type: other

text:
Forest Core - Page 3
 Mini-Me on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:01 am
 Nors įkasti pavyko, Flavijaus smūgis nustūmė padarą tiesiai į Project ašmenys. Atrodė lyg perrėžė gyviui puse kūno. Nuskridęs padaras atsistojo. Jo žaizdos užsivėrė, bet iš stovėsenos matėsi, kad žala buvo. Garsiai suurgzgęs, iš žemės išlindo šaknys ir pradėjo mosikuoti į Project.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:01 am
 Flavijus on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:02 am
 Flavijus įsiuto kai trenkė jį jo draugą ir puolė padarą su dar didesne jėga bandydamas jį perkirsti pusiau.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:02 am
 Project 4 on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:08 am
 Vyro dalgis buvo pernelyg lėtas, kad apsigintų nuo jų apstojusių šakų. Jos išraižė visą Project kūną, ir vargais negalais 'nušienavęs' paskutines šakas, vyras sunkiai laikėsi ant kojų - svirduliavo. Kol Flavijus puolė, jis gavo sekundę atsikvėpti. Vėl sutelkė srovę savo elektro dalgyje ir šovė į padarą.
 -Mirk, demone!
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:08 am
 Mini-Me on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:11 am
 Padaras įsirausė į žemę ir neketino judėti. Abiejų vaikinų atakas atrėmė su šakomis iš žemės. Vieną iš jų paleido į Flavijaus pilvą.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:11 am
 Flavijus on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:14 am
 Flavijus įsiuto ir kirto padarą iš paskutiniu jėgų.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:14 am
 Project 4 on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:30 am
 Project 4 sukaupė dar vieną iškrovą, tačiau ši mirgėjo žalia spalva. Jis paleido iškrovą į Flavijų. Šis galėjo jausti, kaip srovė nedegina, o šildo žaizdas ir padeda joms užsitraukti.
 [use overload]
 Mini-Me on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:33 am
 Flavijaus atakos nebuvo veiksmingos prieš šaknis. Padaras nustatė žvilgsnį į Project ir paleido vieną šaknį jam iš po kojų.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:33 am
 Flavijus on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:38 am
 Flavijus užsimojo kardu už nugaros per šoną, įtempė visus raumenis, girdėjosi kaip sanariai braška, iššoko visur kraujagyslės. Ir monstrišku balsu pradėjo rėkti norėdamas įbauginti padarą. Ir pritūpęs šoto tiesiai į padarą kirsdamas kartu.[Shadow strike]
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:38 am
 Project 4 on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:41 am
 Šaka tvojo Project į krūtinę, ir vyras nuskrido keletą metrų tolyn. Bet iš karto vėl atsikėlė, nors tai darė labai sunkiai.. Šarvai atrodė gerokai apgadinti, vietomis lakstė elektros iškrovos. Elektromanceris pakėlė savo dalgį ir pradėjo eiti link priešo. Žingsnis po žingsnio jis išsibėgo ir pašokęs kirto iš dalgio.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:41 am
 Flavijus on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:44 am
 Flavijus priėjo prie gulinčio padaro ir užsimojęs taikė jam į kaklą.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:44 am
 Project 4 on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:47 am
 Project 4 buvo priblokštas galingo Flavijaus smūgio. Tačiau nebuvo laiko apie tai šnekėto, reikėjo pribaigti priešą. Vyras užsimoju dalgiu bandydamas nukirsti būtybei galvą.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:47 am
 Mini-Me on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:49 am
 Nors du šuoliai judėjo per greitai, ir padaras buvo gan gerai supjaustytas, jis greitai pasislėpė šaknų kevale ir apsisaugojo nuo antrų kirčių. Viena iš šakų atšoko nuo padaro ir pasileido į Falviju.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:49 am
 Flavijus on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:51 am
 Flavijus nublokavęs ataką, spjovė į viską ir trenkė padarui iš galvos į galvą.
 Fate on Tue Jan 20, 2015 1:51 am


jurisdiction: US

text: b" UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE\n\n OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n\n\nSTATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHYLLIS K. FONG\n\n INSPECTOR GENERAL\n\n\n\n Before the\n\n HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE\n ON\n AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND DRUG\n ADMINISTRATION,\n AND\n RELATED AGENCIES\n\n\n February 17, 2005\n\x0c For release only by the House\n Committee on Appropriations\n\n\n\nGood morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for\n\ninviting me to testify before you today to discuss the activities of the Office of Inspector\n\nGeneral (OIG) and to provide you information from our work pertaining to the programs\n\nand operations of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.\n\n\n\nI would like to introduce the members of my senior management team who are here with\n\nme today: Joyce Fleischman, Deputy Inspector General; Robert Young, Assistant\n\nInspector General for Audit; Mark Woods, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations;\n\nand Walt Kowal, Director of our Business Management and Procurement Division.\n\n\n\nI am pleased with the opportunity to provide the Subcommittee with some of the\n\nhighlights of our audit and investigative activities over the past year, inform you about\n\nthe results we achieved, and give you a preview of projects of interest that are pending or\n\nare planned for FY 2005.\n\n\n\nTo ensure that our audit and investigative resources are directed at the most important\n\nchallenges facing USDA, we have begun planning, organizing, and budgeting our work\n\naccording to three major objectives that define our priorities.\n\x0c 2\n\nMy testimony today will be focused on our work directed towards the major challenges\n\nfacing the Department in the areas of Safety, Security and Public Health; Program\n\nIntegrity; and Management of Public Resources.\n\n\n\n I. Safety, Security, and Public Health\n\n\nThe highest priority for our audit and investigative work is to support USDA in the\n\nenhancement of effective safety and security measures to protect USDA and our nation\xe2\x80\x99s\n\nagricultural resources.\n\n\n\nFood Safety: Improving USDA Oversight and Inspection Systems\n\n\n\nEnsuring a safe domestic food supply and providing effective and reliable system of\n\nimport safeguards for foreign-produced food products is a vital responsibility of the\n\nDepartment. Public and congressional concerns continue regarding the ramifications of\n\nBovine Spongiform Encepholopathy (BSE) in Canada\xe2\x80\x99s cattle herd and its impact on the\n\nU.S. cattle market. We are continuing our work on the Department\xe2\x80\x99s surveillance efforts\n\nto detect and estimate the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. cattle herd. We are focusing our\n\nefforts on whether USDA has established effective management control processes over\n\ninspection-related activities, including animal disease surveillance programs. OIG will\n\ndevote significant audit and investigative resources to BSE and other Food Safety issues\n\nin FY 2005 to assist the Department as it addresses the challenging questions that have\n\narisen.\n\x0c 3\n\nInvestigating the USDA Response When BSE-Suspect Cattle Are Identified\n\n\n\nLast year I advised the Subcommittee that OIG was investigating allegations surrounding\n\nthe health status of the BSE-positive cow found in Washington State in December 2003.\n\nAllegations were raised in the media pertaining to the potential falsification of USDA\n\ninspection records that described the cow\xe2\x80\x99s condition before its BSE status was\n\nconfirmed. OIG investigated whether any USDA personnel or private parties provided\n\nfalse information or engaged in any intentional misconduct. We also examined whether\n\nUSDA personnel and employees of the beef processing facility followed proper\n\nprocedures during the inspection of the BSE-positive cow, and during their collection,\n\nhandling, and delivery of tissue samples from the infected cow.\n\n\n\nIn July 2004 testimony before a joint hearing of the House Agriculture and Government\n\nReform Committees on BSE issues, I reported that we found no instances where USDA\n\npersonnel knowingly conveyed false information or engaged in intentional misconduct.\n\nAPHIS and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) concluded that they accurately\n\nidentified the BSE-positive cow. We examined their work and agreed with their\n\nconclusion. OIG discovered no evidence that USDA personnel falsified any records\n\npertaining to the condition of the BSE cow at the time of inspection. Our investigation\n\nalso found that the former employee of the facility, who alleged that the BSE-positive\n\ncow was ambulatory and healthy when it arrived at the facility, described a different\n\nanimal from the one that arrived in the same trailer and later tested BSE-positive.\n\x0c 4\n\nA second OIG investigation into the handling of a BSE-suspect cow by Department\n\nofficials resulted from the premature condemnation of a cow in San Angelo, Texas. On\n\nMay 4, 2004, the FSIS Acting Regional Director in Dallas, Texas reported that a cow\n\nidentified as having Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms by an FSIS veterinarian at\n\na beef processing facility in San Angelo, Texas was not tested for BSE after it had been\n\nslaughtered. The initial decision by the FSIS Veterinary Medical Officer (VMO) on-site\n\nat the facility to test the cow for BSE was overturned by a senior APHIS official and the\n\ncow\xe2\x80\x99s carcass was subsequently sent to a rendering plant.\n\n\n\nOIG investigated whether an APHIS official in Austin, Texas, provided a false statement\n\nto USDA FSIS investigators during their inquiry into his decision not to test the animal at\n\nthe facility. The OIG investigation found no evidence that any of the USDA officials\n\nresponsible for the decision not to take brain tissue samples from the cow for BSE\n\ntesting, or any other USDA personnel, provided false information or engaged in\n\nintentional misconduct. The cow did not enter the food supply; its carcass was disposed\n\nof at a local landfill in accordance with applicable environmental standards.\n\n\n\nAfter the incident, FSIS and APHIS Veterinary Services announced a new joint policy\n\nregarding BSE sampling of condemned cattle at slaughter plants. The policy establishes\n\nprotocols for the agencies\xe2\x80\x99 responsibilities to obtain samples from condemned cattle\n\nexhibiting signs of CNS disorders, regardless of age.\n\x0c 5\n\nThe USDA BSE Surveillance Plan and BSE Enforcement Issues\n\n\n\nThe Department\xe2\x80\x99s testing of cattle for BSE had centered on high-risk cattle\xe2\x80\x94those that\n\nexhibit a CNS disorder or died from unclear causes. After the discovery of a BSE-\n\ninfected animal in Washington State December 2003, APHIS expanded its surveillance\n\nprogram beginning June 1, 2004.\n\n\n\nAs I testified last year, we initiated an audit to assess whether the surveillance program in\n\nplace in December 2003 had been adequately implemented, and whether the expanded\n\nprogram would accomplish its stated goal to determine if \xe2\x80\x9c\xe2\x80\xa6BSE is actually present in\n\nthe population and if so, at what level.\xe2\x80\x9d We concluded that several limitations inherent in\n\nthe expanded sampling plan needed to be clarified to convey what the results of the\n\nesting actually imply. Among the major issues we identified were: sampling was not\n\ntruly random because participation in the program is voluntary; APHIS could not obtain a\n\nstatistically appropriate geographical representation of the U.S. cattle population, so the\n\nchances of detecting BSE, if it exists, would be reduced; and the projected maximum\n\nBSE prevalence rate may be unreliable.\n\n\n\nOur review also determined that cattle condemned at slaughter plants for CNS disorders\n\nwere not always tested for BSE. The Department needed to increase testing of rabies-\n\nnegative brain samples from animals that exhibit clinical signs not inconsistent with BSE.\n\nAt the time of our review, a process for obtaining samples from cattle that \xe2\x80\x9cdied on the\n\x0c 6\n\nfarm\xe2\x80\x9d had not been developed. USDA also needed to standardize the age requirement for\n\nBSE testing.\n\n\n\nBased on our audit findings, we recommended that APHIS fully disclose the assumptions\n\nbehind its sampling plan, clarify the limitations, and ensure that all high-risk animals are\n\nsampled and tested in accordance with USDA policy and the 2004 Surveillance Plan. We\n\nalso recommended that APHIS expedite development of a new system to track and report\n\naccomplishments, and implement performance measures and a continuous risk\n\nassessment. APHIS agreed with all of our recommendations and advised OIG it is\n\nmoving to correct the weaknesses we identified.\n\n\n\nCurrently, OIG has four audits in progress pertaining to BSE. In our BSE Surveillance\n\nProgram \xe2\x80\x93 Phase II audit, OIG is monitoring the Department\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of its\n\nBSE Expanded Surveillance Program, involving both APHIS and FSIS. This audit will\n\nevaluate the effectiveness of APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 expanded BSE Surveillance program; whether BSE\n\nlaboratories are meeting their objectives and are in compliance with program policies and\n\nprocedures for conducting tests on submitted BSE samples and reporting test results to\n\nAPHIS and stakeholders; and if APHIS and FSIS took prompt and proper corrective\n\nactions in response to recommendations in the BSE Surveillance Program - Phase I audit\n\nreport previously cited.\n\n\n\nIn our Phase III review we will evaluate whether the USDA enforcement of the ban on\n\nspecified risk materials (SRMs) in meat products and controls to prevent central nervous\n\x0c 7\n\nsystem (CNS) tissue in advanced meat recovery (AMR) product have been effectively\n\nimplemented. The review will also cover FSIS ante mortem condemnation procedures\n\nand procedures for obtaining brain tissue samples from condemned cattle for BSE testing.\n\nOur target date for completing these two efforts is early summer, 2005.\n\n\n\nThis week, we released our audit of the Department\xe2\x80\x99s (APHIS, FSIS) Oversight of the\n\nImportation of Beef Products from Canada. In May 2003, USDA halted imports of live\n\ncattle, ruminants, and ruminant products from Canada after a Canadian cow tested\n\npositive for BSE. In August 2003, the Department announced that it would allow the\n\nimportation of low-risk beef and other ruminant products from Canada. In response to\n\nCongressional concerns, we evaluated APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 oversight of Canadian beef imports and\n\nwhether proper controls were established to ensure that only low-risk product entered the\n\nU.S. Among our key objectives were to determine whether APHIS met existing\n\nregulatory and policy requirements regarding permits that allowed the importation of\n\nsome Canadian beef products; and whether APHIS properly considered and implemented\n\nrisk-mitigation measures for animal and public health. We found that while APHIS\n\nallowed the import of beef products they considered low risk in an attempt to further\n\ntrade, they did not publicly communicate or explain their actions to all interested parties.\n\nAPHIS changed its policies relating to required risk mitigation measures to allow the\n\nimport of low-risk product produced at facilities that also handled higher risk product,\n\nthereby increasing the potential risk for cross-contamination. OIG made a number of\n\nrecommendations that would strengthen the USDA process for communicating such\n\nchanges in policy and improve controls over Canadian beef product imports. The\n\x0c 8\n\nDepartment has generally agreed with our recommendations and has identified a number of\n\npositive actions to address these concerns.\n\n\n\nFinally, we are completing an audit to evaluate the adequacy of a recall of ineligible\n\nproduct from Canada and will be reporting our results to you.\n\n\n\nFood Contamination and Recall Activities\n\n\nIn my testimony before the Subcommittee for the last two years, I discussed OIG work\n\nregarding FSIS recall operations that involved the adulteration of ground beef products\n\nby Escherichia coli (E. coli) in a Colorado plant. Our audit of the Colorado facility\n\ndetermined that the facility and FSIS had not fulfilled their responsibilities under the\n\nHazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system. OIG made extensive\n\nrecommendations to improve their inspection processes and recall procedures in this\n\naudit. As a result, FSIS directed plants to reassess their HACCP plans for raw ground\n\nbeef products and issued a directive requiring inspectors to obtain processing plants\xe2\x80\x99\n\npathogen test results at least on a weekly basis. FSIS issued a second directive that\n\nclarified when \xe2\x80\x98trace-back\xe2\x80\x99 samples should be taken, and that suppliers shall be notified\n\nof test results.\n\n\n\nAt the time of my testimony last year, two audits on Listeria adulteration recalls were still\n\nunderway. In two audit reports issued in June 2004, we determined that similar to the\n\nColorado recall incident, weaknesses in FSIS\xe2\x80\x99 management control and oversight of the\n\nrecall process were again evident. In response to our recommendations, FSIS issued a\n\x0c 9\n\nnew directive on recall procedures, which implemented a process for selecting customers\n\nfor effectiveness checks, and enhanced instructions to agency personnel for performing\n\neffectiveness checks on products distributed to the National School Lunch Program. We\n\nare still working with FSIS to address the development of a supportable methodology for\n\ndetermining the success, or failure, of a recall.\n\n\n\nRegarding our investigative work on incidents of food adulteration, we investigated the\n\nowner of a California food service management storage and distribution business for\n\nsupplying 47 California school districts with poultry products containing rodent hair,\n\nfeces, and signs of being gnawed by rodents. The owner and plant manager were\n\nconvicted, placed on probation, and fined over $10,000.\n\n\n\n\nControls Over Germplasm Storage Material and Genetically Engineered Organism\n\nField Testing\n\n\n\nUSDA plays a major role in regulating and monitoring genetically engineered organisms\n\n(GEOs), ranging from the storing of germplasm used to produce seeds for such crops, to\n\napproving field tests of genetically engineered crops, to monitoring the movement and\n\nimport of GEO crops. In March 2004, we issued a report on the adequacy of USDA\n\ncontrols over the identification, accountability, and security of plant germplasm at USDA\n\nfacilities. We found that guidance and policies were lacking and that inventory\n\naccountability and physical security needed improvement. The agencies responsible for\n\x0c 10\n\nstoring germplasm and controlling its movement (ARS and APHIS), agreed to take action\n\non our recommendations.\n\n\n\nBecause of the sensitivity and potential impact biotechnology has on U.S. trade, we are\n\ncontinuing our work in this area. We have an audit that is nearing completion that will\n\nreport our evaluation of USDA controls over field tests and movements of GEOs. We are\n\nexamining APHIS\xe2\x80\x99 procedures for approving, controlling, and monitoring field tests of\n\ngenetically engineered crops to prevent the inadvertent release of GEOs in the\n\nenvironment. Uncontrolled and inadvertent release of GEOs, particularly high-risk\n\nGEOs such as those containing pharmaceutical and industrial compounds, can not only\n\nseriously impact the safety of the food supply, but adversely impact trade. Further, the\n\ngenetic diversity of plant life can be compromised. We expect to issue a final report on\n\nour work by late spring.\n\n\n\nHomeland Security and Program Implementation\n\n\nWe place a high priority on work that will assist USDA officials in strengthening the\n\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s defenses against threats to our nation\xe2\x80\x99s food supply, production agriculture,\n\nand Federal facilities.\n\n\nWe reviewed the Department\xe2\x80\x99s progress in addressing the specific security, inventory,\n\nand access deficiencies identified in a previous OIG report on USDA research\n\nlaboratories, and examined its implementation of new policies to improve controls on\n\ninventories and biosecurity. To do so, OIG made unannounced visits to 16 laboratories\n\x0c 11\n\npreviously identified as having deficiencies. We found that while agency officials had\n\nmade great progress to implement biosecurity measures, particularly for BSL-3\n\nlaboratories, further improvement is needed with respect to accountable records, internal\n\nreviews, and cybersecurity.\n\n\n\n\nOur work has shown that subjects of OIG investigations are also of interest to other\n\nmembers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces. This\n\nhas led to several recent cases. OIG participated in the FBI\xe2\x80\x99s JTTF in Columbus, Ohio,\n\nand we assisted in the investigation of an individual for providing material support to the\n\nal Qaeda terrorist network. The individual pled guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia\n\nto one count of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to al Qaeda, and one\n\ncount of Providing Material Support and Resources to al Qaeda. He was sentenced to\n\n20 years in prison.\n\n\n\nOIG created a nationwide task force in order to coordinate with Federal, State and local\n\nlaw enforcement agencies in identifying and prosecuting violators who steal infant\n\nformula from large chain stores. Stolen infant formula is a nationwide problem due to the\n\nresale value of the merchandise on the black market and the potential for overseas\n\ntransfers of the illegal proceeds. OIG is particularly concerned with the health and\n\nwholesomeness of the stolen infant formula because previous investigation indicates it is\n\noften relabeled and resold in smaller grocery stores \xe2\x80\x93 often through the Women, Infants,\n\nand Children (WIC) program. We have found that expired, stolen infant formula is often\n\nrelabeled with new expiration dates and some of the relabeled formula does not contain\n\x0c 12\n\nthe nutrients/ingredients listed on the label. Currently, we have 14 open investigations\n\ninvolving stolen infant formula. We are working with JTTFs in order to assist other\n\nfederal and local law enforcement agencies and to insure that this issue remains an\n\ninvestigative priority.\n\n\n\nEvaluation of the Implementation of the Listed Agent or Toxin Regulations\n\n\n\nSelect agents or toxins are those biological agents listed by APHIS as having the potential\n\nto pose a severe threat to animal and plant health or to animal and plant products. APHIS\n\nis required by The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response\n\nAct to ensure that anyone possessing, using, or transferring these agents is registered with\n\nthe Government.\n\n\n\nWe are examining whether adequate controls are in place at APHIS headquarters to\n\nensure that entities known to use or store listed agents or toxins are registered, that\n\nlaboratory reported security measures are assessed, and that movement of select agents\n\nbetween scientists and laboratories can be documented and tracked. We are also\n\nparticipating in an Interagency Working Group reviewing the export licensing process for\n\nbiological and chemical commodities. The Interagency Working Group is interested in\n\nthe responsibilities and actions of APHIS concerning the possession, use, and transfer of\n\nbiological agents and toxins and their relationship to export licensing.\n\x0c 13\n\nHomeland Security-Related Audit Work Planned in FY 2005\n\n\n\nWe have several security-related audits that we expect to begin work on in FY 2005.\n\nOIG will conduct an audit on the Department\xe2\x80\x99s implementation of the Bioterrorism Act\n\nof 2002. This Act requires, in part, that warehouses and elevators that are used to store\n\ngovernment-owned commodities register with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)\n\nand establish and maintain records that can be used to identify producers. We will assess\n\nwhether USDA has properly verified or required FDA registration and compliance prior\n\nto entering into storage agreements with warehouse and elevator firms. We will also\n\nfollow-up on our prior audit of Forest Service (FS) security over explosives/munitions\n\nmagazines located within the National Forest System (NFS). We will assess FS\xe2\x80\x99 action\n\nto implement our prior recommendations and determine if explosives/munitions\n\nmagazines are adequately secured.\n\n\n\nProtecting the Safety of USDA Employees\n\n\nA fundamental duty of OIG is to expeditiously investigate any incidents of violence or\n\nthreats of violence against USDA employees. USDA employees must be protected\n\nagainst harassment or intimidation as they discharge their duties, whether they are\n\nengaged in protecting public safety as food inspectors, or serving as law enforcement\n\npersonnel in our National Forests. Last fall, OIG helped secure a conviction for a crime\n\nthat took the lives of two dedicated FSIS employees. In October 2004, after a 6-month\n\x0c 14\n\njury trial in Alameda County, California, the owner of a sausage factory was convicted of\n\nhomicide with special circumstances (1st degree murder) for the murder of two FSIS\n\nCompliance Officers and one California Department of Food and Agriculture Investigator\n\nwhile they were on official business at his facility in June 2000. In January, the jury\n\nrecommended that the owner be sentenced to death for this crime. An OIG Special Agent\n\nplayed a primary role in investigating the murders and assisting the prosecution\xe2\x80\x99s case.\n\nSentencing by the judge is imminent.\n\n\n\nLast week, OIG submitted our statutorily-mandated investigative report to Congress\n\npertaining to the deaths of two FS employees who died fighting the Cramer Fire in the\n\nSalmon-Challis National Forest (Idaho). OIG found that certain FS personnel at the Fire,\n\nprimarily the Incident Commander, failed to comply with established FS firefighting\n\npolicies and tactics. Our investigation found that the contract firefighting teams who\n\nwere brought in to assist FS firefighters performed poorly. Therefore, we initiated a\n\nreview of FS\xe2\x80\x99 use of private contract crews, to determine the effectiveness of FS\xe2\x80\x99\n\nprocedures and oversight pertaining to the contract crews\xe2\x80\x99 readiness, training\n\ncertifications, and communication proficiencies, among other issues.\n\n\n\n\nII. Reducing USDA Program Vulnerabilities and Enhancing Program Integrity\n\n\n\n\nOIG\xe2\x80\x99s second priority is to help USDA reduce vulnerabilities and ensure or restore\n\nintegrity in the various benefit and entitlement programs of USDA, including a variety of\n\x0c 15\n\nprograms that provide payments directly and indirectly to individuals or entities.\n\n\n\n\nTargeting Risk and Improper Payments Within USDA\n\n\n\nThe Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) requires the head of each agency\n\nto annually review all programs and activities the agency administers to identify those\n\nthat may be susceptible to significant improper payments. Once these programs are\n\nidentified, the agencies must estimate the annual amount of improper payments and, if\n\nthe estimate is over $10 million and greater than 2.5 percent of program payments, report\n\nthe estimate to Congress along with the actions the agency is taking to reduce those\n\nimproper payments. The Department\xe2\x80\x99s farm programs and food and nutrition programs,\n\nwhich amounted to $34 billion and $46 billion respectively last year, are subject to this\n\nstatute\xe2\x80\x99s requirements. Three primary agencies (Risk Management Agency (RMA),\n\nFarm Service Agency (FSA), and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS))\n\nadminister USDA\xe2\x80\x99s crop insurance, crop disaster, and conservation programs,\n\nrespectively, while the feeding programs are administered by the Food and Nutrition\n\nService (FNS). We audited implementation of the IPIA in these agencies.\n\n\n\nWe found that FNS had available information from numerous sources to establish\n\nbaseline information the agency could have used to establish error rates for feeding\n\nprograms in response to OMB\xe2\x80\x99s data request for improper payment information.\n\x0c 16\n\nHowever, the agency did not believe the information was statistically valid and therefore\n\ncould not be used to report on improper payments.\n\n\n\nOur review of IPIA implementation in FSA and NRCS disclosed little progress being\n\nmade. The agencies did not take necessary action to comply with the Act and implement\n\nOMB\xe2\x80\x99s guidance. The agencies stated the guidance provided by OMB and the\n\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s Office of Chief Financial Office (OCFO) was unclear and therefore they\n\nwere unsure of what actions to take. Our audit of the OCFO\xe2\x80\x99s implementation measures\n\ndisclosed that OCFO\xe2\x80\x99s direction and guidance to the agencies needs to be strengthened,\n\nin order to provide reasonable assurance that program areas vulnerable to improper\n\npayments are fully identified. We will continue to monitor the Department\xe2\x80\x99s\n\nimplementation of the IPIA.\n\n\n\nWe have initiated a multi-faceted and comprehensive review of USDA's farm programs\n\nto identify improper payments and address fraud and abuse. This initiative is now\n\nfocusing on crop insurance, disaster payments, and payment limitations, but will be\n\nexpanded to other USDA farm programs. Our audit and investigative staffs, which have\n\nextensive experience with these programs, are now reviewing previously conducted\n\naudits and investigations and compiling data on program vulnerabilities and their causes.\n\nEfforts will then shift to the development of innovative solutions and the means to\n\nidentify abuse. OIG is working with RMA this year to access and learn how to better use\n\ndata mining tools that will help us proactively target crop insurance fraud by farmers,\n\nagents, and adjustors involving suspicious patterns of claims. Our computer forensics\n\x0c 17\n\nunit will play a major role in the latter phase as it will use its recently enhanced capability\n\nto develop processes that will analyze, manipulate, and cross-match computer data in the\n\nvarious agencies' databases and detect those most likely to be involved in abuse. We\n\nwere very successful in our initial development of computerized targeting of fraud in the\n\nFood Stamp Program and hope to achieve similar success with USDA's farm programs.\n\nWe also plan to work with RMA to enhance our ability to use satellite imagery to\n\nstrengthen the hard evidence used in crop insurance fraud cases.\n\n\n\n\nFood and Nutrition Programs\n\n\n\nOIG has continued to work with FNS to improve program integrity and to identify\n\nimprovements in program administration. In FY 2004, we evaluated internal controls\n\nrelated to National School Lunch Program (NSLP) meal accountability, procurement, and\n\naccounting systems in six States. We identified control weaknesses in meal\n\naccountability procedures, including lack of proper edit checks to ensure the accuracy of\n\nthe daily meal counts and claims for reimbursement, and procurement procedures. For\n\ninstance, in the 2000 school year, the Philadelphia school district claimed reimbursement\n\nfor 241,852 meals served in excess of students in attendance, 147,954 meals in the\n\nincorrect reimbursement category, and 109,778 more free and reduced-price meals than\n\ncould be supported by approved applications and direct certifications. This resulted in\n\nexcess reimbursements of over $800,000. In Chicago, nearly 27 percent of the 598\n\nschools in the district submitted undetected inflated meal claims, over-claiming 642,102\n\nbreakfasts and lunches in the period of October 2003 \xe2\x80\x93 May 2004. Due to the school\n\x0c 18\n\ndistrict\xe2\x80\x99s limited oversight, we questioned over $1.2 million in program funds, and\n\nrecommended collection of over $650,000.\n\n\n\nIn FY 2004, FNS received about $5 million to enhance program integrity in Child\n\nNutrition Programs by expanding assessment of certification accuracy in the school\n\nmeals programs. FNS is using this funding to conduct a study aimed at providing a\n\nreliable, national estimate of over and under payments in the NSLP and the School\n\nBreakfast Program (SBP). The study will analyze data for school year 2005-2006 and we\n\nwill monitor the study results to assure it meets its intended purpose. Depending on the\n\nsignificance of the error rates that will be identified by the study, FNS should be better\n\nable to determine whether changes are needed in eligibility requirements for NSLP and\n\nSBP to reduce ineligible participation.\n\n\n\nOIG also conducted investigations involving over $1 million dollars in false claims\n\ninvolving inflated meal claims for reimbursement from the NSLP and the Child and\n\nAdult Care Feeding Program. Through court actions we have recovered $570,000 in\n\nCalifornia, Louisiana, and Wisconsin, and have $1 million in claims pending in a New\n\nYork case along with three persons sentenced from 6 to 30 months in prison.\n\n\n\nFood Stamp Program Investigations\n\n\n\nIllegal trafficking in Food Stamp Program (FSP) benefits, whether issued through\n\nelectronic benefits transfers (EBT) systems or food coupons, continues to be a major area\n\x0c 19\n\nof concern. Over the last year, we spent approximately 20 percent of our investigative\n\ntime on investigations of FSP fraud. The use of EBT systems to deliver FSP benefits, in\n\naddition to saving administrative program costs by eliminating costs of printing, issuing,\n\nand reconciling millions of paper food stamps every month, has also provided a wealth of\n\nelectronic data of enormous benefit in detecting and investigating suspicious patterns of\n\nactivity and in compiling evidence that is used to successfully prosecute corrupt retailers.\n\n\n\nUsing the Computer Forensic Unit\xe2\x80\x99s (CFU) capabilities, we can analyze the EBT\n\ndatabase and track recipient and store redemption patterns to prove fraud and determine\n\nthe total amount of money involved. The investigation of an authorized store in Chicago\n\nillustrates how we are able to use the data. The subjects of the investigation had moved\n\nthe authorized point of sale device to different locations in Chicago so they could\n\nexchange cash for EBT benefits away from the authorized store. We were able to\n\nanalyze the EBT data to track recipient and store redemption patterns to prove the fraud\n\nas well as determine the total amount of fraud involved in the case. For example,\n\nrecipients redeemed benefits in two stores that were miles apart and physically\n\nimpossible to travel to in the time indicated in the redemption data. Our work resulted in\n\nfour individuals being sentenced to serve from 15 to 57 months in prison and ordered to\n\npay $29.1 million in restitution.\n\n\n\nRMA: Reducing IT Security and Operations Vulnerabilities\n\n\n\nThe Risk Management Agency administers the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation\n\x0c 20\n\n(FCIC) and oversees all programs authorized under the Federal Crop Insurance Act.\n\nRMA\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2004 crop year potential liability exceeded $46 billion. FCIC\xe2\x80\x99s 2004 crop\n\nyear premium subsidy and producer-paid premiums are $2.5 billion and $1.6 billion,\n\nrespectively. As of August 30, 2004, insurance indemnities paid on the 2003 crop year\n\nwere $3.2 billion.\n\n\n\nWe audited RMA\xe2\x80\x99s IT security and operations, which disclosed serious internal control\n\nweaknesses in the overall management and organizational structure for these activities.\n\nRMA\xe2\x80\x99s IT environment is highly vulnerable due, in part, to the overall control of IT\n\noperations by production managers who also control the financial commitments and\n\noutlays. This vulnerability resulted in material noncompliance with OMB and\n\nPresidential Decision Directives. Our electronic vulnerability scans of RMA\xe2\x80\x99s network\n\nrevealed over 300 high- and medium-risk vulnerabilities, insufficient system policy\n\nsettings, and serious and recurring access control weaknesses, compounded by inadequate\n\nfirewalls and intrusion detection devices. Overall, RMA managers did not adhere to the\n\nDepartment\xe2\x80\x99s system development lifecycle methodology for software application\n\ndevelopment, installation, and/or maintenance.\n\n\n\nWe recommended that RMA provide sufficient resources to its new Chief Information\n\nOfficer to effectively oversee IT security and preclude undue influence by production\n\nmanagers. We, additionally, recommended that RMA include the noted material control\n\nweaknesses in its Federal Managers\xe2\x80\x99 Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) report, take\n\nimmediate action to eliminate the vulnerabilities noted, and establish appropriate policies,\n\x0c 21\n\nprocedures, and controls for the agency\xe2\x80\x99s IT operations. We also recommended that\n\nRMA obtain background investigations for all IT contractor employees before access to\n\nsystems, hardware, and facilities is authorized. RMA officials have indicated that they\n\nplan to take aggressive action by prioritizing the recommendations and acting first on\n\nthose that will mitigate the FMFIA material internal control weakness. We will follow-\n\nup to see that corrective actions will be taken.\n\n\n\nRMA: Investigations Into Crop Insurance Payment Fraud\n\n\n\nWe have a number of investigations ongoing into crop insurance fraud, as well as disaster\n\npayment fraud. Most of these investigations involve substantial dollar amounts. For\n\nexample, in two of our cases, OIG investigated 9 persons who schemed to gain over $20\n\nmillion in fraudulent RMA and FSA payments. The investigations have resulted in\n\nforfeiture of $13 million in cash and property to the government in order to recoup some\n\nof these losses. One of the persons has been sentenced to 60 months in prison and the\n\nothers pled guilty and are waiting to be sentenced.\n\n\n\n\nFSA: Investigations into Payment Limitation Fraud\n\n\n\nIn addition to fraud cases involving crop insurance and disaster payments, we have a\n\nnumber of open investigations pursuing fraud involving payment limitations. Our\n\ninvestigations have found variations of a common scheme, such as: fraudulently\n\nincluding the names of individuals on farm operating plans who do not meet FSA\xe2\x80\x99s\n\x0c 22\n\nrequirement that one be \xe2\x80\x9cactively engaged in farming operations\xe2\x80\x9d; establishing farming\n\npartnerships where alleged partners do not actually share in the farming operation; failing\n\nto disclose that partners in one farming partnership have an interest in another farming\n\noperation; and falsifying documents to hide the fact that the financial accounts are\n\nactually commingled with those of another farming entity.\n\n\n\nAs an example, OIG investigated a case of fraud committed by one of Mississippi\xe2\x80\x99s\n\nlargest farmers and his brother. This resulted in both of them pleading guilty in June\n\n2004 to conspiracy to defraud FSA of $11.2 million in subsidy program payments,\n\nsubmitting false statements to FSA, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and\n\nwitness tampering. The plea agreement included the criminal forfeiture of approximately\n\n400 acres and one of the farmer\xe2\x80\x99s houses that had been built with the proceeds from this\n\nscheme. The farmer\xe2\x80\x99s accountant actively participated in the conspiracy and also pled\n\nguilty. From 1999 through 2001, the conspirators created 13 partnerships and 64\n\ndifferent corporations to fraudulently obtain payments from FSA and RMA. They\n\nrecruited and paid individuals for the use of their names and Social Security numbers to\n\nsecure enough stockholders for each entity and misrepresented those names to FSA to\n\nobtain the subsidy payments. The conspirators also attempted to persuade those\n\nindividuals to testify falsely before a Federal grand jury and to OIG agents. The farmer\n\nwas sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and ordered to repay $11.2 million to the\n\ngovernment in restitution. The brother was fined $5,000 and sentenced to 2 years\n\nprobation. The accountant was sentenced to 7 months imprisonment and fined $20,000.\n\x0c 23\n\nNatural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)\n\n\n\nWe are also evaluating the potential for improper payments in NRCS conservation\n\nprograms, as well as determining the impact of any improper payments on other farm\n\nprogram payments. Under various conservation programs administered by NRCS, the\n\nGovernment pays landowners to take marginal agricultural land out of production and put\n\nit into environmentally friendly conservation uses. At the same time, FSA agricultural\n\nprograms provide payments to eligible producers predicated on the number of crop-\n\nspecific \xe2\x80\x9cbase acres\xe2\x80\x9d on the farm used for agricultural activities, as determined by FSA.\n\nIn general, producers are prohibited from receiving both an NRCS conservation easement\n\npayment and FSA agricultural program payments on the same base acres. Landowners\n\nare also paid for conservation easements based on agency appraisals. If appraised values\n\nare not properly established, significant overpayments can be made for conservation\n\neasements. We are finalizing our work and expect to release a report by late spring,\n\n2005.\n\n\n\n III. USDA\xe2\x80\x99s Management of Public Resources\n\n\n\nOIG conducts audits and investigations that focus on improved financial management\n\nand accountability, information technology security and management, protection of\n\npublic assets, employee corruption, Forest Service resources, and rural development\n\nprograms, among others.\n\x0c 24\n\nFinancial Management and Accountability\n\n\n\nBoth the Congress and the President\xe2\x80\x99s Management Agenda have placed emphasis on\n\nimproving financial management in all Federal Departments. Improvements made by the\n\nDepartment to its financial systems have allowed USDA to maintain an unqualified\n\nopinion on its consolidated financial statements for the third consecutive year. While this\n\nis a major achievement, the Department still needs to improve its financial management\n\nprocesses to correct internal control weaknesses. Strong financial management is\n\nrequired to ensure the availability of accurate and timely financial data needed to\n\nproperly manage USDA programs.\n\n\n\nInformation Technology (IT), Security, and Management\n\n\n\nIn 2004, we assessed the adequacy of IT security in the Rural Development (RD) mission\n\narea; Risk Management Agency; APHIS; the Economic Research Service; the Grain\n\nInspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA); the Office of Budget and\n\nProgram Analysis; and the Office of the Chief Economist. Advances in technology have\n\nincreased the Department\xe2\x80\x99s vulnerability to unlawful destruction and penetration by hackers\n\nand other individuals. USDA agencies manage multi-billion dollar programs that are\n\nintegral to homeland security, food safety, and critical infrastructure that must be protected.\n\nWe found weaknesses in IT security programs due to inadequate implementation at each\n\nagency we reviewed. IT security improvements are still needed at USDA\xe2\x80\x99s second largest\n\x0c 25\n\ndata center, the Office of the Chief Information Officer/National Information Technology\n\nCenter\xe2\x80\x99s (OCIO/NITC). We recommended improvements in access controls, security\n\nplans, risk assessments, disaster recovery plans, and identification and correction of\n\npotential system vulnerabilities. OCIO stated that corrective action either has been taken\n\nor is underway to address each issue.\n\n\n\n IV. FY 2006 BUDGET REQUEST\n\n\nWe are very proud of the accomplishments of OIG and pleased to report that in FY 2004\n\nwe continued to more than pay our own way. In the investigations arena, OIG issued\n\n425 investigative reports that resulted in 370 indictments and 350 convictions. These\n\nactions resulted in $292.9 million in fines, restitutions, other recoveries, and penalties\n\nduring the year. In the audit arena, we issued 97 audit reports and management made\n\ndecisions based on 77 of the reports. Our audits resulted in questioned and unsupported\n\ncosts of $15.2 million. Of this, management agreed to recover $9.2 million. In addition,\n\nmanagement agreed to put another $748.2 million to better use. Equally as important,\n\nimplementation of our recommendations by USDA managers will result in more efficient\n\nand effective operations of USDA programs.\n\n\n\nDuring the past year, we have continued to review and evaluate OIG activities and made\n\nchanges as needed to provide the most effective support to the Department\xe2\x80\x99s programs\n\nand operations. One of our most critical efforts continues to be in our information\n\ntechnology (IT) arena. With the essential funding provided by this Committee, we were\n\nable to continue rebuilding our crucial IT infrastructure. Specifically, the agency was\n\x0c 26\n\nable to continue improvements and updates to the network operating system and\n\nassociated software. In addition, new servers were acquired for headquarters and each\n\nregional office. These servers include remote management capabilities, which should\n\nallow quicker resolution and more efficient use of resources. We have also successfully\n\nmirrored our program databases at two locations. This balances workload during normal\n\noperations and provides a real-time backup if a major outage or emergency would occur\n\nat one of the sites.\n\n\n\nWe are continuing to see results through improvement in our audit processes and our\n\ninvestigative forensic efforts. The new IT equipment and specialized software has\n\ncontinued to help OIG complete its audits faster and target its analyses to the highest\n\nUSDA risk areas. The reduced staff time allows OIG to review additional high-risk or\n\nvulnerable programs and operations. As I mentioned earlier, we also plan to continue to\n\nincrease our use of our IT capabilities to further our effort in the improper payments area.\n\n\n\nFor example, we use automated data mining and analysis software to extract, sort,\n\nanalyze, and summarize large volumes of financial and program data to support our\n\nopinions on USDA agency and consolidated financial audits. In contrast, in a manual\n\nenvironment, analysis of such large volumes of data would not be feasible for OIG due to\n\nresource constraints and mandatory audit deadlines.\n\n\n\nOn the Investigations side, the IT funding has allowed our Computer Forensics Unit\n\n(CFU) to process cases utilizing the most up-to-date forensic hardware and software\n\x0c 27\n\ntools. The CFU has also designed and developed its own specialized software, for\n\nexample, to analyze millions of food stamp EBT transactions in order to identify fraud in\n\nthis program. An example of the CFU\xe2\x80\x99s capabilities was demonstrated during the\n\ninvestigation of a recent $3 million rural development business and industrial loan fraud\n\ninvestigation. During the execution of a search warrant, a laptop was seized and the\n\nsubjects stated that the laptop had been \xe2\x80\x9creformatted\xe2\x80\x9d and that nothing would be found on\n\nthe laptop. Through CFU analysis, a copy of Quick Books was found on the restored\n\ncomputer; once recovered, we were able to prove how the fraud was committed.\n\nHardware and software used in CFU allow servers and workstations to be restored in a\n\nforensics laboratory setting, meeting required professional and judicial standards in a\n\nmanner that maintains the integrity of the data so that they can be used in a court of law.\n\nThese forensic tools must be regularly upgraded and replaced in order to keep pace with\n\nthe ever-changing IT hardware and software standards and investigative needs.\n\n\n\nAgain, I want to especially thank the Committee for its support in this area.\n\n\n\nThe President\xe2\x80\x99s FY 2006 request of $81 million for OIG provides for an increase of\n\n$1.6 million for mandatory pay costs and $1.7 million for program changes. The\n\nprogram change increases are $1.1 million to fund the Nationwide Emergency Response\n\nProgram, $300,000 for continued improvements to the CFU, and $300,000 for secure IT\n\ncommunications at the \xe2\x80\x9csecret\xe2\x80\x9d level. The increase for the Emergency Response\n\nProgram will allow OIG to staff, train, and equip specially trained, quick-response teams\n\nto investigate biohazard threats against American agriculture and, as mandated by\n\x0c 28\n\nP.L. 107-203, the duty-related deaths of FS firefighters. The increase for the CFU will be\n\nprimarily for a storage network to efficiently store voluminous amounts of electronic\n\nevidence that can potentially translate to higher case convictions. The increase for secure\n\ncommunications will allow OIG to target IT investments to enable our special agents and\n\nauditors to access Homeland Security information at the \xe2\x80\x9csecret\xe2\x80\x9d level.\n\n\n\nI believe adequate funding for our OIG activities makes good sense. OIG audits and\n\ninvestigations save money for the taxpayers, help ensure the safety and wholesomeness\n\nof the Nation\xe2\x80\x99s food supply, promote USDA Homeland Security efforts, and ensure the\n\nintegrity of USDA programs. As such, I support the President\xe2\x80\x99s budget request for OIG.\n\n\n\nThis concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear\n\nbefore you today and would be pleased to respond to any questions you and the\n\nCommittee may have at this time.\n\n\n\n\n *****\n\x0c"


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 17.12.2011
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 370/15
 Sodba Sodišča (šesti senat) z dne 27. oktobra 2011 – Evropska komisija proti Helenski republiki
 (Zadeva C-601/10) (1)
 (Neizpolnitev obveznosti države - Direktivi 92/50/EGS in 2004/18/ES - Javna naročila storitev - Dodatne storitve vpisovanja v kataster in urbanističnega načrtovanja - Postopek s pogajanji brez predhodne objave obvestila o naročilu)
 2011/C 370/25
 Jezik postopka: grščina
 Stranki
 Tožeča stranka: Evropska komisija (zastopnika: M. Patakia in D. Kukovec, zastopnika)
 Tožena stranka: Helenska republika (zastopnika: S. Chala in D. Tsagkaraki, zastopnika)
 Predmet
 Neizpolnitev obveznosti države – Kršitev členov 8 in 11(3) Direktive Sveta 92/50/EGS z dne 18. junija 1992 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 6, zvezek 1, str. 322) ter členov 20 in 31(4) Direktive 2004/18/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 31. marca 2004 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 6, zvezek 7, str. 132) – Oddaja naročila brez predhodne objave obvestila o naročilu – Pogodba o dodatnih storitvah vpisovanja v kataster in urbanističnega načrtovanja – Občine Vasilikon, Kassandras, Egnatiias in Arethousas
 Izrek
 1.
 Helenska republika s tem, da je v postopku s pogajanji in brez predhodne objave obvestila o naročilu, oddala javno naročilo, katerega predmet so bile dodatne storitve vpisovanja v kataster in urbanističnega načrtovanja, ki niso bile zajete v prvotni pogodbi, sklenjeni z občinami Vasilika, Kassandra, Egnatia in Arethousa, ni izpolnila obveznosti iz členov 8 in 11(3) Direktive Sveta 92/50/EGS z dne 18. junija 1992 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil storitev, kakor je bila spremenjena z Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 97/52/ES z dne 13. oktobra 1997, ter iz členov 20 in 31(4) Direktive 2004/18/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 31. marca 2004 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev.
 2.
 Helenski republiki se naloži plačilo stroškov.
 (1) UL C 63, 26.2.2011.


text:
Blog - Parmacondominio
 Quello delle “immissione rumorose” è un problema particolarmente avvertito in condominio che sfocia spesso in dispute legali che contribuiscono ad intasare i tribunali.
 È evidente che in caso di rumori molesti in condominio bisogna valutare quando viene superata la “normale tollerabilità”, tenendo conto del contesto, del regolamento condominiale, della destinazione d’uso urbanistico e della salvaguardia di un bene assoluto come la salute.
 Se vengono superati i limiti previsti dalle specifiche normative, l’immissione rumorosa è illecita e in questo caso il giudice può imporre i mezzi (es. coibentazione, insonorizzazione, etc) necessari a riportare nei limiti previsti dalla legge, l’immissione rumorosa.
 Per ovviare a queste problematiche il legislatore è intervento negli anni dando precise direttive nella determinazione dei requisiti acustici degli edifici che riportiamo in sintesi di seguito.
 Il DPCM 5/12/97 si applica a tutti gli edifici in cui il rilascio della concessione edilizia è avvenuto dopo il 20 febbraio 1998, quindi non conta la data dell’ultimazione dei lavori.
 Con la Legge Quadro n° 447 del 26 Ottobre 1995, tutti i comuni sono stati obbligati a dotarsi di un regolamento acustico col quale sono state tipizzate le varie zone definendo dei precisi parametri da rispettare. (Es. isolamento acustico di una facciata D2m,nT,w 40 dB – isolamento acustico di un elemento di separazione fra due elementi residenziali Rw 50 dB)
 A questo proposito riportiamo anche
 L’ESTRATTO DEL REGOLAMENTO COMUNALE DI PARMA PER LA DISCIPLINA IN DEROGA DELLE ATTIVITÀ RUMOROSE TEMPORANEE
 Art. 4 LIMITI DI ORARIO E DI RUMORE PER LE ATTIVITÀ DI CANTIERE 1
 L’attività dei cantieri edili, stradali ed assimilabili è svolta di norma tutti i giorni feriali dalle ore 07.00 alle ore 20.00; l’esecuzione di lavori disturbanti (a titolo esemplificativo, escavazioni e demolizioni) e l’impiego di macchinari rumorosi (a titolo esemplificativo, martelli demolitori, flessibili, betoniere, seghe circolari, e gru) sono svolti, di norma, secondo gli indirizzi di cui ai successivi capoversi, dalle ore 08.00 alle ore 13.00 e dalle ore 15.00 alle ore 19.00.
 Durante gli orari in cui è consentito l’utilizzo di macchinari rumorosi, nei cantieri operanti all’aperto, non dovrà mai essere superato il valore limite LAeq = 70 dB(A), riferito ad un tempo di misura TM (tempo di misura) ≥ 10 minuti, rilevato in facciata ad edifici con ambienti abitativi.
 Ai cantieri operanti all’interno degli edifici si applica il limite LAeq = 65 dB(A) con TM (tempo di misura) ≥ 10 minuti misurato nell’ambiente disturbato a finestre chiuse. Per contemperare le esigenze del cantiere con i quotidiani usi degli ambienti confinanti occorre che:
 il cantiere si doti di tutti gli accorgimenti utili al contenimento delle emissioni sonore sia con l’impiego delle più idonee attrezzature e macchine operanti in conformità alle direttive comunitarie in materia di emissione acustica ambientale, che tramite idonea organizzazione dell’attività;
 in occasione dello svolgimento di attività o lavorazioni particolarmente rumorose, venga data preventiva informazione alle persone potenzialmente disturbate, su tempi e modi di esecuzione delle stesse.
 Non si applica il limite di immissione differenziale, né si applicano le penalizzazioni previste dalla normativa tecnica per le componenti impulsive, tonali e/o bassa frequenza.
 ATTIVITÀ DI CANTIERE CHE RISPETTANO I LIMITI DI ORARIO E DI RUMORE 1
 Nelle attività di cantiere, il rispetto dei limiti di orario e di rumore, indicati al precedente articolo 4, è oggetto di apposita dichiarazione da presentarsi all’Amministrazione Comunale: 5 a) nel caso in cui l’attività di cantiere riguardi un intervento soggetto a DIA, contestualmente al deposito della DIA; b) nel caso in cui l’attività di cantiere riguardi un intervento soggetto a Permesso di Costruire, contestualmente alla Comunicazione di Inizio Lavori, secondo quanto previsto nella specifica disciplina approvata dalla Giunta Comunale.
 ATTIVITÀ DI CANTIERE CHE NON RISPETTANO I LIMITI DI RUMORE E DI ORARIO – PROROGA E POSTICIPO DI INIZIO LAVORI 1
 Per le attività di cantiere che, per motivi eccezionali, contingenti e documentabili, superino i limiti di rumore e/o di orari di cui al precedente articolo 4, il proprietario o comunque l’avente titolo, devono richiedere specifica autorizzazione all’Amministrazione Comunale, da rilasciarsi entro il termine massimo di 30 giorni dalla presentazione dell’istanza regolare e completa, secondo quanto previsto nella specifica disciplina approvata dalla Giunta Comunale.
 Nel caso in cui l’attività di cantiere che comporti il superamento dei limiti non termini entro il periodo autorizzato, il proprietario o l’avente titolo devono richiedere all’Amministrazione Comunale una proroga della data precedentemente autorizzata, almeno 15 giorni prima della sua scadenza, secondo quanto previsto nella specifica disciplina approvata dalla Giunta Comunale.
 Qualora l’attività di cantiere non inizi nel periodo autorizzato, il proprietario o l’avente titolo devono trasmettere all’Amministrazione Comunale una comunicazione di posticipo di inizio lavori con l’indicazione delle date di inizio e fine lavori e con la motivazione del posticipo. Il nuovo periodo comunicato non dovrà superare il numero di giorni precedentemente concessi con l’autorizzazione originaria. La comunicazione dovrà essere presentata preventivamente e comunque non oltre il decimo giorno dalla data di inizio lavori autorizzata in precedenza, secondo quanto previsto nella specifica disciplina approvata dalla Giunta Comunale.
 CRITERI E LIMITI 1
 L’uso di macchine da giardino e di attrezzature rumorose è consentito nei giorni feriali, escluso il sabato, dalle ore 08.00 alle ore 13.00 e dalle ore 15.00 alle ore 19.00; nei giorni festivi e al sabato dalle ore 09.00 alle ore 12.00 e dalle ore 16.00 alle ore 19.00. L’impiego di macchine e di impianti per lavori di giardinaggio, deve avvenire in modo tale da limitare l’inquinamento acustico anche con l’utilizzo di macchine conformi alle direttive comunitarie in materia di emissione acustica ambientale delle macchine ed attrezzature.
 Da cortile a parcheggio: va considerato innovazione o un cambio di destinazione d’uso?
 Aumentano le auto ma diminuiscono i parcheggi disponibili in città, ed ecco che, per i condomini che ne hanno la possibilità, trasformare il cortile in un parcheggio può divenire una necessità.
 Cosa si intende per cortile:
 È l’area scoperta, delimitata in tutto o in parte dal fabbricato, che fornisce aria, luce e consente il passaggio di persone e cose. Avvolte svolge funzione di copertura di magazzini o autorimesse sotterranee.
 Fanno parte del cortile il suolo e l’area sovrastante.
 I cavedi sono cortili di piccole dimensione che hanno lo scopo di fornire aria e luce agli immobili. Vanno distinti dagli intercapedini che servono per separare diverse proprietà.
 Le dimensioni dei cortili sono regolate dagli strumenti urbanistici.
 Anche se solo alcuni condomini che lo condividono hanno accesso al cortile, la comproprietà è chiara a causa della sua funzione: garantire aria e luce alle ai condomini.
 Lo spazio aereo sopra il cortile non può essere occupato. Anche quando è di proprietà esclusiva.
 Il cortile può essere usato a condizioni che non se ne alteri la natura, si pregiudichi la stabilità o alteri il decoro architettonico e non si può impedire agli altri di farne parimenti uso.
 Può essere occupato per una parte e un periodo limitati anche quando devono svolgersi lavori nelle proprietà esclusive.
 Ma con quali maggioranze è possibile adottare la delibera per trasformare una parte o tutto il cortile in un parcheggio?
 Per il secondo comma dell’art. 1120 del c.c. la trasformazione del cortile in parcheggio rientra nelle innovazioni che è possibile deliberare con la maggioranza dei presenti che rappresentano almeno la metà del valore dell’immobile (Art. 1136 c.c., secondo comma).
 In questo caso quindi non si applica l’art. 1117-ter, si tratta infatti di una innovazione e non dei casi in cui si delibera per la variazione di destinazione d’uso.
 In quali casi è prevista la possibilità di revisionare i millesimi e cosa bisogna fare
 Capita che leggendo il consuntivo allegato al rendiconto dell’amministratore di condominio, il condomino si accorga di possibili incongruità dovute a presunti errori delle tabelle millesimali.
 Le spese non sembrano equamente suddivise e la domanda più frequente è: ma come mai io, che ho l’appartamento più piccolo, ho più millesimi e pago di più di “tizio” che lo ha più grande del mio?
 Il calcolo dei millesimi tiene conto di diversi criteri tecnici che spesso sembrano non sono applicati in modo uniforme che non dipendono solo dalle dimensioni della propria unità immobiliare.
 Ma cosa succede se ci si accorge di un errore?
 Secondo il codice civile, Art. 69 delle disposizioni di attuazione:
 I valori proporzionali delle singole unità immobiliari espressi nella tabella millesimale di cui all’articolo 68 possono essere rettificati o modificati all’unanimità.
 Tali valori possono essere rettificati o modificati, anche nell’interesse di un solo condomino, con la maggioranza prevista dall’articolo 1136, secondo comma, del codice (la maggioranza dei presenti che rappresentano almeno la metà del valore), nei seguenti casi:
 Quindi l’errore delle tabelle millesimali è certamente causa di revisione delle stesse.
 Anche se nella norma non è specificato, spetta al condomino che lo rileva portare elementi che ne comprovino la richiesta di revisione.
 Tale dimostrazione non è necessaria se tutti sono d’accordo. Tanto più che essendo le tabelle millesimali allegate al regolamento, e potendo ogni condominio, secondo l’Art. 1138 del c.c., richiedere modifica di questo, è possibile richiedere anche la revisione delle tabelle millesimali ad esso allegate.
 La domanda di revisione va presentata all’amministratore il quale deve attivarsi per portare la richiesta in assemblea che deciderà sul da farsi.
 Se l’amministratore non si attiva, si può richiederne la revoca per gravi inadempienze.
 Se invece è l’assemblea a respingere la richiesta di revisione delle tabelle millesimali, il condomino dovrà impugnare la decisione davanti al giudice.
 Verifiche periodiche obbligatorie, cosa deve fare l’amministratore
 Secondo la legge il condominio è da considerarsi alla stregua dei luoghi di lavoro e, come tale, è sottoposto alle normative sulla sicurezza e le verifiche periodiche della messa a terra.
 In particolare, è obbligatorio da parte del datore di lavoro, cioè il condominio in persona dell’Amministratore, fare eseguire le verifiche periodiche sull’efficienza degli impianti elettrici, e la loro conservazione.
 L’art. 86 comma 1 del D.Lgs 81/2008 (Testo Unico della Sicurezza) prevede che “in materia di verifiche periodiche degli impianti elettrici, il datore di lavoro provvede affinché i suddetti impianti elettrici, gli impianti di messa a terra, gli impianti di protezione dai fulmini siano periodicamente sottoposti a controllo secondo le indicazioni delle norme di buona tecnica e la normativa vigente per verificarne lo stato di conservazione e di efficienza ai fini della sicurezza.”
 Posto che per l’articolo 2 dello stesso decreto, alla lettera c), se nel condominio vi sono dei lavoratori che svolgono un’attività lavorativa, questo si configura a tutti gli effetti come un azienda e che l’Amministratore di condominio fa le veci del datore di lavoro. Tale principio è stato ribadito dal Ministero del lavoro nel 2010.
 In conseguenza di ciò, dovranno essere rispettate le relative norme in tema di sicurezza e salute sul lavoro e il responsabile per le verifiche periodiche della messa a terra nel condominio e senza dubbio l’Amministratore.
 In particolare, il Dpr 462/2001 obbliga tutti i datori di lavoro a far effettuare ad Organismi Abilitati le verifiche periodiche sugli impianti di messa a terra, sui dispositivi di protezione dalle scariche atmosferiche e sugli impianti elettrici. Tale verifica, inoltre, è obbligatoria prima che sia messo in esercizio un impianto e rilasciata la relativa dichiarazione di conformità.
 Ma cosa succede se non c’è l’Amministratore, perché non è obbligatorio, o non vi sono lavoratori che esercitano la propria attività nell’ambito del condominio?
 Secondo quanto chiarito dal Ministero del lavoro, nel primo caso l’obbligo delle verifiche ricadono sui condomini che devono nominare un responsabile.
 Se invece non vi sono al momento lavoratori, come ad esempio l’impresa di pulizie, va tenuto conto della potenziale possibilità che questo accada, e, di conseguenza, rimane l’obbligo delle verifiche periodiche.
 Cosa che garantisce i proprietari e l’Amministratore di condominio in caso di un potenziale incidenti, in quanto si è fatto il possibile per evitare un cattivo funzionamento degli impianti.
 Condominio: è possibile installare lucernari sul tetto?
 Il condomino che intenda installarlo per aumentare la luminosità della propria mansarda deve avere l’autorizzazione dell’assemblea?
 Non serve avere alcuna autorizzazione da parte dell’assemblea o dell’Amministratore di condominio se non è stato diversamente previsto dal regolamento contrattuale redatto dal costruttore, per installare abbaini, finestre o lucernari.
 Essendo previsto un utilizzo più intenso della cosa comune, si applica l’articolo 1102 del c.c. (Art. 1102. Uso della cosa comune. Ciascun partecipante può servirsi della cosa comune, purché non ne alteri la destinazione e non impedisca agli altri partecipanti di farne parimenti uso secondo il loro diritto. A tal fine può apportare a proprie spese le modificazioni necessarie per il miglior godimento della cosa. Il partecipante non può estendere il proprio diritto sulla cosa comune in danno degli altri partecipanti, se non compie atti idonei a mutare il titolo in suo possesso.) che non richiede alcuna autorizzazione preventiva.
 Sentenza della Cassazione Civile n.17099/2006
 Il Condomino proprietario del piano sottostante al tetto comune può aprire su esso abbaini e finestre – non incompatibili con la sua destinazione naturale – per dare aria e luce alla sua proprietà, purché le opere siano a regola d’arte e non ne pregiudichi la funzione di copertura, né ledano i diritti degli altri Condomini sul medesimo.
 Termoregolazione in condominio, mettersi in regola evitando sanzioni
 Scade il 30 giugno la proroga, ma cosa bisogna fare?
 Cosa prevede la norma se l’assemblea delibera a favore
 La legge di riforma del condominio 220 del 2012, nell’articolo 1129 c.c. (Nomina, revoca e obblighi dell’amministratore) stabilisce, fra le altre cose, che:
 “Alla cessazione dell’incarico l’amministratore è tenuto alla consegna di tutta la documentazione in suo possesso afferente al condominio e ai singoli condomini e ad eseguire le attività urgenti al fine di evitare pregiudizi agli interessi comuni senza diritto ad ulteriori compensi”.
 Se, contrariamente a quanto stabilito dalla norma, l’assemblea delibera che per il passaggio di consegne tra l’amministratore di condominio uscente e quello entrante, al primo sia dovuto un compenso, il condomino che non è d’accordo, non è tenuto al pagamento di questo costo.
 Saranno quindi gli altri condomini favorevoli e che lo hanno deliberato a ripartirsi volontariamente la spesa.
 Se vi sono gravi inadempienze dell’amministratore è possibile revocarlo senza passare dall’assemblea?
 La revoca dell’amministratore può essere deliberata in ogni momento dall’assemblea con la maggioranza prevista per la nomina (art. 1136 c.c. secondo comma, la metà degli intervenuti che rappresentano almeno la metà del valore) o con le modalità previste dal regolamento di condominio.
 La stessa revoca può essere disposta dall’autorità giudiziaria, su riscorso di ciascun condomino, in caso di mancata rappresentanza in giudizio del condominio da parte dell’amministratore, se non presenta il rendiconto della gestione, o in caso di gravi irregolarità.
 Nel caso siano emerse gravi irregolarità fiscali o di non ottemperanza a quanto previsto dall’art 1129 c.c., in particolare:
 “Costituiscono tra le altre gravi irregolarità:
 l’omessa convocazione dell’assemblea per l’approvazione del rendiconto condominiale, il ripetuto rifiuto di convocare l’assemblea per la revoca e la nomina del nuovo amministratore o negli altri casi previsti dalla legge;
 la gestione secondo modalità che possono creare confusione tra il patrimonio del condominio e il patrimonio dell’amministratore o di altri condomini;
 l’omessa, incompleta o inesatta comunicazione dei dati di cui al secondo comma del presente articolo”.
 I condomini, anche singolarmente, possono chiedere la convocazione dell’assemblea per far cessare la violazione e revocare il mandato dell’amministratore.
 Se l’assemblea non decide in tal senso, ciascun condomino piò rivolgersi all’autorità giudiziaria e se la domanda è accolta, per le spese legali può rivalersi sul condominio e a sua volta il condominio sull’amministratore revocato.
 La relativa domanda deve essere depositata presso il tribunale competente per territorio. Contro il provvedimento del Tribunale può essere proposto reclamo alla Corte d’Appello nel termine di dieci giorni dall’avvenuta notifica.
 Alcuni principi di civile convivenza per un pacifico utilizzo di un bene comune fondamentale
 Come per gli altri beni comuni del condominio, tutti i condòmini hanno il diritto di utilizzare l’ascensore, purché non ne limitino l’uso agli altri o non ne alterino la destinazione d’uso (art. 1102 del c.c.).
 Per una più serena convivenza, i condomini sono dotati, e sono obbligati quando i condòmini sono più di dieci, di un regolamento condominiale che può essere di natura contrattuale o assembleare e che regola e disciplina l’uso delle cose comuni come, appunto, l’ascensore.
 Anche se il regolamento è di natura contrattuale, in genere redatto dal costruttore, le norme in esso contenute, e di natura regolamentare, possono essere sempre modificate con la maggioranza ordinaria (secondo comma Art. 1136 del c.c.).
 La recente legge di riforma ha poi stabilito che le norme regolamentari del condominio non possono vietare il possesso di animali domestici (Art. 1138 c.c. ultimo comma), di conseguenza, non si può impedire al condomino di utilizzare un bene comune come l’ascensore in compagnia del proprio amico a quattro zampe.
 È chiaro a questo punto che le norme che regolano, da parte dei padroni, l’utilizzo dell’ascensore col proprio cane, sono normali regole di convivenza civile, e che l’uso non deve arrecare pregiudizio e disturbo agli altri condomini.
 Se l’ascensore agita il cane, evitare di usarlo, per fare in modo che non disturbi gli altri condomini abbaiando;
 Mantenere l’ascensore in ordine e pulito;
 Tenere il cane legato al guinzaglio e con la museruola;
 Non utilizzare l’ascensore con condomini infastiditi dalla presenza del cane.