text:
 9.2.2008
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 37/24
 Tožba, vložena 26. novembra 2007 – Gebr. Heller Maschinenfabrik proti UUNT – Fernández Martinez (HELLER)
 (Zadeva T-431/07)
 (2008/C 37/38)
 Jezik, v katerem je bila tožba vložena: nemščina
 Stranke
 Tožeča stranka: Gebr. Heller Maschinenfabrik GmbH (Nürtingen, Nemčija) (zastopnika: W. Kessler in S. Baur, odvetnika)
 Tožena stranka: Urad za usklajevanje na notranjem trgu (znamke in modeli)
 Druga stranka pred odborom za pritožbe: Manuel Fernández Martinez (Alicante, Španija)
 Predlogi tožeče stranke
 —
 naj se razveljavi odločba drugega odbora za pritožbe UUNT z dne 11. septembra 2007 v zadevi R 974/2006-2;
 —
 naj se zavrne ugovor ugovarjajoče stranke Manuela Fernándeza Martineza pred drugim odborom za pritožbe;
 —
 naj se plačilo vseh stroškov in taks postopka pred oddelkom za ugovore in odborom za pritožbe UUNT ter tega postopka naloži ugovarjajoči stranki Manuelu Fernándezu Martinezu.
 Tožbeni razlogi in bistvene trditve
 Prijavitelj znamke Skupnosti: Tožeča stranka.
 Zadevna znamka Skupnosti: Besedna znamka HELLER za proizvode in storitve iz razredov 7, 37 in 40 (prijava št. 3 306 602).
 Imetnik znamke ali znaka, navajanega v postopku z ugovorom: Manuel Fernández Martinez.
 Znamka ali znak, navajan v postopku z ugovorom: Španska figurativna znamka „HELLER“ za proizvode iz razreda 7 (št. 2 520 584).
 Odločba oddelka za ugovore: Ugoditev ugovoru in zavrnitev prijave.
 Odločba odbora za pritožbe: Zavrnitev pritožbe.
 Navajani tožbeni razlogi: Kršitev člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe (ES) št. 40/94 (1), saj med spornima znamkama ni verjetnosti zmede.
 (1) Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 40/94 z dne 20. decembra 1993 o znamki Skupnosti (UL L 11, str. 1).


type: other

text:
Čiastkový základ dane z ostatných príjmov | SZČO online
 Čiastkový základ dane z ostatných príjmov
 28.6.2018, prof. Ing. Anna Baštincová CSc., Ing. Viera Mezeiová, Zdroj: Verlag Dashöfer
 4.5.4 Čiastkový základ dane z ostatných príjmov
 prof. Ing. Anna Baštincová CSc., Ing. Viera Mezeiová
 Za ostatné príjmy sa považujú také príjmy, ktoré majú náhodný, príležitostný alebo jednorazový charakter a nepatria medzi príjmy podľa § 5 až § 7 zákona č. 595/2003 Z.z. o dani z príjmov v zn.n.p. (ZDP). Ostatné príjmy z dôvodu ich rôznorodosti nie je možné vymedziť presne a vyčerpávajúcim spôsobom.
 Podľa § 8 ZDP medzi ostatné príjmy patria najmä:
 1. príjmy z príležitostných činností vrátane príjmov z príležitostnej poľnohospodárskej výroby, lesného a vodného hospodárstva a z príležitostného prenájmu hnuteľných vecí,
 2. príjmy z prevodu vlastníctva nehnuteľností,
 3. príjmy z predaja hnuteľných vecí,
 4. príjmy z prevodu opcií,
 5. príjmy z prevodu účasti (podielu) na spoločnosti s ručením obmedzeným, komanditnej spoločnosti alebo z prevodu členských práv družstva,
 6. príjmy zo zdedených práv z priemyselného a iného duševného vlastníctva vrátane autorských práv a práv príbuzných autorskému právu,
 7. dôchodky a podobné opakujúce sa pôžitky,
 8. výhry v lotériách a iných podobných hrách a výhry z reklamných súťaží a žrebovaní,
 9. ceny z verejných súťaží, ceny zo súťaží, v ktorých je okruh súťažiacich obmedzený podmienkami súťaže alebo ak ide o súťažiacich vybratých usporiadateľom súťaže a ceny zo športových súťaží (ak nejde o športovú činnosť vykonávanú v rámci inej samostatnej zárobkovej činnosti – § 6 ods. 2 písm. b),
 10. príjmy z derivátových operácií.
 Medzi príjmy z príležitostných činností vrátane príjmov z príležitostnej poľnohospodárskej výroby, lesného a vodného hospodárstva (ad a) možno zaradiť napr. príjmy z príležitostného predaja lesných produktov, húb, liečivých rastlín, za predaj výrobkov z vlastnej drobnej pestovateľskej a chovateľskej činnosti (ak ju nevykonáva samostatne hospodáriaci roľník na základe osvedčenia sústavne v rámci podnikania). Za príjem z príležitostnej činnosti sa podľa tohto ustanovenia sa príjem dosahovaný z činnosti vykonávanej na základe zmluvného vzťahu, ak vyplácajúci daňovník, ktorý je právnickou osobou alebo fyzickou osobou s príjmami podľa § 6 ZDP, môže znížiť základ dane podľa § 17 až 29 ZDP o odmenu vyplatenú na základe dokladu spĺňajúceho náležitosti účtovného dokladu.
 Medzi príjmy z príležitostného prenájmu hnuteľných vecí patrí napr. príjem za prenájom motorového vozidla, prívesu, kosačky, elektrickej píly, počítača [nie sústavný prenájom hnuteľných vecí, ktorý možno vykonávať len na základe živnostenského oprávnenia - išlo by o príjem z podnikania § 6 ods. 1 písm. b)ZDP].
 Do základu dane (čiastkového základu dane) sa zahŕňajú uvedené druhy príjmov znížené o výdavky preukázateľne vynaložené na ich dosiahnutie. Ak sú výdavky spojené s jednotlivým druhom príjmu vyššie ako príjmy, na rozdiel sa neprihliada (nemožno z nich vykázať stratu).
 Daňovník si môže pri príjmoch z príležitostnej poľnohospodárskej výroby, lesného a vodného hospodárstva uplatniť výdavky vo výške 25 % z týchto príjmov najviac do výšky 5 040 eur ročne, ak neuplatní výdavky preukázateľne vynaložené na dosiahnutie príjmov. Uplatnenie výdavkov uvedeným percentom z príjmov sa nevzťahuje na príjmy z príležitostného prenájmu hnuteľných vecí. Z uvedeného vyplýva, že pri určení čiastkového základu dane z týchto príjmov je možné uplatniť iba výdavky preukázateľne vynaložené na dosiahnutie príjmov a to najviac do výšky jednotlivého druhu príjmu, t. j. príjmov uvádzaných v jednotlivých písmenách § 8 ods. 1 ZDP.
 Medzi príjmy z prevodu nehnuteľností (ad b) patria napr. príjmy z predaja bytu, obytného domu, pozemku. Príjem z predaja nehnuteľnosti sa zahrnie do základu dane (čiastkového základu dane) v tom zdaňovacom období, v ktorom ho daňovník prijal, bez ohľadu na to, v ktorom zdaňovacom období nadobudol vlastnícke právo k nehnuteľnosti kupujúci.
 Príjmy z predaja hnuteľných vecí (ad c) sú od dane z príjmov oslobodené.Za hnuteľnú vec sa nepovažuje cenný papier. Výnimkou je príjem z predaja hnuteľnej veci, ktorá bola zahrnutá do obchodného majetku - tento príjem je súčasťou čiastkového základu dane, ak podnikateľ hnuteľnú vec predá do 5 rokov od jej vyradenia z obchodného majetku.
 Pri určení základu dane (čiastkového základu dane) z príjmov z predaja nehnuteľností, hnuteľných vecí, cenných papierov, príjmov z prevodu opcií a obchodných podielov (písm. b, c, d, e) je daňovým výdavkom cena, za ktorú daňovník vec preukázateľne nadobudol. Pri príjmoch z predaja uvedených druhov majetku je daňovým výdavkom (§ 8 ods. 5 ZDP) kúpna cena preukázateľne zaplatená za vec, cenný papier, opciu, zostatková cena pri odpisovanom majetku zahrnutom v obchodnom majetku, finančné prostriedky vynaložené preukázateľne na technické zhodnotenie, opravu a údržbu vecí, výdavky preukázateľne vynaložené na obstaranie majetku alebo jeho výrobu vo vlastnej réžii (za výdavok sa neuzná hodnota podnikateľovej vlastnej práce na výrobe alebo zhodnotení danej veci).
 Pri príjmoch z prevodu účasti podielu na spoločnosti s ručením obmedzeným, komanditnej spoločnosti a prevodu členských práv družstva sa za výdavok považuje vklad do obchodnej spoločnosti alebo družstva alebo obstarávacia cena podielu.
 V súvislosti s uvedenými druhmi ostatných príjmov (§ 8 ods. 1 ZDP) je potrebné upozorniť na možnosť ich oslobodenia od dane z príjmov, ak spĺňajú stanovený predpoklad uvedený v§ 9 ods. 1 písm. g) ZDP. Podmienkou je, že úhrn týchto príjmov nepresiahne v zdaňovacom období 500 eur. Ak takto vymedzené príjmy presiahnu 500 eur, do základu dane sa zahrnú len príjmy nad takto ustanovenú sumu. Výdavky k príjmom zahrnovaným do základu dane sa zistia rovnakým pomerom ako je pomer príjmov zahrnovaných do základu dane k celkovým príjmom.
 Podľa § 9 ods. 1 písm. g) ZDP je od dane z príjmov oslobodený úhrn príjmov:
 - z prenájmu (§ 6 ods. 3),
 - z príležitostných činností, poľnohospodárskej výroby (§ 8 ods. 1 písm. a)),
 - z predaja opcií (§ 8 ods. 1 písm. d)),
 - z predaja cenných papierov (§ 8 ods. 1 písm. e)),
 - z prevodu účasti (podielu) na spoločnosti s ručením obmedzeným, komanditnej spoločnosti alebo prevodu členských práv družstva (§ 8 ods. 1 písm. f)) o daňový výdavok (§ 8 ods. 5), ak nepresiahne v zdaňovacom období 500 eur. Ak takto vymedzený rozdiel medzi úhrnom príjmov a úhrnom výdavkov presiahne 500 eur, do základu dane sa zahrnie len rozdiel nad takto ustanovenú sumu.
 P. Majko, ktorý je poberateľom starobného dôchodku, prenajíma garáž. Jeho ročný príjem z prenájmu garáže je 500 eur. Tento príjem je od dane oslobodený, pretože výška príjmu z nájomného (§ 6 ods. 3 ZDP) nepresiahla zákonom stanovenú sumu.
 P. Dobrota mal ročný príjem zo závislej činnosti vo výške 15 000 eur a ročný príjem z prenájmu bytu 4 800 eur (mesačne 400 eur). Výdavky preukázateľne vynaložené na dosiahnutie, zabezpečenie a udržanie príjmov z prenájmu vykázal vo výške 2 400 eur.
 Príjmy z prenájmu bytu je povinný priznať k zdaneniu podaním daňového priznania. V daňovom priznaní uvedie sumu zdaniteľných príjmov zo závislej činnosti a zdaniteľných...


text:
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type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 20.12.2008
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 C 327/11
 Överklagande ingett den 22 september 2008 av Lafarge SA av den dom som förstainstansrätten (tredje avdelningen) meddelade den 8 juli 2008 i mål T-54/03, Lafarge SA mot Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission
 (Mål C-413/08 P)
 (2008/C 327/19)
 Rättegångsspråk: franska
 Parter
 Klagande: Lafarge SA (ombud: A. Winckler, F. Brunet, E. Paroche och H. Kanellopoulos, avocats)
 Övrig part i målet: Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission och Europeiska unionens råd
 Klagandens yrkanden
 Klaganden yrkar att domstolen ska
 —
 upphäva Europeiska gemenskapernas förstainstansrätts dom av den 8 juli 2008 i mål T-54/03 och, med bifall till klagandens yrkanden i första instans och med stöd av artikel 229 i EG-fördraget, artikel 61 i domstolens stadga och artikel 17 i rådets förordning nr 17/62 (1), numera artikel 31 i rådets förordning nr 1/2003 (2), ogiltigförklara kommissionens beslut nr 2005/471/EG av den 27 november 2002 (3), i den del klaganden ålagts böter,
 —
 i andra hand delvis upphäva förstainstansrättens dom av den 8 juli 2008 i mål T-54/03 och, med bifall till klagandens yrkanden i första instans, sätta ned de böter som kommissionen ålagt klaganden i beslut nr 2005/471/EG av den 27 november 2002, och
 —
 förplikta kommissionen att ersätta rättegångskostnaderna.
 Grunder och huvudargument
 Klaganden anför sex grunder till stöd för sitt överklagande.
 Klaganden gör för det första gällande att förstainstansrätten har missuppfattat de faktiska omständigheter som låg till grund för dess bedömning, eftersom den fann att kommissionen rätteligen, som grund för att det förelåg en överträdelse, kunde åberopa ett påstått informationsutbyte som sådant, vilket ledde till begränsningar av konkurrensen och en stabilisering av marknaden för gipsskivor.
 Klaganden gör för det andra gällande att förstainstansrätten har åsidosatt bevisbördereglerna, oskuldspresumtionen och principen in dubio pro reo, eftersom den fann att kommissionen hade visat att klaganden hade deltagit i en enda, komplex och fortgående överträdelse utan att det förelåg bevis för överträdelsen och dess varaktighet.
 För det tredje hävdar klaganden att förstainstansrätten har åsidosatt sin motiveringsskyldighet och principen om likabehandling, eftersom den delade kommissionens inställning att bevisningen var tillräcklig för att styrka att klaganden gjort sig skyldig till en överträdelse, trots att samma bevisning inte hade ansetts tillräcklig för att styrka att ett konkurrerande bolag hade gjort sig skyldig till samma överträdelse.
 Klaganden gör för det fjärde gällande att förstainstansrätten har åsidosatt proportionalitetsprincipen och principen om likabehandling, eftersom den inte ifrågasatte utgångsbeloppet för de böter som klaganden ålagts, vilket kommissionen hade fastställt utan att beakta Lafarges omsättning och Lafarges marknadsandelar i förhållanden till konkurrenternas.
 Klaganden klandrar för det femte förstainstansrätten för att i flera avseenden ha gjort sig skyldig till felaktig rättstillämpning och för att ha åsidosatt sin motiveringsskyldighet, eftersom den fann att kommissionen hade grund för att höja de böter som klaganden ålagts, med hänvisning till att det var fråga om upprepade överträdelser, trots att det inte förelåg någon laglig grund härför och inte heller någon lagakraftvunnen dom som kunde åberopas till stöd för en sådan höjning. Härigenom har förstainstansrätten även åsidosatt den allmänna straffrättsliga legalitetsprincipen samt rättssäkerhetsprincipen och principen om god rättskipning.
 För det sjätte påstår klaganden slutligen att förstainstansrätten har gjort sig skyldig till felaktig rättstillämpning, eftersom den fann att kommissionen hade grund för att höja utgångsbeloppet för böterna, med hänvisning till att denna sanktion ska ha en avskräckande effekt, medan den däremot borde ha beaktat det slutliga bötesbeloppet vid bedömningen av huruvida böterna lämpligen skulle höjas för att uppnå en sådan effekt.
 (1) Rådets förordning nr 17/62 av den 7 februari 1962, Första förordningen om tillämpning av fördragets artiklar 85 och 86 (EGT 1962, 13, s. 204; svensk specialutgåva, område 8, volym 1, s. 8).
 (2) Rådets förordning (EG) nr 1/2003 av den 16 december 2002 om tillämpning av konkurrensreglerna i artiklarna 81 och 82 i fördraget (EGT L 1, 2003, s. 1).
 (3) Kommissionens beslut av den 27 november 2002 i ärende COMP/E-1/37.152, Gipsskivor (EGT L 166, 2005, s. 8).


jurisdiction: US

text: b'Report No. D-2007-033 December 14, 2006\n\n\n\n\n The Requirements Process for the Army\n Multi-Mission Radar and the Marine\n Corps Multi-Role Radar System\n\x0c Additional Copies\n\n To obtain additional copies of this report, visit the Web site of the Department of\n Defense Inspector General at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports or contact the\n Secondary Reports Distribution Unit at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax\n (703) 604-8932.\n\n Suggestions for Future Audits\n\n To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Office of the Deputy\n Inspector General for Auditing at (703) 604-9142 (DSN 664-9142) or fax (703)\n 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:\n\n ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions)\n Department of Defense Inspector General\n 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)\n Arlington, VA 22202-4704\n\n\n\n\nAcronyms\nAMA Analysis of Material Approaches\nAoA Analysis of Alternatives\nDCD Directorate of Combat Development\nFAA Functional Area Analysis\nFNA Functional Needs Analysis\nFSA Functional Solution Analysis\nG/ATOR Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar\nGWLR Ground Weapon Locator Radar\nICD Initial Capabilities Document\nJCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration Development System\nJROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council\nMMR Multi-Mission Radar\nMNS Mission Need Statement\nMRRS Multi-Role Radar System\nPIA Post Independent Analysis\n\x0c\x0c Department of Defense Office of Inspector General\nReport No. D-2007-033 December 14, 2006\n (Project No. D2006-D000AE-0150.000)\n\n The Requirements Process for the Army Multi-Mission Radar\n and the Marine Corps Multi-Role Radar System\n\n Executive Summary\n\nWhy You Should Read This Report. This report discusses the processes the Army and\nthe Marine Corps used to generate requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar and the\nMulti-Role Radar System.\n\nBackground. We performed this audit in response to allegations made to the DoD\nHotline. The allegations concerned the processes the Army and the Marine Corps used to\ngenerate requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar and the Multi-Role Radar System,\nwhich are both multiple-mission radar systems. This report addresses the four allegations\nmade concerning:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 defining threat requirements and the urgent need for the radars;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 performing an adequate analysis of alternatives for the radars, to include an\n assessment of current radar systems, upgrades to current radar systems, and\n planned radar systems of the other Services;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 considering combat effectiveness and suitability factors when defining radar\n requirements; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 threatening improper personnel actions against staff wanting to discuss\n alternative means of meeting radar requirements.\n\nResults. We did not substantiate the four DoD Hotline allegations concerning the\nprocesses the Army and the Marine Corps used to support starting acquisitions of the\nMulti-Mission Radar and the Multi-Role Radar System. Since the DoD Hotline received\nthe allegations in September 2004, the Army and the Marine Corps have continued to\nadhere to processes prescribed in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System\nto define requirements for the Army Multi-Mission Radar and the Marine Corps Multi-\nRole Radar System. The Army Directorate of Combat Development had not developed\nan analysis of alternatives because the Multi-Mission Radar was in the pre-concept\nrefinement phase of the acquisition process and early in the Joint Capabilities Integration\nDevelopment System process. The Marine Corps performed an adequate analysis of\nalternatives to support the Multi-Role Radar System as part of the Ground/Air Task\nOriented Radar program. Both the Army and the Marine Corps also adequately\nconsidered combat effectiveness and suitability in defining capability requirements for\nthe radar systems. Additionally, we found no evidence that senior management had\nthreatened the employees developing requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar and the\nMulti-Role Radar System. To avoid duplication of acquisition efforts, the Acquisition\nExecutives for the Army and the Navy and members of the Army-Marine Corps Board\n\x0chave discussed the potential for a joint acquisition program to satisfy multiple-mission\nradar requirements for both Services. While the Army and the Marine Corps do plan to\nfurther consider a joint acquisition effort, key differences in performance parameters for\nradar range and transportability had so far prevented them from forming a joint\nacquisition program.\n\nManagement Comments. We provided a draft of this report on October 19, 2006. No\nwritten response to this report was required. Therefore, we are publishing this report in\nfinal form.\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\x0cTable of Contents\n\nExecutive Summary i\n\nBackground 1\n\nObjective 3\n\nReview of Internal Controls 3\n\nFinding\n Allegations Concerning the Army and Marine Corps Developing\n Requirements for Separate Multiple-Mission Radars 4\n\n\nAppendixes\n A. Scope and Methodology 15\n B. DoD Requirements Process for Weapon Systems 16\n C. Report Distribution 19\n\x0cBackground\n We performed this audit in response to allegations made to the DoD Hotline. The\n allegations concerned the processes the Army and the Marine Corps used to\n generate requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar (MMR) and the Multi-Role\n Radar System (MRRS), which are both multiple-mission radar systems. This\n report addresses the four allegations made concerning:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 defining threat requirements and the urgent need for the radars;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 performing an adequate analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the radars,\n to include an assessment of current radar systems, upgrades to current\n radar systems, and planned radar systems of the other Services;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 considering combat effectiveness and suitability factors when defining\n radar requirements; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 threatening improper personnel actions against staff wanting to discuss\n alternative means of meeting radar requirements.\n\n DoD Process for Determining Weapon System Requirements. Chairman of\n the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint Capabilities Integration and\n Development System,\xe2\x80\x9d May 11, 2005, defines the process DoD uses to identify,\n assess, and prioritize joint military capability needs. The Joint Capabilities\n Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process begins with the top-down\n capabilities identification methodology, which occurs before the start of the\n Defense acquisition management process. The top-down capabilities\n identification methodology is a capabilities-based assessment composed of a\n structured, four-step process that draws on the expertise of all Government\n agencies to identify improvements to current and new warfighting capabilities.\n The four-step process allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the\n assistance of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), to assess and\n provide advice regarding warfighter capability needs for potential Defense\n acquisition programs. In addition, the top-down capabilities identification\n methodology and subsequent JCIDS processes were established to prevent\n redundant acquisition efforts that do not improve the warfighters\xe2\x80\x99 capabilities.\n Appendix B provides details on how DoD uses the top-down capabilities\n identification methodology to support starting the acquisition management\n process.\n\n Multiple-Mission Radars. The Army and the Marine Corps are developing\n ground-based radars capable of performing multiple missions, either\n simultaneously or separately, without requiring hardware additions or physical\n reconfiguration. These missions include air surveillance, air defense, counter-\n battery, and air traffic control. The radars in the air surveillance mission identify\n and track cruise missiles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial\n vehicles. The radars in the air defense mission provide other Service weapon\n systems with radar data needed to shoot down enemy cruise missiles and air-\n breathing threats. The radars in the counter-battery mission identify and track\n enemy rockets, artillery, and mortars for unit use in determining firing positions\n\n 1\n\x0cand impact areas. The radars in the air traffic control mission track aircraft to\nallow air comptrollers to prevent collisions and to ensure orderly and expeditious\nflow of air traffic.\n\nArmy Multi-Mission Radar. The MMR capability is still in the JCIDS process\nand the Army is in the process of completing the top-down capabilities\nidentification methodology. The JCIDS process is preliminary to the Army\ndesignating the MMR as an acquisition program and assigning it an acquisition\ncategory. As envisioned, the MMR will provide multifunctional radar\ninformation to support air surveillance, air defense, counter-battery, and air traffic\ncontrol missions. Additionally, the MMR will support intelligence requirements\nthrough the development of a common operational picture for the Future Combat\nForce. The Army Directorate of Combat Development (DCD), the sponsor office\nresponsible for the preparation of the documents required in the JCIDS process,\nhad completed the first JCIDS document, the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), on\nMarch 6, 2006. Additionally, DCD had drafted the three documents that follow\nthe FAA in the JCIDS process: the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), the\nFunctional Solution Analysis (FSA), and the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).\nAppendix B provides details on the purpose and contents of these JCIDS\ndocuments.\n\nMarine Corps Multi-Role Radar System. On July 20, 2004, the JROC\napproved the operational requirements document for the MRRS. The Marine\nCorps was developing the MRRS as part of the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar\n(G/ATOR) program, which is a single material solution to meet MRRS and\nGround Weapon Locator Radar (GWLR) requirements. The Marine Corps is\ndeveloping the G/ATOR program as an evolutionary acquisition with four\nincremental development and production blocks, referred to as Increments I\nthrough IV. Each increment will have separate acquisition milestone decisions.\nIncrement I will support two missions: air surveillance and air defense.\nIncrement II will address the counter-battery mission. Increment III will\nincorporate tactical enhancements of the air surveillance and air defense missions.\nIncrement IV will address support of the air traffic control mission.\n\n Multi-Role Radar System Missions. The MRRS, Increment I and\nIncrement IV of the G/ATOR program, will meet the Marine Corps requirements\nfor a lightweight, expeditionary, three-dimensional radar capable of performing\nthe air defense, air surveillance, and air traffic control missions. On August 26,\n2005, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and\nAcquisition) approved the program start for Increment I of the G/ATOR program\nand entry in the system development and demonstration phase of the acquisition\nprocess.\n\n Ground Weapon Locator Radar Mission. The GWLR will meet the\nMarine Corps requirements for the counter-battery mission. On June 1, 2005, the\nJROC approved the \xe2\x80\x9cGround Weapons Locator Radar Capabilities Development\nDocument, Annex A to the Multi-Role Radar System Operational Requirements\nDocument,\xe2\x80\x9d including the validation of its key performance parameters. The\nGWLR is Increment II of the G/ATOR program. The Marine Corps plans to start\nIncrement II in FY 2009.\n\n\n 2\n\x0cObjective\n Our overall audit objective was to evaluate allegations from the Defense Hotline\n regarding the adequacy of the processes the Army and the Marine Corps were\n using to support starting acquisition of the Army MMR and the Marine Corps\n MRRS programs. Specifically, we evaluated whether the Army and the Marine\n Corps adequately defined threat requirements, analyzed and considered other\n alternatives, and supported the urgency for developing the radar systems in the\n near term. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology.\n\n\nReview of Internal Controls\n Army and Marine Corps processes used to generate requirements for the MMR\n and the MRRS included adequate internal controls as they applied to the audit\n objectives.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0c Allegations Concerning the Army and\n Marine Corps Developing Requirements\n for Separate Multiple-Mission Radars\n We did not substantiate the four DoD Hotline allegations concerning the\n processes the Army and the Marine Corps used to support starting\n acquisitions of the MMR and MRRS. Since the DoD Hotline received the\n allegations in September 2004, the Army and the Marine Corps have\n continued to adhere to processes prescribed in the Joint Capabilities\n Integration Development System to define requirements for the Army\n MMR and the Marine Corps MRRS. The Army DCD had not developed\n an AoA because the MMR was in the pre-concept refinement phase of the\n acquisition process and early in the JCIDS process. The Marine Corps\n performed an adequate AoA to support the MRRS as part of the G/ATOR\n Program. Both the Army and the Marine Corps also adequately\n considered combat effectiveness and suitability in defining capability\n requirements for the radar systems. Additionally, we found no evidence\n that senior management had threatened the employees developing\n requirements for the MMR and the MRRS. To avoid duplication of\n acquisition efforts, the Acquisition Executives for the Army and the Navy\n and members of the Army-Marine Corps Board have discussed the\n potential for a joint acquisition program to satisfy multiple-mission radar\n requirements for both Services. While the Army and the Marine Corps do\n plan to further consider a joint acquisition effort, key differences in\n performance parameters for radar range and transportability had so far\n prevented them from forming a joint acquisition program.\n\n\nAllegations\n The complainant made the following four allegations concerning the processes\n that the Army and the Marine Corps used to support starting acquisitions of the\n MMR and the MRRS.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Army and the Marine Corps did not adequately define threat\n requirements and the urgent need for the new radar systems.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The Army and the Marine Corps did not perform an adequate AoA for\n the radars, including an assessment of current radar systems, upgrades\n to current radar systems, and planned radar systems of the other\n Service that contained nearly identical performance requirements.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 The Army and the Marine Corps did not adequately consider combat\n effectiveness and suitability factors for new radar systems.\n Specifically, the Services required the MMR and the MRRS to have\n liquid cooling, making them susceptible to failures from minor combat\n damage.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Senior Army and Marine Corps personnel threatened retaliation,\n reprimand, and loss of promotion opportunity for staff wanting to\n discuss alternative means for meeting radar requirements.\n\n\nThreat Requirements and Urgent Need\n Allegation 1. The complainant alleged that the Army and the Marine Corps did\n not adequately define threat requirements and the urgent need for the new radar\n systems.\n\n Audit Results. We did not substantiate the allegation. The Army and the Marine\n Corps implemented processes to adequately define threat requirements and the\n urgent need for the new radar systems.\n\n Army Threat Requirements. Because the Army just started the JCIDS process\n for the MMR, completion of a system threat assessment was not yet required.\n However, the Army DCD had begun to define threat requirements for the MMR.\n Specifically, the draft FNA identified radar capability gaps against current and\n future threats. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency prepared an \xe2\x80\x9cInitial\n Threat Warning Assessment,\xe2\x80\x9d December 1, 2005, for the MMR that identified\n projected adversarial threat capabilities that would affect the MMR design and\n implementation.\n\n Draft Functional Needs Analysis. In the draft FNA, the Army DCD\n stated that the MMR will be required to track a large number of threats to avoid\n fratricide and that the inherent flexibility of the MMR was a critical capability the\n Army needed to offset threats. While the draft FNA primarily discussed threats in\n a general manner, it did discuss five critical gaps. Specifically, existing Army\n radars:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 lacked multi-mission functionality and the capacity to rapidly switch\n between mission modes;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 were unable to detect, track, and shoot down all threats at extended\n ranges within 360 degrees;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 lacked the capability to detect and precisely locate the full spectrum of\n indirect fire locations at extended ranges for the counter-battery\n mission;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 were incapable of accurately predicting the impact points for the\n counter-battery mission; and\n\n\n 5\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 were incapable of classification, characterization, and positive\n identification of aerial objects at high levels of accuracy and\n assurance.\n\n Initial Threat Warning Assessment. The Army did request the Defense\n Intelligence Agency to prepare an Initial Threat Warning Assessment for the\n MMR as required in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3170.01B,\n \xe2\x80\x9cOperation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,\xe2\x80\x9d\n May 11, 2005. In the Initial Threat Warning Assessment, the Defense\n Intelligence Agency identified adversarial threats that could affect a multiple-\n mission radar capability. The Initial Threat Warning Assessment also identified\n actions that adversaries could use to degrade or disrupt the operations, such as\n threats to radars or radar platforms and threats to the associated communications,\n command, control, and computer networks. Threats identified included rocket-\n propelled grenade launchers, anti-material agents, unmanned aerial vehicles, and\n lasers.\n\n Army Urgent Need. The Army did adequately define the urgent need for the\n MMR. The draft FNA identified four current and critical gaps in detecting and\n locating existing medium caliber artillery. Additionally, the \xe2\x80\x9cFuture Combat\n Systems1 Operational Requirements Document,\xe2\x80\x9d January 31, 2005, which the\n JROC validated, stated that the MMR should be capable of simultaneously\n performing the air surveillance, air defense, counter-battery, and air traffic control\n missions for the Brigade Combat Team2 between 2017 and 2020. Further, the\n Deputy Director for DCD stated that developing a multiple-mission radar would\n decrease existing operation and support costs because a single radar rather than\n multiple radars would lower logistical support costs and maintenance\n requirements.\n\n Marine Corps Threat Requirements. Similarly, the Marine Corps adequately\n defined threat requirements for its new multi-role radar system. In the JROC-\n approved operational requirements document for the MRRS dated July 20, 2004,\n the Marine Corps identified the key performance parameters for the MRRS and\n adequately defined the current and near future threats as established in the Marine\n Corps System Threat Assessment Report. It also requires the MRRS to be a\n lightweight, expeditionary, three-dimensional radar capable of detecting cruise\n missiles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles.\n\n In the \xe2\x80\x9cAir Combat Threat Environment Description [the Threat Environment\n Description],\xe2\x80\x9d February 2002, the National Air Intelligence Center presents a\n description of the threat environment that could confront U.S. Air Combat\n Command assets. Specifically, the Threat Environment Description discussed the\n current-to-20-year threat projections of cruise missiles, fixed- and rotary-wing\n\n1\n The Future Combat Systems is composed of a family of advanced, networked, air- and ground-based\n sustainment systems that will include manned and unmanned platforms. The Future Combat Systems\n will operate as a system of systems that will network with existing capabilities and those developed to\n meet the needs of the Brigade Combat Team.\n2\n The Brigade Combat Team, beginning in 2008, will consist of three combined arms battalions and their\n attached support and fire units. The Army plans for the MMR to serve as the Brigade Combat Team\n radar.\n\n 6\n\x0c aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The G/ATOR program, with MRRS, will\n develop capabilities for assisting in countering and eliminating those threats.\n\n In the \xe2\x80\x9cMarine Tactical Command and Control System (1992-2010) System\n Threat Assessment Report [the System Threat Assessment],\xe2\x80\x9d December 16, 1992,\n the Marine Corps evaluated current and projected threats to the Marine Tactical\n Command and Control System. The System Threat Assessment was still relevant\n because it also addresses existing threats identified in the Threat Environment\n Description that specifically relate to the G/ATOR mission. The G/ATOR radars\n directly support the Marine Tactical Command and Control System through the\n Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment and the Tactical Air Operations Center.\n\n The System Threat Assessment identified 11 threats to the Marine Tactical\n Command and Control System, including: air strikes, guided missiles and rockets,\n artillery and mortars, mines, chemical and biological weapons, electronic warfare,\n nuclear weapons, directed energy weapons, small arms and crew-served weapons,\n computer threats, and anti-radiation homing weapons. The MRRS Operational\n Requirements Document and GWLR Capabilities Development Document\n identified three of those threats that the G/ATOR will counter: air strikes, guided\n missiles and rockets, and artillery and mortars.\n\n The G/ATOR program, with MRRS, will assist in countering and eliminating the\n threat from fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The System Threat Assessment\n identified fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft as existing threats to the Marine Air\n Ground Task Force. It stated that those aircraft could be armed with aircraft\n cannon and carry free-fall bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, and guided munitions.\n\n Marine Corps Urgent Need. The Marine Corps did adequately define the urgent\n need for the MRRS. In the \xe2\x80\x9cMission Need Statement [MNS] for Multi-Role\n Radar,\xe2\x80\x9d March 27, 1996, the Marine Corps identified the deficiencies in existing\n capabilities and opportunities to provide new capabilities. The G/ATOR will\n address the deficiencies and provide new capabilities in FY 2011.\n\n The MNS states that the MRRS will provide radar coverage to the Marine Air\n Command and Control System to maintain battlefield situational awareness,\n exercise command and control, and engage hostile threats. The MRRS\n requirements correspond to capability gaps in the Marine Air Ground Task\n Force\xe2\x80\x99s ability to detect, track, and positively identify fixed- and rotary-wing\n aircraft and cruise missiles as outlined in the Marine Corps Mission Area\n Analyses 32 and 35, both dated August 26, 1994. The Military Services conduct\n mission area analyses to identify operational requirements and deficiencies across\n a broad range of functional areas.\n\n\nAnalysis of Alternatives\n Allegation 2. The complainant alleged that the Army and the Marine Corps did\n not perform an adequate AoA for the radars, to include an assessment of:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 current radar systems,\n\n 7\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 upgrades to current radar systems, and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 planned radar systems of the other Service that contained nearly\n identical performance requirements.\n\nAudit Results. We did not substantiate the allegation. The Army DCD had not\ndeveloped an AoA because the MMR was so early in the JCIDS process that it\nwas not yet required. The Marine Corps performed an adequate analysis of\ncurrent radar systems and upgrades to existing fielded systems to support\ndeveloping the MRRS as part of the G/ATOR program. The Marine Corps did\nnot include the Army MMR in the \xe2\x80\x9cMulti-Role Radar System Analysis of\nAlternatives,\xe2\x80\x9d September 16, 2002, because the Army had not yet validated a\nsystem requirement for the MMR.\n\nArmy Analysis of Alternatives. DoD Instruction 5000.2, \xe2\x80\x9cOperation of the\nDefense Acquisition System,\xe2\x80\x9d May 12, 2003, states that the milestone authority\napproves the plan for conducting an AoA at the concept decision point of the\nacquisition process. In the case of the MMR, the program sponsor was taking\nactions to comply with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E\nrequirements that are due before the concept decision. In that respect, the draft\nFSA that the program sponsor prepared did examine numerous alternatives to\nclose the identified capability gaps. In addition, the Army hired an independent\ncontractor to study the potential costs and benefits of various radar concepts.\n\n Draft Functional Solutions Analysis. The program sponsor drafted an\nFSA using the results of three sequential efforts:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 performing an analysis of doctrine, organization, training, material,\n leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to determine\n whether non-material solutions could fill the gaps;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 developing ideas for material approaches; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 developing an analysis for material approaches (AMA) to recommend\n the most feasible approaches to close the gaps.\n\nIn the AMA, the program sponsor evaluated the feasibility of three options for\nmaterial approaches.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The first option included an evaluation of 13 domestic radar systems\n for potential upgrades to meet the MMR capability requirements.\n These systems included air surveillance and air defense radars,\n counter-battery radars, air traffic control radars, and the G/ATOR. Of\n the two most suitable solutions, one would require modifications to the\n radar equating to developing a new system without achieving all of the\n MMR requirements. The other solution, the Marine Corps G/ATOR,\n offered at least twice the range, but required more manpower; was less\n mobile and transportable; and was projected to cost more than twice\n that of the MMR capability.\n\n\n\n 8\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 The second option included an evaluation of eight foreign ground-\n based radar systems to meet the MMR capability requirements. These\n systems included multi-mission radars and counter-battery radars.\n Only two of the eight radars had the potential to meet MMR\n requirements. The first radar would provide improved performance,\n but would require expensive reductions in size and weight to meet\n Army C-130 deployability requirements. Further discussion of the\n C-130 deployability requirements is included under \xe2\x80\x9cDeployability\xe2\x80\x9d in\n Allegation 3. The other radar met the Army C-130 deployment\n requirements, but would require expensive upgrades to address\n considerable capability shortfalls.\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 The third option was an evaluation of the development of a new\n ground-based radar system. The program sponsor based this option on\n the results of an MMR science and technology objective\n demonstration initiated in 2002 to show the feasibility of developing\n the MMR. The demonstration addressed radar requirements for the air\n surveillance, air defense, counter-battery, and air traffic control\n missions. The radar in the demonstration exceeded the performance\n capabilities of the radars in options one and two. For example, the\n radar developed for the MMR science and technology objective\n demonstration had double the range of the Army counter-battery radar\n and the capability to track 10 times more targets than the Army\n counter-battery and air surveillance radars.\n\n Independent Radar Review. The Army independent contractor prepared\n its study, \xe2\x80\x9cAnalysis of Battlefield Radars for the Future Force Unit of Action,\xe2\x80\x9d3\n on February 25, 2004. The contractor studied the potential costs and benefits of\n various radar concepts. In this analysis, the contractor included the following\n alternative radar concepts for the Brigade Combat Team:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the MMR developed under the science and technology objective\n demonstration;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 a counter-battery radar and the MMR developed under the science and\n technology objective demonstration;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an air surveillance and air defense radar, and a counter-battery radar;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Marine Corps G/ATOR; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an air surveillance and air defense radar, and a foreign counter-battery\n radar.\n\n In the study, the contractor observed that the MMR developed under the science\n and technology objective demonstration detected air targets at greater ranges than\n the existing air surveillance and air defense radars, but not at greater ranges than\n the G/ATOR. Further, the contractor concluded that the MMR science\n\n3\n The Future Force Unit of Action has been changed to the Brigade Combat Team.\n\n 9\n\x0c and technology objective demonstration and the G/ATOR in combination would\n have greater reliability and be easier to maintain than the fielded air surveillance\n and air defense radars.\n\n Marine Corps Analysis of Alternatives. The Marine Corps study team\n performed an adequate AoA that addressed existing radar systems and upgrades\n to fielded systems. The Marine Corps used the AoA to determine the best\n material solution to satisfy the Marine Corps operational requirements for a\n lightweight, highly mobile, three-dimensional radar. The study team identified\n and compared four alternative material solutions to satisfy operational\n requirements: baseline radar systems, a non-developmental item, and s-band and\n x-band MRRS.4\n\n Baseline Radar Systems. The baseline alternative included two legacy\n systems: an air surveillance and air defense radar. In addition, the baseline\n alternative also included a developmental air traffic control radar. The Marine\n Corps expected that the air traffic control radar would be developed before\n introducing the MRRS, and therefore identified it as legacy system for the\n baseline alternative.\n\n Non-Developmental Items. The non-developmental item alternative\n included upgrades to two fielded radar systems and one radar system in\n development. Specifically, this alternative included pre-planned product\n improvements to a fielded air surveillance and air defense radar for the short-\n range air defense cueing mission. It also included the air surveillance radar from\n the baseline alternative, but with a proposed upgrade for increased operational\n reliability. This alternative also contained the air traffic control radar in\n development from the baseline radar alternative.\n\n S-Band and X-Band MRRS. The s-band and x-band MRRS alternatives\n were the material development of new radar systems. The AoA stated that the\n new radar systems could perform all three of the required MRRS missions.\n Therefore, the new radar systems represented the capabilities proposed by various\n MRRS science and technology objective demonstration competitors for each of\n the frequency bands.\n\n The AoA study team used a value model with 51 value attributes to evaluate the\n operational effectiveness and suitability of the 4 alternative solutions and to\n conduct a sensitivity analysis of each alternative. Stakeholders participating in\n the conduct of the AoA assigned a relative importance weight to each of the value\n attributes. Using the value model, the study team determined a single overall\n utility or value score for each alternative.\n\n The s-band and x-band MRRS alternatives had value scores that were\n approximately two times higher than that of the baseline radar systems and non-\n developmental item alternatives and scored the same or better than the other\n alternatives on almost every value attribute. The attributes where the s-band and\n\n4\n The s-band and x-band represent different radar bandwidths. The s-band operates at a lower bandwidth,\n providing a greater range of detection and operating better in inclement weather. The x-band operates at\n a higher bandwidth, providing more precision in identifying specific targets.\n\n 10\n\x0c x-band scored higher included transportability, target detection capability, and\n mean-time-to-repair. In the area of transportability, for example, the non-\n developmental item alternatives required more vehicles to transport the radars in\n comparison to the s-band and x-band radar alternatives because it consisted of\n three radar systems rather than one radar system for the s-band and the x-band\n radar alternatives. The s-band alternative outperformed the x-band alternative in\n general areas of detection range, detection altitude, and reliability. However, the\n x-band countered these attributes with higher performance in classifying threats\n and tracking targets. This resulted in differences between the value scores of the\n s-band and x-band MRRS alternatives of less then one percent. The Marine\n Corps has not yet selected which radar type will be used to meet the G/ATOR\n requirements. The Marine Corps will make the radar type determination at\n contract award for the G/ATOR.\n\n\nCombat Effectiveness and Suitability\n Allegation 3. The complainant alleged that the Army and the Marine Corps did\n not adequately consider combat effectiveness and suitability factors for new radar\n systems. Specifically, the Services required the MMR and the MRRS to have\n liquid cooling, making them susceptible to failures from minor combat damage.\n\n Audit Results. We did not substantiate the allegation. The Army DCD did\n consider combat effectiveness and suitability factors for the MMR in assessing all\n potential radar designs. Further, the Marine Corps considered the combat\n effectiveness and suitability factors for the MRRS and the GWLR.\n\n Army Consideration of Combat Effectiveness and Suitability Factors. The\n Army considered combat effectiveness and suitability factors in the draft ICD for\n the MMR, as well as in the MMR developed for the science and technology\n objective demonstration. The draft ICD identified the required capabilities that\n would enable the Brigade Combat Team to achieve offensive, defensive, stability,\n and support operations in any terrain and environmental conditions against the\n full spectrum of aerial and fire support threats. The draft ICD for MMR\n contained combat effectiveness and suitability requirements for deployability,\n agility and versatility, maneuverability and mobility, survivability, and\n sustainability.\n\n Deployability. The MMR must have a level of deployability\n commensurate with that of the Brigade Combat Team. Specifically, the MMR\n must have the ability to be moved with its essential combat load by a C-130\n profile aircraft in accordance with the Future Combat Systems operational\n requirements document.\n\n Agility and Versatility. The MMR must be a multi-functional, single,\n highly versatile radar capable of supporting the air surveillance, air defense,\n counter-battery, and air traffic control missions, while providing intelligence\n surveillance and reconnaissance data.\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0c Maneuverability and Mobility. The MMR must have mobility\ncommensurate with the Brigade Combat Team. Specifically, the MMR must be\ncapable of traveling at off-road tactical speeds of 50 kilometers per hour and\nhard-surface road speeds of 90 kilometers per hour.\n\n Survivability. The MMR must have a level of survivability that allows\noperations with the Future Combat Systems. To accomplish this, the MMR\nsolution must be:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 capable of rapid acceleration survivability dashes;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 able to operate in biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear\n environments without degrading radar performance;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 hardened against directed-energy, high-power microwave, and\n thermobaric weapons;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 able to survive an electromagnetic pulse;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 resistant to electronic tampering, electronic attack, and anti-radiation\n missile engagement; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 able to reduce the probability of detection, intercept, templating, and\n targeting by hostile systems.\n\n Sustainability. The MMR will have sustainability commensurate with\nthe Future Combat Systems. The MMR must provide reliability and availability,\nreduced maintenance costs, built-in test equipment capable of accurately locating\nfaults and reporting the data failure, and compatibility with the Army two-level\nmaintenance system.\n\nFor the MMR developed through the science and technology objective\ndemonstration, the Director, DCD required the contractor not to use a liquid\ncooling system because an earlier liquid-cooled radar consistently had\nmaintenance problems. Accordingly, for the MMR demonstration the contractor\nused an air-cooled system.\n\nMarine Corps Consideration of Combat Effectiveness and Suitability\nFactors. The Marine Corps evaluated combat effectiveness and suitability\nfactors of potential MRRS alternatives in the AoA and established operational\nand combat suitability key performance parameters in requirements documents\nfor the MRRS and GWLR. Also, in the request for proposal for G/ATOR, the\nMarine Corps required contractors to consider the logistical burden of the cooling\nsystem.\n\n Analysis of Alternatives. As discussed in the audit response to\nAllegation 2, the Marine Corps study team used a value model with 51 weighted\nattributes to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability factors of 4\nMRRS alternatives in the AoA. Suitability attributes of the potential alternatives\n\n\n\n 12\n\x0c evaluated included electronic protection and electronic countermeasure features,\n update rates, number and types of vehicles, self-survey and automatic leveling\n capability, set-up and breakdown, and the mean-time-to-repair.\n\n Operational Requirements Documents. The operational requirements\n documents for the MRRS and GWLR contained numerous attributes and key\n performance parameters that addressed the operational and combat suitability\n requirements for the G/ATOR radar system. On July 20, 2004, the JROC\n validated the key performance parameters in the MRRS operational requirements\n document for mobility, deployability, and transportability. A key performance\n parameter required that the radar system be transportable and deployable by\n Marine Air Control Group assets and be reconfigurable from transport to full\n operational mode within 60 minutes by no more than four Marines. In addition,\n the key performance parameter required that the MRRS be internally\n transportable by a C-130 aircraft and be capable of external lift by helicopter.\n\n On June 1, 2005, the JROC also validated the key performance parameters in the\n GWLR capabilities development document for the GWLR to be able to drive on\n and drive off a C-130 aircraft. In addition, the MRRS operational requirements\n document and GWLR capabilities development document required that the radars\n have anti-tamper and technology protection, data integrity, operational\n availability, remote operation, digital and electronic displays, load and unload\n without a material handler, safe operation, and embedded simulation.\n\n Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar Performance Specification. In\n May 2006, the Marine Corps Systems Command issued for Increment I of the\n G/ATOR program, which includes MRRS, an amended request for proposal for\n the system development and demonstration phase of the acquisition process. In\n the performance specification attached to the amended request for proposal, the\n Marine Corps stated that the design of the cooling system for the radar should\n consider the logistical burden on the operating forces. It also stated that the\n design of the G/ATOR should not involve the use of specialized coolant,\n refrigerant, skill sets, and equipment to operate or maintain the radar in a combat\n zone or field environment. The performance specification, however, did not\n require contractors to use a particular type of cooling system or preclude the use\n of a liquid cooling system.\n\n\nImproper Personnel Actions\n Allegation 4. The complainant alleged that Senior Army and Marine Corps\n personnel threatened retaliation, reprimand, and loss of promotion opportunity for\n those wanting to discuss alternative means for meeting radar requirements.\n\n Audit Results. We did not substantiate the allegations. As discussed under the\n audit results for Allegation 2, senior Army and Marine Corps management,\n including the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and\n Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development,\n and Acquisition) had actively considered alternative means for meeting radar\n requirements. Further, we found no evidence that senior management had\n\n 13\n\x0c threatened the employees developing requirements for the MMR and the MRRS.\n In making this determination, we contacted senior managers, employees, the\n civilian personnel and advisory center; and the equal employment opportunity\n office at Fort Bliss, Texas; as well as senior managers, employees, the human\n resource office, and the equal employment opportunity office at the Marine Corps\n Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.\n\n\nArmy and Navy Coordination on Radar Requirements\n In April 2005, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and\n Acquisition) solicited the interest and support of the Army for the G/ATOR\n Program. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and\n Technology) responded that his staff will continue to actively participate in the\n Army-Marine Corps Board to merge their multiple-mission radar requirements, to\n form an agreement to combine technologies, and to establish a joint system. In\n addition, the Assistant Secretary of the Army stated that he would consider\n participating in a joint effort when it was feasible for one program to meet the\n radar priorities and requirements for both Services.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0cAppendix A. Scope and Methodology\n We evaluated the adequacy of the processes the Army and the Marine Corps used\n to generate requirements for the two new radar systems. We reviewed MMR and\n MRRS requirements documents, budget, and threat documents dated from\n March 1996 through September 2006. We interviewed personnel from the Office\n of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army DCD, the Army Intelligence and\n Information Warfare Directorate, and the Marine Corps Systems Command to\n identify the processes used to generate requirements and to obtain requirement,\n threat, and background documentation.\n\n We performed this audit from March 2006 through October 2006 in accordance\n with generally accepted government auditing standards.\n\n Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to\n perform this audit.\n\n Use of Technical Assistance. Two electrical engineers and one computer\n engineer from the Electronics Engineering and Software Engineering Branches,\n Technical Assessment Directorate, Office of Deputy Inspector General for Policy\n and Oversight, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General assisted in the\n audit. The engineers assisted the audit team by determining whether the\n requirements for the MMR and the G/ATOR were similar enough to develop a\n joint radar system rather than two separate radar programs.\n\n Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area. The Government\n Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report\n provides coverage of the DoD Weapons Systems Acquisition high-risk area.\n\n\nPrior Coverage\n No prior coverage has been conducted on the acquisition of the Army Multi-\n Mission Radar or on the Marine Corps Multi-Role Radar System during the\n last 5 years.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0cAppendix B. DoD Requirements Process for\n Weapon Systems\n The following paragraphs describe the top-down capabilities identification\n methodology that DoD uses within the JCIDS process to assess military\n capability needs and to support starting the Defense acquisition management\n process. The paragraphs also provide a brief overview of the Defense acquisition\n management process.\n\n\nTop-Down Capabilities Identification Methodology\n The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, \xe2\x80\x9cJoint\n Capabilities Integration and Development System,\xe2\x80\x9d May 11, 2005, defines the\n process DoD uses to identify, assess, and prioritize joint military capability needs.\n The JCIDS process begins with the top-down capabilities identification\n methodology, which occurs before the start of the Defense acquisition\n management process. The top-down capabilities identification methodology is a\n capabilities-based assessment and consists of a structured, four-step process that\n draws on the expertise of all Government agencies to identify improvements to\n current and new warfighting capabilities. This process allows the Chairman of\n the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assistance of the JROC, to assess and provide\n advice regarding military capability needs for Defense acquisition programs. The\n four sequential steps include the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), the Functional\n Needs Analysis (FNA), the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA), and the Post\n Independent Analysis (PIA). The sponsoring office within a Military Department\n or DoD agency completes the first three steps, while an independent group\n completes the PIA.\n\n Functional Area Analysis. The FAA identifies the operational tasks, conditions,\n and standards needed for defining military objectives, assessing capabilities and\n attributes, and developing integrated architectures. The operational tasks in the\n FAA allow the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an Initial Threat Warning\n Assessment, which identifies adversarial threats affecting an identified capability.\n\n Functional Needs Analysis. The FNA assesses the ability of existing and\n programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the operational tasks developed in\n the FAA. It also evaluates the full range of operating conditions, designates\n standards identified by the FAA, and further defines the integrated architectures.\n Using the tasks identified in the FAA, the FNA also produces a list of capability\n gaps requiring solutions, describes key capability attributes to resolve those\n capability gaps, and develops measures of effectiveness. Finally, the FNA uses\n the measures of effectiveness to evaluate how well existing or programmed\n capabilities support the development of key performance parameters.\n\n Functional Solutions Analysis. The FSA is an operational-based joint\n assessment that solves one or more of the capability gaps identified in the FNA.\n The results of the FSA influence the future direction DoD takes on integrated\n\n 16\n\x0c architectures and provides input to capability roadmaps. Capability roadmaps are\n plans DoD develops using integrated architectures. DoD uses capability\n roadmaps to conduct capability assessments, guide system development, and\n define investment plans. The FSA also contains the Analysis of Material\n Approaches (AMA). The AMA determines which approach or combination of\n material approaches best provides the desired capabilities, determines how the\n approaches align with DoD integrated architectures and capabilities, and\n identifies potential changes to integrated architectures.\n\n Post Independent Analysis. An independent team prepares the PIA to assess the\n results of the FSA and its AMA to ensure that the list of potential capability\n approaches are complete. The independent team then compiles the results of the\n PIA into an appropriate recommendation to the sponsoring office. The sponsor\n then uses the results of the PIA, as well as the results of the FAA, FNA, and FSA,\n to prepare the ICD and a plan for conducting an AoA. The ICD and the AoA plan\n are required to start the Defense acquisition management process.\n\n\nDefense Acquisition Management Process\n DoD Instruction 5000.2, \xe2\x80\x9cOperation of the Defense Acquisition System,\xe2\x80\x9d May 12,\n 2003, establishes a simplified and flexible Defense acquisition management\n process. The Defense acquisition management process is a four-phase process for\n translating mission needs and technology opportunities (based on approved\n mission needs and requirements) into stable, affordable, and well-managed\n acquisition programs. The four phases include concept refinement, technology\n development, system development and demonstration, and production and\n deployment. The program manager and the milestone decision authority are\n required to structure a tailored, responsive, and innovative program. Progress\n through the acquisition life cycle depends on obtaining sufficient knowledge to\n continue to the next stage of development.\n\n Concept Refinement Phase. The concept refinement phase, which begins with\n the concept decision, is the first phase in the Defense acquisition management\n process. Entrance into this phase depends upon having completed the JCIDS top-\n down capabilities identification methodology, having an approved ICD, and a\n plan for conducting an AoA. The ICD describes capability gaps that exist in joint\n warfighting functions and identifies potential material approaches to addressing\n those gaps. The AoA assesses the critical technologies associated with\n technology maturity, technical risk, and other concepts to achieve the best\n possible system solution. During the concept refinement phase, the sponsoring\n office refines the initial concept and develops a technology development strategy.\n The concept refinement phase ends at acquisition Milestone A, the technology\n development decision, when the milestone decision authority approves the\n preferred solution resulting from the AoA and approves the associated technology\n development strategy.\n\n Technology Development Phase. The technology development phase is the\n second phase in the Defense acquisition management process and begins at the\n acquisition Milestone A decision. During this phase, the sponsoring office\n\n 17\n\x0creduces technology risk and determines the set of technologies to be integrated\ninto a full system. In addition, the sponsoring office prepares a capability\ndevelopment document to support program initiation, refine the integrated\narchitecture, and clarify how the program will lead to joint warfighting capability.\nThe capability development document builds on the ICD and provides key and\ndetailed performance parameters necessary to design the proposed system. The\nproject exits technology development when an affordable increment of militarily\nuseful capability has been identified, the technology for that increment has been\ndemonstrated in a relevant environment, and the system can be developed for\nproduction within a short time frame. Acquisition Milestone B, the system\ndevelopment and demonstration decision, follows the completion of the\ntechnology development phase.\n\nFinal Two Phases of the Defense Acquisition Management Process. The\nsystem development and demonstration phase is the third phase in the Defense\nacquisition management process and begins at the Acquisition Milestone B\ndecision. By the Acquisition Milestone B decision, the program manager is\nassigned and the milestone decision authority formally establishes an acquisition\nstrategy. The milestone decision authority also approves the exit criteria the\nprogram manager must achieve to go into the fourth phase of the acquisition\nprocess, production and deployment. The program manager then takes the system\nthrough low-rate initial production and, finally, full-rate production. During full-\nrate production, the program manager delivers the system to the warfighter.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\x0cAppendix C. Report Distribution\n\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense\nUnder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics\n Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis\nUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer\n Deputy Chief Financial Officer\n Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)\nDirector, Program Analysis and Evaluation\nDirector, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy\n\nDepartment of the Army\nCommanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command\nAssistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition Logistics and Technology)\nAuditor General, Department of the Army\n\nDepartment of the Navy\nAssistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)\nNaval Inspector General\nAuditor General, Department of the Navy\nInspector General, Marine Corps\nCommanding General, Marine Corps System Command\n\nDepartment of the Air Force\nAuditor General, Department of the Air Force\n\nNon-Defense Federal Organization\nOffice of Management and Budget\n\n\n\n\n 19\n\x0cCongressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and\n Ranking Minority Member\nSenate Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Committee on Armed Services\nSenate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs\nHouse Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Committee on Armed Services\nHouse Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability,\n Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International\n Relations, Committee on Government Reform\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\x0cTeam Members\nThe Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing,\nAcquisition and Contract Management prepared this report. Personnel of the\nDepartment of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report\nare listed below.\n\nRichard B. Jolliffe\nJohn E. Meling\nHarold C. James\nAndrew D. Greene\nNathan R. Witter\nBreon E. Dehoux\nDouglas W. Slaughter\nCaryn M. Chambers\nJaime A. Bobbio\nWei K. Chang\nMenh Q. Tran\nMeredith H. Johnson\n\x0c\x0c'


text:
 25.4.2022
 GA
 Iris Oifigiúil an Aontais Eorpaigh
 C 171/30
 Ordú Uachtarán na Cúirte Ginearálta an 3 Márta 2022 – Esedra v an Pharlaimint
 (Cás T-46/22 R)
 (Bearta idirlinne - Conarthaí poiblí seirbhísí - Seirbhísí luath-óige - Iarratas ar bhearta idirlinne - Easpa práinne)
 (2022/C 171/55)
 Teanga an cháis: an Fhraincis
 Páirtithe
 Iarratasóir: Esedra SRL (an Bhruiséil, an Bheilg) (ionadaí: M. Vastmans, Dlíodóir)
 Cosantóir: Parlaimint na hEorpa (ionadaithe: M. Pencheva agus M. Kazek, i gcáil Gníomhairí)
 Maidir le
 Iarratas bunaithe ar Airteagal 278 agus Airteagal 279 CFAE ag lorg, ar an gcéad dul síos, bac a chur ar fhorghníomhú chinneadh na Parlaiminte an 26 Samhain 2021 chun an conradh poiblí seirbhísí a dhámhachtain le haghaidh “Bainistiú iomlán lárionad cúram leanaí Pharlaimint na hEorpa sa Bhruiséil, lonnaithe ar Rue Wayenberg” chuig tairgeoir eile agus tairiscint an iarratasóra a dhiúltú, agus, ar an dara dul síos, a ordú don Pharlaimint na bearta is gá a ghlacadh chun éifeachtaí an chinnidh dámhachtana nó an chonartha a tugadh i gcrích tar éis an chinnidh sin a chur ar fionraí.
 An chuid oibríochtúil
 1)
 Déantar an t-iarratas ar bhearta idirlinne a dhíbhe.
 2)
 Déantar na costais a fhorchoimeád.


type: legislation

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 31983R1905
 Regolamento (CEE) n. 1905/83 del Consiglio dell' 11 luglio 1983 che modifica il regolamento (CEE) n. 2766/75 che determina l' elenco dei prodotti per i quali sono fissati prezzi limite e stabilisce le norme per la fissazione del prezzo limite dei suini macellati
 Gazzetta ufficiale n. L 190 del 14/07/1983 pag. 0001 - 0003 edizione speciale finlandese: capitolo 3 tomo 16 pag. 0142 edizione speciale spagnola: capitolo 03 tomo 28 pag. 0107 edizione speciale svedese/ capitolo 3 tomo 16 pag. 0142 edizione speciale portoghese: capitolo 03 tomo 28 pag. 0107
 *****REGOLAMENTO (CEE) N. 1905/83 DEL CONSIGLIO dell'11 luglio 1983 che modifica il regolamento (CEE) n. 2766/75 che determina l'elenco dei prodotti per i quali sono fissati prezzi limite e stabilisce le norme per la fissazione del prezzo limite dei suini macellati IL CONSIGLIO DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità economica europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 2759/75 del Consiglio, del 29 ottobre 1975, relativo all'organizzazione comune dei mercati nel settore delle carni suine (1), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n. 2966/80 (2), in particolare l'articolo 12, paragrafo 4, vista la proposta della Commissione, considerando che, a norma dell'articolo 12 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2759/75, devono essere fissati prezzi limite soltanto per alcuni dei prodotti diversi dal suino macellato di cui all'articolo 1 dello stesso regolamento; che l'elenco di tali prodotti è stato stabilito con il regolamento (CEE) n. 2766/75 (3), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CEE) n. 219/83 (4); considerando che, per i prodotti di cui al regolamento (CEE) n. 2759/75 che non figurano in tale elenco, è stato istituito, a norma dell'articolo 13 dello stesso regolamento, un regime detto dei prodotti pilota e derivati; che tale regime ha tuttavia sollevato determinati problemi di applicazione pratica; considerando che, per taluni prodotti finora soggetti al regime dei prodotti pilota e derivati, la stabilità dei prezzi di vendita sul mercato è risultata maggiore di quanto inizialmente previsto, che tali prodotti possono pertanto essere inclusi nell'elenco dei prodotti per i quali sono fissati prezzi limite, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 L'allegato del regolamento (CEE) n. 2766/75 è sostituito dall'allegato del presente regolamento. Articolo 2 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il 1o agosto 1983. Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, addì 11 luglio 1983. Per il Consiglio Il Presidente C. SIMITIS (1) GU n. L 282 dell'1. 11. 1975, pag. 1. (2) GU n. L 307 del 18. 11. 1980, pag. 5. (3) GU n. L 282 dell'1. 11. 1975, pag. 25. (4) GU n. L 27 del 29. 1. 1983, pag. 1. ALLEGATO « ALLEGATO Elenco dei prodotti di cui all'articolo 12, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2759/75 per i quali sono fissati prezzi limite 1.2.3 // // // // Numero della tariffa doganale comune // Designazione dei prodotti // // // // // // // // 01.03 // Animali vivi della specie suina: // // // A. delle specie domestiche: // // // II. altri: // // // a) Scrofe di un peso minimo di 160 kg e che hanno figliato almeno una volta // // // b) non nominati // // 02.01 // Carni e frattaglie, commestibili, degli animali compresi nelle voci dal n. 01.01 al n. 01.04 incluso, fresche, refrigerate o congelate: // // // A. Carni: // // // III. della specie suina: // // // a) domestica: // // // 2. Prosciutti, anche in pezzi // // // 3. Parti anteriori o spalle, anche in pezzi // // // 4. Lombate, anche in pezzi // // // 5. Pancette, anche in pezzi // // // 6. altre: // // // aa) disossate // // 02.05 // Lardo, escluso il lardo comportante parti magre (ventresca), grasso di maiale e grasso di volatili non pressati né fusi, né estratti con solventi, freschi, refrigerati, congelati, salati o in salamoia, secchi o affumicati: // // // A. Lardo: // // // I. fresco, refrigerato, congelato, salato o in salamoia // // // II. secco o affumicato // // 02.06 // Carni e frattaglie, commestibili, di qualsiasi specie (esclusi i fegati di volatili), salate o in salamoia, secche o affumicate: // // // B. della specie suina domestica: // // // I. Carni: // // // a) salate o in salamoia: // // // 1. Mezzene bacon o 3 / 4 anteriori // // // 2. 3 / 4 posteriori o parti centrali // // // 3. Prosciutti, anche in pezzi // // // 4. Parti anteriori o spalle, anche in pezzi // // // 5. Lombate, anche in pezzi // // // 6. Pancette, anche in pezzi // // // 7. altre: // // // aa) disossate // // // b) secche o affumicate: // // // 1. Prosciutti, anche in pezzi // // // 2. Parti anteriori o spalle, anche in pezzi // // // 3. Lombate, anche in pezzi // // // 4. Pancette, anche in pezzi // // // 5. altre: // // // aa) disossate // // // // // Numero della tariffa doganale comune // Designazione dei prodotti // // // // // // 15.01 // Strutto, altri grassi di maiale e grassi di volatili, pressati, fusi od estratti a mezzo di solventi: // // // A. Strutto e altri grassi di maiale: // // // II. altri // // 16.01 // Salsicce, salami e simili, di carni, di frattaglie o di sangue: // // // B. altri: // // // I. Salsicce e salami, stagionati, anche da spalmare, non cotti // // 16.02 // Altre preparazioni e conserve di carni o di frattaglie: // // // B. altre: // // // III. non nominate: // // // a) contenenti carne o frattaglie della specie suina domestica: // // // 2. altre, contenenti in peso: // // // aa) 80 % o più di carne e/o frattaglie, di ogni specie, compresi il lardo e i grassi, qualunque sia la loro natura o la loro origine: // // // 11. Prosciutti o lombate (ad esclusione dei collari), anche in pezzi // // // 22. Collari o spalle, anche in pezzi » // // // //


text:
 23.12.2019
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 L 332/13
 KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMFØRELSESFORORDNING (EU) 2019/2203
 af 16. december 2019
 om registrering af en betegnelse i registret over beskyttede oprindelsesbetegnelser og beskyttede geografiske betegnelser (»Sneem Black Pudding« (BGB))
 EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —
 under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde,
 under henvisning til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 af 21. november 2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer (1), særlig artikel 52, stk. 2, og
 ud fra følgende betragtninger:
 (1)
 Irlands ansøgning om registrering af betegnelsen »Sneem Black Pudding« er blevet offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende, jf. artikel 50, stk. 2, litra a), i forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 (2).
 (2)
 Da Kommissionen ikke har modtaget indsigelser, jf. artikel 51 i forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012, skal betegnelsen »Sneem Black Pudding« registreres —
 VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:
 Artikel 1
 Betegnelsen »Sneem Black Pudding« (BGB) registreres.
 Betegnelsen i stk. 1 henviser til et produkt i kategori 1.2. Kødprodukter (opvarmet, saltet, røget m.m.) i bilag XI til Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 668/2014 (3).
 Artikel 2
 Denne forordning træder i kraft på tyvendedagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
 Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 16. december 2019.
 På Kommissionens vegne
 For formanden
 Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI
 Medlem af Kommissionen
 (1) EUT L 343 af 14.12.2012, s. 1.
 (2) EUT C 273 af 14.8.2019, s. 7.
 (3) Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 668/2014 af 13. juni 2014 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer (EUT L 179 af 19.6.2014, s. 36).