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 52013PC0247
 Togra le haghaidh RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS ÓN gCOMHAIRLE lena leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011 maidir le Cuntais Eorpacha Eacnamaíocha Chomhshaoil /* COM/2013/0247 final - 2013/0130 (COD) */
 MEABHRÁN MÍNIÚCHÁIN
 1. COMHTHÉACS AN TOGRA
 Glacadh Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011
 maidir le cuntais Eorpacha eacnamaíocha chomhshaoil an 6 Iúil 2011.
 Cumhdaítear trí mhodúl ann: cuntais ar astaíochtaí aeir, cánacha a bhaineann
 leis an gcomhshaol agus cuntais ar shreabhadh ábhar.
 In Airteagal 10 den Rialachán sin, tá liosta
 de mhodúil nua a d’fhéadfaí a thabhairt isteach níos déanaí bunaithe ar thograí
 ón gCoimisiún. Cumhdaítear na chéad trí cinn de na modúil nua atá liostaithe in
 Airteagal 10 sa dréacht‐Rialachán leasaitheach seo: caiteachas ar
 chosaint an chomhshaoil, an earnáil um earraí agus um sheirbhísí comhshaoil
 agus cuntais fuinnimh.
 Cuireann úsáideoirí go leor béime ar anailísiú
 agus ar chur i bhfeidhm cuntas comhshaoil i samhaltú agus i réamhaisnéisí, chun
 tograí beartais a ullmhú agus chun tuairisciú a dhéanamh ar chur chun feidhme
 agus ar thionchar beartais. Leis na modúil nua, beifear in ann na tacair
 shonraí chomhtháite atá ar fáil a shíneadh le haghaidh cur i bhfeidhm agus
 anailíse den sórt sin.
 Tuartar in Airteagal 4 den Rialachán go
 dtabharfaidh Ballstáit faoi staidéir phíolóta ar bhonn deonach d'fhonn tástáil
 a dhéanamh ar a indéanta atá sé modúil nua a thabhairt isteach. Cuireadh roinnt
 de na staidéir phíolóta sin i gcrích cheana, rud lenar léiríodh go soiléir go bhféadfaí
 na trí mhodúil nua a úsáid.
 Úsáidtear sonraí reatha i gcuntasaíocht
 chomhshaoil chun na cuntais a chur i dtoll a chéile. Níl sé riachtanach aon
 sonraí nua a bhailiú chun na modúil nua a chur chun feidhme. Bainfear úsáid
 níos fearr as faisnéis ó ionstraimí reatha maidir le bailiú sonraí.
 Ghlac Coimisiún Staidrimh na
 Náisiún Aontaithe Córas na gCuntas Comhtháite Eacnamaíoch Comhshaoil
 (CCEC) mar chaighdeán staidrimh idirnáisiúnta ag an 43ú seisiún dá
 chuid i mí Feabhra 2012. Tá na modúil nua ag teacht go hiomlán le CCEC.
 Tá an Rialachán leasaitheach atá beartaithe ag
 teacht leis an Straitéis Eorpach athbhreithnithe um Chuntasaíocht Chomhshaoil
 (SECC 2008). Cinnteofar leis an Rialachán seo go mbeidh Forais Staidrimh
 Náisiúnta in ann a gcuid oibre a leathnú maidir le cuntasaíocht chomhshaoil,
 agus é mar phríomhchuspóir sonraí comhchuibhithe agus tráthúla ar chaighdeán
 maith a sholáthar.
 2. TORTHAÍ AN CHOMHAIRLIÚCHÁIN LEIS NA
 PÁIRTITHE LEASMHARA AGUS NA MEASÚNUITHE TIONCHAIR
 Rinneadh an togra a phlé, faoi chuimsiú an
 Chórais Staidrimh Eorpaigh, le soláthraithe agus úsáideoirí sonraí ar an leibhéal
 teicniúil trí chomhairliúcháin i scríbhinn, i dtascfhórsaí, sna meithleacha
 oibre ábhartha maidir le Cuntais Chomhshaoil agus maidir le Staidreamh ar
 Chaiteachas Comhshaoil i mí an Mhárta 2012, agus leis na stiúrthóirí um
 staidreamh agus cuntais chomhshaoil i mí Aibreáin agus i mí na Samhna 2012.
 3. EILIMINTÍ DLÍ AN TOGRA
 Is é an cuspóir atá ag an ngníomh leasaitheach
 atá beartaithe a áirithiú go mbeidh inchomparáideacht idirnáisiúnta ann i gcás cuntas
 eacnamaíoch comhshaoil trí mhodúil bhreise mar atá liostaithe in Airteagal 10
 de Rialachán Uimh. 691/2011 a chuimsiú faoin Rialachán sin.
 Baineann an gníomh beartaithe le hábhar LEE
 agus, dá bhrí sin, ba chóir go mbeadh feidhm aige sa Limistéar Eorpach
 Eacnamaíoch.
 4. IMPLEACHT BHUISÉADACH
 Níl aon impleacht nua ag an togra ar bhuiséad
 an Aontais.
 2013/0130 (COD)
 Togra le haghaidh
 RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS
 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE
 lena leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011
 maidir le Cuntais Eorpacha Eacnamaíocha Chomhshaoil
 (Téacs atá ábhartha maidir leis an LEE)
 TÁ PARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS COMHAIRLE AN
 AONTAIS EORPAIGH,
 Ag féachaint don Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an
 Aontais Eorpaigh, agus go háirithe Airteagal 338(1) de,
 Ag féachaint don togra ón gCoimisiún Eorpach,
 Tar éis dóibh an dréachtghníomh reachtach a
 chur chuig na parlaimintí náisiúnta,
 Ag gníomhú dóibh i gcomhréir leis an ngnáthnós
 imeachta reachtach,
 De bharr an méid seo a leanas:
 (1) Foráiltear i gCinneadh Uimh. xxx ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle
 an xxx 2013 lena leagtar síos
 Seachtú Clár Gníomhaíochta Comhshaoil an Chomhphobail[1] go bhfuil faisnéis fhónta ar na
 príomhthreochtaí, ar na príomhbhrúnna agus ar na príomhghníomhaithe i ndáil le
 hathrú comhshaoil, sár-riachtanach chun beartas éifeachtach a fhorbairt agus an
 beartas sin a chur chun feidhme, agus chun saoránaigh a chumhachtú ar shlí níos
 ginearálta. Ba cheart ionstraimí a fhorbairt d'fhonn cur le feasacht an phobail
 maidir leis na hiarmhairtí comhshaoil a ghabhann le gníomhaíocht eacnamaíoch.
 (2) In Airteagal 10 de
 Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011 iarrtar ar an gCoimisiún tuarascáil maidir
 le cur chun feidhme an Rialacháin seo a chur faoi bhráid Pharlaimint na hEorpa
 agus na Comhairle agus, más iomchuí, tograí a dhéanamh chun modúil nua cuntas
 eacnamaíoch comhshaoil a thabhairt isteach, amhail Caiteachas agus Ioncam i
 leith Chosaint an Chomhshaoil (CICC)/Cuntais ar Chaiteachas i leith Chosaint an
 Chomhshaoil (CCCC), An Earnáil um Earraí agus um Sheirbhísí Comhshaoil (EESC)
 agus Cuntais Fuinnimh.
 (3) Rannchuidíonn na trí mhodúl
 nua seo go díreach le tosaíochtaí beartais an Aontais maidir le fás glas agus
 éifeachtúlacht acmhainne trí fhaisnéis thábhachtach a chur ar fáil maidir le
 táscairí amhail aschur margaidh agus fostaíocht san EESC, caiteachas náisiúnta
 ar chosaint an chomhshaoil agus úsáid fuinnimh de réir mhiondealú mionsonraithe
 NACE.
 (4) Ghlac Coimisiún
 Staidrimh na Náisiún Aontaithe creat lárnach Chóras na gCuntas
 Comhtháite Eacnamaíoch Comhshaoil (CCEC) mar chaighdeán staidrimh idirnáisiúnta
 ag an 43ú seisiún dá chuid i mí Feabhra 2012. Tá na modúil nua
 ag teacht go hiomlán le CCEC.
 (5) Chuathas i gcomhairle leis an
 gCoiste um an gCóras Staidrimh Eorpach,
 (6) Ba cheart, dá bhrí sin,
 Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011 a leasú dá réir,
 TAR ÉIS AN RIALACHÁN SEO A GHLACADH:
 Airteagal 1
 Leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 691/2011
 mar seo a leanas:
 1.
 In Airteagal 2, cuirtear isteach na pointí seo
 a leanas:
 ‘(4) ciallaíonn ‘caiteachas
 ar chosaint an chomhshaoil’ na hacmhainní eacnamaíocha arna gcaitheamh ag aonaid
 chónaitheacha ar chosaint an chomhshaoil. Áirítear le
 cosaint an chomhshaoil gach gníomhaíocht agus beart a bhfuil sé mar phríomhchuspóir
 leo truailliú, agus aon díghrádú eile ar an gcomhshaol, a chosc, a laghdú agus
 a dhíothú. Áirítear leis an méid sin bearta a rinneadh d'fhonn an comhshaol a
 athshlánú tar éis a dhíghrádaithe. Ní áirítear gníomhaíochtaí arb é a
 chomhlíonann siad, den chuid is mó, riachtanais theicniúla nó ceanglais
 inmheánacha le haghaidh sláintíochta nó slándála fiontair nó forais eile, fiú
 má tá na gníomhaíochtaí sin tairbhiúil don chomhshaol;
 (5) ciallaíonn ‘an earnáil
 um earraí agus um sheirbhísí comhshaoil’ na gníomhaíochtaí táirgthe sin de gheilleagar
 náisiúnta a ndéantar táirgí comhshaoil iontu. Is táirgí comhshaoil iad táirgí a
 táirgeadh ar mhaithe le cosaint an chomhshaoil agus le bainistíocht acmhainní. Áirítear le bainistíocht acmhainní an stoc d’acmhainní nádúrtha a
 chaomhnú, a chothabháil agus a fheabhsú agus, dá réir sin, cosaint a thabhairt
 i gcoinne ídithe;
 (6) ciallaíonn ‘cuntais ar
 shreabhadh fisiciúil fuinnimh’ tiomsúcháin chomhsheasmhacha de na sreafaí
 fisiciúla fuinnimh isteach i ngeilleagair náisiúnta, na sreafaí laistigh den
 gheilleagar agus na haschuir chuig geilleagair eile nó chuig an gcomhshaol.’
 2.
 In Airteagal 3(1), cuirtear isteach na pointí
 seo a leanas:
 ‘(d) modúl le haghaidh
 cuntas ar chaiteachas i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil, mar atá leagtha amach in
 Iarscríbhinn IV;
 (e) modúl le haghaidh chuntais
 na hearnála um earraí agus um sheirbhísí comhshaoil, mar atá leagtha amach in Iarscríbhinn V;
 (f) modúl le haghaidh
 cuntas ar shreabhadh fisiciúil fuinnimh, mar atá leagtha amach in Iarscríbhinn VI.’
 3.
 Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in áit Airteagal 8(2):
 ‘2. D'fhonn
 maolú a fháil faoi mhír 1 i leith Iarscríbhinní I, II agus III, déanfaidh
 an Ballstát lena mbaineann iarraidh chuí-réasúnaithe a chur faoi bhráid an
 Choimisiúin faoin 12 Samhain 2011. D'fhonn maolú a fháil faoi mhír 1 i
 leith Iarscríbhinní IV, V agus VI, déanfaidh an Ballstát lena
 mbaineann iarraidh chuí‐réasúnaithe a chur faoi bhráid an Choimisiúin
 faoin [...[2].]’
 4.
 An Iarscríbhinn a ghabhann leis an Rialachán,
 cuirtear isteach í mar Iarscríbhinní IV, V agus VI a ghabhann le Rialachán
 (AE) Uimh. 691/2011.
 Airteagal 2
 Tiocfaidh an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm an
 fichiú lá tar éis lá a fhoilsithe in Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh.
 Beidh an Rialachán seo ina cheangal
 go huile agus go hiomlán agus beidh sé infheidhme go díreach i ngach Ballstát.
 Arna dhéanamh sa Bhruiséil,
 Thar ceann Pharlaimint na hEorpa Thar
 ceann na Comhairle
 An tUachtarán An
 tUachtarán
 IARSCRÍBHINN
 ‘IARSCRÍBHINN IV
 MODÚL LE hAGHAIDH CUNTAS AR CHAITEACHAS I LEITH CHOSAINT AN
 CHOMHSHAOIL
 Roinn 1
 CUSPÓIRÍ
 Le cuntais ar chaiteachas
 i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil, déantar sonraí a thíolacadh ar shlí a luíonn
 go hiomlán leis na sonraí a thuairiscítear faoi CEC, maidir leis an gcaiteachas
 ar chosaint an chomhshaoil, i.e. na hacmhainní eacnamaíocha arna gcaitheamh ag
 aonaid chónaitheacha ar chosaint an chomhshaoil. Leis na cuntais seo, tugtar an deis an caiteachas náisiúnta
 i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil (CC) a thiomsú. Is é an sainmhíniú ar an
 gcaiteachas sin suim na n‐úsáidí a bhaineann aonaid chónaitheacha as seirbhísí
 CC, an ollfhoirmithe caipitil sheasta (OCS) le haghaidh gníomhaíochtaí CC, agus
 aistrithe CC nach bhfuil ina gcontrapháirt i leith ítimí roimhe sin, lúide
 maoiniú ón gcuid eile den domhan.
 Ba
 chóir go mbainfí leas sna cuntais ar chaiteachas i leith chosaint an
 chomhshaoil as an bhfaisnéis atá ann cheana féin sna cuntais náisiúnta (cuntais
 táirgthe agus giniúna ioncaim; OCS de réir NACE, táblaí soláthair agus úsáide;
 sonraí de réir aicmiú fheidhmeanna an rialtais), i staidreamh struchtúrach gnó,
 sa chlár gnó agus i bhfoinsí eile.
 Sainítear san
 Iarscríbhinn seo na sonraí atá le bailiú, le tiomsú agus le tarchur ag na
 Ballstáit le haghaidh na gcuntas ar chaiteachas i leith chosaint an
 chomhshaoil, mar aon leis na sonraí a bhfuil meastóireacht le déanamh orthu ag
 na Ballstáit sin.
 Roinn 2
 CUMHDACH
 Tá na teorainneacha córais
 céanna ag cuntais ar chaiteachas i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil agus atá ag
 CEC agus taispeántar caiteachas i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil maidir le príomhghníomhaíochtaí,
 gníomhaíochtaí tánaisteacha agus gníomhaíochtaí coimhdeacha. Cumhdaítear na hearnálacha seo a leanas:
 –
 rialtas ginearálta (Institiúidí Neamhbhrabúis a
 fhónann do Theaghlaigh) agus corparáidí mar earnálacha institiúideacha a
 tháirgeann seirbhísí CC. Táirgeann saintáirgeoirí seirbhísí CC mar a
 bpríomhghníomhaíocht,
 –
 teaghlaigh, rialtas ginearálta agus corparáidí mar
 thomhaltóirí de sheirbhísí CC,
 –
 an chuid eile den domhan mar thairbhí nó foinse na n‐aistrithe
 le haghaidh chosaint an chomhshaoil.
 Roinn 3
 LIOSTA NA SAINTRÉITHE
 Déanfaidh
 Ballstáit cuntais ar chaiteachas i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil a tháirgeadh de
 réir na saintréithe seo a leanas atá sainmhínithe de réir CEC:
 –
 aschur na seirbhísí cosanta
 comhshaoil. Déantar aschur margaidh, aschur neamh‐mhargaidh
 agus aschur gníomhaíochtaí coimhdeacha a idirdhealú,
 –
 tomhaltas idirmheánach na seirbhísí cosanta
 comhshaoil ag saintáirgeoirí,
 –
 allmhairí agus onnmhairí seirbhísí cosanta
 comhshaoil,
 –
 CBL móide cánacha eile ar tháirgí lúide
 fóirdheontais ar tháirgí a bhaineann le seirbhísí cosanta comhshaoil,
 –
 ollfhoirmiú caipitil sheasta agus éadálacha lúide
 diúscairtí sócmhainní neamh‐tháirgthe neamhairgeadais ar mhaithe le
 seirbhísí cosanta comhshaoil a tháirgeadh,
 –
 tomhaltas deiridh na seirbhísí cosanta comhshaoil,
 –
 aistrithe cosanta comhshaoil (faighte/íoctha).
 Tuairisceofar
 na sonraí ar fad san airgeadra náisiúnta de réir milliúin.
 Roinn 4
 AN CHÉAD BHLIAIN TAGARTHA, AN MHINICÍOCHT AGUS NA SPRIOCDHÁTAÍ
 TARCHURTHA
 1.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a thiomsú agus a tharchur ar bhonn
 bliantúil.
 2.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a tharchur laistigh de 24 mí ó
 dheireadh na bliana tagartha.
 3.
 Chun riachtanais na n‐úsáideoirí le haghaidh tacair
 shonraí atá críochnúil agus tráthúil a shásamh, cuirfidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat) meastacháin d’iomláin an AE-27 ar fáil do phríomh‐chomhiomláin
 an mhodúil sin chomh luath is a bheidh sonraí leordhóthanacha i ndáil le
 tíortha ar fáil. Déanfaidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat), i ngach cás inar féidir, meastacháin i ndáil le sonraí nach bhfuil
 tarchurtha ag na Ballstáit laistigh den sprioc a shonraítear i bpointe 2 a
 tháirgeadh agus a fhoilsiú.
 4.
 Is é an chéad bhliain tagartha an bhliain ina dtiocfaidh
 an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm.
 5.
 Sa chéad tarchur sonraí, áireoidh Ballstáit freisin sonraí
 bliantúla ó 2013 go dtí an chéad bhliain tagartha.
 6.
 I gcás gach tarchuir sonraí chuig an gCoimisiún ina
 dhiaidh sin, soláthróidh na Ballstáit sonraí bliantúla le haghaidh na mblianta n‐3,
 n‐2, n‐1 agus n, i gcás inarb ionann n agus an bhliain tagartha.
 Roinn 5
 TÁBLAÍ TUAIRISCITHE
 1.
 I gcás na saintréithe dá dtagraítear i Roinn 3,
 tuairisceofar sonraí agus iad miondealaithe de réir:
 –
 cineálacha táirgeoirí/tomhaltóirí seirbhísí cosanta
 comhshaoil mar atá sainmhínithe i Roinn 2,
 –
 aicmí aicmiú na ngníomhaíochtaí cosanta comhshaoil
 (CEPA) arna gcomhiomlánú mar seo a leanas:
 Maidir le gníomhaíochtaí ginearálta neamh‐mhargaidh
 an rialtais agus le haistrithe cosanta comhshaoil:
 –
 CEPA 2
 –
 CEPA 3
 –
 Suim CEPA 1 + 4 + 5 + 7
 –
 CEPA 6
 –
 Suim CEPA 8 + 9
 Maidir le gníomhaíochtaí coimhdeacha corparáidí:
 –
 CEPA 1
 –
 CEPA 2
 –
 CEPA 3
 –
 Suim CEPA 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9
 Maidir le corparáidí mar tháirgeoirí tánaisteacha
 agus saintáirgeoirí:
 –
 CEPA 2
 –
 CEPA 3
 –
 CEPA 4
 Maidir le teaghlaigh mar thomhaltóirí:
 –
 CEPA 2
 –
 CEPA 3
 –
 Na cóid NACE seo a leanas maidir le táirgeadh
 coimhdeach seirbhísí CC: NACE Rev. 2 B, C, D, rannán 36. Déanfar sonraí ó
 roinn C a thíolacadh de réir rannáin. Déanfar rannáin 10-12, 13-15 agus
 31-32 a ghrúpáil le chéile. Maidir le Ballstáit nach bhfuil oibleagáid orthu, de
 réir Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 295/2008[3]
 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle (maidir le sainmhínithe ar na
 saintréithe, an fhormáid theicniúil do tharchur na sonraí, ceanglais
 tuairiscithe dhúbailte le haghaidh NACE Rev. 1.1 agus NACE Rev. 2 agus
 maoluithe atá le deonú maidir le staidreamh struchtúracha gnó), sonraí maidir
 le caiteachas i leith chosaint an chomhshaoil a bhailiú i dtaca le ceann amháin
 nó níos mó de na cóid NACE seo, ní gá dóibh sonraí a chur ar fáil i dtaca leis
 na cóid NACE sin.
 2. Is mar seo a leanas atá aicmí CEPA dá
 dtagraítear i mír 1:
 CEPA 1 - Cosaint an aeir thimpeallaigh agus na
 haeráide
 CEPA 2 - Bainistíocht fuíolluisce
 CEPA 3 - Bainistíocht dramhaíola
 CEPA 4 - Cosaint agus feabhsú ithreach,
 screamhuisce agus uisce dromchla
 CEPA 5 - Laghdú torainn agus creatha
 CEPA 6 - Cosaint na bithéagsúlachta agus
 tírdhreach
 CEPA 7 - Cosaint i gcoinne radaíochta
 CEPA 8 – Taighde agus forbairt i réimse an chomhshaoil
 CEPA 9 - Gníomhaíochtaí cosanta comhshaoil eile.
 Roinn 6
 UASRÉ NA nIDIRTHRÉIMHSÍ
 Maidir le cur chun feidhme fhorálacha na
 hIarscríbhinne seo, is é 2 bhliain ón gcéad spriocdháta tarchurtha uasré na
 hidirthréimhse.
 Iarscríbhinn V
 MODÚL LE hAGHAIDH NA hEARNÁLA UM EARRAÍ
 AGUS UM SHEIRBHÍSÍ COMHSHAOIL
 Roinn 1
 CUSPÓIRÍ
 Leis
 an staidreamh maidir le hearraí agus seirbhísí comhshaoil, déantar sonraí a
 thaifeadadh agus a thíolacadh maidir le gníomhaíochtaí táirgthe na ngeilleagar
 náisiúnta a ndéantar táirgí comhshaoil iontu ar shlí a luíonn go hiomlán leis
 na sonraí a thuairiscítear faoi CEC.
 Sainítear san
 Iarscríbhinn seo na sonraí atá le bailiú, le tiomsú, le tarchur, agus a bhfuil
 meastóireacht le déanamh orthu, ag na Ballstáit le haghaidh earraí agus
 seirbhísí comhshaoil.
 Roinn 2
 CUMHDACH
 Tá
 na teorainneacha córais céanna ag an earnáil um earraí agus um sheirbhísí
 comhshaoil agus atá ag CEC agus cuimsítear ann gach earra agus seirbhís
 comhshaoil a chruthaítear laistigh de theorainn an táirgthe. Is é an sainmhíniú a dhéantar ar tháirgeadh in CEC an ghníomhaíocht a
 dhéantar faoi rialú agus faoi fhreagracht aonaid institiúidigh a bhaineann úsáid
 as ionchur saothair, caipiteal agus earraí agus seirbhísí i bhfoirm ionchair chun
 earraí agus seirbhísí a tháirgeadh.
 Tagann
 earraí agus seirbhísí comhshaoil faoi réim na gcatagóirí seo a leanas:
 seirbhísí a bhaineann go sonrach leis an gcomhshaol, táirgí de chuspóir comhshaoil
 amháin (táirgí bainteacha), earraí oiriúnaithe agus teicneolaíochtaí
 comhshaoil.
 Roinn 3
 LIOSTA NA SAINTRÉITHE
 Déanfaidh
 Ballstáit staidreamh maidir leis an earnáil um earraí agus um sheirbhísí
 comhshaoil a tháirgeadh de réir na saintréithe seo a leanas:
 –
 aschur margaidh, ar de sin:
 –
 onnmhairí
 –
 breisluach na ngníomhaíochtaí margaidh
 –
 fostaíocht na ngníomhaíochtaí margaidh.
 Tuairisceofar
 na sonraí ar fad san airgeadra náisiúnta de réir milliúin, seachas an
 tsaintréith ‘fostaíocht’ ar choibhéis lánaimseartha ba cheart a bheith san
 aonad tuairiscithe.
 Roinn 4
 AN CHÉAD BHLIAIN TAGARTHA, AN MHINICÍOCHT
 AGUS NA SPRIOCDHÁTAÍ TARCHURTHA
 1.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a thiomsú agus a tharchur ar bhonn
 bliantúil.
 2.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a tharchur laistigh de 24 mí ó
 dheireadh na bliana tagartha.
 3.
 Chun riachtanais na n‐úsáideoirí le haghaidh tacair
 shonraí atá críochnúil agus tráthúil a shásamh, cuirfidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat) meastacháin d’iomláin an AE-27 ar fáil do phríomh‐chomhiomláin
 an mhodúil sin chomh luath is a bheidh sonraí leordhóthanacha i ndáil le
 tíortha ar fáil. Déanfaidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat), i ngach cás inar féidir, meastacháin i ndáil le sonraí nach bhfuil
 tarchurtha ag na Ballstáit laistigh den sprioc a shonraítear i bpointe 2 a
 tháirgeadh agus a fhoilsiú.
 4.
 Is é an chéad bhliain tagartha an bhliain ina dtiocfaidh
 an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm.
 5.
 Sa chéad tarchur sonraí, áireoidh Ballstáit freisin sonraí
 bliantúla ó 2013 go dtí an chéad bhliain tagartha.
 6.
 I gcás gach tarchuir sonraí chuig an gCoimisiún ina
 dhiaidh sin, soláthróidh na Ballstáit sonraí bliantúla le haghaidh na mblianta n‐3,
 n‐2, n‐1 agus n, i gcás inarb ionann n agus an bhliain tagartha.
 Roinn 5
 TÁBLAÍ TUAIRISCITHE
 1.
 I gcás na saintréithe dá dtagraítear i Roinn 3, tuairisceofar sonraí agus
 iad tras‐aicmithe de réir:
 –
 aicmiú na ngníomhaíochtaí eacnamaíocha, NACE Rev. 2
 (leibhéal comhiomlánaithe A*21 mar a leagtar amach in CEC),
 –
 aicmiú aicme na ngníomhaíochtaí cosanta comhshaoil
 (CEPA) agus aicme na ngníomhaíochtaí bainistíochta acmhainní (CReMA) agus iad grúpáilte
 mar seo a leanas:
 –
 CEPA 1
 –
 CEPA 2
 –
 CEPA 3
 –
 CEPA 4
 –
 CEPA 5
 –
 CEPA 6
 –
 Suim: CEPA 7, CEPA 8 agus CEPA 9
 –
 CReMA 10
 –
 CReMA 11
 –
 CReMA 13
 –
 CReMA 13A
 –
 CReMA 13B
 –
 CReMA 13C
 –
 CReMA 14
 –
 Suim: CReMA 12, CReMA 15 agus CReMA 16
 2.
 Tá aicmí CEPA dá dtagraítear i mír 1 leagtha amach in Iarscríbhinn IV. Is mar seo a leanas atá aicmí CReMA dá dtagraítear i mír 1:
 CReMA 10 – Bainistíocht uisce
 CReMA 11 – Bainistíocht acmhainní foraoise
 CReMA 12 – Bainistíocht flóra agus fána fhiáin
 CReMA 13 – Bainistíocht acmhainní fuinnimh
 CReMA 13A – Táirgeadh fuinnimh ó acmhainní in‐athnuaite
 CReMA 13B – Coigilt agus bainistíocht
 teasa/fuinnimh
 CReMA 13C – Íoslaghdú ar úsáid fuinnimh iontaise
 mar amhábhair
 CReMA 14 – Bainistíocht mianraí
 CReMA 15 – Gníomhaíochtaí taighde agus forbartha
 le haghaidh bainistíocht acmhainní
 CReMA 16 – Gníomhaíochtaí bainistíochta acmhainní
 eile
 Roinn 6
 UASRÉ NA nIDIRTHRÉIMHSÍ
 Maidir le cur chun feidhme fhorálacha na
 hIarscríbhinne seo, is é 2 bhliain ón gcéad spriocdháta tarchurtha uasré na
 hidirthréimhse.
 Iarscríbhinn VI
 MODÚIL LE hAGHAIDH CUNTAS AR
 SHREABHADH FISICIÚIL FUINNIMH
 Roinn 1
 CUSPÓIRÍ
 Le cuntais ar shreabhadh
 fisiciúil fuinnimh, déantar sonraí a thíolacadh maidir le sreafaí fisiciúla
 fuinnimh, arna sloinneadh i dteirigiúil, ar shlí a luíonn go hiomlán leis na
 coincheapa, na prionsabail, agus na sonraí a thuairiscítear faoi Chóras Eorpach
 na gCuntas (CEC). Déantar taifeadadh iontu ar shonraí fuinnimh a bhaineann le
 gníomhaíochtaí eacnamaíocha aonaid chónaitheacha na ngeilleagar náisiúnta agus
 iad miondealaithe de réir gníomhaíochta eacnamaíche. Léiríonn siad soláthar
 agus úsáid na n‐ionchur fuinnimh nádúrtha, na dtáirgí fuinnimh agus na n‐iarmharach
 fuinnimh. Tá táirgeadh, tomhaltas, agus carnadh cuimsithe sna gníomhaíochtaí
 eacnamaíocha.
 Roinn 2
 CUMHDACH
 Tá na teorainneacha córais
 céanna ag cuntais ar shreabhadh fisiciúil fuinnimh agus atá ag CEC agus tá siad
 bunaithe ar phrionsabal an chónaithe freisin.
 I gcomhréir le CEC,
 deirtear gurb ionann aonad agus aonad cónaitheach tíre nuair atá lárionad leasa
 eacnamaíoch an aonaid i gcríoch eacnamaíoch na tíre sin, is é a rá, nuair a
 bhíonn sé ag gabháil do ghníomhaíochtaí eacnamaíocha ar feadh tréimhse fadaithe
 (bliain amháin nó níos mó) sa chríoch sin.
 Le cuntais ar shreabhadh
 fisiciúil fuinnimh, déantar sreafaí fisiciúla fuinnimh a eascraíonn as
 gníomhaíochtaí gach aonaid chónaithigh a thaifeadadh, gan spleáchas don áit as
 a dtagann na sreafaí sin go geografach.
 Le cuntais ar shreabhadh
 fisiciúil fuinnimh, déantar sreafaí fisiciúla fuinnimh a thaifeadadh ón
 gcomhshaol chuig an ngeilleagar, laistigh den gheilleagar, agus ón ngeilleagar
 ar ais chuig an gcomhshaol.
 Roinn 3
 LIOSTA NA SAINTRÉITHE
 Déanfaidh
 Ballstáit cuntais ar shreabhadh fisiciúil fuinnimh a tháirgeadh de réir na
 saintréithe seo a leanas:
 –
 na sreafaí fisiciúla fuinnimh agus iad grúpáilte i
 dtrí chatagóir ghinearálta:
 –
 (i) ionchuir fuinnimh nádúrtha,
 –
 (ii) táirgí fuinnimh,
 –
 (iii) iarmharaigh fuinnimh.
 –
 foinse na sreafaí fisiciúla fuinnimh, agus iad grúpáilte
 i gcúig chatagóir: táirgeadh, tomhaltas, carnadh, an chuid eile den domhan agus
 an comhshaol,
 –
 ceann scríbe na sreafaí fisiciúla, agus iad grúpáilte
 sna cúig chatagóir chéanna le foinse na sreafaí fisiciúla fuinnimh.
 Tuairisceofar
 na sonraí ar fad i dteirigiúil.
 Roinn 4
 AN CHÉAD BHLIAIN TAGARTHA, AN MHINICÍOCHT AGUS NA SPRIOCDHÁTAÍ
 TARCHURTHA
 1.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a thiomsú agus a tharchur ar bhonn
 bliantúil.
 2.
 Déanfar an staidreamh a tharchur laistigh de 18 mí ó
 dheireadh na bliana tagartha.
 3.
 Chun riachtanais na n‐úsáideoirí le haghaidh tacair
 shonraí atá críochnúil agus tráthúil a shásamh, cuirfidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat) meastacháin d’iomláin an AE-27 ar fáil do phríomh‐chomhiomláin
 an mhodúil sin chomh luath is a bheidh sonraí leordhóthanacha i ndáil le
 tíortha ar fáil. Déanfaidh an Coimisiún
 (Eurostat), i ngach cás inar féidir, meastacháin i ndáil le sonraí nach bhfuil
 tarchurtha ag na Ballstáit laistigh den sprioc a shonraítear i bpointe 2 a
 tháirgeadh agus a fhoilsiú.
 4.
 Is é an chéad bhliain tagartha an bhliain ina dtiocfaidh
 an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm.
 5.
 Sa chéad tarchur sonraí, áireoidh Ballstáit freisin sonraí
 bliantúla ó 2013 go dtí an chéad bhliain tagartha.
 6.
 I gcás gach tarchuir sonraí chuig an gCoimisiún ina
 dhiaidh sin, soláthróidh na Ballstáit sonraí bliantúla le haghaidh na mblianta n‐3,
 n‐2, n‐1 agus n, i gcás inarb ionann n agus an bhliain tagartha.
 Roinn 5
 TÁBLAÍ TUAIRISCITHE
 1.
 I gcás na saintréithe dá dtagraítear i Roinn 3, tuairisceofar na sonraí
 seo a leanas:
 –
 Tábla soláthair le haghaidh sreafaí fuinnimh in
 aonaid fhisiciúla. Déantar soláthar na n‐ionchur fuinnimh nádúrtha, na
 dtáirgí fuinnimh, agus na n‐iarmharach fuinnimh (rónna) de réir foinse,
 i.e. ‘soláthraí’ (colúin) a thaifeadadh sa tábla seo.
 –
 Tábla úsáide le haghaidh sreafaí fuinnimh. Déantar
 úsáid na n‐ionchur fuinnimh nádúrtha, na dtáirgí fuinnimh, agus na n‐iarmharach
 fuinnimh (rónna) de réir cinn scríbe, i.e. ‘úsáideoir’ (colúin) a thaifeadadh
 sa tábla seo.
 –
 Tábla d'úsáid sreafaí fuinnimh a bhaineann le
 hastaíochtaí. Déantar úsáid na n‐ionchur fuinnimh nádúrtha agus na
 dtáirgí fuinnimh a bhaineann le hastaíochtaí (rónna) de réir an aonaid úsáide
 agus astaíochta (colúin) a thaifeadadh sa tábla seo.
 –
 An príomhtháscaire fuinnimh ‘tomhaltas iomlán
 fuinnimh de réir aonaid chónaithigh’ agus é miondealaithe de réir tionscail
 agus teaghlaigh.
 –
 Tábla ceangail ina dtaispeántar na gnéithe éagsúla
 lena ndéantar suas an difríocht idir an príomhtháscaire fuinnimh 'úsáid iomlán
 fuinnimh de réir aonaid chónaithigh' agus an príomhtháscaire fuinnimh coiteann arna
 léiriú i staidreamh Eorpach fuinnimh 'olltomhaltas fuinnimh intíre'.
 2. Tá leagan amach coiteann ó thaobh rónna
 agus colún de ag táblaí soláthair agus úsáide sreafaí fuinnimh (lena n‐áirítear
 sreafaí a bhaineann le hastaíochtaí).
 3. Seasann na colúin d’fhoinsí (soláthar) nó do
 chinn scríbe (úsáid) na sreafaí fisiciúla. Tá na colúin grúpáilte i gcúig
 chatagóir:
 –
 Baineann 'táirgeadh' le
 táirgeadh earraí agus seirbhísí. Déantar gníomhaíochtaí táirgthe
 a aicmiú de réir NACE Rev. 2 agus tuairiscítear sonraí sa leibhéal
 comhiomlánaithe A*64).
 –
 Cuirtear gníomhaíochtaí
 'tomhaltais' i láthair i gcolún amháin maidir le tomhaltas deiridh na
 dteaghlach.
 –
 Tagraíonn 'carnadh' do na
 hathruithe i stoic táirgí fuinnimh laistigh den gheilleagar.
 –
 Is é a thaifeadtar faoi 'an chuid
 eile den domhan' na sreafaí de tháirgí allmhairithe agus onnmhairithe.
 –
 Is é a thaifeadtar faoi 'comhshaol'
 foinse na sreafaí ionchuir nádúrtha agus ceann scríbe na sreafaí iarmharaigh.
 4. Sna rónna, déantar tuairisc ar an gcineál
 sreafa fhisiciúil mar atá aicmithe sa chéad phointe le hurchar i Roinn 3.
 5. Is mar seo a leanas atá aicmiú na n‐ionchur
 fuinnimh nádúrtha, na dtáirgí fuinnimh agus na n‐iarmharach fuinnimh:
 –
 Ionchuir fuinnimh nádúrtha atá grúpáilte in ionchuir fuinnimh nádúrtha nach bhfuil in‐athnuaite
 agus in ionchuir fuinnimh nádúrtha in‐athnuaite.
 –
 Táirgí fuinnimh atá
 grúpáilte de réir aicmiú táirgí de réir gníomhaíochta (CPA) agus de réir an
 aicmithe a úsáidtear i staidreamh Eorpach fuinnimh.
 –
 Iarmharaigh fuinnimh, lena
 gcuimsítear dramhaíl (gan luach airgid); caillteanais le linn
 eastósctha/astarraingthe, leithdháileadh/iompar, claochlú/tiontú agus stóráil;
 chomh maith le hítimí comhardaithe chun na táblaí soláthair agus úsáide a
 chomhardú.
 6. Déantar an
 ‘ceangal’ idir tháscaire phrionsabal an chónaithe agus an táscaire bunaithe ar
 chríoch a thíolacadh don gheilleagar náisiúnta iomlán (gan aon mhiondealú de
 réir tionscail) agus faightear é mar seo a leanas:
 úsáid iomlán fuinnimh de réir aonaid chónaithigh
 – úsáid fuinnimh de réir aonaid chónaithigh
 thar lear
 + úsáid fuinnimh de réir aonaid neamhchónaithigh
 ar an gcríoch
 = olltomhaltas fuinnimh intíre (bunaithe ar an
 gcríoch)
 Roinn 6
 UASRÉ NA nIDIRTHRÉIMHSÍ
 Maidir le cur chun feidhme fhorálacha na
 hIarscríbhinne seo, is é 2 bhliain ón gcéad spriocdháta tarchurtha uasré na
 hidirthréimhse.’
 [1] IO L xxx.
 [2] IO: cuir
 isteach dáta – trí mhí tar éis theacht i bhfeidhm an Rialacháin leasaithigh
 seo.
 [3] IO L 97, 9.4.2008, lch. 13.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 3.3.2011
 FR
 Journal officiel de l'Union européenne
 L 58/63
 DÉCISION DU COMITÉ MIXTE DE L’EEE
 No 114/2010
 du 10 novembre 2010
 modifiant l’annexe I (Questions vétérinaires et phytosanitaires) de l’accord EEE
 LE COMITÉ MIXTE DE L’EEE,
 vu l’accord sur l’Espace économique européen, modifié par le protocole portant adaptation de cet accord, ci-après dénommé «l’accord», et notamment son article 98,
 considérant ce qui suit:
 (1)
 L’annexe I de l’accord a été modifiée par la décision du Comité mixte de l’EEE no 60/2010 du 11 juin 2010 (1).
 (2)
 Le règlement (CE) no 357/2008 de la Commission du 22 avril 2008 modifiant l’annexe V du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (2) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (3)
 Le règlement (CE) no 571/2008 de la Commission du 19 juin 2008 modifiant l’annexe III du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil en ce qui concerne les critères de révision des programmes annuels de surveillance de l’ESB (3) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (4)
 Le règlement (CE) no 584/2008 de la Commission du 20 juin 2008 portant application du règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil en ce qui concerne la fixation d’un objectif communautaire de réduction de la prévalence de Salmonella enteritidis et Salmonella typhimurium chez les dindes (4) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (5)
 Le règlement (CE) no 746/2008 de la Commission du 17 juin 2008 modifiant l’annexe VII du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (5) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (6)
 Le règlement (CE) no 933/2008 de la Commission du 23 septembre 2008 modifiant l’annexe du règlement (CE) no 21/2004 du Conseil en ce qui concerne les moyens d’identification des animaux et le contenu des documents de circulation (6) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (7)
 Le règlement (CE) no 956/2008 de la Commission du 29 septembre 2008 modifiant l’annexe IV du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (7) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (8)
 Le règlement (CE) no 1251/2008 de la Commission du 12 décembre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les conditions et les exigences de certification applicables à la mise sur le marché et à l’importation dans la Communauté d’animaux d’aquaculture et de produits issus de ces animaux et établissant une liste des espèces vectrices (8) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (9)
 Le règlement (CE) no 103/2009 de la Commission du 3 février 2009 modifiant les annexes VII et IX du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (9) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (10)
 Le règlement (CE) no 129/2009 de la Commission du 13 février 2009 modifiant le règlement (CE) no 197/2006 en ce qui concerne la validité des mesures transitoires relatives aux anciennes denrées alimentaires (10) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (11)
 Le règlement (CE) no 162/2009 de la Commission du 26 février 2009 modifiant les annexes III et X du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (11) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (12)
 Le règlement (CE) no 163/2009 de la Commission du 26 février 2009 modifiant l’annexe IV du règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil fixant les règles pour la prévention, le contrôle et l’éradication de certaines encéphalopathies spongiformes transmissibles (12) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (13)
 Le règlement (CE) no 199/2009 de la Commission du 13 mars 2009 portant mesure transitoire dérogeant au règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil concernant l’approvisionnement direct en petites quantités de viande fraîche dérivée de cheptels de poulets de chair et de dindes (13) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (14)
 Le règlement (CE) no 213/2009 de la Commission du 18 mars 2009 modifiant le règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil et le règlement (CE) no 1003/2005 en ce qui concerne le contrôle et le dépistage des salmonelles dans les cheptels reproducteurs de Gallus gallus et de dindes (14) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (15)
 Le règlement (CE) no 759/2009 de la Commission du 19 août 2009 modifiant l’annexe du règlement (CE) no 21/2004 du Conseil établissant un système d’identification et d’enregistrement des animaux des espèces ovine et caprine (15) doit être intégré dans l’accord.
 (16)
 La directive 2008/53/CE de la Commission du 30 avril 2008 modifiant l’annexe IV de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne la virémie printanière de la carpe (VPC) (16) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (17)
 La directive 2008/71/CE du Conseil du 15 juillet 2008 concernant l’identification et l’enregistrement des animaux de l’espèce porcine (17) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (18)
 La décision 2008/392/CE de la Commission du 30 avril 2008 aux fins de l’application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil concernant la création d’une page d’information fondée sur l’internet destinée à rendre accessibles par voie électronique des informations sur les exploitations aquacoles et les établissements de transformation agréés (18) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (19)
 La décision 2008/650/CE de la Commission du 30 juillet 2008 modifiant la directive 82/894/CEE du Conseil concernant la notification des maladies des animaux dans la Communauté afin d’ajouter certaines maladies à la liste des maladies à déclaration obligatoire et d’en retirer l’encéphalomyélite à entérovirus du porc (19) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (20)
 La décision 2008/815/CE de la Commission du 20 octobre 2008 portant approbation de certains programmes nationaux de contrôle des salmonelles dans les cheptels de poulets de chair Gallus gallus
 (20) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (21)
 La décision 2008/896/CE de la Commission du 20 novembre 2008 établissant des lignes directrices pour les programmes de surveillance zoosanitaire fondés sur une analyse des risques prévus par la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil (21) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (22)
 La décision 2008/908/CE de la Commission du 28 novembre 2008 autorisant certains États membres à réviser leur programme annuel de surveillance de l’ESB (22) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (23)
 La décision 2008/946/CE de la Commission du 12 décembre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les exigences liées à la mise en quarantaine des animaux d’aquaculture (23) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (24)
 La décision 2009/177/CE de la Commission du 31 octobre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les programmes de surveillance et d’éradication et le statut «indemne de la maladie» des États membres, des zones et des compartiments (24) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (25)
 La décision 2009/247/CE de la Commission du 16 mars 2009 modifiant la décision 2003/322/CE en ce qui concerne l’utilisation de matières de catégorie 1 pour l’alimentation de certaines espèces d’oiseaux nécrophages en Bulgarie (25) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (26)
 La décision 2009/722/CE de la Commission du 29 septembre 2009 modifiant la décision 2003/324/CE concernant une dérogation à l’interdiction de la réutilisation des animaux à fourrure au sein de l’espèce en Lettonie (26) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (27)
 La décision 2009/771/CE de la Commission du 20 octobre 2009 portant approbation de certains programmes nationaux de contrôle des salmonelles chez les dindes (27) doit être intégrée dans l’accord.
 (28)
 Le règlement (CE) no 1251/2008 abroge les décisions de la Commission 1999/567/CE (28) et 2003/390/CE (29), qui sont intégrées dans l’accord et doivent dès lors en être supprimées.
 (29)
 La directive 2008/71/CE abroge la directive 92/102/CEE du Conseil (30), qui est intégrée dans l’accord et doit dès lors en être supprimée.
 (30)
 La décision 2009/177/CE abroge les décisions de la Commission 2002/300/CE (31) et 2002/308/CE (32), qui sont intégrées dans l’accord et doivent dès lors en être supprimées.
 (31)
 Le paragraphe 2 de la partie introductive du chapitre I de l’annexe I spécifie que les dispositions qui concernent les animaux vivants autres que les poissons et les animaux d’aquaculture ne s’appliquent pas à l’Islande et qu’il sera stipulé lorsqu’un acte spécifique ne s’applique pas ou ne s’applique qu’en partie à l’Islande. En conséquence, il convient de préciser, en ce qui concerne la directive 2005/94/CE du Conseil (33), qui a déjà été intégrée dans l’accord, qu’elle ne s’applique pas à l’Islande.
 (32)
 La présente décision s’applique à l’Islande dans les secteurs dans lesquels l’accord ne lui était pas applicable avant le réexamen du chapitre I de l’annexe I par la décision du Comité mixte de l’EEE no 133/2007 du 26 octobre 2007 (34), en tenant compte de la période transitoire précisée au paragraphe 2 de la partie introductive dudit chapitre.
 (33)
 La présente décision ne s’applique pas au Liechtenstein,
 DÉCIDE:
 Article premier
 Le chapitre I de l’annexe I de l’accord est modifié conformément à l’annexe de la présente décision.
 Article 2
 Les textes des règlements (CE) no 357/2008, (CE) no 571/2008, (CE) no 584/2008, (CE) no 746/2008, (CE) no 933/2008, (CE) no 956/2008, (CE) no 1251/2008, (CE) no 103/2009, (CE) no 129/2009, (CE) no 162/2009, (CE) no 163/2009, (CE) no 199/2009, (CE) no 213/2009 et (CE) no 759/2009, des directives 2008/53/CE et 2008/71/CE et des décisions 2008/392/CE, 2008/650/CE, 2008/815/CE, 2008/896/CE, 2008/908/CE, 2008/946/CE, 2009/177/CE, 2009/247/CE, 2009/722/CE et 2009/771/CE en langues islandaise et norvégienne, à publier dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, font foi.
 Article 3
 La présente décision entre en vigueur le 11 novembre 2010, pour autant que toutes les notifications prévues à l’article 103, paragraphe 1, de l’accord aient été faites au Comité mixte de l’EEE (35).
 Article 4
 La présente décision est publiée dans la partie EEE et dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel de l’Union européenne.
 Fait à Bruxelles, le 10 novembre 2010.
 Par le Comité mixte de l’EEE
 Le président
 Stefán Haukur JÓHANNESSON
 (1) JO L 244 du 16.9.2010, p. 3.
 (2) JO L 111 du 23.4.2008, p. 3.
 (3) JO L 161 du 20.6.2008, p. 4.
 (4) JO L 162 du 21.6.2008, p. 3.
 (5) JO L 202 du 31.7.2008, p. 11.
 (6) JO L 256 du 24.9.2008, p. 5.
 (7) JO L 260 du 30.9.2008, p. 8.
 (8) JO L 337 du 16.12.2008, p. 41.
 (9) JO L 34 du 4.2.2009, p. 11.
 (10) JO L 44 du 14.2.2009, p. 3.
 (11) JO L 55 du 27.2.2009, p. 11.
 (12) JO L 55 du 27.2.2009, p. 17.
 (13) JO L 70 du 14.3.2009, p. 9.
 (14) JO L 73 du 19.3.2009, p. 5.
 (15) JO L 215 du 20.8.2009, p. 3.
 (16) JO L 117 du 1.5.2008, p. 27.
 (17) JO L 213 du 8.8.2008, p. 31.
 (18) JO L 138 du 28.5.2008, p. 12.
 (19) JO L 213 du 8.8.2008, p. 42.
 (20) JO L 283 du 28.10.2008, p. 43.
 (21) JO L 322 du 2.12.2008, p. 30.
 (22) JO L 327 du 5.12.2008, p. 24.
 (23) JO L 337 du 16.12.2008, p. 94.
 (24) JO L 63 du 7.3.2009, p. 15.
 (25) JO L 73 du 19.3.2009, p. 20.
 (26) JO L 257 du 30.9.2009, p. 38.
 (27) JO L 275 du 21.10.2009, p. 28.
 (28) JO L 216 du 14.8.1999, p. 13.
 (29) JO L 135 du 3.6.2003, p. 19.
 (30) JO L 355 du 5.12.1992, p. 32.
 (31) JO L 103 du 19.4.2002, p. 24.
 (32) JO L 106 du 23.4.2002, p. 28.
 (33) JO L 10 du 14.1.2006, p. 16.
 (34) JO L 100 du 10.4.2008, p. 27.
 (35) Pas d’obligations constitutionnelles signalées.
 ANNEXE
 Le chapitre I de l’annexe I de l’accord est modifié comme suit:
 1)
 Le texte suivant est ajouté au point 7b [règlement (CE) no 21/2004 du Conseil] de la partie 1.1:
 «—
 32008 R 0933: règlement (CE) no 933/2008 de la Commission du 23 septembre 2008 (JO L 256 du 24.9.2008, p. 5),
 —
 32009 R 0759: règlement (CE) no 759/2009 de la Commission du 19 août 2009 (JO L 215 du 20.8.2009, p. 3).
 Aux fins du présent accord, les dispositions du règlement sont adaptées comme suit:
 Dans le tableau des codes de pays figurant à la note 1 de bas de page de l’annexe, les mentions suivantes sont ajoutées:
 Islande
 IS
 352
 Norvège
 NO
 578»
 2)
 Le texte du point 7 (directive 92/102/CEE du Conseil) de la partie 1.1 est supprimé.
 3)
 Le point suivant est inséré après le point 7c [règlement (CE) no 1760/2000 du Parlement européen et du Conseil] de la partie 1.1:
 «7d.
 32008 L 0071: directive 2008/71/CE du Conseil du 15 juillet 2008 concernant l’identification et l’enregistrement des animaux de l’espèce porcine (JO L 213 du 8.8.2008, p. 31).»
 4)
 Le texte suivant est ajouté au point 8a (directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil) de la partie 3.1, au point 5a (directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil) de la partie 4.1 et au point 4a (directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil) de la partie 8.1:
 «, modifiée par:
 —
 32008 L 0053: directive 2008/53/CE de la Commission du 30 avril 2008 (JO L 117 du 1.5.2008, p. 27).»
 5)
 Le texte suivant est ajouté au point 5a (directive 2005/94/CE du Conseil) de la partie 3.1:
 «Cet acte ne s’applique pas à l’Islande.»
 6)
 Le tiret suivant est ajouté au point 10 (directive 82/894/CEE du Conseil) de la partie 3.1:
 «—
 32008 D 0650: décision 2008/650/CE de la Commission du 30 juillet 2008 (JO L 213 du 8.8.2008, p. 42).»
 7)
 Le point suivant est inséré après le point 41 [règlement (CE) no 737/2008 de la Commission] de la partie 3.2:
 «42.
 32008 D 0896: décision 2008/896/CE de la Commission du 20 novembre 2008 établissant des lignes directrices pour les programmes de surveillance zoosanitaire fondés sur une analyse des risques prévus par la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil (JO L 322 du 2.12.2008, p. 30).»
 8)
 Le texte du point 51 (décision 1999/567/CE de la Commission), du point 65 (décision 2002/300/CE de la Commission), du point 66 (décision 2002/308/CE de la Commission) et du point 72 (décision 2003/390/CE de la Commission) de la partie 4.2 est supprimé.
 9)
 Les points suivants sont insérés après le point 85 [règlement (CE) no 504/2008 de la Commission] de la partie 4.2:
 «86.
 32008 R 1251: règlement (CE) no 1251/2008 de la Commission du 12 décembre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les conditions et les exigences de certification applicables à la mise sur le marché et à l’importation dans la Communauté d’animaux d’aquaculture et de produits issus de ces animaux et établissant une liste des espèces vectrices (JO L 337 du 16.12.2008, p. 41).
 87.
 32008 D 0392: décision 2008/392/CE de la Commission du 30 avril 2008 aux fins de l’application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil concernant la création d’une page d’information fondée sur l’internet destinée à rendre accessibles par voie électronique des informations sur les exploitations aquacoles et les établissements de transformation agréés (JO L 138 du 28.5.2008, p. 12).
 88.
 32008 D 0946: décision 2008/946/CE de la Commission du 12 décembre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les exigences liées à la mise en quarantaine des animaux d’aquaculture (JO L 337 du 16.12.2008, p. 94).
 89.
 32009 D 0177: décision 2009/177/CE de la Commission du 31 octobre 2008 portant application de la directive 2006/88/CE du Conseil en ce qui concerne les programmes de surveillance et d’éradication et le statut «indemne de la maladie» des États membres, des zones et des compartiments (JO L 63 du 7.3.2009, p. 15).»
 10)
 Le tiret suivant est ajouté au point 8b [règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil] de la partie 7.1 et au point 25 [règlement (CE) no 1003/2005 de la Commission] de la partie 7.2:
 «—
 32009 R 0213: règlement (CE) no 213/2009 de la Commission du 18 mars 2009 (JO L 73 du 19.3.2009, p. 5).»
 11)
 Les tirets suivants sont ajoutés au point 12 [règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil] de la partie 7.1:
 «—
 32008 R 0357: règlement (CE) no 357/2008 de la Commission du 22 avril 2008 (JO L 111 du 23.4.2008, p. 3),
 —
 32008 R 0571: règlement (CE) no 571/2008 de la Commission du 19 juin 2008 (JO L 161 du 20.6.2008, p. 4),
 —
 32008 R 0746: règlement (CE) no 746/2008 de la Commission du 17 juin 2008 (JO L 202 du 31.7.2008, p. 11),
 —
 32008 R 0956: règlement (CE) no 956/2008 de la Commission du 29 septembre 2008 (JO L 260 du 30.9.2008, p. 8),
 —
 32009 R 0103: règlement (CE) no 103/2009 de la Commission du 3 février 2009 (JO L 34 du 4.2.2009, p. 11),
 —
 32009 R 0162: règlement (CE) no 162/2009 de la Commission du 26 février 2009 (JO L 55 du 27.2.2009, p. 11),
 —
 32009 R 0163: règlement (CE) no 163/2009 de la Commission du 26 février 2009 (JO L 55 du 27.2.2009, p. 17).»
 12)
 L’adaptation suivante est ajoutée au point 12 [règlement (CE) no 999/2001 du Parlement européen et du Conseil] de la partie 7.1:
 «H.
 À l’annexe IX, chapitre D, section B, point c), le texte suivant est ajouté après les mots “à destination d’un État membre figurant sur la liste établie à l’annexe du règlement (CE) no 546/2006”:
 “ou à destination de la Norvège”.»
 13)
 Le tiret suivant est ajouté au point 45 [règlement (CE) no 197/2006 de la Commission] de la partie 7.2:
 «—
 32009 R 0129: règlement (CE) no 129/2009 de la Commission du 13 février 2009 (JO L 44 du 14.2.2009, p. 3).»
 14)
 La mention suivante est ajoutée au point 47 [règlement (CE) no 646/2007 de la Commission] de la partie 7.2:
 «, modifié par:
 —
 32008 R 0584: règlement (CE) no 584/2008 de la Commission du 20 juin 2008 (JO L 162 du 21.6.2008, p. 3).»
 15)
 Les points suivants sont insérés après le point 50 (décision 2008/486/CE du Conseil) de la partie 7.2:
 «51.
 32008 R 0584: règlement (CE) no 584/2008 de la Commission du 20 juin 2008 portant application du règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil en ce qui concerne la fixation d’un objectif communautaire de réduction de la prévalence de Salmonella enteritidis et Salmonella typhimurium chez les dindes (JO L 162 du 21.6.2008, p. 3).
 52.
 32009 R 0199: règlement (CE) no 199/2009 de la Commission du 13 mars 2009 portant mesure transitoire dérogeant au règlement (CE) no 2160/2003 du Parlement européen et du Conseil concernant l’approvisionnement direct en petites quantités de viande fraîche dérivée de cheptels de poulets de chair et de dindes (JO L 70 du 14.3.2009, p. 9).»
 16)
 Sous l’intitulé «ACTES DONT LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE ET L’AUTORITÉ DE SURVEILLANCE DE L’AELE TIENNENT DÛMENT COMPTE», les points suivants sont insérés après le point 4i (décision 2007/874/CE de la Commission) de la partie 7.2:
 «4j.
 32008 D 0815: décision 2008/815/CE de la Commission du 20 octobre 2008 portant approbation de certains programmes nationaux de contrôle des salmonelles dans les cheptels de poulets de chair Gallus gallus (JO L 283 du 28.10.2008, p. 43).
 4k.
 32009 D 0771: décision 2009/771/CE de la Commission du 20 octobre 2009 portant approbation de certains programmes nationaux de contrôle des salmonelles chez les dindes (JO L 275 du 21.10.2009, p. 28).»
 17)
 Sous l’intitulé «ACTES DONT LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE ET L’AUTORITÉ DE SURVEILLANCE AELE TIENNENT DÛMENT COMPTE», le point suivant est ajouté après le point 41a (décision 2007/667/CE de la Commission) de la partie 7.2:
 «41b.
 32008 D 0908: décision 2008/908/CE de la Commission du 28 novembre 2008 autorisant certains États membres à réviser leur programme annuel de surveillance de l’ESB (JO L 327 du 5.12.2008, p. 24).»
 18)
 Sous l’intitulé «ACTES DONT LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE ET L’AUTORITÉ DE SURVEILLANCE AELE TIENNENT DÛMENT COMPTE», le tiret suivant est ajouté au point 42 (décision 2003/322/CE de la Commission) de la partie 7.2:
 «—
 32009 D 0247: décision 2009/247/CE de la Commission du 16 mars 2009 (JO L 73 du 19.3.2009, p. 20).»
 19)
 Sous l’intitulé «ACTES DONT LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE ET L’AUTORITÉ DE SURVEILLANCE AELE TIENNENT DÛMENT COMPTE», le tiret suivant est ajouté au point 43 (décision 2003/324/CE de la Commission) de la partie 7.2:
 «—
 32009 D 0722: décision 2009/722/CE de la Commission du 29 septembre 2009 (JO L 257 du 30.9.2009, p. 38).»


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 289 Md. 35 (1980)
 421 A.2d 1360
 FRED W. ALLNUTT, INC.
 v.
 COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY
 [No. 2, September Term, 1980.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided November 10, 1980.
 *36 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, and RODOWSKY, JJ.
 James L. Mayer, with whom were Richard B. Talkin and Talkin & Abramson on the brief, for appellant.
 Leonard C. Redmond, III, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, and Alma L. Borenstein, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
 MURPHY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a District Court's order denying a motion to quash an administrative search warrant constitutes a final judgment appealable under Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) § 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
 By ch. 59 of the Acts of 1973, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), now codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Art. 89, §§ 28-49C. The intent and purpose of the Act, as set forth in § 28 (c), is "to assure as far as possible every working man and woman in the State of Maryland safe and healthful working conditions." The Commissioner of Labor and Industry is charged with the responsibility of administering the provisions of the Act. Section 35 (a) authorizes the Commissioner or his representatives:
 "to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site or *37 other area, work place, place of employment, or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer, to inspect and investigate any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, agent or employee."
 By ch. 443 of the Acts of 1978, codified as § 2A of Art. 89, an investigator or inspector of the Division of Labor and Industry[1] is authorized, in connection with inspections under § 35 (a), to apply "to the District Court for an administrative search warrant under the following conditions:
 (1) He is authorized or required by law to make an inspection of certain premises or property in the State;
 (2) He seeks access to such premises or property for the purpose of making an inspection; and
 (3) He is denied access after making a proper request for access of the owner, lessee, tenant, or other person in charge of the premises or property.
 (b) A judge of the District Court may issue an administrative search warrant if the application specifies the nature, scope, and purpose of the inspection to be performed by the applicant and upon a showing that:
 (1) The applicant is authorized or required by law to make the inspection;
 (2) The applicant was denied access to the premises or property after having made a proper request for access at a reasonable time;
 (3) The application is approved by the Attorney General; and
 (4) The inspection is sought for safety or health related purposes."
 *38 On September 24, 1979, a Division inspector attempted to inspect the headquarters and maintenance shop of Fred W. Allnutt, Inc. (Allnutt). Allnutt's president refused to consent to the inspection, and the inspector applied for an administrative search warrant pursuant to § 2A. The application for the warrant recited that entry to the premises was for the purpose of inspecting and investigating "the safety and health conditions of said workplace or premises assuring that the employer ... is furnishing to its employees ... a place of employment ... free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical injuries to its employees" and to determine compliance with the provisions of MOSHA. In addition to containing the requisite statutory recitals, the application stated that the inspection was based upon "a general administrative plan" for the enforcement of MOSHA requiring "general schedule inspections and investigations carried out in accordance with criteria based upon accident experience and number of employees exposed in particular industries." The application further recited that Allnutt was "part of an industry that has a higher ratio of accidents in comparison to other industries." Allnutt's "compliance history" was appended to the application for the warrant.
 Judge Raymond J. Kane, Jr. of the District Court for Howard County issued the administrative search warrant on September 24. Allnutt filed a motion to quash the warrant in the District Court, claiming, among other things, that it was issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The motion was denied and Allnutt appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County. The Commissioner filed a motion in the circuit court raising preliminary objections to the appeal, contending that the District Court's denial of Allnutt's motion to quash the warrant was not an appealable final order. The circuit court agreed and dismissed Allnutt's appeal, following which we granted certiorari.
 Allnutt contends that the denial of its motion to quash was an appealable final order because under § 2A the District *39 Court had jurisdiction only over matters concerning the issuance of the warrant, and once it decided that the warrant would continue in effect, nothing remained to be done by the court. In addition, Allnutt argues that the refusal to grant the motion was a denial of an absolute constitutional right and was therefore immediately appealable. Appellant also suggests that even if the denial of the motion was not a final judgment, the District Court's action was subject to review under the collateral order doctrine. Regarding Art. 89, §§ 2A and 35, appellant argues that § 35 violates both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it permits nonconsensual warrantless searches of private premises. These sections violate the same constitutional provisions, according to Allnutt, because they permit searches that are not based upon probable cause. Allnutt maintains that § 2A is also defective because it is a "special law" violative of § 33 of Art. III of the Maryland Constitution. Finally, appellant challenges the constitutionality of the search warrant issued in the instant case on the ground that (1) the application did not set forth sufficient facts to show probable cause, (2) the inspector was allowed to perform judicial functions in violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Maryland Constitution, (3) the warrant did not contain a specific description of the areas to be searched or the items to be seized, and (4) the warrant exceeded the scope of the statutory authority under which it was issued.[2]
 The Commissioner argues that because the District Court's order denying the motion to quash the search warrant did not finally settle and conclude the rights involved in the action between Allnutt and himself, it was an interlocutory rather than a final appealable order. The Commissioner also contends that the District Court's action is not properly reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. *40 He further argues that §§ 2A and 35, taken together, provide adequate safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. Finally, the Commissioner denies that the warrant in this case was either lacking in specificity or exceeded the statutory authority under which it was issued.
 I
 Section 12-401 (a) of the Courts Article authorizes an appeal "from a final judgment entered in the District Court."[3] A "final judgment" is defined in § 12-101 (f) of the Courts Article as:
 "a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, including an orphans' court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken."
 We observed in Warren v. State, 281 Md. 179, 377 A.2d 1169 (1977), involving an appeal from the District Court, that § 12-101 (f) does not specify what is an appealable final judgment but leaves that determination to the case law. In general, the cases hold that a judgment or order of a court is appealable if it is so final as to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. See Peat & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86, 394 A.2d 801 (1978); Warren v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 183; D.C. Transit Systems v. S.R.C., 259 Md. 675, 270 A.2d 793 (1970); Concannon v. State Roads Comm., 230 Md. 118, 186 A.2d 220 (1962).
 Section 2A of Art. 89 provides for the issuance of an administrative search warrant only if certain prescribed conditions are met. The District Court's power comes exclusively from § 2A, and the court only has jurisdiction *41 either to issue the search warrant or deny the warrant application. Thus, once Judge Kane had issued the warrant and denied Allnutt's motion to quash, nothing remained before the court. Consequently, the District Court's order was appealable as a final judgment under § 12-401 (a) of the Courts Article, and the circuit court was in error in dismissing Allnutt's appeal.
 An analogous situation was involved in Matter of Restland Memorial Park, 540 F.2d 626 (3rd Cir.1976), a case arising under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970). There, an inspector who had been refused entry to the Restland Cemetery applied to a federal district court for an inspection warrant. The warrant was issued, and Restland filed a motion to quash after again refusing to admit the inspector. The district court denied the motion and Restland appealed. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, stating (540 F.2d at 627 n. 3):
 "The present action is independent of, although ancillary to, any enforcement proceeding that may subsequently be pursued under OSHA. The order of the district court refusing to quash the warrant provides `"a final and indisputable basis of action", as between the [agency] and the [cemetery]....' ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 487, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 1137, 38 L. Ed. 1047 (1894). The matter reverts to the processes of the Department of Labor and there is nothing further for the district court to do."
 A similar result was reached in Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1131 (3rd Cir.1979), in which the court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a denial of a motion to quash an inspection warrant.
 II
 While we shall remand the case to the circuit court for consideration of the merits of the appeal, it may be of some benefit to briefly review the basic law respecting the application *42 of Fourth Amendment principles to administrative search warrants.
 In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1959), the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to administrative searches. Frank had been arrested and fined, as prescribed by the Baltimore City Code, for refusing to admit a Health Department inspector who sought to inspect his private dwelling for suspected Code violations. On appeal, Frank argued that his conviction for refusing to permit a warrantless search of his home was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to apply to administrative searches. Justice Douglas, dissenting, claimed that "[t]he Court misreads history when it relates the Fourth Amendment primarily to searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions." 359 U.S. at 376.
 Justice Douglas' view was adopted by the Court in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967). Camara had refused to allow a housing inspector to enter his apartment for the purpose of conducting an inspection because the inspector did not have a search warrant. The municipal code provided that refusal to admit a housing inspector was a misdemeanor, and Camara was subsequently arrested. He filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition after his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied. At the outset, the Court observed that
 "one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is `unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 387 U.S. at 528-29.
 In rejecting the argument that the statute authorizing the inspection provided adequate safeguards against *43 unreasonable searches and seizures, and that a warrant procedure would provide no additional protection, the Court noted that the effect of the statute was to vest in individual inspectors the almost absolute discretion to invade private property. The Court indicated that the exercise of this kind of discretion was precisely what the warrant requirement was intended to prevent. It said:
 "We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review...." Id. at 533.
 The Court said it was not clear that the governmental purpose behind such administrative searches would be frustrated if they were subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that some kind of warrant procedure was required and it undertook to consider the degree of Fourth Amendment protection applicable to administrative searches.
 Camara argued that an administrative warrant should be issued only upon a showing that the inspector had probable cause to believe that a violation of the housing code existed within the particular dwelling to be searched. The Court rejected this contention. It said that to meet constitutional requirements a search must be "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A warrantless administrative search of Camara's apartment was deemed by the Court to be inherently unreasonable, but it did not clearly indicate what showing of probable cause would comply with the reasonableness standard. The Court observed that a balancing of the need to search with the resulting invasion of privacy would be necessary in determining whether a search was reasonable. It suggested that
 "`probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." Id. at 538.
 *44 See v. City of Seattle, supra, involved the attempted inspection of a commercial warehouse by the Seattle Fire Department. The owner of the warehouse refused to permit the inspection because the inspector did not have a warrant. He was convicted of a misdemeanor as a result of this refusal and he challenged the validity of his conviction on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court held that
 "the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment  that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure  is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises." 387 U.S. at 546.
 The Court made the following observation concerning the requisite amount of probable cause: "The agency's particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved." Id. at 545. As in Camara, it was clear that probable cause in the criminal sense was not a constitutional requirement. In addition, the Court envisioned a distinction between inspections of residential and commercial premises. It said: "[w]e do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes...." Id. at 545-46.
 The Camara and See decisions were followed by Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S. Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972). In both Colonnade and Biswell, the Court recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Colonnade, agents from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service were refused permission to inspect Colonnade's storeroom because they did not have a warrant. The agents broke into the storeroom and seized liquor there stored. Colonnade brought suit to have the liquor returned and to have it suppressed as evidence. Although the Supreme Court ultimately decided the case in Colonnade's *45 favor, it did so on the ground that the applicable statute did not authorize forcible entries. The statute did permit the imposition of fines upon licensees, such as Colonnade, who refused to permit warrantless inspections of their premises. The Court found this to be constitutional, saying that See, supra, was inapplicable. The apparent reason for this ruling was the liquor industry's long history of "close supervision and inspection." 397 U.S. at 77.
 The retail firearms industry was the subject of the Court's inquiry in United States v. Biswell, supra, Biswell, who had a federal license to deal in sporting weapons, allowed a Federal Treasury Agent to inspect his locked storeroom after the agent showed him a copy of the statute that authorized warrantless searches. In discussing Biswell's conviction, which resulted from the seizure of illegal weapons found during the search, the Supreme Court said:
 "In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute." 406 U.S. at 315.
 In holding that the warrantless search was reasonable, the Court relied heavily on the extensive governmental regulation of the firearms industry and the need for frequent, unannounced inspections to insure effective regulation. The Court observed:
 "Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders." Id. at 315.
 "It is also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 316.
 *46 Finally, the Court noted that when a firearms dealer "chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id.
 In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978), the Court considered the validity of warrantless, nonconsensual administrative searches authorized by § 8 (a) of the federal Occuational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 657 (a).[4] Because of the marked similarity between the provisions of OSHA and its Maryland counterpart, MOSHA, see J.I. Hass Co. v. Dep't of Lic. and Reg., 275 Md. 321, 340 A.2d 255 (1975), Barlow's is of crucial importance in passing upon the constitutionality of inspection warrants issued in pursuance of §§ 2A and 35 of the Maryland Law.
 In the Barlow's case, an OSHA inspector sought to inspect Barlow's business premises for possible safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. Barlow's president refused to permit the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant. The Secretary of Labor subsequently applied to a federal district court for an order compelling Barlow's to submit to the inspection. The order was issued, but Barlow's again refused to admit the inspector and sought injunctive relief against the warrantless searches allegedly permitted by OSHA. A three-judge federal panel found that the statutory *47 authorization for warrantless searches was unconstitutional and enjoined searches or inspections authorized by § 657 (a). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether warrantless, nonconsensual OSHA searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court began by reaffirming the principle that warrantless searches of commercial premises as well as dwellings generally are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether the purpose of the investigation is civil or criminal. It held that unless some recognized exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, a warrant was required to conduct the inspection of Barlow's premises. The Court considered but rejected the argument that OSHA searches should be excepted from the warrant requirement under the Colonnade-Biswell exceptions for closely regulated industries  an argument grounded upon the relatively long history of minimum wage and maximum hours requirements imposed upon many industries by the government. The Court said: "The element that distinguishes [the liquor and firearms] enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." 436 U.S. at 313. Entering into a business enterprise with the knowledge that wage and hour controls would be imposed and enforced could not  the Court indicated  be construed as consent by an employer to enforcement of the extensive OSHA regulations through warrantless searches. Nor did the Court find merit in the double-barreled argument that warrantless OSHA searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they provided the only effective means of enforcement and that a balancing of the public interest in safe working places with the minimal amount of additional protection that would be afforded industry under a warrant procedure weighed heavily in favor of the public interest. The Court said it was "unconvinced ... that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will make them less effective." Id. at 316. Despite the *48 additional administrative burdens that would be caused by the warrant requirement, the Court concluded that the protection thereby afforded to an employer would be substantial. It said:
 "The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed." Id. at 323.
 Once it had decided that warrantless OSHA searches were not within any recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and were therefore unreasonable, the Court discussed what showing of probable cause would be sufficient to justify the issuance of an inspection warrant. The Court reaffirmed its position in the Camara and See cases that probable cause in the criminal sense was not required:
 "Whether the Secretary proceeds to secure a warrant or other process, with or without prior notice, his entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that `reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular *49 [establishment].' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 538. A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights. We doubt that the consumption of enforcement energies in the obtaining of such warrants will exceed manageable proportions." Id. at 320-21 (footnotes omitted).
 The Court concluded that OSHA was unconstitutional "insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent." Id. at 325. In a final footnote the Court remarked that the Secretary had refused to rely on the possibility that the process issued by the district court was the functional equivalent of a warrant, issued upon an appropriate showing of probable cause, and therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court said: "if the process obtained here, or obtained in other cases under revised regulations, would satisfy the Fourth Amendment, there would be no occasion for enjoining the inspections authorized by [§ 657 (a)]." Id. at 325 n. 23. Thus, the Barlow's case indicates that OSHA searches conducted under the authority of a warrant issued by a court pursuant to a showing of the requisite amount of probable cause would be constitutional.
 That a nonconsensual warrantless search undertaken in pursuance of § 35 of MOSHA would be unconstitutional under Barlow's is clear. Section 35, however, considered in conjunction with § 2A, contemplates that where the inspector is denied entry, an administrative search warrant will be obtained. Indeed, the regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, pursuant to authority vested in him by § 31 of MOSHA, appear to require this procedure. See Comar 9.12.31.03B, which provides that upon an employer's refusal *50 to permit an inspection, the inspector "shall" terminate the inspection, determine the reason for the refusal, and report the refusal to his supervisor. The Commissioner is then required by the regulation to "promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if necessary." The "compulsory process" referred to in the regulation would appear to be the warrant procedure prescribed in § 2A.[5] Thus, the regulation would seem to mandate the issuance of an administrative warrant as a prerequisite to nonconsensual administrative searches.
 In view of Barlow's, it is plain that MOSHA searches conducted with a valid administrative warrant would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Federal cases decided since Barlow's have upheld the constitutionality of § 657 (a), requiring only that nonconsensual OSHA searches be conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1979); Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.1978); Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. La. 1979); Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978).
 Whether an administrative search warrant satisfies the constitutional requirement of probable cause is, of course, another matter. As previously outlined, § 2A of Art. 89 enumerates the conditions under which the District Court is authorized to issue such a warrant; among other requirements, the application must specify the nature and scope of the proposed inspection and indicate that the warrant is sought for safety or health related purposes. Whether § 2A permits the issuance of inspection warrants not based upon probable cause is not, under Barlow's, the test of the warrant's constitutionality; rather, as stated in Barlow's, the test, followed by the federal courts, is whether *51 the warrant was in fact issued upon a proper showing of probable cause. See Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 Duke L.J. 63.
 As we have indicated, Barlow's affords guidance as to the showing of probable cause which is constitutionally essential to justify the issuance of an OSHA inspection warrant, i.e., probable cause may be based "not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that `reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'" 436 U.S. at 320. The Court explained that "[a] warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources ... would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 321. Probable cause in the criminal sense is thus not required. Nor is there a need to demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe that there is an existing OSHA violation on the premises.[6]
 The federal cases dealing with administrative probable cause usually have concerned warrant applications prompted by either the interpretation of statistical data (general schedule inspections) or specific employee complaints. Most of the decisions involving general schedule inspections have interpreted Barlow's as requiring magistrates to make two findings before issuing an administrative search warrant: (1) that a reasonable legislative or administrative inspection program exists and (2) that the proposed inspection comes within that program. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977), the court explained that the following classifications are given to OSHA inspections: imminent danger situations, fatality and catastrophe investigations, employee complaints or follow-up inspections, and general schedule inspections. An OSHA compliance officer seeking *52 to conduct a general schedule inspection provided the magistrate with a warrant application that explained in great detail how he had decided to inspect Reynolds. The affidavit revealed and explained the neutral criteria used to select Reynolds and was found sufficient in demonstrating that reasonable administrative standards had been employed in reaching the decision to inspect. The court concluded that a showing of probable cause had been made and that the warrant was properly issued. A similar result was reached in Matter of Establishment Inspection, Etc., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S. Ct. 174, 62 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1979), in which the affidavit failed to explain why the particular company had been selected for a general schedule inspection but did contain references to special inspection plans designed for the foundry industry of which the company was a part. In Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978), however, the court found that probable cause had not been established because the warrant application did not explain how the plant had been selected for a general schedule inspection from a large number of plants with a similar industrial classification. It said that information "must be presented with each warrant application to show that the administrative standards are being applied to a particular establishment in a neutral manner." Id. at 484. Accord, Matter of Urick Property, 472 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
 Other federal cases that have dealt with administrative probable cause have reviewed warrant applications sought by inspectors who had received employee complaints of OSHA violations. In several cases the courts have found that probable cause to issue the warrant existed when the warrant application contained "specific evidence of an existing violation," Barlow's, supra, 436 U.S. at 320, i.e., the factual basis for the employee's complaint or the written complaint itself, in addition to certain representations by the inspector. See Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.1980); Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1979); Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. *53 1979). A warrant application has been found insufficient to establish probable cause when the factual basis for the employee complaint was not made part of the application. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.1979). Even with such factual allegations, however, at least one court has held that the warrant application must also demonstrate that the inspection is to be made pursuant to a reasonable legislative or administrative plan. See Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. La. 1979). All of these cases have stressed the need for information sufficient to allow a judicial officer to make an independent determination of probable cause, thus avoiding the possibility of acting as a "rubber stamp."
 III
 Upon our remand of the present case to the circuit court, the trial judge will consider the merits of Allnutt's appeal. A key issue for determination is whether, in light of Barlow's and relevant Supreme Court and Maryland cases, § 2A is unconstitutional as permitting the issuance of MOSHA inspection warrants not based upon probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. If the court concludes that § 2A is facially constitutional, it will then be required to assess the averments of the application for the warrant to determine the existence of "probable cause," as that term has been defined by the cases in connection with OSHA and MOSHA type inspections of business establishments for safety or health related purposes.
 Judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County dismissing the appeal vacated; case remanded to that court for determination of the merits of the appeal; costs to be paid by the appellee.
 NOTES
 [1] The Division is a part of the State Department of Licensing and Regulation; the Division's head is the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
 [2] Allnutt limited its certiorari petition to questions involving the appealability of the District Court's order denying the motion to quash. Our grant of certiorari was so limited and accordingly the other issues raised by Allnutt in its brief are not properly before us. See Maryland Rule 813 a.
 [3] With an exception not here pertinent, the appeal is taken to the circuit court of the county in which the judgment was entered; in Baltimore City the appeal in civil cases is to the Baltimore City Court, and in criminal cases to the Criminal Court of Baltimore. See § 12-403 of the Courts Article.
 [4] Section 657 (a) provides:
 "(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized
 (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
 (2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee."
 [5] Congress did not amend 29 U.S.C. § 657 (a), in response to the Barlow's decision. Changes were made, however, in the regulation dealing with objections to inspections. The relevant regulation now specifies that the compulsory process that may be obtained by the Secretary of Labor includes ex parte application for an inspection warrant. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (d). OSHA does not contain any section that is comparable to Art. 89, § 2A.
 [6] See Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 856 (1979); Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 (1979); 8 U. Balt. L. Rev. 88 (1978).