type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b"SIGAR\nSPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for JAN 30\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JAN 30, 2011\nFOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n Afghanistan Reconstruction 2011\n400 Army Navy Drive\nArlington, VA 22202-4704\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS\n\x0cCover Captions (clockwise from left):\nCommando Radio-Kabul\xe2\x80\x99s first woman disc\njockey speaks to listeners during a radio\nbroadcast at Camp Morehead, Afghanistan.\nFunded by the United States, the station pro-\nvides information on Commando operations.\nIt is operated by Afghans who have gradu-\nated from a U.S. training program. (U.S. Army\nphoto, SFC Marcus Quarterman)\nAfghan quality assurance representatives\nvisit a waste treatment plant under construc-\ntion in Kabul province, as part of a U.S. Army\nCorps of Engineers training session. As of July\n2010, the United States had provided $250\nmillion to rebuild Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water sector.\n(USAF photo, SSgt Stacey Haga)\nSchool is in session at the Nad e Ali Central\nSchool in Helmand province. In 2010, U.S.\nprograms provided 21.5 million textbooks to\nstudents throughout Afghanistan. By the end\nof 2011, the United States plans to provide\n$25 million for primary school textbooks\nalone. (RAF photo, SAC Neil Chapman)\nA weaver in Jalalabad continues the ancient\ntradition as he works on a charpoy, a versatile\ndaybed common throughout Afghanistan,\n Young musicians perform at the first winter music academy of the Afghan National Music\nPakistan, and India. One key focus of the U.S.\n Institute. The Institute was founded to revive the musical tradition in Afghanistan: under\nreconstruction program is to encourage the\n the Taliban, music was banned. The institute is supported by contributions from the\ngrowth of local industry. (photo by Aimal Azem)\n United States and the donor community. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)\n\x0cSIGAR Special Inspector General for\n Afghanistan Reconstruction\n JAN 30\n 2011\n\n\n\n\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181)\nestablished the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan\nReconstruction (SIGAR).\n\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the indepen-\ndent and objective\n\xe2\x80\xa2 conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and\n operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the\n reconstruction of Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to pro-\n mote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs\n and operations; and prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs\n and operations.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and\n currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of\n such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.\nAfghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other\nfunding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government\nthat involves the use of amounts appropriated, or otherwise made available for the\nreconstruction of Afghanistan.\n\nSource: P.L. 110-181, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/28/2008.\n\x0cSIGAR RESULTS TO DATE\nAUDITS\n\xe2\x80\xa2 36 completed audit reports, addressing more than $16 billion in reconstruction spending\n\xe2\x80\xa2 $190 million in U.S. reconstruction funds put to better use\n\xe2\x80\xa2 3 forensic audits currently analyzing more than $37 billion of reconstruction contract data\n\nINVESTIGATIONS\n\xe2\x80\xa2 105 ongoing investigations, 62 of allegations of procurement/contract fraud\n\xe2\x80\xa2 4 convictions and more than $6 million in repayments to the U.S. government\n\xe2\x80\xa2 464 Hotline complaints received and addressed\n\nOPERATIONS\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Work conducted in 22 of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s 34 provinces\n\n\n\n\n JOWZJAN KUNDUZ BADAKHSHAN\n BALKH TAKHAR\n\n\n SAMANGAN\n FARYAB BAGHLAN\n SAR-E PUL PANJSHIR\n BADGHIS NURISTAN\n PARWAN KAPISA KUNAR\n BAMYAN LAGHMAN\n KABUL\n HERAT WARDAK\n NANGARHAR\n GHOR LOGAR\n DAYKUNDI\n PAKTIYA\n GHAZNI KHOWST\n\n URUZGAN\n FARAH\n PAKTIKA\n ZABUL\n\n\n Provinces where SIGAR has conducted\n audits and investigations\n NIMROZ Current SIGAR offices\n HELMAND\n KANDAHAR\n\x0c SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR\n\n AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\n\n\n January 30, 2011\n\n\n I am pleased to submit SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s tenth quarterly report to the Congress on the U.S. reconstruction effort\nin Afghanistan. This report covers SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s oversight activities and the status of reconstruction programs in\nAfghanistan, for the reporting period ending January 30, 2011.\n This quarter, SIGAR issued two audit reports, initiated five new audits, and completed its mandated\ncontract audit plan. We learned that our 2009 audit on Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP)\naccountability contributed to the decision by U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to return $190 million of\nFY 2009 CERP funds to the Army to be put to better use. In collaboration with Afghan investigators, SIGAR\nparticipated in negotiations that resulted in two companies repaying $22 million in wages to 4,000 Afghans\nand $11 million in taxes to the Afghan government. Other joint investigations led to $500,000 in cost savings,\nthe recovery of $532,000 in stolen U.S. equipment, the arrest of a contractor for bribery, and the proposed\ndebarment of two companies. SIGAR opened 35 new investigations, bringing the number of ongoing investi-\ngations to 105, 80% of which concern contract/procurement fraud and corruption.\n Over the last two years, SIGAR has grown steadily. We now have 122 full-time professionals working in\nsix locations: one in the United States and five in Afghanistan. Our auditors and investigators have conducted\noversight work in 22 of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s 34 provinces. We have produced 36 audit reports and made more than\n100 recommendations, many of which have had a significant impact on aspects of the reconstruction effort.\nOne of our auditors received an award from the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency for\nhis anti-corruption work.\n I will be leaving SIGAR in early February, knowing that this organization will provide the effective over-\nsight that is critical to protecting the more than $56 billion U.S. investment in Afghanistan from waste, fraud,\nand abuse. It has been an honor to serve two Presidents of the United States. It has also been my privilege to\nwork with SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s excellent staff, with my colleagues in the inspector general community, with our over-\nsight committees in the Congress, and with so many Afghans who are dedicated to rebuilding their country.\n\n\n Very Respectfully,\n\n\n\n\n Arnold Fields\n Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n\n 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202\n\x0c EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR ACTIVITIES, Q1 2011\nSIGAR audits this quarter found that critical reconstruction programs are at risk because of poor\nplanning, insufficient oversight, and the inability of the Afghan authorities to sustain them. These\naudits examined Department of Defense (DoD) plans to build and sustain facilities for the Afghan\nNational Security Forces (ANSF) and 69 projects funded through the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency\nResponse Program (CERP) in Laghman province.\n\n\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s continuing collaboration with Afghan law that DoD had not established adequate mechanisms\nenforcement entities, including the Afghan Shafafiyat to monitor and execute CERP funds. According to\nInvestigative Unit (ASIU), is beginning to produce USFOR-A officials, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s report and other reports\nresults. At the request of the ASIU, SIGAR participated prompted USFOR-A to review CERP use in Afghanistan\nin negotiations with two companies that agreed to pay and to reallocate the funds.\n$22 million of unpaid wages for 4,000 Afghan workers\nand $11 million in unpaid taxes to the Government SIGAR AUDITS\nof the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). SIGAR During this reporting period, SIGAR published two\nalso participated in joint investigations that led to audits:\n$500,000 in cost savings, the recovery of $532,000 in \xe2\x80\xa2 Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases\nstolen U.S. equipment, the arrest of one contractor for Risks for $11.4 Billion Program (SIGAR Audit 11-6)\nbribery, and the proposed debarment of two individuals \xe2\x80\xa2 Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in\nand two companies. Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but\n In addition to the 2 audit reports, SIGAR initiated Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns\n5 new audits, bringing the total number of ongoing Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential\naudits to 16. SIGAR continues to conduct forensic Waste (SIGAR Audit 11-7)\nreviews of $37.65 billion of transaction data related\n Lack of Planning for ANSF Facilities\nto three funds used for Afghanistan reconstruction:\nthe Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Economic SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of U.S. planning for ANSF facili-\nSupport Fund, and the International Control and Law ties found that the Combined Security Transition\nEnforcement Fund. Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) intends to spend\n SIGAR also completed a comprehensive plan $11.4 billion through FY 2012 to build nearly 900\nto conduct audits of contracts, subcontracts, task facilities across Afghanistan to support the ANSF. At\norders, and delivery orders of reconstruction activities the end of 2010, the ANSF had a combined strength\nin Afghanistan, as required by law. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2011 of about 265,000 personnel. The international com-\naudit plan expands the scope of its contract audit munity and the GIRoA plan to increase this number to\nwork and emphasizes identifying opportunities to put 305,600 for FY 2011.\nreconstruction funds to better use. Despite this considerable outlay of funds and\n the large number of facilities involved, SIGAR found\nFUNDS PUT TO BETTER USE that CSTC-A had not developed a long-term construc-\nThis quarter, SIGAR learned that its September 2009 tion plan. The lack of such a plan puts the facilities\naudit on CERP contributed to the decision by the U.S. program at risk of not meeting ANSF strategic and\nForces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to return $190 million operational needs.\nof 2009 CERP funds to the Army. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit found\n\x0c EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\n\n\n\n In addition to paying for the construction of ANSF services to build the ANSF, develop the Afghan econ-\nbases, garrisons, police stations, and training centers, omy, and improve Afghan governing capacity. SIGAR is\nCSTC-A may provide up to $800 million for operations also conducting audits of private security contractors\nand maintenance on these facilities over the next five that provide security for reconstruction projects.\nyears, according to the audit. CSTC-A does not have a\nlong-term maintenance plan that links requirements to New Audits\nlong-term construction plans. Since SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s last report to the Congress, it has initi-\n ated five new audits:\nCERP Projects in Laghman Province at Risk \xe2\x80\xa2 audit of four U.S. Agency for International\nSIGAR found that 27 of the 69 CERP projects it exam- Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of\nined in Laghman province were at risk or have ques- State (DoS) programs in one selected province\ntionable outcomes. The 27 projects at risk accounted \xe2\x80\xa2 audit of USAID contracts in support of its Local\nfor about $49 million, or 92% of the $53 million in Governance and Community Development projects\nobligations that SIGAR reviewed. Most of this CERP \xe2\x80\xa2 audit of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and\ninvestment in Laghman was used for large projects, the Environment (AFCEE) contracts for infrastruc-\nsuch as construction of asphalt roads and new ture projects at the Kabul Military Training Center\nfacilities. The asphalt road projects, valued at about \xe2\x80\xa2 audit of AFCEE contracts for construction projects\n$44.6 million, are at risk because the Afghan provin- and related work at the Afghan Defense University\ncial authorities do not have the resources to operate \xe2\x80\xa2 audit of the use and accountability of U.S. and\nand maintain them. other donor funds contributed to the Afghanistan\n In addition, SIGAR found that USFOR-A lacks a Reconstruction Trust Fund\ncoordinated, results-oriented approach to determine\nwhether CERP projects have achieved their goals, are SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS\nbeing used as intended, and are being sustained. Since SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s last quarterly report to the Congress,\nWithout adequate oversight and assessments of its investigators opened 35 new cases, bringing the\nresults, the Afghan people may not receive the proj- total number of ongoing cases to 105. Approximately\nects\xe2\x80\x99 intended benefits, and the U.S. investment is at 86% of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s cases focus on contract/procure-\nrisk of waste. ment fraud and corruption, and 14% on other crimi-\n nal allegations, such as theft. The SIGAR Hotline\nAudit Plans received 131 complaints\xe2\x80\x94slightly more than\nIn FY 2011, SIGAR is continuing to concentrate received last quarter.\nits audit work in three high-priority areas: contract\nmanagement and oversight, efforts to build the ANSF, LOOKING FORWARD\nand anti-corruption programs. It will also continue to Throughout this year, SIGAR auditors and investiga-\nconduct audits of development assistance and tors will remain focused on detecting and deter-\nprograms to build Afghan governing capacity. ring waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S. reconstruction\n As mandated by the Congress, SIGAR has submit- dollars. SIGAR will also be assessing the degree to\nted a separate plan for its performance audits of which U.S. taxpayer dollars are supporting sustain-\ncontracts and other financial mechanisms. About one- able programs that are helping the United States\nthird of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audits this year will target contractor achieve its reconstruction objectives.\nperformance and agency oversight for contracted\n\x0cTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 1\n SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n 3 $190 Million of CERP Funds Put to Better Use\n 4 SIGAR Audits\n 19 SIGAR Investigations\n 22 SIGAR Budget\n 23 SIGAR Staff\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 2\n AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n 27 NATO Summit in Lisbon\n 28 U.S. Policy Unchanged Following Review\n 30 FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act\n 32 SIGAR Looking Forward\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 3\n RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n 37 Overview\n 41 Status of Funds\n 53 Security\n 67 Governance\n 87 Economic and Social Development\n 101 Counter-Narcotics\n 107 Anti-Corruption\n\x0cTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\n\n SECTION 4\n OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n 113 Completed Oversight Activities\n 118 Ongoing Oversight Activities\n 129 Other Agency Investigations\n\n\n\n\n APPENDICES & ENDNOTES\n 132 Appendix A: Cross-Reference of Report\n to Statutory Requirements\n 136 Appendix B: U.S. Government Appropriated Funds\n 138 Appendix C: SIGAR Audits\n 140 Appendix D: SIGAR Investigations and Hotline\n 141 Appendix E: Abbreviations and Acronyms\n 144 Endnotes\n\x0c Building Civil Aviation Infrastructure\n A mason ensures that bricks are lined up properly while\n building a wall at Mazar-e Sharif International Airport in\n December 2010. Five international airports are currently\n under construction in Afghanistan, funded by the U.S.\n government and its international partners. (U.S. Army\n photo, SGT Michael Reinsch, IJC Public Affairs)\n\n\n\n\nviii SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c1 SIGAR\n OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n 1\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cThrough its audit and investigative\n work over the last 18 months, SIGAR has\nidentified six broad issues putting the U.S.\n investment in Afghan reconstruction at\n risk of being wasted or subject to fraud\n and abuse...: inadequate contract and\n program management, need to work\n in greater partnership with the people\n of the country we are trying to rebuild,\n measuring outputs rather than outcomes,\n inability to curb corruption, insufficient\n local capacity to manage and sustain\n projects, and lack of security.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94Maj. Gen. Arnold Fields (Ret.)\nSpecial Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n Source: SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cTestimony Before the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/18/2010, pp. 10\xe2\x80\x9311.\n\n\n\n\n 2 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR OVERSIGHT\nThis quarter, SIGAR issued 2 audit reports and announced 5 new audits,\nbringing the total number of ongoing audits to 16. SIGAR continues to conduct\nforensic reviews of $37.65 billion of transaction data related to three funds\nused for Afghanistan reconstruction: the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\n(ASFF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and International Control and Law\nEnforcement Fund (INCLE). In addition, SIGAR completed a comprehensive\nplan to conduct audits of contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders\nof reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, as required by law.\n Since SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s last quarterly report to the Congress, its investigators opened\n35 new cases. SIGAR is now conducting 105 ongoing investigations. This\nquarter, the SIGAR Hotline received 131 complaints\xe2\x80\x94a slight increase since\nlast quarter. SIGAR also participated in joint investigations that resulted in\nthe payment of $22 million in unpaid wages to Afghan workers and $11 million\nin unpaid taxes to the GIRoA, $500,000 in cost savings, the recovery of stolen\nequipment, the arrest of one contractor for bribery, and the proposed debar-\nment of two individuals and two companies.\n\n$190 MILLION OF CERP FUNDS PUT TO BETTER USE\nThis quarter, SIGAR learned that its September 2009 audit on DoD\xe2\x80\x99s ability to\naccount the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds con-\ntributed to the decision by the U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to return\n$190 million of 2009 CERP funds to the U.S. Army, which administers the\nprogram. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit, \xe2\x80\x9cIncreased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed\nfor Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d found that\nthe Department of Defense (DoD) had not established adequate mechanisms\nto monitor and administer CERP funds. Other oversight agencies, including\nthe U.S. Army Audit Agency, have also raised concerns about the use of CERP\nfunds. According to USFOR-A officials in Afghanistan, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s report, along\nwith other reports, prompted USFOR-A to review CERP use in Afghanistan.\nThis review resulted in the decision to reallocate the funds.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 3\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 1.1\n\n\nCOMPLETED SIGAR AUDITS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010\nReport Identifier Report Title Date Issued\nSIGAR-Audit-11-7 Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province 1/2011\n Provided Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment\n Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste\nSIGAR-Audit-11-6 Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks for $11.4 1/2011\n Billion Program\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR AUDITS\nSIGAR completed two audits this quarter and also submitted to the Congress\nits \xe2\x80\x9cPlan for Performance Audits of Contracts and Other Financial Mechanisms\nto Meet the Requirements of P.L. 110-181, Section 842 (a) (3).\xe2\x80\x9d This plan is\ndescribed in a quarterly highlight in this section. Table 1.1 lists the audits.\n This quarter, SIGAR initiated five new audits:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a review of four U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and\n U.S. Department of State (DoS) programs in one selected province\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an audit of USAID contracts in support of its Local Governance and\n Community Development projects\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an audit of the U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment\n (AFCEE) contracts for infrastructure projects at the Kabul Military Training\n Center\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an audit of AFCEE contracts for construction projects and related work at\n the Afghan Defense University\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an audit of the use and accountability of U.S. and other donor funds contrib-\n uted to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)\nFor details on SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s new audits, see \xe2\x80\x9cNew Audits Announced this Quarter,\xe2\x80\x9d\nlater in this section.\n\nFiscal Year 2011 Audit Plan\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2011 audit plan expands the scope of its contract audit work and\nemphasizes identifying opportunities to put reconstruction funds to better use.\nAs SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing forensic reviews reveal transaction anomalies, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\nAudit and Investigations directorates will coordinate efforts to address specific\nconcerns about fraud, waste, and abuse.\n SIGAR continues to concentrate its audit work in three high-priority areas:\ncontract management and oversight, efforts to build the Afghan National Security\nForces (ANSF), and anti-corruption programs. In addition, SIGAR will continue\nto conduct audits of development assistance and programs to build Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\ngoverning capacity.\n Using a risk-based approach to prioritizing its work, SIGAR has established\nseven main criteria to identify projects and programs to audit:\n\n\n\n\n 4 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the amount and magnitude of U.S. funding to known risk environments\n\xe2\x80\xa2 indications of specific risks and vulnerabilities, especially related to large\n contracts, procurements, and programs\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the opportunities to realize financial benefits to the U.S. taxpayer, given\n anticipated outcomes and deliverables\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the information provided by SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s oversight committees, U.S. agen-\n cies, U.S. Embassy Kabul, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of\n Afghanistan (GIRoA)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the relevance to the U.S. strategy and goals in Afghanistan\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the security issues affecting the feasibility of conducting work\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the activities of other oversight agencies\n\nCompleted Audit Reports\nSIGAR issued two audit reports this quarter\xe2\x80\x94one focusing on the funding\nand planning of facilities construction for the ANSF and one focusing on the\nstatus of projects funded by CERP and the effectiveness of U.S. oversight of\nthese projects.\n\nAudit 11-6: Security/ANSF Facilities Planning\nInadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks for $11.4 Billion Program\nFrom fiscal years 2005 to 2010, the Congress appropriated about $28 billion for\nthe ASFF. Under the command of USFOR-A, the Combined Security Transition\nCommand-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) uses this funding to equip, train, base, and sus-\ntain the ANSF. The ANSF includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan\nNational Police (ANP). Total ANSF personnel were to reach 243,000 in October\n2010; more recent plans suggest this number may increase to 400,000 by October\n31, 2013. As a result, additional facilities and infrastructure are needed.\n In previous audits of construction contracts for ANA garrisons in Kunduz,\nGamberi, and Farah, SIGAR attempted to determine how the contract require-\nments were developed. However, CSTC-A was unable to document the U.S. plans\nand justification for the number and types of ANA facilities, including docu-\nments delineating the size, location, and use of the garrisons. As SIGAR noted,\nsuch planning documents are critical for CSTC-A to ensure that, as requirements\nchange, plans can be adapted as needed, resources can be prioritized and used to\nachieve strategic goals, and potential waste can be minimized.\n\nOBJECTIVES\nThis audit had the following objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the U.S. funding provided or planned to be provided for the\n construction of ANSF facilities.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s overall planning for the construction and maintenance of\n ANSF facilities.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 5\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nMANDATED CONTRACT of Defense (DoD) administers three of these funds\xe2\x80\x94\n the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s\nAUDIT PLAN Emergency Response Program, and the DoD Drug\n Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund. The U.S.\n Agency for International Development (USAID) adminis-\nThe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of\n ters the Economic Support Fund, and the Department\n2008 (P.L. 110-181) requires that SIGAR develop a\n of State (DoS) manages the International Narcotics\ncomprehensive plan for a series of audits of con-\n Control and Law Enforcement account. (For more infor-\ntracts, subcontracts, task orders, and delivery orders\n mation, see \xe2\x80\x9cStatus of Funds\xe2\x80\x9d in Section 3.)\nrelating to the performance of security and recon-\nstruction functions in Afghanistan. During this report- CONTRACT AWARD/MANAGEMENT ENTITIES\ning period, SIGAR submitted to Congress its \xe2\x80\x9cPlan for U.S. implementing agencies use multiple organiza-\nPerformance Audits of Contracts and Other Financial tions to award and manage contracts. Four DoD\nMechanisms To Meet the Requirements of P.L. 110- organizations manage reconstruction contracts\n181, Section 842 (a) (3).\xe2\x80\x9d to train, equip, base, and sustain the ANSF: U.S.\n About one-third of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audits this year will Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support\ntarget contractor performance and agency oversight Contract Command (C-JTSCC),22 the U.S. Army Corps\nfor contracted services to realize financial benefits to of Engineers (USACE)-Afghanistan Engineer District\nthe U.S. taxpayer. SIGAR is also conducting audits of (AED),23 the Air Force Center for Engineering and\nprivate security contractors that provide security for Environment (AFCEE), and the U.S. Army Space and\nreconstruction projects. Missile Defense Command (SMDC).\n Each planned audit will address one or more of the C-JTSCC manages contracts for U.S. Forces -\nseven issues in Section 842 (h) of P.L. 110-181: Afghanistan (USFOR-A) subcommands, including\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the manner in which contract requirements were most contracts for the Combined Security Transition\n developed and contracts or task and delivery Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A distributes\n orders were awarded and manages all U.S.-provided funding to support the\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the manner in which federal agencies exercised development of the ANSF. USACE and AFCEE man-\n control over the performance of contractors age construction contracts for CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s infrastruc-\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the extent to which operational field commanders ture projects for the ANSF. SMDC manages con-\n were able to coordinate or direct the performance tracts for DoD\xe2\x80\x99s Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology\n of contractors in an area of combat operations Office. In addition to providing aviation support for\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the degree to which contractor employees were Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s counter-narcotics office, SMDC con-\n properly screened, selected, trained, and equipped tracts are used to construct facilities on the Afghan\n for the functions to be performed border to intercept narcotics shipments.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the nature and extent of any incidents of miscon- USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Mission in Kabul enters into and man-\n duct or unlawful activity by contractor employees ages contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the nature and extent of any activity by contractor to support economic development and promote\n employees that was inconsistent with the objec- good governance. USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan-Pakistan Task\n tives of operational field commanders Force in Washington, D.C., reports data on contracts,\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the extent to which any incidents of misconduct or cooperative agreements, and grants. It also provides\n unlawful activity were reported, documented, inves- administrative support for USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Mission in Kabul.\n tigated, and (where appropriate) prosecuted The DoS Office of Acquisitions and Management\n Most of the $56 million that has been appropri- (AQM) enters into contracts on behalf of DoS and is\nated for the reconstruction of Afghanistan has been responsible for department-wide oversight for con-\ndivided among five major U.S. funds. The Department tracts. In addition, two DoS bureaus\xe2\x80\x94the Bureau\n\n\n\n 6 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT\n\n\n\n\nof International Narcotics and Law Enforcement developed a robust plan to assess the manage-\nAffairs and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and ment and oversight of PSCs and their performance in\nMigration\xe2\x80\x94are managing reconstruction contracts. Afghanistan. This plan includes contract audits and\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audits of selected contractors funded audits to identify potential systemic problems. In an\nby DoD, USAID, and DoS will assess the process ongoing audit, SIGAR is assessing the performance\nfor awarding contracts; whether projects are being and oversight of a $93 million contract between\ncompleted within the terms of the contracts; and the USACE and Global Strategies Group for security sup-\nextent to which agencies are implementing effective port services.\noversight to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.\n\nCONTRACT OVERSIGHT FOR 2011 TABLE 1.2\nA SIGAR audit issued last quarter found that\nDoD, DoS, and USAID had obligated more than U.S. OBLIGATIONS MADE AGAINST RECONSTRUCTION\n$17.7 billion to nearly 7,000 contractors and other CONTRACTS AND GRANTS, TOP 20 RECIPIENTS,\n 2007\xe2\x80\x932009\nentities during FY 2007\xe2\x80\x932009. SIGAR is using this\n Awarding Value\naudit to help prioritize its work. Table 1.2 shows the Rank Recipient Entity ($ Millions)\n20 recipients of the largest obligations of reconstruc- 1 DynCorp International INL, USACEa 1,988\ntion funding from FY 2007 through FY 2009 and 2 Louis Berger International, Inc. USAID 736\nidentifies the contracting authority responsible for 3 Kabuljan Construction Company C-JTSCC\n b\n 691\nadministering the contract. 4 Red Sea Construction Company C-JTSCCb 478\n During this reporting period, SIGAR announced 5 KBY & Bozdemir Joint Venture C-JTSCCb 452\nthree new audits of contracts awarded to companies 6 International Relief and Development USAID 392\non this list. AFCEE awarded three task orders, valued 7 Contrack International, Inc. USACE 366\nat $70.5 million, to AMEC Earth and Environment 8 PAE Government Systems INL 349\nfor construction at the Kabul Military Training Center. 9 Development Alternatives, Inc. USAID 331\nAFCEE also awarded a Phase III $75 million task 10 World Bank USAID 322\norder to ECC International, LLC for the Kabul Military 11 FCEC United Infrastructure Projects JV USACE 321\nTraining Center. AFCEE has awarded a cost-plus- 12 Lockheed Martin Integrated SMDC 320\nfixed-fee task order, currently valued at $83 million, Systems, Inc.\nto AMEC Earth and Environment under an indefinite- 13 Technologists, Inc. USACE 303\ndelivery/indefinite-quantity contract for construction 14 United Nations USAID 255\n\nat the Afghan Defense University. USAID awarded a 15 Chemonics International, Inc. USAID 230\n\n$232 million contract for local governance and com- 16 U.S. Training Center SMDC 218\n\nmunity development to Development Alternatives, Inc. 17 ECC International, LLC USACE 204\n 18 ARINC Inc. SMDC 169\n SIGAR has two ongoing audits of DoD and USAID\n 19 AMEC Earth and Environment AFCEE 166\nreconstruction contracts. One is assessing two AFCEE b\n 20 Recon International C-JTSCC 159\ntask orders for infrastructure projects:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a $23.2 million project in Mazar-e Sharif by CH2M a. Numbers affected by rounding. Value represents the total obligations for contracts,\n cooperative agreements, and grants from FY 2007 to FY 2009 reported to SIGAR by the\n Hill Constructors, Inc. respective entity.\n b. C-JTSCC data was provided by JCC-I/A, which was responsible for C-JTSCC\xe2\x80\x99s mission\n\xe2\x80\xa2 a $19.0 million project in Herat by AMEC Earth and at the time. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit report, the JCC-I/A data contained a number of\n errors, including misspellings and some similar contractor names that may refer to the\n Environment, Inc. same contractor. SIGAR took steps to validate and consolidate data, where appropriate;\n however, since the report was published in October 2010, further review of C-JTSCC\xe2\x80\x99s\nThe other audit is examining USAID\xe2\x80\x99s $60 million data revealed additional errors in its reporting, including obligation values that exceed\n actual contract values. SIGAR is working to determine the extent of the problems and will\ncooperative agreement with CARE International. address any concerns with the agency.\n In response to growing concern in the Congress Source: SIGAR, Audit-11-4, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD, State, and USAID Obligated Over $17.7 Billion to About\nand in Afghanistan over the unprecedented use of 7,000 Contractors and Other Entities for Afghanistan Reconstruction During Fiscal Years\n 2007\xe2\x80\x932009,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/27/2010.\nprivate security contractors (PSCs), SIGAR has\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 7\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nFINDINGS\n1. CSTC-A has provided or plans to provide a total of $11.4 billion through\n FY 2012 for construction of nearly 900 ANSF facilities, including at least\n $8 billion from FY 2010 through FY 2012. In addition, up to $800 million may\n be provided for operations and maintenance over the next five years.\n2. Despite the considerable funding and large number of facilities involved,\n CSTC-A has not developed a long-term construction plan, placing the facili-\n ties program at risk of not meeting ANSF strategic and operational needs.\n In a 1998 executive guide for capital asset planning, the U.S. Government\n Accountability Office, in conjunction with the Office of Management and\n Budget, identified best practices for planning the construction of capital\n assets. The guide states that a long-term construction plan is necessary to\n ensure that, as conditions change, plans can be adapted as needed, and\n resources can be prioritized and used effectively to achieve applicable\n strategic goals.\n3. CSTC-A contracted with MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. to,\n among other things, develop an ANSF Comprehensive Plan for Facilities\n Development. SIGAR found that portions of the plan were out of date, and\n most ANSF facilities plans were not completed; nevertheless, this plan was\n the most complete listing and analysis of ANSF facilities that CSTC-A could\n provide. The plan addressed a number of desired elements for long-range\n capital planning, but it did not address other elements, such as identifying\n how current ANSF facilities meet Afghan security objectives, identifying\n gaps in current facilities\xe2\x80\x99 ability to meet security objectives, and evaluating\n how planned facilities will help to eliminate those gaps.\n4. CSTC-A also recognizes that the long-term operations and maintenance of\n ANSF facilities need to be addressed. According to CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s 2008 Campaign\n Plan, sustainment costs may continue through 2025. However, CSTC-A does\n not have a long-term maintenance plan linking requirements to long-term\n construction plans. Such a plan would help CSTC-A identify and rational-\n ize ANSF maintenance requirements across the hundreds of completed and\n planned ANSF facilities to help ensure the most effective and efficient use of\n maintenance funding.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nWithout a facilities plan that reflects current requirements, CSTC-A puts its\n$11.4 billion construction program for ANSF facilities at risk, including building\nfacilities that are inadequate for the projected number of ANSF personnel or that\ndo not meet the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s strategic and operational needs. To ensure that CSTC-A\nmaximizes the use of its funding and that facilities address ANSF strategic goals\nand objectives, SIGAR recommended the following action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop a planning document that incorporates updated requirements for\n ANSF facilities; addresses the justification for and location of all ANSF facili-\n ties; determines how they meet strategic objectives for security; and discusses\n\n\n\n\n 8 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n how facilities will be shared, expanded, or constructed to meet the projected\n end-strength of 400,000 personnel by 2013. This plan should address federal\n government principles and best practices for capital decision-making.\nIn addition, to help ensure that these facilities are used as intended, SIGAR\nrecommended the following action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop a long-range operations and maintenance plan for all ANSF\n facilities.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\nIn its comments on a draft of this audit report, CSTC-A said that long-term con-\nstruction planning in a war zone is difficult but noted some steps it has taken to\naddress SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s concerns. In addition, CSTC-A agreed with the need for a long-\nrange operations and maintenance plan for all ANSF facilities. CSTC-A stated it\nhas asked for additional resources to address this shortcoming.\n\nAudit 11-7: Contract Performance and Oversight/CERP\nCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits,\nbut Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and\nPotential Waste\nSince 2004, the Congress has appropriated nearly $2.64 billion for CERP in\nAfghanistan. CERP enables commanders to fund humanitarian relief and recon-\nstruction projects to immediately assist the local population. In recent years,\nthe Congress has expressed concerns over the rapid growth of CERP funding\nin Afghanistan, the use of CERP funds on large development projects, and the\ncapacity of the GIRoA to absorb more CERP-funded projects.\n SIGAR initiated this audit to examine the funding, outcomes, and oversight\nof 69 selected CERP projects in Laghman province that were approved from\nFY 2008 through FY 2010. The 69 projects selected include 24 active, 42 com-\npleted, and 3 terminated projects that represented 91% of the $58.5 million\nobligated for CERP projects in Laghman during that time. The SIGAR audit\nteam inspected 36 of the projects, which represented $39.8 million in obligations\n(nearly 75%) of the total obligated for all 69 projects.\n\nOBJECTIVES\nThis audit had two objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the projects\xe2\x80\x99 status, including funds obligated and disbursed,\n whether the projects were meeting intended outcomes, and whether they\n were being sustained.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether project oversight by U.S. officials was in accordance with\n applicable guidance.\n\nFINDINGS\n\xe2\x80\xa2 SIGAR found that 27 of the 69 CERP projects examined in Laghman were\n at risk or have questionable outcomes. These projects represent about\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 9\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n $49.2 million (92%) of the total obligations SIGAR reviewed and may result in\n waste. About $2 million was obligated (4% for the projects selected) for\n 19 projects that had generally successful outcomes.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Most of the CERP investment in Laghman was used for large projects,\n specifically for the construction of asphalt roads and new facilities. All\n asphalt road projects (about $44.6 million obligated) are at risk because of\n the lack of maintenance plans. These projects and groups of related infra-\n structure projects were approved without adequate assurance that\n the GIRoA had the resources to sustain them.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 More than $3 million in obligations for new facilities projects was at risk\n because the buildings were completed but were not being used as intended,\n or because construction was ongoing and the GIRoA had not agreed to a\n business plan to sustain the facilities after completion.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 CERP project oversight was not in compliance with applicable requirements,\n placing CERP funds at risk of questionable outcomes and potential waste.\n For example, many project files lacked sufficient documentation to substan-\n tiate payments and contained minimal evidence that project monitoring had\n occurred.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Two groups of related projects\xe2\x80\x94an economic development effort and related\n agricultural storage projects\xe2\x80\x94were large efforts that raised sustainment\n concerns. Such projects require significant amounts of CERP oversight, but\n CERP oversight officials rotate frequently and have been trained to imple-\n ment smaller projects. These projects did not appear to meet an urgent need\n or provide an immediate benefit and raised concerns about sustainment.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 USFOR-A lacks a coordinated, results-oriented approach to determine\n whether CERP projects have achieved their goals, are being used as\n intended, and are being sustained. Without adequate oversight and assess-\n ments of results, the U.S. investment is at risk for waste, and the Afghan\n people may not receive the projects\xe2\x80\x99 intended benefits.\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nTo improve CERP oversight and promote the sustainment of CERP projects in\nLaghman, SIGAR recommended that USFOR-A take the following actions:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop approaches to improve construction quality and sustainment plans\n for active CERP projects, or consider terminating or de-scoping active CERP\n projects and re-obligating the funds for better use, if it is in the best interest\n of the government to do so.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Require contractors to repair defective work for completed projects that are\n still under warranty.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Work with GIRoA officials to develop sustainment plans for CERP projects\n that are completed and have not been sustained. Before committing to\n additional CERP projects, USFOR-A should consider identifying steps for\n Laghman provincial officials to take to sustain projects that have been trans-\n ferred to their authority.\n\n\n\n\n 10 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n To better identify CERP-funded large development efforts and ensure sus-\ntainment plans for these projects, SIGAR recommended that the USFOR-A\ncommander take the following action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Update CERP standard operating procedures to include criteria to help field\n commanders determine when groups of CERP projects should be considered\n related for project planning and approval purposes.\n To help determine whether CERP projects have met their intended\noutcomes and the purposes of CERP, SIGAR recommended that CSTC-A take\nthe following action:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Develop a coordinated, results-oriented approach for evaluating the effec-\n tiveness of CERP projects. Such an approach should include objective,\n quantifiable, and measurable goals; balanced performance measures to mark\n progress toward goals; criteria to define a successful CERP outcome; and\n procedures to collect, analyze, and report on performance data during the\n project and after it is completed.\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\nIn comments on a draft of this audit report, USFOR-A generally concurred with\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s findings and recommendations. USFOR-A stated that SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s recom-\nmendations will ensure a more successful CERP program while protecting U.S.\ntaxpayer dollars. It also outlined several actions it plans to take to address the\nrecommendations, but USFOR-A noted that it faces some challenges, including\nthe limited capacity of local contractors and the lack of funding by the govern-\nment of Afghanistan to support recurring operations and maintenance costs.\n\nNew Audits Announced This Quarter\nThis quarter, SIGAR announced five new audits: three contract audits, and two\nprogram audits. These audits examine key aspects of the U.S. reconstruction\neffort in Afghanistan.\n\nContract Audit: USAID Local Governance and Community\nDevelopment Projects\nThis audit will examine the performance, costs, and outcomes of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s\ncontracts in support of its Local Governance and Community Development\nprojects. The audit has the following objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which USAID has taken action in response to the\n May 2009 audit report issued by the USAID Office of Inspector General.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the adequacy of contract planning and requirements definition, as\n well as the development of appropriate contract language (including the\n definition of desired outcomes) to help achieve the objectives of the U.S. and\n GIRoA strategy for governance and development.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether contracts are completed within contract terms, including\n construction plans and specifications, cost, schedule, and outcome.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 11\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the elements of spending under the contracts, including direct costs,\n other direct costs, and overhead.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess oversight of the contractor\xe2\x80\x99s work and internal controls.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the private security companies, if any, that were hired to provide\n personnel or site security, their roles, whether they were approved by the\n GIRoA, and the effect on future work of changes in the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s policy on\n private security contractors.\n\nContract Audit: Infrastructure Projects at the Kabul Military\nTraining Center\nThis audit will examine AFCEE\xe2\x80\x99s management of infrastructure projects at the\nKabul Military Training Center. From FY 2007 through FY 2010, AFCEE obligated\napproximately $161 million for five task orders under three indefinite-delivery/\nindefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts at the Center. Under these contracts, AFCEE\nawarded a combination of cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price, and time-and-\nmaterials task orders. Work required under these task orders included planning,\nconstruction, and oversight functions with different completion dates. This audit\nhas five objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the adequacy of planning and requirements definition to develop\n appropriate contract language.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether the projects are completed within the terms of the contract\n and construction plans and specifications, including cost, schedule, and\n outcome.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess AFCEE\xe2\x80\x99s compliance with contract administration and oversight\n requirements, including AFCEE policy and regulations, contract provisions,\n and the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify plans, if any, for the ANA to take possession of the facilities, perform\n maintenance, and pay for sustainment costs.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the private security companies, if any, that were hired to provide per-\n sonnel or site security, their roles, and if they were approved by the GIRoA.\n\nContract Audit: Construction at the Afghan Defense University\nThis audit will examine construction projects and related activities at the Afghan\nDefense University. AFCEE awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee task order to AMEC\nEarth and Environment under an IDIQ contract for construction of the Afghan\nDefense University. At the time of award, the task order was valued at approxi-\nmately $70 million, and the project was to be completed in June 2010. Since then,\nAFCEE has issued five modifications to the task order, adding and removing\nrequirements, increasing the amount obligated to about $83 million, and extend-\ning the completion date through June 2011. This audit has four objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether the project is being completed within the terms of the\n contract, including cost, schedule, and outcome.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess AFCEE compliance with contract administration and oversight\n requirements, including AFCEE policy and regulations, contract provisions,\n and the Federal Acquisition Regulation.\n\n\n\n 12 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify plans for the ANA to take possession of the facilities, perform\n maintenance, and pay for sustainment.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify which, if any, private security companies were hired to provide per-\n sonnel or site security, their roles, and if they were approved by the GIRoA.\n\nProgram Audit: Review of Four USAID and State Department\nPrograms in a Select Afghan Province\nSIGAR is initiating an audit of four USAID and DoS programs in a province that\nhas not yet been selected:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Community-Based Stabilization Grants (USAID)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Performance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund (USAID)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Quick Response Fund (DoS)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Public Diplomacy Grants (DoS)\nThese programs are intended to build local governing capacity and promote\ndevelopment at the provincial and district levels. The province will be selected,\nin part, on the basis of the amount of funds spent for these programs.\n The audit has three objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the amount and use of program funds spent in one province during\n FY 2009 and FY 2010.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the steps the U.S. government has taken to ensure that the U.S. funds\n provided for these programs are protected and used for their intended purposes.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which the outcomes associated with the expendi-\n ture of these funds in FY 2009 and FY 2010 helped achieve the objectives\n of the United States and the GIRoA in governance, development, and\n counter-insurgency.\n\nProgram Audit: Use and Accountability of U.S. Funds Contributed\nto the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund\nThis audit will examine the ARTF, which is financed by contributions from the\nUnited States and other donor nations and administered by the World Bank.\nARTF contributions flow through the Afghan national budget and are a means\nwhereby the United States and other donors provide development assistance\ndirectly to the GIRoA. As of September 2010, the United States had contributed\n$972 million\xe2\x80\x94nearly one-fourth of all contributions to the trust fund ($4 billion\nfrom 32 countries and international organizations). This audit is one in a series of\nreviews examining U.S. and other donor assistance to support the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-\ncorruption capabilities, as well as internal controls over U.S. and other donor\nfunds provided to the GIRoA. The audit has two objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Examine the structure of the ARTF, including its relationship to the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s\n overall budget, intended uses, and donor contributions.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the extent to which the United States, the World Bank, and the\n GIRoA have established mechanisms to adequately monitor and account for\n U.S. funds contributed to the ARTF.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 13\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nOngoing Audits: Contract\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR has three ongoing audits examining the con-\nstruction, oversight, and sustainability of two infrastructure projects; a USAID\ncooperative agreement with CARE International; and the performance and over-\nsight of a private security contractor.\n\nReview of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the\nEnvironment Infrastructure Projects in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat\nSIGAR is examining two infrastructure projects undertaken by AFCEE. This\nreview has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Examine modifications to the task orders awarded to the prime construction\n contractors to determine whether construction at Mazar-e Sharif and Herat\n meet the terms of the task orders.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the nature and adequacy of project oversight by the quality assurance\n contractor and AFCEE.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate efforts to ensure the sustainability of the facilities.\n\nReview of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Cooperative Agreement with CARE\nInternational for the Community Development Program for Kabul\nSIGAR is assessing a $60 million cooperative agreement between USAID and\nCARE International\xe2\x80\x94the Community Development Program for Kabul\xe2\x80\x94one of\nfour programs addressing food insecurity in major urban areas in Afghanistan.\nThe completion date of the one-year program was originally March 2010; how-\never, the program has been extended to September 2011. The audit has four\nobjectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the process and procedures USAID followed to award this coopera-\n tive agreement.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether the contract is being implemented within the cost, sched-\n ule, and outcome terms of the agreement.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate USAID\xe2\x80\x99s and CARE\xe2\x80\x99s oversight of the program, including controls\n over cash disbursements.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the extent to which program goals have been achieved.\n\nReview of Reconstruction Security Support Services from Global\nStrategies Group, Inc.\nThis audit is examining whether USACE received the security services it needed\nfrom the contractor at a reasonable cost. SIGAR re-scoped this audit to clarify\nthe objectives. The re-scoped audit has two objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the services provided by Global Strategies Group (Global) and deter-\n mine whether those services were provided in accordance with the contract,\n including schedule, cost, and any modifications.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether USACE conducted its oversight of the Global contract in\n accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, USACE requirements,\n and any oversight provisions in the contract.\n\n\n\n\n 14 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nOngoing Audits: Reconstruction Programs and Operations\nSIGAR has eight ongoing audits of programs and operations related to the U.S.\neffort to build the ANSF, improve governance, and foster economic development.\n\nAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s National Solidarity Program\nThis audit is related to a series of SIGAR audits examining U.S. and other donor\nassistance in support of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption capabilities. These audits\nalso assess the internal controls that Afghan public institutions can exercise to\nensure that donor assistance funds provided to the government are reasonably\nprotected against waste, fraud, and abuse.\n In 2003, the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development estab-\nlished the National Solidarity Program (NSP) to help communities identify, plan,\nmanage, and monitor their own development projects. As of September 2010,\ninternational donor contributions to the NSP totaled more than $1.4 billion. The\nUnited States has provided about $528 million, making it the single largest pro-\nvider of NSP funds. The audit has four objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify U.S. and other donor assistance to the NSP and determine what the\n funds are used for.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the level of oversight and internal controls over donor funds.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether the NSP is achieving its intended results.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Highlight key challenges facing the NSP in its third and final phase.\n\nAfghan National Police Personnel Management\nProcesses and Systems\nSIGAR is conducting this audit to evaluate the extent to which the ANP has\ndeveloped accurate systems for personnel accounting. This audit originally\nfocused on both the ANP and ANA, but SIGAR re-scoped the audit to focus only\non the ANP to avoid duplicating work being conducted by the U.S. Government\nAccountability Office and to respond to the increased interest in the ANP. The\nre-scoped audit has four objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Describe ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Describe actions taken by the GIRoA and donors to implement and maintain\n ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify any challenges that may impede the implementation and sustain-\n ment of ANP personnel management processes and systems.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify the extent to which risks of fraud, waste, and abuse are being\n mitigated.\n\nAccountability for Vehicles Provided to the ANSF\nThe United States has provided tens of thousands of vehicles to the ANSF and\nplans to provide thousands more through at least 2012. Most of these vehicles\nhave been purchased though the Foreign Military Sales system, which is admin-\nistered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. This audit will also provide\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 15\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\ninsights on the overall ability of the ANSF to account for, track, and maintain\nequipment. This audit has three objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Examine ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s vehicle requirements and the extent to which they have\n been met.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess whether CSTC-A and the ANSF can fully account for vehicles pur-\n chased with U.S. funds for the ANSF, including their numbers, types, and\n operational status.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate how CSTC-A ensures that the ANSF can properly safeguard,\n account for, operate, and maintain vehicles purchased with U.S. funds.\n\nU.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Capabilities of the\nAfghan Major Crimes Task Force\nThis audit is assessing U.S. efforts to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan\nMajor Crimes Task Force (MCTF). It is related to a series of reviews examining\nU.S. and donor assistance to support the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption capabilities.\n The audit has three objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify U.S. and other donor assistance to strengthen the MCTF.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether U.S. efforts were designed and implemented in accor-\n dance with applicable laws and regulations.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether U.S. assistance is achieving the intended results.\n\nU.S. and International Donor Assistance for Development of the\nAfghan Banking Sector and Afghan Currency Control Systems\nThe Congress has expressed concerns about the stability of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s bank-\ning system and the bulk cash exported through Kabul International Airport. To\naddress congressional inquiries, SIGAR initiated an audit of U.S. assistance for\nthe development of the Afghan banking sector and currency control systems,\nincluding the regulation of bulk cash flows. The audit has four objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Examine the status and development of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s financial sector,\n including banking and currency control systems.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify currency control systems, policies, and activities of the GIRoA,\n including regulation of bulk cash flows into and out of the country.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Identify programs and activities of the United States to support the develop-\n ment of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s banking sector and strengthen Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s currency\n controls.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the extent to which these programs and activities have achieved their\n goals and have been effectively coordinated.\n\nU.S. Assistance To Develop Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Agricultural Sector\nA top priority of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to rebuild the agriculture\nsector. This audit has four objectives:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify U.S. and donor assistance to Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s agriculture sector\n through the second quarter of FY 2011.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Identify strategies and objectives guiding U.S. assistance to develop\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s agriculture sector.\n\n\n\n 16 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Assess the extent to which U.S. agricultural assistance is achieving strategic\n goals and objectives.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Evaluate the extent to which U.S. agricultural assistance is vulnerable to waste.\n\nImplementation of the Defense Base Act Insurance Program for\nContractors in Afghanistan\nThe Defense Base Act (DBA) Insurance Program, administered by the U.S.\nDepartment of Labor, requires that all federal government contractors and sub-\ncontractors provide workers\xe2\x80\x99 compensation insurance for employees who work\noutside the United States. DoD, DoS, and USAID are the principal U.S. govern-\nment entities involved with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. DoS, USAID,\nand USACE use a single-source insurance provider; all other DoD elements allow\nindividual contractors to select their own DBA insurers. Over the course of this\naudit, SIGAR is examining program costs, program administration, and payments\nto recipients.\n The audit has four objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine how the program works.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Using case studies, determine how much reconstruction funding has been\n spent on DBA insurance and whether funds are appropriately tracked and\n accounted for.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether DBA insurance on reconstruction contracts has been\n purchased as required by prime contractors and subcontractors.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine whether adequate procedures and processes are in place to help\n ensure that beneficiaries receive the benefits they are entitled to.\n\nImplementation and Sustainability of the U.S. Civilian Uplift in\nAfghanistan (Joint Audit with DoS Office of Inspector General)\nThe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan relies in part on the U.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s ability\nto deploy and sustain a civilian effort to build governance and support eco-\nnomic development across the country. The number of U.S. civilian personnel\nin Afghanistan has increased significantly\xe2\x80\x94from 320 in early 2009 to 1,167 in\nDecember 2010. Conducted jointly with the DoS Office of Inspector General, this\naudit is a follow-on audit of aspects of the implementation of the civilian uplift,\nas well as the sustainability of deploying additional civilians to Afghanistan. The\naudit has two objectives:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine the costs of the civilian uplift in Afghanistan for FY 2009 and\n FY 2010 and assess U.S. agencies\xe2\x80\x99 evaluation of these costs.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Determine U.S. agencies\xe2\x80\x99 projected costs for the uplift in FY 2011 and\n FY 2012 and assess their efforts to evaluate and sustain these costs.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 17\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nForensic Audits\nSIGAR is conducting forensic reviews of three Afghanistan reconstruction funds\nunder the authority of P.L. 110-181, as amended. The legislation requires SIGAR\nto investigate improper payments\xe2\x80\x94such as duplicate payments or ineligible\ncontractors\xe2\x80\x94and to prepare a final forensic audit report on programs and\noperations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for\nthe reconstruction of Afghanistan. The reviews include examinations of DoD,\nUSAID, and DoS transaction data related to reconstruction funding.\n\nForensic Review of DoD Transaction Data Related to\nAfghanistan Reconstruction\nIn March 2010, SIGAR initiated a review of DoD appropriation, obligation, and\nexpenditure transaction data related to the ASFF for fiscal years 2005 through\n2009, totaling $25.23 billion. Obtaining data to perform a comprehensive forensic\nreview has been a challenge because SIGAR has limited visibility into the line\ndetail of these transactions. Based on a December 21, 2010, meeting with the\nDefense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)\xe2\x80\x94including Security Assistance\nAccounting for Foreign Military Sales (FMS)\xe2\x80\x94SIGAR confirmed that most of the\nfunds appropriated to the ASFF are transferred immediately to an FMS trust fund\naccount to await disbursement after they are obligated. This accounts for the\ndifficulty in obtaining data necessary for the forensic review. SIGAR is continuing\nits efforts to obtain all relevant data and is expanding the scope to include\nFY 2010 transactions.\n SIGAR is working in conjunction with various members of DFAS, including\nteams responsible for FMS accounting, to help identify data owners and locate\nsource systems. When transaction data is obtained, it will be analyzed using\nextensive data-mining and risk-scoring techniques to identify anomalies that\nmay indicate fraud, waste, or abuse. The results could support or lead to SIGAR\naudits or investigations.\n\nForensic Review of USAID Transaction Data Related to\nAfghanistan Reconstruction\nSIGAR is reviewing USAID appropriation, obligation, and expenditure transaction\ndata, primarily related to the ESF, from FY 2002 to July 2010, totaling $7.4 billion\nin appropriated dollars. SIGAR has completed a preliminary review of 73,272\ntransactions and 1,211 vendors. Forensic analysts performed a series of 19 forensic\ntests to isolate anomalies; the results indicated a number of anomalous activities\nand exceptions.\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s forensic team is examining these anomalies and working to validate\nthe exceptions. SIGAR auditors are performing additional electronic testing and\nworking with SIGAR investigators to examine relevant contract documentation,\ninvoices, and payment files. In addition, SIGAR is applying a risk-scoring meth-\nodology to the results of this analysis and will utilize the results to determine\nfuture, joint audit and investigative initiatives. SIGAR will continue to analyze\n\n\n\n\n 18 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nnew fund data. As necessary, SIGAR will conduct interviews with contract-\ning officials, vendor management, and other staff to further verify exceptions.\nSIGAR will incorporate the results into ongoing investigations and audits, as\nappropriate.\n FIGURE 1.1\n\nForensic Review of DoS Transaction Data Related\n SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: STATUS OF\nto Afghanistan Reconstruction\n OPEN INVESTIGATIONS, OCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93\nSIGAR initiated a review of DoS appropriation, obligation, and expenditure\n DECEMBER 31, 2010\ntransaction data related to the INCLE from FY 2002 to the present, totaling\n$2.68 billion in appropriated dollars. SIGAR officially notified DoS that it would\nbe conducting this audit on June 24, 2010, and held an entrance conference with Total: 105\nDoS on August 19, 2010. Although DoS agreed to locate the correct contacts\nnecessary to identify and pull the appropriate data, it has not yet provided this\ninformation to SIGAR. On December 28, 2010, SIGAR sent a letter to DoS inquir-\ning when this data would be provided. At the time this report went to press,\nSIGAR had not received a response. Preliminary Full\n Investigation Investigation\n 52 51\nSIGAR INVESTIGATIONS\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR opened 35 new cases and participated in\njoint investigations that resulted in the payment of $22 million in unpaid wages\nto Afghan workers and $11 million in unpaid taxes to the GIRoA, $500,000 in cost Assessment\nsavings, the recovery of stolen equipment, the arrest of one contractor for brib- 2\nery, and the proposed debarment of two individuals and two companies. SIGAR\ninvestigators also continued to work closely with investigators and prosecutors\nfrom the Afghan Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office to identify and prioritize appropriate FIGURE 1.2\ncases for joint investigative efforts.\n SIGAR is conducting 105 criminal and civil investigations of waste, fraud, and SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: NEW INVESTIGATIONS,\nabuse of U.S. reconstruction dollars in Afghanistan. As of December 31, 2010, OCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\nSIGAR is conducting 2 assessments, 52 preliminary investigations, and 51 full\ninvestigations. SIGAR closed 7 investigations during this quarter. Total: 35\n Approximately 54% of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s open investigations focus on contract and\nprocurement fraud, 26% on alleged bribery and corruption, and 20% on other\ncriminal allegations, such as theft. Figure 1.1 shows the status of all open investi- Procurement/\n Contract Fraud\ngations. Figure 1.2 shows the new investigations by type. 19\n SIGAR ended the first quarter of FY 2011 with 32 staff assigned to the\nInvestigations directorate. Of these, 16 special agents are assigned to Theft Other\n 4 Public 2\nAfghanistan, and 8 are based at SIGAR Headquarters. Corruption\n 9\n Assessment\nSIGAR Working with Afghan Law Enforcement 1\nSIGAR investigators continue to work closely with Task Force 2010, which was\nestablished to identify contractors and subcontractors who may be diverting Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/18/2011.\n\nfunds to the insurgency or other criminal organizations. SIGAR also collaborated\nwith the Afghan Shafafiyat (\xe2\x80\x9cTransparency\xe2\x80\x9d) Investigative Unit (ASIU), a joint\nU.S.-Afghan investigations team that focuses on investigating, arresting, and\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 19\n\x0cSIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nprosecuting Afghan citizens involved in contract fraud. SIGAR is one of several\nU.S. federal law enforcement agencies working in close cooperation with pros-\necutors and investigators from the Afghan Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office to identify\nand prioritize appropriate cases for joint investigative efforts.\n During this quarter, the ASIU adopted four SIGAR-initiated investigations\nof Afghan companies and citizens alleged to have committed fraud or abuse in\nconnection with reconstruction projects. An ongoing ASIU investigation, involv-\ning Supreme Fuels Trading FZE and Critical Logistic Support resulted in the\nrecovery of $22 million in unpaid wages for 4,000 Afghan employees and $11\nmillion in back taxes for the GIRoA. SIGAR investigators participated in numer-\nous settlement discussions with the companies. SIGAR agents and other U.S. law\nenforcement representatives will receive Letters of Appreciation from the ASIU\nfor their support in this negotiated settlement.\n\nJoint Investigation Results in Arrest of Contractor in India\nA joint investigation conducted by SIGAR, the USAID Office of Inspector General,\nthe Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Contract Corruption Task\nForce, and the National Procurement Fraud Task Force resulted in the arrest of\na senior construction manager for an intergovernmental organization working\nin Afghanistan. This contractor, an Australian citizen, was arrested on October\n12, 2010, at the airport in New Delhi, India, and is awaiting extradition to the\nUnited States.\n The contractor was indicted in the U.S. District Court of Columbia on August 19,\n2010. The indictment, which was initially sealed by the court, was unsealed on\nOctober 12, 2010. The indictment alleges that the contractor solicited a bribe for\nawarding subcontracts funded by USAID. The maximum penalty for the bribery\ncharge is 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.\n\nSIGAR Investigative Efforts Lead to Proposed Debarments\nSIGAR received a number of complaints through SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Hotline alleging that\ntwo companies owned and operated by Americans\xe2\x80\x94K5 Global and Bennett &\nFouch LLC\xe2\x80\x94failed to pay a number of Afghan subcontractors before closing the\ncompanies\xe2\x80\x99 offices and leaving Afghanistan.\n SIGAR shared the complaints with its partners in the ICCTF in Afghanistan\nand consolidated the complaints into a related criminal investigation. Based on\ninformation that SIGAR investigators compiled, analyzed, and provided to the U.S.\nArmy\xe2\x80\x99s Procurement Fraud Branch, proposed debarment letters were prepared\nand issued on December 27, 2010, to the two companies and to two U.S. employ-\nees in management positions with the companies. The proposed debarment\naction states that the companies failed to pay for work valued at $2.55 million.\n\n\n\n\n 20 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Investigations Initiative Saves $500,000\nDuring an ongoing investigation, SIGAR received information alleging that the\nGuryak Bridge in Kunar province, which was built with U.S. reconstruction\nfunds, had collapsed because of substandard construction. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s investiga-\ntion determined that the bridge had been built with CERP funds under a contract\nwith an Afghan contractor.\n The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that had contracted for the con-\nstruction of the bridge was not aware that it had collapsed until SIGAR provided\nthem with pictures and the location. After confirming that the bridge had col-\nlapsed, the PRT advised SIGAR that the bridge was no longer under warranty\nand that a solicitation for repair would be issued. However, a document review\nconducted by SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Investigations and Audit directorates determined that the\nbridge was still under warranty. After reviewing SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s information, the PRT\nagreed to pursue the warranty issue with the Afghan contractor.\n The original amount paid for the bridge was approximately $1.68 million;\nSIGAR was informed that the solicitation for the repair of the bridge would have\nbeen valued at $500,000.\n This investigation is expanding to include another bridge in the same area that\nis also in danger of collapse owing to alleged substandard construction.\n\nSIGAR Investigations Lead to Recovery of Stolen Equipment\nSIGAR is investigating what is alleged to be a large, organized ring involved in\nthe systematic theft of U.S. goods and equipment and warehousing of the stolen\nproperty in and around Kabul, Kandahar, and Bagram Air Force Base. In Bagram\nand throughout Parwan province, SIGAR investigators are working closely\nwith elements of the Army task force that is responsible for military security\noperations in the Bagram Security Zone. The task force has a number of law\nenforcement professionals under contract to mentor the ANP.\n This quarter, in Parwan province, elements of the ANP working with the\ntask force discovered two large freight containers loaded with U.S. construction\ntools and machines worth $532,000, as well as several new four-wheeled utility\nvehicles. The ANP made the discovery after detaining two subjects\xe2\x80\x94\none Pakistani and one Afghan. SIGAR agents\xe2\x80\x94together with law enforce-\nment professionals from the task force, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation\nCommand\xe2\x80\x94determined that the equipment was stolen U.S. property. SIGAR\nagents are investigating the group suspected to be responsible for the theft of\nthese containers and for what is alleged to be large amounts of reconstruction\nmaterials and other U.S.-purchased property and equipment.\n\nOutreach of SIGAR Investigations Nets New Cases\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR special agents and investigative analysts\nconducted fraud awareness presentations in Parwan, Nangarhar, Khowst,\nPanjshir, and Kapisa provinces. These presentations are part of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing\noutreach and fraud awareness program. As a result of these presentations, one\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 21\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 1.3 FIGURE 1.4\n\n\nSOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: OCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\nOCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\n Total: 131\n Total: 131\n\n Closed 73\n Referred Out 26\n E-mail\n Assigned 23\n 109\n Coordinationa 9\n\n 20 40 60 80\n\n Phone\n a. Case has been reviewed, and SIGAR is obtaining additional information.\n 15\n Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/12/2011.\n\n Walk-in Written (not e-mail)\n 4 3\n criminal investigation was initiated, another allegation received was integrated\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/12/2011. into an existing SIGAR investigation, and information received pertaining to a\n security matter was referred to the appropriate U.S. agency.\n\n SIGAR Hotline and Complaints Management System\n This quarter, the SIGAR Hotline and Complaints Management System (HCMS)\n received 131 complaints\xe2\x80\x94an increase of 6 from the previous quarter. The num-\n ber has grown for the fourth consecutive quarter. Since becoming operational\n in January 2009, the HCMS has received 464 reports of alleged fraud, waste, and\n abuse of U.S. funds for Afghanistan reconstruction. The sources and disposition\n of the complaints received this quarter are shown in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4.\n\n SIGAR BUDGET\n Since 2008, when SIGAR was established, the Congress has appropriated $55.8\n million to cover the organization\xe2\x80\x99s operating expenses. During this period, the\n Congress has nearly doubled the amount of funding for the reconstruction of\n Afghanistan. From 2002 through 2008, the Congress provided $29.23 billion for\n Afghanistan reconstruction; since 2008, it has appropriated an additional $26.47\n billion. President Obama has asked for $16.2 billion more for Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\n reconstruction in the FY 2011 budget request. This would bring the total U.S.\n investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan to nearly $72 billion.\n To provide oversight of the expanding reconstruction effort, SIGAR has\n steadily increased its staff. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s budget request of $35.6 million for FY 2011\n will enable the organization to continue to grow and provide the oversight\n needed to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. Table 1.3\n summarizes SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s funding through FY 2010.\n\n\n\n\n 22 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SIGAR OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 1.3\n\n\nSIGAR FUNDING SUMMARY ($ MILLIONS)\nAppropriation Public Law Appropriated Made Available Expires Amount\nSupplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2642 P.L. 110-252 6/30/2008 6/30/2008 6/30/2008 2.0\nSupplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2642 P.L. 110-252 6/30/2008 10/1/2008 9/30/2009 5.0\nConsolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 P.L. 110-329 9/30/2008 9/30/2008 9/30/2010 9.0\nSupplemental Appropriations, for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 2346 P.L. 111-32 6/24/2009 6/24/2009 9/30/2010 7.2\nSupplemental Appropriations, for Fiscal Year 2009, H.R. 2346 P.L. 111-32 6/24/2009 6/24/2009 9/30/2010 (7.2)a\nConsolidated Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 3288 P.L. 111-117 12/16/2009 10/1/2009 9/30/2010 23.0\nFY10 Supplemental Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs, H.R. 4899 P.L. 111-212 7/29/2010 10/1/2010 9/30/2011 7.2\nContinuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.R. 3081 P.L. 111-242 9/30/2010 10/1/2010 9/30/2011 4.0\n2nd Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.J. Res. 101 P.L. 111-290 12/4/2010 12/4/2010 9/30/2011 0.9\n3rd Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.J. Res. 105 P.L. 111-317 12/18/2010 12/19/2010 9/30/2011 0.2\n4th Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.R. 3082 P.L. 111-322 12/22/2010 12/22/2010 9/30/2011 4.5\nTotal 55.8\na. Congress rescinded $7.2 million of funds made available for SIGAR in 2009 (Title XI in P. L. 111-32) and then made them available again\xe2\x80\x94through September 30, 2011\xe2\x80\x94in P.L. 111-212 in 2010.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR STAFF\nThis quarter, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s staff grew from 117 to 122. Taking into account the\nPresident\xe2\x80\x99s requests for significant increases in reconstruction funding, SIGAR\nplans to continue hiring experienced auditors and investigators throughout the\ncoming year. Depending on its funding, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to have 180 full-time\nemployees in FY 2011.\n Through its agreements with the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and USFOR-A,\nSIGAR is authorized to fill 45 positions in Afghanistan: 33 at the Embassy and\n12 at military bases in the field. SIGAR staff are now working at five locations in\nAfghanistan. When this report went to press, SIGAR had 31 full-time positions\nfilled in Afghanistan. SIGAR also employs two foreign service nationals in its\nKabul office. In addition, SIGAR supports its work with staff assigned on short-\nterm temporary duty in Afghanistan. SIGAR typically has from 4 to 10 employees\nin Afghanistan on temporary duty at any given time.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 23\n\x0c Training for Security\n The shura president of Pusht-e Rod district discusses\n security with the Farah Chief of Police, the Masaw Afghan\n Local Police commander, and the U.S. Task Force Arrow com-\n mander after an Afghan Local Police recruitment ceremony\n on January 1, 2011. The ceremony culminated six weeks of\n training that prepared more than 130 Afghans to secure lo-\n cal villages in the district. (ISAF photo, MSgt Brian D. Smith)\n\n\n\n\n24 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c2 AFGHANISTAN\n OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n 25\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cIn Afghanistan, we remain focused\n on the three areas of our strategy: our\n military effort to break the Taliban\xe2\x80\x99s\n momentum and train Afghan forces so\nthey can take the lead; our civilian effort\n to promote effective governance and\ndevelopment; and regional cooperation,\n especially with Pakistan, because our\n strategy has to succeed on both\n sides of the border.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94U.S. President Barack Obama\n\n\n\n\n Source: President Barack Obama, \xe2\x80\x9cStatement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 26 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\nThree significant events this quarter will impact the direction of the U.S. recon-\nstruction effort in 2011:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the agreements reached at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\n summit in November 2010\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the U.S. Administration\xe2\x80\x99s annual review of its strategy for Afghanistan and\n Pakistan, which was completed in December 2010\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383),\n which President Obama signed into law on January 7, 2011\nTaken together, these events established or clarified reconstruction objectives,\ncreated a timeline for the GIRoA to take over full responsibility for security, and\nprovided legislation to define and support critical aspects of the U.S. reconstruc-\ntion effort going forward. The emphasis over the next year will be on building\nAfghan capacity and ensuring that reconstruction projects are sustainable.\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2011 audit plan, described in Section 1 of this report, is focused\non identifying waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars and determining\nwhether U.S.-funded projects are achieving their intended outcomes and can\nbe sustained.\n\nNATO SUMMIT IN LISBON ESTABLISHES TRANSITION\nTIMELINE\nDuring this reporting period, the United States, its partners in the international\ncommunity, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)\nset a timeline for the GIRoA to take full responsibility for security by the end\nof 2014. To accomplish the transition, the United States and the international\ncommunity will devote most of their resources to building the Afghan National\nSecurity Forces (ANSF), improving Afghan capacity to govern, and establishing a\nfoundation for sustainable economic development.\n At the NATO summit in November, the 48 nations contributing to the NATO-\nled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, together with\nthe GIRoA, agreed to begin to turn over security operations to the ANSF in some\ndistricts and provinces this year, and to complete this transition by the end of\n2014. They also vowed to remain committed to supporting Afghanistan long after\nthe transition. The United States, which has nearly 102,000 troops on the ground,\nis the largest contributor to ISAF. U.S. forces account for about 82,000 of the\nnearly 132,000 personnel reporting to ISAF.1\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 27\n\x0cAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n The November 20, 2010, declaration, issued at the end of the summit, stated\nthat NATO is entering a new phase in its mission and that \xe2\x80\x9cthe process of transi-\ntion to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some provinces and\ndistricts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/\nISAF assessment and decision.\xe2\x80\x9d2 The declaration also cautioned that the tran-\nsition \xe2\x80\x9cwill be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to\nwithdrawal of ISAF troops.\xe2\x80\x9d3\n Although the NATO declaration identified strengthening the ANSF as its core\nmission, it also emphasized the importance of the international civilian effort,\nincluding the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), to build\nAfghan governing capacity and provide long-term development assistance.\nNoting that corruption poses a serious challenge for the GIRoA, the declaration\nstressed the importance of continued effort to \xe2\x80\x9cimprove governance, strengthen\nthe rule of law, and ensure sustainable economic growth.\xe2\x80\x9d4\n According to summit participants, if Afghanistan is to achieve lasting stabil-\nity, it must develop a process that allows for the reconciliation and reintegration\nof insurgents. The participants welcomed Afghan-led initiatives such as the\nConsultative Peace Jirga, the High Peace Council, and the Afghan Peace and\nReintegration Program. They said they would \xe2\x80\x9ccontinue to support Afghan-\nled efforts to reconcile and reintegrate those members of the insurgency who\nrenounce violence, cut links with terrorist groups, and accept the Afghan consti-\ntution.\xe2\x80\x9d5 The declaration reiterated the international community\xe2\x80\x99s commitment to\nhuman rights, particularly the rights of women.\n The U.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s annual review of its strategy in Afghanistan and\nPakistan incorporated the agreements reached at the NATO Summit.\n\nU.S. POLICY UNCHANGED FOLLOWING REVIEW OF\nU.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN\nIn December 2010, the Administration completed the Afghanistan and Pakistan\nAnnual Review, which examined all aspects of U.S. policy in the region. The\nreview concluded that the United States has made significant progress toward\nachieving the core goals of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in\nAfghanistan and Pakistan, as well as denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow\nthe GIRoA. The review attributed the progress to the accelerated deployment of\nU.S. and international military and civilian resources that began in July 2009. It\nsaid the strategy developed in 2009 was achieving its objectives and had created\nthe conditions \xe2\x80\x9cto begin a responsible reduction of U.S. forces in July 2011.\xe2\x80\x9d6\nThe late U.S. Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador\nRichard C. Holbrooke, was a principal architect of the strategy and participated\nin the review. President Barack Obama noted that the review \xe2\x80\x9creflected the dedi-\ncation of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, whose memory we honor and whose\nwork we\xe2\x80\x99ll continue.\xe2\x80\x9d7\n\n\n\n\n 28 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n In his statement about the review, President Obama noted that \xe2\x80\x9cthe challenge\nremains to make our gains durable and sustainable.\xe2\x80\x9d8 U.S. resources will be chan-\nneled into four critical areas:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the military effort to break the Taliban\xe2\x80\x99s momentum and train Afghan forces\n to take the lead in providing security\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the civilian effort to promote effective governance and economic\n development\n \xe2\x80\xa2 regional cooperation, especially with Pakistan\n \xe2\x80\xa2 achieving a durable and favorable political resolution to the conflict\nReconstruction will continue to emphasize building the ANSF to enable the\nAfghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to assume\nresponsibility for Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s security by the end of 2014. However, President\nObama warned that for \xe2\x80\x9cthese security gains to be sustained over time, there is\nan urgent need for political and economic progress in Afghanistan.\xe2\x80\x9d9 Therefore,\nthe U.S. government will continue to fund reconstruction programs that help\nAfghanistan improve national and subnational governance, reduce corruption,\nand support efforts to achieve a political solution to the conflict. The United\nStates will also fund focused investments in infrastructure that provide a founda-\ntion for economic development.10\n Building on the transition plan announced by NATO and the goals of the U.S.\nstrategy, the U.S. civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan has developed a\njoint civilian-military campaign plan for 2011. According to the U.S. Embassy Kabul,\n\n\n\n\nPresident Barack Obama makes a surprise visit to service members and civilians at Bagram\nAir Base on December 3. This quarter, the Administration completed a comprehensive review\nof Afghanistan policy, which found significant progress toward meeting U.S. goals. President\nObama noted the continuing challenge of making these gains \xe2\x80\x9cdurable and sustainable.\xe2\x80\x9d (U.S.\nArmy photo, SSgt Lorie Jewell)\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 29\n\x0cAFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\na final draft of the plan is ready to be signed by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and\nGeneral David Petraeus.\n The FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act includes several provisions\nto support the U.S. reconstruction strategy and increase oversight of contractors.\n\nFY 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT\nADDRESSES RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES\nOn January 7, 2011, President Obama signed the FY 2011 NDAA (P.L. 111-383).\nIn addition to authorizing more than $11.6 billion to fund the development of\nthe ANSF, the NDAA authorized the creation of a new infrastructure program to\nsupport the U.S. counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan. It also gave the DoD\nauthority to fund reintegration activities. The legislation established new require-\nments to improve oversight of contractors. Addressing growing concerns about\nsustainability, the provisions related to the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\nProgram (CERP) and the new infrastructure program require implementing agen-\ncies to show how proposed reconstruction projects will be sustained.\n\nLegislation Limits CERP Funding and Establishes New\nInfrastructure Program\nThe NDAA extends CERP for one year, authorizes up to $400 million for CERP\nin Afghanistan in FY 2011, and limits the cost of individual CERP projects to $20\nmillion. It further requires the Secretary of Defense to notify the Congress not\nless than 15 days before obligating CERP funds for any project in Afghanistan\nthat is expected to cost $5 million or more. The notification must include the fol-\nlowing elements:11\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the location, nature, and purpose of the proposed project, including how the\n project is intended to advance the military campaign for Afghanistan\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the budget and implementation timeline for the proposed project\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a plan for the sustainment of the proposed project\n The law reflects congressional concern that DoD was using CERP to fund\nlarge scale projects to support its counter-insurgency strategy rather than for the\noriginal purpose\xe2\x80\x94to implement small-scale projects to enable military com-\nmanders to meet the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs within\ntheir areas of responsibility.\n In October 2009, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of DoD\xe2\x80\x99s internal controls over CERP funds\nfound that CERP was increasingly being used to fund large infrastructure proj-\nects of $500,000 or more. At the time, SIGAR pointed out that although large\nprojects accounted for only 3% of all CERP projects, they consumed more than\n67% of CERP funds. SIGAR observed that large projects pose increased risks for\nCERP for three reasons:12\n \xe2\x80\xa2 These projects usually take several years to complete.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CERP program managers have been trained to implement small projects with\n short timeframes, not complex projects with long timeframes.\n\n\n\n\n 30 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Given the relatively short military rotations in Afghanistan, it is difficult to\n maintain the continuous management and oversight needed to successfully\n complete more complicated projects.\n USFOR-A disagreed that using CERP for large projects poses management\nrisks, pointing out that most of the large contracts were to build roads, which\nare easier to manage than other kinds of projects.13 However, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit this\nquarter of 69 CERP projects in Laghman province\xe2\x80\x94valued at $53 million\xe2\x80\x94found\nthat the highest-cost and most complex projects, including roads, were the most\nat risk of achieving questionable outcomes.14 For more information on this audit,\nsee Section 1.\n The FY 2011 NDAA authorized the creation of a new fund\xe2\x80\x94the Afghanistan\nInfrastructure Fund (AIF)\xe2\x80\x94to be the primary source of DoD funding for large\ndevelopment and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.15 The legislation allows\nDoD to put up to $400 million of its FY 2011 operations and maintenance funds\ninto the AIF, which will support a joint DoD/DoS infrastructure program.16\n\nAfghanistan Infrastructure Program\nThe FY 2011 NDAA authorizes the Secretaries of Defense and State to establish\na program to jointly develop high-priority, large infrastructure projects in sup-\nport of the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Infrastructure\nProgram will be supported by the new $400 million DoD infrastructure fund and\nby DoS/USAID foreign assistance resources. Both DoD and DoS must agree on\nall infrastructure projects. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and USAID will\nimplement the projects. The legislation stipulates that these may include water,\npower, and transportation projects, as well as other projects in support of the\nU.S. counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.17\n The legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to notify the Congress at least\n30 days before obligating funds or transferring funds to DoS for implementing a\nproject under this program. The notification letter must contain a description of\nthe details of the project, a plan for the sustainment of the project, and a descrip-\ntion of how the project supports the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.18\n\nFunds for Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan\nUnder the new legislation, the Secretary of Defense may use a maximum of $50\nmillion from DoD\xe2\x80\x99s operations and management budget to support the reintegra-\ntion of Afghan insurgents who pledge the following:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to cease all support for the insurgency in Afghanistan\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to live in accordance with the Constitution of Afghanistan\n\xe2\x80\xa2 to cease violence against the GIRoA and its international partners\n\xe2\x80\xa2 that they do not have material ties to al-Qaeda or affiliated transnational ter-\n rorist organizations\nThe legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on how\nDoD intends to allocate the reintegration funds. This guidance must include\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 31\n\x0cAfghanistan overview\n\n\n\n\nmechanisms for coordination with the GIRoA and other U.S. government\nagencies, and mechanisms to track rates of recidivism among Afghans who\nparticipate in the reintegration program.19\n\nSIGAR To Provide Recommendations on Oversight of Contractors\nEngaged in Activities Relating to Afghanistan\nThe FY 2011 NDAA requires SIGAR\xe2\x80\x94in consultation with the inspectors general\nof DoD, DoS, and USAID\xe2\x80\x94to take the following actions within 90 days of its\nenactment (by April 7, 2011):\n\xe2\x80\xa2\t Provide recommendations on ways to increase oversight of contractors\n engaged in activities relating to Afghanistan.\n\xe2\x80\xa2\t Report on the status of efforts of the DoD, USAID, and DoS to implement\n existing recommendations regarding oversight of these contractors.\n\xe2\x80\xa2\t Report on the extent to which military and security contractors or subcon-\n tractors engaged in activities relating to Afghanistan have been responsible\n for the deaths of Afghan civilians.\nThe Congress has specifically requested recommendations to reduce U.S. reli-\nance on military and security contractors responsible for the deaths of Afghan\ncivilians, as well as Afghan militias or other armed groups that are not part of the\nANSF.20 Other provisions of the law require contracting authorities to provide\nsufficient oversight of private security contractors (PSCs) to ensure that these\ncontractors are fulfilling the terms of their contracts and complying with regula-\ntory requirements.21\n As part of its legislative mandate, SIGAR has begun a series of audits to assess\nthe management and oversight of PSCs and their performance in Afghanistan.\nThe first of these audits is examining a USACE contractor and is scheduled to be\ncompleted next quarter. Because of growing concern about the activities of PSCs\nand President Karzai\xe2\x80\x99s decree to limit the continuing role of PSCs in Afghanistan,\nSIGAR is planning audits on several PSCs providing security for U.S. reconstruc-\ntion efforts and their compliance with U.S. and Afghan legal requirements.\n\nSIGAR Looking Forward\nDuring 2010, the international community and the GIRoA held a series of meet-\nings\xe2\x80\x94the international conference in London at the end of January, the Kabul\nConference in July, and the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November\xc2\xad\xe2\x80\x94to set the\nstage for the GIRoA to assume responsibility for security and economic develop-\nment. The NATO Summit and the U.S. Administration\xe2\x80\x99s strategic review signaled\nthat the transition in the security sector would start this year and conclude\nin 2014.\n The transition plan depends on developing Afghan capacity in every sector, but\nparticularly in the security sector. Of the more than $56 billion that the Congress\nhas appropriated for reconstruction since 2002, approximately $29 billion (more\nthan 52%) has gone to develop the ANSF. More than $11.6 billion (nearly 62%) of\nthe nearly $18.8 billion that the President has asked the Congress to appropriate\n\n\n\n\n 32 Special inspector general I Afghanistan reconstruction\n\x0c AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW\n\n\n\n\nfor reconstruction in FY 2011 would go to training, equipping, and building facili-\nties for the ANSF.\n SIGAR developed its FY 2011 audit plan to ensure that it provides oversight\nof the reconstruction programs that the United States provides the greatest\nresources for and considers most critical to achieving its strategic objectives in\nAfghanistan. Thus, 6 of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s 16 ongoing audits are assessing aspects of the\nU.S. effort to build the ANSF. They include audits of high-priority construction\nprojects, such as the $161 million Kabul Military Training Center and the $83\nmillion Afghan Defense University, as well as reviews of ANP personnel manage-\nment and ANSF accountability for vehicles provided by the United States.\n The rest of the funding would largely fund programs to promote good gov-\nernance and economic development. SIGAR is also conducting a variety of\ncontract and program audits that assess a range of reconstruction activities.\nThey include an audit of USAID contracts to build local governing capacity as\nwell as reviews of U.S.-funded programs to develop Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s banking and\nagriculture sectors. For a summary of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing audits, see Section 1.\n SIGAR investigators will continue to work closely with other federal agencies\nand with Afghan law enforcement bodies to detect and investigate allegations of\ncontract and procurement fraud, corruption, and other criminal activity related\nto the abuse of U.S. reconstruction dollars. This collaboration is beginning to\nproduce results. This quarter, at the request of the Afghan Shafafiyat Investigative\nUnit (ASIU), a joint U.S.-Afghan investigative team, SIGAR participated in negotia-\ntions with two companies that resulted in the repayment of $22 million in unpaid\nwages for 4,000 Afghan workers and $11 million in unpaid taxes to the GIRoA.\n Throughout this year, SIGAR auditors and investigators will remain focused\non detecting and deterring waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S. reconstruction dol-\nlars. SIGAR will also be assessing the degree to which U.S. taxpayer dollars are\nsupporting sustainable programs that are helping the United States achieve its\nreconstruction objectives.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 33\n\x0c Breaking Ground\n Excavation begins on a new biogas plant in Kabul province in\n December, observed by members of the Afghan Renewable\n Energy Department and contractors. The plant will serve as\n a training and testing facility for future plants throughout\n the country. Expanding the use of renewable energy is a key\n part of the U.S. stabilization strategy for Afghanistan. (USAF\n photo, SSgt Jordan Jones)\n\n\n\n\n34 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c3 RECONSTRUCTION\n UPDATE\n\n\n\n\n 35\n\x0c RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\n \xe2\x80\x9cGoing forward, there must be\n a continued focus on the delivery\nof basic services, as well as transparency\n and accountability. We will also fully\nsupport an Afghan political process that\n includes reconciliation\xe2\x80\xa6 And we will\n forge a new strategic partnership with\n Afghanistan next year, so that we make\n it clear that the United States is\n committed to the long-term\n security and development of\n the Afghan people.\xe2\x80\x9d\n \xe2\x80\x94U.S. President Barack Obama\n\n\n\n\n Source: White House, \xe2\x80\x9cStatement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 36 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\nOVERVIEW\nSection 3 presents a holistic view of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan during\nthis reporting period. Updates on accomplishments, challenges, and local initia-\ntives provide context for the oversight that is needed in reconstruction efforts.\nSidebars throughout the section identify SIGAR audits\xe2\x80\x94both completed and\nongoing\xe2\x80\x94related to those efforts; for ongoing audits, cross-references direct the\nreader to more information in Section 1.\n Section 3 is divided into six subsections: Status of Funds, Security, Governance,\nEconomic and Social Development, Counter-Narcotics, and Anti-Corruption. The\nSecurity, Governance, and Economic and Social Development subsections mirror\nthe three pillars reflected in the Prioritization and Implementation Plan announced\nby the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in 2010 and\noriginally set forth in the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The\nCounter-Narcotics and Anti-Corruption subsections focus on key issues identified\nin both documents.\n\nTOPICS\nSection 3 discusses six broad topics: historical and current funding information,\nsecurity conditions, governance activities, economic and social development\nprograms, counter-narcotics initiatives, and anti-corruption efforts.\n The Status of Funds subsection contains a comprehensive discussion of\nthe monies appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for Afghanistan reconstruc-\ntion. It includes specific information on major U.S. funds and international\ncontributions.\n The Security subsection details U.S. efforts to bolster the Afghan National\nSecurity Forces and discusses U.S. and international efforts to improve security\nin the country. This subsection focuses on programming to improve the Afghan\nNational Army and Afghan National Police, including training, equipping, and\ninfrastructure development.\n The Governance subsection provides an overview of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s progress\ntoward achieving good governance. This subsection focuses on the resolution\nof the September 2010 elections, the status of reintegration and reconciliation\nprogramming, and human rights development.\n The Economic and Social Development subsection looks at reconstruction\nactivities by sector, ranging from agriculture and energy to health services. It\nprovides a snapshot of the state of the economy and updates on progress in\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 37\n\x0cRECONSTRUCTION UPDATE\n\n\n\n\nregulating financial networks, achieving fiscal sustainability, and delivering\nessential services.\n The Counter-Narcotics subsection describes U.S. and GIRoA efforts to combat\nthe drug trade in Afghanistan, including interdiction, alternative development, and\neradication. It also provides updates on poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking.\n The Anti-Corruption subsection describes U.S. and GIRoA initiatives to com-\nbat corruption, including descriptions of anti-corruption agencies and their roles.\n\nMETHODOLOGY\nSection 3 was compiled using information and data from open sources and U.S.\nagencies. All data and information is attributed to the reporting organization in\nendnotes to the text or notes to the tables and figures; because multiple organiza-\ntions provide the data, numbers may conflict. Except for references to SIGAR\naudits or investigations in the text or in sidebars, SIGAR has not verified this\ndata and it does not reflect SIGAR opinions. For a complete discussion of SIGAR\naudits and investigations this quarter, see Section 1.\n\nData Call\nThe data call is a series of questions directed to U.S. agencies about their contri-\nbutions and involvement in reconstruction programming, and the state of affairs\nin Afghanistan. The U.S. agencies that participated in the data call for this quar-\nterly report include the following:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of State\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Department of Defense\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Agency for International Development\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Department of the Treasury\nA preliminary draft of the report was provided to the responding agencies prior to\npublication to allow these agencies to verify and clarify the content of this section.\n\nOpen-Source Research\nOpen-source research draws on the most current, publicly available data from\nreputable sources. A representative list of sources used in this quarterly report\nincludes the following:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. agencies represented in the data call\n \xe2\x80\xa2 International Security Assistance Force\n \xe2\x80\xa2 United Nations (and relevant branches)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 International Monetary Fund\n \xe2\x80\xa2 World Bank\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Asia Foundation\n \xe2\x80\xa2 GIRoA ministries and other Afghan government organizations\nMost of the open-source research is included in the preliminary draft that is\ndistributed to agencies participating in the data call for review before this report\nis published.\n\n\n\n\n 38 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GRAPHICS KEY\n\n\n\n\nUNDERSTANDING THE GRAPHICS\nAll figures and tables report data for this quarter, except where identified in titles or notes.\n\n\n\nBAR CHARTS HEAT MAPS\nThis report discusses many funds and projects with Heat maps assign colors to provinces, based on\ndollar values ranging from millions to billions. To pertinent data. Each color represents a data set,\nprovide an accurate graphical representation of these defined in a legend; darker colors represent larger\nnumbers, some bar graphs appear with a break (a numbers, lighter colors show smaller numbers.\nwavy line) to indicate a jump between zero and a\nlarger number.\n\n\n $500 $200\n\n $450\n $150\n $400\n $100\n $350\n\n $50 0\n 1\xe2\x80\x9320\n 21\xe2\x80\x9340\n $0 $0 41\xe2\x80\x93200\n 201\xe2\x80\x93429\n Bar chart with a Bar chart without\n break in scale a break in scale\n\n\nDISTINGUISHING BILLIONS AND MILLIONS FUNDING MARKERS\nBecause this report details funding in both billions Funding markers identify individual funds discussed\nand millions of dollars, it uses a visual cue to distin- in the text. The agency responsible for managing the\nguish the two measurement units. Dollars reported in fund is listed in the tan box below the fund name.\nbillions are represented in blue, and dollars reported\nin millions are depicted in green.\n\n\n\n\n ESF\n\n\n\n USAID\n\n\n\n Pie Chart in Billions Pie Chart in Millions\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 39\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 40 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nSTATUS OF FUNDS\nTo fulfill SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S. funds As shown in Appendix B, the U.S. President\nappropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. At has requested more than $18.77 billion\npress time, complete appropriation data for these funds was not available for FY 2011 for reconstruction activities for FY 2011;\nbecause Continuing Resolutions were in effect. Some agencies reported amounts if approved, it would bring the total\n cumulative funding to nearly $74.88 billion.\nreceived through the Continuing Resolutions; that data is reflected in the graphics\nfor the pertinent fund. As of September 30, 2010, the United States had appropri-\nated approximately $56.10 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since\nFY 2002. This cumulative funding total is based on data reported by agencies and\namounts appropriated in FY 2010. This total has been allocated as follows:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 nearly $29.35 billion for security\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $16.15 billion for governance and development\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $4.49 billion for counter-narcotics efforts\n\xe2\x80\xa2 nearly $2.08 billion for humanitarian aid\n\xe2\x80\xa2 more than $4.03 billion for oversight and operations\nFigure 3.1 shows the major U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts.\n\nFIGURE 3.1\n\n\nU.S. FUNDS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n FUNDING SOURCES (TOTAL: $56.10)\n ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\n ASFF CERP DoD CN ESF INCLE Other\n CERP: Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency\n $27.83 $2.64 $1.51 $11.14 $2.85 $10.13 Response Program\n\n DoD CN: DoD Drug Interdiction and\n AGENCIES\n Counter-Drug Activities\n Department of\n Department of Defense (DoD) USAID Distributed to\n State (DoS)\n $31.98 $11.14 $2.85\n Multiple Agenciesa ESF: Economic Support Fund\n\n INCLE: International Narcotics Control\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding. Data is as of 9/30/2010.\na. Multiple agencies include DoJ, DoS, USAID, Treasury, and USDA.\n and Law Enforcement\nSources: DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2010, 10/15/2010, 10/6/2010,\n10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Supplemental; FY 2010 Defense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call,\n10/15/2010 and 10/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2010; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2010\n Other: Other Funding\nand 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ, response to SIGAR data call,\n7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 41\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN\n ASFF CERP DoD CN ESF INCLE As of September 30, 2010, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruc-\n tion in Afghanistan totaled approximately $56.10 billion. This total can be divided\n into five major categories of reconstruction funding: security, governance and\n DoD USAID DoS\n development, counter-narcotics, humanitarian, and oversight and operations. For\n complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.\n As shown in Figure 3.2, cumulative appropriations as of FY 2010 increased\nThe amount provided by the five major U.S.\n by nearly 41.4% over cumulative appropriations as of FY 2009, to approximately\nfunds represents nearly 82.0% (more than\n$45.98 billion) of total reconstruction $56.10 billion. Since FY 2002, security efforts have received the largest cumula-\nassistance in Afghanistan since FY 2002. tive appropriations. Appropriations for security (nearly $29.35 billion) account\nOf this amount, nearly 84.7% (more than for more than 52.3% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance. In FY 2010, security\n$38.94 billion) has been obligated, and had a large gain in cumulative appropriations over FY 2009 (more than 45.4%),\nnearly 70.3% (nearly $32.31 billion) has followed by governance and development (nearly 38.7%), and counter-narcotics\nbeen disbursed. The following pages provide (more than 27.9%).\nadditional details on these funds. Figure 3.3 on the facing page displays annual appropriations by funding cat-\n egory from FY 2002 to FY 2010. The bars show the dollar amounts appropriated,\n and the pie charts show the proportions of the total appropriated by category.\n These figures reflect amounts as reported by the respective agencies and\n amounts appropriated in the following legislation:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (FY 2010 Supplemental)\n\n\nFIGURE 3.2\n\nCUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n $56.10\n $55\n $50\n $45\n $39.69\n $40\n $35\n $30 $29.23\n\n $25 $23.04\n $20\n $15 $13.01\n $10 $9.53\n $4.68\n $5 $2.08\n $1.06\n $0\n 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010\n\n\n Security Governance/Development Counter-Narcotics Humanitarian Oversight and Operations Total\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Data is as of 9/30/2010.\nSources: DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2010, 10/15/2010, 10/6/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Supplemental; FY 2010\nDefense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010 and 10/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2010; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2010\nand 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n 42 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the FY 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (FY 2010 DoD\n Appropriations Act)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 the FY 2010 Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban\n Development Related Agencies Appropriations Act (FY 2010 Consolidated\n Appropriations Act)\n As shown in Figure 3.3, appropriations for FY 2010 amounted to nearly $16.42\nbillion, surpassing FY 2009 levels by more than 57.0%. This is the largest amount\nappropriated in a single year for the reconstruction effort.\n FY 2010 appropriations for security increased by nearly 63.5% over FY 2009\nappropriations, to nearly $9.17 billion. Of the total appropriations for FY 2010,\nsecurity initiatives accounted for more than 55.8%, followed by governance\nand development with more than 27.4%. Appropriations in FY 2010 for security\n(nearly $9.17 billion) are the largest appropriations made in a single year for the\nreconstruction effort since FY 2002.\n\nFIGURE 3.3\n\nAPPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE ($ BILLIONS)\n\n $16.42\n $16\n $15\n $14\n $13\n $12\n $11 $10.46\n $10.03\n $10\n $9\n $8\n $7 $6.19\n $6\n $4.85\n $5\n $4 $3.48\n $3 $2.60\n $2\n $1.06 $1.01\n $1\n $0\n 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010\n\n\n Percentage\n\n\n\n\n Security Governance/Development Counter-Narcotics Humanitarian Oversight and Operations Total\n\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Data is as of 9/30/2010.\nSources: DoD response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2010, 10/15/2010, 10/6/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 Supplemental; FY 2010\nDefense Explanatory Statement; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010 and 10/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2010; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2010\nand 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 43\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND\n ASFF The Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide\n the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with equipment, supplies, services,\n and training, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and con-\n DoD struction.24 The primary organization responsible for building the ANSF is the\n North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission - Afghanistan/\n Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan.25\nASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n DoD reported that the FY 2011 Continuing Appropriations Act provided nearly\nDoD reported ASFF funds as available, $1.57 billion for the ASFF, bringing the total cumulative funding for this fund\nobligated, or disbursed. to more than $29.40 billion.26 Of this amount, more than $25.43 billion has been\nAvailable: Total monies available for obligated, of which nearly $23.08 billion has been disbursed.27 Figure 3.4 displays\ncommitments the amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year.\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of December 31, 2010, increased\nDisbursements: Monies that have been by more than $1.82 billion over cumulative obligations as of September 30, 2010.\nexpended Cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2010, increased by more than\nSource: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.\n $1.67 billion over cumulative disbursements as of September 30, 2010.28 Figure\n 3.5 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts made available, obligated,\n and disbursed for the ASFF.\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.4 FIGURE 3.5\n\n ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n Continuing\n Resolution\n $10.0 $30.0 $29.40\n\n Available Available\n as of 9/30/2010\n $27.83\n $27.83\n $8.0\n $25.0 Obligated\n Obligated $25.43\n $23.61 Disbursed\n $6.0 $23.08\n Disbursed\n $20.0 $21.41\n\n $4.0\n\n\n $15.0\n $2.0\n\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 As of Sep 30, 2010 As of Dec 31, 2010\n\n Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. FY 2011 funds are Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Available data is as of\n operating under a continuing resolution. Funds for the entire 9/30/2010. FY 2011 funds are operating under a continuing\n fiscal year had not been appropriated at press time. resolution.\n Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011. Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 44 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nASFF Budget Activities\nDoD allocates funds to three budget activity groups within the ASFF:29 Budget Activity Groups: categories\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, ANA) within each appropriation or fund\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP) account that identify the purposes,\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations) projects, or types of activities financed\nFunds for each budget activity group are further allocated to four sub-activity by the appropriation or fund\ngroups: Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, Training and Operations,\n Sub-Activity Groups: accounting\nand Sustainment.30\n groups that break down the command\xe2\x80\x99s\n As of December 31, 2010, DoD had disbursed nearly $23.08 billion for ANSF\n disbursements into functional areas\ninitiatives. Of this amount, more than $14.80 billion was disbursed for the ANA\nand nearly $8.16 billion was disbursed for the ANP; the remaining nearly $0.12\nbillion was directed to related activities.31 Sources: DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cManual 7110.1-M Department\n of Defense Budget Guidance Manual,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n As shown in Figure 3.6, of the funds disbursed for the ANA, the largest por- 9/28/2009; Depar tment of the Navy, \xe2\x80\x9cMedical Facility\n Manager Handbook,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 5, accessed 10/2/2009.\ntion\xe2\x80\x94more than $6.66 billion\xe2\x80\x94supported Equipment and Transportation. Of the\nfunds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion\xe2\x80\x94more than $2.48 billion\xe2\x80\x94also\nsupported Equipment and Transportation, as shown in Figure 3.7.32\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.6 FIGURE 3.7\n\nASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP\nBy Sub-Activity Group, By Sub-Activity Group,\nFY 2005\xe2\x80\x93December 31, 2010 ($ BILLIONS) FY 2005\xe2\x80\x93December 31, 2010 ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n Total: $14.80 Total: $8.16\n\n\n Equipment and\n Transportation\n $2.48\n Equipment and Sustainment\n Transportation $4.26 Infrastructure Sustainment\n $6.66 $1.52 $2.34\n\n\n\n\n Training and Infrastructure Training and\n Operations $2.48 Operations\n $1.40 $1.81\n\n\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of\n12/31/2010. 12/31/2010.\nSource: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011. Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 45\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n COMMANDER\xe2\x80\x99S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM\n CERP The Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S. command-\n ers in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction\n requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will\n DoD\n immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is intended\n for small projects that are estimated to cost less than $500,000 each.33 Projects\nCERP FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n with cost estimates exceeding $1.00 million are permitted, but they require\n approval from the Commander of U.S. Central Command; projects over\nOMB reported CERP funds as appropriated. $5 million require approval from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.34\nAppropriations: Total monies available for\ncommitments\n Status of Funds\n As of December 31, 2010, DoD reported that the total cumulative funding for\nDoD reported CERP funds as appropriated,\nobligated, or disbursed. CERP amounted to nearly $2.64 billion.35 DoD reported that of this amount,\nAppropriations: Total monies available for more than $1.99 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $1.54 billion has\ncommitments been disbursed.36 Figure 3.8 shows CERP appropriations by fiscal year.\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies DoD reported that cumulative obligations as of December 31, 2010 increased\nDisbursements: Monies that have been by more than $64.04 million over cumulative obligations as of September 30,\nexpended 2010. Cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2010, increased by more\n than $205.97 million over cumulative disbursements as of September 30, 2010.37\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010;\nDoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/14/2010. Figure 3.9 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated,\n obligated, and disbursed for CERP projects.\n\n\n FIGURE 3.8 FIGURE 3.9\n\n CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n Appropriated Appropriated\n as of 9/30/2010\n $1,000 $2.5 $2.64\n $2.64\n\n\n $800 $2.0 Obligated Obligated\n $1.93 $1.99\n\n Disbursed\n $600 $1.5 $1.54\n Disbursed\n $1.33\n $400 $1.0\n\n\n $200 $0.5\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Sep 30, 2010 As of Dec 31, 2010\n\n Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Amounts reported as\n rounding. FY 2011 funds had not been appropriated at press time. provided by DoD and OMB. FY 2011 funds had not been\n Sources: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2011; OMB, appropriated at press time.\n response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2010. Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2011 and\n 10/20/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 46 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nDOD DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES\nDoD\xe2\x80\x99s Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (DoD CN) support DoD CN\nefforts to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related activi-\nties. The DoD CN provides support to the counter-narcotics effort by supporting\nmilitary operations against drug traffickers; expanding Afghan interdiction opera- DoD\ntions; and building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement\xe2\x80\x94including Afghan\nBorder Police\xe2\x80\x94with specialized training, equipment, and facilities.38 DoD CN FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\n DoD reported no change in funding data as of December 31, 2010, from that\nreported as of September 30, 2010. The total cumulative funding for DoD CN DoD reported DoD CN funds as appropriated,\namounted to more than $1.51 billion.39 Of this amount, more than $1.43 billion obligated, or disbursed.\nhad been obligated and disbursed.40 Figure 3.10 displays DoD CN appropriations Appropriations: Total monies available for\n commitments\nby fiscal year and Figure 3.11 shows the cumulative amounts appropriated, obli-\n Obligations: Commitments to pay monies\ngated, and disbursed for DoD CN-funded initiatives.\n Disbursements: Monies that have been\n expended\n\n Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/13/2010.\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.10 FIGURE 3.11\n\n\nDOD CN APPROPRIATIONS BY DOD CN FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ BILLIONS)\nFISCAL YEAR ($ MILLIONS)\n Appropriated Appropriated\n as of 9/30/2010\n$400 $1.50 $1.51\n $1.51\n\n$350\n $1.45\n$300 Obligated Obligated\n $1.43 $1.43\n $1.40 Disbursed Disbursed\n$250\n $1.43 $1.43\n\n$200\n $1.35\n\n$150\n\n $1.30\n$100\n\n $50\n\n $0 $0\n 2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Sep 30, 2010 As of Dec 31, 2010\n\nNotes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Amounts reported as\naffected by rounding. DoD reported that there was no change provided by DoD. DoD reported that there was no change in data\nin data since 9/30/2010. FY 2011 funds had not been since 9/30/2010. FY 2011 funds had not been appropriated at\nappropriated at press time. press time.\nSources: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011; DoD, Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011 and\nresponse to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; H.R. 4899, FY 2010 10/6/2010; DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; H.R.\nSupplemental Appropriations Act, 7/29/2010. 4899, FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 7/29/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 47\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND\n ESF Economic Support Fund programs advance U.S. interests by helping countries\n meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF programs\n support counter-terrorism; bolster national economies; and assist in the develop-\n USAID ment of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more transparent\n and accountable government.41\nESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY As of December 31, 2010, USAID reported that the total cumulative funding\n for ESF amounted to more than $11.14 billion.42 Of this amount, more than $9.57\nUSAID reported ESF funds as appropriated, billion had been obligated, of which nearly $6.74 billion had been disbursed.43\nobligated, or disbursed. Figure 3.12 shows ESF appropriations by fiscal year.\nAppropriations: Total monies available USAID reported that cumulative obligations as of December 31, 2010, increased\nfor commitments by nearly $16.45 million over cumulative obligations as of September 30, 2010.\nObligations: Commitments to pay monies\n Cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2010, increased by more than\nDisbursements: Monies that have been\n $459.83 million over cumulative disbursements as of September 30, 2010.44\nexpended\n Figure 3.13 provides a cumulative comparison of the amounts appropriated,\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 4/19/2010; obligated, and disbursed for ESF programs.\nUSAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2010.\n\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.12 FIGURE 3.13\n\n ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n ($ BILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n\n Appropriated Appropriated\n $3.5 $11.0 $11.14\n as of 9/30/2010\n $11.14\n\n $3.0 $10.0\n Obligated Obligated\n $9.55 $9.57\n $2.5 $9.0\n\n\n $8.0\n $2.0\n\n $7.0 Disbursed\n $1.5\n Disbursed $6.74\n $6.0 $6.28\n $1.0\n\n $5.0\n $0.5\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Sep 30, 2010 As of Dec 31, 2010\n\n Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected\n affected by rounding. Amounts are as provided by USAID and by rounding. Amounts are as provided by USAID and in the FY 2010\n in the FY 2010 Supplemental. FY 2011 funds had not been Supplemental. FY 2011 funds had not been appropriated at press\n appropriated at press time. time.\n Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011; Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011; H.R.\n H.R. 4899, FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 4899, FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 7/29/2010.\n 7/29/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 48 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nINTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL\nAND LAW ENFORCEMENT INCLE\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)\nmanages an account for advancing rule of law and combating narcotics produc-\n DoS\ntion and trafficking\xe2\x80\x94the INCLE account. INCLE supports several INL program\ngroups, including police, counter-narcotics, and rule of law and justice.45\n INL reported that the FY 2011 Continuing Appropriations Act provided more INL FUNDS TERMINOLOGY\nthan $4.59 million for INCLE initiatives, bringing the total cumulative funding for\n INL reported INCLE and other INL funds\nINCLE to nearly $2.86 billion.46 Of this amount, nearly $2.47 billion had been obli-\n as allotted, obligated, or liquidated.\ngated, of which more than $1.75 billion has been liquidated.47 Figure 3.14 displays\n Allotments: Total monies available\nINCLE allotments by fiscal year. for commitments\n INL reported that cumulative obligations as of December 31, 2010, increased Obligations: Commitments to pay monies\nby more than $47.33 million over cumulative obligations as of September 30, Liquidations: Monies that have been expended\n2010. Updated data as of December 31, 2010, resulted in an approximate $111.03\nmillion decrease from the liquidation figure reported as of September 30, 2010.48 Source: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 4/9/2010.\n\nFigure 3.15 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts allotted, obligated,\nand liquidated for INCLE.\n\nFIGURE 3.14 FIGURE 3.15\n\nINCLE ALLOTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON\n($ MILLIONS) ($ BILLIONS)\n\n\n\n Continuing\n$700 $3.0 Resolution\n Allotted $2.86\n $2.85 Allotted\n$600 as of 9/30/2010\n $2.85\n $2.5\n Obligated Obligated\n$500\n $2.42 $2.47\n\n$400\n $2.0\n Liquidated\n$300 $1.86 Liquidated\n $1.75\n\n$200 $1.5\n\n\n$100\n\n\n $0 $0\n 2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 As of Sep 30, 2010 As of Dec 31, 2010\n\nNotes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected\naffected by rounding. FY 2011 funds are operating under a by rounding. Amounts reported as provided by DoS and the FY 2010\ncontinuing resolution. Funds for the entire fiscal year had not Supplemental. Updated data resulted in a lower liquidated figure than\nbeen appropriated at press time. that reported as of 9/30/2010. FY 2011 funds are operating under a\n continuing resolution.\nSources: DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011;\nH.R. 4899, FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011\n7/29/2010. and 10/15/2010; H.R. 4899, FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations\n Bill, 7/29/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 49\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\n INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION\nSIGAR AUDIT FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN\n In addition to assistance provided by the United States, the international\nThis quarter, SIGAR announced a community provides a significant amount of funding, to support reconstruction\nnew audit that will focus on the use efforts in Afghanistan. The GIRoA uses some of this funding to pay staff sala-\nand accountability of U.S. funds ries. In an audit published last quarter, SIGAR found that neither donors nor the\ncontributed to the Afghanistan GIRoA could identify how many employees receive support or how much they\nReconstruction Trust Fund. For more were paid.49 A February 2010 estimate from the Ministry of Finance (MoF), based\ninformation, see Section 1, p. 13. on incomplete data, indicated salary support of more than $45 million for 6,600\n civilian employees and technical advisors. This support is not provided through\n trust funds, the preferred mechanism for providing donor assistance, according\n to the MoF.50\n Contributions that are provided through trust funds are pooled and then dis-\n tributed for reconstruction activities. The two main sources of such funding are\n the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust\n Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).51\n\n Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund\n As of November 21, 2010, the World Bank reported that the ARTF had funded\n 17 active projects with a combined commitment value of over $861.00 million,\n of which $683.27 million has been disbursed.52 Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17 show\n contributions by status and donor as of October 22, 2010. These contributions\n maintain the trust fund\xe2\x80\x99s status as the largest contributor to the GIRoA budget\n for both operating costs and development programs.53\n Contributions are divided into two funding channels\xe2\x80\x94the Recurrent Cost\n (RC) Window and the Investment Window. According to the January 2011\n \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update,\xe2\x80\x9d disbursements from the RC Window amounted\n to $2.15 billion as of November 21, 2010. The RC Window supports the operat-\n ing costs of the GIRoA because domestic revenues continue to be insufficient\n to support its recurring costs.54 The Investment Window supports the costs of\n development programs. The World Bank reported that the disbursement rates\n for the Investment Window have been high\xe2\x80\x9479% of total investments as of\n November 21, 2010.55\n\n\n\n\n 50 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c STATUS OF FUNDS\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.16 FIGURE 3.17\n\nARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SY 1389 BY DONOR, AS OF OCTOBER 22, 2010 ($ MILLIONS) ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR SY 1389,\n AS OF OCTOBER 22, 2010\n Total Commitments: $954 Total Paid In: $356 Proportion of Amounts Paid In to\n Amounts Committed ($ MILLIONS)\n\n United States 215 590\n Total Commitments: $954\n United Kingdom 24 118\n\n Germany 0 67\n Paid In\n Norway 0 39 $356\n Netherlands 33 33\n Canada 27 27\n Remaining\n Sweden 21 24 $599\n Australia 23 23\n\n Spain 0 15\n Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. SY = solar year;\n Others 14 19 SY 1389 runs from 3/21/2010 to 3/20/2011.\n Source: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cARTF: Administrator\xe2\x80\x99s Report on\n Financial Status as of October 22, 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 1.\n 0 100 200 300 400 500 600\n\n\n Paid In Commitments\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding. SY=solar year; SY 1389 runs from 3/21/2010 to 3/20/2011.\nSource: World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cARTF: Administrator\xe2\x80\x99s Report on Financial Status as of October 22, 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 1.\n\n\n\n\nContributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan\nThe Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan reported that as of\nOctober 2010, the United States had contributed approximately $545.6 million\nto the LOTFA.56 A large portion of these funds paid the salaries of approximately\n113,572 ANP personnel\xe2\x80\x94a principal priority of the trust fund.57\n The LOTFA is currently in its sixth phase, which is effective from January 1,\n2011, through March 31, 2013.58\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 51\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 52 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nSECURITY\nThis quarter, the White House released its annual review of U.S. strategy on\nAfghanistan and Pakistan. The review reiterated two core objectives: to deny\nal-Qaeda a safe haven and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the SIGAR AUDIT\nGovernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). It reported that in\n In its audit of an ASFF-funded program to\nsome areas al-Qaeda leadership has been weakened and Taliban momentum has\n build and maintain ANSF facilities, SIGAR\nbeen arrested; however, these gains were characterized as \xe2\x80\x9cfragile and revers-\n found that, despite the considerable\nible.\xe2\x80\x9d59 The Administration found that conditions are being set that will enable\n funding ($11.4 billion through FY 2012)\nthe Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the security lead in early\n and large number of facilities (nearly\n2011 and \xe2\x80\x9ca responsible, conditions-based U.S. troop reduction in July 2011.\xe2\x80\x9d60\n 900 provided or planned), CSTC-A had\n A declaration by the heads of members of the North Atlantic Treaty\n not developed a long-term construction\nOrganization (NATO) in November 2010 also pointed to early 2011\xe2\x80\x94after a joint\n plan, thus placing the program at risk\nGIRoA/NATO assessment\xe2\x80\x94as the starting point for transitioning responsibil-\n of not meeting ANSF strategic and\nity and leadership for security to the Afghans. Like the White House review, the\n operational needs. For more information,\nLisbon declaration emphasized that the transition will be \xe2\x80\x9cconditions-based\xe2\x80\x9d and\n see Section 1, p. 5.\n\xe2\x80\x9cnot calendar driven.\xe2\x80\x9d During the summit, NATO leaders expressed ongoing com-\nmitment to the mission in Afghanistan and anticipated that Afghan forces will\nassume \xe2\x80\x9cfull responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x9d toward\nthe end of 2014.61\n As of December 31, 2010, the United States had appropriated nearly $29.35 billion\nfor security.62 Most of these funds were appropriated through the Afghanistan \xe2\x80\x9cISAF and the Afghan\nSecurity Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided through the Combined Security government have\xe2\x80\xa6adopted\nTransition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) for building, equipping, training, and a robust partnering plan\nsustaining the ANSF.63\n that has accelerated\nSECURITY GOALS tactical-level development\nThis quarter, the force strength of the ANSF was 265,137, according to CSTC-A: of Afghan forces\xe2\x80\x99 leadership\n149,553 in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 115,584 in the Afghan National and units, although\nPolice (ANP).64 Although the number of assigned personnel increased for the significant development\nANA, it declined for the ANP because of a recalculation of ANP assigned force\nstrength based on a new quantitative method. Several factors\xe2\x80\x94including a reas-\n challenges remain.\xe2\x80\x9d\nsessment of how personnel in training and personnel categorized as \xe2\x80\x9cenablers\xe2\x80\x9d \xe2\x80\x94\xe2\x80\x9cOverview of the Afghanistan and\nare counted\xe2\x80\x94contributed to the lower number and were the impetus for the Pakistan Annual Review\xe2\x80\x9d\ndevelopment of the new method.65 In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is evaluating the\nextent to which the ANP has developed accurate systems for personnel account- Source: White House, \xe2\x80\x9cOverview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan\n Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010, accessed online 1/7/2011.\ning; for more information, see Section 1, p. 15.\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 53\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) called\nJoint Coordination and Monitoring Board for the ANSF to reach 305,600 personnel by October 31, 2011.66 Table 3.1 shows\n(JCMB): a joint effort of the GIRoA and changes in ANSF force strength against security goals since last quarter.\nthe international community to monitor\nthe implementation of the Afghanistan SECURITY HIGHLIGHTS\nCompact, which was the result of the 2006 According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), progress across Afghanistan\nLondon Conference. remains uneven. In key operational areas, such as those around Kabul and in\n Helmand where coalition forces had a robust presence in the second half of\n 2010, DoD reported moderate progress in improving security.67 In his December\n 2010 quarterly report to the Security Council, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-\n General reported that anti-government elements have expanded into the northern\n parts of the country, where there is a smaller international military presence, and\n have sustained high levels of activity there.68\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, President Hamid Karzai\n decreed in August 2010 that all national and international private security con-\n tractors (PSCs) would be disbanded within four months. On December 6, 2010,\n two weeks before the decision would have taken effect, the Afghan Ministry of\n Interior (MoI) announced that PSCs could continue to operate, although with\n some restrictions that prevent them from conducting roadblocks and searches,\n actions that fall within the authority of Afghan law enforcement agencies.69\n\n SECURITY INCIDENTS\n In his December 2010 report, the UN Secretary-General stated that the number\n of security incidents this quarter was 66% higher than during the same period in\n 2009, but that the number of incidents decreased after the recent national elec-\n tion. Other security incidents included the continued use of improvised explosive\n devices, abductions, and assassinations against civilians by anti-government\n elements. In addition, the Secretary-General reported that abductions of NGO\n staff and suicide attacks continue. During the quarter, suicide attacks occurred\n three times a week on average, mainly targeting international military forces,\n police, and government officials; complex suicide attacks also continued,\n primarily targeting large international military bases.70\n\n\n\n TABLE 3.1\n\n\n STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR SECURITY\n Priority Current Goal Status\n Afghan National Army 134,000 troops by 10/2010 149,553 troops (as of 12/21/2010)\n 171,600 troops by 10/2011\n Afghan National Police 109,000 personnel by 10/2010 115,584 personnel (as of 11/21/2010)\n 134,000 personnel by 10/2011\n Notes: Numbers affected by rounding.\n Sources: ISAF-IJC, ANP PERSTAT, 12/30/2010; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call\n 1/4/2011; NTM-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/6/2010.\n\n\n\n\n 54 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nAFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY\nAs of December 21, 2010, the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s strength was 149,553 personnel\xe2\x80\x94an increase\nof 11,389 since September 22, 2010\xe2\x80\x94according to CSTC-A. The ANA\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to\nreach 171,600 personnel by October 2011 and 240,000 by October 2013.71\n Of the current total, 85,804 personnel were assigned specifically to the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s\nsix corps, the Special Operations Force (SOF) division, and the 111th Capital Tashkil: Lists of personnel and equipment\nDivision, as of December 30, 2010\xe2\x80\x94according to a recent International Security requirements used by the MoD and MoI\nAssistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) assessment based on Ministry of that detail authorized staff positions\nDefense (MoD) reporting.72 This is a small increase (445) since September 30, and equipment items, in this case for\n2010.73 As of December 20, 2010, the number of personnel authorized by the the ANA and the ANP. (The word means\nMoD\xe2\x80\x99s most recent tashkil for the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s six corps, the SOF division, and the \xe2\x80\x9corganization\xe2\x80\x9d in Dari.)\n111th Capital Division is 96,604.74\n However, the number of assigned troops does not necessarily equal the\n Source: GAO, GAO-08-661, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Security,\xe2\x80\x9d\nnumber of troops present for duty, as shown in Figure 3.18. Troops who are 6/2008, p. 18.\n\nabsent without leave (AWOL) make up a significant share of the percentage of\ntroops who are not available for duty, as shown in Figure 3.19. According to\nIJC, the ANA is addressing attendance issues; as of November 2010, the MoD\nhad empowered ANA commanders to take steps to reverse negative trends and\nincrease attendance.75\n\n\n FIGURE 3.19\nFIGURE 3.18\n ANA PERSONNEL PRESENCE,\nANA PERSONNEL STRENGTH, SELECTED COMPONENTS, SELECTED COMPONENTS,\nON DECEMBER 30, 2010 ON DECEMBER 30, 2010 (PERCENT)\n\n\n 203rd Corps 10,562 6,109 16,671 203rd Corps 63 22 15\n\n 205th Corps 10,801 4,929 15,730 205th Corps 69 18 13\n\n 201st Corps 8,819 2,961 11,780 201st Corps 75 15 10\n\n 215th Corps 7,335 4,235 11,570 215th Corps 63 17 20\n\n 209th Corps 6,308 2,088 8,396 209th Corps 75 13 12\n\n 207th Corps 5,540 2,228 7,768 207th Corps 71 15 14\n\n 111th Capital 5,145 1,942 7,087 111th Capital\n 73 13 14\n Division Division\n\n SOF Division 4,304 2,498 6,802 SOF Division 63 12 25\n\n 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 0 20 40 60 80 100\n\n\n Present for Duty Assigned but Not Present for Duty PDY AWOL Other\n\nNote: Assigned but Not Present for Duty includes medical, training, or authorized leave, as well as AWOL (absent without leave). Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. AWOL = absent\n without leave; PDY = present for duty.\nSource: ISAF-IJC, ANA PERSTAT, 12/30/2010.\n Source: ISAF-IJC, ANA PERSTAT, 12/30/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 55\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n As of November 12, 2010, the ANA had 155 \xe2\x80\x9ckandaks\xe2\x80\x9d or battalions, an increase\n of 42 since May 2010, according to the latest Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Unit Assessment Tool\n (CUAT) provided by IJC. Since the September 2010 CUAT cycle, two kandaks\xe2\x80\x94one\n from the 111th Capital Division and one from the 205th Corps\xe2\x80\x94had demonstrated\n the ability to operate independently. In addition, 35 kandaks showed increased\n readiness from September to November 2010.76\n According to IJC, the ANA participated in 202 major operations and 18,169\n partnered patrols from November 15 to December 21, 2010.77\n\n\nAfghan army soldiers receive weapons\n ANA Training\ntraining during boot camp at Camp Clark, in During this quarter, 28,515 ANA personnel graduated from a wide range of train-\nPaktika province, in November 2010. This ing programs funded by the ASFF, according to CSTC-A. Of that number, 3,514\nquarter, more than 28,500 ANA personnel graduated from development courses for noncommissioned officers, and 918\ngraduated from a wide range of training graduated from courses designed to train new officers or develop the skills of\nprograms funded by the ASFF. (ISAF photo,\n current officers. More than half of this quarter\xe2\x80\x99s graduates had completed the\nSSG Romain Beaulinette, French Army)\n ANA\xe2\x80\x99s basic warrior training program, as shown in Figure 3.20. Several of these\n programs included a component for literacy training. According to CSTC-A,\n three contractors are providing literacy training for the ANA and the ANP. Two\n are Afghan-owned; the third, OT Training Solutions, uses Afghan subcontrac-\n tors. These contracts cover an initial year (until September 2011) and have four\n one-year options, with a total budget forecasted at $243 million. CSTC-A stated\n that the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to have 30,000 personnel in training by December 2010 and\n 60,000 in training by July 2011.78\n\n FIGURE 3.20\n\n ANA TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM\n\n\n Total Graduates: 28,515 Other Training Programs: 5,104\n Consolidated\n Fielding Centera\n Infantry Basic School 1,061\n 5,035\n Up-Armored HMMWV Training 779\n Basic Counter-Insurgency 598\n Warrior Training Courseb\n Other Training\n Training Officer Candidate School\n Programs 558\n 14,862\n 5,104 Kabul Military High School 379\n Officer Development Course 360\n NCO Mujahedeen\n Integration Course 309\n Development\n 3,514 Other Specialized Training 1,060\n\n 0 500 1,000\n\n Notes: Graduates as of 12/30/2010. HMMWV = high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle.\n a. At the Consolidated Fielding Center, units form, equip, and conduct initial collective training.\n b. The Counter-Insurgency Training Course includes coalition forces (civilian and military) as well as ANA.\n Source: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 56 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n In November, more than 1,300 ANA recruits graduated from Basic Warrior\nTraining in Kandahar, according to the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan\n(NTM-A). The graduates are to be deployed to the southern provinces of Uruzgan,\nHelmand, Kandahar, and Zabul. Basic Warrior Training is an intensive eight-week\ncourse in which students receive instruction in military drilling, weapons famil-\niarization, tactics, physical fitness, and literacy.79\n NTM-A also stated that on November 4, 2010, more than 4,560 men and women\ncompeted for the 600 seats in the National Military Academy of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\nclass of 2015. The academy, located in Kabul, was modeled after the U.S. Military\nAcademy.80\n On December 8, 2010, the 209th Corps opened an engineering school in Balkh,\nto train ANA engineers in explosive ordnance disposal and repair of damaged\ninfrastructure, according to the November CUAT report provided by IJC. In addi-\ntion, the Afghan Sergeants Major Academy graduated 23 ANA and ANP sergeants\nmajor in mid-December; they will return to their units. This was the last class led\nby NTM-A instructors. Future courses will be taught by Afghans, IJC stated.81\n\nWomen in the ANA\nThe number of women serving in the ANA has not changed since last quarter,\naccording to CSTC-A. As of December 31, 2010, there were 299 women\xe2\x80\x94195 offi-\ncers and 104 NCOs. A new class of 16 female candidates began officer training on\nDecember 18, 2010. According to CSTC-A, the ANA\xe2\x80\x99s policy is to recruit enough\nfemale personnel to constitute up to 10% of its projected end strength.82\n\nANA Infrastructure\nThis quarter, 14 new infrastructure projects were awarded (valued at $130.5 million),\n53 were ongoing (nearly $1.1 billion), 2 were completed ($7.1 million), and 6 were\nterminated ($97 million), according to CSTC-A. These projects provide buildings and SIGAR AUDIT\nequipment that are necessary for the support, redeployment, and operations of the\n In its audit of a program to build and\nANA. They include barracks, headquarters, training buildings and ranges, adminis-\n maintain nearly 900 ANSF facilities,\ntrative spaces, warehouses and storage buildings, and maintenance facilities.83\n SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not\n The largest projects include an ANA garrison in Paktika, which has an $88.7\n developed a long-term construction\nmillion cost to complete and is scheduled to be finished on September 30, 2011,\n plan that identifies how facility projects\nand the Afghan Defense University in Kabul, which has an $82.8 million cost to\n meet Afghan security objectives,\ncomplete and is scheduled to be finished on November 10, 2011.84 This quarter,\n identifies gaps in the ability of current\nSIGAR announced new audits of contracted infrastructure projects at the Kabul\n facilities to meet security objectives,\nMilitary Training Center and of construction at the Afghan Defense University;\n and evaluates how planned facilities\nfor more information, see Section 1, page 12.\n will help eliminate those gaps. For more\n On November 1, 2010, ITT Corporation took over responsibility for operations\n information, see Section 1, p. 5.\nand maintenance (O&M) for 110 ANA installations in all 34 provinces after being\nawarded two O&M contracts by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in\nJuly 2010. The two contracts\xe2\x80\x94one for facilities in the northern region, and one\nfor facilities in the southern region\xe2\x80\x94are valued at approximately $800 million\nover a five-year period. They also cover ANP police stations. Part of the contract\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 57\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n includes an agreement that ITT Corporation will provide Afghan workers with\n training in facility management and trades, including carpentry, plumbing, and\n electrical work. ITT Corporation is expected to employ 4,000 workers initially,\n approximately 80% of whom will be locally hired Afghans. According to USACE,\n the number of ANSF facilities is increasing at a rate of approximately 10 per\n month. ITT Corporation will take over O&M responsibilities at new facilities as\n they open.85 Oversight of O&M contracts is part of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2011 audit plan;\n for more information, see Section 1, p. 6.\n\n ANA Equipment\n As of January 5, 2011, NATO and the international community have equipped the\n Pseudo-FMS: an adaptation of the Foreign ANSF with more than 450,000 weapons and more than 50 aircraft, according to\n Military Sales (FMS) Program, DoD\xe2\x80\x99s NTM-A/CSTC-A. Coalition forces have purchased and provided the following:86\n government-to-government method for sell- \xe2\x80\xa2 equipment, such as M-16 rifles, 9mm pistols, high-mobility multi-purpose\n ing U.S. defense equipment, services, and wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and light tactical vehicles\n training. As in the traditional FMS, pseudo- \xe2\x80\xa2 aircraft, such as C-27 cargo planes and Mi-17 helicopters\n FMS procurements are overseen by the \xe2\x80\xa2 specialized equipment, such as night-vision goggles and radios\n Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is reviewing accountability for ANSF vehicles pro-\n contrast to the traditional FMS, DoD pur- vided by the United States; for more information, see Section 1, p. 15.\n chases weapons to train and equip the\n From October 1 to December 31, 2010, the ANA fielded 3,835 weapons, 392\n ANSF primarily using funds appropriated\n vehicles, and 1,316 radios, with a cumulative value of $410 million, accord-\n by the Congress for the ASFF.\n ing to CSTC-A. The majority of the equipment fielded by the ANA has come\n from the United States, funded through the ASFF, in pseudo-FMS purchases.\nSources: GAO-09-267, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Weapons Accountability,\xe2\x80\x9d According to CSTC-A, some former Warsaw Pact weapons are still being pro-\naccessed online 10/14/2010; DSCA, \xe2\x80\x9cForeign Military Sales,\xe2\x80\x9d\naccessed online 10/16/2010. cured from countries such as Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Bosnia, but these weapons\n are procured through contracts awarded by U.S. Army contracting offices.\n Other mechanisms or processes for getting equipment to the ANA include\n\n\n TABLE 3.2\n\n\n ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND RADIOS FIELDED\n Type of Equipment Quarter ending 9/30/2010 Quarter ending 12/31/2010\n Weapons\n M16A4 rifle 4,844 2,857\n Other weapons 1,763 978\n Vehicles\n Light and medium tactical vehicles 1,041 340\n Up-armored HMMWVa 154 52\n Radios\n VHF radiosb 2,254 1,168\n HF radiosc 187 148\n a. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152 ambulance models.\n b. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various configurations of Motorola or ICOM radio systems.\n c. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations of CODAN radio systems.\n Sources: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010 and 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 58 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\ncross-leveling (between the ANA and the ANP), the Excess Defense Articles\nprogram, and donations from other countries.87 Cross-leveling: At the strategic and\n Across all categories, less equipment was fielded to the ANA this quarter than operational levels in a theater, the process\nlast, as shown in Table 3.2. IJC noted a shift in focus from building the ANA to of diverting materiel from one military\nbuilding the ANP.88 element to meet the higher priority of\n another, within a commander\xe2\x80\x99s logistical\n authority. Cross-leveling plans must include\nAFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE specific reimbursement procedures.\nAccording to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), eligible\nANP salaries, food allowances, and other priority projects are paid by the Law Excess Defense Articles: a program\nand Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) through reimbursements to the administered by the Defense Security\nMinistry of Finance. Last quarter, the LOTFA reimbursed payments for 113,572 Cooperation Agency. Under authority\nANP personnel.89 As of October 2010, the U.S. contribution to the LOTFA was established in the Foreign Assistance\napproximately $545.6 million, according to CSTC-A.90 For more information on Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control\nthe LOTFA, see \xe2\x80\x9cStatus of Funds\xe2\x80\x9d in this report. Act, defense articles declared as excess\n As of November 21, 2010, the total force strength of the ANP was 115,584, by the military can be offered to foreign\naccording to IJC.91 More than 460 police units provide police services in more governments or international organizations\nthan 360 precincts. These units are mentored and partnered with coalition in support of U.S. national security and\n foreign policy objectives.\nforces and receive training in marksmanship, criminal investigations, foren-\nsics, and traffic control.92 The ANP includes the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP),\nthe Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police Sources: DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDictionary of Military Terms,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online\n 7/12/2010; DSCA, \xe2\x80\x9cExcess Defense Articles,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\n(ANCOP). ANP component strength is based on a November 21, 2010 assess- online 1/13/2011.\nment, as shown in Table 3.3.\n According to CSTC-A, the previous method of quantifying the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s assigned\nforce strength, which is based on data received from the MoI, resulted in exag-\ngerated figures. Among the reasons for this result, CSTC-A stated, was the\ndouble counting of more than 10,000 ANP enablers (personnel assigned to\ntraffic, fire and rescue, medical, training/education, counter-intelligence, counter-\nnarcotics, intelligence, and counter-terrorism units) over a 24-month reporting\nperiod. In addition, CSTC-A stated that the total ANP end strength had excluded\n\nTABLE 3.3\n\n\nANP FORCE STRENGTH, AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 2010\n Authorized Assigned to Not Assigned to\n (Tashkil) Tashkil Positions Tashkil Positions\nANP (Total Strength: 115,584) 122,000 106,448 9,136\nBreakdown By ANP Components\n AUP 71,018 61,777 4,418b\n ABP 20,689 18,994 \xe2\x80\x94\n ANCOP 11,276 6,720 \xe2\x80\x94\n a a\n Other Units 19,017 18,957 4,718b\nNote: \xe2\x80\x94 = not available.\na. Includes personnel assigned to MoI headquarters, anti-crime, training, counter-narcotics, logistics, medical, fire, and customs units; num-\nbers based on difference between total ANP authorized and assigned figures and authorized and assigned totals for each ANP component.\nb. Includes over-tashkil and initial entry students still in training, but not 7,605 non-tashkil personnel assigned to units funded by other\nsources or 761 assigned to the Afghan Public Protection Force.\nSources: ISAF, PERSTAT, 10/4/2010; ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 11/21/2010; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 59\n\x0cSECURITY\n\n\n\n\napproximately 9,000 \xe2\x80\x9cover-tashkil\xe2\x80\x9d personnel (that is, numbers in excess of the\nANP\xe2\x80\x99s authorized strength) and recruits and trainees.93 In an ongoing audit,\nSIGAR is evaluating the extent to which the ANP has developed accurate sys-\ntems for personnel accounting; for more information, see Section 1, p. 15.\n According to IJC, 33% of AUP personnel and 23% of ABP kandaks showed an\nincrease in readiness from September to November 2010. In addition, four ANP\nunits were operating independently.94 IJC noted that challenges to building and\nmaintaining the ANP include low present-for-duty (PDY) rates, an inconsistent\nand uneven assignment process, and a backlog of untrained personnel. IJC stated\nthat possible solutions include enhancing the process for reporting and validating\nPDY rates, ensuring that ANP assignments meet standards for transparency, and\ncontinuing to reform training efforts.95\n\nANP Training\nThis quarter, 9,066 ANP personnel graduated from training courses, according\nto CSTC-A; 3,826 of them completed the AUP basic patrolman course and 1,953\ngraduated from a three-year course for ANP officers, as shown in Figure 3.21.96 Of\nthe graduates this quarter, CSTC-A noted that 5,033 were assigned to AUP, 1,506\nto the ABP, and 1,263 to the ANCOP.97\n In November 2010, there were 17,533 ANP personnel in literacy training,\naccording to CSTC-A. As mentioned earlier, three contractors are providing lit-\neracy training for the ANP and the ANA; two are Afghan-owned, and the third uses\nAfghan subcontractors. These contracts cover an initial year (until September\n2011) and have four one-year options, with a budget estimated at $243 million.\n\nFIGURE 3.21\n\nANP TRAINING GRADUATES BY PROGRAM\n\n Graduates: 9,066\n\n AUP Basic 3,826\n Patrolman\n Three-Year\n 1,953\n Officer\xe2\x80\x99s Course\n\n ABP Course 1,641\n\n ANCOP NCO 770\n\n AUP NCO 330\n\n Driver\xe2\x80\x99s Training 205\n Other Specialized 341\n Training\n 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000\n\nSource: NTM-A/CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 60 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\nCSTC-A stated that the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to have 20,000 personnel in training by\nDecember 2010 and 40,000 in training by July 2011.98\n On December 1, 2010, more than 395 ANCOP personnel completed 16 weeks of\ninstruction at the Central Training Center, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A. The train-\ning was conducted by Italian Carabinieri in tandem with ANP instructors.99\n\nANP Literacy\nAchieving literacy among ANP personnel remains a challenge. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\nOctober 2010 quarterly report, CSTC-A has estimated that about 4.5% of ANP per-\nsonnel are literate, based on random tests and sampling.100 According to NTM-A,\nliteracy figures for the entire force are not available; however, a test administered\nin November to 7,771 new ANP recruits revealed that only 2.24% were literate (174\nrecruits received a passing grade). The overall goal is for all ANP personnel to attain\nthird-grade reading proficiency (by Afghan educational standards); however, no\ntimeline for reaching this goal has yet been set.101\n Members of the ANCOP, the ANP\xe2\x80\x99s elite police unit, are required to be literate. As\nnoted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, however, a sampling of 242 ANCOP\npersonnel suggested that about 5% of the entire unit is literate. In November, 1,456\nANCOP recruits were tested; 4 received passing grades\xe2\x80\x94a rate of 0.27%. NTM-A,\nthe NATO mission responsible for much of the ANSF\xe2\x80\x99s training, recently revised the\nentry procedure for the ANCOP. Semi-literate candidates (those who can read at a\nfirst-grade level) now can join the ANCOP but cannot enter the operational force\nuntil they have completed an intensive four-week training course to bring them up\nto a second-grade reading ability. In addition, literacy training is now incorporated\ninto the 14-week training course for ANCOP NCOs, to ensure that they can read at a\nthird-grade level.102\n According to NTM-A, 17,553 ANP personnel were in literacy training in November\n2010, approaching the goal of having 20,000 in training by December 2010. By July\n2011, a total of 40,000 ANP personnel are expected to be in literacy training.103 In\nOctober 2010, a contract for literacy training was put in place to meet the demand\nfor training approximately 70,000 ANP personnel. In November 2010, NTM-A com-\nmitted $765,000 to ANP literacy training, of which $78,000 was set aside specifically\nfor the ANCOP. The five-year budget forecast for the entire ANSF literacy program is\napproximately \xc2\xa3487 million, as reported by NTM-A (approximately $752.8 million).104\n\nWomen in the ANP\nAs of December 31, 2010, there were 1,241 women serving in the ANP\xe2\x80\x9450 more\nthan CSTC-A reported last quarter:105\n\xe2\x80\xa2 185 officers\n\xe2\x80\xa2 430 NCOs\n\xe2\x80\xa2 362 enlisted women\n\xe2\x80\xa2 264 civilians\n According to CSTC-A, the Gender Affairs Department of the MoI created a\nworking group to add an additional 1,000 female-coded positions to the spring\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 61\n\x0cSECURITY\n\n\n\n\n2011 (solar year [SY] 1389) tashkil. Also, when ANP Recruiting Command stood\nup in spring 2010 (at the beginning of SY 1389) it included a women\xe2\x80\x99s recruiting\ndirectorate. When the female-coded tashkil positions are announced, the new\ndirectorate will lead a recruiting campaign to meet the new goals. CSTC-A noted\nthat the MoI\xe2\x80\x99s goal is to have 5,000 women in the ANP by 2014.106 CSTC-A and the\nMoI have developed a plan to review the tashkil in order to verify true recruiting\nrequirements nationwide. This will involve painstaking analysis of every unit\xe2\x80\x99s\ntashkil for female positions, to compare numbers authorized and assigned.107\n\nANP Infrastructure\nThis quarter, DoD awarded 4 new infrastructure projects valued at $26.1 million.\nIn addition, 173 projects were ongoing ($688.9 million), 14 were completed ($34.6\nmillion), and 5 were terminated ($28.9 million), according to NTM-A/CSTC-A.\nThese projects comprise district and company headquarters, and command,\nlogistical, and training centers. The largest projects (both located in Wardak)\ninclude a national police training center, which is valued at $95.6 million and\nscheduled to be finished on April 24, 2011, and a national logistics center, which\nis valued at $40.1 million and scheduled to be finished on May 28, 2011.108\n On November 1, 2010, ITT Corporation took over O&M responsibilities for\n219 ANP police stations in all 34 provinces. As mentioned earlier in this section,\nthese contracts also cover ANA facilities. ITT Corporation will take over O&M\nresponsibilities at new facilities as they open.109 Oversight of O&M contracts is\npart of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2011 audit plan; for more information, see Section 1, p. 6.\n\nANP Equipment\nFrom October 1 to December 31, 2010, the ANP fielded 9,639 weapons, an increase\nof 50% over the number fielded last quarter. Most (68%) were AK-47 assault rifles.\nIn addition, the ANP fielded 1,532 vehicles and 579 radios. According to CSTC-A,\nthe cumulative value of this equipment is approximately $303 million.110 In an\nongoing performance audit, SIGAR is reviewing the accountability for ANSF\nvehicles provided by the United States; for more information, see Section 1, p. 15.\n CSTC-A noted that most of the equipment fielded by the ANP has come from\nthe United States, funded through the ASFF, in pseudo-FMS purchases. As is the\ncase in the ANA, some former Warsaw Pact weapons are still being procured from\ncountries such as Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Bosnia, but these weapons are procured\nthrough contracts awarded by U.S. Army contracting offices. Other mechanisms\nor processes for getting equipment to the ANP include cross-leveling (between\nthe ANP and ANA), the Excess Defense Articles program, and donations from\nother countries. Goals and benchmarks for equipping the ANP change based on\ncurrent conditions and the strategic needs of the ANP.111 Overall, more equipment\nwas fielded to the ANP this quarter than last, as shown in Table 3.4.\n According to IJC, rapid growth of the ANP\xe2\x80\x94owing to a shift in focus from\nbuilding the ANA to building the ANP\xe2\x80\x94is putting pressure on equipment\navailability in the field. The increase in personnel is outpacing the fielding of\n\n\n\n\n 62 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.4\n\n\nANP WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND RADIOS FIELDED\nType of Equipment Quarter Ending 9/30/2010 Quarter Ending 12/31/2010\nWeapons\n AK-47 assault rifle 4,345 6,575\n Other weapons 2,074 3,064\nVehicles\n Light and medium tactical vehicles 988 1,296\n Up-armored HMMWVa 192 216\nRadios\n VHF radiosb 1,128 579\n HF radiosc 53 0\na. Up-armored HMMWVs include M1151, M1152, and M1152 ambulance models.\nb. Very High Frequency (VHF) radios include various configurations of Motorola or ICOM radio systems.\nc. High Frequency (HF) radios include various configurations of CODAN radio systems.\nSource: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010 and 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\nequipment to the Regional Commands. IJC stated that possible solutions include\nfilling vacant combat support positions in the tashkil; requiring fielded units to\nadopt the most current logistical systems; and working with regional support\ncommands, ISAF, and the MoI to prioritize operational fielding support.112\n\nANP Local Initiatives\nThe Afghan Local Police (ALP) program embeds Afghan and U.S. personnel in\nrural communities to establish village-level police services, improve security,\nconnect villages with district and provincial government institutions, and provide\ndevelopment assistance, according to DoD. These small, defensive forces, which\nPresident Karzai established in August 2010, are supported by local shuras (coun-\ncils), but are controlled by the GIRoA.113\n As of December 31, 2010, the GIRoA and ISAF had established 14 ALP sites\n(an increase of 6 since September), located to ensure balanced ethnic, tribal,\nand geographic representation. The ALP program\xe2\x80\x94in conjunction with Village\nStability Operations (VSO)\xe2\x80\x94focuses on communities that have resisted the\nTaliban and other insurgents, especially in areas that have had limited ANSF and\nISAF presence. A key component is the deployment of ANA Special Forces at a\nnumber of sites, to facilitate security, development, and governance.114 For more\ninformation on VSO, see \xe2\x80\x9cGovernance\xe2\x80\x9d in this report.\n According to DoD, the ALP has produced some positive results and metrics,\nthough the security situation remains fragile in many areas.115 As of December\n31, 2010, the ALP had established security over an area of 12,500 square kilo-\nmeters. DoD stated that the ALP is weakening the influence of the Taliban over\ncommunities, and that senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Mohammad\nOmar, have expressed concern that ALP sites are undermining their rural sup-\nport base. In Omar\xe2\x80\x99s home province, Uruzgan, ALP sites have helped expand\nthe reach of security efforts. They have also had success in parts of neighboring\nDaykundi, Zabul, and Kandahar.116\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 63\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n DoD noted challenges to these efforts. For example, the Taliban and other\n insurgents have intimidated and committed violence against residents at ALP\n sites. Compounding this, ongoing intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions have forced\n the GIRoA to mediate disputes. Notwithstanding these issues, the GIRoA con-\n tinues to establish counter-measures to insurgent actions and adopt long-term\n solutions to local-level challenges, with U.S. support, according to DoD.117\n The GIRoA planned for the ALP to operate for two to five years, at which\n point ALP members are expected to be demobilized or transitioned into the\n ANSF. In provinces such as Helmand, ALP members are transitioning into the\n ANP, according to DoD.118\n\n U.S. Support for the Ministry of Interior\n The Security Assistance Office - Afghanistan (SAO-A), part of NTM-A/CSTC-A,\n has been providing audits to the MoI\xe2\x80\x99s Procurement Department since July 24,\n 2010. SAO-A has completed six contracting-related audits, covering procurement\n planning, bidder eligibility, procurement proceedings, contract award proce-\n dures, contract administration, and payment functions. In these audits, SAO-A\n found that the lack of facilities and equipment\xe2\x80\x94such as office space, office\n furniture, file storage, computers, copiers, and a modern procurement system\xe2\x80\x94\n caused the MoI to expend an inordinate amount of effort to solicit bids, make\n contract awards, and administer contracts. Furthermore, lack of work space\n resulted in a lack of transparency: each office maintained only the paper files\n essential for the specific function it executes.119\n The Procurement Department processes contracts for food, firewood, cloth-\n ing, office equipment, vehicle fuel, building rentals, and construction and repairs.\n CSTC-A plans to transfer the responsibility for procuring an additional $186 million\n in new requirements to the Procurement Department in SY 1390 (2010/2011)\xe2\x80\x94an\n approximate 133% increase over what the department procured in SY 1388.120\n\n U.S. FORCES\n According to USFOR-A, 101,872 U.S. forces were serving in Afghanistan as of\n December 31, 2010\xe2\x80\x941,855 fewer than reported last quarter. These forces were\n assigned as follows:121\nTABLE 3.5 \xe2\x80\xa2 78,322 to ISAF\n \xe2\x80\xa2 3,415 to NTM-A/CSTC-A\nNADR FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN: \xe2\x80\xa2 10,316 to USFOR-A\n2002\xe2\x80\x932010 ($ MILLIONS)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 9,819 to other assignments (unspecified)\nFiscal Year NADR Funding Cumulative Total\n2002\xe2\x80\x932007 $238.60 $238.60\n2008 $26.60 $265.20\n REMOVING UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE\n2009 $48.60 $313.80 Since 2002, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) has provided more than $371.6 million\n2010 $57.80 $371.60 in funding for Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR)\nTotal $371.60 programs to Afghanistan, according to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.\nSource: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011. That funding has increased significantly since 2007, as shown in Table 3.5.122\n\n\n\n\n 64 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c SECURITY\n\n\n\n\n According to DoS, the Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) program\nprovides direct funding to five Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs),\nfour international NGOs, and one U.S. company (DynCorp International) for\nsustained clearance operations, removal and mitigation of abandoned and at-risk\nconventional weapons (to prevent their use by insurgents), and development of\nAfghan technical and managerial capacity. The DoS Bureau of Political-Military\nAffairs\xe2\x80\x99 Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), which manages\nthe program in Afghanistan, reported that this assistance includes the destruc-\ntion of excess, unserviceable, and at-risk ANSF weapons and ordnance. The\nprogram also provides technical assistance for the physical security and stock-\npile management of serviceable, on-hand ANSF weapons and ordnance.123\n The PM-WRA stated that, from October 1, 2009, to September 30, 2010, more\nthan 39.3 million square meters of land had been cleared by DoS-funded imple-\nmenting partners, as shown in Table 3.6. This accounts for nearly 20% of the\n199.8 million square meters that have been cleared since 1997. In addition, these\npartners have destroyed or removed more than 12,542 metric tons of stockpiled,\nabandoned, at-risk, or unserviceable ordnance and ammunition.124 According\nto CWD performance metrics provided by the PM-WRA, the contaminated area\nin Afghanistan was reduced from approximately 670.7 million square meters\nto approximately 650.7 million square meters from December 31, 2009, to\nSeptember 30, 2010.125\n According to DoS, the UN\xe2\x80\x99s Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan\n(MACCA) has revised its strategic goals and near-term objectives to reflect a\nreduced level of donor support. Consequently, MACCA has revised the antici-\npated time required to clear 90% of all known areas contaminated by mines\nand explosive remnants of war. The new goal for achieving this target is 2015.\nMACCA projections indicate that 70% of hazards will be reduced by March 2013.\nAccording to DoS, this projection is based on an assumption of sustained com-\nbined U.S. and international donor funding of no less than $80 million per year.126\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.6\n\n\nCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM METRICS: OCTOBER 1, 2009\xe2\x80\x93SEPTEMBER 30, 2010\n Estimated\n AT/AP UXO SAA Fragments Minefields Contaminated Areas\nDate Range Destroyed Destroyed Destroyed Cleared Cleared (m2) Remaining (m2)\n10/1\xe2\x80\x9312/31/2009 4,649 140,480 58,651 1,055,683 19,289,205 670,710,000\n1/1\xe2\x80\x933/31/2010 2,455 1,943 129,557 603,957 6,475,318 664,235,000\n4/1\xe2\x80\x936/30/2010 2,853 249,946 217,901 968,887 4,464,926 659,770,000\n7/1\xe2\x80\x939/30/2010 3,922 270,793 1,196,158 1,710,708 9,108,108 650,662,000\nTotal 13,879 663,162 1,602,267 4,339,235 39,337,557 650,662,000\nNotes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition.\nSource: DoS, PM-WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 65\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 66 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nGOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, AND\nHUMAN RIGHTS\nAs of December 31, 2010, the United States had provided more than $16.15\nbillion to support governance and development in Afghanistan.127 This section\nfocuses on the efforts of the United States, the international community, and the\nGovernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to improve gover-\nnance and rule of law, including elections and election reform, local governance,\npublic administration, justice systems, and human rights.\n\nOVERVIEW OF EVENTS\nA number of events this quarter affected the progress of efforts to improve gov-\nernance in Afghanistan. The final results of last quarter\xe2\x80\x99s Wolesi Jirga elections\nwere announced and proved contentious: many disagreed with the actions of\nthe two election commissions. The prolonged controversy created a rift between\ngovernment officials, politicians, and voters that continued at press time.\n Also this quarter, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\nmet in Lisbon with officials from the GIRoA to map out a framework for\nincreased GIRoA control of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s security and governance. In addition,\nthe High Peace Council ramped up its efforts to promote reconciliation with\nand reintegration of former insurgents by choosing a leader and conducting its\nfirst outreach events across the country. It is not yet clear how successful these\nefforts will be, but the U.S. government supports the initiatives.\n\nElections\nOn November 24, 2010, after repeated delays, the Independent Election\nCommission (IEC) announced the official results of last quarter\xe2\x80\x99s elections for\nthe Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the National Assembly (except for Ghazni\nprovince, for which official results were announced on December 1).128 More\nthan a quarter of the votes were disqualified, and fewer than half of the incum-\nbent members won reelection.129\n According to the U.S. Department of State (DoS), although irregularities and\nfraud marred the elections, the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission\n(ECC) worked well overall to administer them.130\xc2\xa0At every stage, however, the\nFree and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) observed many irregu-\nlarities that it believes necessitate electoral reform.131 FEFA submitted evidence\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 67\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n to both electoral commissions of 890 \xe2\x80\x9cserious\xe2\x80\x9d cases of electoral irregularities,\n including ballot-stuffing, intimidation of voters, use of fake voter cards, and\n proxy voting.132 According to FEFA, the electoral process requires a number of\n improvements:133\n \xe2\x80\xa2 greater transparency in the work of electoral institutions\n \xe2\x80\xa2 improved vetting of candidates for ties to insurgents\n \xe2\x80\xa2 greater access to election activities for election observers and candidate\n representatives\n \xe2\x80\xa2 more protection for those threatened in the election process\n \xe2\x80\xa2 strengthened independence and technical capabilities for the IEC and ECC\n The elections created a significant shift in the ethnic representation of the\n Wolesi Jirga. Ethnic Pashtuns\xe2\x80\x94Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s largest ethnic group\xe2\x80\x94lost more\n than 20 seats. Insecurity in the predominantly Pashtun south and east, and lower\n levels of Pashtun political organization were the primary reasons for the losses,\n according to the UN.134 Those losses were particularly acute in the majority-Pash-\n tun province of Ghazni, where all 11 seats went to Hazara candidates.135\n\n Controversies\n Throughout the quarter, the elections and decisions affecting their outcome\n provoked controversy. IEC and ECC decisions set off numerous demonstrations\n by Afghans, many of them supporters of unsuccessful candidates. Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\n Attorney General, Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, denounced the election results\n and announced investigations into the conduct of the two commissions and\n the elections. In early December, the Attorney General arrested some IEC\n staff members, which sparked concern from the U.S. Agency for International\n Development (USAID).136\n The allocation of authority to resolve electoral matters was another source\n of controversy: the Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office asserted it had a role, although the\nFIGURE 3.22\n IEC and ECC claimed they had complete legal authority to make all electoral\n decisions. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)\nPOLLING STATIONS INCLUDED AND supported the IEC and ECC.137 In response, President Hamid Karzai approved\nEXCLUDED BY THE IEC AND ECC (PERCENT) the Supreme Court\xe2\x80\x99s proposal to create a special five-member court to resolve\n disputes related to the elections brought by candidates.138\n On January 19, 2011, the special court asked President Karzai to postpone the\n Excluded\n 16\n January 23, 2011 inauguration of the National Assembly to give the court more\n time for its investigations. At press time, it was not yet clear how the court\xe2\x80\x99s\n request would affect the incoming Wolesi Jirga.139\n\n Included IEC and ECC Monitoring\n 84\n During the election and ballot counting, the IEC conducted audits and fraud\n detection and correction measures. It also recounted votes from 6,813 poll-\n ing stations (38.4% of the 17,744 open stations) and subsequently excluded the\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. At \xe2\x80\x9cexcluded\xe2\x80\x9d\npolling stations, some or all of the votes were excluded. results from 2,543 stations.140 Approximately 16% of the polling places were\nSource: UN, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General,\xe2\x80\x9d excluded, as shown in Figure 3.22. The IEC reported 413 candidates suspected\n12/10/2010, p. 2.\n\n\n\n\n 68 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nof fraud to the ECC for resolution; 62 were sitting members of Parliament. In\naddition, the IEC accused an unspecified number of its own officials of fraud.141\nThe IEC admitted that it did not sufficiently control some polling centers, which\nallowed candidates, local commanders, security officials, government staff, and\nothers to commit fraud\xe2\x80\x94sometimes in collusion with IEC staff\xe2\x80\x94to promote\nspecific candidates.142\n The ECC and the 34 Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions (PECCs)\nreceived 5,860 complaints, 2,724 of which were deemed serious enough to possi-\nbly affect results. The ECC\xe2\x80\x99s investigations resulted in the disqualification of 118\ncandidates. The ECC also invalidated votes from 334 polling stations, in addition\nto those invalidated by the IEC. In total, the IEC and ECC invalidated some or all\nof the votes from 2,891 audited stations. These actions invalidated more than 1.3\nmillion votes; almost 4.3 million votes were deemed valid.143 The ECC also inves-\ntigated numerous allegations against candidates accused of campaign finance\nabuses. As a result, 878 candidates were fined for such infractions as receiving\ncampaign donations in excess of permitted amounts and incurring campaign\nexpenses that were greater than the value of their registered property.144\n\nResults of U.S. Support for Election Administration\nU.S. support for the IEC helped the commission recruit and train approximately\n105,000 polling staff members, 3,100 project staff members, and 3,150 district field\ncoordinators. During a two-month program conducted with U.S. assistance, the SIGAR AUDIT\nIEC registered more than 377,000 voters. U.S. assistance helped the ECC recruit In an audit report published in Sep-\nand train 500 staff to conduct investigations, case management, and legal adjudi- tember 2009, SIGAR found that the IEC\ncation. To increase awareness and participation in the elections, the United States faced significant challenges, particularly\nhelped 2,000 civil educators lead voter forums and press training on how best to for the 2010 parliamentary elections,\ncover elections, as well as on the roles of government and its citizens.145 because it lacked the resources to\n As reported in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, the operating bud- undertake elections without continued\nget for the elections was $149.6 million. Funding for the operating budget was international support. For more informa-\nprovided by the United States and international donors through the United tion, see SIGAR, Audit 9-6, \xe2\x80\x9cStrategy\nNations Development Programme. At press time, the final cost had not yet and Resources Needed to Sustain\nbeen determined. USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Elections Afghan Electoral Capacity,\xe2\x80\x9d available at\nObservation Program, which had obligated $15.2 million and expended more www.sigar.mil.\nthan $13 million as of December 31, 2010, funded four international observer\nmissions: Democracy International, National Democratic Institute, International\nRepublican Institute, and the Asia Foundation\xe2\x80\x99s Asian Network for Free\nElections. These four missions provided 301 short-term and long-term observ-\ners in all but five provinces\xe2\x80\x94Nimroz, Uruzgan, Daykundi, Laghman, and Kunar.\nUSAID stated that the lack of security was the greatest challenge to observing\nthese elections.146\n USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Supporting Increased Electoral Participation program funded moni-\ntoring of the election and its aftermath by the National Democratic Institute,\nwhich issued a number of recommendations to improve future elections:147\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The Wolesi Jirga should approve the appointment of IEC commissioners.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The Wolesi Jirga should secure the independence of the ECC.\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 69\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The Wolesi Jirga should launch a comprehensive review of the electoral\n process.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The GIRoA should vigorously prosecute those responsible for election-\n related violence and electoral misconduct.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The ECC should take steps to ensure that PECCs apply uniform procedures\n and act in a transparent manner.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Women\xe2\x80\x99s access to polling stations should be improved.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Greater security for female candidates is needed.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Candidate vetting must be based on established criteria and independent\n identification of illegally armed individuals.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 A national census should be conducted as soon as practicable.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 The ECC should be made into a permanent body.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 An accurate voter registry or civil registry should be prepared.\n\nNATO Lisbon Summit\nOn November 19 and 20, 2010, representatives from NATO, the United States, and\nGIRoA\xe2\x80\x94including the U.S. and Afghan presidents\xe2\x80\x94met in Lisbon. The purpose of\nthe meeting was to lay out a framework for the future of Afghanistan, NATO\xe2\x80\x99s com-\nmitment to the country, and expanded GIRoA control of security and governance.148\n In the official declaration from the summit, NATO and the GIRoA stated\nthat \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan is increasingly capable of exercising its leadership across the\ninter-linked domains of governance, development, and security.\xe2\x80\x9d149 NATO also\nre-affirmed its \xe2\x80\x9clong-term commitment to a sovereign, independent, democratic,\nsecure, and stable Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists\nand terrorism, and to a better future for the Afghan people.\xe2\x80\x9d150\n The GIRoA reaffirmed that it would \xe2\x80\x9cactively carry out its security, governance,\nand development responsibilities in a manner consistent with the commitments\nmade at the London Conference of January 2010 and the Kabul Conference of\nJuly 2010, such as combating terrorism, strengthening the economy, address-\ning corruption, regional security and economic cooperation, and respect for\nhuman rights, in particular the rights of women.\xe2\x80\x9d151 The GIRoA also promised\nto continue to cooperate with its regional neighbors in various decision-making\nprocesses. This cooperation would build on events such as the January 2010\nIstanbul Summit, in which Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s neighbors officially endorsed the pro-\ncess of reconciliation with the Taliban and other insurgent groups.152\n U.S. officials expressed optimism about the results of the summit. U.S.\nAmbassador Karl W. Eikenberry said that NATO\xe2\x80\x99s commitment to increase\nsupport for enhancements to Afghan leadership in governance, military, and eco-\nnomic matters is a positive development. He also saw the results of the summit\nas a clear plan for a transition plan to greater Afghan control.153\n\nRECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION\nRenewed reconciliation and reintegration efforts began in 2010, and they con-\ntinued to progress this quarter. The United States supports reconciliation and\n\n\n\n\n 70 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nreintegration and views these processes as necessary steps in establishing a long-\nterm political resolution.154\n Various efforts to reconcile and reintegrate Taliban forces have occurred since\nthe fall of the Taliban in 2001, according to a U.S. National Defense University\npublication.155 The results of those efforts have been mixed; difficulties in defining\nwhich insurgents were eligible for reconciliation as well as a lack of coordina-\ntion between the many reintegration programs have contributed to the challenge\nof achieving reintegration. The current program, though, is the most extensive\nand best coordinated to date, according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense\n(OSD); it addresses many of the lessons learned from previous efforts.156\n The Afghan people are strongly in favor of reconciliation and are optimistic\nabout its success, according to a November 2010 poll conducted by the Asia\nFoundation. Of those surveyed, 83% favored reconciliation\xe2\x80\x94a 12% improvement\nfrom the Foundation\xe2\x80\x99s October 2009 survey. A large majority (79%) agreed that\nreconciliation would help stabilize the country. Women viewed reconciliation\nslightly less favorably than men: 78% favored reconciliation, as opposed to 88%\nof men.157\n\nHigh Peace Council\nThis quarter, the High Peace Council conducted its first official meetings. On\nOctober 10, 2010, former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was unani-\nmously chosen to lead the Council.158 The Council\xe2\x80\x99s 70 members represent every\nmajor religious, regional, ethnic, and political group in the country. Twelve are\n\n\n\n\nMembers of the High Peace Council and provincial governors from southern Afghanistan\nanswer questions about reconciliation and reintegration during a press conference in Kandahar\nCity on December 6, 2010. The Council conducted three outreach events this quarter to pro-\nmote public support for these two processes. (U.S. Army photo, SPC Edward A. Garibay, 16th\nMobile Public Affairs Detachment)\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 71\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nformer officials of the Taliban regime.159 There are 10 female representatives, and\nwomen are represented in every subcommittee of the Council.160\n From September 2010 to January 12, 2011, the Council conducted three\nmajor regional outreach events (in Nangarhar, Herat, and Kandahar) with the\nAfghan Peace and Reintegration Plan (APRP) Joint Secretariat and provincial\nauthorities, according to DoS. The Council used these events to garner public\nand government support, explain the program, and set the conditions for the\nestablishment of Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees (PPRCs).\nThirteen provinces have convened PPRCs, and 11 others were getting started,\nas of December 31, 2010. According to DoS, the Council\xe2\x80\x99s actions this quarter\nenergized public and government support for the APRP.161\n From January 4 through January 8, 2011, the Council held meetings in\nIslamabad, which represented an extensive regional outreach effort, according\nto OSD. The Council met with Pakistan government and opposition officials, as\nwell as civic and religious leaders. OSD stated that these meetings have opened\nchannels for continued dialogue that could improve regional relations and secure\nPakistani cooperation in future reconciliation and reintegration activities.162\n Throughout the quarter, numerous reports surfaced about the progress of\ntalks between the Council and various insurgent groups. However, the Taliban\nhas publicly denied its involvement with both the Council and the idea of negoti-\nations, labeling any reports to the contrary as propaganda.163 The United Nations\n(UN) Secretary-General\xe2\x80\x99s December 2010 quarterly report stated that although\nthe reconciliation process is difficult, \xe2\x80\x9cThere is an increasing sense that condi-\ntions for reconciliation are becoming more favorable and that there may soon\nbe a real opportunity for a political dialogue leading to a settlement.\xe2\x80\x9d The report\nnoted that all sides must make compromises to reach a political settlement and\nthat any settlement must respect the Afghan Constitution and not undermine the\nachievements in human rights and democratization made in recent years.164\n On October 31, 2010, UNAMA announced it had formed a group of experts\n(the Salaam Support Group) to support the High Peace Council in all aspects\nof its work. UNAMA also announced it would provide logistical support for the\nCouncil at the national and regional levels.165\n\nReconciliation and Reintegration Prospects\nThis quarter, coalition representatives were cautiously optimistic about rein-\ntegration. The Commander of Regional Command-South predicted that once\nthe insurgency encountered sustained pressure from the International Security\nAssistance Force (ISAF), especially during the winter months, elements within\nthose violent groups would become more willing to reintegrate.166 According\nto the late Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard C.\nHolbrooke, a growing number of Taliban members have been communicating\ntheir willingness to reintegrate. Ambassador Holbrooke saw this development as\na product of the fact that many members are less ideological in their core beliefs\nthan the larger Taliban organization and are more aligned with their own smaller\norganizations. This lack of extreme fundamentalism among some elements of the\n\n\n\n 72 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n FIGURE 3.23\n\nTaliban has made some members more willing to reintegrate, especially when DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS FOR\nfaced with the increased military pressure from ISAF.167 REINTEGREES\n\nLocal Reintegration Efforts\nThis quarter, armed groups continued to approach local authorities at various\n REGISTRATION\nlevels throughout the county to express their willingness to disarm and rein-\ntegrate through the GIRoA-led APRP, according to DoD. The APRP consists of\n Expressed intent to reintegrate (PPRC)\nthree stages:168\n \xe2\x80\xa2 outreach and negotiation\n Individual survey (PPRC)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 demobilization\n \xe2\x80\xa2 community recovery Supply of personal details,\n community, employment history,\n As of January 6, 2011, the GIRoA had received pledges of approximately $150 education/employment desires\nmillion to support the APRP. However, the GIRoA has yet to develop the financial\nmechanisms necessary to transfer those funds to provisional authorities for their Listing of grievances\nimplementation.169 ISAF and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan support the APRP through\ntheir work with government officials, the Afghan National Security Forces Biometrics collection (MoI)\n(ANSF), and local leaders. Fourteen provinces had established provincial com-\nmittees, and an additional 13 were in the organizational process. More than 20 Weapon registration/management\n (MoI, MoD) (DIAG)\ndistrict committees had been established, and many others were in the organiza-\ntional process.170\n Issuance of ID card (MoI) (DIAG/PTS)\n According to DoS, 645 individuals claiming to be militants have enrolled\nin the APRP, as of December 31, 2010.171 Representatives of ISAF, the ministries\nof Interior and Defense, and the National Directorate for Security assess requests\nfor reintegrating and record requesters\xe2\x80\x99 biometric data, as well as register and\ncollecting weapons. In addition, assistance packages containing food and non- PROCESSING\nfood items are provided to support reintegrees for 90 days, according to the UN.\nThe UN saw initial signs of reintegration efforts as promising, but it is too early Vetting by community (supported by PPRC)\nto conclude that this indicates a significant trend. Furthermore, questions have\narisen about how many of those individuals are actually militants, and how Sharing of biometric data and intelligence\nmany are noncombatants lured by the assistance programs offered to reinte- with ISAF/Coalition Forces (TF Biometrics)\n\ngrees.172 The demobilization process for a reintegree entails two stages, as\nshown in Figure 3.23. Vetting by the ANSF and\n ISAF/Coalition Forces\n According to OSD, the APRP faces many challenges to achieve success:173\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Afghan caution: OSD noted that Afghans have been cautious about joining\n Reintegration declaration (PPRC)\n the APRP for two reasons. Many doubt its chances of success, and many lack\n confidence in the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s support for it. Placement on restricted target list\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reintegree security: OSD noted that the Taliban has targeted reintegrees, (MoI, MoD, NDS, ISAF/Coalition Forces)\n\n although OSD did not specify the number of attacks. The GIRoA and the\n ANSF are responsible for ensuring reintegrees\xe2\x80\x99 security, but OSD noted Issuance of political amnesty (GIRoA)\n that ISAF should verify the security situation and assist when necessary.\n Furthermore, OSD pointed out that reintegrees are not disarmed and may\n use safe houses temporarily. Notes: PPRC = Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committee.\n DIAG = Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. PTS = Program\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Limited awareness: Although local media coverage of the APRP and the High Takhim-E Solh (\xe2\x80\x9cStrengthening Peace Program\xe2\x80\x9d). TF = Task\n Force. NDS = National Directorate of Security.\n Peace Council has increased awareness of reintegration opportunities, OSD\n Source: OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 73\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n noted that provincial and district officials, as well as the security forces, con-\n tinue to have limited awareness. According to OSD, program implementation,\n mobilization of support, and outreach will fail without greater awareness.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Dialogue issues: Insurgents contact the GIRoA through various chan-\n nels, OSD stated, leaving ISAF unaware of contact until the APRP Joint\n Secretariat reports it. Before an insurgent agrees to reintegrate, it can take\n months of dialogue to establish trust and make the appropriate arrange-\n ments. According to OSD, ISAF supports such dialogue without becoming\n directly involved.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Afghan ownership: Provincial authorities have repeatedly lost interest in\n pursuing individual cases of reintegration, according to OSD, leaving rein-\n tegrees without support and causing many reintegrees to return to the fight.\n Therefore, OSD noted, Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committees and\n Provincial Reintegration Support Teams (PRSTs) must be set up to support\n reintegration.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Targeting restrictions: Dialogue about reintegration occurs with insurgents\n who have been designated as legitimate targets by ISAF. According to OSD,\n such targeting must be restricted as soon as possible\xe2\x80\x94even before a commit-\n ment is made or identification is verified\xe2\x80\x94if reintegration is to succeed. OSD\n noted that targeting can resume if the dialogue fails.\n\nU.S. Assistance in Reintegration\nThe United States has made available up to $100 million in FY 2010 and an esti-\nmated $50 million for FY 2011 to support reintegration, according to DoS. As of\nDecember 31, 2010, the United States has contributed $50 million to the APRP\nthrough the National Solidarity Program (NSP).174 The Afghanistan Reintegration\nProgram (ARP) is a DoD initiative aimed at supporting APRP. During FY 2010,\nmore than $320,000 was spent to support ARP activities. Most of that spend-\ning was concentrated on outreach to shuras and reintegrating individuals into\ntheir communities. Only minimal funds were provided this quarter, according to\nOSD, because a Continuing Resolution in the Congress, in effect until December\n21, 2010, did not include authorization for spending funds on reintegration.\nThe Secretary of Defense, however, authorized the use of Emergency and\nExtraordinary Expense funds for reintegration, allowing some ARP projects to\nbe carried out.175\n Plans and projections for the ARP are fluid. According to OSD, this program\nflexibility is particularly tied to community recovery initiatives, which aim to\nensure that peace and reintegration are permanent by administering commu-\nnity recovery packages that benefit the entire community, not just the former\nfighter. To support community recovery, OSD noted, ISAF is considering using a\nnumber of development programs. This support could include using funds from\nProvincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) assistance, the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency\nResponse Program (CERP), and ARP funding provided under the FY 2011\nNational Defense Authorization Act, if appropriate.176\n\n\n\n\n 74 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nPROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT GOVERNANCE\nThis quarter, improved security, particularly in the south, facilitated a measur-\nable improvement in the performance of provincial and district governments,\naccording to senior DoD and DoS officials.177 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nsaw these gains as tenuous and susceptible to regression.178 According to DoD,\nsustained effort by both GIRoA and coalition forces is crucial for a more solid\nand dependable outcome for Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s governance capabilities.179 Overall,\nAfghan perception of local governance is positive: 78% assess their provincial\ngovernment positively, according to the Asia Foundation.180\n Achieving effective subnational governance is a slow and difficult process,\naccording to DoD. Key structural issues related to low levels of literacy, inad-\nequate access to educational opportunities, difficulties in hiring and maintaining\nstaff as a result of lower salaries than international organizations pay, and perva-\nsive corruption have all contributed to the stagnation of efforts to recruit, train,\nand retain adequate personnel.181 DoD\xe2\x80\x99s most recent assessment of governance in\n124 districts found that only 38% of Afghans reside in areas considered as having\n\xe2\x80\x9cfull authority\xe2\x80\x9d or \xe2\x80\x9cemerging\xe2\x80\x9d governance.182\n\nEnhancing Local Governance\nThis quarter, the United States continued to focus on improving governance\nat the local level. According to DoD, one approach is to find and support local\nleaders who can provide quality leadership and facilitate partnerships between\ncommunities and district governments. According to the Commander of Regional\nCommand-South, program administrators who are responsible for recruiting\nsuch leaders now have sufficient experience to better identify the skills and\nqualifications necessary to succeed in leadership positions at the district level.\nRecruiting elders who can best connect and lead a community through shuras, or\ncommunity councils, to support the GIRoA is a constructive step toward creat-\ning enduring stability. Furthermore, decentralizing appointments and appointing\nindividuals based on merit rather than bribes should increase Afghan\xe2\x80\x99s faith in\ngovernment.183\n From January 1 to December 15, 2010, U.S. assistance helped create 65 new\ndistrict-level community councils in 12 insecure provinces, according to USAID.\nUntil district-level elections are conducted, these councils will serve as the main\nconduit for interactions between communities and government. Existing councils\nhave extended the reach of basic governance institutions at the district level.184\n In areas with improving security, civilian agencies and the GIRoA have part-\nnered effectively to deliver significant progress in enhancing the capabilities of\nlocal governance, according to DoS. DoS has concentrated much of its civilian\nsurge elements on districts in Kandahar and Helmand to coincide with ISAF\xe2\x80\x99s\npush to improve security in those notoriously volatile areas. This has improved\ncivilian capacity in those regions.185\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 75\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n Southern Afghanistan\n The push to improve stability in Kandahar that began in April 2010 has improved\n the security situation enough to create an opportunity to build long-lasting local\n governance capabilities, according to the Commander of Regional Command-\n South. Conditions on the ground have allowed elders to return to their homes\n and travel more freely, with fewer concerns about Taliban retribution for\n cooperation with ISAF.186 According to DoS, however, the Taliban has an active\n assassination campaign against government officials, which has affected the abil-\n ity to establish solid local governance in the area.187\n Helmand province also has improved governance capabilities, according to\n the senior representative of the United Kingdom in southern Afghanistan.188\n Eleven of 14 districts had district governors as of November 8, 2010\xe2\x80\x94a marked\n improvement from 2008, when only 5 district governors were in place.189 Five\n districts in Helmand also have community councils, which have enabled ISAF\n forces to build relationships with local representatives to promote governance\n and economic initiatives that best represent the needs of the local population.190\n The city of Marjah indicates how success in military campaigns can promote\n greater governmental control, according to DoD. In 2009, Marjah was an insur-\n gent command and control center, a focal point for assembly of improvised\n explosive devices, and a hub for illegal narcotics activities. On November 23,\n 2010, after a major security push by ISAF, a DoS official stated that the GIRoA\n controlled Marjah. Progress has been demonstrated through increased voter\n registration\xe2\x80\x94from 22 in the 2009 presidential elections to about 600 in the 2010\n elections.191 A decline in improvised explosive device attacks has enabled govern-\n ment employees to travel in and around the city more freely.192\n\n Local Governance and Community Development\n USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program is\n designed to help create a stable environment for medium- and long-term politi-\n cal, economic, and social development. From October 2006 to December 31,\n 2010, the LGCD obligated more than $316 million and disbursed more than $238.7\n million.193 The program has three main metrics for success:194\nSIGAR AUDIT \xe2\x80\xa2 increased ability of GIRoA officials to provide services\n \xe2\x80\xa2 increased community ownership of stability and development activities\nThis quarter, SIGAR announced a new\n \xe2\x80\xa2 identification of the root causes of instability and addressing them through\naudit of USAID contracts in support of\n operational planning\nits Local Governance and Community\nDevelopment projects. For more infor- This quarter, USAID reported a number of challenges in administering the\nmation, see Section 1, p. 11. LGCD:195\n \xe2\x80\xa2 A failure in ISAF\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cclear and hold\xe2\x80\x9d operations would make success especially\n difficult.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Partnership with the GIRoA requires constant reinforcement.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 In unstable areas, subcontracting is having limited results compared with\n community grants or procurements, and direct implementation.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Activities are not matched to the needs of a counter-insurgency environment.\n\n\n\n\n 76 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n Despite these challenges, according to USAID, the LGCD has helped improve\nstability throughout the country: Shindand, Guzara, and Injil districts in Herat;\nBala Mughrab, Qades, and Muqur districts in Badghis; Lashkar Gah in Helmand;\nMaywand and Kandahar City in Kandahar; along the Khowst-Gardez road in\nKhowst; Jalrez and Nerkh districts in Wardak; and districts in Logar, Paktiya,\nand Parwan. Efforts in Kunar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Paktika, and most of Helmand\nhave been unsuccessful, owing to deteriorating security, corruption, and inad-\nequate planning. In 2011, according to USAID, the LGCD will be replaced by the\nStabilization in Key Areas program, which will divide its work into four regional\nprograms.196\n\nVillage Stability Operations\nDoD\xe2\x80\x99s Village Stability Operations (VSO) program works in conjunction with the\nAfghan Local Police (ALP) program to deploy Afghan and U.S. personnel into\nrural areas to connect villages to district and provincial government institutions,\naccording to OSD. VSO facilitates community development councils and shuras\nto connect villages to the districts, in addition to improving the capacity of dis-\ntrict centers. VSO also helps villagers stand up against insurgents and provides\ndevelopment assistance.197 For additional information on VSO and the ALP\xe2\x80\x99s joint\nwork to improve security, see \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity\xe2\x80\x9d in this report.\n VSO recently established a four-step strategy:198\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Shape: Choose VSO sites by identifying those areas where locals have\n requested assistance against insurgents; are strategically important for the\n GIRoA, ISAF, and insurgents; and are sustainable.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Hold: Embed personnel in the village to assist in governance, development,\n and security.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Build: Link villages to their district and provincial governments through insti-\n tutional arrangements like shuras and development projects.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Transition: Move toward greater Afghan leadership.\nVSO has improved the levels of governance and security in its areas of opera-\ntions, according to OSD. As of December 31, 2010, there were 31 VSO sites.\nUruzgan province, home of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, is one of\nthe most successful areas of VSO operations. VSO and the ALP have expanded\ngovernance and security across the province and have used local empowerment\nto weaken Taliban influence. Similar results have occurred in Daykundi, Zabul,\nand Kandahar. Senior Taliban leaders, including Omar, have expressed concern\nthat VSO and ALP are undermining its rural support.199\n Challenges to VSO remain, though, and the situation remains fragile, accord-\ning to OSD. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have generated a campaign\nof intimidation and assassination against individuals involved with VSO and the\nALP. This campaign has included targeted assassinations, \xe2\x80\x9cnight letters\xe2\x80\x9d (threats)\nto collaborators, and kidnappings of supporters. Furthermore, district gover-\nnance is weak in some areas, which can undercut the connection of villages to\ndistrict and provincial governments. Intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions also\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 77\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n have affected VSO expansion. According to OSD, the GIRoA and the United\n States continue to create counter-measures to blunt insurgent actions and adopt\n long-term solutions to these local governance challenges.200\n\n PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM\n Capacity building continues to be a key issue in enhancing public administration.\n According to the UN, the GIRoA has demonstrated its determination to imple-\n ment the actions outlined in the Kabul Process, which is designed to transition\n the country to full Afghan control. On November 15, 2010, at the 15th meeting\n of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the GIRoA reported that more\n than 70% of the October 2010 benchmarks had been met. The UN saw this as an\n indicator of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s \xe2\x80\x9cgrowing capacity to assume ownership of and responsi-\n bility for Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s transition and development.\xe2\x80\x9d201\n The Afghan Cabinet\xe2\x80\x99s approval of a line in the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s budget to fund the\n Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission was a positive step in improving\n governance, according to the UN. The UN also noted that the GIRoA has devel-\n oped a medium-term fiscal framework to prioritize expenditures and domestic\n revenues, create a strategy aimed at reinvigorating public administration reform,\n revise the Civil Service Law, and propel the implementation of pay and grade\n reform.202\n On October 19, 2010, President Karzai issued a decree that centralized the\n appointment of high-ranking officials in the Civil Service Commission. The\nFIGURE 3.24 decree prevented ministers and governors from selecting their senior staff but\n allowed them to recommend individuals for the staff. This decree is intended to\nSURVEY: HOW MUCH INFLUENCE CAN YOU\n make the appointment process more transparent and less political. Karzai also\nHAVE OVER GOVERNMENT DECISIONS?\n committed to make no appointments himself.203\n Public perception of the GIRoA is fairly positive, according to the previously\n Total: 6,467 mentioned public perception survey by the Asia Foundation: a slight majority\n expressed confidence in public administration (57%) and in the ministries (54%).\n The performance of government was also generally perceived favorably: 73% of\n None at all\n 1,552 Afghans believe that the GIRoA is carrying out its responsibilities, a 6% percent\n increase from 2008.204 And the majority of those polled (54%) believe that they\n Some Very little can influence government decisions, as shown in Figure 3.24.\n 2,716 1,229\n On October 10, 2010, the European Union (EU) announced that it would\n A lot refocus its work to improve capacity at the central and subnational levels\n 776\n of the GIRoA. The EU stated that structural deficiencies in the civil service,\n Don\xe2\x80\x99t know ambiguous mandates, and connections between subnational and central gov-\n 194 ernment institutions are major barriers to legal and structural reform in public\n administration. In response to a request from President Karzai and other high-\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Complete wording of\nquestion was \xe2\x80\x9cHow much influence do you think someone\n ranking officials, the EU has started to evaluate the possibility of a concerted\nlike you can have over government decisions?\xe2\x80\x9d effort to support civil service training. This support could include a dedicated\nSource: Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan in 2010: A Survey of\nthe Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010, p. 200. network of regional training centers across the country.205\n\n\n\n\n 78 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nU.S. Support for Public Administration Reform\nThe GIRoA has developed into an integral partner in the planning and execution\nof numerous projects funded by CERP, according to DoD. GIRoA officials\xe2\x80\x94\nparticularly local representatives working with PRTs\xe2\x80\x94contribute to the\nnomination, prioritization, and selection of CERP projects. In addition, all CERP\nprojects that cost $50,000 or more and that will incur operating or sustainment\ncosts now require a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the responsible\nGIRoA official. This requirement was initiated so that the GIRoA has more infor-\nmation about the cost of sustaining projects. According to DoD, the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s\nparticipation in all stages of projects will ensure Afghan ownership and accep-\ntance of projects.206\n\nPerformance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x99s Performance-Based Governors\xe2\x80\x99 Fund, which has an available pool of $6.8\nmillion, is designed to promote the ability of governors to manage key functions\nof their offices and increase community outreach programs, including conducting SIGAR AUDIT\nshuras. As of December 31, 2010, almost $5.3 million had been spent by provincial\n This quarter, SIGAR announced a\ngovernors, $1.7 million of it since August 20, 2010.207 These funds enabled gover-\n new audit of four DoS and USAID\nnors to manage key functions of their offices and expand community outreach\n programs, including the Performance-\nactivities, including conducting councils and shuras on poppy eradication, dispute\n Based Governors Fund, in one selected\nresolution, and other key issues.208\n province. For more information, see\n The most recent evaluation of the Fund focused on quality of programming,\n Section 1, p. 13.\nequity of benefit sharing, consultation and communication, accountability and\ntransparency, and improved budget practice. It found an average score across\nprovinces of 6.62 out of 10, a performance level deemed \xe2\x80\x9csatisfactory\xe2\x80\x9d by\nUSAID\xe2\x80\x94and an improvement from the previous quarter\xe2\x80\x99s score of 5.83. However,\nscores decreased in nine provinces\xe2\x80\x94three of them by more than one point\n(approximately 10%). USAID noted that the monitoring and evaluation frame-\nwork could be strengthened. Challenges in some provinces include equipment\nand office needs for the Fund itself and limited community outreach or support\nat the district level. Originally slated to end in October 2010, the Fund received\na no-cost extension until the end of January 2011; a cost extension is currently\nunder review.209\n\nJUDICIAL REFORM AND RULE OF LAW\nThis quarter, efforts to improve judicial reform and rule of law continued. These\nefforts aim to promote a robust alternative to the Taliban justice system. At the\ndistrict level, various programs and infrastructure projects were implemented. In\nNerjab, in Kapisa province, construction of the district courthouse was completed\non November 13, 2010.210 On October 10, 2010, UNAMA announced the creation of\nthe \xe2\x80\x9cPeople Awareness of Legal and Judicial Programme,\xe2\x80\x9d a six-month legal and\njudicial awareness initiative in Khowst. The program is intended to promote the\nGIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s rule of law over traditional conflict resolution systems by educating the\npopulation on the governmental system and legal rules and regulations.211\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 79\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n In his December 2010 quarterly report, the UN Secretary-General stated that\n access to justice in Afghanistan has advanced. Legal aid offices opened in sev-\n eral provinces, and nongovernmental organizations expanded legal aid to new\n regions.212 However, despite improvements in Afghans\xe2\x80\x99 perception of their gov-\n ernment, only 48% of Afghans have confidence in the justice system, according to\n the November 2010 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation.213\n\n U.S. Justice Sector Support Program\n As of December 31, 2010, the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) has\n expended more than $47.3 million to achieve its goals; an additional $83.9 million\n is obligated for the program.214 Operating under the U.S. Bureau of International\n Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), JSSP aims to develop the capacity\n of the Afghan criminal justice system by working with Afghan justice profession-\n als, including prosecutors. The JSSP also supports the criminal defense system\n by encouraging coordination between defense attorneys and other professionals\n in the justice system.215\n The current goals of the JSSP are mostly aligned with the goals outlined in the\n GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s Prioritization and Implementation Plan, in its National Program for Law\n and Justice for All, according to INL. The JSSP\xe2\x80\x99s assistance in implementing the\n Plan includes the following initiatives:216\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Improving physical infrastructure and administrative and organizational\n reform: Support for the infrastructure and equipment projects of the GIRoA\n and the World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project (AJSRP).\n Also, the JSSP\xe2\x80\x99s Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office Assistance Section (AGOAS)\n assists in the implementation of pay and grade reforms.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Finalizing commentaries for the civil and penal codes, reviewing and revis-\n ing laws, and optimizing the law-making processes: The JSSP works with the\n Criminal Law Reform Working Group.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Creating legal awareness: The JSSP\xe2\x80\x99s Ministry of Justice Assistance Section\n supports the Ministry of Justice\xe2\x80\x99s Huquq (law) Department, as well as the\n AJSRP\xe2\x80\x99s legal awareness component.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Promoting legal aid: The JSSP works with the Legal Aid Department and the\n Afghan Independent Bar Association.\nINL trains prosecutors, police officers, This quarter, the JSSP increased the number of U.S. and local Afghan lawyers\njudges, and defense attorneys on ethics and on its staff from 93 in September to 107 in December, according to INL. This\nfair trial standards. represented a shortfall of 51 from the number of lawyers that INL had originally\n planned in July. INL stated that it is working to fill these positions by early 2011\nSource: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n and is interviewing local Afghan lawyers to fill the remaining 21 Afghan lawyer\n positions. Thirteen U.S. lawyers have been confirmed for the January/February\n pre-deployment training, and an additional nine advisors have attended training\n and are awaiting clearances before deploying.217\n Each quarter, the JSSP holds provincial training conferences for members of\n the Afghan justice system. Last quarter, the JSSP held two conferences in Logar\n and Wardak. Two other conferences were rescheduled; one, scheduled to take\n\n\n\n\n 80 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nplace in Badghis, was cancelled because of security issues. The JSSP plans to\nhold two conferences next quarter.218\n\nCriminal Procedure Code\nAs of December 31, 2010, the Criminal Procedure Code had not been updated by\nthe Ministry of Justice\xe2\x80\x99s Taqnin Department, which is tasked with scrutinizing\nlegislation to meet the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s legal criteria. During the quarter, justice advisors\nfor the JSSP continued to press the Taqnin on this matter. In early January, how-\never, the Taqnin reported that it would require an additional month to complete\nits review of the Code.\n In November, ISAF placed a U.S. legal advisor in the Taqnin through its Afghan\nHands program, which is designed to build trust between the military and local\npopulations and to accelerate the transition of responsibilities to GIRoA. As of\nJanuary 6, 2011, INL had not been able to assess the effectiveness of the advisor\nin the review process.219\n\nDetainees and Prisoners\nThe transfer of responsibility for detention operations continued this quarter,\naccording to DoD. As of January 6, 2011, Afghan personnel occupied most of\nthe duty positions in two detainee housing units at the detention facility in\nParwan, and they conducted on-the-job training at a third unit. In January 2011,\nthe first official transfer of a detention housing unit to Afghan control occurred,\nand Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435 (CJIATF-435) plans two more\ntransfers of control in March and April. OSD authorized additional funding in the\nFY 2011 Financial and Activity Plan for CJIATF-435 to expand the training and\nequipping of Afghans, so Afghans can improve their ability to operate deten-\ntion centers and thereby enable the rapid transition of detention operations.\nCJIATF-435 administers more than a dozen vocational and educational reinte-\ngration programs for prisoners at the detention facility in Parwan.220 Records of\nattendance at these courses are provided to the detainee review board, which\nmay use that evidence as an indicator of the level of threat posed by the detainee,\naccording to U.S. Special Operations Command.221 CJIATF-435 also assists the\nGIRoA in hosting release shuras, which are designed to give family members and\nmembers of the detainee\xe2\x80\x99s clan the responsibility and tools (employment oppor-\ntunities) to improve the odds that former prisoners can successfully re-enter\nsociety and abandon the insurgency.222\n\nSupport for the Corrections System\nINL funds the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), which partners with\nthe GIRoA to develop a humane, secure, and safe corrections system that meets\ninternational standards and Afghan cultural requirements. This quarter, the CSSP\nenlarged its presence from six provinces to eight, with the addition of efforts\nin Bamyan and Kandahar. INL also awarded contracts to Afghan companies for\nthe construction of prisons in Baghlan and Wardak, as well as a large-capacity\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 81\n\x0cGOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nwater tower and staff barracks at the Pol-i-Charkhi prison.223 Most prisons in\nAfghanistan are housing more prisoners than they are built to handle, as shown\nin Table 3.7.\n During the quarter, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)\nsteering group approved an increase in funding for Central Prison Directorate\nsalaries to help stem rising attrition. Contributions from the United States, the\nUnited Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union to the LOTFA are used, in\npart, for these salaries; Japan has pledged support in the near future.224\n\nHUMAN RIGHTS\nThis quarter, a number of organizations reported on the continued difficulty\nmany Afghan citizens face in exercising their human rights. This section provides\nupdated information on specific human rights issues in Afghanistan related to\ndisplaced citizens, gender equity, and children\xe2\x80\x99s rights.\n\nDisplaced Persons\nAs of November 2, 2010, the United States had contributed more than $710 mil-\nlion to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 2000. Those\nfunds go to help refugees in Afghanistan and around the world. According to\nthe UNHCR, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s continued political, security, and economic develop-\nment challenges have stifled its ability to absorb returnees. Its capacity has been\n\n\n\n\nRefugee camps like this one house hundreds of thousands of returnees. Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s ability\nto absorb refugees has been stifled by continuing political, security, and economic development\nchallenges, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (USAF photo, SSgt Stacey Haga)\n\n\n\n\n 82 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 3.7\n\n\nPROVINCIAL PRISONS: POPULATIONS BY PERCENTAGE OF OVERCROWDING\n Maximum Occupancy Total Prisoners Occupancy Rate\n0\xe2\x80\x93100%\n Paktiya 250 194 78%\n Nuristan 16 2 13%\n101\xe2\x80\x93300%\n Zabul 29 84 290%\n Nangarhar 413 1,134 275%\n Logar 26 65 250%\n Samangan 60 146 243%\n Khowst 71 151 213%\n Kandahar 630 1,114 177%\n Laghman 119 208 175%\n Helmand 453 720 159%\n Badghis 83 129 155%\n Jowzjan 457 666 146%\n Panjshir 24 33 138%\n Kabul 4,978 5,103 103%\n301\xe2\x80\x93600%\n Baghlan 48 284 592%\n Herat 353 2,079 589%\n Sar-e Pul 32 156 488%\n Kapisa 24 116 483%\n Daykundi 26 111 427%\n Ghor 26 111 427%\n Kunar 34 136 400%\n Parwan 61 232 380%\n Balkh 106 400 377%\n Farah 99 364 368%\n Nimroz 73 260 356%\n Ghazni 74 261 353%\n Kunduz 116 405 349%\n Bamyan 26 88 338%\n Badakhshan 50 164 328%\n Wardak 40 122 305%\n601\xe2\x80\x931,000%\n Takhar 46 436 948%\n Uruzgan 34 260 765%\n Paktika 9 62 689%\n Faryab 73 454 622%\nNotes: The International Committee of the Red Cross sets the minimum acceptable prison space per person at 3.4 square meters.\nData reflects male prisoners as of 12/7/2010.\nSource: INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 83\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\n stretched to the limit, resulting in an increasingly poor environment for sustain-\n able return and reintegration.225 The largest numbers of internally displaced\n persons (IDPs) tend to be in the areas with the most perilous security, prevent-\n ing UNHCR from having adequate access to those IDPs. UNHCR stated that the\n number of IDPs is likely to increase in 2011 as a result of heightened military\n operations in the southern, western, and southeastern regions of the country.226\n From September 14 to December 10, 2010, more than 11,000 refugees\n returned to Afghanistan.227 Since 2002, more than 5 million refugees have\n returned, increasing Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s estimated population by more than 20%. For\n areas with the highest areas of return, returnees account for as much as one-\n third of the population. Returnees need economic stability, security, shelter, and\n land, but access to land and returnee and IDP rights are constricted by a weak\n judiciary system. To alleviate the initial hurdles faced by returnees, UNHCR\n increased cash grants to returnees in the first month of return.228\n\n Gender Equity\n This quarter, UNAMA released a report detailing the difficulties that Afghan\n women continue to face and proposing actions and reforms to advance women\xe2\x80\x99s\n rights. It noted that traditional practices\xe2\x80\x94such as child marriage and forced\nFIGURE 3.25\n marriage, the marrying away of girls to settle disputes, the exchange of daugh-\nSURVEY: SHOULD WOMEN BE ALLOWED TO ters between families for marriage, \xe2\x80\x9cforced isolation in the home,\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9chonor\nWORK OUTSIDE THE HOME? killings\xe2\x80\x9d\xe2\x80\x94continue to infringe on the human rights of women and girls through-\n out the country. In addition, women\xe2\x80\x99s rights have not yet improved to the extent\n Total: 6,467\n hoped for after the fall of the Taliban for several reasons:229\n \xe2\x80\xa2 traditional customs, such as dispute resolution methods\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the influence of certain religious tenets within Afghan culture\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the inability of the GIRoA to fully implement the 2009 Law on Elimination of\n Should Violence against Women\n 4,139\n Many elements of the 2009 law seek to terminate the customs, traditions, and\n Should\n not practices that allow or encourage violence against women. However, UNAMA\n 2,134 found that many law enforcement authorities were either unaware of the law or\n were unwilling to enforce it, resulting in the persistence of acute gender\n Don\xe2\x80\x99t know inequity. UNAMA recommended that the GIRoA give the police and judiciary a\n 194 much greater degree of guidance, oversight, and support so that the law can be\n more correctly and consistently applied. The report stressed that improving the\nNotes: Numbers affected by rounding. Complete wording of\nquestion was \xe2\x80\x9cSome people say that women should be\n lives of women in Afghanistan should continue to be a priority of the GIRoA in\nallowed to work outside the home. What is your opinion\nabout this?\xe2\x80\x9d\n reconciliation and reintegration efforts.230 The Asia Foundation\xe2\x80\x99s poll found that\nSource: Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan in 2010: A Survey of a majority of Afghans (64%) believe that women should have the right to work\nthe Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010, p. 218.\n outside the home, as shown in Figure 3.25.\n\n\n\n\n 84 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c GOVERNANCE\n\n\n\n\nChildren\xe2\x80\x99s Rights \xe2\x80\x9cIt is the responsibility\nMany Afghan children continue to be deprived of their rights, according to the of the Government of\nAfghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). A number of fac-\n Afghanistan to ensure the\ntors contribute to the continued difficulties: little awareness in society of those\nrights, lackluster protective mechanisms, political and economic instability, and existence of a complete\ntraditional customs. The Commission recommended that the GIRoA and the legal framework to fully\ninternational community more aggressively promote legal, economic, and aware- protect all children.\nness campaigns aimed at preventing abuse of children\xe2\x80\x99s rights.231 UNICEF will continue to\n Early marriages were the source of 10% of the human rights violations\nreported to the AIHRC in the first six months of 2010. Most of those marriages\n assist in that process.\xe2\x80\x9d\nwere accompanied by violence, and more than 5% had age disparities of 30 or \xe2\x80\x93UNICEF Representative\nmore years. Sexual assaults made up the highest percentage (27.7%) of child Peter Crowley\nhuman rights cases registered with the AIHRC in that period.232\n This quarter, the United Nations Children\xe2\x80\x99s Fund (UNICEF) called on Source: UNICEF, \xe2\x80\x9cUNICEF Calls for a Comprehensive Child Act\n in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\nAfghanistan to enact comprehensive legislation in line with the provisions and\nprinciples of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. One in five Afghan\nchildren dies before age five, and only 6% of children are registered at birth\xe2\x80\x94\nhampering the legal establishment of their identity. The GIRoA has developed\nsome relevant legislation and policies but needs to improve both the nature and\nexecution of GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s laws, according to UNICEF.233\n UNICEF further recommended that the GIRoA should implement these laws\nby monitoring children\xe2\x80\x99s rights, educating children on their rights, and providing\nawareness training to professionals who deal with children the most\xe2\x80\x94educators,\nhealth workers, and police.234\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 85\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n 86 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n As of December 31, 2010, the United States had provided more than $16.15 billion\n to support governance and development in Afghanistan.235 A key component of\n the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to rebuild critical infrastructure and lay the\n foundations for sustainable, long-term economic growth.236 This section provides\n an overview of progress toward reaching these economic development goals,\n by looking at key economic indicators and the efforts of the U.S. government\n and other donors to help Afghanistan rebuild critical infrastructure and deliver\n essential services.\n\n LEADING INDICATORS\n One way to gauge the effectiveness of economic development assistance is to\n track leading indicators that measure growth and fiscal stability, such as gross\n domestic product (GDP), inflation, and exchange rates. The U.S. government\n does not set formal targets for leading indicators in Afghanistan, but these met-\n rics are useful in determining whether the country is on a track toward economic\n growth and fiscal stability. The World Bank, which follows these indicators\n closely, had concluded that Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s economic growth remained strong,\n but volatile, in 2009/2010; it is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for solid\n growth in 2010/2011.237\n\n Gross Domestic Product\n In 2010/2011, real GDP growth in Afghanistan is expected to average 8.5\xe2\x88\x929.0%,\n according to the World Bank\xe2\x80\x99s most recent economic update. The chief factor\n behind this strong level of economic activity, according to the Bank, was the\n high demand for goods and services resulting from the security economy and the\n influx of U.S. and other donor spending. That spending included the following:238\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an estimated 24% increase in donor assistance to support the core budget of\n the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an estimated $4 billion in donor assistance to support off-budget\n expenditures\n Two consecutive years of favorable agricultural production have also contrib-\n uted to strong economic growth. In fact, the World Bank noted that dried fruits\n and seeds now surpass carpets as Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s leading exports. From 2005/2006\n to 2009/2010, dried fruits and seeds grew to half of all Afghan exports.239 A key\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 87\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\nfocus of U.S. agricultural assistance had been to encourage more Afghans to\nswitch from producing cereals and illicit crops to high-value fruits, nuts, and\nseeds. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s previous quarterly reports in 2010, the U.S. Agency\nfor International Development (USAID) has awarded a $30 million grant to help\nAfghan farmers acquire the technical skills, equipment, and inputs necessary to\nplant higher-value crops.240\n The Afghan services sector\xe2\x80\x94including communications, finance, and\ntransportation\xe2\x80\x94continued to be the leading contributor to economic growth\nin 2009/2010, according to the World Bank. Among notable trends, the Bank\nreported that the communications sector grew by a remarkable 45% in 2009/2010.\nAs noted in previous SIGAR quarterly reports, the U.S. government has provided\nfunding to build the capacity of the GIRoA to regulate the telecommunications\nsector and expand telecommunications services to rural communities. By con-\ntrast, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s industrial sector is expected to shrink by 3% in 2009/2010,\nlargely as a result of a decline in manufacturing.241\n\nInflation\nThe Afghan Central Bank has done a good job managing inflation, according to\nthe World Bank. Prudent monetary policies kept inflation to an average of 3% in\n2009/2010, a decrease from the 9% average in 2008/2009. However, the World Bank\nestimated that inflation may increase to 5% in 2010/2011, depending largely on\nfood prices. This reversal is the result of adverse weather conditions in neighbor-\ning countries, which drove up the prices of such essentials as wheat, mutton,\nbeef, sugar, and flour in Afghanistan. Even small increases in food prices can have\na significant effect on Afghans near the poverty line. The World Bank estimated\nthat a 10% increase in wheat prices could push as many as 377,000 Afghans into\npoverty. That is because bread and cereals, rather than nutrient-rich meat and\nvegetables, have accounted for the larger share of the calories consumed by poor\nfamilies.242\n\nExchange Rates\nExchange rates are an important factor in trade because an overvalued currency\nmakes a country\xe2\x80\x99s exports more expensive. Conversely, an undervalued currency\nmakes a country\xe2\x80\x99s exports less expensive.\n In FY 2010, the afghani appreciated against major world currencies, accord-\ning to the World Bank. It appreciated against the U.S. dollar for most of the fiscal\nyear, and by July 2010 it had also appreciated against the euro. Among other\ntrends, the Bank noted that continuing instability in Pakistan weakened the\nPakistani rupee to the point that an increasing number of traders were asking to\nbe paid in afghanis.243\n According to the World Bank, Afghan exports as a share of GDP have fallen from\n24% in 2005/2006 to 15% in 2009/2010. Nevertheless, the International Monetary\nFund (IMF) has concluded that in real terms the afghani is not overvalued.244\n\n\n\n\n 88 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Employment\n Creating jobs is essential to undermining the appeal of extremists and sustaining\n long-term growth in Afghanistan, according to the U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan SIGAR AUDIT\n Regional Stabilization Strategy.245 As previously noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s quarterly In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is assessing\n reports, accurate estimates of the size of the workforce and unemployment rate a $60 million cooperative agreement\n in Afghanistan are not available because of the lack of current national census between USAID and CARE International\n data. It is not possible, therefore, to definitively measure progress toward the for the Community Development\n U.S. goal of increasing employment in the agricultural sector or any other sector; Program for Kabul (CDP-K). This is\n however, USAID provides estimates of the number of jobs created through the one of four cash-for-work programs\n cash-for-work and the Afghan First programs. addressing food insecurity in urban\n According to USAID, in FY 2010 it completed 780 cash-for-work projects, areas. For more information, see\n employed 103,000 laborers, and injected nearly $27 million in wages into the Section 1, p. 14.\n Afghan economy, equivalent to 22,500 full-time jobs.246 USAID also stated that\n from 2008 to 2010 it significantly increased its efforts under the Afghan First\n program and achieved the following results:247\n \xe2\x80\xa2 85,650 Afghan personnel employed\n \xe2\x80\xa2 4,227 local firms under contract\n \xe2\x80\xa2 1,478 Afghan graduates and interns hired\n \xe2\x80\xa2 $1.12 billion in subcontracts, goods, and services procured locally\n\n FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT\n A key part of economic capacity building in Afghanistan is to create the founda-\n tions of a modern financial system. U.S. efforts this quarter included working\n with the Central Bank of Afghanistan to mitigate the risks created by the Kabul\n Bank crisis, expanding access to electronic banking services, and assisting the\n Ministry of Finance in conducting the first audits under the new public sector\n financial management law.\n\n Banking\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s previous quarterly reports, the United States has encour-\n aged the development of private banking and credit institutions as an alternative\n to traditional cash-based systems. According to USAID, U.S. government assis- SIGAR AUDIT\n tance helped increase the number of banking institutions from 12 in FY 2009 to\n In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is examining\n 17 in FY 2010, and the number of commercial bank branches from 280 to 329\n efforts to develop the Afghan banking\n during that same period. In addition, USAID stated that U.S. government assis-\n sector and currency control systems. For\n tance helped achieve a slight increase in the total number of Afghan borrowers\n more information, see Section 1, p. 16.\n in FY 2010, as microfinance institutions made available $777 million in loans and\n commercial banks made available $71 million in loans.248\n An example of U.S. assistance is the $100 million fund that USAID estab-\n lished in 2010 to increase the access of Afghan farmers to agricultural credit.249\n During the year, U.S. government-funded financial institutions in Afghanistan\n disbursed more than 19,000 loans totaling $15.3 million in 14 provinces, accord-\n ing to USAID.250\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 89\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Kabul Bank Crisis\n Public confidence in private banks suffered a major setback in August and\n September 2010 when allegations were made public of significant fiduciary mis-\n conduct at Kabul Bank, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s largest private bank. Kabul Bank was a key\n part of the financial system, responsible for one-third of the country\xe2\x80\x99s deposits\n and nearly 57% of all loans in 2009. The bank lost nearly all of its liquidity in one\n week because of the resulting run on its deposits, according to the World Bank.\n The lack of reliable information about the size of these losses has made it diffi-\n Forensic audit: an in-depth review of cult to determine the extent of the problem or its impact on the financial stability\n transactional data to detect material of the country, the World Bank concluded.251\n financial misstatements, fraud, or In February 2010, the GIRoA had approached the U.S. government for fund-\n mismanagement, involving substantive ing and assistance in procuring a forensic audit of Kabul Bank and Azizi Bank,\n tests or evidence collection that presumes according to the U.S. Treasury (Treasury). The estimated cost of these audits was\n the possibility of dishonesty at various $10 million. Treasury identified an internationally credible audit firm, as well as\n levels of management, including override funding, to implement this request.252\n of internal controls, falsification of Following the run on Kabul Bank, however, the GIRoA changed its position\n documents, and collusion. on the parameters of the proposed forensic audits. According to Treasury, the\n GIRoA insisted on maintaining control of the audits and on being the sole recipi-\nSource: AICPA, \xe2\x80\x9cForensic Services Audits and Corporate\n ent of the results. These conditions were unacceptable to Treasury. 253\nGovernance\xe2\x80\x94Bridging the Gap: The Final Report,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed\nonline 1/5/2011.\n The GIRoA is pursuing the possibility of funding forensic audits through\n other donors as part of a new IMF program, according to Treasury. The U.S.\n government is not a direct participant in these negotiations. As of January 4,\n 2011, Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Central Bank had not scheduled any bank audits and had not\n signed any independent bank audit contracts, according to Treasury.254\n The salaries of 220,000 Afghan security forces and civil servants are distrib-\n uted through the Kabul Bank.255 Treasury stated that, following the Kabul Bank\n crisis, the Central Bank of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) decided\n to develop the option to use commercial banking services from other financial\n institutions.256 Treasury provided technical assistance to the GIRoA to research\n and draft proposals to procure another bank to distribute government salaries.\n Kabul Bank continues to operate under special conditions, and as of October\n 2010, there had been no delays in civil service salary payments, according to the\n World Bank.257\n\n Alternate Payment Mechanisms\n In another financial sector development this quarter, Citibank announced\n that its Global Transaction Services division had entered into an agreement\n with the privately owned Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) in Kabul to\n strengthen AIB\xe2\x80\x99s payment transaction capabilities. The agreement was facili-\n tated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as part of its effort to create\n sustainable banking services, support the growth of the private sector, and\n attract foreign investment.258\n To fight corruption and maintain accountability for funds, the U.S. govern-\n ment has strongly encouraged and supported the development of electronic\n mechanisms as an alternative to traditional cash-based transactions, as noted in\n\n\n\n 90 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s previous quarterly reports. AIB\xe2\x80\x99s services will include the provision of\n ATMs and electronic fund transfers, according to Citibank.259 More than half of\n all Afghan civil servants now receive their salaries through electronic fund trans-\n fers, according to the World Bank.260\n\n Revenue Collection\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s July 2010 quarterly report, domestic revenue collection in\n Afghanistan is steadily improving. According to the World Bank, however, col-\n lection still lags significantly behind the amount needed to fund core government\n expenditures.261\n The IMF expects that domestic revenue collection in Afghanistan will increase\n from 9.6% of GDP in FY 2010 to 10.3% of GDP in FY 2011.262 For the current\n Afghan fiscal year, domestic revenues could climb as high as $1.7 billion, accord-\n ing to DoD\xe2\x80\x94a 30% increase over the previous year.263 This is primarily the result\n of improved tax and customs administration, and the introduction of a new\n ad-valorem tax on imports, according to DoD.264 Despite this improved perfor-\n mance, DoD noted that the GIRoA was still able to fund only about 54% of its\n core operating expenses from domestic revenues.265\n To help strengthen the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s financial management capabilities, USAID\n pledged $84 million to support the Afghan Civil Service Institute. The Institute\xe2\x80\x99s\n mission is to provide a unified training curriculum for all national and provincial\n civil servants.266 The United States is also providing $2.5 million annually in oper-\n ational support for the Afghan National Customs Academy, according to the U.S.\n Department of State (DoS). This is in addition to the $2 million provided by the\n United States for construction and renovation of the customs academy training\n facilities. Treasury also has provided ongoing technical assistance to the Ministry\n of Finance to strengthen the internal auditing capacity of Afghan ministries.267\n As a result of efforts to build Afghan revenue collection capacity, the World\n Bank recently reported a significant change in the composition of domestic rev-\n enues. The share of those revenues attributable to taxes (property, income, sales,\n and excise) jumped from 38% in 2008/2009 to 48% in 2009/2010. Similarly, the\n share attributable to customs duties and fees increased from 32% in 2008/2009 to\n 35% in 2009/2010. At the same time, the share attributable to non-tax incomes\xe2\x80\x94 Article 61 of the Afghan Public Finance\n such as administrative fees, property taxes, fines, penalties and sales of lands and Expenditure Management Law says,\n and buildings\xe2\x80\x94declined by nearly half.268 \xe2\x80\x9cThe Ministry of Finance shall establish\n an internal audit administration and\n appoint auditors to audit the financial\n Public-Sector Financial Management and accounting affairs of all State\n In November 2010, advisors from Treasury began working with auditors from\n administrations.\xe2\x80\x9d The auditors may\n the Ministry of Finance to review the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and require the relevant administrations\n Development. According to Treasury, this is the first Afghan ministry with line to provide all information needed for\n budget authority to undergo an audit as authorized by Article 61 of the Afghan auditing financial affairs.\n Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law. In December 2010, a joint\n team of U.S. and Afghan government auditors began audit work at three other Source: GIRoA, Public Finance and Expenditure\n Management Law.\n ministries: the Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation, the Ministry of\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 91\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Public Health, and the Ministry of Energy and Water. These audits are expected\n to be completed by March 2011, according to Treasury. Treasury also stated that\n U.S. and GIRoA auditors have agreed to a multi-year plan to conduct Article 61\n audits of the remaining 17 ministries and 9 state administrations, including DAB\n and the Independent Directorate of Local Government.269\n\n ESSENTIAL SERVICES\n Increasing the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to deliver public services is one of the four key\n objectives of the U.S. economic development strategy in Afghanistan, accord-\n ing to DoS.270 One indication of the challenges confronting Afghanistan is its\n ranking in the most recent Human Development Index, published by the UN\n Development Programme (UNDP). Afghanistan ranked 155 of 169 countries in\n 2010, among the least developed in the world.271\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s per capita gross national income was the highest of the\n 15 bottom-ranked countries in the 2010 UNDP report. Yet, the same report\n concludes that about 42% of Afghans still live in poverty. Life expectancy at\n birth is 44.6 years, the lowest of the 15 bottom-ranked countries in the world.\n The under-five mortality rate is 257 per 1,000 live births\xe2\x80\x94and the maternal\n mortality rate is 1,800 per 100,000 births, one of the highest in the world. Most\n Afghans do not have access to safe drinking water, and 63% do not have access\n to adequate sanitation.272\n This section addresses key developments in U.S. efforts to improve the capa-\n bility of the GIRoA to deliver essential services that address these challenges.\n\n Energy\n As previously noted by SIGAR, Afghanistan continues to import energy because\n it consumes more than it produces. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has\nSIGAR AUDIT identified the lack of access to electricity as an obstacle to sustaining the gains\n achieved by the counter-insurgency strategy, especially in areas of high con-\nIn its audit of the energy sector, SIGAR\n flict, such as Kandahar.273 As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report,\nfound that although progress has\n CENTCOM has proposed providing generators and fuel to Kandahar on a\nbeen made, the GIRoA lacked the\n short-term basis until the capacity of the Kajaki Dam is increased. According to\ncapacity to collect enough revenue\n CENTCOM, the transitional energy solution for Kandahar consists of the follow-\nand as a result could not operate\n ing elements:274\nand maintain the power-generating\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Shorandam Industrial Park Site (formerly known as Kandahar Industrial\nsystems or recruit enough qualified\n Park-KIP): A diesel generator rated at 10 MW (actual capacity of 8 MW) began\nstaff. For more information, see SIGAR\n providing power on December 1, 2010. Average daily power production is\nAudit 10-4, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Energy\n 4.4 MW, and construction and installation of support facilities continue.\nSupply Has Increased but an Updated\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Bagh-e Pul Site (formerly known as the Russian Silo): Diesel generators\nMaster Plan Is Needed and Delays\n rated at 10 MW (actual capacity of 8 MW) have been delivered. They are\nand Sustainability Concerns Remain,\xe2\x80\x9d\n scheduled to be moved to the site on January 20, 2011, and to begin furnish-\navailable at www.sigar.mil.\n ing power on March 1, 2011.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Southeast Electrical Power System (SEPS) Starter Kit: The kit was pro-\n cured to provide the Afghan public utility company (DABS) with equipment\n\n\n\n\n 92 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n to make immediate, critical improvements to the Kandahar City power\n distribution system. CENTCOM expects the DABS to install the equipment\n over the next 24 months to enhance low- and medium-voltage distribution in\n Kandahar City.\n The generators and short-term fuel supplies for the two 10-MW power plants\n were purchased with funds from the Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\n Program (CERP), according to CENTCOM. As of January 2011, approximately\n $100 million was under contract to support these efforts.275\n On January 7, 2011, the President signed into law the Ike Skelton National\n Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 authorizing the Afghanistan\n Infrastructure Program (AIP). This legislation authorized DoD to use up to\n $400 million in operations and maintenance funds for large scale infrastructure\n projects. CENTCOM expects that AIP, rather than CERP, will fund the estimated\n $40\xe2\x80\x9389 million needed in FY 2011 for fuel, as well as operating and maintenance\n costs, for all the Kandahar power generators.276 The change in funding sources\n for this project reflects the concerns expressed by the Congress in the NDAA\n that CERP was not intended to carry out large-scale projects. SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit of\n CERP funded projects in Laghman province highlighted similar concerns.277\n For more information about this SIGAR audit, see Section 1, p. 9.\n\n TAPI PIPELINE\n In another energy-related development this quarter, the President of Turkmenistan\n signed a framework agreement with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan\n and the Minister of Oil and Natural Gas of India to work toward implementation\n of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.\n This event follows the signing of a similar agreement by the energy ministers\n in 2010. If built, the TAPI natural gas pipeline would export natural gas from\n Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, providing transit fees\n for the GIRoA.278\n The TAPI pipeline project has been under discussion since 1995, and many\n obstacles remain to its implementation, as previously noted by SIGAR.279 This\n quarter, the Russian state-owned enterprise Gazprom announced its interest in\n possibly joining the TAPI consortium.280\n\n Education\n According to USAID, U.S. government education assistance in 2010 produced\n several achievements:281\n \xe2\x80\xa2 40,850 Afghan teachers trained\n \xe2\x80\xa2 60,000 children enrolled in community-based education\n \xe2\x80\xa2 21.5 million textbooks provided\n\n Health Services\n The U.S. government is providing $4 million to help the Ministry of Public Health\n (MoPH) conduct a national demographic and health survey that will provide\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 93\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n a framework to address Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s high rate of maternal mortality.282 As of\n November 30, 2010, according to USAID, $2,848,266 had been spent on this survey;\n an additional $350,000 was expected to be spent in December 2010. The costs\n included capacity-building efforts to assist the MoPH with the methodology, sam-\n pling, and management of the survey.283 USAID noted the following milestones:284\n \xe2\x80\xa2 A total of 24,000 Afghan households from 751 population clusters were iden-\n tified for sampling.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Some 150 to 180 field staff\xe2\x80\x94including surveyors, supervisors, editors, and\n monitors\xe2\x80\x94were hired to collect survey data; in addition, 5 full-time editors\n and 15 data entry operators were hired.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Of 751 surveys, 681 (91%) were completed and received for data entry, as of\n December 24, 2010.\n Preliminary results are expected to be available in February or March 2011,\n according to USAID. The MoPH is planning to disseminate the survey results at a\n national seminar in June 2011.285\n\n Water\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water sector has suffered severe damage from years of conflict and\n persistent drought. To develop Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water resources, the U.S. govern-\nSIGAR AUDIT ment awarded approximately $250 million in grants, contracts, and cooperative\n agreements from 2002 through the second quarter of 2010, according to the\nIn its review of funding obligated for\n Government Accountability Office (GAO). A GAO audit released this quarter\nreconstruction contracts from FY 2007\n reported that the U.S. government plans to accelerate its efforts to rebuild\nthrough FY 2009, SIGAR found that\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water sector and will need an additional $2.1 billion to fully fund\nthe lack of a centralized database\n the projects planned for FY 2010 to FY 2014.286\nfor reconstruction projects was a\n The challenges to this sector were highlighted in the most recent National\nmajor obstacle to effective oversight.\n Risk and Vulnerability Assessment for Afghanistan (NRVA), which found that\nFor more information, see SIGAR,\n only about 27% of Afghans have access to safe drinking water and only about\nAudit 11-4, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD, State, and USAID\n 5% have access to improved sanitation.287 The World Bank reported in 2010 that\nObligated Over $17.7 Billion to About\n the percentage of the Afghan population with access to piped water infrastruc-\n7,000 Contractors and Other Entities\n ture is among the lowest in the world\xe2\x80\x9418%.288 Irrigation in Afghanistan remains\nfor Afghanistan Reconstruction During\n underdeveloped, as well. Only about 30% of the agricultural land has access to\nFiscal Years 2007\xe2\x80\x932009,\xe2\x80\x9d available at\n adequate supplies of water, according to the GAO.289\nwww.sigar.mil.\n GAO\xe2\x80\x99s audit of the water sector reached conclusions similar to those of SIGAR\n infrastructure audits, which have consistently found that sustainability and\n inter-agency coordination remain challenging. The GAO audit concluded that\n the efforts of U.S. agencies in the water sector were hampered by the lack of\n a centralized database for reconstruction projects. The lack of an inter-agency\n implementation plan was also an issue.290\n\n Transportation\n As part of the U.S. strategy to improve freedom of movement and expand trade\n routes in Afghanistan, the United States is building transportation infrastructure,\n including roads, railroads, and airports. This quarter, progress continued on the\n\n\n\n\n 94 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Strategic Provincial Roads project connecting towns in the east and south to pro-\n vincial centers; however, civil aviation suffered a setback owing to Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\n failure to set up a regulatory agency capable of enforcing internationally\n accepted safety standards.\n\n Roads\n USAID has obligated $270 million of the Strategic Provincial Roads project to\n build roads in eastern and southern Afghanistan. The project was originally\n scheduled to build more than 1,000 kilometers (km) of engineered gravel roads SIGAR AUDIT\n and bridges by December 2011. Because of construction delays, however, the\n In its audit of CERP-funded projects in\n scope of the project has been reduced to 450 km. According to USAID, more than\n Laghman province, SIGAR found that\n 1,800 km of regional highways, national highways, and provincial and rural roads\n about $44.6 million in asphalt road\n were completed in 2010.291\n projects were at risk because of the\n USAID also noted that continuing construction and refurbishment on 800 km\n lack of maintenance plans. The audit\n of roads includes the following funding:292\n noted that the road projects had been\n \xe2\x80\xa2 $178 million for a 101-km section of the national highway between Gardez\n approved without adequate assurances\n and Khowst\n that the GIRoA had the resources to\n \xe2\x80\xa2 $95 million for a 92-km section of the national highway between Gardez and\n maintain them. For more information,\n Ghazni\n see Section 1, p. 9.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 $126 million for a 103-km section of the national highway in Badakhshan,\n 97% of which was completed in December 2010\n To address the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s lack of capacity to maintain roads, the North Atlantic\n Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a new pilot program between the\n International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security\n Forces (ANSF) to secure and maintain the roads in Kapisa province. Under this\n agreement, NATO forces will train locally recruited ANSF forces to protect the\n roads, clear them of mines, and maintain them.293\n In cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Public Works, USAID is continuing\n to support a project to operate and maintain more than 1,500 km of rehabilitated\n roads. Part of this program includes evaluating the technical and managerial\n competencies and needs of both GIRoA and private-sector Afghan companies\n involved in road construction, according to USAID.294\n\n Railroads\n At the end of 2010, three major rail lines were in the planning, development, or\n construction stages. If completed, they could help spur economic development by\n providing Afghanistan with access to the Indian Ocean and markets in Asia, Central\n Asia, and Europe. Two of the three proposed lines would be funded through the\n Asian Development Bank (ADB). The United States and Japan are the two largest\n contributors to the ADB, each holding about 15% of the bank\xe2\x80\x99s shares.295\n The longest rail line would run north to south along a proposed 718-km route\n from Mazar-e Sharif to Torkham, linking central Afghanistan to Pakistan and\n Uzbekistan. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, the state-owned\n Chinese company that won the rights to develop the Aynak copper mine signed\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 95\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n an agreement with the GIRoA to build this rail line. This company has a signifi-\n cant investment in rail lines in Pakistan, according to a NATO publication, and\n plans to link this new railway to Pakistan\xe2\x80\x99s state-owned railway network. The\n Afghan line is to be designed to carry the heavy loads required by extractive\n industries; if completed, it would expedite the export of minerals extracted from\n the Aynak mine.296\n A second railway corridor under discussion would run east to west, from Herat\n to Sherkhan Bandar. This line would be jointly financed by the Asian Development\n Bank and the GIRoA. As of November 2010, a feasibility study was under way for\n this 1,105-km railway; completion of the rail line is estimated to take five to nine\n years. In addition, according to a NATO publication, Iran is providing the funds for\nFIGURE 3.26\n a $1.2 million feasibility study for a rail line linking Iran to Herat.297\n A third, shorter rail line is nearing completion\xe2\x80\x94the 75-km rail line from Hairatan\nPROPOSED RAILWAY LINES to Mazar-e Sharif. This rail line was cofinanced by the Asian Development Bank\n and the GIRoA. As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April 2010 quarterly report, USAID provided\n UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN\n $5 million to help finish construction of this rail line. The estimated completion date\n TURKMENISTAN\n CHINA for this project is June 2011.298\n Hairatan\n Sherkhan Figure 3.26 shows the proposed rail lines, which loosely parallel some of the\n Bandar\n Mazar-e ancient Silk Road routes. Officials hope these new rail lines will relieve pressure\n Sharif PAKISTAN\n on the town of Hairatan, near the Uzbekistan border, according to a NATO publi-\n Torkham\n Herat\n Logar\n Copper Mine\n cation. About half of all commercial imports pass through Hairatan, and the town\n cannot cope with the growing volume of trade.299\n Kandahar\n\nIRAN Corridor 1A\n Spin Boldak\n Corridor 1B\n Airlines\n Corridor 1C As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s April and October 2010 quarterly reports, the U.S. govern-\n ment funds infrastructure and training programs to build civil aviation capacity\nSource: NATO, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report in Afghanistan. A major milestone was achieved in March 2010 when ISAF turned\non Infrastructure in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, p. 2.\n over a key portion of the Kabul International Airport to GIRoA control.\n This quarter, however, the challenge in bringing this sector up to international\n standards was underscored by the decision of the European Commission to ban\n all Afghan private airlines from landing in European Union countries because of\n safety concerns. Joining state-owned Ariana Afghan airways, which was already\n blacklisted, were private carriers Kam Airways, Pamir Airways, and Safi Airways.\n In announcing the ban, the European Commission noted that the GIRoA had\n failed to set up a regulatory agency that complied with the standards set by the\n International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).300\n Banned carriers could continue to land in European airspace, however, by\n leasing planes from carriers that meet ICAO international safety standards.301\n Following the announcement, Safi Airways announced that it would lease\n European-registered aircraft for its Frankfurt passengers in order to continue\n operating its Frankfurt-to-Kabul routes.302\n\n\n\n\n 96 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Communications\n The tremendous growth of telecommunications is one of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s success\n stories. In contrast to other areas of the economy, the private sector has led the\n growth of the telecommunications sector. According to the World Bank, private\n firms accounted for 99.2% of all telecommunications subscriptions in Afghanistan\n by early 2010. More than half of all Afghan households have at least one cell\n phone, and the World Bank forecasted that cell phone subscriptions will reach\n 19 million by the end of 2011.303\n This quarter, Afghan Wireless, one of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s five licensed cellular\n network operators, announced it had selected Nokia Siemens to expand its\n coverage, especially in rural areas. Under the terms of the contract, the Swedish\n company will modernize and expand the Afghan operator\xe2\x80\x99s cellular network and\n will provide data management, billing, and charging platforms, as well as other\n support services.304\n The Nokia contract reflects the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to encourage providers to\n upgrade cellular phone service nationwide to a faster standard and to expand to\n rural underserved areas. There were more than 14 million mobile phone sub-\n scribers in Afghanistan as of June 2010, according to the Ministry of Information\n and Communications Technology. Continually upgrading service is important FIGURE 3.27\n to the economy because, among other reasons, in 2010 this sector provided the\n single largest source of tax revenue for the GIRoA.305 ATTACKS ON INFRASTRUCTURE,\n In another communications development this quarter, Radio Azadi announced OCTOBER\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 2010\n By Province\n the launch of an interactive news and emergency alert service for Etisalat mobile\n phone subscribers in Afghanistan. This new service was made possible through an\n Etisalat partnership with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, an organization funded Ghazni\n by the U.S. government.306 Radio Azadi was founded by Radio Free Europe in 1985; Kabul\n today, it is a leading media outlet in Afghanistan, reaching an estimated 50% of the Zabul\n nation\xe2\x80\x99s population. Azadi is widely known for the diversity and popularity of its Kandahar\n programming and for sponsoring a debate during the presidential elections featur- Helmand\n ing President Hamid Karzai and two other leading candidates.307 Khowst\n Paktika\n Impact of Security on Infrastructure Logar\n In addition to budget and capacity constraints, security continues to affect the Kunar\n sustainability of Afghan infrastructure projects. According to CENTCOM, from Paktiya\n October 1 through December 25, 2010, there were 111 attacks against infra- Baghlan\n structure. These attacks consisted primarily of improvised explosive devices, Farah\n direct fire, and indirect fire. CENTCOM noted that attacks this quarter followed Kunduz\n seasonal weather trends\xe2\x80\x94decreasing as weather conditions became less favor- Nangarhar\n able.308 These attacks occurred in 16 provinces, as shown in Figure 3.27. Uruzgan\n Protection of key infrastructure is part of the ISAF counterinsurgency strategy. Wardak\n For example, SIGAR noted in its January 2010 quarterly report that a force of 4,000 0 10 20 30\n ISAF and ANSF troops protected the military convoy delivering the third turbine to\n the Kajaki Dam, in which the U.S. has invested more than $100 million.309 Source: CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 97\n\x0c ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n Ban on Private Security Contractors\nCENTCOM reported that 16,733 private This quarter, President Karzai issued an executive decree banning private secu-\nsecurity contractors were on the DoD payroll rity contractors (PSCs), which would have had a major impact on the ability\nin Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of of development partners to implement reconstruction projects. The ban would\n2010. Of these, 140 were U.S. citizens, 980 have required all PSCs to disband and leave the country by December 17, 2010.310\nwere third-country nationals, and 15,613 Many development organizations depend on PSCs.\nwere Afghans or host-country nationals. After extensive discussions with the international community, a spokesman\nSource: DoD/ADUSD (Program Support), \xe2\x80\x9cContractor Support\n for the Afghan Ministry of Interior announced on December 6, 2010, that licensed\nof U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, PSCs would be allowed to continue to operate in Afghanistan until their con-\nIraq and Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2010.\n tracts expire. The following restrictions apply:311\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PSCs must move out of the diplomatic enclave in Kabul, and their personnel\n must wear uniforms.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PSCs guarding NATO convoys are required to partner with the ANSF.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PSCs are not allowed to stop vehicles, search houses, or put up roadblocks.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PSC responsibilities for providing security will be gradually transitioned to\n the ANSF.\n\n INDUSTRY AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT\n This quarter, key developments included a new U.S.-funded project to strengthen\n financial management at the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and\n Livestock (MAIL), as well as the release of a World Bank report highlighting con-\n tinued challenges in developing Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s private sector.\n\n Agriculture and Food Aid\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, wheat is Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\n staple crop, providing half of the country\xe2\x80\x99s caloric needs. This quarter, the U.S.\n Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a new program to strengthen food\n security in Afghanistan by introducing a new strain of disease-resistant wheat\n seed. This new type of seed is designed to halt the spread of wheat-stem rust,\n which could threaten Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s crop yields. After a sufficient quantity of the\n seed has been produced, the MAIL plans to make it available to more than 60,000\n Afghan farmers in 2011. According to researchers at the USDA, this donation will\n provide Afghanistan with 65% of its rust-resistant wheat stock for 2011.312\n In addition to increasing crop yields, U.S. government programs provide direct\n food assistance to vulnerable Afghans. As previously noted in SIGAR quarterly\n reports, Afghanistan is a net food importer because it cannot yet produce enough\nAn Afghan child carries a bag of Strong food to meet domestic consumption needs. As of December 9, 2010, USAID\nFood paste, a combination of nutritious\n reported that it had provided a total of $45.98 million to the World Food Program\ningredients distributed to malnourished chil-\ndren under five. The Strong Food program and Catholic Relief Services to distribute food commodities to food-insecure\nwas introduced by U.S.-led PRTs. Today, the areas of Afghanistan.313\ncommodities are procured locally, and the In a major capacity-building effort this quarter, the USDA awarded a $36\nprogram is managed by Afghans, providing million cooperative agreement to the Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance\njobs as well as nutritional support. (USAF (VEGA) to strengthen the financial management capabilities of the MAIL. The\nphoto, SrA Ashley N. Avecilla)\n goal is to help prepare the ministry to receive more direct funding from the U.S.\n\n\n\n 98 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT\n\n\n\n\n government, according to the USDA. VEGA will make recommendations to\n modernize the MAIL and improve the effectiveness of its operations. It will also\n help the ministry establish a grants management unit capable of receiving and SIGAR AUDIT\n managing funds from international donors.314\n In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is examining\n the programs of U.S. agencies involved\n Private-Sector Development in developing the agriculture sector\n The U.S. government has identified improvements that need to be made in and the effect of these programs on\n order to promote private sector development in Afghanistan. As noted in the counter-insurgency effort. For more\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 quarterly report, USAID provided $56.3 million from information, see Section 1, p. 16.\n 2004 to 2009, to help ameliorate obstacles to land titling and ownership. The\n lack of reform in these areas has been identified as a key obstacle to growing\n the private-sector economy.315\n This quarter, the World Bank released its annual Doing Business 2011 survey\n for 183 economies worldwide, which highlighted persistent challenges in this\n area. Afghanistan fell two places in the rankings, from 165 in 2010 to 167 in 2011.\n The change was caused primarily by greater difficulties reported in starting a Major Trade Agreement Reached:\n business, obtaining construction permits, registering property, getting credit, and On January 11, 2011, Afghanistan and\n enforcing contracts. For example, the survey ranked Afghanistan as the worst in Pakistan formally signed and exchanged\n the world (183rd) in terms of protecting investors, trading across borders, and the instruments ratifying the Afghanistan-\n closing a business.316 Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. This\n The survey noted that it takes about 250 days in Afghanistan to register property, agreement, which is to go into effect within\n compared with 50 days in Pakistan, 37 in Tajikistan, 51 in Iraq, and 36 in Iran.317 In 30 days, will make it easier for Afghan\n trucks to transport Afghan products to India.\n addition, the survey found that Afghanistan faced many challenges in trading across\n borders because of inefficient customs procedures that caused significant delays Source: DoS, U.S. Embassy Kabul, response to SIGAR data\n call, 1/19/2011.\n and too many paperwork requirements for both exporters and importers.318\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 99\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n100 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\nFrom 2002 through 2010, the United States appropriated more than $4.49 billion\nfor counter-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan.319 In 2010, Afghanistan saw a\nmarked decline in the yield of poppy fields. Nevertheless, the country remained\nthe world\xe2\x80\x99s largest producer of poppy.\n This quarter, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)\nconducted several successful interdiction campaigns. However, according to\nthe U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Afghan counter-narcotics forces remain\nhighly dependent on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).\n\nPOPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM PRODUCTION\nThis quarter, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported\nthat Afghan opium production has dropped significantly\xe2\x80\x94from 6,900 metric\ntonnes (MT) in 2009 to 3,600 MT in 2010.320 The low yield was caused primarily\nby a poppy blight that affected crops. DoD stated that GIRoA actions\xe2\x80\x94including\ncampaigns carried out before planting time and alternative development pro-\ngrams\xe2\x80\x94also contributed to the decrease in poppy cultivation.321\n Despite the low yield, the UNODC reported that Afghanistan remains the\nlargest poppy-cultivating country in the world, as shown in Figure 3.28 on the\nnext page.322 In 2010, Myanmar, the country with the second-highest cultivation,\nproduced 15.1 kilograms (kg) of poppy per hectare of land while Afghanistan\nproduced 29.2 kg per hectare.323\n According to the UNODC, the type of land in Afghanistan contributes to its\nhigh poppy cultivation. Farmers in Myanmar grow poppy on steep hills with poor\nsoil and no irrigation systems, while Afghan farmers cultivate on flat land with\nbetter soil and irrigation.324\n Twenty of Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s 34 provinces were poppy-free, as of September 2010,\naccording to the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement\nAffairs (INL)\xe2\x80\x94the same number reported by the UNODC in September 2009.\nNo new provinces became poppy-free in 2010; only two were made poppy-free\nin 2009.325 Poppy-free provinces qualify for a $1 million annual incentive award\nthrough the Good Performers Initiative, a joint effort of INL and the Afghan\nMinistry of Counter-Narcotics.326\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 101\n\x0cCOUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nFIGURE 3.28\n\n\nPOPPY CULTIVATION IN MAJOR POPPY-GROWING COUNTRIES, 1998\xe2\x80\x932010 (HECTARES)\n\n250,000\n\n\n\n200,000\n\n\n\n150,000\n\n\n\n100,000\n\n\n\n 50,000\n\n\n 0\n 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010\n\n\n Afghanistan Myanmar Lao PDR\nSource: UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, p. 9.\n\n\n\n\nNARCOTICS TRAFFICKING\nBecause of the low poppy yield in 2010, a hectare of poppy yielded a higher gross\nincome for Afghan poppy farmers in 2010\xe2\x80\x94$4,900 per household, compared with\n$3,600 in 2009.327 The revenue from the sale of these narcotics could provide more\nthan $660 million in funding for Afghan crime syndicates and billions of dollars of\nprofit for international criminal organizations, according to the UNODC.328\n\nCOMBATING THE DRUG TRADE\nThe narcotics trade weakens Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s political stability, economic growth,\nrule of law, and ability to address internal security problems, according to INL.\nIn addition, the narcotics trade hampers the fight against the insurgency. INL\nstated this quarter that fighting the narcotics trade in Afghanistan requires a\nwhole-of-government approach, combining counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics,\ndevelopment, and governance.329\n Corruption presents a special challenge to counter-narcotics efforts. According\nto DoD, the prevalence of corruption creates a favorable environment for\nnarco-traffickers.330\n This quarter, U.S. counter-narcotics programming focused on assisting the\nGIRoA with interdiction and alternative development programming.\n\n\n\n\n 102 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\nInterdiction Operations\nThis quarter, most interdiction operations took place across the south and\nsouthwest, where most poppy is grown. According to DoD, the Afghan National\nSecurity Forces (ANSF) also increased the number of operations it carried out\nin the east and north. These operations focused on combating the insurgency-\nnarcotics-corruption nexus.331\n From October 1 to December 27, 2010, the ANSF, in partnership with ISAF,\nconducted 78 interdiction efforts in which 137 suspects were arrested. These\njoint operations seized the following items:332\n \xe2\x80\xa2 21,072 kg of opium\n \xe2\x80\xa2 161 kg of morphine\n \xe2\x80\xa2 3,109 kg of heroin\n \xe2\x80\xa2 15,170 kg of chemicals\n As of January 6, 2011, there was no interdiction campaign plan in Afghanistan.\nAccording to DoD, the lack of such a plan has created difficulties for military\nplanners and has limited the success of counter-narcotics efforts.333\n Afghanistan has several counter-narcotics forces, including the Counter-\n A counter-narcotics poster denounces the\nNarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and the Afghan Special Narcotics\n cultivation of poppy in Marjah, Helmand\nForces. However, DoD stated this quarter that these forces continue to rely province. Reducing poppy cultivation is a\non ISAF support when operating in areas with a significant Taliban presence, key element of U.S. and GIRoA counter-\nespecially in Regional Command-South, where the link between insurgency and narcotics programming. (USMC photo,\nthe narcotics trade is strongest. According to DoD, the GIRoA continues to work LCpl Richard P. Sanglap-Heramis)\nclosely with ISAF to improve the capabilities of the CNPA.334\n\nAlternative Development Programming\nAlternative development programming aims to provide farmers with economi-\ncally viable legal alternatives to growing illicit crops.335 Agriculture is the major\nsource of income for most Afghans.336 The 2010 Afghanistan and Pakistan SIGAR AUDIT\nRegional Stabilization Strategy identified agriculture as the fastest conveyer of\n As part of an ongoing audit of U.S.\nlicit jobs. With more legal avenues at farmers\xe2\x80\x99 disposal, the goal of the strategy is\n assistance to the agriculture sector,\nthat fewer farmers will grow poppy, thereby weakening the drug trade that funds\n SIGAR is examining the effectiveness of\nthe insurgency.337\n U.S. agricultural programming in achiev-\n The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) does not measure\n ing counter-narcotics objectives. For\nprogress in alternative development on a quarterly basis. Because farmers plant\n more information, see Section 1, p. 16.\ntheir crops in the fall, it is difficult to gauge the acreage that is planted until the\ncrops mature in February and March. However, three U.S. alternative develop-\nment projects reported specific activities this quarter:338\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA) Plus\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer (AWATT)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Roots of Peace\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 103\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\n AVIPA Plus\n AVIPA Plus, an extension of the $60 million AVIPA project of 2008, was launched\n in June 2009 and is set to end in March 2011. This $300 million project has two\n purposes: to provide farmers with vouchers to purchase agricultural materials,\n including seed and fertilizer, and to implement permanent programming in south-\n ern Afghanistan (especially Helmand and Kandahar) that will make long-term\n alternative development possible. The AVIPA project is increasingly focused on\n permanent programming, which includes the following:339\n \xe2\x80\xa2 replacements for poppy (such as tree and vine crops)\n \xe2\x80\xa2 cash-for-work programs\n \xe2\x80\xa2 grants-in-kind to local organizations and communities rather than short-term\n voucher assistance\n As of December 31, 2010, USAID had distributed AVIPA vouchers to 173,755\n farmers in 31 provinces. Of these vouchers, 165,380 were redeemed for certified\n wheat seed and fertilizer. In a separate initiative, AVIPA distributed vouchers to\n farmers in Helmand and Kandahar; 32,266 vouchers were redeemed for melon,\n legume, okra, vegetable and corn seed, and fertilizer.340\n AVIPA also performs province-specific activities. For instance, under the\n IDEA-NEW program, 15,000 farmers in Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nuristan\n Jerib: one-fifth of a hectare of land. received vouchers for vegetable seeds and fertilizer to plant on half a jerib of\n land. In Helmand, where approximately 50% of all Afghan poppy was cultivated\n in 2010, the project provided farmers with agricultural inputs (including seed,\nSource: USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cRAMP Nangarhar Emergency Wheat Package fertilizer, tools, and machinery) as well as training in agricultural modern tech-\nReport,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2006, p. 1.\n niques. According to USAID, the additional income derived through this program\n is likely to deter farmers from growing poppy; however, the program has not\n tracked whether these farmers have switched to other crops.341\n\n AWATT\n As noted in SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s October 2010 report, reductions in poppy cultivation are\n sustainable only if water is available to grow alternative crops. INL has reported\n that poppy requires less water than other crops\xe2\x80\x94a benefit in a land plagued by\n drought and poor irrigation.342\n Karezes: traditional underground water The $24 million AWATT program aims to improve licit agricultural productivity\n systems in Afghanistan, which can be by developing efficient, community-based, irrigation water resource distribution\n thousands of years old. The water in these and management systems.343 AWATT, a USAID/New Mexico State University proj-\n systems flows all year; farmers have mini- ect, has active projects in several provinces, as shown in Figure 3.29.344\n mal control over the discharge rate from This quarter, AWATT focused on rehabilitating karezes. Demand for water has\n season to season, or from day to night. increased, lowering the water table. As a result, old irrigation systems are pro-\n ducing less water. According to USAID, the karezes have been collapsing, forcing\n villagers to find ways to clean or rebuild the water systems\xe2\x80\x94a dangerous, time-\nSource: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n consuming job.345\n\n\n\n\n 104 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c COUNTER-NARCOTICS\n\n\n\n\n The Shindand district in Herat has been facing acute difficulty with karezes. FIGURE 3.29\n\nThis quarter, AWATT engineers designed a way to rehabilitate the district\xe2\x80\x99s\n AWATT PROJECTS BY PROVINCE\nkarezes, lining them with rock masonry and precast concrete slabs to eliminate\ncave-ins and thus the need to clean the systems annually. In addition to the\nrepairs, engineers installed a gate at the end of the newly lined karezes so that\nfarmers can control the flow of the water from the systems.346\n\nRoots of Peace\nAs of December 2010, nearly $3.5 million had been disbursed under the Roots\nof Peace grant, according to USAID. Roots of Peace aims to increase income for\nrural farmers by improving their production and shifting their focus to crops with\nhigher market value. The program operates in 16 southern, eastern, and central No Activity\nprovinces. According to USAID, the program had made the following progress:347 Planning Projects\n\xe2\x80\xa2 High-market-value orchards: Some 645 hectares of orchards and vineyards Active Projects\n\n were planted by 4,000 farmers.\n Source: New Mexico State University, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Water,\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Exporting and marketing fresh fruits: Grapes, pomegranates, mulberry, Agriculture and Technology Transfer,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online\n 1/9/2011.\n apricots, and apples were exported to Dubai, Tajikistan, India, Pakistan,\n the Netherlands, and Canada. Roots of Peace assistance with fruit storage\n enabled farmers and merchants to increase post-season sales. As a result,\n prices increased two- to threefold over four to five months.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Gender activities: Women in 125 households began establishing small-scale\n poultry enterprises.\n\nEradication\nAlthough the United States does not perform poppy eradication activities,\nthe GIRoA conducts some eradication through the Governor-Led Eradication\nprogram. No poppy fields were eradicated this quarter because eradication is a\nseasonal activity, conducted from February to May.348\n This quarter, the UNODC reported that eradication operations in 2010 had\naffected only 2% of the area under cultivation. In Myanmar, operations in 2010\neradicated 22%.349\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 105\n\x0cTITLE OF THE SECTION\n\n\n\n\n106 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ANTI-CORRUPTION\n\n\n\n\nANTI-CORRUPTION\nAs of December 31, 2010, the United States had appropriated more than $16.15 bil-\nlion to support governance and development in Afghanistan; governance includes\nanti-corruption efforts.350 SIGAR AUDIT\n In an audit report issued last quarter, SIGAR noted that reconstruction funding\n In an audit report released in August\nwas still being provided without a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. This\n 2010, SIGAR found that the United\nquarter, SIGAR received reports that the strategy was signed, but at press time had\n States had provided relatively little\nnot received documentation confirming that the strategy had been finalized.\n assistance to Afghan anti-corruption\n Transparency International ranked Afghanistan the third most corrupt country\n entities charged with monitoring the\nin the world in 2010.351 Although a 2010 Asia Foundation survey found that 78% of\n proper use of reconstruction funds. For\nAfghans have a positive opinion of their provincial governments, a Transparency\n more information, see SIGAR, Audit\nInternational survey published this quarter showed that Afghans are split in their\n 10-15, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Reconstruction Efforts in\nopinions about government effectiveness in fighting corruption.352 The survey,\n Afghanistan Would Benefit from a\nwhich measured public perceptions of corruption in 86 countries, found that 39%\n Finalized Comprehensive U.S. Anti-\nof Afghans believe that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan\n Corruption Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d available at\n(GIRoA) has been ineffective in fighting corruption, as shown in Figure 3.30.353 The\n www.sigar.mil.\nbarometer also showed that Afghans consider the judiciary to be the most corrupt\ninstitution in the country\xe2\x80\x94more corrupt than political parties, police forces, the\nlegislature, and the private sector.354 Survey results also indicated that petty bribery\nis a common problem in Afghanistan: 61% of Afghans reported that they had paid a\nbribe in the preceding 12 months.355\n FIGURE 3.30\n\n\nGIROA EFFORTS AFGHAN PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF\nAccording to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the THE GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99S EFFORTS TO FIGHT\nGIRoA has been increasing its focus on anti-corruption programming.356 For instance, CORRUPTION (PERCENT)\non December 5, 2010, the Herat Provincial Council organized a two-day forum to\ndiscuss streamlining anti-corruption efforts in the province. Speaking at that event,\nthe Director-General of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC,\npreviously referred to as the HOO) stated that civil society, provincial councils, and Effective Ineffective\nthe public sector can all play a crucial role in improving anti-corruption efforts in the 35 39\n\nprovince. The forum received support from the UNAMA and other UN agencies.357\n The GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption efforts are divided between several agencies and Neither\norganizations that receive support from the United States and other international 26\ndonors. Table 3.8 on the next page provides an overview of each organization,\nits areas of responsibility, the leader of the organization, and the U.S. agencies\n Source: Transparency International, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Corruption\nsupporting it. Barometer 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010, p. 47.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 107\n\x0c ANTI-CORRUPTION\n\n\n\n\n High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption\n The HOOAC was established by President Hamid Karzai in July 2008. He charged it\n with the primary responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the implementation\n of the GIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption strategy. The HOOAC is also responsible for imple-\n menting administrative procedural reform in Afghanistan.358\n In December 2010, the Director-General of the HOOAC stated that the GIRoA\n was working to revise Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s anti-corruption laws so that they conform to\n the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.359\n In a report issued in November 2010, DoD noted that the HOOAC had begun\n publishing the asset declarations of senior GIRoA officials. However, some senior\n officials had refused to complete their declarations despite requests from the\n HOOAC and President Karzai. DoD reported that the HOOAC has also been slow to\n publish the declarations it received\xe2\x80\x94an indication that the HOOAC is reluctant to\n undertake serious reforms when they are politically sensitive.360\n\n Progress on Corruption Cases\n This quarter, the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\n (INL) reported that it had been using case records from the Anti-Corruption Unit\n (ACU) to track the success of anti-corruption activities. Specifically, INL had tracked\n the number of corruption cases being developed, the speed with which they were\n handled, and their dispositions. However, the Afghan Attorney General, who leads the\n ACU, had subsequently refused to provide INL with updates on corruption cases. INL\n noted that until the Attorney General is willing to share these records with the interna-\n tional community, INL will not be able to track the progress of these cases.361\n The GIRoA has several law enforcement offices that specialize in anti-corruption\n cases. The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) investigates potential corruption crimes.\n When the MCTF makes arrests, the ACU prosecutes the cases in the Anti-Corruption\nTABLE 3.8\n\n\nGIROA ANTI-CORRUPTION ORGANIZATIONS\n U.S. Support\nFocus Organization Reports To Provided By Mission\nPreventive High Office of Oversight and President USAID Coordinate and monitor the implementation of\nMeasures Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), preventive measures, including the Anti-Corruption\n established 2008 Strategy, to help limit government corruption\nGovernment Control and Audit Office President USAID, Audit financial matters within the GIRoA\nOversight (CAO), established 1981 Treasury\nProsecution Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), Attorney General DoJ, INL Prosecute corruption cases\n established 2009\nInvestigation Major Crimes Task Force Deputy Minister of Security (Ministry of Interior), Director INL, DoJ, FBI Investigate high-level corruption cases\n (MCTF), established 2009 of Security General (National Directorate of Security)\nDrug-Related Law Criminal Justice Task Force Ministry of Interior (Counter-Narcotics Police of INL Investigate and prosecute drug-related crimes and\nEnforcement (CJTF), established 2005 Afghanistan), Ministry of Justice (prosecutors), corruption\n Supreme Court (Central Narcotics Tribunal)\nSources: HOOAC, \xe2\x80\x9cWho We Are?\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/16/2011; U.S. Embassy Kabul, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Celebrates Anti-Corruption Day,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/15/2010; SIGAR, Audit 10-8, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Control and Audit Office\nRequires Operational and Budgetary Independence, Enhanced Authority, and Focused International Assistance to Effectively Prevent and Detect Corruption,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/9/2010; DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cClinton: Afghans Face Critical\nMoment With Karzai\xe2\x80\x99s Second Term,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/19/2010; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011; INL, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Program Overview,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/14/2011; DoJ, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels to\nAfghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010; DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAdvancing Freedom and Democracy Reports,\xe2\x80\x9d 5/2009; CJTF, \xe2\x80\x9cWelcome to the CJTF Website,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/16/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 108 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ANTI-CORRUPTION\n\n\n\n\nTribunal.362 Drug-related corruption cases are handled by the Criminal Justice Task\nForce, a team of Afghan prosecutors and police investigators who investigate and\nprosecute significant narcotics crimes and related crimes such as corruption and\nmoney laundering. These crimes are tried before the Central Narcotics Tribunal.363\n\nMajor Crimes Task Force\nAs of December 2010, the MCTF had 100 investigators from the Ministry of Interior\n(MoI), and 63 from the National Directorate of Security. According to INL, the\nMCTF is operating at 70% capacity.364 SIGAR AUDIT\n The MCTF receives counterterrorism and intelligence support from the U.S.\n In an ongoing audit, SIGAR is examining\nFederal Bureau of Investigation and mentoring support from the U.S. Department of\n the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to\nJustice (DoJ).365 The MCTF continued to pursue corruption cases for investigation\n strengthen the capabilities of the\nthis quarter and has arrested officials who are believed to be corrupt, according to\n Major Crimes Task Force. For more\nINL. However, few of these cases have been brought to trial.366\n information, see Section 1, page 16.\n In early 2010, the MCTF conducted an investigation of government official\nMuhammad Zia Salehi, which led to his arrest in June for accepting a bribe for\nreleasing a detainee.367 Following the arrest, President Karzai ordered Salehi\xe2\x80\x99s\nrelease and demanded two investigations of the MCTF, for illegal activities and for\nviolations of Salehi\xe2\x80\x99s human rights.368 The Attorney General dismissed the case,\ndespite evidence that the accused engaged in corruption. In December, according\nto INL, the Attorney General discussed transferring two lead prosecutors on the\nSalehi case to a provincial office.369\n\nAnti-Corruption Unit\nThe ACU falls under the Afghan Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office. In the past, its prosecu-\ntors and investigators (all Afghans) had DoJ mentors and specialists to provide\nadvice and mentoring support.370 However, according to INL, in July 2010, the SIGAR AUDIT\nAttorney General terminated all mentoring activities for the ACU and for the\n In an audit report released in\nAttorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office. The DoJ mentors were permitted to return to the ACU in\n December 2009, SIGAR found that\nDecember but were still restricted from assisting prosecutors on specific cases. INL\n the HOO suffered from a limited\nobserved that more cases were being diverted away from the ACU and the Anti-\n operational capacity. The audit also\nCorruption Tribunal to other courts and prosecutors.371\n found that the organization lacked\n Also in July, according to INL, the Attorney General issued a directive that\n the independence required to meet\nprohibited the use of polygraphs to vet prosecutors\xe2\x80\x94a screening process that\n international standards for an oversight\nhad been set in place to prevent corruption. Since July, the Attorney General\n institution and that the United States\nhired 50 prosecutors for the ACU, none of whom have been screened with poly-\n had not designated a specific office to\ngraphs. The Supreme Court issued a similar directive prohibiting polygraphs; as\n oversee or coordinate U.S. assistance\na result, only 5 of the 11 judges on the Anti-Corruption Tribunal have been vetted\n to the HOO. For more information, see\nwith polygraphs.372\n SIGAR, Audit 10-2, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s High\n This quarter, the GIRoA secured eight corruption convictions of mid-level\n Office of Oversight Needs Significantly\ngovernment officials, none of them through the Anti-Corruption Tribunal;\n Strengthened Authority, Independence,\nhowever, INL noted that these cases were under appeal. INL also noted that no\n and Donor Support to become an\nhigh-level government officials were prosecuted. The GIRoA initiated several\n Effective Anti-Corruption Institution,\xe2\x80\x9d\ninvestigations, but INL was not provided with details.373\n available at www.sigar.mil.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 109\n\x0c Guarding the Roads\n A member of the Road Maintenance Team (RMT) scans\n the Tagab Valley for insurgent activity at a checkpoint in\n November 2010. This checkpoint was built by the RMT,\n civilians, and personnel from the International Security\n Assistance Force and the Afghan National Police. A SIGAR\n audit released this quarter found that many road projects\n are at risk because of inadequate planning for maintenance\n and sustainment. (ISAF photo, USAF SSgt Joseph Swafford)\n\n\n\n\n110 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c4 OTHER AGENCY\n OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n 111\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n112 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\nEach quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and\nongoing oversight activities. These agencies are performing oversight activities in\nAfghanistan and providing results to SIGAR:\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)\n\xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General\n (USAID OIG)\nThe descriptions appear as they were submitted, with these changes for consis-\ntency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of\nfull names; standardized capitalization, hyphenation, and preferred spellings; and\nthird-person instead of first-person construction.\n\nCOMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES\nTable 4.1 lists the five oversight projects related to reconstruction or security that\nthe participating agencies reported were completed this quarter.\n\nTABLE 4.1\n\n\nRECENTLY COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES,\nAS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010\nAgency Report Number Date Issued Project Title\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3002 12/30/2010 Review of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE To Provide Operations and Maintenance\n to Embassy Kabul\nGAO GAO-11-138 11/15/2010 Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts To Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, But Improvements\n Needed in Project Planning, Coordination, and Management\nGAO GAO-11-1 10/1/2010 Iraq and Afghanistan: DoD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts,\n Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel\nUSAAA A-2011-0020-ALL 11/16/2010 Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP), U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) (FOUO)\nUSAID OIG F-306-11-001-S 11/6/2010 Review of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Ministerial Assessment Process\nNote: MERO = Middle East Regional Office.\nSources: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; DoS OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; GAO, response to SIGAR data call,\n1/4/2011; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 113\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nU.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General\xe2\x80\x93\nMiddle East Regional Office\nReview of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE To Provide Operations and\nMaintenance to Embassy Kabul\n(Report No. 10-MERO-3002, Issued December 30, 2010)\nThe objectives of this performance evaluation are to determine: (1) the require-\nments and provisions of the contract and task orders, (2) the amount of funding\nthe Department has obligated and expended to provide embassy facility opera-\ntions and maintenance through contracts for fiscal years 2005-2009, (3) the\neffectiveness of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s contract performance in providing facility operations and\nmaintenance to Embassy Kabul, (4) PAE\xe2\x80\x99s controls for inventorying, record-\ning, and safeguarding U.S. government-furnished equipment and property in\nAfghanistan, whether the equipment has been properly accounted for, and the\nchallenges to maintaining accountability, (5) how well the Department admin-\nisters and manages the contract and task orders to provide oversight of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s\nperformance in Afghanistan, (6) whether the contract includes FAR clause\n52.222.50, which provides administrative remedies if, during the term of the\ncontract, the contractor or subcontractor engage in severe forms of trafficking in\npersons, and (7) how the Department ensures that costs are properly allocated\nand supported.\n\nGovernment Accountability Office\nDuring the last quarter, GAO released two reports\xe2\x80\x94one pertaining to U.S. efforts\nto support the Afghan water sector, and U.S. agencies\xe2\x80\x99 implementation of the\nSynchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker in Afghanistan and Iraq.\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s report on U.S. efforts to support the Afghan water sector found that\n the goals outlined in the U.S. government\xe2\x80\x99s 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy\n generally align with Afghan government strategic goals for the water sector. The\n Strategy identifies short-, medium-, and long-term goals to be achieved between\n 2010 and 2014. Additionally, since 2002, the U.S. government has implemented a\n wide range of water projects throughout Afghanistan to improve access to safe\n drinking water and sanitation, agriculture irrigation, and water-sector manage-\n ment. These projects generally align with Afghan water-sector goals.\n The United States expects to accelerate development efforts in the water\n sector and estimates that an additional $2.1 billion will be needed to fund\n these efforts from FY 2010 through FY 2014. The Government Performance\n and Results Act and several U.S. strategic documents concerning opera-\n tions in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of inter-agency coordination.\n GAO has reported on the importance of inter-agency coordination and\n collaboration when multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. counter-\n terrorism-related efforts.\n GAO\xe2\x80\x99s review showed that the United States has taken steps to better\n coordinate water-sector development projects but that additional efforts are\n\n\n\n 114 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n needed. For example, the U.S. government has developed an Infrastructure\n Working Group, an Inter-Agency Water Strategy, and has started to meet on\n a regular basis. However, an inter-agency implementation plan called for in\n the strategy has not been completed. Also, USAID and DoD have not devel-\n oped a centralized database to enhance coordination, which GAO previously\n recommended. Moreover, U.S. agencies generally do not meet on a regular\n basis with all the relevant ministries in the Afghan government, and they lack\n complete data concerning other donor projects to maximize the U.S. invest-\n ment in development projects.\n USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Automated Directives System outlines USAID\xe2\x80\x99s performance\n management and monitoring procedures. GAO found that gaps existed in\n USAID\xe2\x80\x99s performance management and monitoring efforts for water sector\n projects in Afghanistan. For example, while four of the six implementers of\n projects GAO reviewed established performance indicators, some did not\n always establish targets for the indicators as required. In addition, although\n USAID collected quarterly progress reports from five of the six water project\n implementers for the projects GAO reviewed, it did not analyze and interpret\n this information as required. Finally, though USAID has identified several\n alternative monitoring procedures staff can use to help mitigate monitoring\n challenges in high-threat environments, USAID has not effectively ensured\n that such guidance was disseminated to staff in Afghanistan.\n The U.S. government has included a focus on building sustainability\n into U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. Recent U.S. strategies have\n emphasized the importance of project sustainability. GAO has identified\n two key elements to ensuring water project sustainability: enhancing tech-\n nical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions\n with water-sector responsibilities, and ensuring funding is available to keep\n projects operational after they have been completed. Ongoing USAID water\n projects included in this review have incorporated sustainability initiatives.\n DoD guidance also emphasizes sustainability. However, DoD officials have\n acknowledged the difficulties of sustaining water projects in Afghanistan.\n GAO makes several recommendations to the USAID Administrator, in\n conjunction with DoD and other relevant agencies, to improve planning,\n coordination, and management of U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan.\n This includes developing an inter-agency plan and designating a centralized\n database. GAO also recommends steps the USAID Administrator needs to\n take to improve performance management. USAID and DoD generally con-\n curred with GAO\xe2\x80\x99s recommendations (GAO-11-138).\n\xe2\x80\xa2 GAO\xe2\x80\x99s report on U.S. agencies\xe2\x80\x99 implementation of the Synchronized\n Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) found that while DoD,\n DoS, and USAID designated SPOT as their system for tracking statutorily\n required information in July 2008, SPOT still cannot reliably track informa-\n tion on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq\n or Afghanistan. As a result, the agencies relied on sources of data other\n than SPOT to respond to GAO requests for information. The agencies\xe2\x80\x99\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 115\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n implementation of SPOT has been affected by some practical and technical\n issues, but their efforts also were undermined by a lack of agreement on\n how to proceed, particularly on how to track local nationals working under\n contracts or assistance instruments. The lack of agreement was due in part\n to agencies not having assessed their respective information needs and how\n SPOT can be designed to address those needs and statutory requirements.\n In 2009, GAO reported on many of these issues and recommended that\n the agencies jointly develop a plan to improve SPOT\xe2\x80\x99s implementation. The\n three agencies reported to GAO that as of March 2010 there were 262,681\n contractor and assistance personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18% of\n whom performed security functions. Due to limitations with agency-reported\n data, caution should be used in identifying trends or drawing conclusions\n about the number of personnel in either country. Data limitations are attrib-\n utable to agency difficulty in determining the number of local nationals, low\n response rates to agency requests for data, and limited ability to verify the\n accuracy of reported data. For example, a DoS office noted that none of its\n Afghan grant recipients provided requested personnel data.\n While agency officials acknowledged not all personnel were being counted,\n they still considered the reported data to be more accurate than SPOT data.\n Only DoS and USAID tracked information on the number of contractor and\n assistance personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during the\n review period. DoS reported 9 contractor and assistance personnel were killed\n and 68 wounded, while USAID reported 116 killed and 121 wounded. Both\n agencies noted that some casualties resulted from nonhostile actions. DoD still\n lacked a system to track similar information and referred GAO to Department\n of Labor data on cases filed under the Defense Base Act for killed or injured\n contractors. As GAO previously reported, Labor\xe2\x80\x99s data provide insights but are\n not a good proxy for the number of contractor casualties.\n DoD, DoS, and USAID obligated $37.5 billion on 133,951 contracts and\n assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during FY\n 2009 and the first half of FY 2010. DoD had the vast majority of contract obli-\n gations. Most of the contracts were awarded during the review period and\n used competitive procedures. DoS and USAID relied heavily on grants and\n cooperative agreements and reported that most were competitively awarded.\n While DoD and DoS did not comment on the draft report, USAID com-\n mented on the challenges of implementing SPOT and provided revised\n personnel data that GAO reviewed and included in the report. In response to\n GAO\xe2\x80\x99s 2009 report, DoD, DoS, and USAID did not agree with the recommen-\n dation to develop a plan for implementing SPOT because they felt ongoing\n coordination efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe a plan is\n needed to correct SPOT\xe2\x80\x99s shortcomings and is not making any new recom-\n mendations (GAO-11-1).\nIn addition, GAO began a new engagement focusing on U.S. efforts to build the\nAfghan government\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to manage its budget and finances.\n\n\n\n\n 116 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nU.S. Army Audit Agency\nCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program (CERP), U.S. Forces -Afghanistan\n(USFOR-A) (FOUO)\n(Report No. A-2011-0020-ALL, Issued November 16, 2010)\nThis report is protectively marked For Official Use Only. The Deputy\nCommanding General, USFOR-A requested the audit. USFOR-A agreed with the\nreport\xe2\x80\x99s conclusions and recommendations and took action or was in the process\nof taking action on the recommendations. The Assistant Secretary of the Army\n(Financial Management and Comptroller) provided the official Army position and\nagreed with the report\xe2\x80\x99s finding and recommendations.\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development Office\nof Inspector General\nReview of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Ministerial Assessment Process\n(Report No. F-306-11-001-S, Issued November 6, 2010)\nThe final report was issued on November 6, 2010. USAID OIG conducted this\nreview to determine whether USAID\xe2\x80\x99s ministerial assessment process provides\nreasonable assurance of identifying significant vulnerabilities that could result in\nwaste or misuse of U.S. government resources.\n Most of the assessments completed to date were based mainly on reviews of\nwritten procedures, inquiries of ministry officials, and inspection of a limited\nnumber of transactions. More testing of controls would have provided greater\nassurance of detecting vulnerabilities that could result in waste or misuse of U.S.\ngovernment funds.\n The draft scopes of work for future assessments can be strengthened by tell-\ning reviewers what program(s) ministries may be asked to manage, assessing the\ncontrol environment, expanding coverage of controls over human resources and\nfixed assets, and providing more detailed guidance to reviewers on how to assess\ncompliance with applicable laws and regulations.\n The report recommended that USAID/Afghanistan\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop and implement suitable policies, procedures, and practices so that\n ministerial assessments will provide reasonable assurance of identifying\n significant vulnerabilities that could result in waste or misuse of U.S. govern-\n ment funds.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Make appropriate modifications to the scopes of work for future ministerial\n assessments as outlined in this report.\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Rely on joint donor assessments of host government ministries to the degree\n that they meet USAID\xe2\x80\x99s needs. If additional assessments are needed to meet\n USAID\xe2\x80\x99s needs, the work should build on but not duplicate work already\n performed, to the extent possible.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 117\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\n ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES\n As of December 31, 2010, the participating agencies reported 38 ongoing over-\n sight activities related to reconstruction or security in Afghanistan. The activities\n reported are listed in Table 4.2 and described in the following sections by agency.\n\n Department of Defense Office of Inspector General\n DoD continues to face many challenges in executing its Overseas Contingency\n Operations (OCO), formerly known as \xe2\x80\x9cthe Global War on Terror.\xe2\x80\x9d DoD OIG has\nTABLE 4.2\n\n\nONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010\nAgency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title\nDoD OIG D2011-D000FR-0089.000 11/30/2010 Internal Controls Over Distribution and Reconciliation of Funds for the Afghanistan National Army\n Payroll\nDoD OIG D2011-D000JB-0068.000 11/17/2010 Requirements Development Process for Military Construction Projects in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2011-D000JA-0075.000 11/2/2010 DoD Oversight of the Northern Distribution Network\nDoD OIG D2011-D000AS-0030.000 10/1/2010 Management and Oversight for DoD Acquisition and Support of Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft\nDoD OIG and D2011-D000JA-0009.000 9/30/2010 Afghan National Police Training Program (Joint)\nDoS OIG 11AUD3001 11/2010\nDoD OIG D2010-D000FL-0276.000 9/2/2010 Controls Over the Reporting and Propriety of Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\n Program Payments in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0165.001 6/21/2010 Implementation of Security Provisions of a U.S. Army Intelligence and\n Security Command Contract for Linguist Support\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JO-0229.000 6/14/2010 Construction of the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000SPO-0198.000 4/19/2010 Assessment of Efforts To Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0138.000 2/18/2010 Information Operations in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2010-D000JA-0091.000 12/9/2009 Force Protection Programs for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan\nDoD OIG D2008-D000CD-0256.000 8/7/2008 DoD Body Armor Contracts\nDoS OIG/SIGAR 11AUD3003 10/2010 Afghanistan Civilian Uplift (Joint)\nDoS OIG-MERO 11-MERO-3007 12/2010 Limited-Scope Review of the Needs Assessments and Facilities Conditions for Newly Developed\n Department of State Positions in Afghanistan\nDoS OIG-MERO 11-MERO-3003 10/2010 Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\xe2\x80\x99 Facility Operations and\n Maintenance Support Contract with the Major Crimes Task Force in Afghanistan (Contract Evaluation)\nDoS OIG-MERO 11-MERO-3004 9/2010 Review of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Program Effectiveness To\n Reintegrate and Resettle Afghan Refugees\nDoS OIG-MERO 11-MERO-3001 9/2010 Review of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\xe2\x80\x99 Correction systems\n support Program (CSSP) in Afghanistan\nDoS OIG-MERO 10-MERO-3001 2/2010 Review of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE To Provide Operations and Maintenance to\n Afghan Counter-Narcotics Units in Afghanistan\nGAO 351552 12/9/2010 Marine Corps Equipping Strategies to Reset Equipment\nGAO 320815 11/5/2010 Afghan Capacity Building\nGAO 351525 8/13/2010 DoD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)\nGAO 320794 7/21/2010 Accountability of U.S. Direct Funding to Afghanistan\nGAO 351514 6/14/2010 Army Advise and Assist Brigades\nGAO 351492 4/30/2010 Personnel, Equipment, and Supply Support for Operations in Afghanistan\nGAO 351489 4/26/2010 DoD Vetting in Afghanistan\n\n\n\n\n 118 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nTABLE 4.2 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2010\nAgency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title\nGAO 320766 4/1/2010 U.S. Civilian Surge in Afghanistan\nGAO 351463 3/12/2010 Afghanistan ISR Capabilities\nGAO 320712 9/2/2009 U.S. Efforts To Develop Capable Afghan National Army (ANA) Forces\nGAO 351393 8/21/2009 DoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations\nUSAAA A-2011-ALL-0098.000 10/9/2010 Bulk Fuel Operations in Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2011-ALL-0135.000 10/9/2010 Micro-Purchases of Field Ordering Officers - Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-ALL-0480.000 5/21/2010 Agreed-Upon Procedures Attestation for USFOR-A LOGCAP Course of Action - Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-ALL-0421.000 4/4/2010 LOGCAP IV Contract Requirements Determination-Afghanistan\nUSAAA A-2010-ALL-0103.000 3/3//2010 Controls Over Vendor Payments Phase II - Afghanistan\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Review of Cash Disbursement Practices Employed by Selected USAID/Afghanistan\n Contractors and Grantees\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Election Support Programs\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer (AWATT) Program\nUSAID OIG Not provided Not provided Audit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Construction of Health and Education Facilities (CHEF) Program\nSources: DoD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; DoS OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; DoS OIG-MERO, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; GAO, response to SIGAR data call,\n1/4/2011; USAAA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 12/21/2010.\n\n\n\n\nidentified priorities based on those challenges and has responded by expand-\ning its coverage of OCO operations and its presence in Southwest Asia. As DoD\ncontinues its OCO to include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it will stay\nfocused on issues important to accomplish the mission and ensure the depart-\nment makes efficient use of its resources to support the warfighter.\n The DoD OIG-led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group coordinates and\ndeconflicts federal and DoD OCO-related oversight activities. The Group held its\nfifteenth meeting in November 2010.\n DoD OIG\xe2\x80\x99s ongoing OEF-related oversight addresses the safety of personnel\nwith regard to construction efforts, force protection programs for U.S. personnel,\naccountability of property, improper payments, contract administration, distri-\nbution and reconciliation of funds for the Afghan National Army (ANA) payroll;\noversight of the contract for training the Afghan National Police (ANP); logistical\ndistribution within Afghanistan; information operations, armoring capabilities,\nand acquisition planning and controls over funding for the Afghan National\nSecurity Forces (ANSF).\n\nOversight Activities\nFor the first quarter of FY 2011, DoD OIG had 43 ongoing oversight activities and\nissued 3 reports that support OEF. Of those 43 ongoing projects, 12 directly relate\nto reconstruction or security operations in Afghanistan and are incorporated in\nthis quarterly report. Of the 3 issued reports, none directly relate to reconstruc-\ntion or security operations in Afghanistan as defined by SIGAR and therefore are\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 119\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nnot incorporated in this quarterly report. These three reports address contract\nadministration matters and testing of assets that support DoD operations in\nAfghanistan.\n\nInternal Controls Over Distribution and Reconciliation of Funds\nfor the Afghanistan National Army Payroll\n(Project No. D2011-D000FR-0089.000, Initiated November 30, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether adequate controls are in place to ensure that\nthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission - Afghanistan/Combined\nSecurity Transition Command - Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) is distributing DoD\nfunds accurately and timely to the Afghanistan ministries for the ANA payroll. In\naddition, DoD OIG is determining whether NTM-A/CSTC-A has implemented an\nadequate mentoring process to assist Afghanistan ministries in providing accu-\nrate payments to ANA personnel.\n\nRequirements Development Process for Military Construction\nProjects in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2011-D000JB-0068.000, Initiated November 17, 2010)\nDoD OIG is evaluating the requirements development process for military con-\nstruction projects in Afghanistan. Specifically, DoD OIG is determining whether\nthe requirements development process results in statements of work that clearly\ndefine required results, have measurable outcomes, and meet DoD needs.\n\nDoD Oversight of the Northern Distribution Network\n(Project No. D2011-D000JA-0075.000, Initiated November 2, 2010)\nDoD OIG is assessing DoD oversight of the Northern Distribution Network and\nevaluating the ability of DoD to plan, coordinate, and execute sustainment opera-\ntions for Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network.\n\nManagement and Oversight for DoD Acquisition and Support of Non-Standard\nRotary-Wing Aircraft\n(Project No. D2011-D000AS-0030.000, Initiated October 1, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether DoD officials properly and effectively managed\nthe acquisition and support of non-standard rotary-wing aircraft, such as the\nRussian Mi-17 aircraft, to include those acquired using the Afghanistan Security\nForces Fund or any DoD-related requirements. Multiple projects may be initiated\nunder this objective.\n\nAfghan National Police Training Program\n(Project No. D2011-D000JA-0009.000) [D-S 11AUD3001], Initiated September 30, 2010)\nDoD OIG and the DoS Inspector General (DoS OIG) are performing this joint\naudit to meet an anticipated requirement in the FY\xc2\xa02011 National Defense\nAuthorization Act that will require DoD OIG, in consultation with DoS OIG, to\n\n\n\n\n 120 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nissue a report on the ANP Training Program. DoD OIG/DOS IG is evaluating\nDoD and DoS efforts to transfer contract administration for the ANP Program.\nSpecifically, DoD OIG/DoS OIG will assess the cost, performance measures, and\nplanning efforts associated with the transfer to ensure enhanced contract over-\nsight, adequate funding and support, and effective program management. The\njoint team also plans to follow up on the joint DoD OIG Report\xc2\xa0No. D-2010-042\nand DoS OIG Report No. MERO-A-I O-6, \xe2\x80\x9cDepartment of Defense Obligations and\nExpenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and\nMentoring of the Afghan National Police,\xe2\x80\x9d February 9, 2010.\n\nControls Over the Reporting and Propriety of Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response\nProgram Payments in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000FL-0276.000, Initiated September 2, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether the internal controls over CERP payments\nmade to support operations in Afghanistan are adequate. Specifically, DoD OIG\nwill review the controls to ensure payments are proper and that complete, accu-\nrate, and meaningful data is reported to those decision-makers responsible for\nmanaging the CERP. This audit is the second in a series of audits that addresses\nthe internal controls over the CERP payments made to support operations in\nAfghanistan.\n\nImplementation of Security Provisions of a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security\nCommand Contract for Linguist Support\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0165.001, Initiated June 21, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether the security provisions of a U.S. Army\nIntelligence and Security Command contract for linguist support in Afghanistan\n(W911W4-07-D-0010) were implemented effectively. This project is one in a\nseries of reviews regarding linguist support in Afghanistan. Project D2010-\nD000JA-0165.000 addresses whether contract for linguist support in Afghanistan\n(W911W4-07-D-0010) included appropriate security provisions.\n\nConstruction of the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JO-0229.000, Initiated June 14, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and\nUSFOR-A procured construction services and administered the construction\ncontract for the Detention Facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, in accordance with\nthe Federal Acquisition Regulation and other applicable laws and regulations.\nSpecifically, DoD OIG will determine whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\nproperly monitored contractor performance during construction of the Detention\nFacility in Parwan and whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has taken or\nshould take recourse against the contractor because of potential latent defects,\nnegligence, or fraud.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 121\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nAssessment of Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the\nExpanded Afghan National Police\n(Project No. D2010-D000SPO-0198.000, Initiated April 19, 2010)\nDoD OIG is determining whether U.S. government, NATO/International Security\nAssistance Force (NATO/ISAF), coalition, and Government of the Islamic\nRepublic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources\nto train, equip, and mentor the ANP are prepared, issued, operative, and relevant.\nDoD OIG will also determine the status of actions taken in response to recom-\nmendations made in DoD OIG Report Nos. SPO-2009-006 and SPO-2009-007, as\nthey pertain to the ANP.\n\nInformation Operations in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0138.000, Initiated February 18, 2010)\nDoD OIG is evaluating the ability of U.S. Central Command and USFOR-A to\nconduct information operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, DoD OIG will\nassess the support provided by DoD organizations that enable those commands\nto conduct information operations.\n\nForce Protection Programs for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan\n(Project No. D2010-D000JA-0091.000, Initiated December 9, 2009)\nDoD OIG is reviewing the force protection programs for primary gathering facili-\nties and billeting areas of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Specifically, it is assessing\nthe program support and resources that commanders have for facility planning,\nantiterrorism, and safety programs protecting their forces. The audit is focus-\ning on Bagram Airfield, Kandahar Airfield, Camp Eggers, and the New Kabul\nCompound.\n\nDoD Body Armor Contracts\n(Project No. D2008-D000CD-0256.000, Initiated August 7, 2008)\nDoD OIG is examining the contracts and contracting process for body armor and\nrelated test facilities. Specific objectives will include evaluating the background\nand qualifications of the contractors, the criteria for awarding the contracts, the\nquality assurance process, and any relationships that may exist between the con-\ntractors and government officials. The review of the quality assurance process\nwill include reviewing the results of First Article Testing and Lot Acceptance\nTesting for the body armor contracts. DoD OIG issued Report No. D-2010-029, on\nDecember 21, 2009, discussing the contract award of DoD body armor contracts.\nDoD OIG plans to issue additional reports related to this project.\n\n\n\n\n 122 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nDepartment of State Office of Inspector General\nOversight Activities\n\nAudit of the Afghan National Police Training (Joint)\n(Project No. 11AUD3001, Initiated November 2010)\nObjectives: Per an anticipated requirement in the FY 2011 National Defense\nAuthorization Act that will require DoD OIG, in consultation with DoS OIG, to\nissue a report on the ANP training program, DoS OIG\xe2\x80\x99s objective is to evalu-\nate the DoD and DoS efforts to transfer contract administration for the ANP\nProgram. Specifically, DoS OIG will assess the cost, performance measures,\nand planning efforts associated with the transfer to ensure enhanced contract\noversight, adequate funding and support, and effective program management.\nDoS OIG also plans to follow-up on the joint DoD IG Report No. D-2010-042\nand DoS IG Report No. MERO-A-10-6, \xe2\x80\x9cDepartment of Defense Obligations and\nExpenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and\nMentoring of the Afghan National Police,\xe2\x80\x9d February 9, 2010.\n\nAfghanistan Civilian Uplift (Joint)\n(Project No. 11AUD3003, Initiated October 2010)\nObjective: The objective of this audit is to determine the costs of the Civilian\nUplift in Afghanistan, including how much has been spent to date (2009 to\npresent) and an estimate of how much it will cost to sustain the effort (present\nthrough 2012). DoS OIG\xe2\x80\x99s work will focus on the costs associated with the hiring,\ntraining, deployment, and necessary life and operational support of civilian uplift\npersonnel assigned to Afghanistan.\n\nDepartment of State Office of Inspector General\xe2\x80\x93\nMiddle East Regional Office\nOversight Activities\n\nLimited-Scope Review of the Needs Assessments and Facilities Conditions for\nNewly Developed Department of State Positions in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 11-MERO-3007, Initiated December 2010)\nObjectives: The primary objectives of this evaluation are to determine (1) the\ndegree to which DoS conducted needs assessments to identify, develop, and\nstaff new positions at Embassy Kabul and its constituent posts; and (2) whether\navailable office facilities and housing or that already provided to staff filling these\nnew positions are adequate, safe, and secure.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 123\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nReview of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\xe2\x80\x99\nFacility Operations and Maintenance Support Contract with the Major Crimes\nTask Force in Afghanistan (Contract Evaluation)\n(Project No. 11-MERO-3003, Initiated October 2010)\nObjectives: The primary objectives of this evaluation are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of the contract; (2) the amount of funding DoS\nhas obligated and expended to provide facility operations and maintenance;\n(3) DynCorp\xe2\x80\x99s contract performance in providing facility operations and mainte-\nnance to the Major Crimes Task Force at Camp Falcon; and (4) how DoS ensures\nthat costs incurred are properly allocated and supported.\n\nReview of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) Program\nEffectiveness to Reintegrate and Resettle Afghan Refugees\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3004, Initiated September 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of agreements with the UN High Commissioner for\nRefugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and nongovernmental\norganizations; (2) how assistance requirements were calculated; (3) whether\nassistance reached intended targets; (4) if program performance measures\nwere established and achieved; and (5) the effectiveness of Embassy Kabul and\nProvincial Reconstruction Teams to manage and coordinate the humanitarian\nresponse in Afghanistan.\n\nReview of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs\xe2\x80\x99\nCorrection Systems Support Program (CSSP) in Afghanistan (Contract Evaluation)\n(Project No. 11-MERO-3001, Initiated September 2010)\nObjectives: The primary objectives of this evaluation are to determine whether\n(1) technical training, institutional capacity building, and leadership training for\ncorrections systems and Ministry of Justice officials are appropriate and effec-\ntive; (2) new prison renovation and construction meets human and sustainable\nstandards and is being completed in a timely manner; (3) the prison classification\nsystem separates common criminals from insurgents; (4) programs to reduce\nradicalization of prisoners are effective; and (5) adequate correction facilities\nexist to meet the needs of juveniles and women.\n\nReview of the Department of State\xe2\x80\x99s Contract with PAE to Provide Operations and\nMaintenance to Afghan Counternarcotics Units in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 10-MERO-3001, Initiated February 2010)\nObjectives: The objectives of this performance audit are to determine (1) the\nrequirements and provisions of the contract and task orders; (2) the amount of\nfunding the Department has obligated and expended to provide embassy facil-\nity operations and maintenance through contracts for FY 2005\xe2\x80\x932009; (3) the\neffectiveness of PAE\xe2\x80\x99s contract performance in providing facility operations and\n\n\n\n\n 124 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nmaintenance to Afghan counter-narcotics units in Afghanistan; (4) PAE\xe2\x80\x99s controls\nfor inventorying, recording, and safeguarding U.S. government-furnished equip-\nment and property in Afghanistan, whether the equipment has been properly\naccounted for, and the challenges to maintaining accountability; (5) how well\nDoS administers and manages the contract and task orders to provide oversight\nof PAE\xe2\x80\x99s performance in Afghanistan; (6) whether the contract includes FAR\nclause 52.222.50, which provides administrative remedies if, during the term of\nthe contract, the contractor or subcontractor engage in severe forms of traffick-\ning in persons; and (7) how DoS ensures that costs are properly allocated and\nsupported.\n\nGovernment Accountability Office\nOversight Activities\n\nMarine Corps Equipping Strategies to Reset Equipment\n(Project No. 351552, Initiated December 9, 2010)\nThis review will focus on the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps has a strategy\nin place to manage the reset of ground and aviation equipment returning from Iraq\nand Afghanistan; (2) the Marine Corps\xe2\x80\x99 strategy for resetting equipment is aligned\nwith the Marine Corps\xe2\x80\x99 plan for force modernization; (3) the Marine Corps is able\nto determine the total reset costs for equipment used in operations in Iraq and\nAfghanistan; and (4) the Marine Corps\xe2\x80\x99 budget request from FY 2009\xe2\x80\x9312 for equip-\nment reset is consistent with budget guidance.\n\nAfghan Capacity Building\n(Project No. 320815, Initiated November 5, 2010)\nThis review will focus on U.S. efforts to build Afghan capacity to manage and\noversee the budget and build a sound financial management system. Specifically,\nthe extent to which U.S. efforts are aligned with Afghan and international com-\nmunity goals and have improved the Afghan government\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to manage its\nbudget and finances.\n\nDoD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)\n(Project No. 351525, Initiated August 13, 2010)\nThis review will focus on DoD efforts to institutionalize the Task Force\xe2\x80\x99s\nmission, expand its scope to other countries, and evaluate its activities,\nincluding establishing goals and metrics to measure outcomes.\n\nAccountability of U.S. Direct Funding to Afghanistan\n(Project No. 320794, Initiated July 21, 2010)\nThis review will focus on identifying total U.S. funding and direct assistance\nprovided to Afghanistan to support the lines of effort (security, governance,\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 125\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nand development) and the extent to which U.S. agencies have implemented\ninternal controls and provided oversight over direct assistance.\n\nArmy Advise and Assist Brigades\n(Project No. 351514, Initiated June 14, 2010)\nThis review will focus on the extent to which Army has defined the roles and\nmissions of augmented brigade combat teams; defined the training and resourc-\ning requirements for augmented brigade combat teams; been able to fill the\nrequirements for augmented brigade combat teams; and the extent to which\nArmy and DoD have assessed their use for security force assistance.\n\nPersonnel, Equipment, and Supply Support for Operations in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 351492, Initiated April 30, 2010)\nThis review will focus on how DoD is supplying operations in Afghanistan in\naccordance with established plans and timelines and any challenges faced in sup-\nplying operations.\n\nDoD Vetting in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 351489, Initiated April 26, 2010)\nThis review will focus on DoD processes to award contracts to Afghan and\nPakistani firms. Specifically, the extent to which DoD has developed and imple-\nmented a process to vet Afghan and Pakistani firms; shares information on\nAfghanistan and Pakistan firms with DoS, USAID, NATO, and the UN; and has\nassurance that armed Afghan private security contractor personnel are screened.\n\nU.S. Civilian Surge in Afghanistan\n(Project No. 320766, Initiated April 1, 2010)\nThis review focuses on the extent and processes through which U.S. agen-\ncies are prioritizing and fulfilling staffing requirements for the civilian surge in\nAfghanistan and the steps taken by U.S. agencies to prepare their personnel for\ndeployment.\n\nAfghanistan ISR Capabilities\n(Project No. 351463, Initiated March 12, 2010)\nThis review will focus on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)\nsupport to military operations in Afghanistan. Specifically, DoD\xe2\x80\x99s incorporation\nof ISR capabilities and identification of ISR shortfalls for military operations in\nAfghanistan into its planning efforts.\n\nU.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan National Army (ANA) Forces\n(Project No. 320712, Initiated September 2, 2009)\nThis review focuses on how much U.S. and coalition partners have provided\ntoward the development of the ANA and how much estimated future funding will\n\n\n\n 126 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nbe needed to sustain the ANA; the extent to which U.S. and coalition partners\nhave made progress in increasing the size and capability of the ANA; and the\nchallenges encountered.\n\nDoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations\n(Project No. 351393, Initiated August 21, 2009)\nThis review will focus on the extent to which DoD and the services identified\nmeet wartime health care personnel requirements for current operations; what\nchallenges they are encountering meeting those requirements; and to what\nextent they have the tools needed to meet those requirements.\n\nU.S. Army Audit Agency\nOversight Activities\n\nBulk Fuel Operations in Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2011-ALL-0098.000, Initiated October 9, 2010)\nThis audit will determine if Class III bulk fuel depot and terminal sites in\nAfghanistan have sufficient internal controls over storage and distribution opera-\ntions to ensure the accurate accountability of bulk fuel products and prevent the\nunauthorized diversion of fuel.\n\nMicro-Purchases of Field Ordering Officers - Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2011-ALL-0135.000, Initiated October 9, 2010)\nThis audit will determine whether procedures for micro purchases by field\nordering officers had sufficient controls in place to justify requirements and\naccountability of purchases.\n\nAgreed-Upon Procedures Attestation for USFOR-A LOGCAP Course of\nAction-Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2010-ALL-0480.000, Initiated May 21, 2010)\nThis attestation is being performed in Afghanistan. It will determine if the correc-\ntive actions presented in the USFOR-A LOGCAP course of action decision brief\nwere implemented and provide assurance that requirements were processed\nthrough the appropriate review board.\n\nLOGCAP IV Contract Requirements Determination-Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2010-ALL-0421.000, Initiated April 4, 2010)\nThis audit will determine if the requirements determination and validation\nprocesses for the LOGCAP IV contract are in place and operating as intended.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 127\n\x0cOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nControls Over Vendor Payments Phase II \xe2\x80\x93 Afghanistan\n(Project Code A-2010-ALL-0103.000, Initiated March 3, 2010)\nThis audit will determine if the Army has effective controls to ensure the accuracy\nof vendor payments for contingency operations in Southwest Asia (Afghanistan).\n\nU.S. Agency for International Development Office\nof Inspector General\nOversight Activities\nDuring the quarter, USAID OIG issued three financial audits covering $22.8 mil-\nlion in costs. The audits identified $943,875 in questioned costs and a shortfall\nin required cost-sharing contributions of $688,901. Also during the quarter, four\nadditional financial audits were being planned or were in process, and task\norders for seven financial audits were in process of being awarded. Financial\naudits of USAID/Afghanistan programs are performed by public accounting firms\nand by DCAA, and USAID/OIG performs desk reviews and/or quality control\nreviews of the audits and transmits the reports to USAID for action.\n\nReview of Cash Disbursement Practices Employed by Selected\nUSAID/Afghanistan Contractors and Grantees\nObjective: To determine whether the cash disbursement practices employed by\nselected USAID/Afghanistan contractors and grantees ensure that disbursements\nare reasonable, allocable, and allowable under the agreements.\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Election Support Programs\nObjective: To determine whether the Support for Increased Electoral\nParticipation in Afghanistan (IEP) and Support to the Electoral Process\n(STEP) programs are achieving their main goals of building the capacity of the\nIndependent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission,\nsupporting voter registration and election administration, strengthening the\nability of political parties and independent candidates to participate in elections,\nand strengthening the ability of Afghan citizens to effectively participate in the\nelectoral process.\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer\n(AWATT) Program\nObjective: To determine if the Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer\nProgram is achieving its main goals.\n\n\n\n\n 128 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT\n\n\n\n\nAudit of USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Construction of Health and Education\nFacilities (CHEF) Program\nObjective: To determine if the activities funded under USAID/Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s\nCHEF program are achieving the program\xe2\x80\x99s main goals of strengthening the\nGIRoA\xe2\x80\x99s ability to provide health service to its citizens and train competent\nteachers by constructing provincial hospitals, midwife training centers, and\nprovincial teacher training centers.\n\nOTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS\nSIGAR regularly coordinates with other government agencies conducting\ninvestigations in Afghanistan to monitor the progress of those investigations.\nAs of December 31, 2010, three open cases were being investigated by DoS OIG\nInvestigations (DoS OIG-INV). Table 4.3 lists the number of open and closed\ninvestigations as of December 31, 2010.\n\n\nTABLE 4.3\n\n\nINVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES: OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS\nAgency Open Cases Closed Cases Total Cases\nDoS OIG-INV 3 2 5\nTotal 3 2 5\nSource: DoS OIG-INV, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 129\n\x0c The Official Seal of SIGAR\n The Official Seal of SIGAR represents the coordination of efforts\n between the United States and Afghanistan to provide accountability\n and oversight of reconstruction activities. The phrase along the top\n side of the seal\xe2\x80\x99s center is in Dari and means \xe2\x80\x9cSIGAR.\xe2\x80\x9d The phrase\n along the bottom side of the seal\xe2\x80\x99s center is in Pashtu and has the\n same meaning.\n\n\n\n\n130 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cAPPENDICES\nAND ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n 131\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX A\nCROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY\nREQUIREMENTS\nThis appendix cross-references the pages of this report to the quarterly reporting\nand related requirements under SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s enabling legislation, the National Defense\nAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. No. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229 (Table A.1).\n\n\nTABLE A.1\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSupervision\nSection 1229(e)(1) The Inspector General shall report directly Report to the Secretary of All sections\n to, and be under the general supervision State and the Secretary of\n of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary Defense\n of Defense\nDuties\nSection 1229(f)(1) OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN Review appropriated/ All sections\n RECONSTRUCTION.\xe2\x80\x94 available funds\n It shall be the duty of the Inspector General\n to conduct, supervise, and coordinate Review programs,\n audits and investigations of the treatment, operations, contracts using\n handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated/\n appropriated or otherwise made available available funds\n for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and\n of the programs, operations, and contracts\n carried out utilizing such funds, including\n subsections (A) through (G) below.\nSection 1229(f)(1)(A) The oversight and accounting of the obliga- Review obligations and SIGAR\n tion and expenditure of such funds expenditures of appropri- Oversight\n ated/available funds\n Funding\nSection 1229(f)(1)(B) The monitoring and review of reconstruction Review reconstruction SIGAR\n activities funded by such funds activities funded by appro- Oversight\n priations and donations\nSection 1229(f)(1)(C) The monitoring and review of contracts Review contracts using Note 1\n funded by such funds appropriated and available\n funds\nSection 1229(f)(1)(D) The monitoring and review of the transfer Review internal and external Appendix B\n of such funds and associated information transfers of appropriated/\n between and among departments, agen- available funds\n cies, and entities of the United States, and\n private and nongovernmental entities\nSection 1229(f)(1)(E) The maintenance of records on the use of Maintain audit records SIGAR\n such funds to facilitate future audits and Oversight\n investigations of the use of such fund[s] Appendix C\n Appendix D\n\n\n\n\n 132 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(f)(1)(F) The monitoring and review of the effective- Monitoring and review Audits\n ness of United States coordination with as described\n the Governments of Afghanistan and\n other donor countries in the implementa-\n tion of the Afghanistan Compact and the\n Afghanistan National Development Strategy\nSection 1229(f)(1)(G) The investigation of overpayments such as Conduct and reporting of Investigations\n duplicate payments or duplicate billing and investigations as described\n any potential unethical or illegal actions of\n Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated\n entities, and the referral of such reports, as\n necessary, to the Department of Justice to\n ensure further investigations, prosecutions,\n recovery of further funds, or other remedies.\nSection 1229(f)(2) OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT.\xe2\x80\x94 Establish, maintain, and All sections\n The Inspector General shall establish, oversee systems, proce-\n maintain, and oversee such systems, dures, and controls\n procedures, and controls as the Inspector\n General considers appropriate to discharge\n the duties under paragraph (1)\nSection 1229(f)(3) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER Duties as specified in All sections\n INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978.\xe2\x80\x94 Inspector General Act\n In addition,. . .the Inspector General shall\n also have the duties and responsibilities\n of inspectors general under the Inspector\n General Act of 1978\nSection 1229(f)(4) COORDINATION OF EFFORTS.\xe2\x80\x94 Coordination with the Other Agency\n The Inspector General shall coordinate with, inspectors general of Oversight\n and receive the cooperation of, each of the DoD, DoS, and USAID\n following: (A) the Inspector General of the\n Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector\n General of the Department of State, and (C)\n the Inspector General of the United States\n Agency for International Development\nFederal Support and Other Resources\nSection 1229(h)(5)(A) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.\xe2\x80\x94 Expect support as All sections\n Upon request of the Inspector General for requested\n information or assistance from any depart-\n ment, agency, or other entity of the Federal\n Government, the head of such entity shall,\n insofar as is practicable and not in con-\n travention of any existing law, furnish such\n information or assistance to the Inspector\n General, or an authorized designee\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 133\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(h)(5)(B) REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE.\xe2\x80\x94 None reported N/A\n Whenever information or assistance\n requested by the Inspector General is,\n in the judgment of the Inspector General,\n unreasonably refused or not provided, the\n Inspector General shall report the circum-\n stances to the Secretary of State or the\n Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, and to\n the appropriate congressional committees\n without delay.\nReports\nSection 1229(i)(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS.\xe2\x80\x94 Report \xe2\x80\x93 30 days after All sections\n Not later than 30 days after the end of each the end of each calendar Appendix B\n fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General quarter\n shall submit to the appropriate committees\n of Congress a report summarizing, for the Summarize activities of the\n period of that quarter and, to the extent inspector general\n possible, the period from the end of such\n quarter to the time of the submission of Detailed statement of all\n the report, the activities during such period obligations, expenditures,\n of the Inspector General and the activities and revenues\n under programs and operations funded\n with amounts appropriated or otherwise\n made available for the reconstruction of\n Afghanistan. Each report shall include,\n for the period covered by such report,\n a detailed statement of all obligations,\n expenditures, and revenues associated with\n reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in\n Afghanistan, including the following \xe2\x80\x93\nSection 1229(i)(1)(A) Obligations and expenditures of appropri- Obligations and expen- Appendix B\n ated/donated funds ditures of appropriated/\n donated funds\nSection 1229(i)(1)(B) A project-by-project and program- Project-by-project and Funding\n by-program accounting of the costs program-by-program\n incurred to date for the reconstruction of accounting of costs. List Note 1\n Afghanistan, together with the estimate of unexpended funds for each\n the Department of Defense, the Department project or program\n of State, and the United States Agency for\n International Development, as applicable,\n of the costs to complete each project and\n each program\nSection 1229(i)(1)(C) Revenues attributable to or consisting Revenues, obligations, and Funding\n of funds provided by foreign nations or expenditures of donor funds\n international organizations to programs\n and projects funded by any department or\n agency of the United States Government,\n and any obligations or expenditures of\n such revenues\n\n\n\n\n 134 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)\n\n\nCROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER\nP.L. NO. 110-181, \xc2\xa7 1229\nPublic Law Section SIGAR Enabling Language SIGAR Action Section\nSection 1229(i)(1)(D) Revenues attributable to or consisting of for- Revenues, obligations, and Funding\n eign assets seized or frozen that contribute expenditures of funds from\n to programs and projects funded by any U.S. seized or frozen assets\n government department or agency, and any\n obligations or expenditures of such revenues\nSection 1229(i)(1)(E) Operating expenses of agencies or entities Operating expenses of Funding\n receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise agencies or any organiza-\n made available for the reconstruction of tion receiving appropriated Appendix B\n Afghanistan funds\nSection 1229(i)(1)(F) In the case of any contract, grant, Describe contract details Note 1\n agreement, or other funding mechanism\n described in paragraph (2)* \xe2\x80\x94\n (i) The amount of the contract or other fund-\n ing mechanism;\n (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the\n contract or other funding mechanism;\n (iii) A discussion of how the department or\n agency of the United States Government\n involved in the contract, grant, agreement,\n or other funding mechanism identified and\n solicited offers from potential contractors\n to perform the contract, grant, agreement,\n or other funding mechanism, together with\n a list of the potential individuals or entities\n that were issued solicitations for the offers;\n and\n (iv) The justification and approval\n documents on which was based the\n determination to use procedures other than\n procedures that provide for full and open\n competition\nSection 1229(i)(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.\xe2\x80\x94 Publish report www.sigar.mil\n The Inspector General shall publish on a as directed\n publically-available Internet website each Dari and\n report under paragraph (1) of this subsec- Pashtu\n tion in English and other languages that the translation in\n Inspector General determines are widely process\n used and understood in Afghanistan\nSection 1229(i)(4) FORM.\xe2\x80\x94 Publish report All sections\n Each report required under this subsection as directed\n shall be submitted in unclassified form,\n but may include a classified annex if the\n Inspector General considers it necessary\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 135\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n APPENDIX B\n U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATED FUNDS ($ MILLIONS)\n Table B.1 lists appropriated funds by program, per year, for Afghanistan reconstruction\n efforts, as of September 30, 2010, and the FY 2011 Presidential Budget Request.\n TABLE B.1\n\n\n U.S. FUNDING SOURCES AGENCY TOTAL\n SECURITY\n Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) DoD 27,833.24\n Train & Equip (DoD) DoD 440.00\n Foreign Military Financing (FMF) DoS 1,058.50\n International Military Education and Training (IMET) DoS 8.30\n NDAA Section 1207 Transfer Other 9.90\n Total - Security 29,349.94\n GOVERNANCE & DEVELOPMENT\n Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) DoD 2,639.00\n Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund DoD 0.00\n Economic Support Fund (ESF) USAID 11,143.41\n Development Assistance (DA) USAID 885.21\n Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA) DoD 550.00\n Child Survival & Health (CSH + GHAI) USAID 486.42\n Commodity Credit Corp (CCC) USAID 30.09\n Freedom Support Act (FSA) USAID 5.00\n USAID (other) USAID 34.27\n Non-Prolif, Antiterrorism, Demining, & Related (NADR) DoS 371.60\n Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisors USDA 5.70\n Treasury Technical Assistance Treasury 3.52\n Total - Governance & Development 16,154.22\n COUNTERNARCOTICS\n International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE) DoS 2,853.75\n Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Activities, (DoD CN) DoD 1,511.17\n Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) DoJ 127.37\n Total - Counternarcotics 4,492.29\n HUMANITARIAN\n PL 480 Title I USDA 5.00\n PL 480 Title II USAID 701.21\n Disaster Assistance (IDA) USAID 372.53\n Transition Initiatives (TI) USAID 34.44\n Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) DoS 590.10\n Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO) DoS 69.30\n Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA) DoS 25.20\n Food for Progress USDA 109.49\n 416(b) Food Aid USDA 95.18\n Food for Education USDA 50.49\nNote: Numbers affected by rounding.\n Emerson Trust USDA 22.40\nSources: OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011;\nDoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/22/2010; DoD,\n Total - Humanitarian 2,075.34\nresponses to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2010, 10/15/2010, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS\n10/6/2010, 10/14/2009, and 10/1/2009; FY 2010\nSupplemental; FY 2010 Defense Explanatory Statement; Oversight 76.40\nDoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/15/2010 and Other 3,955.80\n10/12/2010; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call,\n10/12/2010; OMB, responses to SIGAR data call, Total - International Affairs Operations 4,032.20\n10/19/2010 and 4/19/2010; USAID, responses to SIGAR\ndata call, 10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoJ, TOTAL FUNDING 56,103.99\nresponse to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to\nSIGAR data call, 4/2009. TOTAL FUNDING IF PRESIDENT'S BUDGET IS APPROVED 74,875.89\n\n\n\n\n 136 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\n FY 2011\n PRESIDENTIAL\n BUDGET\nFY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 REQUEST\n\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 995.00 1,908.13 7,406.40 2,750.00 5,606.94 9,166.77 11,619.30\n 0.00 0.00 150.00 290.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 57.00 191.00 413.70 396.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.20 0.30 0.60 0.80 0.80 1.10 1.60 1.40 1.50 1.50\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.90 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 57.20 191.30 564.30 1,682.60 1,908.93 7,407.50 2,761.50 5,608.34 9,168.27 11,620.80\n\n 0.00 0.00 40.00 136.00 215.00 209.00 488.33 550.67 1,000.00 1,100.00\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 400.00\n 117.51 239.29 893.88 1,280.57 473.39 1,210.71 1,399.51 2,182.55 3,346.00 3,316.30\n 18.30 42.54 153.14 169.58 185.01 166.81 149.43 0.40 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 165.00 135.00 250.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 7.52 49.68 33.40 38.00 41.45 100.77 63.07 58.23 94.30 71.10\n 7.30 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.02 4.22 4.22 0.00\n 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 0.50 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.32 3.55 2.90 0.00\n 44.00 34.70 66.90 38.20 18.20 36.60 26.60 48.60 57.80 69.30\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.70 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.95 0.19 0.13 0.75 0.44 0.00 0.00\n 194.63 534.04 1,332.38 1,913.30 933.24 1,724.02 2,163.03 2,854.36 4,505.22 4,956.70\n\n 60.00 0.00 220.00 709.28 232.65 251.74 307.08 484.00 589.00 450.00\n 0.00 0.00 71.80 224.54 108.05 290.97 189.64 235.06 391.11 354.60\n 0.58 2.87 3.72 16.77 23.66 20.38 40.59 18.80 0.00 0.00\n 60.58 2.87 295.52 950.59 364.36 563.09 537.31 737.86 980.11 804.60\n\n 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 159.50 46.10 49.20 56.60 60.00 60.00 177.00 65.41 27.40 15.50\n 197.09 85.77 11.16 4.22 0.04 0.03 17.01 27.28 29.93 0.00\n 8.07 11.69 11.22 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.99 0.00\n 135.47 61.50 63.30 47.10 36.00 53.80 44.25 76.79 71.89 65.00\n 23.90 9.90 20.00 15.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 4.96 9.08 30.10 23.24 9.47 20.55 12.09 0.00 0.00\n 46.46 14.14 34.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 9.27 6.12 10.02 25.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.40 0.00 0.00 0.00\n 595.49 248.33 204.66 165.14 144.36 123.30 281.21 182.64 130.21 80.50\n\n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 14.30 25.20 34.40 44.70\n 155.60 35.30 207.60 136.10 131.90 207.80 434.40 1,047.60 1,599.50 1,264.60\n 155.60 35.30 207.60 136.10 131.90 210.30 448.70 1,072.80 1,633.90 1,309.30\n1,063.50 1,011.84 2,604.46 4,847.73 3,482.79 10,028.21 6,191.75 10,456.00 16,417.71\n 1,063.50 1,011.84 2,604.46 4,847.73 3,482.79 10,028.21 6,191.75 10,456.00 16,417.71 18,771.90\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 137\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX C\nSIGAR AUDITS\nCompleted Audits\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR completed two audits, as listed in Table C.1.\n\nTABLE C.1\n\n\nCOMPLETED SIGAR AUDITS AS OF JANUARY 30, 2011\nReport Identifier Report Title Date Issued\nSIGAR-Audit-11-7 Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided 1/2011\n Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to\n Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste\nSIGAR-Audit-11-6 Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risks for $11.4 Billion 1/2011\n Program\n\n\n\n\nNew Audits\nDuring this reporting period, SIGAR initiated five new audits, as listed in Table C.2.\n\nTABLE C.2\n\n\nNEW SIGAR AUDITS AS OF JANUARY 30, 2011\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-041A USAID Local Governance and Community Development Projects 1/13/2011\nSIGAR-040A Construction at the Afghan Defense University 1/3/2011\nSIGAR-039A Infrastructure Projects at the Kabul Military Training Center 11/30/2010\nSIGAR-038A Review of Four USAID and State Department Programs in a Select Afghan 11/19/2010\n Province\nSIGAR-037A Use and Accountability of U.S. Funds Contributed to the Afghanistan 11/13/2010\n Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)\n\n\n\n\n 138 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nOngoing Audits\nSIGAR has 11 audits in progress, as listed in Table C.3.\n\nTABLE C.3\n\n\nONGOING SIGAR AUDITS AS OF JANUARY 30, 2011\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-031A Accountability of ANSF Vehicles 11/10/2010\nSIGAR-036A U.S. and International Donor Assistance for Development of the Afghan Banking 10/18/2010\n Sector and Afghan Currency Control Systems\nSIGAR-035A U.S. Assistance To Develop Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Agricultural Sector 10/15/2010\nSIGAR-034A Implementation and Sustainability of the U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan (con- 10/14/2010\n ducted jointly with the DoS Office of Inspector General)\nSIGAR-033A Implementation of the Defense Base Act Insurance Program for Contractors in 8/26/2010\n Afghanistan\nSIGAR-032A U.S. Efforts To Strengthen the Capabilities of the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force 8/24/2010\nSIGAR-029A Review of USAID\xe2\x80\x99s Cooperative Agreement with CARE International for the 7/15/2010\n Community Development Program for Kabul\nSIGAR-013A Afghan National Police (ANP) Personnel Management Processes and Systems 6/25/2010\nSIGAR-017A Reconstruction Security Support Services from Global Strategies Group Inc. 6/14/2010\nSIGAR-025A Review of U.S. Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment Infrastructure 5/5/2010\n Projects in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat\nSIGAR-023A Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s National Solidarity Program 4/13/2010\n\n\n\n\nForensic Audits\nSIGAR has three forensic audits in progress, as listed in Table C.4.\n\nTABLE C.4\n\n\nSIGAR FORENSIC AUDITS AS OF JANUARY 30, 2011\nAudit Identifier Project Title Date Initiated\nSIGAR-027A Forensic Review of DoS Transaction Data Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction 6/24/2010\nSIGAR-026A Forensic Review of USAID Transaction Data Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction 6/24/2010\nSIGAR-022A Forensic Review of DoD Data Related to Afghanistan Reconstruction 2/25/2010\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 139\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\n APPENDIX D\nFIGURE D.1\n SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE\nSIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: NEW INVESTIGATIONS, SIGAR Investigations\nOCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010 This reporting period, SIGAR opened 35 new investigations, bringing the total of\n open investigations to 105. Of the new investigations, most involve corruption\n Total: 35 and procurement/contract fraud, as shown in Figure D.1. SIGAR closed 7 investi-\n gations this quarter, as shown in Figure D.2.\n\n Procurement/\n FIGURE D.2\n Contract Fraud\n 19\n SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS: CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, OCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\n Theft Other\n 4 Public 2\n Corruption Total: 7\n 9\n Assessment\n 1 Procurement/Contract Fraud 3\n Public Corruption 2\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/18/2011.\n Theft 2\n\n 0 1 2 3\n\n Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/18/2011.\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR Hotline\n Of the 131 Hotline complaints received last quarter, most were submitted by\nFIGURE D.3\n e-mail or telephone, as shown in Figure D.3. Of these complaints, most were\nSOURCE OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS, closed, referred to other agencies, or assigned, as shown in Figure D.4.\nOCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\n FIGURE D.4\n\n Total: 131\n STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: OCTOBER 1\xe2\x80\x93DECEMBER 31, 2010\n\n Total: 131\n E-mail\n 109\n\n Closed 73\n Referred Out 26\n Phone Assigned 23\n 15 Coordinationa 9\n\n Walk-in Written (not e-mail) 20 40 60 80\n 4 3\n a. Case has been reviewed, and SIGAR is obtaining additional information.\nSource: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/12/2011. Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 1/12/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 140 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX E\nABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\n\nACRONYM OR\nABBREVIATION DEFINITION\nABP Afghan Border Police\nACU Anti-Corruption Unit\nAED Afghanistan Engineering District\nAFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (U.S.)\nAGOAS Attorney General\xe2\x80\x99s Office Assistance Section\nAIB Afghanistan International Bank\nAIF Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund\nAIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission\nAIP Afghanistan Infrastructure Program\nAJSRP Afghanistan Justice Sector Reform Project (World Bank)\nALP Afghan Local Police\nANA Afghan National Army\nANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police\nANP Afghan National Police\nANSF Afghan National Security Forces\nAPRP Afghan Peace and Reintegration Plan\nAQM Office of Acquisitions and Management (U.S.)\nARP Afghanistan Reintegration Program (U.S.)\nARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund\nASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund\nASIU Afghan Shafafiyat Investigative Unit\nAT/AP anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance\nAUP Afghan Uniformed Police\nAVIPA Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture\nAWATT Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer\nAWOL absent without leave\nC-JTSCC CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contract Command\nCAO Control and Audit Office (Afghan)\nCDP-K Community Development Program for Kabul\nCENTCOM Central Command (U.S.)\nCERP Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program\nCJIATF-435 Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435\nCJTF Criminal Justice Task Force\nCNPA Counter-Narcotics Police - Afghanistan\nCSSP Correctional System Support Program\nCSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan\nCUAT Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Unit Assessment Tool\nCWD Conventional Weapons Destruction\nDAB Da Afghanistan Bank\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 141\n\x0cAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nACRONYM OR\nABBREVIATION DEFINITION\nDABS Afghan national utility company\nDFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service (U.S.)\nDIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups\nDoD Department of Defense (U.S.)\nDoD CN Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (U.S)\nDoJ Department of Justice (U.S.)\nDoS Department of State (U.S.)\nECC Electoral Complaints Commission\nESF Economic Support Fund\nFEFA Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan\nFMS Foreign Military Sales\nFY fiscal year\nFY 2010 Supplemental FY 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act\nGAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.)\nGIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan\nHCMS SIGAR Hotline and Complaints Management System\nHMMWV high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle\nHOOAC High Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption (Afghan)\nICAO International Civil Aviation Organization\nIDIQ indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity\nIDP internally displaced person\nIEC Independent Election Commission (Afghan)\nIJC International Security Assistance Force Joint Command\nIMF International Monetary Fund\nINCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S)\nINL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)\nISAF International Security Assistance Force\nJCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board\nJSSP Justice Sector Support Program\nkg kilogram\nkm kilometer\nLGCD Local Governance and Community Development\nLOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan\n 2\nm square meters\nMACCA Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (UN)\nMAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (Afghan)\nMCTF Major Crimes Task Force (Afghan)\nMoD Ministry of Defense (Afghan)\nMoF Ministry of Finance (Afghan)\nMoI Ministry of Interior (Afghan)\nMoPH Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)\nMT metric ton\nNADR Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs\nNATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization\n\n\n\n\n 142 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c APPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nACRONYM OR\nABBREVIATION DEFINITION\nNDAA National Defense Appropriations Act\nNDS National Directorate of Security\nNGO non-governmental organization\nNRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment\nNSP National Solidarity Program\nNTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan\nO&M operations and maintenance\nOCO Overseas Contingency Operations\nOEF Operation Enduring Freedom\nOSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)\nPDY present for duty\nPECC Provincial Electoral Complaints Commission (Afghan)\nPM/WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs - Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement\nPPRC Provincial Peace and Reintegration Committee\nPRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration\nPRST Provincial Reintegration Support Teams\nPRT Provincial Reconstruction Team\nPSC private security contractor\nPTS Program Takhim-E-Solh (Afghan)\nRC Window Recurrent Cost Window\nRMT Road Maintenance Team\nSAA small-arms ammunition\nSAO-A Security Assistance Office - Afghanistan\nSEPS Southeast Electrical Power System\nSMDC U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command\nSOF Special Operations Force (Afghan)\nSY solar year\nTAPI pipeline Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline\nTFBSO Task Force on Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan\nTreasury Department of the Treasury (U.S.)\nUN United Nations\nUNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan\nUNDP UN Development Programme\nUNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees\nUNICEF UN Children\xe2\x80\x99s Fund\nUNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime\nUSAAA U.S. Army Audit Agency\nUSACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\nUSAID U.S. Agency for International Development\nUSDA U.S. Department of Agriculture\nUSFOR-A U.S. Forces - Afghanistan\nUXO unexploded ordnance\nVEGA Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance\nVSO Village Stability Operations\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 143\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n1. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n2. Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Governments Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in\n Lisbon, 11/20/2010.\n3. Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Nations Contributing to the UN-Mandated, NATO-Led International Security Force\n (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 11/20/2010.\n4. Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Nations Contributing to the UN-Mandated, NATO-Led International Security Force\n (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 11/20/2010.\n5. Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Nations Contributing to the UN-Mandated, NATO-Led International Security Force\n (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 11/20/2010.\n6. Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review.\n7. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, \xe2\x80\x9cStatement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010.\n8. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, \xe2\x80\x9cStatement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010.\n9. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, \xe2\x80\x9cStatement by the President on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010.\n10. Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review.\n11. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1212.\n12. SIGAR, Audit 09-5, \xe2\x80\x9cIncreased Viability, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 9/9/2009.\n13. SIGAR, Audit 09-5, \xe2\x80\x9cIncreased Viability, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 9/9/2009.\n14. SIGAR Audit 11-7, \xe2\x80\x9cCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and\n Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011.\n15. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committees on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on H.R. 6523, Ike Skelton\n National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.\n16. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1217.\n17. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1217.\n18. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1217.\n19. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1216.\n20. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Section 1219.\n21. FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383), Sections 831, 832, and 833.\n22. In June 2010, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) was re-designated the CENTCOM Contracting Command. In\n November 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense named C-JTSCC as the successor organization to JCC-I/A and expanded the organization\xe2\x80\x99s\n contracting mission to include Kuwait and Pakistan.\n23. AED was divided into two sections on August 3, 2009. AED-South, based in Kandahar, is in charge of construction in Regional Command-South\n and Regional Command-West. AED-North, based in Kabul, manages construction in Regional Command-North and Regional Command-East.\n24. P.L. 111-32, \xe2\x80\x9cSupplemental Appropriations Act 2009,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/24/2009.\n25. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2009; NTM-A, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cNew NATO Command Activated in Kabul; Continues Afghan Training,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/23/2009.\n26. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n27. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n28. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n29. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n30. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n31. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n32. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n33. DoD, Financial Management Regulation, \xe2\x80\x9cCommander\xe2\x80\x99s Emergency Response Program: Vol. 12, Ch. 27,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2009, p. 27-3.\n34. DoD, responses to SIGAR vetting, 1/21/2011 and 4/21/2010.\n35. See Appendix B of this report.\n36. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 144 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n37. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2011.\n38. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDrug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense FY 2009 Supplemental Request Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities,\xe2\x80\x9d\n accessed online 4/13/2010.\n39. See Appendix B of this report.\n40. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n41. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/16/2009.\n42. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011.\n43. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011.\n44. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011.\n45. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.\n46. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011.\n47. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011.\n48. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2011.\n49. SIGAR, Audit 11-5, \xe2\x80\x9cActions Needed To Mitigate Inconsistencies in and Lack of Safeguards over U.S. Salary Support to Afghan Government\n Employees and Technical Advisors,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/29/2010, p. ii.\n50. MoF, \xe2\x80\x9cDonor Financial Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2009; SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/30/2010, p. 10.\n51. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Report to the U.S. Congress,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/30/2010, p. 51.\n52. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. 17.\n53. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. 17.\n54. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. 17.\n55. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. 17.\n56. CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Phases I through V,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010.\n57. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 3rd Quarter Project Progress Report (July\xe2\x80\x93September 2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 9/30/2010, p. 5.\n58. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, 3rd Quarter Project Progress Report (July\xe2\x80\x93September 2010),\xe2\x80\x9d 9/30/2010, p. 5.\n59. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cOverview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010, accessed online 1/7/2011.\n60. White House, \xe2\x80\x9cOverview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/16/2010, accessed online 1/7/2011.\n61. NATO, \xe2\x80\x9cLisbon Summit Declaration,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010, accessed online 1/8/2011.\n62. See Appendix B of this report.\n63. U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, \xe2\x80\x9cHandbook 09-27: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Chapter 14,\xe2\x80\x9d 4/2009, accessed online 1/7/2011.\n64. ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 11/21/2010; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call 1/4/2011.\n65. SIGAR, \xe2\x80\x9cRecord of Meeting - CJ1 Follow-up,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/17/2010 and 12/14/2010, pp. 1\xe2\x80\x932.\n66. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. 17; London Conference on Afghanistan, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Afghanistan\n Compact,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/1/2006, p. 5.\n67. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010, p. 7.\n68. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n69. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 4.\n70. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, pp. 3\xe2\x80\x934.\n71. CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010 and 1/4/2011; SIGAR, Audit-11-6, \xe2\x80\x9cInadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risk for\n $11.4 Billion Program,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011, p. iii.\n72. ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 12/30/2010.\n73. ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 12/30/2010; ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 9/30/2010.\n74. ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 12/30/2010.\n75. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n76. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n77. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n78. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n79. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Army Instructor, Recruits Optimistic after Graduation in Kandahar,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/15/2010, accessed online 12/15/2010.\n80. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cThousands of Afghans Compete for Military Academy Admission,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/4/2010, accessed online 12/14/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 145\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n81. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n82. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n83. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n84. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n85. USACE, \xe2\x80\x9cNew O&M Contracts to Sustain Facilities, Provide Job Training in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/28/2010, accessed online 12/27/2010.\n86. NTM-A, \xe2\x80\x9cANSF Receives Training, Equipment from NTM-A,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/7/2011, accessed online 1/11/2011.\n87. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2010.\n88. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n89. UNDP, \xe2\x80\x9cLOTFA-Phase V, 3rd Quarter Project Progress Report,\xe2\x80\x9d 9/2010, p. 5.\n90. CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cLaw and Order Trust Fund Phases I through V,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010.\n91. ISAF-IJC, PERSTAT, 11/21/2010.\n92. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n93. SIGAR, record of meeting with CSTC-A CJ1, 11/17/2010 and 12/14/2010; NTM-A/CSTC-A, ANP PERSTAT SOP, 11/18/2010, p. 2; ISAF-IJC,\n PERSTAT, 11/21/2010.\n94. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n95. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n96. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n97. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n98. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n99. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Recruits Learn Police, Military Techniques,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/3/2010, accessed online 12/14/2010.\n100. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2011.\n101. NTM-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n102. NTM-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n103. NTM-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n104. NTM-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n105. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n106. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n107. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n108. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n109. USACE, \xe2\x80\x9cNew O&M Contracts to Sustain Facilities, Provide Job Training in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/28/2010, accessed online 12/27/2010.\n110. CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011 and 1/13/2011.\n111. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2010.\n112. IJC, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n113. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n114. OSD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2010 and 1/11/2011.\n115. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011; DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010, p. 67.\n116. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n117. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n118. OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n119. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cMOI Procurement \xe2\x80\x93 Competent and Compliant,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/12/10, accessed online 12/14/2010.\n120. NTM-A/CSTC-A, \xe2\x80\x9cMOI Procurement \xe2\x80\x93 Competent and Compliant,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/12/10, accessed online 12/14/2010.\n121. USFOR-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011; CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010.\n122. OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/20/2011.\n123. DoS, PM-WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n124. DoS, PM-WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n125. DoS, PM-WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n126. DoS, PM-WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n127. See Appendix B of this report.\n\n\n\n\n 146 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n128. IEC, \xe2\x80\x9cThe IEC Releases Final Results,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/08/2010; UN, \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Secretary-General,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n129. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 2; CSIS, \xe2\x80\x9cPreliminary Results for\n Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s Wolesi Jirga Election,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/26/2010, accessed online 1/18/2011; National Democratic Institute, \xe2\x80\x9c2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections,\xe2\x80\x9d\n http://2010.afghanistanelectiondata.org, accessed online 1/19/2011.\n130. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAnnouncement of Certified Results in the Afghan Parliamentary Elections,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/24/2010, accessed online 12/6/2010.\n131. FEFA, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cElectoral Reform Must Start Now,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/24/2010.\n132. FEFA, \xe2\x80\x9cFifth Observation Report of the 2010 Election Observation Mission: From Counting to Preliminary Results,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/3/2010, accessed online\n 12/14/2010.\n133. FEFA, \xe2\x80\x9cFifth Observation Report of the 2010 Election Observation Mission: From Counting to Preliminary Results,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/3/2010.\n134. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, pp. 2\xe2\x80\x933.\n135. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 2; CRS, Katzman, Kenneth,\n \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Government Formation and Performance,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/6/2009, p. 8.\n136. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010 p. 3; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cSupport to the Electoral\n Process (STEP) in Afghanistan, Monthly Report - November 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/15/2010.\n137. UNAMA, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cWelcoming Joint Statement by Afghan Independent Election Authorities,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/11/2010.\n138. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cQuarterly Country Update: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2011.\n139. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cLeading Stories in Today\xe2\x80\x99s Afghan Media,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/19/2011, accessed online 1/19/2011.\n140. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 2.\n141. ECC, press release, 11/6/2010.\n142. IEC/ECC, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Statement,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/11/2010.\n143. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 2.\n144. ECC, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cBreaches of the IEC Campaign Finance Regulation,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/8/2010.\n145. USAID, response to data call, 12/27/2010.\n146. USAID, response to data call, 1/3/2011.\n147. NDI, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Supporting Increased Electoral Participation,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010.\n148. NATO, \xe2\x80\x9cDeclaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an\n Enduring Partnership Signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010; UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications\n for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010; White House, \xe2\x80\x9cFact sheet: President Obama\xe2\x80\x99s Participation in the Nato Summit Meetings in\n Lisbon,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n149. NATO, \xe2\x80\x9cDeclaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an\n Enduring Partnership Signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n150. NATO, \xe2\x80\x9cDeclaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an\n Enduring Partnership Signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n151. NATO, \xe2\x80\x9cDeclaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an\n Enduring Partnership Signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n152. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan President Gains Regional Support at Istanbul Summit,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/27/2010, accessed online 12/10/2010.\n153. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cRemarks to the Press by U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/22/2010.\n154. DoD OSD, response to data call, 1/6/2011.\n155. NDU, Tarzi, Armin, \xe2\x80\x9cRecalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation Program,\xe2\x80\x9d PRISM, 9/2010, p. 67.\n156. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/14/2011.\n157. Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010.\n158. GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cBurhanuddin Rabbani Chosen as Chairman of the High Council for Peace,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n159. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n160. EU, Press Release, 11/7/2010; UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 5.\n161. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011.\n162. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/13/2011.\n163. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 6.\n164. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 147\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n165. UN, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cUN Sets Up Expert Group to Support Afghan Peace Efforts,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/31/2010, p. 16.\n166. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD News Briefing with British Army Maj. Gen. Carter via Teleconference from Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/28/2010.\n167. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Briefing on Trip to Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/29/2010.\n168. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n169. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n170. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n171. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011.\n172. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n173. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n174. DoS, response to SIGAR data call, 1/12/2011.\n175. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n176. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n177. DoD/DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Background Briefing with Senior Officials at the Pentagon,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n178. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Chief of Staff Speech,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/17/2010.\n179. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Chief of Staff Speech,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/17/2010.\n180. Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010.\n181. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010.\n182. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010.\n183. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD News Briefing with British Army Maj. Gen. Carter via Teleconference from Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/28/2010.\n184. USAID, response to data call, 12/27/2010.\n185. DoD/DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Background Briefing with Senior Officials at the Pentagon,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n186. American Forces Press Service, \xe2\x80\x9cElders Could Fuel Stability in Kandahar, General Says,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/28/2010.\n187. DoD/DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Background Briefing with Senior Officials at the Pentagon,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n188. Armed Forces Press Service, \xe2\x80\x9cHelmand Province Sees Improvements,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/5/2010.\n189. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cMultinational Effort Advances Governance and Development in Helmand, Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/8/2010.\n190. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Mills and Governor Mangal via Teleconference from Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/7/2010.\n191. DoD/DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Background Briefing with Senior Officials at the Pentagon,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n192. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Mills and Governor Mangal via Teleconference from Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/7/2010.\n193. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; USAID: Afghanistan, Fact Sheet, \xe2\x80\x9cLocal Governance and Community Development,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/2010.\n194. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n195. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n196. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n197. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n198. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n199. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n200. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/11/2011.\n201. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 10.\n202. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, pp. 8\xe2\x80\x939.\n203. Independent Reform and Civil Service Commission, \xe2\x80\x9cMore Appointment Authority to IARCSC,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/20/2010.\n204. Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010.\n205. EU, Press Release, 10/10/2010.\n206. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2011.\n207. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n208. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 12/27/2010.\n209. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n210. ISAF, press release, New Courthouse Strengthens Kapisa Rule of Law,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/15/2010.\n211. UN, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cLegal and Judicial Awareness Programme Launched in Khowst,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/10/2010.\n212. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010, p. 10.\n\n\n\n\n 148 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n213. Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010.\n214. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n215. INL,\xe2\x80\x9cJSSP: Welcome,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 7/7/2010.\n216. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011; GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cPrioritization and Implementation Plan,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/20/2010, p. 16.\n217. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011; INL response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2010; INL response to SIGAR data call, 9/29/2010.\n218. INL, response to data call, 1/6/2011.\n219. INL, response to data call, 1/6/2011.\n220. DoD/OSD, response to data call, 1/6/2011; DoD/OSD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2011.\n221. CENTCOM, \xe2\x80\x9cDetainees Prepare for Return to Afghan Society,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/10/2010.\n222. DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n223. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n224. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n225. UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cUnited States of America,\xe2\x80\x9d www.unhcr.org, accessed online 1/21/2011; UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Appeal 2011 Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/1/2010.\n226. UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Appeal 2011 Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/1/2010.\n227. UN, \xe2\x80\x9cThe Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/10/2010.\n228. UNHCR, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Appeal 2011 Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/1/2010; DoS, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/17/2011.\n229. UNAMA, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cHarmful Traditional Practices that Violate Women\xe2\x80\x99s Rights Widespread in Afghanistan: Speedy Implementation of the\n Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women Needed,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010; UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cHarmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law\n on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010.\n230. UNAMA, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cHarmful Traditional Practices that Violate Women\xe2\x80\x99s Rights Widespread in Afghanistan: Speedy Implementation of the\n Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women Needed,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010; UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cHarmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law\n on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010.\n231. AIHRC, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAIHRC Is Concerned About the Condition of Children\xe2\x80\x99s Human Rights in the Country,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n232. AIHRC, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAIHRC Is Concerned About the Condition of Children\xe2\x80\x99s Human Rights in the Country,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/20/2010.\n233. UNICEF, \xe2\x80\x9cUNICEF Calls for a Comprehensive Child Act in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n234. UNICEF, \xe2\x80\x9cUNICEF Calls for a Comprehensive Child Act in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/23/2010.\n235. See Appendix B of this report.\n236. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010, pp. i, 18.\n237. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 1.\n238. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p 2.\n239. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, pp. 2\xe2\x80\x933.\n240. USAID, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cUSAID Grants $30 Million to Champion Afghan Farmers,\xe2\x80\x9d2/4/2010.\n241. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 3.\n242. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, pp. 13, 14.\n243. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 5.\n244. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, pp. 4\xe2\x80\x935.\n245. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2010, p. i.\n246. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n247. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n248. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n249. DoS, U.S. Embassy Kabul, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan Farmers Gain More Access to Credit Through New $100 Million Agricultural Development Fund,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/21/2010.\n250. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n251. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, pp. 1, 10.\n252. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n253. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n254. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n255. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 10.\n256. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 149\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n257. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 10; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n258. CITI, \xe2\x80\x9cCITI and Afghanistan International Bank Enter into Banking Agreement,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/13/2010.\n259. CITI, \xe2\x80\x9cCITI and Afghanistan International Bank Enter into Banking Agreement,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/13/2010.\n260. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 10.\n261. World Bank/DfID, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Public Expenditure Trends and Fiscal Sustainability,\xe2\x80\x9d p. 2.\n262. IMF, \xe2\x80\x9cRegional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 63.\n263. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x9d (1230), 11/2010, p. 73.\n264. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x9d (1230), 11/2010, p. 73.\n265. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x9d (1230), 11/2010, p. 73.\n266. USAID, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Civil Service Commission and U.S. Government Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Begin Civil Service\n Support Program,\xe2\x80\x9d 2/22/2010.\n267. DoS, U.S. Embassy Kabul, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghan National Customs Academy Inaugural Graduation, Kabul,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/15/2010; Treasury, response to\n SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n268. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 6.\n269. Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n270. DoS, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, 1/2010, p. 18.\n271. UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, 11/4/2010, p. 50.\n272. UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, 11/4/2010, pp. 145, 159, 163, 171, 200.\n273. DoD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 4/2010, pp. 13, 24.\n274. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n275. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 1/7/2011.\n276. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n277. U.S. Congress, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committees on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House on H.R. 6523, 12/22/2010,\n pp. 122\xe2\x80\x93123.\n278. GIRoA, Office of the President, \xe2\x80\x9cBrief Remarks by H.E. Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the TAPI Summit\n Meeting,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/11/2010; MoM, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Finalizes and Signs Gas Pipeline Framework Agreement from Turkmenistan to\n Afghanistan, India and Pakistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 9/22/2010.\n279. IAGS, Journal of Energy Security, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan, the TAPI Pipeline, and Energy Geopolitics,\xe2\x80\x9d by John Foster, 3/23/2010, p. 6; ADB, Technical\n Assistance Consultant Report, \xe2\x80\x9cIslamic Republic of Afghanistan: Preparing the Natural Gas Development Project (Project #37085),\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2007, p. 9.\n280. Voice of Russia, \xe2\x80\x9cGazprom to Bid for Trans-Afghan Pipeline,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/22/2010.\n281. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n282. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n283. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n284. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n285. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n286. GAO, Audit-11-138, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, But Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/2010, p. 1.\n287. EU, \xe2\x80\x9cNational Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/8: A Profile of Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d10/2009, p. iii.\n288. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Forum 2007, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Challenges and Progress,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/12/2011.\n289. GAO, Audit-11-138, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/2010, pp. 1, 5.\n290. GAO, Audit-11-138, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 11/2010, p. 43.\n291. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n292. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2011.\n293. ISAF, press release, \xe2\x80\x9dRoad Maintenance Teams Up and Running in Tagab District,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/29/2010.\n294. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/5/2011.\n295. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report on Infrastructure in Afghanistan: The Rise of the Afghan Rails,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, pp. 1, 4; ADB, \xe2\x80\x9cADB Members, Capitol\n\n\n\n\n 150 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n Stock and Voting Power as of December 31, 2009,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/13/2011.\n296. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report on Infrastructure in Afghanistan: The Rise of the Afghan Rails,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, pp. 1, 3, 4.\n297. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report on Infrastructure in Afghanistan: The Rise of the Afghan Rails,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, pp. 3, 4.\n298. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report on Infrastructure in Afghanistan: The Rise of the Afghan Rails,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, p. 3; Arzu TV Afghanistan, transcript, \xe2\x80\x9cU.S.\n Envoy Visits Northern Afghanistan City to Open Consulate, 2/14/2010.\n299. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cSpecial Report on Infrastructure in Afghanistan: The Rise of the Afghan Rails,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010, pp. 3\xe2\x80\x934.\n300. EU, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cCommission Updates List of Banned Air Carriers, 11/23/2010; EU, Legal Notice, Updated List of Banned Carriers, 11/23/2010.\n301. EU, Legal Notice, Updated List of Banned Carriers, 11/23/2010.\n302. SAFI, news update, \xe2\x80\x9cEU Ban for Afghan Registered Aircraft Results in Suspension of Safi Airways Flights Between Kabul and Frankfurt,\xe2\x80\x9d\n 12/20/2010.\n303. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Economic Update,\xe2\x80\x9d 10/2010, p. 10.\n304. Dow Jones, \xe2\x80\x9cNokia Siemens Networks Gets Afghanistan Mobile Network Deal,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2/2010; MCIT website, list of GSM mobile operators in\n Afghanistan, accessed online 12/30/2010; Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority (ATRA), \xe2\x80\x9cA Glance at the Telecom Developments in\n Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/12/2011.\n305. MCIT, \xe2\x80\x9cTelecom Statistics End June 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/30/2010; Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority, \xe2\x80\x9cWhat is a 3G Network,\xe2\x80\x9d\n accessed online 12/30/2010; National Defense University, \xe2\x80\x9cInformation and Communication Technologies for Reconstruction and\n Development: Afghanistan Challenges and Opportunities,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/2008, p. 28.\n306. Radio Azadi, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cRadio Azadi Launches Interactive SMS Service in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/18/2010.\n307. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website, Radio Free Afghanistan, accessed online 12/29/2010.\n308. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2011.\n309. CENTCOM, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2010.\n310. CIMIC, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan-Security: The Private Security Companies (PSCs) Dilemma in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/20/2010, p. 4.\n311. VOA, \xe2\x80\x9cKarzai Shelves Plans to Ban Private Security Firms,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/6/2010, accessed online 12/22/2010.\n312. USDA, press release, \xe2\x80\x9cUSDA Outlines Efforts to Improve Food Security in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/5/2010.\n313. USAID, DCHA/OFDA, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2011, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan-Complex Emergency,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010.\n314. VEGA, \xe2\x80\x9cVEGA Awarded $36 million towards Afghanistan Agricultural Revitalization with USDA,\xe2\x80\x9d 1/3/2011.\n315. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cRequest for Proposal No. 306-10-0031: Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) Project,\xe2\x80\x9d 7/29/2010, p. 6.\n316. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cDoing Business 2011: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d11/3/2010.\n317. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cDoing Business 2011: Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/3/2010, p. 24.\n318. World Bank, \xe2\x80\x9cDoing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/3/2010, pp. 63\xe2\x80\x9368.\n319. See Appendix B of this report.\n320. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cFirst Afghan to Afghan Training in CNTA,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/7/2010; UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Survey Findings,\xe2\x80\x9d 9/2009, p. 1.\n321. DoD, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/13/2011.\n322. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, p. 9.\n323. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, p. 57.\n324. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, pp. 11.\n325. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011; UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Opium Survey 2009: Survey Findings,\xe2\x80\x9d 9/2009, p. 1.\n326. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n327. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, pp. 45, 63.\n328. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cFirst Afghan to Afghan Training in CNTA,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/7/2010.\n329. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n330. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n331. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n332. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n333. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n334. DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n335. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cUNODC and Alternative Development,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010; INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n336. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n\n\n\n\n REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS I JANUARY 30, 2011 151\n\x0c ENDNOTES\n\n\n\n\n337. GIRoA, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2009, p. 5.\n338. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n339. USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cAVIPA Plus,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/14/2011.\n340. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n341. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011. Note: IDEA-NEW stands for Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, West.\n342. INL, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan: Drug Flow/Transit,\xe2\x80\x9d 3/2003; USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n343. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; USAID, \xe2\x80\x9cFY2010 Annual Report: AWATT,\xe2\x80\x9d 9/30/2010, p. 9.\n344. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; NM State University, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online\n 1/9/2011.\n345. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011; NM State University, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online\n 1/9/2011.\n346. New Mexico State University, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 1/9/2011; USAID, response to SIGAR\n data call, 1/3/2011.\n347. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/3/2011.\n348. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n349. UNODC, \xe2\x80\x9cSouth East Asia: Opium Survey 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/2010, p. 68.\n350. See Appendix B of this report.\n351. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cPeople\xe2\x80\x99s Support Needed to Fight Corruption in Herat: Government,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010.\n352. Asia Foundation, \xe2\x80\x9cAfghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/9/2010, p. 79; Transparency International, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Corruption\n Barometer 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010, p. 47.\n353. Transparency International, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Corruption Barometer 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010, p. 47.\n354. Transparency International, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Corruption Barometer 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d12/9/2010, p. 43.\n355. Transparency International, \xe2\x80\x9cGlobal Corruption Barometer 2010,\xe2\x80\x9d 12/9/2010, p. 46.\n356. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cPeople\xe2\x80\x99s Support Needed to Fight Corruption in Herat: Government,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010.\n357. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cPeople\xe2\x80\x99s Support Needed to Fight Corruption in Herat: Government,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010.\n358. HOOAC, \xe2\x80\x9cWho We Are?\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010.\n359. UNAMA, \xe2\x80\x9cPeople\xe2\x80\x99s Support Needed to Fight Corruption in Herat: Government,\xe2\x80\x9d accessed online 12/14/2010.\n360. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010, pp. 63\xe2\x80\x9364.\n361. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n362. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011; DoJ, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels to Afghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n363. DoJ, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels to Afghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n364. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n365. DoJ, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels to Afghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n366. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n367. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n368. DoD, \xe2\x80\x9cReport on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,\xe2\x80\x9d 11/2010, p. 63.\n369. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n370. DoJ, \xe2\x80\x9cAttorney General Travels to Afghanistan for Meetings with U.S., Afghan Officials,\xe2\x80\x9d 6/30/2010.\n371. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n372. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n373. INL, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2011.\n\n\n\n\n 152 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL I AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n\x0cCover Captions (clockwise from left):\nCommando Radio-Kabul\xe2\x80\x99s first woman disc\njockey speaks to listeners during a radio\nbroadcast at Camp Morehead, Afghanistan.\nFunded by the United States, the station pro-\nvides information on Commando operations.\nIt is operated by Afghans who have gradu-\nated from a U.S. training program. (U.S. Army\nphoto, SFC Marcus Quarterman)\nAfghan quality assurance representatives\nvisit a waste treatment plant under construc-\ntion in Kabul province, as part of a U.S. Army\nCorps of Engineers training session. As of July\n2010, the United States had provided $250\nmillion to rebuild Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s water sector.\n(USAF photo, SSgt Stacey Haga)\nSchool is in session at the Nad e Ali Central\nSchool in Helmand province. In 2010, U.S.\nprograms provided 21.5 million textbooks to\nstudents throughout Afghanistan. By the end\nof 2011, the United States plans to provide\n$25 million for primary school textbooks\nalone. (RAF photo, SAC Neil Chapman)\nA weaver in Jalalabad continues the ancient\ntradition as he works on a charpoy, a versatile\ndaybed common throughout Afghanistan,\n Young musicians perform at the first winter music academy of the Afghan National Music\nPakistan, and India. One key focus of the U.S.\n Institute. The Institute was founded to revive the musical tradition in Afghanistan: under\nreconstruction program is to encourage the\n the Taliban, music was banned. The institute is supported by contributions from the\ngrowth of local industry. (photo by Aimal Azem)\n United States and the donor community. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)\n\x0cSIGAR\nSPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for JAN 30\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR | QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS | JAN 30, 2011\nFOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION\n Afghanistan Reconstruction 2011\n400 Army Navy Drive\nArlington, VA 22202-4704\n\n\n\n\n 1 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS\n\x0c"