text:
 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2015 12 14
 COM(2015) 641 final
 2015/0292(NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolo, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą, sudarymo Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių vardu
 AIŠKINAMASIS MEMORANDUMAS
 2002 m. balandžio 1 d. Briuselyje buvo pasirašytas ir 2006 m. balandžio 1 d. įsigaliojo Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimas, steigiantis Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją.
 Remiantis Aktu dėl Kroatijos Respublikos stojimo Kroatijos Respublika prisijungia prie Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių pasirašytų ar sudarytų susitarimų sudarydama prie tų susitarimų pridedamus protokolus.
 Pridedamas pasiūlymas yra Susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolo, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą, sudarymo teisinė priemonė.
 2012 m. rugsėjo 14 d.
 1
 Taryba įgaliojo Komisiją pradėti derybas su trečiosiomis šalimis dėl atitinkamų protokolų sudarymo. Derybos su Libano Respublika buvo sėkmingai užbaigtos.
 Derybų rezultatai laikomi patenkinamais. Komisija prašo Tarybos priimti pridedamus sprendimus dėl protokolo pasirašymo ir sudarymo.
 Tarybos prašoma gavus Europos Parlamento pritarimą sudaryti protokolą.
 2015/0292 (NLE)
 Pasiūlymas
 TARYBOS SPRENDIMAS
 dėl Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolo, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą, sudarymo Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių vardu
 EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS TARYBA,
 atsižvelgdama į Sutartį dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo, ypač į jos 217 straipsnį kartu su 218 straipsnio 6 dalies a punktu,
 atsižvelgdama į Aktą dėl Kroatijos Respublikos stojimo, ypač į jo 6 straipsnio 2 dalį,
 atsižvelgdama į Europos Komisijos pasiūlymą,
 atsižvelgdama į Europos Parlamento pritarimą,
 kadangi:
 (1)2002 m. balandžio 1 d. Briuselyje buvo pasirašytas ir 2006 m. balandžio 1 d. įsigaliojo Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimas, steigiantis Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją;
 (2)Kroatijos Respublika Europos Sąjungos nare tapo 2013 m. liepos 1 d.;
 (3)pagal Akto dėl Kroatijos Respublikos stojimo 6 straipsnio 2 dalies sąlygas dėl Kroatijos Respublikos prisijungimo prie Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, susitariama Tarybai, veikiančiai Sąjungos bei vienbalsiai visų valstybių narių vardu, sudarant Susitarimo protokolą su Libano Respublika;
 (4)2012 m. rugsėjo 14 d. Taryba įgaliojo Komisiją pradėti derybas su atitinkamomis trečiosiomis šalimis. Derybos su Libano Respublika buvo sėkmingai užbaigtos. [data] [vieta] Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu pasirašytas prisijungimo prie Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolas, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą (toliau – Protokolas);
 (5)Protokolas turėtų būti patvirtintas,
 PRIĖMĖ ŠĮ SPRENDIMĄ:
 1 straipsnis
 Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu patvirtinamas Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolas, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą
 2
 .
 Protokolo tekstas pridedamas prie šio sprendimo.
 2 straipsnis
 Tarybos pirmininkas paskiria asmenį, kuris įgaliojamas Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu pateikti Protokolo 7 straipsnyje numatytą pranešimą ir taip išreikšti Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių sutikimą laikytis Protokolo.
 3 straipsnis
 Šis sprendimas įsigalioja [data]
 Priimta Briuselyje
 Tarybos vardu
 Pirmininkas
 (1)
 Tarybos sprendimas, kuriuo suteikiami įgaliojimai pradėti derybas dėl Europos Sąjungos arba Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir vienos ar kelių trečiųjų šalių arba tarptautinių organizacijų pasirašytų arba sudarytų susitarimų pritaikymo atsižvelgiant į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą (Tarybos dok. Nr. 13351/12 LIMITED).
 (2)
 Tekstas paskelbtas [OL nuoroda] kartu su sprendimu dėl pasirašymo.
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPOS KOMISIJA
 Briuselis, 2015 12 14
 COM(2015) 641 final
 PRIEDAS
 PROTOKOLASEuropos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolas, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą
 prie
 Pasiūlymo dėlTARYBOS SPRENDIMO
 dėl Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolo, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą, sudarymo Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių vardu
 PRIEDAS
 PROTOKOLAS
 Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, protokolas, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Kroatijos Respublikos įstojimą į Europos Sąjungą
 BELGIJOS KARALYSTĖ,
 BULGARIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 ČEKIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 DANIJOS KARALYSTĖ,
 VOKIETIJOS FEDERACINĖ RESPUBLIKA,
 ESTIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 AIRIJA,
 GRAIKIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 ISPANIJOS KARALYSTĖ,
 PRANCŪZIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 KROATIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 ITALIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 KIPRO RESPUBLIKA,
 LATVIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKA,
 LIUKSEMBURGO DIDŽIOJI HERCOGYSTĖ,
 VENGRIJA,
 MALTOS RESPUBLIKA,
 NYDERLANDŲ KARALYSTĖ
 AUSTRIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 LENKIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 PORTUGALIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 RUMUNIJA,
 SLOVĖNIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 SLOVAKIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 SUOMIJOS RESPUBLIKA,
 ŠVEDIJOS KARALYSTĖ,
 JUNGTINĖ DIDŽIOSIOS BRITANIJOS IR ŠIAURĖS AIRIJOS KARALYSTĖ,
 Europos Sąjungos sutarties ir Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo Susitariančiosios Šalys (toliau – valstybės narės), atstovaujamos Europos Sąjungos Tarybos,
 bei
 EUROPOS SĄJUNGA, toliau – Europos Sąjunga,
 ir
 LIBANO RESPUBLIKA (toliau – Libanas),
 toliau šiame protokole – Susitariančiosios Šalys,
 kadangi:
 1)2002 m. balandžio 1 d. Briuselyje pasirašytas ir 2006 m. balandžio 1 d. įsigaliojo Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimas, steigiantis Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją (toliau – Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimas);
 2)2011 m. gruodžio 9 d. Briuselyje pasirašyta ir 2013 m. liepos 1 d. įsigaliojo Sutartis dėl Kroatijos Respublikos stojimo į Europos Sąjungą (toliau – Stojimo sutartis);
 3)pagal Akto dėl Kroatijos Respublikos stojimo 6 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl Kroatijos prisijungimo prie Susitarimo susitariama sudarant Susitarimo protokolą;
 4)siekiant užtikrinti, kad būtų atsižvelgta į dvišalius Sąjungos ir Libano interesus, surengtos Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo 22 straipsnio 2 dalyje numatytos konsultacijos,
 SUSITARĖ:
 1 straipsnis
 Kroatijos Respublika tampa Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, steigiančio Europos bendrijos bei jos valstybių narių ir Libano Respublikos asociaciją, Susitariančiąja Šalimi ir kaip kitos Sąjungos valstybės narės atitinkamai priima Susitarimo, bendrų ir vienašalių deklaracijų tekstus ir į juos atsižvelgia.
 I SKYRIUS
 Europos ir Viduržemio jūros regiono šalių susitarimo, visų pirma jo priedų ir protokolų, teksto pakeitimai
 2 straipsnis
 Kilmės taisyklės
 4 protokolas iš dalies keičiamas taip:
 1.18 straipsnio 4 dalis papildoma šia formuluote: „Izdano naknadno“.
 2.V priedas pakeičiamas taip:
 1. V priedas
 SĄSKAITOS FAKTŪROS DEKLARACIJOS TEKSTAS
 Sąskaitos faktūros deklaracija, kurios tekstas pateikiamas toliau, turi būti surašyta pagal išnašose nustatytus reikalavimus. Tačiau išnašų teksto pateikti nereikia.
 Tekstas bulgarų kalba
 Износителят на продуктите, обхванати от този документ (митническо разрешение No ... (
 1
 ) декларира, че освен където е отбелязано друго, тези продукти са с ... преференциален произход (
 2
 ).
 Tekstas ispanų kalba
 El exportador de los productos incluidos en el presente documento [autorización aduanera no ...(1)] declara que, salvo indicación en sentido contrario, estos productos gozan de un origen preferencial...(2).
 Tekstas čekų kalba
 Vývozce výrobků uvedených v tomto dokumentu (číslo povolení ... (1)) prohlašuje, že kromě zřetelně označených mají tyto výrobky preferenční původ v ... (2).
 Tekstas danų kalba
 Eksportøren af varer, der er omfattet af nærværende dokument, (toldmyndighedernes tilladelse nr. ... (1)), erklærer, at varerne, medmindre andet tydeligt er angivet, har præferenceoprindelse i ... (2).
 Tekstas vokiečių kalba
 Der Ausführer (Ermächtigter Ausführer; Bewilligungs-Nr. ... (1)) der Waren, auf die sich dieses Handelspapier bezieht, erklärt, dass diese Waren, soweit nicht anders angegeben, präferenzbegünstigte ... (2) Ursprungswaren sind.
 Tekstas estų kalba
 Käesoleva dokumendiga hõlmatud toodete eksportija (tolliameti kinnitus nr ... (1)) deklareerib, et need tooted on ... (2) sooduspäritoluga, välja arvatud juhul, kui on selgelt näidatud teisiti.
 Tekstas graikų kalba
 Ο εξαγωγέας των προϊόντων που καλύπτονται από το παρόν έγγραφο [άδεια τελωνείου υπ’ αριθ. ... (1)] δηλώνει ότι, εκτός εάν δηλώνεται σαφώς άλλως, τα προϊόντα αυτά είναι προτιμησιακής καταγωγής ... (2).
 Tekstas anglų kalba
 The exporter of the products covered by this document (customs authorisation No ... (1)) declares that, except where otherwise clearly indicated, these products are of ... (2) preferential origin.
 Tekstas prancūzų kalba
 L’exportateur des produits couverts par le présent document [autorisation douanière no ... (1)] déclare que, sauf indication claire du contraire, ces produits ont l’origine préférentielle ... (2).
 Tekstas kroatų kalba
 Izvoznik proizvoda obuhvaćenih ovom ispravom (carinsko ovlaštenje br. .(1)..) izjavljuje da su, osim ako je drukčije izričito navedeno, ovi proizvodi .... (2) preferencijalnog podrijetla.
 Tekstas italų kalba
 L’esportatore delle merci contemplate nel presente documento [autorizzazione doganale n. ... (1)] dichiarache, salvo indicazione contraria, le merci sono di origine preferenziale ... (2).
 Tekstas latvių kalba
 Eksportētājs produktiem, kuri ietverti šajā dokumentā (muitas pilnvara Nr. ... (1)), deklarē, ka, izņemot tur, kur ir citādi skaidri noteikts, šiem produktiem ir priekšrocību izcelsme no ... (2).
 Tekstas lietuvių kalba
 Šiame dokumente išvardintų prekių eksportuotojas (muitinės liudijimo Nr. ... (1)) deklaruoja, kad, jeigu kitaip nenurodyta, tai yra ... (2) preferencinės kilmės prekės.
 Tekstas vengrų kalba
 A jelen okmányban szereplő áruk exportőre (vámfelhatalmazási szám: ... (1)) kijelentem, hogy eltérő egyértelmű jelzés hianyában az áruk preferenciális ... (2) származásúak.
 Tekstas maltiečių kalba
 L-esportatur tal-prodotti koperti b’dan id-dokument (awtorizzazzjoni tad-dwana nru. ... (1)) jiddikjara li, ħlief fejn indikat b’mod ċar li mhux hekk, dawn il-prodotti huma ta’ oriġini preferenzjali ... (2).
 Tekstas nyderlandų kalba
 De exporteur van de goederen waarop dit document van toepassing is (douanevergunning nr. ... (1)), verklaart dat, behoudens uitdrukkelijke andersluidende vermelding, deze goederen van preferentiële ...oorsprong zijn (2).
 Tekstas lenkų kalba
 Eksporter produktów objętych tym dokumentem (upoważnienie władz celnych nr ... (1)) deklaruje, że z wyjątkiem gdzie jest to wyraźnie określone, produkty te mają ... (2) preferencyjne pochodzenie.
 Tekstas portugalų kalba
 O exportador dos produtos cobertos pelo presente documento [autorização aduaneira n.o ... (1)], declara que, salvo expressamente indicado em contrário, estes produtos são de origem preferencial ... (2).
 Tekstas rumunų kalba
 Exportatorul produselor ce fac obiectul acestui document [autorizația vamală nr. ... (1)] declară că, exceptând cazul în care în mod expres este indicat altfel, aceste produse sunt de origine preferențială ... (2).
 Tekstas slovėnų kalba
 Izvoznik blaga, zajetega s tem dokumentom (pooblastilo carinskih organov št. ... (1)) izjavlja, da, razen če ni drugače jasno navedeno, ima to blago preferencialno ... (2) poreklo.
 Tekstas slovakų kalba
 Vývozca výrobkov uvedených v tomto dokumente [číslo povolenia ... (1)] vyhlasuje, že okrem zreteľne označených, majú tieto výrobky preferenčný pôvod v ... (2).
 Tekstas suomių kalba
 Tässä asiakirjassa mainittujen tuotteiden viejä (tullin lupa nro ... (1)) ilmoittaa, että nämä tuotteet ovat, ellei toisin ole selvästi merkitty, etuuskohteluun oikeutettuja ... (2) alkuperätuotteita.
 Tekstas švedų kalba
 Exportören av de varor som omfattas av detta dokument (tullmyndighetens tillstånd nr ... (1)) försäkrar att dessa varor, om inte annat tydligt markerats, har förmånsberättigande ... ursprung (2).
 Tekstas arabų kalba
 .................................................................................................................................................. (
 3
 ) (Vieta ir data)
 .................................................................................................................................................. (
 4
 )
 (Eksportuotojo parašas; papildomai aiškia rašysena turi būti nurodytas deklaraciją pasirašiusio asmens vardas ir pavardė)
 II SKYRIUS
 Pereinamojo laikotarpio nuostatos
 3 straipsnis
 Tranzitu vežamos prekės
 Susitarimo nuostatos gali būti taikomos iš Libano į Kroatiją arba iš Kroatijos į Libaną eksportuojamoms prekėms, kurios atitinka Susitarimo 4 protokolo nuostatas ir kurios Kroatijos įstojimo dieną yra pakeliui arba laikinai saugomos Libano arba Kroatijos muitinės sandėlyje arba laisvojoje zonoje.
 Tokiais atvejais gali būti taikomas lengvatinis režimas, jeigu importuojančios šalies muitinėms per keturis mėnesius nuo įstojimo datos pateikiamas eksportuojančios šalies muitinės atgaline data išduotas kilmės įrodymo dokumentas.
 III SKYRIUS
 Baigiamosios ir bendrosios nuostatos
 4 straipsnis
 Libano Respublika įsipareigoja nereikšti jokių pretenzijų, prašymų arba skundų ir nekeisti bei neatšaukti jokių nuolaidų pagal 1994 m. GATT XXIV straipsnio 6 dalį ir XXVIII straipsnį dėl Sąjungos plėtros.
 5 straipsnis
 Tinkamu metu po šio protokolo parafavimo Sąjunga valstybėms narėms ir Libano Respublikai pateikia Susitarimo versiją kroatų kalba. Su sąlyga, kad šis protokolas įsigalios, šio straipsnio pirmajame sakinyje nurodyta kalbos versija tampa autentiška tokiomis pačiomis sąlygomis, kaip ir Susitarimo versijos anglų, arabų, bulgarų, čekų, danų, estų, graikų, ispanų, italų, latvių, lenkų, lietuvių, maltiečių, nyderlandų, portugalų, prancūzų, rumunų, slovakų, slovėnų, suomių, švedų, vengrų ir vokiečių kalbomis.
 6 straipsnis
 Šis protokolas yra neatskiriama Susitarimo dalis.
 7 straipsnis
 Šį protokolą Europos Sąjunga, Europos Sąjungos Taryba valstybių narių vardu ir Libanas patvirtina laikydamiesi savo procedūrų. Susitariančiosios Šalys viena kitai praneša, kad būtinos procedūros yra baigtos. Patvirtinimo dokumentai deponuojami Europos Sąjungos Tarybos generaliniame sekretoriate.
 Šis protokolas įsigalioja pirmą mėnesio dieną po tos dienos, kai visos Šalys praneša viena kitai, kad būtinos procedūros yra baigtos.
 Kol Protokolas neįsigaliojo, jis taikomas laikinai nuo 2013 m. liepos 1 d.
 8 straipsnis
 Šis protokolas sudaromas dviem egzemplioriais anglų, arabų, bulgarų, čekų, danų, estų, graikų, ispanų, italų, kroatų, latvių, lenkų, lietuvių, maltiečių, nyderlandų, portugalų, prancūzų, rumunų, slovakų, slovėnų, suomių, švedų, vengrų ir vokiečių kalbomis ir tekstas kiekviena iš šių kalbų yra vienodai autentiškas.
 TAI PATVIRTINDAMI, toliau nurodyti tinkamai įgalioti atstovai pasirašė šį protokolą.
 Priimta ... [vieta], ... [data]
 Europos Sąjungos ir jos valstybių narių vardu
 Libano Respublikos vardu
 (1)
 Kai sąskaitos faktūros deklaraciją surašo patvirtintas eksportuotojas, kaip apibrėžta šio protokolo 22 straipsnyje, šiame laukelyje reikia įrašyti patvirtinto eksportuotojo leidimo numerį. Kai sąskaitos faktūros deklaraciją surašo ne patvirtintas eksportuotojas, žodžiai skliausteliuose yra ištrinami ar paliekamas tuščias laukelis.
 (2)
 Reikia nurodyti produktų kilmę. Kai sąskaitos faktūros deklaracija visa ar iš dalies susijusi su Seutos ir Melilijos kilmės statusą turinčiais produktais, kaip apibrėžta protokolo 37 straipsnyje, eksportuotojas turi aiškiai juos nurodyti simboliu „CM“ dokumente, kuriame surašoma deklaracija.
 (3)
 Šių nuorodų galima neįtraukti, jeigu informacija yra nurodyta pačiame dokumente.
 (4)
 Žr. protokolo 22 straipsnio 5 dalį. Tais atvejais, kai eksportuotojas neprivalo pasirašyti, tai taip pat reiškia, kad nereikia nurodyti pasirašančiojo vardo ir pavardės.“


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Ważna informacja prawna
 |
 22003D0066
 Dziennik Urzędowy L 257 , 09/10/2003 P. 0004 - 0007
 Decyzja Wspólnego Komitetu EOGnr 66/2003z dnia 20 czerwca 2003 r.zmieniająca załącznik I (Sprawy weterynaryjne i fitosanitarne) do Porozumienia EOGWSPÓLNY KOMITET EOG,uwzględniając Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, dostosowane Protokołem dostosowującym Porozumienie o Europejskim Obszarze Gospodarczym, zwane dalej Porozumieniem, w szczególności jego art. 98,a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:(1) Załącznik I do Porozumienia został zmieniony decyzją Wspólnego Komitetu EOG nr 31/2003 z dnia 14 marca 2003 r. [1](2) Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 22 maja 2001 r. ustanawiające przepisy dotyczące zapobiegania, kontroli i zwalczania niektórych pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych [2] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(3) Rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 1248/2001 z dnia 22 czerwca 2001 r. zmieniające załączniki III, X i XI do rozporządzenia (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w odniesieniu do nadzoru epidemiologicznego i badań pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych [3] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(4) Rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 1326/2001 z dnia 29 czerwca 2001 r. ustanawiające środki przejściowe, umożliwiające przejście do przepisów rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 999/2001 ustanawiającego zasady dotyczące zapobiegania, kontroli i zwalczania niektórych pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych oraz zmieniające załączniki VII i XI do tego rozporządzenia [4] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(5) Rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 270/2002 z dnia 14 lutego 2002 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady dotyczące materiałów określonego ryzyka oraz nadzoru epidemiologicznego odnośnie do pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych oraz zmieniające rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1326/2001 odnośnie do żywienia zwierząt i wprowadzania do obrotu owiec i kóz oraz produktów od nich pochodzących [5] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(6) Rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 1494/2002 z dnia 21 sierpnia 2002 r. zmieniające załączniki III, VII i XI do rozporządzenia (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w odniesieniu do monitorowania gąbczastej encefalopatii bydła, zwalczania gąbczastej encefalopatii bydła, usuwania materiału szczególnego ryzyka oraz zasad przywozu żywych zwierząt i produktów pochodzenia zwierzęcego [6] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(7) Decyzję Komisji 2002/1003/WE z dnia 18 grudnia 2002 r. ustanawiająca minimalne wymogi w zakresie badania genotypów białka prionowego u owiec [7] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(8) Rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 260/2003 z dnia 12 lutego 2003 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w odniesieniu do zwalczania pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych u owiec i kóz oraz zasad handlu żywymi owcami, kozami i zarodkami bydlęcymi [8] należy włączyć do Porozumienia.(9) Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1248/2001 uchyla decyzję Komisji 98/272/WE [9], która jest włączona do Porozumienia i w konsekwencji należy ją wykreślić z Porozumienia.(10) Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 1326/2001 uchyla decyzje Komisji 94/381/WE [10] i 94/474/WE [11], które są włączone do Porozumienia i w konsekwencji należy je wykreślić z Porozumienia.(11) Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 260/2003 uchyla decyzję Komisji 92/290/EWG [12], która jest włączona do Porozumienia i w konsekwencji należy ją wykreślić z Porozumienia.(12) Niniejszej decyzji nie stosuje się w odniesieniu do Liechtensteinu i Islandii,PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZĄ DECYZJĘ:Artykuł 1W rozdziale I załącznika I do Porozumienia wprowadza się następujące zmiany:1) w części 7.1 pkt 11 (decyzja Rady 2000/766/WE), dodaje się tiret w brzmieniu:"— 32001 R 1326: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 1326/2001 z dnia 29 czerwca 2001 r. (Dz.U. L 177 z 30.6.2001, str. 60).";2) w części 7.1 po pkt 11 (decyzja Rady 2000/766/WE), dodaje się, co następuje:"Kontrola TSE (pasażowalne encefalopatie gąbczaste)12. 32001 R 0999: rozporządzenie (WE) nr 999/2001 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 22 maja 2001 r. ustanawiające przepisy dotyczące zapobiegania, kontroli i zwalczania niektórych pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych (Dz.U. L 147 z 31.5.2001, str. 1), zmienione:- 32001 R 1248: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 1248/2001 z dnia 22 czerwca 2001 r. (Dz.U. L 173 z 27.6.2001, str. 12),- 32001 R 1326: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 1326/2001 z dnia 29 czerwca 2001 r. (Dz.U. L 177 z 30.6.2001, str. 60),- 32002 R 0270: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 270/2002 z dnia 14 lutego 2002 r. (Dz.U. L 45 z 15.2.2002, str. 4),- 32002 R 1494: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 1494/2002 z dnia 21 sierpnia 2002 r. (Dz.U. L 225 z 22.8.2002, str. 3),- 32003 R 0260: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 260/2003 z dnia 12 lutego 2003 r. (Dz.U. L 37 z 13.2.2003, str. 7).Przepisy rozporządzenia, do celów niniejszego Porozumienia, otrzymują następujące brzmienie:A. W rozdziale A część I pkt 2.3 załącznika III, po wyrazie"Szwecja".dodaje się, co następuje:"i Norwegia".B. W rozdziale A część II pkt 2 załącznika III dodaje się, co następuje:"Norwegia | 42500". |C. W rozdziale A część II pkt 3 załącznika III dodaje się, co następuje:"Norwegia | 6000". |D. W rozdziale A pkt 3 załącznika X, dodaje się, co następuje:"Norwegia: | VeterinærinstituttetPostboks 8156 Dep.N-0033 OsloNorwegia".". |3) w części 7.2 po pkt 16 (decyzja Komisji 2001/9/WE), dodaje się, co następuje:"17. 32001 R 1326: rozporządzenie Komisji (WE) nr 1326/2001 z dnia 29 czerwca 2001 r. ustanawiające środki przejściowe, umożliwiające przejście do przepisów rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 999/2001 ustanawiającego zasady dotyczące zapobiegania, kontroli i zwalczania niektórych pasażowalnych encefalopatii gąbczastych oraz zmieniające załączniki VII i XI do tego rozporządzenia (Dz.U. L 177 z 30.6.2001, str. 60), zmienione:- 32002 R 0270: rozporządzeniem Komisji (WE) nr 270/2002 z dnia 14 lutego 2002 r. (Dz.U. L 45 z 15.2.2002, str. 4).";"18. 32002 D 1003: decyzja Komisji 2002/1003/WE z dnia 18 grudnia 2002 r. ustanawiająca minimalne wymogi w zakresie badania genotypów białka prionowego u owiec (Dz.U. L 349 z 24.12.2002, str. 105).";4) W części 1.2 skreśla się teksty pkt 7 (decyzja Komisji 92/290/EWG), 26 (decyzja Komisji 94/381/WE), 27 (decyzja Komisji 94/474/WE), i 78 (decyzja Komisji 98/272/WE).Artykuł 2Teksty rozporządzeń (WE) nr 999/2001, 1248/2001, 1326/2001, 270/2002, 1494/2002 i 260/2003 i decyzji 2002/1003/WE w języku norweskim, które mają być opublikowane w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej, są autentyczne.Artykuł 3Niniejsza decyzja wchodzi w życie dnia 21 czerwca 2003 r., pod warunkiem że wszystkie notyfikacje na mocy art. 103 ust. 1 Porozumienia zostały dokonane wobec Wspólnego Komitetu EOG [13].Artykuł 4Niniejsza decyzja zostaje opublikowana w Sekcji EOG i w Dodatku EOG do Dziennika Urzędowego Unii Europejskiej.Sporządzono w Brukseli, dnia 20 czerwca 2003 r.W imieniu Wspólnego Komitetu EOGP. WesterlundPrzewodniczący[1] Dz.U. L 137 z 5.6.2003, str. 30.[2] Dz.U. L 147 z 31.5.2001, str. 1.[3] Dz.U. L 173 z 27.6.2001, str. 12.[4] Dz.U. L 177 z 30.6.2001, str. 60.[5] Dz.U. L 45 z 15.2.2002, str. 4.[6] Dz.U. L 225 z 22.8.2002, str. 3.[7] Dz.U. L 349 z 24.12.2002, str. 105.[8] Dz.U. L 37 z 13.2.2003, str. 7.[9] Dz.U. L 122 z 24.4.1998, str. 59.[10] Dz.U. L 172 z 7.7.1994, str. 23.[11] Dz.U. L 194 z 29.7.1994, str. 96.[12] Dz.U. L 152 z 4.6.1992, str. 37.[13] Wskazano wymogi konstytucyjne.--------------------------------------------------


type: legislation

text:
 2.8.2011
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 199/44
 A BIZOTTSÁG 759/2011/EU VÉGREHAJTÁSI RENDELETE
 (2011. augusztus 1.)
 az egyes gyümölcs- és zöldségfélék behozatali árának meghatározására szolgáló behozatali átalányértékek megállapításáról
 AZ EURÓPAI BIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződésre,
 tekintettel a mezőgazdasági piacok közös szervezésének létrehozásáról, valamint egyes mezőgazdasági termékekre vonatkozó egyedi rendelkezésekről szóló, 2007. október 22-i 1234/2007/EK tanácsi rendeletre (az egységes közös piacszervezésről szóló rendelet) (1),
 tekintettel az 1234/2007/EK tanácsi rendeletnek a gyümölcs- és zöldség-, valamint a feldolgozottgyümölcs- és feldolgozottzöldség-ágazatra alkalmazandó részletes szabályainak a megállapításáról szóló, 2011. június 7-i 543/2011/EU bizottsági végrehajtási rendeletre (2) és különösen annak 136. cikke (1) bekezdésére,
 mivel:
 Az Uruguayi Forduló többoldalú kereskedelmi tárgyalásai eredményeinek megfelelően az 543/2011/EU végrehajtási rendelet a XVI. mellékletének A. részében szereplő termékek és időszakok tekintetében meghatározza azokat a szempontokat, amelyek alapján a Bizottság rögzíti a harmadik országokból történő behozatalra vonatkozó átalányértékeket,
 ELFOGADTA EZT A RENDELETET:
 1. cikk
 Az 543/2011/EU végrehajtási rendelet 136. cikkében említett behozatali átalányértékeket e rendelet melléklete határozza meg.
 2. cikk
 Ez a rendelet 2011. augusztus 2-án lép hatályba.
 Ez a rendelet teljes egészében kötelező és közvetlenül alkalmazandó valamennyi tagállamban.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2011. augusztus 1-jén.
 a Bizottság részéről, az elnök nevében,
 José Manuel SILVA RODRÍGUEZ
 mezőgazdasági és vidékfejlesztési főigazgató
 (1) HL L 299., 2007.11.16., 1. o.
 (2) HL L 157., 2011.6.15., 1. o.
 MELLÉKLET
 Az egyes gyümölcs- és zöldségfélék behozatali árának meghatározására szolgáló behozatali átalányértékek
 (EUR/100 kg)
 KN-kód
 Országkód (1)
 Behozatali átalányérték
 0702 00 00
 AR
 23,8
 ZA
 27,3
 ZZ
 25,6
 0707 00 05
 TR
 100,6
 ZZ
 100,6
 0709 90 70
 TR
 115,3
 ZZ
 115,3
 0805 50 10
 AR
 65,7
 CL
 79,0
 TR
 60,0
 UY
 69,6
 ZA
 76,0
 ZZ
 70,1
 0806 10 10
 CL
 54,3
 EG
 166,4
 MA
 198,0
 TN
 223,5
 TR
 164,0
 ZA
 98,7
 ZZ
 150,8
 0808 10 80
 AR
 93,3
 BR
 84,1
 CL
 89,4
 CN
 78,9
 NZ
 110,2
 US
 131,3
 ZA
 91,9
 ZZ
 97,0
 0808 20 50
 AR
 75,9
 CL
 105,9
 CN
 51,0
 NZ
 127,9
 ZA
 108,5
 ZZ
 93,8
 0809 20 95
 CL
 267,8
 TR
 290,0
 ZZ
 278,9
 0809 30
 TR
 139,7
 ZZ
 139,7
 0809 40 05
 BA
 51,5
 IL
 150,1
 XS
 57,7
 ZA
 70,8
 ZZ
 82,5
 (1) Az országoknak az 1833/2006/EK bizottsági rendeletben (HL L 354., 2006.12.14., 19. o.) meghatározott nómenklatúrája szerint. A „ZZ” jelentése „egyéb származás”.


type: caselaw

text:
 30.12.2006
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 C 326/1
 Zloženie sľubu nových sudcov Súdneho dvora Európskych spoločenstiev
 (2006/C 326/01)
 Pán Bonichot, pani Lindh a pán von Danwitz, vymenovaní za sudcov Súdneho dvora Európskych spoločenstiev rozhodnutiami zástupcov vlád členských štátov Európskych spoločenstiev zo 6. apríla 2006 (1) a zo 6. júla 2006 (2) na obdobie od 7. októbra 2006 do 6. októbra 2012, zložili 6. októbra 2006 pred Súdnym dvorom sľub.
 Pán Bot, pán Mazák a pani Trstenjak, vymenovaní za generálnych advokátov na Súdnom dvore Európskych spoločenstiev rozhodnutím zástupcov vlád členských štátov Európskych spoločenstiev zo 6. apríla 2006 (1) na obdobie od 7. októbra 2006 do 6. októbra 2012, zložili 6. októbra 2006 pred Súdnym dvorom sľub.
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 104, 13. apríla 2006, s. 39.
 (2) Ú. v. EÚ L 215, 5. augusta 2006, s. 30.


type: wikipedia

text:
Major General Sir Charles William Gwynn, KCB, CMG, DSO, FRGS (4 February 1870 – 12 February 1963) was an Irish born British Army officer, geographer, explorer and author of works on military history and theory.
 Birth and education
 Charles William Gwynn was the fourth son of John Gwynn (1827–1917), Regius Professor of Divinity at Trinity College, Dublin, and his wife, Lucy Josephine (1840–1907) daughter of the Irish nationalist William Smith O'Brien. He was born at Ramelton, County Donegal, while his father was rector of the local church. He was educated at St. Columba's College, Dublin and at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.
 Military career
 Gwynn was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on 15 February 1889.
 Promoted to lieutenant on 15 February 1892, he saw active service in West Africa 1893–94 in operations against the Sofas, and in 1897 joined the geographical section of the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Following the reconquest of Sudan from the Mahdi, Gwynn undertook survey work there, remaining until 1904. He was promoted to captain on 15 February 1900, received a brevet promotion to major on the following day, and was appointed a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) for his survey work determining the Ethiopia-Sudan controversial border. He attended the Staff College, Camberley from 1905 to 1906.
 In June 1911, he was detailed to Australia as an instructor at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, where he served as the director of military art, instructing cadets in tactics, strategy and military history, with the local rank of lieutenant colonel. During much of his time there he acted as Commandant while the head of the College, Brigadier General W.T. Bridges, was away on tour. With the outbreak of World War I, he returned to England, where he unsuccessfully sought a posting to France. In July 1915, he was sent to the Middle East and was appointed General staff Officer Grade 1 (GSO1) of the Australian 2nd Division at Gallipoli. He was eventually posted to serve as the Chief of Staff of the II Anzac Corps, a position he held until the end of the war. He was present at the battle of Messines in June 1917. His brother, Stephen, and Stephen's son, Dennis, also served in the Great War.
 Gwynn was appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath in 1918. During the Great War he was mentioned in dispatches six times, received the brevet ranks of lieutenant-colonel and colonel, and was awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre and the French Légion d'honneur.
 After World War I, he served in a variety of staff assignments, culminating in May 1926 when he was made Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley. Upon his retirement in 1931, he was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.
 Later life
 After his retirement, in 1934, Major General Gwynn wrote Imperial Policing, now regarded as a classic in the field of low intensity conflict and small wars.
 Family
 In 1904 Gwynn married Mary ("Molly") Armstrong, widow of Lieutenant Lowry Armstrong of the Royal Navy. Molly Gwynn had a daughter by her first husband, named Margery Armstrong. Charles Gwynn had no children. Molly Gwynn died in 1951. Charles Gwynn spent his final years in Dublin, where he died in 1963 at the age of 93.
 Personal characteristics
 Gwynn was of medium height and wiry in build. He had a slight stammer.
 Publications by Charles Gwynn
 The Frontiers of Abyssinia: a retrospect Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 36, No. 143 (Apr. 1937), pp. 150–161
 Imperial Policing London: Macmillan, 1934
 The Second Great War: A Standard History (9 volumes, The Waverley Book Company Ltd in association with The Amalgamated Press, 1939-1946, edited by Sir John Hammerton), as Military Editor.
 Photographs
 References
 External links
 British Army Officers 1939−1945
 Imperial Policing
 1870 births
 1963 deaths
 British Army major generals
 Knights Commander of the Order of the Bath
 Companions of the Order of St Michael and St George
 Companions of the Distinguished Service Order
 Fellows of the Royal Geographical Society
 English explorers
 Explorers of Africa
 Irish people of World War I
 British Army personnel of World War I
 People from County Down
 Royal Engineers officers
 Graduates of the Staff College, Camberley
 Graduates of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich
 Commandants of the Staff College, Camberley


jurisdiction: US

text:
 822 A.2d 1129 (2003)
 2003 ME 67
 STATE of Maine
 v.
 Foster BATES.
 Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
 Argued: March 12, 2003.
 Decided: May 8, 2003.
 *1130 G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Attorney General (orally), Fernand R. LaRochelle, Asst. Attorney General, Augusta, for State.
 Jane Elizabeth Lee (orally), Portland, for defendant.
 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
 CALKINS, J.
 [¶ 1] Foster Bates appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 (1983 & Supp.2002), and gross sexual assault (Class A), id. § 253 (Supp.2002), entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.) after a jury trial.[1] Bates contends that the court erred in jury selection by allowing persons who had read a newspaper article about the murder to sit on the jury. He also *1131 challenges the admission of testimony from his ex-wife concerning his conduct on the evening of the murder, and he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Bates further appeals from his sentence of life imprisonment. We affirm both the convictions and the sentence.
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
 [¶ 2] The following facts were in evidence at Bates's trial. Tammy Dickson was last seen alive early in the evening of Thursday, February 17, 1994. She lived in an apartment complex and routinely had morning coffee with neighbors, but she did not appear on Friday. When her neighbors had not seen her by Saturday, one of them tried to contact William Quinn, with whom Dickson had an on-again/off-again relationship. The neighbor finally reached Quinn on Sunday and asked Quinn to check on Dickson. Quinn had a key to Dickson's apartment, and Sunday evening he went there and discovered Dickson's body.
 [¶ 3] The police were notified, and when they arrived they removed a blanket covering Dickson and saw that her hands were bound behind her, a pillowcase and items of clothing covered her face, and she was naked from the waist down. Items from Dickson's apartment were taken to the crime laboratory for further examination, and some samples were sent to the FBI lab. The medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was strangulation and that Dickson had been dead for several days before her body was discovered. At the post-mortem examination, the medical examiner found a green sock in Dickson's mouth and bruising on Dickson's body, including abrasions on her arms, elbows, and knees that were consistent with rug burns.
 [¶ 4] The police interviewed numerous people including Quinn and Bates. Bates and his wife were neighbors of Dickson, and Bates told police that he had been at a basketball game on Thursday night. He denied having any relationship with Dickson other than that Dickson had sometimes babysat for Bates's child. The police obtained blood samples from Quinn and Bates.
 [¶ 5] Two years later, the results of the DNA analysis by the FBI lab became available, showing that Quinn's semen was on a robe found near Dickson's body. The vaginal swabs that had been taken from Dickson were not conclusive. The police questioned Quinn extensively, and Quinn disclosed that there had been a green sock in Dickson's mouth when he discovered her body. This was information that the police had not given to the public. Quinn admitted that he could have gone to Dickson's apartment on the night of the murder and had sex with her. He acknowledged that he had been drinking heavily at the time.
 [¶ 6] Several years later further DNA tests with newer technology were done on the swab of Dickson's vagina, and these tests matched the sperm cells on the vaginal swab to Bates. Bates was reinterviewed by the police, and again he denied having a sexual relationship with Dickson. Bates was arrested, indicted, and tried for Dickson's murder.
 [¶ 7] One of Dickson's neighbors testified at trial that a month before the murder Dickson woke up the neighbor in the middle of the night. Dickson was shaking with fear and said that she had awakened to discover Bates sitting on her bed and stroking her hair. The neighbor also recalled a second incident a week before the murder when Dickson showed fear of Bates. A person who worked with Bates testified that Bates told the co-worker that *1132 he had been to Dickson's apartment Thursday night, which was the night of the murder.
 [¶ 8] Bates testified at trial that he had been having a sexual affair with Dickson and had sexual intercourse with her the Wednesday before the murder, but he denied raping or murdering Dickson. Bates and his wife lived together in 1994 but later divorced. Over the objection of defense counsel, Bates's former wife testified that on Thursday night, February 17, 1994, Bates left their apartment at approximately ten o'clock and did not come home until three o'clock the next morning.
 [¶ 9] During jury selection, an issue arose concerning a newspaper article that had appeared that morning in a Portland newspaper. The article was about the murder, and it stated that Dickson's son, who was eighteen months old at the time of the murder, was found in his playpen in Dickson's apartment where he had apparently been left unattended from the time of Dickson's death until the discovery of her body. Bates had previously asked the court to exclude at trial any evidence concerning the fact that the child had been left with his dead mother for several days, and at the time of jury selection, the court had not yet ruled on the request. After jury selection, the State represented that it would not offer any such evidence, and the presence of the child in the apartment was not a fact put in evidence.
 [¶ 10] The court inquired of the seventy-five member venire how many had seen the newspaper article and instructed everyone not to read it. Seventeen people responded that they had already seen the article. After the court asked general questions of the entire venire, the prospective jurors were questioned individually in chambers by counsel and the court. Those who had read the article were specifically asked about it. Most who had read it were challenged for cause and were excused. The court and counsel continued to individually question enough potential jurors to arrive at the number of thirty-seven, after all challenges for cause had been determined. Included in the thirty-seven were three people who had read the newspaper article, but who had said that they could decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial; these three were not challenged for cause. The State and the defense counsel exercised their preemptory challenges. A jury of twelve with three alternates was chosen. The jury that deliberated and convicted Bates included the three people who had read the article.
 [¶ 11] The jury found Bates guilty of both murder and gross sexual assault. Following the receipt of sentencing memoranda, the court held a sentencing hearing and imposed a life sentence for murder and a thirty-year concurrent sentence on the gross sexual assault conviction. Bates filed an application to allow a sentencing appeal, which we granted and consolidated with his appeal from the convictions.
 II. JUROR ISSUE
 [¶ 12] Bates argues that the seating of three jurors who had read the newspaper article denied him a fair and impartial jury. He contends that because of the article these three jurors had information not in evidence  that Dickson's young son had been left in the apartment with his dead mother for three days. Because there was no challenge to these three jurors, we review the court's decision to seat them for obvious error. State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 9 (Me.1994).
 [¶ 13] Bates argues that it was apparent from several comments made by members of the venire, who were excused for cause, that the presence of the child was a fact *1133 that was extremely disturbing to people. Of the potential jurors who were questioned about the newspaper article, several spontaneously mentioned the child. Several said the fact of the child stuck in their minds. Others who admitted they could not be fair and impartial indicated that it was the fact of the child that affected them. Thus, Bates argues that because there was a highly emotional and prejudicial fact, which was not put in evidence, but was known to the three jurors who had read the newspaper article, he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury.
 [¶ 14] Potential jurors who have read prejudicial newspaper stories are not automatically excused from jury service. If the potential juror is able to lay aside what he or she has read and base a verdict only on the evidence at trial, there is no error in seating the juror. See State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 20, 776 A.2d 621, 627; State v. Littlefield, 374 A.2d 590, 595 (Me.1977). The three jurors who were seated in this case all said that they could render a verdict based on the evidence. All three recognized that newspapers sometimes do not report the facts correctly and stated that they could put aside anything they had read in the newspaper. The individual collogues between the three jurors, court, and counsel failed to demonstrate that these jurors were so affected by the newspaper article that they could not be fair and impartial. Indeed, just the opposite appears to be true. The essence of these three collogues was that the jurors would be fair and impartial, and that is likely the reason that neither the State nor defense counsel challenged them for cause. Bates has not shown that it was error to seat the three jurors or that their participation in his convictions denied him a fair and impartial jury.
 III. MARITAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE
 [¶ 15] Bates claims that his ex-wife should not have been allowed to testify that, on the night of the murder, he left the marital home at approximately ten o'clock and did not return until three o'clock the next morning. He contends that his conduct of leaving the house was a marital communication intended to be confidential. We review the trial court's determination concerning whether certain testimony should be excluded as privileged for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boucher, 652 A.2d 76, 77 (Me.1994).
 [¶ 16] The marital communications privilege is set forth in the last sentence of 15 M.R.S.A. § 1315 (2003): "The husband or wife of the accused is a competent witness except in regard to marital communications." This statutory privilege is further refined in M.R. Evid. 504(b), which provides, "A married person has a privilege to prevent his or her spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication from such person to the spouse." A confidential marital communication is defined as one that "is made privately by any person to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person." M.R. Evid. 504(a).
 [¶ 17] We have acknowledged, in the context of the marital communications privilege, that it is possible for conduct to be a form of communication. State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 689-90 (Me.1978). However, in order for the conduct to be considered communication, it must be intended to communicate something to the spouse. Id. at 690. Furthermore, we have said that in order for the conduct to be considered a communication coming within the privilege, confidentiality must be an inducing factor. Id. at 691. It is difficult to discern what Bates intended to communicate to his wife by leaving his *1134 residence, other than to say, "I am leaving." It is even more difficult to discern how confidentiality was an inducing factor in that conduct.
 [¶ 18] Even if we were to agree that Bates's conduct of leaving his marital abode in the presence of his spouse was communication, it is impossible to see how it was intended to be confidential. Bates lived in an apartment complex in South Portland. Leaving his apartment exposed him to any neighbor or passer-by who happened to be watching. We noted in Smith that the inquiry concerning confidentiality should focus on "the spouse's reasonable expectation of confidentiality." Id. Conduct knowingly exposed to the public cannot form the basis of a claim of a reasonable expectation of confidentiality because it is not reasonable to think that activity exposed to the public should remain private. Id. at 692. Because Bates's conduct was not a confidential marital communication, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Bates's wife to testify as to his whereabouts on the night of the murder.
 IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
 [¶ 19] We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing the evidence in "the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the trier of fact rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged." State v. Turner, 2001 ME 44, ¶ 6, 766 A.2d 1025, 1027.
 A. Murder
 [¶ 20] Bates was convicted of the intentional or knowing murder of Dickson. "A person is guilty of murder if ... [h]e intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) (1983).
 [¶ 21] There was no dispute that Dickson was dead. The primary contested issue was whether Bates caused her death, and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that he was responsible. Bates's sperm was found in Dickson's vagina; he admitted that he lied to investigators about his involvement with Dickson; and Dickson was afraid of him. There was evidence that he left his residence for several hours on the night of the murder.
 [¶ 22] It was not necessary for the jury to eliminate entirely the possible alternative explanation that Quinn or some other person was responsible for Dickson's death; it was only necessary that the jury determine, with reference to all the evidence presented, that such an alternative was not sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt about Bates's guilt. See State v. Black, 2000 ME 211, ¶ 14, 763 A.2d 109, 113. Given the totality of the evidence, including the fact that Dickson was afraid of Bates, and the lack of evidence that Dickson had any fear of Quinn, it was rational for the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Bates was the murderer. There was sufficient evidence to support Bates's conviction for murder.
 B. Gross Sexual Assault
 [¶ 23] Bates argues that the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of gross sexual assault because it was not sufficient to prove compulsion. "A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and ... [t]he other person submits as a result of compulsion." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A). "Compulsion" is defined, in this context, as
 [T]he use of physical force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, *1135 serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or another human being.
 Id. § 251(1)(E) (Supp.2002).
 [¶ 24] The jury could have concluded that Bates compelled Dickson to have sexual intercourse from the DNA evidence, Bates's admission that he and Dickson had sexual intercourse, the evidence of Dickson's fear of Bates, and the evidence that Dickson's half-naked body was covered with abrasions. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the same physical force that caused Dickson's death by strangulation was also used to overpower Dickson's resistance to sexual intercourse with Bates. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for gross sexual assault.
 V. SENTENCE
 [¶ 25] Bates also appeals the sentence of life imprisonment and argues that a term of years should have been imposed. The first step a court must take in determining a sentence is to consider "the particular nature and seriousness of the offense." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(1) (Supp.2002). We have referred to this step as the establishment of the "basic" sentence. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me.1993). The basic sentence is determined without regard to the defendant's particular circumstances. We review a court's determination of the basic sentence for misapplication of principle. State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 24, 697 A.2d 73, 80-81. The second step in the sentencing analysis is the court's determination of the "maximum" sentence, that is, the sentence after applying aggravating and mitigating factors to the basic sentence. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2) (Supp.2002). We review the trial court's application of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 26, 697 A.2d at 81.
 [¶ 26] The court established that the basic sentence for Bates is life imprisonment. In State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149-50 (Me.1990), we listed attendant circumstances that can justify a life sentence, and one of those is sexual abuse. The Shortsleeves case provides a guideline for placing the particular murder along a continuum of criminal conduct. See State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 768 (Me.1996). Here, the court carefully reviewed the facts surrounding Dickson's murder, including the accompanying gross sexual assault. Because Bates forcibly raped Dickson shortly before he murdered her, the court did not misapply sentencing principles in determining the basic sentence to be a life sentence. See id. at 769 (holding that court did not misapply sentencing principles in giving a life sentence for murder accompanied by sexual abuse, torture, and extreme cruelty, "any one of which justifies a life sentence").
 [¶ 27] The court then moved to the second step in the sentencing analysis, and determined the maximum sentence by considering all other relevant factors including those related to the particular offender. See Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154; 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2). The court found that aggravating factors, such as Bates's prior felony convictions, lack of remorse, and refusal to take responsibility, outweighed any mitigating factors. The court did not abuse its discretion in considering and weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors or in determining that the second step in the sentencing analysis did not lead to a reduction in the basic sentence for life.
 The entry is:
 Judgment and sentence affirmed.
 NOTES
 [1] Both of these statutes were later amended. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 (Supp.2002) (effective Jan. 31, 2003); id. § 253 (Supp.2002) (effective Jan. 31, 2003).


text:
 3.4.2017
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 104/42
 Sodba Splošnega sodišča z dne 16. februarja 2017 – Holistic Innovation Institute/REA
 (Zadeva T-706/14) (1)
 ((„Raziskovanje in tehnološki razvoj - Projekti, ki jih financira Unija na področju raziskovanja - Sedmi okvirni program za raziskave, tehnološki razvoj in predstavitvene dejavnosti (2007-2013) - Projekta ZONeSEC in Inachus - Sklep o zavrnitvi udeležbe tožeče stranke - Ničnostna in odškodninska tožba“))
 (2017/C 104/58)
 Jezik postopka: španščina
 Stranki
 Tožeča stranka: Holistic Innovation Institute, SLU (Pozuelo de Alarcón, Španija) (zastopnika: sprva R. Muñiz García, nato J. Marín López, odvetnika)
 Tožena stranka: Izvajalska agencija za raziskave (zastopniki: S. Payan–Lagrou in V. Canetti, agentki, skupaj z J. Rivasom, odvetnikom)
 Predmet
 Prvič, predlog na podlagi člena 263 PDEU za razglasitev ničnosti Sklepa direktorja REA z dne 24. julija 2014 (ARES (2014) 2461172) o zaključku pogajanj s tožečo stranko in o zavrnitvi njene udeležbe pri evropskih projektih Inachus in ZONeSEC ter, drugič, predlog na podlagi člena 268 PDEU za povračilo škode, ki naj bi jo tožeča stranka utrpela zaradi njene izključitve iz udeležbe pri navedenih projektih in zaradi objave nekaterih informacij o njej po navedenem sklepu.
 Izrek
 1.
 Tožba se zavrne.
 2.
 Holistic Innovation Institute, SLU se naloži plačilo stroškov tega postopka.
 3.
 Vsaka stranka nosi svoje stroške v zvezi s postopkom za izdajo začasne odredbe.
 (1) UL C 421, 24.11.2014.


text:
 27.8.2011
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 252/40
 Klage, eingereicht am 30. Juni 2011 — Ecologistas en Acción-CODA/Kommission
 (Rechtssache T-341/11)
 2011/C 252/89
 Verfahrenssprache: Spanisch
 Parteien
 Kläger: Ecologistas en Acción-CODA (Madrid, Spanien) (Prozessbevollmächtigter: Rechtsanwalt J. Doreste Hernández)
 Beklagte: Europäische Kommission
 Anträge
 Der Kläger beantragt,
 —
 den — wegen Ausbleibens einer Antwort innerhalb der Frist — abschlägigen Beschluss des Generalsekretariats der Europäischen Kommission, mit dem der Antrag auf Zugang zu Dokumenten im Verfahren GESTDEM 2011/6 abgelehnt wurde, für nichtig zu erklären;
 —
 festzustellen, dass Ecologistas en Acción Anspruch auf Zugang zu nachstehenden Dokumenten hat, zu denen der Zugang rechtswidrig verweigert wurde:
 a)
 Summary by the Spanish Ministry of Environment of the information submitted to the European Commission concerning the environmental assessment of the construction of the Granadilla Port, transmitted to the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union on 4 November 2005,
 b)
 Erläuterung, complementary information by Gobierno de Canarias, November 2005,
 c)
 Alternative analysis concerning the location of the Granadilla Port by Gobierno de Canarias, July 2005;
 —
 der Beklagten die Kosten aufzuerlegen.
 Klagegründe und wesentliche Argumente
 Gegenstand der vorliegenden Klage ist ein Antrag auf Zugang zu Umweltdokumenten, der von der Kommission stillschweigend abgelehnt worden sei.
 Verweigert wurde der Zugang zu drei Dokumenten, die die spanische Verwaltung im Zusammenhang mit dem Bau eines Hafens in Granadilla (Teneriffa, Spanien) der Europäischen Kommission zur Stellungnahme nach Art. 6 Abs. 4 der Richtlinie 92/43/EWG des Rates vom 21. Mai 1992 zur Erhaltung der natürlichen Lebensräume sowie der wildlebenden Tiere und Pflanzen (ABl. L 206, S. 7) vorgelegt hat.
 Der Kläger macht zwei Klagegründe geltend.
 1.
 Erster Klagegrund: Verstoß gegen die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1049/2001 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 30. Mai 2001 über den Zugang der Öffentlichkeit zu Dokumenten des Europäischen Parlaments, des Rates und der Kommission (ABl. L 145, S. 43)
 —
 Die Beklagte habe Ecologistas en Acción die Gründe für die Ablehnung des Antrags auf Zugang zu den drei Dokumenten nicht schriftlich mitgeteilt und die Entscheidung über diesen Antrag letztlich dem Königreich Spanien überlassen, obwohl die Dokumente unter keine der in Art. 4 Abs. 1, 2 und 3 der erwähnten Verordnung vorgesehenen Ausnahmen fielen.
 2.
 Zweiter Klagegrund: Verstoß gegen die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1367/2006 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 6. September 2006 über die Anwendung der Bestimmungen des Übereinkommens von Århus über den Zugang zu Informationen, die Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung an Entscheidungsverfahren und den Zugang zu Gerichten in Umweltangelegenheiten auf Organe und Einrichtungen der Gemeinschaft (ABl. L 264, S. 13)
 —
 Da die drei beantragten Dokumente „Umweltinformationen“ darstellten, verstoße die stillschweigende Ablehnung des Dokumentenzugangs gegen den Wortlaut und den Geist der vorgenannten Verordnung sowie des Übereinkommens von Århus.


text:
5 . 4 . 97 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften Nr . C 108/ 19
 Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten Klage der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
 über kosmetische Mittel ( J ) einer nationalen Vorschrift gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, eingereicht am
 entgegen, die über die in der Richtlinie enthaltenen Ein 24 . Februar 1997
 schränkungen hinausgehende Verbote von Ankündigungen ( Rechtssache C-83/97 )
 beim Vertrieb kosmetischer Mittel enthält ?
 ( 97/C 108/38 )
 (M ABl . Nr . L 262 vom 27. 9 . 1976 , S. 169 . Die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften hat am
 24 . Februar 1997 eine Klage gegen die Bundesrepublik
 Deutschland beim Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemein
 schaften eingereicht. Prozeßbevollmächtigter ist Herr Dr.
 Götz zur Hausen, Mitglied des Juristischen Dienstes der
 Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften . Zustel
 Klage der Société Anonyme des Caves et Producteurs Réunis lungsbevollmächtigter ist Herr Carlos Gomez de la Cruz,
 de Roquefort ( Aveyron ) u. a. gegen Kommission der Euro Mitglied des Juristischen Dienstes der Kommission der
 päischen Gemeinschaften, eingegangen am 25 . Februar Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Centre Wagner C-254,
 1997 Kirchberg, Luxemburg.
 ( Rechtssache C-80/97)
 Die Klagepartei beantragt, der Gerichtshof möge wie folgt
 ( 97/C 108/36 ) entscheiden :
 Beim Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften ist am 1 . Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat dadurch gegen
 25 . Februar 1997 eine Klage eingegangen, die die Societe ihre Verpflichtungen aus dem EG-Vertrag verstoßen,
 Anonyme des Caves et Producteurs Reunis de Roquefort daß sie nicht innerhalb der vorgeschriebenen Frist alle
 ( Aveyron ) u.a . beim Gericht erster Instanz eingereicht Maßnahmen erlassen hat, um der Richtlinie 92/43/
 hatten . Diese als Rechtssache T-140/96 in das Register EWG des Rates vom 21 . Mai 1992 zur Erhaltung der
 natürlichen Lebensräume sowie der wildlebenden Tiere
 eingetragene Klage war Gegenstand eines Beschlusses, mit
 dem das Gericht erster Instanz sich für nicht zuständig und Pflanzen ( J ) nachzukommen .
 erklärt und die Rechtssache an den Gerichtshof abgegeben 2 . Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland trägt die Kosten des
 hat, damit dieser über die Klage auf Nichtigerklärung Verfahrens .
 entscheiden kann .
 Klagegründe und wesentliche Argumente
 Die geltend gemachten Klagegründe und wesentlichen
 Die Klagegründe und wesentlichen Argumente entsprechen
 Argumente waren Gegenstand einer im Amtsblatt der den in der Rechtssache C-56/97 (2 ) vorgetragenen; die Frist
 Europäischen Gemeinschaften Nr. C 318 vom 26 . Oktober
 für die Umsetzung der Richtlinie ist seit dem 5 . Juni 1994
 1996 auf S. 24 veröffentlichten Mitteilung.
 abgelaufen .
 (') ABl . Nr . L 206 vom 22 . 7. 1992 , S. 7 .
 ( 2 ) Siehe S. 12 dieses Amtsblatt.
 Klage der Bergpracht Milchwerk GmbH & Co. KG u.a.
 gegen die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften,
 eingereicht am 25 . Februar 1997 Klage der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
 gegen die Portugiesische Republik, eingereicht am 28 . Fe
 ( Rechtssache C-82/97 ) bruar 1997
 ( 97/C 108/37) ( Rechtssache C-88/97 )
 ( 97/C 108/39 )
 Beim Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften ist am
 25 . Februar 1997 eine Klage eingegangen, die die Berg Die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften hat am
 pracht Milchwerk GmbH & Co. KG u.a . beim Gericht 28 . Februar 1997 eine Klage gegen die Portugiesische
 erster Instanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaften erhoben Republik beim Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaf
 hatten. Das Gericht erster Instanz hat die Rechtssache, die ten eingereicht. Bevollmächtigter der Klägerin ist Francisco
 unter der Nummer T-141 /96 eingetragen worden ist, durch de Sousa Fialho, Juristischer Dienst, Zustellungsbevoll
 Abgabeentscheidung an den Gerichtshof abgegeben, damit mächtigter ist Carlos Gömez de la Cruz, Centre Wagner,
 dieser über den Antrag auf Nichtigerklärung entscheiden Luxemburg-Kirchberg.
 kann .
 Die Klägerin beantragt,
 Die Klagegründe und wesentlichen Argumente gehen aus — festzustellen, daß die Portugiesische Republik dadurch
 der Mitteilung hervor, die im Amtsblatt der Europäischen gegen ihre Verpflichtungen aus Artikel 189 Absatz 3
 Gemeinschaften Nr. C 336 vom 9 . November 1996 , S. 30, EG-Vertrag und Artikel 23 Absatz 1 der Richtlinie
 veröffentlicht worden ist .
 92/43/EWG des Rates vom 21 . Mai 1992 zur Erhaltung
 der natürlichen Lebensräume sowie der wildlebenden
 Tiere und Pflanzen (M verstoßen hat, daß sie nicht die zur


text:
 17.10.2014
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 299/7
 A BIZOTTSÁG 1089/2014/EU VÉGREHAJTÁSI RENDELETE
 (2014. október 16.)
 az EMGA-kiadásokra rendelkezésre álló nettó egyenlegről szóló 367/2014/EU végrehajtási rendelet módosításáról
 AZ EURÓPAI BIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződésre,
 tekintettel a közös agrárpolitika finanszírozásáról, irányításáról és monitoringjáról és a 352/78/EGK, a 165/94/EK, a 2799/98/EK, a 814/2000/EK, az 1290/2008/EK és a 16/2008/EK tanácsi rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről szóló, 2013. december 17-i 1306/2013/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendeletre (1) és különösen annak 16. cikke (2) bekezdésére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A 367/2014/EU végrehajtási rendelet (2) meghatározza az Európai Mezőgazdasági Garanciaalap (EMGA) kiadásaira rendelkezésre álló nettó egyenleget, valamint az Európai Mezőgazdasági Vidékfejlesztési Alap (EMVA) számára a 2014–2020-as költségvetési évekre szóló, a 73/2009/EK rendelet (3) 10c. cikke (2) bekezdése, 136. cikke, 136b. cikke és az 1307/2013/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet (4) 66. cikke (1) bekezdése alapján rendelkezésre álló összegeket.
 (2)
 Franciaország, Lettország és az Egyesült Királyság a 73/2009/EK rendelet 136a. cikke (1) bekezdésének és az 1307/2013/EU rendelet 14. cikke (1) bekezdésének megfelelően 2013. december 31-ig értesítette a Bizottságot azon döntéséről, hogy a közvetlen kifizetések 2014–2019. naptári évekre megállapított éves nemzeti felső határainak bizonyos százalékáig terjedő összeget átcsoportosít az 1305/2013/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet (5) szerint az EMVA-ból finanszírozott vidékfejlesztési programozás céljaira. A vonatkozó nemzeti felső határok kiigazítása a 994/2014/EU bizottsági felhatalmazáson alapuló rendelettel (6) történt.
 (3)
 Horvátország, Málta, Lengyelország és Szlovákia a 73/2009/EK rendelet 136a. cikke (2) bekezdésének és az 1307/2013/EU rendelet 14. cikke (2) bekezdésének megfelelően 2013. december 31-ig értesítette a Bizottságot azon döntéséről, hogy a 2015–2020-as időszakban az 1305/2013/EU rendelet szerint az EMVA-ból finanszírozott vidékfejlesztési programozás keretébe tartozó intézkedésekhez nyújtandó támogatásra elkülönített összeg bizonyos hányadát átcsoportosítja a közvetlen kifizetésekhez. A vonatkozó nemzeti felső határok kiigazítása a 994/2014/EU bizottsági felhatalmazáson alapuló rendelettel történt.
 (4)
 Az 1311/2013/EU, Euratom tanácsi rendelet (7) 3. cikke (1) bekezdésének megfelelően a többéves pénzügyi keretnek e rendelet I. mellékletében meghatározott, a piachoz kapcsolódó kiadások és a közvetlen kifizetések finanszírozása tekintetében meghatározott részleges felső összeghatárait e rendelet 6. cikkének (1) bekezdésében előírt technikai kiigazítások szerint kell kiigazítani, az EMVA és a közvetlen kifizetések közötti átcsoportosításokat követően.
 (5)
 A 367/2014/EU végrehajtási rendeletet ezért ennek megfelelően módosítani kell,
 ELFOGADTA EZT A RENDELETET:
 1. cikk
 A 367/2014/EU végrehajtási rendelet a következőképpen módosul:
 1.
 Az 1. cikk helyébe a következő szöveg lép:
 „1. cikk
 Az Európai Mezőgazdasági Garanciaalap (EMGA) kiadásaira rendelkezésre álló nettó egyenleg, valamint az Európai Mezőgazdasági Vidékfejlesztési Alap (EMVA) számára a 2014–2020-as költségvetési évekre szóló, a 73/2009/EK rendelet 10c. cikke (2) bekezdése, 136. cikke, 136a. 136b. cikke és az 1307/2013/EU rendelet 14. cikke és 66. cikkének (1) bekezdése alapján rendelkezésre álló összegeket e rendelet melléklete ismerteti.”.
 2.
 A melléklet helyébe e rendelet mellékletének szövege lép.
 2. cikk
 Ez a rendelet az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjában való kihirdetését követő hetedik napon lép hatályba.
 Ez a rendelet teljes egészében kötelező és közvetlenül alkalmazandó valamennyi tagállamban.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2014. október 16-án.
 a Bizottság részéről
 az elnök
 José Manuel BARROSO
 (1) HL L 347., 2013.12.20., 549. o.
 (2) A Bizottság 2014. április 10-i 367/2014/EU végrehajtási rendelete az EMGA-kiadásokra rendelkezésre álló nettó egyenlegről (HL L 108., 2014.4.11., 13. o.)
 (3) A Tanács 2009. január 19-i 73/2009/EK rendelete a közös agrárpolitika keretébe tartozó, mezőgazdasági termelők részére meghatározott közvetlen támogatási rendszerek közös szabályainak megállapításáról és a mezőgazdasági termelők részére meghatározott egyes támogatási rendszerek létrehozásáról, az 1290/2005/EK, a 247/2006/EK és a 378/2007/EK rendelet módosításáról, valamint az 1782/2003/EK rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről (HL L 30., 2009.1.31., 16. o.).
 (4) Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács 2013. december 17-i 1307/2013/EU rendelete a közös agrárpolitika keretébe tartozó támogatási rendszerek alapján a mezőgazdasági termelők részére nyújtott közvetlen kifizetésekre vonatkozó szabályok megállapításáról, valamint a 637/2008/EK és a 73/2009/EK tanácsi rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről (HL L 347., 2013.12.20., 608. o.).
 (5) Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács 2013. december 17-i 1305/2013/EU rendelete az Európai Mezőgazdasági Vidékfejlesztési Alapból (EMVA) nyújtandó vidékfejlesztési támogatásról és az 1698/2005/EK tanácsi rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről (HL L 347., 2013.12.20., 487. o.).
 (6) A Bizottság 2014. május 13-i 994/2014/EU felhatalmazáson alapuló rendelete a 73/2009/EK tanácsi rendelet VIII. és VIIIc. mellékletének, az 1305/2013/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet I. mellékletének, valamint az 1307/2013/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet II., III. és VI. mellékletének módosításáról (HL L 280., 2014.9.24., 1. o.).
 (7) A Tanács 2013. december 2-i 1311/2013/EU, Euratom rendelete a 2014 és 2020 közötti időszakra szóló többéves pénzügyi keret megállapításáról (HL L 347., 2013.12.20., 884. o.).
 MELLÉKLET
 „MELLÉKLET
 (millió EUR – folyó árakon)
 Költségvetési év
 Az EMVA rendelkezésére álló összegek
 Az EMVA-ból átcsoportosított összegek
 Az EMGA-kiadásokra rendelkezésre álló nettó egyenleg
 A 73/2009/EK rendelet 10b. cikke
 A 73/2009/EK rendelet 136. cikke
 A 73/2009/EK rendelet 136b. cikke
 Az 1307/2013/EU rendelet 66. cikke
 A 73/2009/EK rendelet 136a. cikkének (1) bekezdése és az 1307/2013/EK rendelet 14. cikkének (1) bekezdése.
 A 73/2009/EK rendelet 136a. cikkének (2) bekezdése és az 1307/2013/EK rendelet 14. cikkének (2) bekezdése.
 2014
 296,3
 51,6
 4,0
 43 778,1
 2015
 51,600
 4,000
 621,999
 499,384
 44 189,785
 2016
 4,000
 648,733
 498,894
 44 474,161
 2017
 4,000
 650,434
 498,389
 44 706,955
 2018
 4,000
 652,110
 497,873
 44 730,763
 2019
 4,000
 654,405
 497,320
 44 754,915
 2020
 4,000
 656,699
 496,647
 44 776,948”


type: other

text:
Protection des données | GROUNDIES® Urban Barefootwear
 La formulation anglaise n'est donnée qu'à titre d'information. Le texte allemand fait foi.
 Vous pouvez visiter nos sites Web sans fournir aucune information personnelle. Chaque fois qu'un site Web est consulté, le serveur Web n'enregistre automatiquement qu'un fichier journal du serveur, qui contient le nom du fichier demandé, votre adresse IP, la date et l'heure de l'accès, le volume de données transféré et le fournisseur demandeur (données d'accès) et documente l'accès.
 Ces données d'accès sont évaluées exclusivement dans le but d'assurer le bon fonctionnement du site et d'améliorer nos services. Conformément à l'art. 6, al. 1, let. 1, let. 1, let. f de l'ODSGVO, cela sert à sauvegarder nos intérêts essentiellement légitimes dans une présentation correcte de notre offre dans le cadre d'une évaluation des intérêts. Toutes les données d'accès seront effacées au plus tard sept jours après la fin de votre visite.
 Dans le cadre du traitement pour notre compte, un tiers fournisseur nous fournit les services d'hébergement et d'affichage du site Web. Cela sert à protéger nos intérêts légitimes prédominants dans une présentation correcte de notre offre dans le cadre d'une pondération des intérêts. Toutes les données collectées dans le cadre de l'utilisation de ce site Web ou dans les formulaires prévus à cet effet dans la boutique en ligne comme décrit ci-dessous seront traitées sur ses serveurs. Un traitement sur d'autres serveurs n'a lieu que dans le cadre expliqué ici.
 2. La collecte et l'utilisation des données pour l'exécution du contrat, l'établissement du contact
 Nous collectons des données personnelles lorsque vous nous les fournissez volontairement dans le cadre de votre commande ou lorsque vous nous contactez (par ex. via le formulaire de contact ou par e-mail). Les champs obligatoires sont marqués comme tels, car dans ces cas, nous avons besoin des données pour traiter le contrat ou pour traiter votre contact et vous ne pouvez pas envoyer la commande ou le contact sans leurs informations. Les données qui sont soulevées sont évidentes à partir des formulaires de saisie respectifs. Nous utilisons les données que vous nous avez fournies conformément à l'art. 6, al. 1, al. 1, let. 1, let. b DSGVO pour le traitement des contrats et le traitement de vos demandes de renseignements. Si vous avez donné votre accord conformément à l'art. 6 al. 1 al. 1 let. 1 let. a ODSGVO en décidant d'ouvrir un compte client, nous utiliserons vos données dans le but d'ouvrir un compte client. Après l'achèvement complet du contrat ou la suppression de votre compte client, vos données seront limitées à un traitement ultérieur et supprimées après l'expiration des délais de conservation en vertu du droit fiscal et commercial, sauf si vous avez expressément consenti à une utilisation ultérieure de vos données ou si nous nous réservons le droit d'utiliser les données au-delà, ce qui est autorisé par la loi et dont nous vous informons dans cette déclaration. La suppression de votre compte client est possible à tout moment et peut s'effectuer soit par un message à la possibilité de contact décrite ci-dessous, soit via une fonction prévue à cet effet dans le compte client.
 Afin d'exécuter le contrat conformément à l'art. 6, al. 1, al. 1, let. 1, let. b DSGVO, nous transmettons vos données à l'entreprise de transport chargée de la livraison, dans la mesure où cela est nécessaire pour la livraison de la marchandise commandée. En fonction du prestataire de services de paiement que vous avez sélectionné lors de la commande, nous transmettons les données de paiement collectées à cet effet à l'établissement de crédit et au prestataire de services de paiement que nous avons mandaté ou au service de paiement sélectionné afin de traiter les paiements. Dans certains cas, les prestataires de services de paiement sélectionnés collectent également ces données eux-mêmes si vous y créez un compte. Dans ce cas, vous devez vous enregistrer auprès du prestataire de services de paiement en utilisant vos données d'accès lors du processus de commande. La déclaration de protection des données du prestataire de services de paiement concerné s'applique à cet égard.
 Si vous abonnez à notre lettre d'information, nous utiliserons les données nécessaires à cette fin ou que vous nous fournissez séparément afin de vous envoyer régulièrement notre lettre d'information électronique sur la base de votre consentement conformément à l'art. 6, al. 1, let. 1, al. 1, let. a ODSGVM.
 Vous pouvez vous désabonner de la newsletter à tout moment en envoyant un message à la personne de contact décrite ci-dessous ou via un lien dans la newsletter prévue à cet effet. Après votre désinscription, nous effacerons votre adresse e-mail à moins que vous n'ayez expressément consenti à l'utilisation ultérieure de vos données ou que nous nous réservions le droit d'utiliser d'autres données autorisées par la loi et dont nous vous informons dans cette déclaration.
 Si nous recevons votre adresse e-mail dans le cadre de la vente d'un produit ou d'un service et que vous ne vous y opposez pas, nous nous réservons le droit de vous envoyer régulièrement des offres pour des produits similaires à ceux déjà achetés dans notre gamme par e-mail sur la base du § 7 alinéa 3 UWG. Cela nous permet de protéger nos intérêts essentiellement légitimes dans le cadre d'une approche publicitaire à l'égard de nos clients dans le cadre d'une pondération des intérêts.
 5. Intégration du Trusted Shops Trusted Shops Trustbadge
 Nous avons intégré le Trusted Shops Trustbadge sur ce site afin d'afficher notre Trusted Shops Trustmark et d'offrir les produits Trusted Shops aux clients après avoir passé une commande.
 Cela sert la protection de nos intérêts légitimes dans la commercialisation optimale de notre offre selon l'art. 6 (1) 1 lit f GDPR qui sont prépondérants dans le processus d'équilibrage des intérêts. Le Trustbadge et les services de badges de confiance annoncés sont offerts par Trusted Shops GmbH, Subbelrather Str. 15C, 50823 Cologne, Allemagne.
 A chaque utilisation du Trustbadge, le serveur web enregistre automatiquement un fichier journal du serveur qui contient par exemple votre adresse IP, la date et l'heure de la demande, le volume de données transmises et le fournisseur demandeur (données d'accès) et documente la demande. Ces données d'accès ne sont pas analysées et sont automatiquement écrasées au plus tard sept jours après la fin de votre visite sur le site.
 6. Les cookies et l'analyse du Web
 Afin de rendre la visite de notre site Web attrayante et de permettre l'utilisation de certaines fonctions, d'afficher des produits appropriés ou d'effectuer des études de marché, nous utilisons des cookies sur différentes pages. Cela nous permet de sauvegarder nos intérêts essentiellement légitimes dans une présentation optimisée de notre offre conformément à l'art. 6 al. 1 al. 1 let. 1 let. 1 let. f de la DSGVO dans le cadre d'une pondération des intérêts. Les cookies sont de petits fichiers texte qui sont automatiquement stockés sur votre terminal. Certains des cookies que nous utilisons sont supprimés après la fin de la session de navigation, c'est-à-dire après la fermeture de votre navigateur (cookies de session). D'autres cookies restent sur votre terminal et nous permettent de reconnaître votre navigateur lors de votre prochaine visite (cookies persistants). Vous trouverez la durée d'enregistrement dans la vue d'ensemble dans les paramètres des cookies de votre navigateur Internet. Vous pouvez paramétrer votre navigateur de manière à être informé de la configuration des cookies et décider individuellement si vous souhaitez les accepter ou les refuser, dans certains cas ou de manière générale, refuser l'acceptation des cookies. Chaque navigateur diffère dans la façon dont il gère les paramètres des cookies. Ceci est décrit dans le menu d'aide de chaque navigateur, qui explique comment vous pouvez modifier les paramètres de votre cookie. Vous les trouverez pour chaque navigateur sous les liens suivants :
 SafariTM : https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/guide/safari/sfri11471/12.0/mac/10.14
 OperaTM : https://help.opera.com/fr/latest/web-preferences/#cookies
 Pour l'analyse du site Web, des données sont automatiquement collectées et stockées sur ce site Web à l'aide des technologies de la société econda GmbH (www.econda.de), à partir desquelles des profils d'utilisateur sont créés à l'aide de pseudonymes. Cela nous permet de sauvegarder nos intérêts légitimes dans une présentation optimisée de notre offre conformément à l'art. 6 al. 1 al. 1 let. f de la DSGVO. Des cookies peuvent être utilisés à cette fin. Les profils d'utilisateurs pseudonymisés ne sont pas fusionnés avec les données personnelles du titulaire du pseudonyme sans l'autorisation expresse de les fournir séparément. Les données collectées dans ce contexte seront effacées après que nous ayons cessé d'utiliser econda aux fins prévues et à la fin de son utilisation. Vous pouvez vous opposer à tout moment à la collecte et au stockage des données avec effet pour l'avenir en cliquant sur ce lien.
 Après votre objection, un cookie d'exclusion sera stocké sur votre terminal. Si vous supprimez vos cookies, vous devez cliquer à nouveau sur le lien.
 Nous utilisons Google AdWords pour annoncer notre site Web dans les résultats de recherche Google et sur des sites Web tiers. Pour ce faire, lorsque vous visitez notre site Web, le cookie de remarketing de Google est installé sur votre navigateur, ce qui permet l'affichage automatique de publicités basées sur les centres d'intérêt à l'aide d'un identifiant de cookie pseudonyme et d'informations sur les visites de votre site. Cela sert la protection de nos intérêts légitimes dans la commercialisation optimale de notre site Web conformément à l'art. 6 (1) 1 lit f GDPR qui sont prépondérants dans le processus d'équilibrage des intérêts.
 Tout traitement de données allant au-delà de ce cadre n'a lieu que si vous avez autorisé Google à associer votre historique de navigation sur le Web et les applications à votre compte Google et à utiliser les informations de votre compte Google pour personnaliser les annonces que vous voyez sur le Web. Si, dans un tel cas, vous visitez notre site Web alors que vous êtes connecté à Google, Google utilisera vos données avec les données de Google Analytics pour créer et définir des listes d'audience pour le remarketing inter-appareils. A cet effet, Google joindra temporairement vos données à celles de Google Analytics afin d'augmenter le nombre de visiteurs.
 Le remarketing Google AdWords est proposé par Google LLC (www.google.com). Google LLC a son siège social aux États-Unis et est certifiée selon la protection de la vie privée de l'UE et des États-Unis. Vous trouverez ici le certificat actualisé. Sur la base de cet accord entre les États-Unis et la Commission européenne, cette dernière a reconnu que les entités certifiées au titre du bouclier de protection de la vie privée garantissent un niveau adéquat de protection des donné.
 8. Pixel d'audience personnalisé Facebook
 Nous utilisons Facebook Custom Audience Pixel sur notre site Web, un service Facebook qui utilise un cookie pour suivre comment nos efforts de marketing sur Facebook sont suivis et améliorés en suivant votre comportement après que vous ayez cliqué sur notre annonce Facebook pour être dirigé vers notre site. Ce processus est utilisé pour évaluer l'efficacité des publicités Facebook à des fins statistiques et d'études de marché afin d'optimiser les efforts publicitaires futurs.
 Les données recueillies sont anonymes pour nous et ne nous fournissent aucune information sur votre identité. Toutefois, les données sont stockées et traitées par Facebook afin qu'il soit possible de se connecter au profil d'utilisateur correspondant et que Facebook puisse utiliser les données à ses propres fins publicitaires, conformément aux directives d'utilisation des données de Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/). Cela peut permettre à Facebook et à ses affiliés de placer des publicités sur Facebook et en dehors de Facebook.
 Vous pouvez vous opposer à la collecte de pixels de Facebook telle que décrite ci-dessus et à l'utilisation de vos informations pour afficher des publicités Facebook. Si vous êtes connecté à Facebook, vous pouvez définir vos préférences quant aux types de publicités que vous voyez sur le site Web Facebook suivant : https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=ads.
 Utilisation des plugins de réseaux sociaux de Facebook
 Notre site web utilise des plugins dits de réseaux sociaux (« plugins »).
 Si vous appelez une page de notre site Web qui contient un tel plugin, votre navigateur établira un lien direct vers les serveurs de Facebook, Google, Twitter ou Instagram. Ensuite, le contenu du plugin sera transféré par le fournisseur concerné directement dans votre navigateur et intégré dans la page que vous consultez. Cela permet aux fournisseurs d'obtenir des informations que vous avez consulté la page de notre site Web dans votre navigateur, même si vous n'avez pas de compte chez le fournisseur concerné ou si vous n'êtes pas actuellement connecté. Ces informations (y compris votre adresse IP) seront envoyées directement depuis votre navigateur au serveur du fournisseur concerné (qui peut se trouver aux États-Unis) et y seront stockées. Si vous vous êtes connecté à votre compte de réseau social, les fournisseurs pourront attribuer directement votre visite sur notre site à votre compte de réseau social. Si vous interagissez avec les plugins, par exemple en cliquant sur le bouton'J'aime' ou'Partager', ces informations seront également envoyées directement au serveur du fournisseur et y seront stockées. De plus, l'information sera publiée sur la page du réseau social et vos contacts pourront la consulter. Cela sert la protection de nos intérêts légitimes dans la commercialisation optimale de notre site Web conformément à l'art. 6 (1) 1 lit f GDPR qui sont prépondérants dans le processus d'équilibrage des intérêts.
 Pour en savoir plus sur l'objectif et l'étendue de la collecte, du traitement ultérieur et de l'utilisation des données par les fournisseurs, et pour connaître les options de contact disponibles et vos droits à cet égard, ainsi que la manière dont vous pouvez personnaliser votre navigateur pour mieux protéger votre vie privée, veuillez consulter les politiques de confidentialité des données des fournisseurs:
 Si vous ne voulez pas que les réseaux sociaux attribuent les données collectées via notre site Web directement à votre compte de réseau social, vous devez vous déconnecter du compte concerné avant de visiter notre site Web. Vous pouvez également utiliser des add-ons pour votre navigateur, par exemple le bloqueur de script « NoScript » (http://noscript.net/), pour arrêter les plugins.
 10. envoi de rappels par e-mail
 Rappel d'évaluation par Trusted Shops.
 Si vous nous avez donné votre consentement exprès pendant ou après votre commande conformément à l'art. 6, al. 1, let. 1, let. 1, let. a de la DSGVO, nous enverrons votre adresse e-mail à Trusted Shops GmbH, Subbelrather Str. 15c, 50823 Köln (www.trustedshops.de) pour qu'ils puissent vous envoyer un rappel d'évaluation par e-mail..
 Vous avez le droit d'obtenir gratuitement des informations concernant les données stockées sur votre personne et, le cas échéant, de les corriger, d'en limiter le traitement, d'en permettre la portabilité ou de les supprimer.
 Si vous avez des questions sur la manière dont nous collectons, traitons ou utilisons vos données personnelles, si vous souhaitez obtenir, corriger, bloquer ou supprimer vos données, ou si vous souhaitez retirer tout consentement que vous avez donné, ou si vous souhaitez vous désabonner de toute utilisation particulière de données, veuillez nous contacter directement en utilisant les coordonnées fournies dans notre avis.
 Vous pouvez également déposer une plainte auprès de l'autorité de contrôle compétente en matière de protection des données.
 Dans la mesure où nous traitons les données personnelles comme décrit ci-dessus afin de sauvegarder nos intérêts essentiellement légitimes dans le cadre d'une évaluation des intérêts, vous pouvez vous opposer à ce que ce traitement prenne effet à l'avenir. Si le traitement est effectué à des fins de marketing direct, vous pouvez exercer ce droit à tout moment comme décrit ci-dessus. Si le traitement est effectué à d'autres fins, vous n'avez le droit de vous y opposer que s'il y a des raisons découlant de votre situation particulière.
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