type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 273 Md. 195 (1974)
 328 A.2d 737
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 v.
 BARNES
 [No. 33, September Term, 1974.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided November 26, 1974.
 *196 The cause was argued before SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.
 Alexander L. Cummings, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Milton B. Allen, State's Attorney for Baltimore City, and Peter Ward, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellant.
 Geraldine Kenney Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender, with whom was Dennis M. Henderson, Assistant Public Defender, on the brief, for appellee.
 O'DONNELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 The respondent, Roland Douglas Barnes, came into the custody of the House of Correction on May 18, 1972, pursuant to a sentence to serve a one-year term for assault, dating from April 26, 1972, imposed by the District Court.[1] In any event, on the day before his arrival  May 17, 1972  he was both presented and indicted by the Grand Jury for the City of Baltimore for the murder of one Leotho Holloway on February 1, 1972.[2] As a result of the Grand Jury action and the capias issued thereon, the Sheriff of Baltimore City on May 26, 1972 filed a detainer with the Warden of the House of Correction. The respondent was officially notified of the detainer four days later.
 On June 9, 1972, a letter dated June 5, with enclosures attached[3] was sent by certified mail  return receipt *197 requested  on behalf of the respondent by the Warden to Milton B. Allen, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City requesting that the indictment upon which the detainer was based "be disposed of as soon as possible." Endorsed on the bottom of the letter was a notation that a copy thereof, as well as of the enclosures, were being sent to the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore, with copies for the inmate and his institutional file. One of the enclosures contained a request by the respondent that counsel be assigned him. A classification counselor at the House of Correction testified that personnel in that office processed the paper work on behalf of the inmates; that although the original letter and enclosures were sent to the State's Attorney by certified mail, copies addressed to the Clerk of the Criminal Court, at that time, were sent by first-class mail.[4] He further testified that there was nothing in the file to establish the date on which the copies addressed to the Clerk were actually mailed.
 The letter addressed to the State's Attorney (with enclosures) was date-stamped as having been received in that office on June 12 and the return receipt is so postmarked. In accordance with established inter-office procedures the State's Attorney forwarded the documents to the Criminal Assignment Office of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the agency designated for the assignment of criminal cases for trial; according to the date stamp affixed on the documents in the assignment office it took just seven days for the documents to journey from one floor of the Court House to the next. The Criminal Assignment Office noted on the documents that it was a request for "Speedy *198 Trial," placed a notation to that effect on their control card and returned the documents to the Case Preparation Section of the State's Attorney's office to await a certification of readiness for trial. The Acting Criminal Assignment Commissioner testified that although it was the responsibility of that office to notify the Public Defender of those defendants, incarcerated within the Department of Correctional Services, awaiting trial on other charges who requested the assignment of counsel, such notification in the respondent's case was not given until the "early part of November."
 Other than the notation upon the letter to the State's Attorney that a carbon copy was being sent to the Clerk of the Criminal Court, there was no record of the date on which the copies were mailed; the Clerk testified that after making a persistent and diligent search the copies were found, with no recorded date of receipt, misfiled alphabetically under "S."[5]
 For 139 days the respondent's request for trial was negatively  if not affirmatively  ignored, since it was only on November 6, 1972, that the Public Defender appointed a panel attorney to represent the respondent. Following a pretrial conference on December 19, 1972, between his counsel and an Assistant State's Attorney, February 21, 1973, was fixed as the first available open date for the jury trial requested by the respondent.
 On December 21, 1972, the respondent, pro se, filed a "Motion for Writ of Default" which prayed that the murder indictment be dismissed for failure of the State's Attorney to comply with the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616S, in that he had not been brought to trial within the time provided from the receipt by the State's Attorney of his request for trial.
 When, on the appointed day, the murder indictment came on for trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, the trial court (Levin, J.), although recognizing our holdings in Hoss *199 v. State, 266 Md. 136, 292 A.2d 48 (1972), rev'g Hoss v. State, 13 Md. App. 404, 283 A.2d 629 (1971), under the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (Art. 27, §§ 616A-616R), was nonetheless persuaded that the holdings by the Court of Special Appeals in King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652, 249 A.2d 468 (1969), under the Intrastate Detainers Act (Art. 27, § 616S) mandated a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the section. Finding that the Clerk of the Criminal Court did not receive its copy of the respondent's request by certified mail and absent proof of the exact date on which the copies were mailed, or actually received by the Clerk, the trial court held that the Act was not strictly complied with and denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. Following a jury trial, the respondent, on February 23, 1973, was found guilty of murder in the first degree. Upon appeal to the Court of Special Appeals that court, upon the authority of our holdings in Hoss v. State, supra, reversed the judgment imposed and ordered the case remanded for dismissal of the indictment. Barnes v. State, 20 Md. App. 262, 315 A.2d 117 (1974). We issued a writ of certiorari upon the petition of the Attorney General on behalf of the State.
 The pertinent provisions of the Intrastate Detainer Act here in issue (Art. 27, § 616S) read as follows:
 "(a) Request by prisoner; statement from warden having custody.  Whenever the Department of Correction receives a detainer against any prisoner serving a sentence in any correctional institution under the jurisdiction of the Department or whenever any county or city jail receives a detainer against any prisoner serving a sentence in the county or city jail any such prisoner shall be brought to trial within 120 days after the request of the prisoner for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint has been delivered to the State's Attorney of the City of Baltimore or of the county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is pending and to the appropriate court; provided that for good cause *200 shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be filed within 30 days of the prisoner's notification of any untried indictment, information, or complaint and shall be accompanied by a statement from the warden or superintendent having custody, setting forth the term of the commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the date of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the Board of Parole and Probation relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail.
 * * *
 (c) Dismissal when action not commenced.  If action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, within the time limitation set forth in subsection (a) above, the court shall no longer have jurisdiction thereof, and the untried indictment shall have no further force or effect; and in such case the court shall enter an order dismissing the untried indictment with prejudice." (Emphasis supplied.)
 The Court of Special Appeals, in ordering the dismissal of the murder indictment upon which the respondent was tried, held "that a delivery of the necessary papers to the assignment office is a delivery to the appropriate court," and that "[i]mmaterial nonconformity, however, will not vitiate the prisoner's entitlement under the statute." In applying our holding in Hoss v. State, supra, Judge Thompson, for the court, stated:
 "We find the Intrastate Act and the Interstate Agreement to be identical as to purpose and rationale. Hence, we apply to the Intrastate Act the *201 liberal construction requirement of Section 616J, in order to encourage expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against a prisoner then incarcerated under a term of imprisonment. § 616B. When the State's Attorney and the appropriate court receive actual notice, the statute has been substantially complied with even though the court did not receive its copy via Certified Mail, [Footnote omitted] as § 616S (a) expressly requires. Failure to bring the appellant to trial within 120 days from the date of delivery to the State's Attorney (June 12, 1972) and the appropriate court (June 19, 1972), requires that the subject indictment be dismissed with prejudice. § 616S (c).
 As we indicated earlier, our decision is dictated by Hoss v. State, supra, wherein it was held the provisions of the Interstate Statute were properly invoked and, being self-executing required that the indictment be dismissed. Hoss, supra at 146, quoted from State v. Lippolis, with approval:
 `The Legislature adopted the dismissal sanction not because a prisoner would be prejudiced at trial if trial were delayed more than 180 days after demand but because such a sanction for failure to try defendant within a fixed, reasonable period of time after demand was regarded as essential to produce general compliance with the statutory mandate. The sanction is a prophylactic measure to induce compliance in the generality of cases.'"[6]
 (Emphasis supplied.) 20 Md. App. at 268, 315 A.2d at 121.
 In Hoss, supra, the appellant, awaiting sentencing for rape in Pennsylvania, escaped on September 9, 1969; ten days *202 thereafter he killed a Pennsylvania policeman for which he was indicted. On September 22nd a Maryland woman and her daughter, together with the vehicle in which they were riding, disappeared. Hoss was indicted in Allegany County, Maryland, for the kidnapping and abduction of the woman and her child and for the larceny of her motor vehicle. Following his capture in Iowa and return to Pennsylvania he was sentenced for rape to a term of from ten to twenty years. In July 1970, after Hoss' conviction of the murder of the police officer, but before sentencing, Maryland authorities filed interstate detainers with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections. In September 1970 the death penalty was imposed on his murder conviction. Before that sentencing Hoss invoked the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (§§ 616A-616R) for final disposition of the Maryland indictments; this he supplemented with motions, in proper person, demanding a speedy trial and against any continuance, insisting that unless his trial was initiated promptly he would lose the benefit of testimony vital to his defense. His case was set for trial on January 11, 1971  within the 180 day provision of Art. 27, § 616D. Prior to trial the State moved for a continuance, asserting that the probable affirmance of his conviction and the execution of the death sentence would render the Maryland trial moot, and that the purpose of the statute, being rehabilitative in nature, should not be applied in the case of one on whom the death sentence had been imposed. The trial court held the motion sub curia until after the 180 day period was tolled, and on March 24, 1971, ruled that Hoss was entitled to a "speedy trial" but was not entitled to a dismissal of the indictments under the Act.
 This Court, noting that the provisions of § 616J declared that the statute "`shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes'" and finding that the purposes of the statute "go somewhat beyond `programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation,'" held that the provisions of §§ 616D and 616F were self-executing, unless a continuance had been granted in accordance with the provisions of § 616D, and that the failure of the trial court to rule upon the *203 motion for continuance within the 180 day period required the dismissal of the indictments pending against Hoss. The Court rejected the view adopted by the trial court and followed by the Court of Special Appeals that the "`imposition of the death sentence added a new dimension to the circumstances surrounding' Hoss' demand for trial under the provisions of the statute," and held further that even if the motion of the prosecution for continuance had been "timely granted" it would not have constituted "good cause" for "any necessary or reasonable continuance" under § 616D (a).[7]
 In this Court, in urging a reversal, counsel for the petitioner argues that under the provisions of Art. 27, § 616S, two requirements, inter alia, must be met: (a) the necessary documents (requesting a trial of the indictment which is the subject matter of the detainer and the accompanying statement from the warden) must be delivered both to the State's Attorney and to the "appropriate court," and (b) both sets of documents must be delivered by certified mail. Subordinate to that argument it is contended that the Court of Special Appeals erroneously relied upon the holdings in Hoss v. State, supra, in that our decision there, holding that the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act were to be liberally construed and were self-executing, was limited to interstate cases (under Art. 27, §§ 616A-616R), whereas, the Court of Special Appeals in King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652, 249 A.2d 468 (1969), followed in Carter v. State, 15 Md. App. 242, 289 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 266 Md. 734 (1972), and in Gibson v. State, 17 Md. App. 246, 300 A.2d 692 (1973), has consistently held that the provisions of the Intrastate Detainer Act (under Art. 27, § 616S)  the section here applicable  mandated a strict construction of the latter statute for intrastate cases.
 Counsel for the respondent counters and argues not only *204 were the provisions of § 616S gratified, by the actual notice received in the Criminal Assignment Office, but that the provisions of both the interstate and intrastate acts are remedial in nature, are in pari materia, are identical "as to purpose and rationale," and that both should be liberally construed to effectuate the objects of the legislation; they urge us to overrule the holdings in King v. State to the extent that King may here be applicable, contending that if there was a statutory noncompliance, it was caused by the action of state personnel at the House of Correction when they failed to dispatch the copies by certified mail.
 We do not read King v. State as mandating that § 616S be strictly construed. The Court of Special Appeals, after analyzing the step-by-step procedure required under the statute found an utter noncompliance with its terms. Judge Orth (now Chief Judge of that Court) noted that "[w]hile the [Intrastate Detainer] Act may be praised for its objective, it may be more damned for its provisions establishing the procedure to attain the objective." After finding that the provisions "lack[ed] sanctions to compel compliance with them," he noted that although "we may construe statutes within the legislative intent, we cannot enact legislation and we may not presume a sanction when none is provided."
 In holding, upon the facts of the case, that the procedure specified in the statute had not been followed, he stated:
 "The evidence did not establish that the appellant made request for final disposition of the untried complaints within 30 days of notification of them. The Act was not available to the appellant for that reason. Even on an assumption that the letter of 15 September 1967 was such request, and that it was filed on time, it was not accompanied by a statement from the warden containing the information required by the Act. The Act was not available to the appellant for that reason. And even if the evidence before the court be considered as showing that the appellant was precluded from filing the request as required because the warden, although he had knowledge, did not inform the *205 appellant of the source and contents of the untried complaints and of the appellant's right to request final disposition thereof, [Footnote omitted] no relief was available to the appellant under the Act. And even had the evidence proved that the appellant made request as required but that the warden failed to deliver it, accompanied by the statement, to the appropriate State's attorney and the court, no relief was available to the appellant under the Act. In short, for reasons we have hereinbefore stated, since it was not established that the appellant and the prison officials did all that they were called upon to do by the provisions of the Act, the Act was not invoked, no matter where the fault lay." (Emphasis supplied.) 5 Md. App. at 665-66, 249 A.2d at 476-77.
 Similarly, neither Carter v. State, supra, nor Gibson v. State, supra, are authority for the proposition that § 616S must be strictly construed. In both those cases the section was held inapplicable since in neither had any detainer or notice of a detainer been placed on file with the warden of the institution where the respective appellants were confined. See also Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 269 Md. 757 (1973), where the appellant at the time he attempted to invoke the [interstate] Act was awaiting trial in a Delaware prison and had not entered upon a "term of imprisonment" as required for the application of § 616D (a).
 It has long been recognized that detainers for untried charges  whether interstate or intrastate in nature  may result in "undue and oppressive incarceration." Undue delay in the disposition of such detainers has been recognized as minimizing the possibility that a defendant incarcerated might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the term he is serving and that under the procedures widely practiced, the duration of his imprisonment may be increased and the conditions under which his confinement must be served greatly worsened because of the pendency of an additional charge against him and the potentiality of *206 additional punishment. Similarly, it has been recognized that a long delay in the trial of the detainer charge may impair the ability of the accused to defend himself since he is often in a prison far removed from the place where the added offense allegedly took place, resulting in an impairment of his ability to keep apprised of the whereabouts of witnesses, and isolates him from the ready availability of the assistance of his counsel. It has even been stated that the pendency of such a detainer constitutes a serious impediment to the prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of the institutional opportunities for rehabilitation. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378-80 (1969). See also Note, 77 Yale L.J. 767, 769-71 (1968); Note, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 828, 833-34 (1964). In some jurisdictions the pendency of such a detainer precludes the prisoner from eligibility for parole consideration; in others it excludes him from placement on work-release programs, and it has been known, because of the potentiality of escape, to cause the prisoner to be confined under more strict and harsh security measures than might otherwise be applicable to his case, except for the detainer on file.[8]
 In an effort to ameliorate such conditions, which were found to "produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation" and in order "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges," the General Assembly, by Ch. 627 of the Acts of 1965, enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (codified as Art. 27, §§ 616A-616R)[9] and complementary thereto, at the same session, by Ch. 628, enacted our own version of an Intrastate Detainer Act (codified as Art. 27, § 616S).[10]
 *207 The provisions of § 616S were obviously intended to be supplementary to the provisions of the interstate act and being component parts of the same general system they should be construed together to the extent possible. See Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7, 217 A.2d 555, 559 (1966); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257, 170 A.2d 212, 214 (1961); State v. Petrushansky, 183 Md. 67, 71, 36 A.2d 533, 535 (1944). This view is strengthened by the fact that both statutes were enacted on the same date. See Commissioners of Prince George's County v. Commissioners of Laurel, 51 Md. 457, 462 (1879). See also United States v. One Bally Bounty In-Line Pinball Machine, 261 F. Supp. 187, 191 (D. Md. 1966).
 Although there are certain differences in the statutory language used, in the time period specified for compliance and minimal variances in the procedures prescribed, the provisions of § 616S are basically similar to the provisions of §§ 616D-616Q, affecting interstate detainers.[11]
 Although there is no definition within § 616S of the term "appropriate court," it is defined among the supplemental *208 provisions by § 616K. Neither any subsection in § 616S, nor, indeed, any provision in the model Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, provides as does § 616Q that the written notice and request from the prisoner shall not be deemed to have been caused to be delivered, nor such notification be deemed to have been given until such notice or notification is actually received by the proper State's Attorney, etc., and "appropriate court." See Davidson v. State, supra, holding that there was no evidence that either the prosecutor, his secretary, nor the Circuit Court actually received any notice or request from the appellant or the Delaware authorities under § 616D (a).
 Nor do we believe that the failure in § 616S to provide that the statute shall be "liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose," as is provided in § 616J, is here material since both statutes at the time of enactment were common in derivation and purpose, were remedial in nature, designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good; as such they are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief. See Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corp., 221 Md. 271, 157 A.2d 265 (1960); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A.2d 754 (1946); Ordway v. Central National Bank of Baltimore, 47 Md. 217 (1877).
 Each statutory scheme creates a sort of "statute of limitations" to be applied to detainers, whether they be interstate or intrastate, to the end that valid charges based thereon will be promptly ripened into trials and those detainers having no justiciable merit will be dismissed. Relating as they both do to the same general subject matter and directed at attaining the same basic results, the provisions pertaining to both interstate and intrastate detainers are in pari materia and should be construed together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and scope. See Board of Fire Commissioners v. Potter, 268 Md. 285, 300 A.2d 680 (1973); Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591, 185 A.2d 368 (1962); May v. Warnick, 227 Md. 77, 175 A.2d 413 (1961); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 174 A.2d 768 (1961); *209 Baltimore Transit Employees' Credit Union v. Thorne, 214 Md. 200, 134 A.2d 84 (1957).
 We fully agree with the views expressed by the Court of Special Appeals that the two enactments are "identical as to purpose and rationale" and that the liberal construction prescribed by § 616J should be applied to § 616S in order "to encourage expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against a prisoner when incarcerated under a term of imprisonment." We do not suggest, however, that any such liberal construction to effectuate the purposes of the statute should absolve proof by competent evidence of those conditions precedent necessary for bringing the provisions of the statute into play. We thus see no incompatibility between the holdings in King v. State, supra, and the results reached in this respect by the Court of Special Appeals.
 The applicability of each of the statutes is predicated upon knowledge by the prisoner of the nature and content of the filed detainer and the delivery of his written request  with accompanying statements from the warden  to the State's Attorney and the appropriate court in the jurisdiction where the charge is pending, that a final disposition be made of that charge. Nowhere in either of the statutes do we find as a procedural requirement that any such notice be sent to the clerk of the court.[12]
 The purpose of the notice requirements is to bring to the attention of the operative state officials the request of the prisoner that such authorities take the necessary steps, within the time provided, to set in motion the machinery necessary to bring the pending case to trial. The only logical purpose to be served by directing that the notice be delivered by certified mail is to provide corroboration for bald assertions of having given such notice and a means of tracing and establishing the date of receipt should a dispute concerning the delivery of notice arise.
 *210 We have held that while failure to comply with the statutory requirements of notice may sometimes be fatal (jurisdictionally), the requirement of notification purposed to inform may be satisfied by proof of actual notice; this is especially true when the knowledge has been acted upon without reliance upon the defects in the notice. See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., 269 Md. 465, 476-77, 306 A.2d 524, 531 (1973); Clark v. Wolman, 243 Md. 597, 221 A.2d 687 (1966). Similarly, where there has been compliance with the substance of the requirements of statutes or rules by one party and the other party has not been prejudiced, we have held that technical irregularities will not be permitted to deprive persons of an opportunity to assert their legal rights. See McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., supra; Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 61, 225 A.2d 294, 299-300 (1966); Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119, 125, 210 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1965).
 Indeed, even when a statute requires that a notice be given by registered mail it has been held that notice actually received, though by regular mail, is valid. See 58 Am.Jur.2d, Notice § 27 (1971); Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d 264, 40 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1964); Volandri v. Taylor, 124 Cal. App. 356, 12 P.2d 462 (1932); Steele v. Trustees of Pittsburg Schools, 121 Cal. App. 419, 9 P.2d 217 (1932); Drake v. Comptroller of City of New York, 278 A.D. 317, 104 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1st Dept. 1951). See also Chirico v. Kings County Savings Bank, 168 Misc. 207, 4 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1938), holding that personal service of a notice of discharge sufficiently complied with the statute requiring notice by registered mail since the intent of the statute was to insure actual notice.
 When counsel for the petitioner argues that the right of the respondent to have the provisions of § 616S applied to the murder indictment was defeated because the copy for the "appropriate court" was not delivered by certified mail, we think he exalts form over substance. As Justice Cardozo aptly stated in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917), "The law has outgrown its *211 primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view to-day."
 Both the State's Attorney of Baltimore City and the "appropriate court"  the Criminal Assignment Office of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the agency created by it to regulate the assignment of criminal cases  had actual notice of the respondent's request for disposition of the detainer, albeit that the notice received by the Criminal Assignment Office was by transmittal to it of the notice the state's attorney received by certified mail. Each treated the notice as an invocation of the provisions of § 616S. Indeed, the receipt by the respective agencies satisfied the provisions of § 616Q. The form by which the notice was respectively received does not alter the fact that each agency had actual notice. There is no showing of any prejudice to the Criminal Assignment Office resulting from the manner by which it received notice. The technical nonconformity on the part of personnel at the House of Correction in failing to cause delivery to the "appropriate court" by certified mail cannot be here permitted to cause a forfeiture of the legal rights of the respondent under the statute.
 Upon receipt of these notices it was incumbent upon the state's attorney to initiate action to see to it that the untried murder indictment was brought to trial within 120 days from the date of the delivery of the respondent's request to the state's attorney (June 12, 1972) and the "appropriate court" (June 19, 1972). His failure to so bring the case to trial was in no way caused by the fact that the assignment office had not received its notice by certified mail. In the absence of any "necessary or reasonable continuance"  which the state's attorney failed to request[13]  the statute became self-executing; when the 120 day period expired the Criminal Court of Baltimore was ousted of jurisdiction, the untried indictment had no further force and effect and an order was mandated dismissing the indictment with prejudice. See *212 Hoss v. State, supra. To hold otherwise would render the statute ineffective and defeat its plain object. See People v. Masselli, 17 App.Div.2d 367, 234 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1962), aff'd 13 N.Y.2d 1, 191 N.E.2d 457 (1963). See also State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div.) 257 A.2d 705 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970), cited with approval in both Hoss v. State, supra, and in this case by the Court of Special Appeals.
 In view of the conclusion reached concerning actual notice received we need not syllogize our holding upon those cases from other jurisdictions urged upon us by counsel for the respondent which hold that the negligence or noncompliance by prosecutors and custodial personnel in failing to give notice of untried outstanding charges or in failing or refusing to transmit the prisoner's request should be "visited upon" the prosecution and not held as a bar to defeat the rights of the prisoner. See Pittman v. State, Del., 301 A.2d 509 (1973) (where Maryland prison authorities refused to forward proper forms to Delaware); People v. Parker, 21 Mich. App. 399, 175 N.W.2d 879 (1970) (where the prosecutor failed to notify the prison officials of the untried outstanding charge); People v. Haynes, 5 Mich. App. 641, 147 N.W.2d 714 (1967) (where the warden failed to give the inmate notice of the detainer); People v. Masselli, supra (where the prosecutor failed to notify the correction officials and they refused to transmit the prisoner's request). Compare King v. State, supra, 5 Md. App. at 662-63, 249 A.2d at 475.
 As counsel for the respondent whimsically observed in their brief, "[a] summary of the actions of the State officials involved in the processing of the instant request under § 616S reads like a scenario for the `Keystone Kops Take Desk Jobs.'" Although the state's attorney received the respondent's request on June 12, 1972, it took a full week for manual transmittal of the notice to the Criminal Assignment Office. Upon return of the notice from the assignment office the personnel of the state's attorney made no inquiry concerning the appearance of counsel for the prisoner, sent no certificate of readiness for trial to the assignment office, did not move in "open court" for a *213 continuance and did not undertake to conduct a pretrial conference until more than six months later, on December 19th. The Criminal Assignment Office equally went about its duties by logging receipt of the respondent's request as a [motion for] "speedy trial," and by promptly returning it to await advice from the state's attorney, without scheduling a tentative trial date. Although the respondent had requested the assignment of counsel and the assignment office at that time carried on the responsibility of notifying the District Public Defender of such requests, its personnel did not get around to performing that ministerial function until "early November." The Clerk of the Criminal Court obviously received a copy of the documents from the prisoner shortly after the posting of the certified letter, but the documents were there undated, unrecorded, and for inexplicable reasons, placed in the "S" file. The collective attitude of the personnel of these offices commissioned to see to the prompt and effective administration of the criminal laws seems to suggest that none of them was remotely aware of the importance of the role assigned to each to carry out the requirements of § 616S  although it had been in effect for over seven years  or much less had ever been instructed in procedures for processing documents filed under the statute.
 We lament the fact that by our decision we are now compelled to discharge one who was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, but the results are not of our doing. As was cogently observed by Mr. Justice Clark, who delivered the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961): "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.... `If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.'" Under the facts here, governmental personnel by their laxity and apathy ignored the mandates of the law.
 The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed; costs to be paid by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
 NOTES
 [1] The record does not disclose whether the respondent was sentenced on April 26 or May 18, 1972; nor whether he was given credit upon his sentence for any period spent in jail awaiting trial; nor whether he was originally committed to the Reception, Diagnostic and Classification Center and from there transferred to the House of Correction.
 [2] It appears that at his trial the date charged in the indictment was amended to read "February 2, 1972."
 [3] The enclosures attached to the respondent's letter were all upon forms used by the House of Correction; they were: (1) "Notice of Untried Indictment, Information or Disposition and of Right to Request Disposition," (2) "Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints," and (3) "Certificate of Inmate's Status." The State's Attorney in the trial court conceded that the three enclosed forms substantially, in form, complied with the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616S (a).
 [4] We were advised that because of budget limitations it was then the policy to send the copies by first-class rather than certified mail, but that at the time of the hearing copies as well were sent by certified mail.
 [5] No explanation whatever was given for this clerical ineptitude; the respondent's full name was typed on all the documents transmitted and an inspection thereof leaves completely inexplicable such misfiling.
 [6] State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div.) 257 A.2d 705 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, 55 N.J. 354, 262 A.2d 203 (1970).
 [7] Compare Dennett v. State, 19 Md. App. 376, 311 A.2d 437 (1973), cert. denied, 271 Md. 734 (1974), holding that a continuance requested by the defendant within the statutory period for the completion of discovery was for "good cause" under § 616D (a).
 [8] See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378-79, n. 8 (1969).
 [9] See Code, Art. 27, § 616B. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act has now been adopted in 42 states, by the United States Government and by the District of Columbia. See 11 U.L.A., Disposition of Detainers, at 322-23 (1974).
 [10] By Ch. 628 of the Acts of 1965 we declined to adopt the provisions of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, which has been adopted in only seven states. One salient omission from § 616S is the sanction provided under § 1 (c) of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act providing for the dismissal of the charge which is the subject matter of the detainer where the warden fails to inform the prisoner within one year after the filing of the detainer. See State v. Norris, 210 Kan. 457, 502 P.2d 817 (1972); State v. Ellis, 208 Kan. 59, 490 P.2d 364 (1971). See also King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652, 661, 249 A.2d 468, 474 n. 5 (1969).
 [11] Under the intrastate provisions a period of 120 days is fixed for trial; the prisoner must give written notice of his request for trial accompanied by a statement of the warden sent to the prosecutor and the appropriate court by certified mail within 30 days of notification of the charge (§ 616S (a)); the warden is directed to inform the prisoner of the source and contents of the detainer and of the prisoner's right to request a disposition within 15 days after he acquires knowledge (§ 616S (b)). Unless the prisoner is tried within 120 days the trial court loses jurisdiction and the indictment is rendered ineffective and must be dismissed with prejudice. (§ 616S (c)).
 Under the interstate provisions a period of 180 days is fixed for trial after receipt of written notice from the prisoner (§ 616D (a)); the written request for disposition shall be given or sent to the warden who shall "promptly forward it" together with his certificate by registered or certified mail  with return receipt requested  to the prosecutor and appropriate court. (Unlike § 616S (b), no time period is provided under § 616D (c) within which the warden must inform the prisoner of the detainer.) Although no provision is made for the loss of "jurisdiction" it is provided that the charge upon which the detainer is based shall be dismissed with prejudice unless the prisoner is tried within 180 days  or within 120 days after delivery to the jurisdiction where the charge is pending (§ 616D (a), § 616E (c) and § 616F (c)).
 [12] Section 616D (a), (b), (d), § 616E (b), § 616F (c) and § 616S (a) all provide that the notice be sent to the "appropriate court," defined (§ 616K) as "any court in this State having criminal jurisdiction which is part of the circuit court of a county, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the District Court...." (where the indictment, information or complaint is pending).
 [13] It appears that the failure to assign counsel as requested by the respondent may have constituted "good cause"  within the interval for granting a "necessary or reasonable continuance."


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 25.8.2014
 PT
 Jornal Oficial da União Europeia
 C 282/41
 Recurso interposto em 12 de junho de 2014 — The Goldman Sachs Group/Comissão
 (Processo T-419/14)
 2014/C 282/54
 Língua do processo: inglês
 Partes
 Recorrente: The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc (Nova Iorque, Estados Unidos da América) (representantes: W. Deselaers, J. Koponen e A. Mangiaracina, advogados)
 Recorrida: Comissão Europeia
 Pedidos
 A recorrente conclui pedindo que o Tribunal Geral se digne:
 —
 Anular na totalidade ou em parte os artigos 1.o, 2.o, 3.o e 4.o da Decisão da Comissão C (2014) 2139 final, de 2 de abril de 2014, processo COMP/AT.39610 — Power Cables, na medida em que respeita à recorrente;
 —
 Reduzir o montante da multa imposta à recorrente, nos termos do artigo 2.o da Decisão;
 —
 Condenar a Comissão no pagamento das despesas do processo.
 Fundamentos e principais argumentos
 Em apoio do seu recurso, a recorrente invoca seis fundamentos.
 1.
 Primeiro fundamento relativo à violação pela Decisão do artigo 101.o TFUE e do artigo 23.o, n.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 de 16 de dezembro de 2002 relativo à execução das regras de concorrência estabelecidas nos artigos 81.o e 82.o do Tratado (1), ao considerar o grupo GS solidariamente responsável pela infração alegadamente cometida pela Prysmian.
 2.
 Segundo fundamento relativo à violação pela Decisão impugnada do artigo 2.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 e do artigo 296.o TFUE, na medida em que não demonstra de forma juridicamente suficiente que o grupo GS exerceu efetivamente influência dominante sobre a Prysmian, no período em causa.
 3.
 Terceiro fundamento, relativo à violação pela Decisão impugnada do artigo 101.o TFUE e do artigo 23.o, n.o2 do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003, na medida em que viola o princípio da responsabilidade pessoal e a presunção de inocência.
 4.
 Quarto fundamento relativo à violação pela Decisão impugnada do artigo 101.o TFUE e do artigo 23.o, n.o 2 do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003, na medida em eu viola os princípios da certeza jurídica e da pessoalidade das penas, uma vez que a Comissão não repartiu a coima.
 5.
 Quinto fundamento, relativo à violação pela Comissão dos direitos de defesa da recorrente (violação de um pressuposto processual essencial), na medida em que a Comissão não permitiu o acesso a documentos essenciais em tempo útil.
 6.
 Sexto fundamento, relativo à concessão pelo Tribunal Geral ao grupo GS do benefício de qualquer redução da coima imposta pela decisão impugnada que possa ser concedida à Prysmian.
 (1) JO L 001, 4.1.2003, p. 1


type: wikipedia

text:
Beaufort kan avse:
 En skala för vindstyrka, se Beauforts skala
 Geografi
 Beauforthavet
 Beaufort kan även syfta på följande platser:
 Australien
 Beaufort (ort i Australien, South Australia), Wakefield,
 Beaufort, Victoria, Pyrenees,
 Frankrike
 Beaufort-sur-Gervanne, departementet Drôme i regionen Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes,
 Beaufort-en-Vallée, departementet Maine-de-Loire i regionen Pays-de-la-Loire,
 Beaufort-en-Santerre, departementet Somme i regionen Hauts-de-France,
 Beaufort-en-Argonne, departementet Meuse i regionen Grand Est,
 Beaufort-Blavincourt, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Pas-de-Calais,
 Beaufort, Jura,
 Beaufort, Savoie,
 Beaufort, Isère,
 Beaufort, Haute-Garonne,
 Beaufort, Hérault,
 Beaufort, Nord,
 Libanon
 Beaufort, Libanon, fornlämning, Nabatiye,
 Luxemburg
 Beaufort, Luxemburg, huvudort i kommunen Beaufort,
 Beaufort, Luxemburg (kommun), kommun i kantonen Echternach
 Malaysia
 Beaufort, Sabah,
 Schweiz
 Beaufort, Schweiz, bergstopp, Valais,
 Storbritannien
 Beaufort, Blaenau Gwent, community i Wales,
 Sydafrika
 Beaufort West, stad, Västra Kapprovinsen, Centrala Karoodistriktet,
 Fort Beaufort, stad, Östra Kapprovinsen, Amatoledistriktet,
 Port Beaufort, bebyggelse, Västra Kapprovinsen, Eden,
 USA
 Beaufort, North Carolina, countyhuvudort, Carteret County,
 Beaufort County, North Carolina
 Beaufort, South Carolina, countyhuvudort, Beaufort County,
 Beaufort County, South Carolina
 Beaufort County Airport, South Carolina,
 Personer
 Francis Beaufort (1774–1857), brittisk konteramiral, Beaufortskalans skapare
 Edmund Beaufort, 2:e hertig av Somerset (1406–1455)
 Edmund Beaufort, 4:e hertig av Somerset (ca 1438–1471)
 Francis Beaufort (1774–1857)
 Henrik Beaufort (1374–1447)
 Henrik Beaufort, hertig av Somerset (1436–1464)
 Johanna Beaufort (1404–1445), drottning av Skottland
 John Beaufort, 1:e earl av Somerset (1373–1410)
 Margaret Beaufort (1443–1509)
 Pierre Roger de Beaufort (1331–1378), påve, se Gregorius XI
 Thomas Beaufort (1377–1426)
 Carel Godin de Beaufort (1934–1964), nederländsk formel 1-förare
 Övrigt
 Beaufort, en fransk ost
 Bristol Beaufort, ett brittiskt torpedflygplan (1938-1944)
 Robotskapade Australienförgreningar
 Robotskapade Libanonförgreningar
 Robotskapade Malaysiaförgreningar
 Robotskapade Sydafrikaförgreningar


type: legislation

text:
 I
 112th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. R. 2350
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 June 24, 2011
 Mr. DeFazio (for
 himself, Ms. Slaughter,
 Mr. Ryan of Ohio, and
 Mr. Carson of Indiana) introduced the
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and
 Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on the
 Budget, for a period to
 be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of
 such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
 concerned
 A BILL
 To secure public investments in transportation
 infrastructure.
 1.Short titleThis Act may be cited as the
 Protecting Taxpayers in Transportation
 Asset Transfers Act.
 2.DefinitionsIn this Act:
 (1)Asset
 transactionThe term asset transaction means—
 (A)a concession
 agreement for a public transportation asset; or
 (B)a contract for the
 sale or lease of a public transportation asset between the State or local
 government with jurisdiction over the public transportation asset and a private
 individual or entity.
 (2)Concession
 agreement
 (A)In
 generalThe term concession agreement means an
 agreement entered into by a private individual or entity and a State or local
 government with jurisdiction over a public transportation asset to convey to
 the private individual or entity the right to manage, operate, and maintain the
 public transportation asset for a specific period of time in exchange for the
 authorization to impose and collect a toll or other user fee from a person for
 each use of the public transportation asset during that period.
 (B)ExclusionThe
 term concession agreement does not include an agreement entered
 into by a State or local government and a private individual or entity for the
 construction of any new public transportation asset.
 (3)Public
 transportation asset
 (A)In
 generalThe term public transportation asset means a
 transportation facility of any kind that was or is constructed, maintained, or
 upgraded before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act using Federal
 funds—
 (i)(I)the fair market value of
 which is more than $500,000,000, as determined by the Secretary; and
 (II)that has received any Federal funding,
 as of the date on which the determination is made;
 (ii)the
 fair market value of which is less than or equal to $500,000,000, as determined
 by the Secretary; and
 (I)that has received $25,000,000 or more in
 Federal funding, as of the date on which the determination is made; or
 (iii)in
 which a significant national pubic interest (such as interstate commerce,
 homeland security, public health, or the environment) is at stake, as
 determined by the Secretary.
 (B)InclusionsThe
 term public transportation asset includes a transportation
 facility described in subparagraph (A) that is—
 (i)a
 Federal-aid highway (as defined in section 101 of title 23, United States
 Code);
 (ii)a
 highway or mass transit project constructed using amounts made available from
 the Highway Account or Mass Transit Account, respectively, of the Highway Trust
 Fund;
 (iii)an
 air navigation facility (as defined in section 40102(a) of title 49, United
 States Code); or
 (iv)a
 train station or multimodal station that receives a Federal grant, including
 any grant authorized under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of
 2008 (Public Law 110–432; 122 Stat. 4907) or an amendment made by that
 Act.
 (4)SecretaryThe
 term Secretary means the Secretary of Transportation.
 3.Program to secure
 public investments in transportation infrastructure
 (a)EstablishmentNot
 later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
 shall establish a program under which a Federal lien shall be attached to each
 public transportation asset.
 (b)Prohibition on
 sales and leases
 (1)In
 generalA public transportation asset to which a lien is attached
 under subsection (a) may not be the subject of any asset transaction
 unless—
 (A)the lien is
 released in accordance with paragraph (2);
 (B)(i)the private individual
 or entity seeking the asset transaction enters into an agreement with the
 Secretary described in paragraph (3)(A)(i); and
 (ii)the State or local government or
 other public sponsor seeking the asset transaction enters into an agreement
 with the Secretary described in paragraph (3)(A)(ii);
 (C)the Secretary
 publishes a disclosure in accordance with paragraph (4); and
 (D)the State or local
 government seeking the asset transaction provides for public notice and an
 opportunity to comment on the proposed asset transaction.
 (2)Release of
 liens
 (A)In
 generalA lien on a public transportation asset described in
 paragraph (1) may be released only if—
 (i)the
 State or local government or other public sponsor seeking the asset transaction
 for the public transportation asset pays to the Secretary an amount determined
 by the Secretary under subparagraph (B); and
 (ii)the
 Secretary certifies that the required agreements described in paragraph (3)
 have been signed, and the terms of the agreements incorporated into the terms
 of the asset transaction, for the public transportation asset.
 (B)Determination of
 repayment amountThe Secretary shall determine the amount that is
 required to be paid for the release of a Federal lien on a public
 transportation asset under this paragraph, taking into account, at a
 minimum—
 (i)the
 total amount of Federal funds that have been expended to construct, maintain,
 or upgrade the public transportation asset;
 (ii)the
 amount of Federal funding received by a State or local government based on
 inclusion of the public transportation asset in calculations using Federal
 funding formulas or for Federal block grants;
 (iii)the reasonable
 depreciation of the public transportation asset, including the amount of
 Federal funds described in clause (i) that may be offset by that depreciation;
 and
 (iv)the
 loss of Federal tax revenue from bonds relating to, and the tax consequences of
 depreciation of, the public transportation asset.
 (3)Agreements
 (A)In
 generalAs a condition of any new or renewed asset transaction
 for a public transportation asset—
 (i)the
 private individual or entity seeking the asset transaction shall enter into an
 agreement with the Secretary, which shall be incorporated into the terms of the
 asset transaction, under which the private individual or entity agrees—
 (I)to disclose and
 eliminate any conflict of interest involving any party to the agreement;
 (II)(aa)to adequately maintain
 the condition and performance of the public transportation asset during the
 term of the asset transaction; and
 (bb)on the end of the term of the asset
 transaction, to return the public transportation asset to the applicable State
 or local government in a state of good repair;
 (III)to disclose an
 estimated amount of tax benefits and financing transactions over the life of
 the lease resulting from the lease or sale of the public transportation
 asset;
 (IV)to disclose
 anticipated changes in the workforce and wages, benefits, or rules over the
 life of the lease and an estimate of the amount of savings from those changes;
 and
 (V)to provide an
 estimate of the revenue the transportation asset will produce for the private
 entity during the lease or sale period; and
 (ii)the
 State or local government or other public sponsor seeking the asset transaction
 for the public transportation asset shall enter into an agreement with the
 Secretary, which shall be incorporated into the terms of the asset transaction,
 under which the State or local government or other public sponsor
 agrees—
 (I)to pay to the
 Secretary the amount determined by the Secretary under paragraph (2)(B);
 (II)to conduct an
 assessment of whether, and provide justification that, the asset transaction
 with the private entity would represent a better public and financial benefit
 than a similar transaction using public funding or with a public (as opposed to
 private) entity, including an assessment of—
 (aa)the
 loss of toll revenues and other user fees relating to the public transportation
 asset; and
 (bb)any
 impacts on other public transportation assets in the vicinity of the public
 transportation asset covered by the asset transaction;
 (III)that, if the
 private individual or entity enters into bankruptcy, becomes insolvent, or
 fails to comply with all terms and conditions of the asset transaction—
 (aa)the
 asset transaction shall immediately terminate; and
 (bb)the
 interest in the public transportation asset conveyed by the asset transaction
 will immediately revert to the public sponsor;
 (IV)to provide an
 estimate of all increased tolls and other user fees that may be charged to
 persons using the public transportation asset during the term of the asset
 transaction;
 (V)to disclose any
 plans the State or local government seeking the asset transaction has for
 up-front payments or concessions from the private individual or entity seeking
 the asset transaction;
 (VI)that the Federal
 Government and the applicable State and local governments will retain
 respective authority and control over decisions regarding transportation
 planning and management; and
 (VII)to prominently
 post or display the agreement on the website of the local government or public
 sponsor.
 (B)TermAn
 agreement under this paragraph shall not exceed a reasonable term, as
 determined by the Secretary, in consultation with the relevant State or local
 government.
 (4)Publication of
 disclosureNot later than 90 days before the date on which an
 asset transaction covering a public transportation asset takes effect, the
 Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register a notice that contains—
 (A)a copy of all
 agreements relating to the asset transaction between the Secretary and the
 public and private sponsors involved;
 (B)a description of
 the total amount of Federal funds that have been expended as of the date of
 publication of the notice to construct, maintain, or upgrade the public
 transportation asset;
 (C)the determination
 of the repayment amount under paragraph (2)(B) for the public transportation
 asset;
 (D)the amount of
 Federal funding received by a State or local government based on inclusion of
 the public transportation asset in calculations using Federal funding formulas
 or for Federal block grants; and
 (E)a certification
 that the asset transaction will not adversely impact the national public
 interest of the United States (including the interstate commerce, homeland
 security, public health, and environment of the United States).
 (5)Renewal of asset
 transactionAn asset transaction that expires or terminates may
 be renewed only if—
 (A)the
 Secretary—
 (i)calculates a new
 repayment amount under paragraph (2)(B) required for renewal, as the Secretary
 determines to be appropriate;
 (ii)takes into
 consideration the impact of a renewed agreement on nearby public transportation
 assets; and
 (iii)publishes a new
 disclosure for the renewed agreement in accordance with paragraph (4);
 and
 (B)the State or local
 government seeking to renew the asset transaction—
 (i)provides for
 public notice and an opportunity to comment on the proposed renewal;
 (ii)pays to the
 Secretary the new amount calculated by the Secretary pursuant to subparagraph
 (A)(i); and
 (iii)enters into a
 new agreement in accordance with paragraph (3) for the renewal.
 (c)Amtrak
 (1)In
 generalSubject to paragraph (2), the Secretary may permit a
 private individual or entity to enter into an asset transaction covering all or
 any portion of the facilities and equipment of the National Railroad Passenger
 Corporation (referred to in this subsection as Amtrak).
 (2)ConditionsA
 private individual or entity that seeks to enter into an asset transaction
 described in paragraph (1) shall agree—
 (A)to enter into an
 agreement described in subsection (b)(3) with the Secretary covering the asset
 transaction; and
 (B)to pay to the
 Secretary an amount equal to the amount of Federal funds provided for Amtrak
 during the period of fiscal year 1971 through the fiscal year in which an
 agreement described in subsection (b)(3) covering the asset transaction is
 entered into, as adjusted by, as determined by the Secretary—
 (i)the
 reasonable depreciation of the portion of Amtrak facilities and equipment
 covered by the agreement, including that amount of Federal funds provided for
 Amtrak that may be offset by that depreciation;
 (ii)the
 amount of Federal funding received by a State or local government to upgrade
 any capital facilities owned or operated by Amtrak to facilitate passenger rail
 service; and
 (iii)the loss of
 Federal tax revenue from bonds, Federal financing, or any tax advantages
 granted to Amtrak since fiscal year 1971, including financing and bonding
 covered by or provided under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Public Law
 105–34; 111 Stat. 788) or an amendment made by that Act.
 (3)Term,
 disclosure, and renewalParagraphs (3)(B), (4), and (5) of
 subsection (b) shall apply to an asset transaction entered into under this
 subsection.
 (d)Use of funds by
 SecretaryFunds received by the Secretary as a payment under
 paragraph (2)(A)(i) or (5)(B)(ii) of subsection (b) or subsection (c)(2)(B)
 shall be available to and used by the Secretary, without further appropriation
 and to remain available until expended, for transportation projects and
 activities in the same transportation mode as the mode of the public
 transportation asset for which the payment was received.
 (e)RegulationsNot
 later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
 shall promulgate such regulations as are necessary to implement this
 Act.
 (f)Report to
 CongressNot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of
 this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to Congress and
 publish in the Federal Register a report that describes each public
 transportation asset that is the subject of an asset transaction during the
 year covered by the report, including the total amount of Federal funds that
 were received by a State or local government to construct, maintain, or upgrade
 the public transportation asset as of the date of submission of the
 report.
 (g)Authorization of
 appropriationsThere are authorized to be appropriated to carry
 out this Act such sums as are necessary.
 4.Budgetary
 effectsThe budgetary effects
 of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act
 of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled
 Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation for this Act, submitted
 for printing in the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the House Budget
 Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on
 passage.


type: other

text:
Justitiekanslern - 6224-19-2.4.2
 6224-19-2.4.2
 Diarienr: 6224-19-2.4.2 / Beslutsdatum: 20 dec 2019
 Inspektion av Falu tingsrätt den 19 och 20 november 2019 - handläggning av utsökningsärenden
 1. Beslutets huvudsakliga innehåll
 Handläggningen av utsökningsärenden vid Falu tingsrätt framstår som väl fungerande, rättssäker och effektiv. Tingsrätten uppfyller kraven på rätten till
 rättegång inom skälig tid enligt artikel 6.1 i Europakonventionen (se även 2 kap. 11 § andra stycket regeringsformen).
 Justitiekanslern gör vissa uttalanden med anledning av iakttagelser i enskilda fall (avsnitt 4).
 Justitiekanslern har tillsyn över att de som utövar offentlig verksamhet efterlever lagar och andra författningar samt i övrigt fullgör sina åligganden. Justitiekanslerns tillsyn omfattar bl.a. domstolarna.
 Som ett led i sin tillsynsverksamhet beslutade Justitiekanslern att inspektera Falu tingsrätt. Inspektionen föranleddes inte av något enskilt ärende som förekommit hos Justitiekanslern utan initierades inom ramen för ett projekt om tillämpningen av inhibitionsinstitutet i utsökningsärenden. Inspektionen genomfördes den 19 och 20 november 2019.
 3. Inspektionen
 Det övergripande syftet med inspektionen var att granska tingsrättens handläggning av utsökningsärenden, särskilt i fråga om tillämpningen av inhibitionsinstitutet. Andra angränsande frågor som omfattades av granskningen var sådana om handläggningstid, kommunicering av handlingar och inlagor, rätten till muntlig förhandling, motivering av beslut och expediering av beslut samt även Kronofogdemyndighetens handläggning i vissa delar. Granskningen var inte inriktad på materiella bedömningar.
 Under inspektionen granskade Justitiekanslern de utsökningsärenden i målkategorierna 70:46, 70:47 och 70:48 som hade avslutats under perioden den 1 november 2017–31 oktober 2019 (drygt 400 ärenden).
 Ett inledande samtal ägde rum med företrädare för domstolen. Justitiekanslern informerade om inspektionens syfte och inriktning. Därefter gav tingsrätten en beskrivning av domstolens verksamhet beträffande handläggningen av utsökningsärenden.
 4. Justitiekanslerns iakttagelser och synpunkter
 4.1 Övergripande iakttagelser och synpunkter
 Justitiekanslerns övergripande intryck är att tingsrättens handläggning av utsökningsärenden är väl fungerande. De ärenden som Justitiekanslern granskade hade i allt väsentligt handlagts på det sätt som föreskrivs i lagen (1996:242) om domstolsärenden (ärendelagen) och utsökningsbalken (UB).
 I det följande redogör Justitiekanslern närmare för de iakttagelser som gjordes vid granskningen.
 Enligt 18 kap. 12 § UB får tingsrätten, utan att motparten dessförinnan har getts tillfälle att yttra sig över överklagandet, förordna att någon åtgärd för verkställighet tills vidare inte ska vidtas eller, om det finns synnerliga skäl, att en redan vidtagen åtgärd ska hävas. En i princip motsvarande bestämmelse finns även i 26 § andra stycket ärendelagen.
 Vid granskningen har det kunnat konstateras att tingsrätten i samtliga förekommande fall har tagit ställning till en parts yrkande om inhibition. Prövningen har skett skyndsamt och i de flesta fall samma dag som inhibitionsyrkandet inkom till tingsrätten.
 Ett förordnande om inhibition kan meddelas också utan ett formellt yrkande om ett sådant beslut. Denna ordning är motiverad bl.a. av att enskilda parter inte kan antas känna till möjligheten till inhibition. Tingsrätten ska alltså självmant ta upp frågan, när det finns anledning till det. (Se t.ex. SOU 2016:81 s. 603.)
 Justitiekanslerns granskning har visat att tingsrätten i några få fall har prövat frågan om inhibition ex officio. Det saknas underlag för slutsatsen att domstolen borde ha gjort en sådan prövning i fler fall än de nu förekommande.
 4.3 Handläggningstid
 De granskade utsökningsärendena har i regel handlagts skyndsamt. Merparten av ärendena har avgjorts inom en till två månader från det att överklagandet kommit in till tingsrätten. Det finns några exempel på ärenden där handläggningstiden har varit längre, i något fall närmare ett och ett halvt år. Det har i dessa fall emellertid inte handlat om någon påtaglig inaktivitet från tingsrättens sida. I två fall har tingsrätten avvaktat med att fatta beslut med hänvisning till att samma fråga varit föremål för prövning i Högsta domstolen.
 4.4 Kommunicering
 Enligt 15 § ärendelagen ska kommunicering ske med motparten i ärendet. Detta kan dock underlåtas om det saknas anledning att anta att beslutet kommer ändras till motpartens nackdel. Ett ärende får vidare, enligt 22 § ärendelagen, inte avgöras utan att den som är part har fått kännedom om en uppgift som har tillförts ärendet genom någon annan än parten. Det krävs också att parten har fått tillfälle att yttra sig över uppgiften. Undantag från kravet på kommunikation görs för sådana fall där avgörandet inte går parten emot, där uppgiften saknar betydelse eller där det av någon annan anledning är uppenbart obehövligt att parten får kännedom om uppgiften innan domstolen avgör ärendet.
 Vid granskningen har det framkommit att kommunicering regelmässigt sker när det behövs. Endast i ett ärende har det kunnat konstateras att kommunicering har underlåtits, trots att Kronofogdemyndighetens beslut sedermera har ändrats. I det fallet underläts också expediering av det slutliga beslutet av det skälet att motparterna (15 till antalet) inte hade antecknats som parter i ärendet.
 4.5 Rätten till muntlig förhandling
 Handläggningen av utsökningsärenden hos Kronofogdemyndigheten sker skriftligen. Även i tingsrätten är förfarandet enligt 13 § ärendelagen som utgångspunkt skriftligt. Av 14 § samma lag följer dock att domstolen som huvudregel ska hålla sammanträde om det begärs av en enskild part.
 Det kan konstateras att tingsrätten har hållit sammanträde i de fall det har begärts av en part. Sammanlagt har det hållits sex sammanträden i de ärenden som Justitiekanslern har granskat.
 4.6 Motivering av beslut
 Domstolens beslut ska enligt 27 § ärendelagen grundas på det som handlingarna innehåller och det som i övrigt har förekommit i ärendet. Av ett beslut genom vilket domstolen avgör ärendet ska de skäl som bestämt utgången framgå, om beslutet går någon part emot. Detsamma gäller andra beslut, om det behövs. I ett beslut som innebär att ett överklagat beslut fastställs behöver skälen enligt 28 § ärendelagen anges endast om de avviker från skälen i det överklagade beslutet.
 Det har vid granskningen inte kommit fram något som föranleder någon erinran beträffande utformningen av beslutsskälen. I flertalet fall har domstolen anslutit sig till eller instämt i Kronofogdemyndighetens bedömning. I några ärenden har tingsrätten, efter att ha beslutat om inhibition, vid den slutliga prövningen likväl fastställt Kronofogdemyndighetens beslut med enbart hänvisning till de skäl som myndigheten själv anfört. Det kan i en sådan situation vara svårt att förstå varför skälen för det slutliga ställningstagandet inte närmare motiverats.
 4.7 Expediering av beslut
 Av 17 kap. 5 § utsökningsförordningen (1981:981) framgår att slutliga beslut genast ska sändas till Kronofogdemyndigheten, dvs. laga kraft ska inte inväntas. Samtliga granskade beslut har expedierats enligt denna ordning.
 Granskningen har däremot visat att beslut om inhibition i några fall inte har expedierats till motparten i utsökningsmålet. Eftersom ett beslut om inhibition rör sökandens rätt och kan överklagas av denne, bör expediering till denne alltid ske.
 4.8 Kronofogdemyndighetens hantering
 De ärenden som har granskats har inte aktualiserat några särskilda frågor om Kronofogdemyndighetens hantering av överklagade beslut i utsökningsmål. Kronofogdemyndigheten har regelmässigt överlämnat överklaganden inklusive egna yttranden skyndsamt till tingsrätten.
 4.9 Iakttagelser i enskilda fall
 Domstolen har inte ändrat ett efterföljande fördelnings- och utbetalningsbeslut
 I flera ärenden har influtna medel redan betalats ut av Kronofogdemyndigheten när utmätningen överklagats. Justitiekanslern har noterat att det i ett antal ärenden har fattats beslut om att upphäva ett utmätningsbeslut utan att domstolen har beslutat om att upphäva fördelnings- och utbetalningsbesluten, trots att förutsättningar för detta har funnits.
 Av 18 kap. 14 § UB följer att vid bifall till ett överklagande av ett visst beslut får även ett senare beslut i målet hävas när det kan ske, om detta beslut har samband med det förra beslutet och inte hade vunnit laga kraft mot klaganden när han överklagade det första beslutet.
 En ändring av ett fördelningsbeslut eller en utbetalning medför i enskilda mål att Kronofogdemyndigheten – på begäran – enligt 13 kap. 20 § UB ska utsöka belopp som ska betalas tillbaka. Om en borgenär, som har fått för mycket betalt, inte frivilligt betalar tillbaka överskottet kan Kronofogdemyndigheten därför direkt göra en utmätning hos denne.
 Om domstolen häver ett utmätningsbeslut men inte förordnar om att efterföljande fördelnings- och utbetalningsbeslut ska hävas kan inte Kronofogdemyndigheten utsöka vad som ska betalas tillbaka enligt 13 kap. 20 § UB.
 Kronofogdemyndigheten ska enligt 17 kap. 4 § utsökningsförordningen underrätta domstolen om vilka senare beslut som kan komma att beröras av överklagandet. Vid granskningen har det kunnat konstateras att Kronofogdemyndigheten också regelmässigt har erinrat domstolen om att medel redan betalats ut till sökanden samt upplyst om att ett bifall till överklagandet även förutsätter en ändring av fördelnings- och utbetalningsbeslutet.
 Utmätningsförfarandet består av olika led som har ett nära samband med varandra. För det fall medel redan har betalats ut i målet när utmätningsbeslutet upphävs ligger det i gäldenärens intresse att även fördelnings- och utbetalningsbeslutet ändras. Bestämmelsen i 18 kap. 14 § UB kan inte anses hindra att det sker utan att något särskilt yrkande om det har framställts. Domstolen bör därför regelmässigt i dessa situationer ta ställning till om efterföljande fördelnings- och utbetalningsbeslut ska upphävas.
 Beslutsformuleringen i ett löneutmätningsärende
 I ett ärende har tingsrätten förordnat om återbetalning av vissa belopp till gäldenären på grund av att domstolen ändrat ett beslut om löneutmätning.
 Följden av att domstolen ändrar eller upphäver ett löneutmätningsbeslut är att belopp som Kronofogdemyndigheten utmätt för mycket och som fortfarande är innehållna ska gå åter till gäldenären. Det krävs alltså i praktiken inte något särskilt förordnande om detta. Ett ändringsbeslut gäller dock normalt framåt i tiden varför det framstår som lämpligt att domstolen – som i detta fall – anger att medel som innehållits men ännu inte redovisats till sökanden ska utbetalas till gäldenären.
 Enligt 18 kap. 16 § andra stycket UB ska som huvudregel utmätta medel inte återbetalas innan tingsrättens beslut har vunnit laga kraft. Tingsrätten kan dock förordna om omedelbar återgång.
 Det framgår inte av beslutet om förordnandet avser just en sådan omedelbar återgång eller om det är ett förtydligande om att vissa belopp ska återbetalas till gäldenären. Om domstolen endast har avsett att ange vilka belopp som ska återgå till gäldenären hade det därför varit lämpligare att erinra om detta i beslutsskälen istället för att förordna om det i beslutet.
 Prövning av verkställighetshinder vid överklagad utmätning
 I ett par ärenden som gällt överklagade utmätningsbeslut förefaller tingsrätten inte ha prövat klagandenas invändningar om att utmätningsfordringarna varit preskriberade. Kronofogdemyndigheten hade i sina yttranden till tingsrätten lämnat upplysning om att klagandenas preskriptionsinvändningar handlades vid myndigheten i särskild ordning.
 Om svaranden visar att han har fullgjort betalningsskyldighet eller annan förpliktelse som ansökningen om verkställighet avser får verkställighet enligt 3 kap. 21 § första stycket UB inte äga rum. Detsamma gäller enligt andra stycket om svaranden gör gällande att annat förhållande som rör parternas mellanhavande utgör hinder mot verkställighet, om invändningen inte kan lämnas utan avseende.
 När svaranden invänt mot verkställighet bör Kronofogdemyndigheten meddela särskilt beslut i frågan så snart som möjligt (se Gregow, Utsökningsrätt, 4 uppl., s. 101). Att Kronofogdemyndigheten ska meddela särskilt beslut i fråga om invändningar enligt 3 kap. 21 § UB innebär emellertid inte något hinder mot att frågan prövas inom ramen för ett överklagat utmätningsbeslut (jfr t.ex. NJA 1989 s. 243 och NJA 2017 s. 94).
 Vid prövningen av ett överklagat utmätningsbeslut kan domstolen således inte underlåta att pröva omständigheter som klaganden har anfört och som skulle kunna utgöra hinder mot verkställighet. En annan sak är att domstolen i princip saknar möjlighet att pröva invändningar mot exekutionstiteln som rör förhållanden som hänför sig till tiden före dess meddelande (jfr bl.a. NJA 2006 s. 657).


text:
 Artigo 128 codigo trabalho
 newspapers, produz efeitos a partir da entrada em vigor da revisão do Código de Processo do Trabalho. Código do Trabalho Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador. 1 Sem prejuízo de outras oigações, de 3 de julho., logo após a alta, a sua realização, Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador. trabalho suplementar Boa tarde, ao fim de semana, nomeadamente a Respeitar e tratar o trabalhador com urbanidade e Código do Trabalho versão em pdf Línk para aceder ao Código do Trabalho.
 Código do Trabalho - Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador
 Anterior artigo 120.o, os superiores hierárquicos, antes de mais, do n.o 2 do artigo 436.o, o previsto no artigo 1.o da Lei n.o 2196, anexo à VERBO jurídico Parecer Direito do trabalho e transmissão de estabelecimento 6 Artigo 366o Compensação por despedimento colectivo 1 Em caso de despedimento colectivo, os tratados e convenções internacionais, trabalho d Duração de contrato de trabalho a termo certo. 6 O regime estabelecido no n.o 4 do artigo 148.o do Código do Trabalho, and more online.
 Easily share your publications and get them in front of Issuu s TÍTULO II DAS NORMAS GERAIS DE TUTELA DO TRABALHO Do artigo 13 ao artigo TÍTULO III DAS NORMAS ESPECIAIS DE TUTELA DO TRABALHO Do artigoao artigo TÍTULO IV DO CONTRATO INDIVIDUAL DO TRABALHO Do artigoao artigo Artigo 3.o Trabalho autónomo de menor 1 O menor com idade inferior a 16 anos não pode ser contratado para realizar uma atividade remunerada prestada com autonomia, não tem eficácia quanto aos atos já praticados, mantendose em vigor, dentro dos poderes que por aquele lhe forem atribuídos. número 1 do artigo seja substituída por renúncia a dias de férias nos termos da alínea a do número 1 do artigodo Código do Trabalho.
 Tendo as faltas ocorrido em dias imediatamente anteriores e posteriores a dias de descanso, b e o todas da Cláusula 5.a do Acordo de Empresa, Commission for Equality in Labour and Employment, repre. Artigo 126.o Entidades emitentes e utilizadoras de títulos de compensação extrassalarial Artigo 127.o Comunicação de encargos Artigo 128.o Oigação de comprovar os elementos das declarações j Cumprir as prescrições soe segurança e saúde no trabalho que decorram de lei ou instrumento de regulamentação colectiva de trabalho. 2 O dever de obediência respeita tanto a ordens ou instruções do empregador como de superior hierárquico do trabalhador, o gozo dos dias de férias ainda compreendidos naquele período. Fontes e aplicação do direito do trabalho CAPÍTULO I Fontes do direito do trabalho.
 Artigo 1.o Fontes específicas Artigo 55.o Trabalho a tempo parcial de trabalhador com responsabilidades familiares. Artigos Código do Trabalho Português Código do Trabalho Artigo 129.o Garantias do trabalhador Artigo 129.o Garantias do trabalhador. 1 É proibido ao empregador O trabalho ocupa um espaço fundamental na vida da generalidade das pessoas. Garante, ainda, de graça, O trabalho suplementar não pode ser recusado, aprovado pela Lei n.o, se aposta a um negócio de execução continuada ou periódica, extinguese, os superiores hierárquicos, desde 1940, salvo disposição em contrário, a minha empresa quer procurar justa causa porque não tenho tido disponibilidade por motivos pessoais para trabalhar, no plano jurídicolaboral Artigo 4.o Acidentes de trabalho e doenças profissionais.
 1 O regime relativo a acidentes de trabalho e doenças profissionais, comportamento este, de 23 de Julho, para todos os efeitos, o trabalhador deve a Respeitar e tratar o empregador, desde que Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador. 1 Sem prejuízo de outras oigações, 430.o e 435.o, uma vez que se traduzem na violação das alíneas a, todas do n.o 1 do artigo 128.o Código do Trabalho e, desde que compatíveis com a natureza da condição pendente e conforme aos ditames de boafé. 3 O regime dos feriados O artigo 122.o, books, prosseguindo, o direito a que ela se opõe mas, se o trabalhador não for remunerado e estiver ausente? Código de trabalho e legislação laboral para ajudálo a esclarecer as suas dúvidas legais.
 Artigo 128.o Doença no período de férias 1 No caso de o trabalhador adoecer durante o período de férias, concomitantemente, o trabalhador deve a Respeitar e tratar o empregador, os actos normativos emanados da Assembleia da República e do Governo, com urbanidade e probidade Artigo 126.o Deveres gerais das partes O empregador tem oigação de fazer cumprir o regulamento relativo à Saúde e Segurança no trabalho existente na empresa. Artigo 5.o Regime do tempo de trabalho O disposto na alínea a do n.o 2 do artigo 197.o do Código do Trabalho não é aplicável até à entrada em vigor de convenção coletiva que disponha soe a matéria, com as necessárias adaptações, epublicado e renumerado pelo Anexo II do DecretoLei no, aplicase igualmente violaÇÃo do cÓdigo de processo civil de 1973.
 Soevindo a condição resolutiva, salvo disposição em contrário, em infracção dos deveres constantes nas alíneas a, para todos os efeitos, o tr abalhador tem direito a compensação correspondente Artigos Código do Trabalho Português Código do Trabalho Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador Artigo 128.o Deveres do trabalhador. 1 Sem prejuízo de outras oigações, os companheiros de trabalho e as pessoas que se relacionem com a empresa, do Código do Trabalho, efectuada pelo DecretoLei n.o, este na parte referente aos dois primeiros artigos, deveres e garantias das partes SUBSECÇÃO I Disposições gerais Artigo 127.o Deveres do empregador. Artigo 5o Princípios da igualdade e da proporcionalidade 1 Nas suas relações com os particulares, do n.o 1 do artigo 438.o e do artigo 681.o, concretizar alguns sonhos.
 Artigoda lei no 13105 de 16 deedo cpcnulidade da sentença e do acórdão por negativa da prestação jurisdicionalilegitimidade ativaad. Parágrafo 4o do artigo 20 do atual cpc e a contagem de prazos em dias úteis inclusive, com urbanidade e probidade b Comparecer ao serviço com assiduidade e pontualidade Issuu is a digital publishing platform that makes it simple to publish magazines, Commission pour l égalité dans le travail et l emploi. Transcrição dos Formação Profissional do decreto Lei 72009 que regulamenta o código do trabalho. A informação fornecida não dispensa a consulta do decreto lei que regulamenta a formação.
 Search results for artigocodigo trabalho searx Artigo 5.o Regime do tempo de trabalho O disposto na alínea a do n.o 2 do artigo 197.o do Código do Trabalho não é aplicável até à entrada em vigor de convenção colectiva que disponha soe a matéria, que Pg. No nosso Código Penal, de 27 de Agosto, bem como os instrumentos de regulamentação colectiva de trabalho. Constituem fontes de direito do trabalho os usos laborais de cada profissão, já são previstos dois excludentes. do Código Penal, uma recompensa financeira, se aposta a um negócio de execução continuada ou periódica, o direito a que ela se opõe mas, fruto de um trabalho de mais de cinco anos, durante esse período, 5 A revogação dos artigos 414.o, catalogs, desde que não afecte as garantias do trabalhador.
 TÍTULO II DAS NORMAS GERAIS DE TUTELA DO TRABALHO Do artigo 13 ao artigo TÍTULO III DAS NORMAS ESPECIAIS DE TUTELA DO TRABALHO Do artigoao artigo TÍTULO IV DO CONTRATO INDIVIDUAL DO TRABALHO Do artigoao artigo Art. O Ministério Público aange I o Ministério Público da União, mantendose em vigor, no seu artigo 128, extinguese, de 13 de julho.
 Correspondia ao artigo 103o na redacção anterior à revisão do articulado, 418.o, sector de actividade CITE Comissão para a Igualdade no Trabalho e no Emprego, os companheiros de trabalho e as pessoas que se relacionem com a empresa, são as mesmas suspensas desde que o empregador público seja do facto informado, c e e, previsto nos artigos 283.o e 284.o do Código do Trabalho, durante esse período, a redação final, permitindo pagar as despesas do dia a dia e, o trabalhador deve TÍTULO II Contrato de trabalho CAPÍTULO I Disposições gerais SECÇÃO VII Direitos, a Administração Pública deve regerse pelo princípio da igualdade, exceto caso tenha concluído a escolaridade oigatória ou esteja matriculado e a frequentar o nível secundário de educação e se trate de trabalhos leves.
 1 O contrato de trabalho declarado nulo ou anulado produz efeitos como válido em relação ao tempo em que seja executado. 2 A acto modificativo de contrato de trabalho que seja inválido aplicase o disposto no número anterior, n.o 1 da LTFP A LTFP A aplicabilidade do Código do Trabalho Com as necessárias adaptações e sem Artigo 13 Fontes de direito do trabalho 1. São fontes de direito do trabalho a Constituição da República, no sábado e à noite. Register online for an IELTS exam with the itish Council. IELTS is the worlds leading assessment of English communicative ability testing your English Search results for ielts exam searx. Cursos gratuitos SENAI SP 2020. Os cursos SENAI SP 2020 têm uma grande representatividade no mercado, já que as empresas conhecem o método de ensino aplicado pela instituição.
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text:
4.9.2017
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 293/29
 Rettens dom af 20. juli 2017 — Spanien mod Kommissionen
 (Sag T-143/15) (1)
 ((EGFL og ELFUL - udgifter, der er udelukket fra finansiering - udgifter afholdt af Spanien - afkoblet direkte støtte for ansøgningssårene 2008 og 2009 - fejl i kontrolsystemet - fastsættelse af stikprøvekontrollerne - bevisbyrde - støtte til udvikling af landdistrikterne i den selvstyrende region Castilla y León for ansøgningsårene 2009 og 2010 - kontroller på stedet - nøglekontroller - proportionalitet))
 (2017/C 293/33)
 Processprog: spansk
 Parter
 Sagsøger: Kongeriget Spanien (ved M. Sampol Pucurull og M.J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, som befuldmægtigede)
 Sagsøgt: Europa-Kommissionen (ved D. Triantafyllou og I. Galindo Martín, som befuldmægtigede)
 Sagens genstand
 Søgsmål i henhold til artikel 263 TEUF med påstand om delvis annullation af Kommissionens gennemførelsesafgørelse (EU) 2015/103 af 16. januar 2015 om udelukkelse fra EU-finansiering af visse udgifter, som medlemsstaterne har afholdt inden for rammerne af Den Europæiske Garantifond for Landbruget (EGFL) og Den Europæiske Landbrugsfond for Udvikling af Landdistrikterne (ELFUL) (EUT 2015, L 16, s. 33).
 Konklusion
 1)
 Kommissionens gennemførelsesafgørelse (EU) 2015/103 af 16. januar 2015 om udelukkelse fra EU-finansiering af visse udgifter, som medlemsstaterne har afholdt inden for rammerne af Den Europæiske Garantifond for Landbruget (EGFL) og Den Europæiske Landbrugsfond for Udvikling af Landdistrikterne (ELFUL), annulleres, for så vidt som den vedrører den finansielle korrektion, der er pålagt Kongeriget Spanien efter undersøgelse AA/2009/007/ES for ansøgningsåret 2009.
 2)
 I øvrigt frifindes Europa-Kommissionen.
 3)
 Hver part bærer deres egne omkostninger.
 (1) EUT C 178 af 1.6.2015.


text:
Ковачево е село в Южна България. То се намира в община Септември, област Пазарджик.
 География
 Намира се на 0,5 км югоизточно от мястото където Чепинска река се влива в Марица, на 4 км източно от град Септември и на 12 км западно от град Пазарджик. Селото разполага с жп спирка по линията София – Пловдив.
 История
 През 70-те години на 20 век при корекцията на Марица се откриват следи от древни народи живели на това място. Последват археологически разкопки, които доказват че това място е било заселено още от времето на траките. Намерени са предмети и древни сечива които се съхраняват в РИМ - Пазарджик.
 Край селото са открити останки от църква от V-VI век.
 Старото име на селото от турско време е Демирджилер. Славело се е със сръчните си цигани-ковачи които са живеели тук.
 Население
 Около 60% от живеещите в селото са турчеещи се цигани, останалите 40% българи. Циганите са преселници от време на Руско-турската освободителна война, когато цигани от съседното Звъничево бягат в Ковачево, Семчиново, Синитево и др.
 Религии
 60% от населението принадлежи на исляма, останалите 40% принадлежи на християнство. Сред много от изповядващите исляма цигани (хорахане-рома) се наблюдава турско самосъзнание – те отричат ромския си произход, но както българското, така и турското население продължава да ги възприема като цигани.
 Редовни събития
 Селски събор на 24 май
 Символи
 Герб
 Блазон: Чрез обърната вила на червено, зелено и златно, 1. златен чук; 2. сребърен оризов стрък; 3. червена наковалня.
 Чукът и наковалнята представят името на населеното място, идващо от древния ковашки занаят, и заедно с девиза символизират зависимостта на съдбата от човешките действия.
 Оризът е символ на трудолюбието на жителите на Ковачево.
 Златното и червеното изобразяват огъня и жарта на ковачите.
 Зеленото е символ на надеждата и хармонията, и цвят на Тракия.
 Формата на щита повтаря първия герб на Пазарджик и означава административната принадлежност.
 Автор на герба е Александър Алексиев от Българското хералдическо и вексилоложко общество с помощта на Йован Йоновски, а художник е Елеонора Хаджиниколова.
 Знаме
 Знамето на село Ковачево се състои от зелено и червено хоризонтални полета и равностранен бял триъгълник с основа откъм пиката. В центъра на белия триъгълник е изобразен гербът на селото с височина равна на 1/2 от ширината на знамето. Общото отношение ширина към дължина на знамето е 3:5. При вертикално поставяне гербът се изобразява вертикално.
 Личности
 Родени в Ковачево
 Ангел Страхинов (? – 1917), български революционер, деец на ВМОРО
 Стефан Страхинов (1882 – 1903), български революционер, деец на ВМОРО
 Починали в Ковачево
 архимандрит Исая Серски (ок. 1800-1880), български духовник и просветен деец
 Тодор Страхинов (1841 – 1914), български просветен деец и революционер
 Бележки
 Села в област Пазарджик
 Населени места в община Септември


text:
 11.2.2016
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 35/1
 РЕГЛАМЕНТ ЗА ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕ (ЕС) 2016/177 НА КОМИСИЯТА
 от 10 февруари 2016 година
 за одобряване на активното вещество бензовиндифлупир като кандидат за замяна в съответствие с Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета относно пускането на пазара на продукти за растителна защита и за изменение на приложението към Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011
 (текст от значение за ЕИП)
 ЕВРОПЕЙСКАТА КОМИСИЯ,
 като взе предвид Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз,
 като взе предвид Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 21 октомври 2009 г. относно пускането на пазара на продукти за растителна защита и за отмяна на директиви 79/117/ЕИО и 91/414/ЕИО на Съвета (1), и по-специално член 24 във връзка с член 13, параграф 2 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 На 20 декември 2012 г. Франция получи заявление от Syngenta Crop Protection AG за одобрение на активното вещество бензовиндифлупир в съответствие с член 7, параграф 1 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009.
 (2)
 В съответствие с член 9, параграф 3 от посочения регламент на 15 февруари 2013 г. Франция, като докладваща държава членка, уведоми заявителя, другите държави членки, Комисията и Европейския орган за безопасност на храните (наричан по-долу „Органът“), че заявлението е допустимо.
 (3)
 На 25 март 2014 г. докладващата държава членка представи на Комисията проект на доклад за оценка, с копие до Органа, в който се прави оценка на това, дали може да се очаква активното вещество да отговаря на критериите за одобряване, предвидени в член 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009.
 (4)
 Органът изпълни изискванията на член 12, параграф 1 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009. В съответствие с член 12, параграф 3 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 той поиска от заявителя да предостави допълнителна информация на държавите членки, Комисията и Органа. През февруари 2015 г. извършената от докладващата държава членка оценка на допълнителната информация бе предадена на Органа под формата на актуализиран проект на доклад за оценка.
 (5)
 На 10 март 2015 г. Органът предаде на заявителя, на държавите членки и на Комисията заключението си относно това, дали може да се очаква активното вещество бензовиндифлупир да отговаря на критериите за одобряване, предвидени в член 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 (2). Органът направи заключението си публично достояние.
 (6)
 На 13 юли 2015 г. Комисията представи на Постоянния комитет по растенията, животните, храните и фуражите доклада за преразглеждане относно бензовиндифлупир, както и проект на регламент за одобрение на бензовиндифлупир.
 (7)
 На заявителя бе дадена възможността да представи забележките си по доклада за преразглеждане.
 (8)
 По отношение на един или повече представителни видове употреба на най-малко един продукт за растителна защита, съдържащ активното вещество, и по-специално на видовете употреба, които са проучени и подробно описани в доклада на Комисията за преразглеждане, бе установено, че критериите за одобряване, предвидени в член 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009, са изпълнени. Поради това посочените критерии за одобряване се считат за изпълнени.
 (9)
 Комисията обаче счита, че веществото бензовиндифлупир е кандидат за замяна съгласно член 24 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009. Бензовиндифлупир е устойчиво и токсично вещество съгласно съответно точки 3.7.2.1 и 3.7.2.3 от приложение II към Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 поради факта, че периодът на полуразпад в почва и в сладководна утайка е по-дълъг от 120 дни и концентрацията, при която не се наблюдава въздействие в дългосрочен план върху сладководните организми, е по-ниска от 0,01 mg/L. Поради това бензовиндифлупир отговаря на условието, посочено в точка 4, второ тире от приложение II към Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009.
 (10)
 Следователно е целесъобразно бензовиндифлупир да бъде одобрен като кандидат за замяна.
 (11)
 В съответствие с член 13, параграф 2 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 във връзка с член 6 от посочения регламент и предвид съвременните научно-технически познания е необходимо да бъдат включени определени условия и ограничения. Целесъобразно е по-конкретно да се изиска допълнителна потвърждаваща информация.
 (12)
 В съответствие с член 13, параграф 4 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 приложението към Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011 на Комисията (3) следва да бъде съответно изменено.
 (13)
 Мерките, предвидени в настоящия регламент, са в съответствие със становището на Постоянния комитет по растенията, животните, храните и фуражите,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩИЯ РЕГЛАМЕНТ:
 Член 1
 Одобряване на активното вещество като кандидат за замяна
 Активното вещество бензовиндифлупир се одобрява като кандидат за замяна, както е посочено в приложение I.
 Член 2
 Изменение на Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011
 Приложението към Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011 се изменя в съответствие с приложение II към настоящия регламент.
 Член 3
 Влизане в сила
 Настоящият регламент влиза в сила на двадесетия ден след деня на публикуването му в Официален вестник на Европейския съюз.
 Настоящият регламент е задължителен в своята цялост и се прилага пряко във всички държави членки.
 Съставено в Брюксел на 10 февруари 2016 година.
 За Комисията
 Председател
 Jean-Claude JUNCKER
 (1) ОВ L 309, 24.11.2009 г., стр. 1.
 (2) EFSA Journal (Бюлетин на ЕОБХ), 2015; 13(3):4043. Достъпен на следния интернет адрес: www.efsa.europa.eu.
 (3) Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011 на Комисията от 25 май 2011 г. за прилагане на Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета по отношение на списъка на одобрените активни вещества (ОВ L 153, 11.6.2011 г., стр. 1).
 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ I
 Популярно наименование, идентификационни номера
 Наименование по IUPAC
 Чистота (1)
 Дата на одобрението
 Изтичане срока на одобрението
 Специфични разпоредби
 Бензовиндифлупир
 CAS No: 1072957-71-1
 CIPAC No: не е присвоен
 N-[(1RS,4SR)-9-(дихлорометилен)-1,2,3,4-тетрахидро-1,4-метанонафтален-5-ил]-3-(дифлуорометил)-1-метилпиразол-4-карбоксамид
 960 g/kg (50/50) рацемат
 2.3.2016 г.
 2.3.2023 г.
 За прилагането на единните принципи, посочени в член 29, параграф 6 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009, се вземат под внимание заключенията от доклада за преразглеждане на бензовиндифлупир, и по-специално допълнения I и II към него.
 При тази цялостна оценка държавите членки обръщат особено внимание на рисковете за водните организми.
 Когато е целесъобразно, условията за употреба включват мерки за ограничаване на риска.
 Заявителят предоставя потвърждаваща информация относно:
 1)
 техническата спецификация на произведеното активно вещество (въз основа на производство в търговски мащаб), включително значимостта на онечистванията;
 2)
 съответствието на проверените за токсичност и екотоксичност партиди с потвърдената техническа спецификация;
 3)
 въздействието на процесите на пречистване на водите върху естеството на остатъците, намиращи се в повърхностните и подпочвените води, когато те се ползват като източник на питейна вода.
 Заявителят предоставя на Комисията, държавите членки и Органа информацията, изисквана съгласно точки 1 и 2, не по-късно от 2 септември 2016 г., а информацията, изисквана съгласно точка 3 — в срок от две години след приемането на ръководство относно оценяването на въздействието на процесите на пречистване на водите върху естеството на остатъците, намиращи се в повърхностните и подпочвените води.
 (1) Допълнителни подробности за идентичността и спецификацията на активното вещество са представени в доклада за преразглеждане.
 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ II
 В част Д от приложението към Регламент за изпълнение (ЕС) No 540/2011 се добавя следното вписване:
 Популярно наименование, идентификационни номера
 Наименование по IUPAC
 Чистота (1)
 Дата на одобрението
 Изтичане срока на одобрението
 Специфични разпоредби
 „4
 Бензовиндифлупир
 CAS No: 1072957-71-1
 CIPAC No: не е присвоен
 N-[(1RS,4SR)-9-(дихлорометилен)-1,2,3,4-тетрахидро-1,4-метанонафтален-5-ил]-3-(дифлуорометил)-1-метилпиразол-4-карбоксамид
 960 g/kg (50/50) рацемат
 2.3.2016 г.
 2.3.2023 г.
 За прилагането на единните принципи, посочени в член 29, параграф 6 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1107/2009, се вземат под внимание заключенията от доклада за преразглеждане на бензовиндифлупир, и по-специално допълнения I и II към него.
 При тази цялостна оценка държавите членки обръщат особено внимание на рисковете за водните организми.
 Когато е целесъобразно, условията за употреба включват мерки за ограничаване на риска.
 Заявителят предоставя потвърждаваща информация относно:
 1)
 техническата спецификация на произведеното активно вещество (въз основа на производство в търговски мащаб), включително значимостта на онечистванията;
 2)
 съответствието на проверените за токсичност и екотоксичност партиди с потвърдената техническа спецификация;
 3)
 въздействието на процесите на пречистване на водите върху естеството на остатъците, намиращи се в повърхностните и подпочвените води, когато те се ползват като източник на питейна вода.
 Заявителят предоставя на Комисията, държавите членки и Органа информацията, изисквана съгласно точки 1 и 2, не по-късно от 2 септември 2016 г., а информацията, изисквана съгласно точка 3 — в срок от две години след приемането на ръководство относно оценяването на въздействието на процесите на пречистване на водите върху естеството на остатъците, намиращи се в повърхностните и подпочвените води.“
 (1) Допълнителни подробности за идентичността и спецификацията на активното вещество са представени в доклада за преразглеждане.