type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 284 Md. 720 (1979)
 399 A.2d 891
 THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND ET AL.
 v.
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE ET AL.
 [No. 63, September Term, 1978.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided April 11, 1979.
 Motion for reconsideration filed February 2, 1979.
 Denied February 16, 1979.
 *722 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ., and reargued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.
 Argued and reargued by Daniel H. Honemann, with whom were Roger A. Clapp, Robert Sloan and Clapp, Somerville, Black & Honemann on the brief, for appellants.
 Argued and reargued by Francis X. Pugh, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, on the brief and Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, on supplemental brief, for appellees.
 DIGGES, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
 The event that precipitated this case occurred in mid-1975 when the petitioners, the trustees of a trust created by the will of Annesley Bond Baugh, were notified by respondent Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene that as of July 1, 1975, the charge to the trust for the care of the testatrix's daughter at Spring Grove State Hospital was being increased. The daughter, also named Annesley Bond Baugh, is now approximately sixty-eight years old and has resided at this mental hospital since 1944. The facts, none of which are here in dispute, show that from 1968, when the mother died, until July 1975 all costs for her daughter's care were paid out of the trust fund created by Mrs. Baugh's will. The will, executed in 1957 and amended to a minor degree by codicils in 1961 and 1963, provides in pertinent part:
 FIFTH: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of my estate, including all property over *723 which I have a power of testamentary disposition under any will of my husband, Frederick H. Baugh, unto my son, Frederick H. Baugh, Jr., and First National Bank of Baltimore, the survivor of them and their successors, as Trustees, IN TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, NEVERTHELESS, for the following uses and purposes:
 A. My Trustees shall collect the rents, revenues, income and profits from my trust estate and after paying or providing for the payment of all taxes, dues, charges and expenses, shall dispose of the income and principal as follows:
 1. My Trustees, accounting from the date of my death, shall pay from time to time the net income and so much of the principal as they, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may determine, to my daughter, Annesley Bond Baugh, or, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may apply the same for her maintenance, comfort and support.
 2. Upon the death of my daughter my Trustees shall pay her funeral expenses unless her individual estate is sufficient to pay such expenses and shall transfer and deliver the balance of my trust estate then in their hands unto my son, Frederick H. Baugh, Jr., if he be then living. If my son should not be then living, my surviving Trustee shall retain the trust estate and pay the net income therefrom for the maintenance, education, comfort and support of his children living from time to time. When the youngest child of my son reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, this trust shall terminate and cease and the surviving Trustee shall transfer and deliver the principal of the trust estate and all accumulated income thereon to the then living children and descendants of my son, per stripes.
 From 1968 until 1973, the income generated by the trust corpus proved to be sufficient to pay all costs of the daughter's care at the hospital and the trustees applied it to *724 that cause. The income, however, became insufficient in 1973 to discharge this obligation and from then until 1975 the trustees exercised the discretion granted them by the will and invaded the principal in order to pay the difference between the trust income and the hospital charges. Upon receipt in mid-July 1975 of a notice from the hospital of an additional increase in costs, the trustees decided that further invasion of the principal would not advance the testatrix's purposes in creating the trust and, as a consequence, notified the respondent that future payments would be limited to the trust income.[1] The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, in contesting the trustees' construction of their responsibilities to Miss Baugh under the will, maintained the position that both the trust income and the principal, if need be, could be used in an appropriate amount to help defray the total cost of the daughter's care.
 As a result of this conflict, a series of administrative appeals followed. When each resulted in a ruling adverse to the trustees, they sought judicial review by appealing to the Baltimore City Court. See Md. Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol., 1978 Supp.), Art. 41, § 206B; id. (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 255 (a). That court held that after all the income of Mrs. Baugh's trust had been utilized on her daughter's behalf, the corpus was, as an asset of the patient, then legally chargeable for the unpaid portion of the cost of the daughter's care assessed under Md. Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol., 1975 Cum. Supp.), Art. 59, § 40 (currently codified at Md. Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.), Art. 43 § 601). From this order a timely appeal was taken by the trustees to the Court of Special Appeals and we granted certiorari prior to that court's consideration of the matter. Having concluded that the trustees acted within the authority granted them by the provisions of the trust in refusing to further deplete its principal, we will reverse.
 The paramount issue now before us is whether the trust principal may be charged with the costs of the care of *725 Annesley Bond Baugh. The answer to this question, in turn, depends on which of two commonly recognized types of trusts the testatrix intended to create, that is, whether by the fifth item of her will she intended to establish a support trust or a discretionary trust.
 A support trust, it is generally recognized, is one that provides that "the trustee shall pay or apply only so much of the income and principal or either as is necessary for the education or support of the beneficiary," thereby barring the beneficiary from transferring his interest and precluding his creditors from reaching it. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 154 (1957); accord, G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 229, at 726 (2d ed. 1965); 2 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 154, at 1176 (3d ed. 1967). If this trust were entirely for the support of Miss Baugh, however, she could, by showing the trustees have abused their discretion, compel them to make any payment reasonably necessary for that purpose, Offutt v. Offutt, 204 Md. 101, 110, 102 A.2d 554, 559 (1954) (quoting Restatement of Trusts § 128, Comment e (1935)); likewise, this Court has recognized that when a supplier of necessaries  the State in this case  has a claim against the beneficiary of a support trust, the interest of the beneficiary in the trust can be reached to compel payment for the required items or services. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 660, 65 A.2d 292, 295 (1949) (quoting Restatement of Trusts § 157 (1935)); see Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570, 573-74 (1884).[2]
 In contrast, if, by direction of the settlor, all or any part of the trust assets can be totally withheld from the beneficiary by the trustees then, to the extent it can be so retained, a discretionary trust would be created. The Restatement of Trusts, Second, sets forth the definition and incidents of a discretionary trust as follows:
 [I]f by the terms of a trust it is provided that the trustee shall pay to or apply for a beneficiary only *726 so much of the income and principal or either as the trustee in his uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to pay or apply, a transferee or creditor of the beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to pay any part of the income or principal. [Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155(1) (1957).]
 Accord, G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, supra, § 228, at 717, 720-21; 2 A. Scott, supra, § 155, at 1180. Thus, payment cannot be compelled out of a discretionary trust unless it is shown that the trustees have acted arbitrarily, dishonestly, or from an improper motive in denying the beneficiary the funds sought. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, Comment d (1957); see Offutt v. Offutt, supra, 204 Md. at 110, 102 A.2d at 558.
 Bearing in mind these trust classifications, we proceed to the task of ascertaining, from the four corners of the will, which form of trust the testatrix-settlor intended to create. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 649, 392 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978) (citing authorities); Shriners Hospitals v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 270 Md. 564, 570-71, 312 A.2d 546, 550 (1973) (same). After reviewing the will and its codicils to determine Mrs. Baugh's intent, we think the critical passage indicating her desires and directions is found in paragraph one of the fifth clause which, because of its importance, we here set out again:
 1. My Trustees, accounting from the date of my death, shall pay from time to time the net income and so much of the principal as they, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may determine, to my daughter, Annesley Bond Baugh, or, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may apply the same for her maintenance, comfort and support.
 The respondent contends that the testatrix, by the use of these words, exhibited an intention to devote the principal of the trust fund to the maintenance, comfort, and support of her daughter, while the petitioners have consistently declared that the principal, as distinguished from the income, was not unreservedly devoted to the support of Annesley Bond Baugh *727 but is to be dispensed only as the trustees, in their absolute discretion, see fit.[3]
 In examining the language of this paragraph as it deals with the trust corpus, we observe that it speaks of the distribution of the principal in two different contexts. It first declares: "My trustees ... shall pay ... so much of the principal as they, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may determine, to my daughter Annesley Bond Baugh...." Although this provision allows the trustees to pay any part of the principal to Miss Baugh for any reason, it also forecloses her right to compel such payments because any distribution rests solely within the trustees' discretion, if that discretion is honestly exercised. Thus, when considered alone, this language indicates the testatrix desired that the distribution of the principal be handled by the trustees under the rules and incidents applying to discretionary trusts. The application of this seemingly clearcut provision is somewhat muddled, however, by the testatrix's additional direction that her trustees "in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may apply the same for [my daughter's] maintenance, comfort and support." Respondent argues that by mixing language that traditionally connotes a discretionary trust with that often used to establish a support trust, the testatrix in this instance was qualifying her earlier grant of absolute discretion to her trustees and mandating that they act consistent with the more limited discretion connected with a trust for support when dealing with matters involving her daughter's maintenance.
 Usually, if the purpose of the trust is to provide support, words to that effect are included in the clause directing the trustees to pay. For example, "the trustees shall pay to the *728 beneficiary of this trust so much of the income or principal as they deem necessary for his maintenance, comfort, and support," is a fairly typical clause that clearly shows the testator's intent to create a support trust. Indeed, the testatrix in this instance included within part A of the fifth item a paragraph designated as "2", quoted earlier, that provides that after her daughter's death, if her son were also dead, "my surviving Trustee shall retain the trust estate and pay the net income therefrom for the maintenance, education, comfort and support of his children living from time to time." This is clearly a support clause for her grandchildren and, had the testatrix so desired, she could have provided for Miss Baugh's support with similar language. She did not do so, however, but instead qualified the language of support by adding words describing the discretion her trustees were to exercise as being "absolute and uncontrolled," an addition negating any suggestion that the testatrix wished to limit her trustees' power to deal with the principal in matters concerning her daughter's support and maintenance to the somewhat more restricted authority that is associated with a support trust. See Town of Randolph v. Roberts, 346 Mass. 578, 195 N.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1964); McNeal v. Bonnel, 412 S.W.2d 167, 170-71 (Mo. 1969); In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148, 150-51 (1943); Estate of Escher, 94 Misc. 2d 952, 407 N.Y.S.2d 106, 109-11 (Sur. Ct. 1978); cf. City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865, 867-68 (1946). But see In re Lackmann's Estate, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186, 189 (1958); In re Estate of Browning, 76 Misc. 2d 1041, 352 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770-71 (Sur. Ct. 1974); Bureau of Support in Dept. of Ment. H. & C. v. Kreitzer, 16 Ohio St. 2d 147, 243 N.E.2d 83, 85-86 (1968). Our conclusion, therefore, is that the trust, as it related to the principal, was not unqualifiedly for the support of Miss Baugh, but rather could be used for such a purpose at the sole discretion of the trustees.
 In so stating, we are aware that this interpretation of paragraph one's language appears to deprive the second half of that paragraph of any independent meaning, because it does not seem to change or add to the trustees' power, *729 thereby contravening the constructional rule that "[a]ll of the language in [a trust instrument] should be given effect where possible." Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 188, 52 A.2d 100, 105 (1947). Upon closer scrutiny, however, we think this is not the case. With regard to discretionary trusts, the Restatement, Second, points out:
 Unless a valid restraint on alienation has been imposed ..., if the trustee pays to or applies for the beneficiary any part of the income or principal with knowledge of the transfer or after he has been served with process in a proceeding by a creditor to reach it, he is liable to such transferee or creditor. [Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155 (2) (1957).]
 In this case, the testatrix imposed a restraint on alienation, of the kind denoted above, in the fifth item of her will by stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this will, my Trustees shall pay all amounts of income and principal payable hereunder to any person into the hands of such person and not unto any other person or corporation whatsoever, ... nor can any of said payments be anticipated." The effect of this spendthrift provision upon any discretionary payment of the principal, whether for support or some other purpose, would be to require that it be given directly to Miss Baugh and not to her creditors or assigns. By adding the latter provision of the first paragraph, however, we think testatrix was expressing her intention that the trustees could make discretionary payments for support from the principal directly to a creditor despite the spendthrift provision. Thus, our conclusion is that Mrs. Baugh, taking into account her daughter's mental condition, sought to insure her well-being by giving her the income from the trust and, in addition, sought to clothe her trustees with maximum flexibility to deal with the trust corpus so that they, in their absolute discretion, might make payments directly into the hands of her daughter or directly to creditors providing her daughter with necessary items or services.[4]
 *730 Our determination that the testatrix created a discretionary trust, of course, precludes any argument that the trustees can be compelled to pay the principal of the trust for Miss Baugh's care at Spring Grove unless it can be shown that they acted "dishonestly or arbitrarily or from an improper motive." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, Comment d (1957); see Town of Randolph v. Roberts, supra, 195 N.E.2d at 73 ("arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith"). No such showing was made or even attempted to be made here. In a memorandum filed in the course of the trustees' appeal to the Baltimore City Court they declared:
 In declining to consume the corpus of the trust to meet the escalating costs for Miss Baugh's care at Spring Grove, the Trustees have given thoughtful consideration to Miss Baugh's age, her continuing and future needs in relation to the size of the trust estate, and the fact that the Trustees have been notified that Miss Baugh may be discharged from Spring Grove in the near future and require maintenance and support independent of a state facility.
 We cannot say that they have misstated their reasons or that their decision was in any way capricious, dishonest, or improperly motivated. As such, the trust principal is not chargeable for the costs of Miss Baugh's care and the trustees cannot be compelled to invade it to defray those costs.
 There remains for our consideration the question as to whether this action is defective because neither the life beneficiary nor the contingent remaindermen have been joined as parties. Since, generally speaking, if the construction of a will or trust instrument is requested in a suit for that purpose, or incident to another action, all those whose interest will be affected by the judgment should be named as parties, see, e.g., McMahon v. St. Paul's Ref. Church, 194 Md. *731 262, 268, 71 A.2d 17, 20 (1950); Noel v. Noel, 173 Md. 152, 162, 195 A. 315, 320 (1937); E. Miller, Equity Procedure § 21, at 26-28 (1897), we, of our own accord, ordered reargument of this case with the specific direction that the issue of the adequacy of parties be addressed.
 The reason for this general rule concerning parties was explained by Judge Parke in Noel v. Noel, when he observed for this Court:
 [I]n furtherance of a sound public policy, ... [courts seek a judgment] which finally and completely determines, without a multiplicity of suits or circuity of procedure, the rights and interests which all parties have in the subject matter or object of the suit, in order that the parties may safely obey and act upon the [judgment]. Not only does a court .. . determine the questions involved, but through its [judgment] it completely arranges and enforces the rights and interests which the [judgment] immediately affects. [173 Md. at 162, 195 A. at 320 (citation omitted).]
 Consequently, the Noel Court went on to explain:
 Where a person sues or defends ... in a fiduciary capacity, the necessity of making the beneficiary a party depends upon whether or not there may exist any conflict of interest. As a general rule, the fiduciary represents the beneficiary in suits which relate to the fiducial relation, and it is unnecessary for the beneficiary to be joined as plaintiff or defendant, if there is no conflict of interest between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, nor among the beneficiaries themselves. If the suit embrace the purpose to determine rights between the beneficiaries, or the fiduciary and the beneficiaries, it is necessary to bring in the beneficiaries as parties. Hence, where the fiduciary asserts a right or an interest in his personal capacity which, if established, would make him a beneficiary or create a right in diminution, conflict, or extinction of the *732 rights or interests of any beneficiary, the beneficiaries must be parties in a suit to ascertain and decree these rights or interests. [Id. at 162-63 [320] (citations omitted).]
 Even though, as just noted, a trustee does not usually stand for his cestui que trust in a suit respecting trust property, so that both trustee and beneficiary are necessary parties in such an action, there are exceptions to this rule with the modern tendency being to extend the trustee's power to represent the beneficiaries.[5] G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, supra, § 593, at 284 (2d ed. 1960). Based on our review of the authorities, both in this State and elsewhere, it would now appear that whether a trustee can adequately represent the cestui que trust in a particular action, or whether the latter is a necessary party, is dependent on the circumstances present in each case. That is, in light of the existing milieu and the decision to be made, is it the court's view that the cestui que trust should be before it to look after his own interest?
 Considering first the contingent remaindermen-beneficiaries mentioned in the fifth clause of *733 Mrs. Baugh's will, we conclude that although it would have been proper had they been joined, these beneficiaries were not necessary parties. In our view, this ruling logically follows from the early decision of this Court in Darne v. Catlett, 6 H. & J. 475 (1825). In Catlett a father made a bequest of $6000 to named executors with the direction to these fiduciaries that the interest thereon should be paid to his daughter during her life if, in the executors' opinion, the money was necessary for her decent support. Further, it was provided that upon the death of the daughter the principal and any accrued unexpended interest should be divided among any of the daughter's children who survived her. When the executors failed to pay the interest annually to the daughter she sued them and they defended on the ground that the plaintiff's children, as remaindermen, were necessary parties but had not been joined. After alluding to the principle that all persons interested in the subject of a suit, whether their interest be legal or beneficial, should be made parties, and recognizing that for practical convenience courts, including this one, had recognized many exceptions to that rule, our predecessors did not conceive that the case which was before them came within the scope of the general rule. Judge Archer reasoned for the Court:
 The mother applies to the court to compel the application of the interest to relieve her necessities. This application for relief is confined to the terms of the trust, and to that portion of the trust money to which she has an interest. The principal belonging to her children is not sought to be affected. It is true they have an interest in any balance of this fund, applicable to her use, which at her death may remain unexpended. But the power conferred is entirely discretionary in the executors, and they are at liberty to apply the whole of it to the mother, if they deem it proper. Having this unlimited discretion reposed in them, it is believed that they could not be held accountable to the children. [Id. at 483-84 (emphasis supplied).]
 *734 Accordingly, it was decided that the children were not necessary parties. Accord, Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Hutton, 159 Md. 50, 65-67, 149 A. 689, 694-95 (1930) (citing Catlett and applying its rationale). In the case now before us the contingent beneficiaries, who it might be claimed are necessary parties, possess only a remote interest because, no matter whether the mother created a support or discretionary trust for her daughter, at a minimum, unlimited discretion is reposed in the trustees to pay all the principal to the life beneficiary and, consequently, under Catlett and Hutton they are not necessary parties to these proceedings.
 A more difficult decisional problem exists with respect to whether the life beneficiary here is a necessary party. Although unquestionably it would have been more prudent had Miss Baugh been named by the State as a litigant, we conclude that under the somewhat unique facts present here she, likewise, is not a necessary party.
 In considering this matter, we find the decision of our predecessors in Cottman Co. v. Trust Co., 169 Md. 595, 182 A. 551 (1936), to be of considerable aid and supportive of this result. There, Cottman Company, a corporation engaged in the tugboat business, issued a number of ten-year convertible debentures. When, at maturity, the company could not pay the $43,000 then due, an extension was agreed to by the obligor, all the bondholders, and the original trustee appointed under the debenture agreement, with a mortgage being given on nine of the obligor's tugboats as additional security. Later, three of the tugs were damaged and the Cottman Company paid out of its funds the costs of their repair. When the Cottman Company's insurance carrier paid, as it was obligated to do, $4074.74 to the trustee for the damage to the boats, the tugboat company asked that this money be turned over to it. This request was refused and Cottman Company filed suit against the trustee. In its answer, the trustee submitted that, although knowing the identity of the several bondholders, the complainant did not name them as parties to the proceeding as required. In *735 determining that the bondholders were not necessary parties, this Court, speaking through Judge Mitchell, stated:
 The common interest of all concerned, the bondholders, the trustee, and the tugboat company, was the successful operation of the business, the coincident value of the bonds, and their ultimate redemption. The question in litigation was a single one, the disposition of the insurance money; and there were but two courses open before the chancellor: To direct its transfer to the mortgagor, or to permit its retention by the trustee as additional security. The mortgagor and the trustee, respectively, represented these conflicting views, either of which could have been held by the bondholders, or a number of them. Whichever position they may have taken in the controversy was represented by one or the other of the actual parties to the suit. In this connection we quote from Sweet v. Parker, 22 N.J. Eq. 453, 455: "Many exceptions exist to the general rule that in equity all must be parties who have an interest in the object of the suit. The reason or principle of such exceptions is stated as follows in Calvert on Parties, sec. 2, p. 20; `If they are required to be parties merely as the owners and protectors of a certain interest, then the proceedings may take place with an equal prospect of justice if that interest receives an effective protection from others. It is the interest which the court is considering, and the owner merely as the guardian of that interest; if, then, some other persons are present, who, with reference to that interest, are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question, the object is satisfied for which the presence of the actual owner would be so required, and the court may, without putting any right in jeopardy, take its usual course and make a complete decree.'" [Id. at 606-07 [556].]
 *736 Thus, Cottman Co. stands for the principle that, when a seemingly necessary but unjoined party is only one of several owners or protectors of an interest that is the subject of litigation, if others are present before the court who effectively represent that interest then those parties, although normally indispensible, need not necessarily be joined, depending on the circumstances, in order to be bound by the judgment entered.[6]Cf. Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 282-301, 380 A.2d 12, 14-24 (1977); E. Miller, supra, § 29, at 37.
 As to this case, we observe that only the passage of time can definitively demonstrate which of the two possible answers to the single constructional issue being litigated here  whether the mother created a support trust or a discretionary trust for the benefit of her daughter  will prove to be the more advantageous to the life beneficiary. In theory, even though not likely, it could develop that Miss Baugh would benefit to a greater degree by an interpretation that concluded a support trust was intended because, in that event, the daughter would possess a greater right to insist that the trust principal be utilized for her support than would be true if a discretionary trust were created. Yet, no matter which of the alternative positions the life beneficiary would urge were she not a person under disability, each has been forcefully put forth by one or the other of the parties, both of whom are bona fidely seeking antagonistic results. Considering this, together with the fact that the purpose for which this suit was initially instituted concerns solely the interpretation of a written document as a matter of law, we think we are fully justified in reaching our already indicated conclusion that the life beneficiary here is not a necessary party.
 *737 Thus, even though we conclude the necessary parties were present to litigate this controversy, the determination of the Baltimore City Court as to the nature of the Baugh trust was in error and consequently must be reversed.
 Judgment of the Baltimore City Court reversed.
 Costs to be paid by respondent.
 NOTES
 [1] It is undisputed that as of July 1975 the principal of the trust, having a value of approximately $100,000, generated an annual income of about $5200, while the yearly cost of care for Miss Baugh at the hospital was about $14,400.
 [2] Even though the State provides the beneficiary here with the necessities of life, because such care and support is not gratuitous, Whitworth, Adm'r v. Department, 222 Md. 98, 105, 158 A.2d 765, 769 (1960), it cannot be considered an independent source of income to the beneficiary so as to relieve the trustees of any duty they may otherwise have to pay. See In re Gruber's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656-57 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
 [3] The disposition of the Baugh trust's income is not at issue here as the trustees have indicated that pursuant to the language of the above quoted paragraph directing them to "pay from time to time the net income ... to my daughter," they will remit the income derived from the trust to the State for Miss Baugh's care. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a settlor from designating that his trustees exercise one measure of control over a trust's income and another type over the principal. See McNeal v. Bonnel, 412 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Mo. 1967) (although under terms of will income of corpus must be paid by trustees to beneficiary annually, corpus itself subject to discretionary trust).
 [4] Likewise, we think that the testatrix's reference to the application of the "same" for her daughter's support gives the trustees license to ignore the spendthrift clause and, as they have heretofore done in paying the State for Miss Baugh's care at the hospital; deliver the income, not into the hands of Miss Baugh, but to those providing her with necessaries.
 [5] One such exception in this State has been set out in Maryland Rule 205 b, which provides:
 b. Trustee.
 1. Representation of Beneficiary.
 In an action concerning real or personal estate, where the entire estate sought to be affected is vested in a trustee, under any instrument, with an immediate and unqualified power of sale, coupled with the right to give receipts, such trustee shall represent the person beneficially interested under the trust to the same extent as an executor or administrator in an action concerning personal estate represents the persons beneficially interested in such personal estate, and in such case it shall not be necessary to make the person beneficially interested under the trust a party to the action.
 2. Beneficiary May Be Made Party.
 Any party interested may, upon his application, be made a party to such action and the court may, upon consideration of the matter on the hearing, order such person to be made a party.
 For other exceptions that are generally recognized throughout the country that permit a trustee to represent the cestui que trust so that notice to the former is binding on the latter see G.G. Bogert & G.T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 593 (2d ed. 1960).
 [6] The author of an American Law Reports annotation on trust beneficiaries as parties, in citing the case under the heading of "Mortgages and deeds to trustees securing numerous bonds or other obligations, generally," 9 A.L.R. 2d 10, 157 (1950), appears to suggest that this Court's holding in Cottman Co. v. Trust Co., 169 Md. 595, 182 A. 551 (1936), is applicable only to actions involving bonds or similar obligations; however, a reading of the case discloses no such limitation. Accord, Mason v. Mason, 366 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1963) (citing Cottman Co. and applying its rationale in will contest proceedings).


type: other

text:
ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO DE DIREITO E A REALIDADE ATUAL DE NOSSO SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA CRIMINAL. REFLETINDO SOBRE O PUNITIVISMO E O LAWFARE CONTRA O EX-PRESIDENTE LULA. - Empório do Direito
 Afrânio Silva Jardim 12/06/2018
 1) PUNITIVISMO E ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO DE DIREITO SÃO INCOMPATÍVEIS E SE EXCLUEM.
 Talvez quem “feche os olhos” para ilegalidades, em nome de um ilusório combate à criminalidade, não saiba ou não concorde com o que se disse acima ...
 Talvez quem julgue segundo o que ele desejasse que a lei dissesse e não em consonância com o que efetivamente a lei dispõe não saiba ou não concorde com o que se disse acima ...
 2) O SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL E O LAWFARE CONTRA O EX-PRESIDENTE LULA.
 Vamos explicar o que está ocorrendo, de forma didática e clara, em face da negativa da presidenta Carmem Lúcia em não permitir, pelo Plenário, o julgamento de duas Ações Diretas de Constitucionalidade.
 2.1 – Tais ações têm como objetivo ser julgado constitucional o artigo 283 do Código de Processo Penal que dispõe:
 Por esta regra legal, não é possível a prisão sem o trânsito em julgado da condenação. Não é admitida a prisão automática, como simples efeito de uma condenação penal, ainda que provenha de acórdão de tribunais.
 Lógico que o citado dispositivo legal não impede a prisão em flagrante nem as prisões cautelares que menciona.
 2.2 – Ora, o Plenário não tem como dizer que este artigo 283 do CPP é inconstitucional. Ele não está em conflito com nenhuma regra da Constituição Federal ou mesmo com nenhum princípio que dela se extraia.
 Muito pelo contrário, ela corrobora a regra constitucional, a qual dispõe sobre a presunção de inocência até o trânsito em julgado da condenação penal.
 2.3 – Desta forma, o que deve ser debatido e discutido NÃO É O PRINCÍPIO DA PRESUNÇÃO DE INOCÊNCIA, MAS SIM SE O ARTIGO 283 DO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO PENAL É CONSTITUCIONAL OU NÃO.
 2.4 – Assim, não tem procedência a alegação da ministra Carmem Lúcia de que é muito recente o entendimento do S.T.F. de 2016, no sentido de que é cabível a execução provisória e, por tal motivo, não merece ele ser rediscutido. Este tema não é o objeto das duas A.D.C.s.
 Repito: o objeto das ações declaratórias de inconstitucionalidade não é a regra da constituição que veda a presunção de culpa antes do trânsito em julgado, mas sim a constitucionalidade do supra citado artigo 283.
 Assim, a ministra Rosa Weber deve se ater a votar sobre a constitucionalidade ou não desta regra do Código de Processo Penal, não importando o seu entendimento pessoal e o precedente do S.T.F. a que ela diz estar subordinada.
 Aliás, os ministros estão esquecendo do art.105 da Lei de Execuções Penais que, expressamente, exige o trânsito em julgado da condenação para que possa ser iniciada a execução da pena privativa de liberdade.
 2.5 – Como a ministra Carmem Lúcia sabe, como todos sabem, que o artigo 283 do Cod. Proc. Penal não é inconstitucional, ela impede que se decida a matéria, para não ser derrotada no seu entendimento. Prevaricação?? Autoritarismo??? Voluntarismo??? Mero Capricho???
 Não pode ser considerado democrático o país em que apenas uma pessoa decide se um relevante processo será julgado ou não pelo mais alto tribunal deste país !!! Isto é simplesmente um absurdo !!!
 Ora, se o artigo 283 não é inconstitucional, tem de ser aplicado. Para tal, não precisa de interpretação que conforme a Constituição Federal, pois a sua redação está em absoluta consonância com esta Lei Maior. É preciso que tenhamos absoluta honestidade intelectual.
 Importante notar que nada disso leva à impunidade, pois os juízes continuam podendo decretar prisões temporárias ou preventivas no curso de inquérito policial ou do processo.
 Apenas precisam demonstrar, fundamentadamente, a necessidade de tal prisão antes ou depois da condenação, consoante está expresso em nosso sistema processual.
 Os juízes não podem decidir como eles gostariam que a lei dissesse. Eles têm de decidir em conformidade com o que está dito nas regras jurídicas. Fora disso, não há Estado de Direito e passamos a ter indesejáveis voluntarismos e ativismos no âmbito do Poder Judiciário.
 3) AINDA ESPERAMOS QUE SE FAÇA JUSTIÇA. A PRISÃO DO EX-PRESIDENTE LULA NÃO FAZ O MENOR SENTIDO. A PRISÃO DO EX-PRESIDENTE LULA JÁ PASSOU DOS LIMITES ÉTICOS, POLÍTICOS E HUMANITÁRIOS.
 Este breve texto não terá enfoque ou sentido jurídico. Aqui não vou discutir a inconstitucionalidade e ilegalidade da prisão do ex-presidente Lula.
 Por isso, não escrevo como um professor de Direito, mas sim como um cidadão politicamente consciente e muito influenciado pelos valores cunhados pelo pensamento humanista. Desde a minha infância, talvez por influência de meu falecido pai, sempre muito me incomodou a injustiça, mormente a injustiça social.
 Nesta perspectiva, quero dar uma espécie de “testemunho” para afirmar enfaticamente que o Lula é um homem bom; que o Lula é um homem afável e generoso; que o Lula é um homem especial e dotado de um talento invulgar. Lula dá atenção aos outros; Lula presta atenção nos outros; Lula se preocupa com os outros; Lula é sensível ao sofrimento dos outros.
 Ademais, como é do conhecimento público, Lula saiu da Presidência da República com aprovação popular superior a 80% dos brasileiros. Foi o melhor Presidente de toda a história do nosso país. Indiscutivelmente, Lula foi e é um líder popular em nível nacional. Foi um líder mundial, respeitado por todos os chefes de Governo e Estados estrangeiros. Recebeu mais de 30 (trinta) títulos “Honoris Causa” em tradicionais universidades de quase todos os continentes, sendo que hoje está indicado ao cobiçado prêmio Nobel da Paz.
 Enfim, que sentido faz manter uma pessoa com estes atributos isolado da sociedade, isolado de seus familiares e amigos? Que sentido faz manter um líder popular como este enclausurado em um quarto? Quem ganha com isso? O que se ganha com isso?
 Como disse no início, aqui não quero discutir aspectos legais da prisão do ex-presidente Lula. Entretanto, o certo é que, juridicamente, ele poderia ser solto através de vários argumentos e instrumentos jurídicos, tais como: 1) outorga cautelar de efeito suspensivo aos seus atuais recursos processuais; 2) anulação de sua condenação, em face de graves vícios no seu processo, como a incompetência dos órgãos judiciais que o condenaram; 3) o entendimento da impossibilidade de prisão automática em face da princípio da constitucional da inocência; 4) a aplicação da regra do artigo 283 do Código de Processo Penal e do artigo 105 da Lei de Execuções Penais, apenas para dar alguns exemplos.
 Assim, seria mais do que razoável, ainda que sob o aspecto jurídico ou humanitário, que este extraordinário homem não ficasse enclausurado em um quarto das dependências policiais como se fosse um troféu de magistrados punitivistas, raivosos e carentes de sensibilidade com a dor de seu semelhante.
 Por isso, manifesto aqui a minha indignação. Não consigo ficar indiferente a tanta injustiça. Não podemos achar isso natural. Não podemos ficar indiferentes e nos acomodarmos. A todo momento, o Poder Judiciário coloca em liberdade pessoas que se encontram nas mesmas condições processuais do ex-presidente. Por que este tratamento diferenciado para com o maior líder popular de toda a história do Brasil ???
 Acho que tudo isto está passando do razoável.
 Acho que tudo isto é a negação do valor justiça em nossa pátria.
 Acho que tudo isto cria uma perigosa perplexidade em nossa população, que já não acredita mais no atual sistema de justiça criminal.
 Acho, por derradeiro, que parte do nosso Poder Judiciário está ofuscado por uma sanha punitivista, ingênua ou perversa, muito decorrente de uma contaminação ideológica ou política, incompatíveis com a correta aplicação do Direito e da Justiça aos casos concretos.
 As pessoas bem informadas e conscientes estão perplexas, angustiadas, tristes, devastadas e desesperadas com esta dramática situação, com esta singular situação, com esta absurda situação.
 De minha parte, com muita dose de otimismo, só me resta este voto de esperança: que algum dia a verdadeira justiça venha a imperar em nossa combalida e sofrida sociedade.
 Imagem Ilustrativa do Post: Reunião com prefeitos e deputados do PT, no Diretório Estadual de SP // Foto de: Partido dos Trabalhadores // Sem alterações
 Disponível em: https://www.flickr.com/photos/partidodostrabalhadores/35658466636


jurisdiction: EU

text:
C 48/2 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 20.2.1999
 Zuchtschweine Epe GbR, representados por Gerd Rentz- Puissochet, presidente de seccËaÄo, J. C. Moitinho de
 mann e Rudolf Brenken, advogados em Quakenbrück Almeida (relator) e C. Gulmann, juízes, advogado-geral:
 (Alemanha), com domicílio escolhido no Luxemburgo no D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, secretaÂrio: L. Hewlett, adminis-
 escritório dos advogados Michel Molitor, Pierre Feltgen e tradora, proferiu em 10 de Dezembro de 1998 um acórdaÄo
 AndreÂ Harpes, 14 A, rue des Bains, que tem por objecto cuja parte decisória eÂ a seguinte:
 um recurso em que se pede a revogacËaÄo do acórdaÄo profe-
 rido pelo Tribunal de Primeira InstaÃncia das Comunidades 1. O artigo 51., n. 1, do Regulamento (CEE) n. 574/72
 Europeias (Quinta SeccËaÄo) em 15 de Abril de 1997, Schrö- do Conselho, de 21 de MarcËo de 1972, que estabelece
 der/ComissaÄo (T-390/94, Colect., p. II-501), sendo recor- as modalidades de aplicacËaÄo do Regulamento (CEE)
 rida a ComissaÄo das Comunidades Europeias (agente: n. 1408/71 relativo aÁ aplicacËaÄo dos regimes de segu-
 Claudia Schmidt, assistida por Bertrand Wägenbaur), o rancËa social aos trabalhadores assalariados, aos traba-
 Tribunal de JusticËa (Quinta SeccËaÄo), composto por P. Jann lhadores naÄo assalariados e aos membros da sua famí-
 (relator), presidente da primeira seccËaÄo, exercendo funcËoÄes lia que se deslocam no interior da Comunidade, na
 de presidente da quinta seccËaÄo, C. Gulmann, D. A. O. versaÄo alterada e actualizada pelo Regulamento (CEE)
 Edward, L. Sevón e M. Wathelet, juízes, advogado-geral: n. 2001/83 do Conselho, opoÄe-se a que, no caso de
 D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, secretaÂrio: R. Grass, proferiu em um antigo trabalhador fronteiricËo, beneficiaÂrio de
 10 de Dezembro de 1998 um acórdaÄo cuja parte decisória prestacËoÄes de invalidez, que reside num Estado-mem-
 eÂ a seguinte: bro que naÄo o da instituicËaÄo devedora e cuja resideÃncia
 estaÂ mais próxima da instituicËaÄo do Estado compe-
 1. EÂ negado provimento ao recurso. tente que da do Estado de resideÃncia, a instituicËaÄo
 competente efectue o controlo administrativo e meÂdico
 2. A. Schröder e Jan e K.-J. Thamann saÄo condenados do interessado sem ter solicitado um controlo preÂvio aÁ
 nas despesas. instituicËaÄo do lugar da sua resideÃncia. A mesma dispo-
 sicËaÄo naÄo se opoÄe, todavia, a que o interessado renun-
 (1) JO C 252 de 16.8.1997. cie ao controlo preÂvio pela instituicËaÄo do lugar de resi-
 deÃncia, na condicËaÄo de a renuÂncia ser livre e inequívo-
 ca.
 2. O artigo 40. do mesmo regulamento naÄo se opoÄe a
 que, no caso da primeira determinacËaÄo de uma presta-
 cËaÄo de invalidez concedida a uma pessoa residente
 ACÓRDAÄO DO TRIBUNAL
 num Estado-membro que naÄo o da instituicËaÄo compe-
 (Terceira SeccËaÄo) tente, esta determine o grau de invalidez com base no
 de 10 de Dezembro de 1998 seu próprio exame meÂdico, sem previamente ter solici-
 tado um exame aÁ instituicËaÄo do lugar de resideÃncia.
 no processo C-279/97 (pedido de decisaÄo prejudicial do Todavia, a instituicËaÄo competente deve ter em conta
 Centrale Raad van Beroep): Bestuur van het Landelijk documentos e relatórios meÂdicos, bem como informa-
 instituut sociale verzekeringen contra C. J. M. Voeten e cËoÄes de ordem administrativa, provenientes da institui-
 J. Beckers (1) cËaÄo do Estado de resideÃncia do interessado.
 (SegurancËa social Ð Trabalhadores fronteiricËos Ð Invali-
 dez Ð Controlo meÂdico) (1) JO C 271 de 6.9.1997.
 (1999/C 48/03)
 (Língua do processo: neerlandeÃs)
 (TraducËaÄo provisória; a traducËaÄo definitiva seraÂ publicada ACÓRDAÄO DO TRIBUNAL
 na «ColectaÃnea da JurisprudeÃncia»)
 (Terceira SeccËaÄo)
 No processo C-279/97, que tem por objecto um pedido de 10 de Dezembro de 1998
 dirigido ao Tribunal de JusticËa, nos termos do artigo 177. no processo C-290/97 (Pedido de decisaÄo prejudicial do
 do Tratado CE, pelo Centrale Raad van Beroep (Países Bundesfinanzhof): Georg Bruner, agindo sob o nome
 Baixos), destinado a obter, nos litígios pendentes neste comercial «Georg Bruner», contra Hauptzollamt Ham-
 órgaÄo jurisdicional entre Bestuur van het Landelijk insti- burg-Jonas (1)
 tuut sociale verzekeringen e C. J. M. Voeten, J. Beckers,
 uma decisaÄo a título prejudicial sobre a interpretacËaÄo dos (RestituicËoÄes aÁ exportacËaÄo Ð Nomenclatura dos produtos
 artigos 40. e 51. do Regulamento (CEE) n. 574/72 do agrícolas)
 Conselho, de 21 de MarcËo de 1972, que estabelece as (1999/C 48/04)
 modalidades de aplicacËaÄo do Regulamento (CEE)
 n. 1408/71 relativo aÁ aplicacËaÄo dos regimes de segurancËa (Língua do processo: alemaÄo)
 social aos trabalhadores assalariados, aos trabalhadores
 naÄo assalariados e aos membros da sua família que se des- (TraducËaÄo provisória; a traducËaÄo definitiva seraÂ publicada
 locam no interior da Comunidade, na versaÄo alterada e na «ColectaÃnea da JurisprudeÃncia»)
 actualizada pelo Regulamento (CEE) n. 2001/83 do Con-
 selho (JO L 230 de 22.8.1984, p. 86; EE 05 F3 p. 133), o No processo C-290/97, relativo a um pedido apresentado
 Tribunal de JusticËa (Terceira SeccËaÄo), composto por J.-P. ao Tribunal de JusticËa das Comunidades Europeias, nos


type: legislation

text:
 |
 52012PC0406
 Propuesta de DECISIÓN DEL CONSEJO dirigida a España sobre medidas concretas para reforzar la estabilidad financiera /* COM/2012/0406 final - 2012/0198 (NLE) */
 EXPOSICIÓN
 DE MOTIVOS
 CONTEXTO DE LA
 PROPUESTA
 España está sufriendo últimamente una
 presión creciente en los mercados financieros. La incertidumbre de estos
 mercados se ha derivado principalmente de la situación del sector bancario, que
 se ha visto afectada adversamente por el estallido de la burbuja inmobiliaria y
 del sector de la construcción y por la recesión económica subsiguiente. Como
 consecuencia de ello, varios bancos españoles han acumulado un gran volumen de
 activos problemáticos, lo que ha sembrado inquietud acerca de la viabilidad de
 algunos de ellos.
 El 9 de junio, el Eurogrupo fue informado
 sobre la intención de las autoridades españolas de solicitar ayuda financiera
 para recapitalizar su sector bancario. El Eurogrupo declaró estar dispuesto a
 responder favorablemente a dicha petición y se comprometió a conceder una ayuda
 financiera a España que cubra las necesidades de capital estimadas junto con un
 margen de seguridad adicional, con un importe total estimado de 100 000
 millones de euros.
 El 25 de junio de 2012, el Gobierno
 español solicitó ayuda financiera exterior en el contexto del actual proceso de
 reestructuración y recapitalización del sector bancario español. Una primera
 petición oficial fue presentada tras la publicación, el 21 de junio de 2012, de
 los resultados de la primera fase de la evaluación independiente de los
 balances de los bancos. La ayuda se solicita en el marco de la ayuda financiera
 de la FEEF para la recapitalización de las entidades financieras.
 A raíz de esta petición, la Comisión
 Europea, en cooperación con el BCE, la Autoridad Bancaria Europea (ABE) y el
 FMI, realizó una evaluación independiente de la aptitud de España para recibir
 dicha ayuda, concluyendo que España cumple los requisitos necesarios.
 En la Cumbre de la zona del euro de 29 de
 junio de 2012, los jefes de Estado o de Gobierno declararon que, una vez que el
 MEDE (Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad) fuera plenamente operativo, la ayuda se
 le transferiría, sin darle el estatuto de acreedor preferente. Cuando se haya
 creado un mecanismo de supervisión único para los bancos de la zona del euro,
 con la participación del BCE, el MEDE podría tener la posibilidad de
 recapitalizar los bancos directamente a través de un nuevo instrumento.
 2012/0198 (NLE)
 Propuesta de
 DECISIÓN DEL CONSEJO
 dirigida a España sobre medidas
 concretas para reforzar la estabilidad financiera
 EL CONSEJO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA,
 Visto el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la
 Unión Europea (TFUE) y, en particular, su artículo 136, apartado 1, letra a), de
 conformidad con el procedimiento de su artículo 126, apartado 6,
 Vista la propuesta de la Comisión
 Europea,
 Considerando lo siguiente:
 (1) El artículo 136,
 apartado 1, letra a), del TFUE prevé la posibilidad de adoptar medidas
 relativas a los Estados miembros cuya moneda es el euro para reforzar la
 coordinación y supervisión de su disciplina presupuestaria.
 (2) La abundancia de
 financiación exterior a bajo coste en la pasada década alimentó la demanda
 interna y un periodo de auge de los activos, concentrado particularmente en el
 sector inmobiliario. El estallido de la burbuja inmobiliaria y del sector de la
 construcción y la recesión económica subsiguiente han afectado adversamente al
 sector bancario español. Como consecuencia de ello, a excepción de unas cuantas
 grandes entidades de crédito diversificadas a nivel internacional, los bancos
 españoles han perdido en gran medida el acceso a los mercados de financiación
 mayorista en condiciones asequibles y, de esta forma, se han hecho muy
 dependientes de la refinanciación del Eurosistema. Por otra parte, su capacidad
 de tomar fondos prestados se ha visto seriamente limitada por los efectos de la
 degradación de sus calificaciones crediticias sobre la disponibilidad de
 garantías.
 (3) La considerable
 contracción de la economía en los últimos años, que está afectando de forma muy
 negativa al empleo y al desempleo, ha deteriorado sustancialmente la situación
 presupuestaria de España. Según la actualización de las previsiones de la
 primavera de 2012 de los servicios de la Comisión, el déficit público será del
 6,3% del PIB en 2012, frente a una previsión de déficit equivalente al 5,3% del
 PIB contenida en el programa de estabilidad de 2012 y en el proyecto de
 presupuesto para 2012. La deuda pública bruta aumentó hasta el 68,5% del PIB en
 2011 y, según la actualización de las previsiones de la primavera de 2012 de
 los servicios de la Comisión, aumentará al 80,9% del PIB en 2012 y al 86,8% en
 2013, con la hipótesis de mantenimiento de la política económica, con lo cual se
 rebasaría el valor de referencia del Tratado en todos los años. Los riesgos
 asociados al escenario macroeconómico y a los objetivos presupuestarios, así
 como a medidas de rescate financiero adicionales, pueden contribuir a un mayor
 aumento de la deuda pública. A la luz de esta evolución, el 10 de julio de 2012
 el Consejo, en virtud del artículo 126, apartado 7, del TFUE, dirigió una
 recomendación a España para que este país ponga fin a su situación de déficit
 excesivo en 2014 a más tardar.
 (4) Las autoridades
 españolas han tomado una serie de importantes medidas encaminadas a abordar los
 problemas del sector bancario. Entre dichas medidas cabe destacar el
 saneamiento de los balances de los bancos, el aumento de los requisitos de
 capital mínimo, la restructuración del sector de las cajas de ahorro y un
 aumento significativo de los requisitos de provisionamiento para los préstamos
 relacionados con la promoción inmobiliaria y los activos embargados. Sin
 embargo, estas medidas no han sido suficientes para reducir la presión del
 mercado.
 (5) En febrero de 2011, las
 autoridades españolas aumentaron el coeficiente de capital mínimo obligatorio
 («capital principal») al 8% de los activos ponderados en función del riesgo de
 los bancos y dieron a los bancos plazo hasta septiembre de 2011 para cumplir
 con esta nueva exigencia. Para los bancos más dependientes de la financiación
 mayorista y caracterizados por un acceso limitado al mercado, el ratio de
 capital mínimo se aumentó al 10%. En febrero y mayo de 2012, nuevas normas
 obligaron a los bancos a aumentar sus provisiones y sus reservas de capital
 frente a posibles pérdidas sobre préstamos productivos y no productivos
 asociados a activos en el sector inmobiliario y de la construcción. El volumen
 global previsto de estos nuevos requisitos de provisionamiento ascendía a
 aproximadamente 84 000 millones de euros.
 (6) A partir de abril de
 2012, la contribución financiera bruta total del Estado español (excluyendo las
 garantías para la emisión de obligaciones) ascendía a aproximadamente
 34 000 millones de euros (3,2% del PIB). La ayuda de capital se
 proporcionaba a través del Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB),
 dotado con un capital de 15 000 millones de euros, de los cuales
 9 000 millones de euros ya se habían desembolsado. El Estado también ha
 proporcionado garantías para la emisión de obligaciones preferentes por los
 bancos, por un importe de alrededor de 86 000 millones de euros (siendo el
 saldo vivo de estas garantías de aproximadamente 58 000 millones de euros).
 Aunque el FROB todavía mantenía una capacidad de financiación de alrededor de
 27 000 millones de euros (en abril de 2012), el apoyo que puede
 proporcionar el sector público nacional no bastará para constituir un mecanismo
 de protección suficientemente sólido para permitir el necesario saneamiento de
 todo el sector bancario.
 (7) La inquietud acerca de
 la necesidad de una mayor recapitalización del sector bancario ha contribuido a
 aumentar las presiones del mercado sobre las obligaciones estatales españolas. Los
 rendimientos de estas obligaciones han alcanzado niveles claramente superiores
 a 500 puntos básicos a finales de junio y principios de julio de 2012,
 aumentando los costes de financiación de la deuda soberana española. La
 creciente carga de intereses dificulta aún más el saneamiento de las finanzas
 públicas españolas y la corrección de su déficit excesivo. Por consiguiente, la
 restructuración y recapitalización global del sector bancario constituye un
 importante elemento para reducir la presión sobre la hacienda pública española.
 (8) El 25 de junio de 2012,
 las autoridades españolas solicitaron oficialmente ayuda financiera en el
 contexto del actual proceso de restructuración y recapitalización del sector
 bancario español. La ayuda se solicita en el marco de la ayuda financiera de la
 FEEF para la recapitalización de las entidades financieras. La concesión de la
 ayuda se supedita al cumplimiento de determinadas condiciones por el sector
 financiero. Dichas condiciones deben ser totalmente coherentes con las medidas
 de coordinación adoptadas en el marco de los Tratados de la UE y, en
 particular, con las contenidas en la presente Decisión.
 (9) El aumento de la
 resistencia a largo plazo del sector bancario español es esencial para
 preservar la estabilidad financiera de España y limitar el riesgo de contagio
 de las tensiones financieras a otras economías de la zona del euro y, de esta
 forma, evitar efectos adversos sobre el funcionamiento adecuado de la economía
 y de la unión económica y monetaria. Las medidas adoptadas hasta la fecha para
 abordar estos problemas no han sido suficientes. Por lo tanto, son necesarias
 nuevas medidas, además de las obligaciones impuestas a España en el marco del
 procedimiento de déficit excesivo y de las recomendaciones de corregir los
 desequilibrios macroeconómicos en el marco del Semestre Europeo. En especial,
 España debe aplicar nuevas medidas concretas para abordar eficazmente el
 problema derivado de los «activos heredados», restablecer la financiación basada
 en el mercado, reducir la dependencia de los bancos respecto del apoyo a la
 liquidez por parte del banco central y potenciar los mecanismos de detección de
 riesgos y gestión de crisis.
 (10) Como parte de la
 estrategia global, es fundamental abordar eficazmente el problema derivado de
 los «activos heredados» requiriendo una clara segregación de los activos
 problemáticos en los balances de los bancos que reciben ayuda. Esto debe
 aplicarse, en particular, a los préstamos relacionados con la promoción
 inmobiliaria y los activos embargados. Dicha segregación disipará cualquier
 duda que pueda persistir sobre la calidad de los balances de los bancos,
 permitiéndoles realizar mejor su función de intermediación financiera.
 (11) Por otra parte,
 aumentando la transparencia de los balances de los bancos de esta forma se
 puede facilitar una reducción ordenada de la exposición de los bancos al sector
 inmobiliario, restablecer la financiación basada en el mercado y reducir la
 dependencia de los bancos respecto del apoyo a la liquidez recibido del banco
 central.
 (12) La garantía de un marco
 sólido para el sector bancario español requiere el fomento de los mecanismos de
 detección de riesgos y gestión de crisis. Una estrategia eficaz debe incluir
 cambios encaminados a reforzar el marco de regulación y supervisión, teniendo
 en cuenta la experiencia de la crisis financiera. Por otro lado, debe mejorarse
 la gobernanza empresarial conforme a las mejores prácticas internacionales.
 HA ADOPTADO LA PRESENTE DECISIÓN:
 Artículo 1
 1. España recapitalizará de
 forma adecuada y reestructurará a fondo su sistema bancario. A este respecto,
 España desarrollará, en coordinación con la Comisión Europea y en consulta con
 el BCE, una estrategia para la estructura, el funcionamiento y la viabilidad
 futuros de los bancos españoles, que determinará la forma de garantizar su
 capacidad de operar sin recibir más apoyo estatal.
 2. Los principales
 componentes de esta estrategia serán una reforma de los segmentos del sector
 bancario español en dificultades y un reforzamiento de los marcos de regulación
 y supervisión del sector bancario.
 3. La reforma de los
 segmentos del sector bancario español en dificultades constará de los tres
 elementos siguientes:
 (a) determinación de las necesidades de
 capital de cada banco a través de un examen global de la calidad de los activos
 del sector bancario y de una prueba de la resistencia de cada banco basada en
 este examen de la calidad de los activos;
 (b) recapitalización, reestructuración
 y/o resolución de forma ordenada de los bancos en dificultades, sobre la base
 de planes encaminados a corregir los posibles déficits de capital detectados en
 las pruebas de resistencia;
 (c) segregación de los activos de los
 bancos que reciban ayuda pública para su recapitalización, y transferencia de los
 activos deteriorados a una sociedad externa de gestión de activos.
 4. Con el fin de garantizar
 un marco sólido para el sector bancario, España también reforzará los marcos de
 regulación y supervisión y la gobernanza en este sector. La estrategia incluirá,
 en particular, las medidas siguientes:
 (a) Las entidades de crédito españolas
 deberán aumentar su ratio de capital ordinario de nivel 1 al 9% como mínimo.
 (b) A partir del 1 de enero de 2013, las
 entidades de crédito españolas deberán aplicar la definición de capital
 establecida en el Reglamento sobre requisitos de capital.
 (c) Se evaluará de nuevo el marco legal
 en materia de constitución de provisiones para pérdidas crediticias. En
 particular, partiendo de la experiencia de la crisis financiera, las autoridades
 españolas presentarán propuestas relativas a la reforma del marco permanente en
 la materia, teniendo en cuenta las medidas temporales introducidas durante los
 últimos meses y el marco contable de la UE.
 (d) Se reforzará más la independencia
 operativa del Banco de España. Se transferirán al Banco de España el poder
 sancionador y de concesión de licencias del ministro de Economía respecto del
 sector bancario.
 (e) Los procedimientos de supervisión
 del Banco de España se reforzarán aún más mediante una auditoría interna.
 (f) Se revisarán los mecanismos de
 gobernanza de los organismos de la red de seguridad financiera (FROB y FGD) con
 objeto de evitar posibles conflictos de intereses.
 (g) Se fortalecerán las normas de
 gobernanza del sector de cajas de ahorros y de los bancos propiedad de las
 cajas de ahorros.
 (h) Se potenciará la legislación sobre
 protección del consumidor y sobre valores, cuyo cumplimiento será más
 controlado por las autoridades.
 Artículo
 2
 El destinatario de la presente Decisión
 será España.
 Artículo 3
 La presente Decisión se publicará en el Diario
 Oficial de la Unión Europea.
 Hecho en Bruselas, el
 Por
 el Consejo
 El
 Presidente


text:
21.12.2015
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 429/23
 Rettens dom af 28. oktober 2015 — Monster Energy mod KHIM — Home Focus (MoMo Monsters)
 (Sag T-736/14) (1)
 ((EF-varemærker - indsigelsessag - ansøgning om EF-ordmærket MoMo Monsters - de ældre EF-ordmærker MONSTER og MONSTER ENERGY og det ældre internationale figurmærke MONSTER ENERGY - relativ registreringshindring - ingen lighed mellem varerne - ingen risiko for forveksling - artikel 8, stk. 1, litra b), i forordning (EF) nr. 207/2009))
 (2015/C 429/29)
 Processprog: engelsk
 Parter
 Sagsøger: Monster Energy Company (Corona, Californien, De Forenende Stater) ved solicitor P. Brownlow)
 Sagsøgt: Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) (ved E. Zaera Cuadrado, som befuldmægtiget)
 Den anden part i sagen for appelkammeret ved Harmoniseringskontoret: Home Focus Development Ltd (Tortola, De Britiske Jomfruøer)
 Sagens genstand
 Søgsmål anlagt til prøvelse af afgørelse truffet den 7. august 2014 af Andet Appelkammer ved Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) (sag R 1167/2013-2) vedrørende en indsigelsessag mellem Monster Energy Company og Home Focus Development Ltd.
 Konklusion
 1)
 Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) frifindes.
 2)
 Monster Energy Company betaler sagens omkostninger.
 (1) EUT C 448 af 15.12.2014.


text:
 30.4.2020
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 138/1
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) 2020/587
 af 29. april 2020
 om ændring af gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 om fastlæggelse af krav til luftfartøjsidentifikation med henblik på overvågning af det fælles europæiske luftrum og gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 om fastlæggelse af krav til overvågningens præstationer og interoperabilitet i det fælles europæiske luftrum
 (EØS-relevant tekst)
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2018/1139 af 4. juli 2018 om fælles regler for civil luftfart og oprettelse af Den Europæiske Unions Luftfartssikkerhedsagentur og om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 2111/2005, (EF) nr. 1008/2008, (EU) nr. 996/2010, (EU) nr. 376/2014 og direktiv 2014/30/EU og 2014/53/EU og om ophævelse af (EF) nr. 552/2004 og (EF) nr. 216/2008 og Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3922/91 (1), særlig artikel 44, stk. 1, litra a), og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 For at garantere, at luftfartøjer, flyvepladser, lufttrafikstyring, luftfart og det europæiske lufttrafikstyringsnet opererer sikkert og effektivt, bør der fastsættes bestemmelser om visse forbedringer af de operative regler for udnyttelse af luftrummet, luftfartøjsudstyr og lufttrafikstyringstjenester og luftfartstjenester, herunder systemer og komponenter hertil, der er nødvendige for udnyttelsen af luftrummet. Der bør derfor fastsættes nye og ajourførte sikkerhedsrelaterede interoperabilitetskrav i Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 (2) og Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 (3).
 (2)
 Under hensyntagen til erfaringerne fra den igangværende gennemførelse af luftbåren overvågningskapacitet og de jordbaserede systemers databehandlingskapacitet er det nødvendigt effektivt og rettidigt at installere luftfartøjsudstyr, så hele overvågningskæden kan opnå de forventede fordele inden for de fastsatte frister. Kriterierne for undtagelser fra kravene om at udstyre luftfartøjer bør ændres for at skabe klarhed over, hvilke luftfartøjer der skal udstyres, og hvilke luftfartøjer der skal være omfattet af en undtagelse fra disse krav. Et tilstrækkeligt antal luftfartøjer bør udstyres for at opretholde systemets effektivitet, samtidig med at der ikke bør pålægges en urimelig økonomisk byrde.
 (3)
 Et betydeligt antal udstyrede luftfartøjer er allerede certificeret i overensstemmelse med den internationale standard for luftbårne dele og apparatur til overvågningssystemer, svarende til Chicagokonventionens bilag 10, bind IV, tredje udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 77. Denne standard er fuldt ud forenelig med de forventede overvågningssystemer. Hvis der blev stillet krav om anvendelse af standarden svarende til Chicagokonventionens bilag 10, bind IV, fjerde udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 85, jf. bilag II til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 i den nugældende udgave, ville dette pålægge en urimelig økonomisk byrde. Derfor bør standarden svarende til Chicagokonventionens bilag 10, bind IV, tredje udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 77, betragtes som minimumskravet. De tekniske minimumsstandarder, som luftfartøjsoperatørerne skal overholde, og som er fastsat i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011, bør derfor ændres.
 (4)
 Statsluftfartøjer, hvis flyvninger gennemføres som almen lufttrafik, bør udstyres med funktionsdygtige SSR-transpondere i overensstemmelse med de krav, der gælder for civile luftfartøjer, jf. artikel 5, stk. 5, litra a) og c), i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011. De procedurer og betingelser, der gælder for statsluftfartøjer, som ikke kan udstyres med funktionsdygtige SSR-transpondere, bør fortsat være som dem, der er fastsat i artikel 8 i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011.
 (5)
 Kravene til de formelle ordninger angående overførsel af overvågningsdata mellem luftfartstjenesteudøverne bør ændres for at afspejle de eksisterende datadistributionsscenarier med henblik på at lette udvekslingen af overvågningsdata og undgå uforholdsmæssigt store byrder for den leverende udøver.
 (6)
 For at sikre, at statsluftfartøjer kan operere effektivt, bør der fastsættes bestemmelser om, at det europæiske ATM-system skal kunne sætte de statsluftfartøjer, der medvirker i følsomme operationer og træning, i stand til at operere ved tildeling af særskilte SSR-koder, og gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 bør derfor ændres.
 (7)
 Udbruddet af covid-19-viruspandemien og den deraf følgende indvirkning på luftfartssektoren har udmøntet sig i uforudsigelige hindringer for, at luftfartøjsoperatører kan bringe deres luftfartøjer i overensstemmelse med visse krav i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011. Som følge heraf bør den frist for luftfartøjsoperatører, der er fastsat i artikel 5, stk. 5, og artikel 8, stk. 1 og 2, i gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011, udskydes til den 7. december 2020, og gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 bør derfor ændres.
 (8)
 Gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 og gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 bør derfor ændres.
 (9)
 Foranstaltningerne i denne forordning er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra det udvalg, der er omhandlet i artikel 127, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2018/1139 —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 Bilag II til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 ændres i overensstemmelse med bilag I til nærværende forordning.
 Artikel 2
 I gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 foretages følgende ændringer:
 1)
 Artikel 2, stk. 2, læses således:
 »2. Denne forordning finder anvendelse på alle flyvninger, der gennemføres som almen lufttrafik i henhold til instrumentflyvereglerne inden for det fælles europæiske luftrum med undtagelse af artikel 7, stk. 3 og 4, der finder anvendelse på alle flyvninger, der gennemføres som almen lufttrafik.«
 2)
 I artikel 4 udgår stk. 4.
 3)
 Artikel 5, stk. 5 og 6, læses således:
 »5. Operatører sikrer senest den 7. december 2020, at:
 a)
 luftfartøjer, der gennemfører flyvninger som omhandlet i artikel 2, stk. 2, er udstyret med funktionsdygtige SSR-transpondere, som opfylder følgende betingelser:
 i)
 de har den kapacitet, der er fastlagt i del A i bilag II
 ii)
 de har den funktionskontinuitet, der er nødvendig for ikke at udgøre en operationel risiko
 b)
 luftfartøjer med en maksimal certificeret startmasse på over 5 700 kg, eller hvis maksimale egenfart i marchhøjde kan overstige 250 knob, som gennemfører de i artikel 2, stk. 2, nævnte flyvninger med et individuelt luftdygtighedsbevis, der er udstedt for første gang den 7. juni 1995 eller senere, er udstyret med funktionsdygtige SSR-transpondere, der opfylder følgende betingelser:
 i)
 de har den kapacitet, der er fastlagt i del A og B i bilag II
 ii)
 de har den funktionskontinuitet, der er nødvendig for ikke at udgøre en operationel risiko
 c)
 fastvingede luftfartøjer med en maksimal certificeret startmasse på over 5 700 kg, eller hvis maksimale egenfart i marchhøjde kan overstige 250 knob, som gennemfører de i artikel 2, stk. 2, nævnte flyvninger med et individuelt luftdygtighedsbevis, der er udstedt for første gang den 7. juni 1995 eller senere, er udstyret med funktionsdygtige SSR-transpondere, der opfylder følgende betingelser:
 i)
 de har den kapacitet, der er fastlagt i del A, B og C i bilag II
 ii)
 de har den funktionskontinuitet, der er nødvendig for ikke at udgøre en operationel risiko.
 Første afsnit, litra b) og c), finder ikke anvendelse på luftfartøjer, som opererer inden for det fælles europæiske luftrum, og som tilhører en af følgende kategorier:
 i)
 de flyves med vedligeholdelse for øje
 ii)
 de flyves med eksport for øje
 iii)
 deres operationer vil blive indstillet senest den 31. oktober 2025.
 Operatører af luftfartøjer med et første luftdygtighedsbevis, der er udstedt før den 7. december 2020, skal senest den 7. juni 2023 opfylde kravene i første afsnit, litra b) og c), på følgende betingelser:
 i)
 de har inden den 7. december 2020 udarbejdet et eftermonteringsprogram, hvori der påvises overensstemmelse med første afsnit, litra b) og c)
 ii)
 disse luftfartøjer har ikke modtaget EU-midler med henblik på at bringe sådanne luftfartøjer i overensstemmelse med de krav, der er fastsat i første afsnit, litra b) og c).
 For luftfartøjer, for hvilke transpondernes kapacitet midlertidigt ikke lever op til funktionskravene i første afsnit, litra b) og c), har operatørerne ret til at operere det pågældende luftfartøj i det fælles europæiske luftrum i højst tre på hinanden følgende dage.
 6. Operatører sikrer, at luftfartøjer, som er udstyret i overensstemmelse med stk. 5, og som har en maksimal certificeret startmasse på over 5 700 kg, eller hvis maksimale egenfart i marchhøjde kan overstige 250 knob, opererer med antennediversitet med en minimumspræstation som foreskrevet i afsnit 3.1.2.10.4 i bilag 10 til Chicagokonventionen, bind IV, tredje udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 77.«
 4)
 I artikel 5 udgår stk. 7.
 5)
 I artikel 6 udgår stk. 2.
 6)
 I artikel 7 udgår stk. 2.
 7)
 Artikel 7, stk. 3, læses således:
 »3. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at tildelingen af ICAO's 24-bit luftfartøjsadresser til luftfartøjer, der er udstyret med en Mode S-transponder, er i overensstemmelse med kapitel 9 og tilhørende tillæg i bilag 10 til Chicagokonventionen, bind III, anden udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 90.«
 8)
 Artikel 8, stk. 1 og 2, læses således:
 »1. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at statsluftfartøjer senest den 7. december 2020 opfylder kravene i artikel 5, stk. 5, litra a).
 2. Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at statsluftfartøjer af transporttypen senest den 7. december 2020 opfylder kravene i artikel 5, stk. 5, litra c).«
 9)
 I artikel 8 indsættes som stk. 8:
 »8. For statsluftfartøjer, for hvilke transpondernes kapacitet midlertidigt ikke lever op til funktionskravene i stk. 1 og 2, har medlemsstaterne ret til at tillade det pågældende luftfartøj at operere i det fælles europæiske luftrum i højst 3 på hinanden følgende dage.«
 10)
 Artikel 14 udgår.
 11)
 Følgende indsættes som artikel 14a:
 »Artikel 14a
 Flyveplaner
 Operatører af ikkeudstyrede statsluftfartøjer, der er meddelt i henhold til artikel 8, stk. 3, og operatører af luftfartøjer, der ikke er udstyret i overensstemmelse med artikel 5, stk. 5, og som opererer inden for det fælles europæiske luftrum, skal angive indikatorerne SUR/EUADSBX, SUR/EUEHSX, SUR/EUELSX eller en kombination heraf under punkt 18 i flyveplanen.«
 12)
 Bilag II ændres som angivet i bilag II til nærværende forordning.
 13)
 Bilag IV ændres som angivet i bilag III til nærværende forordning.
 Artikel 3
 Denne forordning træder i kraft på tyvendedagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 29. april 2020.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 Ursula VON DER LEYEN
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 212 af 22.8.2018, s. 1.
 (2) Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 af 22. november 2011 om fastlæggelse af krav til luftfartøjsidentifikation med henblik på overvågning af det fælles europæiske luftrum (EUT L 305 af 23.11.2011, s. 23).
 (3) Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 af 22. november 2011 om fastlæggelse af krav til overvågningens præstationer og interoperabilitet i det fælles europæiske luftrum (EUT L 305 af 23.11.2011, s. 35).
 BILAG I
 Punkt 3 i bilag II til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1206/2011 ændres således:
 (1)
 litra c) affattes således:
 »c)
 et luftfartøj, som er berettiget til at få tildelt en »conspicuity code«, der er fastsat i henhold til artikel 4, stk. 6, litra c), forlader eller på anden måde sendes ud af det luftrum, der er nævnt i punkt 1«
 (2)
 følgende litra d) tilføjes:
 »d)
 statsluftfartøjer, der medvirker i nationalt følsomme operationer eller træning, hvor sikkerhed og fortrolighed er påkrævet.«.
 BILAG II
 I bilag II til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 foretages følgende ændringer:
 (1)
 I del A foretages følgende ændringer:
 a)
 nr. 1 affattes således:
 »1.
 Mindstekapaciteten for SSR-transpondere skal være Mode S Level 2, der opfylder præstations- og funktionalitetskriterierne i bilag 10 til Chicagokonventionen, bind IV, tredje udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 77.«
 b)
 nr. 5 affattes således:
 »5.
 De i nr. 4 omhandlede dataelementer må kun overføres fra transponderen via Mode S-protokollen. Certificeringsprocessen for luftfartøjer og udstyr skal omfatte overførslen af disse dataelementer.«
 c)
 nr. 6 udgår.
 (2)
 I del B foretages følgende ændringer:
 a)
 nr. 1 affattes således:
 »1.
 Mindstekapaciteten for SSR-transpondere skal være Mode S Level 2, der opfylder præstations- og funktionalitetskriterierne i bilag 10 til Chicagokonventionen, bind IV, tredje udgave, inkl. alle ændringer indtil nr. 77.«
 b)
 nr. 15 affattes således:
 »15.
 Bortset fra formater forbeholdt militær brug må de dataelementer, der er nævnt i nr. 14, kun overføres fra transponderen via protokollen extended squitter ADS-B. Certificeringsprocessen for luftfartøjer og udstyr skal omfatte overførslen af disse dataelementer.«
 c)
 nr. 16 udgår.
 (3)
 I del C foretages følgende ændringer:
 a)
 i nr. 2, affattes indledningen således:
 »2.
 Følgende dataelementer skal, hvis de står til rådighed i en digital bustilslutning, sendes af transponderen efter anmodning fra den jordbaserede overvågningskæde via Mode S-protokollen og i overensstemmelse med de formater, der angives i ICAO's dokument 9871 (2. udgave):«
 b)
 nr. 4 affattes således:
 »4.
 De i nr. 3 omhandlede dataelementer må kun overføres fra transponderen via Mode S-protokollen. Certificeringsprocessen for luftfartøjer og udstyr skal omfatte overførslen af disse dataelementer.«.
 BILAG III
 I bilag II til gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 1207/2011 affattes således:
 »BILAG IV
 Krav til oprettelsen af de formelle ordninger, der er omhandlet i artikel 5, stk. 2
 De formelle ordninger mellem luftfartstjenesteudøvere angående udveksling eller tilrådighedsstillelse af overvågningsdata skal omfatte følgende minimumsindhold:
 a)
 parterne i disse ordninger
 b)
 ordningernes gyldighedsperiode
 c)
 overvågningsdataenes omfang
 d)
 overvågningsdataenes kilder
 e)
 overvågningsdataenes udvekslingsformat
 f)
 det punkt, hvortil overvågningsdatatjenesten leveres
 g)
 aftalt serviceniveau for så vidt angår:
 —
 overvågningsdatas opfyldelse af præstationskrav, som fastsat ved artikel 4, stk. 3
 —
 procedurer i tilfælde af manglende funktionsdygtighed
 h)
 procedurer til håndtering af ændringer
 i)
 rapporteringsordninger med hensyn til præstation og disponibilitet herunder uforudsete udfald
 j)
 ordninger vedrørende ledelse og koordinering
 k)
 ordninger vedrørende beskyttelse og anmeldelse i henseende til den jordbaserede overvågningskæde.
 «.


text:
6.11.2010
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 301/56
 Sag anlagt den 13. september 2010 — Bottega Veneta International mod KHIM (formen på en håndtaske)
 (Sag T-409/10)
 ()
 2010/C 301/89
 Processprog: italiensk
 Parter
 Sagsøger: Bottega Veneta International Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (ved avvocati P. Roncaglia, G. Lazzeretti, M. Boletto og E. Gavuzzi)
 Sagsøgt: Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design)
 Sagsøgerens påstande
 —
 Afgørelse truffet den 16. juni 2010 af Første Appelkammer ved Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) (sag R 1247/2009-1) annulleres.
 —
 Harmoniseringskontoret tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger samt omkostningerne i forbindelse med klagesagen for Første Appelkammer.
 Søgsmålsgrunde og væsentligste argumenter
 Det omhandlede EF-varemærke: bestående af et tredimensionelt tegn kendt som en »veneta«-taske (registreringsansøgning nr. 66332608) for varer i klasse 18 (»tasker og håndtasker«)
 Undersøgerens afgørelse: Afslag på registreringsansøgningen
 Appelkammerets afgørelse: Afvisning af klagen
 Søgsmålsgrunde: Tilsidesættelse af regel 9, stk. 3, litra a), i forordning nr. 2868/95 og af artikel 7, stk. 1, litra b), og stk. 3, i forordning nr. 207/2009.


type: contracts

text:
 Anunţ juridic important
 |
 22001D0133
 Jurnalul Oficial L 022 , 24/01/2002 p. 0020 - 0021 ediţie specială în limba cehă capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 ediţie specială în limba estonă capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 ediţie specială în limba maghiară capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 ediţie specială în limba lituaniană capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 LV.ES capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 MT.ES capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 PL.ES capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 SK.ES capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23 ediţie specială în limba slovenă capitol 11 volum 07 p. 22 - 23
 Decizia nr. 133/2001a Comitetului mixt al SEEdin 9 noiembrie 2001de modificare a anexei II (Reglementări tehnice, standarde, încercări și certificare) la Acordul SEECOMITETUL MIXT AL SEE,având în vedere Acordul privind Spațiul Economic European, astfel cum a fost modificat prin Protocolul de adaptare a Acordului privind Spațiul Economic European, denumit în continuare "acordul", în special articolul 98,întrucât:(1) Anexa II la acord a fost modificată prin Decizia nr. 62/2001 a Comitetului mixt al SEE din 19 iunie 2001 [1].(2) Directiva 94/53/CE a Comisiei din 15 noiembrie 1994 de modificare a articolului 2 din Directiva 93/91/CEE a Comisiei de adaptare la progresul tehnic a Directivei 78/316/CEE a Consiliului de apropiere a legislațiilor statelor membre privind amenajarea interioară a autovehiculelor (identificarea comenzilor, a martorilor și a indicatoarelor) [2] trebuie să fie încorporată în acord.(3) Directiva 2001/1/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 22 ianuarie 2001 de modificare a Directivei 70/220/CEE a Consiliului privind măsurile preconizate împotriva poluării aerului cu emisiile poluante provenind de la autovehicule [3] trebuie să fie încorporată în acord,DECIDE:Articolul 1La punctul 3 (Directiva 70/220/CEE a Consiliului) din capitolul I al anexei II la acord, se adaugă următoarea liniuță:- "— 32001 L 0001: Directiva 2001/1/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 22 ianuarie 2001 (JO L 35, 6.2.2001, p. 34)."Articolul 2La punctul 34 (Directiva 78/316/CEE a Consiliului) din capitolul I al anexei II la acord, se adaugă următoarea liniuță:- "— 394 L 0053: Directiva 94/53/CE a Comisiei din 15 noiembrie 1994 (JO L 299, 22.11.1994, p. 26)."Articolul 3Textele Directivei 94/53/CE a Comisiei și ale Directivei 2001/1/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului în limbile islandeză și norvegiană, care urmează să fie publicate în Suplimentul SEE al Jurnalului Oficial al Comunităților Europene, sunt autentice.Articolul 4Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare la 10 noiembrie 2001, cu condiția efectuării tuturor notificărilor prevăzute la articolul 103 alineatul (1) din acord către Comitetul mixt al SEE [****].Articolul 5Prezenta decizie se publică în Secțiunea SEE și în Suplimentul SEE ale Jurnalului Oficial al Comunităților Europene.Adoptată la Bruxelles, 9 noiembrie 2001.Pentru Comitetul mixt al SEEPreședinteleE. Bull[1] JO L 238, 6.9.2001, p. 5.[2] JO L 299, 22.11.1994, p. 26.[3] JO L 35, 6.2.2001, p. 34.[****] Nu sunt indicate cerințe constituționale.--------------------------------------------------