jurisdiction: US

text: b' UNCLASSIFIED\n Improved Contract\n Monitoring\n United States Department of State\n\n and the Broadcasting Board of Governors\n\n Office of Inspector General\n\nOffice of Inspector General\n\n\n Office of Audits\n\n\n\n Improved Contract Documentation and\n\n Monitoring by the Regional Procurement\n\n Support Office Are Needed for Construction \n\n Projects Associated With the President\xe2\x80\x99s\n\n Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\n\n\n\n Report Number AUD/IP-12-03, November 2011\n\n\n\n\n Important Notice\n\n This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the\n Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy\n directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be\n made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board\n of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior\n authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be\n determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper\n disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.\n\n\n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n Spotlight: Improved Contract Documentation by the Regional\n Support Office Are Needed for Construction Projects Associated With\n the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\n O f f i c e of In s pect o r Gene r al\n AU D / IP-1 2 \xc2\xb7 0 3 Oc t o ber 2 011\n\n\n\n Why OIG Conducted This Audit Objective\nThe Department of State OIG is requ ired, under the Tom Lan- The primary objective of this review was to determine\ntos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against whether RPSO appropriately awarded and monitored PEPFAR\nHIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of construction contracts. The results of the OIG\'s work are be-\n2008, to conduct financia l audits, inspections, and perform - ing reported in two reports. In June 2011, OIG issued AUD/IP-\nance reviews of PEPFAR. This review focused on 100 of 145 11-14 Audit of Construction and Transfer of Ownership of the\ncon tracts and task orders that the Regional Procurem ent Sup- President\'s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFARj Overseas\nport Office in Frankfurt, Germany (RPSO) awarded for PEPFAR Construction Projects, a report that focused on the Depart-\nconstruction projects between FY 2003 and the first quarter of ment\'s Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator\'s oversight\nFY 2010. The 100 procurements totaled $39,207,381 and of PEPFAR properties\nwere for the design, construction, and monitoring of construc-\ntion of clinics, labs, and other health facilities throu ghout Af-\nrica .\n\n\n\nWhat OIG Found\nOIG fo und that RPSO did not comply with requirements in the Federal Acquisition Regulation or the Department\'s Contracti ng\nOfficer\'s Representative (COR) Handbook for maintaining contract files t o demonstrate performance of required actions in\nawarding and monitoring PEP FAR construction contracts. Specifically, contract files OIG reviewed were missing evidence of one\nor more ofthe following required contract award actions: obtaining Independent Government Cost Estimates, publicizing t he\nsolicitation and requirements, and delegating COR responsibilities. In 38 of the 100 contracts and task orders reviewed by OIG,\nRPSO also inappropriately included contingency costs of $2,126,148. After the contracts were awarded, contract files in Tanza-\nnia and Uganda did not always contain adeq uate documentation showing required monitoring actions: including obt aining in-\nspection reports or ensuring inspection reports received met contract requirements; conducting site visits; and reviewing pro-\ngress payments.\n\nRPSO did not always document essential contract award actions, so the Department cannot be assured these actions were al-\nways performed for PEPFAR construction contracts. Because of inadequate monitoring, the Department cannot be assured that\nPEPFAR buildings were properly constructed and that payments to co ntractors were for work actually completed. Since RPSO\ncontracting officers are ultimately responsib le for ensuring adequate monitoring, RPSO should have ensured that qualified per-\nsonnel were available to monitor contracts, as was done in Ethiopia with the employment of a civil engineer.\n\n\n\n\nOIG Recommended\nRPSO should instruct its staff to determine whether required contract award actions for PEPFAR co nstruction contracts were\nproperly performed and documented; stop including contin gency costs in PEPFAR construction contracts and task or ders; re-\nview existing PEPFAR construction contracts and reclaim contingency costs inappropriately included in any contracts, as practi-\ncable; instruct its procurement staff to fully document contract monitoring to assess whether contractor performance is satis-\nfactory; and requ ire posts with substantial planned costs for PEPFAR construction projects to obtain an advisor with construc-\ntion expertise to monitor contracts. The Department agreed with all frve of the report\'s recommendat ions and has t aken ac-\ntions to address them. As a result, DIG closed one recommendation and considers the other four recommendations resolved,\npending evidence that further action s have been taken.\n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c United States Department of State\n and the Broadcasting Board of Governors\n\n Office o/Inspector General\n\n\n\n\n PREFACE\n\n\n This report was prepared by th~ Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector\nGeneral Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as\namended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by\nOIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability\nand positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors .\n\n This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post,\nor function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant\nagencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.\n\n The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge\navailable to OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for\nimplementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective,\nefficient, and/or economical operations.\n\n I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.\n\n\n\n\n Harold W. Geisel\n Deputy Inspector General\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nAcronyms\n\n\nAIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome\nA/LM/AQM Office of Acquisitions Management, Bureau of Administration\nCDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention\nCMS construction monitoring services\nCOR contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative\nDepartment Department of State\nFAH Foreign Affairs Handbook\nFAR Federal Acquisition Regulation\nHHS Department of Health and Human Services\nHIV human immunodeficiency virus\nIGCE Independent Government Cost Estimate\nOIG Office of Inspector General\nPEPFAR President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief\nRPSO Regional Procurement Support Office\nS/GAC Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator\n\n\n\n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n Table of Contents \n\nSection Page\n\n\nExecutive Summary .........................................................................................................................1 \n\n\nBackground ..................................................................................................................................2 \n\n\nObjective ..................................................................................................................................5 \n\n\nResults of Review ..........................................................................................................................5 \n\n\n Contract Files for PEPFAR Construction Contract Award Actions Were Incomplete .......5 \n\n Contingency Costs Were Inappropriately Included in Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts ............8 \n\n Incomplete Contract Monitoring Leaves PEPFAR Construction Projects at Risk ...........10 \n\n\nBest Practice \xe2\x80\x93 Standard Design for PEPFAR Construction .......................................................15 \n\n\nList of Recommendations ..............................................................................................................17 \n\n\nAppendices \n\n\n A. Scope and Methodology................................................................................................18 \n\n B. Bureau of Administration Office of Acquisitions Management Response .................22 \n\n\nMajor Contributors to This Report ..............................................................................................27 \n\n\n\n\n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n Executive Summary\n In 2003, the Regional Procurement Support Office (RPSO) in Frankfurt, Germany, began\nawarding and monitoring President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) construction\ncontracts for the Department of State (Department) and the Centers for Disease Control and\nPrevention (CDC). The contracts, including associated task orders, were awarded for the design,\nconstruction, and monitoring of the construction of hospitals, clinics, and laboratories supporting\nthe treatment of patients with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency\nsyndrome (HIV/AIDS) in nine countries in Africa.1 The primary objective of this review was to\ndetermine whether RPSO appropriately awarded and monitored PEPFAR construction contracts.\nThe results of the Office of Inspector General\xe2\x80\x99s (OIG) work are being reported in two reports.\nOIG\xe2\x80\x99s previous report focused on the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Office of the U.S. Global AIDS\nCoordinator\xe2\x80\x99s oversight of the construction and transfer of PEPFAR properties.2\n\n OIG found that RPSO did not comply with requirements in the Federal Acquisition\nRegulation (FAR) or the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Contracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative (COR) Handbook,\nwhich is contained in the Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH), for maintaining contract files to\ndemonstrate performance of required actions in awarding and monitoring PEPFAR construction\ncontracts. (Details of the methodology of OIG\xe2\x80\x99s review are shown in Appendix A, \xe2\x80\x9cScope and\nMethodology.\xe2\x80\x9d) Specifically, 34 PEPFAR construction contracts3 at RPSO were missing\nevidence of one or more of the following required contract award actions for three of eight\ncategories OIG reviewed:4 obtaining Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCE),\npublicizing the solicitation and requirements, and delegating COR responsibilities. During this\nreview, OIG also found that RPSO inappropriately included contingency costs in these contracts\nand task orders totaling $2,126,148. Because Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda were awarded\nmost of the contracts and task orders, OIG selected these countries for review and found that at\ntwo of the three posts\xe2\x80\x94Tanzania and Uganda\xe2\x80\x94contract monitoring files did not always contain\nadequate documentation showing required monitoring actions, including: obtaining inspection\nreports or ensuring inspection reports received met contract requirements; conducting site visits;\nand reviewing progress payments. However, OIG found that in Ethiopia, an engineer with\ntechnical construction expertise took responsibility for most of the monitoring functions for the\nU.S. Government, which resulted in better recordkeeping and more effective oversight.\n\n RPSO did not always document essential contract award actions, so the Department\ncannot be assured that these actions were always performed for PEPFAR construction contracts.\nAlso, because of inadequate monitoring, the Department cannot be assured that PEPFAR\nbuildings were properly constructed and that payments made to contractors were for work\nactually completed. Since RPSO contracting officers are ultimately responsible for ensuring\n\n1\n The nine countries are Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique, Kenya, Botswana, and \n\nMalawi. \n\n2\n Audit of Construction and Transfer of Ownership of the President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\n\nOverseas Construction Projects (AUD/IP-11-14, June 2011). \n\n3\n There are 66 task orders associated with the 34 contracts for a total of 100 procurement actions. \n\n4\n The remaining five award categories reviewed include: providing justification for other than full and open\n\ncompetition, obtaining proper funding authorization, evaluating technical proposals, ensuring full and open\n\ncompetition, and reviewing cost proposals. \n\n 1\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nadequate monitoring, RPSO should have ensured that qualified personnel were available to\nmonitor contracts, as was done in Ethiopia with the employment of an engineer.\n\n In September 2011, OIG provided a draft of this report with five recommendations to\nimprove RPSO operations to the director of the Office of Acquisitions Management in the\nBureau of Administration (A/LM/AQM). Specifically, OIG recommended that RPSO instruct its\nprocurement staff to determine whether required contract award actions for PEPFAR\nconstruction contracts were properly performed and documented; stop including contingency\ncosts in PEPFAR construction contracts and task orders unless identified contingencies arise\nfrom presently known and existing conditions, as described in the FAR5; review existing\nPEPFAR construction contracts and reclaim contingency costs inappropriately included in any\ncontracts as practicable; fully document contract monitoring to assess whether contractor\nperformance is satisfactory; and require posts with substantial planned costs for PEPFAR\nconstruction projects to obtain a technical advisor with construction expertise to monitor\nconstruction contracts.\n\n In its October 7, 2011, response to the draft report, presented in Appendix B,\nA/LM/AQM agreed with all recommendations and stated it had already taken steps to address\nsome of the recommendations. Based on A/LM/AQM\xe2\x80\x99s response, OIG considers\nRecommendation 1 resolved and closed. The four remaining recommendations are considered\nresolved because steps are being taken to implement them; however, they will remain open until\nA/LM/AQM provides evidence that they have been fully implemented.\n\n Background\n RPSO Frankfurt6 acquires supplies and services for U.S diplomatic posts throughout the\nworld. RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s procurement personnel manage all stages of the procurement process, including\nsoliciting quotations, processing task orders, and executing and administering contracts. RPSO\nhas developed a specialized program for the acquisition of construction contracting services in\nwhich it awards security upgrades, designs and builds projects, and acquires architectural and\nengineering services.\n\n From FY 2003 through the first quarter of FY 2010,7 RPSO awarded 145 overseas\nconstruction procurements (contracts and associated task orders) for the CDC in support of\nPEPFAR. These 145 procurements, with a value totaling $56,009,736, were awarded to\nconstruction companies in nine African countries and included laboratories, hospitals, and\nclinics, as well as construction monitoring and architect and engineering services, as shown in\nFigure 1.\n\n\n5\n FAR 31.205-7, \xe2\x80\x9cContingencies.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n6\n Another RPSO, located in Fort Lauderdale, FL, acquires supplies and services for diplomatic posts in Latin\n\nAmerica, the Caribbean, and Canada. \n\n7\n At the beginning of FY 2010 (Nov. 4, 2009), the CDC sent a cable to posts advising the posts\xe2\x80\x99 staffs to \xe2\x80\x9ccease and \n\ndesist\xe2\x80\x9d from participating in the award of contracts for PEPFAR construction (Cable 09 CDC ATLANTA GA 7821,\n\n\xe2\x80\x9cCDC Officials \xe2\x80\x93 Requisitioning Procurements Using State Department Funds\xe2\x80\x9d). This cable is detailed further in\n\nOIG\xe2\x80\x99s report AUD/IP/11-14, June 2011. \n\n 2\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n Figure 1. Regional Procurement Support Office Construction Procurements\n Total Values By Country Awarded FY 2003 - FY 2010\n (in U.S. Dollars)\n Zambia Botswana\n 3,299,140 279,316\n Uganda\n 4,750,490 Ethiopia\n 16,274,205\n\n\n\n\n Kenya\n 2,813,360\n Malawi\n Tanzania 175,021\n Mozambique\n 22,276,299 Namibia 2,821,880\n 3,320,025\n\n Source: OIG-generated from RPSO contract files.\n\n Of the 145 contracts and task orders RPSO awarded from FY 2003 through the first\nquarter of FY 2010, OIG reviewed files at RPSO for 100 contracts and task orders,8 valued at a\ntotal of $39,207,381: 34 contracts,9 valued at $17,492,381, and 66 associated task orders, valued\nat $21,715,000. Of these 100 contract files, 59 files covered construction activities in the\ncountries OIG visited: 38 in Tanzania, 7 in Uganda, and 14 in Ethiopia. Of these 59 files, 29\nwere for construction monitoring services or design services, and 30 were for construction\nactivities, as shown in Table 1. (The contract files reviewed are further detailed in Appendix A.)\n\n Table 1. Construction Activities for Three Posts Visited\n A & E Services\n Actual and\n Country Total Construction CMS Services *\n\n Tanzania 38 18 20\n Uganda 7 4 3\n\n Ethiopia 14 8 6\n\n Total 59 30 29\n Source: OIG-generated from COR contract monitoring files.\n *Inspection reports and site visits are not required for architectural\n and engineering (A&E) services and contract monitoring services\n (CMS). Therefore, for these types of procurements, OIG reviewed\n only progress payments.\n\n\n\n\n8\n Ninety-five of the 100 contracts and task orders OIG reviewed were awarded between FYs 2007 and 2009. The \n\nremaining five contracts were awarded outside this period: two contracts were awarded in FY 2005, two contracts \n\nwere awarded in FY 2006, and one contract was awarded in FY 2010.\n\n9\n The 34 contracts consisted of 21 firm-fixed-price contracts and 13 indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts. \n\n 3\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n Contracting officers at RPSO issued firm-fixed-price contracts and indefinite-\ndelivery/indefinite-quantity contracts with fixed-price task orders for these construction\nprocurements. With firm-fixed-price contracts or task orders, contractors receive a fixed cost for\nsupplies or services not subject to any cost adjustment based on the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s actual\nexperience.10 According to the FAR, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts are used\n\xe2\x80\x9cto acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future\ndeliveries are not known at the time of contract award,\xe2\x80\x9d11 and individual task orders are then\nissued as separate awards for individual requirements.12\n\n The FAR further states that the head of an office performing contracting functions must\nestablish files that contain the records of all contractual actions.13 The documentation should\nadequately represent a complete history of transactions, showing the complete background of\ndecisions made at each step of the acquisition process and provide support for actions taken. The\ndocumentation is also essential to ensure that information is available \xe2\x80\x9cin the event of litigation\nor congressional inquiries.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nContracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative\n\n RPSO delegates the day-to-day monitoring of these procurements to personnel in the\nfield by issuing a COR delegation memorandum, which the COR is required to sign and return to\nthe contracting officer. The COR\xe2\x80\x99s signature certifies that he or she has read and understands the\ncontents of the COR Handbook.\n\n CORs are responsible for maintaining adequate records that document the performance of\ntheir duties. COR contract files should contain the COR delegation memorandum, a copy of the\ncontract, correspondence and memoranda for the record on contractor performance, records\nrelated to the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s quality control plan and results of quality control activities, the\nsurveillance schedule, and documentation pertaining to the COR\xe2\x80\x99s acceptance of performance of\nservices.\n\nConstruction Monitoring Services\n\n For the three posts OIG visited, RPSO also awarded contracts to architectural and\nengineering firms to perform construction monitoring services (CMS) for PEPFAR construction\nprojects.14 These CMS contracts refer to the CMS contractor as the \xe2\x80\x9con-site Government\nRepresentative.\xe2\x80\x9d However, the contracts OIG reviewed caution that the CMS contractor does\nnot have the authority to direct the activity of the construction contractor.\n\n According to the contracts, the CMS contractor is responsible for construction contract\nmonitoring and reporting on all aspects of construction, including structural, electrical,\n\n\n10\n FAR 16.202-1, \xe2\x80\x9cFirm-Fixed-Price Contracts \xe2\x80\x93 Description.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n11\n FAR 16.501-2(a), \xe2\x80\x9cIndefinite-Delivery Contracts.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n12\n FAR 16.504, \xe2\x80\x9cIndefinite-Quantity Contracts.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n13\n FAR 4.801(a) and (b)(1)(2)(3)(4), \xe2\x80\x9cGovernment Contract Files \xe2\x80\x93 General.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n14\n CMSs were included in 36 of the 145 construction procurements awarded by RPSO.\n\n 4\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nmechanical, and security work. Specific required CMS actions include, but are not limited to,\nthe following:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Visiting the site periodically and monitoring the performance of the construction\n contractor.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Observing, inspecting, and evaluating the construction work.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Enforcing quality control requirements.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Identifying and notifying the COR of potential schedule slippages.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Reviewing the construction contractor\xe2\x80\x99s monthly progress payment requests and\n recommending appropriate action to the COR.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Preparing and submitting timely and accurate weekly and monthly progress reports to\n the COR.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Providing clear and comprehensive photographs that depict the entire property with\n the date and location (no fewer than five pictures to be taken and submitted with each\n report).\n\n CMS contractors are required to submit written reports that must include date and time of\nthe visit, weather conditions and temperatures, persons met on-site the day of inspection, workers\npresent, and any item found deficient, along with a recommended corrective action.\n\n Objective\n The results of OIG\xe2\x80\x99s work are being reported in two reports. The primary objective of\nthis review was to determine whether RPSO followed applicable Federal regulations in awarding\nand monitoring PEPFAR construction contracts. The previous report focused on the Office of\nthe U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator\xe2\x80\x99s oversight of PEPFAR construction projects and the transfer\nof these projects to host governments.15\n\n Results of Review\n\nContract Files for PEPFAR Construction Contract Award Actions Were\nIncomplete\n RPSO did not comply with FAR or COR Handbook requirements for maintaining\ncontract files16 to demonstrate that required actions were performed in awarding PEPFAR\nconstruction contracts for three of eight award categories that OIG reviewed. For the 34 contract\nfiles reviewed,17 OIG determined that 18 files were missing required documentation for one or\nmore of the following award actions:\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Eleven files did not include an IGCE.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Eight files contained no evidence that the solicitation or requirements were publicized.\n15\n Audit of Construction and Transfer of Ownership of the President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\n\nOverseas Construction Projects, AUD/IP-11-14, June 2011. \n\n16\n FAR 4.801(a) and (b)(1)(2)(3)(4). \n\n17\n Sixty-six task orders are associated with the 34 contracts. \n\n 5\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n \xef\x82\xb7 Ten files did not include a COR delegation memorandum.\n\n Because RPSO did not always document these contract award actions, the Department\ncannot be assured that it obtained a fair and reasonable price from the bidder or offeror or that\nthe solicitation was adequately publicized to ensure full and open competition. In addition, the\nfailure to document the delegation of COR duties provides the Department no assurance that the\nCOR understands his or her responsibilities.\n\nMissing Contract Award Documentation\n\n RPSO contracting officers did not consistently adhere to the FAR or the COR Handbook\nin awarding PEPFAR construction contracts on behalf of the CDC for the following required\nactions: preparing an IGCE, publicizing the solicitation and requirements, and delegating COR\nresponsibilities by memorandum.\n\n Of the 34 contracts OIG reviewed, totaling $17,492,381, OIG found 18 contracts, valued\nat $8,464,199 (or 48.4 percent of the total value), that had documentation missing for one or\nmore required award actions described as follows:\n\n Independent Government Cost Estimate \xe2\x80\x93 RPSO procurement officials did not ensure\nthat an IGCE was prepared for nearly one-third (11 of 34) of the PEPFAR construction contracts\nthey awarded. The FAR18 requires that the COR prepare an IGCE for supplies and services over\nthe simplified acquisition threshold of $150,000.19 The Department\xe2\x80\x99s guidance in the COR\nHandbook states that an IGCE should be prepared by the contracting officer and the COR.\nIGCEs are important in establishing a fair price for U.S. Government contracts. The COR\nHandbook states that IGCEs are the basis for reserving funds for the contract as part of\nacquisition planning and for comparing costs or prices proposed by offerors. It further states that\nIGCEs are an objective basis for determining price reasonableness in cases in which one bidder\nor offeror responds to a solicitation.\n\n Publicizing Solicitations and Requirements \xe2\x80\x93 OIG found no evidence that RPSO\ncontracting personnel publicized requirements for eight (24 percent) of 34 contracts awarded, as\nrequired by the FAR.20 Acquisitions between $25,000 and $5 million are subject to some form\nof public notification appropriate to local conditions at the overseas post. RPSO procurement\nofficials stated that they had sent Standard Forms 330, Architect-Engineer Qualifications, to\narchitects recommended by the post. However, this form is used as part of the evaluation\nprocess and does not constitute proper notification. Sending information only to certain\ncompanies could be viewed as favoring specific vendors and is more likely to subject the\nDepartment to legal action by companies. For public notification, RPSO should have used the\nembassy Web site, local advertisement, notification to trade associations, or other methods\nappropriate for the post.\n\n\n18\n FAR 36.203, \xe2\x80\x9cGovernment Estimates of Construction Costs.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n19\n FAR 2.101 defines the simplified acquisition threshold as $150,000, as of October 1, 2010. The simplified\n\nacquisition threshold at the time of OIG fieldwork was $100,000. \n\n20\n FAR 5.101(b), \xe2\x80\x9cDissemination of Information \xe2\x80\x93 Methods of Disseminating Information.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n 6\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n COR Delegation \xe2\x80\x93 OIG found that RPSO contracting officers had not properly delegated\nCOR duties for 10 (29 percent) of 34 PEPFAR construction contracts they awarded. Contracting\nofficers are required to prepare and issue a COR delegation memorandum as part of the award\nprocess in accordance with the COR Handbook.21 CORs are to act as the contracting officers\xe2\x80\x99\nauthorized representatives for these PEPFAR construction projects, assisting in the\nadministration of the contract. As such, they should receive a delegation memorandum outlining\ntheir responsibilities at the same time the requirements are initiated, as required by the COR\nHandbook.22 However, Department contracting personnel did not always issue delegation\nmemoranda to the CORs and, in some cases, did not follow up with CORs to ensure signed\nmemoranda were returned to RPSO for inclusion in the contract files. Properly documenting the\ndelegation of duties for CORs is important because it certifies that CORs understand their\nresponsibilities.\n\nConclusion\n\n Because RPSO did not always document contract award actions, the Department cannot\nbe assured that required contract actions were taken for the PEPFAR construction contracts.\nSpecifically, documentation of procurement actions that establish price, promote competition and\ncontract transparency, and delineate contract administration roles and responsibilities are\nessential to demonstrate the adequacy of the contract award.\n\n Management Comments to the Finding and OIG Analysis\n\n A/LM/AQM, in its October 7, 2011 response, disagreed that an IGCE was necessary in\nestablishing a fair price. A/LM/AQM stated that price reasonableness was established by\ncontacting three or more contractors and therefore an IGCE was not necessary.\n\n FAR 36.203 requires that \xe2\x80\x9c[a]n independent Government estimate of construction costs\nshall be prepared and furnished to the contracting officer at the earliest practicable time for each\nproposed contract and for each contract modification anticipated to exceed the simplified\nacquisition threshold.\xe2\x80\x9d Because the PEPFAR contracts exceeded the simplified acquisition\nthreshold, IGCEs should have been prepared.23 Further, Department regulations24 require that an\nIGCE be prepared \xe2\x80\x9cto serve as a basis for comparing costs or prices proposed by offerors\xe2\x80\x9d and\nthe Department\xe2\x80\x99s Overseas Contracting and Simplified Acquisition Guidebook states that one of\nthe purposes of the IGCE is to determine price reasonableness.\n\n Recommendation 1. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\n Frankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its procurement staff to review active PEPFAR\n construction contract files to determine whether required contract award actions for\n PEPFAR construction contracts were properly performed and documented, including\n\n21\n 14 FAH-2 H-143.2(2), \xe2\x80\x9cAppointment Procedures.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n22\n 14 FAH-2 H-142, \xe2\x80\x9cResponsibilities of the Contracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n23\n FAR 2.101 defines the simplified acquisition threshold as $150,000, as of October 1, 2010. The simplified\n\nacquisition threshold at the time of OIG fieldwork was $100,000. \n\n24\n 14 FAH-2 H-351 a (2) and c.\n\n\n 7\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n obtaining an Independent Government Cost Estimate, publicizing contract solicitations,\n and delegating a contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative. If documentation supporting any of\n these actions is found, it should be included in the respective file.\n\n Management Response: A/LM/AQM agreed with the recommendation and stated it had\n conducted a complete review of PEPFAR files in January 2011, in response to OIG\xe2\x80\x99s\n preliminary findings, and has added missing documentation to the files.\n\n OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation resolved and closed because of the\n actions taken by RPSO to implement the recommendation, along with evidence that\n PEPFAR construction contract files have been reviewed and deficiencies pertaining to\n documentation addressed.\n\nContingency Costs Were Inappropriately Included in Firm-Fixed-Price\nContracts\n Contingency costs of about $2 million were inappropriately included in eight firm-fixed-\nprice contracts and 30 task orders valued at nearly $30 million out of the 100 contracts and task\norders awarded by RPSO and reviewed by OIG. Because these contingency costs were part of\nthe overall value of the contract, the funds could be spent without pre-approval from the\nDepartment. As a result, the Department could pay for goods or services it would otherwise not\napprove.\n\nConstruction Procurements With Contingency Costs\n\n Of the 100 PEPFAR construction procurements (contracts and task orders) awarded\nbetween FY 2005 and the first quarter of FY 2010 reviewed, OIG found that 38 contracts and\ntask orders, valued at $29,926,033, inappropriately included contingency costs totaling\n$2,126,148. The contracts and tasks orders with inappropriate contingency costs are shown by\ncountry and dollar amount in Table 2.\n\n Table 2. Contracts and Task Orders With Inappropriate\n Contingency Costs (in U.S. Dollars)\n Country Contingency Cost PEPFAR Amount\n\n Tanzania 964,668 10,027,924\n Ethiopia 708,931 13,635,953\n Uganda 8,265 204,817\n Namibia 29,348 711,511\n Zambia 118,748 934,984\n Mozambique 194,250 2,500,000\n Kenya 101,938 1,910,844\n\n Total $ 2,126,148 $ 29,926,033\n\n Source: OIG-generated from RPSO contract files.\n\n\n 8\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n A contingency, as described in the FAR 31.205-7, is \xe2\x80\x9ca possible future event or condition\narising from presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of which is indeterminable at the\npresent time.\xe2\x80\x9d According to the FAR, contingencies may be included in estimates of future costs\nif they \xe2\x80\x9carise from presently known and existing conditions, the effects of which are foreseeable\nwithin reasonable limits of accuracy.\xe2\x80\x9d However, effects that cannot \xe2\x80\x9cbe measured so precisely as\nto provide equitable results to the contractor and to the Government\xe2\x80\x9d are to be excluded from\ncost estimates.\n\nContingency Costs and Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts\n\n The director of RPSO stated that the office added funds on contracts for contingencies to\nstreamline the administrative process, because if additional funds were needed after contract\naward, it could take months to get a modification approved. Some contract terms stated that the\ncontingency funds were to \xe2\x80\x9ccover any additional construction effort that is required but could not\nbe identified in time for inclusion in the solicitation package.\xe2\x80\x9d In addition, some task orders\nincluded language about contingency funds, stating that they were for possible construction\nrevisions during the performance period and were placed in the contract for obligation purposes\nonly. The contingency cost amount for some contracts was estimated as a percentage of the total\ncontract value because, at the time of contract award, RPSO contracting officials could not\ndetermine the amount that would be needed. Further, the contract terms did not require any\nadditional information from the contractor in order for the contractor to request payments for\nthese contingency funds. For the contract files OIG reviewed that included either contingency\ncosts or \xe2\x80\x9cprovisional funds,\xe2\x80\x9d OIG found no evidence that, at the time of contract award, the\ncontingency costs for the PEPFAR construction contracts were for known and existing\nconditions.\n\n According to the FAR,25 a firm-fixed-price contract \xe2\x80\x9cprovides for a price that is not\nsubject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s cost experience in performing the\ncontract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for\nall costs and resulting profit or loss.\xe2\x80\x9d The COR Handbook26 states that payment for satisfactory\ncompletion of work is fixed and the contractor receives the pre-negotiated, fixed amount,\nregardless of actual costs incurred.\xe2\x80\x9d Adding funds to the contract for unknown future costs or\ncontingencies in essence negates the purpose of a firm-fixed-price contract. In addition, the\ncontractor may spend contingency funds on goods and services without approval from the U.S.\nGovernment, which could result in the Department paying for goods and services it would\notherwise not approve. Ending the practice of adding contingency costs to firm-fixed-price\nPEPFAR construction contracts and reclaiming $2 million in contingency costs inappropriately\nincluded in previous contracts and task orders are appropriate and prudent actions to ensure the\neffective use of PEPFAR funding.\n\n\n\n\n25\n FAR 16.202-1. \n\n26\n 14 FAH-2 H-232, \xe2\x80\x9cFixed-Price Contracts.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n 9\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n Management Comments to the Finding and OIG Analysis\n\n In its response to OIG\xe2\x80\x99s draft report, A/LM/AQM stated that RPSO required modification\nto PEPFAR contracts before contingency funds could be released and this information was\nclearly stated in RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s contract documents. However, in some of the contracts OIG reviewed,\nthe language was unclear regarding how to handle contingencies. For example, in Tanzania, the\nlanguage in the contract related to contingencies was confusing to the COR, technical advisor,\nand contractor. The technical advisor for the projects OIG reviewed said the language regarding\ncontingencies was ambiguous and the COR responsible for overseeing the project said that\nRPSO procurement staff provided conflicting guidance about how to treat contingency costs.\nThe contractor on the project was also unclear about how contingencies should be handled\nbelieving that they were entitled to the full amount of the award, including contingencies,\nbecause the award was fixed price.\n\n Recommendation 2. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\n Frankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its personnel to stop the practice of including\n contingency funds in PEPFAR construction contracts unless identified contingencies\n arise from presently known and existing conditions, as described in section 31.205-7 of\n the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\n\n Management Response: A/LM/AQM agreed with the recommendation and stated\n RPSO issued informal guidance to staff about contingencies after OIG\xe2\x80\x99s visit to RPSO.\n\n OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation resolved because RPSO has taken\n steps to address the recommendation; however, this recommendation will remain open\n until RPSO provides evidence that personnel have received guidance about the proper\n application of contingency costs.\n\n Recommendation 3. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\n Frankfurt, Germany, review existing PEPFAR construction contracts and reclaim any\n contingency costs inappropriately included in contracts as practicable.\n\n Management Response: A/LM/AQM agreed with the recommendation and stated\n RPSO Frankfurt has used change orders to modify contracts that contained contingency\n costs or has deobligated the contingency costs from PEPFAR construction contracts.\n\n OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation resolved because RPSO has taken\n steps to implement it; however, this recommendation will remain open until RPSO\n provides evidence that PEPFAR construction contracts containing contingency costs have\n been modified or contingency costs deobligated for the award actions OIG reviewed.\n\nIncomplete Contract Monitoring Leaves PEPFAR Construction Projects at\nRisk\n At two of the three posts OIG visited\xe2\x80\x94Tanzania and Uganda\xe2\x80\x94OIG reviewed 22\nPEPFAR contract files related to actual construction, 18 in Tanzania and four in Uganda, that did\n 10\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nnot always contain adequate documentation of required monitoring actions.27 Specifically, eight\nof the 18 COR contract files reviewed in Tanzania lacked evidence to show that CORs obtained\ninspection reports from independent CMS contractors. Additionally, the inspection reports that\nwere included in the files in Tanzania and Uganda did not always include the detailed\ninformation required by the contract terms. In Tanzania, three of 18 files also did not contain\nevidence showing that site visits were being conducted. OIG also found that 12 of the 38\nconstruction and construction-related contract files OIG reviewed in Tanzania (see Table 1) did\nnot contain evidence showing that progress payments had been reviewed. In Ethiopia, however,\nan engineer with technical construction expertise was hired to handle most of the monitoring\nfunctions for the U.S. Government, which resulted in better recordkeeping and more effective\noversight.\n\n The FAR28 requires that contract files contain all pertinent contract actions. Therefore,\nthe contracting officers at RPSO were ultimately responsible for ensuring that contract files\ncontained evidence of monitoring efforts, but they did not always provide adequate oversight of\nCORs to ensure these activities were documented. As a result, the U.S Government cannot be\nassured that construction always followed design specifications and met quality standards.\n\nMonitoring Requirements\n\n The COR Handbook29 states:\n\n To assure performance of a contract in the manner most beneficial to the U.S.\n Government, the U.S. Government has the responsibility to actively watch and\n follow the contractor\'s performance and take prompt, affirmative action to correct\n problems. This is one of the most vital elements of what is called \xe2\x80\x98contract\n administration,\xe2\x80\x99 i.e., making sure that the terms and conditions agreed upon when\n the contract was awarded are actually carried out.\n\n As part of contract administration, CORs are required to \xe2\x80\x9cmaintain a file documenting\nsignificant actions and containing copies of trip reports, correspondence, and reports and\ndeliverables received under the contract.\xe2\x80\x9d30\n\nContract Monitoring in Ethiopia\n\n OIG found that Ethiopia had proper documentation to show consistent monitoring,\nincluding very detailed records of monitoring activities for the eight construction files reviewed.\nFor example, the CMS contractor monitored construction by employing a resident employee, or\n\xe2\x80\x9cresident engineer,\xe2\x80\x9d who was on- site and worked the same hours as the construction\ncontractor.31 On a daily basis, the resident engineer monitored and recorded the number and type\n\n27\n Of the 100 PEPFAR construction contract files OIG reviewed, 14 were in Ethiopia, 38 were in Tanzania, and \n\nseven were in Uganda. Of these files, 29 were for CMS or design services, and 30 were for construction activities. \n\n28\n FAR 4.801(a) and (b)(1)(2)(3)(4). \n\n29\n 14 FAH-2 H-511(a), \xe2\x80\x9cAdministration.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n30\n 14 FAH-2 H-513c(2), \xe2\x80\x9cThe Contracting Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Representative\xe2\x80\x99s (COR) Role in Contract Administration.\xe2\x80\x9d \n\n31\n A resident engineer is an on-site monitor employed by the CMS contractor. \n\n 11\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nof workers, on-site equipment, type and amount of work performed, and other information and\nactivities. Reports that included this information were prepared daily and signed by the resident\nengineer and construction contractor. Daily reports were subsequently incorporated into monthly\nprogress reports provided to the COR.\n\n In addition, the COR in Ethiopia had an engineer with technical construction expertise to\noversee and work closely with the CMS contractor to ensure that the contract requirements were\nmet and construction project progressed as expected.\n\nContract Monitoring in Tanzania and Uganda\n\n At two posts OIG visited\xe2\x80\x94Tanzania and Uganda\xe2\x80\x94OIG found that CORs did not obtain\nadequate documentation from CMS contractors of construction monitoring activities.\nSpecifically, eight of 18 PEPFAR construction contract files reviewed in Tanzania contained no\nevidence that inspection reports were obtained, and the remaining files often did not include all\nof the elements required under the terms of the contract. Although the four construction contract\nfiles reviewed in Uganda contained one inspection report for each project under construction, the\nfiles did not include all of the required monthly reports, and the single report obtained for each\nproject did not include the detailed information required under the terms of the contract. Three\nof 18 contract files reviewed in Tanzania did not contain evidence to show that CORs had\nconducted site visits. In addition, 12 of the 38 construction and construction-related contract\nfiles OIG reviewed in Tanzania contained no evidence showing that progress payments had been\nreviewed.\n\n Inspection Reports \xe2\x80\x93 Although required, CMS contractors did not provide inspection\nreports to the COR for eight of 18 construction contract files in Tanzania. OIG also found that\nthe inspection reports were received sporadically, although the contract terms generally required\nreports to be submitted monthly. The inspection reports that the CORs received in Tanzania and\nUganda did not always address inspection elements required by the contract, such as the date and\ntime of the inspection, individuals met on-site the day of inspection, workers present, and any\nitems found to be deficient. Each deficient item should include a description and explanation\n(cause) of the deficiency, the impact or consequences, recommended corrective action, and\npotential hazards.\n\n CMS contractors were required to carry out and document inspections to determine\nwhether services were performed according to the contract requirements and provide copies of\ninspection reports to the COR. In accordance with the COR Handbook,32 the COR must ensure\nthat the contractor complies with reporting provisions in the contract. The COR Handbook also\nstates that the \xe2\x80\x9cCOR must read and understand the progress reports to identify and initiate steps\nto deal with any threats to performance that they may disclose.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n However, in Uganda, the COR received only one combined inspection report for all four\nongoing projects from the CMS contractor in March 2010, even though the CMS contractor\nshould have been monitoring the projects for 5 months beginning in October 2009 and sending\n\n32\n 14 FAH-2 H-522.2, \xe2\x80\x9cReports.\xe2\x80\x9d\n 12\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nmonthly reports to the COR. Prior to OIG\xe2\x80\x99s site visit to Tanzania, the COR made a special effort\nto obtain CMS inspection reports for the construction contract files but received reports for only\nsix of 18 contracts.\n\n Site Visits \xe2\x80\x93 OIG found that three of 18 construction procurement files in Tanzania did\nnot contain evidence of any COR site visits. Although Uganda\xe2\x80\x99s files showed at least one COR\nsite visit report for each of the four ongoing projects, the files were missing reports for dates site\nvisits were indicated to have occurred, as noted in the files. In accordance with the COR\nHandbook,33 CORs are required to conduct site visits to check a contractor\xe2\x80\x99s actual performance\nagainst the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s reported performance. In addition, physical on-site visits provide\nassurance that the contractor is performing work as expected.\n\n Progress Payment Reviews \xe2\x80\x93 OIG found that 12 of 38 construction and construction-\nrelated COR contract files in Tanzania did not contain evidence that CORs were reviewing\nprogress payment requests. CORs are required to review contractor invoices prior to payment to\nensure that costs are valid and to compare claimed costs against actual progress. According to\nthe COR Handbook34 CORs are responsible for \xe2\x80\x9cmonitoring the contractor\'s technical progress\nand the expenditures of resources relating to the contract.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\nResponsibility for Contract Monitoring\n\n In practice, RPSO contracting officers are primarily involved in the solicitation and\naward of procurements; CORs perform day-to-day contract monitoring after the award.\nHowever, RPSO contracting officers are ultimately responsible for contract monitoring because\nthey are required to assess whether contractor performance is satisfactory.35\n\n RPSO contracting officers stated that they are not responsible for ensuring that CORs\nproperly monitor construction projects, but rather this is the responsibility of program officials or\nthe CMS contractor. RPSO contracting officers said they tend to get involved with CORs only\nwhen specifically requested or when the contract needs to be modified. Some of RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s\ncontract files that OIG reviewed included copies of progress reports and site visits for PEPFAR\nconstruction projects. However, these documents were not always included in RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s contract\nfiles or the COR\xe2\x80\x99s contract files at post.\n\n RPSO contracting officers stated that many CORs monitoring PEPFAR construction\ncontracts were CDC medical professionals who often were not experienced in monitoring\nconstruction contracts. However, because RPSO contracting officers and contract specialists\nwere aware of this limitation, they should have been even more involved with the CDC-\ndesignated CORs to ensure that proper procedures were followed. The director of RPSO\nacknowledged that CORs from the CDC would benefit from hiring engineers to confirm before\npayment whether buildings were completed according to specifications. However, at two posts\nwith substantial construction (Tanzania and Uganda), there was no engineer on-site to perform\nthis task.\n33\n 14 FAH-2 H-522.3, \xe2\x80\x9cSite Visits.\xe2\x80\x9d\n34\n 14 FAH-2 H-142b(7).\n35\n 14 FAH-2 H-513a.\n 13\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n The U.S. Government cannot be assured that PEPFAR facilities in Tanzania and Uganda\nwere properly constructed or monitored. At one location in Tanzania, a site where a PEPFAR\nfacility was to be built had previously been a trash dump. The original design contractor did not\nperform an environmental scan of this location, which would have likely been uncovered through\neffective monitoring. At another PEPFAR\xe2\x80\x93constructed facility in Uganda, the contractor had\ncompleted renovating a laboratory to be used for treating tuberculosis patients but did not install\na key piece of equipment required to operate the laboratory\xe2\x80\x94a negative air pressure system.\nThis system is required to meet international accreditation standards and is used to prevent the\ndispersion of microbial pathogens from contaminated areas. CDC personnel told OIG that,\nbefore they could open the lab, they would require an additional $70,000 to $80,000 to obtain\nand install the system. In addition, without evidence of progress payment reviews, contractors\nmay be paid for work that may not have been actually completed, and the U.S. Government is\nnot assured that constructed facilities meet design specifications.\n\n Recommendation 4. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\n Frankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its procurement staff to fully document\n contract monitoring to assess whether contractor performance is satisfactory.\n\n Management Response: A/LM/AQM agreed with the recommendation and stated\n RPSO Frankfurt \xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\xa6will provide additional guidance to CORs emphasizing the need to\n maintain adequate contract files on contract monitoring.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation resolved because A/LM/AQM has\n agreed to take necessary steps to implement it; however, this recommendation will\n remain open until RPSO provides evidence that CORs responsible for PEPFAR\n construction contracts have received additional guidance about maintaining contract\n monitoring files.\n\n Recommendation 5. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\n Frankfurt, Germany, require posts with substantial planned costs for PEPFAR\n construction projects to obtain a technical advisor with construction expertise for\n monitoring construction contracts.\n\n Management Response: A/LM/AQM agreed with \xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\xa6the concept of posts obtaining a\n technical advisor with construction expertise for monitoring construction contracts\xe2\x80\x9d but\n stated that RPSO Frankfurt cannot require CORs to hire a technical advisor. However,\n A/LM/AQM stated that RPSO Frankfurt will augment guidance to its customers,\n emphasizing ways to improve contract monitoring.\n\n OIG Analysis: OIG considers this recommendation resolved because A/LM/AQM has\n agreed to take steps to improve technical oversight of PEPFAR construction contracts;\n however, this recommendation will remain open until RPSO provides evidence that that\n additional guidance emphasizing ways to improve contract monitoring has been\n disseminated.\n\n\n 14\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n Best Practice \xe2\x80\x93 Standard Design for PEPFAR Construction\n At the outset of his administration, President Obama stated that the U.S. Government\nneeded to work better, faster, and more efficiently. The Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United\nStates Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of\n200836 reauthorized PEPFAR funding for FY 2009 and required, among other items, that a best\npractices report be disseminated. In addition, on September 14, 2010, the President\xe2\x80\x99s\nManagement Council\xe2\x80\x94a group of Federal agency Deputy Secretaries overseeing the President\xe2\x80\x99s\nefficiency goals\xe2\x80\x94stated that the Council is \xe2\x80\x9cpursuing a management agenda that embraces\ntechnological innovations and management best practices to improve effectiveness, efficiency,\nand customer service.\xe2\x80\x9d37\n\n OIG noted a best practice of using standard design to construct PEPFAR facilities in\nTanzania and Ethiopia. If implemented more widely, this best practice could reduce costs and\nproject completion times for PEPFAR construction.\n\nStandard Design\n\n The CDC has plans to construct approximately 90 medical facilities. Most buildings\nconstructed for PEPFAR are medical facilities, including laboratories and outpatient health\nclinics. In Tanzania, the CDC hired consultants to analyze planned projects, and these\nconsultants recommended using standard design. In Ethiopia, the CDC is building seven\nregional laboratories using the same design. The advantages of using standard design are\ndescribed in \xe2\x80\x9cBest Practice \xe2\x80\x93 Standard Design.\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n\n\n\n36\n Section 205 of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, \n\nTuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-293 \xc2\xa7 205).\n\n37\n Memorandum for the Senior Executive Service, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Accountable Government Initiative \xe2\x80\x93 an Update on Our \n\nPerformance Management Agenda,\xe2\x80\x9d Office of Management and Budget, September 14, 2010. \n\n\n 15\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\n Best Practice - Standard Design\n\nIn Tanzania, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) currently has five standard\ndesigns ranging from small to supersize. CDC Tanzania has engaged architectural services to\nuse standard design to build four care and treatment centers with 13 rooms and three care and\ntreatment centers with 11 rooms. These clinics have standardized layout, roofing, walls,\nsecurity, plumbing, and electrical requirements. CDC Tanzania also engaged architectural\nservices to use a standard design to renovate 11 one-room tuberculosis clinics. This standard\ndesign turned the one-room clinics into six-room clinics, with installed plumbing; wiring for\ncomputers, phones, and fans; and a layout to accommodate patient confidentiality and patient\nflow.\n\nIn Ethiopia, the CDC is building seven regional laboratories using the same design. The\ndesign requirements include safety protection, radio frequency shielding, seismic\nconsideration, utility and drainage systems, and water treatment. The standard design makes it\neasier to modify existing laboratories and easier to transfer modifications to future project\ndesigns. Even where standard design is not used, such as for outpatient annexes in various\nsizes, project materials come from a standardized set of specifications. To further its standard\ndesign efforts, CDC Ethiopia issued a scope of work order for design work at medical facilities\nseeking an integrative prototype outpatient department model.\n\nUsing standard design includes the following advantages:\n \xef\x82\xb7 Cost savings from minimizing architectural services.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Shortened time of project from site selection to project completion because individual\n project architectural analyses and drawings are not needed. The Department recorded a\n 34 percent shorter project duration in its first year using standard design for embassies.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Reduction in project error because approved designs are repeated.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Incorporation of specific expertise that might not be available through local architects\n into standard design.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Ease of monitoring and assessing the progress and quality of construction.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Shorter learning curve for contractors bidding to build the facilities.\n \xef\x82\xb7 Ability to standardize laboratory equipment\xe2\x80\x94changing the design of the laboratories\n makes it more difficult to coordinate the various types and location of equipment in\n laboratories. \xc2\xa0\n\n\n\n\n 16\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n List of Recommendations\nRecommendation 1. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\nFrankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its procurement staff to review active PEPFAR\nconstruction contract files to determine whether required contract award actions for PEPFAR\nconstruction contracts were properly performed and documented, including obtaining an\nIndependent Government Cost Estimate, publicizing contract solicitations, and delegating a\ncontracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representative. If documentation supporting any of these actions is found, it\nshould be included in the respective file.\n\nRecommendation 2. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\nFrankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its personnel to stop the practice of including\ncontingency funds in PEPFAR construction contracts unless identified contingencies arise from\npresently known and existing conditions, as described in section 31.205-7 of the Federal\nAcquisition Regulation.\n\nRecommendation 3. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\nFrankfurt, Germany, review existing PEPFAR construction contracts and reclaim any\ncontingency costs inappropriately included in contracts as practicable.\n\nRecommendation 4. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\nFrankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its procurement staff to fully document contract\nmonitoring to assess whether contractor performance is satisfactory.\n\nRecommendation 5. OIG recommends that the Regional Procurement Support Office in\nFrankfurt, Germany, require posts with substantial planned costs for PEPFAR construction\nprojects to obtain a technical advisor with construction expertise for monitoring construction\ncontracts.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n Appendix A\n Scope and Methodology\n The purpose of this review was to assess Department of State (Department) effectiveness\nin awarding and monitoring contracts supporting President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief\n(PEPFAR) projects. The primary objective of this review was to determine whether the\nDepartment followed applicable policies, regulations, and procedures in awarding and\nmonitoring PEPFAR construction projects.\n\n To obtain an understanding of laws and regulations related to the award and monitoring\nof overseas construction and construction-related activities, the Office of Inspector General\n(OIG) reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Foreign Affairs Manual, the\nForeign Affairs Handbook, Department of State Acquisition Regulations, and the Overseas\nContracting and Simplified Acquisition Guidebook.\n\n OIG also searched the Internet and the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Web site for information relevant to\nthe construction industry, Federal construction contracting, and the construction of health care\nfacilities. OIG obtained and reviewed documents from the Department and the Centers for\nDisease Control and Prevention that explained the PEPFAR overseas construction process and\nprocedures, as well as information about issues affecting the procurement process.\n\n OIG met with key personnel from the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and\nthe Bureau of Administration to discuss their roles and understanding of PEPFAR overseas\nconstruction projects.\n\n OIG\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Audits conducted this review from January 2010 to January 2011 in\naccordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, issued in January 2005 by the Council of\nthe Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.\n\nContract Files Reviewed and Sites Visited\n\n During this review, OIG visited the Regional Procurement Support Office (RPSO) in\nFrankfurt, Germany, from January to February 2010 to obtain an understanding of RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s\ncontract award and monitoring processes. OIG also developed a list, using contract files, of all\nPEPFAR overseas construction projects awarded by RPSO from FY 2003 through the first\nquarter of FY 2010 to nine African countries: Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Namibia, Zambia,\nMozambique, Kenya, Botswana, and Malawi. OIG\xe2\x80\x99s list showed that RPSO awarded 145\ncontracts and task orders, valued at $56,009,736, during the period to these nine countries. Of\nthe 145 contracts and task orders, 99 contracts and task orders (68 percent), totaling $43,300,994,\nwere awarded to Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda. OIG focused its review on contracts and task\norders that were awarded from FYs 2007\xe2\x80\x932009, although five of the 100 contracts reviewed\nwere not awarded during that time period,1 thereby narrowing the scope from 145 contracts and\n\n1\n These five contracts consisted of two contracts awarded in FY 2005, two contracts awarded in FY 2006, and one\ncontract awarded in FY 2010.\n 18\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\ntask orders to 100, as shown in Table 1. These 100 files contained 34 contracts (21 firm-fixed-\nprice contracts and 13 indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts) and 66 associated task\norders, all of which totaled $39,207,381.\n\n Table 1. Total PEPFAR Overseas Construction Procurements, FY 2003 \xe2\x80\x93 FY 2010\n Country Awarded by RPSO Reviewed by OIG at RPSO Reviewed by OIG at Post\n Number Value in U.S. Number Value in U.S. Number Value in U.S.\n of Items* Dollars of items Dollars of items Dollars\n Tanzania 58 22,276,299 52 11,991,137 38 7,275,944\n Ethiopia 22 16,274,205 14 15,865,597 14 15,865,597\n Uganda 19 4,750,490 17 2,980,433 7 2,475,443\n Subtotal 99 43,300,994 83 30,837,167 59 25,616,984\n Percent of Totals 68 77 83 79 100 100\n Namibia 12 3,320,025 5 1,805,691 - -\n Zambia 12 3,299,140 3 1,141,687 - -\n Mozambique 3 2,821,880 3 2,821,880 - -\n Kenya 11 2,813,360 4 2,321,640 - -\n Botswana** 6 279,316 2 279,316 - -\n Malawi 2 175,021 - - - -\n Subtotal 46 12,708,742 17 8,370,214 - -\n Percent of Totals 32 23 17 21 - -\n Totals 145 $ 56,009,736 100 $ 39,207,381 59 $ 25,616,984\n Percent of Totals 100 100 69 70 59 65\n Source: OIG-generated from RPSO contract files.\n *The number of items includes contracts and task orders.\n ** Although OIG verified that RPSO awarded six contracts for Botswana, OIG was unable to determine the\nfunding source for four of the contracts. Therefore, the dollar amounts for those four contracts have not been\nincluded.\n\n At RPSO, OIG reviewed the 100 files to determine whether the files contained the\nrequired documentation to show that procurement personnel followed Federal laws and policies\nin awarding and monitoring these contracts and their associated task orders. In addition, OIG\nassessed whether the contract files contained documentation to show that RPSO provided\noversight for the PEPFAR construction projects.\n\n OIG then selected Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda for site visits conducted in April and\nMay 2010 because these three countries were the chief beneficiaries of PEPFAR construction\nprocurements, as indicated above in Table 1. They had 83 procurements related to PEPFAR\nconstruction projects valued at $30,837,167 (or 79 percent of the total $39,207,381) for the\nperiod FY 2007 through FY 2009. At these three posts, OIG reviewed 59 of the 83 (or 71\npercent) COR files, valued at $25,616,984, to determine whether the files contained adequate\nevidence of monitoring, such as inspection reports, site visit reports, and progress payments with\nrequired acceptance and approval.\n\n\n\n 19\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n OIG interviewed contracting officer\xe2\x80\x99s representatives, construction monitoring services\npersonnel hired by RPSO, and host country officials overseas to gain an understanding of their\nprocedures for monitoring construction projects and to determine the extent of coordination with\ncontracting officers at RPSO. OIG also visited nine construction sites in various phases of\nconstruction, including two completed facilities. At these sites, OIG observed the level of\nprogress on construction projects and methods used to monitor construction. OIG also gained an\nunderstanding of the services to be provided and any problems or delays encountered. The\nconstruction sites OIG visited in each country are shown in Table 2.\n\n Table 2. PEPFAR Construction Sites Visited\n National Headquarters and Zonal Blood Transfusion Center\xc2\xa0\n Tanzania\xc2\xa0 Temeke Hospital Ward\xc2\xa0\n Tandale Care and Treatment Clinic\xc2\xa0\n Zewditu Hospital Health Clinic, ART Treatment\n Ethiopia Adama Hospital Regional Blood Bank Laboratory\n Armed Forces Hospital Health Clinic, VCT/ART\n Uganda Blood Transfusion Services\n Uganda Mukono Health Center IV\n National TB & Referral Laboratory\n Source: OIG-generated.\n\n After its site visits, OIG reviewed and materials obtained from RPSO and COR files to\ndetermine whether these files were complete and to identify discrepancies needing resolution.\nSubsequently, in January 2011, OIG requested and obtained from RPSO additional information\nand responses that addressed contract award issues and answers to its questions resulting from its\nreview of procurement documents. OIG analyzed the additional information provided and\nadjusted its results accordingly.\n\nData Reliability and Use of Computer-Processed Data\n\n OIG obtained from RPSO\xe2\x80\x99s database a list of PEPFAR construction procurements.\nRPSO developed this database as a separate log to track procurements by year. OIG compared\nthe list generated from the RPSO database with information contained in RPSO files to verify the\ncompleteness of the list. OIG believes that the data was sufficiently reliable for purposes of its\nreport and that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and\nconclusions based on the review objective.\n\nPrior OIG Reports\n\n In June 2011, OIG reported 2 that the Department\xe2\x80\x99s Office of the U.S. Global AIDS\nCoordinator (S/GAC) coordinated, provided oversight for, and transferred PEPFAR overseas\n\n2\n Audit of Construction and Transfer of Ownership of the President\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\nConstruction Projects, AUD/IP-11-14, June 2011.\n 20\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\nconstruction projects on an ad hoc basis. In addition, S/GAC did not establish effective internal\ncontrols for PEPFAR construction projects and did not properly transfer completed construction\nprojects to host governments. OIG made four recommendations for S/GAC (1) to develop an\ninteragency memorandum of agreement to address the PEPFAR overseas construction projects,\n(2) to seek resolution about the legal dispute on construction authority with senior-level\nmanagement within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), (3) to appoint a\nsenior-level official with the requisite experience in construction and authority to make decisions\nrelated to PEPFAR overseas construction projects, and (4) to establish guidance for all agencies\ninvolved with PEPFAR overseas construction projects that clearly describes procedures for\nconstruction and property management.\n\n The second recommendation, which pertained to the legal dispute, was closed because\nS/GAC immediately took action to reclaim and redistribute $51 million in PEPFAR construction\nfunds provided to HHS and the U.S. Agency for International Development\xe2\x80\x94thus eliminating\nthe need for resolution of the legal dispute with HHS. The remaining three recommendations are\nresolved because S/GAC has taken action to implement them. They can be closed when OIG\nreceives and accepts documentation showing that they have been implemented.\n\n\n\n\n 21\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n Appendix B\n\n\n\n United States\n StatE" Department of State\n Washington , D. C. 20520\n\n October 7,2011\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\nMEMORANDUM\n\nTO: OIG// AUD - Evelyn R. K1emstine\n OIG\n\nFROM: Catby Rea~MlAQM\n Cathy\n\nSUBJECT: Response to ~r::1t\xc2\xb7\n ~r~\xc2\xb7 Report on Improved Contract Documentation and\n Monitoring by the\n tbe Regional Procurement Support Office Are Needed\n for Construction Projects Associated with\n witb the\n tbe President\'s Emergency\n Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\n\nThe following are the Office of Acquisitions Management (AILMlAQM)\ncomments on Recommendations 1I tbrough 5 and technical comments of the\nsubject Audit Report.\n\nRecommendation 1 . OIG recommends tbat that tbe\n the Regional Procurement Support\nOffice in Frankfurt, Gennany,\n Germany, issue instructions for its procurement staff to review\nactive PEPF AR construction contract files to determine whether required contract\naward actions for PEPFAR construction contracts were properly perfonned and\ndocumented, including obtaining an Independent Govermnent\n Government Cost Estimate,\npublicizing contract solicitations, and delegating a contracting officer\n officer\'s\n \'s\nrepresentative. If documentation supporting any of these actions is found\n found,, it\nshould be included in tbe\n the respective file .\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s Response: AlLMlAQM concurs with witb this recommendation.\nRPSO Frankfurt issued infonnal\n informal guidance and discussed repeatedly in staff\nmeetings to review active PEPF AR construction contract files for completeness.\nRPSO Frankfurt publicizes construction contracts on the Berlin embassy website\nand with\n witb local construction companies tbat\n that are recommended by the client. For A\n& E contracts, restricting advertisement to the\n tbe Berlin embassy website will exclude\nnotifying qualified and registered companies in the country where work is going to\nbe performed\n performed.. Competition was sought and achieved tbrough wide distribution to\n the applicable countries. Based on OIG findings, a\nknown architecture firms in tbe\n\n\n\n\n 22 \n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\ncomplete review of all PEPFAR files was conducted in January 2011 and\nappropriate missing documentation has been added to lbe\n the file.\n\nRecommendation 2. OIG recommends lbat that the Regional Procurement Support\nOffice in Frankfurt, Germany, issue instructions for its personnel to stop the\npractice of including contingency funds in PEPF AR construction contracts unless\nidentified contingencies arise from presently known and existing conclitions,\n conditions, as\ndescribed in section 31.205-7\n 31 .205-7 of lbe\n the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\n Regulation.\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s Response: AlLMlAQM concurs with wilb this recommendation\n recommendation..\nRPSO Frankfurt issued informal\n infortnal guidance repeatedly in staff meetings since the\n~iG\'s original visit. RPSO Frankfurt will periodically remind staff about\nOIG\'s\ncontingency funds in construction contracts. RPSO Frankfurt notes lbat that in a firm \xc2\xad-\nfixed contract the inclusion of risk in a contractor\n contract,, lbe contractor\'s\n \'s proposal (sometimes referred\nto as a contingency) is allowable\n allowable.. In cases where risk is already priced and a\nseparate line item for contingencies is identified, RPSO staff will not include lbese\n these\ncosts unless lbey\n they are in accordance wilb\n with FAR 31 .205-7 .\n\nRecommendation 3. OIG recommends lbat that lbe\n the Regional Procurement Support\n Gertnany, review existing PEPFAR construction contracts and\nOffice in Frankfurt, Germany,\nreclaim any contingency costs inappropriately included in contracts as practicable\n practicable..\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s Response: RPSO Frankfurt employed lbis ~IG\'s\n this practice prior to ~iG \'s\naudit and will continue lbis\n this practice. All such costs identified from lbe\n the PEPF AR\nconstruction contracts were modified via valid change orders (including\n (inclucting requests\nfor equitable adjustments) or deobligated from the contract.\n\nRecommendation 4. OIG recommends lbat that the Regional Procurement Support\nOffice in Frankfurt ,.Germany,, issue instruction for its procurement staff to fully\n Frankfurt,.Germany\ndocument contract monitoring to assess whelber\n whether contractor performance is\nsatis\nsatisfactory.\n factory.\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s Response: RPSO Frankfurt will provide additional guidance to\nCORs emphasizing the need to maintain adequate contract files on contract\nmonitoring. RPSO Frankfurt documents the Contracting Officer\'s file for past\nperformance as required by lbe\n the FAR.\n\nRecommendation 5. OIG recommends lbat that lbe\n the Regional Procurement Support\n Frankfurt,, Germany\nOffice in Frankfurt Germany,, require posts wilb\n with substantial planned costs for\n\n\n\n\n 23 \n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\nPEPFAR construction projects to obtain a technical advisor with construction\nexpertise for monitoring construction contracts.\n\nAILMlAQM\'s Response: NLMlAQM\nAlLMlAQM\'s NLMJAQM agrees witb with the concept of posts obtaining\na technical advisor with construction expertise for monitoring construction\ncontracts. RPSO Frankfurt recommends to all PEPFAR clients to hire a technical\nadvisor and issues IDIQ contracts to A&E firms\n fIrms to perform construction\nmonitoring services to assist posts. RPSO Frankfurt cannot require that customers\nobtain a technical advisor if the\n tbe COR believes sufficient expertise is already\navailable to monitor the program. RPSO Frankfurt will augment guidance to\nconstruction customers to emphasi\n emphasize\n ze various ways to improve contract monitoring\nto include better monitoring documentation and more effective use of\n oftechnical\n technical\nsupport.\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s technical corrections to tbe\nAILMlAQM\'s the draft OIG report: RPSO Frankfurt\nrespectfully submits the\n tbe following recommended changes to the draft report text:\n\nPage 6 - " the\n tbe Department cannot be assured tbat\n that it obtained a fair and reasonable\nprice from the bidder or offeror" -\n\nAILMlAQM\'s\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: RPSO Frankfurt submits that adequate competition\nwas always received.\n received. Three or more contractors were contacted in all cases for all\n aU\ncontracts awarded. Price reasonableness is then established by competitive price\ncomparison.\n\nPage 6 - "IGCEs are important in establishing a fair price for U.S. Go vernment\n Government\ncontracts. "\n "\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: RPSO Frankfurt submits that in accordance with FAR\nAILMlAQM\'s\n15.402 and 15.404-1 adequate price competition establishes price reasonableness.\n reasonableness.\nTherefore, in cases where an IGCE was not provided by post, adequate price\ncompetition was received by three or more firms\n fIrms and thus\n tbus price reasonableness was\nestablished. IGCEs are useful to perform price analysis when competition is\nlacking.\n\nPage 7 - "Because these contingency costs were part of the overall value of the\ncontract, the\n tbe funds could be spent without pre-approval from the Department."\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: RPSO Frankfurt submits that the above statement is\nAILMlAQM\'s commeots:\ninaccurate. Obligated dollars tbat the contract in tbis\n that were placed on tbe this capacity were\n\n\n\n\n 24 \n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\nspecifically excluded from the firm fixed price\n price.. Additionally, in order for the\ncontractor to utilize these funds a formal modification, authorizing specific\n speci fic work to\nthe contract, was required.\n\nPage 8 - " Further ,the contract terms did not require any additional information\nfrom the contract in order for the contractor to request payments for these\ncontingency funds."\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: RPSO Frankfurt submits when a contingency or\n written\nprovisionall sum was placed on an award it was specifically wr\nprovisiona itten in the award\nthat the funds associated with those line items could only be utilized upon a formal\n formal\ncontract modification that incorporated them into the firm fixed price\n price..\n\nPage 9 - similar statement about the contractor being able to spend these monies\nwithout prior approval.\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: RPSO Frankfurt reasserts our above two comments\nwruch\nwhich are applicable to thls\n this portion of the report.\n\nPage 12 - "RPSO contract ing officers stated that they are not responsible for\n contracting\nensuring the CORs properly monitor construction projects"\n\nAlLMlAQM\'s comments: AlLMlAQM advises that Contracting Officers appoint\nCORs and are responsible to ensure they fulfill their duties\n duties.. RPSO Frankfurt relies\nheavily on the CORs to monitor their projects.\n\n\n\n\n 25 \n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\nDrafted: AlLM: Mark Bohac x5-5840\n\nCleared:\n AlLMlAQMIWWD:\n NOPE:\n NFO\n NFO:: _\n\n\n\n\n 26 \n\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\nMajor Contributors to This Report\nNaomi Snell, Director\nInternational Programs Division\nOffice of Audits\n\nBarbara Ferris, Audit Manager\nInternational Programs Division\nOffice of Audits\n\nSharon Richards, Auditor\nInternational Programs Division\nOffice of Audits\n\nCristina Ward, Auditor\nInternational Programs Division\nOffice of Audits\n\nDoug Hundley, Auditor\nInternational Programs Division\nOffice of Audits\n\n\n\n\n 27\n UNCLASSIFIED\n\x0cFRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE, OR MISMANAGEMENT\n of Federal programs\n\n and resources hurts everyone.\n\n\n\n\n Call the Office of Inspector General\n\n HOTLINE\n\n 202/647-3320\n\n or 1-800-409-9926\n\n to report illegal or wasteful activities.\n\n\n\n You may also write to\n\n Office of Inspector General\n\n U.S. Department of State\n\n Post Office Box 9778\n\n Arlington, VA 22219\n\n\n Please visit our Web site at oig.state.gov\n\n\n Cables to the Inspector General\n\n should be slugged \xe2\x80\x9cOIG Channel\xe2\x80\x9d\n\n to ensure confidentiality.\n\n\x0cUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\x0c'


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Άποψη: ΟΙΚΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΕΜΟΣ Ν.ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ Στο 20,2% η ανεργία στο Νότιο Αιγαίο
 ΟΙΚΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΕΜΟΣ Ν.ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ Στο 20,2% η ανεργία στο Νότιο Αιγαίο
 “Σε μια εποχή κατάρρευσης της οικονομίας και έκρηξης της ανεργίας περιμέναμε να ακούσουμε από την Υπουργό Εργασίας αλλά και από την Περιφέρεια ένα σχέδιο που να συνδέει την απασχόληση με ενεργητικές πολιτικές και μάλιστα σε οικονομικούς τομείς που μπορούν να επιβιώσουν και να προσφέρουν λύσεις για "διατηρήσιμη” απασχόληση. Η Υπουργός Εργασίας μάς παρουσίασε στην πραγματικότητα ένα σχέδιο για “καφέ της παρηγοριάς”, επιβεβαιώνοντας την έλλειψη στρατηγικής που υπάρχει σε κεντρικό πολιτικό επίπεδο για τη δημιουργία βιώσιμων – διατηρήσιμων θέσεων απασχόλησης. Επιβεβαιώθηκε, η απουσία μιας συνεκτικής οικονομικής, κοινωνικής και περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής που να προσφέρει διέξοδο από την πολλαπλή κρίση στην οποία βυθιζόμαστε”. Αυτά τόνισε στην ομιλία του στο Περιφερειακό Συμβούλιο Ν. Αιγαίου που πραγματοποιήθηκε στη Ρόδο την Πέμπτη 28/4/2011, ο Νίκος Χρυσόγελος, Περιφερειακός Σύμβουλος με τον ΟΙΚΟΛΟΓΙΚΟ ΑΝΕΜΟ, Γραμματέας του Περιφερειακού Συμβουλίου Ν. Αιγαίου μετά την παρουσίαση από την Υπουργό Εργασίας του Τοπικού Συμφώνου Απασχόλησης για το Ν. Αιγαίο και άλλων προγραμμάτων για την ανεργία.
 “Η αύξηση της ανεργίας είναι ραγδαία και για πρώτη φορά μεταπολιτευτικά η χώρα φτάνει σε ποσοστά της τάξης του 15% που αντιστοιχούν σε επίπεδα ανεργίας που υπήρχαν τη δεκαετία του ’60. Ή έκρηξη της ανεργίας είναι άμεσο αποτέλεσμα της κρίσης και της αποτυχίας της οικονομικής και δημοσιονομικής πολιτικής, που έχουν άμεσες συνέπειες πλέον και στην κοινωνία. Εκατοντάδες χιλιάδες θέσεις εργασίας τα τρία τελευταία χρόνια έχουν χαθεί, οδηγώντας την κοινωνία και τους πολίτες σε απόγνωση. Σε σχέση με το 2008, οι άνεργοι είναι περισσότεροι κατά 350.000. Πάνω από 1 στους 3 νέους δεν έχει δουλειά. Από τους 714.675 εγγεγραμμένους στα μητρώα του ΟΑΕΔ ανέργους κατά το μήνα Μάρτιο, μόνο ποσοστό 42,8%, δηλαδή 305.952 άνεργοι, είναι επιδοτούμενοι.
 Ιδιαίτερα ανησυχητικά είναι τα στοιχεία για την ανεργία και στο Νότιο Αιγαίο, που καταλαμβάνει πλέον την δεύτερη υψηλότερη θέση, με την ανεργία να έχει εκτιναχθεί από το 11,8% το 2006 και το 15,3% τον Ιανουάριο 2010, στο 20,2% τον Ιανουάριο 2011. Ωστόσο, εκτός από τους ποσοτικούς δείκτες η σημερινή ανεργία είναι ποιοτικά διαφορετική από την ανεργία πριν το 2008. Η κατάσταση στο Ν. Αιγαίο φαίνεται να είναι ακόμα χειρότερη, κυρίως για τους νέους ανθρώπους που σε μεγάλο ποσοστό, ίσως και 40%, αδυνατούν να βρουν δουλειά, καθώς και για άτομα με ειδικές ανάγκες ή ικανότητες. Άλλοι εργάζονται ευκαιριακά και δεν καταγράφονται ως άνεργοι. Πολλοί απασχολούμενοι κυρίως στον τουριστικό τομέα σε νησιά τους καλοκαιρινούς μήνες εγγράφονται ως άνεργοι τους υπόλοιπους μήνες στον ΟΑΕΔ των περιοχών κατοικίας τους και φυσικά στους καταλόγους ανεργίας του ΟΑΕΔ δεν εμφανίζονται οι χιλιάδες μικρές επιχειρήσεις που έχουν κλείσει μέχρι σήμερα. Εκατοντάδες εργατοϋπάλληλοι παρά το γεγονός ότι εργάστηκαν κάποιους μήνες δεν έχουν αποπληρωθεί ακόμα. Επίσης, νέοι επιστήμονες από τα νησιά που αδυνατούν να βρουν εργασία παραμένουν στις μεγάλες πόλεις και άρα δεν εγγράφονται στους καταλόγους του ΟΑΕΔ στην περιφέρεια Ν. Αιγαίου. Ας μην ξεχνάμε επίσης ότι οι εγγεγραμμένοι στον ΟΑΕΔ άνεργοι είναι μέρος του συνόλου των πραγματικά ανέργων, με δεδομένο ότι πολλοί δεν δικαιούνται επιδομάτων και άρα δεν εγγράφονται στον ΟΑΕΔ είτε είναι ημι-απασχολούμενοι και νέοι ελεύθεροι επαγγελματίες με χαμηλά εισοδήματα τις περισσότερες φορές. Πέρα από τους επίσημους αριθμούς η ανεργία και η φτώχια είναι φανερή πλέον σε σημαντικά τμήματα του πληθυσμού των νησιών και ας δείχνουν τα στατιστικά στοιχεία ότι η περιφέρεια Ν. Αιγαίου είναι από τις πιο πλούσιες με μέσο κατά κεφαλή εισόδημα 25.000 ευρώ.
 Το πρόγραμμα για «Κοινωφελή Εργασία» που ανακοίνωσε και εδώ η κυρία Υπουργός προβλέπει 55.000 θέσεις 5μηνης απασχόλησης με αμοιβή μηνιαίως 625 €. Ακόμα και αν η πολιτική της κυβέρνησης και του υπουργείου εργασίας πετύχει τους στόχους που έχει θέσει, 55.000 άνεργοι θα εργαστούν απλώς για ένα πεντάμηνο λαμβάνοντας μια αμοιβή συνολικά 3.125 € έκαστος. Δηλαδή, ουσιαστικά τα χρήματα που θα έπαιρνε ένας άνεργος σε περίπου 7 μήνες ως επίδομα ανεργίας, θα τα λαμβάνει τώρα εργαζόμενος για 5 μήνες!!!
 Δεν είναι αλήθεια ότι το πρόγραμμα που εξαγγέλθηκε είναι η εναλλακτική λύση στην σημερινή ζοφερή πραγματικότητα. Ο τρόπος που αντιλαμβάνεται το Υπουργείο Εργασίας την κοινωφελή εργασία δεν έχει σε τίποτα να κάνει με ότι σημαίνουν οι κοινωνικές επιχειρήσεις και η κοινωνική οικονομία σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο. Η χώρα μας θα έπρεπε να ρίξει πραγματικά βάρος, με αφορμή αυτή τη βαθιά κρίση που βιώνουμε, στην ενδυνάμωση του κοινωνικού τομέα και των κοινωνικών επιχειρήσεων, κάτι που μπορεί να συμβάλει σημαντικά στην επίτευξη κοινωνικών και περιβαλλοντικών στόχων, όπως έχει δείξει η εμπειρία από άλλες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες, μέσα από βιώσιμες οικονομικές δραστηριότητες και να δημιουργήσει χιλιάδες κοινωνικά αποτελεσματικές θέσεις εργασίας.
 Όπως πάει να εφαρμοστεί το πρόγραμμα «Κοινωφελής Εργασία» στη χώρα μας, θα συνδέσει την έννοια κοινωνική οικονομία με μια αντίληψη επιδόματος χαμηλού κόστους εργαζομένων για ένα μάλιστα πεντάμηνο (ισόποσου με το επίδομα ανεργίας ενός 7μήνου). Δυστυχώς, φαίνεται ότι το Υπουργείο Εργασίας έχει πλήρη άγνοια για τις προϋποθέσεις και τους όρους ανάπτυξης της κοινωνικής οικονομίας και των κοινωνικών επιχειρήσεων. Το να πλακοστρώνεις ένα χώρο ή να φτιάχνεις ένας στέγαστρο (παραδείγματα που χρησιμοποίησε η Υπουργός) εμπλέκοντας άνεργους που αμείβονται για την εργασία αυτή με ποσά της τάξης των 625 Ευρώ δεν είναι πολιτική που αντιμετωπίζει το πρόβλημα της ανεργίας. Είναι ένα ημίμετρο για να απορροφηθεί στατιστικά ένα κομμάτι της ανεργίας, παρουσιάζοντας μείωση του ρυθμού αύξησης της ανεργίας.
 Στην Γερμανία ή σε άλλες χώρες, η απασχόληση των ανέργων σε κοινωνικές επιχειρήσεις ή γενικότερα σε κοινωφελή εργασία γίνεται για χρονικό διάστημα (συνήθως 2 χρόνια) και με όρους (παροχή εκπαίδευσης παράλληλα με την εργασία στην πράξη, συμβουλευτική υποστήριξη κ.ά.) έτσι ώστε πράγματι ο άνεργος να μπορέσει να σταθεί στα πόδια του και να εργαστεί είτε στον φορέα που τον απασχολεί προσωρινά ή σε ανάλογο φορέα είτε μέσα από τη δημιουργία ατομικής ή κοινωνικής επιχείρησης. Ποιος, όμως, πιστεύει ότι ένας άνεργος θα είναι σε θέση για κάτι τέτοιο μετά από απασχόληση μόλις 5 μηνών και χωρίς κάποιες άλλες συνοδευτικές δράσεις κατά τη διάρκεια του 5μήνου και μετά από αυτό; Τι είδους δεξιότητες μπορεί κανείς να αποκτήσει εργαζόμενος για 5 μήνες σε εργασίες που απ’ ό,τι φαίνεται θα είναι χειρωνακτικές, σύμφωνα και με τα παραδείγματα που έδωσε η υπουργός, καθαρισμός παραλιών κλπ. Ακόμα όμως και τέτοιες εργασίες θα μπορούσαν να συνοδευτούν από μια συγκεκριμένη εξειδίκευση και απόκτηση δεξιοτήτων, παραδείγματος χάριν επεξεργασία πέτρας και κατασκευή παραδοσιακών πετρόκτιστων κτισμάτων ή παραδοσιακών κεραμικών σκεπών κλπ. Όχι όμως σε πέντε μήνες και όχι με απλή εργασία. Και φυσικά ελλοχεύει ο κίνδυνος να αντικατασταθεί η κανονικά αμειβόμενη εργασία με υποαμειβόμενη παραβιάζοντας και τα στοιχειώδη εργασιακά δικαιώματα για τις αντίστοιχες θέσεις.
 Από τη συζήτηση μέχρι τώρα στο Περιφερειακό Συμβούλιο, διαπιστώνουμε δυστυχώς, ότι η Περιφέρεια Ν. Αιγαίου δεν έχει τουλάχιστον μέχρι σήμερα ένα σχέδιο για το θέμα της ανεργίας, αν και από την υπουργό Εργασίας ακούσαμε σήμερα ότι πρέπει να συντονιστούν φορείς στο Ν. Αιγαίο για να υποβάλλουν μέσα σε 1,5 μήνα από κοινού 15-20 προγράμματα στο Ν. Αιγαίο. Προϋπόθεση βέβαια είναι οι αιτούντες να αποκτήσουν διαχειριστική επάρκεια στο διάστημα αυτό από τις κεντρικές υπηρεσίες του Υπουργείου Εργασίας
 Θα σπαταληθούν, φοβόμαστε, πόροι χωρίς να υπάρξει αποτέλεσμα στο ζητούμενο, που είναι η δημιουργία βιώσιμων θέσεων εργασίας μέσα από ενεργοποίηση της κοινωνίας και των κοινωνικών φορέων. Ελπίζουμε να διαψευστούν οι φόβοι μας και να υπάρξουν μηχανισμοί ελέγχου και αξιολόγησης και οι ελάχιστοι πόροι που θα διατεθούν να μην σπαταληθούν κι αυτοί σε πελατειακές σχέσεις και εξυπηρετήσεις, όπως έχει γίνει στο παρελθόν με πολλαπλάσια ποσά. Οι πολίτες και ιδιαίτερα οι νέοι πρέπει να απαιτήσουν να μπει ένα τέλος σε αυτές τις εξευτελιστικές διαδικασίες. Επίσης, θα πρέπει να παρακολουθείται συνεχώς ο τρόπος εφαρμογής αυτών των ανεπαρκέστατων προγραμμάτων, ώστε να μην χρησιμοποιηθούν με τρόπο που θα οδηγούσε σε αντικατάσταση κανονικών θέσεων εργασίας με 5μηνίτες χαμηλά αμειβόμενους, γιατί κάτι τέτοιο θα οδηγούσε με την στήριξη μάλιστα προγραμμάτων συγκράτησης της ανεργίας σε απώλεια κι άλλων θέσεων εργασίας.
 Είναι, όμως ανησυχητικό ότι, όπως φαίνεται, η Περιφέρεια και οι Δήμοι (ελπίζουμε να διαψευστούμε από κάποιους Δήμους) δεν είναι έτοιμοι να αναλάβουν έναν σημαντικό ρόλο στην πράσινη μεταρρύθμιση της οικονομίας και στη δημιουργία δομών κοινωνικής αλληλεγγύης – παρά την ευκολία με την οποία χρησιμοποιούν σήμερα μια νέα ορολογία – ρόλος και δομές που είναι απαραίτητες για την κάλυψη του τεράστιου κενού που δημιουργεί η κατάρρευση του όποιου συστήματος κοινωνικής πρόνοιας υπήρχε στη χώρα, στην σημερινή εποχή βαθιάς οικονομικής, δημοσιονομικής, κοινωνικής και περιβαλλοντικής κρίσης.
 Στην παρουσίαση του προγράμματος «Τοπικά Σύμφωνα Απασχόλησης», η κυρία Υπουργός τόνισε ότι «θα δημιουργηθούν θέσεις εργασίας ενταγμένες σε έναν ολοκληρωμένο αναπτυξιακό σχεδιασμό για κάθε Περιφέρεια, ο οποίος αξιοποιεί τα συγκριτικά πλεονεκτήματα, το ανθρώπινο δυναμικό και τους διαθέσιμους πόρους κάθε περιοχής σε δυναμικούς κλάδους και προϊόντα υψηλής προστιθέμενης αξίας». Τέτοια συζήτηση, πάντως, δεν έχει γίνει στο Περιφερειακό Συμβούλιο, αν και θα έπρεπε να είναι το κυρίαρχο αυτούς τους 4 μήνες, ώστε να πεισθούμε ότι η Περιφέρεια ξέρει που πηγαίνει και πράγματι υπάρχει ένα σχέδιο για την αντιμετώπιση της πολύπλευρης κρίσης που, όπως είχαμε επισημάνει εγκαίρως, πλήττει και την Περιφέρεια Ν. Αιγαίου, με άλλες ίσως αιχμές και εντάσεις και με άλλα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά σε σχέση με τις υπόλοιπες περιφέρειες της χώρας.
 - Καταθέτουμε προτάσεις για ενεργή πολιτική δημιουργίας πολύ περισσότερων θέσεων εργασίας – σε σχέση με αυτές που σήμερα χάνονται- αλλά σε τομείς της οικονομίας που είναι κοινωνικά και περιβαλλοντικά αναγκαίες και μακροχρόνια βιώσιμες. Μια προοπτική διεξόδου από την κρίση μπορεί να προκύψει μόνο αν αυτές οι νέες θέσεις εργασίας εστιάσουν γύρω από την πράσινη καινοτομία με σεβασμό στη φέρουσα ικανότητα των ευαίσθητων νησιωτικών οικοσυστημάτων. Τομείς, όπως, η εξοικονόμηση ενέργειας και νερού, η ανάπτυξη, κατασκευή και εγκατάσταση συστημάτων Ανανεώσιμης Ενέργειας με πρωτοβουλία και προς όφελος των τοπικών κοινωνιών, η επαναχρησιμοποίηση-ανακύκλωση και κομποστοποίηση απορριμμάτων, η βιολογική γεωργία, ο αγρο- και οικο-τουρισμός μπορούν να αποτελέσουν ένα ρεαλιστικό πέταγμα προς τα εμπρός για τα νησιά του Ν. Αιγαίου. Αυτοί οι τομείς, όμως, δεν μπορούν να αναπτυχθούν με 5μηνη εργασία ανθρώπων που θα περνάνε για λίγο από μια θέση για να πάρουν ένα μικρό επίδομα. Απαιτούν συνεκτικές και καλά σχεδιασμένες πολιτικές σε κεντρικό και περιφερειακό επίπεδο και πλήρη εφαρμογή διαφορετικών εργαλείων υποστήριξης, από παραδοσιακά όπως τα φορολογικά κίνητρα και τα ευρωπαϊκά προγράμματα μέχρι νέα εργαλεία όπως “πράσινα ομόλογα με πρωτοβουλία της Περιφέρειας και τοπικών φορέων”, δημιουργία νέων -εναλλακτικών προς τις μεγάλες τράπεζες – μέσων χρηματοδότησης και συμβουλευτικών υποδομών για πράσινες καινοτομίες στην περιοχή του Ν. Αιγαίου. Πολλές θέσεις εργασίας – διετούς διάρκειας και όχι στη βάση αυτών που προβλέπονται από τα προγράμματα του Υπουργείου Εργασίας – θα πρέπει να στηρίξουν τις νέες δομές και τον νέο τρόπο οργάνωσης της κοινωνίας και της αυτοδιοίκησης την εποχή της οικονομικής και κοινωνικής κρίσης.
 - Θα είμαστε ενεργοί στην προσπάθεια να μην σπαταληθούν – όπως έγινε στο παρελθόν με πολύ περισσότερα χρήματα - τα ανεπαρκή χρήματα που θα διατεθούν ως “καφές της παρηγοριάς” για τους ανέργους, όσο και κυρίως για να γίνουν αλλαγές στην οικονομική και κοινωνική πολιτική που θα οδηγήσουν σε βιώσιμες και διατηρήσιμες θέσεις εργασίας.
 - Θα βρισκόμαστε σε επαγρύπνηση και καλούμε σε συνεργασία τους κοινωνικούς κι επαγγελματικούς φορείς για να δημιουργήσουμε μια ασπίδα προστασίας ενάντια σε όποια απόπειρα να χρησιμοποιηθούν τα ελάχιστα αυτά χρήματα, που προέρχονται από ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους και τις συνδρομές των εργαζομένων, ως μέσο εξαγοράς συνειδήσεων, για τη διατήρηση πελατειακών σχέσεων. Πρέπει να τελειώνουμε με αυτή την αθλιότητα, είναι υποχρέωση των θεσμικών φορέων να διαμορφώνουν πολιτικές και συνθήκες που δημιουργούν θέσεις εργασίας με ισότιμους και αξιοκρατικούς όρους πρόσβασης όλων σε αυτές. Πρέπει να εμποδίσουμε όσους προσπαθήσουν να διαχειριστούν λεφτά που δεν είναι δικά τους για να ξανα-παραπλανήσουν τους πολίτες, να τους εξαναγκάζουν “να φιλάνε κατουρημένες ποδιές” για να βρουν μια ψευτο-απασχόληση 5 μηνών με αμοιβή 3.125 Ευρω συνολικά!
 Επαναφέρουμε άμεσα την πρόταση του ΟΙΚΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΥ ΑΝΕΜΟΥ Ν. ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ για τη δημιουργία στο πλαίσιο του Περιφερειακού Συμβουλίου δυο άλλων επιτροπών, όπως προβλέπει ο νόμος, μία από τις οποίες θα πρέπει να είναι μια Επιτροπή Κοινωνικής Συνοχής και Αλληλεγγύης, που θα έχει ως πρώτο καθήκον της να προετοιμάσει ένα σχέδιο στρατηγικής της περιφέρειας για την απασχόληση και την κοινωνική αλληλεγγύη την εποχή της κρίσης, ώστε πράγματι καταρχήν οι πόροι που θα διατεθούν από τα «Τοπικά Σύμφωνα Απασχόλησης» και την «κοινωφελή εργασία» να πιάσουν τόπο και να μην σπαταληθούν και παράλληλα να προωθηθούν μια ουσιαστική και όχι επιφανειακή κι αναποτελεσματική πολιτική για τη δημιουργία διατηρήσιμων θέσεων απασχόλησης.
 Αναρτήθηκε από apo στις 11:02 μ.μ.
 Ετικέτες Οικολογία, Οικονομία, Τοπική Αυτοδιοίκηση


type: wikipedia

text:
Kuldīgas rajons bija administratīvā iedalījuma vienība LPSR (1949—1990) un Latvijas Republikas (1990—2009) sastāvā. Tas atradās Kurzemes vidienē un robežojās ar Tukuma rajonu, Talsu rajonu, Ventspils rajonu, Liepājas rajonu un Saldus rajonu.
 Izveide un reorganizācija
 1949. gada 31. decembra administratīvi teritoriālās reformas rezultātā Kuldīgas apriņķis tika likvidēts un tā teritorija iekļauta Kuldīgas, Auces, Saldus un Skrundas lauku rajonos.
 1952.—1953. gadā Kuldīgas rajons ietilpa Liepājas apgabalā. 1956. gadā Kuldīgas rajonam tika pievienota daļa no Alsungas rajona, bet 1959. gadā daļa no Skrundas rajona. Laikā no 1962. gada aprīļa līdz 1967. gada janvārim Kuldīgas rajonam bija pievienota arī Ventspils rajona daļa Ventas labajā krastā. Pēc Latvijas Republikas atjaunošanas 1990. gadā Kuldīgas rajona ciemi tika pārdēvēti par pagastiem.
 Teritoriālais iedalījums (1983)
 Pilsētas
 Kuldīga
 Pilsētciemati
 Alsunga ar lauku teritoriju
 Skrunda ar lauku teritoriju
 Ciemi
 Ēdoles — Gudenieku — Ievukalnu — Kabiles — Kurmāles — Laidu — Nīkrāces — Padures — Raņķu — Rendas — Rudbāržu — Rumbas — Snēpeles — Turlavas — Vārmes.
 Teritoriālais iedalījums (2008)
 Pilsētas
 Kuldīga
 Skrunda ar lauku teritoriju
 Pagasti
 Alsungas pagasts — Ēdoles pagasts — Gudenieku pagasts — Īvandes pagasts — Kabiles pagasts — Kurmāles pagasts — Laidu pagasts — Nīkrāces pagasts — Padures pagasts — Pelču pagasts — Raņķu pagasts — Rendas pagasts — Rudbāržu pagasts — Rumbas pagasts — Snēpeles pagasts — Turlavas pagasts — Vārmes pagasts.
 Iedzīvotāju
 Iedzīvotāju skaita izmaiņas
 Likvidācija
 Saskaņā ar 1998. gadā pieņemto "Administratīvi teritoriālās reformas likumu" un 2008. gada "Administratīvo teritoriju un apdzīvoto vietu likumu" 2009. gada 1. jūlijā Kuldīgas rajons tika likvidēts un tā teritorijā izveidoti
 Alsungas novads
 Kuldīgas novads,
 Skrundas novads.
 Atsauces
 Latvijas rajoni


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 26.11.2011
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 347/4
 Urteil des Gerichtshofs (Erste Kammer) vom 6. Oktober 2011 — Europäische Kommission/Portugiesische Republik
 (Rechtssache C-493/09) (1)
 (Vertragsverletzung eines Mitgliedstaats - Art. 63 AEUV und Art. 40 des EWR-Abkommens - Freier Kapitalverkehr - Ausländische und inländische Pensionsfonds - Körperschaftsteuer - Dividenden - Befreiung - Unterschiedliche Behandlung)
 2011/C 347/04
 Verfahrenssprache: Portugiesisch
 Parteien
 Klägerin: Europäische Kommission (Prozessbevollmächtigte: R. Lyal und M. Afonso)
 Beklagte: Portugiesische Republik (Prozessbevollmächtigte: L. Inez Fernandes und H. Ferreira)
 Gegenstand
 Vertragsverletzung eines Mitgliedstaats — Verstoß gegen Art. 63 AEUV und Art. 40 des EWR-Abkommens — Beschränkungen des Kapitalverkehrs — Ausländische und inländische Pensionsfonds — Dividenden — Besteuerung — Ungleichbehandlung
 Tenor
 1.
 Die Portugiesische Republik hat dadurch gegen ihre Verpflichtungen aus Art. 63 AEUV und Art. 40 des Abkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum vom 2. Mai 1992 verstoßen, dass sie die Befreiung von der Körperschaftsteuer den im portugiesischen Hoheitsgebiet ansässigen Pensionsfonds vorbehalten hat.
 2.
 Die Portugiesische Republik trägt die Kosten.
 (1) ABl. C 37 vom 13.2.2010.


type: legislation

text:
 II
 112th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. 1043
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 May 23, 2011
 Mr. Graham (for himself
 and Mr. Chambliss) introduced the
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
 Committee on Energy and Natural
 Resources
 A BILL
 To amend the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
 to promote energy security through the production of petroleum from oil sands,
 and for other purposes.
 1.Short
 titleThis Act may be cited as
 the Oil Sands Energy Security Act of
 2011.
 2.Procurement and
 acquisition of alternative fuelsSection 526 of the Energy Independence and
 Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17142) is repealed.