text:
 21.3.2013
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 81/38
 РЕШЕНИЕ НА СЪВМЕСТНИЯ КОМИТЕТ НА ЕИП
 No 236/2012
 от 31 декември 2012 година
 за изменение на приложение XX (Околна среда) към Споразумението за ЕИП
 СЪВМЕСТНИЯТ КОМИТЕТ НА ЕИП,
 като взе предвид Споразумението за Европейското икономическо пространство („Споразумението за ЕИП“), и по-специално член 98 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 на Комисията от 18 ноември 2011 г. за създаване на Регистър на ЕС за периода на търгуване, започващ от 1 януари 2013 г. и за следващите периоди на търгуване в рамките на Европейската схема за търговия с емисии, съгласно Директива 2003/87/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и Решение No 280/2004/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и за изменение на Регламент (ЕО) No 2216/2004 и на Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010 на Комисията (1) следва да бъде включен в Споразумението за ЕИП.
 (2)
 Решение No 280/2004/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 11 февруари 2004 г. относно механизма за мониторинг на емисиите на парникови газове в Общността и прилагане на Протокола от Киото (2) не е включено в Споразумението за ЕИП и следователно специфичните изисквания за докладване, предвидени в това решение, не се прилагат спрямо държавите от ЕАСТ.
 (3)
 Държавите от ЕАСТ се включват в Регистъра на Съюза и в Дневника на операциите в Европейския съюз („ДОЕС“). Централният администратор изпълнява задачите си по отношение на държавите от ЕАСТ, а Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ е компетентният орган, който дава необходимите указания на централния администратор по отношение на разпоредбите във връзка с прилагането на Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 за държавите от ЕАСТ.
 (4)
 Договарящите се страни разбират, че специфичното естество на СТЕ на ЕС и съответната стандартизирана и защитена система от регистри съгласно Директива 2003/87/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета (3), в която се предвижда създаването на Регистър на ЕС, налагат необходимостта от специални правила за съхранение и достъп до данните във връзка с Регистъра на ЕС, за да се гарантира, че квотите за емисии на парникови газове съответстват на експлоатационните и техническите спецификации за стандартите за обмен на данни в системите от регистри по Протокола от Киото, и че прехвърлянето на такива квоти е съвместимо със задълженията, произтичащи от Протокола от Киото.
 (5)
 Тъй като схемата за търговия с емисии на ЕС вече се прилага и за държавите от ЕАСТ, същото следва да стане и с Регистъра на ЕС. В съответствие с Решение на Съвместния комитет на ЕИП No 152/2012 от 26 юли 2012 г. (4) партидата на ЕС за общото количество квоти, партидата на ЕС за общото количество квоти за авиационни емисии, тръжната партида на ЕС, партидата на ЕС за разпределение, партидата на ЕС за резерва за нови участници, тръжната партида на ЕС за квоти за авиационни емисии и партидата на ЕС за специалния резерв обхващат квотите за държавите от ЕАСТ.
 (6)
 Договарящите се страни признават особения характер на Регистъра на ЕС и на ДОЕС, както и отговорностите на Комисията по отношение на сигурното функциониране и поддръжката на системата. Следователно Комисията следва да е в състояние да осигури незабавно прекъсване на достъпа, когато това е необходимо, в съответствие с Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011, като същевременно отчита ролята на Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ. Това решение не засяга бъдещи въпроси, свързани с установената по силата на Споразумението за ЕИП структура с два стълба.
 (7)
 Договарящите се страни признават, че е от съществено значение на правоприлагащите и данъчните органи на дадена договаряща се страна, Европейската служба за борба с измамите на Европейската комисия, Европейската сметна палата, Евроюст, както и на компетентните органи, посочени в член 11 от Директива 2003/6/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета (5) и в член 37, параграф 1 от Директива 2005/60/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета (6), на компетентните национални надзорни органи, националните административни органи на договарящите се страни, и компетентните органи, посочени в член 18 от Директива 2003/87/ЕО да бъде дадено право да получат определени данни, съхранявани в Регистъра на ЕС и в Дневника на операциите в Европейския съюз в ясно определени случаи, ако това е необходимо за изпълнение на техните задачи, както е посочено в член 83 от Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 г. и член 75 от Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010 на Комисията (7), последно изменен с Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011.
 (8)
 По същата причина договарящите се страни, въпреки че отчитат, че Решение 2009/371/ПВР на Съвета (8) не е включено в Споразумението за ЕИП, признават, че Европол получава постоянен достъп само за четене на данни, съхранявани в Регистъра на ЕС и в EUTL.
 (9)
 Договарящите се страни обаче припомнят, че предоставянето на право на информация и на постоянен достъп само за четене, както е предвидено в член 83 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1193/2011 и член 75 от Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010, последно изменен с Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011, не засяга уговорката, че полицейското и съдебното сътрудничество по наказателноправни въпроси, както и данъчната администрация или правоприлагането попадат извън обхвата на Споразумението за ЕИП, и че следователно регламентите не предоставят на посочените институции каквито и да било други права, освен тези, изрично предвидени в член 83 и член 75 на съответния регламент.
 (10)
 Ето защо приложение XX към Споразумението за ЕИП следва да бъде съответно изменено,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩОТО РЕШЕНИЕ:
 Член 1
 Приложение XX към Споразумението за ЕИП се изменя, както следва:
 1.
 Точка 21ан (Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010 на Комисията) се изменя, както следва:
 i)
 Добавя се следният текст:
 „, изменен със:
 —
 32011 R 1193: Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 на Комисията от 18 ноември 2011 г. (ОВ L 315, 29.11.2011 г., стр. 1).“
 ii)
 Адаптации з) и и) се преномерират съответно като адаптации й) и м).
 iii)
 След адаптация ж) се вмъква следната адаптация:
 „з)
 В член 64, параграф 1 и член 64а, параграф 2 се добавят следните алинеи:
 „Когато става въпрос за партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, Комисията незабавно уведомява Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ за указанията, дадени на централния администратор, и за причините за тези указания.
 Ако прекъсването на достъпа не е хоризонтално и доколкото е насочено към индивидуални партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ приема в срок от три работни дни решение относно приложимостта на указанията на Комисията въз основа на обясненията, дадени от Комисията. Липсата на решение на Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ не оказва влияние върху валидността на указанията, дадени от Комисията, или на действията, предприети от централния администратор.“
 i)
 В член 64а, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Думата „Комисия“ се заменя с думите „Надзорен орган на ЕАСТ“, когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ.“ “
 iv)
 След адаптация й) се вмъкват следните адаптации:
 „к)
 В член 75, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, тези данни могат да бъдат предоставени от централния администратор след предварителното съгласие на Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ.“
 л)
 В член 75, параграф 5а се добавя следната алинея:
 „Европол информира Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ и Комисията за начина, по който използва данните, когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ.“ “
 2.
 След точка 21ан (Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010 на Комисията) се вмъква следното:
 „21ана.
 32011 R 1193: Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 на Комисията от 18 ноември 2011 г. за създаване на Регистър на ЕС за периода на търгуване, започващ от 1 януари 2013 г. и за следващите периоди на търгуване в рамките на Европейската схема за търговия с емисии, съгласно Директива 2003/87/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и Решение No 280/2004/ЕО на Европейския парламент и на Съвета и за изменение на Регламент (ЕО) No 2216/2004 и на Регламент (ЕС) No 920/2010 на Комисията (ОВ L 315, 29.11.2011 г., стр. 1).
 За целите на настоящото Споразумение разпоредбите на регламента се тълкуват със следните адаптации:
 а)
 Издаването, прехвърлянето и отмяната на квоти, засягащи държавите от ЕАСТ, техните оператори и операторите на въздухоплавателни средства, администрирани от тях, се регистрират в Дневника на операциите в Европейския съюз.
 Централният администратор е компетентен да извършва задачите, посочени в член 20, параграфи от 1 до 3 от Директива 2003/87/ЕО, в случаите когато са засегнати държавите от ЕАСТ, техните оператори или операторите на въздухоплавателни средства, администрирани от тях.
 б)
 Към член 7, параграф 4 се добавя следното изречение:
 „Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ координира прилагането на настоящия регламент с националните администратори във всяка държава от ЕАСТ и с централния администратор.“
 в)
 Към член 31, параграф 7 се добавя следното изречение:
 „Думата „Комисия“ се заменя с думите „Надзорен орган на ЕАСТ“, когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ.“
 г)
 В член 49, параграф 2, член 50, параграф 2, член 53, параграф 2 и член 54, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „По отношение на националните таблици за разпределение на квоти на държавите от ЕАСТ централният администратор получава инструкции от Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ.“
 д)
 В член 70, параграф 1 и член 71, параграф 2 се добавят следните алинеи:
 „Когато става въпрос за партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, Комисията незабавно уведомява Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ за указанията, дадени на централния администратор, и за причините за тези указания.
 Ако прекъсването на достъпа не е хоризонтално и доколкото е насочено към индивидуални партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ приема в срок от три работни дни решение относно приложимостта на указанията на Комисията въз основа на обясненията, дадени от Комисията. Липсата на решение на Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ не оказва влияние върху валидността на указанията, дадени от Комисията, или на действията, предприети от централния администратор.“
 е)
 В член 71, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Думата „Комисия“ се заменя с думите „Надзорен орган на ЕАСТ“, когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ.“
 ж)
 В член 73, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Национален администратор на държава от ЕАСТ може да поиска от Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ да възобнови процеси, прекъснати в съответствие с параграф 1, ако счете, че въпросите, довели до прекъсването, са решени. Ако това е така, Надзорният орган на ЕАСТ, след консултация с Комисията, издава указания за централния администратор да възстанови тези процеси. В противен случай Надзорният орган отхвърля искането в разумен срок и незабавно информира националния администратор за това, като излага своите основания и определя критерии, които да бъдат изпълнени, за да може искането да бъде прието.“
 з)
 В член 83, параграф 3 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ, тези данни могат да бъдат предоставени от централния администратор след предварителното съгласие на Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ.“
 и)
 В член 83, параграф 6 се добавя следната алинея:
 „Европол информира Надзорния орган на ЕАСТ и Комисията за начина, по който използва данните, когато става въпрос за титуляри на партиди под юрисдикцията на държава от ЕАСТ.“ “
 Член 2
 Текстовете на Регламент (ЕС) No 1193/2011 на исландски и норвежки език, които ще бъдат публикувани в притурката за ЕИП към Официален вестник на Европейския съюз, са автентични.
 Член 3
 Настоящото решение влиза в сила на 1 януари 2013 г. или в деня след последната нотификация до Съвместния комитет на ЕИП съгласно член 103, параграф 1 от Споразумението (9), ако тази дата е по-късна.
 Член 4
 Настоящото решение се публикува в раздела за ЕИП и в притурката за ЕИП към Официален вестник на Европейския съюз.
 Съставено в Брюксел на 31 декември 2012 година.
 За Съвместния комитет на ЕИП
 Председател
 Atle LEIKVOLL
 (1) ОВ L 315, 29.11.2011 г., стр. 1.
 (2) ОВ L 49, 19.2.2004 г., стр. 1.
 (3) ОВ L 275, 25.10.2003 г., стр. 32.
 (4) ОВ L 309, 8.11.2012 г., стр. 38.
 (5) ОВ L 96, 12.4.2003 г., стр. 16.
 (6) ОВ L 309, 25.11.2005 г., стр. 15.
 (7) ОВ L 270, 14.10.2010 г., стр. 1.
 (8) ОВ L 121, 15.5.2009 г., стр. 37.
 (9) Без отбелязани конституционни изисквания.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 ROZPORZĄDZENIE WYKONAWCZE KOMISJI (UE) .../...
 z dnia 16.4.2019 r.
 w sprawie wcześniejszego powiadamiania o przesyłkach niektórych kategorii zwierząt i towarów wprowadzanych na terytorium Unii
 (Tekst mający znaczenie dla EOG)
 KOMISJA EUROPEJSKA,
 uwzględniając Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej,
 uwzględniając rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2017/625 z dnia 15 marca 2017 r. w sprawie kontroli urzędowych i innych czynności urzędowych przeprowadzanych w celu zapewnienia stosowania prawa żywnościowego i paszowego oraz zasad dotyczących zdrowia i dobrostanu zwierząt, zdrowia roślin i środków ochrony roślin, zmieniające rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 999/2001, (WE) nr 396/2005, (WE) nr 1069/2009, (WE) nr 1107/2009, (UE) nr 1151/2012, (UE) nr 652/2014, (UE) 2016/429 i (UE) 2016/2031, rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 1/2005 i (WE) nr 1099/2009 oraz dyrektywy Rady 98/58/WE, 1999/74/WE, 2007/43/WE, 2008/119/WE i 2008/120/WE, oraz uchylające rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (WE) nr 854/2004 i (WE) nr 882/2004, dyrektywy Rady 89/608/EWG, 89/662/EWG, 90/425/EWG, 91/496/EWG, 96/23/WE, 96/93/WE i 97/78/WE oraz decyzję Rady 92/438/EWG (rozporządzenie w sprawie kontroli urzędowych)
 1
 , w szczególności jego art. 58 akapit pierwszy lit. b),
 a także mając na uwadze, co następuje:
 (1)W rozporządzeniu (UE) 2017/625 ustanowiono m.in. ramy przeprowadzania kontroli urzędowych i innych czynności urzędowych dotyczących zwierząt i towarów, które wprowadza się na terytorium Unii z państw trzecich, i służących sprawdzeniu zgodności z unijnymi przepisami w celu ochrony zdrowia ludzi, zwierząt i roślin, dobrostanu zwierząt oraz – w odniesieniu do organizmów zmodyfikowanych genetycznie (GMO) i środków ochrony roślin – również środowiska. Ramy te obejmują kontrole urzędowe, którym poddaje się zwierzęta i towary wprowadzane do Unii z państw trzecich przez wyznaczone punkty kontroli granicznej.
 (2)Rozporządzenie (UE) 2017/625 zawiera wymóg, aby podmiot odpowiedzialny za niektóre przesyłki wprowadzane na terytorium Unii dokonywał wcześniejszego powiadomienia właściwych organów w punkcie kontroli granicznej przed przybyciem przesyłek. Aby umożliwić tym organom terminowe i skuteczne przeprowadzanie kontroli urzędowych, należy ustalić termin wcześniejszego powiadomienia na co najmniej jeden dzień roboczy przed przybyciem przesyłki.
 (3)Jednak ze względu na ograniczenia logistyczne związane z transportem w określonych przypadkach dotrzymanie terminu wcześniejszego powiadomienia wynoszącego jeden dzień roboczy przed przybyciem przesyłki może nie być możliwe. Może to mieć miejsce na przykład w przypadku, gdy przesyłka jest przewożona z miejsca wysyłki do punktu kontroli granicznej w czasie krótszym niż 24 godziny, a informacje niezbędne do uzupełnienia odpowiednich części wspólnego zdrowotnego dokumentu wejścia (dokumentu CHED), wymaganego do dokonania wcześniejszego powiadomienia zgodnie z art. 56 ust. 3 lit. a) rozporządzenia (UE) 2017/625, nie są dostępne przed załadunkiem przesyłki. W takich przypadkach państwa członkowskie powinny mieć możliwość wprowadzenia wymogu dokonywania wcześniejszego powiadomienia co najmniej cztery godziny przed przybyciem przesyłki, tak aby również w takich okolicznościach można było zapewnić terminowe i skuteczne przeprowadzanie kontroli urzędowych.
 (4)Rozporządzenie delegowane Komisji [C(2019)1847]
 2
 stanowi, że państwa członkowskie mogą zwolnić punkty kontroli granicznej wyznaczone na potrzeby przywozu nieobrobionych kłód oraz drewna przetartego i zrębionego z określonych minimalnych wymogów mających zastosowanie do punktów kontroli granicznych ze względu na szczególne ograniczenia geograficzne. Rozporządzenie to stanowi również, że kontrole urzędowe i inne czynności urzędowe w punkcie kontroli granicznej wyznaczonym dla wyżej wymienionych towarów mogą być przeprowadzane przez mobilny zespół ds. kontroli urzędowych. W związku z tym, aby zapewnić wystarczająco dużo czasu na organizację kontroli urzędowych i innych czynności urzędowych w tych punktach kontroli granicznej, w niniejszym rozporządzeniu należy przewidzieć odstępstwo od przepisów dotyczących minimalnego okresu na dokonanie wcześniejszego powiadomienia o przybyciu przesyłek.
 (5)Ze względu na to, że rozporządzenie (UE) 2017/625 stosuje się od dnia 14 grudnia 2019 r., niniejsze rozporządzenie powinno również stosować się od tej daty.
 (6)Środki przewidziane w niniejszym rozporządzeniu są zgodne z opinią Stałego Komitetu ds. Roślin, Zwierząt, Żywności i Pasz,
 PRZYJMUJE NINIEJSZE ROZPORZĄDZENIE:
 Artykuł 1
 Wcześniejsze powiadamianie o przesyłkach
 1.Podmiot odpowiedzialny za przesyłkę należącą do kategorii zwierząt i towarów, o których mowa w art. 47 ust. 1 rozporządzenia (UE) 2017/625, dokonuje wcześniejszego powiadomienia właściwego organu w punkcie kontroli granicznej pierwszego przybycia do Unii co najmniej jeden dzień roboczy przed przewidywanym przybyciem przesyłki.
 2.Na zasadzie odstępstwa od ust. 1, jeżeli ograniczenia logistyczne uniemożliwiają dotrzymanie terminu określonego w tym ustępie, właściwe organy w punkcie kontroli granicznej mogą stosować termin wcześniejszego powiadomienia wynoszący co najmniej cztery godziny przed przewidywanym przybyciem przesyłki.
 3.Na zasadzie odstępstwa od ust. 1 właściwe organy w punkcie kontroli granicznej wyznaczonym na potrzeby przywozu nieobrobionych kłód oraz drewna przetartego i zrębionego zgodnie z art. 4 rozporządzenia delegowanego Komisji [C(2019)1847] mogą stosować termin wcześniejszego powiadomienia wynoszący do pięciu dni roboczych przed przewidywanym przybyciem takich przesyłek.
 Artykuł 2Wejście w życie i stosowanie
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wchodzi w życie dwudziestego dnia po jego opublikowaniu w Dzienniku Urzędowym Unii Europejskiej.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie stosuje się od dnia 14 grudnia 2019 r.
 Niniejsze rozporządzenie wiąże w całości i jest bezpośrednio stosowane we wszystkich państwach członkowskich.
 Sporządzono w Brukseli dnia 16.4.2019 r.
 W imieniu Komisji
 Przewodniczący
 Jean-Claude JUNCKER
 (1)
 Dz.U. L 95 z 7.4.2017, s. 1.
 (2)
 DZ.U....


type: wikipedia

text:
Drugi nazivi: Homalocephala texensis, Echinocactus lindheimeri
 Preporučena temperatura: Noć: 5-11°C
 Tolerancija hladnoće: najviše do -18°C
 Minimalna temperatura: 12°C
 Izloženost suncu: cijeli dan
 Porijeklo: SAD (Teksas, Novi Meksiko), Meksiko (Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas)
 Opis: dok je mlad ovaj kaktus raste sam, raste polako, naraste do 30 cm u širinu i 20 cm u visinu .
 Cvjetovi: cvjetovi su ružičaste boje, narastu do 6 cm.
 Vanjske poveznice
 Echinocactus


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
The judgment in this case was entered upon the verdict of a jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City in favor of the appellees for $168.00, being the amount paid by the appellees for repairing damage to their truck occasioned by a collision between it and the truck of the appellant. From that judgment the appellant has taken this appeal. The single exception contained in the record is to the action of the court below in refusing certain prayers of the appellant. At the close of the testimony in the case, the appellees, plaintiffs below, did not offer any prayers, and the appellant offered nine prayers designated as defendant's A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I prayers. The court rejected defendant's A, B, C, D, H and I prayers, and this action of the court constitutes the single bill of exception in the case. At the argument in this Court and in the brief of the appellant, the exception to the action of the court in rejecting defendant's C, D, H and I prayers was abandoned, and the appellant only asks that we review the action of the court in rejecting its A and B prayers. These were the usual demurrer to the evidence prayers and ask for an instructed verdict for the defendant; so that our province in this case is confined to deciding the correctness of the action of the court below in refusing these prayers. The appellant admits the ownership of the truck which caused the damage, the general employment of the driver of that truck, and his negligence as being the cause of the collision. He, however, contends that he is not liable for the reason that the uncontradicted evidence *Page 25
 in this case shows that Murphy, the driver of the truck, was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, or that at said time he was the servant of some other person and not the servant of the appellant. In order to determine the soundness of this contention we are required to examine all of the evidence in the case. Upon a careful examination of the record we find these facts undisputed: That the appellant, Louis Salowitch, trading as the Salowitch Auto-Part Company, was engaged in the business of dealing in auto parts and used serviceable trucks, his place of business being Clifton Avenue and Monroe Street in the City of Baltimore; that he had been so engaged for five years prior to the accident; that he was the owner of the truck causing the damage complained of, and that the truck at the time of the accident was being driven by Murphy, who was in the general employ of the appellant. There is conflict in the testimony as to how long Murphy had been employed by the appellant, the appellant himself testifying that he had engaged him about four days before the accident, and Murphy testifying that he had been employed about a month and a half. This, however, is immaterial for the purposes of this decision. That on the day of the accident the appellant was not at his place of business but had gone to Washington, going direct from his residence and not having been at his place of business at all that day; that the accident occurred at the corner of Lafayette and Pennsylvania Avenues, about 9.30 or 10 o'clock A.M.; that at the time of the accident Morris Salowitch, brother of Louis Salowitch, was in the truck sitting alongside of Murphy the driver; that Morris Salowitch lived with his and the appellant's father, who conducted a grocery business at 250 South Eden Street, and also lived at that place; that the duties of Murphy were tearing down machines and working in the automobile shop of the appellant; that he had no operator's license to drive a car; that after the accident Murphy drove the truck to the home of the appellant's father, the appellant's brother accompanying him, and left it at that place, going immediately *Page 26
 thereafter out of the State and not returning until apprehended and taken into the traffic court. These facts are established by the testimony offered on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant and are uncontradicted. The evidence as to what occurred at the place of business of the appellant on the morning of and before the accident, as related by Murphy, who testified for the plaintiff, and the evidence of the appellant and his brother, Morris, is in direct conflict one with the other, and it is impossible to reconcile the two versions. The testimony of Murphy is, that on the morning of the accident, a little while after he went to work, "Mr. Salowitch's brother came up and wanted a truck; Mr. Salowitch was not there so his brother went to the telephone to call him up, then he called me to the telephone and I spoke to Mr. Louis Salowitch and Mr. Salowitch told me to take the truck and drive it for his brother; I took the truck and drove it and we were hauling some groceries, and on our way back to Mr. Salowitch's place, I had a collision at Pennsylvania and Lafayette Avenues." This was in Murphy's examination in chief, and on cross-examination he said: "I was not employed to drive automobiles; it was about half past nine or ten o'clock that morning when Mr. Salowitch's brother came to the place and, after a conversation with me, he went to the telephone to speak to Mr. Salowitch, my employer; I recognized his voice and while I can't remember exactly what the conversation was, he told me to take the truck out and drive for his brother and I did it. * * * Mr. Salowitch told me to go with his brother and haul groceries for his father. Yes, I admit that immediately after this accident I ran away and went out of town; I went to Altoona, Pennsylvania, the same day." The above quoted testimony of Murphy was all of the testimony offered on behalf of the plaintiff bearing upon the question of whether or not Murphy was the servant of the appellant at the time of the accident, and was at that time acting within the scope of his employment. The testimony of the appellant in his own defense was that he had employed *Page 27
 Murphy about four days before the accident and he was employed to tear down machines and work in the shop, and he had nothing to do with the driving or operation of machines; that Murphy never had any authority from him to operate this machine; that the morning of the accident he, the witness, went to Washington, leaving Baltimore about eight o'clock; that he did not go to his place of business at all on that day, but next morning went to the shop and his attention was called to damage to his truck by his foreman saying, "Look what Murphy done," and showing him a little two-ton Packard with the bumper smashed and the radiator leaking. He further testified that he did not have such a conversation on the telephone as Murphy testified to here, and did not remember calling Murphy or anybody else that morning; that Murphy said it was between 9.30 and 10 o'clock, and that he, the witness, was in Washington at 10 o'clock. The witness further testified that Murphy had no authority to drive any machine belonging to the witness, and that Murphy had testified at the traffic court that he, Murphy, "did not have my permission to drive that car that morning." The witness Morris Salowitch, brother of the appellant, testified as follows: "This is the way I came to be on the truck. On Sunday afternoon my brother, Louis, was visiting my mother with his wife and he told me he was to go to Washington Monday morning; I came up to his yard to see him before he left, but he was gone already; I came up about half-past seven or eight o'clock; I must have got there quarter after eight. I told John, the colored man, that Louis wasn't there, I was going down town. I hung around awhile and I was watching them tear down cars — I liked to see how they did it; I told him I was going down town about half-past nine or ten o'clock and the driver there, Murphy, he told me he could take me down, he said he was going that way and I went with him; no, I had not seen my brother that morning; I was down at the place for about an hour, some thing like that; John was boss there and giving orders, telling Murphy to tear down certain parts *Page 28
 of the truck, tearing certain parts away and put iron on a certain pile; I had seen Murphy around there once before; he was with one of the drivers from a big truck that came in to be repaired; I told Murphy I was going down town and of course Louis didn't come back; he said I can take you down and I went with him. He went from Clifton to Fulton, up Fulton to North, North to Pennsylvania and he turned down and he went down to near Lafayette, and I seen the big Republic truck; I recognized it with a lot of packages and right smart speed; I don't know how fast and Murphy turned in short and he hit him in the back. * * * We didn't have any groceries on the truck and we didn't have any on the truck before this accident. I was only on the truck about five minutes, just as long as it takes to run down to that street there; we hadn't gone anywhere else between my brother's place and the scene of the accident; Murphy was taking me home; I asked him where are you going, he said that is all right, he was going down that way; I had not seen Murphy drive any car before for my brother." On cross-examination witness testified: "It was about half-past nine when we left my brother's place and the accident happened in about five minutes, just as long as it takes us to get to this place; no, sir, I had not been around delivering groceries, Murphy was taking me down town, he was taking me to my home."
 The law applicable to this class of cases is familiar and well settled by decisions of this Court, to the effect that where the ownership of the vehicle causing the collision is in the defendant and the driver thereof is in the general employ of the defendant, there is a reasonable presumption that at the time of the accident the driver is the servant of the defendant and acting within the scope of his employment. Vonderhorst BrewingCo. v. Amrhine, 98 Md. 406; Stewart Taxi Service Co. v. Roy,127 Md. 70; Dearholt Motor Sales Co. v. Merritt, 133 Md. 323. The most recent expression of this rule is the case ofJordan-Stabler Co. v. Tankersly, 146 Md. 454, where the Court said: "This Court *Page 29
 has held that in a collision caused by an automobile operated by the servant of the owner there is a reasonable presumption that the servant was acting in the scope of his employment and upon the business of his master, and that the burden of overcoming this presumption is upon the master by showing that the servant was engaged in business other than his employer's." It is equally well established that this presumption is a rebuttable one and may be rebutted by the uncontradicted testimony offered on behalf of either the defendant or the plaintiff, or both, and when so rebutted the case ought not to go to the jury. Symington v.Sipes, 121 Md. 313; State, use of Bebelius, v. Benson,129 Md. 693; Dearholt Motor Sales Co. v. Merritt, 133 Md. 323; Pollockv. Watts, 142 Md. 403. Therefore, the present case presents one in which the uncontradicted evidence establishes the ownership of the truck by the appellant and the general employment by the appellant of Murphy, the driver, thus creating the presumption that he was the servant and agent of the appellant, acting within the scope of his employment, which, together with the negligence of Murphy, would be sufficient to entitle the case to be submitted to the jury, and such evidence upon which the jury might render a verdict for the plaintiff; but if the record discloses that this presumption is rebutted by the uncontradicted evidence offered on behalf of either the appellant or appellee, conclusively showing that the driver Murphy at the time of the accident was not acting within the scope of his employment, there would be no evidence upon which the jury could legally render a verdict for the plaintiff, for the reason that the presumption has been fully met and overcome. Whether or not the evidence, as disclosed by the record, is of such a character as will overcome the presumption, is a question of law for the court. If the evidence offered on behalf of the defendant, which in respect to this point is fully set out herein, is true, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, because it clearly appears therefrom that Murphy took the truck of the defendant without any authority or acquiescence by the defendant, and *Page 30
 at the time of the accident was using it for his own or some one other than the master's business. This proposition is fully sustained by the authority of Symington v. Sipes, Debelius v.Benson, Pollock v. Watts, and Jordan-Stabler v. Tankersly,
 hereinbefore cited. If the plaintiff's right to recover rested solely upon the presumption which the undisputed evidence of both plaintiff and defendant created and was met by the evidence of the defendant, we would have no hesitation in holding that the presumption had been fully rebutted and that the court was in error in refusing to grant the prayers of the defendant for an instructed verdict in his behalf. We, however, have additional testimony on behalf of the plaintiff from its witness, Murphy, the driver of the truck, and we must examine this testimony, because if it is in conflict with the testimony offered by the defendant to rebut the presumption, there would be presented a case for the jury and not for the court, as it is the jury's province to pass upon the credibility and weight of the testimony. In making this examination we find that the testimony of Murphy, if true, although contradicted by the defendant, presents a case where the owner of an automobile has loaned it and the driver, his general servant, to another, for use in that other's business, wholly apart and distinct from the business of the owner, and not in any manner, directly or indirectly, in furtherance of the owner's business. Whether or not the law under such conditions relieves the owner of liability is an important question, and upon its decision this case must depend. In the case of Symington v. Sipes, supra, Judge Urner said: "The liability of the appellant, upon the ground that the chauffeur was in the service and pay of the appellant's brother during the trip to and from Virginia, was disputed. We do not find it necessary to pass upon these questions, as the point we have considered is conclusive of the case." This direct point has never been passed upon by this Court, although we have employed language in former cases which would tend to indicate our opinion, should the point be directly presented. In the case *Page 31
 of Sacker v. Waddell, 98 Md. 43, Judge Boyd used this language: "The master may so hire or loan his servant to another for some special service, as that he will, as to that particular service, become the servant of such third person. If the master has parted with all power of control over the servant and permits the third person to make such use of him as he may deem proper, he mayquoad that service, be the servant of the third person, and not of the general master." In the more recent case of SugarRefining Co. v. Gilbert, 145 Md. 251, the Court, speaking through Judge Pattison, quoted with approval the language of Judge Boyd in Sacker v. Waddell, and added: "In 18 R.C.L. 757, sec. 223, it is said: `There is no doubt that the general servant of one person may become the servant of another by submitting himself to the control and direction of the other. In such a case the servant becomes the fellow servant of the servants of the person under whose control he comes, and neither his general master nor his special master is liable if he is injured by the negligence of one of the other servants.'" In the same case there was cited with approval the case of Delory v.Blodgett, 185 Mass. 126, in which case the court said: "When one person lends his servant to another for a particular employment, the servant, for anything done in that particular employment, must be dealt with as the servant of the man to whom he is lent, although he remains a general servant of the person who lent him. * * * The test is, whether, in the particular service, which he is engaged to perform, he continues liable to the direction and control of his master, or becomes subject to that of the party to whom he is lent or hired." There is nothing in the cases ofSacker v. Waddell, and Sugar Refining Co. v. Gilbert, which is in conflict with the opinion in the case of Bentley, Shriver Co. v. Edwards, 100 Md. 653. In that case the owner of the automobile truck, Burmeister, was engaged in the business of hiring trucks, accompanied by drivers, to various parties who needed such service. The particular truck was at the time of the accident being driven by Edwards, *Page 32
 the plaintiff in that case, and was engaged in hauling articles of merchandise for Bentley, Shriver Co., that company indicating to the plaintiff what merchandise he was to haul and where he was to place same. The accident occurred while the plaintiff was unloading the truck in front of the defendant's place of business, and was occasioned by the negligence of a general servant of the defendant. It was contended by the defendant that the plaintiff was a fellow servant of the servant of the defendant and therefore could not recover against the common master. This contention was overruled by this Court, for the reason that the evidence conclusively showed that when Edwards was hauling merchandise for the defendant he was engaged directly in the business of Burmeister, his general master, and his acts were in furtherance of that master's business in furnishing trucks and drivers for hire. This decision was in accord with the great weight of authority in respect to the hiring of vehicles and drivers by livery-stable keepers or garage-men, in which, although the passenger, or one who hires, has the authority to direct the driver when and where to drive, it has been practically universally held that the owner is liable for an accident occurring during the period for which the vehicle and driver are used by the passenger. The class of cases represented by Bentley, Shriver Co. v. Edwards is totally different from the present case, and the principles therein laid down have no application, because in that case the truck belonged to and the driver was in the general employ of a master whose business it was to hire trucks and drivers to the general public, which while engaged in such service were directly furthering the general master's business; while here, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, we have the case of a man loaning, without recompense, a truck and driver to his father for purposes in no wise connected with the owner's business and purely for the benefit of the person to whom they have been loaned. It is uncontradicted that the business of the appellant was dealing in auto parts and buying, repairing and selling second-hand motor trucks, and *Page 33
 that it was no part of Murphy's general duties, as the servant of the appellant, to drive motor trucks; therefore, if the evidence of the plaintiff is believed, when the appellant loaned the truck and driver to his father, the servant was in the special service of another, engaged in that other's business and subject to his control and direction. Murphy thus temporarily became the servant of some one other than the appellant and was such other's servant at the time of the accident. This being true, the defendant was not liable for injuries resulting from such accident. In Berryon Automobiles (4th Ed.), page 1108, section 1225, it is said: "The rule is well settled that a servant in the general employment of one person may also become the special servant of another, with all the mutual rights and obligations of master and servant between them for the time of, and in relation to, the special service in which the servant is temporarily engaged. If an employer loans a servant to another for some special service, the latter with respect to that service may become liable as a master for the acts of the servant without any actual contract of employment between them or payment for service. This principle of law is so familiar that it scarcely needs the citation of authority to support it." And at page 1125 of the same work, section 1244, the author says: "The liability of one person for the negligence of another depends upon the contractual relation between the two of master and servant. In the absence of such relation no one can be held responsible for the conduct of another. Consequently the owner of an automobile is not liable for an injury to a third person due to the negligent operation of his automobile by one to whom he has loaned the machine. * * * The same rule applies * * * where he lends both his car and chauffeur to another." It will, therefore, be seen from what we have said that the presumption of the driver acting within the scope of his employment in this case is fully rebutted, whether we consider the defendant's testimony or the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff, and *Page 34
 the same is true when we consider all of the evidence of both parties, plaintiff and defendant, in combination. There is no evidence in this case which would entitle the plaintiff to recover, except the presumption arising from ownership and general employment of the driver, and we have no hesitancy in saying that this presumption is fully and conclusively met and destroyed by the evidence produced in behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The case should have been withdrawn from the jury, and there was error in the refusal of the lower court to grant the defendant's A and B prayers. For this error the judgment must be reversed, without a new trial.
 Judgment reversed, without awarding a new trial, the appelleesto pay the costs of the appeal.


text:
 26.1.2015
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 C 26/20
 Kasační opravný prostředek podaný dne 24. listopadu 2014 Vadzimem Ipatau proti rozsudku Tribunálu (prvního senátu) vydanému dne 23. září 2014 ve věci T-646/11, Ipatau v. Rada
 (Věc C-535/14 P)
 (2015/C 026/24)
 Jednací jazyk: francouzština
 Účastníci řízení
 Účastník řízení podávající kasační opravný prostředek: Vadzim Ipatau (zástupce: M. Michalauskas, advokát)
 Další účastnice řízení: Rada Evropské unie
 Návrhová žádání účastníka řízení podávajícího kasační opravný prostředek
 —
 zrušit rozsudek Tribunálu ze dne 23. září 2014 (věc T 646/11),
 —
 rozhodnout s konečnou platností ve věci nebo vrátit věc k rozhodnutí Tribunálu,
 —
 uložit Radě náhradu nákladů řízení, včetně nákladů řízení před Tribunálem.
 Důvody kasačního opravného prostředku a hlavní argumenty
 Na podporu svého kasačního opravného prostředku navrhovatel předkládá čtyři důvody.
 Zaprvé navrhovatel tvrdí, že se Tribunál dopustil porušení práva na účinnou soudní ochranu, když podání žádosti o právní pomoc upřel odkladný účinek, pokud jde o lhůtu stanovenou pro podání žaloby na neplatnost proti napadenému aktu.
 Zadruhé Tribunálu vytýká, že se dopustil porušení práva na obhajobu. Tribunál totiž rozhodl, že Rada nebyla povinna sdělit navrhovateli důkazy v jeho neprospěch ani mu poskytnout příležitost být vyslechnut před přijetím rozhodnutí 2012/642/SZBP (1) a prováděcího nařízení č. 1017/2012 (2).
 Zatřetí se Tribunál dopustil nesprávného právního posouzení, když dospěl k závěru, že důvody stanovené ve sporných aktech jsou dostatečné.
 Začtvrté se Tribunál dopustil nesprávného právního posouzení, když dospěl k závěru, že sporné akty nebyly nepřiměřené.
 (1) Rozhodnutí Rady 2012/642/SZBP ze dne 15. října 2012 o omezujících opatřeních vůči Bělorusku (Úř. věst. L 285, s. 1).
 (2) Prováděcí nařízení Rady (EU) č. 1017/2012 ze dne 6. listopadu 2012, kterým se provádí čl. 8a odst. 1 nařízení (ES) č. 765/2006 o omezujících opatřeních vůči Bělorusku (Úř. věst. L 307, s. 7).


text:
On October 23rd, 1914, between the hours of four and five in the afternoon the infant plaintiff (appellant here) was playing hockey with a number of companions in the bed of Windsor avenue, a public highway of Baltimore City.
 At the same time H. Nelson Gambril, an inspector in the office of the water engineer of the city, was returning to his home on a motorcycle, at a speed of between five and seven miles an hour, having completed his day's work. His route lay along Windsor avenue. As he approached the group of boys, of which the plaintiff was one, he reduced his speed, sounded his horn and called out to the boys who were before him. The plaintiff apparently did not hear him, nor the warning of his approach given by some of the plaintiff's comrades.
 Gambril endeavored to avoid colliding with the plaintiff by swerving the course of his machine, but when not more than three or four feet from the plaintiff, the latter jumped directly in front of the machine, and in endeavoring to avoid striking the lad Gambril again changed the direction of the machine, but the left handle bar hit the boy, throwing him to the pavement, where he struck his head and was severely injured. To recover damages for that injury this suit was brought.
 The record is chiefly noteworthy for the fact that there is no conflict of evidence presented.
 The sole exception is a blanket one to the ruling of the Court on the prayers.
 The ground mainly relied on by the appellant is the alleged error of the trial Court in submitting to the jury the *Page 365
 question of contributory negligence in the 5th, 7th, 8th and 10th prayers.
 The record does not disclose any objection taken in the trial Court such as that now presented here. Certainly no special exception was reserved upon the ground of the lack or insufficiency of evidence tending to show contributory negligence.
 The Code provides (Art. 5, § 9): "Nor shall any question arise in the Court of Appeals as to the insufficiency of evidence to support any instruction actually granted, unless it appear that such question was distinctly made to and decided by the Court below." This section has been frequently applied by this Court. Gunther v. Dranbauer, 86 Md. 1; Sturtevant v.Dugan, 106 Md. 615; Stewart Taxi Serv. Co. v. Roy,127 Md. 79. If there was no other reason, the judgment appealed from would have to be affirmed.
 There is another and controlling reason which leads to the same result. The first two prayers offered on behalf of the City asked for a directed verdict for the defendant; the first being in form a general demurrer to the evidence, and the second to the like effect, upon the specific ground of the failure to show any act of negligence such as to warrant the submission of the case to the jury.
 These prayers were refused by the trial Court. This was error, but not such error as involves any reversal of the judgment.
 As has already been said there is no real conflict in any of the evidence as to the way in which the accident occurred. The plaintiff himself on the stand testified, that he did not remember anything about the accident; that he did not recollect hearing a motorcycle approach, by the blowing of a horn, or any signal or bell given, nor did he hear the man on the motorcycle or anybody call out to him.
 Gaskins, one of the boys who was playing with the plaintiff, testified that he heard the toot of the horn, that the motorcycle was running between five and seven miles an hour, that the plaintiff got hit on the hand by a hockey stick, *Page 366
 dropped his own stick and was holding his own hand as the motorcycle approached, and that the plaintiff had his back to the motorcycle, that he would not say that the plaintiff did not see the motorcycle as it approached him, that immediately after the collision the machine went down an embankment on the side of the street, that Gambril immediately dismounted and came up to where the plaintiff was lying.
 Jett, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that Gambril before reaching the plaintiff had slowed down to between four and five miles an hour, that when he saw the plaintiff was in his path, he turned out towards the left side of the street, and just as he turned the plaintiff jumped towards the middle of the street, and he (Gambril) made every effort in the world to get out of the way of the plaintiff, turned again to the right and threw the machine and himself through an opening in the curb down the embankment, that the plaintiff always had his back towards the motorcycle. This witness does not recall hearing a horn blow, but did hear the boys with whom he was playing say, here comes a motorcycle; this was before the plaintiff was struck; that the plaintiff jumped right in the way of the motorcycle.
 The witnesses Auer, Wellman, Rauch and Autz all testified to substantially the same condition.
 Gambril when called to the stand testified to the collision, and that he was going at the rate of five or six miles an hour at the time of the accident; that as he approached the group of boys he was blowing his horn almost continuously, and in addition called out to the boys who were playing polo in the street, to look out. That the witness thought that the warnings were heard by the boys, but that the plaintiff jumped directly in the path of the machine which struck him a glancing blow on the right side.
 Dewey Wilson, called by the defendant, was on the open lot some little distance from the group of boys in the street, he saw the motorcycle approaching, heard the horn sounded, and heard some one holler. He estimated the speed of the motorcycle at from five to seven miles an hour. *Page 367
 The substance of the evidence has thus been stated with some particularity, because it clearly shows that Mr. Gambril did everything that he could, or could have been expected to do, for the purpose of avoiding the accident, and that there was no act or omission on his part of a character to constitute actionable negligence.
 The case, therefore, falls directly in line with the case ofHavermale v. Houck, 122 Md. 82, and the authorities there cited, and no error would have been committed had the trial Court directed a verdict for the defendant.
 The case was, however, submitted to the jury which brought in a verdict for the defendant, so that the error of the Court in rejecting the first and second prayers of the City became harmless error, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed.
 Judgment affirmed, with costs. *Page 368


text:
 26.5.2007
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 C 117/31
 Skarga wniesiona w dniu 26 marca 2007 r. — EREF przeciwko Komisji
 (Sprawa T-94/07)
 (2007/C 117/50)
 Język postępowania: angielski
 Strony
 Strona skarżąca: European Renewable Energies Federation (EREF) ASBL (Bruksela, Belgia) (przedstawiciel: adwokat D. Fouquet)
 Strona pozwana: Komisja Wspólnot Europejskich
 Żądania strony skarżącej
 —
 stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji Komisji Europejskiej C(2006) 4963 wersja ostateczna z dnia 24 października 2006 r.;
 —
 stwierdzenie, że instrument finansowy, którego rzecz dotyczy, stanowi w swej obecnej formie i strukturze pomoc państwa niezgodną z prawem;
 —
 w drugiej kolejności nakazanie Komisji wszczęcia formalnej procedury dochodzenia na podstawie art. 88 ust. 2WE dla sprawy NN 62/B/2006;
 —
 obciążenie Komisji Europejskiej wszystkimi kosztami postępowania, włącznie z kosztami poniesionymi przez skarżącą.
 Zarzuty i główne argumenty
 Skarżąca wniosła w 2004 r. skargę do Komisji dotyczącą m. in. tego, że różne aspekty finansowania nowej elektrowni atomowej budowanej w Finlandii stanowią pomoc państwa i nie zostały notyfikowane. W 2006 r. Komisja podzieliła akta na dwie sprawy o numerach NN 62/A/2006 i NN 62/B/2006.
 W niniejszej sprawie skarżąca żąda stwierdzenia nieważności decyzji Komisji C(2006) 4963 wersja ostateczna, która dotyczy sprawy pomocy państwa NN 62/B/2006, w której Komisja stwierdziła, że linia kredytowa przyznana przez konsorcjum pięciu banków i pożyczka udzielona przez AB Svensk Exportkredit (SEK) nie stanowi pomocy państwa w rozumieniu art. 87 ust. 1 WE.
 Skarżąca twierdzi, że dokonany przez Komisję podział akt na dwie odrębne sprawy jest sprzeczny z prawem zarówno pod względem formalnym, jak i materialnym. Zdaniem skarżącej przyznanie linii kredytowej i pożyczki przy tak niskim oprocentowaniu było możliwe wyłącznie dzięki poręczeniu francuskiej agencji ubezpieczeń kredytów eksportowych COFACE. Aspekty pomocy państwa w związku z udziałem COFACE były jednak rozpatrywane w sprawie NN 62/A/2006. Skarżąca podnosi z tego powodu, że podział akt na dwie odrębne sprawy, w wyniku czego element poręczenia wypadł ze sprawy NN 62/B/2006, doprowadził Komisję do błędnej oceny, że przyznanie linii kredytowej i pożyczki SEK przy tak niskim oprocentowaniu nie może stanowić pomocy państwa już z tego powodu, że zaangażowane banki — zdaniem Komisji — stanowiły własność prywatną.
 Ponadto skarżąca uważa, że — nawet nie uwzględniając poręczenia COFACE — linia kredytowa i pożyczka udzielona przez SEK stanowią pomoc państwa, ponieważ:
 —
 nisko oprocentowanej linii kredytowej udzielono przy udziale banków BLB i BNP Paribas, które zdaniem skarżącej są bankami publicznymi, oraz
 —
 pożyczka SEK udzielona została przez bank będący w 100 % własnością państwa przy oprocentowaniu poniżej warunków rynkowych.
 W końcu skarżąca podnosi brak uzasadnienia i oczywisty błąd w ocenie.


text:
 24.11.2012
 NL
 Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie
 C 366/10
 Arrest van het Hof (kamer) van 4 oktober 2012 — Europese Commissie/Republiek Oostenrijk
 (Zaak C-75/11) (1)
 (Niet-nakoming - Burgerschap van Unie - Reis- en verblijfsrecht - Artikelen 20 VWEU en 21 VWEU - Discriminatie op grond van nationaliteit - Artikel 18 VWEU - Richtlijn 2004/38/EG - Artikel 24 - Afwijking - Reikwijdte - Lidstaat waar voordeel van gereduceerde vervoertarieven uitsluitend is voorbehouden aan studenten wier ouders in die staat kinderbijslag ontvangen)
 2012/C 366/16
 Procestaal: Duits
 Partijen
 Verzoekende partij: Europese Commissie (vertegenwoordigers: V. Kreuschitz en D. Roussanov, gemachtigden)
 Verwerende partij: Republiek Oostenrijk (vertegenwoordigers: C. Pesendorfer en M. Fruhmann, gemachtigden)
 Voorwerp
 Niet-nakoming — Schending van artikelen 18, 20 en 21 VWEU alsook van artikel 24 van richtlijn 2004/38/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 29 april 2004 betreffende het recht van vrij verkeer en verblijf op het grondgebied van de lidstaten voor de burgers van de Unie en hun familieleden, tot wijziging van verordening (EEG) nr. 1612/68 en tot intrekking van richtlijnen 64/221/EEG, 68/360/EEG, 72/194/EEG, 73/148/EEG, 75/34/EEG, 75/35/EEG, 90/364/EEG, 90/365/EEG en 93/96/EEG (PB L 158, blz. 77) — Tussen verschillende entiteiten van een lidstaat en ondernemingen voor openbaar vervoer gesloten overeenkomsten voor de verkoop van vervoersbewijzen tegen gereduceerd tarief aan studenten — Uitsluiting van het voordeel van zulke reducties ten aanzien van de studenten waarvan de ouders geen recht hebben op kinderbijslag in deze staat
 Dictum
 1)
 Door het voordeel van gereduceerde vervoertarieven in beginsel uitsluitend voor te behouden aan studenten waarvan de ouders Oostenrijkse kinderbijslag ontvangen, is de Republiek Oostenrijk de verplichtingen niet nagekomen die op haar rusten krachtens artikel 18 VWEU junctis de artikelen 20 VWEU en 21 VWEU en krachtens artikel 24 van richtlijn 2004/38/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 29 april 2004 betreffende het recht van vrij verkeer en verblijf op het grondgebied van de lidstaten voor de burgers van de Unie en hun familieleden, tot wijziging van verordening (EEG) nr. 1612/68 en tot intrekking van richtlijnen 64/221/EEG, 68/360/EEG, 72/194/EEG, 73/148/EEG, 75/34/EEG, 75/35/EEG, 90/364/EEG, 90/365/EEG en 93/96/EEG.
 2)
 De Republiek Oostenrijk wordt verwezen in de kosten.
 (1) PB C 130 van 30.4.2011.


text:
 21.6.2008
 EL
 Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
 C 158/2
 Απόφαση του Δικαστηρίου (δεύτερο τμήμα) της 8ης Μαΐου 2008 [αιτήσεις των Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Γερμανία), Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre (Γαλλία), για την έκδοση προδικαστικής αποφάσεως] — Zuckerfabrik Jülich AG (πρώην Jülich AG) κατά Hauptzollamt Aachen
 (Συνεκδικασθείσες υποθέσεις C-5/06 και C-23/06 έως C-36/06) (1)
 (Ζάχαρη - Εισφορές επί της παραγωγής - Λεπτομέρειες εφαρμογής του καθεστώτος των ποσοστώσεων - Καθορισμός του εξαγώγιμου πλεονάσματος - Καθορισμός του μέσου όρου ζημιών)
 (2008/C 158/03)
 Γλώσσες διαδικασίας: η γερμανική και η γαλλική
 Αιτούντα δικαστήρια
 Finanzgericht Düsseldorf, Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre
 Διάδικοι στην υπόθεση της κύριας δίκης
 Zuckerfabrik Jülich AG (πρώην Jülich AG) (C-5/06) Saint Louis Sucre SNC (C-23/06), Société des Sucreries du Marquenterre SA (C-24/06), SA des Sucreries de Fontaine Le Dun, Bolbec, Auffray (SAFBA) (C-25/06), SA Lesaffre Frères (C-26/06), Tereos, παρεμβαίνουσα υπέρ της Sucreries, Distilleries des Hauts de France (C-27/06), SA Sucreries & Distilleries de Souppes — Ouvré fils (C-28/06), SA Sucreries de Toury et Usines Annexes (C-29/06), Tereos (C-30/06), Tereos, παρεμβαίνουσα υπέρ της SAS Sucrerie du Littoral Groupe SDHF (C-31/06), Cristal Union (C-32/06), Sucrerie Bourdon (C-33/06), SA Sucrerie de Bourgogne (C-34/06), SAS Vermendoise Industries (C-35/06), SA Sucreries et Raffineries d'Erstein (C-36/06)
 κατά
 Hauptzollamt Aachen (C-5/06), Directeur général des douanes et droits indirects, Receveur principal des douanes et droits indirects de Gennevilliers (C-23/06 έως C-36/06)
 Αντικείμενο της υποθέσεως
 Προδικαστικές — Finanzgericht Düsseldorf, Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre — Ερμηνεία του άρθρου 15 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1260/2001 του Συμβουλίου, της 19ης Ιουνίου 2001, για την κοινή οργάνωση των αγορών στον τομέα της ζάχαρης (ΕΕ L 178, σ. 1) — Κύρος του άρθρου 16, παράγραφος 5, του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 314/2002 της Επιτροπής, της 20ής Φεβρουαρίου 2002, για τη θέσπιση των λεπτομερειών εφαρμογής του καθεστώτος των ποσοστώσεων στον τομέα της ζάχαρης (EE L 50, σ. 40), όπως τροποποιήθηκε με τον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) 1140/2003 της Επιτροπής, της 27ης Ιουνίου 2003, για τροποποίηση στον τομέα της ζάχαρης, τον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) 779/96 για τις λεπτομέρειες εφαρμογής όσον αφορά τις ανακοινώσεις και τον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) 314/2002 για τη θέσπιση λεπτομερειών εφαρμογής του καθεστώτος των ποσοστώσεων (ΕΕ L 160, σ. 33) — Κύρος του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1775/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 14ης Οκτωβρίου 2004, για καθορισμό, για την περίοδο εμπορίας 2003/2004, των ποσών των συνεισφορών στην παραγωγή όσον αφορά τον τομέα της ζάχαρης (ΕΕ L 316, σ. 4) — Λήψη υπόψη, για τον καθορισμό του πλεονάσματος που είναι δυνατόν να εξαχθεί, του συνόλου του εξαχθέντος όγκου ζάχαρης, ισογλυκόζης και σιροπιού ινσουλίνης, και για τον καθορισμό της μέσης ζημίας ανά τόνο ζάχαρης, μόνο της ποσότητας που αποτέλεσε αντικείμενο επιστροφής λόγω εξαγωγής
 Διατακτικό της αποφάσεως
 Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 15, παράγραφος 1, στοιχείο γ', του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1260/2001 του Συμβουλίου, της 19ης Ιουνίου 2001, για την κοινή οργάνωση των αγορών στον τομέα της ζάχαρης, προκειμένου να υπολογιστεί το εξαγώγιμο πλεόνασμα, πρέπει να αφαιρεθούν από την κατανάλωση όλες οι ποσότητες των εξαγόμενων προϊόντων του άρθρου αυτού, είτε καταβλήθηκαν πράγματι επιστροφές είτε όχι.
 Το άρθρο 15, παράγραφος 1, στοιχείο δ', του εν λόγω κανονισμού πρέπει να ερμηνευθεί υπό την έννοια ότι όλες οι ποσότητες των εξαγόμενων προϊόντων του άρθρου αυτού, είτε καταβλήθηκαν πράγματι επιστροφές είτε όχι, πρέπει να λαμβάνονται υπόψη για τον καθορισμό τόσο του εξαγώγιμου πλεονάσματος όσο και του μέσου όρου ζημιών ανά τόνο προϊόντος.
 Ο κανονισμός (ΕΚ) 1762/2003 της Επιτροπής, της 7ης Οκτωβρίου 2003, σχετικά με τον καθορισμό, για την περίοδο εμπορίας 2002/2003, των ποσών των εισφορών επί της παραγωγής όσον αφορά τον τομέα της ζάχαρης, και ο κανονισμός (ΕΚ) 1775/2004 της Επιτροπής, της 14ης Οκτωβρίου 2004, για καθορισμό, για την περίοδο εμπορίας 2003/2004, των ποσών των εισφορών επί της παραγωγής όσον αφορά τον τομέα της ζάχαρης είναι ανίσχυροι.
 Η εξέταση του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1837/2002 της Επιτροπής, της 15ης Οκτωβρίου 2002, για τον καθορισμό, όσον αφορά την περίοδο εμπορίας 2001/2002, των ποσών των εισφορών επί της παραγωγής καθώς και του συντελεστή της συμπληρωματικής εισφοράς στον τομέα της ζάχαρης, δεν κατέληξε στον εντοπισμό στοιχείων δυνάμενων να επηρεάσουν το κύρος του.
 (1) ΕΕ C 74 της 25.3.2006.


text:
 8.5.2017
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 144/23
 Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des Verwaltungsgerichts Berlin (Deutschland) eingereicht am 3. Februar 2017 — INEOS Köln GmbH gegen Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 (Rechtssache C-58/17)
 (2017/C 144/29)
 Verfahrenssprache: Deutsch
 Vorlegendes Gericht
 Verwaltungsgericht Berlin
 Parteien des Ausgangsverfahrens
 Klägerin: INEOS Köln GmbH
 Beklagte: Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 Vorlagefrage
 Ist der Beschluss der Kommission vom 27. April 2011 zur Festlegung EU-weiter Übergangsvorschriften zur Harmonisierung der kostenlosen Zuteilung von Emissionszertifikaten gemäß Artikel 10a der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates (2011/278/EU) (1) dahingehend auszulegen, dass die Definition des „Anlagenteils mit Prozessemissionen“ nach Art. 3 lit. h) des Beschlusses 2011/278/EU einen gasförmigen Aggregatzustand des unvollständig oxidierten Kohlenstoffs voraussetzt, oder erfasst sie auch unvollständig oxidierten Kohlenstoff in flüssigem Zustand?
 (1) ABl. L 130, S. 1.


type: contracts

text:
 9.8.2007
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea
 L 209/56
 DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE
 Nru 31/2007
 tas-27 ta' April 2007
 li temenda l-Anness XVIII (Is-saħħa u s-sigurtà fuq il-post tax-xogħol, il-liġijiet tax-xogħol u t-trattament ugwali għall-irġiel u n-nisa) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE
 IL-KUMITAT KONĠUNT TAŻ-ŻEE,
 Wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, kif emendat bil-Protokoll li jaġġusta l-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejjaħ ‘il-Ftehim’, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 98 tiegħu,
 Billi:
 (1)
 L-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim kien emendat bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE Nru 124/2006 tat-22 ta' Settembru 2006 (1).
 (2)
 Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2005/47/KE tat-18 ta' Lulju 2005 dwar il-Ftehim bejn il-Komunità tal-Ferroviji Ewropej (CER) u l-Federazzjoni Ewropea għall-Ħaddiema tat-Trasport (ETF) dwar ċerti aspetti tal-kondizzjonijiet tax-xogħol ta' ħaddiema mobbli assenjati għal servizzi transkonfinali interoperabbli fis-settur tal-ferroviji (2) għandha tkun inkorporata fil-Ftehim,
 IDDEĊIEDA DAN LI ĠEJ:
 Artikolu 1
 Il-punt li ġej għandu jidħol wara l-punt 32h (id-Direttiva 2003/88/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill) ta' l-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim:
 “32i.
 32005 L 0047: Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2005/47/KE tat-18 ta' Lulju 2005 dwar il-Ftehim bejn il-Komunità tal- Ferroviji Ewropej (CER) u l-Federazzjoni Ewropea għall-Ħaddiema tat-Trasport (ETF) dwar ċerti aspetti tal-kondizzjonijiet tax-xogħol ta' ħaddiema mobbli assenjati għal servizzi transkonfinali interoperabbli fis-settur tal-ferroviji (ĠU L 195, 27.7.2005, p. 15).”
 Artikolu 2
 It-testi tad-Direttiva 2005/47/KE fil-lingwa Iżlandiża u l-lingwa Norveġiża, li għandhom jiġu ppubblikati fis-Suppliment taż-ŻEE tal-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea, għandhom ikunu awtentiċi.
 Artikolu 3
 Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tidħol fis-seħħ fit-28 ta' April 2007, sakemm ikunu saru n-notifiki kollha skond l-Artikolu 103(1) tal-Ftehim lill-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE. (*)
 Artikolu 4
 Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tkun ippubplikata fis-Sezzjoni u fis-Suppliment taż-ŻEE tal-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta' l-Unjoni Ewropea.
 Magħmul fi Brussell, 27 ta' April 2007.
 Għall-Kumitat Konġunt taż-ŻEE
 Il-President
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) ĠU L 333, 30.11.2006, p. 53.
 (2) ĠU L 195, 27.7.2005, p 15.
 (*) Ebda rekwiżiti kostituzzjonali m'huma indikati.


text:
Christian Bäckman (* 28. apríl 1980, Alingsås, Švédsko) je bývalý švédsky reprezentant v ľadovom hokeji.
 Klubový hokej
 Christian Bäckman hrával na poste obrancu. Je 191 cm vysoký a váži 93 kg (údaj z roku 2006). V roku 1998 bol draftovaný v úvodnom drafte NHL klubom St. Louis Blues už v prvom kole z 24. miesta. V sezónach 1998–2002 hral za Frölunda HC Göteborg v švédskej hokejovej Elitserien. V sezóne 2002/03 sa prvýkrát dostal na ľad NHL, aj keď odohral za St. Louis Blues iba 4 zápasy. Už v nasledujúcej sezóne 2003/04 sa však stal stabilným hráčom Blues a odohral 66 zápasov. V sezóne 2004/05 (počas lockoutu v NHL) hral znovu za Frölunda HC Göteborg. V St. Louis Blues nosí dres číslo 55. Na sezónu 2005/06 mal uzavretú zmluvu na 912 tisíc dolárov. Pred nasledujúcou podpísal nový viacročný kontrakt.Na konci sezóny 2007/2008 bol vymenený do New York Rangers. V lete 2008 ho Rangers spoločne s Fiodorom Tjutinom vymenili do Columbus Blue Jackets za Nikolaja Žerdeva a Dana Fritschea.
 Reprezentácia
 Reprezentoval Švédsko na troch Majstrovstvách sveta (2004, 2005, 2010), kde z mužstvom získal dve medaile, v roku 2004 striebornú a v roku 2010 bronzovú.
 Na Zimných olympijských hrách 2006 v Turíne získal zlatú olympijskú medailu. Nosil reprezentačný dres číslo 8.
 Zimné olympijské hry 2006
 Švédsko získalo na olympiáde v Turíne zlaté olympijské medaily. Po rozpačitom úvode, keď v základnej skupine skončilo až na treťom mieste po prehrách s Ruskom 0:5 a Slovenskom 0:3, už nezaváhalo. V štvrťfinále zdolalo Švajčiarsko 6:2, v semifinále Česko 7:3 a vo finále severského rivala Fínsko tesne 3:2.
 Štatistiky
 Externé odkazy
 Christian Bäckman na stránke St. Louis Blues
 Švédski hokejisti
 Švédski olympijskí víťazi
 Olympijskí víťazi v ľadovom hokeji
 Hráči Frölunda HC Göteborg
 Hráči Worcester IceCats
 Hráči St. Louis Blues
 Hráči New York Rangers
 Hráči Columbus Blue Jackets
 Hokejisti draftovaní klubom St. Louis Blues
 Účastníci MS v hokeji 2004
 Účastníci MS v hokeji 2005
 Účastníci MS v hokeji 2010
 Hokejisti na Zimných olympijských hrách 2006


text:
 20.7.2013
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 207/38
 Rikors ippreżentat fid-29 ta’ April 2013 — Castell Macía vs UASI — PJ Hungary (PEPE CASTELL)
 (Kawża T-242/13)
 2013/C 207/64
 Lingwa tar-rikors: l-Ispanjol
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: José Castell Macía (Elche, Spanja) (rappreżentanti: G. Marín Raigal, P. López Ronda, H. Mosback u G. Macias Bonilla, avukati)
 Konvenut: L-Uffiċċju għall-Armonizzazzjoni fis-Suq Intern (Trade marks u Disinni)
 Parti oħra quddiem il-Bord tal-Appell: PJ Hungary Szolgáltató kft (PJ Hungary kft) (Budapest, l-Ungerija)
 Talbiet tar-rikorrenti
 —
 tannulla d-deċiżjoni tal-Ewwel Bord tal-Appell tal-Uffiċċju għall-Armonizzazzjoni fis-Suq Intern (Trade marks u Disinni), tas-7 ta’ Frar 2013, mogħtija fil-Każ Nru 1401/2012-1, b’mod li tiġi miċħuda l-oppożizzjoni magħmula u tintlaqa’ l-applikazzjoni għal trade mark Komunitarja Nru 6 798 862“PEPE CASTELL” u l-kundanna tal-konvenut għall-ispejjeż taż-żewġ istanzi;
 —
 tikkundanna lill-UASI, bħala konvenut, ibati l-ispejjeż tiegħu stess kif ukoll l-ispejjeż tar-rikorrenti f’dan ir-rikors;
 —
 jekk ikun il-każ, tordna lill-intervenjenti tbati l-ispejjeż tagħha u tħallas l-ispejjeż tar-rikorrenti f’din il-proċedura.
 Motivi u argumenti prinċipali
 Applikanti għat-trade mark Komunitarja: ir-rikorrenti
 Trade mark Komunitarja kkonċernata: it-trade mark verbali “PEPE CASTELL” għal prodotti u servizzi fil-klassijiet 16, 25 u 39 — Applikazzjoni għal trade mark Komunitarja Nru 6 798 862
 Proprjetarju tat-trade mark jew tas-sinjal invokat insostenn tal-oppożizzjoni: PJ Hungary Szolgáltató kft
 Trade mark jew sinjal invokat: it-trade mark figurattiva bl-elementi verbali “Pepe Jeans FOOTWEAR” għal prodotti fil-klassi 25
 Deċiżjoni tad-Diviżjoni tal-Oppożizzjoni: oppożizzjoni milqugħa
 Deċiżjoni tal-Bord tal-Appell: appell miċħud
 Motivi invokati: ksur tal-Artikolu 8(1)(b) tar-Reglament Nru 207/2009


text:
 17.4.2013
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 107/5
 VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE KOMISIE (EÚ) č. 343/2013
 zo 16. apríla 2013,
 ktorým sa ustanovujú paušálne dovozné hodnoty na určovanie vstupných cien niektorých druhov ovocia a zeleniny
 EURÓPSKA KOMISIA,
 so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
 so zreteľom na nariadenie Rady (ES) č. 1234/2007 z 22. októbra 2007 o vytvorení spoločnej organizácie poľnohospodárskych trhov a o osobitných ustanoveniach pre určité poľnohospodárske výrobky (nariadenie o jednotnej spoločnej organizácii trhov) (1),
 so zreteľom na vykonávacie nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 543/2011 zo 7. júna 2011, ktorým sa ustanovujú podrobné pravidlá uplatňovania nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1234/2007, pokiaľ ide o sektory ovocia a zeleniny a spracovaného ovocia a zeleniny (2), a najmä na jeho článok 136 ods. 1,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Vykonávacím nariadením (EÚ) č. 543/2011 sa v súlade s výsledkami Uruguajského kola mnohostranných obchodných rokovaní ustanovujú kritériá, na základe ktorých Komisia stanovuje paušálne hodnoty na dovoz z tretích krajín, pokiaľ ide o výrobky a obdobia uvedené v časti A prílohy XVI k uvedenému nariadeniu.
 (2)
 Paušálne dovozné hodnoty sa vypočítajú každý pracovný deň v súlade s článkom 136 ods. 1 vykonávacieho nariadenia (EÚ) č. 543/2011, pričom sa zohľadnia premenlivé každodenné údaje. Toto nariadenie by preto malo nadobudnúť účinnosť dňom jeho uverejnenia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie,
 PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
 Článok 1
 Paušálne dovozné hodnoty uvedené v článku 136 vykonávacieho nariadenia (EÚ) č. 543/2011 sú stanovené v prílohe k tomuto nariadeniu.
 Článok 2
 Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dňom jeho uverejnenia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
 Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
 V Bruseli 16. apríla 2013
 Za Komisiu v mene predsedu
 Jerzy PLEWA
 generálny riaditeľ pre poľnohospodárstvo a rozvoj vidieka
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 299, 16.11.2007, s. 1.
 (2) Ú. v. EÚ L 157, 15.6.2011, s. 1.
 PRÍLOHA
 Paušálne dovozné hodnoty na určovanie vstupných cien niektorých druhov ovocia a zeleniny
 (EUR/100 kg)
 Číselný znak KN
 Kód tretej krajiny (1)
 Paušálna dovozná hodnota
 0702 00 00
 MA
 60,1
 TN
 93,4
 TR
 115,7
 ZZ
 89,7
 0707 00 05
 AL
 46,1
 JO
 158,2
 TR
 131,7
 ZZ
 112,0
 0709 93 10
 MA
 91,2
 TR
 113,6
 ZZ
 102,4
 0805 10 20
 EG
 50,9
 IL
 66,4
 MA
 69,7
 TN
 66,4
 TR
 69,1
 US
 86,4
 ZZ
 68,2
 0805 50 10
 TR
 83,6
 ZA
 116,4
 ZZ
 100,0
 0808 10 80
 AR
 115,9
 BR
 85,7
 CL
 127,5
 CN
 76,7
 MK
 29,8
 NZ
 149,4
 US
 207,4
 ZA
 99,4
 ZZ
 111,5
 0808 30 90
 AR
 120,1
 CL
 140,2
 CN
 98,6
 TR
 204,5
 ZA
 132,8
 ZZ
 139,2
 (1) Nomenklatúra krajín stanovená nariadením Komisie (ES) č. 1833/2006 (Ú. v. EÚ L 354, 14.12.2006, s. 19). Kód „ZZ“ znamená „iného pôvodu“.


text:
Anul 56 (LVI) a fost un an obișnuit după calendarul iulian. E cunoscut că anul 809 după Ad Urbe Condita și că anul consulatului lui Saturninus și Scipio.
 Evenimente
 Începe conflictul dintre Imperiul Roman și Imperiul Part după invadarea Armeniei de către regele Vologases I, care l-a înlocuit pe conducătorul și aliatul romanilor cu fratele său, Tiridates I al Armeniei prin anii 52-53.
 Publius Clodius Thrasea Paetus a devenit consul al Romei.
 În China sub domnia dinastiei Han, era Janwu se încheie și începe era Jianwuzhongyuan
 Nașteri
 Gaius Cornelius Tacitus, istoric roman
 Decese
 Lucius Volusius Saturninus, politician și guvernator roman
 56


text:
Замфѝрово е село в Северозападна България. То се намира в Община Берковица, област Монтана.
 История
 Старото име на селото е Гушанци. Комунистическият режим променя името му на Замфирово в чест на Замфир Попов, комунистическия деятел и участник в Септемврийското въстание.
 Обществени институции
 Читалище „Развитие“ е основано на 3 март 1928 година. От 1978 година се помещава в нова сграда със застроена площ 884 m2, зрителен салон с 500 места, който има и балкон, оборудвана сцена с отвор 11 метра, голям репетиционен салон, гримьорни, складови помещения, работилница, библиотека, Младежки клуб – дискотека, радиовъзел. Библиотечен фонд: 11 226 тома. Председател на УС: Тодор Петков.
 Духов оркестър с 8 участници, с р-л Атанас Димитров, национални изяви.
 Фолклорен танцов състав с 18 участници, с р-л Севда Тодорова, национални изяви.
 Фолклорна певческа група с 16 участници, р-л Савета Николова, национални изяви.
 Детска фолклорна певческа група с 12 участници, Милка Димитрова Генкова, национални изяви.
 Ансамбъл за изворен фолклор „Гушанци“ с 40 участници, Севда Тодорова. Консултант – Митко Иванов.
 цигански фолклорен танцов състав с 14 участници. Р-л Севда Тодорова – концертни изяви – на местно, общинско и областно ниво.
 Детски театрален колектив -10 участници – р-л Милка Димитрова Генкова – представления на местно ниво.
 Посрещат и професионални изпълнители.
 Към читалищято се организира и курс по английски език.
 Редовни събития
 Честват се празници като 11 май патронен празник на местното училище. Всяка година се прави събор на селото, който по принцип е в неделята преди 24 май.
 Външни препратки
 Статия за кмета на Замфирово д-р Крум Крумов
 „Летопис на село Замфирово“ (от древността до Освобождението 1878 година), Геройко Милчев, 1992
 Domesticating Revolution: From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village, Creed, G. W. (1998), University Park, PA: Pennsylvania, State University Press – Антропологично изследване с участие на жителите на село Замфирово
 Бележки
 Села в област Монтана
 Населени места в община Берковица


text:
18.1.2014
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 15/6
 Anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse indgivet af Centrale Raad van Beroep (Nederlandene) den 17. oktober 2013 — Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank mod E. Fischer-Lintjens
 (Sag C-543/13)
 2014/C 15/07
 Processprog: nederlandsk
 Den forelæggende ret
 Centrale Raad van Beroep
 Parter i hovedsagen
 Sagsøger: Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank
 Sagsøgt: E. Fischer-Lintjens
 Præjudicielle spørgsmål
 1)
 Skal begrebet »ret til« i artikel 27 ff. i forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71 (1) fortolkes således, at for fastlæggelsen af, fra hvilket tidspunkt der er ret til pension eller rente, er tidspunktet for vedtagelsen af en afgørelse om tildeling, i henhold til hvilken pensionen er blevet udbetalt, eller tidspunktet for den med tilbagevirkende kraft tilkendte pension, afgørende?
 2)
 Såfremt der med begrebet »ret til« sigtes til begyndelsestidspunktet for den med tilbagevirkende kraft tilkendte pension:
 Er det foreneligt hermed, at en pensionsberettiget, der er omfattet af artikel 27 i forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71 efter nederlandsk lovgivning, ikke kan tegne en sygeforsikring med den samme tilbagevirkende kraft?
 (1) Rådets forordning af 14.6.1971 om anvendelse af de sociale sikringsordninger på arbejdstagere, selvstændige erhvervsdrivende og deres familiemedlemmer, der flytter inden for Fællesskabet (EFT 1971 II, s. 366).


text:
 COMISSÃO EUROPEIA
 Bruxelas, 26.1.2017
 COM(2017) 45 final
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO PARLAMENTO EUROPEU E DO CONSELHO
 relativa à mobilização do Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia para prestar assistência ao Reino Unido, a Chipre e a Portugal
 EXPOSIÇÃO DE MOTIVOS
 O Regulamento (UE, Euratom) n.o 1311/2013 do Conselho, de 2 de dezembro de 2013, que estabelece o quadro financeiro plurianual para o período 2014-2020
 1
 , nomeadamente o artigo 10.o, autoriza a mobilização do Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia até um limite máximo anual de 500 000 000 EUR (a preços de 2011), para além das rubricas correspondentes do quadro financeiro.
 As condições de elegibilidade para o Fundo estão estabelecidas no Regulamento (CE) n.o 2012/2002 do Conselho que institui o Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia, alterado pelo Regulamento (UE) n.o 661/2014 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 15 de maio de 2014.
 Com base nos pedidos do reino Unido, de Chipre e de Portugal, o cálculo da ajuda do Fundo, baseado na estimativa dos prejuízos totais causados pelas catástrofes, é o seguinte:
 Catástrofe
 Danos diretos totais
 (milhões de EUR)
 Aplicado o limiar para as catástrofes regionais
 (milhões de EUR)
 Aplicado o limiar para as catástrofes de grandes proporções
 (milhões de EUR)
 2,5 % dos prejuízos diretos totais até ao limiar para as catástrofes de grandes proporções
 (EUR)
 6 % dos prejuízos diretos totais acima do limiar para as catástrofes de grandes proporções
 (EUR)
 Montante total da ajuda proposta
 (EUR)
 Reino Unido - inundações em 2016 (catástrofe regional)
 2 412,042
 626,764
 n.a.
 60 301 050
 -
 60 301 050
 Chipre - seca e incêndios em 2016 (catástrofe de grandes proporções)
 180,803
 n.a.
 101,412
 2 535 300
 4 763 460
 7 298 760
 Portugal - incêndios na Madeira em 2016 (catástrofe regional)
 157,000
 40,850
 n.a.
 3 925 000
 -
 3 925 000
 TOTAL
 71 524 810
 Tendo em conta o exame dos pedidos acima referidos
 2
 e tendo em conta os valores máximos da contribuição do Fundo, bem como a margem existente para a reafetação de dotações, a Comissão propõe a mobilização do Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia num montante total de 71 524 810 EUR.
 A Comissão vai apresentar um projeto de orçamento retificativo (POR) com o objetivo de inscrever no orçamento de 2017 as dotações de autorização e de pagamento específicas.
 Em caso de desacordo, será iniciado um procedimento de diálogo tripartido nos termos do n.o 11 do Acordo Interinstitucional de 2 de dezembro de 2013 entre o Parlamento Europeu, o Conselho e a Comissão sobre a disciplina orçamental, a cooperação em matéria orçamental e a boa gestão financeira
 3
 .
 Proposta de
 DECISÃO DO PARLAMENTO EUROPEU E DO CONSELHO
 relativa à mobilização do Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia para prestar assistência ao Reino Unido, a Chipre e a Portugal
 O PARLAMENTO EUROPEU E O CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA,
 Tendo em conta o Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia,
 Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CE) n.o 2012/2002 do Conselho, de 11 de novembro de 2002, que estabelece o Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia
 4
 , nomeadamente o artigo 4.o, n.o 3,
 Tendo em conta o Acordo Interinstitucional de 2 de dezembro de 2013 entre o Parlamento Europeu, o Conselho e a Comissão sobre a disciplina orçamental, a cooperação em matéria orçamental e a boa gestão financeira
 5
 , nomeadamente o ponto 11,
 Tendo em conta a proposta da Comissão Europeia,
 Considerando o seguinte:
 (1)O Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia (a seguir designado por «Fundo») permite à União responder de forma rápida, eficiente e flexível a situações de emergência a fim de manifestar a sua solidariedade para com a população das regiões afetadas por catástrofes naturais.
 (2)A intervenção do Fundo não deve exceder o montante máximo anual de 500 000 000 EUR (a preços de 2011), conforme disposto no artigo 10.o do Regulamento (UE, Euratom) n.o 1311/2013 do Conselho
 6
 .
 (3)Em 26 de fevereiro de 2016, o Reino Unido apresentou um pedido de mobilização do Fundo, na sequência das inundações que afetaram 11 regiões
 7
 entre dezembro de 2015 e janeiro de 2016. No seu pedido, as autoridades do Reino Unido sublinhavam que a avaliação dos danos estava incompleta e que os dados eram apenas provisórios. O processo de pedido final foi concluído em 22 de setembro de 2016.
 (4)Em 5 de setembro de 2016, Chipre apresentou um pedido de mobilização do Fundo, na sequência das consequências da grave seca que se fazia sentir desde outubro de 2015 e dos incêndios ocorridos em 18 e 19 de junho de 2016.
 (5)Em 21 de setembro de 2016, Portugal apresentou um pedido de mobilização do Fundo, na sequência de incêndios na ilha da Madeira ocorridos entre 8 e 13 de agosto de 2016.
 (6)Os pedidos do Reino Unido, de Chipre e de Portugal respeitam as condições para a concessão de uma contribuição financeira do Fundo, previstas no artigo 4.o do Regulamento (UE) n.o 2012/2002.
 (7)Por conseguinte, o Fundo deve ser mobilizado a fim de ser concedida uma contribuição financeira ao Reino Unido, a Chipre e a Portugal.
 (8)A fim de reduzir ao mínimo o tempo necessário para a mobilização do Fundo, a presente decisão deverá ser aplicada a partir da data da sua adoção,
 ADOTARAM A PRESENTE DECISÃO:
 Artigo 1.o
 No quadro do orçamento geral da União para o exercício de 2017, é mobilizado o Fundo de Solidariedade da União Europeia, em dotações de autorização e de pagamento, como se indica em seguida:
 a) é concedido ao Reino Unido um montante de 60 301 050 EUR;
 a) é concedido a Chipre um montante de 7 298 760 EUR;
 a) é concedido a Portugal um montante de 3 925 000 EUR;
 Artigo 2.o
 A presente decisão entra em vigor no dia da sua publicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.
 A presente decisão é aplicável a partir de ... [data da sua adoção]**.].
 8Feito em Bruxelas, em
 Pelo Parlamento Europeu
 Pelo Conselho
 O Presidente
 O Presidente
 (1)
 JO L 347 de 20.12.2013, p. 884.
 (2)
 Comunicações da Comissão C(2017) 124, de 13.01.2017, para o Reino Unido, e C(2017) 358, de 24.01.2017, para Chipre e Portugal.
 (3)
 JO C 373 de 20.12.2013, p. 1.
 (4)
 JO L 311 de 14.11.2002, p. 3.
 (5)
 JO C 373 de 20.12.2013, p. 1.
 (6)
 Regulamento (UE, Euratom) n.o 1311/2013 do Conselho, de 2 de dezembro de 2013, que estabelece o quadro financeiro plurianual para o período 2014-2020 (JO L 347 de 20.12.2013, p. 884).
 (7)
 UKC2-Northumberland, UKD1-Cumbria, UKD3-Great Manchester, UKD4-Lancashire, UKE2-North Yorkshire, UKE4-West Yorkshire, UKL1-West Wales and the Valleys, UKM2-Eastern Scotland, UKM3-South Western Scotland, UKM5-North Eastern Scotland and UKN0-Northern Ireland.
 (8)
 Data a inserir pelo Parlamento antes da publicação no JO.


text:
 11/Sv. 089
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 262
 22009D0063
 L 232/19
 SLUŽBENI LIST EUROPSKE UNIJE
 29.05.2009.
 ODLUKA ZAJEDNIČKOG ODBORA EGP-a
 br. 63/2009
 od 29. svibnja 2009.
 o izmjeni Priloga XIII. (Promet) Sporazumu o EGP-u
 ZAJEDNIČKI ODBOR EGP-a,
 uzimajući u obzir Sporazum o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, kako je izmijenjen Protokolom o prilagodbi Sporazuma o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru, dalje u tekstu „Sporazum”, a posebno njegov članak 98.,
 budući da:
 (1)
 Prilog XIII. Sporazumu je izmijenjen Odlukom Zajedničkog odbora EGP-a br. 50/2009 od 24. travnja 2009. (1).
 (2)
 Direktiva 2008/96/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 19. studenoga 2008. o sigurnom upravljanju cestovnom infrastrukturom (2) treba se unijeti u Sporazum,
 ODLUČIO JE:
 Članak 1.
 Iza točke 17.i (Direktiva 2004/54/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća) Priloga XIII. Sporazumu umeće se sljedeća točka:
 „17.j
 32008 L 0096: Direktiva 2008/96/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 19. studenoga 2008. o sigurnom upravljanju cestovnom infrastrukturom (SL L 319, 29.11.2008., str. 59.).”
 Članak 2.
 Tekstovi Direktive 2008/94/EZ na islandskom i norveškom jeziku koji se objavljuju u Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije, vjerodostojni su.
 Članak 3.
 Ova Odluka stupa na snagu 30. svibnja 2009., pod uvjetom da su sve obavijesti iz članka 103. stavka 1. Sporazuma podnesene Zajedničkom odboru EGP-a (3).
 Članak 4.
 Ova se Odluka objavljuje u odjeljku o EGP-u i Dodatku o EGP-u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu 29. svibnja 2009.
 Za Zajednički odbor EGP-a
 Predsjednik
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) SL L 162, 25.6.2009., str. 31.
 (2) SL L 319, 29.11.2008., str. 59.
 (3) Ustavni zahtjevi nisu navedeni.


text:
24.11.2014
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea
 C 421/34
 Sentenza del Tribunale dell’8 ottobre 2014 — Bermejo Garde/CESE
 (Causa T-529/12 P) (1)
 ((«Impugnazione - Funzione pubblica - Funzionari - Reclutamento - Avviso di posto vacante - Nomina a un posto di direttore - Ritiro della candidatura del ricorrente - Nomina di un altro candidato - Domande di annullamento - Annullamento in primo grado dell’avviso di posto vacante contestato per incompetenza dell’autore dell’atto - Assenza di risposta esplicita all’insieme dei motivi e degli argomenti formulati dalle parti - Principio di buona amministrazione - Irricevibilità delle conclusioni dirette ad ottenere l’annullamento delle decisioni adottate sulla base dell’avviso di posto vacante contestato - Articolo 91, paragrafo 2, dello Statuto - Domanda di risarcimento danni - Diritto ad una tutela giurisdizionale effettiva - Obbligo di motivazione da parte del Tribunale della funzione pubblica - Causa matura per la decisione - Rigetto del ricorso»))
 2014/C 421/47
 Lingua processuale: il francese
 Parti
 Ricorrente: Moises Bermejo Garde (Bruxelles, Belgio) (rappresentante: L. Levi, avvocato)
 Altra parte nel procedimento: Comitato economico e sociale europeo (CESE) (rappresentanti: M. Lernhart, agente, assistito da B. Wägenbaur, avvocato)
 Oggetto
 Impugnazione diretta all’annullamento parziale della sentenza del Tribunale della funzione pubblica dell’Unione europea (Prima Sezione) del 25 settembre 2012, Bermejo Garde/CESE (F-51/10, non ancora pubblicata nella Raccolta).
 Dispositivo
 1)
 La sentenza del Tribunale della funzione pubblica dell’Unione europea (Prima Sezione) del 25 settembre 2012, Bermejo Garde/CESE (F-51/10), è annullata nella parte in cui respinge senza motivazione la domanda di risarcimento danni del ricorrente.
 2)
 L’impugnazione è respinta quanto al resto.
 3)
 La domanda di risarcimento danni presentata dal sig. Moises Bermejo Garde dinanzi al Tribunale della funzione pubblica è respinta.
 4)
 Il sig. Bermejo Garde sopporterà le proprie spese relative al presente grado di giudizio.
 5)
 Il Comitato economico e sociale europeo (CESE) sopporterà le proprie spese relative sia al procedimento dinanzi al Tribunale della funzione pubblica sia al presente procedimento nonché le spese sostenute dal sig. Bermejo Garde in primo grado.
 (1) GU C 55 del 23.2.2013.


text:
 8.2.2014
 HR
 Službeni list Europske unije
 C 39/22
 Tužba podnesena 11. studenoga 2013. — Cosmowell protiv OHIM-a — Haw Par (GELENKGOLD)
 (Predmet T-599/13)
 2014/C 39/38
 Jezik na kojem je tužba podnesena: njemački
 Stranke
 Tužitelj: Cosmowell GmbH (Sankt Johann in Tirol, Austrija) (zastupnik: Rechtsanwalt J. Sachs)
 Tuženik: Ured za usklađivanje na unutarnjem tržištu (žigovi i dizajni)
 Druga stranka u postupku pred žalbenim vijećem: Haw Par Corp. Ltd (Singapur, Singapur)
 Zahtjevi
 Tužitelj od Općeg suda zahtijeva da:
 —
 poništi odluku četvrtog žalbenog vijeća Ureda za usklađivanje na unutarnjem tržištu (žigovi i dizajni) od 5. rujna 2013 u predmetu R 2013/2012-4;
 —
 naloži snošenje troškova postupka uključujući i troškove koje je tijekom žalbenog postupka imao intervenijent.
 Tužbeni razlozi i glavni argumenti
 Podnositelj prijave žiga Zajednice: tužitelj
 Predmetni žig Zajednice: figurativni žig, koji sadrži prikaz tigra i verbalni element „GELENKGOLD”, za proizvode iz razreda 5, 29 i 30 prijava za registraciju žiga Zajednice br. 9 957 978
 Nositelj žiga ili znaka navedenog u postupku prigovora: Haw Par Corp. Ltd
 Navedeni žig ili znak: figurativni žigovi Zajednice, koji sadrže prikaz tigra, za proizvode iz razreda 5
 Odluka odjela za prigovore: prigovor se prihvaća
 Odluka žalbenog vijeća: žalba se odbija
 Tužbeni razlozi: povreda čl. 8. st. 1. t. (b) Uredbe (EZ) br. 207/2009.


text:
 29.3.2016
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 C 111/3
 Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki ga je vložilo Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Avstrija) 14. decembra 2015 – Umweltverband WWF Österreich/Landeshauptmann von Tirol
 (Zadeva C-663/15)
 (2016/C 111/04)
 Jezik postopka: nemščina
 Predložitveno sodišče
 Verwaltungsgerichtshof
 Stranke v postopku v glavni stvari
 Vlagatelj revizije: Umweltverband WWF Österreich
 Nasprotna stranka v revizijskem postopku: Landeshauptmann von Tirol
 Druga stranka: Ötztaler Wasserkraft GmbH
 Vprašanja za predhodno odločanje
 1.
 Ali člen 4 Direktive 2000/60/ES (1) o določitvi okvira za ukrepe Skupnosti na področju vodne politike (v nadaljevanju: Okvirna direktiva o vodah) ali Okvirna direktiva o vodah kot takšna okoljski organizaciji v postopku, v katerem ni treba opraviti presoje vplivov na okolje v skladu z Direktivo 2011/92/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. decembra 2011 o presoji vplivov nekaterih javnih in zasebnih projektov na okolje (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva PVO), priznavata pravice, za varstvo katerih ima dostop do upravnih ali sodnih postopkov v skladu s členom 9(3) Konvencije o dostopu do informacij, udeležbi javnosti pri odločanju in dostopu do pravnega varstva v okoljskih zadevah, ki je bila s Sklepom Sveta 2005/370/ES z dne 17. februarja 2005 odobrena v imenu Evropske skupnosti (v nadaljevanju: Aarhuška konvencija)?
 Če je odgovor na prvo vprašanje pritrdilen:
 2.
 Ali iz določb Aarhuške konvencije izhaja, da mora biti omogočeno uveljavljanje teh pravic že v postopku pred upravnim organom ali pa zadošča možnost priznanja pravnega varstva proti odločbi upravnega organa v sodnem postopku?
 3.
 Ali je dopustno, da nacionalno procesno pravo (člen 42 Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz; zakon o splošnem upravnem postopku, v nadaljevanju: AVG) določa, da mora okoljska organizacija – tako kakor tudi druge stranke postopka – svoje ugovore pravočasno uveljavljati že v postopku pred upravnimi organi in ne šele v pritožbi na upravno sodišče, pri čemer v nasprotnem primeru izgubi svoj položaj stranke in tudi ne more več vložiti pritožbe na upravno sodišče?
 (1) Direktiva Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2000/60/ES z dne 23. oktobra 2000 o določitvi okvira za ukrepe Skupnosti na področju vodne politike (UL, posebna izdaja v slovenščini, poglavje 15, zvezek 5, str. 275).