type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 266 Md. 117 (1972)
 291 A.2d 672
 ROCKVILLE FUEL AND FEED CO., INC.
 v.
 CITY OF GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND
 [No. 364, September Term, 1971.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided June 14, 1972.
 The cause was argued before BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ., and ROBERT E. CLAPP, JR., Associate Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, specially assigned.
 Robert L. Burchett, with whom were Miller, Miller & Canby on the brief, for appellant.
 Joe M. Kyle for appellee.
 BARNES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 In Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499 (1970), we decided that under the applicable zoning ordinance of the City of Gaithersburg, the appellant in the present case, *119 Rockville Fuel and Feed Company, Inc. (Rockville Fuel or Plaintiff), was entitled to have its application for a special exception to construct and operate a concrete batching plant on its 3.6069 acre tract of land in Gaithersburg located in an I-2 zone (Heavy Industrial), there being no sufficient evidence before the Board of Appeals to justify the denial by it of the application. After our decision, the Mayor and Council of Gaithersburg enacted a text amendment to the Gaithersburg zoning ordinance which removed the "concrete or cement products manufacture" use as a permitted use in the I-2 zone and placed that use in the prohibited uses in that zone. Rockville Fuel, having been denied a permit to proceed with the construction and operation of its proposed concrete batching plant because of the provisions of the text amendment, filed a suit in equity for declaratory relief and an injunction seeking a declaration of its right "to construct and use the proposed concrete batching plant as set forth in Special Exception Case A-113 and that, as ancillary relief, the Court enter an injunction in this proceeding enjoining the City, its agents, servants and employees from interfering with Plaintiff in his [sic] pursuit of a building permit and subsequent construction and use of the proposed plant, in accordance with the Special Exception granted to the Plaintiff in case No. A-113."
 The new suit was heard before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Levine, J.) on October 14, 1971. Substantially all of the relevant facts were the subject of a stipulation by counsel for the parties and legal memoranda were submitted by them. Judge Levine filed a well-considered and helpful opinion on December 22, 1971, with an order declaring, inter alia, "that the denial of a site plan and building permit for the construction of a concrete mixing plant was not illegal." From this order, Rockville Fuel took a timely appeal to this Court.
 Judge Levine has stated the facts of the present case so well in his opinion that we shall use his statement of the facts in this opinion. Judge Levine stated:
 "Rockville Fuel is the owner of a 3.6069 acre *120 tract of land within the City of Gaithersburg located on the site of the old Thomas cannery on Chestnut Street adjacent to what is known as the Federline Apartments; however, the site is probably better known for its position at one of the principal entrances to the agricultural grounds, scene of the annual county fair. At all relevant times the property has been zoned I-2 (heavy industrial) as defined by the Gaithersburg Zoning Ordinance. Similarly, the most recent master plan of zoning adopted by Gaithersburg on February 4, 1970, recommends that the subject property be used for commercial-industrial purposes.
 "The property was purchased by the Plaintiff in March, 1967, at a cost of $375,000, for the exclusive purpose of building the concrete plant. On March 25, 1968, the Plaintiff filed an application for a special exception pursuant to the zoning ordinance which then included such plants as one of the permitted uses in the I-2 zone. The Board of Appeals for the City of Gaithersburg on December 10, 1968, denied the request for the special exception. From that decision, an appeal was taken to this Court which affirmed the denial. Thereafter, the decision of this Court was appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland which on March 4, 1970, filed its opinion reversing this Court and remanding the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. Rockville Fuel and Feed v. Board of Appeals, supra. The Court of Appeals held that the application for the special exception had been wrongfully denied and that the Board should grant the application upon remand on such conditions and safeguards as might then be appropriate under the existing ordinance and the evidence adduced before it.
 "At their next meeting following the decision *121 of the Court of Appeals held on March 16, 1970, the Mayor and Council of Gaithersburg adopted a resolution instructing the City Manager to file a zoning text amendment, the sole purpose of which was the deletion of ready-mix concrete plants as a permitted use in the I-2 zone and their inclusion as a prohibited use. This action was taken under circumstances which would reasonably permit an inference that but for the outcome of the case before the Court of Appeals, no such resolution would have been proposed. This follows not only from the timing, which was hardly coincidental, but also from the minutes of that meeting and the court testimony of James W. Hane, a member of both the City Council and the Board of Appeals at the time of the resolution.
 "On the following day, the City Manager, acting pursuant to the aforesaid resolution, caused an application for a zoning text amendment to be filed that had as its sole purpose the elimination of ready-mix concrete plants as permitted uses in the I-2 zone, and their inclusion in the list of prohibited uses.
 "On March 25, 1970, the Plaintiff filed a site-development plan application in accordance with the requirements of the zoning ordinance. This application required the approval of the City Planning Commission prior to the issuance of a building permit. Pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals issued on April 3, 1970, the Board of Appeals on April 9, 1970, adopted a resolution granting the Plaintiff's application for a special exception. On April 15, 1970, the Planning Commission conducted a public hearing on the zoning text amendment which was proposed for the purpose of deleting ready-mix concrete plants. At that same meeting, the Planning Commission also considered Plaintiff's application *122 for the site-development plan and gave it preliminary approval. On May 1, 1970, the Plaintiff attempted to file an application for a building permit to construct the proposed batching plant, but said application was refused because final site-plan approval had not been obtained.
 "On May 4, 1970, the Mayor and Council conducted a public hearing on the proposed zoning text amendment. The City Planning Director was the only witness in favor of it and counsel for the Plaintiff was the only witness who testified in opposition thereto. Immediately following the hearing, a pre-prepared resolution granting the application was produced which was adopted. Immediately upon its adoption, it was declared to be an emergency measure, thereby causing it to take effect immediately upon approval by the Mayor rather than twenty days thereafter.[1] In an exchange which took place at that time, it was revealed that no pre-prepared resolution denying the text amendment had been produced or made available; and in response to a request from Plaintiff's counsel, no specific reason for the emergency was given. On May 5, 1970, the Mayor approved the ordinance granting the zoning text amendment.
 "On May 6, 1970, the Planning Commission conducted a public hearing on the Plaintiff's site-plan application and disapproved the plan on the basis of the action taken on the preceding day by the Mayor in approving the zoning text amendment to the ordinance. Following preliminary approval given to the site-plan application on April 15, 1970, the Plaintiff had filed amended plans that complied with the requests *123 of the Planning Commission made on April 15, and hence the amended plans were ready for final approval at the meeting of May 6. As a consequence of the Mayor's approval of the zoning text amendment to the ordinance, concrete mixing plants have not been permitted in the City of Gaithersburg since May 5, 1970.
 "On May 19, 1970, the Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the disapproval of the site plan with the Board of Appeals, alleging inter alia that it was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful and unconstitutional. No action has ever been taken on that appeal nor has a building permit ever been issued to the Plaintiff.
 "The Plaintiff asserts three basic contentions: (1) that Rockville Fuel had by reason of the Court of Appeals decision acquired a vested right to `operate a concrete batching plant' which cannot be defeated by the adoption of the amendment to the ordinance; (2) that the ordinance amendment is unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiff, in that it was not general legislation, but was aimed solely at Rockville Fuel, and that by being applied retrospectively to the Plaintiff, denied it due process and equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and (3) that Gaithersburg was estopped from taking any action denying to the Plaintiff the right to operate the concrete mixing plant."
 Rockville Fuel makes the same three contentions before us as it made before the lower court and we will consider them in the order indicated.
 (1)
 Rockville Fuel earnestly argued below and before us that the amendatory ordinance cannot constitutionally impair its "vested right" to construct and to operate a *124 concrete batching plant resulting from our decision in Rockville Fuel v. Board of Appeals, supra. Unfortunately for it, our prior decisions and those of our predecessors indicate that Rockville Fuel has no such "vested right."
 In The Richmond Corporation v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 254 Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969), we reviewed the Maryland and the general law in regard to "vested rights" in an existing zoning use and stated:
 "In Maryland it is established that in order to obtain a `vested right' in the existing zoning use which will be constitutionally protected against a subsequent change in the zoning ordinance prohibiting or limiting that use, the owner must (1) obtain a permit or occupancy certificate where required by the applicable ordinance and (2) must proceed under that permit or certificate to exercise it on the land involved so that the neighborhood may be advised that the land is being devoted to that use." (254 Md. at 255-56, 255 A.2d at 404.)
 It is clear that even the obtention of a building permit in furtherance of a then permitted zoning use does not create a "vested right" constitutionally insulated against a change in the zoning ordinance forbidding the particular use. Ross v. Montgomery County, 252 Md. 497, 250 A.2d 635 (1969). In Ross, in which the landowner had a building permit to construct a then permitted apartment hotel and had poured one footing for the building in an attempt to retain the building permit, but later filled in the excavation, we held that the landowners had acquired no "vested right" protecting the proposed use against a subsequent amendment to the applicable zoning ordinance and stated:
 "`It is idle to say that the issuance of the building permit created a vested right that would render inoperative the Zoning Regulations * * *.'"
 (252 Md. at 505, 250 A.2d at 640.)
 *125 We cited with approval and followed the prior decisions of this Court in Board of County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County v. Snyder, 186 Md. 342, 46 A.2d 689 (1946) and Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A.2d 273 (1947) and also quoted, with approval, from 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (3rd ed.) Ch. 57, § 3, at 57-6 to 57-7, as follows:
 "`* * * The majority rule, which can be synthesized from the multitudinous decisions in this area, may be stated as follows: A landowner will be held to have acquired a vested right to continue the construction of a building or structure and to initiate and continue a use despite a restriction contained in an ordinance where, prior to the effective date of the ordinance, in reliance upon a permit theretofore validly issued, he has, in good faith, made a substantial change of position in relation to the land, made substantial expenditures, or has incurred substantial obligations. * * *'" (252 Md. at 506, 250 A.2d at 640.)
 In Malmar Associates v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971), the landowner had planned the construction of an apartment project in three sections. One section had been completed when the zoning ordinance was amended to require a special exception to permit the number of two and three bedroom apartments in any apartment building to exceed certain percentages. The owner obtained such a special exception for the second section. When the zoning text amendment was adopted, the owner had expended $118,542.20 for surveys, soil tests, architectural designs and engineering work on the third section for which 442 bedrooms were proposed. The text amendment reduced that number to 367 without a special exception. The special exception was denied and the owner contended that its investment gave it a vested *126 right to a permit for an apartment building containing 442 bedrooms. In sustaining the validity and effectiveness of the text amendment as it applied to the third section, we cited with approval and followed Richmond, supra. See Ross, supra; Mandel v. Board of County Commissioners, 238 Md. 208, 208 A.2d 710 (1965); and, Shapiro and Snyder, both supra. We also quoted with approval from 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning (3rd ed.) Ch. 57, § 1, at 57-2 to 57-4, as follows:
 "It is generally held that neither the filing of an application for a building permit nor the issuance of a building permit, although valid and issued in conformity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance, alone confers any rights in the applicant or permittee as against a change in the zoning ordinance which imposes further limitations upon the use or structure proposed. As a matter of dicta, some courts have stated that the amendment of the ordinance constitutes, ipso facto, a revocation of any permit for a use or structure prohibited by the amendment.
 "Where the landowner has done nothing subsequent to obtaining the permit, he is usually held to be bound by any change in the zoning ordinance even if its effect is to nullify the permit."
 (260 Md. at 309, 272 A.2d at 15.)
 In the instant case, although the special exception was granted as required by our mandate in Rockville Fuel v. Board of Appeals, supra, no permit was ever obtained by Rockville Fuel and, of course, no construction was begun. The authorities cited clearly indicate that Rockville Fuel had obtained no "vested right" to construct and operate a concrete batching plant on its Gaithersburg land.
 Rockville Fuel seeks to distinguish the prior Maryland cases already mentioned on the ground that its right to have the special exception granted had been determined *127 by this Court and this determination gave it a "vested right" to construct and operate the proposed concrete batching plant. This contention is, in our opinion, without merit. Our prior decision determined that the Board of Appeals should grant the special exception with appropriate conditions under the law then existing and this the Board of Appeals did as required by the mandate. No "vested right" was conferred upon Rockville Fuel by this action. Such a "vested right" could only result when a lawful permit was obtained and the owner, in good faith, has proceeded with such construction under it as will advise the public that the owner has made a substantial beginning to construct the building and commit the use of the land to the permission granted.
 This Court has consistently held that "a zoning case must be decided upon the law applicable at the time the case is before us, in the absence of intervening vested rights." DalMaso v. Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 264 Md. 691, 694, 288 A.2d 119, 121 (1972) and prior cases therein cited. The basic question in the present case is, therefore, the second question, i.e., is the text amendment to the Gaithersburg zoning ordinance unconstitutional as it applies to Rockville Fuel? We now turn to that question.
 (2)
 Rockville Fuel does not contend in the present case that the zoning amendment prevents it from using its land for all lawful and proper uses permitted in the I-2 zone and hence would amount to a taking of its land for public use without the payment of just compensation as prohibited by Art. III, Sec. 40A of the Maryland Constitution. Indeed, James D. Ward, Secretary-Treasurer of Rockville Fuel, stated on cross-examination that "* * * it would be entirely possible for some other owner to use it [the subject property] for another purpose other than a concrete batching plant."
 The question then is whether or not the amendatory zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as being arbitrary, *128 unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory and thus a violation of the provisions of Art. 23 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution prohibiting a denial of due process of law and of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As Judge Levine aptly stated:
 "In mounting its two-pronged attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance amendment, Rockville Fuel argues earnestly that Gaithersburg's action was taken solely for the purpose of thwarting Plaintiff's construction of the concrete mixing plant. Hence, it says, the ordinance was `a special law for a special case', and not general legislation for the protection and benefit of the public. In support of this contention, it points with considerable force to the following facts: that immediately following the Court of Appeals decision, the City Attorney suggested the amendment as an antidote; the timing and sequence of the various actions then taken by Gaithersburg's official bodies in furtherance of the amendment; and the fact that while the amendment eliminates concrete mixing plants, a number of uses which are at least as obnoxious were retained in the zoning ordinance.
 "The case on which it places great reliance for this argument is North West Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 (1948). There, the Baltimore City property in question had been in a commercial use district since the original zoning ordinance of 1931. In the immediate vicinity was a large area of residential classification. In 1945, the appellant purchased property in the commercial district for expansion of its storage facilities which it required for its building materials manufacturing business, and because of the property's access to a railroad siding. After obtaining an occupancy permit, it cleared and *129 filled the property and otherwise prepared it for use at a cost of $50,000 which included the purchase price. By 1946, the preparations were completed and the property was being used.
 "In October 1945, an amendment to the ordinance was proposed which changed the property from the `second commercial use district' to the `residential use district'. While this amendment was under consideration, the appellant filed three applications for building permits. This incurred considerable neighborhood opposition but the permits were issued. In April 1946, after undergoing a tortuous journey through the various public agencies, the ordinance was approved. A group of nearby property owners sued for injunction and a declaration that the three building permits were void. On appeal from a decree enjoining the appellant from erecting the three warehouse buildings and from using the property for any use not permitted by the ordinance amendment, the appellant contended, inter alia, that the amendment was unconstitutional as applied to it in depriving it of property without due process and in denying it equal protection of the law.
 "The Court of Appeals reversed the decree, holding the ordinance amendment was invalid as applied to the appellant for being unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to the section of the Zoning Enabling Act (Acts of 1927, Chapter 705, Article 66 B, Section 3) which required zoning regulations to `be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and ... with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its suitability for particular uses....'
 "We believe the Plaintiff has placed a gloss on O'Rourke which we are unable to accept. At the outset, it should be noted that the facts in *130 O'Rourke are distinguishable from the case at bar in that O'Rourke is concerned with a change from one entire zoning classification to another (commercial to residential) after the commercial use had been established. Here, we deal with the elimination of one particular use (not yet established) from among many permitted in the heavy industrial classification. Furthermore, it is clear that the sole basis for the amendment was a `plebescite [sic] of neighbors' without any supporting evidence that related to the public health, comfort, safety or welfare. There is also a strong suggestion from the cases cited with approval in the opinion, including Vine v. Zabriskie, 122 N.J.L. 4, 6, 3 A.2d 886, 887 (1939), also quoted extensively in Plaintiff's memorandum, that the effect of the amendment was to restrict the owner from using the property for any reasonable purpose. A similar contention has not been advanced by the Plaintiff, nor is there any evidence to support it. Mandel, supra, at 217.
 "The argument that through its action nullifying the special exception by the amendment, Gaithersburg violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights of due process and equal protection is not dissimilar from the contention asserted in Eutaw Enterprises, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 241 Md. 686, 217 A.2d 348 (1966) which, although it was concerned with an existing use, is apposite to the case at bar. There, an ordinance was adopted which eliminated check-cashing businesses from `residential and office use districts,' but allowing existing businesses 18 months in which to cease operating. In disposing of the equal protection argument, the Court found controlling the case of Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957), a landmark *131 case in the area of non-conforming uses. It quoted Grant with approval:
 "`If it does not clearly appear that this legislative finding [that billboards in residential areas so seriously incommoded the health, comfort and general welfare that the benefit to the public good brought about by their removal from such areas substantially outweighed the resulting harm to individuals] was unreasonable and arbitrary  almost demonstrably wrong from the record  the courts may not disturb it.'
 (emphasis supplied) 241 Md. at 694.
 "The Court stated that the City Council could reasonably and properly have believed check-cashing businesses to be inconsistent and incompatible with uses customary in a residential and office use district, and ultimately have determined that check-cashing uses were detrimental to the public health, comfort and welfare.
 "The transcript of the public hearing held by the Gaithersburg Planning Commission on the proposed amendment includes the testimony of the City Planning Director. He testified that a new comprehensive zoning ordinance was expected imminently which had among its goals the elimination of heavy industrial uses from the `historic heart of the City,' in order to preserve it as an area of residential and commercial uses. He testified that to this end, the anticipated ordinance would eliminate a number of heavy industrial uses so as to conform it to the plan which had already been adopted. Quite obviously, concrete mixing plants was one of the uses which was to be eliminated by the forthcoming ordinance. This testimony, in effect, adopted the analysis which the Planning Staff *132 had made in recommending approval of the amendment.
 "The Planning Commission registered its approval of the amendment which it forwarded to the Mayor and Council. In doing so, it affirmed the views presented to it and indicated its concern with the effect that concrete mixing plants might have on the environment. The views of the Planning Commission were presented to the Mayor and Council as were those of the Plaintiff, following which the amendment received final approval.
 "Clearly these facts are sufficient to bring this case within the ambit of the test enunciated in Grant and followed in Eutaw, in that `the City Council could have found that [cement mixing plants] in residential [and commercial] areas so seriously incommoded the health, comfort and general welfare that the benefit to the public good brought about by their removal from such areas substantially outweighed the resulting harm to individuals.... If it does not clearly appear that this legislative finding was unreasonable and arbitrary  almost demonstrably wrong from the record  the courts may not disturb it.' 241 Md. at 694.
 "It is important to note, as we stressed in disposing of the vested rights issue, that in the case at bar, unlike the non-conforming use cases which include Eutaw and Grant, we are not concerned with an existing use. This distinction merely attenuates the Plaintiff's contention. The Court of Appeals noted the distinction in Eutaw with the following statement:
 "`The distinction between an ordinance that restricts future uses and one that requires existing uses to stop after a reasonable time, is not a difference in kind but one of degree and, in each case, constitutionality *133 depends on overall reasonableness, on the importance of the public gain in relation to the private loss.' 241 Md. at 695.
 "Eutaw also appears dispositive of Plaintiff's reliance on the argument that since it had the only proposal pending in the City for a concrete mixing plant, the amendment was aimed solely at it, and thus constituted special legislation.
 "`The holdings of Grant control this case. The ordinances here complained of were constitutional exercises of legislative power. Ordinance 465, when it validly excluded check cashing operations from residential zones from the date of its enactment, necessarily made such operations then already in existence in such zone nonconforming uses. The fact, if it is a fact, that Eutaw was the only commercial check casher in a residential district when the ordinances were enacted and that the City Council knew this, would not make them invalid as to Eutaw. It had no vested right in the zoning classification under which it operated and no right to expect that the classification of the property in which it operated would remain unchanged indefinitely. The ordinances, passed after deliberation and full consideration of expert and professional advice were general in application and drawn to apply in the same way, presently and in the future, to all similarly situated.' (emphasis supplied) 241 Md. at 696.
 "The Plaintiff has not established that the zoning text amendment is unconstitutional as applied to it."
 (3)
 Finally, Rockville Fuel contends that the City of Gaithersburg is estopped to take any action to deny it *134 the right to construct and operate a concrete batching plant. We do not agree with this contention.
 We adopt, as the opinion of the Court, Judge Levine's opinion on this point, as follows:
 "It [Rockville Fuel] urges that by its provision for concrete batching plants as a permitted use in the zoning ordinance, subject to a special exception, Gaithersburg induced it to purchase the subject property; that, in continued reliance thereon, Rockville Fuel prosecuted its special-exception application and the resulting appeals at the expense of `considerable time and money'. In effect, the argument is that under those circumstances, Gaithersburg's action came too late to be applied to Rockville Fuel.
 "That the doctrine of estoppel may be applied to municipal corporations is well settled in this State. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 197 A.2d 821 (1964).
 "However, no authority has been brought to our attention, nor have we been able to find any, which holds that a municipal corporation may be estopped from amending an ordinance on the basis that someone previously purchased property in reliance upon the ordinance. Public policy considerations alone would appear to constitute an overwhelming answer to that contention. Furthermore, there is not the slightest suggestion offered by the Plaintiff that Gaithersburg was on notice that the property was being purchased with the intended purpose of applying for a special exception. Nor is there any evidence showing that the Plaintiff was induced by any conduct on the Defendant's part. Normally, mere silence, standing alone, does not create an estoppel where there is no duty to speak. Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 216 A. *135 2d 521 (1966); and, in any event, the silent party must have knowledge of the facts. Mason v. Dulaney, 144 Md. 108, 124 A. 390 (1923).
 "Finally, there is no evidence that Rockville Fuel, in acquiring the land and being unable to seek a special exception, has suffered injury, since the testimony did not disclose the present worth as compared to its purchase price. Savonis v. Burke, supra.
 "Even if we consider the estoppel claim merely within the narrow framework of the Plaintiff's efforts to secure the special exception in reliance upon the conduct of Gaithersburg, as distinguished from the purchase of the real estate, we remain confined to the proposition that the inducement consisted of mere silence on the Defendant's part. In sum, the doctrine of estoppel would appear applicable to this case only if we had first reached the conclusion that the Plaintiff had a vested right in retaining concrete batching plants as a special-exception use under the zoning ordinance, a contention which we have already examined and rejected. Board of County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County v. Maurice Snyder, supra."
 See also City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow Shopping Center, 264 Md. 481, 495-96, 287 A.2d 242, 249-50 (1972), in which Judge Finan, for the Court, reviewed our prior cases and a number of opinions of the highest courts of other states on the subject of estoppel of municipal corporations, citing Baltimore v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 634, 51 A.2d 273 (1947), with approval, and quoting from McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 8, § 25.153, at 489 (1965 Rev. Vol.). See also Harris Used Car v. Anne Arundel County, 257 Md. 412, 418-19, 263 A.2d 520, 523-24 (1970).
 Order of December 22, 1971, affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs.
 NOTES
 [1] "No point is made by the Plaintiff that the declaration of emergency was contrary to law."


jurisdiction: EU

text:
5.2.2000 DA De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende C 34/19
 — Det Forenede Kongeriges undladelse af at rejse administra- Forenede Kongerige havde vedtaget de bestemmelser, der er
 tiv eller strafferetlig påtale over for kaptajner eller redere, nødvendige for at efterkomme det i Kommissionens påstand
 der måtte antages at have undladt at overholde den nævnte direktiv.
 relevante lovgivning vedrørende bevarelses- og kontrolfor-
 anstaltninger, er en overtrædelse af artikel 1, stk. 2, i
 forordning nr. 2057/82 som ændret (jf. artikel 1, stk. 2, i (1) EFT L 365 af 31.12.1994, s. 10.
 forordning nr. 2241/87 med virkning fra 1.8.1987).
 (1) Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 170/83 af 25.1.1983 om en fælles-
 skabsordning for bevarelse og forvaltning af fiskeressourcerne,
 EFT L 24 af 27.1.1983, s. 1.
 (2) Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2057/82 af 29.6.1982 om fastsættelse
 af visse foranstaltninger til kontrol med fiskeri fra fartøjer
 hjemmehørende i medlemsstaterne, EFT L 220 af 29.7.1982, s. 1.
 (3) Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2241/87 af 23.7.1987 om fastsættelse
 af visse foranstaltninger til kontrol af fiskeri, EFT L 207 af
 29.7.1987, s. 1. Sag anlagt den 3. december 1999 af Kommissionen for De
 Europæiske Fællesskaber mod Den Italienske Republik
 (Sag C-466/99)
 (2000/C 34/36)
 Sag anlagt den 1. december 1999 af Kommissionen for De Ved De Europæiske Fællesskabers Domstol er der den 3. de-
 Europæiske Fællesskaber mod Det Forenede Kongerige cember 1999 anlagt sag mod Den Italienske Republik af
 Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber ved Lena
 (Sag C-455/99) Ström, Kommissionens Juridiske Tjeneste, og ved appeldom-
 mer Giacinto Bisogni, der er udstationeret som national ekspert
 ved Kommissionens Juridiske Tjeneste, som befuldmægtigede,
 (2000/C 34/35) og med valgt adresse i Luxembourg hos Carlos Gómez de la
 Cruz, Wagnercentret, Kirchberg.
 Ved De Europæiske Fællesskabers Domstol er der den 1. de-
 cember 1999 anlagt sag mod Det Forenede Kongerige af Sagsøgeren har nedlagt følgende påstande:
 Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber ved ledende
 juridisk konsulent Richard Wainwright, som befuldmægtiget,
 og med valgt adresse i Luxembourg hos Carlos Gómez de — Det fastslas, at Den Italienske Republik ikke har overholdt
 la Cruz, Kommissionens Juridiske Tjeneste, Wagnercentret, de forpligtelser, der påhviler den i henhold til henholdsvis
 Luxembourg. artikel 7, artikel 6 og artikel 14 i direktiv 75/442/EØF (1),
 91/689/EØF (2) og 94/62/EF (3), idet den ikke har meddelt
 Kommissionen oplysningerne vedrørende planerne for
 Sagsøgeren har nedlagt følgende påstande: håndtering og bortskaffelse af affald, af farligt affald og af
 emballageaffald.
 — Det fastslås, at Det Forenede Kongerige har udeladt at
 opfylde sine forpligtelser i henhold til direktiv 94/62/EF (1)
 — Kommissionen tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger.
 af 20. december 1994 om emballage og emballageaffald,
 idet det ikke har vedtaget de love og administrative
 bestemmelser, der er nødvendige for at efterkomme direk-
 tivet. Søgsmålsgrunde og væsentligste argumenter
 — Det Forenede Kongerige tilpligtes at betale sagens omkost-
 ninger. Den Italienske Republik skulle meddele Kommissionen de
 oplysninger, der er foreskrevet i direktiv 75/442/EØF,
 91/689/EØF og 94/62/EF om udarbejdelsen af planer for
 Søgsmålsgrunde og væsentligste argumenter håndtering og bortskaffelse af affald, af farligt affald og af
 emballageaffald i medfør af henholdsvis artikel 7, artikel 6 og
 artikel 14 i direktiverne.
 Artikel 249 EF (tidligere artikel 189 i EF-traktaten), hvorefter
 et direktiv med hensyn til det tilsigtede mål er bindende for
 enhver medlemsstat indebærer en forpligtelse for medlemssta- Dette er ikke sket, og Kommissionen har heller ikke modtaget
 terne til at overholde den i direktivet fastsatte gennemførelses- oplysningerne efter den begrundede udtalelse, der er meddelt
 frist. Denne frist udløb den 30. juni 1996, uden at Det de italienske myndigheder den 21. oktober 1998.


text:
 271 Md. 352 (1974)
 317 A.2d 142
 PATTEY ET AL.
 v.
 BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR WORCESTER COUNTY ET AL.
 [No. 200, September Term, 1973.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided March 29, 1974.
 *354 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and LEVINE, JJ.
 K. King Burnett for appellants.
 Joseph E. Moore, with whom were Edward H. Hammond, Jr., Patrick L. Rogan, Jr., Eric L. Cummings and Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn on the brief, for Chincoteague Bay Limited Partnership, one of appellees. No brief filed on behalf of Board of County Commissioners for Worcester County, other appellee.
 LEVINE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 A large number of Worcester County residents bring this appeal from a circuit court decision affirming a zoning reclassification of 1870 acres in the Fourth Election District of that county. The county commissioners, who approved the zoning application, and the applicant, Chincoteague Bay Limited Partnership, are the appellees; appellants appeared as protestants at the hearing before the county commissioners.
 The property sought to be rezoned actually belongs to a total of some sixteen persons with whom the applicant has entered into contracts of purchase. The land is described generally as bounded by Chincoteague Bay on the east, Langmaid Road on the north, Harmon Landing Road on the south, and Basketswitch Road on the west. It is some seventeen miles south of Ocean City by road, and is separated from Assateague Island by the Bay. Most of it lies in the A-1 (agricultural) district with the portion closest to the Bay being zoned C-1 (conservation) district. Under the county's zoning ordinance, initially adopted in 1965, minimum lots of one acre are required in the A-1 district. The conservation district, as that name would suggest, is restricted to summer cottages and trailers on lots of at least *355 two acres in size. The zoning application sought the following classifications:
 332 acres R-2 (urban residential)
 1,018 acres R-3 (apartment district)
 409 acres R-4 (hotel district)
 80 acres R-5 (general residence district)
 31 acres B-1 (neighborhood business)
 -----
 1,870 acres
 The zoning ordinance requires minimum lot sizes of 7,500 square feet in the R-2 classification and 5,000 in the other categories.
 As we have indicated, zoning was introduced to Worcester County by the enactment of an ordinance in 1965. This action was accompanied by the adoption of an original comprehensive zoning map for the entire county. Although a land use plan (the Plan) was not promulgated until the following year, it was preceded, as were the 1965 actions, by the establishment of a planning commission and the employment of a zoning consultant, Julius Tarrant (Tarrant), who conducted a thorough study leading to the production and ultimate adoption of the Plan. The Plan indicated that the area in which the subject property is located should ultimately be the site of "non-urban residential development." It was envisioned that this category would be utilized in the following manner:
 "Non-Urban Residential Areas. These include both existing and projected developments of a primarily single-family residential nature, at such densities as will not require central water or sewer systems. Not more than 2 dwellings per gross acre can be permitted safely where individual wells and septic tanks must be relied upon. The average density more likely will be around 1 or 1 1/2 dwellings per acre, after allowance for the necessary roads, streets, odd-shaped lots, and waste areas. Not included in this designation are the rural non-farm dwellings, existing or future, which are *356 and will continue to be scattered generally throughout the rural parts of the county, on larger sites and independent of any community facilities. The non-urban residential areas are intended primarily for the large-lot subdivisions where roads or streets would be provided, along with incidental churches, playgrounds, community houses, and other facilities associated with residential areas and not of a commercial nature." (emphasis added and omitted).
 The zoning application, filed in 1972, sought the classifications listed above on the sole ground that the subject property "has changed in character due to recent development programs in the County such as Ocean Pines"; furthermore, it was alleged, "[t]he County's future land use map, in fact, indicates that this tract should be used for Residential purposes." The application was initially referred to the Worcester County Planning Commission which, after noting that the Plan projected the area "as a potential site for non-urban residential type development," recommended that the application be approved subject to certain enumerated conditions. The thrust of those conditions was that the density of the area for which R-3 (apartment) zoning was recommended, be maintained at the R-2 (urban residential) level of four dwelling units per acre and minimum lot sizes of 7500 square feet.
 On June 6, 1972, the matter was heard by the county commissioners. At that hearing, the principal witness for the applicant was Calvin Burns who had also signed the application as its agent. He is a mechanical and civil engineer and had been the consulting engineer for the Ocean Pines development, a planned community near Ocean City. One other witness for the applicant was a zoning inspector who, when asked whether he was not of the opinion "that a mistake occurred [in the Plan]," replied instead, "I think the Planning Commission was somewhat foresighted when they anticipated that this land, eventually, in twenty years would probably be subject to residential development." The two remaining witnesses for the applicant, Mr. Jerry Wolman, *357 its general partner, and a Mr. Morris of the planning commission, added no testimony of significant quality. Many of the protestants also presented their views in opposition to the application.
 A week later, after receiving a letter from the applicant accepting the conditions recommended by the planning commission, the county commissioners voted unanimously to approve the application. This decision was announced in the form of a "release" in which it was found that there had been:
 "... a sufficient change in the area of Worcester County to meet these standards. Development of Assateague Island's Federal and State Parks has brought about a tremendous influx of vacationers with very little overnight accommodations for these people. The growth of the Tenth Election District (Ocean City) has caused a tremendous impact on the outlying area...."
 On September 15, 1972, three months after the application had been approved and two months after that decision had been appealed to the circuit court, the county commissioners issued a document called "HARBOR TOWN REZONING  FINDINGS OF FACTS." That paper purported to amplify rather extensively the grounds for approval of the rezoning application. The county commissioners concluded that there had been a substantial change "in the character of the neighborhood where the property is located since the promulgation of the original comprehensive land use plan." (emphasis added). They based their conclusion upon these findings:
 1. Increased development had occurred elsewhere in the county, especially in the Ocean City area, including the Ocean Pines community.
 2. That the newly built sewage treatment plant at the Town of Newark had sufficient reserve capacity to serve the applicant's needs for four or five years; thereafter, its own "self-contained" treatment system would be in existence.
 *358 3. That State Route 113, some two miles to the west of the subject property, was to be improved; and that the applicant had agreed to provide access and interior roadways for its development.
 4. The establishment of Assateague Island as a National Seashore Park by the federal government had created a need for overnight accommodations on the mainland  especially in the area of the subject property  since the park is geared primarily to daytime use.
 5. A prior rezoning of property in the area of Porter's Neck and Cropper's Island from agricultural and conservation uses to R-1 (rural residential).
 The decision of the county commissioners was appealed to the circuit court. After resolving some preliminary procedural disputes, none of which merits any reference here, the trial court rendered its decision  106 pages in length  affirming the approval of the rezoning application. We reverse.
 In upholding the reclassification, the trial court injected the issue of "mistake" into the case, although previously it had been mentioned only once  in the aborted question referred to earlier in this opinion. In addition, the court also ruled that there was sufficient evidence of "change" to sustain the application. It rested this part of its decision on the availability of the Newark water and sewer system and the "appropriation" of Assateague Island for a National Seashore Park.
 In their appeal to this Court, appellants present a number of reasons for urging reversal of the decision below, including some which are based on constitutional grounds. In the view we take of this case, however, we need consider only the question whether the rezoning decision can be sustained in light of the requirement in Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66B, § 4.05 (a) "that there was a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood where the property is located or that there was a mistake in *359 the existing zoning classification." The parties are in agreement that the "change-mistake" rule was the controlling standard to be applied by the county commissioners in deciding whether to grant the rezoning application.
 Since this case involves an attempt to amend an original comprehensive zoning map, it is dominated by the strong presumption of correctness which attaches to such original zoning, Valenzia v. Zoning Board, 270 Md. 478, 483, 312 A.2d 277 (1973); Trainer v. Lipchin, 269 Md. 667, 672-73, 309 A.2d 471 (1973); Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 652, 304 A.2d 244 (1973); Rockville v. Henley, 268 Md. 469, 472, 302 A.2d 45 (1973). As we said in Stratakis:
 "... To sustain a piecemeal change in circumstances such as those present here, strong evidence of mistake in the original zoning or comprehensive rezoning or evidence of substantial change in the character of the neighborhood must be produced, (citations omitted)." 268 Md. at 652-53 (emphasis in original).
 The burden of producing such "strong" evidence, as we also noted there, is an onerous one, Trainer v. Lipchin; Stratakis v. Beauchamp, both supra; Cabin John Ltd. v. Montgomery Co., 259 Md. 661, 670, 271 A.2d 174 (1970).
 Mindful of this fundamental principle, we consider this case in light of the "change-mistake" rule, turning first to the trial judge's determination that the rezoning should be upheld on the basis of "mistake."
 I
 There is considerable doubt, as appellants urge, that the question of "mistake" was properly considered by the circuit court, since evidence on this issue was actually never presented to the county commissioners nor was the question considered by them in approving the application, or by the planning commission in recommending that they do so. As we have already indicated, the "mistake" issue surfaced initially in the trial judge's decision. On appeal from a *360 zoning decision of a legislative body, the reviewing court is generally confined to a determination of whether sufficient evidence has been presented at the zoning hearing to make the issues fairly debatable, and may only consider for that purpose evidence which is on the record. Aspen Hill Venture v. Mont. Co., 265 Md. 303, 316-17, 289 A.2d 303 (1972); Montgomery Co. Coun. v. Kaslow, 235 Md. 45, 52, 200 A.2d 184 (1964); see Suburban v. Rockville Council, 241 Md. 1, 6, 215 A.2d 200 (1965). Furthermore, Art. 66B, § 4.05 (a) requires that the legislative body make findings of fact where the effect of its action "is to change the zoning classification." These requirements are virtually stripped of their significance if, on appeal, the reviewing court may furnish its own grounds for granting the requested classification.
 Wholly apart from whether the issue was properly before it, the circuit court erred in ruling that there was sufficient evidence of "mistake" to make that issue fairly debatable. The trial judge purportedly concluded that a "mistake" had been made in the "delineation of the `Districts' upon the official General Zoning Map of Worcester County" as well as the "Official Land Use Plan Map." It is apparent from his entire opinion, however, that the "mistake" on which he bottomed his decision, was that made by the planning consultant in recommending that "too much land [be] reserved under an agricultural classification." In short, the trial court took the planners to task rather than the county commissioners, who adopted the agricultural and conservation classifications for the subject property in 1965.
 Thus, the trial judge fell into error by ignoring the basic distinction between a master plan, on the one hand, and a zoning map, comprehensive zoning, or zoning classification, on the other. Nottingham Village v. Balto. Co., 266 Md. 339, 354-55, 292 A.2d 680 (1972); Chapman v. Montgomery County, 259 Md. 641, 644, 271 A.2d 156 (1970); Bd. of Co. Comm'rs v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 685, 215 A.2d 209 (1965). As we have said, a master plan is only a guide and is not to be confused with a comprehensive zoning, zoning map, or zoning classification, Nottingham Village v. Balto. Co.; *361 Chapman v. Montgomery County; Bd. of Co. Comm'rs v. Edmonds, all supra. It is a "mistake" in the latter, not in the master plan, which may support a rezoning.
 As we have indicated, the conclusions of the trial judge on the issue of "mistake" were unsupported by evidence of any kind presented at the zoning hearing, much less by any expert testimony. To support a zoning reclassification, there must be evidence before the legislative body which establishes that the "mistake" was "basic and actual"; and that it was made "at the time" the property was zoned, which in this case would have been at the time of the original zoning in 1965. Surkovich v. Doub, 258 Md. 263, 271, 265 A.2d 447 (1970); Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 266, 211 A.2d 309 (1965) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the "mistake" alleged to have occurred must relate to the specific property for which the rezoning is sought, and may not consist of generalities, see Surkovich v. Doub, supra at 272.
 There was not one shred of evidence before the county commissioners, nor in the facts impermissibly considered by the trial court when it departed from the record, which supports a finding of "mistake" in the 1965 legislative action placing the subject property in the agricultural and conservation districts. The evidence is uncontradicted in showing that the area in which this property is located was completely rural in 1965, and remains substantially so today; and that the subject property consists partly of marshland. Far from having been a "mistake," the original zoning was the only logical course which the legislative body could have taken "at the time."
 II(a)
 An effective argument made by appellants, in urging reversal, is that the rezoning cannot be sustained on the basis of a "change" in the character of the neighborhood if for no other reason than the applicant's failure to delineate the neighborhood in which it claims the substantial change occurred. Rockville v. Henley, supra at 473; Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capital Realty, 267 Md. 364, 376, 297 A.2d 675 (1972); *362 Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 110, 297 A.2d 81 (1972). We said in Border v. Grooms:
 "... As the cited cases indicate, that which reasonably constitutes the neighborhood of the subject property is one of the basic facts to be established by an applicant for rezoning, and because of its fundamental involvement in any case resting on a contention of a change in the character of the neighborhood it must be satisfactorily shown upon the record...." 267 Md. at 110.
 Here, the applicant made no effort to meet this requirement in presenting its case to the county commissioners, nor did the latter make any finding of fact in this regard. The trial judge took two approaches in considering this question. At the conclusion of his opinion, he said:
 "That, from the evidence, and from a map of the geography of the area, it can easily be determined that the Board of County Commissioners for Worcester County was considering an area in close proximity of the Village of Newark, bordering on the shores of Chincoteague Bay, in close proximity, therefore, to the shores of the Assateague National Seashore, ...."
 The dominant theme of his decision on this point, however, is that in Worcester County, it is unnecessary to delineate the neighborhood or, otherwise stated, that the entire county is the "neighborhood." His precise basis for this notion appears to be sections 20.11 and 20.12 of the Worcester County Zoning Ordinance. Those provisions merely provide for map amendments in "recognition of the fact that sections of Worcester County are changing from a rural to a residential, commercial, industrial, or other character...." It is quite likely that most, if not all, zoning ordinances provide for anticipated growth and zoning changes.
 Although, for purposes of this case, the applicant's failure to delineate the "neighborhood" is alone sufficient to *363 mandate reversal under our prior decisions, we are inclined to consider the "change" issue in light of appellants' suggestion of what, at the most, could constitute the "reasonable `neighborhood.'" It is bounded by Route 113 on the west, the Bay on the east, Mason Landing Road on the north, and Cedartown Road on the south. Roughly, this comprises an area of some sixteen square miles and would barely include the Town of Newark, some two miles from the subject property, within the northwest corner of the "neighborhood."
 We have said that the concept of a "neighborhood" is a flexible one and will vary according to the geographical location involved; it being axiomatic that in rural or semi-rural areas, as in the case at bar, the "neighborhood" will be larger and more fluid than in a city or suburban area, Border v. Grooms, supra at 109; Prince George's Co. v. Prestwick, 263 Md. 217, 226, 282 A.2d 491 (1971); Montgomery v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, 263 Md. 1, 5, 280 A.2d 901 (1971). By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this flexibility be so distorted as to include Ocean City and Ocean Pines, which are some 15 to 17 miles to the north of the subject property. What Judge Barnes said for the Court in Clayman v. Prince George's Co., 266 Md. 409, 292 A.2d 689 (1972) seems especially apposite here:
 "Although what constitutes the neighborhood of a subject property for the purposes of applying the Maryland `change-mistake' rule `should not be precisely and rigidly defined, but may vary from case to case,' ... nevertheless, the neighborhood in any area must be an area which reasonably constitutes the immediate environs of the subject property.... The rule requires that the `neighborhood' must be the immediate neighborhood of the subject property, not some area miles away; ...." 266 Md. at 418 (emphasis in original).
 Clearly, those areas were not within the "immediate neighborhood of the subject property."
 *364 Assuming a satisfactory delineation of the neighborhood, then, we turn finally to the question whether the applicant met its "onerous" burden of showing a substantial change in its character.
 II(b)
 Although the county commissioners listed several "changes" on which they relied for granting the rezoning, in this Court appellees rely primarily on two of them: the availability of the Newark sewerage system and the establishment of Assateague Island as a National Seashore Park. Concededly, we have held that a "change" may occur where new or expanded sewer facilities are shown. Montgomery v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs, supra at 7; Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, 239, 216 A.2d 530 (1966). But cf. Clayman v. Prince George's Co., supra at 419. The facts here, however, do not support the application of those decisions.
 First, the Newark facility has been variously described as two to three miles from the subject property. Secondly, there is no evidence of any commitment or agreement by the Worcester County Sanitary District to extend the use of the Newark sewerage system to the applicant. This is borne out by the testimony of Calvin Burns, its principal witness, who, when asked "whether they [the Town of Newark] will approve of this type of plan, or have they been approached yet," replied, "I haven't approached the Town of Newark particularly." Indeed, his entire reference to the proposed use of the Newark facility was equivocal, to say the least, as this testimony indicates:
 "What I did say, we feel that there may be ways that we could send our effluent, our initial effluent for the first couple, three or four years, to the Town of Newark's plant that already exists, until we built our plant which we will be building." (emphasis added).
 Appellees attempt to supply this critical omission in the record by the inclusion of a letter dated September 12, 1972, from the District Engineer addressed to Burns. It suggests *365 the possibility of an agreement between the applicant and the Worcester County Sanitary District, whereby the capacity of the Newark system would be expanded to serve the applicant's proposed development "for a limited period of time," in exchange for substantial financial considerations. The difficulty with the letter is that it was written some three months after the rezoning was approved, and was not even considered by the circuit court. As we have already stressed, in our review of a zoning decision we are confined to the record before the legislative body, Aspen Hill Venture v. Mont. Co.; Montgomery Co. Coun. v. Kaslow, both supra, except for such additional evidence as may have been received pursuant to Art. 66B, § 4.08 (b).
 Moreover, there is no merit in the applicant's contention that a "change" occurred when Assateague Island became a National Seashore Park. The thrust of this tenuous argument is that the development which would have taken place on the island  were this not precluded by the prevailing federal controls  must now find its way to the mainland, especially at the site of the applicant's property. Assateague, of course, is some six miles across Chincoteague Bay from the subject property. It is some 25-30 miles by automobile which represents the only practical means of travel, since there are no docking facilities on the island opposite the subject property. Thus, Assateague Island clearly is not within the "neighborhood." What appellees have failed to recognize is that when we speak of "substantial changes in the character of the neighborhood," we mean "changes must occur in that immediate neighborhood of such a nature as to have affected its character." Clayman v. Prince George's Co., supra at 418 (emphasis in original).
 A brief word is in order with respect to the remaining "changes" cited by the county commissioners. What we have already said concerning the "neighborhood" is dispositive of the applicant's reliance upon the development of Ocean City and Ocean Pines, many miles to the north. There is even less merit in the argument that the future improvement of State Route 113 is a "change," since there is nothing in the record *366 to indicate that this proposal was unknown to the legislative body which adopted the original zoning in 1965. Finally, the rezoning of some 100 acres in the Porter's Neck-Cropper's Island area does not meet the test either. Not only is it questionable whether that land, being some two miles away, is within the "neighborhood," but that rezoning fails in another respect. There, the property was rezoned from the agricultural and conservation districts to R-1 (rural residential). The latter requires minimum lot sizes of 20,000 square feet with a maximum density of two dwelling units per acre. In short, it is a less dense classification than any of those sought by the applicant. As such, it does not represent "a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood" when applied here.
 Thus, there was insufficient evidence before the county commissioners to make fairly debatable the issue that a "substantial change" had occurred. In sum, therefore, the applicant failed to sustain the "onerous" burden which our countless decisions have fastened upon it.
 Judgment reversed; remanded for entry of an order reversing the decision of the County Commissioners of Worcester County; appellees to pay costs.


type: wikipedia

text:
Wälderschanze – kompleks skoczni narciarskich o punktach konstrukcyjnych K85, K55, K33 i K18 w austriackiej miejscowości Andelsbuch.
 Pierwsze skocznie w Andelsbuch wybudowano w 1928. Uległy one zniszczeniu podczas II wojny światowej i w 1947 powstała na ich miejsce Wälderschanze. Obiekt kilkukrotnie ulegał przebudowie. Organizowano na nim mistrzostwa Austrii w skokach narciarskich, po raz ostatni w 2000, z okazji 75-lecia lokalnego klubu.
 Parametry skoczni normalnej
 Hill Size: 88 m
 Punkt konstrukcyjny: 85 m
 Rekord skoczni: 96,5 m (David Zauner, 2003-01-25)
 Nachylenie progu: 10,5°
 Igelit: brak
 Klub sportowy: WSV Andelsbuch
 Bibliografia
 Skocznie narciarskie w Austrii


type: other

text:
Dabar yra 2020 Vas 17 21:55
 SMS Paslaugos [Paslaugų pirkimas, unban pirkimas]
 Puslapis 106 iš 106 [ 1060 pranešimai(ų) ] Eiti į Ankstesnis 1 ... 102, 103, 104, 105, 106
 Pranešimo tema: Re: SMS Paslaugos [Paslaugų pirkimas, unban pirkimas]
 Žinutės numeris: #1051 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 01 19:24
 Užsiregistravo: 2011 Kov 12 22:19
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 Žinutės numeris: #1052 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 03 19:20
 Užsiregistravo: 2013 Rgp 31 15:01
 if(is_dir('install'))
 <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="5; url=./install">

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 $mysqli = new mysqli($dbhost, $dbuser, $dbpass, $dbdata);
 if(empty($dbhost_amx) && empty($dbuser_amx) && empty($dbpass_amx) && empty($dbdata_amx)) { $mysqli_amx = $mysqli; }
 else { $mysqli_amx = new mysqli($dbhost_amx, $dbuser_amx, $dbpass_amx, $dbdata_amx); }
 if($mysqli->connect_error) { die('Connect Error: '.$mysqli->connect_error); }
 if($mysqli_amx->connect_error) { die('Connect Error: '.$mysqli_amx->connect_error); }
 $ok = "OK ";
 $kada = date("Y-m-d");
 /*==================NELYSTI==================*/
 $config = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_config`");
 if($config->num_rows > 0)
 while($obj = $config->fetch_object()) { $objs[$obj->id] = $obj->value; }
 extract($objs, EXTR_OVERWRITE);
 $version = "6.0.0";
 //WEB admin name/pass
 $web_admin_name = "adminas"; //CHANGE
 $web_admin_pass = "adminas"; //CHANGE
 //SMS Answers
 $unbanned = "Jus sekmingai atbanintas!";
 $no_ban_exist = "IP kuri issiuntete neegzistuoja musu ban liste!";
 $unbans = $mysqli_amx->query("SELECT * FROM `".$amxbans_prefix."_bans` WHERE `expired` = '-1'");
 $bans = $mysqli_amx->query("SELECT * FROM `".$amxbans_prefix."_bans` WHERE `expired` = '0'");
 $banned = $mysqli_amx->query("SELECT * FROM `".$amxbans_prefix."_bans` WHERE `player_ip` = '".$ip."' AND `expired` = '0'");
 $bans1 = $bans->num_rows < 1 ? "0" : $bans->num_rows;
 $unbans1 = $unbans->num_rows < 1 ? "0" : $unbans->num_rows;
 $banned1 = $banned->num_rows;
 $fl = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_flags`");
 $mp = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_messages_types`");
 $priv = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_order_prvilegies`");
 $list = $mysqli_amx->query("SELECT * FROM `".$amxbans_prefix."_amxadmins` WHERE `expired` >= '".time()."' ORDER BY `expired` ASC");
 $servers_lst = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_servers`");
 $makro_l = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_makro_types`");
 function dExpired($mysqli)
 $mysqli->query("DELETE FROM `amx_amxadmins` WHERE `expired` < '".time()."'");
 function limitString($string, $limit = 100)
 if(strlen($string) < $limit)
 $regex = "/(.{1,$limit})\b/";
 preg_match($regex, $string, $matches);
 function reload_admins($mysqli)
 $server_list = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_servers`");
 $server = new Rcon();
 while($row = $server_list->fetch_object())
 $server->Connect("".$row->ip."", "".$row->port."", "".$row->rcon."");
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 $result = $mysqli->query("SELECT * FROM `unban_order_prvilegies` WHERE `name` = '".$name."'")->fetch_object();
 return $result->priv;
 function randomPassword($lenght = 8)
 $pass = array(); //remember to declare $pass as an array
 $alphabet = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUWXYZ0123456789";
 $alphaLength = strlen($alphabet) - 1; //put the length -1 in cache
 for ($i = 0; $i < $lenght; $i++)
 return implode($pass); //turn the array into a string
 Žinutės numeris: #1053 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 03 19:39
 Pranešimai: 4550
 psychical rašė:
 moku 20
 Žinutės numeris: #1054 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 04 21:42
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 laimiukas3,
 Žinutės numeris: #1055 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 06 19:29
 Na reiks atnaujinti gal amxbans gal pasikeis.
 Žinutės numeris: #1056 Parašytas: 2020 Sau 07 19:56
 Jei nori skaičiuot tik sms/makro unban, tai galiu padaryt atskirą table, kai unban nusiperka ir kad juos perkeltų ten
 Žinutės numeris: #1057 Parašytas: 2020 Vas 08 20:41
 A kokia amxbans versija jūs naudojat ,jau išbandžiau viska nenusiima banai ir viskas blin .
 Žinutės numeris: #1058 Parašytas: 2020 Vas 09 15:49
 Parašęs kelias žinutes
 Užsiregistravo: 2015 Bal 26 15:39
 Įėjus į projektų banų sąrašą apačioje įprastai rodoma versija. Aš naudoju 6.0.4, kažkada bandžiau naujesnę versiją, bet, nepasiteisino - buvo daugiau klaidų (čia gana seniai, gal situacija pasikeitus, bet, abejoju..)
 Žinutės numeris: #1059 Parašytas: 2020 Vas 10 18:35
 Kai parasau https://www.fenix.lt/sms/pay/vpsnet_sms_unban.php meta klaida error
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 Persirasiau viska is naujo vistiek tas pats blin
 Žinutės numeris: #1060 Parašytas: 2020 Vas 10 19:02
 Juokingiausia, kad problemą turi tik tu O kitas dalykas, padėčiau, jei tai nebūtų vpsnet, kadangi jų sistemos aš nesuprantu, nes test žinučių siųsti neįmanoma, atsakymo kokį tiksliai gauni nerodo, tai per daug reikalauja išteklių jų sistemai ką nors daryt...


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Trecastelli est une commune italienne d'environ habitants située dans la province d'Ancône dans la région des Marches dans le centre de l'Italie.
 Trecastelli est née de la fusion de trois communes Castel Colonna, Monterado et Ripe. La nouvelle commune existe depuis le .
 Géographie
 Histoire
 Économie
 Culture
 Administration
 Hameaux
 Brugnetto, Castel Colonna, Croce, Francavilla, Giombino, Monterado, Passo Ripe, Ponte Lucerta, Ponterio, Ripe
 Communes limitrophes
 Corinaldo, Mondolfo (PU), Monte Porzio (PU), Ostra, San Costanzo (PU), Senigallia
 Personnalités liées à Trecastelli
 Jumelages
 Voir aussi
 Liens externes
 Notes et références
 Commune dans la province d'Ancône
 Fondation en 2014
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text:
 Događaji
 Siječanj
 4. siječnja – U uvali kod mjesta Ljubač, u podvelebitskom kraju, zadarski arheolozi pronašli su antičku tvornicu keramike. Uz radionicu je pronađeno i pristanište odakle se keramika prevozila po Sredozemlju.
 4. siječnja – Održana je utrka ženskog slaloma Svjetskog skijaškog kupa na zagrebačkom Sljemenu. Snježnom kraljicom postala je Amerikanka Mikaela Shiffrin.
 23. siječnja – U Katalonskom parlamentu donesena Deklaracija o suverenosti i pravu na određenje naroda Katalonije.
 Veljača
 2. veljače – Prosvjedi u Vukovaru protiv uvođenja ćiriličnih natpisa.
 15. veljače – Eksplozija meteorita nad ruskim gradom Čeljabinsk.
 28. veljače – Papa Benedikt XVI. u 20 h iz zdravstvenih razloga povukao se s dužnosti poglavara Rimokatoličke crkve. Postao je tako prvi papa koji je abdicirao nakon Grgura XII. 1415., te prvi koji je to učinio dobrovoljno nakon Celestina V. 1294.
 Ožujak
 4. ožujka – Građanski rat u Siriji
 13. ožujka – Izabran novi, 266. poglavar Rimokatoličke crkve: kardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio (nadbiskup Buenos Airesa) koji je uzeo crkveno ime Franjo. On je prvi papa iz Južne Amerike.
 Travanj
 30. travnja – Nizozemska kraljica Beatrix abdicirala, prijestolje nasljeđuje njezin najstariji sin Willem-Alexander.
 Svibanj
 8. svibnja – Ustavni sud Španjolske suspendirao Deklaraciju o suverenosti i pravu na određenje naroda Katalonije.
 19. svibnja – Održani su lokalni izbori u Hrvatskoj.
 22. svibnja – Island odustao od pristupanja Europskoj uniji.
 25. svibnja – Mario Mandžukić postao prvi hrvatski nogometaš koji je postigao pogodak u finalu Lige prvaka.
 29. svibnja – Haaški sud je nepravomoćnom odlukom u prvostupanjskom procesu osudio hrvatske generale iz BiH: Jadranka Prlića na 25 godina zatvora; Brunu Stojića, Milivoja Petkovića i Slobodana Praljka na 20 godina; Valentina Ćorića na 16 godina; Berislava Pušića na 10 godina.
 30. svibnja – Haaški sud je oslobodio čelnike srbijanske sigurnosne službe Jovicu Stanišića i Franka Simatovića.
 31. svibnja – Asteroid 1998 QE2 prošao pored Zemlje s udaljenosti od oko 5,8 milijuna kilometara.
 Lipanj
 1. lipnja – Šibenik zatresao potres jačine 2,5 po Richteru.
 14. lipnja – Island je prekinuo postupak za prijam u Europsku uniju.
 15. lipnja – Osnovan je Bosanskohercegovački vaterpolski savez.
 29. lipnja – Papa Franjo objavio encikliku Lumen fidei.
 Srpanj
 1. srpnja – Republika Hrvatska postala je 28. članica Europske unije.
 1. srpnja – Otvoren New Century Global Centre, najveća zgrada na svijetu.
 3. srpnja – U državnom udaru svrgnut egipatski predsjednik Mohamed Mursi.
 13. srpnja – Održan završni turnir prvog izdanja Red Bull Sidruna.
 Kolovoz
 15. kolovoza – Otkriven olinguito, potpuno nova vrsta sisavca.
 Rujan
 1. rujna – Velški napadač Gareth Bale prešao je iz Tottenhama u Real Madrid za 100 000 000 eura, što je najskuplji nogometni i športski transfer svih vremena.
 Listopad
 23. listopada – Poginula je glumica Dolores Lambaša u Slavonskom Brodu.
 29. listopada – Svečano je otvoren Marmaray, najdublji željeznički tunel na svijetu.
 Studeni
 Prosinac
 1. prosinca – U Republici Hrvatskoj održan je narodni ustavotvorni referendum na kojem su glasači izravno odlučili (65.87% glasova) da se u Ustav upiše odredba po kojoj se brak određuje kao životna zajednica muškarca i žene.
 14. prosinca – Kina uspješno spustila rover na Mjesec postavši tako treća zemlja kojoj je to uspjelo, nakon SAD-a i SSSR-a. Ovo je prva misija na Mjesec nakon sovjetske 1976. godine.
 Športski događaji
 Svjetsko prvenstvo u rukometu – Španjolska 2013.
 FIFA Konfederacijski kup 2013.
 XVII. Mediteranske igre – Mersin 2013.
 Ljetna univerzijada 2013.
 Svjetsko prvenstvo u vaterpolu 2013.
 Europsko prvenstvo u košarci – Slovenija 2013.
 Obljetnice i godišnjice
 520. godišnjica Krbavske bitke
 460. godišnjica smrti hrvatskog renesansnog pjesnika i dramatika Hanibala Lucića
 355. godišnjica smrti hrvatskog baroknog pjesnika Ivana Bunića Vučića
 222. godišnjica praizvedbe opere Čarobna frula austrijskog skladatelja Wolfganga Amadeusa Mozarta
 200. godišnjica rođenja i 120. godišnjica smrti hrvatskog književnika i političara Ljudevita Vukotinovića
 190. godišnjica rođenja hrvatskog političara, publicista, književnika Ante Starčevića
 140. godišnjica rođenja hrvatskog povjesničara, književnika i političara Rudolfa Horvata
 140. godišnjica rođenja jednog od najvećih hrvatskih arhitekata secesije Rudolfa Lubynskog
 130. godišnjica rođenja hrvatskog kipara, arhitekta i književnika Ivana Meštrovića
 90. godišnjica smrti hrvatske skladateljice Dore Pejačević
 70. godišnjica smrti hrvatskog kipara Ive Lozice
 22. godišnjica napada na Dubrovnik i početka obrane Dubrovnika
 20. godišnjica Operacije Medački džep
 Rođenja
 22. srpnja – Princ George od Cambridgea
 Smrti
 Siječanj
 1. siječnja – Patti Page, američka pop-pjevačica i glumica (* 1927.)
 1. siječnja – Ante Dražančić, hrvatski liječnik (* 1928.)
 2. siječnja – Ljubo Nikolić, hrvatski novinar (* 1923.)
 4. siječnja – Zoran Žižić, crnogorski političar (* 1951.)
 4. siječnja – Tony Lip, američki glumac (* 1930.)
 5. siječnja – Lujo Medvidović, hrvatski književnik i odvjetnik (* 1950.)
 5. siječnja – Vladimir Šenauer, hrvatski nogometaš (* 1930.)
 11. siječnja – Aaron Swartz, član Internetske kuće slavnih (* 1986.)
 25. siječnja – Rade Bulat, hrvatski narodni heroj, partizan (* 1920.)
 28. siječnja – Anđela Potočnik, hrvatska folklorna umjetnica (* 1933.)
 29. siječnja – Nikola Ćubela, hrvatski umjetnik, dugogodišnji ravnatelj Zagrebačkog kazališta lutaka (* 1946.)
 29. siječnja – Nikola Martić, hrvatski pjesnik (* 1938.)
 30. siječnja – Luka Tripković, hrvatski novinar i publicist (* 1947.)
 Veljača
 1. veljače – Robin Sachs, engleski glumac (* 1951.)
 3. veljače – Zlatko Papec, hrvatski nogometaš (* 1934.)
 7. veljače – Krsto Papić, hrvatski redatelj (* 1933.)
 8. veljače – Josif Tatić, srbijanski glumac (* 1946.)
 8. veljače – Boris Festini, hrvatski glumac (* 1930.)
 13. veljače – Ivan Večenaj, hrvatski slikar i književnik (* 1920.)
 14. veljače – Reeva Steenkamp, južnoafrička manekenka (* 1983.)
 16. veljače – Tony Sheridan, engleski pjevač, gitarist i tekstopisac (* 1940.)
 16. veljače – Dražen Boić, hrvatski pijanist i skladatelj (* 1931.)
 17. veljače – Mindy McCready, američka country pjevačica (* 1975.)
 17. veljače – Richard Briers, engleski glumac (* 1934.)
 17. veljače – Milan Gvero, general Vojske Republike Srpske (* 1937.)
 19. veljače – Joaquín Cordero, meksički glumac (* 1923.)
 19. veljače – Lou Myers, američki glumac (* 1935.)
 25. veljače – Đuro Utješanović, hrvatski glumac (* 1940.)
 25. veljače – Milan Velimirović, srbijanski šahist (* 1952.)
 25. veljače – Carmen Montejo, kubansko-meksička glumica (* 1925.)
 26. veljače – Višnja Machiedo, hrvatska esejistica, prevoditeljica i kritičarka (* 1940.)
 27. veljače – Mario Perušina, hrvatski snimatelj (* 1934.)
 27. veljače – Dale Robertson, američki glumac (* 1923.)
 28. veljače – DJ Ajax, australski glazbenik (* 1971.)
 Ožujak
 1. ožujka – Bonnie Franklin, američka glumica (* 1944.)
 5. ožujka – Hugo Chávez, venezuelanski političar i državnik (* 1954.)
 6. ožujka – Chorão, brazilski pjevač i glazbenik (* 1970.)
 7. ožujka – Damiano Damiani, talijanski scenarist, filmski redatelj (* 1922.)
 14. ožujka – Toni Marošević, hrvatski novinar, urednik i radijski voditelj (* 1945.)
 16. ožujka – Frank Thornton, engleski glumac (* 1921.)
 17. ožujka – Šimun Seletković, hrvatski glazbenik, skladatelj, dirigent (* 1917.)
 20. ožujka – Nora Šitum, hrvatska djevojčica (* 2007.)
 21. ožujka – Robert Komen, hrvatski dopredsjednik Hrvatskog nogometnog saveza i predsjednik NK Rijeke (* 1965.)
 28. ožujka – Richard Griffiths, engleski glumac (* 1947.)
 28. ožujka – Boris Strel, slovenski skijaš (* 1959.)
 Travanj
 2. travnja – Jane Henson, američka lutkarica (* 1934.)
 3. travnja – Mariví Bilbao, španjolska glumica (* 1930.)
 4. travnja – Roger Ebert, američki filmski kritičar i novinar (* 1942.)
 5. travnja – Regina Bianchi, talijanska glumica (* 1921.)
 6. travnja – Veljko Despotović, srbijanski scenograf (* 1931.)
 6. travnja – Bigas Luna, španjolski filmski redatelj (* 1946.)
 8. travnja – Margaret Thatcher, britanska političarka (* 1925.)
 8. travnja – Annette Funicello, američka glumica (* 1942.)
 8. travnja – Sara Montiel, španjolska pjevačica i glumica (* 1928.)
 10. travnja – Aleksandar Kozlina, srbijanski nogometaš (* 1938.)
 11. travnja – Maria Tallchief, američka balerina (* 1925.)
 11. travnja – Jonathan Winters, američki glumac i komičar (* 1925.)
 15. travnja – Richard LeParmentier, američki glumac (* 1946.)
 17. travnja – Deanna Durbin, američka glumica (* 1921.)
 19. travnja – Allan Arbus, američki glumac (* 1918.)
 Svibanj
 1. svibnja – Milan Tomić Šerif, hrvatski kazališni djelatnik, svestrani pirotehničar, planinar i antifašistički borac (* 1929.)
 2. svibnja – Ivan Turina, hrvatski nogometni vratar (* 1980.)
 3. svibnja – Branko Vukelić, hrvatski političar (* 1958.)
 6. svibnja – Giulio Andreotti, talijanski političar (* 1919.)
 7. svibnja – Ray Harryhausen, američki filmski producent (* 1920.)
 7. svibnja – Aubrey Woods, britanski glumac (* 1928.)
 7. svibnja – Mato Ergović, hrvatski glumac (* 1927.)
 8. svibnja – Josip Juras, hrvatski političar (* 1944.)
 8. svibnja – Jeanne Cooper, američka glumica (* 1928.)
 13. svibnja – Joyce Brothers, američka psihologinja i glumica (* 1927.)
 16. svibnja – Paul Shane, engleski glumac i komičar (* 1940.)
 17. svibnja – Jorge Rafael Videla, argentinski vojni diktator (* 1925.)
 20. svibnja- Ray Manzarek, američki glazbenik (* 1939.)
 20. svibnja – Zdenka Korošec, hrvatska novinarka (* 1932.)
 22. svibnja – Andrea Gallo, talijanski svećenik (* 1928.)
 23. svibnja – Georges Moustaki, francuski pjevač (* 1934.)
 23. svibnja – James Sisnett, najstarija osoba otoka Barbadosa (* 1900.)
 24. svibnja – Antonio Puchades, španjolski nogometaš (* 1925.)
 26. svibnja – Irena Golub, natjecateljica hrvatskog reality showa MasterChef (* 1985.)
 29. svibnja – Dragan Banović, hrvatski fotograf, osnivač Dubrovačke televizije (* 19??)
 Lipanj
 1. lipnja – Jelena Genčić, jugoslavenska tenisačica (* 1936.)
 3. lipnja – Frank Lautenberg, američki političar (* 1924.)
 9. lipnja – Iain Banks, škotski pisac (* 1954.)
 12. lipnja – Jiroemon Kimura, najstariji živući muškarac u povijesti (* 1897.)
 16. lipnja – Josip Kuže, hrvatski nogometaš i nogometni trener i izbornik (* 1952.)
 18. lipnja – Cvijeta Job, hrvatska likovna umjetnica (* 1924.)
 19. lipnja – James Gandolfini, američki glumac (* 1961.)
 21. lipnja – Alen Pamić, hrvatski nogometaš (* 1989.)
 22. lipnja – Zoran Kravar, hrvatski književnik (* 1948.)
 22. lipnja – Veljko Barbieri, hrvatski turistički menadžer i osnivač ACI nautičkih marina na Jadranu (* 1929.)
 25. lipnja – Božidar Novak, hrvatski novinar, urednik, publicist (* 1924.)
 27. lipnja – Stefano Borgonovo, talijanski nogometaš (* 1964.)
 Srpanj
 2. srpnja – Fawzia Egipatska, egipatska princeza (* 1921.)
 2. srpnja – Douglas Engelbart, američki izumitelj (* 1925.)
 3. srpnja – Roman Bengez, slovenski nogometaš (* 1964.)
 9. srpnja – Željko Malnar, hrvatski pustolov, putopisac, TV voditelj (* 1944.)
 9. srpnja – Ivo Škopljanac, hrvatski športski novinar (* 1950.)
 13. srpnja – Cory Monteith, kanadski glumac i pjevač (* 1982.)
 Kolovoz
 11. kolovoza – Eliza Gerner, hrvatska glumica (* 1920.)
 Rujan
 1. rujna – Zvonko Bušić, hrvatski politički aktivist (* 1946.)
 23. rujna – Vlatko Marković, bivši predsjednik Hrvatskog nogometnog saveza (* 1937.)
 Listopad
 1. listopada – Igor Mrduljaš, hrvatski teatrolog i kazališni kritičar (* 1945.)
 2. listopada – Nevenka Košutić Brozović, hrvatska povjesničarka književnosti (* 1929.)
 4. listopada – Võ Nguyên Giáp, vijetnamski političar, general i državnik (* 1911.)
 20. listopada – Jovanka Broz, udovica bivšega jugoslavenskog predsjednika Tita (* 1924.)
 23. listopada – Dolores Lambaša, hrvatska filmska, televizijska i kazališna glumica (* 1981.)
 27. listopada – Vinko Coce, hrvatski pjevač (* 1954.)
 29. listopada – Rudolf Kehrer, ruski pijanist i glasovirski pedagog (* 1923.)
 Studeni
 2. studenog – Zlatko Crnković, hrvatski prevoditelj i književnik (* 1931.)
 28. studenog – Mitja Ribičič, slovenski političar i visoki dužnosnik SFRJ (* 1919.)
 Prosinac
 5. prosinca – Nelson Mandela, južnoafrički političar, borac protiv apartheida i prvi crni predsjednik JAR-a (* 1918.)
 7. prosinca – Zvjezdan Linić, hrvatski katolički svećenik, franjevac (* 1941.)
 9. prosinca – Jovo Kapičić, crnogorski vojni, policijski i diplomatski dužnosnik SFRJ (* 1919.)
 11. prosinca – Vladimir Veselica, hrvatski, političar, ekonomist i hrvatski proljećar (* 1938.)
 Izvori
 Vanjske poveznice


text:
Alice – Wild und unersättlich (Alternativtitel Marilyn – Wild und unersättlich) ist ein Schweizer Pornofilm aus dem Jahr 1981. Er ist eine der ersten Produktionen der Schweizer Filmproduktionsgesellschaft Yvofilm AG, die von 1981 bis 1985 erfolgreich eine Reihe von Erotik- und Pornofilmen produzierte und damit am damaligen Boom von Erotik- und Pornoproduktionen teilnahm.
 Handlung
 Alice und Michel treffen in Paris in einem leeren Nobelrestaurant aufeinander. Wie sich später herausstellt, kam das Blind Date über ein Heiratsinstitut zustande. Michel ist von Alice verzaubert und lädt sie zu einem Ski-Urlaub in sein Schweizer Chalet ein. Dort nähern sich die beiden an, bis sie von Elaine und Pierre überrascht werden, mit denen sich Michel das Chalet teilt. Auch ein Hausmädchen kommt hinzu. Am Abend bereitet Michel für Alice und seine Freunde, darunter auch Eric, ein Strip-Fondue zu, bei dem die Hüllen der Anwesenden schnell fallen. Einer Orgie folgt ein nächtlicher Ski-Ausflug. Am nächsten Tag gehen alle auf die Piste, danach macht Alice einen Spaziergang. Es folgt eine Fantasie-Sequenz von Eric, der Alice zu klassischer Musik romantisch am Fenster tanzen sieht. Der weitere Verlauf des Tages endet wieder mit einer Orgie der Skifreunde, zu der auch die Nachbarn eingeladen sind. Am nächsten Tag verkündet Alice überraschend Eric ihre Zuneigung und Liebe und dass sie nur in einer festen Paar-Beziehung glücklich werden kann.
 Hintergrund
 Wie bei allen Produktionen von Pierre und Yvonne Spiegel (Yvofilm AG) lag auch Alice ein vollständiges Drehbuch zugrunde, was sonst in der Pornofilmbranche oft nicht der Fall ist. Die Aussenaufnahmen von Alice wurden wie bei vielen Yvofilm-Produktionen in einem grossen Chalet in Amden, St. Gallen über dem Walensee gedreht.
 Die Filme wurden dabei in drei Versionen gedreht, in einer Erotik-Fassung gänzlich ohne Sex, in einer Softcore-Version mit simuliertem oder nicht sichtbarem Sex und in einer Hardcore-Fassung mit explizierter Darstellung von Penetration und Ejakulation. Im Gegensatz zum – üblichen – Vorgehen, eine Hardcore-Fassung „herunterzuschneiden“, wurden diese Fassungen bereits während der Dreharbeiten durch entsprechende Kameraeinstellungen erstellt.
 Kameramann Francois About führte auch die Kamera bei Filmen im Mainstream-Bereich, wie zum Beispiel für Killer kennen keine Gnade und Brigade mondaine.
 Veröffentlichungen
 Die französische Hardcore-Version L'amour aux sports d'hiver hatte 1981 in der Schweiz Premiere, danach wurde der Film auch in Frankreich gezeigt. Im Verleih der Spiegel-Film lief die Hardcore-Fassung in Zürich exklusiv im Kino Maxim an der Langstrasse. In der früheren Bundesrepublik Deutschland wurde die deutsche Hardcore-Version unter dem Titel Alice – Wild und unersättlich in der ungeschnittenen Langfassung von 90 Minuten gezeigt.
 Die Softcore-Version wurde in Deutschland durch Erwin C. Dietrich verliehen. Die englische Softcore-Version lief unter dem Titel Alice – White Heat und in einer Länge von 90 Minuten unter anderem in den USA. Im deutschsprachigen Fernsehen wurde eine auf 73 Minuten gekürzte Softcore-Fassung erstmals am 7. März 1992 auf SAT 1 gezeigt.
 Filmreihe
 Weitere Titel des Regisseurs Michel Lemoine aus der bei Herzog Video erschienen Filmreihe „Marilyn“ mit Olinka Hardiman als Hauptdarstellerin sind:
 Marilyn – Ein Sommer voller Leidenschaft
 Marilyn – Burning Snow
 Marilyn my Love
 Marilyn – Scharfe Girls auf Achse
 Comeback of Marilyn
 Weblinks
 Einzelnachweise
 Filmtitel 1981
 Pornofilm
 Französischer Film
 Schweizer Film


type: legislation

text:
 EIROPAS KOMISIJA
 Briselē, 16.7.2021
 COM(2021) 394 final
 2021/0217(NLE)
 Priekšlikums
 PADOMES LĒMUMS
 par nostāju, kas Eiropas Savienības vārdā ir jāieņem EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā attiecībā uz grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības (budžeta pozīcija PA 13 17 01 “Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai”)
 (Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)
 PASKAIDROJUMA RAKSTS
 1.Priekšlikuma priekšmets
 Šis priekšlikums attiecas uz lēmumu, ar ko nosaka nostāju, kas Savienības vārdā jāieņem EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā saistībā ar paredzēto Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma pieņemšanu attiecībā uz grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības
 2.Priekšlikuma konteksts
 2.1.EEZ līgums
 Līgums par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu (“EEZ līgums”) garantē pilsoņiem un uzņēmējiem vienlīdzīgas tiesības un pienākumus iekšējā tirgū Eiropas Ekonomikas zonā. Ar to ir paredzēts visās 30 EEZ valstīs, tostarp ES dalībvalstīs, Norvēģijā, Islandē un Lihtenšteinā, ieviest ES tiesību aktus, kas reglamentē četras pamatbrīvības. Turklāt EEZ līgums attiecas uz sadarbību citās svarīgās jomās, piemēram, pētniecības un izstrādes, izglītības, sociālās politikas, vides, patērētāju aizsardzības, tūrisma un kultūras jomā, kuras kopā dēvē par horizontālās un papildu politikas jomām. Līgums stājās spēkā 1994. gada 1. janvārī. Eiropas Savienība kopā ar tās dalībvalstīm ir līguma puse.
 2.2.EEZ Apvienotā komiteja
 EEZ Apvienotā komiteja ir atbildīga par EEZ līguma pārvaldību. Tā ir forums viedokļu apmaiņai saistībā ar EEZ līguma darbību. Lēmumus pieņem, ievērojot konsensa principu. Saskaņā ar Lisabonas līgumu par EEZ jautājumu koordinēšanu no ES puses atbild Eiropas Ārējās darbības dienests.
 2.3.Paredzētais EEZ Apvienotās komitejas akts
 Gaidāms, ka EEZ Apvienotā komiteja pieņems EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmumu (“paredzētais akts”) attiecībā uz grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības.
 Paredzētā akta mērķis ir ļaut EEZ Eiropas Brīvās tirdzniecības nolīguma (EBTA) valstīm 2021. finanšu gadā turpināt piedalīties Savienības sagatavošanas darbībā aizsardzības pētniecībai (turpmāk “sagatavošanas darbība”).
 Sagatavošanas darbība notika laikposmā no 2017. līdz 2019. gadam; tikai šajā periodā Savienības budžetā varēja iekļaut saistību apropriācijas. Tomēr vēl nav izpildītas iepriekšējo gadu juridiskās saistības, kas paredzētas saskaņā ar sagatavošanas darbību. Šā iemesla dēļ EEZ EBTA valstīm būtu jāturpina piedalīties.
 Tā kā Lihtenšteina un Islande nav paudušas interesi par dalību šajā sagatavošanas darbībā, EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma projekts attiecas tikai uz Norvēģiju.
 Paredzētais akts būs pusēm saistošs saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 103. un 104. pantu.
 3.Savienības vārdā ieņemamā nostāja
 EĀDD sadarbībā ar Komisijas dienestiem iesniedz EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma projektu, lai Padome tos pieņemtu kā Savienības nostāju. EĀDD cer pēc iespējas drīz iesniegt EEZ Apvienotajai komitejai minēto dokumentu.
 Pievienoto EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma projekta saturs un būtība pārsniedz to, ko var uzskatīt tikai par tehniskiem pielāgojumiem Padomes Regulas Nr. 2894/94 nozīmē. Tādējādi Savienības nostāju nosaka Padome.
 EEZ līguma 78. pants paredz, ka līgumslēdzējas puses stiprina un paplašina sadarbību atbilstīgi ES rīcībai pētniecības un tehnoloģiju attīstības jomā.
 Norvēģija jau piedalījās sagatavošanas darbībā aizsardzības pētniecībai 2017.–2019. gadā, kuras laikā tika piešķirtas saistību apropriācijas, un tā turpinās piedalīties, līdz visas maksājumu apropriācijas būs izsmeltas. Turklāt Norvēģija jau 2014. gadā ir i) noslēgusi sadarbības nolīgumu ar Eiropas Aizsardzības aģentūru, un ii) saistītā Aizsardzības un drošības jomas iepirkuma direktīva (2009/81/EK) tika iekļauta EEZ līgumā.
 Saskaņā ar ES budžeta politiku līdzdalība ES darbībās var notikt tikai tad, ja ir veikta attiecīga finanšu iemaksa. Tomēr maksājumu var veikt tad, kad ir pieņemts šis Padomes lēmuma projekts un EEZ EBTA valstīm ir iesniegts tam sekojošais Eiropas Komisijas sagatavotais ES aicinājums veikt iemaksas.
 Tādēļ, lai aptvertu laikposmu no 2021. gada 1. janvāra līdz attiecīgā maksājuma saņemšanai, Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma projektu ar atpakaļejošu spēku piemēro no 2021. gada 1. janvāra. Lēmuma piemērošana ar atpakaļejošu spēku neietekmē attiecīgo personu tiesības un pienākumus, un tiek ievērots tiesiskās paļāvības princips.
 Pievienotajam Apvienotās komitejas lēmumam ir pievienots EEZ EBTA valstu vienpusējs paziņojums, kurā norādīts, ka lēmums paplašina līgumslēdzēju pušu sadarbību, lai turpinātu EEZ EBTA valstu dalību Savienības sagatavošanas darbībā aizsardzības pētniecības jomā. EEZ EBTA valstis uzskata, ka aizsardzības lietas neietilpst EEZ līguma tvērumā un ka tādēļ šā lēmuma pieņemšana nepaplašina EEZ līguma tvērumu tā, ka papildus EEZ EBTA valstu dalībai minētajā sagatavošanas darbībā tiktu iekļautas arī aizsardzības lietas. EEZ EBTA valstis arī uzsver, ka Islande un Lihtenšteina nedz piedalās šajā sagatavošanas darbībā, nedz atbalsta to finansiāli.
 4.Juridiskais pamats
 4.1.Procesuālais juridiskais pamats
 4.1.1.Principi
 Līguma par Eiropas Savienības darbību (LESD) 218. panta 9. punktā paredzēti lēmumi, ar kuriem nosaka “nostāju, kas Savienības vārdā jāapstiprina kādā ar nolīgumu izveidotā struktūrā, ja šāda struktūra ir tiesīga pieņemt lēmumus ar juridiskām sekām, izņemot lēmumus, kas papildina vai groza attiecīgajā nolīgumā noteikto iestāžu sistēmu.”
 Jēdziens “lēmumi ar juridiskām sekām” ietver aktus, kam ir juridiskas sekas saskaņā ar starptautisko tiesību normām, kuras reglamentē attiecīgo struktūru. Tas ietver arī instrumentus, kam nav saistoša spēka saskaņā ar starptautiskajām tiesībām, bet kas “var būtiski ietekmēt ES likumdevēja pieņemtā tiesiskā regulējuma saturu”
 1
 .
 4.1.2.Piemērošana konkrētajā gadījumā
 EEZ Apvienotā komiteja ir struktūra, kas izveidota ar līgumu, proti, ar EEZ līgumu. Akts, kuru EEZ Apvienotā komiteja ir aicināta pieņemt, ir lēmums ar juridiskām sekām. Paredzētais akts atbilstoši starptautiskajām tiesībām būs saistošs saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 103. un104. pantu.
 Paredzētais akts nepapildina un negroza līgumā noteikto iestāžu sistēmu. Tāpēc ierosinātā lēmuma procesuālais juridiskais pamats ir LESD 218. panta 9. punkts saistībā ar 1. panta 3. punktu Padomes Regulā Nr. 2894/94 par Līguma par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu īstenošanas kārtību.
 4.2.Materiālais juridiskais pamats
 4.2.1.Principi
 Lēmuma, ko pieņem saskaņā ar LESD 218. panta 9. punktu, materiālais juridiskais pamats galvenokārt ir atkarīgs no tā, kāds mērķis un saturs ir paredzētajam aktam, attiecībā uz kuru Savienības vārdā tiek ieņemta nostāja. Ja paredzētajam aktam ir divi mērķi vai divi komponenti, no kuriem viens ir klasificējams kā galvenais, bet otrs ir pakārtots, lēmums saskaņā ar LESD 218. panta 9. punktu jābalsta uz vienu materiālo juridisko pamatu, proti, to, kas nepieciešams galvenajam vai dominējošajam mērķim vai komponentam.
 Paredzētajam aktam, ar ko vienlaikus vēlas sasniegt virkni mērķu vai kam ir vairāki komponenti, kuri ir nesaraujami saistīti un no kuriem neviens nav pakārtots otram, materiālajā juridiskajā pamatā lēmumam saskaņā ar LESD 218. panta 9. punktu būs izņēmuma kārtā jāietver dažādie atbilstīgie juridiskie pamati.
 4.2.2.Piemērošana konkrētajā gadījumā
 Paredzētajam aktam ir mērķi un komponenti sagatavošanas darbību finansēšanā aizsardzības pētniecības jomā. Materiālais juridiskais pamats atbilst šīs sagatavošanas darbības juridiskajam pamatam, kas ir Regulas (ES, Euratom) 2018/1046 (“Finanšu regula”) 58. panta 2. punkta b) apakšpunkts
 2
 .
 4.3.Secinājumi
 Ierosinātā lēmuma juridiskajam pamatam vajadzētu būt Regulas (ES, Euratom) 2018/1046
 3
 58. panta 2. punkta b) apakšpunktam saistībā ar LESD 218. panta 9. punktu un 1. panta 3. punktu Padomes Regulā Nr. 2894/94 par Līguma par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu īstenošanas kārtību.
 5.Ietekme uz budžetu
 Norvēģija veic finanšu iemaksas budžeta pozīcijā PA 13 17 01 “Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai”. Precīzu summu nosaka, līdzko ir pieņemts šis Padomes lēmums.
 6.Paredzētā akta publicēšana
 Tā kā ar EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmumu tiks grozīts EEZ līguma 31. protokols par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības, ir lietderīgi to pēc pieņemšanas publicēt Eiropas Savienības Oficiālajā Vēstnesī.
 2021/0217 (NLE)
 Priekšlikums
 PADOMES LĒMUMS
 par nostāju, kas Eiropas Savienības vārdā ir jāieņem EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā attiecībā uz grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības (budžeta pozīcija PA 13 17 01 “Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai”)
 (Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)
 EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS PADOME,
 ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Savienības darbību un jo īpaši tā 218. panta 9. punktu,
 ņemot vērā Padomes Regulu (EK) Nr. 2894/94 (1994. gada 28. novembris) par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonas līguma īstenošanas kārtību
 4
 un jo īpaši tās 1. panta 3. punktu,
 Ņemot vērā Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulu (ES, Euratom) 2018/1046 (2018. gada 18. jūlijs) par finanšu noteikumiem, ko piemēro Savienības vispārējam budžetam, ar kuru groza Regulas (ES) Nr. 1296/2013, (ES) Nr. 1301/2013, (ES) Nr. 1303/2013, (ES) Nr. 1304/2013, (ES) Nr. 1309/2013, (ES) Nr. 1316/2013, (ES) Nr. 223/2014, (ES) Nr. 283/2014 un Lēmumu Nr. 541/2014/ES un atceļ Regulu (ES, Euratom) Nr. 966/2012
 5
 un jo īpaši tās 58. panta 2. punkta b) apakšpunktu,
 ņemot vērā Eiropas Komisijas priekšlikumu,
 tā kā:
 (1)Līgums par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu
 6
 (“EEZ līgums”) stājās spēkā 1994. gada 1. janvārī.
 (2)Saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 98. pantu EEZ Apvienotā komiteja cita starpā var lemt par EEZ līguma 31. protokola grozīšanu.
 (3)EEZ līguma 31. protokolā ir ietverti noteikumi par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības.
 (4)EEZ EBTA valstis turpina piedalīties Savienības darbībās, kas saistītas ar budžeta pozīciju PA 13 17 01 (Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai), kura iekļauta Eiropas Savienības 2021. finanšu gada vispārējā budžetā.
 (5)Tādēļ, lai šī paplašinātā sadarbība varētu turpināties no 2021. gada 1. janvāra, būtu jāgroza EEZ līguma 31. protokols.
 (6)Savienības nostājai EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā vajadzētu pamatoties uz pievienoto lēmuma projektu,
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 Nostāja, kura Savienības vārdā jāieņem EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā attiecībā uz ierosināto grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības, pamatojas uz šim lēmumam pievienoto EEZ Apvienotās komitejas lēmuma projektu.
 2. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā tā pieņemšanas dienā.
 Briselē,
 Padomes vārdā –
 priekšsēdētājs
 (1)
 Tiesas spriedums, 2014. gada 7. oktobris, Vācija/Padome, C-399/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, 61.–64. punkts.
 (2)
 OV L 193, 30.7.2018., 1. lpp.
 (3)
 OV L 193, 30.7.2018., 1. lpp.
 (4)
 OV L 305, 30.11.1994., 6.–8. lpp.
 (5)
 OV L 193, 30.7.2018., 1. lpp.
 (6)
 OV L 1, 3.1.1994., 3. lpp.
 ---documentbreak---
 EIROPAS KOMISIJA
 Briselē, 16.7.2021
 COM(2021) 394 final
 PIELIKUMS
 dokumentam
 priekšlikums PADOMES LĒMUMAM
 par nostāju, kas Eiropas Savienības vārdā ir jāieņem EEZ Apvienotajā komitejā attiecībā uz grozījumu EEZ līguma 31. protokolā par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības(budžeta pozīcija PA 13 17 01 "Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai")
 PIELIKUMS
 EEZ APVIENOTĀS KOMITEJAS LĒMUMS
 Nr. [...]
 ([...] gada [...]),
 ar ko groza EEZ līguma 31. protokolu par sadarbību īpašās jomās, kas nav četras pamatbrīvības
 EEZ APVIENOTĀ KOMITEJA,
 ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Ekonomikas zonu (“EEZ līgums”) un jo īpaši tā 98. pantu,
 tā kā:
 (1)Ir lietderīgi turpināt EEZ līguma līgumslēdzēju pušu sadarbību Savienības darbībās, kuras finansē no Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta, attiecībā uz sagatavošanas darbību aizsardzības pētniecībai.
 (2)Ir lietderīgi, ka šai sadarbībai vajadzētu turpināties pēc 2020. gada 31. decembra neatkarīgi no tā, kad tiek pieņemts šis lēmums vai ja par šim lēmumam nepieciešamo konstitucionālo prasību izpildi, ja tādas ir, tiek ziņots pēc 2021. gada 10. jūlija.
 (3)Tādēļ, lai minēto paplašināto sadarbību varētu īstenot no 2021. gada 1. janvāra, būtu jāgroza EEZ līguma 31. protokols,
 IR PIEŅĒMUSI ŠO LĒMUMU.
 1. pants
 EEZ līguma 31. protokola 1. pantam pievieno šādu punktu:
 “14.a)EBTA dalībvalstis no 2021. gada 1. janvāra iesaistās Savienības darbībā, kas saistītas ar šādu budžeta pozīciju, kura iekļauta Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžetā attiecībā uz 2021. finanšu gadu:
 -PA 13 17 01: “Sagatavošanas darbība aizsardzības pētniecībai”
 b)EBTA dalībvalstis finansiāli atbalsta a) apakšpunktā minēto darbību saskaņā ar Līguma 82. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunktu.
 c)Islande un Lihtenšteina nedz piedalās šajā sagatavošanas darbībā, nedz finansiāli atbalsta a) apakšpunktā minētos pasākumus.”
 2. pants
 Šis lēmums stājas spēkā nākamajā dienā pēc pēdējā paziņojuma iesniegšanas saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 103. panta 1. punktu
 1*.
 To piemēro no 2021. gada 1. janvāra.
 3. pants
 Šo lēmumu publicē Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša EEZ iedaļā un tā EEZ papildinājumā.
 Briselē, [...].
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas vārdā —
 priekšsēdētājs
 [...]
 EEZ Apvienotās komitejas
 sekretāri
 [...]
 EBTA dalībvalstu deklarācija
 lēmumam Nr. [...], ar ko groza EEZ līguma 31. protokolu, lai turpinātu līgumslēdzēju pušu sadarbību Savienības sagatavošanas darbībā aizsardzības pētniecībai
 [pieņemt kopā ar lēmumu un publicēt OV]
 Šis lēmums paplašina līgumslēdzēju pušu sadarbību, turpinot EBTA valstu dalību Savienības sagatavošanas darbībā aizsardzības pētniecībai. EBTA valstis uzskata, ka aizsardzības lietas neietilpst EEZ līguma tvērumā un ka tādēļ šā lēmuma pieņemšana nepaplašina EEZ līguma tvērumu tā, ka papildus EBTA valstu dalībai minētajā sagatavošanas darbībā tiktu iekļautas arī aizsardzības lietas. EBTA valstis arī uzsver, ka Islande un Lihtenšteina nedz piedalās šajā sagatavošanas darbībā, nedz atbalsta to finansiāli.
 (1)
 *
 [Konstitucionālās prasības nav norādītas.] [Konstitucionālās prasības ir norādītas.]