jurisdiction: US

text: b"OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\nAUDIT OF USAID/ECUADOR\xe2\x80\x99S\nSUSTAINABLE FORESTS AND\nCOASTS PROGRAM\nAUDIT REPORT NO. 1-518-14-012-P\nJULY 31, 2014\n\n\n\n\nSAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR \n\n\x0cOffice of Inspector General\n\n\nJuly 31, 2014\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nTO: \t USAID/Ecuador Mission Director, Christopher Cushing\n USAID/M/OAA/P Division Chief, Marcelle Wijesinghe\n\nFROM: \t Acting Regional Inspector General/San Salvador, David Clark /s/\n\nSUBJECT:\t Audit of USAID/Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s Sustainable Forests and Coasts Program\n (Report No. 1-518-14-012-P)\n\nThis memorandum transmits our final report on the subject audit. We considered your\ncomments on the draft report and included them in their entirety in Appendix II of this report.\n\nThis report contains three recommendations to help improve USAID\xe2\x80\x99s reporting regarding\nchallenges encountered and resources leveraged. Your written comments in response to the\ndraft report indicate that you made management decisions on all three. Please provide the Audit\nPerformance and Compliance Division in the USAID Office of the Chief Financial Officer with\nthe necessary documentation to achieve final action.\n\nThank you and your staff for the cooperation and assistance extended to us during this audit.\n\n\n\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development\nEmbajada Americana\nUrb. y Blvd Santa Elena\nAntiguo Cuscatlan, Depto. La Libertad\nSan Salvador, El Salvador\nhttp://oig.usaid.gov/\n\x0cCONTENTS \n\nSummary of Results ................................................................................................................... 1 \n\n\nAudit Findings............................................................................................................................. 3 \n\n\n Program Did Not Deliver the Economic Benefits Anticipated.................................................. 3 \n\n\n Implementer Overstated Leverage by 63 Percent ................................................................. 5 \n\n\nEvaluation of Management Comments..................................................................................... 7 \n\n\nAppendix I\xe2\x80\x94Scope and Methodology ...................................................................................... 8 \n\n\nAppendix II\xe2\x80\x94Management Comments ................................................................................... 10 \n\n\nAppendix III\xe2\x80\x94Program Areas in Ecuador............................................................................... 13 \n\n\x0cSUMMARY OF RESULTS \n\nEcuador is known for both its biological diversity and its dramatic rate of deforestation. The\nFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ranked Ecuador 14th highest in the\nworld in average annual reduction in forests in 2010. The country\xe2\x80\x99s forests, including coastal\nmangroves that shelter fish and other organisms and reduce erosion caused by tides and\nstorms, are threatened by agricultural expansion, illegal logging, and climate change.1\n\nDespite having protected areas, Ecuador has not managed them well. To strengthen the\nGovernment of Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s efforts in protected areas, on June 15, 2009, USAID/Ecuador\nawarded Chemonics a 5-year cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Sustainable Forests and\nCoasts Program.2 It sought to improve biodiversity conservation in critical habitats while\nimproving local livelihoods in target communities through activities linked to conservation goals.\nIn addition, the program sought to develop conservation partnerships with local organizations.\nThe program\xe2\x80\x99s total estimated cost through June 2014 was $15.8 million. As of December 31,\n2013, $15.0 million had been obligated, and $13.2 million spent.\n\nThe Regional Inspector General/San Salvador conducted this audit to determine whether\nUSAID/Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s Sustainable Forests and Coasts Program was achieving its main goal of\nconserving biodiversity to benefit residents in coastal Ecuador and adjacent forests by\nestablishing long-term partnerships with local organizations.\n\nThe audit verified that the mission was achieving its main goals related to conserving\nbiodiversity and developing partnerships for conservation. Specifically, the audit team noted the\nfollowing accomplishments:\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The program completed studies that provide data critical to managing the supply of crabs in\n the Gulf of Guayaquil and developed case studies that can benefit other regions and\n resources.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t USAID closely collaborated with the Ministry of Environment on many activities, including\n those to strengthen its strategic planning and oversight, improve management policies, and\n expand environmental education. The mission has supported the ministry\xe2\x80\x99s successful Socio\n Bosque3 Program by helping rural communities meet requirements for participation. These\n include obtaining land titles and preparing plans detailing how the communities will use the\n cash payments they receive.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The program has strong support at the local, regional, and national levels of Ecuadorian\n government and has developed excellent relationships with implementing organizations and\n project beneficiaries. The latter group previously did not feel included in planning community\n1\n EcoDecision, \xe2\x80\x9cECUADOR: An overview from the REDD Countries Database,\xe2\x80\x9d April 2012. REDD stands\nfor Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, a collaborative initiative launched by the\nUnited Nations.\n2\n Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.306 defines this type of contract and its purpose.\n3\n USAID/Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s 2013 Performance Plan Report characterizes Socio Bosque as a \xe2\x80\x9ccash-for-\nconservation program.\xe2\x80\x9d It pays individuals and communities that sign a 20-year agreement with the\nMinistry of the Environment to conserve forests.\n\n\n 1\n\x0c activities. The audit team noted that USAID\xe2\x80\x99s partners and beneficiaries appreciated the\n program\xe2\x80\x99s flexibility in responding to the communities\xe2\x80\x99 needs. For example, some\n communities requested equipment to boost production of various goods, and the project\n promised to deliver it.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The program built or strengthened several networks and coalitions, which are positioned to\n continue activities that promote their constituents\xe2\x80\x99 interests.\n\nThe program was less successful at improving local livelihoods in target communities through\nactivities linked to conservation goals, as noted below.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The program did not deliver the economic benefits anticipated in the contract (page 3). In\n many cases, the program did not appreciably increase incomes per person through direct\n assistance in the five value chains, and it did not establish strong commercial links.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Chemonics overstated leverage4 by 63 percent and misclassified public resources as private\n resources (page 5). Chemonics was unable to create strong private sector alliances, as\n envisioned in the contract.\n\nThe audit recommends that USAID/Ecuador and USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Policy Division of the Office of\nAcquisition and Assistance take the following steps to improve the effectiveness of the program\nand mission operations:\n\n1. \tDocument in its final report the challenges that this program faced in improving\n livelihoods, and upload the evaluation to the Development Experience Clearinghouse\n (page 5).\n\n2. \tIn conjunction with Chemonics, (1) update the definition of the leverage indicator to\n include only resources leveraged during the life of the program, (2) classify nonprofits as\n public institutions and for-profits as private institutions, (3) disaggregate private and\n public resources leveraged when reporting, and (4) report revised figures in its final\n report (page 6).\n\n3. \t Update the Automated Directives System (ADS) Chapters 302 and 303 to include clear\n definitions and criteria for identifying and classifying leverage under contracts outside of\n formal Global Development Alliance activities (page 6).\n\nDetailed findings appear in the following section. The scope and methodology are described in\nAppendix I. Management comments appear in their entirety in Appendix II, and our evaluation of\nmanagement comments is on page 7.\n\n\n\n\n4\n Leverage refers to resources that an implementer mobilizes from entities other than the U.S.\nGovernment to offset project or program costs.\n\n\n 2\n\x0cAUDIT FINDINGS\nProgram Did Not Deliver the\nEconomic Benefits Anticipated\nAccording to the contract, Chemonics would improve local livelihoods in target communities\nthrough activities linked to conservation goals:\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Provide economic benefits to 10,000 individuals by the end of fiscal year 2013, primarily by\n developing five value chains5\xe2\x80\x94agriculture, fisheries, wood products, nontimber forest\n products, and tourism\xe2\x80\x94that could increase incomes while still protecting national resources.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Seek opportunities to develop other environmentally friendly value chains.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Link 20 Ecuadorian enterprises to national, regional, and international markets for\n sustainably produced goods and services.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Identify partners\xe2\x80\x94buyers, producers, and banks\xe2\x80\x94to support these efforts.\n\nThe program allocated more than $6 million to improve livelihoods, which represents about\n40 percent of the total program expenditures. According to Chemonics, the program surpassed\nits target for boosting incomes and savings, providing economic benefits to 16,225 individuals.\n\nDespite the positive reporting and the significant investment in environmentally friendly value\nchains, the program created only limited economic benefits for a substantially smaller number of\nbeneficiaries. Most of the beneficiaries the program reported (13,465, or 83 percent) did not\nreceive economic benefits from direct program activities; rather, they received economic\nbenefits from the Government of Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s Socio Bosque Program. The program spent about\n$500,000 to support Socio Bosque activities and by including a large number of Socio Bosque\nbeneficiaries in its reporting, the program is misrepresenting its own role in assisting the groups\ntargeted by the contract.\n\nDirect beneficiaries numbered 2,760. The program spent more than $5.5 million to raise their\nincomes by developing value chains, but many people realized only slight improvements. For\nexample, Chemonics reported that the average annual increase in income for participants\nworking in the forestry sector was only $53 per year. Among farmers, if one increased his\nincome by as little as $12 per year, the program counted this as an increased benefit for a\nfamily of five.\n\nEconomic benefits were so small because the program was largely unable to establish\nprofitable, environmentally friendly economic links and value chains. None of the commercial\nconnections involved regional or international markets as expected by the contract, and the 20\nlinks with local markets generated only a small amount of sales.\n\n\n\n\n5\n A value chain includes all activities required to produce a good or service and deliver it to the final\ncustomer. Value chains include activities such as production, marketing, and distribution.\n\n\n 3\n\x0cFor example, as of September 2013, seven ivory palm6 trade arrangements had generated an\naverage of only $892 in increased sales per enterprise. This small increase was shared by\ndozens of producer families. By September 2013, nearly half of the economic links established\nby the program had failed, demonstrating that developing enterprises in the targeted areas was\nextremely challenging for the program.\n\nUSAID/Ecuador and Chemonics officials offered several reasons for the disappointing results:\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The current USAID team managing the program and Chemonics said the scope of work was\n too ambitious and did not reflect the program\xe2\x80\x99s challenges. The program was designed by\n USAID/Ecuador staff who had higher expectations for economic growth in the targeted\n areas. For example, the contract suggested including sales increases as an indicator, but\n these figures were so unimpressive that Chemonics did not formally track or report them. As\n another example, the program\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to assist local businesses with business plans,\n financing, and facilities development have been minimal. When implementation began,\n program officials, largely environmentalists, quickly realized that the contract was too\n optimistic when their rapid assessments showed that targeted communities had very little\n potential for developing new products and engaged mostly in subsistence farming.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The Chemonics team was generally made up of highly qualified and experienced\n environment professionals. However, none had significant experience in business\n development, as Chemonics and USAID staff were more concerned about the project\xe2\x80\x99s\n focus on conservation.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The targeted areas, which included remote forests and coastal areas, lack the infrastructure\n and equipment to expand their business operations and transport goods to market. For\n example, some communities are accessible only by boat or by lengthy walks. Because\n conservation is a priority, the program did not include building any infrastructure.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t The targeted beneficiaries generally lacked formal education, business experience, and\n knowledge of best business practices. Chemonics officials believed that training them to\n become successful entrepreneurs would require more resources than were available during\n the program.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t According to Chemonics officials, poor weather adversely affected the production of some\n items. For example, the 2011 cacao production in Esmeraldas was severely limited because\n of a drought. In 2013, inadequate rainfall dramatically reduced the harvest of high-quality\n ivory nut.\n\nAs a result, the program has not had the economic impact the contract envisioned. It did not\ncreate much economic benefit through direct assistance in the five targeted value chains, and it\ndid not establish strong commercial ties. The results are particularly disappointing given the\nmillions of dollars allocated to these activities.\n\nThe weak program results highlight the challenges facing programs that seek to provide\neconomic benefits while encouraging conservation, and may offer lessons for future programs.\nAccording to ADS 203.1, USAID missions \xe2\x80\x9cmust strive to continuously learn and improve their\napproach in achieving results.\xe2\x80\x9d Missions must submit evaluation reports to USAID's central\n\n6\n Ivory palm is a South American tree whose hardened fruit, the ivory nut, is used to make buttons, beads,\nand figurines.\n\n\n 4\n\x0cdocument repository, the Development Experience Clearinghouse, to promote the sharing of\ninformation. To see that lessons learned from this program are shared, we make the following\nrecommendation.\n\n Recommendation 1. We recommend that USAID/Ecuador document the challenges\n faced in improving livelihoods in its final report and upload the evaluation to the\n Development Experience Clearinghouse.\n\nImplementer Overstated Leverage by\n63 Percent\nAccording to the contract, leveraging private sector resources was an important aspect of the\nprogram, and Chemonics was expected to develop strong, Global Development Alliance\n(GDA)7-like alliances with the private sector. The contract committed Chemonics to leverage at\nleast $4.5 million in public and private funds, and the amount of leveraging achieved was\ntracked as one of the program\xe2\x80\x99s nine indicators.\n\nAs of September 30, 2013, Chemonics reported that it had leveraged $16.9 million in non-\nUSAID resources for the program, of which $11.7 million came from the public sector and\n$5.1 million from the private sector, as shown below (difference from total due to rounding).\n\n Amount Leveraged as of September 30, 2013 (Unaudited)\n ($ million)\n\n\n\n 5.1\n\n\n\n 11.7\n 10.5 Private\n Public\n 0.4\n Overstated\n 5.9\n\n\n\n\n Amount\xc2\xa0Reported Amount\xc2\xa0Beyond\xc2\xa0End Amount\xc2\xa0That\xc2\xa0Should\n $16.9 of\xc2\xa0Program\xc2\xa0$10.5 Be\xc2\xa0Reported\xc2\xa0$6.3\n\n\nHowever, these amounts significantly overstated the amount of leveraging achieved.\nChemonics counted contributions that the Government of Ecuador anticipated making over the\n\n7\n A Global Development Alliance is a partnership between USAID and the private sector in which the\npartners work together to develop and implement activities that meet the objectives of both while\nadvancing development.\n\n\n 5\n\x0cnext 20 years through the Socio Bosque Program, as well as future contributions from the Inter-\nAmerican Development Bank. According to USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Acquisition and Assistance Policy\nDirective 04-16, \xe2\x80\x9cLeveraging refers to that portion of a project or program costs not borne by the\nFederal Government.\xe2\x80\x9d Thus, it does not include contributions that presumably will occur after\nthe program ends. Chemonics should have reported only contributions made during the life of\nthe program. Counting future contributions by the partner government assumes continued\npolitical support and resources. As a result, Chemonics overstated the amount of actual\nleverage by 62.6 percent; the amount reported should have been $6.3 million.\n\nFurthermore, Chemonics made errors when classifying public and private leveraging achieved\nby the program. Chemonics classified contributions by the Inter-American Development Bank\nand other foundations as private sector contributions, when in fact these groups should have\nbeen classified as public contributors. Resources coming from for-profit entities are private\nsector, whereas resources from nonprofit entities are public. Chemonics misclassified the\namounts because USAID/Ecuador never provided Chemonics with clear definitions of public\nversus private leveraging.\n\nThese problems occurred because USAID does not have clear definitions and criteria for\nimplementing partners to use when identifying and classifying leverage outside of formal GDA\nactivities. Some USAID missions have required contractors to use USAID\xe2\x80\x99s leveraging\ndefinitions from guidance related to formal GDA programs; this guidance clearly specifies that\ncontractors should count as leverage only new, nonpublic resources from the private sector and\nother nontraditional USAID partners. However, use of this guidance is only mandatory for formal\nGDA activities, which this is not. The revised results show more clearly that the program was\nunable to create strong private sector alliances as envisioned in the contract. Only 6.7 percent\n($420,000) of the $6.3 million in leveraged resources came from the private sector.\n\nChemonics met its leveraging requirement. Still, because Chemonics did not report its\nleveraged resources accurately, the program is exaggerating its accomplishments. In particular,\nthe reporting hid the fact that private sector leveraging, expected to be a major result of the\nprogram, was very small. Therefore, we make the following recommendations.\n\n Recommendation 2. We recommend that USAID/Ecuador, in conjunction with\n Chemonics, (1) update the definition of the leverage indicator to include only resources\n leveraged during the life of the program, (2) classify nonprofits as public institutions and\n for-profits as private institutions, (3) disaggregate private and public resources leveraged\n when reporting, and (4) report revised figures in its final report; it should then document\n all four actions.\n\nTo ensure that future informal GDA programs that require leverage adopt clear, standard\ndefinitions, we also recommend that the Office of Acquisition and Assistance issue clarifying\nguidance.\n\n Recommendation 3. We recommend that the Policy Division of the Office of Acquisition\n and Assistance update Automated Directives System Chapters 302 and 303 to include\n definitions and criteria for identifying and classifying leverage requirements in contracts\n and assistance agreements outside of formal Global Development Alliance activities.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\x0cEVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT\nCOMMENTS\nUSAID/Ecuador agreed with Recommendations 1 and 2, and M/OAA/P agreed with\nRecommendation 3. Comments from the mission and M/OAA/P indicate they made\nmanagement decisions on all three recommendations. Our evaluation of management\ncomments follows.\n\nRecommendation 1. USAID/Ecuador decided to document the challenges faced in improving\nlivelihoods in its final report. It intended to complete the final report and upload it to the\nDevelopment Experience Clearinghouse by July 31, 2014. We acknowledge the mission\xe2\x80\x99s\nmanagement decision.\n\nRecommendation 2. USAID/Ecuador decided to break down leverage information into four\ncategories in its final report, which will be completed by July 31, 2014. The four categories will\nbe (1) governmental not including Socio Bosque, (2) governmental meaning Socio Bosque\nonly, (3) nongovernmental organizations, and (4) private for-profit organizations. We\nacknowledge the mission\xe2\x80\x99s management decision.\n\nRecommendation 3. USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Policy Division of the Office of Acquisition and Assistance\ndecided to revise ADS to distinguish between leverage and cost share, clarify regulations\napplicable to both terms, and provide criteria for differentiating between leverage and cost share\nby August 30, 2014. We acknowledge the mission\xe2\x80\x99s management decision.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\x0c Appendix I\n\n\n\nSCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\nScope\nRIG/San Salvador conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted\ngovernment auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to\nobtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and\nconclusions in accordance with our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained\nprovides that reasonable basis.\n\nThe purpose of this audit was to determine whether USAID/Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s Sustainable Forests and\nCoasts Program was achieving its main goal of conserving biodiversity to benefit residents in\ncoastal Ecuador and adjacent dry forests and wet tropical forests by establishing long-term\npartnerships with local organizations.\n\nThe mission awarded Chemonics a cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract, which began on\nJune 15, 2009, and was to end on June 14, 2014. As of December 31, 2013, the entire\n$15.0 million had been obligated, and $13.2 million had been spent. Additional funds were to be\nadded to the program in its final months, bringing the total estimated costs to $15.8 million. We\ntested the amount spent.\n\nThe audit covered activities that occurred from the start of the contract on June 15, 2009,\nthrough December 31, 2013\xe2\x80\x94the first 3.5 years of the program. We reviewed applicable laws\nand regulations as well as USAID policies and procedures pertaining to the program, including\nADS 203, 204, 253, 320, and 540; the Biodiversity Policy; Leverage Overview;8 and\nsupplemental guidance.\n\nIn planning the audit, we identified and reviewed relevant controls that USAID/Ecuador used to\nmanage the program and oversee its activities. These controls included Chemonics\xe2\x80\x99 quarterly\nand annual performance reports, performance management plans, and annual work plans. We\nalso met with Chemonics to obtain status updates, discussed implementation issues, and\nconducted field visits to meet with stakeholders. In addition, the auditors examined the mission\xe2\x80\x99s\nportfolio review notes and its fiscal year 2013 annual self-assessment of management controls,\nwhich missions are required to perform to comply with the Federal Managers\xe2\x80\x99 Financial Integrity\nAct, to determine whether the assessment cited any relevant weaknesses.\n\nThe audit team conducted fieldwork from February 3 through February 21, 2014, in Quito and\nalong the coast of Ecuador. We visited USAID/Ecuador and Chemonics\xe2\x80\x99 offices in Quito and\nthree of the program\xe2\x80\x99s four intervention areas\xe2\x80\x94the Chongon Colonche area, Guayas Province,\nand Reserva Marina Galera San Francisco, pictured in Appendix III.\n\nMethodology\nTo answer the audit objective, we interviewed USAID/Ecuador\xe2\x80\x99s contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s\nrepresentative, the environment team leader, the mission environment officer, contract\nspecialists, monitoring and evaluation specialists, the training adviser, and the TIP adviser. We\nreviewed the contract and its modifications, work plans, the performance management plan,\n8\n http://inside.usaid.gov/idea/gp/leverage-overview, accessed on June 5, 2014.\n\n\n 8\n\x0c Appendix I\n\n\nprogress reports, financial reports, the midterm evaluation, and other documents. We\ninterviewed Chemonics\xe2\x80\x99 chief of party, deputy chief of party for programming, the monitoring\nand evaluation specialist, and staff from three of the four regions.\n\nThrough these interviews and the review of program documentation, the audit team obtained an\nunderstanding of (1) the program\xe2\x80\x99s goals, (2) how performance indicators, targets, and baseline\ndata were established to measure progress, (3) how the mission verified the quality of the data\nthat Chemonics reported, (4) how the mission monitored program activities, and (5) whether the\nmission was aware of any allegations of fraud or other potential illegal acts or noncompliance\nwith laws, regulations, and contract terms.\n\nIn addition, we performed the following audit tests:\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Reviewed and tested the performance indicators and targets to determine their\n appropriateness.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Reviewed and tested the procedures the mission established to monitor and confirm the\n accuracy of the program\xe2\x80\x99s reported results.\n\n\xef\x82\xb7\t Documented and tested compliance with award requirements for leveraging funds, doing\n gender analysis, countering human trafficking, doing branding and marking, and mitigating\n environmental risk.\n\nTogether with USAID/Ecuador and Chemonics, we judgmentally selected various activities\nalong the coast for field visits. Sample selection was based on factors including accessibility and\ndiversity of activities. We conducted field visits to validate reported results to the extent possible.\nSince the testing and site selections were based on judgmental samples, the results and\nconclusions related to the analysis were limited to the items and areas tested, and cannot be\nprojected to the entire population. We believe our substantive testing was sufficient to support\nthe audit\xe2\x80\x99s findings.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0c Appendix II\n\n\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMENTS \n\n UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT\n\n\n Memorandum\nDATE: July 3, 2014\n\nTO: Van Nguyen /s/, Regional Inspector General/San Salvador\n\nFROM: Christopher Cushing, USAID/Ecuador Mission Director\n\nSUBJECT: Comments to USAID/Ecuador's Sustainable Forests and Coasts Program\n - Draft Audit Report No. 1-518-14-0XX-P, sent June 6, 2014\n\n\n\nThank you for giving USAID/Ecuador the opportunity to respond to the draft report of the Audit\nof USAID/Ecuador's Sustainable Forests and Coasts Program, sent to us on June 6, 2014.\nUSAID/Ecuador appreciates the time and consideration that the audit team invested in\npreparing this report.\n\nBelow we have listed the three audit findings and recommendations. Following each\nrecommendation are USAID/Ecuador's comments and suggestions on the draft audit report\nfor your consideration.\n\nRecommendation 1: We recommend that USAID/Ecuador document the\nchallenges faced in improving livelihoods in its final evaluation report and\nupload the evaluation to the Development Experience Clearinghouse.\n\nWe will document the challenges faced in improving livelihoods in the final report for the\nproject and upload this report to the Development Experience Clearinghouse. Please note\nthat there will be no final evaluation for the project because of the closing of the project (June\n14, 2014), as well as the closing of the USAID/Ecuador Mission (September 30, 2014), in\nresponse to the Government of Ecuador's moratorium on extending existing or beginning new\nactivities. Please also note that the recommendation does not allege any USAID/Ecuador\nnon-compliance with required submissions to the Development Experience Clearinghouse.\n\nRecommendation 2: We recommend that USAID/Ecuador,in conjunction with\nChemonics, (1) update the definition of the leverage indicator to include only\nresources leveraged during the life of the program, (2) classify nonprofits as\npublic institutions and for-profits as private institutions, (3) disaggregate private\nand public resources leveraged when reporting, and (4) report revised figures in\nits final report; and document all four actions.\n\n\n 10\n\x0c Appendix II\n\n\n\nIn the final report for the project, USAID/Ecuador staff will document revised leverage figures\nidentifying resources leveraged during the life of the program. We will further break down\nthese figures into four categories: (1) governmental (not including Socio Bosque); (2)\ngovernmental (Socio Bosque only); (3) private non-governmental private for-profit\norganizations. Please note that we will report Socio Bosque separately because it\ncontributed significantly more than other governmental sources.\n\nRecommendation 3: We recommend that the Policy Division of the Office of\nAcquisition and Assistance update Automated Directives System Chapters 302\nand 303 to include clear definitions and criteria for identifying and classifying\nleverage requirements in contracts and assistance agreements outside of formal\nGlobal Development Alliance activities.\n\nThis recommendation to amend the Automated Directives System (ADS) sections 302 and\n303 is not within the manageable control of USAID/Ecuador. Revisions or additions to the\nADS are within the sole purview of USAID/Washington. We note that the recommendation\ndoes not allege any USAID/Ecuador non-compliance with existing requirements for\nleverage. Based on the above, we ask that Recommendation #3 be removed from the final\nreport or that you accept this response as final Mission action to close out this\nrecommendation.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0c Appendix II\n\n\nManagement comments on Recommendation 3 received by e-mail July 16, 2004, on\nbehalf of Marcelle Wijesinghe, Division Chief, M/OAA/P:\n\nBy August 30, M/OAA/P will process revisions to the Automated Directives System 303.3.10.2\nthat will (1) clearly distinguish between leverage and cost share with clear definitions, (2) clarify\nthe regulatory environment for both cost share and leverage, (3) provide criteria for identifying\nleverage as distinct from cost share and the applicability, if any, of leverage to assistance\ninstruments.\n\nSince the ADS process takes some time to incorporate changes into any of the chapters, we\nneed time for that process and also to check what effect, if any, that this change will have on\nany related ADS chapters.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\x0c Appendix III \n\n\n\n Program Areas in Ecuador\n\n\n\n\nSource: USAID Work Plan.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0cU.S. Agency for International Development \n\n Office of Inspector General \n\n 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW \n\n Washington, DC 20523 \n\n Tel: 202-712-1150 \n\n Fax: 202-216-3047 \n\n http://oig.usaid.gov\n\x0c"


type: wikipedia

text:
Starosta je najvyšší predstaviteľ obce, výkonný orgán volený občanmi v priamych voľbách. Vykonáva obecnú správu a zastupuje obec navonok. V Košiciach a v Bratislave je starosta najvyšším predstaviteľom mestskej časti, primátor celého mesta. V minulosti sa najvyšší predstaviteľ obce nazýval richtár.
 Legislatívne normy
 Podrobnosti o funkcii starostu stanovuje 4. Hlava Ústavy Slovenskej republiky o územnej samospráve a zákon SNR č. 369/1990 Zb. o obecnom zriadení. Podľa tohto zákona je funkcia starostu nezlučiteľná s funkciou:
 poslanca obecného zastupiteľstva,
 zamestnanca obce, v ktorej bol zvolený,
 štatutárneho orgánu rozpočtovej organizácie alebo príspevkovej organizácie zriadenej obcou, v ktorej bol zvolený,
 predsedu samosprávneho kraja,
 vedúceho zamestnanca orgánu štátnej správy,
 podľa osobitného zákona (napr. zákona č. 154/2001 Z.z. o prokurátoroch a právnych čakateľoch)
 Platové podmienky
 Platy starostov sa určujú podľa priemerného zárobku v slovenskom hospodárstve. Tento údaj sa násobí koeficientom 1,49 až 3,58 v závislosti od veľkosti obce. Podľa zákona číslo 154/2011 Z. z platného od 1. júna 2011 sa základné platy primátorov a starostov znížili o 10%, ale obecné zastupiteľstvá ich môžu zvýšiť o 70%. Bratislavské noviny uvádzajú porovnanie mestskej časti Nové Mesto a Staré Mesto. V oboch majú zákonom stanovený základný plat 2223€, v Novom Meste je zvýšený o 34%, v Starom až o 66%. Celkom tak starosta Rudolf Kusý zarába ako starosta 2979€, starostka Starého Mesta Tatiana Rosová 3691€ ako jeden z najvyšších platov v bratislavskej samospráve. Keďže však už uvedený zákon umožňuje starostom vykonávať súčasne funkciu poslanca NRSR, môže T. Rosová poberať aj poslanecký plat 7106€ a patriť medzi najlepšie platených verejných činiteľov Slovenska. Pre porovnanie v meste Vysoké Tatry má starosta základný plat zvýšený o 40% a bude teda dostávať 2337 €.
 Referencie
 Pozri aj
 Primátor
 Iné projekty
 – 4. Hlava Ústavy slovenskej republiky
 Externé odkazy
 Zákon SNR č. 369/1990 Zb. o obecnom zriadení
 Územná samospráva
 Povolania


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21996D0613(09)
 Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 45/95 av den 22 juni 1995 om ändring av bilaga II (tekniska bestämmelser, standarder, provning och certifiering) till EES-avtalet
 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning nr L 140 , 13/06/1996 s. 0041 - 0041
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉNS BESLUT nr 45/95 av den 22 juni 1995 om ändring av bilaga II (tekniska bestämmelser, standarder, provning och certifiering) till EES-avtalet GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR BESLUTAT FÖLJANDEmed beaktande av Avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, i dess lydelse enligt protokollet med justeringar av detta avtal, i det följande kallat "avtalet", särskilt artikel 98 i detta, ochmed beaktande av följande:Bilaga II till avtalet ändrades genom Gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 17/95 (1).Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 94/48/EG av den 7 december 1994 om ändring för trettonde gången av direktiv 76/769/EEG om tillnärmning av medlemsstaternas lagar och andra författningar om begränsning av användning och utsläppande på marknaden av vissa farliga och preparat (beredningar) (2) skall införlivas med avtalet.Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 94/60/EG av den 20 december 1994 om ändring för fjortonde gången av direktiv 76/769/EEG om tillnärmning av medlemsstaternas lagar och andra författningar om begränsning av användning och utsläppande på marknaden av vissa farliga ämnen och preparat (beredningar) (3) skall införlivas med avtalet.HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.Artikel 1 Följande strecksatser skall läggas till i punkt 4 (rådets direktiv 76/769/EEG) i kapitel XV i bilaga II till avtalet före anpassningen:"- 394 L 0048: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 94/48/EG av den 7 december 1994 (EGT nr L 331, 21.12.1994, s. 7).- 394 L 0060: Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 94/60/EG av den 20 december 1994 (EGT nr L 365, 31.12.1994, s. 1)."Artikel 2 Texterna till direktiven 94/48/EG och 94/60/EG på isländska och norska språken, vilka bifogas respektive språkversion av detta beslut, är autentiska.Artikel 3 Detta beslut träder i kraft den 1 juli 1995 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i avtalet har lämnats till Gemensamma EES-kommittén.Artikel 4 Detta beslut skall offentliggöras i EES-delen av och i EES-supplementet till Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning.Utfärdat i Bryssel den 22 juni 1995.På Gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnarP. BENAVIDESOrdförande(1) EGT nr L 83, 13.4.1995, s. 48.(2) EGT nr L 331, 21.12.1994, s. 7.(3) EGT nr L 365, 31.12.1994, s. 1.


text:
28.7.2005
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 L 198/36
 EEE JUNGTINIO KOMITETO SPRENDIMAS Nr. 39/2005
 2005 m. kovo 11 d.
 iš dalies keičiantis EEE susitarimo XI priedą (Telekomunikacijų paslaugos)
 EEE JUNGTINIS KOMITETAS,
 atsižvelgdamas į Europos ekonominės erdvės susitarimą su pakeitimais, padarytais Protokolu, patikslinančiu Europos ekonominės erdvės susitarimą (toliau - Susitarimas), ypač į jo 98 straipsnį,
 kadangi:
 (1)
 Susitarimo XI priedas buvo iš dalies pakeistas 2004 m. liepos 9. d. EEE jungtinio komiteto sprendimu Nr. 105/2004 (1).
 (2)
 Į Susitarimą turi būti įtrauktas 2004 m. balandžio 28 d. Komisijos sprendimas 2004/411/EB dėl tinkamos asmens duomenų apsaugos Meno saloje (2) su pataisymais, padarytais OL L 208, 2004 6 10, p. 47,
 PRIĖMĖ ŠĮ SPRENDIMĄ:
 1 straipsnis
 Po Susitarimo XI priedo 5eh punkto (Komisijos sprendimas 2003/821/EB) įterpiamas šis punktas:
 „5ei.
 32004 D 0411: 2004 m. balandžio 28 d. Komisijos sprendimas 2004/411/EB dėl tinkamos asmens duomenų apsaugos Meno saloje (OL L 151, 2004 4 30, p. 48) su pataisymais, padarytais OL L 208, 2004 6 10, p. 47.“
 2 straipsnis
 Sprendimo Nr. 2004/411/EB, pataisyto OL L 208, 2004 6 10, p. 47, tekstai islandų ir norvegų kalbomis, kurie turi būti paskelbti Europos Sąjungos oficialiojo leidinio EEE priede, yra autentiški.
 3 straipsnis
 Šis sprendimas įsigalioja 2005 m. kovo 12 d., jei EEE jungtiniam komitetui buvo pateikti visi pranešimai pagal Susitarimo 103 straipsnio 1 dalį (3).
 4 straipsnis
 Šis sprendimas skelbiamas Europos Sąjungos oficialiojo leidinio EEE dalyje ir EEE priede.
 Priimta Briuselyje, 2005 m. kovo 11 d.
 EEE jungtinio komiteto vardu
 Pirmininkas
 Richard WRIGHT
 (1) OL L 376, 2004 12 23, p. 35.
 (2) OL L 151, 2004 4 30, p. 48.
 (3) Konstituciniai reikalavimai nenurodyti.


text:
Seznam glasbenih producentov:
 A
 Mirwais Ahmadzai
 Richard B. Allen
 Chet Atkins, kitarist in avtor nove mehke zvrsti countryja.
 Reed Arvin
 B
 Roy Thomas Baker
 Boris Bele, producent skupine Buldožer, direktor NIKA records
 Joey Beltram
 Emile Berliner
 Sonny Bono, delal s Phil Spectorjem, producent plošč Sonnyja in Cher
 Joe Boyd producent plošč Fairport Convention idr
 Perry Bradford
 Gerry Bron
 T-Bone Burnett, producent plošč Elvisa Costella, Boba Dylana, Roya Orbisona, skupin The Wallflowers, Counting Crows, Marshalla Crenshawa, Sama Phillipsa, skupine Los Lobos, Bruca Cockburna, Gillian Welch in filmske glasbe za film bratov Coen O Brother, Where Art Thou?.
 George H. Buck
 John Burgess
 Richard James Burgess
 C
 John Cale
 Leonard Chess, producent »Maybellene«, mnogo drugih rock and roll in bluesovskih pesmi, ustanovitelj založbe Chess Records.
 Clive Chin
 Tony Clarke
 Bob Clearmountain
 George Clinton
 Stuart Colman
 D
 Def Jef
 Derri Daugherty
 Willie Dixon, basist in glavni producent z založbo Chess Records.
 Clement Seymour »Sir Coxsone« Dodd, ustanovitelj legendarne jamajške založbe Studio One
 Jack Douglas, producent skupin Aerosmith, Cheap Trick in Lennonovega albuma »Double Fantasy«
 Tom Dowd
 Gus Dudgeon
 E
 Brian Eno
 Ahmet Ertegün
 Nesuhi Ertegün
 Gene Eugene
 Bob Ezrin, producent skupine The Guess Who, Alica Coopra, Lou Reedovega albuma »Berlin«, albuma skupine Kiss »Destroyer«, albuma skupine Pink Floyd »The Wall« in skupine Jane's Addiction
 F
 Flood
 G
 Milt Gabler
 Nigel Godrich
 Giorgio Gomelsky
 Dave Goodman
 H
 John Hammond
 Martin Hannett
 Dave Hassinger
 Mark Heard
 Buddy Holly
 Trevor Horn
 I
 Jimmy Iovine
 J
 Glyn Johns
 John Paul Jones
 Richard M. Jones
 Quincy Jones
 K
 Eddie Kramer
 L
 Robert Lange
 Nick Launey
 Leftfield
 Steve Lillywhite
 M
 Sir George Martin
 Cosimo Matassa
 Joe Meek
 Terry Melcher
 Lester Melrose
 Giorgio Moroder
 Martin Garrix
 N
 Gil Norton
 O
 Paul Oakenfold
 William Orbit
 P
 P. Diddy
 Hugh Padgham
 Jimmy Page
 Les Paul
 Prince Paul
 Ralph Peer
 Al Perkins
 Lee »Scratch« Perry
 Sam Phillips
 Prince
 Q
 R
 Duke Reid
 Penny Rimbaud
 Nile Rodgers
 Dan Rothchild
 Rick Rubin
 Michael Roe
 Todd Rundgren
 William Russell
 RZA
 Franci Rainer
 Dejan Radičević - Daisy
 S
 Alex Sadkin
 Phil Spector
 Spectre (glasba)
 Stock, Aitken and Waterman
 Mike Stone
 Sly Stone
 T
 Shel Talmy
 Terry Scott Taylor
 Creed Taylor
 Bob Thiele
 Timbaland
 King Tubby
 Ike Turner
 U
 V
 Tony Visconti
 W
 Wagon Christ
 Clarence Williams
 Mayo Williams
 X
 Y
 Z
 Producenti


type: other

text:
Łączenie spółek. Obowiązki następcy prawnego
 Na podstawie art. 14b § 1 i § 6 ustawy z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. Ordynacja podatkowa (t.j. Dz.U. z 2015 r. poz. 613 ze zm.) oraz § 4 pkt 2 rozporządzenia Ministra Finansów z dnia 22 kwietnia 2015 r. w sprawie upoważnienia do wydawania interpretacji przepisów prawa podatkowego (Dz.U. z 2015 r., poz. 643), Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Katowicach, działający w imieniu Ministra Finansów, stwierdza, że stanowisko Wnioskodawcy, przedstawione we wniosku z 22 czerwca 2016 r. (data wpływu do tut. Biura 28 czerwca 2016 r.), o wydanie interpretacji przepisów prawa podatkowego, dotyczącej podatku dochodowego od osób prawnych w zakresie:
 obowiązku złożenia zeznania rocznego przez następcę prawnego za Spółkę przejmowaną w sytuacji zamknięcia ksiąg Spółki przejmowanej (pytanie oznaczone we wniosku jako Nr 1),
 możliwości odliczenia w ww. zeznaniu straty z lat ubiegłych poniesionych przez Spółkę przejmowaną (pytanie oznaczone we wniosku jako Nr 2)
 W dniu 28 czerwca 2016 r. do tut. Biura wpłynął wniosek o wydanie interpretacji przepisów prawa podatkowego, dotyczącej podatku dochodowego od osób prawnych w zakresie obowiązku złożenia zeznania rocznego przez następcę prawnego za Spółkę przejmowaną w sytuacji zamknięcia ksiąg Spółki przejmowanej oraz możliwości odliczenia w ww. zeznaniu straty z lat ubiegłych poniesionych przez Spółkę przejmowaną.
 Wnioskodawca planuje przejąć, w trakcie 2016 r., w trybie określonym w art. 492 § 1 pkt 1 ustawy z dnia 15 września 2000 r. Kodeks spółek handlowych (t.j. Dz.U. z 2013 r. poz. 1030 ze zm. , dalej jako „KSH”), spółkę z ograniczona odpowiedzialnością, w której posiada 100% udziałów (dalej jako: „Spółka przejmowana”). Rozliczenie połączenia na gruncie prawa bilansowego nastąpi w trybie art. 44b lub art. 44c ustawy z dnia 29 września 1994 r. o rachunkowości (t.j. Dz.U. z 2013 r. poz. 330 ze zm., dalej jako: „URach”), przy zastosowaniu metody nabycia bądź metody łączenia udziałów. Rok obrotowy i podatkowy Spółki przejmowanej pokrywa się z rokiem kalendarzowym. W związku z połączeniem Wnioskodawcy ze Spółką przejmowaną, na dzień połączenia, zgodnie z ustawą o rachunkowości, zostanie dokonane zamknięcie ksiąg rachunkowych Spółki przejmowanej, niezależnie od tego czy zostanie zastosowana metoda nabycia czy metoda łączenia udziałów. Tym samym ostatni rok podatkowy Spółki przejmowanej będzie krótszy od kalendarzowego i będzie trwał od 1 stycznia 2016 r. do dnia połączenia. W związku z zamknięciem ksiąg rachunkowych Spółki przejmowanej, Wnioskodawca, jako następca prawny Spółki przejmowanej, działając w oparciu o przepisy art. 27 ust. 1 i 2 ustawy CIT, złoży w wymaganym terminie zeznanie Spółki przejmowanej o wysokości dochodu (straty) osiągniętego przez Spółkę przejmowaną w ostatnim roku podatkowym, tj. w roku trwającym od dnia 1 stycznia 2016 r. do daty wpisu połączenia w KRS. Spółka przejmowana, na dzień 31 grudnia 2014 r. wygenerowała stratę podatkową. W zeznaniu podatkowym złożonym za rok podatkowy 2015, Spółka przejmowana rozliczyła połowę wygenerowanej straty z osiągniętym w 2015 r. dochodem. W bieżącym roku podatkowym, tj. 2016 r., Spółka przejmowana generuje dochód podatkowy.
 Czy w sytuacji zamknięcia ksiąg Spółki przejmowanej zasadne jest twierdzenie, że w świetle przepisu art. 8 ust. 6 ustawy CIT rok podatkowy Spółki przejmowanej zakończy się w dniu połączenia i czy Wnioskodawca jako spółka przejmująca (a tym samym następna prawny spółki przejmowanej), będzie zobowiązany złożyć za Spółkę przejmowaną, zeznanie roczne? (pytanie oznaczone we wniosku Nr 1)
 Czy w związku z zamknięciem roku podatkowego Spółki przejmowanej Wnioskodawca, jako następca prawny, będzie miał obowiązek wykazania oraz rozliczenia osiągniętego przez Spółkę przejmowaną dochodu za okres ostatniego roku podatkowego (kończącego się w dniu wpisu połączenia w KRS) oraz możliwość rozliczenia straty Spółki przejmowanej z lat ubiegłych z dochodem Spółki przejmowanej osiągniętym w trakcie 2016 r., zgodnie z art. 7 ust. 5 ustawy CIT? (pytanie oznaczone we wniosku Nr 2)
 Zdaniem Wnioskodawcy, zamknięcie ksiąg rachunkowych spółki przejmowanej przy rozliczaniu przejęcia metodą łączenia udziałów bądź metodą nabycia, spowoduje zakończenie roku podatkowego Spółki przejmowanej i obowiązek złożenia przez Wnioskodawcę, jako następcę prawnego, zeznania rocznego CIT-8 Spółki przejmowanej za okres od dnia 1 stycznia 2016 r. do dnia połączenia. Tym samym, Wnioskodawca będzie miał obowiązek wykazania oraz rozliczenia osiągniętego przez Spółkę przejmowaną dochodu w roku podatkowym, który zakończy się w dniu wpisu połączenia do KRS oraz możliwość rozliczenia, zgodnie z art. 7 ust. 5 ustawy CIT, straty z lat ubiegłych z dochodem Spółki przejmowanej. Zgodnie bowiem z art. 7 ust. 2 ustawy CIT, dochodem, z zastrzeżeniem art. 10, art. 11 i art. 24a, jest nadwyżka sumy przychodów nad kosztami ich uzyskania, osiągnięta w roku podatkowym; jeżeli koszty uzyskania przychodów przekraczają sumę przychodów, różnica jest stratą. Jak stanowi art. 7 ust. 5 ustawy CIT, o wysokość straty, o której mowa w ust. 2, poniesionej w roku podatkowym można obniżyć dochód w najbliższych kolejno po sobie następujących pięciu latach podatkowych, z tym że wysokość obniżenia w którymkolwiek z tych lat nie może przekroczyć 50% kwoty tej straty.
 Zgodnie z przepisami KSH, jednym ze sposobów połączenia spółek jest łączenie się przez przejęcie polegające na przeniesieniu całego majątku spółki przejmowanej na spółkę przejmującą za udziały lub akcje, które spółka przejmująca wydaje wspólnikom spółki przejmowanej (por. art. 492 § 1 pkt 1 KSH). Natomiast w świetle ustawy o rachunkowości, połączenie spółek może nastąpić metodą nabycia (por. art. 44a ust. 1 URach) lub metodą łączenia udziałów (por. art. 44a ust. 2 URach).
 W przypadku połączenia jednostek przepisy ustawy o rachunkowości jako regułę zakładają obowiązek zamknięcia ksiąg rachunkowych. Stanowi o tym art. 12 ust. 2 pkt 4 URach, zgodnie z którym księgi rachunkowe w jednostce przejmowanej zamyka się na dzień połączenia związanego z przejęciem jednostki przez inną jednostkę, to jest na dzień wpisu do rejestru tego połączenia. Z kolei art. 12 ust. 3 pkt 2 URach wskazuje, że jeśli rozliczenie połączenia następuje metodą łączenia udziałów i nie powoduje powstania nowej jednostki, to można nie zamykać ksiąg rachunkowych podmiotu przejmowanego. Z przedstawionych powyżej przepisów ustawy o rachunkowości wynika jednoznacznie obowiązek zamknięcia ksiąg rachunkowych jednostki przejmującej w przypadku łączenia spółek. Dotyczy on zarówno rozliczenia połączenia metodą nabycia, jak i metodą łączenia udziałów. Jedynie w przypadku rozliczenia połączenia w trybie art. 44c URach (tj. metodą łączenia udziałów), na zasadzie wyjątku podmiot pr...


text:
 11/Sv. 109
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 259
 22011D0070
 L 262/26
 SLUŽBENI LIST EUROPSKE UNIJE
 ODLUKA ZAJEDNIČKOG ODBORA EGP-a
 br. 70/2011
 od 1. srpnja 2011.
 o izmjeni Priloga II. (Tehnički propisi, norme, ispitivanje i potvrđivanje) Sporazumu o EGP-u
 ZAJEDNIČKI ODBOR EGP-a,
 uzimajući u obzir Sporazum o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, kako je izmijenjen Protokolom o prilagodbi Sporazuma o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, dalje u tekstu „Sporazum”, a posebno njegov članak 98.,
 budući da:
 (1)
 Prilog II. Sporazumu izmijenjen je Odlukom Zajedničkog odbora EGP-a br. 50/2011 od 20. svibnja 2011. (1).
 (2)
 Uredbu Komisije (EU) br. 1266/2010 od 22. prosinca 2010. o izmjeni Direktive 2007/68/EZ u pogledu zahtjeva za označivanje vina (2) treba unijeti u Sporazum.
 (3)
 Direktivu Komisije 2011/8/EU od 28. siječnja 2011. o izmjeni Direktive 2002/72/EZ u pogledu ograničenja uporabe bisfenola A u plastičnim bočicama za hranjenje dojenčadi. (3) treba unijeti u Sporazum
 (4)
 Ova se Odluka ne primjenjuje na Lihtenštajn,
 ODLUČIO JE:
 Članak 1.
 Poglavlje XII. Priloga II. Sporazumu mijenja se kako slijedi:
 1.
 U šestu alineju (Direktiva Komisije 2007/68/EZ) u točku 18. (Direktiva 2000/13/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća) dodaje se sljedeća alineja:
 „—
 32010 R 1266: Uredba Komisije (EU) br. 1266/2010 od 22. prosinca 2010. (SL L 347, 31.12.2010., str. 27.).”
 2.
 U točku 54.zzb (Direktiva Komisije 2002/72/EZ) dodaje se sljedeća alineja:
 „—
 32011 L 0008: Direktiva Komisije 2011/8/EU od 28. siječnja 2011. (SL L 26, 29.1.2011., str. 11.).”
 Članak 2.
 Tekstovi Uredbe (EU) br. 1266/2010 i Direktive 2011/8/EU na islandskom i norveškom jeziku, koji se objavljuju u Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije, vjerodostojni su.
 Članak 3.
 Ova Odluka stupa na snagu 2. srpnja 2011., pod uvjetom da su sve obavijesti iz članka 103. stavka 1. Sporazuma podnesene Zajedničkom odboru EGP-a (4).
 Članak 4.
 Ova se Odluka objavljuje u odjeljku o EGP-u i Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu 1. srpnja 2011.
 Za Zajednički odbor EGP-a
 Predsjednik
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) SL L 196, 28.7.2011., str. 29.
 (2) SL L 347, 31.12.2010., str. 27.
 (3) SL L 26, 29.1.2011., str. 11.
 (4) Ustavni zahtjevi nisu navedeni.


text:
 15.3.2012
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 L 76/56
 DÉCISION DU COMITÉ MIXTE DE L’EEE
 No 164/2011
 du 19 décembre 2011
 modifiant l’annexe XIII (Transports) de l’accord EEE
 LE COMITÉ MIXTE DE L’EEE,
 vu l’accord sur l’Espace économique européen, modifié par le protocole portant adaptation de cet accord, ci-après dénommé l’«accord», et notamment son article 98,
 considérant ce qui suit:
 (1)
 L’annexe XIII de l’accord a été modifiée par la décision du Comité mixte de l’EEE no 152/2011 du 2 décembre 2011 (1).
 (2)
 Le règlement (CE) no 690/2009 de la Commission du 30 juillet 2009 modifiant le règlement (CE) no 216/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil concernant des règles communes dans le domaine de l’aviation civile et instituant une Agence européenne de la sécurité aérienne, et abrogeant la directive 91/670/CEE du Conseil, le règlement (CE) no 1592/2002 et la directive 2004/36/CE (2) doit être intégré dans l’accord,
 A ADOPTÉ LA PRÉSENTE DÉCISION:
 Article premier
 La mention suivante est ajoutée au point 66n [règlement (CE) no 216/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil] de l’annexe XIII de l’accord:
 «, modifié par:
 —
 32009 R 0690: règlement (CE) no 690/2009 de la Commission du 30 juillet 2009 (JO L 199 du 31.7.2009, p. 6).»
 Article 2
 Les textes du règlement (CE) no 690/2009 en langues islandaise et norvégienne, à publier dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, font foi.
 Article 3
 La présente décision entre en vigueur le 20 décembre 2011, pour autant que toutes les notifications prévues à l’article 103, paragraphe 1, de l’accord aient été faites au Comité mixte de l’EEE (3), ou le jour d’entrée en vigueur de la décision du Comité mixte de l’EEE no 163/2011 du 19 décembre 2011 (4), la date la plus tardive étant retenue.
 Article 4
 La présente décision est publiée dans la partie EEE et dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel de l’Union européenne.
 Fait à Bruxelles, le 19 décembre 2011.
 Par le Comité mixte de l’EEE
 Le président
 Kurt JÄGER
 (1) Voir page 36 du présent Journal officiel.
 (2) JO L 199 du 31.7.2009, p. 6.
 (3) Pas d’obligations constitutionnelles signalées.
 (4) Voir page 51 du présent Journal officiel.