jurisdiction: US

text:
 221 Md. 337 (1960)
 157 A.2d 610
 BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
 v.
 BOWERS ET AL.
 [No. 89, September Term, 1959.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided January 22, 1960.
 Motion for rehearing filed February 19, 1960.
 Denied March 14, 1960.
 The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.
 Benjamin Chambers and Paul S. Clarkson, with whom were Alfred P. Ramsey and John Grason Turnbull on the brief, for the appellant.
 Kenneth C. Proctor and Claude A. Hanley, with whom were W. Lee Thomas and Charles J. Hessian on the brief, for the appellees.
 HORNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This appeal involves the second round in the controversy between the descendants of Mary Ann Burnham (the Burnhams) and the heirs of Priscilla Lee (the Lees) on one side and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the company) on the other with respect to the grant of an easement by Mary Ann Burnham (the grantor) to the company across the tract of land now owned by the Burnhams and Lees as tenants in common, on which easement the company operates and maintains the electric transmission line it constructed thereon more than thirty years ago.
 In the first round of this litigation, which was an ejectment suit, we held in Burnham v. Balto. Gas & Electric Co., 217 Md. 507, 144 A.2d 80 (1958), that the grant of the easement operated (by the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case) to bind the Burnhams as to an undivided one-half interest in the tract as tenants in common with the Lees but did not bind the latter who own the other undivided one-half interest.
 *340 This second case, which is a partition proceeding, was filed by the company while the ejectment suit was pending. At our suggestion the lower court stayed further prosecution of the ejectment case pending the proceedings in this case, but we declined in the first appeal to pass upon the right of the company to maintain this partition suit. In this proceeding, the company seeks to have the tract divided in kind between the Burnhams and the Lees in such manner that the Burnhams be given that moiety of the tract across which the transmission line easement extends and that the Lees be given half of the tract in value free and clear of the easement, and, in the alternative, seek a sale of the land, subject to the company's easement, and a division of the proceeds between the Burnhams and the Lees in such manner as will protect the rights of the latter as if the burden created by the easement did not exist.
 After the opinion in the ejectment case had been filed the company amended its prayers for relief in this partition proceeding to ask that the Burnhams be required by mandatory order to join in the company's bill for partition (whether or not the company was entitled to maintain this action in its own right) so that the company's easement "may be perfected and preserved and so that the * * * [company] `may receive the full benefit of its deed,'" from the grantor.
 The Burnhams and Lees demurred to the amended bill on the sole ground "that under the provisions of * * * [Code (1957), Art. 16, § 154, * * * the company] is not a party in interest authorized to bring" a bill for partition. The chancellor overruled the demurrer on the ground that the company as grantee of the easement had a right in equity to compel the Burnhams to exercise their right to partition "to give the grantee the benefit of the grant." In their answer, the Burnhams and Lees denied the material allegations of the bill as amended, including the allegation that the tract should be divided into two parcels. They did not, however, specifically seek partition in kind of their respective aliquot shares.
 On June 28, 1852, Mary Ann Burnham and Priscilla Lee, who were sisters, were granted the 118-acre tract of land, located in Baltimore County thirteen miles north of downtown *341 Baltimore City, which is the subject of this controversy, as tenants in common in fee, subject to a life estate of the surviving sister in the whole. When Priscilla died in 1861, her surviving sister, in addition to her own undivided interest in one-half of the tract in fee, had the entire possessory interest in the tract until her death in 1943. At the time of her death, Priscilla, who had not married, was survived by a son. On November 11, 1924, Mary Ann conveyed the easement in question to the company, but at that time the company did not know, nor was it advised by anyone, of an outstanding interest in the heirs of Priscilla. And, for more than twenty-five years none of the Lees, and, for more than thirteen years none of the Burnhams, made any objection to the operation and maintenance of the transmission line or asserted any unacquired or outstanding interest in the land across which the transmission line had been constructed following the grant of the easement. The southern portion of the tract, fronting about 1200 feet on Broadway Road, is fairly level and generally cleared. North of the transmission line, which crosses the tract approximately parallel to and 900 feet north of the road, the tract is wooded, hilly and traversed by several small streams of water.
 One of the witnesses produced by the company, a real estate broker, was of the opinion that the tract was divisible in kind into two parcels so as to give the Lees the equivalent of one-half of the total value as if the tract was not subject to the easement, and after estimating the value of the whole, described several ways the tract could be divided between the Burnham descendants and the Lee heirs, which generally would allot the front portion to the Lees subject to a right of way for the use of the back portion to be allotted to the Burnhams. Another broker, although he found a different value, was also of the opinion that the tract could be divided into two parcels of equal value though not the same size. Both witnesses had walked over and examined the tract for the purpose of forming an opinion as to whether or not it could feasibly be divided in kind between the Burnhams and the Lees, but neither of them specifically testified that the tract could be partitioned without loss or injury. All three of the *342 witnesses for the Burnhams and Lees were also real estate experts. One testified that the property could not be so divided as "to allocate to each of those persons entitled" their aliquot share because the tract could not be divided into thirty-five parcels of varying sizes "without seriously damaging the market value of the whole," but he did not testify as to the feasibility of dividing the tract into two parcels. Another testified that the tract could not be divided into thirty-five parcels without loss or injury due to zoning regulations and the topography of the land. And the third witness testified that "the property could not be actually divided in any way without substantial damage to both portions" or "equally in any way into any number of parcels." However, except for the statement as to zoning and topography, none of the three stated the basis for their opinions that the tract could not be partitioned in kind.
 The chancellor, being of the opinion that the "very nature of the property prevents a partition in kind without loss or injury," declined to appoint commissioners to inquire into the feasibility of partitioning the tract, and dismissed the bill.
 Since we have previously decided that the Burnhams are bound by the grant of the easement [Burnham v. Balto. Gas & Electric Co., supra], the posture of the dispute on this appeal presents further problems of what a court of equity may do to protect the respective rights and interests of the parties.
 The company in effect contends that it has a right to require a partition of the tract into two parcels of equal value and in such manner that only the Burnhams' portion would thereafter be subject to its easement; that commissioners should have been appointed to make such partition in kind; and that the Lees are estopped from objecting to the partition sought by the company. On the other hand, the Burnhams and the Lees, in opposing the position of the company, assert that a right to partition does not exist; that equity does not have jurisdiction in this case; and that the only remedy available to the company to perfect its defective title is by a condemnation suit at law.
 As we see it the only questions presented on this appeal involve: (i) the right to partition and (ii) the right to have *343 commissioners appointed to ascertain whether the tract is susceptible of partition.
 (i). Right to Partition.
 Code (1957), Art. 16, § 154, reads in pertinent part as follows:
 "The court may decree a partition of any lands, * * * or any right, interest or estate therein, * * * on the bill or petition of any joint tenant, tenant in common, or any parcener or any concurrent owner, * * * or if it appear that said lands, * * * or right, interest or estate thereon cannot be divided without loss or injury to the parties interested, the court may decree a sale thereof, and a division of the money arising from such sale among the parties, according to their respective rights * * *."
 At the old common law only coparceners had a right of partition. Originally joint tenants and tenants in common could not compel others to partition. But this was remedied by the statute of 31 Hen. 8, c. 1, providing that joint tenants and tenants in common in their own right could compel other owners to make partition in the same manner as coparceners had been and were compelled to do. Walker, Law and Practice of Partition [in England], p. 4 (2d ed., 1882). In these respects, the enactment of Chapter 72 of the Acts of 1785, was merely declaratory of the preexisting common law. Thus, as was stated in Hardy v. Leager, 212 Md. 565, 130 A.2d 737 (1957), the right of partition in kind existed and continues to exist independent of statute. General statutory authority to decree a sale and divide the proceeds was added by Chapter 311 of the Acts of 1831, as was the inclusion of a "concurrent owner" among those entitled to partition.
 Partition in kind was at common law a matter of right, except where there was no proof of title, and inconvenience or difficulty would not formerly prevail to prevent it. But under the statute  even though partition is still a matter of right  when partition in kind cannot be made without loss or injury to the parties, the court may decree a sale of the property. Lloyd v. Gordon, 2 H. & McH. 254 (1789); Campbell v. *344 Lowe, 9 Md. 500 (1856); Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 571 (1870); Brendel v. Klopp, 69 Md. 1, 13 A. 589 (1888); Dugan v. Baltimore, 70 Md. 1, 16 A. 501 (1889); Johnson v. Hoover, infra (1892); Tolson v. Bryan, 130 Md. 338, 100 A. 366 (1917); Hardy v. Leager, supra (1957).
 The company in its reply brief insists that as a concurrent owner it is entitled to partition in its own right. It may be that the company has such a right. See Harrell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 105 (1911). Cf. Cook v. Boehl, 188 Md. 581, 53 A.2d 555 (1947). But, it is not necessary for us to decide the question here. For, if we assume, without deciding, that the company is not a concurrent owner, we think that it has a right to require the Burnhams to seek partition to the end that it may enjoy the full benefits to which it is entitled under the grant of the easement.
 While there is no case in this state directly in point, the holdings of the cases in other jurisdictions  though not all of them began as partition proceedings  are to the effect that a grantee of an easement from less than all of the cotenants has a right in equity to require the grantor or his heirs to seek partition in order that the grantee may enjoy the full benefits of the conveyance. In Mee v. Benedict, 98 Mich. 260, 57 N.W. 175 (1893), where the owners of 23/24ths of a tract of land had sold the timber rights to Mee and thereafter, together with the owner of the remaining 1/24th interest, had conveyed the whole tract to Benedict subject to such rights, it was held that Mee, though he had no property right to support a partition proceeding, had a right in equity to require his grantor to sue for partition of the land to the end that the timber rights would attach to the portion allotted to Mee's grantor. In the course of the majority opinion, it was said on pages 262 and 263:
 "[T]he only means of making that conveyance effectual to carry out the intent of the parties was for * * * [the grantor of the timber rights] to ask and obtain partition of the lands. This they had the right, and it was their duty, to do, and equity would require and compel action on their part to *345 that end. * * * We do not depart from the doctrine that such conveyance is void as against the cotenant, but it is void only in so far as it affects the cotenant's rights. * * * [B]ut it is not void as against the grantor, and we think it is competent, under the general equity powers of the court, to compel the grantor of a special interest to take such steps as to make his conveyance effectual."
 The decision in Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leech, 33 S.C. 175, 11 S.E. 631 (1890), 35 S.C. 146, 14 S.E. 730 (1892), and 39 S.C. 446, 17 S.E. 994 (1893), is directly in point. There a widow, owning a one-third undivided interest in a tract of land, conveyed an easement thereover to a railroad company, and when her children, the other cotenants, brought an action for damages against the railroad, the court held that it was entitled to an order requiring partition as upon an application by the widow, directed partition commissioners to allot to the widow, if practicable, the land over which the railroad had been constructed, and held, after the widow's death, that her children were likewise bound to seek partition. There it was said [at p. 450 of 39 S.C. 446]: "where a tenant in common has undertaken to place a burden upon the common property, partition should be, if practicable, so made as to allot to such tenant in common the portion upon which the burden has been placed."[1] For other cases in accord, see Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 121 F.2d 318 (C.C.A., 6th, 1941) [conveyance of easement for railroad tract by owners of one-sixth interest in land]; Cook v. International, etc. R.R. Co., 22 S.W. 1012 (Tex. Civ. App., 1893) [easement *346 for railroad right of way granted by two of several cotenants]; Harrell v. Mason,[2] supra (1911) [grant of timber rights from one of two cotenants]; and Pellow v. Arctic Mining Co., 164 Mich. 87, 128 N.W. 918 (1910) [grant of mineral rights from one of two cotenants]. Cf. Gittings v. Worthington, 67 Md. 139, 9 A. 228 (1887); Dugan v. Baltimore, supra (1889). See also Whitton v. Whitton, 38 N.H. 127 (1859); Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 334, 139 S.W. 693 (1911); Jones v. Berg, 105 Wash. 69, 177 P. 712 (1919); Simpson-Fell Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 136 Tex. 158, 125 S.W.2d 263 (1939); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement, etc., Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123 S.W.2d 290 (1939); Taylor v. Grange, L.R. 13 C.D. 223 (1879).
 We hold that the company has a right to require the Burnhams to seek partition in kind.
 (ii). Right to Appointment of Commissioners.
 On the question of whether the tract is partitionable in kind, there was evidence to the effect that it was feasible to divide it into two parcels, one to be allotted to the Burnhams subject to the company's easement and the other to the Lees subject to a right of way to and from the public road. Because the Burnhams and Lees did not want partition, they produced testimony to the effect that the tract could not be divided into thirty-five parcels so as to give each of the parties having an interest therein his or her aliquot share without loss or injury, but other than a mere statement that the zoning regulations and the topography of the land would prevent partition in kind, there was no evidence as to why it could not be so divided had they desired partition into aliquot shares. Furthermore, there is nothing in the pleadings, other than a general denial, to indicate whether the Burnhams and Lees actually opposed partition, but the record as a whole leaves no doubt that they object to partition in kind whether *347 it be into two parcels or thirty-five. However, a mere objection by dissentient parties without more is not a good reason for denying partition.
 In seeking a division of the tract into two parcels, the company bases its claim to partition in kind on two premises. First, it insists that since the Burnhams are under compulsion to sue for partition on behalf of the company they are precluded from objectiong to a division of the tract into two parcels, and secondly, that the Lees are estopped from objecting to a fair and equitable partition because they are precluded from taking advantage of their protracted silence and acquiescence. In seeking to require the company to institute condemnation proceedings in a court of law to perfect its defective title to the easement, the Burnhams and Lees contend that a court of equity is not the proper forum because a partial partition cannot be had without the consent of all the parties in interest.
 While it is true that partition in kind may not be defeated except upon a showing of loss or injury to the parties, Thruston v. Minke, supra; Rowe v. Gillelan, 112 Md. 108, 76 A. 500 (1910); Hardy v. Leager, supra, there is no doubt that in this country the weight of authority is to the effect that there may not be a partial partition in kind without the consent of the parties concerned. In Gaither v. Fraser, 289 Ky. 308, 158 S.W.2d 434 (1942), a partial partition was allowed when it did not imperil the interest of other owners. In other jurisdictions partial partition without consent has been allowed under permissive statutory provisions. See, for instance, Poundstone v. Everly, 31 Pa. 11 (1854); Eddie v. Eddie, 138 Mo. 599, 39 S.W. 451 (1897); Baldwin v. Foster, 157 Cal. 643, 108 P. 714 (1910); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 67 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. App., 1933); Feamster v. Feamster, 123 W. Va. 353, 15 S.E.2d 159 (1941); Mello v. Mello, 322 Mass. 68, 76 N.E.2d 9 (1947); Newson v. Johnson, 255 S.W.2d 33 (Ky., 1953). Maryland, along with the majority, seemingly requires consent if there is to be a partial partition. This is so because "[t]he object of partition is a division of the property between the several co-tenants so as to put an end to the co-tenancy, and to vest *348 in each person a sole estate in a specific part or allotment of the property." Dugan v. Baltimore, supra, at p. 6.
 We agree that the Burnhams are precluded from objecting to the partial partition sought by the company. Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leech, supra. But we do not agree that the Lees are estopped from so objecting. We have held in several recent cases that mere silence, standing alone, does not generally have the effect of an estoppel. See, for instance, Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 155 A.2d 491 (1959); Mohr v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 216 Md. 197, 140 A.2d 49 (1958), and the cases therein cited. In the Alvey case we said "if the acquiescence alleged is to constitute an estoppel, it must be shown that the classical elements necessary to establish an estoppel in pais are present." We find no evidence in this case to support the claimed estoppel.
 However, that does not mean that the company is not entitled to partition in kind if it is feasible. Under the express provisions of § 154, supra, any tenant in common generally has the right to secure separate enjoyment of his interest either by partition or by sale and a division of the proceeds. Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 49 A.2d 454 (1946). The evidence as to partitionability was meager, it is true, but the weight of such as was produced was to the effect that the tract might feasibly be divided in kind between the Burnhams and the Lees. Other than the unsupported assertions that it was not divisible, there was no substantial evidence that partition was impossible. A court may not assume without clear and convincing proof that an unimproved tract of land is not susceptible of partition. Cf. Watson v. Godwin, 4 Md. Ch. 25 (1851), where it was held, in the absence of sufficient proof that a sale would be to the interest and advantage of all the parties, that the case should "stand over" so that the bill for a sale could, by amendment, be converted into a bill for partition. In the case at bar, since there was a possibility that the tract could be partitioned in kind without loss or injury, the chancellor should have appointed commissioners to ascertain whether the land was susceptible of partition, and in so doing should have instructed them that a right of way may be reserved for equality and that the court may award *349 a sum of money to be paid for the same purpose. In Johnson v. Hoover, 75 Md. 486, 492, 23 A. 903, 905 (1892), it was held that "[t]he right of partition in kind was an undeniable right if feasible." See also Campbell v. Lowe, supra (1856); Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill 256 (1847). Clearly, the chancellor should not have dismissed the bill.
 In its bill, the company also prayed for a sale of the tract subject to its easement in the event partition in kind was not feasible, but both sides chose to ignore that possibility. There is, therefore, no question before us on this appeal with respect to a sale and an equitable division of the proceeds should partition in kind be impracticable without loss or injury; nor is there a corollary question as to who should justly compensate the Lees for the depreciation, if any, caused by or resulting from the burden created by the granting of the easement.
 For the reasons hereinbefore assigned, the order of the chancellor must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 Order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, the appellees to pay the costs.
 NOTES
 [1] The Leech case was not overruled by Duke v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 71 S.C. 95, 50 S.E. 675 (1905), as the appellees suggest. On the contrary, after the decision in the Duke case, the principle of "equitable partition" applied in the Leech case was affirmed in Jeter v. Knight, 81 S.C. 265, 62 S.E. 259 (1908), and Williams v. Bruton, 121 S.C. 30, 113 S.E. 319 (1922); and by the Fourth Circuit, applying South Carolina law, in Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 Fed. 465 (C.C.A., 4th, 1916), cert. den. 242 U.S. 640 (1916), and Burdine v. Southern Utilities Co., 11 F. (2d) 29 (C.C.A., 4th, 1926).
 [2] Nor was the Harrell case overruled by Shepard v. Mt. Vernon Lumber Co., 192 Ala. 322, 68 So. 880 (1915), for in the latter case the contractual time for cutting timber having expired, the owner of the timber rights was not entitled to sue for partition.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 31.12.2020
 EN
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 L 445/23
 Exchange of letters on the provisional application of the Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
 A. Letter from the European Atomic Energy Community
 HE. Tim Barrow
 UK Ambassador to the EU
 UK Mission to the European Union
 Avenue d'Auderghem, 10
 B-1040 BRUSSELS
 Brussels, 30 December 2020
 Dear Ambassador,
 Reference is made to the Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (‘the Agreement’).
 I have the honour to inform you that the European Atomic Energy Community is prepared to apply the Agreement on a provisional basis with effect from 1 January 2021, pending its entry into force and the completion of the final legal-linguistic revision process of all language versions of the Agreement, provided that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is prepared to do the same and has further notified the European Atomic Energy Community prior to 1 January 2021 of the completion of its internal requirements and procedures necessary for provisional application.
 If the Agreement is provisionally applied, the Parties shall understand references in the Agreement to the entry into force of the Agreement as references to the date from which the Agreement is provisionally applied, namely 1 January 2021. For greater certainty, Article 24(3) of the Agreement shall be understood to apply where provisional application ceases without the Agreement being concluded.
 The European Atomic Energy Community proposes that Article 25 of the Agreement is replaced by the following: ‘This Agreement shall be drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages. All language versions of the Agreement shall be subject to final legal-linguistic revision, which shall be completed by 30 April 2021. The language versions resulting from this legal-linguistic revision shall replace ab initio the signed versions of the Agreement and shall be established as authentic and definitive by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Parties.’
 I should be obliged if you would confirm the agreement to the foregoing by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the conditions specified in this letter.
 Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.
 On behalf of the European Atomic Energy Community
 Ilze JUHANSONE
 B. Letter from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
 Ms Ilze Juhansone
 Secretariat-General
 European Commission
 Rue de la Loi 200/Wetstraat 200
 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
 Belgium
 30th December 2020
 Dear Secretary-General,
 I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date, which reads as follows:
 "Reference is made to the Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (“the Agreement”).
 I have the honour to inform you that the European Atomic Energy Community is prepared to apply the Agreement on a provisional basis with effect from 1 January 2021, pending its entry into force and the completion of the final legal-linguistic revision process of all language versions of the Agreement, provided that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is prepared to do the same and has further notified the European Atomic Energy Community prior to 1 January 2021 of the completion of its internal requirements and procedures necessary for provisional application.
 If the Agreement is provisionally applied, the Parties shall understand references in the Agreement to the entry into force of the Agreement as references to the date from which the Agreement is provisionally applied, namely 1 January 2021. For greater certainty, Article 24(3) of the Agreement shall be understood to apply where provisional application ceases without the Agreement being concluded.
 The European Atomic Energy Community proposes that Article 25 of the Agreement is replaced by the following: “This Agreement shall be drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages. All language versions of the Agreement shall be subject to final legal-linguistic revision, which shall be completed by 30 April 2021. The language versions resulting from this legal-linguistic revision shall replace ab initio the signed versions of the Agreement and shall be established as authentic and definitive by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Parties."
 I have the honour to confirm the agreement of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to provisional application of the Agreement on the conditions specified in your letter, including further notification of completion of its internal requirements and procedures necessary for provisional application.
 Please accept, Madam, the assurance of my highest consideration.
 On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
 Lindsay CROISDALE-APPLEBY, CMG


type: legislation

text:
N° C 82/38 Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 3. 4. 89
 Artículo 2
 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el tercer día siguiente al de su publicación en el Diario
 Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas.
 Será aplicable a partir del inicio de la campaña lechera 1989/90.
 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada
 Estado miembro.
 Hecho en ...
 Por el Consejo
 Propuesta de
 REGLAMENTO (CEE) N° ... DEL CONSEJO
 de...
 por el que se modifica el Reglamento (CEE) n° 1079/77 en lo que se refiere a la tasa de
 corresponsabilidad en el sector de la leche y de los productos lácteos
 (89/C 82/31)
 EL CONSEJO DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, cuenta de la importancia de los intereses públicos en juego;
 que los datos y previsiones actualmente disponibles
 demuestran que los objetivos antes citados no podrán
 Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Económica alcanzarse probablemente al final del período previsto; que
 Europea, y, en particular, su artículo 43, es necesario por consiguiente fijar el tipo de la tasa en el
 2 % del precio indicativo de la leche para la campaña
 lechera 1989/90,
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión,
 HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO:
 Visto el dictamen del Parlamento Europeo,
 Visto el dictamen del Comité Económico y Social, Artículo 1
 Considerando que el Reglamento (CEE) n° 1079/77 del En el artículo 2 del Reglamento (CEE) n° 1079/77 se
 Consejo (*), cuya última modificación la constituye el añadirá el apartado siguiente:
 Reglamento (CEE) n°... (2) , estableció una tasa de
 corresponsabilidad aplicable hasta el final de la campaña « 10. Por lo que se refiere a la campaña lechera 1989/
 lechera 1989/90 y que gravaba en principio, el conjunto de 90, la tasa de corresponsabilidad se fija en 2 % del
 las cantidades de leche entregadas a las industrias lácteas precio indicativo de la leche.»
 así como determinadas ventas de productos lácteos en
 granja;
 Artículo 2
 Considerando que dicha tasa de corresponsabilidad estaba
 destinada a establecer un mayor equilibrio en el mercado
 lechero creando un nexo más directo entre la producción y El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el tercer día
 las posibilidades de salida de los productos lácteos, habida siguiente al de su publicación en el Diario Oficial de las
 Comunidades Europeas.
 í1) DO n° L 131 de 26. 5. 1977, p. 6. Será aplicable a partir del inicio de la campaña lechera
 (2) DO n° L ... 1989/90.
 ---pagebreak--- 3. 4. 89 Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas N° C 82/39
 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada
 Estado miembro.
 Hecho en ...
 Por el Consejo
 Propuesta de
 REGLAMENTO (CEE) N° ... DEL CONSEJO
 de...
 por el que se fijan, para la campaña lechera 1989/90, los precios de umbral de determinados
 productos lácteos
 (89/C 82/32)
 EL CONSEJO DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Producto piloto del
 grupo de productos ECUS/100 kg
 Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Económica
 Europea, 1 57,26
 2 197,08
 Visto el Reglamento (CEE) n° 804/68 del Consejo, de 27 de 3 277,36
 junio de 1968, por el que se establece la organización 4 102,63
 5 135,06
 común de mercados en el sector de la leche y de los 6 347,37
 productos lácteos í 1 ), cuya última modificación la constitu- 7 396,13
 ye el Reglamento (CEE) n ° . . . (2) y, en particular, su 8 327,78
 artículo 4, 9 609,05
 10 355,53
 11 327,08
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión, 12 97,81
 Considerando que los precios de umbral deben fijarse de
 forma que los precios de los productos lácteos importados
 se sitúen en un nivel que corresponda al precio indicativo de
 2. Los productos piloto contemplados en el apartado 1
 la leche, habida cuenta de la necesaria protección de la
 serán los que se definen en el Anexo I del Reglamento (CEE)
 industria de transformación de la Comunidad; que, por
 n° 2915/79 del Consejo, de 18 de diciembre de 1979, por el
 consiguiente, es oportuno, fijar el precio de umbral
 que se determinan los grupos de productos y las
 basándose en el precio indicativo de la leche, (teniendo en
 disposiciones especiales relativas al cálculo de las exaccio-
 cuenta la relación que se desea lograr entre el valor de la
 nes reguladoras en el sector de la leche y de los productos
 materia grasa de la leche y el de la leche desnatada, así como
 lácteos (3), cuya última modificación la constituye el
 los costes y los rendimientos uniformes de cada uno de los
 Reglamento (CEE) n° 3609/88 (4).
 productos lácteos de que se trata; que es conveniente tener
 en cuenta un importe a tanto alzado destinado a garantizar
 una protección suficiente de la industria de transformación
 de la Comunidad,
 Artículo 2
 HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO:
 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el tercer día
 siguiente al de su publicación en el Diario Oficial de las
 Artículo 1 Comunidades Europeas.
 1. Para la campaña lechera 1989/90, los precios de Será aplicable a partir del inicio de la campaña lechera
 umbral se fijan de la siguiente forma: 1989/90.
 (!) DO n° L 148 de 28. 6. 1968, p. 13. (3) DO n° L 329 de 24. 12. 1979, p. 1.
 (2) DO n° L ... (4) DO n° L 315 de 22. 11. 1988, p. 1.


type: wikipedia

text:
Maadlus 1896. aasta suveolümpiamängudel
 Kreeka-Rooma maadlus
 Võistlused toimusid absoluutses kategoorias Panathinaikó staadionil 10. aprillil, esikohakohtumine 11. aprillil.
 Registreerunuid: 10
 Võistlejaid: 5
 Riike: 4
 Peeti ainult 4 kohtumist. Esimesena loositi vastamisi Launceston Elliot ja Carl Schuhmann. Nähes, et Elliot oli tükk maad pikem ja raskem, olid pealtvaatajad kindlad, et matš ei kesta kaua. Nii läkski, kuid nelja minuti pärast oli selili hoopis Elliot!
 Teine kohtumine Stephanos Christopouluse ja Momcsilló Tapavicza vahel oli ametliku protokolli järgi tasavägine, kuid lõppes ungarlase loobumisega.
 Kolmandas matšis maadlesid kreeklased omavahel. Heitlus ei kestnud kaua, sest Christopoulos vigastas õlga.
 Finaalkohtumine Schuhmanni ja Giorgios Tsitase vahel oli kestnud nelikümmend minutit, kui kohtunikud selle pimeduse tõttu katkestasid. Schuhmann väitis, et seda pole vaja, sest seljatab vastase mõne minutiga, kuid kohtunikud ei uskunud. Järgmisel päeval alustati uuesti. Schumann maadles nüüd palju aktiivsemalt ja võitis kahekümne minutiga.
 Siis hakkas publik nõudma, et Schuhmann maadleks ka Christopoulosega. On teadmata, kas kohtunikud selle keelasid või polnud Christopoulos selleks suuteline.
 1896. aasta suveolümpiamängud
 Maadlus olümpiamängudel


text:
 |
 52012PC0413
 Togra le haghaidh RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS ÓN gCOMHAIRLE lena leasaítear Rialachán Uimh. 1100/2007 ón gComhairle lena mbunaítear bearta chun an stoc Eascann Eorpach a athshlánú /* COM/2012/0413 final - 2012/0201 (COD) */
 MEABHRÁN MÍNIÚCHÁIN
 1. COMHTHÉACS AN TOGRA
 Sa Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh
 (CFAE) déantar idirdhealú idir na cumhachtaí arna dtarmligean chuig an
 gCoimisiún chun gníomhartha neamhreachtacha a bhfuil feidhm ghinearálta leo a
 ghlacadh chun eilimintí neamhriachtanacha áirithe a fhorlíonadh nó a leasú sa
 ghníomh reachtach mar atá leagtha síos in Airteagal 290(1) den CFAE
 (gníomhartha tarmligthe), agus na cumhachtaí arna dtabhairt don Choimisiún
 coinníollacha aonfhoirmeacha a ghlacadh chun gníomhartha de chuid an Aontais
 atá ina gceangal dlí a chur chun feidhme mar atá leagtha síos in Airteagal 291(2)
 den CFAE (gníomhartha cur chun feidhme).
 Maidir le Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 182/2011 a
 ghlacadh, rinne an Coimisiún an ráiteas seo a leanas:
 "Tabharfaidh an Coimisiún faoi scrúdú ar
 na gníomhartha reachtacha uile atá i bhfeidhm agus nár oiriúnaíodh don nós
 imeachta rialúcháin lena ngabhann grinnscrúdú roimh do Chonradh Liospóin teacht
 i bhfeidhm, chun a mheasúnú ar gá na hionstraimí sin a oiriúnú do chóras na
 ngníomhartha tarmligthe a tugadh isteach le hAirteagal 290 den Chonradh ar
 Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh. Cuirfidh an Coimisiún na tograí is iomchuí ar
 aghaidh chomh luath agus is féidir agus tráth nach déanaí ná na dátaí a
 luaitear san fhéilire táscach atá san iarscríbhinn a ghabhann leis an ráiteas
 seo[1]."
 Sa chomhthéacs seo is gá Rialachán (CE)
 Uimh. 1100/2007 a ailíniú le rialacha nua an CFAE. Ba cheart na cumhachtaí
 a thugtar don Choimisiún faoin Rialachán sin a athaicmiú mar chumhachtaí
 tarmligthe agus mar chumhachtaí cur chun feidhme.
 Ba cheart, dá bhrí sin, é a thabhairt de
 chumhacht don Choimisiún gníomhartha tarmligthe a ghlacadh chun bearta a
 ghlacadh chun dul i ngleic leis an laghdú mór ar phraghsanna na n‐eascann
 a úsáidtear ar mhaithe le hathstocáil, i gcomparáid leis na heascanna sin a
 úsáidtear ar chúiseanna eile.
 Mar an gcéanna, ba cheart é a thabhairt de
 chumhacht don Choimisiún gníomhartha tarmligthe a ghlacadh maidir le formheas
 an Choimisiúin ar Phleananna Bainistíochta Eascann ar bhonn sonraí eolaíocha
 agus teicniúla.
 Déantar foráil in Airteagal 9(3) maidir
 leis an gComhairle le bearta malartacha a ghlacadh chun spriocleibhéil éalaithe
 a bhaint amach. Dá bhrí sin, tugtar de chumhacht don Chomhairle, leis an téacs
 mar atá sé faoi láthair, an eilimint neamhriachtanach sin den Rialachán a
 leasú. Ní féidir nós imeachta cinnteoireachta mar é a úsáid níos mó faoin CFAE
 agus ba cheart an fhoráil sin a scriosadh.
 Tá Airteagal 1(2) den Rialachán imithe i
 léig toisc é bheith bunaithe ar Chinneadh 2008/292/CE ón gCoimisiún an 4 Aibreán 2008[2] a bhunaigh chun críocha an
 Rialacháin seo, nach gnáthóg nádúrtha don eascann Eorpach í an Mhuir Dhubh ná
 na habhainnchórais atá ceangailte léi. Ba cheart, dá bhrí sin, an fhoráil sin a
 scriosadh.
 Ina theannta sin, tá Airteagal 3 den
 Rialachán imithe i léig toisc Cinneadh 2009/310/CE ón gComhairle an
 2 Aibreán 2009[3] a rinne formheas ar iarratais ón gCipir, ó Mhálta, ón
 Ostair, ón Rómáin agus ón tSlóvaic ar iad a dhíolmhú ón oibleagáid Plean
 Bainistíochta Eascann a ullmhú. Níl aon iarratas ar feitheamh ar dhíolmhú ón
 oibleagáid sin. Ba cheart, dá bhrí sin, an fhoráil sin a scriosadh.
 2. TORTHAÍ AN CHOMHAIRLIÚCHÁIN LE PÁIRTITHE
 LEASMHARA AGUS MEASÚNUITHE TIONCHAIR
 Ní raibh gá le comhairliúchán leis na
 páirtithe leasmhara ná le measúnú tionchair.
 3. EILIMINTÍ DLÍTHIÚLA AN TOGRA
 · Achoimre ar an ngníomhaíocht atá beartaithe
 Is í an phríomhghníomhaíocht dhlíthiúil na
 cumhachtaí a bronnadh ar an gCoimisiún le Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007
 ón gComhairle a aithint agus na cumhachtaí sin a aicmiú mar chumhachtaí
 tarmligthe nó mar chumhachtaí cur chun feidhme.
 · Bunús dlí
 Airteagal 43(2) den Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú
 an Aontais Eorpaigh.
 · Prionsabal na coimhdeachta
 Tagann an togra faoi inniúlacht eisiach an
 Aontais Eorpaigh.
 · Prionsabal na comhréireachta
 Leis an togra leasaítear bearta atá ann cheana
 i Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007 agus níl aon chúis imní faoi phrionsabal
 na comhréireachta dá bhrí sin.
 · Rogha ionstraime
 An ionstraim atá beartaithe: Rialachán ó
 Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle.
 Ní bheadh ionstraimí eile leormhaith ar an
 gcúis seo a leanas: ní mór Rialachán a leasú le Rialachán eile.
 4. IMPLEACHT BHUISÉADACH
 Ní bhaineann aon chaiteachas breise ón Aontas
 leis an mbeart seo.
 2012/0201 (COD)
 Togra le haghaidh
 RIALACHÁIN Ó PHARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS
 ÓN gCOMHAIRLE
 lena leasaítear Rialachán Uimh. 1100/2007
 ón gComhairle lena mbunaítear bearta chun an stoc Eascann Eorpach a athshlánú
 TÁ PARLAIMINT NA hEORPA AGUS
 COMHAIRLE AN AONTAIS EORPAIGH,
 Ag féachaint don Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an
 Aontais Eorpaigh, agus go háirithe Airteagal 43(2) de,
 Ag féachaint don togra ón gCoimisiún Eorpach,
 Ag féachaint don tuairim ó Choiste Eacnamaíoch
 agus Sóisialta na hEorpa,
 Tar éis dóibh an dréachtghníomh reachtach a
 chur chuig na parlaimintí náisiúnta,
 Ag gníomhú dóibh i gcomhréir leis an
 ngnáthnós imeachta reachtach,
 De bhrí gur :
 (1) Le Rialachán (CE)
 Uimh. 1100/2007[4]
 ón gComhairle tugtar cumhachtaí don Choimisiún roinnt de na forálacha sa
 Rialachán sin a chur chun feidhme.
 (2) Mar thoradh ar theacht i
 bhfeidhm Chonradh Liospóin, ní mór na cumhachtaí arna dtabhairt don Choimisiún
 faoi Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007 a ailíniú le hAirteagal 290
 agus le hAirteagal 291 den Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh.
 (3) Chun feidhm a thabhairt
 d'fhorálacha áirithe Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007, ba cheart an
 chumhacht chun gníomhartha a ghlacadh i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 290 den
 Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh a tharmligean maidir le bearta a
 ghlacadh a théann i ngleic leis an laghdú suntasach i bpraghsanna an mhargaidh
 ar eascanna a úsáidtear ar mhaithe le hathstocáil, i gcomparáid le heascanna a
 úsáidtear ar chúiseanna eile.
 (4) Tá sé ríthábhachtach go
 ndéanfadh an Coimisiún comhairliúcháin iomchuí le linn an ullmhúcháin a bheidh
 ar bun aige maidir le glacadh gníomhartha tarmligthe, lena n‐áirítear ar
 leibhéal na saineolaithe.
 (5) Ba cheart don Choimisiún, le
 linn dó gníomhartha tarmligthe a ullmhú agus a tharraingt suas, a áirithiú go
 ndéanfaí doiciméid ábhartha a tharchur chuig Parlaimint na hEorpa agus chuig an
 gComhairle ar mhodh comhuaineach, tráthúil agus iomchuí.
 (6) Ba cheart cumhachtaí cur chun
 feidhme a thabhairt don Choimisiún chun a áirithiú go mbeidh dálaí comhionanna
 ann agus forálacha an Rialacháin (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007 maidir le formheas
 ón gCoimisiún ar Phleananna Bainistíochta Eascann ar bhonn sonraí teicniúla
 agus eolaíocha, á gcur chun feidhme. Ba cheart na cumhachtaí sin a fheidhmiú i
 gcomhréir le Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa
 agus ón gComhairle an 16 Feabhra 2011 lena leagtar síos na rialacha
 agus na prionsabail ghinearálta a bhaineann leis na sásraí maidir le rialú ag
 na Ballstáit ar fheidhmiú chumhachtaí chur chun feidhme an Choimisiúin[5].
 (7) Ní bheidh de chumas ag an
 gCoimisiúin tuairisciú do Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus don Chomhairle ar na
 bearta a bhaineann le hathstocáil, lena n‐áirítear an fhorbairt ar
 phraghsanna an mhargaidh faoin 1 Iúil 2011, toisc an fhaisnéis
 ábhartha a bheith curtha isteach go déanach ag roinnt Ballstáit. Ba cheart, dá
 bhrí sin, spriocdháta na tuarascála seo a chur ar athló go dtí an
 31 Nollaig 2012.
 (8) Tugtar de chumhacht don
 Chomhairle an eilimint neamhriachtanach sin den Rialachán a leasú i leagan
 reatha an Rialacháin sin, a bhaineann leis an gcumhacht bearta malartacha a
 ghlacadh d'fhonn spriocleibhéil éalaithe a bhaint amach. Ós rud é nach féidir
 nós imeachta cinnteoireachta mar é a úsáid níos mó faoin CFAE is ceart an
 fhoráil sin a scriosadh.
 (9) Bunaíodh le
 Cinneadh 2008/292/CE ón gCoimisiún an 4 Aibreán 2008 [6] nach gnáthóg nádúrtha don
 eascann Eorpach í an Mhuir Dhubh ná na habhainnchórais atá ceangailte léi chun
 críocha an Rialacháin. Tá Airteagal 1(2) den Rialachán imithe i léig agus
 ba cheart é a scriosadh.
 (10) Formheasadh le
 Cinneadh 2009/310/CE ón gComhairle an 2 Aibreán 2009[7] iarratais ón gCipir, ó Mhálta,
 ón Ostair, ón Rómáin agus ón tSlóvaic ar iad a dhíolúnú ón oibleagáid Plean
 Bainistíochta Eascann a ullmhú. Níl aon iarratas ar feitheamh ar dhíolmhú ón
 oibleagáid sin. Tá Airteagal 3 den Rialachán imithe i léig dá bhrí sin
 agus ba cheart é a scriosadh.
 (11) Ba cheart dá bhrí sin
 Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007 a leasú dá réir sin,
 TAR ÉIS AN RIALACHÁN SEO A GHLACADH:
 Airteagal 1
 Leasaítear Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 1100/2007
 mar seo a leanas:
 (1)
 Scriostar mír 2 d'Airteagal 1.
 (2)
 Scriostar Airteagal 3.
 (3)
 In Airteagal 5, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas
 in ionad mhír 1:
 "1. Formheasfaidh an Coimisiún na
 pleananna bainistíochta eascann trí bhíthin gníomhartha cur chun feidhme i
 gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta scrúdúcháin dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 12b(2)."
 (4)
 Maidir le Airteagal 7, cuirtear an méid seo a
 leanas in ionad mhír 6 agus mhír 7:
 "6. I gcás ina dtarlaíonn laghdú mór ar
 phraghsanna an mhargaidh ar eascanna a úsáidtear ar mhaithe le hathstocáil, i
 gcomparáid le heascanna a úsáidtear ar chúiseanna eile, cuirfidh an Ballstát
 lena mbaineann an Coimisiún ar an eolas. Féadfaidh an Coimisiún, trí
 ghníomhartha tarmligthe arna nglacadh i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 12a agus
 chun dul i ngleic leis an gcás, céatadáin na n‐eascann a úsáidtear ar
 mhaithe le hathstocáil dá dtagraítear i mír 2 a laghdú go sealadach.
 7. Tuairisceoidh an Coimisiún, tráth nach
 déanaí ná an 31 Nollaig 2012, do Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus don
 Chomhairle agus déanfar measúnú ar na bearta a bhaineann le hathstocáil lena n‐áirítear
 forbairt ar phraghsanna an mhargaidh."
 (5)
 Scriostar mír 3 d'Airteagal 9.
 (6)
 Cuirtear isteach Airteagal 12a agus Airteagal 12b
 mar seo a leanas:
 "Airteagal 12a
 An tarmligean a
 fheidhmiú
 1. Is faoi réir na
 gcoinníollacha atá leagtha síos san Airteagal seo a thugtar de chumhacht don
 Choimisiún gníomhartha tarmligthe a ghlacadh.
 2. Tabharfar ar feadh tréimhse
 neamhchinntithe tarmligean na gcumhachtaí dá dtagraítear i Rialachán 7(6).
 3. Féadfaidh Parlaimint na
 hEorpa nó an Chomhairle tarmligean na gcumhachtaí dá dtagraítear in
 Airteagal 7(6) a chúlghairm tráth ar bith. Cuirfear deireadh leis an
 tarmligean cumhachta a shonraítear sa chinneadh sin trí bhíthin cinnidh
 cúlghairme. Tiocfaidh sé i bhfeidhm an lá tar éis fhoilsiú an chinnidh in Iris
 Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh nó ar dháta níos déanaí arna shonrú sa
 chinneadh. Ní dhéanfaidh sé difear do bhailíocht aon cheann de na gníomhartha
 tarmligthe atá i bhfeidhm cheana.
 4. A luaithe a ghlacfaidh sé
 gníomh tarmligthe, tabharfaidh an Coimisiún fógra ina leith do Pharlaimint na
 hEorpa agus don Chomhairle go comhuaineach.
 5. Ní thiocfaidh gníomh
 tarmligthe a ghlactar de bhun Airteagal 7(6) i bhfeidhm ach amháin mura
 mbeidh aon agóid curtha in iúl ag Parlaimint na hEorpa nó ag an gComhairle laistigh
 de thréimhse dhá mhí tar éis fógra faoin ngníomh sin a thabhairt do Pharlaimint
 na hEorpa agus don Chomhairle nó, más rud é, roimh dheireadh na tréimhse sin,
 go mbeidh Parlaimint na hEorpa agus an Chomhairle araon tar éis a chur in iúl
 don Choimisiún nach ndéanfaidh siad agóid. Cuirfear dhá mhí leis an tréimhse
 sin ar thionscnamh ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa nó ón gComhairle.
 Airteagal 12b
 Nós imeachta coiste
 1. Beidh an Coiste um Iascach
 agus Dobharshaothrú a bunaíodh le hAirteagal 30 de Rialachán (CE) Uimh. 2371/2002
 de chúnamh ag an gCoimisiún. Is é a bheidh sa choiste sin coiste de réir bhrí
 Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 182/2011.
 2. I gcás ina ndéantar tagairt
 don mhír seo, beidh feidhm ag Airteagal 5 de Rialachán (AE)
 Uimh. 182/2011."
 Airteagal 2
 Tiocfaidh an Rialachán seo i bhfeidhm ar an
 bhfichiú lá tar éis a fhoilsithe in Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh.
 Beidh an Rialachán seo ina cheangal
 go huile agus go hiomlán agus beidh sé infheidhme go díreach i ngach Ballstát.
 Arna dhéanamh sa
 Bhruiséil,
 Thar ceann Pharlaimint na hEorpa Thar
 Ceann na Comhairle
 An tUachtarán An
 tUachtarán
 [1] IO L 55, 28.2.2011,
 lch. 19.
 [2] IO L 98, 10.4.2008, lch. 14.
 [3] IO L 91, 3.4.2009, lch. 23.
 [4] IO L 248, 22.9.2007, lch. 17.
 [5] IO L 55, 28.2.2011, lch.13.
 [6] IO L 98, 10.4.2008, lch. 14.
 [7] IO L 91, 3.4.2009, lch. 23.


text:
 Tapahtumia
 29. huhtikuuta – Kiinan Ming-dynastia valtasi Taiwanin.
 21. kesäkuuta – Kardisin rauha Ruotsin ja Venäjän välillä.
 Englannissa säädettiin Corporation Act, jolla pyrittiin rajoittamaan julkiset virat vain Englannin kirkon jäsenille.
 Syntyneitä
 25. tammikuuta – Antonio I, Monacon ruhtinas (k. 1731)
 5. maaliskuuta – Francesco Gasparini, italialainen säveltäjä ja musiikkipedagogi (k. 1727)
 9. maaliskuuta – Torsten Rudeen, ruotsalainen runoilija, professori, piispa ja valtiopäiväedustaja (k. 1729)
 14. toukokuuta – Lorentz Clerck, ruotsalainen kenraalimajuri ja maaherra (k. 1720)
 6. kesäkuuta – Giacomo Antonio Perti, italialainen säveltäjä (k. 1756)
 9. kesäkuuta – Fjodor III, Venäjän tsaari (k. 1682)
 2. syyskuuta – Georg Böhm, saksalainen urkuri ja säveltäjä (k. 1733)
 7. syyskuuta – Gunno Dahlstierna, ruotsalainen runoilija (k. 1709)
 13. syyskuuta – Germund Cederhielm, ruotsalainen laki- ja hallintomies (k. 1741)
 27. lokakuuta – Fjodor Apraksin, venäläinen kreivi ja yliamiraali (k. 1728)
 1. marraskuuta – Ludvig, Grand Dauphin, Ranskan kruununprinssi (k. 1711)
 8. marraskuuta – Kaarle II, Espanjan viimeinen Habsburg-sukuinen kuningas (k. 1700)
 8. joulukuuta – Christopher Polhem, ruotsalainen keksijä ja teollisuusmies (k. 1751)
 18. joulukuuta – Christopher Polhem, ruotsalainen keksijä ja teollisuusmies (k. 1751)
 Nicholas Hawksmoor, brittiläinen arkkitehti (k. 1736)
 Guillaume de l’Hôpital, ranskalainen matemaatikko (k. 1704)
 Pieter Mortier, ranskalais-alankomaalainen kartografi, kaivertaja ja kirjakauppias (k. 1711)
 John Rambo, amerikkalainen poliitikko (k. 1741)
 Kuolleita
 5. helmikuuta – Shunzhi, Kiinan Qing-dynastian ensimmäinen keisari (s. 1638)
 9. maaliskuuta – Jules Mazarin, italialais-ranskalainen poliitikko ja kardinaali (s. 1602)
 4. huhtikuuta – Alexander Leslie, skotlantilainen sotilas ja Ruotsin sotamarsalkka (s. 1580)
 27. toukokuuta – Archibald Campbell, skotlantilainen markiisi (s. 1607)
 1. kesäkuuta – James Guthrie, skotlantilainen pappi (s. 1612)
 3. kesäkuuta – Gottfried Scheidt, saksalainen säveltäjä ja urkuri (s. 1593)
 21. kesäkuuta – Andrea Sacchi, italialainen taidemaalari (s. 1599)
 3. heinäkuuta – Johan Rosenhane, ruotsalainen valtaneuvos, vapaaherra ja maaherra (s. 1611)
 16. elokuuta – Thomas Fuller, englantilainen saarnaaja ja historioitsija (s. 1608)
 29. elokuuta – Louis Couperin, ranskalainen säveltäjä ja cembalisti (s. 1626)
 16. lokakuuta – Amico Panici, italialainen katolinen piispa (s. 1599)
 16. marraskuuta – João Lourenço Rebelo, portugalilainen säveltäjä (s. 1610)
 19. marraskuuta – Lars Kagg, ruotsalainen kreivi ja sotamarsalkka (s. 1595)
 syyskuussa – Girard Desargues, ranskalainen arkkitehti, sotilasinsinööri ja matemaatikko (s. 1591)
 Jan Gerritsz van Bronckhorst, alankomaalainen taidemaalari (s. 1603)
 Elie Diodati, ranskalainen poliitikko ja libertiini (s. 1576)
 Vasile Lupu, Moldavian ruhtinas 1634–1653 (s. 1595)
 Boris Morozov, venäläinen pajari ja poliitikko (s. 1590)
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Ellis Rimmer (2 January 1907 – 16 March 1965) was an English professional footballer who played for Tranmere Rovers, Sheffield Wednesday and Ipswich Town. He was a left winger who was quite tall and scored his fair share of headed goals. His career lasted from 1924 until 1939 during which time he played 447 league games, scoring 142 goals, he also played for the England national football team on four occasions. He was also a talented musician and often played piano at public appearances.
 Playing career
 Early days
 Rimmer was born in Birkenhead on 2 January 1907, he played as an amateur for Parkside, Northern Nomads and Whitchurch before signing as a professional for Tranmere Rovers as a 17-year-old in 1924. In his three seasons with Tranmere, Rimmer played briefly with football legends Dixie Dean and Tom 'Pongo' Waring, making 62 league appearances and scoring 20 goals. His good form alerted other clubs and in February 1928 he was signed by Sheffield Wednesday manager Bob Brown for a fee of £3,000.
 Sheffield Wednesday
 Sheffield Wednesday were in a grave situation when Rimmer signed for them, they were seven points adrift at the foot of Division One. However Rimmer, who made his Wednesday debut on 25 February 1928 against Newcastle United, was to take part in what has gone down in Sheffield Wednesday history as the "Great Escape" as they picked up 17 points from a possible 20 in their last 10 matches to avoid relegation by a single point. The following two seasons saw Wednesday transformed from relegation strugglers to league winners as they lifted the Division One title in 1928–29 and 1929–30 with Rimmer a virtual ever present on the left wing. He played in Sheffield Wednesday's 2–1 defeat by Arsenal in the Charity Shield at Stamford Bridge in October 1930.
 In April 1930 he was called up by England for his first international cap, scoring twice in a 5–2 victory over Scotland in the 1930 British Home Championship. Three other Wednesday players Bill Marsden, Alf Strange and Ernie Blenkinsop all played in that match. Rimmer played a further three international matches, his last being just before his 25th birthday in December 1931 against Spain.
 The first two full seasons of the 1930s saw Rimmer net 24 and 23 goals respectively, an excellent effort for a winger whose main job was to provide chances for other players. The 1934–35 season was probably his most memorable as Wednesday lifted the FA Cup with Rimmer netting two late goals in the final against West Bromwich Albion. He scored eight FA Cup goals in total that season and achieved the rare feat of scoring in every round, only twelve players have managed this in the history of English football. He also scored 18 league goals to give him a best ever season tally of 26 and finished as Wednesday's top scorer. He continued to be a regular for Wednesday until March 1938 when Bill Fallon took his place on the left wing. In his 10-year career with Sheffield Wednesday, Rimmer played 418 games in all competitions, scoring 140 goals.
 Latter career and retirement
 Rimmer was transferred to Division Three South team Ipswich Town in August 1938, making his debut against Cardiff City on 10 September 1938. He only made four appearances for Ipswich before deciding to retire in January 1939 after playing his last match against Northampton Town in a Southern Section Cup tie.
 After retirement Rimmer ran The Hallamshire House, a public house in Sheffield and then in Formby, Merseyside. He died in Formby on 16 March 1965, aged 58.
 Honours
 Sheffield Wednesday
 Football League First Division winner 1928–29, 1929–30
 FA Cup winner: 1935
 Charity Shield winner 1935
 References
 1907 births
 Sportspeople from Birkenhead
 1965 deaths
 Tranmere Rovers F.C. players
 Sheffield Wednesday F.C. players
 Ipswich Town F.C. players
 English footballers
 England international footballers
 Association football forwards
 Northern Nomads F.C. players
 FA Cup Final players