type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 707 A.2d 841 (1998)
 349 Md. 215
 William H. MILES
 v.
 STATE of Maryland.
 No. 14, Sept. Term, 1996.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 6, 1998.
 *843 Sherrie B. Glasser, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
 Gary E. Bair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI,[*] and RAKER, JJ., and ROBERT C. MURPHY, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
 *842 ELDRIDGE, Judge.
 The petitioner William H. Miles was found guilty of common law battery for punching a man who had denied Miles's request for money. Based on the same act, Miles was also found guilty of "aggressive panhandling" in violation of former Art. 19, § 249, of the Baltimore City Code, which made it unlawful, inter alia, to "touch[ ] another person in the course of panhandling without that person's consent."[1] Miles received separate sentences for the battery and the aggressive panhandling. Miles appealed, arguing, inter alia, that common law battery was a lesser-included offense and that, therefore, into the sentence for battery should merge into the sentence for aggressive panhandling. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, applied the required evidence test and concluded that the sentences should not merge because battery and aggressive panhandling each contain elements which the other does not. We granted Miles's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine the question of merger. Miles v. State, 342 Md. 263, 674 A.2d 961 (1996).
 I.
 We have often pointed out that, as a matter of Maryland common law, the normal standard for determining whether one offense merges into another is what is usually called the "required evidence test." State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 391, 631 A.2d 453, 456 (1993); Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 319, 619 A.2d 531, 537 (1993); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 531, 601 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1992); Biggus v. State, 323 Md. 339, 350, 593 A.2d 1060, 1065 (1991); Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 316, 593 A.2d 671, 673 (1991); Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 616, 583 A.2d 1056, 1058 (1991). As these cases indicate, the required evidence test is applicable to *844 common law offenses as well as offenses under statutes enacted by the General Assembly. Recently, in State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 391-392, 631 A.2d at 456-457, we explained the required evidence test as follows:
 "The required evidence test `focuses upon the elements of each offense; if all of the elements of one offense are included in the other offense, so that only the latter offense contains a distinct element or distinct elements, the former merges into the latter.' Snowden v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 617, 583 A.2d at 1059, quoting State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 517, 515 A.2d 465, 473 (1986). Stated another way, the `required evidence is that which is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for each... offense. If each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, or in other words, if each offense contains an element which the other does not,' there is no merger under the required evidence test even though both offenses are based upon the same act or acts. `But, where only one offense requires proof of an additional fact, so that all elements of one offense are present in the other,' and where both `offenses are based on the same act or acts, ... merger follows....' Williams v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 317-318, 593 A.2d at 673, quoting in part Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 267, 353 A.2d 240, 246-247 (1976)."
 When one offense is found to be a lesser-included offense of another under the required evidence test, ordinarily a "sentence may be imposed only for the offense having the additional element or elements." State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 392, 631 A.2d at 457. See also, In re Montrail M., supra, 325 Md. at 534, 601 A.2d at 1105; Biggus v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 350-351, 593 A.2d at 1065-1066; Snowden v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 617-619, 583 A.2d at 1059-1060; Middleton v. State, 318 Md. 749, 760-761, 569 A.2d 1276, 1281 (1990); State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 521, 515 A.2d 465, 475 (1986); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203-204, 388 A.2d 926, 930 (1978); Flannigan v. State, 232 Md. 13, 19, 191 A.2d 591, 593-594 (1963). This is true even where the lesser-included offense carries a greater maximum authorized sentence. "[W]here two offenses are deemed the same under the required evidence test, the included offense merges into the offense having a distinct element regardless of the maximum authorized sentence for each offense." State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 405, 631 A.2d at 464.
 The required evidence test, however, is not the only standard for resolving questions of merger. For example, where one offense is included in another, the offenses still may not merge under some circumstances where the General Assembly has "specifically or expressly authorized multiple punishments." State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 394, 631 A.2d at 458; Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989) ("when specifically authorized by the legislature, cumulative sentences... may under some circumstances be imposed"); Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 143-150, 416 A.2d 265, 268-271 (1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990, 990, 101 S. Ct. 1688-1689, 68 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1981).
 Conversely, where two offenses are separate under the required evidence test, there still may be a merger for sentencing purposes based on considerations such as the rule of lenity, historical treatment, judicial decisions which generally hold that the offenses merge, and fairness. Biggus v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 356, 593 A.2d at 1068; Williams v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 320-322, 593 A.2d at 675; Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222-224, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990); White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 746, 569 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1990). See also Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md. 114, 131-144, 665 A.2d 685, 693-700 (1995) (Raker, J., dissenting); State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 394, 631 A.2d at 458. When merger is not based upon the required evidence test, and therefore neither offense is the greater in terms of elements, the offense carrying the highest maximum authorized sentence is ordinarily considered to be the greater offense. Thus, "the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty merges into the offense carrying the greater penalty." Williams v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 322, 593 A.2d at 676. See, e.g., White v. *845 State, supra, 318 Md. at 747, 569 A.2d at 1274; State v. Jenkins, supra, 307 Md. at 521, 515 A.2d at 475.
 A question not previously decided by any decision of this Court, but presented by this case, concerns Maryland common law merger principles where the same conduct constitutes two offenses, one being a statewide common law offense or a statutory offense under an enactment by the General Assembly, and the other being a locally enacted offense. The two offenses involved in this case are the common law crime of battery and "aggressive panhandling" proscribed by a former Baltimore City ordinance.
 II.
 The facts of the instant case are uncomplicated. Miles was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and convicted of common law battery and "aggressive panhandling" based on the events of April 2, 1994. On that afternoon, Norman Morrison and two female companions had just parked their cars along a Baltimore City street when Miles approached them asking for money. Although they told him no, Miles followed them and continued to ask for money. Morrison told his two companions to keep walking, while he went in a different direction, apparently because he feared for their safety. Miles followed Morrison, tapped him on the shoulder, and punched him in the face, cracking his glasses and cutting him under his eye. Morrison contacted the police and later identified Miles as his assailant from a photographic array.
 Miles was charged with common law battery as well as "aggressive panhandling" in violation of former Art. 19, § 249, of the Baltimore City Code. The record makes it absolutely clear that the prosecution of both charges was based on the same act, namely Miles's punching Morrison in the face. Miles was convicted of both offenses. The circuit court sentenced Miles to 10 years imprisonment for battery and a consecutive 90-day term of imprisonment for aggressive panhandling.
 Miles appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that his conviction for battery should have merged into his conviction for aggressive panhandling, inasmuch as all of the elements of battery were included in the elements of aggressive panhandling. Miles claimed that battery is a lesser-included offense of aggressive panhandling under the required evidence test.
 The Court of Special Appeals applied the required evidence test and held that battery was not a lesser-included offense of aggressive panhandling because, in that court's view, each offense required proof of an element not required by the other. To convict for aggressive panhandling, the State was required to prove that Miles asked Mr. Morrison for money in a public place and also acted in one of six specified ways.[2] Although it was unclear under which of the six delineated actions the jury convicted Miles, the Court of Special Appeals assumed that it was former Art. 19, § 249(b)(2)(ii), which prohibits "touching another person in the course of panhandling without that person's *846 consent." According to the Court of Special Appeals, "[f]or the State to convict a defendant of battery, it must prove that the defendant used unlawful force with an intent to touch the victim." The Court of Special Appeals noted that aggressive panhandling, as defined by the Baltimore City Code, required proof of a number of elements not required to establish battery, such as begging in a public place. The more difficult question, however, was whether battery contained any elements not included in aggressive panhandling. The court found that, while both battery and aggressive panhandling each required an unconsented touching, battery included an additional element of intent not required to convict for aggressive panhandling. Thus, the intermediate appellate court held that each offense required proof of an element not required by the other, so that battery did not merge into aggressive panhandling.
 Under our view of the merger issue, however, we need not and shall not decide whether each offense required proof of an element not required by the other.
 III.
 The numerous merger cases previously decided by this Court have either involved statutory offenses under enactments of the General Assembly or common law offenses. Thus, heretofore we have only considered the merger of offenses which were enacted by or subject to the control of one legislative body. In all of these cases, we have first turned to the required evidence test as the usual standard for determining merger questions. We have also looked at express legislative intent, the rule of lenity, history, treatment by other jurisdictions, and fairness. We are aware of no case, however, in this jurisdiction or elsewhere, which holds that the required evidence test should be employed to merge a state common law or statutory offense into an offense under a locally enacted ordinance.
 The early American common law view was that offenses under state law and offenses under locally enacted ordinances constitute separate and distinct crimes, even when they proscribe the same conduct. See, e.g., Norwood v. Wiseman, 141 Md. 696, 700, 119 A. 688, 690 (1922); Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 414, 74 A. 581, 583 (1909) ("`The State law and the [municipal] by-law may both stand together if not inconsistent. Indeed, an act may be a penal offence under the laws of the State, and further penalties, under proper legislative authority, [may] be imposed for its commission by municipal by-laws, and the enforcement of the one would not preclude the enforcement of the other,'" quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 421 (5th Ed.)); Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331, 336 (1861); Mayor and Aldermen, etc. v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, 403 (1848) (offenses "against the corporation and the State, we have seen are distinguishable, and wholly disconnected"); Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 374, 14 S.W. 38, 39 (1890) ("When made penal by the State and the city or town, each act becomes a separate offense against the State and the municipality. In that event the penalty imposed by the city or town is superadded to that fixed by the general law, on account of the additional wrong donefor the offense against the municipality"); C. Theisen v. W.H.H. McDavid, City Marshal, 34 Fla. 440, 443, 16 So. 321, 322 (1894) (an "offender may be tried and punished for the same act under both [an] ordinance and [a] State law"); Kemper v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 219, 222, 3 S.W. 159, 160 (1887) (offenses "against the city and the State, although consisting of the same act, are quite distinguishable, and the prosecution for each offense proceeds upon different grounds"); State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 453, 13 N.W. 913, 915 (1882) ("The same act, prohibited by both the city and the state, may thus constitute two offences, which are intrinsically and legally distinguishable. In support of this proposition the authorities are abundant and nearly unanimous"). See also, e.g., Hankins v. The People, 106 Ill. 628 (1883); Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 Ill. 11 (1879); Town of Bloomfield v. Trimble, 54 Iowa 399, 6 N.W. 586 (1880); Louisiana v. Clifford, 45 La. Ann. 980, 13 So. 281 (1893); New Jersey v. Plunkett, 3 Har. 5 (N.J.1840); Oregon v. Bergman, 6 Or. 341 (1877); Oregon v. Sly, 4 Or. 277 (1872); City Council v. O'Donnell, 29 S.C. 355, 7 S.E. 523 (1888); Greenwood v. State, 65 Tenn. 567, 6 Baxt. 567 (1873).
 *847 The earlier view that state offenses and locally enacted offenses are treated as separate and distinct has been modified, because of double jeopardy principles, with respect to successive prosecutions. Thus, where a state offense and a locally enacted offense would be deemed the same under double jeopardy principles, a conviction or acquittal for one would ordinarily be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the other. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S. Ct. 1184, 25 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1970); Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 267 n. 5, 353 A.2d 240, 246 n. 5 (1976). Double jeopardy principles may also require modification of the traditional common law view, under certain circumstances, with regard to the imposition of multiple punishments.
 Nevertheless, the defendant makes no argument in this Court that double jeopardy principles required that his battery conviction under state law merge into his aggressive panhandling conviction under the local ordinance. Moreover, we question whether an argument to this effect would be very persuasive. Cf. State v. Lancaster, supra, 332 Md. at 403, 631 A.2d at 462-463 (majority opinion), 332 Md. at 422-425, 631 A.2d at 473-474 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting), 332 Md. at 434-435, 631 A.2d at 478-479 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). Since, however, no argument based upon the double jeopardy prohibition has been made in this case, we need not explore the matter further.
 In light of the traditional common law principle that a state offense and a locally enacted offense are normally treated as separate and distinct, regardless of the elements of each, a state offense will not be deemed to be a lesser included offense of a locally enacted offense for purposes of merger under Maryland common law. The state offense will not, under the required evidence test, merge into an offense created by an ordinance enacted by a county or a municipality.
 In addition to its common law foundation, this result is supported by sound public policy. Generally, locally enacted ordinances have a lesser status than state law and must, in the event of conflict, yield to general state law. See Constitution of Maryland, Article XI-A, § 3, Article XI-E, § 6, Article XI-F, § 10. Application of the required evidence test to merge a state offense into a locally enacted offense would permit local governments to supercede state criminal law policy simply by passing an ordinance creating an offense which includes all of the elements of a particular state crime, which adds as an additional element a circumstance normally present when the state crime is committed, but which carries a drastically reduced maximum penalty. Under the required evidence test, whenever both offenses were charged based on the same acts, and the defendant was convicted, the local policy concerning punishment would prevail over the state policy. This would not be in accord with the normal relationship between state law and locally enacted ordinances.
 Therefore, the required evidence test has no application to merger questions involving a state common law or statutory offense and an offense under a locally enacted ordinance.
 IV.
 Our holding that the required evidence test is inapplicable, however, does not end the merger inquiry. As previously indicated, where the same act constitutes different offenses, and where there is no merger under the required evidence test, there still may be a merger for sentencing purposes. The applicable principles of Maryland law were summarized in Williams v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 321-322, 593 A.2d at 675, as follows:
 "When two offenses do not merge under the required evidence test, we have applied as a principle of statutory construction the `rule of lenity,' which `provides that doubt or ambiguity as to whether the legislature intended that there be multiple punishments for the same act or transaction `will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.' White v. State, supra, 318 Md. at 744, 569 A.2d at 1273, quoting Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70, 78 (1978) (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S. Ct. 620, 622, 99 L. Ed. 905, 910-911 (1955)). See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 312 Md. [494], 510, *848 540 A.2d [1125] 1138 [1133] [(1988)]; State v. Jenkins, supra, 307 Md. at 518-521, 515 A.2d at 473-475. See also Monoker v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 223, 582 A.2d at 529 (pointing out that the rule of lenity is applicable where both offenses are statutory or where one offense is statutory and the other is a common law crime).
 "In addition to the rule of lenity, we have looked to other considerations in deciding whether two offenses, when based on the same conduct, should be deemed the same. As Judge Cole for the Court explained in White v. State, supra, 318 Md. at 745-746, 569 A.2d at 1274,
 `like other canons of statutory construction, the rule of lenity is neither absolute nor exclusive. Other considerations may also be applicable in arriving at a principled decision.... For example, in deciding merger questions, we have examined the position taken in other jurisdictions. We have also looked to whether the type of act has historically resulted in multiple punishments. See Jenkins, 307 Md. at 518-21, 515 A.2d at 473-75; State v. Boozer, 304 Md. 98, 497 A.2d 1129 (1985). The fairness of multiple punishments in a particular situation is obviously important. See State v. Oliver, 302 Md. 592, 611 n. 12, 490 A.2d 242, 251 n. 12 (1985); Brooks, 284 Md. at 423, 397 A.2d at 599-600. Cf. Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 397, 354 A.2d 825, 833, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027, 97 S. Ct. 652, 50 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1976).'
 "More recently, in Monoker v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 222-223, 582 A.2d at 529, we held that, under the circumstances there presented, the offense of soliciting one to perform a criminal act should merge into conspiracy to commit the same act, saying:
 `[B]ecause the solicitation was part and parcel of the ultimate conspiracy and thereby an integral component of it, it would be fundamentally unfair to Monoker for us to require him to suffer twice....'"
 See also Spitzinger v. State, supra, 340 Md. at 132, 665 A.2d at 693 (Raker, J., dissenting); Biggus v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 356, 593 A.2d at 1068.
 Although the rule of lenity is not applicable where both offenses involved are common law offenses, it is applicable where one offense is a common law crime and the other offense was created by statute. Monoker v. State, supra, 321 Md. at 223, 582 A.2d at 529; White v. State, supra, 318 Md. at 745-747, 569 A.2d at 1273-1274. Since one of the offenses here involved was created by a Baltimore City ordinance, the rule of lenity is applicable. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the prosecution of both offenses was based on the same act of Miles punching Morrison in the face. Nothing in the language of former Art. 19, § 249, of the Baltimore City Code suggests that the City Council intended cumulative punishments when a violation of the ordinance also constituted another offense. Under the rule of lenity, therefore, we do not attribute such intent to the City Council.
 As earlier discussed, where there is merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty. Moreover, for purposes of merger, a statewide common law offense or an offense under an enactment of the General Assembly should always be considered greater than an offense under a locally enacted ordinance.[3]
 Consequently, in light of the rule of lenity, Miles's conviction for aggressive panhandling will be vacated.
 V.
 Although not raised or discussed by the parties, there is another reason for vacating Miles's aggressive panhandling conviction. As previously noted, supra n. 1, the aggressive panhandling ordinance in effect when Miles punched Morrison in the face, and under which Miles was convicted, was held unconstitutional by the United States District *849 Court for the District of Maryland in August 1994. See Patton v. Baltimore City, No. S93-2389 (D.Md., August 19, 1994). The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed no appeal from this decision, and, instead, acquiesced in the federal court's holding of unconstitutionality. The Mayor and City Council, referring to the federal court decision, repealed the aggressive panhandling statute and enacted an entirely new Art. 19, § 249, in December 1994. See Baltimore City Ordinance 447, enacted December 15, 1994. Miles was tried and convicted for violating the repealed statute in January 1995.
 Under Maryland common law "the repeal of a statute creating a criminal offense, after conviction under the statute but before final judgment, including the final judgment of the highest court empowered to review the conviction, requires reversal of the judgment...." Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 363, 204 A.2d 54, 57 (1964). Under the common law rule, it was often stated that the repeal of a statute "operated as a pardon of all offenses under it, and superseded the jurisdiction of the court in any suit pending, to enforce a penalty under such repealed statute." Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564, 566-567, 35 S.W. 554, 555 (1896). See 6 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 21.44 at 370 (3rd ed. 1988 Revised Volume).
 With respect to statutes passed by the General Assembly, however, this rule has been modified by the general saving clause statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1, § 3. As this Court explained in State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 345, 402 A.2d 876, 879 (1979), "[w]e interpret this provision as saving any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under a statute which is subsequently repealed or amended unless the repealing act expressly provides otherwise." Thus, under the general saving clause, when the General Assembly repeals or amends a statute, the common law rule does not apply, and a prosecution under the repealed statute may ordinarily continue despite the repeal. See Bell v. State, supra, 236 Md. at 367, 204 A.2d at 60.
 Nevertheless, as Judge Oppenheimer pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Bell v. State, supra, 236 Md. at 373, 204 A.2d at 63, "it is generally held that state saving statutes do not apply to ordinances." See Barton v. Incorporation of Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495, 496 (1885) (state saving statute "does not apply to the ordinances of municipal corporations, but solely to laws enacted by the General Assembly"); Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303, 307, 35 P. 869, 870-871 (1894); Naylor v. The City of Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285, 287 (1870) (state saving statute "applies solely to statutes enacted by the legislature, and not to the laws of a corporation; and we cannot extend its operation to ordinances"); East Lake Lot Own. Assoc. v. Town of Prin. Lakes, 246 Ind. 333, 334, 205 N.E.2d 821, 821-822 (1965); Rutherford v. Swink, supra, 96 Tenn. at 568, 35 S.W. at 555 (saving statute "was only intended to apply to the statutes of the State, and ... the common law rule still applies ... to the repeal of municipal ordinances"); Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41 Utah 154, 162, 125 P. 389, 392 (1912) ("it has universally been held by the courts that such provisions were not intended to have, and do not have, any application to municipal ordinances, or to any proceeding instituted under them"); 6 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, supra, § 21.44 at 370 ("[c]ontrary to the statutory rule as to state offenses, generally the repeal of an ordinance pending a prosecution under it operates to stop the prosecution and to release the defendant, unless it is otherwise provided in the repealing ordinance"); 1 Mathews, Municipal Ordinances, § 25.03 at 245 (2d ed. 1991 Revision) ("[a] repealing ordinance should always provide a reservation to the effect that such repeal should not have any effect on existing litigation and shall not operate as an abatement of any action or proceeding then pending under or by virtue of the repealing ordinance. Unless of course, it is the desire of the legislative body to cancel all existing prosecutions that may be pending under the repealed ordinance").
 Baltimore City Ordinance No. 447 (1994) does not contain a reservation or a saving clause to the effect that proceedings under former § 249 should be preserved despite *850 the repeal. See East Lake Lot Own. Assoc. v. Town of Prin. Lakes, supra, 246 Ind. at 334, 205 N.E.2d at 822 ("[i]t appears necessary then to enact a saving clause in each repeal of an ordinance to preserve proceedings dependent on the repealed ordinance"); Cf. City of Rochester v. Crittenden P.R. Academy, Inc., 135 Misc. 451, 452, 238 N.Y.S. 215, 215 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1930) (prosecution under repealed ordinance proper where repealing ordinance provided "for the repeal of the existing ordinance, except as to offenses committed thereunder which `may be * * * prosecuted * * * as fully and to the same extent as if such repeal had not been effected'"). Nor is this Court aware of any general saving provision applicable to ordinances either in state law or in the Baltimore City Code or in the Baltimore City Charter. Therefore, the repeal of former Art. 19, § 249, operated as an abatement of the proceedings against Miles for violation of that section. It is an alternative ground requiring that his aggressive panhandling conviction be vacated.[4]
 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT ON THE CHARGE OF BATTERY AND TO VACATE THE CONVICTION ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
 NOTES
 [*] Karwacki, J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and the adoption of the opinion.
 [1] Art. 19, § 249, was initially adopted by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as Ordinance 275 in 1993. Miles's punching the victim occurred on April 2, 1994. In August 1994, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that § 249 was unconstitutional in that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In December 1994, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore repealed former Art. 19, § 249, and enacted an entirely new § 249, designed to correct the constitutional infirmity found by the federal court. Miles was tried for violating the former § 249, as well as for battery, on January 19, 1995. The trial transcript indicates that neither the trial judge nor the prosecuting attorney nor the assistant public defender representing Miles were aware of the federal court decision or of the repeal of the statute.
 [2] At the time of Miles's offense, Art. 19, § 249(b), of the Baltimore City Code provided as follows:
 "(b) Definitions.
 (1) `Panhandling' means any act by which one person asks, begs or solicits alms from another or others in person, by requesting an immediate donation of money or other thing of value. Panhandling includes the spoken, written, or printed word or such other act conducted with the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or thing of value.
 (2) `Aggressive Panhandling' means panhandling which is accompanied by one or more of the following:
 (i) approaching, speaking to, or following a person in such a manner as would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act upon the person, or upon property in the person's immediate possession;
 (ii) touching another person in the course of panhandling without that person's consent;
 (iii) continuously panhandling from a person, or following the person, after the person has made a negative response;
 (iv) intentionally blocking or interfering with the safe passage of a person or a vehicle by any means, including unreasonably causing a person to take evasive action to avoid physical contact;
 (v) using obscene or abusive language either during the course of panhandling or following refusal; or
 (vi) acting with the intent of intimidating another person into giving money or another thing of value."
 [3] In fact, the maximum jail sentence which a county or municipality may provide for an offense is six months imprisonment. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 23A, § 3(a); Art. 25A, § 5(A)(2).
 [4] Moreover, even if there were a general saving statute applicable to penal ordinances enacted by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, it is not at all clear that a saving statute, employing the standard language of such statutes, would apply under circumstances like those in the case at bar. The typical situation contemplated by saving statutes is where the legislative body, for policy reasons, or for style, technical corrections, code organization, or similar reasons, itself decides to repeal or revise a statute or to repeal and reenact a statute with amendments. When the legislative body repeals a penal statute because of its belief that the statute is invalid, and that a conviction under the statute would be invalid, it is unlikely that the legislation body intends to "save" such "invalid" penalties. In the present situation, the United States District Court held former Art. 19, § 249, invalid on grounds that would have precluded Miles's conviction under that ordinance; the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore acquiesced in that holding of invalidity and, in lieu of an appeal, decided to repeal the "invalid" statute. It is doubtful that typical saving statutes are intended to cover this situation.


type: wikipedia

text:
1697 (MDCXCVII) byl rok, který dle gregoriánského kalendáře započal úterým.
 Události
 11. září – bitva u Zenty, Evžen Savojský překvapil a rozdrtil turecká vojska přecházející Tisu. Poté zpustošil Bosnu a vyplenil Sarajevo...
 20. září – uzavřen Rijswijkský mír, který ukončil válku mezi Francií a tzv. Velkou aliancí
 Petr Veliký cestuje inkognito po Evropě
 Karel XII. nastoupil v 15 letech na švédský trůn
 začíná hladomor ve Finsku (1697–1699)
 Koldínův zákoník se stává jediným zákoníkem městského práva platným na Moravě
 Probíhající události
 1683–1699 – Velká turecká válka
 1688–1697 – Devítiletá válka
 1689–1697 – Válka krále Viléma
 Narození
 Česko
 leden – Josef Jiří Jelínek, barokní sochař a řezbář († 23. ledna 1776)
 16. dubna – Jan Antonín Scrinci, lékař a fyzik, rektor UK († 28. dubna 1773)
 13. prosince – Lazar Widemann, český sochař a řezbář († 29. ledna 1769)
 neznámé datum – Ignác Hubatka, skladatel († 4. února 1745)
 neznámé datum – Jan Václav Přepyský z Rychemberka, šlechtic († 11. září 1765)
 Svět
 1. ledna – Antonio Galli da Bibbiena, italský malíř a architekt († 28. ledna 1774)
 30. ledna – Johann Joachim Quantz, německý flétnista a skladatel († 12. července 1773)
 15. února – Vito Maria Amico, italský historik a politik († 15. prosince 1762)
 1. dubna – Antoine François Prévost, francouzský spisovatel († 23. prosince 1763)
 10. května – Jean-Marie Leclair, francouzský skladatel a houslový virtuos († 22. října 1764)
 6. srpen – Karel VII. Bavorský, vévoda a kurfiřt bavorský, (vzdoro)císař Svaté říše římské († 1745)
 7. října – Giovanni Antonio Canal, italský malíř († 1768)
 8. října – Cornelis Troost, nizozemský malíř období baroka († 7. března 1750)
 10. listopadu – William Hogarth, anglický malíř a grafik († 26. října 1764)
 5. prosince – Giuseppe de Majo, italský skladatel († 18. listopadu 1771)
 Úmrtí
 Česko
 12. června – Matthaeus Zeidler, jezuitský teolog, rektor olomoucké univerzity (* 26. listopadu 1626)
 Svět
 1. března – Francesco Redi, italský lékař a přírodovědec (* 18. února 1626)
 5. dubna – Karel XI., švédský král (* 24. listopadu 1655)
 7. července – John Aubrey, anglický starožitník a spisovatel (* 12. března 1626)
 22. listopadu – Libéral Bruant, francouzský architekt (* 1636)
 17. prosince – Eleonora Marie Josefa Habsburská, dcera císaře Ferdinanda III., polská královna (* 21. května 1653)
 Hlavy států
 Anglie – Vilém III. (1688–1702)
 Francie – Ludvík XIV. (1643–1715)
 Habsburská monarchie – Leopold I. (1657–1705)
 Osmanská říše – Mustafa II. (1695–1703)
 Polsko-litevská unie – August II. Silný (1697–1706)
 Rusko – Petr I. Veliký (1682–1725)
 Španělsko – Karel II. (1665–1700)
 Švédsko – Karel XI. (1660–1697) / Karel XII. (1697–1718)
 Papež – Inocenc XII. (1691–1700)
 Perská říše – Husajn Šáh
 Externí odkazy
 17. století


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 21994A0517(08)
 Avtal mellan Europeiska ekonomiska gemenskapen och Republiken Kazakstan om handel med textilprodukter - Protokoll A - Protokoll B som avses i artikel 9 - Protokoll C - Protokoll D - Godkända protokoll - Notväxling
 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning nr L 123 , 17/05/1994 s. 0278 - 0305 Finsk specialutgåva Område 11 Volym 31 s. 0280 Svensk specialutgåva Område 11 Volym 31 s. 0280
 AGREEMENT between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Kazakhstan on trade in textile products>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >>Hänvisning till >


text:
 30.11.2006
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 333/38
 AFGØRELSE TRUFFET AF DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG
 Nr. 116/2006
 af 22. september 2006
 om ændring af bilag II (Tekniske forskrifter, standarder, prøvning og certificering) til EØS-aftalen
 DET BLANDEDE EØS-UDVALG HAR -
 under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde som ændret ved protokollen om tilpasning af aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde, i det følgende benævnt »aftalen«, særlig artikel 98, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Bilag II til aftalen blev ændret ved afgørelse nr. 86/2006 af 7. juli 2006 (1) truffet af Det Blandede EØS-udvalg.
 (2)
 Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 6/2006 af 5. januar 2006 om ændring af bilag I og II til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2377/90 om en fælles fremgangsmåde for fastsættelse af maksimalgrænseværdier for restkoncentrationer af veterinærmedicinske præparater i animalske levnedsmidler for så vidt angår dihydrostreptomycin, tosylchloramidnatrium og piceae turiones recentes extractum (2) bør indarbejdes i aftalen.
 (3)
 Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 205/2006 af 6. februar 2006 om ændring af bilag I og II til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2377/90 om en fælles fremgangsmåde for fastsættelse af maksimalgrænseværdier for restkoncentrationer af veterinærmedicinske præparater i animalske levnedsmidler for så vidt angår toltrazuril, diethylenglycolmonoethylether og polyoxyethylensorbitanmonooleat (3) bør indarbejdes i aftalen -
 TRUFFET FØLGENDE AFGØRELSE:
 Artikel 1
 Følgende led indsættes i punkt 14 (Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2377/90) i kapitel XIII i bilag II til aftalen:
 »—
 32006 R 0006: Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 6/2006 af 5. januar 2006 (EUT L 3 af 6.1.2006, s. 3)
 —
 32006 R 0205: Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 205/2006 af 6. februar 2006 (EUT L 34 af 7.2.2006, s. 21).«
 Artikel 2
 Den islandske og norske udgave af forordning (EF) nr. 6/2006 og (EF) nr. 205/2006, der offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-tillæg, er autentiske.
 Artikel 3
 Denne afgørelse træder i kraft den 23. september 2006, forudsat at Det Blandede EØS-udvalg har modtaget alle meddelelser i henhold til aftalens artikel 103, stk. 1 (4).
 Artikel 4
 Denne afgørelse offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidendes EØS-afsnit og EØS-tillæg.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 22. september 2006.
 På vegne af Det Blandede EØS-udvalg
 Oda Helen SLETNES
 Formand
 (1) EUT L 289 af 19.10.2006, s. 21.
 (2) EUT L 3 af 6.1.2006, s. 3.
 (3) EUT L 34 af 7.2.2006, s. 21.
 (4) Ingen forfatningsmæssige krav angivet.


text:
 13.9.2012
 EN
 Official Journal of the European Union
 L 248/1
 DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE
 No 74/2012
 of 30 April 2012
 amending Annex I (Veterinary and phytosanitary matters) to the EEA Agreement
 THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,
 Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, as amended by the Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agreement’, and in particular Article 98 thereof,
 Whereas:
 (1)
 Annex I to the Agreement was amended by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 35/2012 of 30 March 2012 (1).
 (2)
 Council Directive 2009/158/EC of 30 November 2009 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in, and imports from third countries of, poultry and hatching eggs (2) is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (3)
 Commission Decision 2011/214/EU of 1 April 2011 amending Annexes II to IV to Council Directive 2009/158/EC on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in, and imports from third countries of, poultry and hatching eggs (3) is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (4)
 Commission Implementing Decision 2011/277/EU of 10 May 2011 amending Annex II to Decision 93/52/EEC as regards the recognition of certain regions in Italy as officially free of brucellosis (B. melitensis) and amending the Annexes to Decision 2003/467/EC as regards the declaration that certain regions of Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom are officially free of bovine tuberculosis, bovine brucellosis and enzootic bovine leukosis (4) is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (5)
 Commission Implementing Decision 2011/674/EU of 12 October 2011 amending Decision 2004/558/EC as regards the infectious bovine rhinotracheitis-free status of certain administrative regions in Germany (5) is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (6)
 Commission Implementing Decision 2011/675/EU of 12 October 2011 amending Decision 2003/467/EC as regards the declaration of Latvia as officially tuberculosis-free Member State and the declaration of certain administrative regions in Portugal as officially enzootic-bovine-leukosis-free regions (6) is to be incorporated into the Agreement.
 (7)
 Directive 2009/158/EC repeals Council Directive 90/539/EEC (7) which is incorporated in the Agreement and which is therefore to be repealed under the Agreement.
 (8)
 This Decision concerns legislation regarding live animals other than fish and aquaculture animals. Legislation concerning these matters shall not apply to Iceland, as specified in paragraph 2 of the Introductory Part of Chapter I of Annex I to the Agreement. This Decision is therefore not to apply to Iceland.
 (9)
 This Decision concerns legislation regarding veterinary matters. Legislation regarding veterinary matters shall not apply to Liechtenstein as long as the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products is extended to Liechtenstein, as specified in the sectoral adaptations to Annex I to the Agreement. This Decision is therefore not to apply to Liechtenstein,
 HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
 Article 1
 Chapter I of Annex I to the Agreement shall be amended as follows:
 (1)
 the text of point 4 (Council Directive 90/539/EEC) in Part 4.1 and point 3 (Council Directive 90/539/EEC) in Part 8.1 shall be deleted;
 (2)
 the following shall be inserted after point 4 (Council Directive 90/539/EEC) in Part 4.1:
 ‘4a.
 32009 L 0158: Council Directive 2009/158/EC of 30 November 2009 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in, and imports from third countries of, poultry and hatching eggs (OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 74), as amended by:
 —
 32011 D 0214: Commission Decision 2011/214/EU of 1 April 2011 (OJ L 90, 6.4.2011, p. 27).
 This act shall not apply to Iceland.
 The provisions of the Directive shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be read with the following adaptations:
 (a)
 in Article 13, the word “Norway” shall be added after the word “Finland”;
 (b)
 in Annex IV, the word “Norway” shall be added after the word “Finland” in footnote 3 of Model 1, footnotes 4 and 6 of Model 2, footnotes 1 and 4 of Model 3, footnote 3 of Model 4, footnotes 3 and 5 of Model 5 and footnote 1 of Model 6.’;
 (3)
 the following indent shall be added in point 14 (Commission Decision 93/52/EEC) in Part 4.2:
 ‘—
 32011 D 0277: Commission Implementing Decision 2011/277/EU of 10 May 2011 (OJ L 122, 11.5.2011, p. 100).’;
 (4)
 the following indents shall be added in point 70 (Commission Decision 2003/467/EC) in Part 4.2:
 ‘—
 32011 D 0277: Commission Implementing Decision 2011/277/EU of 10 May 2011 (OJ L 122, 11.5.2011, p. 100),
 —
 32011 D 0675: Commission Implementing Decision 2011/675/EU of 12 October 2011 (OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 19).’;
 (5)
 the following indent shall be added in point 80 (Commission Decision 2004/558/EC) in Part 4.2:
 ‘—
 32011 D 0674: Commission Implementing Decision 2011/674/EU of 12 October 2011 (OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 17).’;
 (6)
 the following shall be inserted after point 3 (Council Directive 90/539/EEC) in Part 8.1:
 ‘3a.
 32009 L 0158: Council Directive 2009/158/EC of 30 November 2009 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in, and imports from third countries of, poultry and hatching eggs (OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 74), as amended by:
 —
 32011 D 0214: Commission Decision 2011/214/EU of 1 April 2011 (OJ L 90, 6.4.2011, p. 27).
 This act shall not apply to Iceland.
 The provisions of the Directive shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, be read with the following adaptations:
 (a)
 in Article 13, the word “Norway” shall be added after the word “Finland”;
 (b)
 in Annex IV, the word “Norway” shall be added after the word “Finland” in footnote 3 of Model 1, footnotes 4 and 6 of Model 2, footnotes 1 and 4 of Model 3, footnote 3 of Model 4, footnotes 3 and 5 of Model 5 and footnote 1 of Model 6.’.
 Article 2
 The texts of Directive 2009/158/EC, Decision 2011/214/EU and Implementing Decisions 2011/277/EU, 2011/674/EU and 2011/675/EU in the Norwegian language, to be published in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, shall be authentic.
 Article 3
 This Decision shall enter into force on 1 May 2012, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee (8).
 Article 4
 This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of, and in the EEA Supplement to, the Official Journal of the European Union.
 Done at Brussels, 30 April 2012.
 For the EEA Joint Committee
 The Acting President
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 (1) OJ L 207, 2.8.2012, p. 2.
 (2) OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 74.
 (3) OJ L 90, 6.4.2011, p. 27.
 (4) OJ L 122, 11.5.2011, p. 100.
 (5) OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 17.
 (6) OJ L 268, 13.10.2011, p. 19.
 (7) OJ L 303, 31.10.1990, p. 6.
 (8) No constitutional requirements indicated.


text:
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 22010A0407(01)
 Nolīgums starp Eiropas Savienību un Šveices Konfederāciju, ar ko paredz noteikumus Šveices Konfederācijas līdzdalībai programmā Jaunatne darbībā un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā (2007–2013)
 Oficiālais Vēstnesis L 87 , 07/04/2010 Lpp. 0009 - 0018
 Nolīgumsstarp Eiropas Savienību un Šveices Konfederāciju, ar ko paredz noteikumus Šveices Konfederācijas līdzdalībai programmā "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā (2007–2013)EIROPAS SAVIENĪBA, turpmāk "Savienība",no vienas puses,un ŠVEICES KONFEDERĀCIJA, turpmāk "Šveice",no otras puses,abas turpmāk "Puses",tā kā:(1) Kopīgajā deklarācijā, kas pievienota septiņiem 1999. gada 21. jūnijā parakstītajiem Eiropas Kopienas un Šveices nolīgumiem, ir paredzētas turpmākas sarunas attiecībā uz nolīgumu par Šveices līdzdalību apmācības un jaunatnes programmās.(2) Attiecīgi ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Lēmumiem Nr. 1719/2006/EK [1] un Nr. 1720/2006/EK [2] ( 2006. gada 15. novembris) izveido programmu "Jaunatne darbībā" laikposmam no 2007. gada līdz 2013. gadam un rīcības programmu mūžizglītības jomā.(3) Lēmuma Nr. 1719/2006/EK 5. pantā un Lēmuma Nr. 1720/2006/EK 7. pantā noteikts, ka Šveice var piedalīties šajās programmās, ja starp Kopienu un Šveici ir noslēgts divpusējs nolīgums,IR VIENOJUŠĀS PAR TURPMĀKO.1. pantsŠveice piedalās programmā "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā (turpmāk "programmas") saskaņā ar noteikumiem un nosacījumiem, kas izklāstīti šajā nolīgumā un tā I, II un III pielikumā, kuri ir tā sastāvdaļa.2. pantsŠo nolīgumu piemēro, no vienas puses, teritorijās, kurām piemēro Līgumus, kas ir Savienības pamatā, atbilstīgi minētajos Līgumos paredzētajiem nosacījumiem, un, no otras puses, Šveices teritorijā.3. pantsŠis nolīgums ir noslēgts uz spēkā esošo programmu darbības laiku. Tomēr, neskarot šā panta otro daļu, ja Savienība nolemj pagarināt šo darbības laiku, neizdarot grozījumus programmās, šo nolīgumu attiecīgi automātiski pagarina, ja vien kāda no Pusēm 30 dienu laikā pēc lēmuma pieņemšanas par programmu darbības laika pagarināšanu neinformē otru Pusi par atteikšanos pagarināt sadarbības laiku. Darbības laika pagarinājumā Šveicei katru gadu būs jāsniedz finansiāls ieguldījums tādā pašā apmērā, kāds tai noteikts par 2013. gadu.Šo nolīgumu nepagarinās, ja tiks izbeigts vai denonsēts 1999. gada 21. jūnija Nolīgums starp Eiropas Kopienu un tās dalībvalstīm, no vienas puses, un Šveices Konfederāciju, no otras puses, par personu brīvu pārvietošanos.Savienība vai Šveice var denonsēt šo nolīgumu, par savu lēmumu paziņojot otrai Pusei. Nolīgumu pārtrauc piemērot, sākot no finanšu gada, kas seko paziņošanai, ja paziņojums ir sniegts līdz 1. oktobrim. Pretējā gadījumā nolīgumu pārtrauc piemērot, sākot no otrā finanšu gada, kas seko paziņošanai.Projekti un pasākumi, ko finansē finanšu gados pirms tā gada, kurā nolīgumu pārtrauc piemērot, turpinās līdz to noslēgumam atbilstīgi nosacījumiem, kas izklāstīti šajā nolīgumā un tā pielikumos, un saskaņā ar līguma noteikumiem, ko piemēro šiem projektiem un pasākumiem. Puses, abpusēji vienojoties, risina visas citas iespējamās denonsēšanas izraisītās problēmas.4. pantsKomisijas pārstāvji un valsts iestādes pārstāvji, kuri nozīmēti par novērotājiem programmu komiteju sanāksmēs, vajadzības gadījumā pēc viena pārstāvja pieprasījuma apspriežas par pasākumiem, uz kuriem attiecas šis nolīgums. Pēc šīs apspriešanās Apvienotā komiteja, kura izveidota saskaņā ar 1999. gada 21. jūnija Nolīgumu starp Eiropas Kopienu un tās dalībvalstīm, no vienas puses, un Šveices Konfederāciju, no otras puses, par personu brīvu pārvietošanos, ir tiesīga grozīt šā nolīguma pielikumus, parasti ar rakstisko procedūru, ja tas ir nepieciešams, lai ievērotu programmām piemērojamos noteikumus vai lai ievērotu Šveices absorbcijas spēju izmaiņas. Pielikumu grozījumi stājas spēkā nākamajā dienā pēc tam, kad Apvienotā komiteja ir pieņēmusi attiecīgo lēmumu. Turpretim, ja Puses vienojas par jebkurām izmaiņām šā nolīguma noteikumos, tie stājas spēkā pēc tam, kad pabeigtas attiecīgās iekšējās procedūras.5. pantsPuses šo nolīgumu ratificē vai noslēdz atbilstīgi to attiecīgajām iekšējām procedūrām. Nolīgums stājas spēkā otrā mēneša pirmajā dienā pēc pēdējā paziņojuma starp Pusēm par attiecīgo procedūru pabeigšanu.Kamēr nav pabeigtas pirmajā daļā minētās procedūras, Puses šo nolīgumu piemēro provizoriski pasākumiem, ko finansē no tā gada Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta, kurš seko parakstīšanai, un ne agrāk kā no 2011. gada budžeta, ar noteikumu, ka ir izpildīti nosacījumi, kas minēti I pielikuma 2. punktā.Ja viena Puse paziņo otrai, ka tā neratificēs vai neslēgs parakstīto nolīgumu, provizorisko piemērošanu pārtrauc, sākot no finanšu gada, kas seko paziņošanai. Paziņojums, ar ko pārtrauc provizorisko piemērošanu, neietekmē Pušu pienākumus attiecībā uz projektiem un pasākumiem, ko finansē no paziņošanas gada Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta, ne arī Šveices finansiālo ieguldījumu par gadu, kurā izdarīts paziņojums.6. pantsŠo nolīgumu sagatavo divos eksemplāros angļu, bulgāru, čehu, dāņu, franču, grieķu, holandiešu, igauņu, itāļu, latviešu, lietuviešu, maltiešu, poļu, portugāļu, rumāņu, slovāku, slovēņu, somu, spāņu, ungāru, vācu un zviedru valodā, un visi šie teksti ir vienlīdz autentiski.Съставено в Брюксел на петнайсети февруари две хиляди и десета година.Hecho en Bruselas, el quince de febrero de dos mil diez.V Bruselu dne patnáctého února dva tisíce deset.Udfærdiget i Bruxelles den femtende februar to tusind og ti.Geschehen zu Brüssel am fünfzehnten Februar zweitausendzehn.Kahe tuhande kümnenda aasta veebruarikuu viieteistkümnendal päeval Brüsselis.Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις δέκα πέντε Φεβρουαρίου δύο χιλιάδες δέκα.Done at Brussels on the fifteenth day of February in the year two thousand and ten.Fait à Bruxelles, le quinze février deux mille dix.Fatto a Bruxelles, addì quindici febbraio duemiladieci.Briselē, divi tūkstoši desmitā gada piecpadsmitajā februārī.Priimta du tūkstančiai dešimtų metų vasario penkioliktą dieną Briuselyje.Kelt Brüsszelben, a kétezer-tizedik év február havának tizenötödik napján.Magħmul fi Brussell, fil- ħmistax-il jum ta’ Frar tas-sena elfejn u għaxra.Gedaan te Brussel, de vijftiende februari tweeduizend tien.Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia piętnastego lutego roku dwa tysiące dziesiątego.Feito em Bruxelas, em quinze de Fevereiro de dois mil e dez.Întocmit la Bruxelles, la cincisprezece februarie două mii zece.V Bruseli dňa pätnásteho februára dvetisícdesať.V Bruslju, dne petnajstega februarja leta dva tisoč deset.Tehty Brysselissä viidentenätoista päivänä helmikuuta vuonna kaksituhattakymmenen.Som skedde i Bryssel den femtonde februari tjugohundratio.За Европейския съюзPor la Unión EuropeaZa Evropskou uniiFor Den Europæiske UnionFür die Europäische UnionEuroopa Liidu nimelΓια την Ευρωπαϊκή ΈνωσηFor the European UnionPour l'Union européennePer l'Unione europeaEiropas Savienības vārdāEuropos Sajungos varduAz Európai Unió részérőlGħall-Unjoni EwropeaVoor de Europese UnieW imieniu Unii EuropejskiejPela União EuropeiaPentru Uniunea EuropeanăZa Európsku úniuZa Evropsko unijoEuroopan unionin puolestaFör Europeiska unionen+++++ TIFF +++++За Конфедерация ШвейцарияPor la Confederación SuizaZa Švýcarskou konfederaciFor Det Schweiziske ForbundFür die Schweizerische EidgenossenschaftŠveitsi Konföderatsiooni nimelΓια την Ελβετική ΣυνομοσπονδίαFor the Swiss ConfederationPour la Confédération suissePer la Confederazione svizzeraŠveices Konfederācijas vārdāŠveicarijos Konfederacijos varduA Svájci Államszövetség részérőlGħall-Konfederazzjoni ŻvizzeraVoor de Zwitserse BondsstaatW imieniu Konfederacji SzwajcarskiejPela Confederação SuíçaPentru Confederația ElvețianăZa Švajčiarskou konfederáciuZa Švicarsko konfederacijoSveitsin valaliiton puolestaFör Schweiziska edsförbundet+++++ TIFF +++++[1] OV L 327, 24.11.2006., 30. lpp.[2] OV L 327, 24.11.2006., 45. lpp.--------------------------------------------------I PIELIKUMSNoteikumi Šveices līdzdalībai programmā "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā1. Šveice piedalās programmā "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā (turpmāk "programmas") un, ja vien šajā nolīgumā nav paredzēts citādi, dara to, ievērojot mērķus, kritērijus, procedūras un termiņus, kas noteikti Lēmumā Nr. 1719/2006/EK un Lēmumā Nr. 1720/2006/EK.2. Ievērojot Lēmuma Nr. 1719/2006/EK 8. panta un Lēmuma Nr. 1720/2006/EK 6. panta noteikumus un saskaņā ar Komisijas lēmumiem par dalībvalstu, Komisijas un valsts aģentūru attiecīgajiem pienākumiem, īstenojot programmas, Šveice:- apņemas izveidot vai iecelt un uzraudzīt piemērotu struktūru (Šveices valsts aģentūru), lai nodrošinātu no programmām izrietošo darbību īstenošanas saskaņotu pārvaldību valsts mērogā,- uzņemas atbildību par to, lai Šveices valsts aģentūra pareizi apsaimniekotu tai nodotās apropriācijas, ko piešķir kā atbalstu projektiem, kā arī- īsteno pasākumus, kas pienācīgi garantē piemērotu finansēšanu, revīziju un finanšu uzraudzību Šveices valsts aģentūrā, kura no Komisijas saņem ieguldījumu pārvaldības un īstenošanas izmaksām.Šveice īsteno visus citus pasākumus, kas nepieciešami programmu sekmīgai darbībai valsts mērogā.3. Lai varētu piedalīties programmās, Šveice katru gadu veic finansiālo ieguldījumu Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžetā saskaņā ar kārtību, kas paredzēta II pielikumā.4. Noteikumi Šveices iestāžu, organizāciju un personu, kas ir tiesīgas piedalīties programmā, kandidatūru iesniegšanai, novērtēšanai un atlasei ir tādi paši, kādus piemēro Savienības iestādēm, organizācijām un personām, kas ir tiesīgas piedalīties programmā.5. Lai nodrošinātu programmām Savienības dimensiju un iegūtu tiesības saņemt Savienības finansiālo atbalstu, projektos un pasākumos būs jāiesaista vismaz viens partneris no kādas Savienības dalībvalsts.6. Šā pielikuma 3. punktā minētajam Šveices finansiālajam ieguldījumam procentuālā izteiksmē, ko piešķirs darbībām, kuras saskaņā ar programmu noteikumiem jāpārvalda Šveices valsts aģentūrai, jāatspoguļo šo darbību daļa programmu budžetā Savienības mērogā. Atbalstu Šveices valsts aģentūras izmaksām par programmu pārvaldību un īstenošanu aprēķina, piemērojot tos pašus kritērijus, ko piemēro Savienības dalībvalstīm.7. Saskaņā ar spēkā esošajiem noteikumiem Savienības dalībvalstis un Šveice dara visu, lai atvieglotu pārvietošanos un uzturēšanos studentiem, skolotājiem, praktikantiem, pasniedzējiem, universitāšu administratīvajam personālam, jauniešiem un citām attiecīgām personām, kuras pārvietojas starp Šveici un Savienības dalībvalstīm, lai piedalītos pasākumos, uz kuriem attiecas šis nolīgums.8. Neskarot Komisijas un Eiropas Savienības Revīzijas palātas pienākumus attiecībā uz programmu uzraudzību un novērtēšanu, Šveices piedalīšanos programmās nepārtraukti uzrauga, sadarbojoties Komisijai un Šveicei. Šveice iesniedz Komisijai vajadzīgos ziņojumus, un to var iesaistīt citos īpašos pasākumos, kurus šajā nolūkā pieņēmusi Savienība.Komisijas lēmumus par dalībvalstu, Komisijas un valsts aģentūru attiecīgajiem pienākumiem, īstenojot programmas, kā arī kopīgos standartus, kas noteikti valsts aģentūrām paredzētajā rokasgrāmatā, kuru pievienos līgumiem starp Komisiju un Šveices valsts aģentūru, piemēro attiecībām starp Šveici, Komisiju un Šveices valsts aģentūru.Komisijas un Šveices valsts aģentūras vai Šveices saņēmēju, kā arī Šveices valsts aģentūras un Šveices saņēmēju noslēgto līgumu pamatā ir attiecīgie noteikumi Finanšu regulā, ko piemēro Eiropas Savienības vispārējam budžetam, un tās īstenošanas kārtībā, jo īpaši līgumu piešķiršanas un noslēgšanas jomā. Šos noteikumus Šveices dalībniekiem piemēro tāpat kā visiem programmu dalībniekiem.Papildu noteikumi par finanšu kontroli, atgūšanu un citiem krāpšanas apkarošanas pasākumiem ir noteikti III pielikumā.Ja Šveices valsts aģentūras pārkāpumu, nolaidības vai krāpniecības gadījumā Komisija nevar pilnībā atgūt līdzekļus, kas tai pienākas no Šveices valsts aģentūras, atbildību par neatgūtajiem līdzekļiem uzņemas Šveices iestādes.9. Jebkura saziņa ar Komisiju attiecībā uz pieteikumu iesniegšanas procesu, līgumiem, iesniedzamajiem ziņojumiem un citiem programmas administratīvajiem aspektiem notiek kādā no Savienības iestāžu oficiālajām valodām.--------------------------------------------------II PIELIKUMSŠveices finansiālais ieguldījums programmā "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā1. Jaunatne darbībāLai varētu piedalīties programmā "Jaunatne darbībā", Šveices finansiālais ieguldījums Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžetā ir šāds (miljonos euro):2011. gads | 2012. gads | 2013. gads |1,7 | 1,8 | 1,9 |2. Rīcības programma mūžizglītības jomāLai varētu piedalīties rīcības programmā mūžizglītības jomā, Šveices finansiālais ieguldījums Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžetā ir šāds (miljonos euro):2011. gads | 2012. gads | 2013. gads |14,2 | 14,9 | 15,6 |3. Ceļa un uzturēšanās izdevumus, kas radušies Šveices pārstāvjiem un ekspertiem, kuri kā novērotāji piedalās Lēmuma Nr. 1719/2006/EK 9. pantā un Lēmuma Nr. 1720/2006/EK 10. pantā minēto komiteju darbā vai citās sanāksmēs saistībā ar programmu īstenošanu, Komisija atmaksā ar tādu pašu pamatojumu un saskaņā ar tādām pašām procedūrām, kādas ir spēkā attiecībā uz Savienības dalībvalstu pārstāvjiem un ekspertiem.4. Pēc šā nolīguma stāšanās spēkā vai pēc tam, kad uzsākta šā nolīguma provizoriska piemērošana, un katra nākamā gada sākumā Komisija nosūta Šveicei pieprasījumu iemaksāt budžetā līdzekļus, kas atbilst ieguldījumam katrai no programmām, uz kurām attiecas šis nolīgums.Šveices finansiālo ieguldījumu izsaka un maksā euro.Ja Šveice Komisijas pieprasījumu veikt ieguldījumu saņem pirms 1. februāra, tai ieguldījums jāveic pirms 1. marta vai ne vēlāk kā 30 dienas pēc tam, kad saņemts pieprasījums iemaksāt līdzekļus, ja tas ir saņemts pēc 1. februāra.Par jebkuru maksājuma kavējumu no dienas, kad beidzies iemaksas termiņš, Šveice maksā procentus par nenomaksāto summu. Šo procentu likme ir Eiropas Savienības Oficiālā Vēstneša C sērijā publicētā likme, kuru Eiropas Centrālā banka piemēro refinansēšanas pamatoperācijām un kura ir spēkā maksājuma termiņa mēneša pirmajā kalendārajā dienā, pieskaitot trīsarpus procentu punktus.--------------------------------------------------III PIELIKUMSFINANŠU KONTROLE, ATGŪŠANA UN CITI KRĀPŠANAS APKAROŠANAS PASĀKUMII. Revīzija un krāpšanas apkarošanas pasākumi, ko īsteno Savienība1. Komisija tieši sazinās ar Šveicē reģistrētiem programmu dalībniekiem un to apakšuzņēmējiem. Tie var Komisijai tieši iesniegt jebkuru attiecīgo informāciju un dokumentāciju, kas tiem jāiesniedz, pamatojoties uz šajā nolīgumā minētajiem instrumentiem un uz līgumiem, kas noslēgti, piemērojot tos.2. Saskaņā ar Padomes Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 ( 2002. gada 25. jūnijs) par Finanšu regulu, ko piemēro Eiropas Kopienu vispārējam budžetam [1], kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1995/2006 ( 2006. gada 13. decembris) [2], un saskaņā ar Komisijas Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002 ( 2002. gada 23. decembris), ar ko paredz īstenošanas kārtību Padomes Regulai (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 par Finanšu regulu, ko piemēro Eiropas Kopienu vispārējam budžetam [3], kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 478/2007 ( 2007. gada 23. aprīlis) [4], kā arī saskaņā ar citiem šajā nolīgumā minētajiem noteikumiem ar Šveicē reģistrētiem programmu finansējuma saņēmējiem noslēgtajos dotāciju nolīgumos paredz, ka Komisijas darbinieki vai citas Komisijas pilnvarotas personas jebkurā laikā programmu finansējuma saņēmēju un to apakšuzņēmēju telpās var veikt finanšu un citu darbību revīzijas.Šveices valsts aģentūras kontus un darbības pārbauda Komisijas darbinieki vai citas Komisijas pilnvarotas personas. Šīs pārbaudes var attiecināt arī uz Šveices izveidotās struktūras spēju piemērot šajā nolīgumā minētos programmu noteikumus un spēju īstenot pareizu finanšu vadību saskaņā ar kritērijiem attiecīgajos pantos Regulā (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002, kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1995/2006 ( 2006. gada 13. decembris), un Regulā (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002, kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 478/2007 ( 2007. gada 23. aprīlis).3. Komisijas darbinieki un citas Komisijas pilnvarotas personas var attiecīgi piekļūt vietām, darbiem un dokumentiem, kā arī visai informācijai, tostarp elektroniskā formātā, kas ir vajadzīga, lai veiktu šādas revīzijas. Šīs piekļuves tiesības skaidri norāda līgumos, ko noslēdz, piemērojot šajā nolīgumā minētos instrumentus. Eiropas Revīzijas palātai ir tādas pašas tiesības kā Komisijai.Revīziju var veikt pēc programmu vai šā nolīguma termiņa beigām saskaņā ar attiecīgajos līgumos paredzētajiem noteikumiem.4. Saskaņā ar šo nolīgumu Komisija/Eiropas Birojs krāpšanas apkarošanai (OLAF) ir pilnvarota/pilnvarots veikt pārbaudes un inspekcijas uz vietas Šveices teritorijā atbilstīgi reglamentam, kas noteikts Padomes Regulā (Euratom, EK) Nr. 2185/96 ( 1996. gada 11. novembris) par pārbaudēm un apskatēm uz vietas, ko Komisija veic, lai aizsargātu Eiropas Kopienu finanšu intereses pret krāpšanu un citām nelikumībām [5].Pārbaudes un inspekcijas sagatavo un veic ciešā sadarbībā ar Šveices valdības izraudzītām Šveices kompetentajām iestādēm, kurām laicīgi paziņo par pārbaužu un inspekciju objektu, mērķi un juridisko pamatojumu, lai tās varētu sniegt visu vajadzīgo palīdzību.Ja attiecīgās Šveices iestādes vēlas, tās var piedalīties pārbaudēs un inspekcijās uz vietas.Ja programmu dalībnieki pretojas pārbaudei vai inspekcijai uz vietas, Šveices iestādes saskaņā ar valsts tiesību normām sniedz Komisijas/OLAF inspektoriem vajadzīgo palīdzību, lai tie varētu izpildīt savu uzdevumu veikt pārbaudi vai inspekciju uz vietas.Komisija/OLAF Šveices iestādes nekavējoties informē par visiem faktiem, kuri norāda uz iespējamiem pārkāpumiem un par kuriem tai/tam ziņots pārbaudes vai inspekcijas uz vietas gaitā. Komisija/OLAF jebkurā gadījumā iepriekšminēto iestādi informē par šādu pārbaužu un inspekciju iznākumu.II. Revīzija un krāpšanas apkarošanas pasākumi, ko īsteno Šveice1. Šveices kompetentā valsts finanšu kontroles iestāde veic atbilstīgu programmu īstenošanas finanšu kontroli saskaņā ar 8. pantu Komisijas lēmumos par dalībvalstu, Komisijas un valsts aģentūru attiecīgajiem pienākumiem, īstenojot programmu "Jaunatne darbībā" un mūžizglītības programmu (2007–2013), un saskaņā ar kopīgajiem standartiem, kas noteikti valsts aģentūrām paredzētajā rokasgrāmatā, kura pievienota līgumiem starp Komisiju un Šveices valsts aģentūru. Par visiem iespējamajiem vai faktiskajiem krāpšanas un pārkāpumu gadījumiem, kā arī par visiem ar tiem saistītajiem pasākumiem, ko veic Šveices valsts aģentūra un valsts iestādes, nekavējoties ziņo Komisijas dienestiem. Šveice nodrošina iespējamo un faktisko krāpšanas un pārkāpumu gadījumu izmeklēšanu un atbilstīgas turpmākas darbības pēc valsts vai Savienības pārbaudēm."Pārkāpums" ir Savienības attiecīgo tiesību normu, ko piemēro saskaņā ar šo nolīgumu, vai no šā nolīguma izrietošo līgumsaistību pārkāpums, ko izraisa kāda ekonomikas dalībnieka rīcība vai nolaidība, kas kaitē vai varētu kaitēt Eiropas Savienības vispārējam budžetam vai tās pārvaldītiem budžetiem, veicot nepamatotus izdevumus."Krāpšana" ir tīša darbība vai bezdarbība, kas ir saistīta ar:- kļūdainu, neprecīzu vai nepilnīgu paziņojumu vai dokumentu iesniegšanu vai izmantošanu, kas izraisa nelikumīgu līdzekļu piesavināšanos vai nelikumīgu līdzekļu aizturēšanu no Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta vai budžetiem, ko pārvalda Eiropas Savienība vai kas tiek pārvaldīti Eiropas Savienības vārdā,- informācijas neizpaušanu, ar ko tiek pārkāptas īpašas saistības, kura rada tādas pašas sekas,- līdzekļu nepareizu izmantošanu mērķiem, kuriem šādi līdzekļi sākotnēji nav piešķirti.2. Šveices iestādes veic atbilstīgus pasākumus, lai nepieļautu un apkarotu visu aktīvo vai pasīvo korupciju visos iepirkumu procedūras vai dotāciju piešķiršanas procedūras posmos vai attiecīgo līgumu īstenošanas laikā."Aktīva korupcija" ir kādas personas tīša rīcība, kas piesola vai sniedz tieši vai pastarpināti jebkura veida labumu amatpersonai savās vai kādas trešās personas interesēs, lai šī amatpersona rīkotos vai atturētos no saviem pienākumiem atbilstīgas rīcības, vai arī īstenotu savas funkcijas, pārkāpjot dienesta pienākumus, nodarot vai iespējami nodarot kaitējumu Eiropas Savienības finanšu interesēm."Pasīva korupcija" ir kādas amatpersonas tīša rīcība, kas tieši vai pastarpināti pieprasa vai saņem jebkāda veida labumu sev vai kādai trešai personai vai akceptē šāda labuma apsolījumu, lai rīkotos vai atturētos no saviem pienākumiem atbilstīgas rīcības, vai arī īstenotu savas funkcijas, pārkāpjot dienesta pienākumus, nodarot vai iespējami nodarot kaitējumu Eiropas Savienības finanšu interesēm.3. Šveices iestādes un darbinieki, kas ir atbildīgi par programmu īstenošanas darbībām, veic visus piesardzības pasākumus, lai izvairītos no interešu konflikta, un nekavējoties informē Komisiju par šāda interešu konflikta vai situācijas, kas varētu radīt interešu konfliktu, rašanos.III. KonfidencialitāteUz paziņoto vai citādi saskaņā ar šo pielikumu iegūto informāciju attiecas pienākums glabāt dienesta noslēpumu, un tā aizsargājama tāpat, kā tamlīdzīgu informāciju aizsargā Šveices tiesību akti un atbilstīgie Savienības iestādēm piemērojamie noteikumi. Šādu informāciju var paziņot tikai tām personām Savienības iestādēs, dalībvalstīs vai Šveicē, kurām tā ir jāzina amata pienākumu veikšanai, un to nedrīkst izmantot citiem mērķiem, kā vien lai nodrošinātu Pušu finansiālo interešu efektīvu aizsardzību.IV. Administratīvie pasākumi un sankcijasNeskarot Šveices krimināllikuma piemērošanu, Komisija var noteikt administratīvos pasākumus un sankcijas saskaņā ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002, kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1995/2006 ( 2006. gada 13. decembris), un Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002, kurā jaunākie grozījumi izdarīti ar Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 478/2007 ( 2007. gada 23. aprīlis), kā arī saskaņā ar Padomes Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2988/95 ( 1995. gada 18. decembris) par Eiropas Kopienu finanšu interešu aizsardzību [6].V. AtgūšanaAttiecībā uz netiešām centralizētās pārvaldības darbībām Šveices valsts aģentūras pienākums ir izsniegt pieprasījumus līdzekļu atgūšanai un īstenot jebkādas nepieciešamās tiesiskās darbības pret saņēmējiem, apspriežoties ar Komisiju. Šveices valsts aģentūrai piedēvējamu pārkāpumu, nolaidības vai krāpniecības gadījumā par neatgūtajiem līdzekļiem ir atbildīgas Šveices iestādes.Attiecībā uz Komisijas veiktām tiešām centralizētās pārvaldības darbībām Komisijas lēmumi, kas pieņemti saskaņā ar šo nolīgumu un kas uzliek finansiālas saistības tiesību subjektiem, kuri nav valstis, ir izpildāmi Šveicē. Izpildi reglamentē civilprocesa normas, kas ir spēkā Šveicē. Izpildes rīkojumu pievieno lēmumam, un vienīgā formalitāte ir lēmuma autentiskuma pārbaude, ko veic iestāde, kuru Šveices valdība izraudzījusi šim nolūkam, informējot par to Komisiju. Kad pēc Komisijas lūguma šīs formalitātes ir izpildītas, tā var uzsākt izpildi saskaņā ar attiecīgās valsts tiesību aktiem, vēršoties tieši kompetentajā iestādē. Eiropas Savienības Tiesa kontrolē Komisijas lēmuma likumību.Eiropas Savienības Tiesas spriedumi saskaņā ar šķīrējklauzulu līgumā, kas noslēgts atbilstīgi šā nolīguma darbības jomai, izpildāmi ar tādiem pašiem noteikumiem.[1] OV L 248, 16.9.2002., 1. lpp.[2] OV L 390, 30.12.2006., 1. lpp.[3] OV L 357, 31.12.2002., 1. lpp.[4] OV L 111, 28.4.2007., 13. lpp.[5] OV L 292, 15.11.1996., 2. lpp.[6] OV L 312, 23.12.1995., 1. lpp.--------------------------------------------------PADOMES DEKLARĀCIJA PAR ŠVEICES LĪDZDALĪBU KOMITEJĀSPadome vienojas, ka Šveices pārstāvji piedalās novērotāju statusā programmas "Jaunatne darbībā" un rīcības programmas mūžizglītības jomā (2007–2013) komiteju sanāksmēs, lai izskatītu jautājumus, kas attiecas uz Šveici. Šveices pārstāvji nedrīkst būt klāt, kad šajās komitejās notiek balsošana.--------------------------------------------------


text:
 28.8.2014
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 L 256/22
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉNS BESLUT
 nr 45/2014
 av den 8 april 2014
 om ändring av bilaga II (Tekniska föreskrifter, standarder, provning och certifiering) till EES-avtalet
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT
 med beaktande av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet (nedan kallat EES-avtalet), särskilt artikel 98, och
 av följande skäl:
 (1)
 Kommissionens förordning (EU) nr 758/2013 av den 7 augusti 2013 om rättelse av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1272/2008 om klassificering, märkning och förpackning av ämnen och blandningar (1) bör införlivas med EES-avtalet.
 (2)
 Kommissionens förordning (EU) nr 944/2013 av den 2 oktober 2013 om ändring, för anpassning till den tekniska och vetenskapliga utvecklingen, av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1272/2008 om klassificering, märkning och förpackning av ämnen och blandningar (2) bör införlivas med EES-avtalet.
 (3)
 Bilaga II till EES-avtalet bör därför ändras i enlighet med detta.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Följande strecksatser ska läggas till i kapitel XV punkt 12zze (Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1272/2008) i bilaga II till EES-avtalet:
 ”—
 32013 R 0758: Kommissionens förordning (EU) nr 758/2013 av den 7 augusti 2013 (EUT L 216, 10.8.2013, s. 1)
 —
 32013 R 0944: Kommissionens förordning (EU) nr 944/2013 av den 2 oktober 2013 (EUT L 261, 3.10.2013, s. 5)”.
 Artikel 2
 Texterna till förordningarna (EU) nr 758/2013 och (EU) nr 944/2013 på isländska och norska, som ska offentliggöras i EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning, ska vara giltiga.
 Artikel 3
 Detta beslut träder i kraft den 9 april 2014 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i EES-avtalet har gjorts (3).
 Artikel 4
 Detta beslut ska offentliggöras i EES-delen av och EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den 8 april 2014.
 På gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnar
 Gianluca GRIPPA
 Ordförande
 (1) EUT L 216, 10.8.2013, s. 1.
 (2) EUT L 261, 3.10.2013, s. 5.
 (3) Inga konstitutionella krav angivna.


text:
De koperwiek (Turdus iliacus) is een zangvogel uit de familie lijsters (Turdidae). De wetenschappelijke naam van de soort werd in 1758 gepubliceerd door Carl Linnaeus.
 Kenmerken
 De koperwiek is een kleine lijster, met een opvallende wenkbrauwstreep en opvallende roestbruin/oranje flanken en oksels. De soort is vaak te horen tijdens de trek in oktober/november, als ze 's nachts in grote groepen over de Lage Landen trekken.
 Koperwieken zijn vaak te zien in gezelschap van andere lijsters, meestal kramsvogels. Koperwieken zijn wat kleiner dan kramsvogels en hebben een donkere oogstreep, met daarboven een scherp afgetekende witte wenkbrauwstreep. De ondervleugels zijn 'kopergekleurd'. Kramsvogels zijn groter, hebben een grijze kop en grijze stuit, een erg vage wenkbrauwstreep, en witte ondervleugels en oksels. Het geluid van beide is ook anders. Koperwieken maken een hoog langgerekt 'tjiehhh' geluid.
 Verspreiding en leefgebied
 In Noord-Europa is de koperwiek een talrijke broedvogel van naald- en berkenbossen. In de winter trekken ze, meestal 's nachts, naar het zuidwesten. Veel koperwieken blijven in Nederland overwinteren. Wanneer de winter te koud wordt, verlaten ze het land weer en trekken verder naar het zuiden, of verplaatsen ze zich naar de stad, waar het warmer is.
 Koperwieken komen in Nederland en België alleen om te overwinteren. Broeden doen ze in het hoge noorden.
 De soort telt 2 ondersoorten:
 T. i. coburni (IJslandse koperwiek): IJsland en de Faeröereilanden.
 T. i. iliacus: van noordelijk en oostelijk Europa tot centraal Siberië.
 Wetenschappelijke naam
 In de eerste editie van Fauna svecica, van 1746, maakte Linnaeus nog geen onderscheid tussen de koperwiek en de zanglijster, hoewel bij diverse auteurs van vóór 1758 de naam "iliacus" al werd gebruikt voor de koperwiek, en de naam "musicus" voor de zanglijster. Bij Linnaeus waren in 1746 onder de naam Turdus musicus een beschrijving en verschillende referenties te vinden waarin de twee soorten samen als één soort werden opgevat. In de tiende druk van Systema naturae, van 1758, maakte Linnaeus het onderscheid wél, maar verwarde de beide soorten. Onder Turdus iliacus gaf hij een beschrijving van de zanglijster, maar referenties voor de koperwiek; onder Turdus musicus gaf hij een beschrijving van de koperwiek, maar referenties voor de zanglijster. In de twaalfde editie was de verwarring grotendeels opgelost, en werden onder de naam Turdus iliacus een adequate beschrijving en diverse correcte referenties naar andere auteurs gegeven die allemaal betrekking hadden op de koperwiek.
 In 1909 stelde de Duitse ornitholoog Ernst Hartert voor om de namen iliacus en musicus op basis van de beschrijvingen in de tiende druk van Systema naturae te gaan gebruiken, en dus de twee namen te verwisselen. Die suggestie werd maar door een deel van de ornithologen opgevolgd. Voor de zanglijster raakte vanaf dat moment de naam Turdus philomelos , 1831 in zwang. Die naam werd in 1956 door de International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature op de Official List of Specific Names in Zoology geplaatsen.
 Over de naam van de koperwiek bestond echter, door Harterts voorstel, nog steeds verwarring, en daarom deden Ernst Mayr en Charles Vaurie in 1957 een beroep op dezelfde commissie om de naam Turdus musicus te onderdrukken en een neotype aan te wijzen voor Turdus iliacus. In 1959 wees de commissie het verzoek volledig toe. Daarmee is Turdus musicus geen beschikbare naam meer.
 De wetenschappelijke naam van de koperwiek wordt, vanwege de verwisseling van naam en beschrijving door Linnaeus in 1758, regelmatig geciteerd als Turdus iliacus , 1766. Met de aanwijzing van een neotype is de naam uit 1758 echter gefixeerd. Hij staat bovendien met dat oudste jaartal op de Official List of Specific Names in Zoology; citeren van het jaartal 1766 is dus onjuist.
 Status
 De koperwiek heeft een beperkt broedgebied en daardoor is er de kans op uitsterven. De grootte van de populatie werd in 2015 door BirdLife International geschat op tientallen miljoenen individuen, maar de aantallen nemen af. Om deze redenen staat deze soort sinds 2015 als gevoelig op de Rode Lijst van de IUCN.
 Zie ook
 Echte lijsters
 Lijsters
 Externe links
 SoortenBank.nl beschrijving, afbeeldingen en geluid
 Echte lijsters
 Dier uit het Palearctisch gebied
 Dier uit het Nearctisch gebied
 IUCN-status gevoelig