jurisdiction: US

text:
 In re: Tyrell A., No. 49, September Term, 2014
 JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS – SENTENCING – RESTITUTION – CO-
 PARTICIPANT IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NOT ELIGIBLE ORDINARILY
 A trial court does not have the authority generally to order, as a condition of
 probation, a juvenile respondent to pay restitution to a voluntary and willing co-
 participant in the delinquent conduct for which the respondent is found delinquent, absent
 exceptional circumstances.
 Circuit Court for Montgomery County
 Case No. 06-J-12-268
 Argued: 9 February 2015
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
 MARYLAND
 No. 49
 September Term, 2014
 IN RE: TYRELL A.
 Barbera, C.J.,
 Harrell,
 Battaglia,
 Greene,
 Adkins,
 McDonald,
 Watts,
 JJ.
 Opinion by Harrell, J.
 Filed: March 30, 2015
 “The first rule of Fight Club is: You do not talk about
 Fight Club.”—Fight Club (Fox 2000 Pictures, Regency
 Enterprises, Linson Films 1999).
 In this case, at the very least, the first rule of Fight Club was violated apparently.
 Two high school students, both of whom were minors at the time of the underlying
 pugilistic display, engaged in a fist-fight. Their verbal argument that commenced in front
 of their school came to blows behind the school. The pre-fight publicity attracted an
 audience, causing a disturbance in scholastic activities. In the course of the fight, one of
 the combatants, Dylan P., suffered a broken nose and damaged sinuses.
 In a subsequent juvenile proceeding, Tyrell A. (“Petitioner”), the nominal victor of
 the main event, was found by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a
 juvenile court, to have been involved in the common law offense of affray. 1 For purposes
 of determining Petitioner’s involvement, the Court found Dylan P. to be also a participant
 in the affray; however, he was not charged with any delinquent act arising from the fight.
 The Circuit Court placed Petitioner on probation. One of the conditions of his
 probation required him to pay restitution for a portion of the medical expenses incurred
 by Dylan P. for treatment of his injuries suffered during the affray. We consider here
 1
 The common law crime of affray is committed when mutual combatants cause
 fear and disruption to the public. Hickman v. State, 193 Md. App. 238, 248, 996 A.2d
 974, 980 (2010) (citing 2A C.J.S. Affray, §1). One of the principal differences between
 affray and common law assault and/or battery is that the victim of an affray is deemed to
 be the public, rather than an individual. Hickman, 193 Md. App. at 252-53; 996 A.3d at
 982. Presumably, an assault or battery may become subsequently an affray or an affray
 may “morph” into an assault or battery.
 whether the Circuit Court had discretion, under Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.),
 Criminal Procedure Article, §§ 11-603, 11-222 (“CP”), to order restitution, under the
 circumstances, to a voluntary co-participant in the delinquent act of affray for which
 Petitioner was found involved.
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 On 11 April 2012, the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County filed a juvenile
 petition alleging that Petitioner was a delinquent child who committed second degree
 assault and affray. A merits hearing was held on 14 June 2012. Petitioner and the State
 reached a plea agreement in which Petitioner admitted involvement in the alleged affray
 and the State withdrew the charge of second degree assault.
 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, informed
 Petitioner of his trial rights and, satisfied that he understood the impact of his admission
 and was admitting freely and voluntarily to the affray, accepted Petitioner’s admission.
 The State then offered the following predicate facts in support of Petitioner’s admission:
 On January 13, 2012, at Blake High School [Tyrell A.]
 and [Dylan P.] were arguing in front of the high school.
 [Tyrell A.] challenged [Dylan P.] to a fight out behind the
 school wherein [Tyrell A.] punched [Dylan P.] in the face two
 times, breaking his nose and damaging his sinuses. This fight
 caused a disturbance of school operations and its students and
 all events occurred in Montgomery County, Maryland.
 Petitioner accepted the State’s proffer, adding only that “[Tyrell A.] didn’t invite
 [Dylan P.] to the rear of the school. [Dylan P.] did go to the rear of the school and that’s
 where the affray occurred.” On this information, the juvenile judge determined that
 Petitioner committed the offense of affray. After inquiring as to the cause of the argument
 2
 that led to the two-punch knockout—money for a bus fare, according to Petitioner—the
 judge placed Petitioner on probation.2
 The terms of Petitioner’s probation required that he observe a curfew and other
 rules set by his parents, continue with outpatient drug treatment, and participate in an
 education assessment and any directed family-based services. The State also sought
 restitution to be paid to Dylan P. for his medical expenses resulting from his injuries
 sustained in the affray. A restitution hearing was scheduled for a later date so that
 Petitioner’s counsel could prepare Petitioner’s defense.
 On 19 July 2012, the juvenile court held a restitution hearing. Petitioner, through
 his attorney, argued that restitution was not appropriate because Dylan P. was not the
 victim of the affray, but rather a co-participant who was involved equally in the
 delinquent conduct. The State, pointing to the language of the restitution statutes, argued
 that the statutory text did not prohibit restitution to co-participants of criminal or
 delinquent conduct and, therefore, the Court had discretion to order restitution.
 The Circuit Court amended Petitioner’s probation to require Petitioner’s payment
 of $299.76 to Dylan P. as partial restitution for Dylan P.’s medical expenses. This sum
 was half of the amount sought by the State. According to the judge, because both
 Petitioner and Dylan P. were participants in the affray, and therefore Dylan P. was as
 responsible for his injuries as Petitioner, it was not appropriate for Petitioner to pay the
 2
 Petitioner was on probation already for an unrelated earlier offense. The juvenile
 judge modified the previous probation order.
 3
 full amount of the medical expenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
 the restitution requirement of his probation.
 In an unreported opinion, a divided panel of the intermediate appellate court
 affirmed the Circuit Court’s order of restitution. The majority relied on the text of CP §
 11-601(j) defining “victim” for purposes of CP §11-603. Judge Irma Raker (specially
 assigned) authored a dissenting opinion, focusing rather on the ordinary usage of
 “victim” within the criminal law and concluding that Dylan P. was not a victim within the
 ambit of the statute.
 Petitioner sought our review of the restitution requirement as a condition of his
 probation. We issued a writ of certiorari, In re: Tyrell A., 439 Md. 327, 96 A.3d 143
 (2014), to consider the following questions:
 1) Does the term “victim,” defined in Md. Code (2001,
 2008 Repl. Vol) Criminal Procedure Art., §§ 11-601(j) and
 11-603(a), as “a person who suffers death, personal injury, or
 property damage or loss as a direct result of a crime or
 delinquent act,” include an individual who sustains personal
 injury while voluntarily participating in the crime or
 delinquent act?
 2) Is an individual who sustains personal injury while
 voluntarily participating in the common law offense of affray
 a “victim” within the meaning of §§ 11-601(j) and 11-603(a)?
 3) Should the definition of “victim” in §§ 11-601(j) and
 11-603(a) be given a different interpretation in juvenile
 delinquency cases than in criminal cases?[3]
 3
 Both Petitioner and the State agree that “victim,” as used in Maryland’s statutory
 restitution regime, should be interpreted synonymously for criminal and delinquency
 (Continued...)
 4
 4) Did the trial court lack authority to order Petitioner to
 make restitution in this case?
 DISCUSSION
 A trial court has discretion to order restitution when, “as a direct result of the
 crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed,
 converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased . . . .” CP § 11-
 603(a)(1). Restitution may be ordered for medical and funeral expenses, direct out-of-
 pocket losses, loss of earnings, and certain government expenses. See CP § 11-603(a).
 “Victim” is defined as: “(1) a person who suffered death, personal injury, or property
 damage or loss as a direct result of a crime or delinquent act; or, (2) if the person is
 deceased, the personal representative the estate of the person.” CP § 11-601(j). The
 present case turns on whether a person who was a voluntary co-participant in the crime or
 delinquent act may be deemed a “victim” under CP § 11-601(j).
 When interpreting statutes, we seek to ascertain and implement the intent of the
 Legislature. Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 580, 103 A.3d 658, 663
 (2014); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2d
 439, 445 (2005); Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002). We look
 first to the text of the statute. “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly
 consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends
 (...continued)
 cases. The Court of Special Appeals did not hold otherwise. We assume that to be the
 case for the purposes of this opinion.
 5
 ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of
 construction.” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275, 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 (2010). If
 ambiguity is found in the text, or if the plain meaning of the text does not comport with
 the apparent purpose of the statute, we consult other indicia of legislative intent,
 including the relevant statute’s legislative history, the context of the statute within the
 broader legislative scheme, and the rationality of competing constructions.4 Witte, 369
 Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165.
 A. Text of CP § 11-601(j)
 The text of CP § 11-601(j) does not eliminate expressly co-participants in criminal
 or delinquent acts from being considered a “victim” for purposes of restitution. A
 voluntary participant in a criminal or delinquent activity may be harmed as a direct result
 of that activity. Indeed, some actions are criminalized, at least in part, for the very reason
 that a participant may be harmed. See, e.g., Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.),
 4
 In certain of our cases, we stated that our analysis ends generally if we find the
 language unambiguous. Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 467, 66 A.3d 600, 611 (2013);
 Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 (2006). In other cases, we
 stated that an investigation of the apparent purpose of the statute should accompany the
 textual analysis, even if no ambiguity is found. See Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med.
 Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 581, 103 A.3d 658, 663 (2014); Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257,
 275–76, 987 A.2d 18, 28–29 (2010); Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318,
 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003). Considering the ultimate goal of determining and applying the
 will of the Legislature, it is appropriate to consider other evidence of legislative intent,
 even if merely to confirm that our conclusion of the unambiguous meaning of the statute
 is correct. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 214, 973
 A.2d 233, 241 (2009) (“we may resort to legislative history to ensure that our plain
 language interpretation is correct”).
 6
 Criminal Law Article, §§ 3-102 (prohibiting assisting a person to commit or attempt
 suicide), 5-601 (prohibiting possession, attempts at acquisition, or administration of a
 controlled dangerous substance), 10-108 (prohibiting possession and use of a tobacco
 product by a minor). As the Supreme Court of the United States noted in Bond v. United
 States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), however, “it is not unusual to consider the ordinary
 meaning of a defined term, particularly when there is dissonance between that ordinary
 meaning and the reach of the definition.”5 Id. at 2091. The General Assembly legislates,
 5
 The Court of Special Appeals appears to favor the principle that “when the
 statute does define a term, it will be accorded the specially defined meaning rather than
 its common meaning.” F.D.R. Srour P’ship v. Montgomery Cnty., 179 Md. App. 109,
 129-30, 944 A.2d 1149, 1161 (2008). In F.D.R Srour, a builder challenged a Maryland
 Tax Court determination that a Montgomery County development impact tax applied to
 the builder’s project. The statute imposing the tax, by its terms, applied “to any
 development for which an application for a building permit [was] filed on or after” a
 certain date. Id. at 124, 944 A.2d at 1158. Before the effective date of the impact tax, the
 builder received permits for and began constructing retaining walls to level the parcel and
 make it suitable for building, but had not received permits for constructing the structures
 that would occupy the parcel ultimately. Id. at 115, 944 A.2d at 1152-53. The builder was
 assessed the impact tax upon applying for building permits to construct two warehouse
 buildings on the property. Id., at 115, 944 A.2d at 1153.
 Before the Court of Special Appeals, the builder argued that retaining walls
 represented commencement of development for which the building permit application
 was filed, relying on cases in which Maryland courts acknowledged the necessity and
 centrality of erecting retaining walls as an initial step in paving the way for the overall
 development. Id. at 125, 944 A.2d at 1159. According to the builder, because the
 commencement of the retaining walls demonstrated that development had begun before
 the effective date of the tax, the tax was not assessed properly against the project. The
 intermediate appellate court, however, turned to the definition of “development” in the
 statute, rather than the ordinary meaning of development heralded by the builder. The
 relevant statute stated:
 (Continued...)
 7
 like the United States Congress, against “the backdrop of certain unexpressed
 presumptions” Id. at 2088 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
 248 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, ambiguity may lurk.
 The definition of “victim” contained in CP § 11-601(j), assuming for the sake of
 argument that it may embrace voluntary participants of criminal conduct, is at odds with
 the ordinary meaning of the term. In common parlance, a person who participates
 actively and voluntarily in criminal conduct, and is thereby injured in a highly
 (...continued)
 Development means the carrying out of any building
 activity or the making of any material change in the use of
 any structure or land which requires issuance of a building
 permit and:
 (1) Increases the number of dwelling units; or
 (2) Increases the gross floor area of nonresidential
 development.
 Id. at 125, 944 A.2d at 1158. Because the building of retaining walls did not increase the
 gross floor area of the non-residential development at issue in the case, the intermediate
 appellate court held that development had not yet begun for the purpose of the tax-
 authorizing statute. The Court of Special Appeals applied the statutory definition without
 considering the ordinary meaning of the term “development.” After granting certiorari,
 we affirmed, also without considering the ordinary meaning of “development.” F.D.R.
 Srour P’ship v. Montgomery Cnty., 407 Md. 233, 252, 964 A.2d 650, 661 (2009).
 The difference between the present case and F.D.R. Srour (and most cases in
 which the Legislature defines statutory terms) is the stark contrast between the statutory
 definition and the ordinary meaning of the term at issue here. The use of “development”
 to refer only to dwelling units or increased floor space does not create the same
 dissonance as using “victim” to describe a voluntary participant in criminal activity who
 was injured as a result. Ambiguity is not created each time the Legislature defines a term
 differently than the ordinary meaning of the term, but only where the two are difficult to
 reconcile.
 8
 foreseeable way based on the nature of the crime, is not ordinarily a “victim.” Under the
 State’s interpretation of CP § 11-601(j), however, such a person would be a “victim” for
 the purposes of CP § 11-603, with presumed eligibility for restitution from his or her
 accomplices and co-participants.6
 We assume the General Assembly used consciously the term “victim,” rather than
 some other term (such as “affected person,” “injured party,” or “harmed individual”).
 “[O]ur rules of statutory construction require us to interpret the statute such that ‘no
 word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or
 nugatory.’” Allen v. State, 440 Md. 643, 670-71, 103 A.3d 700, 716 (2014) (quoting
 Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006)). Although it is
 conceivable that the term was intended to be merely a placeholder, it would be a curious
 one. The incongruence, it seems to us, between the ordinary meaning of “victim” and a
 plain meaning “take” on the definition in CP § 11-601(j) urged by the State warrants
 further investigation of the intent of the General Assembly.
 B. Context of CP § 11-601(j) within the Maryland Code
 Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, titled “Victims
 and Witnesses,” of which Maryland’s restitution scheme is codified in Subtitle 6,
 6
 CP § 11-603(b) states: “A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under
 subsection (a) of this section if: (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the
 court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this
 subsection.” But see CP § 11-605(a)(2) (restitution need not be ordered if there are
 “extenuating circumstances”); see footnote 14 below.
 9
 contains definitions of “victim” in other contexts. Consideration of these similar statutory
 definitions casts a shadow of doubt as to the legislative intent animating CP § 11-601(j).
 Subtitle 1 of the Criminal Procedure Article, pertaining to victims’ rights
 throughout criminal and delinquent proceedings, does not contain an overarching
 definition of “victim”; however, the term is defined for purposes of victim notification.
 Criminal Procedure § 11-104(a)(2) defines “victim” as “a person who suffers actual or
 threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm as a direct result of a crime or
 delinquent act.” A law enforcement officer, District Court commissioner, or juvenile
 intake officer who first makes contact with the so defined “victim” is required to give
 him or her pamphlets summarizing the rights afforded to victims under Maryland law.
 See CP § 11-104(b); CP § 11-914(9). Prosecutors are required to: (1) provide the victim
 with a pamphlet highlighting post-indictment rights of victims under Maryland law; (2)
 inform the victim about the possibility of restitution; and (3) notify the victim of any plea
 agreement, judicial action, or proceeding that affects the interests of the victim. CP § 11-
 104(c).
 Subtitle 2 of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article establishes a set of pretrial
 rights for victims of assault and delinquent acts. For delinquent acts, the Subtitle defines
 “victim” as having the “meaning stated in § 3-8A-01 of the Courts [and Judicial
 Proceedings] Article.” Criminal Procedure § 11-202(a). Maryland Code (1974, 2013
 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-8A-01, in turn, defines “victim”
 as: “(i) [a] person who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm
 as a result of a delinquent act; or (ii) an individual against whom an act specified in § 3-
 10
 8A-19.1(b) of this subtitle is committed or alleged to have been committed.” Neither
 section makes a distinction between voluntary co-participants in the injurious crime and
 innocent victims.
 To delineate the rights held by victims of delinquent acts, CP § 11-202(b) points
 also to Title 3A of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Victims are afforded a
 voice in the juvenile justice system. They are kept informed of the actions taken against a
 child, being notified, for example, that a petition alleging that the child was delinquent
 has been filed or that the intake officer declined to authorize a petition (with an
 explanation of the reasons he or she so decided). Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.),
 Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-8A-10(d)(4), (g)(2). Victims are able even to
 participate in significant decisions about rehabilitation of the child. If the intake officer
 seeks to engage in “informal adjustment” of the matter, rather than judicial action, he or
 she must obtain first the permission of the victim. Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.),
 Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-8A-10(f). The victim also may appeal an intake
 officer’s decision not to authorize the filing of a petition with the court after receiving a
 complaint alleging a delinquent act. Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and
 Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-8A-10(h)(1)(i).
 Subtitle 5 of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides for certain post-
 sentencing procedures for defendants charged with felonies and child respondents alleged
 to have committed delinquent acts that would have been felonies if committed by an
 adult. See CP § 11-502. Within the Subtitle, “victim” is defined as “a person who suffers
 direct or threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm as a direct result of a crime or
 11
 delinquent act.” CP § 11-501(b). No distinction is made for co-participants in the
 criminal or delinquent activity that caused the harm.
 Criminal Procedure § 11-503 obligates the State’s Attorney, at the victim’s
 request, to provide to the victim notification of subsequent proceedings, including
 appeals, sentence reviews, and sentence modification hearings. In this notice, the State’s
 Attorney must include the date, time, location, and a description of the proceeding. CP §
 11-503(d). Similarly, the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, at the
 request of the victim, must notify the victim of a violent crime7 if: (1) the convicted
 person has been found guilty of violating parole; (2) a warrant or subpoena has been
 issued for the convicted person; (3) the convicted person is being considered for a
 commutation, pardon, or remission of sentence; (4) the convicted person has violated
 mandatory supervision; and, (5) the Department will enter into a predetermined parole
 release agreement with the convicted person. CP § 11-505. Notification is also required at
 the convict or delinquent child’s release from confinement. CP § 11-508.
 7
 Violent crime is defined as abduction; first degree arson; first, second, and third
 degree burglary; kidnapping; manslaughter (except involuntary manslaughter); mayhem;
 maiming; murder; rape; robbery; carjacking; first and second degree sexual offense; use
 of a handgun in the commission of a felony; first degree child abuse; sexual child abuse;
 first degree assault; and assault with intent to murder, rape, rob, or commit a first or
 second degree sexual offense. See CP § 11-505; Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.),
 Correctional Services Article, § 7-101(m); Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.),
 Criminal Law Article, §14-101(a). Under a reading of Subtitle 5 analogous to the one the
 State offers of Subtitle 6, a joint participant committing one of these crimes, who was
 thereby injured, would be considered a “victim” to the same extent as the person on
 whom the crime was committed.
 12
 Another element of Subtitle 5 provides for victims’ participation in the parole
 process. According to CP § 11-505(b), victims under Subtitle 5 have the rights provided
 for in Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Correctional Services Article, §§ 7-801,
 7-304.8 Under these provisions, victims may provide updated written victim impact
 statements to the Maryland Parole Commission, make recommendations to the
 Commission about the advisability of releasing the inmate, request that the inmate be
 prohibited from contacting the victim while under supervision, and attend the parole
 hearing. Id.
 Subtitles 9 and 10 of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article also define facially
 “victim” to include voluntary participants in the crimes that caused their injuries. Both
 subtitles define principally “victim” as “a person who suffers direct or threatened
 physical, emotional, or financial harm as a direct result of a crime.” See CP §§ 11-910(f),
 8
 Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Correctional Services Article, §§ 7-801,
 7-304 define “victim” in a more narrow way:
 In this section, “victim” means:
 (1) an individual who suffers personal physical injury
 or death as a direct result of a crime;
 (2) a victim of child abuse under § 3-601 or §2-602 of
 the Criminal Law Article;
 (3) a victim of a violent crime;
 (4) if the victim is deceased, disabled, a minor, a
 designated family member or other representative of the
 victim.
 No distinction is made regarding participants in crimes and innocent victims.
 13
 11-1001(e).9 Subtitle 9 authorizes the Victim and Witness Protection and Relocation
 Program. Subtitle 10 provides guidelines for treatment of victims of crimes, victims’
 representatives, and witnesses. Neither subtitle excepts participants in the crimes or
 delinquent conduct from their definition of victim.
 The definitions of “victim” in Subtitles 1, 2, 5, 9, and 10 differ slightly from the
 definition in Subtitle 6. In each of the subtitles, however, “victim” is defined in a way
 that does not exclude voluntary co-participants in the criminal or delinquent activity that
 9
 Criminal Procedure §11-910(f) also defines as a “victim,” in addition to those
 harmed by a “crime,” a defined term in CP § 11-910(c), a person harmed by “a violation
 of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article.” Maryland Code (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol),
 Transportation Article, § 21-902 prohibits driving under the influence or while
 intoxicated by drugs or alcohol. CP § 11-910(c) defines as a “crime”:
 (1) . . . conduct that is a crime under:
 (i) common law;
 (ii) § 109 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
 Caroline County;
 (iii) § 4-103 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
 Carrol County;
 (iv) § 8A-1 of the Code of Public Local Laws of
 Talbot County; or
 (v) except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
 subsection, the Annotated Code.
 (2) “Crime” does not include a violation of the
 Transportation Article that is not punishable by a term of
 confinement.
 Criminal Procedure § 11-1001 defines “crime” as “conduct that is a crime under
 the law of this State or federal law.” The two definitions of “victim” are the same for
 purposes of our analysis.
 14
 caused the co-participant’s injury.10 On the other hand, if the omission by the General
 Assembly from any distinguishment of voluntary co-participants in criminal or
 delinquent conduct injured by that conduct from innocent victims in the definition of
 “victim” for purposes of Subtitle 6 creates no room for doubt, then there would be
 similarly no ambiguity in like circumstances in the other subtitles considered here. Yet,
 when that assumption is tested, it yields more doubt that a plain meaning approach is
 rational regarding Subtitle 6’s provisions.
 We are skeptical of the proposition that the General Assembly intended voluntary
 co-participants of crimes who are injured as a result of the underlying misconduct to
 partake in the punishment and rehabilitation of their criminal cohorts. It is certainly
 reasonable to doubt that the General Assembly intended in Subtitle 2, in the case of two
 delinquent children who commit a burglary in the course of which one of the children is
 injured, for example, that the injured participant would be able to block the “informal
 adjustment” of the other participant, if that result was determined by the intake officer to
 be in the best interests of the child and most likely to lead to rehabilitation. It is also less
 than certain that, for purposes of Subtitle 5, the General Assembly intended, in the case of
 two adults who commit a burglary in which one of the co-participants is injured, that the
 10
 Criminal Procedure § 11-601(j) characterizes as a victim only a person who
 suffered death, personal injury, or property damage or loss as a result of the crime. A
 person who suffers emotional injury or threatened injury is not a victim for purposes of
 the definition.
 15
 injured burglar would be permitted to participate in the parole hearings of his or her co-
 miscreant.
 Practical issues arise if the definitions of “victim” in Title 11 were interpreted
 literally as the State and other courts in the present case interpret CP § 11-601(j). In
 Attorney Grievance Commission v. Smith, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2015) (2015 WL
 737412), we held recently that an Assistant State’s Attorney violated Maryland Lawyers’
 Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.3, 8.4(d), and 8.4(a)11 when he was grossly
 negligent in failing to communicate at all with the victim in a child sexual abuse case and
 her foster mother, including providing the notifications required by CP § 11-104 and
 failing to verify information (which proved to be false) he used to obtain a postponement
 of the criminal case beyond the Hicks date. Id., slip op. at 17-18, 21, 24-25. As a result,
 we suspended indefinitely the attorney from the practice of law in Maryland, with leave
 to apply for reinstatement to our Bar in no sooner than sixty days. Id., slip op. at 27.
 Although our holding that the attorney violated MLRPC 1.3 was not based solely on his
 failure to notify the victim and her foster mother of the proceedings, prosecutors might
 feel obligated, lest they run afoul of the MLRPC, to notify injured co-participants in
 11
 Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.3 requires an
 attorney to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
 MLRPC 8.4(d) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in
 conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” MLRPC 8.4(a) states that “[i]t
 is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the [MLRPC],
 knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.”
 16
 crimes as well. The practical effects of keeping criminal and delinquent participants
 notified of the status of the processing of their partners-in-crime are dubious.
 The only subtitle of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article that exempts
 explicitly participants in a crime from receiving the same benefits as innocent victims is
 the criminal victims’ compensation scheme provided in Subtitle 8. The Criminal Injuries
 Compensation Board provides State-funded compensation for innocent victims of certain
 crimes. Opert v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., 403 Md. 587, 590, 943 A.2d 1229, 1231
 (2008). Comparison between the language of the compensation scheme contained in
 Subtitle 8 and the restitution scheme contained in Subtitle 6 further muddies the waters
 surrounding the definition of “victim” in CP § 11-601(j).
 In Subtitle 8, “victim” is defined more broadly than in Subtitle 6. Criminal
 Procedure § 11-801(f) states:
 Victim means a person:
 (1) who suffers physical injury or death as a result of a
 crime or delinquent act;
 (2) who suffers psychological injury as a direct result
 of:
 (i) a fourth degree sexual offense or a delinquent
 act that would be a fourth degree sexual offense if
 committed by an adult;
 (ii) a felony or delinquent act that would be a
 felony if committed by an adult; or
 (iii) physical injury or death resulting from a crime
 or delinquent act; or
 (3) who suffers physical injury or death as a direct
 17
 result of:
 (i) trying to prevent a crime or delinquent act or an
 attempted crime or delinquent act from occurring in
 the person’s presence;
 (ii) trying to apprehend an offender who had
 committed a crime or delinquent act in the person’s
 presence or had committed a felony or a delinquent
 act that would be a felony if committed by an adult;
 or
 (iii) helping a law enforcement officer in the
 performance of the officer’s duties or helping a
 member of a fire department who is being
 obstructed from performing the member’s duties.
 Criminal Procedure § 11-601(j) limits victims for purposes of restitution generally to only
 those injured as a direct result of the acts that made the conduct illegal. State v.
 Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 513, 103 A.3d 618, 623 (2014) (citing Goff v. State, 387 Md.
 327, 344, 875 A.2d 132, 142 (2005); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 60-61, 862 A.2d 419,
 426–27 (2004)).
 Despite the broader definition of “victim” with regard to the operations of the
 Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, persons who engage in mutual combat or
 participate in a crime or delinquent act (and are injured in the course of that misconduct)
 are denied compensation. Criminal Procedure § 11-810(d)(3) states explicitly that “[a]
 claimant may not receive an award if: (i) [t]he victim initiated, consented to, provoked, or
 unreasonably failed to avoid a physical confrontation with the offender; or (ii) the victim
 was participating in a crime or delinquent act when the injury was inflicted.”
 18
 The explicit exclusion of criminal and delinquent participants and mutual
 combatants from compensation under Subtitle 8 cuts both ways for our present purposes.
 On one hand, one could read it as a policy statement of the Legislature. As so considered,
 it would be logical for the General Assembly to disprove similarly of a court ordering
 restitution to be paid by one participant of a crime to a co-participant. The Legislature
 may have viewed excluding a co-participant from being a “victim” as so obvious that it
 was axiomatic and need not be spelled-out across-the-board. By the same token, the
 omission in CP § 11-810(d)(3) of such a distinction may suggest also that the Legislature
 was aware that the definition of “victim” in CP § 11-601(j) (and elsewhere in Title 11 of
 the Criminal Procedure Article) should be construed to include participants in the crimes
 or delinquent acts that caused their injury.12 It is not difficult to imagine that the
 Legislature might have decided to be more parsimonious regarding distribution of State
 funds than those of convicted criminals or minors found to be delinquent. The fog of
 doubt continues to shroud our inquiry. We look next to the origins of the statute in our
 quest to discover the intent of the Legislature.
 C. Legislative History of CP § 11-601(j)
 12
 The language of the present Subtitle 8 of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure
 Article comes to us from Senate Bill 4 of 1968. 1968 Maryland Laws ch. 455 (S.B. 4). As
 discussed below, the precursor to CP § 11-601(j) was enacted in 1989. The language now
 codified in Subtitle 8 was available for comparison during the legislative process during
 which the current Subtitle 6 was enacted.
 19
 The definition of “victim” in CP § 11-601(j) has its genesis in Senate Bill 417 of
 1989. According to the Bill: “‘Victim’: (i) [m]eans a person who suffers personal injury,
 death, or property loss as a direct result of crime; and (ii) includes, in the event of a death
 of a victim, the victim’s estate.” 1989 Maryland Laws ch. 487. The Bill was codified as
 Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 640(a)(9). Subsequent revisions of
 the language were not intended to change substantively the original definition.13
 Nothing in the bill file of Senate Bill 417 illuminates for our inquiry the General
 Assembly’s intent regarding the definition of “victim” now codified in CP § 11-601(j).
 According to the Floor Report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Senate Bill
 417 would, in the Committee’s opinion:
 (1) Authorize courts to order restitution in any case in which the Criminal Injuries
 Compensation Board pays benefits to the victim of a crime.
 (2) Require a court to order restitution if: (a) the defendant is convicted, the court
 accepts a plea of nolo contendere, or the defendant receives probation before
 judgment; (b) restitution is requested by the victim or the State acting on
 13
 Restitution for delinquent acts was treated formerly under separate statutes. In
 1997, however, Senate Bill 311 and House Bill 768 brought both criminal and juvenile
 restitution under the same statute. See 1997 Maryland Laws chs. 311 (S.B. 311), 312
 (H.B. 768). Other changes in the text include only switching the order of the recognized
 injuries, changing the punctuation, and specifying that property damage is included, in
 addition to property loss. Compare 1997 Maryland Laws chs. 311 (S.B. 311), 312 (H.B.
 768), with CP § 11-601(j).
 20
 behalf of the victim; and (c) the victim faced one of the expenses for which
 restitution or the Criminal Compensation Board paid benefits to the victim.
 (3) Require a court to hold a hearing to determine if a defendant who fails to make
 restitution is in contempt of court or has violated probation or parole,
 including determining if the defendant became intentionally impoverished to
 avoid paying restitution.
 (4) Require the recording of restitution as a civil judgment which creates a lien on
 the real property of the defendant in the county of the recording.
 (5) Require that the Parole Board and Patuxent Institution make payment of
 restitution a condition of parole or work release if restitution was ordered as
 part of a sentence or probation.
 (6) Exempt ordered restitution from being discharged by pardon, commutation of
 sentence, or parole, unless a pardon explicitly states that the defendant was
 convicted in error.
 Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Floor Report at 1-2 (1989). The summary
 did not mention making restitution more readily available, even though “victim” was not
 a defined term previously.
 None of the other documents in the bill file indicate that the General Assembly
 intended to broaden the class of injured persons who could be considered a “victim” and
 thereby become eligible for restitution. The retained documents do not make it obvious
 that the Legislature intended to make restitution available in cases in which compensation
 21
 from the Criminal Compensation Board would be unavailable. By the same token, there
 is no indication that the General Assembly intended the statutes to be congruent.
 D. Policy Considerations
 When “confronted with ambiguity regarding legislative intent, it is our duty to
 announce a rule that we are convinced is best supported by sound jurisprudential policy
 germane to the pursuit of legislative intent.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md.
 469, 493, 914 A.2d 735, 749 (2007). “In construing a statute, ‘we seek to avoid
 constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’”
 Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 182, 909
 A.2d 694, 700 (2006) (quoting Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112
 (1994)); accord Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 359, 65 A.3d 141,
 148 (2013). Consideration of the practical outcomes of the competing understanding of
 “victim” in CP § 11-601(j) supports, in our view, Petitioner’s position that the Legislature
 did not intend restitution to be available for a voluntary co-participant in the criminal
 conduct that led to that person’s injury.
 The interpretation of CP § 11-601(j) proposed by the State would confer on
 voluntary co-participants in criminal and delinquent conduct a presumption of a right to
 restitution for injuries resulting from their offenses. See supra note 6. If one participant of
 the mutual criminal endeavor was injured in the course of a criminal or delinquent act,
 the other participant or participants could be ordered to pay restitution (whether in full or
 based on a sort of comparative fault basis, as was the case here) for the injuries. Using
 courts to this end seems to us absurd in concept.
 22
 The State argues implicitly that, because restitution is discretionary under
 Maryland’s statutory regime, courts would not be required to impose restitution in a way
 that places courts in an inappropriate role or facilitates criminal undertakings.14 This
 misses the mark. Even if there are some conceivable rare situations in which restitution
 may be ordered in favor of a person who was a co-participant in a crime that caused his
 or her injury,15 we must analyze the case before us. Ordering restitution in the present
 14
 Criminal Procedure § 11-605 states:
 (a) In general. – A court need not issue a judgment of
 restitution . . . if the court finds:
 (1) that the restitution obligor does not have the
 ability to pay the judgment of restitution; or
 (2) that there are extenuating circumstances that
 make a judgment of restitution inappropriate.
 (b) Refusal of restitution. – A court that refuses to
 order restitution that is requested . . . shall state on the record
 the reasons.
 According to the State, the term “extenuating circumstances” affords trial courts
 discretion to deny restitution to any victim. One possible extenuating circumstance
 considered by the court, in the State’s view, might be that the “victim” was a co-
 participant in the crime or delinquent act. Petitioner, relying on the legislative history of
 the provision, asserts that participation in the crime or delinquent act is not one of the
 factors that the Legislature intended for the court to consider.
 15
 United States v. Sanga, 967 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992), discussed infra Part E.,
 held that, for purposes of a federal restitution statute, restitution was appropriate for a co-
 conspirator in a scheme to smuggle aliens into the United States and illegally obtain their
 citizenship. Id. at 1334-35. After being smuggled into the United States, the victim’s
 foreign passport was confiscated by the defendant, the victim was put to work as a live-in
 maid for the defendant at a substandard wage, and was coerced into having sex with the
 defendant in exchange for forged documents that would allow the victim to seek
 employment outside of the defendant’s home. Id. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals
 (Continued...)
 23
 case, and other cases in which the person for whom restitution is ordered was a voluntary
 and equal participant throughout the crime or delinquent act that caused the injury, would
 be inappropriate.
 The rehabilitative aims of restitution in juvenile cases, Robey v. State, 397 Md.
 449, 458, 918 A.2d 499, 505 (2007), as well as the accompanying retributive and
 compensative aims present in criminal orders of restitution, Stachowski, 440 Md. at 512,
 103 A.3d at 623, may still be achieved even if courts do not have the authority to order
 restitution to co-participants of the crime causing injury. In the present case, Petitioner
 was accused of both second degree assault of Dylan P. and affray. Had there been a
 sufficient factual proffer or other development of the factual record in support of the
 second degree assault charge, the State could have sought Petitioner’s agreement to pay
 restitution for the assault as part of the plea negotiations. The trial court would then have
 authority to order restitution or require payment as a condition of probation. See
 Stachowski, 440 Md. at 516, 103 A.3d at 625.
 In the present case, however, Petitioner was found involved only in the delinquent
 act of affray and did not agree to pay restitution for the assault or affray for which he was
 accused. By its definition, affray requires at least two voluntary participants. Hickman v.
 (...continued)
 for the Ninth Circuit, the victim had become “the object of, rather than a participant in the
 criminal goals of the conspirators.” Id. at 1335. Restitution to participants in crimes or
 delinquent acts under Maryland’s restitution scheme may be appropriate in analogous
 situations in which the purported victim’s participation has ended at a material point in
 the ongoing criminal enterprise.
 24
 State, 193 Md. App. 238, 248, 996 A.2d 974, 980 (2010). In the State’s factual proffer,
 there was no indication that Dylan P. was anything but a willing and equal participant in
 the affray until the two dispositive punches were landed by Tyrell A.16
 The State’s concern that unsubstantiated claims of criminal or delinquent
 participation could form a basis for a denial of restitution is inapposite to the present case.
 The trial judge, by finding Petitioner involved in the affray and Dylan P. 50% responsible
 for what happened to him, made an affirmative factual determination that Dylan P. was a
 co-participant. There is nothing in this record to suggest otherwise.
 E. “Victim” under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
 Federal courts have held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
 (“MVRA”), which requires restitution for certain offenses, does not authorize restitution
 to co-participants in criminal endeavors.17 The federal statute defines “victim” in a
 similar fashion to CP § 11-601(j). According to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(2):
 16
 The Maryland Crime Victims’ Resource Center, as amicus curiae, questions the
 voluntariness of Dylan P.’s participation in the fist-fight with Petitioner. The State’s
 limited factual proffer, the elements of affray, and the trial judge’s determination that
 Dylan P. was responsible equally for his injuries, however, are clear. In a situation where
 an injured person participated unwillingly in a crime or delinquent act, the trial court may
 have discretion to order restitution.
 17
 Because of the similarities between the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
 1996 (“MVRA”) and the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”), the
 analysis of whether participants in crimes can be “victims” under the statutes are the
 same. United States v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1249 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). There exist,
 however, other federal restitution statutes. Id. at 1248 n.1.
 25
 For the purposes of this section, the term “victim”
 means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of
 the commission of an offense for which restitution may be
 ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as
 an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal
 activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's
 criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
 pattern. In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age,
 incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of
 the victim or representative of the victim's estate, another
 family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by
 the court, may assume the victim’s rights under this section,
 but in no event shall the defendant be named as such
 representative or guardian.
 Like the Maryland statute, the MVRA, on its face, does not except clearly co-
 participants in crimes from being “victims” and thereby be eligible for restitution ordered
 in their favor. Interpretation of the federal statute is persuasive for interpretation of
 Maryland’s restitution statute.18 Federal courts have found that the practical outcomes of
 18
 The State, noting the mandatory nature of the MVRA and contrasting that with
 the discretion invested in trial judges under Maryland’s restitution statute, argues that the
 federal cases should not be persuasive. The mandatory MVRA and discretionary VWPA,
 however, are treated the same by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lazarenko. Id. at
 1249 n.2.
 The majority of the panel of the Court of Special Appeals here found the federal
 cases unpersuasive. As the majority noted, the purpose of restitution under the MVRA is
 not to punish or rehabilitate the defendant, but rather restore the losses caused by the
 crime. See United States v. Hunter, 618 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010). Restitution
 under Maryland’s regime aims to punish and rehabilitate the criminal or delinquent child,
 as well as compensate the victim. State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 512, 103 A.3d 618,
 623 (2014). Although this distinction diminishes somewhat the persuasive force of the
 federal cases, it does not erase it entirely. The federal courts’ reasoning regarding the
 proper role of courts and their ability to inspire public confidence remains appealing.
 26
 ordering restitution to participants in crimes makes it unlikely that restitution was
 intended for participants in the crimes causing injury.
 In United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2006), one of the defendants,
 Lionel Reifler, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire
 fraud, and commercial bribery, and two counts of commercial bribery. As a result, Reifler
 was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and ordered to pay $2 million in restitution to
 the victims of the conspiracy. Id. Among those to whom Reifler was ordered to pay
 restitution were other co-conspirators in the planned fraud. Id. at 127. On appeal, the U.S.
 Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the restitution order and remanded the case
 to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that co-conspirators could not be victims
 under the MVRA. Id. at 127, 139. Although no party raised the issue of restitution
 ordered to participants in the crime, the panel of the federal Court of Appeals noted that
 an order entered under the MVRA that has the effect of
 treating coconspirators as “victims,” and thereby requires
 “restitutionary” payments to the perpetrators of the offense of
 conviction, contains an error so fundamental and so adversely
 reflecting on the public reputation of the judicial proceedings
 that we may, and do, deal with it sua sponte.
 Id. at 127.
 In United States v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2010), a panel of the U.S.
 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that restitution cannot be ordered between co-
 27
 conspirators, absent exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1249.19 Pavel Lazarenko was
 convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering at a time
 when he was Prime Minister of Ukraine. Id. The federal trial court ordered Lazarenko to
 pay more than $19 million in restitution to his co-conspirator, whom the trial court found
 was a victim under the MVRA. Id. A jury in the main criminal case found that Lazarenko
 obtained money illegally from Peter Kiritchenko as a result of extortion, but that
 Kiritchenko was an active party in the conspiracy. Id. at 1250. The U.S. Court of Appeals
 for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because Kiritchenko was a major part of the
 conspiracy in which he participated willingly and made no attempt to withdraw—and
 from which he profited greatly—no exceptional circumstances were present. The trial
 court’s order mandating restitution was vacated.20 Id. at 1252.
 The Lazarenko court agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
 Reifler, noting that ordering restitution to a co-conspirator was a “fundamental error” and
 harmed the public reputation of the courts. Id. at 1252. Even though “[u]nder the plain
 text of the MVRA . . . co-conspirators have just as much right to restitution as do
 innocent victims[,]” id. at 1250, the Court reasoned that Congress could not have
 19
 Lazarenko involved only the legality of the order of restitution. A mountain of
 litigation arose from the underlying criminal conduct. See 624 F.3d at 1249 (describing
 the appeals of the criminal trial and related forfeiture litigation).
 20
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted its agreement with the Court of
 Appeals for the Second Circuit that “an order of restitution to a co-conspirator is a
 ‘fundamental’ error that ‘adversely reflects on the public reputation of the judicial
 proceedings.’” Id. at 1252 (quoting U.S. v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 127 (2d Cir. 2006)).
 28
 intended for federal courts to “be involved in redistributing funds among wholly guilty
 co-conspirators . . . [,]” id. at 1251.
 United States v. Sanga, 967 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992), discussed in Lazarenko,
 demonstrates the kind of reasoning and exceptional circumstances that might allow
 restitution among co-conspirators and participants of the crime causing injury. In Sanga,
 the defendant, Efren Sanga, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the
 United States and obtaining unlawfully citizenship for them. Id. at 1333. As a result,
 Sanga was ordered to pay restitution to Annie Quinlob, a live-in maid he smuggled into
 the United States from the Philippines. Sanga argued that Quinlob was not a victim for
 purposes of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 because she was a willing
 participant in the conspiracy to smuggle her into the United States.21 Id. 1333-34.
 Under the circumstances of Sanga, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
 found that restitution was appropriate. Quinlob, after arriving to the United States, sought
 to return to the Philippines. Id. at 1334. Sanga, however, took Quinlob’s passport and
 21
 The VWPA defines victim similarly to the MVRA. Codified in 18 U.S.C. §
 3663, the VWPA states:
 For the purposes of this section, the term “victim”
 means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of
 the commission of an offense for which restitution may be
 ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as
 an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal
 activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's
 criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
 pattern.
 29
 return airplane ticket, and threatened her life if she left his employment. Id. Sanga and his
 wife kept Quinlob as a servant, paying her only $150 a month for working fourteen hours
 a day, seven days a week. Id. at 1334. After working as Sanga’s maid for two years,
 Quinlob sought employment outside Sanga’s home. Id. at 1335. She was forced to have
 sex with Sanga in exchange for a false Guam identification card. Id. The federal appellate
 court noted that “[a]ny criminal complicity in the conspiracy which Quinlob might bear
 stopped at the point at which she became the object of, rather than a participant in[,] the
 criminal goals of the conspirators.” Id. at 1335.
 The Court in Lazarenko distinguished Sanga on multiple grounds. According to
 the Court:
 Our decision in Sanga did not hinge solely on
 Quinlob’s non-participation in the victimizing behavior. Our
 analysis was informed by the fact that Quinlob was not
 named as a co-conspirator in the indictment; that she had a
 very minor role in the conspiracy; and that her persecution
 began after the completion of her small part of the conspiracy.
 Although she was technically a co-conspirator, her very small
 role was unconnected to the overall conspiracy; indeed, had
 she known the full extent of the conspiracy—that she would
 be forced to be a slave and rape victim—she would not have
 entered the conspiracy.
 Here, by contrast, the government named Kiritchenko
 as the primary co-conspirator in the indictment. Kiritchenko
 willingly participated in most of the conspiracy, unlike in
 Sanga. Indeed, Kiritchenko knowingly participated in the
 conspiracy even though he knew that his own past
 “victimization” was the basis of the laundered money, unlike
 in Sanga, where Quinlob immediately sought to withdraw
 from the conspiracy and return to the Philippines once she
 discovered the true purpose of the conspiracy. And
 Kiritchenko, unlike Quinlob, profited greatly from the overall
 criminal enterprise. In short, Kiritchenko’s deep and willing
 30
 complicity in the heart of the conspiracy, following his initial
 victimization, sharply distinguishes this case from Sanga.
 Lazarenko, 624 F.3d at 1252 (citations omitted). It appears to us that the thrust of the
 federal appellate court’s reasoning revolved around Quinlob’s and Kiritchenko’s relative
 levels of voluntary participation in the criminal conduct for which restitution was
 ordered. Congress could have intended plausibly restitution ordered to someone in
 Quinlob’s situation, and doing so would not harm the public confidence in the courts.
 Given the depth of Kiritchenko’s participation in the relevant conspiracy, however, it was
 unlikely that Congress intended federal courts to order payment of restitution under those
 circumstances. The concerns and approach highlighted by these federal cases are
 persuasive to us.
 CONCLUSION
 The dissonance between the ordinary understanding of the term “victim” and its
 specific definition in CP § 11-601(j) of Maryland’s restitution statute creates ambiguity.
 The State’s interpretation would create a presumption that criminal adventurers may be
 entitled to an order ameliorating the injurious consequences of their misdeeds through
 restitution from their co-participants. See supra note 6.. It strikes us as unlikely that the
 General Assembly intended such an arrangement. Absent clear legislative intent to do so,
 we will not give a statute an unreasonable interpretation. We therefore hold that Title 11,
 Subtitle 6 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code does not authorize
 trial courts generally to order restitution in favor of a person who is a voluntary and
 31
 willing participant in the crime or delinquent activity that caused his or her injury, absent
 exceptional circumstances. See the federal cases supra.
 The record of the present case indicates that Dylan P. was a voluntary co-
 participant. The factual proffer by the State’s Attorney, the statements of Petitioner, and
 the comments by the trial judge all indicate that Dylan P. fought willingly with Petitioner.
 Further, the voluntary nature of the fight is a necessary element in affray for which
 Petitioner was found involved. No exceptional circumstances of the kind discussed in the
 federal cases exist on the record of the present case. We therefore direct vacation of the
 requirement of Petitioner’s probation that he pay restitution to Dylan P.
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
 APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED
 TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
 REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
 COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY TO
 VACATE THE CONDITION OF THE
 ORDER OF PROBATION THAT CALLS
 FOR RESTITUTION TO BE PAID TO
 DYLAN P., CONSISTENT WITH THIS
 OPINION. MONTGOMERY COUNTY TO
 PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
 THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
 32


type: other

text:
 Zákon anebo spravedlivé přesvědčení? « Advokátní kancelář JUDr. Luboš Chalupa
 Zákon anebo spravedlivé přesvědčení?
 Právní rádce 8/2007
 V Bulletinu advokacie č. 6/2007 byla uveřejněna reakce předního realitního specialisty Mgr. Ing. Petra Baudyše „K úsilí o co nejvíce neplatných smluv“ na můj článek „Neplatnost smluv uzavřených povinnou osobou v průběhu exekuce a restituce“ publikovaný v Bulletinu advokacie č. 3/2007.
 Mgr. Ing. Petr Baudyš ve svém článku popírá základní principy absolutní neplatnosti právního úkonu, tj. že absolutní neplatnost právního úkonu působí ze zákona s účinky ex tunc s vyloučením jejího dodatečného zhojení.1)
 Autor – a spravedlivě nutno dodat, že nikoli sám – zastává stále rozšířenější účelový výklad zákona o neplatnosti právního úkonu podle toho, jaké jsou jeho konečné dopady. Kupní smlouvu uzavřenou v rozporu s ustanovením § 44 odst. 72) a § 47 odst. 43) zákona č. 120/2001 Sb., o soudních exekutorech a exekuční činnosti (exekuční řád) a o změně dalších zákonů (dále jen „exekuční řád“), považuje za platnou, pokud návrh na vklad do katastru nemovitostí byl povinným podán až po skončení exekuce, a to proto, že převod vlastnictví nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí je dvouetapový. Za neplatnou ji pak považuje, pokud byl návrh na vklad podán ještě za trvání exekuce. Uvedený právní názor Mgr. Ing. Petra Baudyše není právně možný zejména proto, že chybí zákonná úprava o dodatečném zhojení absolutně neplatného právního úkonu dodatečným pominutím jeho protiprávnosti.
 Nutno kategoricky odmítnout také společensky škodlivou argumentaci Mgr. Ing. Baudyše o možném podvodném jednání účastníků smlouvy antidatováním smlouvy a o obtížích při zjišťování okamžiku uzavření smlouvy, neobsahuje-li tato datum. Argumentace podvodným jednáním jen dosvědčuje, jak je masivně rozšířeno myšlení o porušování a obcházení zákonů, k čemuž mimo jiné preventivně směřují také ustanovení zákona o neplatnosti právních úkonů pro obcházení zákona.
 KUPNÍ SMLOUVA UZAVŘENÁ
 JE ABSOLUTNĚ NEPLATNÁ
 Otázka absolutní neplatnosti kupní smlouvy uzavřené v rozporu se zákonem [např. porušení předběžného opatření dle § 76 odst. 1 písm. e) občanského soudního řádu, porušení nařízení soudního výkonu rozhodnutí dle § 335b odst. 1 písm. a) občanského soudního řádu, porušení blokačních ustanovení restitučních právních předpisů] je konstantní judikaturou uveřejněnou ve Sbírce soudních rozhodnutí a stanovisek již vyřešena tak, že kupní smlouva uzavřená v rozporu se zákazem nakládání s majetkem povinného je absolutně neplatná.4)
 Právní názor o dodatečném zhojení absolutně neplatné smlouvy o převodu vlastnictví nemovitostí uzavřené v rozporu s kogentním ustanovením zákona zakazujícím nakládat s majetkem povinného nemá oporu ani v zákoně, ani v právní teorii – právní názor Mgr. Ing. Petra Baudyše je v tomto ojedinělý a navádějící k porušování zákona (úsilí o porušování zákona).
 Smlouva o převodu vlastnictví věci, včetně nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí, uzavřená povinným v průběhu exekučního řízení s ujednáním o odkládací podmínce účinnosti smlouvy dle § 36 odst. 2 občanského zákoníku na dobu po skončení exekuce je však platná –stejně jako smlouva o smlouvě budoucí.
 PŘEZKUMNÁ ČINNOST KATASTRU
 Skutečnost, zda je účastník řízení oprávněn nakládat s předmětem právního úkonu a zda není omezen ve smluvní volnosti týkající se věci, která je předmětem právního úkonu, ve smyslu § 5 odst. 1 zákona č. 265/1992 Sb., o zápisech vlastnických a jiných věcných práv k nemovitostem, zkoumá katastrální úřad v řízení o vklad do katastru nemovitostí ex lege jen ke dni podání návrhu na vklad vlastnického práva do katastru nemovitostí.
 Katastrální úřad nemá pravomoc – i kdyby byl přesvědčen o jiných právních vadách smlouvy o převodu vlastnictví nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí vyvolávajících její absolutní neplatnost – zamítnout návrh na vklad vlastnictví pro jiné než výslovně stanovené zákonné důvody (v § 5 odst. 1 zákona č. 265/1992 Sb.), které existovaly ke dni podání návrhu na vklad.
 Ustanovení § 47 odst. 4 exekučního řádu3) – na rozdíl od ustanovení § 44 odst. 7 citovaného zákona umožňujícího výjimky v případě běžné obchodní činnosti, uspokojování základních životních potřeb, udržování a správy majetku – stanoví absolutní zákaz nakládání s majetkem povinného dotčeného exekučním příkazem. Právním úkonem ve smyslu § 44 odst. 7 a § 47 odst. 4 exekučního řádu je smlouva o převodu vlastnictví nemovitostí a nikoli návrh na vklad vlastnického práva. Návrh na vklad vlastnického práva do katastru nemovitostí není hmotněprávním úkonem ve smyslu § 34 občanského zákoníku, nýbrž procesním úkonem účastníka řízení učiněným na podkladě správního řádu. Vklad vlastnického práva do katastru nemovitostí rovněž není hmotněprávním úkonem ve smyslu § 34 občanského zákoníku, nýbrž procesním rozhodnutím katastrálního úřadu jako orgánu státní správy.
 Katastrální úřad má ze zákona zejména s ohledem na generální pravomoc soudů v občansko právních věcech jen omezenou pravomoc posuzovat vybrané právní otázky sloužící ke splnění jeho registrační činnosti při evidenci nemovitostí, a proto nelze oprávněně argumentovat tím, že katastrální úřad zkoumá omezení účastníků nakládat s převáděnými nemovitostmi jen ke dni podání návrhu na vklad; právní otázky, které ze zákona není oprávněn zkoumat katastrální úřad dle ustanovení § 5 odst. 1 zákona č. 265/1992 Sb., zůstávají plně v pravomoci soudů včetně absolutní neplatnosti kupní smlouvy uzavřené v rozporu se zákonem před podáním návrhu na vklad.
 PRO ROZPOR SE ZÁKONEM
 NELZE ZHOJIT
 Smlouva o převodu vlastnictví věci, včetně nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí, uzavřená povinným jako převodcem v mezidobí od doručení usnesení o nařízení exekuce povinnému dle § 44 odst. 7 exekučního řádu (případně od doručení exekučního příkazu dle § 47 odst. 4 exekučního řádu povinnému) až do skončení exekuce, tj. zpravidla úplného vymožení pohledávky, jejího příslušenství a nákladů exekuce nebo pravomocného zastavení řízení – s výjimkou sjednání odkládací podmínky smlouvy dle ustanovení § 36 odst. 2 občanského zákoníku a zákonných výjimek vyplývajících z § 44 odst. 7 exekučního řádu2) (běžná obchodní činnost, uspokojování základních životních potřeb, udržování a správy majetku) – je pro rozpor se zákonem absolutně neplatná.
 Na tom nic nemění skutečnost, že návrh na vklad vlastnického práva na podkladě takto uzavřené smlouvy byl katastrálnímu úřadu podán až po skončení exekuce, neboť absolutní neplanost právního úkonu nelze dodatečně zhojit, nestanoví-li výslovně zákon jinak.1)
 V případě, že kogentní ustanovení zákona výslovně zakazuje určité majetkové dispozice po určité období (například tak, že povinný nesmí majetek převést na jiného, zatížit ho nebo s ním jinak nakládat, jinak je právní úkon, kterým povinný porušil tuto povinnost, neplatný), vyvolává porušení této povinnosti bez dalšího vždy absolutní neplatnost zakázaného právního úkonu pro rozpor se zákonem ve smyslu ustanovení § 39 občanského zákoníku. Právní následky tohoto porušení přitom nemají vliv na neplatnost dotčeného právního úkonu, bez ohledu na vědomost stran o tomto zákazu a bez ohledu na to, že jím nebyla způsobena třetí osobě žádná újma (např. z důvodu pozdějšího vymožení plnění exekutorem z jiného majetku povinného či zastavení exekuce).
 Není žádného důvodu, aby srovnatelná a stejný účel sledující ustanovení § 335b odst. 1 písm. a) občanského soudního řádu (zákaz, aby po doručení usnesení o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí povinný převedl nemovitost na někoho jiného nebo ji zatížil) a § 44 odst. 7 exekučního řádu 2) byla soudy vykládány rozdílně.5)
 ...ANI PODÁNÍM NÁVRHU NA VKLAD
 PO SKONČENÍ EXEKUCE
 Byla-li smlouva o převodu vlastnictví věci, včetně nemovitostí, uzavřena povinnou osobou jako převodcem v průběhu celého exekučního řízení v rozporu s ustanovením § 44 odst. 7 a § 47 odst. 4 exekučního řádu (zpravidla do vymožení pohledávky, jejího příslušenství a nákladů exekuce nebo pravomocného zastavení exekuce) – s výjimkou výslovného ujednání účastníků o odkládací podmínce platnosti dle ustanovení § 36 odst. 2 občanského zákoníku a zákonných výjimek – je tato smlouva pro rozpor se zákonem vždy absolutně neplatná, a to bez ohledu na to, že návrh na vklad do katastru nemovitostí byl podán až po skončení exekuce.
 ROZHODNÝM OKAMŽIKEM
 JE TOTIŽ ÚČINNOST SMLOUVY
 Platnost smlouvy o převodu vlastnictví věci, včetně nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí, a její soulad (rozpor) se zákonem – dovolenost právního úkonu – nutno posuzovat ke dni jejího uzavření (účinnosti) a v případě sjednání odkládací podmínky ke dni jejího naplnění.
 Pro zjištění, zda je smlouva o převodu vlastnictví věci, včetně nemovitostí evidovaných v katastru nemovitostí, pro soulad (rozpor) se zákonem – dovolenost právního úkonu – platná či nikoli, je rozhodující okamžik její účinnosti, kterým je u písemně uzavřených smluv (nestanoví-li zákon či smlouva výslovně jinak – např. odkládací podmínka dle § 36 odst. 2 občanského zákoníku) okamžik jejího podpisu všemi účastníky.
 De lege ferenda navrhuji doplnit připravovaný nový občanský zákoník o toto ustanovení: „Výklad kogentního ustanovení zákona v rozporu s jeho jednoznačným slovním vyjádřením je nepřípustný.“
 1) Rozsudek Nejvyššího soudu ČR ze dne 27. 10. 1999, č. j. 22 Cdo 910/98 (in. Soudní rozhledy č. 2/2000): „Platné právo neumožňuje zpětné zhojení vad právních úkonů absolutně neplatných (konvalidaci). Proto je pro právní posouzení smlouvy o smlouvě budoucí rozhodný stav v době jejího uzavření, skutečnosti nastalé později nemají na její platnost vliv.“
 2) § 44 odst. 7: „Po doručení usnesení o nařízení exekuce nesmí povinný nakládat se svým majetkem včetně nemovitostí a majetku patřícího do společného jmění manželů, vyjma běžné obchodní činnosti, uspokojování základních životních potřeb, udržování a správy majetku. Právní úkon, kterým povinný porušil tuto povinnost, je neplatný.“
 3) § 47 odst. 4: „Exekuční příkaz doručí exekutor oprávněnému, povinnému a dalším osobám, kterým se podle zvoleného způsobu exekuce doručuje usnesení o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí podle občanského soudního řádu.“
 4) Rozsudek Nejvyššího soudu ČR ze dne 15. 12. 2004, sp. zn. č. 30/2005 Sb. rozh.: „Kupní smlouva, kterou povinný převedl nemovitost na jiného, i když usnesením o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí mu to soud zakázal (§ 335b odst. 1 písm. a/ o. s. ř.), je neplatná pro rozpor se zákonem (§ 39 obč. zák.). Pro právní úkony, které obsahem nebo účelem odporují zákonu, je charakteristické, že se ocitají v rozporu s výslovným imperativem (zákazem, příkazem) formulovaným v zákoně, popř. s imperativem obsahovým, tj. sice expressis verbis neformulovaným, ale ze zákona přímo vyplývajícím. Vznik a plnění z takových právních úkonů objektivní právo nepřipouští, jinými slovy, účinky, které s nimi účastníci spojovali, nemohou nastat.“
 Rozsudek Krajského soudu v Hradci Králové ze dne 2. 5. 2000, sp. zn. 1 A Co 18/2000 č. 59/2001 Sb. rozh.: „Kupní smlouva, kterou prodávající porušil zákaz převodu věci (nemovitosti) uložený mu vykonatelným předběžným opatřením ve smyslu § 76 odst. 1 písm. e) o. s. ř, je pro rozpor se zákonem absolutně neplatná.“
 Stanovisko Nejvyššího soudu ČR č. 34/1993 Sb. rozh.: „Ustanovení § 9 odst. 1 zákona č. 87/1991 Sb. je ustanovením kogentním (donucujícím), jehož význam je ještě zdůrazněn poslední větou tohoto odstavce, že totiž právní úkony uzavřené v rozporu s tímto ustanovením jsou neplatné.“
 Stanovisko Nejvyššího soudu ČR č. 31/2006 Sb. rozh.: „Již doručením usnesení o nařízení exekuce nastupují zákazy dispozic s majetkem povinného, nýbrž i s majetkem patřícího do společného jmění (§44 odst. 7 ex. řádu), a to i kdyby manžel povinného s takovým nakládáním souhlasil (§ 145 odst. 2 věta druhá obč. zákoníku). Samo usnesení o nařízení exekuce (aniž by zde byl exekuční příkaz) má tudíž dopad do majetkové sféry manžela povinného.“
 Rozsudek Vrchního soudu v Praze sp. zn. 15 Cmo 7/2005: „Vydáním exekučního příkazu ohledně majetku, který má být exekucí postižen, není dotčen zákaz dispozice dlužníka s ostatním majetkem. Nakládá-li proto dlužník i s ostatním majetkem v rozporu s § 44 odst. 7 ex. R., jedná se o neplatný právní úkon.“
 Nález pléna Ústavního soudu ze dne 1. 3. 2007, sp. zn. Pl. ÚS 8/06, bod 34: „Právní jistotě nepřispívá ani nejednotná soudní praxe při tzv. upuštění od exekuce (§ 46 odst. 3 věta první zák. č. 120/12001 Sb.). Dikce tohoto ustanovení naznačuje, že jde o neformální úkon exekutora, což nelze považovat za přípustné. Je třeba jednoznačně určit okamžik ukončení exekučního řízené (též ve vztahu ke třetím osobám, např. pro výmaz poznámky z katastru nemovitostí). Zatímco v řízení vedeném u Obvodního soudu pro Prahu 5 soud usnesením ze dne 5. 3. 2004, č. j. Nc 733/2003-102, exekuci zastavil, v řízení vedeném u Obvodního soudu pro Prahu 3 žádný obdobný úkon nebyl učiněn. Ústavní soud považuje za vhodné, aby obecné soudy řízení o výkon rozhodnutí důsledně postupovaly podle § 268 odst. 1 písm. g) obč. soudního řádu a řízení zastavovaly i tehdy, zanikne-li vymáhaná pohledávka splněním v průběhu exekučního řízení.“
 5) Usnesení Nejvyššího soudu ČR ze dne 13. 3. 2007, sp. zn. 30 Cdo 2441/2006: „Podle ust. § 335 odst. 3 věty první o. s. ř. ve znění účinném do 31. 12. 2000 [totožnou úpravu – co do obsahu – přejal týž předpis účinný od 1. 1. 2001 – viz § 335b odst. 1 písm. a) o. s. ř.] musí usnesení o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí obsahovat zákaz, aby povinný nemovitost převedl na někoho jiného nebo ji zatížil.
 Neplatnost právního úkonu podle § 39 obč. zák. je neplatností absolutní, která působí ze zákona (ex lege) a od počátku (ex tunc), takže subjektivní občanská práva a občanskoprávní povinnosti z takového právního úkonu vůbec nevzniknou, přičemž není rozhodné, zda účastníci smlouvy o důvodu její neplatnosti věděli.
 Porušením zákazu uloženého usnesením o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí se Nejvyšší soud zabýval v rozsudku ze dne 15. 12. 2004, sp. zn. 20 Cdo 2662/2003, uveřejněném ve Sbírce soudních rozhodnutí a stanovisek pod R 30/2005, a v němž dospěl k závěru, že kupní smlouva, kterou povinný převedl nemovitost na jiného, i když usnesením o nařízení výkonu rozhodnutí mu to soud zakázal [§ 335b odst. 1 písm. a) o. s. ř.], je neplatná pro rozpor se zákonem (§ 39 obč. zák.). V odůvodnění tohoto rozhodnutí pak Nejvyšší soud uvedl, že pro právní úkony, které obsahem nebo účelem odporují zákonu, je charakteristické, že se ocitají v rozporu s výslovným imperativem (zákazem, příkazem) formulovaným v zákoně, popř. s imperativem obsahovým, tj. sice expressis verbis neformulovaným, ale ze zákona přímo vyplývajícím. Vznik a plnění z takových právních úkonů objektivní právo nepřipouští, jinými slovy, účinky, které s nimi účastníci spojovali, nemohou nastat. Na roveň výslovnému či obsahovému zákazu právního jednání lze klást případy, kdy účastníci řízení svými projevy vůle odporují tomu, co jim rozhodnutím zakázal soud, pokud zmocnění k takovému opatření má podklad v objektivním právu. Typicky jde o případy, kdy soud předběžným opatřením podle § 76 odst. 1 písm. e) o. s. ř. účastníku uloží, aby nenakládal s určitými věcmi nebo právy (viz rozsudek Krajského soudu v Hradci Králové ze dne 2. 5. 2000, sp. zn. 18 Co 18/2000, uveřejněný ve Sbírce soudních rozhodnutí a stanovisek 9/2001 pod č. 59), kdy zakáže povinnému nakládat s (movitými) věcmi, které vykonavatel sepíše (§ 324 o. s. ř.), nebo kdy vysloví zákazy převést (zatížit) nemovitost (popř. spoluvlastnický podíl), podnik, jeho část (popř. spoluvlastnický podíl), anebo věci, práva a jiné majetkové hodnoty, které slouží k provozování podniku nebo vzhledem ke své povaze mají tomuto účelu sloužit bez souhlasu správce [§ 335b odst. 1 písm. a), § 338h odst. 1 písm. a), c) o. s. ř.]. Okolnosti, že v určitých případech zákon soudu ukládá, aby rozhodnutím zákaz vyslovil, a že tím upravuje jeho postup v řízení, jsou pro posouzení následků jednání, jímž účastník rozhodnutí nerespektuje, bezcenné.
 Jestliže v posuzované věci bylo zjištěno, že usnesením Obvodního soudu pro Prahu 6 ze dne 2. 12. 1994, sp. zn. E 349/94, které nabylo právní moci dne 31. 12. 1994, byl nařízen výkon rozhodnutí prodejem nemovitostí – mimo jiné p. č. 980/1, ve vlastnictví povinného J. S., kterému byl současně dán zákaz, aby postižené nemovitosti převedl na někoho jiného nebo je zatížil, a přesto J. S. kupní smlouvou a smlouvou o zřízení věcných břemen ze dne 15. 12. 1997 prodal předmětné pozemky, jež vznikly rozdělením pozemku p. č. 980/1, žalobkyni, nelze odvolacímu soudu vytýkat nesprávné právní posouzení věci, jestliže dospěl k závěru, že tato smlouva je absolutně neplatná podle § 39 obč. zák. a že se žalobkyně vlastnicí sporných nemovitostí na základě této smlouvy nestala.
 K námitce v dovolání, že v dané věci ‚smluvní strany rozpor se zákonem odstranily čl. V. předmětné kupní smlouvy‘, v němž prodávající prohlašuje, ‚že ke dni zápisu vkladu vlastnického práva pro kupující nebudou na předmětu koupě váznout žádné dluhy ani zástavní práva pro existující pohledávky‘, dovolací soud dodává, že absolutní neplatnost smlouvy podle § 39 obč. zák. nelze vyloučit uvedeným prohlášením prodávajícího J. S. (a obecně ani ujednáním účastníků ve smlouvě obsaženým), které je pouze jeho jednostranným závazkem, a nikoliv dohodnutou odkládací podmínkou (k tomu srov. § 36 odst. 2 obč. zák. a komentář k němu), za níž se považuje taková podmínka, kde právní účinky platného právního úkonu nastanou až splněním této podmínky.“


type: wikipedia

text:
Emanuel Lehocký (* 4. január 1876, Osuské – † 24. september 1930, Bratislava) bol slovenský sociálnodemokratický politik. Bol jedným zo signatárov Martinskej deklarácie.
 Profesionálna kariéra
 Narodil sa v rodine remeselníka Jozefa Lehockého a jeho manželky Anny Lacóovej. Vyučil sa za krajčíra a v roku 1892 odišiel pracovať do Budapešti. V roku 1896 sa vrátil na Slovensko. V roku 1902 sa stal úradníkom nemocenskej pokladnice v Bratislave. Po vzniku ČSR bol členom revolučného Národného zhromaždenia a pracoval ako referent sociálnej spravodlivosti na Ministerstve s plnou mocou pre správu Slovenska. Pôsobil aj ako riaditeľ Robotníckej sociálnej poisťovne a riaditeľ Okresnej nemocenskej poisťovne v Bratislave.
 Politická kariéra
 Počas pobytu v Budapešti vstúpil do do Sociálnodemokratickej strany Uhorska. Po jeho návrate na Slovensko bola v roku 1905 založená Slovenská sociálnodemokratická strana. Emanuel Lehocký bol zvolený za predsedu Výkonného výboru strany. Po nútenom začlenení ústrednej SSDS do Sociálnodemokratickej strany Uhorska bol až do roku 1918 na čele Slovenského výkonného výboru.
 Emanuel Lehocký sa podieľal na príprave Deklarácie slovenského národa, ktorá bola vyhlásená 30. októbra 1918 v Martine a bol zvolený za člena Výkonného výboru Slovenskej národnej rady. Po martinskom zhromaždení pripravoval zjazd SSDS, ktorý sa zišiel 25. decembra 1918 v Liptovskom Mikuláši a bola na ňom prijatá deklarácia vernosti Československej republike. Bezprostredne po skončení zjazdu odcestoval spolu s ďalšími 23 delegátmi na XII. zjazd sociálnej demokracie do Prahy. Na tomto zjazde, ktorý sa uskutočnil v decembri 1918 sa zlúčila slovenská a česká sociálna demokracia do jednotnej Československej sociálnodemokratickej strany robotníckej. Emanuel Lehocký sa stal členom jej Ústredného výboru a predsedom Slovenského výkonného výboru. V rokoch 1920 až 1925 vykonával funkciu senátora Národného zhromaždenia.
 Novinárska činnosť
 Emanuel Lehocký sa zaslúžil o založenie Slovenských robotníckych novín, ktoré vyšli s finančným prispením českých sociálnych demokratov vo Viedni prvýkrát 1. októbra 1904 ako mesačník. V roku 1906 založil aj druhý mesačník Napred, ktorý sa objavoval vždy medzi dvoma číslami Slovenských robotníckych novín. Obidva mesačníky zanikli roku v 1909, keď namiesto nich začal vychádzať týždenník Robotnícke noviny. Pre svoju novinársku činnosť bol Lehocký niekoľkokrát policajne prenasledovaný a v roku 1907 bol odsúdený na dva mesiace väzenia a pokutu 600 korún.
 Emanuel Lehocký je pochovaný na Ondrejskom cintoríne v Bratislave. Martin Rázus o ňom v roku 1934 napísal, že „nebol ani o mak menším národovcom, než ktorýkoľvek z našich najprvších“.
 Externé odkazy
 Záznam o narodení a krste v matrike riadok 1
 Emanuel Lehocký na stránke SDSS
 Slovenskí politici
 Signatári Martinskej deklarácie
 Narodenia v 1876
 Úmrtia v 1930
 Osobnosti z Osuského