type: wikipedia

text:
Voodoo 2 – akcelerator grafiki 3D do komputerów PC produkowany przez firmę 3Dfx Interactive. Kartę podłączano złączem PCI do płyty głównej oraz specjalnym przewodem do właściwej karty graficznej. Możliwe było szeregowe połączenie dwóch kart Voodoo 2 ze sobą co dodatkowo zwiększało wydajność. Karta ta przyśpieszała obliczenia związane z grafiką 3D. Także w tym modelu akceleratora do działania była też wymagana karta graficzna 2D lub 3D.
 Dane techniczne
 Pamięć 8 lub 12 MB EDO RAM,
 rozdzielczości: 640x480, 800x600 oraz 1024x768 (tylko w układzie SLI),
 Głębia koloru 16-bit.
 Karty graficzne


type: other

text:
0380020023, Affinity Medical Technologies - a Molex company 0380020023 yra sandėlyje. Pirkite 0380020023 su geriausia kaina Components-Mart.com
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type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21984A1005(01)
 Aftale i form af brevveksling mellem Det europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab på den ene side og den danske regering og landsstyret på Færøerne på den anden side om indførelse af en ordning for laksefiskeriet i det nordlige Atlanterhav
 EF-Tidende nr. L 264 af 05/10/1984 s. 0002
 ***** AFTALE i form af brevveksling mellem Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab paa den ene side og den danske regering og landsstyret paa Faeroeerne paa den anden side om indfoerelse af en ordning for laksefiskeriet i det nordlige Atlanterhav A. Brev fra Faeroeernes landsstyre Hr. . . . . . ., De faeroeske myndigheder har taget til efterretning, at Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab har udtrykt bekymring over det faeroeske laksefiskeri. Jeg skal hermed bekraefte, at de faeroeske myndigheder har givet tilsagn om for nedenfor anfoerte fangstsaeson at indfoere foelgende restriktioner for det faeroeske laksefiskeri, indtil der vedtages en reguleringsordning som led i konventionen om bevarelse af laksebestanden i Nordatlanten; 1. De faeroeske myndigheder vil begraense fangsterne af laks i faeroeske farvande (Faeroeernes fiskerijurisdiktion) til i alt 625 tons fersk, hel fisk i saesonen, der begynder den 1. oktober 1984 og slutter den 31. maj 1985. 2. Laksefiskeri vil ikke finde sted uden for den under punkt 1 naevnte fangstsaeson. Jeg ville vaere Dem taknemmelig, saafremt De vil bekraefte, at Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab er indforstaaet med det ovenfor anfoerte. Modtag, hr. . . . . . ., forsikringen om min mest udmaerkede hoejagtelse. For Faeroeernes landsstyre B. Brev fra Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab Hr. . . . . . ., Jeg har den aere at anerkende modtagelsen af Deres skrivelse af dags dato med foelgende ordlyd: »De faeroeske myndigheder har taget til efterretning, at Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab har udtrykt bekymring over det faeroeske laksefiskeri. Jeg skal hermed bekraefte, at de faeroeske myndigheder har givet tilsagn om for nedenfor anfoerte fangstsaeson at indfoere foelgende restriktioner for det faeroeske laksefiskeri, indtil der vedtages en reguleringsordning som led i konventionen om bevarelse af laksebestanden i Nordatlanten: 1. De faeroeske myndigheder vil begraense fangsterne af laks i faeroeske farvande (Faeroeernes fiskerijurisdiktion) til i alt 625 tons fersk, hel fisk i saesonen, der begynder den 1. oktober 1984 og slutter den 31. maj 1985. 2. Laksefiskeri vil ikke finde sted uden for den under punkt 1 naevnte fangstsaeson. Jeg ville vaere Dem taknemmelig, saafremt De vil bekraefte, af Det europaeiske oekonomiske Faellesskab er indforstaaet med det ovenfor anfoerte.«. Jeg har den aere at meddele Dem, at Faellesskabet har noteret sig indholdet af Deres skrivelse. Modtag, hr. . . . . ., forsikringen om min mest udmaerkede hoejagtelse. Paa vegne Raadet for De europaeiske Faellesskaber


text:
1312. aasta (MCCCXII) oli 14. sajandi 12. aasta.
 Sündmused maailmas
 Paavsti otsusega lõpetati Templiordu tegevus.
 Saksa kuningas Heinrich VII sai Saksa-Rooma keisriks ja vallutas Firenze.
 Mallorca kuningaks sai Sancho I.
 7. september – Kastiilia kuningaks sai Alfonso XI.
 Kuldhordis kuulutati islam riigiusuks.
 Sündmused Eestis
 Inkvisiitor Franciscus de Moliano käis Liivimaal ja kogus orduvastaseid kaebusi, mille tagajärjel pandi ordu kirikuvande alla.
 ...
 Sündinud
 13. november – Edward III, Inglismaa kuningas
 ...
 Surnud
 ...
 Viited
 1312


text:
„Vprašanje za predhodno odločanje – Policijsko in pravosodno sodelovanje v kazenskih zadevah – Okvirni sklep 2002/584/PNZ – Evropski nalog za prijetje – Odreditveni pravosodni organ – Evropski nalog za prijetje, ki ga je izdal švedski državni tožilec – Pogoj obstoja učinkovitega pravnega sredstva zoper odločitev o izdaji evropskega naloga za prijetje“
 1. Na Sodišču so znova vloženi predlogi za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, na podlagi katerih bo treba odločiti,(2) ali je mogoče državno tožilstvo (v obravnavanem primeru Švedske) opredeliti kot „odreditveni pravosodni organ“ evropskega naloga za prijetje (ENP) v smislu člena 6(1) Okvirnega sklepa 2002/584/PNZ.
 2. Dvomi, ki jih navaja predložitveno sodišče v obravnavani zadevi ter v zadevah C‐626/19 PPU in C‐627/19 PPU, se pridružujejo dvomom, ki jih je navedlo sodišče v Luksemburgu (zadeva C‐566/19 PPU), in se nanašajo, natančneje, na razlago, ki jo je treba podati v zvezi s sodbo Sodišča OG in PI (državni tožilstvi v Lübecku in Zwickauu)(3).
 3. Enaki dvomi so se pojavili v zvezi z belgijskim (zadeva C‐627/19 PPU) in francoskim (zadevi C‐566/19 PPU in C‐626/19 PPU) državnim tožilstvom, v zvezi s katerima sem predstavil svoje sklepne predloge z istim datumom.
 4. Konkretno, vprašanje, ki je predmet tega predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, sovpada z enim od vprašanj, ki so bila postavljena v zadevi C‐626/19 PPU, združeni z zadevo C‐566/19 PPU, in se nanaša na ENP, ki jih je izdalo državno tožilstvo zaradi kazenskega pregona.
 7. Glede na informacijo, ki jo je zagotovila švedska vlada, člen 2 Förordning (2003:1178) om överlämnade till Sverige enligt en europeisk arresteringsorder (uredba št. 1178 iz leta 2003 o predaji osebe na Švedskem na podlagi [ENP], v nadaljevanju: uredba ENP) določa, da ENP izda državni tožilec tako zaradi kazenskega pregona kot tudi zaradi izvršitve kazni ali varnostnega ukrepa, s katerima se odvzame prostost.
 8. V skladu s členom 3 uredbe ENP se lahko ENP izda zaradi kazenskega pregona, kadar je bil izdan začasni nalog za pridržanje zahtevane osebe, ker obstaja sum, da je storila kršitev, za katero se lahko naloži kazen odvzema prostosti za eno leto ali več.
 9. Kot je navedla švedska vlada, začasno pridržanje odobri sodišče na zahtevo državnega tožilca. Po tem, ko sodišče odredi začasno pridržanje, državni tožilec popolnoma neodvisno odloči, ali bo izdal ENP, pri čemer presodi zlasti njegovo sorazmernost.
 10. Švedsko državno tožilstvo je 27. maja 2019 izdalo ENP zaradi kazenskega pregona zoper osebo XD(7).
 11. ENP je bil po prijetju osebe XD na Nizozemskem 28. maja 2019 predložen rechtbank Amsterdam (prvostopenjsko sodišče v Amsterdamu, Nizozemska), ki se je odločilo postaviti to vprašanje za predhodno odločanje:
 „Ali je mogoče državnega tožilca, ki sodeluje pri izvajanju sodne oblasti v odreditveni državi, ki pri opravljanju svojih funkcij, neposredno povezanih z izdajo evropskega naloga za prijetje, deluje neodvisno in ki je izdal ENP, šteti za odreditveni pravosodni organ v smislu člena 6(1) Okvirnega sklepa [...], če je sodišče v odreditveni državi članici že pred dejansko odločitvijo državnega tožilca o izdaji ENP presodilo o pogojih za izdajo ENP in zlasti o sorazmernosti tega ukrepa?“
 12. Zadeva je bila pri Sodišču vložena 22. avgusta 2019. Ker je bila osebi XD odvzeta prostost, je predložitveno sodišče zaprosilo, da se zadeva obravnava po nujnem postopku, čemur je Sodišče ugodilo.
 13. Pisna stališča so predložili oseba XD, belgijska in švedska vlada, nizozemsko državno tožilstvo in Komisija.
 14. Javna obravnava je potekala 24. oktobra 2019 in na njej so se skupaj obravnavale zadeve C‐566/19 PPU, C‐626/19 PPU in C‐627/19 PPU. Udeležili so se je osebe JR, YC, XD, ZB, državni tožilec v Luksemburgu, državni tožilec Nizozemske, nizozemska, francoska, švedska, belgijska, irska, španska, italijanska in finska vlada ter Komisija.
 15. Vprašanje, postavljeno v tej zadevi, sovpada s prvim od vprašanj iz zadeve C‐626/19 PPU, v zvezi s katero sem navedel stališče v sklepnih predlogih, ki sem jih prav tako predstavil na isti datum.
 16. Zato je smiselno, da se v celoti sklicujem na navedene sklepne predloge. V njih nisem preučil le vprašanja sodnega nadzora nad ENP, ki jih izda državno tožilstvo (na katero se nanaša ta predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe), temveč tudi to, ali je mogoče člane te institucije opredeliti kot „odreditveni pravosodni organ“ v smislu Okvirnega sklepa.
 17. V tem postopku rechtbank Amsterdam (prvostopenjsko sodišče v Amsterdamu) domneva, da lahko švedsko državno tožilstvo izda ENP, ker ima značilnosti neodvisnosti, ki opredeljujejo „odreditveni pravosodni organ“ v smislu člena 6(1) Okvirnega sklepa.
 18. Ker v tej zadevi neodvisnost švedskega državnega tožilstva ni bila predmet razprave, ni bila predložena informacija, ki je nujno potrebna za presojo, ali imajo člani te institucije v skladu z njenim ustavnim statusom ter njeno organizacijsko in funkcionalno strukturo profil, ki ga je zahtevalo Sodišče v sodbi z dne 27. maja 2019, PF (generalno tožilstvo v Litvi)(8). Zato v zvezi s tem ne morem izraziti stališča.
 19. V skladu z informacijo, ki jo je zagotovilo predložitveno sodišče, je ENP v obravnavanem primeru izdalo državno tožilstvo po izdaji nacionalnega naloga za prijetje (NNP), ki ga je odobril pravosodni organ, ki je že preveril zahteve za izdajo ENP in, konkretno, njegovo sorazmernost.
 20. Ta položaj je torej podoben položaju v zadevi C‐626/19 PPU, katere preučitev me je privedla do ugotovitve, da sodni nadzor, izveden ob izdaji NNP, zaradi svoje narave ne more izpolniti „zahtev za učinkovito sodno varstvo“, navedenih v točki 75 sodbe OG in PI (državni tožilstvi v Lübecku in Zwickauu), to je varstvo, ki ga vedno zahteva zadevna oseba in se udejanja s postopkom, v katerem ta lahko posreduje in sodeluje ter s tem uresničuje svojo pravico do obrambe.(9)
 21. Zato se lahko izpolnjenost zahtev za izdajo ENP s strani državnega tožilca, ki ga je mogoče opredeliti kot „odreditveni pravosodni organ“ v smislu člena 6(1) Okvirnega sklepa, preuči pred izdajo ENP, vendar njegova izdaja ne izključuje pravice zahtevane osebe, da zoper ENP vloži pravno sredstvo (razen če se tako ogroža kazenski postopek) po njegovi izdaji ali po njegovi vročitvi.
 22. Glede na navedeno Sodišču predlagam, naj rechtbank Amsterdam (prvostopenjsko sodišče v Amsterdamu, Nizozemska) odgovori:
 7 Po navedbah tega tožilstva je bila oseba XD osumljena trgovine z drogami.
 8 Zadeva C‐509/18, EU:C:2019:457; v nadaljevanju: sodba PF (generalni državni tožilec v Litvi).
 9 Sklepni predlogi v zadevah C‐566/19 PPU in C‐626/19 PPU, točka 84.


text:
 15.3.2012
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 L 76/14
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS
 nr 130/2011,
 2. detsember 2011,
 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu II lisa („Tehnilised normid, standardid, katsetamine ja sertifitseerimine”)
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi „leping”, eriti selle artiklit 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1)
 Lepingu II lisa on muudetud EMP Ühiskomitee 21. oktoobri 2011. aasta otsusega nr 116/2011 (1).
 (2)
 Lepingusse tuleb inkorporeerida komisjoni 15. märtsi 2011. aasta määrus (EL) nr 253/2011, millega muudetakse XIII lisa Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruses (EÜ) nr 1907/2006, mis käsitleb kemikaalide registreerimist, hindamist, autoriseerimist ja piiramist (REACH) (2).
 (3)
 Lepingusse tuleb inkorporeerida komisjoni 21. mai 2010. aasta otsus 2010/296/EL biotsiidiregistri loomise kohta (3),
 ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Lepingu II lisa XV peatükki muudetakse järgmiselt:
 1)
 punkti 12zc (Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 1907/2006) lisatakse järgmine taane:
 „—
 32011 R 0253: komisjoni määrus (EL) nr 253/2011, 15. märts 2011 (ELT L 69, 16.3.2011, lk 7).”;
 2)
 punkti 12zy (komisjoni otsus 2010/675/EL) järele lisatakse järgmine punkt:
 „12zz.
 32010 D 0296: komisjoni otsus 2010/296/EL, 21. mai 2010, biotsiidiregistri loomise kohta (ELT L 126, 22.5.2010, lk 26).”
 Artikkel 2
 Määruse (EL) nr 253/2011 ja otsuse 2010/296/EL islandi- ja norrakeelsed tekstid, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentsed.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus jõustub 3. detsembril 2011, tingimusel et EMP Ühiskomiteele on edastatud kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõike 1 kohased teated (4).
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 Brüssel, 2. detsember 2011
 EMP Ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) ELT L 341, 22.12.2011, lk 80.
 (2) ELT L 69, 16.3.2011, lk 7.
 (3) ELT L 126, 22.5.2010, lk 26.
 (4) Põhiseadusest tulenevaid nõudeid ei ole nimetatud.


text:
 22.12.2011
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 L 341/85
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE
 Nru 120/2011
 tal-21 ta’ Ottubru 2011
 li temenda l-Anness XIII (Trasport) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE
 IL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, kif emendat permezz tal-Protokoll li jaġġusta l-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejjaħ “il-Ftehim”, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 98 tiegħu,
 Billi:
 (1)
 L-Anness XIII tal-Ftehim ġie emendat bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE Nru 104/2011 tat-30 ta’ Settembru 2011 (1).
 (2)
 Ir-Regolament ta’ Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 390/2011 tad-19 ta’ April 2011 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 474/2006 li jistabbilixxi l-lista Komunitarja ta’ kumpaniji tal-ajru [trasportaturi bl-ajru] li huma soġġetti għal projbizzjoni fuq l-operat fil-Komunità (2) għandu jiġi inkorporat fil-Ftehim.
 ADOTTA DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI:
 Artikolu 1
 L-inċiż li ġej jiżdied mal-punt 66zab (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 474/2006) tal-Anness XIII tal-Ftehim:
 “—
 32011 R 0390: Ir-Regolament ta’ Implimentazjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 390/2011 tad-19 ta’ April 2011 (ĠU L 104, 20.4.2011, p. 10).”
 Artikolu 2
 It-testi tar-Regolament ta’ Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 390/2011 bil-lingwa Islandiża u dik Norveġiża, li għandhom ikunu ppubblikati fis-Suppliment taż-ŻEE ta’ Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, għandhom ikunu awtentiċi.
 Artikolu 3
 Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tidħol fis-seħħ fl-1 ta’ Novembru 2011, sakemm in-notifiki kollha taħt l-Artikolu 103(1) tal-Ftehim ikunu saru lill-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE (*)
 Artikolu 4
 Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tiġi ppubblikata fis-Sezzjoni taż-ŻEE, u fis-Suppliment taż-ŻEE, ta’ Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.
 Magħmul fi Brussell, il-21 ta’ Ottubru 2011.
 Għall-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE
 Il-President
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) ĠU L 318, 1.12.2011, p. 42.
 (2) ĠU L 104, 20.4.2011, p. 10.
 (*) L-ebda rekwiżiti kostituzzjonali ma huma indikati.


text:
Fedora Linux (aiemmin Fedora Core) on Red Hatin tukeman Fedora-projektin kehittämä sekä ylläpitämä Linux-pohjainen käyttöjärjestelmä eli jakelupaketti. Fedora-hattuun viittava nimi tulee Red Hatin ”Shadowman”-logossa käytetystä päähineestä.
 Fedoran uusia versioita pyritään julkaisemaan puolen vuoden välein. Jokaista julkaisuversiota tuetaan kahden seuraavan version verran kuukauden siirtymäajalla. Näin ollen jokaista julkaisua tuetaan vähintään 13 kuukautta. Käyttäjät voivat päivittää Fedoran seuraavaan versioon asentamatta koko järjestelmää uudestaan.
 Historia
 Projekti aloitettiin seuraajana Red Hat Linux -jakelulle: Red Hat avasi kehitysprosessiaan ja yhdisti kehityksen Fedora Linux -projektin kanssa Fedora Project -nimelle.
 Fedora Core 1:n julkaisusta ilmoitettiin 6. marraskuuta 2003. Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) siirtyi käyttämään Fedoraa pohjana: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 perustui Fedora Core 3 -julkaisuun.
 Fedora on ylävirrassa Red Hat Enterprise Linux -jakelulle, jolloin Fedora voi innovoida nopeampaan tahtiin ja osa Fedoran paketeista valitaan kaupalliseen RHEL-jakeluun. Fedora korvasi aiemman Red Hat Linuxin perustana RHEL-jakelulle. Red Hat on järjestellyt uudestaan CentOS-jakelua, jolloin se on vastaavalla tavalla ylävirrassa RHEL-jakelulle.
 Yleiskatsaus
 Fedora-julkaisut jaetaan eri käyttötarkoituksien mukaan räätälöityihin ratkaisuihin, joiden tarkoituksena on tarjota integroidut ratkaisut eri käyttöalueille.
 Fedoran julkaisuversiosta 21 lähtien jakelu julkaistiin kolmena räätälöitynä ratkaisuna (Workstation, Server, Cloud) sen sijaan että olisi Lego-palikoiden tapaan vain joukko paketteja, joista asennuksessa valitaan halutut.
 Workstation on suunnattu perinteiseen työpöytäkäyttöön ja sen erityiskohderyhmä on ohjelmistokehittäjät. Server on perinteiseen suoraan laitteistolla ajettavaan palvelinkäyttöön tarkoitettu ratkaisu.
 Cloud on yleiskäyttöisien virtuaalikoneiden luomiseen ja on tarjolla valmiina levykuvina muun muassa Vagrant- ja OpenStack-ympäristöihin.
 Fedora Atomic-versio toi Project Atomicin muutoksia, kunnes sen korvasi Fedora CoreOS. Fedora CoreOS on minimaalinen ympäristö säiliöintiympäristössä suoritettavien kuormien käyttöön.
 Fedora 33:n myötä esineiden internetille suunnattu Fedora IoT on nostettu virallisten ratkaisujen joukkoon. Silverblue on muunnos Workstation-versiosta, joka on tarkoitettu muuttumattomaksi (): jokainen asennus on samanlainen eri koneilla ja se ei muutu käytön aikana. Silverblue keskittyy säiliöityihin sovelluksiin ja sovelluskehitykseen.
 Fedora Workstation -versiossa oletuksena työpöytäympäristönä on GNOME. Vaihtoehtona GNOMElle Fedora tarjoaa muitakin työpöytäympäristöjä valmiina Spins-projektin alla. Spins-projektin versiot tarjoavat KDE, Xfce, LXDE, MATE ja SoaS-työpöydät.
 Labs-projektin alla on tarjolla kokoelmia tiettyyn tarkoitukseen suunnattuja ohjelmistoja, jotka voidaan asentaa itsenäisinä Fedora-asennuksina tai lisäyksinä tavallisiin Fedoran asennuksiin.
 Fedora asennetaan Live-CD-levykuvalta, joka voidaan ajaa DVD:ltä tai USB-muistilta. Myös verkkoasennus on mahdollinen HTTP:n, FTP:n tai NFS:n kautta. Fedora käyttää RPM-paketointia ja käynnistyslataajana toimii GNU GRUB.
 Fedora siirtyi käyttämään systemd:tä alkaen Fedora 15:stä.
 Fedorassa on ollut Wayland käytössä alkaen Fedora 25:stä.
 Fedora-asennuslevyt sisältävät ainoastaan pienen määrän paketteja. Lisää ohjelmistoja on saatavilla eri pakettivarastoista. Viralliset ovat Fedora, joka sisältää koko järjestelmän ja Fedora Updates, jossa on uusimmat versiot. Lisäksi on tarjolla epävirallisia pakettivarastoja; ne tarjoavat ohjelmistoja, joita Fedora ei pysty tarjoamaan epäyhteensopivan lisenssin tai muista syistä erillään pidetyistä kuten mahdollisten patenttien vuoksi.
 RPMFusion on yksi kolmannen osapuolen pakettivarastoista.
 Vaihtoehtona käyttöjärjestelmäkohtaisille paketeille Fedorassa on mukana Flatpak-paketoinnin tarvitsema ohjelmisto.
 Toolbox on Fedora Silverbluessa oleva säiliöinnin hallintaohjelmisto, joka on vaihtoehto muille hallintaohjelmistoille kuten Podman, Docker ja Vagrant. Toolbox tarjoaa joukon yksinkertaisia komentoja säiliöiden luomiseen, käyttämiseen luettelomiseen ja poistamiseen.
 Arkkitehtuurit
 Tuettuihin arkkitehtuureihin kuuluvat ARM64, MIPS, Power, RISC-V, S/390x ja x86-64. Aiemmin tuettuja ovat olleet IA-64, PA-RISC, SPARC ja 32-bittinen x86 (Fedora 25 saakka).
 Versiohistoria
 Fedora Project antoi aiemmin koodinimet eri versioille. Käytännöstä luovuttiin version 20 jälkeen.
 Suosio ja merkitys
 Linux-ytimen pääkehittäjä Linus Torvalds käyttää Fedoraa kaikissa tietokoneissaan.
 DistroWatch-sivuston mukaan Fedora on marraskuussa 2015 viidenneksi katsotuin Linux-käyttöjärjestelmä sivustolla. DistroWatchin tietojen perusteella Fedora on ollut yhdeksänneksi suosituin vuosina 2020 ja 2021.
 Vuonna 2016 kerrottiin, että Fedoran kolmea peräkkäistä julkaisuversiota on ladattu 1,2 miljoonaa kertaa sen verkkosivujen kautta.
 Versio 34 on jakelun suosituin versio vuosikausiin projektin johtajan Matthew Millerin mukaan.
 Lähteet
 Aiheesta muualla
 Fedora-projektin sivusto
 FedoraForum.org – Tukifoorumi
 Fedora Spins – Vaihtoehtoisten työpöytien lataussivu
 Red Hat Linuxin johdannaiset


text:
Ona Leonaitė-Kairienė (1898 m. gruodžio 14 d. Samarkande, Uzbekija – 1958 m. birželio 11 d. Kaune) – Lietuvos advokatė, redaktorė. Stepono Kairio žmona.
 Biografija
 Gimė Samarkande, kur jos tėvai dėl politinių sąlygų buvo priversti gyventi. 1906 m. su tėvais grįžo į Lietuvą ir apsigyveno Kaune, mokėsi gimnazijoje. 1914 m. persikėlė į Vilnių, po metų su tėvais evakavosi į Maskvą. 1916 m. baigė Maskvos gimnaziją.
 1918 m. gegužės mėn. su tėvais grįžo į Lietuvą. 1918 m. Valstybės Tarybos raštinės darbuotoja. 1920 m. pradėjo studijuoti Ciuricho ir Berlyno universitetuose, 1927 m. baigė teisės studijas Lietuvos universitete.
 1923 m. spalio 17 d. susituokė su inžinieriumi Steponu Kairiu, kuris dažnai lankydavosi Vokietijos sostinėje, ir buvo ištikima jo bendražygė iki pat 1944 m.
 1923 m. atstovavo LSDP Antrojo Internacionalo kongrese Hamburge. Nuo 1929 m. advokatavo ir dirbo organizacijoje politiniams kaliniams ir emigrantams šelpti. 1930 m. dalyvavo SI kongrese Vienoje. Bendradarbiavo „Socialdemokrate“. 1934 m. redagavo „Darbo visuomenę“ (išėjo 14 numerių, Nr. 2 konfiskuotas). 1938 m. „Minties“ atsakingoji redaktorė, 1939–1940 m. redaktorė.
 Okupacijų metai
 1944 m. balandžio mėn. vokiečių Gestapui išaiškinus VLIK'o sudėtį, organizacijos pirmininkas S. Kairys turėjo paskubomis apleisti namus ir pasitraukti iš Kauno. Bandydami surasti jos vyrą, 1944 m. gegužės mėn. gestapininkai suėmė Oną Kairienę ir išlaikė ją savo rūsiuose dvi savaites.
 Nors ir turėjo galimybę pasitraukti į Vakarus artėjant frontui, tačiau O. Kairienė liko Lietuvoje, tikėdamasi, kad jos vyras greitai grįš į laisvą kraštą. Be to, sprendimą nulėmė pareigos jausmas invalidui broliui Vytautui. Pradžioje bolševikai O. Kairienės nelietė, net davė jai darbą Botanikos sode. Bet 1948 m. vasarą ji buvo suimta ir su broliu ištremta dešimčiai metų į Irkutsko srities Taljano ir Skoropadlės kaimą, kur jai leista mokyti vaikus vokiečių kalbos vidurinėje mokykloje.
 Po aštuonerių metų tremties, 1956 m. birželio mėn. gavo leidimą grįžti į Lietuvą. Abu su broliu grįžo invalidais, gavo darbo senoje vietoje, nors ir už nedidelį atlyginimą. Nepritekliai priveikė – 1957 m. pradžioje ją ištiko pirmasis kraujo išsiliejimas į smegenis. Draugų ir medikų pagalba ji vėl pakilo, tačiau prasidėjo kitos ligos, o 1958 m. birželio 10 d. ją ištiko naujas priepuolis, po kurio ji sekančią dieną mirė. Giminių ir artimųjų palydėta, birželio 13 d. palaidota Petrašiūnų kapinėse, kur, grįžusi iš Sibiro, ji buvo dar suskubusi perkelti savo tėvų palaikus.
 „Mirtis man poilsis saldus didybėj savo galingoj“ – rašė ji saviesiems į JAV, atsigavusi po pirmojo priepuolio.
 Šaltiniai
 Lietuvos politikai
 Lietuvos advokatai
 Lietuvos redaktoriai


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
In re Cody H., No. 27, September Term, 2016. Opinion by Greene, J.
 JUVENILE JUSTICE—RESTITUTION
 Under § 11-603(a)(2)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Article, a court may order restitution in a
 criminal or juvenile case if, “as a result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered . . .
 loss of earnings.” A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under § 11-603(a) if the
 victim or the State requests restitution and the court is presented with competent evidence of a
 loss of earnings. See CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b). The juvenile court awarded restitution for loss
 of earnings for the period between September 2014, when the victim’s injury occurred, and
 April 29, 2015 the date of the restitution hearing before the Magistrate. The restitution ordered
 did not include any amount for the victim’s future loss of earnings, i.e., the period after the date
 of the restitution hearing. Notably, the General Assembly did not create an express limitation
 on restitution for future loss of earnings in § 11-603(a)(2)(iii), and an award for future loss of
 earnings could have been proper in this case as long as it was not speculative and did not cover
 losses not reasonably certain to occur. We shall hold that the award of restitution in this case
 was within the confines of the restitution statute and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special
 Appeals.
 Where a loss of earnings claim was proven by testimony, regarding the employment and the
 inability to work, and a letter from the employer regarding the duration and wage figures, there
 was competent evidence to support an order of restitution for loss of earnings. Here, although
 the letter from the employer stated “approximate” hours and wages, the evidence was
 nonetheless sufficient to support a claim for loss of earnings. The standard for restitution is not
 one of absolute certainty or precision. Rather, there must be competent evidence showing
 entitlement to and the amount of lost earnings or expenses reasonably certain to be incurred by
 the victim as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act. Further, such a claim must not be
 speculative.
 Circuit Court for Baltimore County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 Case No. J14-001852
 Argued: November 4, 2016 OF MARYLAND
 No. 27
 September Term, 2016
 ______________________________________
 IN RE CODY H.
 ______________________________________
 Barbera, C.J.
 Greene,
 Adkins,
 McDonald,
 Watts,
 Hotten,
 Getty,
 JJ.
 ______________________________________
 Opinion by Greene, J.
 ______________________________________
 Filed: March 24, 2017
 This case concerns a restitution award entered following a juvenile delinquency
 proceeding involving Petitioner, Cody H. (“Cody”). On February 19, 2015, a family
 magistrate of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the magistrate”) found that Cody
 had committed the delinquent act of assault by punching a sixteen year-old victim, Zachary
 F. (“Zachary”), in the face and breaking his jaw. At the disposition hearing held on April
 29, 2015, the magistrate made a recommendation for a restitution award of $1,489.61 to
 the victim for medical expenses related to the assault. The magistrate did not award
 restitution for loss of earnings because the magistrate found that claim to be speculative.
 The State filed exceptions to the recommendation. An exceptions hearing was held before
 a juvenile court judge on June 15, 2015. The judge sustained the State’s exception on the
 issue of restitution and imposed an additional restitution amount of $5,000 for Zachary’s
 lost earnings.
 Cody argues that the restitution statute, Md. Code (1974, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 11-
 603 of the Criminal Procedure Article, does not permit the court to order restitution for lost
 wages to be earned in the future and that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that
 the restitution ordered in this case was supported by competent evidence. For the reasons
 that follow, we shall hold that the restitution award in this case was proper under § 11-603.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 On August 31, 2014, a group of high school students, including Cody and Zachary,
 attended a party where alcohol was consumed. Zachary drank a large amount of alcohol
 and fell asleep in a chair at the party. Zachary later awoke to Cody spraying him with some
 sort of liquid from a bottle, which Zachary later testified he believed contained a cleaning
 solution. Zachary and Cody engaged in an altercation when Zachary attempted to take the
 spray bottle away from Cody. During the altercation, Cody punched Zachary in the jaw.
 The day after the party, Zachary sought medical care for his jaw, which was fractured in
 two places. To treat the fractures, Zachary had a metal plate surgically implanted to allow
 his jaw to properly heal. Zachary’s jaw was wired shut for five-to-six weeks and Zachary
 then underwent a second surgery to remove wires from his jaw. Zachary missed
 approximately three weeks of school at the beginning of the 2014 – 2015 school year due
 to his injury. Zachary and his mother reported the incident to the Baltimore County Police
 on October 7, 2014.
 The Respondent, the State of Maryland (“the State”) instituted juvenile delinquency
 proceedings against Cody. On behalf of Zachary, the State sought a restitution award of
 $1,492.61 for Zachary’s medical expenses and $6,400.00 for Zachary’s loss of earnings.
 At the adjudicatory hearing held on February 19, 2015, Cody admitted to punching Zachary
 but alleged provocation. The juvenile court found that Cody unlawfully assaulted Zachary.
 A disposition and restitution hearing was held on April 29, 2015. At the disposition
 hearing, the magistrate presiding received testimony regarding Zachary’s medical
 treatment and expenses and his lost earnings. Zachary testified that he was scheduled to
 work at Roseda Farm as part of a work-study program during the 2014 –2015 school year.
 The program was to begin on the first day of school and to continue for approximately
 forty weeks. Zachary would have earned $6,400 as part of this program. Zachary testified
 that he was not able to participate in the program because the vibrations from farm
 2
 machinery he would be required to operate would cause damage to his healing jaw.
 Zachary’s father also testified as to the program in which Zachary would have participated.
 At the restitution hearing, the State introduced a letter from the office manager at
 Roseda Farm, Marcia Bryant, in support of Zachary’s claim for loss of earnings. The letter
 read as follows:
 To Whom this May Concern:
 Zachery [sic] [F.] was an employee of Roseda Farm starting in August 2014.
 Zachery was going to be on the work study program at Hereford High School
 and would have continue[d] working at Roseda Farm for the 2014/2015
 school year. Zachery would have worked approximately 20 hours a week for
 approximately 40 weeks. Zachery would have made $6,400 if he would have
 continued at Roseda Farm.
 Sincerely,
 Marcia Bryant
 Office Manager
 The magistrate recommended a restitution award of $1,489.61 for medical expenses
 and did not recommend any restitution for Zachary’s lost earnings. Despite being
 persuaded that Zachary had planned to work at Roseda Farm, and noting that Zachary’s
 testimony regarding the employment was alone sufficient to reach this conclusion, the
 magistrate declined to recommend a restitution award for loss of earnings. The magistrate
 found that the claim for $6,400 in lost earnings was speculative because nothing in the
 record established the duration Zachary would have otherwise continued to work at Roseda
 Farm or that Zachary was unable to find alternative employment. Further, the magistrate
 noted that the loss “certainly had not yet occurred.”
 3
 The State filed exceptions to the magistrate’s restitution order. An exceptions
 hearing took place on June 15, 2015 before a judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore
 County, sitting as a juvenile court. The judge concluded that the State had established that
 Zachary was unable to participate in the work-study program due to injuries sustained in
 the assault by Cody. In response to Cody’s argument that the loss of earnings was
 speculative, the judge commented that Zachary’s claim was not any more speculative than
 any other lost wages claim, adding, “wouldn’t that be the argument on any claim for lost
 wages, that the person could have been fired, they could have quit, they could have left for
 another employment?” In making his determination, the judge relied on Zachary’s
 testimony as evidence of Zachary’s inability to work, commenting: “You’ve got his
 testimony that the job required him to work, to operate machinery that the machinery
 involved vibrations and the vibrations from the machinery would adversely impact the
 healing of his jaw. That’s, that was his testimony as to why he was unable to work.”
 The judge issued the following ruling:
 I do think that the [magistrate] and find that the [magistrate] was clearly
 erroneous in finding that an Order of lost earnings in the case was
 speculative. The victim in the case had been employed by this employer at
 the rate of $8.00 an hour. That [the Roseda Farm letter] clearly demonstrates
 that the employer was offering continued employment to the victim, Zachary
 [F.], for the entire school year that he was enrolled at Hereford High,
 beginning in September, or they have August of 2014 for a period of forty
 weeks. There’s nothing in the testimony in the transcript that as of the date
 of the hearing in front of Magistrate McAllister, which was April the 29th of
 2015, that at any point in time he was able to go back to work. I’ll reduce
 the claim based on the fact that at least through April the 29th he was unable
 to work, so I’m going to give him the four months of April, through April,
 from the beginning of September through the end of the year. So that’s eight
 months times 4.3 weeks. I’m going to find that’s thirty-two weeks, at
 minimum, at $8.00 an hour, times twenty hours a week, so I have $640 times
 4
 eight hours, $8.00 rather is his lost wage claim, which I total at being $5,120.
 I’ll give the Defendant the further benefit and round the number down to
 $5,000 and enter an Order in the case. Restitution for lost wages against the
 Respondent and the parent in the amount of $5,000 and reduce that to an
 Order.
 Thus, the juvenile court awarded restitution for loss of earnings for the 32-week period
 between Zachary’s injury in September 2014 and the restitution hearing before the
 magistrate on April 29, 2015. The restitution award did not include any amount for
 Zachary’s future loss of earnings, i.e., the remaining eight-week period in the work study
 program which occurred after the restitution hearing.
 Cody noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the juvenile
 court abused its discretion by ordering restitution in the amount of $5,000 for Zachary’s
 loss of earnings because the magistrate erred by admitting the Roseda Farm letter and
 because Zachary’s lost earnings were not a “direct result” of Cody’s delinquent act. The
 Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, concluded that the information in the
 Roseda Farm letter was corroborated by the testimony of Zachary and of his father, which
 supported the reliability of the letter. The court thus held that the letter was sufficiently
 reliable to satisfy the relaxed evidentiary standard applicable to juvenile proceedings. The
 intermediate appellate court also found it significant that the magistrate expressed that the
 letter was irrelevant to his determination of the facts.1 The Court of Special Appeals also
 held that the evidence adduced at trial constituted a competent basis for the court to
 reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Zachary’s loss of earnings
 1
 The magistrate explained that he was persuaded of Zachary’s planned participation in the
 work-study program by Zachary’s testimony alone.
 5
 was a direct result of the delinquent act. The court noted the possibility that additional
 evidence could have been introduced at the hearing to provide additional support for the
 juvenile court’s conclusion, but explained that it is not within the purview of the appellate
 courts to consider additional ways in which the State could have bolstered the restitution
 claim. Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s order.
 Cody petitioned this Court for review and we granted certiorari to answer the
 following questions:
 1. Does Maryland’s restitution statute allowing for recovery of lost earnings
 “as a direct result of the crime” permit the court to order restitution for
 lost earnings to be earned in the future and for lost earnings for a
 randomly selected period of time?
 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding that competent evidence
 was introduced to support the claim for eight months of lost wages?
 In re Cody, 448 Md. 724, 141 A.3d 135 (2016). For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm
 the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and uphold the restitution award issued by
 the juvenile court.
 DISCUSSION
 Standard of Review
 We ordinarily apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s
 order of restitution. Silver v. State, 420 Md. 415, 427, 23 A.3d 867, 874 (2011). See also
 Wiredu v. State, 222 Md. App. 212, 228, 112 A.3d 1014, 1023 (2015) (“The decision to
 order restitution pursuant to [§11-603] and the amount lie within the trial court’s sound
 discretion and we review the trial court’s decision on the abuse of discretion standard.”).
 However, because the first question presented by Cody involves statutory interpretation,
 6
 we review the first issue de novo.2 Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 337, 875 A.2d 132, 138
 (2005) (explaining that questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are
 reviewed de novo).
 Legal Contentions
 Cody contends that § 11-603 does not permit courts to order restitution for a future
 loss of earnings. To support this contention, Cody argues that the operative verbs within
 the statutory scheme are written in the past tense and that this indicates that the General
 Assembly intended to authorize a restitution order for financial loss that has already been
 incurred. Cody argues that compensation for the loss of future earnings is a civil remedy
 and involves complex calculations that are too difficult to assess in a proceeding ancillary
 to a criminal sentencing. It is Cody’s position that the judge abused his discretion in
 ordering the restitution because it was speculative and it was based upon an approximation
 of how many hours, and for what pay, Zachary might work. Finally, Cody asserts that the
 evidence introduced to support the restitution claim was not competent evidence. Cody
 claims that the record is devoid of any evidentiary basis for determining that Zachary’s
 inability to earn money was connected to his injury sustained during the assault.
 The position of the State is that the order of restitution for lost earnings was a proper
 exercise of the juvenile judge’s discretion. The State argues that even if the statute does
 2
 The juvenile court had competent evidence before it of both past (from the injury to the
 hearing) and future (beyond the hearing) loss of earnings. As discussed below, the court
 only awarded restitution for past loss of earnings, but we are called to interpret the statute
 and determine whether it encompasses restitution claims for future loss of earnings.
 7
 not allow for future lost wages, the outcome in this case is unaffected because the judge
 ordered restitution for lost wages during a time period that had already occurred. Further,
 the State contends that this Court need not, and should not, consider whether restitution for
 future earnings lost beyond the restitution hearing fall under the statute. The State urges,
 however, if we consider the issue, we should hold that the restitution statute covers future
 loss of earnings. The State also maintains that Cody’s argument that the judge’s calculation
 resulted in a speculative amount is without merit because competent evidence established
 the amount of weeks for which Zachary would work, the amount of hours per week, and
 the amount of compensation he would receive. The State adds that the judge reduced the
 amount of restitution for loss of earnings to reflect the time period which had expired at
 the time of the initial restitution hearing and further reduced the amount for Cody’s benefit
 to account for the approximation. The State posits that Cody’s attempt to “manufacture
 uncertainty” should fail because entitlement to “restitution should not be premised on the
 ability to identify an amount with microscopic precision.” The State explains that there is
 a presumption that a victim is entitled to restitution where competent evidence is introduced
 and that Zachary’s testimony that he was prevented from working in the program because
 of his injury was competent evidence to justify an order of restitution.
 Amicus Curiae, Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center, Inc., submitted a brief
 in this case contending that § 11-603 allows judgments of restitution for future loss of
 earnings. Amicus Curiae argues that the plain language of the statute does not limit
 restitution to past loss of earnings, and that our case law and the legislative history of the
 statute confirm that it permits restitution for a future loss of earnings.
 8
 Restitution for Loss of Earnings
 “In Maryland, restitution may be ordered, with qualifications, as a direct sentence
 for a crime or delinquent act, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by the underlying
 sentencing or remedial statute.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 55, 862 A.2d 419, 423 (2004).
 Under § 11-603(a)(2)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure Article, a Court may order restitution
 in a criminal or juvenile case if, “as a result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim
 suffered . . . loss of earnings.” A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under §
 11-603(a) if the victim or the State requests restitution and the court is presented with
 competent evidence of a loss of earnings. See CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b). See also In re
 Tyrell A., 442 Md. 354, 364, 112 A.3d 468, 474 (2015) (explaining the statutory
 presumption of restitution). “Restitution under this section ‘is a criminal sanction, not a
 civil remedy.’ It serves the familiar penological goals of retribution and deterrence, and
 especially rehabilitation.” McDaniel v. State, 205 Md. App. 551, 558, 45 A.3d 916, 920
 (2012) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 512, 103
 A.3d 618, 623 (2014). “It is long established that in Maryland, ‘juvenile courts have broad
 discretion to order restitution, either against the juvenile himself, a parent, or both.’” In re
 Earl F., 208 Md. App. 269, 276, 56 A.3d 553, 557 (2012) (quoting In re Delric H., 150
 Md. App. 234, 249, 819 A.2d 1117, 1126 (2003)).
 Restitution under [§ 11-603] serves several objectives, including: (1)
 rehabilitation of the defendant; (2) compensation of the victim; and (3)
 penalizing the transgressor. One purpose is to compensate victims who have
 been injured or who have suffered property loss as a result of the wrongful
 acts of a minor[.] Restitution can impress upon the [juvenile] the gravity of
 the harm he has inflicted upon another[,] and provide an opportunity for him
 9
 to make amends. As such, compensation of the victim is an important factor
 to consider in the overall goal of rehabilitating the juvenile respondent.
 In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. at 250–51, 819 A.2d at 1126–27 (internal citations omitted).
 We first consider whether the restitution statute permitted the juvenile court to order
 restitution for loss of earnings on the facts of this case. We are thus required to interpret §
 11-603 “to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible
 from the language of the statute . . . itself.” Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571, 880
 A.2d 343, 349 (2005). The provision at issue allows a court to order restitution where “as
 a result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered . . . loss of earnings.” CRIM.
 PROC. § 11-603(a)(2)(iii). The General Assembly did not define the term “loss of earnings”
 in the restitution statute. Nor does an examination of the legislative history of § 11-603
 reveal a definition for this term. Therefore, we read “the plain language of the statute and
 [the] ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates the interpretation of
 its terminology.” Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613, 937 A.2d 242, 257 (2007)
 (quoting Kushell v. Dept. of Nat. Res., 385 Md. 563, 576–78, 870 A.2d 186, 193–94
 (2005)). In determining the ordinary meaning of words, we have found it helpful to consult
 their dictionary definitions. Bd. of Ed. of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Marks-Sloan, 428 Md.
 1, 28, 50 A.3d 1137, 1153 (2012). See also Ali v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 416 Md. 249,
 260–62, 6 A.3d 890, 896–98 (2010) (“When the Court can ascertain the Legislature’s intent
 from the plain meaning of the verbiage, the Court need not delve deeper . . . . In seeking
 to apply the plain-meaning rule, it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a
 term’s ordinary and popular meaning.”).
 10
 “Loss” is defined in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1137
 (2d ed. 1987) as “detriment, disadvantage, or deprivation from failure to keep, have, or
 get[.]” “Earnings” is defined as “money earned; wage; profits.” The Randomhouse
 Dictionary of the English Language 613 (2d ed. 1987). When interpreting legislative
 intent, “we apply the language [of the statute] as written and in a commonsense manner.”
 Downes, 388 Md. at 571, 880 A.2d at 343. Here, Zachary had scheduled employment
 through which he would have been paid wages or “earnings.” Zachary suffered a loss of
 earnings to the extent that his injuries deprived him of the opportunity to work and earn the
 wages, and to the extent that he failed to “get” the wages to which he was entitled.
 Therefore, under the plain language of § 11-603, Zachary suffered a “loss of earnings.”
 A basic principle of statutory construction is that we read a statute in a manner that
 neither broadens nor narrows the meaning of the plain language. Condon v. State of
 Maryland-Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993) (“[A] court may not
 add or delete words to make a statute reflect an intent not evidenced in that language[.]”).
 The plain language of the statute does not include a limitation on future loss of earnings,
 nor does it differentiate between past and future losses of earnings. If the General
 Assembly had intended to create such a limitation or distinction, it would have
 affirmatively done so. See id. Thus, we conclude that there is no express statutory
 limitation on restitution for future loss of earnings.
 There are, however, express statutory requirements that the loss or expense must be
 a direct result of the crime or delinquent act and that the claim for restitution must be shown
 11
 by competent evidence.3 CRIM. PROC. § 11-603. Moreover, our decisional law also places
 limitations on a judge’s discretion to order restitution. In order for restitution to be proper,
 the claim for restitution cannot be speculative. McDaniel, 205 Md. App. at 563, 45 A.3d
 at 922 (“Our interpretation [that the term ‘losses’ covers expenses not yet incurred by the
 time of the hearing] does not mean that mere speculative claims will satisfy the statutory
 requirements for recovery.”). Furthermore, the restitution cannot cover things that are not
 certain to occur in the future. Id. (“A victim must still present competent evidence that
 the expenses are reasonably certain to be incurred.”) (emphasis added).
 In order to confirm that we are correct in our conclusion that an exclusion on future
 damages is not one of the statutory or decisional law limitations on restitution, we examine
 briefly the legislative history of § 11-603 as well as our case law. See Bourgeois v. Live
 Nation Entm’t, Inc., 430 Md. 14, 27, 59 A.3d 509, 516 (2013) (“Legislative history may be
 considered in an effort both to confirm what appears to be a clear intent from the language
 itself and to discern legislative intent when that intent is not entirely clear from the statutory
 language.”); Ali, 416 Md. at 261, 6 A.3d at 897 (“Notwithstanding the outcome of a plain-
 meaning analysis, however, [i]n the interest of completeness . . . we may look at the
 purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that
 which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.”) (quotation omitted).
 3
 That the legislature included express limitations on restitution for loss of earnings but did
 not expressly create a limitation on loss of future earnings is evidence that the legislature
 intended for the statute to cover both past and future losses.
 12
 Prior to 1997, the predecessor to § 11-603, then codified as Article 27, § 807, did
 not mention juveniles. Md. Code Ann. (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol.) § 807 of Article 27. Rather,
 a separate statute addressed juvenile restitution, which up until 1996, was codified at § 808.
 At that time, there was no provision in § 808 (the juvenile restitution statute) regarding loss
 of income. In re Zephrin D., 69 Md. App. 755, 761, 519 A.2d 806 (1987), superseded by
 statute as stated in In re Jason W., 94 Md. App. 731, 619 A.2d 163 (1993). However, in
 1997, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 173, which repealed § 808 and rewrote §
 807 to apply to both criminal defendants and juveniles. Md. Laws 1997, Chs. 311 and 312,
 § 1. See also In re John M., 129 Md. App. 165, 173 n.2 , 741 A.2d 503, 507 n.2 (1999)
 (“Section 1, chs. 311 and 312, Acts 1997, effective October 1, 1997, repealed the former §
 808 of Article 27 and rewrote Article 27, § 807. Substantive portions of the superseded §
 808, including those at issue in this case, were included in the new § 807.”). Senate Bill
 173 was referred to as “The Victims’ Rights Act of 1997.” 1997 Md. Laws, Ch. 311, § 1,
 p. 2212. The General Assembly passed the Act “[for] the purpose of . . . expanding
 certain victims’ rights laws to include juvenile proceedings[.]” Id. Thus, the purpose of
 the 1997 Act was to make victims’ rights laws, including our restitution statute, more
 expansive. This is consistent with our conclusion that the legislature did not intend to
 create a limitation on restitution for loss of future earnings.
 Moreover, a review of our case law confirms our conclusion. In McDaniel, the
 Court of Special Appeals focused on the addition of the words “or losses” to subsection
 (a)(2)(i) of § 11-603 and found that the term loss includes both past and future damages.
 Specifically, the court held that the restitution statute allowed for restitution for dental work
 13
 that the victim needed but had not yet been performed at the time of the restitution hearing.
 205 Md. App. at 563, 45 A.3d at 922:
 [T]he goal of the General Assembly in adding [the words] “or losses” was to
 expand the circumstances in which a victim could claim restitution from a
 defendant. We think “dental losses,” however imprecise a phrase, was meant
 to cover a situation in which an individual has suffered a harm—a dental
 injury—and has not yet expended money to correct it.
 Id. In view of McDaniel, we see no reason why the legislature would have intended to
 allow for past and future damages by employing the word “losses” in subsection (a)(2)(i)
 but not by the word using “loss” in subsection (a)(2)(iii). Applying McDaniel in the context
 of a loss of earnings, we conclude that a victim is entitled to an award for loss of future
 earnings as long as the award meets both the statutory and decisional law limitations, i.e.,
 the claim is not speculative, the claim covers losses reasonably certain to occur, the loss
 was a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, and the claim is shown by competent
 evidence.4
 Turning to the case at bar, we address Cody’s argument that the restitution awarded
 in this case was improper. It is not clear why Cody considers this case to be one of “future
 earnings” because the loss of earnings restitution awarded in this case was for wages lost
 by Zachary as of the date of the restitution hearing. Cody cites cases outside-of-Maryland
 wherein restitution for lost earnings was ordered for “wages lost by the victim as of the
 4
 We emphasize that an award of restitution for future loss of earnings is proper only to the
 extent that it meets these requirements. The restitution statute is not so broad as to
 encompass uncertain or speculative damages, or tort damages, such as restitution for pain
 and suffering. See, e.g. State v. Addison, 191 Md. App. 159, 990 A.2d 614 (2010) (noting
 that courts may award a victim lost wages “already accrued” or “reasonably anticipated”).
 14
 date restitution was ordered and not for any future earnings.” For example, Cody attempts
 to support his position by relying on the Washington state case of State v. Lewis, 791 P.2d
 250 (Wash. 1990). In that case, the appellate court reversed an order of restitution for
 future lost wages of a deceased victim because the calculation of such wages would be
 speculative and because it concluded that the Washington legislature intended the statute
 to be read in the past tense, allowing restitution for losses that have already been incurred.
 Lewis, 791 P.2d at 253. That case is not at all factually similar to the case at bar. Here,
 Zachary had definite employment for a scheduled duration with an approximation of the
 wages he would earn and hours he would work. Moreover, Zachary had incurred the loss
 of these earnings at the time of the restitution hearing.
 Perhaps illustrative of Cody’s definition of future lost earnings is his reliance upon
 the definition used by the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Bryant, 122 P.3d 1026
 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005):
 Although the phrase “lost wages” is not defined in the restitution statute, or
 anywhere else in the criminal code, the comparable phrase “loss of earnings”
 is generally defined in the civil context as earnings that were not received
 from the date of injury to the date damages for that injury are determined. In
 contrast, the phrase “loss of future earnings” is generally defined as earnings
 that, because of the opposing party’s conduct, are not expected to be received
 from the date damages are determined forward.
 Bryant, 122 P.3d at 1028 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Assuming that the
 above definition of loss of future earnings is proper, the restitution ordered in this case does
 not fit within that definition. The restitution in the case at bar is not commensurate with
 the definition of “loss of future earnings.” Here, the restitution was ordered for eight
 months from the date of injury for wages that Zachary did not earn accounting from the
 15
 date of his injury to the date of restitution hearing. No award was made for future earnings
 lost beyond the date of the restitution hearing. Instead, the juvenile court awarded
 restitution for wages that Zachary had already lost by the time of the restitution hearing. 5
 Therefore, although an award for a future loss of earnings is permissible under our
 restitution statute, no such restitution was awarded in this case.6
 Although we conclude that, contrary to Cody’s contentions, the restitution award in
 this case is not one for “future loss of earnings,” we must still decide whether the award is
 proper considering the aforementioned statutory and decisional law limitations on
 restitution awards. As discussed in further detail below, competent evidence was
 introduced in this case to demonstrate that there was a loss of earnings and that the loss of
 earnings was a direct result of the assault by Cody. Thus, the award satisfies the statutory
 requirements that the loss be a direct result of the crime or delinquent act and that the claim
 5
 It is worth noting that at the exceptions hearing held on June 15, 2015, the presiding judge
 did not award restitution for loss of earnings for Zachary’s entire work-study period,
 instead the judge calculated restitution to be awarded from the time of the injury to the date
 of the initial restitution hearing before the magistrate on April 29, 2015. Had the judge
 ordered restitution for Zachary’s entire work study period, such an award would have been
 proper even though it would have included restitution for a future loss of earnings. Such
 an award would still not be speculative or based on a loss not reasonably certain to be
 incurred because Zachary’s employment was definite and the juvenile court had before it
 competent evidence as to the hours Zachary would have worked and the wages he would
 have earned.
 6
 Cody also argues that part of the restitution order was not for a “loss of earnings” within
 the meaning of § 11-603 “because Zachary had not been working at Roseda Farm. . . at the
 time of the assault.” We are unable to find in our case law, nor has Cody offered, support
 for the proposition that the victim must have been working at the time of the assault to be
 eligible for restitution for lost earnings. It is sufficient that Zachary had definite
 employment scheduled and that a calculation of his earnings “did not encompass
 speculative future work.” McDaniel, 205 Md. App. at 565, 45 A.3d at 924.
 16
 be proven by competent evidence. CRIM. PROC. § 11-603. As to the restitution’s
 satisfaction of the decisional law limitations—that the claim not be speculative and not
 cover losses not reasonably certain to be incurred—a review of two cases is illustrative.
 In McDaniel, the victim suffered a “dental loss”—a dental injury which, at the time
 of the restitution hearing, he had not yet expended money to correct. 205 Md. App. at 563,
 45 A.3d at 922. The Court of Special Appeals approved the restitution award in that case
 based upon an estimate of cost to repair and restore the victim’s teeth. McDaniel, 205 Md.
 App. at 565, 45 A.3d at 924. In so holding, the Court explained that “[t]he statement of
 the cost of repairing the dental damage and of replacing Robinson's missing tooth was
 specific enough; it was of a definite amount that did not encompass speculative future
 work.” Id. In the case at bar, as established through testimony and through the Roseda
 Farm letter, Zachary was employed for a specified duration and was able to provide an
 approximation of the hours and wages involved. McDaniel stands for the proposition that
 an estimate as to the numerical value of the loss is sufficient to support a restitution claim.
 Id. Thus, applying that proposition to the case sub judice, we conclude that Zachary’s
 restitution claim satisfies the requirement that the claim not be speculative.
 In In re John M., the Court of Special Appeals set aside a restitution order in the
 amount of $38,300 for future counseling expenses of the juvenile’s two sexual assault
 victims. In re John M., 129 Md. App. at 185, 741 A.2d at 514 (“The juvenile court only
 has the ability to award restitution for reasonable sums that have already been incurred that
 are causally related to the juvenile’s delinquent acts. Thus, an award for counseling
 expenses already incurred was appropriate, but not the award for the then future counseling
 17
 expenses.”). In so holding, the Court noted that “statutory limitations and due process
 considerations do not permit an order of restitution for counseling expenses that are not yet
 certain to occur.”). Id. Contrary to the award for future counseling expenses in In re John
 M., which were not reasonably certain to be incurred by the victims, here, there is no
 uncertainty about Zachary’s loss of earnings. Zachary incurred his loss at the moment he
 became incapacitated to perform his job and earn wages. Moreover, the restitution awarded
 in this case was for wages lost during the period of time between the assault and the
 restitution hearing, and not for the future (i.e. beyond the restitution hearing). We thus
 conclude that Zachary’s restitution claim satisfies the requirement that the award cover
 only losses that the victim is reasonably certain to incur. Accordingly, the restitution
 ordered in this case was permitted under § 11-603.
 Competency of Evidence
 Subsection (b) of § 11-603 allows for a presumption of a right to restitution,
 providing:
 (b) A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of
 this section if:
 (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and
 (2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed
 in subsection (a) of this section.
 CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b). See also McDaniel, 205 Md. App. at 559, 45 A.3d at 920 (“[A]
 victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of § 11–603 when the
 court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this
 section.”) (quotation omitted). Here, the State and Zachary requested restitution, thus the
 18
 application of the presumption provided in § 11-603(b) hinges upon whether the juvenile
 court was presented with competent evidence of a loss of earnings as a direct result of the
 delinquent act. See CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b)(2). “Competent evidence of entitlement to,
 and the amount of, restitution need only be reliable, admissible, and established by a
 preponderance of the evidence.” Id. See also In re Billy W., 387 Md. 405, 433, 875 A.2d
 734, 750 (2005) (citing Alix v. E–Z Serve Corp., 846 So. 2d 156, 159 (La. App. 2003), for
 the proposition that “competent evidence” is evidence that has “some degree of reliability
 and trustworthiness”). Therefore, the evidence presented in support of Zachary’s
 restitution claim is competent if it was reliable, relevant, admissible, and trustworthy.
 The rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay, do not strictly apply to a
 juvenile restitution proceeding. See In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. at 249, 819 A.2d at
 1126 (“We hold that a juvenile court has the discretion, in the interest of justice, to decline
 the strict application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence . . . in a restitution hearing.”).
 However, “[e]ven though a court may decline to require a strict application of evidentiary
 rules, there still exists an inherent reliability/credibility requirement which a proponent of
 the offered evidence must satisfy.” In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. at 248–49, 819 A.2d at
 1126.
 Cody argues that “[n]othing in the letter or Zachary’s testimony established
 precisely how many hours he would work or how long he would be working or, for that
 matter, why he could not work at all.” Here, evidence that Zachary’s loss of earnings was
 a direct result of the assault by Cody was presented through testimony of Zachary and
 Zachary’s father, as well as through the Roseda Farm letter. Zachary testified to suffering
 19
 a broken jaw as a result of being assaulted by Cody. Zachary also testified to missing
 weeks of school due to his injuries. Further, Zachary testified that he worked with the
 tractor, weed whacker, and other small farm equipment during his previous employment at
 Roseda Farm. When asked why he could not continue to work at Roseda Farm, Zachary
 testified that he was unable to work at Roseda Farm because the vibrations from the farm
 machinery would cause issues with his healing jaw. Moreover, Zachary testified that it
 was not his decision to forgo participation in the work study program.
 Both Zachary and his father testified that Zachary was scheduled to work in the
 program at Roseda Farm for the school year and that he would work twenty hours per week
 at a compensation rate of $8.00 per hour. The Roseda Farm letter provided evidence that
 Zachary was scheduled to work at the farm for approximately 20 hours per week for
 approximately 40 weeks. The letter also provided evidence as to the approximate amount
 Zachary would have earned. The letter was signed by Marcia Bryant, who signed the letter
 in her capacity as the “office manager” at Roseda Farm. Zachary’s father testified that he
 obtained the letter by asking Zachary’s “boss” at Roseda Farm for “something in writing
 to confirm that [Zachary] was part of the program.” As the Court of Special Appeals noted
 below, “[a]lthough Zachary’s father’s explanation for how the letter was obtained would
 not satisfy any exceptions to the rule against hearsay, it does provide additional context
 and reliability to the document.” Moreover, the information contained in the letter was
 consistent with the testimony of Zachary and his father. Therefore, the letter served to
 corroborate and enhance the reliability of the testimonial evidence.
 20
 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence as to the restitution claim was
 competent and that Zachary was presumed to have a right to restitution. Cody has not
 overcome this presumption by showing that the restitution was unfair or unreasonable. See
 CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b).
 Cody nonetheless takes issue with the fact that the Roseda Farm letter provided
 approximate figures regarding how many hours per week Zachary would work and for how
 many weeks total. Cody argues that the amount of the claim for loss of earnings is too
 speculative to serve as a basis for restitution.7 However, the standard for restitution is not
 one of absolute certainty or precision.8 Rather, there must be competent evidence showing
 entitlement to and the amount of lost earnings or expenses to be incurred by the victim as
 a direct result of the crime or delinquent act. McDaniel, 205 Md. App. at 559, 45 A.3d at
 920 (“Competent evidence of entitlement to, and the amount of, restitution need only be
 7
 In an attempt to support this contention, Cody cites case law from out of State to suggest
 that a restitution award for loss of earnings must be “based on a quantifiable loss that
 occurred in the interim between the crime and the restitution award” and that loss of
 earnings awards permitted under a restitution statute “are limited to quantifiable out-of-
 pocket losses at the time of the restitution award.” Straub v. State, 292 P.3d 273 (Idaho
 2013). However, we note that approximations that are derived from competent evidence
 are not the antithesis of “quantifiable” losses. Moreover, the hearing judge exercised his
 discretion to account for this approximation by further reducing the award from $5,120 to
 $5,000 for Cody’s benefit.
 8
 At the exceptions hearing, Cody’s counsel argued that the loss of earnings claim was
 speculative because there was “no certainty that Zach[ary] would have stayed at the same
 job [or] that the employer would have kept paying him the same wage.” The judge
 responded, “[W]ouldn't that be the argument on any claim for lost wages, that the person
 could have been fired, they could have quit, they could have left for another employment?”
 We agree with the Circuit Court that if the standard were one of certainty, one would be
 hard-pressed to make a successful restitution claim for loss of earnings.
 21
 reliable, admissible, and established by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citation
 omitted). As discussed above, the evidence presented at the restitution hearing amounted
 to competent evidence of a loss of earnings as a direct result of a delinquent act. Nowhere
 in our case law can we find support for the proposition that in order for lost wages
 restitution to be proper, the figures presented must be exact down to the decimal.
 Finally, Cody seems to suggest that in order to show loss of earnings as a direct
 result of the delinquent act, and thus be entitled to restitution, the State must have proven
 Zachary was unable to work any job.9 We cannot find, and Cody does not offer, any
 support from our decisional or statutory laws that this is a requirement of § 11-603. We
 have stated that something is a “direct result” where there is no intervening agent or
 occurrence separating the criminal act and the victim’s loss. See Goff, 387 Md. at 344, 875
 A.2d at 142. See also Stachowski, 440 Md. at 513, 103 A.3d at 623. Here, as discussed
 above, competent evidence showed that Zachary’s jaw was injured as a result of the assault
 by Cody. Competent evidence also showed that Zachary had a job at Roseda Farm, where
 he would be expected to operate small farm machinery, and that the vibrations from the
 farm machinery would disrupt his healing jaw, thus rendering him unable to work there.
 Accordingly, we hold that competent evidence supported the restitution claim.
 9
 Cody contends that “the record is devoid of any evidentiary basis on which the Circuit
 Court could have found a connection between Zachary’s continuing medical and dental
 conditions and his ability to earn money by fulfilling his work-study program’s
 requirements in another capacity at Roseda Farms [sic].” (emphasis added). This asks
 more from one seeking restitution than the statute requires. Zachary testified his job at
 Roseda Farm entailed handling farm machinery, which if he operated, would disrupt his
 healing jaw.
 22
 CONCLUSION
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the loss of earnings restitution awarded to
 Zachary in this case was consistent with the law under § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure
 Article and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
 SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.
 PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS.
 23