jurisdiction: US

text: b'DOE/IG-0483\n\n\n\n\n AUDIT IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL\n DECISION DIRECTIVE 63, CRITICAL\n REPORT INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION\n\n\n\n\n SEPTEMBER 2000\n\n\n\n\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICES\n\x0c September 22, 2000\n\n\n\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY\n\nFROM: Gregory H. Friedman (Signed)\n Inspector General\n\nSUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on the Department\'s "Implementation of\n Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection"\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nIn 1997, a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection concluded that the\nnational critical infrastructures \xe2\x80\x93 energy, banking, transportation, vital human services, and\ntelecommunications \xe2\x80\x93 were vulnerable to attack through the malicious use of commonly available\ntools. On May 22, 1998, as a result of the Commission\'s findings, the President issued\nPresidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure Protection. PDD 63\nrequired Federal agencies to take action to eliminate significant vulnerabilities, especially\ncyber-related, and to assure the continuity and viability of the nation\'s critical infrastructures.\n\nUnder PDD 63 the Department of Energy (Department) is required to develop and implement a\nnumber of infrastructure protective measures. Specifically, the Department was required to:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Develop and implement an internal plan for protecting its critical infrastructure assets\n by May 22, 2000; and,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Coordinate external energy sector infrastructure protection activities by aiding private\n sector electric power and petroleum entities in assessing their vulnerabilities to cyber\n and physical attack, recommending plans to eliminate vulnerabilities, and proposing a\n system for identifying and preventing attacks.\n\nThe objective of our audit was to determine whether the Department\'s implementation of\nPDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, was achieving its intended purpose.\n\nRESULTS OF AUDIT\n\nThe audit disclosed that the Department had not implemented its critical infrastructure protection\nplan to mitigate significant vulnerabilities, or assure the continuity and viability of its critical\ninfrastructures. While external energy sector infrastructure protection activities were progressing\nand a number of internal and collateral actions had been completed, actions had not progressed to\n\x0c -2-\n\n\nthe point where the objectives of PDD 63 were being accomplished. For example:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Planning and assessment activities required by PDD 63, such as critical asset\n identification, vulnerability assessments, and corrective action plans remained\n incomplete; and,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 PDD 63 implementation efforts had not been given sufficient management attention\n or priority. Implementation efforts were hampered by a lack of specific\n Departmental plans, performance measures, and goals.\n\nThe Department\'s progress to date in fully implementing and executing PDD 63 increases the\nrisk of malicious damage to its cyber-related critical infrastructure that could adversely impact\nthe Department\'s ability to protect critical assets and deliver essential services. National goals\nfor achieving an initial protection capability by the end of 2000 and a fully functional\ninfrastructure protection program by 2003 may also be adversely impacted.\n\nMANAGEMENT REACTION\n\nWe recommended a series of actions to help ensure that future efforts to protect the\nDepartment\'s critical infrastructures are successful. Management concurred with the finding\nand recommendations.\n\nAttachment\n\ncc: Deputy Secretary\n Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment\n Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator for Nuclear Security\n Chief Information Officer\n Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations\n\x0cImplementation of Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical\nInfrastructure Protection\n\nTABLE OF\nCONTENTS\n\n\n\n Overview\n\n Introduction and Objective ..........................................................1\n\n Conclusions and Observations............................................\xe2\x80\xa6....2\n\n\n Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical\n Infrastructure Protection\n\n Details of Finding.......................................................................3\n\n Recommendations and Comments ...........................................8\n\n\n Appendices\n\n 1. Examples of Potential Cyber-based Critical\n Infrastructure Assets .............................................................9\n\n 2. Scope and Methodology ............... ...............................\xe2\x80\xa6...10\n\n 3. Prior Reports\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa611\n\n 4. Management Comments\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa6\xe2\x80\xa612\n\x0cOverview\n\nINTRODUCTION AND In 1997, a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection\nOBJECTIVE concluded that the national critical infrastructures \xe2\x80\x93 energy, banking,\n transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications \xe2\x80\x93 must be\n viewed in a new context in the information age. The linkages resulting\n from the integration of telecommunications and computer systems have\n created a new dimension of vulnerability that poses an unprecedented\n national risk. Our infrastructures can now be attacked and damaged\n through the malicious use of commonly available tools.\n\n As a result of the Commission\'s findings, the President issued\n Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure\n Protection, on May 22, 1998. PDD 63 required Federal agencies to\n take action to eliminate significant vulnerabilities, especially cyber-\n related, and to assure the continuity and viability of the nation\'s critical\n infrastructures. The President also set two national infrastructure\n protection goals. First, an initial operating capability for infrastructure\n protection is to be achieved by the end of 2000. Second, by May 2003,\n the United States is to have established the ability to protect its critical\n infrastructures from intentional acts that could diminish the abilities of:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Federal government to perform essential national security\n missions and ensure the general public health and safety;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 State and local governments to maintain order and to deliver\n minimum essential public services; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the\n economy and delivery of essential telecommunications, energy,\n financial, and transportation services.\n\n PDD 63 required the Department of Energy (Department) to develop\n and implement internal and external protective measures. Internally,\n the Department was required to develop and implement a plan for\n protecting its critical infrastructure assets, including appointment of\n responsible officials, by May 22, 2000. Externally, the Department was\n required to coordinate energy sector infrastructure protection activities\n by serving as the Federal government\'s liaison with private industry on\n issues related to protecting electric power and petroleum production and\n storage assets. Specifically, the Department was required to aid private\n sector entities in assessing their vulnerabilities to cyber and physical\n attack, to recommend plans to eliminate vulnerabilities, and to propose\n a system for identifying and preventing attacks.\n\n\n\nPage 1 Introduction and Objective\n\x0c The objective of our audit was to determine whether the Department\'s\n implementation of PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, was\n achieving its intended purpose.\n\n\nCONCLUSION AND While external energy sector infrastructure protection activities were\nOBSERVATIONS progressing and a number of internal and collateral actions had been\n completed, the Department had not implemented its critical\n infrastructure protection plan to mitigate significant vulnerabilities, or\n assure the continuity and viability of its critical infrastructures.\n Therefore, the Department could not achieve the purpose of PDD 63.\n Planning and assessment activities required by PDD 63, such as critical\n asset identification, vulnerability assessments, and corrective action\n plans remained incomplete. Required actions were not completed\n because the Department had not given PDD 63 implementation efforts\n sufficient management attention or priority. For instance, a lack of\n specific plans, performance measures, and goals negatively impacted\n implementation efforts. The Department\'s lack of progress in\n implementing PDD 63 increases the risk of malicious damage to its\n cyber-related critical infrastructure that could adversely impact the\n Department\'s ability to protect critical assets and deliver essential\n services. National goals for achieving an initial protection capability by\n the end of 2000 and a fully functional infrastructure protection program\n by 2003 may also be adversely impacted.\n\n In our opinion, the audit identified issues that management should\n consider when preparing its year-end assurance memorandum on\n management controls.\n\n\n\n ______Signed___________\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\n\n\nPage 2 Conclusions and\n Observations\n\x0cInfrastructure Protection\n\nCritical Infrastructure The Department had not implemented its Critical Infrastructure\nProtection Efforts Not Protection Plan (CIPP) to mitigate significant vulnerabilities or assure\nComplete the continuity and viability of its critical infrastructures. Specifically,\n the Department\'s plan had not been amended to correct deficiencies in\n the areas of threat analysis and emergency planning disclosed by an\n external expert review. Also, the Department had not completed\n internal infrastructure protection assessment activities such as critical\n asset identification, vulnerability assessments, or the preparation of\n corrective action plans and did not meet established milestones. Even\n though the Department had not achieved the intended purpose of\n PDD 63, it had made progress in completing certain preliminary\n actions, external coordination activities, and several collateral efforts.\n\n Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan\n\n While a significant amount of effort was initially devoted to the\n preparation of its overall CIPP, the Department had not completed\n action to correct plan deficiencies reported by an expert review team.\n The initial plan described the Department\'s overall methodology for\n identifying critical assets and performing vulnerability assessments.\n The plan also established milestones for completing these tasks.\n However, a subsequent expert review of the plan found that it lacked\n detail in several areas. The review team indicated that the plan did not\n include sufficient detail in the threat analysis and emergency planning\n areas. Despite guidance by the review team, the Department did not\n take action to revise its CIPP to address the team\'s findings. According\n to an official with the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office\n (CIAO), the Department was one of only three Federal agencies that\n had not submitted a revised CIPP incorporating the expert review\n team\'s comments.\n\n Critical Infrastructure Assessment Activities and Milestones\n\n The Department also had not completed the critical asset identification\n process essential for successful implementation of PDD 63. Although\n the Department\'s CIPP required that the process be completed and a\n report submitted to the Under Secretary by March 1999, little progress\n had been made. The Department had not completed the process of\n evaluating infrastructure assets based on their ability to impact national\n security, public safety and health, national economic security, or the\n ability to satisfy internal management and administrative functions.\n Lack of progress in this area prompted the National CIAO to offer the\n Department assistance with the identification process. While the\n\n\n\nPage 3 Details of Findings\n\x0c Department had agreed to accept the offer, no target completion dates\n or performance goals for the task had been established.\n\n The Department did not achieve established milestones for completing\n vulnerability assessments or developing corrective action plans. As\n with critical asset identification, these activities were specifically\n required by the Department\'s implementation plan and are essential for\n successful implementation of PDD 63. For instance, the results of\n specific vulnerability assessments, based on a Departmental threat\n statement, should have been provided to the Under Secretary in\n February 2000. Also, summaries of all corrective action plans\n developed to mitigate identified vulnerabilities should have been\n provided to the Under Secretary by March 2000.\n\n Department\'s Progress\n\n While the Department had not been successful in satisfying internal\n planning and implementation requirements, it had completed a number\n of preliminary activities. During early stages of its implementation\n efforts, for instance, the Department established a critical infrastructure\n protection task force to begin the process of developing a means of\n protecting its own assets. In addition, it assigned the Chief Information\n Officer responsibility for information assurance and the Chief\n Infrastructure Assurance Officer responsibility for protecting physical\n assets. Overall programmatic responsibility for PDD 63\n implementation was also consolidated under the Office of Security and\n Emergency Operations.\n\n The Department had made progress in fulfilling its responsibilities for\n coordinating energy sector infrastructure protection activities. Overall,\n activities associated with protecting critical private sector utility and\n petroleum industry assets were progressing. The Office of Critical\n Infrastructure Protection (OCIP), under the Office of Security and\n Emergency Operations, is working with private sector entities on issues\n related to protecting critical industry assets. Since its creation, the\n OCIP submitted detailed budget requests and developed comprehensive\n action plans for identifying and mitigating private sector vulnerabilities.\n Additionally, OCIP is tracking the progress of discrete tasks, such as\n vulnerability assessments, and appears to be making progress toward\n achieving established milestones.\n\n The Department was involved with or had completed several collateral\n initiatives that should facilitate but not replace PDD 63 implementation.\n The Department focused on these exigent issues and delayed\n\nPage 4 Details of Finding\n\x0c implementation efforts accordingly. Specifically, the Department had\n been immersed in a complex-wide effort to improve cyber security.\n This effort began in late 1999 and was steadily progressing. The Year\n 2000 Computer Remediation effort, with the attendant identification of\n mission essential or critical information systems, was also recently\n completed. Based on the success of the Year 2000 effort, the\n Department was able to make the new year rollover without major\n difficulty.\n\n While the Department\'s on-going initiative to improve cyber security\n had achieved a number of successes, that program, standing alone, is\n insufficient to satisfy the mandate of PDD 63. As we pointed out in our\n recent report on Audit of Unclassified Computer Network Security at\n Selected Field Sites (DOE/IG-0459, February 2000), the Department\n had begun an effort to mitigate long-standing network vulnerabilities\n and improve the overall cyber security climate. Such actions, while\n noteworthy, should be viewed as a foundation rather than as a substitute\n for the comprehensive vulnerability assessment process envisioned by\n PDD 63. For instance, vulnerability tests conducted in connection with\n the cyber security initiative were limited in scope, and may not satisfy\n PDD 63 requirements to evaluate the interdependencies between\n Departmental systems as well as external infrastructures such as\n telecommunications, power, and transportation.\n\n The Department also had not taken advantage of the systems listing\n prepared in support of the Year 2000 remediation program to reduce the\n PDD 63 implementation burden. Although this listing of critical\n information systems cannot be substituted for the specific asset\n identification process required by PDD 63, the Department may be able\n to leverage such information to facilitate implementation efforts. For\n instance, based on our preliminary analysis, we identified some\n noteworthy examples of systems that the Department should consider as\n critical infrastructure assets (see Appendix 1 of this report). Such\n Departmental systems, if compromised, could negatively impact\n national security, public safety and health, economic security, or the\n Department\'s ability to satisfy internal administrative and management\n functions.\n\n\nImplementation To accomplish its stated purpose, PDD 63 identified a series of specific\nRequirements actions Federal agencies were required to perform. For example, the\n Department was required to develop and fully implement a plan for\n protecting its critical computer ("cyber-based") and physical assets by\n\n\n\nPage 5 Details of Finding\n\x0c May 22, 2000. Federal agencies were also required to subject their\n infrastructure protection plans to an expert review process sponsored by\n the National Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. An important\n intention of PDD 63 was for Federal agencies to provide the private\n sector with a model on how to best protect national critical\n infrastructure assets.\n\n In addition to satisfying internal infrastructure protection requirements,\n the Department was also charged with the responsibility for\n coordinating energy sector activities. Specifically, the Department was\n assigned the responsibility for serving as the Federal government\'s\n liaison to private industry on issues related to protecting electric power\n and petroleum production and storage assets. This responsibility\n required the Department to aid private sector entities in assessing their\n vulnerabilities to cyber and physical attack, to recommend plans to\n eliminate vulnerabilities, and to propose a system for identifying and\n preventing attacks.\n\n\nInternal Implementation While the Department had embarked on a major effort designed to\nEfforts Have Not Been improve cyber security and sustainability of cyber-related critical\nGiven Sufficient Attention infrastructures, it had not given sufficient attention or priority to PDD\nor Priority 63 implementation. Specific performance measures or goals had not\n been established, detailed funding plans had not been prepared and\n resources needed for implementation had not been identified.\n Competing priorities and organization changes also detracted from\n implementation efforts.\n\n Lack of Performance Measures or Goals\n\n The Department did not develop specific performance measures or\n goals, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act, to\n guide PDD 63 implementation efforts. For instance, our analysis of the\n Department\'s Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 Performance Agreement disclosed\n that infrastructure protection activities were assigned to the Office of\n Nonproliferation and National Security even though the CIPP divided\n critical asset protection responsibilities between the Department\'s Chief\n Information Officer and the Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer.\n Additionally, the Department\'s FY 2000 and FY 2001 Performance\n Plans did not contain specific measures or goals for completing critical\n infrastructure protection activities.\n\n\n\n\nPage 6 Details of Finding\n\x0c Funding and Resource Plans\n\n Detailed resource and funding plans identifying all critical\n infrastructure protection tasks also had not been prepared. While the\n Department formulated detailed tasks for assisting external entities with\n critical infrastructure protection activities, internal implementation\n plans had not been developed. Resource plans identifying requirements\n such as personnel, facilities and training necessary for implementation\n had not been prepared. The Department\'s budget requests for FY\'s\n 1999, 2000, and 2001 also did not seek specific funding for internal\n critical infrastructure protection efforts. Furthermore, budget\n submissions for cyber security for those same years did not specifically\n identify funding for completing internal infrastructure protection tasks\n such as critical asset identification, vulnerability assessments, or\n corrective action plans. In contrast, the Department budgeted\n $2.1 million and $13 million for FY\'s 2000 and 2001, respectively, for\n external critical infrastructure protection efforts.\n\n Organizational Focus\n\n Organizational challenges impacted the Department\'s critical\n infrastructure protection efforts. The Office of the Chief Information\n Officer indicated that the Department had elected to focus on exigent\n problems in the cyber security area rather than on completing PDD 63\n planning and assessment activities. Other officials from the Office of\n Security and Emergency Operations also indicated that PDD 63\n implementation efforts had been delayed due to competing priorities\n such as Year 2000 remediation efforts and reorganizations within the\n Department.\n\n\nImplementation The Department\'s lack of progress in implementing PDD 63 increases\nShortcomings Could the risk of malicious damage to its cyber-related critical infrastructure\nImpact Departmental and that could adversely impact the Department\'s ability to protect critical\nNational Systems assets and deliver essential services. Without the benefit of critical\n asset identification, vulnerability assessments, and corrective actions,\n the Department may not be able to swiftly eliminate any significant\n vulnerability to cyber attacks or ensure that any interruption or\n manipulation of cyber assets will be brief, infrequent, manageable, and\n minimally detrimental. Such protection efforts are necessary not only\n to ensure the Department\'s ability to perform national missions, deliver\n essential services, and ensure public safety and health but also for\n achievement of principal PDD 63 objectives.\n\n\nPage 7 Details of Finding\n\x0c Furthermore, the Department\'s overall lack of progress in\n implementing its CIPP may impact national goals. Without\n Departmental improvements, the national goals of realizing an initial\n infrastructure protection capability by the end of year 2000, and\n developing a fully functional critical infrastructure protection\n program by year 2003 may not be achieved. Additionally, other\n Federal agencies that rely on the Department for services or\n information may be unable to complete their critical infrastructure\n protection efforts until the Department\'s implementation efforts are\n complete. For example, the Department of Defense and the Nuclear\n Regulatory Commission rely on a Departmental nuclear material\n accountability system and may be adversely affected by the\n Department\'s lack of progress.\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Director, Office of Security and Emergency\n Operations take the following actions to facilitate PDD 63\n implementation:\n\n 1. Revise the Department\'s CIPP to include expert review\n team comments and new implementation milestones;\n\n 2. Prepare a detailed, comprehensive resource plan for all\n critical infrastructure protection efforts;\n\n 3. Reallocate budgetary resources and/or seek additional\n funds to satisfy critical infrastructure protection\n requirements; and\n\n 4. Establish specific critical infrastructure protection\n performance measures, based on revised CIPP milestones,\n and include them in the Department\'s annual performance\n plans.\n\nMANAGEMENT REACTIONS Management concurred with the finding and recommendations.\n (Management\'s comments are included in their entirety in\n Appendix 4).\n\n\nAUDITOR COMMENTS Management\'s actions are responsive to our recommendations.\n\n\n\n\nPage 8 Recommendations and Comments\n\x0cAppendix 1\n\n\n EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL CYBER-BASED\n CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSETS\n\n\n\n\n Focus Area System Name Responsible Organization\n National Security Nuclear Materials Management and Security and Emergency\n Safeguards System Operations\n Nuclear Material Inventory System Defense Programs\n at Los Alamos\n SECOM Tracking System Defense Programs\n Safety and Health Defense Waste Processing Facility Environmental Management\n Process Control Systems at Savannah\n River\n Tank Monitoring and Control Environmental Management\n System at Hanford\n Economy Supervisory Control and Data Bonneville Power\n Acquisition System Administration\n Supervisory Control and Data Western Area Power\n Acquisition Energy Management Administration\n System\n Agency Operations Corporate Human Resource Management and Administration\n Information System\n Departmental Integrated Standardized Core Chief Financial Officer\n Accounting System\n\n\n\n\nPage 9 Critical Infrastructure Assets\n\x0cAppendix 2\n\nSCOPE The audit was performed between January and July 2000 at Department\n Headquarters in Washington, DC. We conducted our audit, in part, to\n support a President\'s Council on Integrity and Efficiency initiative to\n review Federal government-wide PDD 63 implementation efforts. The\n scope of the audit work was primarily limited to reviewing plans and\n specific actions taken by the Department to identify and protect cyber-\n based critical infrastructure assets for compliance with PDD 63.\n\n\nMETHODOLOGY To satisfy the audit objective, we:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed applicable directives and guidance, such as\n Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure\n Protection, dated May 22, 1998, and the Government\n Performance and Results Act of 1993.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Analyzed the Department\'s November 18, 1998, Critical\n Infrastructure Protection Plan.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Analyzed Departmental budget requests and performance\n plans for information related to critical infrastructure\n protection efforts.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Reviewed the conclusions reached by an independent expert\n review team from the National Critical Infrastructure\n Assurance Office.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Held discussions with management officials from the Offices\n of Security and Emergency Operations, Chief Information\n Officer, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and the National\n Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.\n\n The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted\n Government auditing standards for performance audits and included\n tests of internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations to\n the extent necessary to satisfy the audit objective. Because our review\n was limited, it would not necessarily have disclosed all internal control\n deficiencies that may have existed. Also, we did not rely on computer-\n processed data to accomplish our audit objective. An exit conference\n was held with the Office of Security and Emergency Operations on\n July 6, 2000.\n\n\n\n\nPage 10 Scope and Methodology\n\x0cAppendix 3\n\n RELATED OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND\n GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Audit of Departmental Integrated Standardized Core Accounting System (DISCAS) Operations at\n Selected Field Sites, (AP-FS-97-02, June 1997). The report pointed out that some weaknesses existed in\n the general and application controls for DISCAS that could adversely affect the reliability of data\n processed through the system.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Audit of the ADP General Controls at Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory\n (CR-FS-L-98-01, February 1998). The report stated that, although general controls had been\n established for ensuring that application controls could not be rendered ineffective by circumvention or\n modification, further enhancements were needed to ensure proper security over sensitive computer\n systems and data.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Audit of the ADP General Controls at Oak Ridge Complex, (CR-FS-L-98-02, February 1998). The\n report stated that, although general controls had been established for ensuring that application controls\n could not be rendered ineffective by circumvention or modification, further enhancements were needed\n to ensure proper security over computer systems and data.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Report on Critical Infrastructure Protection \xe2\x80\x93 Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000\n Experiences, United States General Accounting Office (GAO), (GAO/AIMD-00-1, October 1999). The\n report stated that our nation\'s computer based critical infrastructures are at increasing risk of severe\n disruption. The report pointed out that, in the Federal government, these risks are not being adequately\n addressed, and that tests and evaluations show that Federal systems are not being effectively protected,\n even though these systems process, store, and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive data and are\n indispensable to agency operations. GAO concluded that it is important that the Federal government\n take advantage of experience gained in addressing the Year 2000 challenge as it strives to reduce the\n risk associated with longer term threats to critical infrastructures.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Audit of Unclassified Computer Network Security at Selected Field Sites, (DOE/IG-0459, February\n 2000). The report disclosed that six Departmental sites had significant internal or external weaknesses\n that increased the risk that their unclassified computer networks could be damaged by malicious attack.\n The OIG pointed out the need for correcting vulnerabilities found and establishing specific goals and\n performance measures for improving the level of unclassified computer security relating to network\n operations.\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 Information Security: Vulnerabilities in DOE\'s Systems for Unclassified Civilian Research, United\n States General Accounting Office (GAO), (GAO/AIMD-00-140, June 2000). The report stated that\n unclassified information systems for scientific research are not consistently protected at all DOE\n laboratories. GAO recommended that the Secretary take immediate steps to strengthen information\n technology security management at DOE laboratories.\n\n\n\nPage 11 Prior Reports\n\x0cAppendix 4\n\n\n\n\nPage 12 Management Comments\n\x0cPage 13 Management Comments\n\x0cPage 14 Management Comments\n\x0cPage 15 Management Comments\n\x0cPage 16 Management Comments\n\x0c IG Report No. : DOE/IG-0483\n\n CUSTOMER RESPONSE FORM\n\n\nThe Office of Inspector General has a continuing interest in improving the usefulness of its products. We\nwish to make our reports as responsive as possible to our customers\' requirements, and, therefore, ask that\nyou consider sharing your thoughts with us. On the back of this form, you may suggest improvements to\nenhance the effectiveness of future reports. Please include answers to the following questions if they are\napplicable to you:\n\n1. What additional background information about the selection, scheduling, scope, or procedures of the\n audit would have been helpful to the reader in understanding this report?\n\n2. What additional information related to findings and recommendations could have been included in this\n report to assist management in implementing corrective actions?\n\n3. What format, stylistic, or organizational changes might have made this report\'s overall message more\n clear to the reader?\n\n4. What additional actions could the Office of Inspector General have taken on the issues discussed in this\n report which would have been helpful?\n\nPlease include your name and telephone number so that we may contact you should we have any questions\nabout your comments.\n\nName _____________________________ Date __________________________\n\nTelephone _________________________ Organization ____________________\n\nWhen you have completed this form, you may telefax it to the Office of Inspector General at (202) 586-\n0948, or you may mail it to:\n\n Office of Inspector General (IG-1)\n Department of Energy\n Washington, DC 20585\n\n ATTN: Customer Relations\n\nIf you wish to discuss this report or your comments with a staff member of the Office of Inspector General,\nplease contact Wilma Slaughter at (202) 586-1924.\n\x0cThe Office of Inspector General wants to make the distribution of its reports as customer friendly and cost\n effective as possible. Therefore, this report will be available electronically through the Internet at the\n following alternative address:\n\n\n Department of EnergyOffice of Inspector General, Home Page\n http://www.ig.doe.gov\n\n\n Your comments would be appreciated and can be provided on the\n Customer Response Form attached to the report.\n\x0c'


type: caselaw

text:
 209 Md. 413 (1956)
 121 A.2d 185
 MOWER
 v.
 MOWER
 [No. 119, October Term, 1955.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 16, 1956.
 The cause was argued before BRUNE, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.
 Irvin S. Friedman, with whom was Sheldon A. Rubenstein on the brief, for appellant.
 Morton H. Perry for appellee.
 DELAPLAINE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 This suit was instituted in the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City by Irene H. Mower against her husband, Nathan Mower, to obtain (1) a divorce a mensa et thoro, (2) alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony, (3) custody of their minor son and payments for his support and maintenance, and (4) counsel fee for her attorney.
 *416 The parties were married in Baltimore in February, 1940, and lived together for more than 14 years. At the time of the institution of the suit on September 14, 1954, and even at the time of the trial the parties were both residing in the house owned by complainant on Jonquil Avenue. Their son, who is over 11 years old, is mentally retarded and at the time of the trial was in the Rosewood State Training School in Baltimore County.
 Complainant sought a divorce on the ground that her husband abandoned her bedroom on August 1, 1954. She complained that her husband "just picked himself up and walked out of the bedroom and took up sleeping quarters in the living room on the first floor."
 Complainant's only witness was her niece, Mrs. Peggy Toback, who resides on Reisterstown Road, but who had been a frequent visitor in the home. Mrs. Toback testified that her aunt told her that she had tried "the best she could" to get along with defendant but that he was "a pretty cold person, and it was very difficult to live with him." She also testified that defendant told her that he had been sleeping on the first floor, and that "things had gone too far for reconciliation," but she added that he never gave any reason for leaving the bedroom.
 Defendant testified that the reason why he was sleeping downstairs was that his wife made him nervous. He specifically complained that she had made it unpleasant for him when they were lying in bed by telling how wonderful other husbands were. He swore that he had no intention of returning to the bedroom. His explanation was: "You can't return to something where circumstances are so unpleasant that you can't lie in bed."
 Defendant further testified that in 1953, after they had been living together for 13 years, they consulted attorneys and effected a reconciliation. Soon afterwards, however, the marriage began to deteriorate again. Finally on August 1, 1954, defendant left the bedroom and slept thereafter on the sofa in the living room. Complainant did not provide any meals for her husband. Both got their meals elsewhere. They seldom spoke to *417 each other. Neither made any further effort toward reconciliation. After the trial defendant moved out of the house.
 On December 30, 1954, the Court ordered defendant to pay the sum of $6 per week to complainant as alimony pendente lite.
 The chancellor doubted the story that the husband slept on the first floor. However, he was of the opinion that both parties were at fault, and that consequently neither party was entitled to a divorce. On June 28, 1955, he passed an order dismissing the bill of complaint, and directing defendant to pay to complainant's attorney the sum of $75 as counsel fee. Complainant appealed from that order.
 The Maryland chancery statute provides that divorces a mensa et thoro may be decreed for the following causes: (1) cruelty of treatment, (2) excessively vicious conduct, and (3) abandonment and desertion. Code 1951, art. 16, sec. 34. In order to constitute abandonment and desertion as a ground for divorce, there must be a voluntary separation of one spouse from the other, or the refusal to renew a suspended cohabitation, without justification either in the wrongful conduct or the consent of the other. Crumlick v. Crumlick, 164 Md. 381, 165 A. 189; Miller v. Miller, 185 Md. 79, 84, 42 A.2d 915.
 It is unquestionably the law in this State that permanent refusal of either the husband or the wife to have sexual intercourse with the other spouse, from no consideration of health or other good reason, constitutes matrimonial desertion although the parties continue to live in the same house. Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889; Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312, 46 A.2d 617; Kelsey v. Kelsey, 186 Md. 324, 326, 46 A.2d 627; Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 290, 291, 89 A.2d 609; Lent v. Lent, 202 Md. 240, 244, 96 A.2d 14. It is understood, of course, that the mere fact that a husband ceases to occupy the room in which he and his wife have been accustomed to sleep and thereafter occupies alone another room in the house is not necessarily a withdrawal of marital right *418 from the wife which constitutes desertion within the meaning of the statute. It is only where it is without good reason that the husband leaves his wife and permanently refuses to have intercourse with her that the occupancy of another room constitutes desertion as a ground for divorce. Ruckle v. Ruckle, 141 Md. 207, 118 A. 472; Wysocki v. Wysocki, 185 Md. 38, 41, 42 A.2d 909; Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312, 46 A.2d 617. Moreover, the law is clear that the complainant who seeks a divorce has the burden of proving the allegation that the defendant refused to fulfill the marital duty. Owings v. Owings, 148 Md. 124, 128 A. 748; Lent v. Lent, 202 Md. 240, 245, 96 A.2d 14.
 In the case before us it was undisputed that on August 1, 1954, defendant left the bedroom where he and his wife had been sleeping together for some years, and that he did not sleep on the second floor at any time thereafter. It was virtually conceded that the marital relation terminated at that time, although the parties continued to live under the same roof. Defendant had no excuse for his retreat from the bedroom, except his complaint that his wife talked too much and nagged him. Such a complaint did not justify him in terminating the marital relation. This Court has repeatedly stated that the law of Maryland does not countenance the separation of a husband and wife except for grave and weighty causes, and that nagging and even the use of vulgar and abusive language do not amount to such conduct as will justify one spouse in deserting the other. No misconduct of the wife will justify her husband in deserting her unless it becomes impossible for him to continue to live with her without loss of his health or self-respect, or there is reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or suffering. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 158 Md. 80, 148 A. 259; Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 189 Md. 322, 55 A.2d 719; Gold v. Gold, 191 Md. 533, 539, 62 A.2d 540; Smith v. Smith, 196 Md. 219, 76 A.2d 160. Accordingly in this case defendant did not ask for or receive any affirmative relief.
 *419 It is likewise clear that complainant is not entitled to a divorce. She did not claim that she asked for sexual intercourse and that her husband refused her. She admitted on the stand that she did not know any reason why her husband stopped sleeping with her. It is evident that she was satisfied with a termination of cohabitation. Even though living in the same house, they seldom spoke to each other. Neither party made any earnest effort to preserve the marriage. It was a clear case of incompatibility. It is a reasonable inference that complainant was satisfied to have her husband spend the nights on the first floor. She admitted that she told him that as long as they were not getting along, she wanted him to leave her alone. Where husband and wife were living under the same roof without marital cohabitation, and no gesture of conciliation or forgiveness was made by either, the only possible inference is that they both preferred to live in sullen hostility. Davey v. Davey, 202 Md. 428, 432, 96 A.2d 606. For these reasons we agree with the chancellor that neither party in this case was entitled to a divorce.
 However, complainant's bill prayed not only for a divorce and alimony, but also for custody of the minor child and payments for his support and maintenance. The Maryland statute now empowers the court of equity in any case in which the care and custody of the children of the parties forms a part of the relief prayed, whether a divorce is decreed or not, to order and direct who shall have the guardianship and custody of the children pendente lite or permanently, and be charged with their support and maintenance, and may at any time thereafter annul, vary or modify such order in relation to the children. Code 1951, art. 16, sec. 34; Bennett v. Bennett, 197 Md. 408, 79 A.2d 513, 29 A.L.R. 2d 467.
 We do not think the bill should have been dismissed. Where a bill for divorce a mensa et thoro also prays for custody of a minor child and for its support and maintenance, and the divorce is denied, the bill should not be dismissed but custody should be awarded and jurisdiction *420 should be retained for the purpose of awarding support and maintenance if the circumstances should warrant such action. Sause v. Sause, 192 Md. 88, 63 A.2d 632.
 Order affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case remanded, the costs to be paid by appellee.


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 14.4.2007
 PT
 Jornal Oficial da União Europeia
 C 82/4
 Acórdão do Tribunal de Justiça (Segunda Secção) de 15 de Fevereiro de 2007 (pedido de decisão prejudicial de Hof van beroep te Brussel — Bélgica) — BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy/Benelux-Merkenbureau
 (Processo C-239/05) (1)
 (Marcas - Directiva 89/104/CEE - Pedido de registo de uma marca para um conjunto de produtos e de serviços - Exame do sinal pela autoridade competente - Tomada em consideração de todos os factos e circunstâncias pertinentes - Competência de um órgão jurisdicional nacional para o qual é interposto recurso)
 (2007/C 82/06)
 Língua do processo: neerlandês
 Órgão jurisdicional de reenvio
 Hof van beroep te Brussel
 Partes no processo principal
 Recorrente: BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy
 Recorrido: Benelux-Merkenbureau
 Objecto
 Pedido de decisão prejudicial — Hof van Beroep te Brussel — Interpretação do artigo 3.o da Primeira Directiva 89/104/CEE do Conselho, de 21 de Dezembro de 1988, que harmoniza as legislações dos Estados-Membros em matéria de marcas (JO L 40, p. 1) — Pedido de registo da marca «The Kitchen Company »— Análise do sinal pela autoridade competente — Tomada em consideração de todos os factos e circunstâncias pertinentes Acórdão Koninklijke KPN Nederland
 Parte decisória
 A Primeira Directiva 89/104/CEE do Conselho, de 21 de Dezembro de 1988, que harmoniza as legislações dos Estados-Membros em matéria de marcas, deve ser interpretada no sentido de que:
 —
 quando a autoridade competente recusa o registo de uma marca, é obrigada a indicar na sua decisão a conclusão a que chegou relativamente a cada um dos produtos e dos serviços objecto do pedido de registo, independentemente da forma como este pedido foi formulado. No entanto, quando o mesmo motivo de recusa é oposto relativamente a uma categoria ou a um grupo de produtos ou de serviços, a autoridade competente pode limitar-se a uma fundamentação global relativamente a todos os produtos ou serviços em causa
 —
 não se opõe a uma legislação nacional que impede um órgão jurisdicional para o qual foi interposto recurso de uma decisão da autoridade competente de se pronunciar sobre o carácter distintivo da marca de forma separada relativamente a cada um dos produtos e dos serviços visados no pedido de registo, desde que nem essa decisão nem esse pedido tivessem por objecto categorias de produtos ou de serviços ou produtos ou serviços considerados separadamente;
 —
 não se opõe a uma legislação nacional que impede um órgão jurisdicional para o qual foi interposto recurso de uma decisão da autoridade competente de tomar em consideração factos e circunstâncias posteriores à data de adopção dessa decisão.
 (1) JO C 217, de 3.9.2005.


type: legislation

text:
 114 HR 1028 IH: Return of Certain Lands At Fort Wingate to The Original Inhabitants Act
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2015-02-24
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 I
 114th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 1028
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 February 24, 2015
 Mr. Pearce (for himself and Mr. Young of Alaska) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources
 A BILL
 To provide for the implementation of the negotiated property division regarding Former Fort Wingate
 Depot Activity in McKinley County, New Mexico, and for other purposes.
 1.Short titleThis Act may be cited as the Return of Certain Lands At Fort Wingate to The Original Inhabitants Act. 2.FindingsCongress finds the following:
 (1)In January 1993, the active mission of the Fort Wingate Activity Depot located in McKinley County, New Mexico (in this Act referred to as Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity), ceased, and the installation was closed pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100–526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
 (2)The lands occupied by the Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity were originally the ancestral lands of both the Zuni Tribe and Navajo Nation, as indicated by the ancestral history and large number of archaeological and cultural sites identified on the lands.
 (3)The Secretary of the Interior, with the support of the Zuni Tribe, the Navajo Nation, and other concerned parties, determined that upon completion of environmental remediation of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity, lands no longer needed by the Department of the Army would be transferred to the Secretary of the Interior and held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation.
 (4)On July 8, 2013, the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation, acting through the respective tribal leadership, who received authority from their tribal governments to enter into good faith discussions, and through their respective legal representatives, met in the Capitol office of Congressman Don Young, with Congressman Ben Ray Luján and Congressman Steve Pearce present, for final discussions to fairly divide Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity.
 (5)In the resulting discussions, the tribal leaders informally agreed to the property divisions reflected in the map titled Fort Wingate Depot Activity Negotiated Property Divisions July 2013 prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers (in this Act referred to as the Map), and the land division outlined in section 3 was created in consultation with the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation.
 (6)This Act achieves the goal of fairly dividing Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity for the benefit of the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation.
 3.Division and treatment of lands of former Fort Wingate Depot Activity, New Mexico, to benefit the
 Zuni Tribe and Navajo Nation
 (a)Immediate trust on behalf of Zuni Tribe; ExceptionSubject to valid existing rights and to easements reserved pursuant to section 4, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity depicted in blue on the Map and transferred to the Secretary of the Interior are to be held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior for the Zuni Tribe as part of the Zuni Reservation, unless the Zuni Tribe otherwise elects under subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (c)(3) to have the parcel conveyed to it in Restricted Fee Status.
 (b)Immediate trust on behalf of the Navajo Nation; ExceptionSubject to valid existing rights and to easements reserved pursuant to section 4, all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to the lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity depicted in blue on the Map and transferred to the Secretary of the Interior are to be held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior for the Navajo Nation as part of the Navajo Reservation, unless the Navajo Nation otherwise elects under subsection (c)(3) to have the parcel conveyed to it in Restricted Fee Status.
 (c)Subsequent transfer and trust; restricted fee status alternative
 (1)Transfer upon completion of remediationNot later than 60 days after the date on which the New Mexico Environmental Department certifies that remediation of a parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity has been completed consistent with section 5, the Secretary of the Army shall transfer administrative jurisdiction over the parcel to the Secretary of the Interior.
 (2)Notification of transferNot later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Interior assumes administrative jurisdiction over a parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity under paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Interior shall notify the Zuni Tribe and Navajo Nation of the transfer of administrative jurisdiction over the parcel.
 (3)Trust or restricted fee status
 (A)TrustExcept as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of the Interior shall hold each parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity transferred under paragraph (1) in trust—
 (i)for the Zuni Tribe, in the case of land depicted in blue on the Map; or (ii)for the Navajo Nation, in the case of land depicted in green on the Map.
 (B)Restricted fee status alternativeIn lieu of having a parcel of land held in trust under subparagraph (A), the Zuni Tribe, with respect to land depicted in blue on the Map, and the Navajo Nation, with respect to land depicted in green on the Map, may elect to have the Secretary of the Interior convey the parcel or any portion of the parcel to it in restricted fee status.
 (C)Notification of electionNot later than 45 days after the date on which the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation receives notice under paragraph (2) of the transfer of administrative jurisdiction over a parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity, the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation shall notify the Secretary of the Interior of an election under subparagraph (B) for conveyance of the parcel or any portion of the parcel in restricted fee status.
 (D)ConveyanceAs soon as practicable after receipt of a notice from the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation under subparagraph (C), but in no case later than 6 months after receipt of the notice, the Secretary of the Interior shall convey, in restricted fee status, the parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity covered by the notice to the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation, as the case may be.
 (E)Restricted fee status definedFor purposes of this Act only, the term restricted fee status, with respect to land conveyed under subparagraph (D), means that the land so conveyed— (i)shall be owned in fee by the Indian tribe to whom the land is conveyed;
 (ii)shall be part of the Indian tribe’s Reservation and expressly made subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian tribe;
 (iii)shall not be sold by the Indian tribe without the consent of Congress; (iv)shall not be subject to taxation by any government other than the government of the Indian tribe; and
 (v)shall not be subject to any provision of law providing for the review or approval by the Secretary of the Interior before an Indian tribe may use the land for any purpose, directly or through agreement with another party.
 (d)Survey and boundary requirements
 (1)In generalThe Secretary of the Interior shall— (A)provide for the survey of lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity taken into trust for the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation or conveyed in restricted fee status for the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation under subsection (a), (b), or (c); and
 (B)establish legal boundaries based on the Map as parcels are taken into trust or conveyed in restricted fee status.
 (2)ConsultationNot later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall consult with the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation to determine their priorities regarding the order in which parcels should be surveyed, and, to the greatest extent feasible, the Secretary shall follow these priorities.
 (e)Relation to certain regulationsPart 151 of title 25, Code of Federal Regulations, shall not apply to taking lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity into trust under subsection (a), (b), or (c).
 4.Retention of necessary easements and access
 (a)Easements for cleanup and remediationThe lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity held in trust or conveyed in restricted fee status pursuant to section 3 shall be subject to reservation by the United States of such easements as the Secretary of the Army determines are reasonably required to permit access to lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity for administrative, environmental cleanup, and environmental remediation purposes. The Secretary of the Army shall provide to the governments of the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation written copies of all easements reserved under this subsection.
 (b)Shared access
 (1)Parcel 1 shared cultural and religious accessIn the case of the lands of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity depicted as Parcel 1 on the Map, the lands shall be held in trust subject to a shared easement for cultural and religious purposes only. Both the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation shall have unhindered access to their respective cultural and religious sites within Parcel 1. Within 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation shall exchange detailed information to document the existence of cultural and religious sites within Parcel 1 for the purpose of carrying out this paragraph. The information shall also be provided to the Secretary of the Interior.
 (2)Other shared accessSubject to the written consent of both the Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation, the Secretary of the Interior may facilitate shared access to other lands held in trust or restricted fee status pursuant to section 3, including, but not limited to, religious and cultural sites.
 (c)I–40 Frontage road entranceThe access road for the Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity, which originates at the frontage road for Interstate 40 and leads to the parcel of the Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity depicted as administration area on the Map, shall be held in common by the Zuni Tribe and Navajo Nation to provide for equal access to Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity.
 (d)Department of Defense Access to Missile Defense Agency facilityLands held in trust or conveyed in Restricted Fee Status pursuant to section 3 shall be subject to easements reasonably required to permit access to the Missile Defense Agency facility as needed by the Department of Defense.
 5.Environmental remediation
 (a)Responsibility for cleanupNothing in this Act shall be construed as alleviating, altering, or affecting the responsibility of the United States for cleanup and remediation of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity according to the terms previously agreed to by the Secretary of the Army and the New Mexico Environment Department.
 (b)LiabilityNeither the Zuni Tribe nor the Navajo Nation shall be liable for any damages resulting from Department of the Army activities on Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity or the use by the Department of the Army of hazardous substances, toxic substances, heavy metals, explosives, pollutants, contaminants, waste or petroleum products, or any combination thereof, regardless of when the contamination is discovered or where it has spread.
 (c)Treatment of claims against tribes
 (1)In generalThe Zuni Tribe and the Navajo Nation shall be held harmless from any claim, suit, demand, judgment, cost, or fee arising from Department of the Army activities on or off the Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity site, or the prior use of hazardous substances, toxic substances, heavy metals, explosives, pollutants, contaminants, waste or petroleum products, or any combination thereof, regardless of when the contamination is discovered or where it has spread.
 (2)Notification requirementAfter a parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity has been transferred or conveyed under section 3, the Zuni Tribe or the Navajo Nation shall notify the Secretary of the Army of the existence or discovery of any contamination or hazardous material on the parcel.
 (d)Effect of environmental certificationCertification by the New Mexico Environment Department that a parcel of land of Former Fort Wingate Depot Activity has been fully remediated shall satisfy all Federal environmental requirements necessary for the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Interior to carry out their responsibilities to transfer or convey the parcel under section 3.


type: wikipedia

text:
(EPCI, ) ist der Oberbegriff für alle Arten von Gemeindeverbänden in Frankreich. Es gibt verschiedene Typen von EPCI, die sich durch den Umfang ihrer Kompetenzen sowie durch die Mindestzahl der vertretenen Einwohner unterscheiden. Seit dem Jahr 2013 ist jede französische Gemeinde gesetzlich verpflichtet, einem EPCI anzugehören. Seit 2014 werden die Gemeindeverbandsräte direkt vom Volk gewählt.
 Typen von Gemeindeverbänden
 Die verschiedenen Typen von EPCI sind im allgemeinen Gesetzbuch zu Gebietskörperschaften (, CGCT) festgelegt. Folgende Arten von Gemeindeverbänden gibt es:
 Syndicat de communes (seit 1890) mit verschiedenen Varianten, darunter dem Syndicat intercommunal à vocation multiple (SIVOM)
 Communauté de communes (seit 1992)
 Communauté urbaine (seit 1966)
 Communauté d’agglomération (seit 1999)
 Syndicat d’agglomération nouvelle (seit 1983)
 Métropole (seit 2010, maßgeblich verändert im Jahr 2014)
 Établissement public territorial (seit 2016, zur Untergliederung der Métropole du Grand Paris)
 Die EPCI sind Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts. Sie sind eine Form von und damit anders als die Gemeinden, die sich in ihnen zusammenschließen, selbst keine eigenständigen Gebietskörperschaften (). Insbesondere sind ihre Kompetenzen damit auf diejenigen Gebiete begrenzt, die ihnen gesetzlich oder durch Vereinbarung zwischen den beteiligten Gemeinden zugewiesen sind.
 Mit dem Inkrafttreten einer Gesetzesänderung vom 27. Januar 2014 wurden diejenigen EPCI mit Steuerkompetenz, die mindestens 400.000 Einwohner in einem Ballungsraum von über 650.000 Einwohnern zählten, in Métropoles umgewandelt. Ausnahmen bildeten die Métropole du Grand Paris und die Métropole d’Aix-Marseille-Provence, die am 1. Januar 2016 gebildet werden sollten.
 Zahlen
 Zum 1. Januar 2018 gab es in Frankreich 1.240 EPCI (mit eigener Steuererhebung, d. h. ausgenommen die ), darunter 1000 , 206 , 23 und 11 . Zurzeit gibt es noch die vier Inseln Île-de-Bréhat, Île-de-Sein, Île d’Yeu und Ouessant die keiner EPCI angehören.
 Funktionsweise und Gremien
 Das beschlussfassende Organ eines EPCI ist das bzw. der (Verbandsrat). Dieses Gremium funktioniert im Wesentlichen wie ein Gemeinderat. Durch seine Beschlüsse erledigt es die Angelegenheiten, die in den Kompetenzbereich des EPCI fallen. Insbesondere beschließt es den Haushalt. Das Gremium tritt mindestens einmal pro Vierteljahr auf Anordnung seines Vorsitzenden zusammen. Seine Sitzungen sind öffentlich, sofern nicht explizit anderweitig beantragt.
 Bis zum Jahr 2014 wurden die Mitglieder der Verbandsräte von den Gemeinderäten aus der Mitte ihrer Mitglieder gewählt. Seit den Kommunalwahlen vom März 2014 sind die Verbandsräte direkt vom Volk gewählt; die Wahl erfolgt gleichzeitig mit derjenigen der Gemeinderäte. Eine Ausnahme bilden Gemeinden mit weniger als 1000 Einwohnern; diese entsenden auch weiterhin Mitglieder des Gemeinderats in den Gemeindeverbandsrat.
 Der Vorsitzende des Verbandsrats ist das ausführende Organ des EPCI. Er ordnet die Ausgaben an, ist der Chef der verschiedenen Abteilungen des EPCI und sein rechtlicher Vertreter. Er kann einen Teil seiner Aufgaben an seine Stellvertreter abgeben, deren Zahl zwischen 4 und 15 beträgt, jedoch 20 Prozent der Zahl der Beschäftigten des EPCI nicht überschreiten darf. Der Ratsvorsitzende wird im Anschluss an jede Wahl des Verbandsrates von diesem neu gewählt nach denselben Modalitäten, die auch bei Bürgermeisterwahlen anzuwenden sind.
 Weblinks
 Einzelnachweise