet need more than its initial 60-day supply of spare\nparts. According to NTM-A, the 2nd MSF Brigade has since received its one year supply of spare parts, and should be able to\npush these parts down to the 1st, 2nd, and 4th MSF Kandaks.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 7\n\x0cparts were ordered on time, delivery issues in getting parts into Afghanistan as well as ANA logistics\ndistribution challenges added additional delays outside of DOD\xe2\x80\x99s control. For example, shipments going\nthrough Pakistan experienced delays due to the closure of the Pakistan ground transportation corridor. In\nNovember 2013, DOD reported that most of the blocked cargo from last year\xe2\x80\x99s Pakistan ground transportation\ncorridor had arrived in Afghanistan.13 However, in April 2014, the NTM-A MSF program manager stated that\ncontainers of spare parts as well as MSFVs continued to face significant delays going through Pakistan. As of\nMarch 2014, 76 containers containing MSF spare parts were stuck in Pakistan. Furthermore, according to\ncoalition advisors, once parts arrive in Afghanistan, the immature ANA logistics system faces numerous\nchallenges, such as the effective ordering and processing of spare parts, which limits the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\ndistribute parts to brigades and kandaks, including the MSF.\n\n\nDOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR ALL MSFVS, BUT ITS OVERSIGHT OF TEXTRON\xe2\x80\x99S\nSUPPORT TO FIELDED MSFVS IS LIMITED\n\nDOD Can Fully Account for All MSFVs\nAs of March 25, 2014, DOD was able to account for all MSFVs produced and their status. Once Textron\nproduces the MSFVs, DOD takes ownership when the Defense Contract Management Agency accepts delivery\nusing a DD Form 250. Our analysis of these forms shows that, as of March 25, 2014, Textron had delivered,\nand the Defense Contract Management Agency had accepted, all 634 MSFVs Textron was contracted to\nprovide\xe2\x80\x94623 that will be provided to the ANA and 11 that will remain in DOD\xe2\x80\x99s possession as test vehicles. For\neach form, we checked the shipment number, shipment date, vehicle serial number, contract number line\nitem, and comments made by personnel accepting the vehicles.\nIn addition, we found that CSTC-A could account for the status of the 623 MSFVs being provided to the ANA. As\nof March 25, 2014, CSTC-A had transferred 419 of the planned 623 MSFVs to the ANA and was able to\nprovide us with MOD Form 9s for all transferred vehicles.14 MOD Form 9s record the transfer of ownership from\nCSTC-A to the ANA. The 204 vehicles that are still in DOD\xe2\x80\x99s possession before being transferred to the ANA\nwere either de-processing in Afghanistan, being used for training, in transit to Afghanistan, awaiting\ntransportation in the United States, or were refurbished test vehicles.\n\n\nDOD Oversight of Support to Fielded MSFVs Is Limited\nAlthough ACC-WRN assigned contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives (COR) and PdM-ATV provided assistance to\noversee Textron\xe2\x80\x99s performance in Afghanistan,15 DOD has limited oversight of Textron at ANA brigades and\nkandaks. From April 2011 through May 2014, 11 PdM-ATV personnel, consisting of CORs, associates, and one\ncontractor, performed oversight of Textron\xe2\x80\x99s activities in Afghanistan. Although there was some overlap among\nthese individuals, for the most part there was only one of these individuals in Afghanistan at any given time. At\n\n\n13 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013.\n14 As noted above, 634 is the total number of MSFVs ACC-WRN contracted with Textron to produce and deliver. The\n\nconcept of operations calls for 623 MSFVs to be transferred to the ANA. The remaining 11 vehicles are test vehicles that\nwill not undergo refurbishment and will not be provided to the ANA. This brings the total number of MSFVs currently in\nDOD\xe2\x80\x99s possession to 215 vehicles\xe2\x80\x94204 that will be transferred to the ANA and 11 test vehicles that will remain in DOD\xe2\x80\x99s\npossession.\n15 While ACC-WRN is the implementer of the MSFV contract, the COR within PdM-ATV oversees Textron\xe2\x80\x99s performance. To\n\nsupport the contractor oversight process, PdM-ATV deployed assistant CORs to Afghanistan who provided information\nregarding contractor performance to the COR who was located at the PdM-ATV in the United States. The COR can\nrecommend contract actions to ACC-WRN but cannot award, agree to, or sign any agreements, commitments, or\nmodifications that involve price, quantity, quality, delivery schedule, or other terms and conditions. Only the contracting\nofficer at ACC-WRN can implement such contract actions.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 8\n\x0cthe time of our fieldwork in October 2013 and January 2014, for example, only one person in Afghanistan was\nassigned oversight functions at the active MSF sites\xe2\x80\x94the Armor Branch School, 1st and 2nd MSF Brigade\nheadquarters, and the four MSF kandak locations\xe2\x80\x94throughout Afghanistan. According to the COR designation\nletter, the COR\xe2\x80\x99s primary responsibilities are to monitor Textron\xe2\x80\x99s performance and maintain documentary\nevidence of oversight. The COR must verify that Textron fulfills all the technical requirements of the contract\nand related work orders. If, during monitoring activities, the COR observes incidents of faulty work, work delays,\nor other problems with contractor performance, the COR must record and report the issue to both Textron and\nthe contracting officer. The COR designation letter also stipulates that the COR will \xe2\x80\x9cperform, or cause to be\nperformed, inspections\xe2\x80\x9d to verify that these issues have been rectified. However, the COR was not always\nlocated in Afghanistan. According to PdM-ATV, from October 2011 to January 2012, from June 2012 to March\n2013, and from July 2013 to April 2014, the COR assigned to the program was located outside of Afghanistan.\nThe Defense Contingency COR Handbook recommends that multiple CORs be designated when the contract\nrequires several functions to be performed across multiple locations. Although PdM-ATV provided an associate\nto assist the COR in oversight responsibilities, this individual was not formally tasked or given the authorities of\na COR. Furthermore, most of the oversight was conducted in Kabul with limited visits to the brigades and\nkandaks. For example, the most recent PdM-ATV associate arrived in Afghanistan in January 2014, but, as of\nApril 2014, had been unable to reach any sites outside of Kabul to conduct direct oversight. The associate\nattempted to travel to the 2nd MSF Brigade on multiple occasions, but the flights were cancelled for unknown\nreasons. According to NTM-A officials and advisory team commanders, the associate has spent most of the\ntime at the de-processing and training sites in and around Kabul, where a majority of the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s work\ntakes place. According to NTM-A officials, past associates rarely conducted site inspections at other sites, even\nthough the 2nd MSF Kandak has been deployed to Zabul province since November 2012, the 3rd MSF Kandak\nto Helmand province since April 2013, the 2nd MSF Brigade to Kandahar province since April 2013, and the 4th\nMSF Kandak to Kandahar province since January 2014. On April 2, 2014, ACC-WRN reported that a new COR\nwas assigned to Kabul. While this provides formal direct oversight of activities in Kabul, it does not ensure that\noversight will be provided at the brigades and kandaks.\nPdM-ATV officials told us they have relied on reporting from the coalition advisors and Textron\xe2\x80\x94the entity they\nare supposed to be monitoring\xe2\x80\x94to help them conduct technical oversight and administer the contracts outside\nof Kabul. The PdM-ATV associate stated that coalition advisors often call and relay their concerns when\nproblems with the MSFV arise. The associate also told us that the coalition advisory teams sometimes report\nproblems up their chains of command, but when this occurs, the COR does not learn of the problems until up\nto a week later. To keep all stakeholders aware of the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s work, the associate holds teleconferences\nevery other week with PdM-ATV, CSTC-A, and other officials. The advisory team commanders also told us that\nthey frequently talk with the associate, but that they prefer more on-the-ground oversight. In addition to the\nteleconference, the COR prepares and submits a monthly report of contractor performance to ACC-WRN, as\nrequired by the COR appointment letter.\n\n\nANA\xe2\x80\x99S CAPACITY TO INDEPENDENTLY OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE MOBILE\nSTRIKE FORCE VEHICLES IS AFFECTED BY A LACK OF TRAINING AND\nPROBLEMS WITH OBTAINING SPARE PARTS\n\nMSF Crewmembers Lack Comprehensive Training\nMSF crewmembers receive 8 weeks of initial MSFV operator training at the Armor Branch School. Although the\ncourses at the school cover the basic technical elements required to operate the MSFV, each MSF\ncrewmember is trained to be proficient in only one of the three positions\xe2\x80\x94driver, gunner, and vehicle\ncommander\xe2\x80\x94considered critical to the full operation of the MSFV. For example, any MSFV crewmember trained\nas a driver cannot necessarily operate as a gunner or vice versa. Therefore, if a MSF crew loses any of its three\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 9\n\x0ccrewmembers, the remaining members may not be able to operate the vehicle at its full capability until that\ncrewmember is replaced. At the 3rd MSF Kandak, coalition advisors created their own cross-training for the\nkandak\xe2\x80\x99s drivers, gunners, and vehicles commanders to remedy this situation. It is unclear, however, whether\nother kandaks will create a similar training program.\nAdding to the risk for MSF operations, replacement crewmembers at deployed kandaks may not receive any\ntraining in MSFV operations. ANA soldiers selected to replace MSF crewmembers lost to attrition are often\nselected from infantry units and lack any MSFV experience. While the MSF brigade and kandaks in the Kabul\nvicinity can send individuals to the Armor Branch School, this is less feasible for the brigade and kandaks\nlocated away from Kabul, such as the 2nd MSF Kandak in Zabul province (southeastern Afghanistan) and the\n3rd MSF Kandak in Helmand province (southwestern Afghanistan). For example, during our fieldwork in January\n2014, coalition advisors at the 3rd MSF Kandak in Kandahar stated that most of the kandak\xe2\x80\x99s replacements\ndid not have any training, resulting in lower mission capable rates for the kandak. The 3rd MSF coalition\nadvisors worked with 2nd Brigade advisors to create a training program to address this and other issues, which\nhelped increase the kandak\xe2\x80\x99s mission capability rate. However, there are no similar programs at other\nkandaks. We requested information on MSF attrition and operational readiness, but this information is not\nmaintained by the brigades, kandaks, or NTM-A.\n\n\nSupplying MSF Spare Parts Continues To Be a Challenge\nDifficulties in distributing parts through the ANA logistics system raise concerns about the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\nsustain the MSFV. As previously noted, MSF brigades and kandaks faced delays in receiving their full\ncomplement of spare parts with only one of the three kandaks receiving parts after exhausting its 60-day\nsupply of initial spare parts. Textron conducts de-processing, sorting, and delivery to the ANA for MSFV spare\nparts. Textron field service representatives receive spare parts at their de-processing facility near Pol-e-Charki.\nTextron then organizes and inventories the spare parts before they are sent to the two MSF brigades, which in\nturn are responsible for the final distribution of spare parts, on an as needed basis, to their respective\nkandaks.\nSIGAR and other oversight agencies have previously reported on concerns regarding the ANA logistics system.\nSpecifically, in October 2013, we issued a report focusing on the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s limited ability to manage and track\nvehicle spare parts.16 The DOD Inspector General also issued a report in December 2011 highlighting\nsignificant vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the ANA logistical system, including the challenge of establishing\na more effective system of oversight with respect to ANA equipment, supplies, and installations.17\nEven with coalition and Textron support, supplying MSFV spare parts is a challenge. According to the PdM-ATV,\nthe MSF faces challenges in ordering spare parts through the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s Central Supply Depot. A simple parts\nrequest requires multiple approvals, which creates administrative backlogs. In addition, the ANA relies on\npaper records and suffers from low literacy, further complicating the process of ordering spare parts.\nAccording to an advisory team commander, between November 2013 and late January 2014, personnel from\nthe Central Supply Depot held up a large shipment of MSFV parts for the 2nd MSF Brigade in order to conduct\nan inventory, despite the parts already having been inventoried by Textron upon arrival in Afghanistan.\nAccording to the commander, the parts remained held up by Central Supply Depot personnel even after a\nsenior ANA official issued an order in late November 2013 authorizing a special convoy to deliver the parts.\nThe parts were released in late January 2014 only after direct involvement from the Commanding General,\nNTM-A.\n\n\n\n16SIGAR Audit 10-11, Afghan National Army: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Lacks Key Information\non Inventory in Stock and Requirements for Vehicle Spare Parts, October 16, 2013.\n17 Department of Defense Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2012-028, Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition\n\nEfforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army, December 9, 2011.\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 10\n\x0cSimilarly, MSF kandaks rely on coalition advisor support to process orders for spare parts. For example,\nadvisors with the 2nd MSF Kandak scanned spare parts orders and sent them to an advisor at the Central\nSupply Depot to provide to the ANA rather than rely on hand delivery by the ANA. The first Textron MSFV\ncontract, which includes the Textron logistics support, is scheduled to end in December 2014. The pending\ndrawdown of coalition troops in the same timeframe means that neither coalition forces nor Textron will have\nthe personnel or resources to continue to provide the level of logistics support services that the MSF has relied\nupon to date. Instead, the MSF will rely on the ANA logistics system for ordering and receiving spare parts.\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nTextron performed well under its contract to produce and deliver MSFVs for the ANA, and to provide the MSFV\xe2\x80\x99s\ncrewmembers\xe2\x80\x94driver, gunner, and vehicle commander\xe2\x80\x94the required initial training at the Armor Branch\nSchool in Kabul. Although Textron is also being paid to provide field training and maintenance, it has not been\nable do so through no fault of its own. DOD has not had personnel available to provide the security as called\nfor under the contract when Textron is conducting field training and maintenance. The absence of such training\nand maintenance will eventually impact the MSF units\xe2\x80\x99 ability to operate their vehicles at optimal levels.\nSimilarly, DOD has not had adequate oversight personnel available to verify that Textron is adhering to contract\nrequirements when conducting work at ANA brigades and kandaks.\nCompounding this situation are problems with the lack of crewmember cross-training and the lack of spare\nparts availability. First, since each crewmember is only trained in one of the three MSFV positions, the loss of\nany one crewmember could render the vehicle incapable of conducting missions. In addition, replacement\ncrewmembers are taken from field units with no MSFV training and, particularly for those units away from the\nArmor Branch School in Kabul, the individuals will likely not get needed training. Second, the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s spare parts\nlogistics system remains weak and, as a result, MSFV spare parts are not getting to the MSF brigades and\nkandaks. To their credit, coalition forces are providing some field training and securing spare parts when they\ncan, but their assistance will be ending soon. This instance of the U.S. purchasing equipment for the Afghan\nmilitary and police, which they struggle to sustain, is not new. In this case, the $661.3 million spent acquiring\nthe MSFVs for the Afghans would not be optimized unless the MSFV crewmembers receive full and continuous\ntraining and the MSF brigades and kandaks receive adequate levels of spare parts to keep their vehicles\nmission capable.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 11\n\x0cRECOMMENDATIONS\n\nTo ensure that Textron is adequately supported in its implementation of the MSFV contracts and that\nappropriate contract oversight is provided, SIGAR recommends that the Executive Director, ACC-WRN, and the\nCommander, IJC:\n 1. Review the requirements for contractor support at the MSF brigades and kandaks, taking into account\n the level of security support available, and modify the contract to reflect realistic capabilities for\n oversight, and determine which actions are needed to conduct proper oversight of maintenance and\n training; and\n 2. Assign oversight responsibilities to government personnel working with Textron at the brigades and\n kandaks and have them report to the COR.\nTo improve the long-term sustainability of MSF operations, we recommend that the Commanding General,\nNTM-A:\n 3. Work with the ANA to provide post-Armor Branch School operator training.\n\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\n\nArmy Materiel Command and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan provided written comments on a draft of this report.\nArmy Materiel Command\xe2\x80\x99s comments\xe2\x80\x94which include comments from ACC-WRN\xe2\x80\x94and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\ncomments\xe2\x80\x94which include comments from CSTC-A and NTM-A\xe2\x80\x94are incorporated in the report, as appropriate.\nThese comments, along with our responses, are also reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. In\naddition, PdM-ATV submitted informal technical comments which we incorporated in the report, as appropriate.\nAlthough NTM-A did not comment on the first recommendation to review requirements for contractor support\nat the MSF brigades and kandaks, ACC-WRN and CSTC-A concurred with it. In its comments, ACC-WRN stated\nthat it will adjust the contract as necessary by December 31, 2014. In its comments, CSTC-A noted changes to\nthe contract\xe2\x80\x99s language to ensure appropriate security and oversight and stated that the 4th MSF Kandak in\nKandahar is currently receiving its full support under the contract.\nACC-WRN and CSTC-A also concurred with the second recommendation to assign oversight responsibilities to\ngovernment personnel working with Textron at the brigades and kandaks and have them report to the COR. In\nits comments, ACC-WRN stated that it will assign additional CORs or government monitors to oversee Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\nwork at the brigades and kandaks by December 31, 2014. CSTC-A stated that it will recommend that PdM-ATV\nassign assistant CORs to the 2nd MSF Kandak in Qalat and 3rd MSF Kandak in Shorabak to support its COR or\nassociate in Kabul. However, NTM-A did not concur with the second recommendation, stating that it could not\njustify permanently assigning DOD personnel to the MSF brigade and kandak levels where, for example, at the\nkandak level there are as few as three to five contractor personnel. NTM-A further stated that because the\nnumber of MSF sites will be decreasing, the COR or associate in Kabul will have more time to visit the MSF\nbrigades and kandaks on a regular basis and provide sufficient oversight. However, we did not recommend\nassigning a permanent individual to solely provide oversight of Textron\xe2\x80\x99s contractors at the MSF brigades and\nkandaks. As we noted in the draft report, coalition advisors already interact with Textron contractors, and,\ntherefore, are in a position to provide oversight. In addition, while the COR or PdM-ATV\xe2\x80\x99s forward associate may\nnow have additional time to conduct oversight at the MSF brigades and kandaks, this does not mean they will\nbe able to access these locations on a regular basis and provide sufficient oversight. As we noted in our draft\nreport, the PdM-ATV associate in Kabul made multiple attempts to visit the 2nd MSF Brigade in Kandahar, but\nwas unable to do so due to flight cancellations.\nNTM-A concurred with the third recommendation to work with the ANA to provide post-Armor Branch School\noperator training, and commented that it is developing post-Armor Branch School operator training to provide\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 12\n\x0cnew recruits MSFV-specific training before they join an MSF unit. NTM-A added that the Armor Branch School\nwill form a Quality Assurance Cell responsible for developing common standards and assessing MSF units\nagainst those standards.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 13\n\x0cAPPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\nThis audit focuses on the procurement, training, operation, and maintenance of Mobile Strike Force Vehicles\n(MSFV) for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The objectives of this audit were to (1) determine the extent to\nwhich Textron has met its contractual obligations to produce, deliver, train and provide field support for the\nANA MSFVs; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. government oversight in the procurement, delivery, training\nand maintenance of MSFVs for the ANA; and (3) determine the extent to which the ANA has the capacity to\noperate and maintain its current and planned fleet of MSFVs. To accomplish these objectives, we obtained\ndata from and met with officials from the NATO Training Mission\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Combined Security\nTransition Command\xe2\x80\x93Afghanistan (CSTC-A), other Department of Defense (DOD) components, Textron, the\nANA\xe2\x80\x99s Mobile Strike Force (MSF), and Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). We also reviewed relevant MSFV\nreceiving and transfer documents, and analyzed the two contracts requiring Textron to provide vehicles, spare\nparts, maintenance, and training.\nTo determine the extent to which Textron met its contractual obligations to produce, deliver, and provide field\nsupport for the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s MSFVs, we reviewed two contracts awarded to Textron. We reviewed DD Form 250\nreceiving forms to verify delivery of vehicles from Textron to the U.S. government, and MOD Form 9 transfer\nforms to verify the transfer of vehicles from CSTC-A to the ANA. Additionally, we analyzed data from Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\nweekly vehicle de-processing reports from September 1, 2013 through January 12, 2014, to confirm the arrival\nof MSFVs in Afghanistan that had not yet been transferred to the ANA.\nWe also reviewed Textron\xe2\x80\x99s MSFV course materials for classes taught at the Armor Branch School. We\nconducted site visits to Textron\xe2\x80\x99s field level maintenance classroom and main de-processing facilities at Pol-e-\nCharki on October 14, 2013 and January 15, 2014. During our field visits, we toured the MSF brigades and\nkandaks and spoke with Textron contractor personnel, NTM-A and CSTC-A officials, and the Product Manager\nfor Allied Tactical Vehicles (PdM-ATV)\xe2\x80\x94a U.S. Army group of acquisition personnel responsible for the life cycle\nmanagement of tactical vehicle fleets. We also interviewed members of the advisory teams attached to the\nArmor Branch School, members of the advisory teams attached to the MSF brigades and kandaks, ANA\nstudents at the Armor Branch School, ANA MSFV instructors at the Armor Branch School, and ANA\ncommanders for the 1st MSF Brigade, 2nd MSF Brigade, 2nd MSF Kandak, and 3rd MSF Kandak.\nTo evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. government oversight of the MSF program, we reviewed contract\nperformance work statements, quality assurance surveillance plans, and weekly status reports by Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\nlead field service representative. We interviewed officials from PdM-ATV, NTM-A, CSTC-A, and Textron to obtain\na greater understanding of the processes in place to effectively provide program oversight. We also interviewed\nmembers of the advisory teams attached to the MSF brigades and kandaks to obtain their views on whether\nsufficient U.S. government oversight existed at the brigades and kandaks.\nTo determine the extent to which the ANA had the capacity to operate and maintain its current and planned\nfleet of MSFVs, we reviewed the NTM-A concept of operations for the MSF. We interviewed U.S. and coalition\nofficials from PdM-ATV, NTM-A, CSTC-A, and International Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC), about\nthe roles they played in developing and adapting the concept. To gain an understanding of the MSF operations\nin the field and the performance of the force, we interviewed Textron field service representatives, and\nmembers of the advisory teams attached to the MSF brigades and kandaks, and ANA commanders for the 1st\nMSF Brigade, 2nd MSF Brigade, 2nd MSF Kandak, and 3rd MSF Kandak.\nWe did not use or rely on computer-processed data for the purpose of the audit objectives, and, therefore, did\nnot assess its reliability. With respect to assessing internal controls, we analyzed agency internal control\nprocesses including processes to oversee contractor operations to accomplish our first objective of\ndetermining whether Textron and CSTC-A could account for all vehicles produced under the contract. We also\nreviewed the contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative appointment letter. We interviewed officials at PdM-ATV, NTM-\nA, CSTC-A, IJC, and Textron. We reviewed receiving and transfer documents as well as contractor-provided\nweekly status reports.\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 14\n\x0cWe conducted our work from July 2013 through May 2014 in Washington, D.C., and at coalition and ANA sites\nin Kabul, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces, Afghanistan, in accordance with generally accepted\ngovernment auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain\nsufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our\naudit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and\nconclusions based on our audit objectives. SIGAR conducted this audit under the authority of Public Law No.\n110-181, as amended; the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with generally\naccepted government auditing standards.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 15\n\x0cAPPENDIX II - COMMENTS FROM ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 16\n\x0cSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 17\n\x0cSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 18\n\x0cSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 19\n\x0cAPPENDIX III - COMMENTS FROM U.S. FORCES\xe2\x80\x93AFGHANISTAN\n\n.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 20\n\x0c HEADQUART\'ERS\n COMBINiEDSECURITYlRANS(TlONCON.MAND-AFGHANISTAN\n MINISTERIAL/!\xc2\xa3NISORY GROlA\'\n l<ABU1... llFGHAMSTAN\n M\'O 1\'E. 09356\n\n RS\'lY iO\n ATTamONOF\n CSTC-A 24JUN2014\n\n\n MEMORANDUM TI-IRU United States Forces - Af@hanistan (C.JlG). APO AE 09356\n United States Central Command (CCIG). :vtacDill AFB, FL 3362 l\n\n FOR: Special Inspector General fur Atgbanistan Reconstruction_ 2530 Crystal Drive. Arlington. VA\n 22W1-3940\n\n SUBJECT: CSTC-A Draft Response to SlGAR Draft Report: -Afgban Mobile Strike Force V chicles:\n Contractor Met Requirements. But l.ong-Tenn Operation and Maintenance Remain a Concern" (SIGAR\n 14-X Audil Report).\n\n REFERENCE: Draft Report. dated July 2014, Special lnspectorGeneral fuT Afghanistan Reconstruction\n (SfGAR l4-X Audit Report).\n\n\n I. The puqiose of this memorandum is to provide responses to recommendations made in the SlGAR 14-\n X Audit Report.\n\n 2. CSTC-A appreciates SIGAKs concerns with the long term operation and maintenance of the Mobile\n Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) contract. ContractDT support remains a priority of CSTC-A. while the\n oversight of mainrenanee and training at the brigade and kandak levels continue to be an invaluable as.set\n to the safety of the MSFV Field Service Representlltivcs (FSR). To ensure proper security is provided.\n CSTC-A has taken :>reps to dedicate increased oversight by guvemment employees, as well as the\n Contr.teting Officer Representative (COR) at the forward locations- Furthermore. the MSFV support will\n transition tQ two major looations in Kandahar and Kabul, providing the COR a better opportunity of\n oversight from a Coalition f\'orce secured looation.\n\n 3. SIGAR has requested responses to three recommendations made in the draft report. CSTC-A has\n provided responses to recommendations one and two-\n\n 4. Point of contact fur this action is CPT Todd R. Williams at._!_ _ _ _ ___.!or via e-mail ar\n\n\n\n\n /\xc2\xb7~~\n K/v(NR.W~L\n Major General. rlSLArmy\n Commanding General\n\n Enclosure:\n CSTC-A Draft Report Response\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 21\n\x0cSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 22\n\x0cSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 23\n\x0c SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Response to Comments from DOD\n\n1. We are not recommending assigning a permanent individual to solely provide oversight of Textron\xe2\x80\x99s\n contractors at the MSF brigades and kandaks. As we note in the report, coalition advisors already interact\n with Textron contractors and are in a position to provide oversight. In addition, while the contracting\n officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative or the Product Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles\xe2\x80\x99 forward associate may now\n have additional time to conduct oversight at the MSF brigades and kandaks, this does not mean that they\n will be able to access these locations on a regular basis and provide sufficient oversight. As we note in our\n report, the Product Manager for Allied Tactical Vehicles\xe2\x80\x99 associate in Kabul made multiple attempts to visit\n the 2nd MSF Brigade in Kandahar, but was unable to do so due to flight cancellations.\xc2\xa0\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 24\n\x0cAPPENDIX IV - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS\n\nDaniel Chen, Senior Program Manager\nParker S. Laite III, Senior Program Analyst\nZachary J. Rosenfeld, Program Analyst\nMia E. Bonarski, Methodologist\nLieutenant General John F. Goodman (U.S. Marine Corps, retired), Special Advisor to the Inspector General\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 25\n\x0c This audit report was conducted\n under project code SIGAR-085A.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR 14-85-AR/Mobile Strike Force Vehicles Page 26\n\x0c The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Mission Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the\n reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and\n objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of\n taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate\n and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and\n recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and\n other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and\n funding decisions to:\n \xef\x82\xb7 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction\n strategy and its component programs;\n \xef\x82\xb7 improve management and accountability over funds\n administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their\n contractors;\n \xef\x82\xb7 improve contracting and contract management\n processes;\n \xef\x82\xb7 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and\n \xef\x82\xb7 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.\n\n\n Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Web\n site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports,\n Reports and Testimonies testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.\n\n\n\n\n To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of\nTo Report Fraud, Waste, and fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\n Abuse in Afghanistan hotline:\n Reconstruction Programs \xef\x82\xb7 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud\n \xef\x82\xb7 Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil\n \xef\x82\xb7 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300\n \xef\x82\xb7 Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303\n \xef\x82\xb7 Phone International: +1-866-329-8893\n \xef\x82\xb7 Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378\n \xef\x82\xb7 U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065\n\n\n\n Public Affairs Officer\n Public Affairs \xef\x82\xb7 Phone: 703-545-5974\n \xef\x82\xb7 Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil\n \xef\x82\xb7 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs\n 2530 Crystal Drive\n Arlington, VA 22202\n\x0c'


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS
 Bruxelas, 05.04.1995
 COM(95) 116 fmal
 Proposta de
 REGULAMENTO (CE) DO CONSELHO
 que altera o Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94 do Conselho, de 20 de Dezembro de
 1994, que estabelece, para 1995, determinadas medidas de conservação e de gestão
 dos recursos haliêuticos da Área de Regulamentação definida na Convenção sobre a
 Futura Cooperação Multilateral nas Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico
 (apresentada pela Comissão)
 ---pagebreak--- EXPOSIÇÃO DOS MOTIVOS
 Na sua reunião extraordinária, de 31 de Janeiro a 1 de Fevereiro de 1995, a Organização
 das Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico (NAFO) adoptou uma proposta de repartição,
 entre as partes contratantes da NAFO, do TAC de alabote da Gronelândia nas subáreas
 NAFO 2 e 3 para 1995. A proposta atribui 12,59% do TAC total à Comunidade, ou seja
 3 400 toneladas.
 Em consequência, o Conselho adoptou, em 28 de Fevereiro de 1995, uma decisão em
 que a Comunidade formula uma objecção a esta repartição, nos termos do n° 1 do artigo
 XII da Convenção NAFO.
 A presente proposta altera o Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94 do Conselho, de 20 de
 Dezembro de 1994, que estabelece, para 1995, determinadas medidas de conservação e
 de. gestão dos recursos haliêuticos da área de regulamentação definida na Convenção
 sobre a Futura Cooperação Multilateral nas Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico, a fim
 de fixar as novas limitações de captura da Comunidade sob a forma de uma quota
 autónoma de 18 630 toneladas para 1995.
 A presente proposta não prejudica a aplicação do TAC de 27 000 toneladas já adoptado
 pelo Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94. Para o efeito, é mantido o sistema de declaração de
 capturas de 48 em 48 horas e são incluídas disposições destinadas a permitir a suspensão
 da pesca no caso de ser atingido o TAC de 27 000 toneladas, mesmo se as frotas
 comunitárias não tiverem capturado as 18 630 toneladas.
 O Conselho é convidado a adoptar a presente proposta.
 ---pagebreak--- Proposta de
 REGULAMENTO (CE) N° DO CONSELHO
 que altera o Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94 do Conselho, de 20 de Dezembro de
 1994, que estabelece, para 1995, determinadas medidas de conservação e de gestão
 dos recursos haliêuticos da Área de Regulamentação definida na Convenção sobre a
 Futura Cooperação Multilateral nas Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico
 O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia,
 Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CEE) n° 3760/92 do Conselho, de 20 de Dezembro de
 1992, que institui um regime comunitário da pesca e da aquicultura1, e, nomeadamente,
 o n° 4 do seu artigo 8 o ,
 Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão,
 Considerando que o Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94 do Conselho, de 20 de Dezembro de
 19942, estabelece uma limitação das capturas totais de alabote da Gronelândia nas
 subáreas NAFO 2 e 3 e um sistema de declaração das capturas de 48 em 48 horas;
 Considerando que a Comissão de Pescas da NAFO, numa reunião extraordinária de 30
 de Janeiro a 1 de Fevereiro de 1995, propôs uma repartição do TAC de alabote da
 Gronelândia para 1995;
 Considerando que o Conselho decidiu formular uma objecção a tal repartição, com base
 no n° 1 do artigo XII da Convenção NAFO;
 Considerando que, nos termos da objecção à repartição decidida pela NAFO, é
 necessário estabelecer uma quota comunitária autónoma que limite as capturas
 comunitárias de alabote da Gronelândia na Área de Regulamentação em 1995;
 Considerando que a importância desta quota autónoma deve observar os critérios
 expressos pela Comunidade na NAFO, isto é, ter em conta as capturas registadas
 recentemente;
 Considerando que a quota autónoma deve respeitar a medida de conservação estabelecida
 para este recurso, ou seja o TAC de 27 000 toneladas; que, para o efeito, é necessário
 prever a possibilidade de suspender a pesca uma vez atingido o TAC, mesmo antes do
 esgotamento da quota autónoma; que, para assegurar a observância do TAC, é necessário
 manter o sistema de declaração das capturas de 48 em 48 horas,
 JO n° L 389 de 31.12.1992, p. 1.
 JO n° L 363 de 31.12.1994, p. 48.
 ---pagebreak--- ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO
 Artigo 1°
 O Regulamento (CE) n° 3366/94 é alterado do seguinte modo:
 O Anexo I é substituído pelo anexo do presente regulamento.
 Artigo 2o
 Quaisquer capturas realizadas pelos Estados-membros em 1995, antes da adopção do
 presente regulamento, serão deduzidas da quota estabelecida no anexo.
 Artigo 3°
 O presente regulamento entra em vigor no dia seguinte ao da sua publicação no Jornal
 Oficial das Comunidades Europeias.
 O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente
 aplicável em todos os Estados-membros.
 Feito em Bruxelas,
 Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 .4-
 ---pagebreak--- ANEXO I
 Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quota 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie Divisão
 geográfica
 Bacalhau Atlântico do NAFO 2J3KL Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 Bacalhau Atlântico do NAFO 3NO Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quota 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie Divisão
 geográfica
 Bacalhau Atlântico do NAFO 3M Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha 513
 Grécia
 Espanha 1 574
 França 221
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal 2 155
 Reino Unido 1 022
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 5 485
 Cantarilho Adântico do NAF0 3M Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 4 030
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quota 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie Divisão
 geográfica
 Cantarilho Atlântico do NAFO 3LN Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha 476
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 476
 Solha Atlântico do NAFO 3M(1) Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 (>)
 Não haverá pesca directa desta espécie, que será capturada unicamente como captura acessória, sem
 prejuízo do disposto no n° 3 do artigo 4 o
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quota 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie geográfica Divisão
 Solha Atlântico do NAFO 3LNO(1) Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 LuxemburgQ
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 Azevia Atlântico do NAF0 3LNO(1) Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE - o
 (1)
 Não haverá pesca directa desta espécie, que será capturada unicamente como captura acessória, sem
 prejuízo do disposto no n° 3 do artigo 4 o
 2
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quote 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie Divisão
 geográfica
 Solhão Atlântico do NAFO 3NO (1) Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 Capelim Atlântico do NAFO 3NO Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 (1)
 Não haverá pesca directa desta espécie, que será capturada unicamente como captura acessória, sem
 prejuízo do disposto no n° 3 do artigo 4 o
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quota Í995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie geográfica Divisão
 Lula Atlântico do NAFO- Bélgica
 Noroeste subáreas 3 + 4 Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros ,
 Total CE p.m.
 Alabote da Atlântico do NAFO- Bélgica
 Gronelândia Noroeste subáreas 2 + 3 Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha *
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 18 630®
 (2) Esta quota está sujeita à observância do TAC de 27 000 toneladas estabelecido para esta unidade
 populacional. Uma vez esgotado o TAC, será suspensa a pesca dirigida a esta espécie,
 independentemente do nível das captaras.
 lo
 ---pagebreak--- Unidade populacional
 Estado- Quote 1995
 Região membro (toneladas)
 Espécie Divisão
 geográfica
 Camarão Atlântico do NAFO 3LNO(1) Bélgica
 Noroeste Dinamarca
 Alemanha
 Grécia
 Espanha
 França
 Irlanda
 Itália
 Luxemburgo
 Países Baixos
 Portugal
 Reino Unido
 Áustria
 Finlândia
 Suécia
 Disponível para
 os Estados-
 membros
 Total CE 0
 (1)
 Não haverá pesca directa desta espécie, que será capturada unicamente como captura acessória, sem
 prejuízo do disposto no n° 3 do artigo 4 o
 U
 ---pagebreak--- ISSN 0257-9553
 COM(95) 116 final
 DOCUMENTOS
 PT 03
 N.* de catálogo : CB-CO-95-125-PT-C
 ISBN 92-77-87199-7
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