text:
 22.5.2010
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 C 134/45
 Beroep ingesteld op 17 maart 2010 — Lidl Stiftung/BHIM — Vinotasia (VITASIA)
 (Zaak T-124/10)
 2010/C 134/74
 Taal van het verzoekschrift: Duits
 Partijen
 Verzoekende partij: Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG (Neckarsulm, Duitsland) (vertegenwoordigers: M. Schaeffer en A. Marx, advocaten)
 Verwerende partij: Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen)
 Andere partij in de procedure voor de kamer van beroep: Vinotasia GmbH (Koblenz, Duitsland)
 Conclusies
 —
 de beslissing van de vierde kamer van beroep van 14 januari 2010 in beroepsprocedure R 1054/2008-4 vernietigen,
 —
 oppositie nr. B 1 027 947, die op 30 juni 2006 werd ingesteld, afwijzen voor zover deze oppositie werd toegewezen bij beslissing van de oppositieafdeling van 30 mei 2008,
 —
 verweerder verwijzen in de kosten van de procedure voor het Gerecht van de Europese Unie en van de procedure voor de vierde kamer van beroep van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen),
 —
 subsidiair, de procedure schorsen tot een in kracht van gewijsde gegane beslissing is gegeven over de op 17 maart 2010 bij het Duitse octrooi- en merkenbureau ingestelde vordering tot nietigverklaring van het oudere Duitse merk „VINOTASIA” (nr. 302 15 015).
 Middelen en voornaamste argumenten
 Aanvrager van het gemeenschapsmerk: verzoekster
 Betrokken gemeenschapsmerk: woordmerk „VITASIA” voor waren van de klassen 29, 30, 31, 32 en 33 (aanvraagnr. 4 691 101)
 Houder van het oppositiemerk of -teken in de oppositieprocedure: Vinotasia GmbH
 Oppositiemerk of -teken: Duits woordmerk „VINOTASIA” (nr. 302 15 015) voor waren en diensten van de klassen 32, 33 en 35
 Beslissing van de oppositieafdeling: gedeeltelijke toewijzing van de oppositie
 Beslissing van de kamer van beroep: verwerping van het beroep
 Aangevoerde middelen: schending van artikel 8, lid 1, sub b, van verordening nr. 207/2009 (1), aangezien er geen gevaar voor verwarring van de conflicterende merken bestaat.
 (1) Verordening (EG) nr. 207/2009 van de Raad van 26 februari 2009 inzake het gemeenschapsmerk (PB L 78, blz. 1).


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
John B. Roberts, late of Baltimore City, died on or about April 6th, 1923, leaving a will and three codicils. By the terms of the will he devised and bequeathed his entire estate to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, one of the appellants, in trust, to collect the income therefrom and to pay the net income to his wife during her life, and upon her death to divide the corpus into five equal parts and to pay the income from said parts, respectively, to the following persons during their respective lives with remainders as indicated below, viz.:
 1. His son, Major William M. Roberts, at his death, remainder to his descendants then living, but if no descendants, remainder in equal shares to testator's nephew and niece, John Roberts and Isabel Dallam.
 2. John Roberts, a nephew; remainder to his descendants living at his death, per stirpes; and if none, to such of his sisters, Mary Roberts, Isabel Dallam, Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Whiteford as may be then living, and the descendants then living of such of them as may be then deceased, per stirpes.
 3. Isabel Dallam, a niece; remainder to her descendants living at her death, per stirpes; and if none, to such of her sisters, Mary Roberts, Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Whiteford, and her brother, John Roberts, as may then be living, and the descendants then living of such of them as may then be deceased, per stirpes.
 4. Mary Roberts, a niece; remainder to her descendants living at her death, per stirpes; and if none, to such of her sisters, Isabel Dallam, Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Whiteford and her brother, John Roberts, as may then be living, and the descendants then living of such of them as may then be deceased, per stirpes.
 5. Sallie Street, a half-sister; remainder to Mary Roberts if she be living at the death of Sallie, and if not, to such of testator's nieces and nephew, Isabel Dallam, Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Whiteford and John Roberts, as may be then living, *Page 408
 and the descendants then living of such of them as may then be deceased, per stirpes.
 The trustee is given power to sell and to change investments.
 By the first codicil, testator's wife, who was named as executor of the will, having died, Francis A. White is substituted as executor.
 By the second codicil he makes several small bequests, and the following important change in his will, viz.:
 "The one-fifth interest in my estate given to my nephew, John Roberts, I wish changed and given to my niece, Mary Roberts, she to receive the interest during her life; at her death I wish her to place it by her will as she may desire. Also the one-fifth interest given my niece, Mary Roberts, I wish her to have the interest paid her during her life — at her death to place it as she may wish — by her will. The interest on one-fifth of my estate to be paid my son, W.M. Roberts, on his death I wish divided between my nephew, John Roberts, and my niece, Mrs. Whiteford, Mrs. Howard being dead. The interest on one-fifth of my estate given to Sallie Street at her death to be paid to my niece, Mary Roberts. After the death of my niece, Mary Roberts, I wish this interest divided between my nephew, John Roberts, and my niece, Mrs. Whiteford, Mrs. Howard being dead."
 The third codicil is as follows:
 "My niece, Mrs. Dallam, died December the 25th, 1922. In my will I left her the interest on one-fifth of my estate; this I wish paid and equally divided between her sons, Donald, John W. and Charles L. Dallam.
 "Interest to be paid every six months.
 "John B. Roberts, "1116 St. Paul St., "Feby. 3rd, 1923."
 "Witness: "Arthur W. Bond. "S.H. Walker" *Page 409
 On the death of testator, his son, Major Roberts, being dissatisfied with the provisions of the will, threatened to file a caveat. This was averted by an agreement reached by the surviving nephew and nieces of testator and the children of Mrs. Dallam, who had died, to which Major Roberts and Sallie Street assented, as follows:
 "In The
 "Orphans' Court of Baltimore City.
 "In the Matter of the Estate of John B. Roberts,
 Late of Baltimore City, Deceased.
 "This agreement, made this 21st day of June, in the year 1923, by and between Mary Roberts, John W. Roberts, Wilhelmina Whiteford, Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam and Charles L. Dallam, legatees and distributees under the last will and testament of John B. Roberts, late of Baltimore City, deceased.
 "Whereas, by the last will and testament and codicils thereto of the said John B. Roberts, late of Baltimore City, deceased, he devised all of his property as therein set forth, said will being duly admitted to probate and now of record amongst the Will Records of Baltimore City;
 "And whereas, Major William M. Roberts, the only son of said John B. Roberts, is about to file a caveat to said will, because of its provisions, which are unsatisfactory to him;
 "And whereas, in consideration of the agreement on the part of the said William M. Roberts to settle all controversies in reference to said will, with the understanding that he shall receive 45% of the net amount of said estate, and the other devisees therein named, being the parties to this agreement, who together with Miss Sallie Street, to whom one-fifth of said estate was devised in trust, are to receive 55% of the net amount of said estate;
 "Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth, that in consideration of the premises and of the agreement on the part of William M. Roberts to take 45% of said estate, in lieu of all his interest therein (this agreement not intended, however, to affect the devise of certain specific chattels referred to in said will, *Page 410
 which are to go as provided in said will), the said Mary Roberts, John W. Roberts, Wilhelmina Whiteford, Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam and Charles L. Dallam do hereby agree that 45% of the said estate of John B. Roberts, deceased, shall be paid in cash in the final distribution of said estate free, clear and discharged of any trust, to the said William M. Roberts, upon his relinquishing all his rights of every kind and character in the balance of said estate, or any contingent interest therein, except as to the personal chattels above referred to, and that 2/5 of the balance of said estate, consisting of 55% of the net amount thereof, shall be paid to Mary Roberts free, clear and discharged of any trust, and that 1/5 of the remaining part of said estate which was devised to the said William M. Roberts for life, with remainder over to John W. Roberts and Wilhelmina Whiteford absolutely, shall go to and vest in the said John W. Roberts and Wilhelmina Whiteford absolutely, free, clear and discharged of any trust, to be divided between them share and share alike.
 "And whereas, by the last codicil to said will, the interest on 1/5 of the estate was directed to be paid and divided equally between Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam and Charles L. Dallam, and that some question existed as to whether they had any right to anything but the income thereof; it is further understood and agreed that in view of the fact that the said Major William M. Roberts has released all his interest in 55% of this estate, in consideration of receiving 45% thereof absolutely, and that the 1/5 interest so devised to the said Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam and Charles L. Dallam shall vest in them absolutely, and be paid to them in cash, free, clear and discharged of any trust or any possible claim of the said William M. Roberts to said 1/5 interest in said 55% of the net amount of said estate, and that the 1/5 interest in said 55% of said estate devised to Sallie Street for life is to remain in trust as provided in said will. *Page 411
 "And the parties to this agreement further agree that they will sign any other or further agreement that may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this settlement, whether by agreeing that the will shall be set aside and the distribution made as hereinbefore set forth, or whether the estate shall be distributed under a proceeding duly instituted in one of the equity courts of Baltimore City, under the provisions of chapter 228 of the Acts of 1920.
 "As witness our hands and seals the day and year above written.
 "Mary Roberts. (Seal) "John W. Roberts. (Seal) "Wilhelmina Whiteford. (Seal) "Donald Dallam. (Seal) "John W. Dallam. (Seal) "Chas. L. Dallam. (Seal)."
 The bill of complaint in this case (with the above mentioned will, codicils and agreement as exhibits) was filed by the executor and the trustee against William M. Roberts and wife, John William Roberts (called John Roberts in the will) and wife, adults; the two infant children of John W. Roberts, the three children (all adults) of Isabel Dallam, deceased; the son and daughter (adults) of Mrs. Howard, deceased, and their spouses, Mrs. Whiteford, adults, and her three infant children, and Sallie Street, adult. The bill alleges the facts above recited, describes the parties, and alleges that all the persons now living and interested, or possibly interested, and affected, as legatees under various constructions of the will and codicils, so far as here material, are made respondents. It further alleges that said agreement is satisfactory to all the adult defendants, although some of them have not yet signed it, and that said agreement is intended to settle and determine all controversies with reference to the validity of the will; that plaintiffs believe that said settlement is to the best interest of the estate as a whole in the contest with the next of kin, and, therefore, believe that it should be ratified *Page 412
 unless the court should determine that the carrying out of the same improperly alters the rights of the beneficiaries' intersese, by reason of the provisions accelerating remainders, as set forth in said agreement; that plaintiffs, as representing all possible interests under the said will and codicils, feel it to be their duty to impartially call the attention of the court to the possible interpretations of the will, other than those assumed in said agreement, under which possible interpretations the rights of certain of the beneficiaries under the will as so construed are ignored or adversely affected; that in so far as the agreement may ignore or affect the rights of possible beneficiaries, not parties to the agreement, plaintiffs submit the same without recommendation since they feel they have no right to determine questions which may be questions of interpretation adversely affecting the interests of certain beneficiaries or possible beneficiaries, and feel that their duty is limited to making parties to the bill such possible beneficiaries now in esse and apprising the court of the rights of other possible unborn beneficiaries in order that their interests, if any, may be protected in such manner as to the court may seem proper.
 The debatable questions suggested by the bill are as follows:
 1. It sets out the provision of the will in favor of Major William M. Roberts, and the modification of the provision of the will as to the remainder in said one-fifth part by the second codicil, and suggests that a conceivable construction of this part of the will and codicil which is not contemplated by the settlement agreement would be, that the remainder to the children of William M. Roberts, created by the original will, was not revoked, but that the original provision of the will above referred to was only modified in the codicil with respect to the executory devise over in the event of Major Robert's death without children, and that, therefore, under this possible construction any future children of Major Roberts might conceivably have an interest in the estate, which is ignored in the proposed settlement. *Page 413
 2. It sets out the provisions of the will as to the second and fourth shares, and the modifications thereof by the second codicil; and avers that the part of the agreement relating to these shares is based on the assumption that Mary Roberts by joining in the agreement defeats the possibility of any future claim by beneficiaries under her own will, if she should exercise her testamentary power of appointment conferred by the codicil, and is based on the further assumption that the remainder in default of appointment would vest in Major Roberts, who is a party to the agreement. The bill suggests that if the first assumption is not well provided that the future possible beneficiaries under the will of Mary Roberts might have a possible interest in the estate; and if the second assumption is not well founded, and if the provisions in the original will govern, in default of appointment under the testamentary power conferred by the second codicil (there being no express
 revocation except as to the life interest in the second share), then any future children of Mary Roberts or the executory devisees, as determined upon the death of Mary Roberts, would have a possible interest in the estate; that while all of the children now in esse who might conceivably take in default of appointment have been made parties, the future children of Mary Roberts and the future children of the executory devisees named in the original will and the future possible beneficiaries under the will of Mary Roberts are not represented in this proceeding, and their rights, if any, are ignored in the agreement.
 3. It sets out the provisions of the will as to the third share and the modification thereof by the third codicil, and avers that the agreement that this share shall be paid to Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam and Charles L. Dallam, children of Isabel Dallam, deceased, absolutely and discharged of any trusts, is based upon the assumption either that they are entitled to the corpus of this share or that they are entitled to a life estate therein, with remainder to Major Roberts, who is a party to the agreement. The bill suggests that another conceivable construction is that the sons of *Page 414
 Isabel Dallam above named are entitled to life estates and their descendants to remainders in their respective shares, and that under such a construction the rights of any future children of the said sons are not represented and are ignored in the proposed settlement.
 The plaintiffs recommend the ratification of the said settlement in so far as it is a settlement between the estate and Major Roberts, the next of kin, but submit the question whether they ought to recommend the carrying out of the other terms of the settlement in so far as they involve assumptions as to the proper interpretation of the will, for the instructions of the court. The executor, one of the plaintiffs, states that he has filed in the orphans' court a partial inventory of personal estate, a list of debts and an inventory of real estate, and suggests that, in view of complications growing out of this proposed settlement, the further administration of the estate be carried on in the circuit court; and the plaintiffs further suggest that if the agreement is ratified it will be necessary to sell some of the real estate for the purpose of distribution, and that the trustee be authorized and directed in such event to sell such part of the real estate as may be necessary or desirable for that purpose, under the power contained in the will.
 The prayer of the bill is:
 a. That the court take jurisdiction and such action with respect to the ratification of the settlement agreement as may seem proper.
 b. That the court take jurisdiction over the further settlement and distribution of the estate and over the further administration of the trustee therein, and that the court authorize and direct the sale under its supervision by the trustee under the powers conferred by the will of all or so much of the real estate as may be necessary or desirable for the purposes aforesaid.
 c. For further relief.
 The answer filed by William M. Roberts and wife admits the threatented contest and the proposed agreement of settlement *Page 415
 referred to in the bill, and that said agreement is satisfactory to them, with certain provisos not necessary to be stated here, and avers that with such provisos they are willing that the compromise and settlement proposed shall, "if properly extended by this Court to them and the other parties in interest, including the said Sallie Street, and, if properly perfected by this Court in such a manner as to be binding upon all parties concerned in the subject matter thereof, be carried into full effect by the decree or decrees of this Court; provided, however, that the said William M. Roberts does hereby expressly and distinctly reserve the right, should he see fit, in case said agreement shall not be lawfully carried into full and final effect by a final decree of this Court in this cause within the space of two years and six months from the probate of the said alleged will and codicils of the said John B. Roberts, to file a caveat or caveats to said will and to any one or more or all of said codicils; and to set aside the same."
 The answer further states that in case said agreement of settlement shall be carried into effect by a final decree said defendants have no objection to the administration of the personal estate in this cause, or to the sale in this cause, so far as necessary for the purposes of distribution, of the real estate by the said trustee.
 The answer of Sallie Street admits all the allegations of the bill and consents to the relief prayed therein and to the passage of such decree as to the court may seem proper and just.
 The answers of John W. and Elizabeth Roberts, his wife, and Wilhelmina Whiteford, Mary Roberts, Donald, John W. and Charles L. Dallam, admit facts alleged in the bill as to the threatened contest and the proposed agreement of settlement, and consent to a decree in this case "upon the condition that said agreement is carried out according to its express terms, so far as their interests are concerned."
 The answer of Isabel Thompson and Harry Lee Thompson, her husband, William Winston Howard and Nina *Page 416
 Howard, his wife, admits the death of John B. Roberts on April 6th, 1923, leaving a will and three codicils which has been duly probated; that Margaret Howard, the mother of the said Isabel Thompson and William Winston, died intestate on or about March 16th, 1921, survived by two children, her only descendants, to wit: Isabel Thompson, who is married to Harry Lee Thompson, and William Winston Howard, who is married to Nina Howard; and that they are all of age.
 On petition of plaintiffs a guardian ad litem was appointed for the infant defendants, and Samuel K. Dennis was appointed counsel for the infant defendants; and Samuel K. Dennis was also appointed "counsel to represent the interests of all unborn or unknown persons whose beneficial interests may be affected by the proposed settlement agreement"; and an answer of the infant defendants by their guardian ad litem was filed by Samuel K. Dennis, their solicitor.
 Testimony was taken and the case submitted to the court, which decreed that the settlement agreement be ratified and confirmed "to the extent hereinafter set forth in this decree," which provided:
 1. That further administration and settlement of the estate be conducted under the direction and supervision of the court in said proceeding, and that the court assume jurisdiction of the trusts created by the will and the codicils thereto.
 2. That certain pecuniary bequests be paid in full to the legatees.
 3. That certain chattels specifically bequeathed be delivered to the legatees.
 4. That the real estate be sold by the trustee under the powers contained in the will.
 5. That out of the net residuary estate there be set apart for William M. Roberts, son of the testator, forty-five per cent.; of which one part equivalent to twenty-five per cent. of the entire residuary estate shall be paid or delivered by the executor to the said William M. Roberts as his absolute *Page 417
 property, free and clear of any further trust, and the remaining part (being equivalent to twenty per cent. of the entire residuary estate) shall be paid over or delivered by the executor to the Safe Deposit Trust Company of Baltimore, as trustee, in trust to hold and manage the same and to pay the net income therefrom to the said William M. Roberts during his life and on his death to pay the corpus of said trust, free and discharged from the trust, to his descendants living at his death, perstirpes, if he leaves any descendants, but if there be no descendants of his living at his death, then the said trustees shall pay the corpus of said estate to such persons as the said William M. Roberts may by his will appoint, or in default of such appointment, to his personal representatives or assigns; said trustee to have all of the rights, powers and duties set forth in the will of John B. Roberts; said William M. Roberts and his wife to deliver to the trustee a duly executed release and assignment, assigning to Mary Roberts absolutely all their rights in the remainder or reversions in the second and fourth shares created by the said will (the life estates in said shares being already vested in said Mary Roberts), and also releasing all and every other interest or claim, which they or either of them have or may in the future have in the estate of the late John B. Roberts, either under any of the provisions of said will or as heirs at law or next of kin, reserving, however, to the said William B. Roberts in the said release the same right or interest in any property belonging to the estate and not now known or mentioned, as has been decreed to him, out of the net residuary estate now known.
 6. That the remaining fifty-five per cent. of the net residuary estate shall be divided by the executor into five equal parts and distributed as follows:
 a. One-fifth to John W. Roberts and Wilhelmina Whiteford, free, clear, and discharged of any trust, to be divided between them, share and share alike (this fifth being the fifth devised by said will and codicils to William M. Roberts for life, with remainder over to John W. Roberts and *Page 418
 Wilhelmina Whiteford, absolutely, the life estate therein being terminated by the above mentioned release to be executed as aforesaid).
 b. One-fifth to Donald Dallam, John W. Dallam, and Charles Dallam, absolutely and free, clear, and discharged of any trust, share and share alike, "the court being of the opinion that the absolute interest therein is vested in said Donald Dallam, Charles L. Dallam, and John W. Dallam by virtue of said will and codicils."
 c. One-fifth to the Safe Deposit Trust Company, trustee, to be held by it with the powers in said will set forth, in trust to pay the net income thereof to Sallie Street during her life, and after her death to pay the net income thereof to Mary Roberts during her life, and after the death of Mary Roberts to pay over the corpus in equal shares to John Roberts, his personal representatives or assigns, and Wilhelmina Whiteford, her personal representatives or assigns.
 d. Two-fifths to Mary Roberts, free, clear, and discharged of any trust, "the court being of the opinion that the effect of the will and codicils and release herein required of William M. Roberts is to vest in said Mary Roberts the entire interest in said remaining two-fifths."
 The decree makes certain provisions as to details of enforcement, which it is not here necessary to set out.
 The form of the decree was approved by all the parties through their solicitors.
 The two appeals in one record are from said decree, and were taken, by order of the Chancellor, by the executor and the trustee, who were plaintiffs below, and by the guardian adlitem of the infant defendants. The appellants in both appeals concede that, even if the difficulty suggested in the bill of complaint as to the first share be valid, it is removed by the terms of the decree, by which any possible interest of future children of William M. Roberts in one-fifth of the estate is preserved. It will be unnecessary therefore to consider further this objection. It is also conceded that the construction of the will and third codicil, by which the Dallam *Page 419
 children are given absolute estates, and of the will and second codicil, in accordance with which the trust is continued as to the fifth share during the lives of Sallie Street and Mary Roberts and the life of the survivor of them with remainder to John Roberts and Wilhelmina Whiteford, free and clear of the trust, is free from serious difficulty. We concur in the conclusion of the Chancellor as to both of these shares.
 The objection seriously urged is as to the disposition made by the agreement of settlement and by the decree of the second and fourth shares. Our conclusion as to these shares is likewise in accordance with that reached by the Chancellor. In our opinion the testator intended by the second codicil to revoke the provisions of his will as to these shares. The language of this codicil indicates clearly that the testator meant not only to give his niece, Mary Roberts, the power of appointment by will, but that he relied upon her exercising the power, and intended to leave the remainder in these shares otherwise undisposed of. The result of which conclusion is that he died intestate as to these remainders, and they went to his son, Major Roberts, as his next of kin, subject to the exercise of the power of appointment by Mary Roberts. By the assignment of these remainders to Mary Roberts under the terms of the decree she will have the entire interest in these shares, and the super-added testamentary power will then be extinguished by her contract.
 The conclusions reached by the Chancellor, in all of which we concur, as to the true construction of the will and codicils in reference to the respective shares, remove all the difficulties which were suggested in the bill of complaint and ably presented by counsel in argument.
 Except, possibly, as to future children of William M. Roberts, as to whom it is unnecessary to express an opinion because of the provision made by the decree to protect any interest they might have, the parties in interest are all in being, adults, and parties to the proceeding. It was therefore competent for them, subject to the ratification of the *Page 420
 court, to bind all interests (with the possible exception just mentioned) by the agreement of settlement, which, as ratified by the decree, excludes no one entitled under the will and codicils.
 Some, at least, of the difficulties suggested by counsel for appellants would have been not only serious but insuperable if the constructions of the will and codicils suggested as possible had been found to be the true construction. For we do not understand that under chapter 228 of the Acts of 1920 the court has power to ratify an agreement by adult parties in interest which would change a will to the extent of depriving infants, either born or unborn, of interests bequeathed them. The sort of compromise which that act seems to contemplate is one by which the amount of an estate may be decreased in order to effect a settlement of a claim against the estate.
 It does not contemplate the extinction, or the change ofcharacter, of interests given to infants in such estate.
 Decree affirmed and cause remanded, costs to be paid out ofthe estate.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 10.12.2013
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 L 329/13
 UITVOERINGSVERORDENING (EU) Nr. 1278/2013 VAN DE COMMISSIE
 van 9 december 2013
 tot vaststelling van de forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit
 DE EUROPESE COMMISSIE,
 Gezien het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie,
 Gezien Verordening (EG) nr. 1234/2007 van de Raad van 22 oktober 2007 houdende een gemeenschappelijke ordening van de landbouwmarkten en specifieke bepalingen voor een aantal landbouwproducten („integrale-GMO-verordening”) (1),
 Gezien Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 van de Commissie van 7 juni 2011 tot vaststelling van nadere bepalingen voor de toepassing van Verordening (EG) nr. 1234/2007 van de Raad, wat de sectoren groenten en fruit en verwerkte groenten en fruit betreft (2), en met name artikel 136, lid 1,
 Overwegende hetgeen volgt:
 (1)
 Bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 zijn, op grond van de resultaten van de multilaterale handelsbesprekingen van de Uruguayronde, de criteria vastgesteld aan de hand waarvan de Commissie voor de producten en de perioden die in bijlage XVI, deel A, bij die verordening zijn vermeld, de forfaitaire waarden bij invoer uit derde landen vaststelt.
 (2)
 De forfaitaire invoerwaarde wordt elke dag berekend overeenkomstig artikel 136, lid 1, van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011, met inachtneming van de variabele gegevens voor die dag. Bijgevolg moet deze verordening in werking treden op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie,
 HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:
 Artikel 1
 De in artikel 136 van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 bedoelde forfaitaire invoerwaarden worden vastgesteld in de bijlage bij de onderhavige verordening.
 Artikel 2
 Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.
 Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.
 Gedaan te Brussel, 9 december 2013.
 Voor de Commissie, namens de voorzitter,
 Jerzy PLEWA
 Directeur-generaal Landbouw en Plattelandsontwikkeling
 (1) PB L 299 van 16.11.2007, blz. 1.
 (2) PB L 157 van 15.6.2011, blz. 1.
 BIJLAGE
 Forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit
 (EUR/100 kg)
 GN-code
 Code derde landen (1)
 Forfaitaire invoerwaarde
 0702 00 00
 AL
 45,1
 MA
 81,4
 TN
 86,4
 TR
 84,7
 ZZ
 74,4
 0707 00 05
 AL
 59,9
 MA
 127,8
 TR
 122,5
 ZZ
 103,4
 0709 93 10
 MA
 153,0
 TR
 161,8
 ZZ
 157,4
 0805 10 20
 AR
 30,4
 AU
 88,3
 MA
 36,7
 TR
 61,1
 UY
 36,0
 ZA
 55,2
 ZW
 19,7
 ZZ
 46,8
 0805 20 10
 AU
 135,6
 MA
 58,6
 ZZ
 97,1
 0805 20 30, 0805 20 50, 0805 20 70, 0805 20 90
 TR
 66,3
 ZZ
 66,3
 0805 50 10
 TR
 70,1
 ZZ
 70,1
 0808 10 80
 BA
 42,7
 MK
 36,9
 NZ
 160,5
 US
 165,4
 ZA
 199,9
 ZZ
 121,1
 0808 30 90
 TR
 130,9
 US
 211,2
 ZZ
 171,1
 (1) Landennomenclatuur vastgesteld bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1833/2006 van de Commissie (PB L 354 van 14.12.2006, blz. 19). De code „ZZ” staat voor „overige oorsprong”.


type: other

text:
Pravomoc ESD rozhodovat jako rozhodčí soud - Ústav práva ®
 V rozsudku Soudního dvora ze dne 17. března 2005 ve věci Komise Evropských společenství proti AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA a dalším, věc C-294/02 (dále jen „Rozsudek ESD“)[1], v němž byl ze strany ESD podáván výklad čl. 181 SEHS (nynější článek 238 SES) a Nařízení (ES) č. 1346/2000, čl. 181 SES, článků 4, 16, 17 a 40 nařízení (ES) č. 1346/2000 a čl. 42 JŘSD, dospěl ESD k těmto závěrům:
 1. Z použití výrazů ‚Soudní dvůr‘ ve Smlouvě vyplývá, že toto označení se nevztahuje na jeden či druhý soud Společenství, ale na orgán Společenství, který zahrnuje Soudní dvůr a Soud. V důsledku toho musí být odkaz na ‚Soudní dvůr‘ učiněný v článku 238 SES chápán tak, že se týká tohoto orgánu, a tedy tento orgán musí být uveden ve smlouvě k tomu, aby mohla být přiznána pravomoc jednomu nebo druhému soudu Společenství.
 2. Smlouva nestanoví žádné zvláštní znění rozhodčí doložky. Za těchto okolností je třeba jakékoliv ustanovení, které uvádí, že smluvní strany mají v úmyslu pro své případné spory odejmout pravomoc vnitrostátních soudů a stanovit pravomoc soudů Společenství, považovat za dostatečné k tomu, aby byla podle článku 238 SES založena pravomoc posledně uvedených. Určení Soudu toto kritérium jasně splňuje, aniž by bylo nezbytné vykládat dotyčnou doložku ve světle práva, které je pro smlouvu rozhodné.
 3. Skutečnost, že se strany snažily chybně určit konkrétní soud v rámci orgánu ‚Soudního dvora‘, který bude pověřen rozhodováním jejich sporů, a rozhodčí doložka v důsledku toho pozbývá částečně účinnost, není na překážku úmyslu, který strany jasně vyjádřily, odejmout pro své případné spory pravomoc vnitrostátních soudů a stanovit pravomoc soudů Společenství.
 Jak plyne odůvodnění rozhodnutí, dne 12. srpna 2002 podala Komise žalobu proti sedmi společnostem (AMI Semiconductor, A-Consult, Intracom, Ision, Euram, Nordbank a InterTeam, dále jen „žalované“) 1) na základě článku 238 SES. Svou žalobou se domáhala, aby Soudní dvůr uložil žalovaným jako solidárním dlužníkům zaplatit Komisi částku ve výši 317 214 eur, zvýšenou o úroky. Částka představovala vrácení záloh, které Komise uhradila podle smlouvy uzavřené s těmito společnostmi v rámci projektu Esprit č. 26927, nazvaného „Electronic Commerce Fulfilment Service for the Electronics Industry (ECFS/E)“ (Služby umožňující elektronický obchod v elektronickém průmyslu).
 Dne 8. června 1998 uzavřelo Společenství zastoupené Komisí s žalovanými smlouvu o finančním příspěvku poskytnutém těmto společnostem na uskutečnění projektu. Žalované byly povinny plnit smlouvu společně a nerozdílně. Smlouva byla sepsána v angličtině a řídila se německým právem.
 Projekt měl za cíl umožnit prodej přebytečných polovodičových součástek mezi podniky působící v oblasti elektronického průmyslu bez účasti zprostředkovatele, a snížit tak náklady transakce. Podle smlouvy činila doba provádění projektu 18 měsíců, od 1. května 1998 do konce října 1999.
 Pro Komisi stanovila smlouva možnost spolupracovat při správě smlouvy se znalci. V takovém případě Komisi příslušelo přijmout vhodná opatření k zajištění, aby tito znalci nešířili a neužívali důvěrné údaje, které jim byly poskytnuty. Komise měla smluvním stranám předem sdělit podrobné informace týkající se těchto znalců a měla přiměřeně zohlednit námitky vznesené smluvními stranami, odůvodněné legitimními obchodními důvody. Celkové nahraditelné náklady projektu byly odhadnuty na 1 080 000 ECU. Podle smlouvy měl příspěvek Komise pokrýt až 50 % těchto nákladů v maximální výši 540 000 ECU. Základ nákladů, který měl být zachován, byl obsažen v přílohách smlouvy, které obsahovaly také přesná kritéria použitelná pro výpočet nahraditelných nákladů.
 Článek 7 přílohy II smlouvy obsahoval rozhodčí doložku, podle které měl „Soud prvního stupně Evropských společenství a v případě opravného prostředku Soudní dvůr Evropských společenství výlučnou pravomoc rozhodovat spory mezi Komisí a smluvními stranami, pokud jde o platnost, použití a výklad smlouvy.
 Uskutečňování projektu bylo zahájeno v květnu 1998. Dne 15. prosince 1998 předaly smluvní strany Komisi zprávu týkající se šestiměsíčního období, popisující dosažené cíle. V této zprávě prohlásily, že poskytly v celém rozsahu jednotlivá plnění stanovená v příslušných pracovních programech. Proto, aby mohly být výsledky zanesené ve zprávách smluvních stran ověřeny, navrhla Komise zřízení kontrolní skupiny („Review Team“). Kontrolní skupina předložila svou první zprávu o přezkumu při setkání Komise a smluvních stran konaném dne 11. června 1999. V této zprávě poukázala na vážné nedostatky při provádění projektu. Na základě těchto zjištění oznámila daná skupina přerušení projektu do 1. července 1999 a vyzvala žalované, aby jí zaslaly všechny nezbytné informace prokazující, že odstranily vady při provádění projektu zmíněné ve zprávě o přezkumu.
 V dopise ze dne 18. června 1999 shrnula Komise rozhodnutí, která byla přijata při setkání dne 11. června 1999. Rovněž při této příležitosti stanovila žalovaným dodatečnou lhůtu a pohrozila vypovězením smlouvy. Dalšími dopisy ze dne 29. června a 14. července 1999 Komise opětovně zpochybnila plnění smluvních povinností žalovaných a vyzvala je k napravení neplnění prací, jakož i k odstranění zjištěných nedostatků, a to ve lhůtě jednoho měsíce.
 Na počátku července 1999 předložily žalované Komisi zprávu týkající se dvanáctiměsíčního období, popisující dosažené cíle. Podle této zprávy provedly projekt v souladu se smlouvou. Dne 5. července 1999 předložila kontrolní skupina druhou zprávu o přezkumu, která zohlednila informace obsažené ve zprávě o dosaženém pokroku během dvanácti měsíců, a další doplňující dokumenty, které smluvní strany dodaly. Tato zpráva kritizovala zásadním způsobem veškerá plnění. Část těchto plnění byla však přijata, přestože byla posouzena jako nedostatečně kvalitní. Ačkoli žalované poskytly při setkání konaném dne 8. září 1999 nové úplné shrnutí dosažených cílů, kontrolní skupina od svých závěrů neupustila. Dopisem ze dne 21. prosince 1999 adresovaným společnosti InterTeam oznámila Komise vypovězení smlouvy se zpětnou účinností ke dni 8. září 1999.
 Dne 22. prosince 1999 rozhodla valná hromada společnosti InterTeam o jejím vstupu do likvidace. Dne 8. listopadu 2001 byla společnost InterTeam vymazána z obchodního rejstříku. Proti společnosti A-Consult bylo dne 10. července 2002 zahájeno řízení o soudním vyrovnání. A-Consult vzala následně zpět návrh na zahájení řízení o soudním vyrovnání, neboť v souladu s rakouskými právními předpisy o konkurzu bylo dané řízení ukončeno a dne 25. července 2002 bylo zahájeno „konkurzní řízení, které následuje po řízení o soudním vyrovnání“ („Anschlußkonkursverfahren“). Dne 19. července 2002 bylo zahájeno úpadkové řízení týkající se majetku společnosti Ision.
 Článek 225 odst. 1 SES, ve znění vycházejícím z Niceské smlouvy, zní následovně:
 Soud prvního stupně je příslušný rozhodovat v prvním stupni ve věcech v článcích 230, 232, 235, 236 a 238 s výjimkou těch, které jsou v působnosti některé soudní komory nebo které statut vyhrazuje Soudnímu dvoru. Statut může stanovit, že Soud prvního stupně je příslušný i pro jiné věci.
 Proti rozhodnutím Soudu prvního stupně podle tohoto odstavce je možno za podmínek a v mezích stanovených statutem podat opravný prostředek k Soudnímu dvoru, omezený na právní otázky.
 Článek 51 statutu Soudního dvora, ve znění platném do 31. května 2004, před vstupem v platnost rozhodnutí Rady 2004/407/ES, Euratom ze dne 26. dubna 2004, kterým se mění články 51 a 54 Protokolu o statutu Soudního dvora stanovil:
 Odchylně od pravidla obsaženého v čl. 225 odst. 1 Smlouvy o SES je pro žaloby podané členskými státy, orgány Společenství a Evropskou centrální bankou příslušný Soudní dvůr.‘
 Rozhodčí doložka obsažená v čl. 7 přílohy II smlouvy stanoví výlučnou pravomoc Soudu rozhodovat v prvním stupni všechny spory, které mohou ze smlouvy vzejít.
 Je však nesporné, že systém rozdělení pravomocí mezi Soud a Soudní dvůr tak, jak byl upraven Smlouvou, jakož i statutem Soudního dvora, jež tvoří přílohu této Smlouvy, neumožňoval Soudu v době, kdy byl podán návrh na zahájení řízení, rozhodovat o žalobách podaných orgány Společenství, jak je tomu v projednávaném případě. Z tohoto důvodu byla žaloba po svém původním podání do kanceláře Soudu předána na základě článku 54 statutu Soudního dvora soudní kanceláři posledně uvedeného.
 Navzdory tomu, že účastníci řízení nezpochybňují pravomoc Soudního dvora, musí Soudní dvůr bez návrhu přezkoumat použitelnost rozhodčí doložky. Bylo tedy třeba odpovědět na otázku, zda určení Soudu v rozhodčí doložce může založit pravomoc Soudního dvora podle článku 238 SES, který přiznává ‚Soudnímu dvoru‘ zvláštní pravomoci.
 Z výše uvedených důvodů, které jsou citovány shora v právní větě, je podle názoru ESD nutné tyto otázky odpovědět kladně.
 1. Z rozsudku ESD tak vyplývá, že Soudní dvůr (ESD) má pravomoc rozhodovat na základě rozhodčí doložky obsažené ve veřejnoprávní nebo soukromoprávní smlouvě uzavřené Společenstvím nebo jeho jménem.
 2. Určení Soudu toto kritérium jasně splňuje, aniž by bylo nezbytné vykládat dotyčnou rozhodčí doložku ve světle práva, které je pro smlouvu rozhodné.
 4. Z výše uvedeného vak zřetelně vyplývá, jak extenzivní je dosah rozhodčí doložky v interpretaci ESD. Zatímco české soudy považují v mnoha obdobných případech rozhodčí doložku sjednanou ve prospěch nepříliš určitě a jasně označeného subjektu přísně formalisticky automaticky za ex lege neplatnou, ESD posuzuje ve skutkové obdobných, ne-li stejných, případech otázku platnosti rozhodčí doložky výrazně liberálně, až voluntaristicky.
 5. Primárním kritériem platnosti rozhodčí doložky a podřízení právního procesu režimu a pravidlům rozhodce nebo rozhodčího soudu je to, že rozhodčí doložka obsahuje vůli stran odejmout řešení sporu vnitrostátním soudům. Až sekundární je pak přesné označení soudního subjektu v rámci Společenství (Unie), který konkrétně spor rozhodne.
 6. Zajímavé je z českého pohledu limitovaného černobílou optikou rozhodce vs. státní soud rovněž zjištění, že jako rozhodčí soud působí v rámci Unie samotný ESD. ESD je ostatně podle názoru autora této statě rozhodčím soudem nejen v případech, kdy jeho pravomoc založí rozhodčí doložka obsažená ve smlouvě mezi tou či onou korporací se sídlem v některém z členských států EU na jedné a některým z orgánů Unie na straně druhé, ale generelně (obecně), neboť každou jednotlivou část zakladatelských smluv EU zakládající pro řešení určitého konkrétního sporu pravomoc Soudu prvního stupně nebo Evropského soudního dvora je třeba považovat za rozhodčí doložku svého druhu, sjednanou konsensuálně jednotlivými členskými státy EU.
 Článek byl publikován dne 16.08.2011 na www.elaw.cz


text:
ECLI:SI:VSLJ:2015:II.CP.1140.2014
 VSL0076314
 Dušan Barič (preds.), Bojan Breznik (poroč.), Majda Lušina
 priposestvovanje stvarne služnosti - pogoji za priposestvovanje stvarne služnosti - stopnja prepričanja kot dokazni standard - popravni sklep - prepozna pritožba - zavrženje pritožbe
 Tožniki morajo s stopnjo prepričanja dokazati, da so dvajset let izvrševali služnost, saj bo le na ta način izkazana pravna podlaga za poseg v lastninsko pravico toženke.
 I. Pritožba tožečih strank se zavrže.
 II. Pritožbi tožene stranke se ugodi in se sodba v izpodbijanem delu (točki I in III) razveljavi in zadeva v navedenem obsegu vrne sodišču prve stopnje v novo sojenje.
 III. Tožeče stranke krijejo svoje stroške pritožbenega postopka.
 1. Sodišče prve stopnje je z izpodbijano sodbo ugotovilo, da v korist gospodujočega zemljišča parc. št. 468 k. o. Y (ID znak: 001), ki je v lasti tožnikov obstaja služnostna pravica dostopa in vožnje z vsemi vozili po obstoječi poti, ki poteka po parc. št. 269/2 k. o. X (ID znak: 002), preko služečega zemljišča parc. št. 275/3 k. o. X (ID znak: 003)(1) , ki je v lasti toženke, do parc. št. 272/6 k. o. X (ID znak: 004), za redne preglede in redna čiščenja vodotoka, redne preglede vodne pregrade in redna in nujna vzdrževalna dela na nepremičnini parc. št. 468 k. o. Y(2) in na njej stoječih vodnih objektov (točka I), kar so tožniki zahtevali več, kot izhaja iz I. točke izreka sodbe, je prvo sodišče zavrnilo (točka II) ter še odločilo, da vsaka pravdna stranka nosi svoje stroške postopka (točka III).
 2. Tožniki so po pooblaščencu zoper zavrnilni del sodbe vložili pritožbo dne 27. 12. 2013 zaradi zmotne in nepopolne ugotovitve dejanskega stanja ter zaradi napačne uporabe materialnega prava. Pritožbenemu sodišču so predlagali, da pritožbi ugodi in sodbo v izpodbijanem delu spremeni tako, da tožbenemu zahtevku v celoti ugodi, podredno pa, da izpodbijano sodbo razveljavi in zadevo vrne sodišču prve stopnje v novo sojenje(3) .
 3. Toženka vlaga laično pritožbo, v kateri navaja, da tožniki nimajo služnostne pravice preko služečega zemljišča parc. št. 275/3 k. o. X, ki je v lasti toženke. Tudi če bi tožniki lahko prihajali preko parc. št. 269/2, ki je v lasti M. D., obstaja pravnoformalna ovira, ker so med javno potjo in parc. št. 269/2 ter služečim zemljiščem parcele, ki niso v lasti pravdnih strank in tožniki na teh parcelah nimajo služnostne pravice. Med pravdnimi strankami je bilo sporno, ali so tožniki dejansko izvrševali služnost na zatrjevani način. Prvo sodišče pri odločitvi ni upoštevalo, da ne obstajajo zadostni dokazi za dvajsetletno neprekinjeno izvrševanje služnosti. Sodnica je v postopku poudarjala, da tožniki niso dokazali kontinuitete, ki je potrebna za pridobitev služnosti, kar je izpostavila še na zadnji obravnavi, sodba pa je zavzela nasprotno stališče v korist tožnikov. Prvo sodišče je ugotavljalo, ali so tožniki od 3. 11. 1989 do 4. 11. 2009 uporabljali pot, ki poteka po zemljišču toženke, za vzdrževanje Krišljevega jezu na parc. št. 468 k. o. Y. Prvo sodišče v obrazložitvi sodbe dejanske ugotovitve gradi na izpovedbah tožnikov, ki jih šteje kot verodostojne, ker so skladne, taka sinhroniziranost tožnikov v vseh izjavah pa objektivnemu opazovalcu kaže na neverodostojnost, saj se toliko različnih oseb kot je tožnikov, ne more po več kot dvajsetih letih natančno enako spominjati, razen če se niso podrobno uskladili pred pričanjem. Nobena od nezainteresiranih prič, ki živijo ob sporni poti ni potrdila navedb tožnika, celo ne D. K., ki je v sorodu z enim od tožnikov, ki bi lahko opazila številne aktivnosti tožnikov v zvezi z uporabo poti, pa jih ni, saj se ni spominjala, da bi videla peljati tovornjake po poti v zadnjih dvajsetih letih; enkrat je videla le kolesnice bagra. Tudi J. B. nikoli ni videl nikogar uporabljati poti, nikoli ni videl, da bi po tej poti vozil bager ali kakšen kamion. Priča tožnikov V. B. je izpovedal, da je Vodnogospodarsko podjetje v času njegove zaposlitve od 1986 do 2004 obnavljalo K. jez in čistilo strugo kot pooblaščenec države, strugo v obdobju od 1995 do 2005 pa je čistilo SGP T. Navedeni dokazi potrjujejo, da tožniki niso dokazali kontinuitete služnosti med leti 1989 in 2005, ker so dela v jezu in strugi opravljale druge družbe, ki niso pravne prednice tožnikov in niso povezane s tožniki. Za čiščenje struge je bilo potrebno dovoljenje, tožniki pa so priložili dokument z dne 3. 11. 2005, ki izkazuje njihove koncesijske pravice šele od 2005 dalje, kar se ujema tudi s pričevanjem V. B. Šele od 25. 8. 2009 je določen odsek vodotoka, na katerem imajo tožniki upravičenje. ARSO jim je naložil, da morajo pravnoformalno pridobiti služnostne pravice v dokumentu določenega vplivnega območja, kar je razlog za vložitev tožbe na ugotovitev služnostne pravice na podlagi priposestvovanja, ki je za tožnike najcenejši način, da bi prišli do formalnopravno vpisane služnostne pravice. Tožniki so predložili listinske dokaze glede čiščenja reke in vzdrževanja jeza le za leta 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008 in 2009. Račun za beton iz leta 1989 je lahko namenjen čemur koli znotraj privatnega ali gospodarskega omrežja tožnikov, še posebej, ker je v tistem obdobju jez po pričevanju V. B. obnavljalo Vodnogospodarsko podjetje, ne pa tožniki. Pravna prednica toženke I. O. ni nikomur dala služnostne pravice, saj je to bilo proti njenim principom. Če bi pokojna mati toženke vedela, da kdorkoli poskuša služnost izvajati, bi mu to preprečila. To potrjuje tudi dokument Vodnogospodarskega podjetja v spisu, ko je podjetje delalo na K. jezu in je potrebovalo prevoz preko služečega zemljišča. Nepopolno je bilo ugotovljeno dejansko stanje, ker se je sodnica na ogledu parcel na terenu odločila, da si parc. št. 278 ne bo ogledala, čeprav je takšen predlog dala toženka. Parc. št. 278 je bila v letih 1989 do 1995 edina pot, po kateri so delovni stroji lahko prišli do jezu. V navedenem obdobju nobeno vozilo ni vozilo preko služečega zemljišča. Dokument iz leta 1980 dokazuje, da je Krišljev jez obnavljalo Vodnogospodarsko podjetje in da se je za potrebe dovoza do jezu uporabljala parc. št. 278 in ne služeče zemljišče, kot to trdijo tožniki. Situacija na terenu 2013 je drugačna kot je bila leta 2009, ko so tožniki vložili tožbo in povsem drugačna v letih med 1989 in 2009. Šele po vložitvi tožbe so tožniki začeli pospešeno širiti in utrjevati sporno pot. V zemljiško knjigo je vpisana javna pot po parc. št. 852/4 vse do struge reke in Krišljevega jezu, česar prvo sodišče v sodbi ne upošteva. Po navedeni poti je direkten dostop do nekdanje elektrarne H. Č., ki je bila zgrajena 1991. Navedena priča zanika obstoj javne poti preko svojih parcel in zatrjuje, da je vozil drugje do svoje elektrarne, vendar ne razloži, zakaj si je podaljšal in otežil dostop do svojega objekta, če je bil možen dostop direktno po njegovem zemljišču. Tožniki na zaslišanju niso vedeli, da je stara hiša G. stala na povsem drugem mestu kot sedanja nedokončana gradnja, kar dokazuje, da nobenega od tožnikov ni bilo blizu služeče parcele. Tožnikom ni poznano dejansko stanje toženkine in sosednje parcele pred letom 1995, zato ne morejo trditi, da so vozili od leta 1989.
 4. Pritožba tožnikov se zavrže. Pritožba toženke je utemeljena.
 5. Pooblaščenec tožečih strank je prejel sodbo sodišča prve stopnje 6. 12. 2013, pritožbo pa so tožniki po pooblaščencu vložili 27. 12. 2013. Rok za pritožbo je bil petnajst dni, pritožbeni rok pa se je iztekel 23. 12. 2013, ker je bila zadnji dan roka 21. 12. 2013 sobota. Ker pritožba ni bila vložena pravočasno, jo je pritožbeno sodišče zavrglo kot prepozno (prvi odstavek 352. člena Zakona o pravdnem postopku(4)). Očitna pisna napaka v imenu tretje tožnika v izreku sodbe sodišča prve stopnje, ki je bila popravljena s popravnim sklepom, ni relevantna okoliščina, ki bi opravičevala podaljšanje pritožbenega roka.
 6. Pritožbeno sodišče ne sledi pritožbi toženke v delu, v katerem izpodbija dokazno oceno sodišča prve stopnje, da je pot po služečem zemljišču, ki je v lasti toženke, kakršna je tudi danes, v enakem obsegu in stanju napravila že Vodnogospodarska skupnost v letih 1985 - 1986, ko je obnavljala K. jez. Tega dejstva ne ovržejo trditve, da pravna prednica toženke nikoli ne bi dopustila gradnje takšne poti za potrebe služnosti in da je bila pot narejena za potrebe služečega zemljišča, kakor tudi ne fotografije, na katere opozarja pritožba(5). Trasa poti je razvidna iz skice izmer z dne 23. 10. 1980, obstoj poti pa dokazuje tudi zahteva za parcelacijo z dne 16. 9. 1980. Tudi ogled je potrdil pravilne ugotovitve prvega sodišča o obstoju poti, kot je bila ugotovljena na podlagi listinske dokumentacije, pri čemer ni odločilno, ali je možen dostop do reke oziroma jezu še po kakšni drugi poti. Obstoj poti so poleg tožnikov potrdile tudi priče (M. P., V. B., R. D. in J. B.). Dokazna ocena sodišča prve stopnje je v tem delu prepričljiva, pregledna ter skrbno in podrobno obrazložena, zato se pritožbeno sodišče v izogib ponavljanju sklicuje na razloge iz obrazložitve sodbe sodišča prve stopnje(6).
 7. Izhodišča sodišča prve stopnje o uporabi materialnega prava, kot izhajajo iz 19. - 24. tč. obrazložitve sodbe so pravilna. Odločilno je vprašanje, ali so tožniki s stopnjo prepričanja dokazali, da so od pridobitve (so)lastninske pravice na gospodujočem zemljišču nepretrgoma (vsaj) od leta 1989 izvrševali služnostno pravico, in ali so služnostno pravico izvrševali na prepoznaven način tudi za lastnika služečega zemljišča, ki izvrševanju služnostne pravice ni nasprotoval, oziroma ali so na enak način izvrševali služnostno pravico že pravni predniki tožnikov, ker se čas izvrševanja služnostne pravice pravnih prednikov všteva v priposestvovalno dobo, ki je potrebna za pridobitev stvarne služnosti tožnikov.
 8. Pritožbeno sodišče ugotavlja, da so v dejanskih ugotovitvah, glede izvrševanja služnostne pravice tožnikov, v obrazložitvi sodbe nasprotja, zaradi katerih ni mogoče s stopnjo prepričanja sprejeti dejanske ugotovitve prvega sodišča, da so tožniki od pridobitve (so)lastninske pravice nepretrgoma izvrševali služnostno pravico. Že trditvena podlaga tožnikov v tem delu je skopa, še posebej glede izvrševanja služnosti s strani pravnih prednikov, ki naj bi imeli na gospodujočem zemljišču postavljene MHE od leta 1900, tožniki pa naj bi (sedaj) imeli na nepremičnini štiri hidroelektrarne. Še bolj skopo pa je dokazno gradivo, še posebej listinska dokumentacija o uporabi poti zaradi vzdrževalnih del po izpolnitvenih pomočnikih, saj obstaja obsežna listinska dokumentacija šele od leta 2005 dalje, ko so tožniki pridobili koncesijo, nekaj pa je tudi dokazil za leto 2003, za predhodno obdobje pa je le račun za nabavo betona in neoriginalni predračun, popis del in končni obračun, vse iz leta 1989. Tožniki v svojih izpovedbah niso pojasnili, od kdaj obratujejo hidroelektrarne na gospodujočem zemljišču, zakaj so čistili vodotok, če je vodotok čistila Vodnogospodarska skupnost, ki je imela za to dovoljenje (kasneje SGP T.) in zakaj je pot naredila Vodnogospodarska skupnost, če so tožniki oziroma njihovi pravni predniki sicer takrat še neutrjeno pot vseskozi uporabljali za dostop do reke in gospodujočega zemljišča, ob tem, da je jez obnavljala Vodnogospodarska skupnost leta 1985. Priča V. B., ki je od leta 1986 delal v Vodnogospodarskem podjetju in bil tam zaposlen do leta 2004, je še izpovedal, da je bilo treba čistiti gramoz zaradi hidroelektrarne. Navedena dejstva bi morala biti tožnikom predstavljena ob njihovem zaslišanju, da se do njih opredelijo, kar bi lahko vplivalo na dokazno oceno glede njihove verodostojne izpovedbe. Tožniki bi morali tudi pojasniti razloge, zaradi katerih obstaja obsežna dokumentacija o delih na rečni strugi in gospodujočem zemljišču šele od leta 2005 dalje in zakaj pravni predniki niso zahtevali priznanja služnostne pravice od pravne prednice toženke in zaradi katerih razlogov so šele leta 2009 zahtevali sodno priznanje stvarne služnosti na podlagi priposestvovanja. Tožniki tudi niso pojasnili, na kakšen način bi pravna prednica toženke lahko vedela za neprekinjeno izvrševanje služnostne pravice s strani tožnikov, še posebej iz razloga, ker iz izpovedb prič M. P., M. D., J. B. in D. K. izhaja, da nikoli niso videli nikogar, ki bi s strani tožnikov po zatrjevani poti dostopal do jezu in ga vzdrževal oziroma, da v zadnjih dvajsetih letih niso videli, da bi služnostno pot uporabljali tovornjaki ali bagri(7). Pritožba tudi izpostavlja, da tožniki niso izvrševali služnostne pravice, saj jim niso bile poznane okoliščine, vezane na gradnjo G. hiše.
 9. Sodišče prve stopnje bo zato moralo v novem postopku podrobneje zaslišati tožnike in jim predstaviti navedena dejstva, na podlagi katerih bo šele možna dokazna ocena, ali so tožniki s stopnjo prepričanja dokazali obstoj stvarne služnosti, saj bo le na ta način izkazana pravna podlaga za poseg v lastninsko pravico toženke.
 10. Pritožbeni razlogi so utemeljeni, zato je pritožbeno sodišče pritožbi ugodilo in sodbo v izpodbijanem delu razveljavilo ter zadevo v navedenem obsegu vrnilo sodišču prve stopnje v novo sojenje.
 11. Ker je pritožbeno sodišče pritožbo tožnikov zavrglo, tožniki krijejo svoje stroške pritožbenega postopka, odločitev o povrnitvi stroškov postopka pravdnih strank pred sodiščem prve stopnje pa je pritožbeno sodišče razveljavilo in v navedenem obsegu zadevo vrnilo sodišču prve stopnje v novo odločanje.
 Op. št. (1): V nadaljevanju služeče zemljišče.
 Op. št. (2): V nadaljevanju gospodujoče zemljišče.
 Op. št. (3): Pritožbeno sodišče vsebinsko ne povzema pritožbenih navedb, ker je bila pritožba zavržena, ker je bila vložena prepozno, kar bo obrazloženo v nadaljevanju.
 Op. št. (4): V nadaljevanju ZPP.
 Op. št. (5): Podrobneje o tem glej 31. točko sodbe.
 Op. št. (6): Sodišče prve stopnje bo moralo v novem sojenju, če bo izdalo sodbo, znova obrazložiti navedene razloge, ki jih pritožbeno sodišče sicer sprejema kot prepričljive.
 Op. št. (7): Podrobneje glej povzetek izpovedb v sodbi sodišča prve stopnje tč. 34.
 SPZ člen 217. ZPP člen 352, 352/1.
 P2RvYy0yMDEyMDMyMTEzMDc4Mzcz


text:
 116 HRES 293 EH: Providing for budget enforcement for fiscal year 2020.
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2019-04-09
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 IV
 116th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. RES. 293
 In the House of Representatives, U. S.,
 April 9, 2019
 RESOLUTION
 Providing for budget enforcement for fiscal year 2020.
 1.Budget matters
 (a)Fiscal year 2020For the purpose of enforcing the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for fiscal year 2020, the allocations, aggregates, and levels provided for in subsection (b) shall apply in the House of Representatives in the same manner as for a concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2020 with appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal year 2020 and for fiscal years 2021 through 2029. (b)Committee allocations, aggregates, and levelsIn the House of Representatives, the chair of the Committee on the Budget shall submit a statement for publication in the Congressional Record as soon as practicable, containing—
 (1)for the Committee on Appropriations, committee allocations for fiscal year 2020 for new discretionary budget authority of $1,295,018,000,000, and the outlays flowing therefrom, and committee allocations for fiscal year 2020 for current law mandatory budget authority and outlays, for the purpose of enforcing section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; (2)for all committees of the House other than the Committee on Appropriations, committee allocations for fiscal year 2020 and for the period of fiscal years 2020 through 2029 consistent with the most recent baseline of the Congressional Budget Office, as adjusted, to the extent practicable, for the budgetary effects of any provision of law enacted during the period beginning on the date such baseline is issued and ending on the date of submission of such statement, for the purpose of enforcing section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974;
 (3)aggregate spending levels for fiscal year 2020 in accordance with the allocations established under paragraphs (1) and (2), for the purpose of enforcing section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; and (4)aggregate revenue levels for fiscal year 2020 and for the period of fiscal years 2020 through 2029 consistent with the most recent baseline of the Congressional Budget Office, as adjusted, to the extent practicable, for the budgetary effects of any provision of law enacted during the period beginning on the date such baseline is issued and ending on the date of submission of such statement, for the purpose of enforcing section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
 (c)Additional matterThe statement referred to in subsection (b) may also include for fiscal year 2020, the matter contained in the provisions referred to in subsection (h). (d)AdjustmentsThe chair of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives may adjust the allocations, aggregates, and other budgetary levels included in the statement referred to in subsection (b)—
 (1)to reflect changes resulting from the Congressional Budget Office’s updates to its baseline for fiscal years 2020 through 2029; or (2)for any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report by the amounts provided in such measure if such measure would not increase the deficit for either of the following time periods: fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024 or fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2029.
 (e)Overseas contingency operations/Global war on terrorism adjustment limitThe chair of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives may adjust the allocations, aggregates, and other budgetary levels included in the statement referred to in subsection (b) in accordance with the Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism adjustment in section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 for any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report, except that such adjustment shall not exceed $69,000,000,000 for the revised security category or $8,000,000,000 for the revised nonsecurity category. (f)Adjustment for Internal Revenue Service tax enforcementThe chair of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives may adjust the allocations, aggregates, and other budgetary levels included in the statement referred to in subsection (b) as follows:
 (1)In generalIf a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report making appropriations for fiscal year 2020 specifies an amount in the Enforcement account and the Operations Support account for tax enforcement activities, including tax compliance to address the Federal tax gap, of the Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury, then the adjustment shall be the additional new budget authority provided in such measure for such purpose, but shall not exceed $400,000,000. (2)DefinitionAs used in this subsection, the term additional new budget authority means the amount provided for fiscal year 2020, in excess of $8,584,000,000, in a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report and specified for tax enforcement activities, including tax compliance to address the Federal tax gap, of the Internal Revenue Service.
 (g)Adjustment for the U.S. census for 2020The chair of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives may adjust the allocations, aggregates, and other budgetary levels included in the statement referred to in subsection (b) as follows: (1)In generalIf a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report making appropriations for fiscal year 2020 specifies an amount for the 2020 Census in the Periodic Censuses and Programs account of the Bureau of the Census of the Department of Commerce, then the adjustment shall be the new budget authority provided in such measure for such purpose, but shall not exceed $7,500,000,000.
 (2)DefinitionAs used in this subsection, the term new budget authority means the amount provided for fiscal year 2020 in a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or conference report and specified to pay for expenses associated with 2020 Census operations. (h)Application (1)Upon submission of the statement referred to in subsection (b), all references to allocations, aggregates, or other appropriate levels in this concurrent resolution in sections 5201, 5202, and 5203 of the House Concurrent Resolution 71 (115th Congress), specified in section 30104(f)(1) of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, and continued in effect by section 103(m) of House Resolution 6 (116th Congress), shall be treated for all purposes in the House of Representatives as references to the allocations, aggregates, or other appropriate levels contained in the statement referred to in subsection (b), as adjusted in accordance with this section or any Act.
 (2)The provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 71 (115th Congress), specified in section 30104(f)(1) of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, shall have no force or effect through the remainder of the One Hundred Sixteenth Congress except for the sections of such concurrent resolution identified in paragraph (1). (i)Adjustment for House passage of H.R. 2021Upon passage of H.R. 2021, the chair of the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives may adjust the allocations, aggregates, and other budgetary levels included in the statement referred to in subsection (b) consistent with H.R. 2021 as passed by the House.
 2.Limitation on advance appropriations
 (a)In generalExcept as provided in subsection (b), any general appropriation bill or bill or joint resolution continuing appropriations, or amendment thereto or conference report thereon, may not provide an advance appropriation. (b)ExceptionsAn advance appropriation may be provided for programs, activities, or accounts identified in lists submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the chair of the Committee on the Budget—
 (1)for fiscal year 2021, under the heading Accounts Identified for Advance Appropriations in an aggregate amount not to exceed $28,852,000,000 in new budget authority, and for fiscal year 2022, accounts separately identified under the same heading; and (2)for fiscal year 2021, under the heading Veterans Accounts Identified for Advance Appropriations in an aggregate amount not to exceed $87,636,650,000 in new budget authority.
 (c)DefinitionThe term advance appropriation means any new discretionary budget authority provided in a general appropriation bill or bill or joint resolution continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2020, or any amendment thereto or conference report thereon, that first becomes available following fiscal year 2020. Cheryl L. Johnson,Clerk.