jurisdiction: US

text:
This is the third time this case has been here. The first appeal was from a judgment on demurrer for the defendant, reported in 148 Md. 569, where this court held the newspaper *Page 607
 article sued on libelous per se. The second appeal, reported in151 Md. 285, was from a judgment for defendant.
 The present appeal is from a judgment for the plaintiff, on twenty-six exceptions to the evidence, one to the rulings on the prayers, and one to the refusal of the court to allow the defendant's pleas to be taken to the jury room. But eight of the exceptions to the evidence were mentioned in the appellant's brief or at the argument, though the other eighteen were not abandoned. The twenty-seventh exception covered all the rulings on the prayers, viz.: the granting of the only prayer offered by the plaintiff, and the refusal of the defendant's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and tenth prayers.
 The plaintiff's (appellee's) prayer is: "The plaintiff by his counsel prays the court to instruct the jury that if they find for the plaintiff in this case and shall further find that the plea of justification has not been sustained by the evidence, if the jury shall so find, then the jury may award the plaintiff such damages as in their judgment will be fair compensation for the injury sustained and punish the defendant for publishing the article complained of." This prayer only applies when, on all the facts offered in evidence, the verdict of the jury should be for the plaintiff. It would not apply if the jury had been of the opinion that the libelous article published had been a substantially correct report of so much of Judge Moss' charge to the grand jury as had referred to the plaintiff and the conduct of his office as sheriff of Anne Arundel County. It would not apply if the jury had been of the opinion that the article published by the appellant had not correctly reported Judge Moss' charge, and the appellant had sufficiently proved under its plea of justification the facts therein alleged against the appellee. In either event such a conclusion by the jury would have meant a verdict for the appellant. The verdict for the appellee could only mean that the jury found the appellant had not published a substantially correct report of Judge Moss' charge to the grand jury and had not, under its plea of justification, proven the truth of *Page 608
 the charges against the appellee. This being the effect produced in the minds of the jury by the defense of the appellant, and the publication having been declared by this court, in 148 Md. 569, to be libelous, was the appellee entitled to an instruction to the jury that they could, if they thought the circumstances so warranted, render a verdict for punitive damages?
 The appellant relies upon the decision of this court in Freshv. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, as authority for its contention that the appellee's prayer should have been refused. In the Fresh case Judge McSherry said of the plaintiff's second prayer that it was erroneous because "it allowed punitive damages to be recovered even though the jury were not required to find the existence of actual malice on the part of the appellant. In cases of this character such is not the law. If the action brings the words within a qualified privilege, no damages can be recovered at all unless the plaintiff shows that actual malice prompted the publication or utterance." The Fresh case differs from the instant case in that the defense there was one of privilege only, with no attempt to justify. It is well settled that if a publication is made on a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and defense is made on the ground of privilege, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove express malice, unless the communication contains expressions which exceed the bounds of privilege. Bavington v. Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 90; Fresh v.Cutter, supra.
 The appellee's contention, as expressed in its prayer, is that if the defendant files pleas of justification which the jury may find to be unsupported by the evidence, this is evidence of express malice. The appellant contends that "a plea of justification, even though unsustained, is not proof of such actual malice as will destroy the defense of privilege," and cites 36 Cyc. 1237; Odgers on Slander and Libel, 191 and 250, and other authorities. We are aware that there is some difference of opinion as to the inference of malice vel non to be drawn from a plea of justification. Of *Page 609
 this situation, Newell on Slander and Libel (3rd Ed.), 422, says: "Some of our courts hold that a plea of justification in suits for defamation, if unsupported by evidence is in itself an aggravated repetition of the original defamation and evidence of continuing malice. Other courts hold the contrary doctrine. In some jurisdictions it is held that when the justification is not fully established the circumstances may be considered in mitigation of damages." This court has declared for the rule that unsupported plea of justification is evidence of malice. InBlumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328, 342, it is said: "The appellant had by plea asserted the truth of the charge his language imputed, and if untrue, as the jury found it to be, it was a re-assertion of the slander and, connected with other circumstances suggestive of malice, it could be considered as some evidence of malice; or, as Chief Justice Parsons expressed it in Wolcott v. Hull, 6 Mass. 514, where the defendant justified and with proof sought to maintain the charge, `it is evidence of continuing malice.'" And in Coffin v. Brown,94 Md. 190, 199, 200, it was said: "Although some courts of high authority have taken the contrary view, we are of the opinion that such a plea, when not sustained, is evidence of malice and is an aggravation of the wrong." "By this plea of justification the defendant assumes the serious burden of proving the truth of the defamatory matter" (McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 428. See also Blumhardt v. Rohr, supra; Coffin v. Brown, supra; Bowie v.Evening News, 151 Md. 288) "and is a question for the jury." We find no error in the granting of the plaintiff's (appellee's) prayer.
 The appellant's first prayer is the usual demurrer prayer, the second, third, fourth and fifth prayers are respectively demurrers to the evidence under the first, second, third and fourth counts of the declaration. The several counts were respectively based on the four editions of the Baltimore Evening News of October 20th, 1924, purporting to publish a part of the charge of Judge Robert Moss to the grand jury of Anne Arundel County on that day, wherein Judge Moss *Page 610
 is reported to have severely criticised John Bowie, sheriff of the county, and the police officers of Annapolis. The headline of the article, three columns wide, in the first edition of the paper, were "Jurist Hints at Scandal in Anne Arundel"; "Scandal in Anne Arundel County is Hinted"; in the second edition, "County Scandal Hinted," "Scandal in Anne Arundel County is Hinted"; in the third and fourth editions, "Jurist Rebukes Anne Arundel Sheriff," "Sheriff is Rebuked by Judge." In all the editions is a subhead, "Increase of Bootlegging is called Disgrace in Charge to Jury." In the publication, what purports to be the charge of Judge Moss is the following: "Special Dispatch to the News. Annapolis, Oct. 20. Corruption in official circles of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County was strongly hinted at by Judge Robert Moss of the circuit court in his charge to the grand jury this morning. The judge's charge also included a stinging rebuke to Sheriff Bowie of the county. After declaring the increase of bootlegging was a disgrace to the county, Judge Moss said a clean-up of conditions was in order. He referred to Garfield Chase (colored) who was employed as a `stool pigeon' by the sheriff's office in running down bootlegs and said repeated attempts to tamper with Chase and make him useless as a State's witness had been made. He blamed Sheriff Bowie for permitting these attempts and intimated that a member of the city police force was responsible for them. The court insisted that Chase be indicted either for bootlegging or for perjury and urged the jury to go to the bottom of the plot to save those against whom Chase was to testify."
 The appellant's five prayers are really demurrers to all the evidence, as the only differences are in the headline, the news article being the same in all four editions of the paper. The only possible reason for offering these prayers is on the hypothesis that the publications were all substantially accurate and fair reports of the charge of Judge Moss to the Anne Arundel grand jury, and that they are within the bounds of privilege. Unless there be express malice, which *Page 611
 in such cases the plaintiff must show, "a report will be privileged if it is substantially a fair account of what took place in court." "It is sufficient to publish a fair abstract."Newell on Slander and Libel (3rd Ed.), 669. "Reports of proceedings of courts of justice are privileged by the occasion, if fair, bona fide and impartial, though defamatory of individuals and published to the world at large." McBee v.Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 417.
 There is no question here that the publication sued on comes within the class of qualified privilege, and that, in the absence of malice, if it was a fair, bona fide and substantially accurate report of Judge Moss' charge, the appellant would be entitled to a verdict. If the facts are uncontroverted and there is no evidence of express malice, the question is one of law for the court. Bavington v. Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 90. In that case the court, quoting from Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, said, "Expressions in excess of what the occasion warrants do not perse take away the privilege, but such excess may be evidence of malice."
 There is no evidence in this case that the appellant was moved by any hostility, hatred, or ill will toward the appellee in publishing the news item complained of. The situation here was aptly stated in Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334, 339: "Libelous articles in newspapers seldom spring from any hostility to the individual, but usually from a ruthless disregard of personal feelings and private rights in the mad hunt for news and sensations." It has already been decided by this court, in148 Md. 569, that the publication is libelous per se, and its only excuse is the appellant's claim that it was a fair, bona fide,
 and substantially correct report of Judge Moss' charge. InGarrett v. Dickerson, 19 Md. 418, 450, it was said: "Words ascertained to be privileged as matter of law still involve the element or fact of good faith in speaking them, and that in general, evidence of any act or circumstance tending to show the want of good faith may be offered to remove the protection of privilege, and show the existence of malice." Bavington v.Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 90; Jump v. Barnes, 139 Md. 101, 106. *Page 612
 The evidence as to what Judge Moss did say in his charge is controverted and fragmentary, and so contradictory as not to warrant this court in saying, as a matter of law, that the publication sued on was a fair, bona fide, and substantially accurate report of his charge. The circumstances under which the news was gathered and reported do not aid in convincing us of its accuracy. "Newspapers have no particular privilege and are required to exercise due care in gathering and publishing public happenings." 36 C.J. 1273; State Journal v. Redding, 175 Ky. 388;Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, supra.
 The evidence is that the Evening News correspondent at Annapolis was not in the court-room when Judge Moss charged the grand jury and did not hear the charge. He had heard of it and went to the court-room, and made inquiry, from four or five persons who were present, as to what Judge Moss had said. "I feel sure that one of them was a member of the bar and that they were all people who were capable of stating what happened, * * * and as a result of that I had it pretty clearly in my mind that the judge had said certain things; and I framed the story or rather I took notes. * * * I had regarded the story as a very important news story. * * * So when I had the story framed in my mind I * * * called up the office. * * * The facts that I am reasonably sure of are that the judge scored conditions in the county at large in regard to the selling of liquor and certain conditions at the jail; and that he had criticized official action on account of this Garfield Chase incident. That is all I remember with any clearness." He could not remember any of the persons from whom he got his information and did not get a verification of the story from Judge Moss.
 Judge Moss testified that he had sent the sheriff (appellee) to make an investigation for him of the Garfield Chase incident, and that the sheriff had reported that investigation, which was a verification of the street rumor and more in detail. Garfield Chase, a negro, himself charged with "bootlegging," *Page 613
 was a witness against another "bootlegger." Some friends of the latter, including a justice of the peace, a notary and a chum of Chase, went to the jail and obtained from him a statement which was a repudiation of his story before the magistrate. After referring to certain matters in his charge, Judge Moss testified: "Then I passed to this other matter and, as I repeat, I may have said `Sheriff Bowie has verified this information for me,' or something of that kind. That is as far as I went on that. I then told the grand jury about this transaction as it had been reported to me by Sheriff Bowie. * * * I didn't say anything as to conditions at the jail. * * * I did not say that they ought to find him (Chase) guilty of perjury * * * I told them about conditions in the upper part of the county. * * *" As to bootlegging "It is my impression that I said it was a disgrace to the county. * * * Q. What did you say in reference to the management of the jail in regard to this permitting of an attempt to tamper with Garfield Chase, in your charge to the grand jury? A. I said nothing directly, but when I declared that it was done without permission of the sheriff's office or the state's attorney, you could call it an implied criticism of the warden of the jail for letting them in. Q. Why did you put it on the warden? A. I didn't put it on the warden; I impliedly blamed the warden because he was there and the sheriff was not there. * * * Q. Now did you say in your charge to the grand jury that the system at the jail was lax and that people were allowed to go in and out at will * * * ? A. I am about as certain as I can be of anything that I did not say it. You are dealing with generalities, I was dealing with a specific offense at the jail for a specific purpose."
 It does not appear anywhere in Judge Moss' testimony that he blamed Sheriff Bowie for the increase of bootlegging in the county, for lax conditions at the jail, or for permitting the tampering with the witness Chase. The only conclusion to be drawn from Judge Moss' testimony is that his sole reference to the jail was to the tampering of outsiders with Chase, and he got the information upon which he based his charge from the sheriff himself. There was other evidence that the *Page 614
 Chase incident was the only reference made to the jail or to the sheriff in the charge. There was no testimony from any of the witnesses that Judge Moss administered "a stinging rebuke to Sheriff Bowie of the county," except from two policemen, one of whom said that Sheriff Bowie told him "that Judge Moss raked him over the coals and also myself"; the other, "I heard Judge Moss say in his charge to the jury about Sheriff Bowie and about the police force in Anne Arundel County and also Annapolis not trying to enforce the law." It is evident that the testimony as to what Judge Moss said in his charge to the grand jury is conflicting and contradictory, and that the question of privilege in this case was for the jury. Bavington v. Robinson, supra.
 The first sentence of the "Special Dispatch to the News" was, "Corruption in official circles was strongly hinted at by Judge Robert Moss of the circuit court in his charge to the grand jury this morning." The word "corruption" does not appear in the evidence in this case except in the publication. Judge Moss did not use it and never testified that he did, nor was there any evidence of any charge of corruption having been made or "hinted at." There was no evidence that the appellant's newspaper correspondent at Annapolis gave any information to the paper of Judge Moss' charge from which a hint or a charge of corruption might be inferred. It was the inference drawn by the appellant's editors or writers from the substance of the charge as given second hand to the Annapolis reporter and relayed by him to Baltimore by telephone. After the first sentence the article is substantially as the correspondent testified he gave it to the paper. These facts, as related by the correspondent, if Judge Moss was correctly reported, were charges of certain laxity, carelessness, or negligence of the sheriff's office in the enforcement of the liquor laws and in the management of the jail, but it is a far cry from laxity and negligence to corruption, which is as ugly a word as can be fastened on a public official. In this publication the only official of Anne Arundel County mentioned was Sheriff Bowie, and, when "corruption in official circles of * * * Anne Arundel County was strongly *Page 615
 hinted at" in this publication, the reader would naturally infer that it was intended for the only county official named in the article, and that is Sheriff Bowie. If Judge Moss had made the charge or hint of corruption, the appellant would have been protected by its qualified privilege. It was the appellant's conclusion as to the meaning of what it published as Judge Moss' charge, and when it drew such an inference it took the risk of a jury's construction. Because of the contradictory testimony as to what Judge Moss did say, the question of privilege, which was submitted to the jury by the appellant's sixth and ninth prayers, the appellant's first, second, third, fourth, and fifth prayers, to take the case from the jury, were properly refused.
 The appellant's seventh prayer was for an instruction that there was no proof of actual or express malice, and if the jury found the publication sued on to be a substantially correct report of Judge Moss' charge, their verdict must be for the defendant. This was properly refused, because the finding of malice depends upon a finding of the substantial accuracy or inaccuracy of the report of the charge. If the report of the charge in this case was substantially correct, there was no malice; otherwise, if incorrect; unless the plea of justification had been sustained. The appellant's tenth prayer was for an instruction that there was no legally sufficient evidence to entitle the appellee to punitive damages. What we have said of the plaintiff's prayer applies to this prayer, and there was no error in its refusal.
 The twenty-eighth exception was to the refusal of the court to grant the request of the appellant's counsel to allow the jury to take with them to the jury room the pleas of the appellant, and particularly the plea of justification. The request was made on the theory that the pleas were necessary to supplement the plaintiff's prayer. The authority which the appellant cites (Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 116) is authority for the court's refusal to yield to the appellant's request, as that case declares that the matter is within the discretion of the trial court and not subject to review on appeal. In the opinion in that case, it is said that the *Page 616
 issues raised by the pleas are supposed to be fully explained to the jury in the course of the trial and "the jury are not left to grope through the technical verbiage of the pleadings to ascertain for themselves what issues are required to be determined."
 We will next take up the exceptions to the evidence to which the appellant referred in its brief and at the argument. The first of these, the sixth, is the exception taken on objection to the plaintiff's question, "In what manner, if at all, did you refer to Sheriff Bowie in your charge to the grand jury?" We fail to see the ground of this objection. The inquiry was as to the correctness or incorrectness of the report of Judge Moss' charge to the grand jury in so far as it referred to Sheriff Bowie, and the question could have had no other purpose. Although the court refused to allow the question on cross-examination covered by the eighth exception, it was immediately followed by a question to the same effect which was answered without objection. The twelfth exception was to the refusal of the court to strike out Judge Moss' answer to the question, "What did John Bowie do while sheriff during his last term of office to check bootlegging in Anne Arundel County?" to which Judge Moss answered, "Bowie did all that was reasonably in his power to do to enforce the law," and then went on to give some instances of special efforts made under the judge's direction and at his request. This answer may be general, but inasmuch as the defendant under its plea of justification was attempting to show that Sheriff Bowie was doing practically nothing to enforce the liquor laws, the appellee was entitled to prove whether the sheriff was diligent in enforcing the law. The defendant's brief indicates that its chief objection was that the jury was bound to be impressed by the fact that Judge Moss was giving the plaintiff a clean record "in the manner in which he performed his duties." This is hardly consistent with the defendant's claim of privilege, based on the alleged remarks of the same judge, which it says were directed against the sheriff.
 The seventeenth exception was to the question of Judge *Page 617
 Worthington to the witness Chase, "Who lived at the jail and had charge of it actually while you were there?" This is evidently based on the fact that, while the sheriff did not live in the jail, the warden, who was appointed by the county commissioners and not by the sheriff, did live there, and although the sheriff was held, under the last decision in this case (151 Md.), to be responsible for the conduct of the jail in spite of the fact that there was a warden so appointed, the jury was entitled to know to what extent the sheriff had personal knowledge of what went on at the jail. There is evidence in the record that the sheriff did not personally know, until informed by Judge Moss, of the tampering with the witness Chase. In the first sentence of the newspaper article, "corruption" of county officials is strongly hinted at, and the nearest approach to corruption in this case would be a charge of subornation of perjury, and if the sheriff did not know about this the hint in this instance could hardly apply. Then, too, after the evidence was in the jury were instructed by the appellant's eighth prayer, which was granted, that the sheriff was the legal custodian of the prisoners at the jail.
 The eighteenth and nineteenth exceptions were on questions put to A. Theodore Brady, state's attorney for Anne Arundel County, as to what statements of fact in the publication were or were not correct. This is an inquiry as to what Judge Moss said in his charge, and Mr. Brady, who said he was present when the charge was delivered, could have been asked what Judge Moss said, and he might have used the publication to refresh his recollection, but for no other purpose.
 The twentieth exception was to the refusal of the court to permit the grand jury report of its investigation of the jail to be offered in evidence. The members of the grand jury might have been called and examined as to their investigations of the jail and the sheriff's management of the same, and the plaintiff would then have had an opportunity to cross-examine them on their direct testimony. This was only pertinent under the plea of justification, which was an *Page 618
 attack on the sheriff's conduct of his office and management of the jail. Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444. The twenty-fifth exception was to the question, "What was the relationship between these two officers (the sheriff's chief deputy and Curry, a police officer of Annapolis) relative to the enforcement of the liquor laws?" to which Sheriff Bowie answered, "No co-operation." It was then objected to. The objection was not to the question, and there was no motion to strike out either the question or the answer. Curry had testified for the defendant, and at most it could only have been permitted for the purpose of showing that their official relations were not cordial. Neither question nor answer could possibly have had any effect on the result. One of the grounds of objection to this question was that the relationship between the police officers of Annapolis and the sheriff's deputy was not relevant to the issues. Curry had testified that there "is only one jail at Annapolis; that is for the county and city prisoners," so that the officers of the county and city must have had frequent contact in the jail at least.
 The first four unargued exceptions were on questions directed to employees of the News to disprove malice. Inasmuch as the court instructed the jury that, if the publication was a substantially correct report of the judge's charge, then they should find for the defendant, the element of malice was eliminated, and no harm done by the refusal of the court to allow these questions. The fifth exception was to questions to Judge Moss as to whether he had had any prior information as to the matters mentioned in the charge, to which he answered "Yes," in which we see no impropriety. The seventh exception was in substance a question asked of and not answered by Judge Moss during his examination. The same thing applies to the ninth. The tenth was on sustaining the objection to a question asked Judge Moss as to whether or not he "put it up pretty strongly." If the charge was sensational enough to cause the publication, the defendant had answered this in advance of the trial by the publication. The eleventh was a question to Judge Moss as *Page 619
 to whether the appellee had told him after the suit was brought that Epstein was going to tell the Baltimore News people that he took a drink at the jail. This matter was all brought out in the evidence, so that it was only a repetition of what covers pages of the record. The thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth exceptions were all taken while Mrs. Strahorn, the court stenographer, was on the stand, and every one of the questions asked and objected to and the answers moved to be stricken out were to questions asked and answered without objection several times of witnesses during the trial. Their propriety or impropriety did not exclude or admit the testimony offered, as it all was in the case without objection.
 The twenty-first was on a motion to strike out the testimony of Mrs. Strahorn, a witness offered by the plaintiff to attack the credibility of one of the defendant's witnesses. Mrs. Strahorn testified that she knew his reputation for truth and veracity and had heard it discussed in the community, and the court held her properly qualified to testify and refused the motion. The twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth were on objections to questions put to the appellee for the purpose of showing in part what efforts he did make to enforce the liquor laws in his county, and were clearly admissible in answer to the plea of justification, and proper for the jury to consider.
 Finding no reversible error in the rulings on the evidence, and no error in the rulings on the prayers, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
 Judgment affirmed, with costs. *Page 620


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 VYKONÁVACIE NARIADENIE KOMISIE (EÚ) .../...
 z 19. 4. 2018,
 ktorým sa stanovujú technické kritériá elektronických štítkov pre vybavenie námorných lodí
 (Text s významom pre EHP)
 EURÓPSKA KOMISIA,
 so zreteľom na Zmluvu o fungovaní Európskej únie,
 so zreteľom na smernicu 2014/90/EÚ z 23. júla 2014 o vybavení námorných lodí a o zrušení smernice Rady 96/98/ES
 1
 , a najmä na jej článok 11 ods. 4,
 keďže:
 (1)Smernicou 2014/90/EÚ sa na Komisiu prenášajú vykonávacie právomoci, aby stanovila primerané technické kritériá, pokiaľ ide o konštrukčný návrh, funkčné vlastnosti, pripevnenie a používanie týchto elektronických štítkov.
 (2)Bola vykonaná analýza nákladov a prínosov
 2
 , z ktorej vyplynulo kladné hodnotenie používania elektronických štítkov ako doplnku značky zhody.
 (3)Elektronické štítky vybavenia námorných lodí si nevyžadujú veľké investície, ale prinášajú výhody pre výrobcov, vlastníkov a prevádzkovateľov lodí a orgány dohľadu nad trhom.
 (4)Špecifikácie stanovené v tomto nariadení vychádzajú z porovnania dostupných technológií v rámci analýzy nákladov a prínosov, ako aj z jej návrhov na primeranú štruktúru kódov používaných na identifikáciu vybavenia námorných lodí.
 (5)Z porovnania existujúcich nosičov údajov a štruktúr výmeny údajov v rámci analýzy nákladov a prínosov vyplynulo odporúčanie využívať ako najvhodnejšie technológie kódy matice údajov a rádiofrekvenčnú identifikáciu (ďalej len „RFID“).
 (6)V analýze nákladov a prínosov sa takisto uviedlo, že obmedzená kapacita uchovávania údajov na elektronickom štítku znamená, že informácie na elektronickom štítku musia obsahovať odkaz na databázy, kde možno nájsť podrobnejšie informácie. Kódy matice údajov a rádiofrekvenčná identifikácia (ďalej len „RFID“) uvedené v tomto nariadení obsahujú kľúčové informácie poskytujúce takéto odkazy.
 (7)V dôsledku toho by sa mala používať jedinečná identifikácia vybavenia námorných lodí založená na štandardizovanej štruktúre kódu nezávislej od typu elektronického štítku. Táto identifikácia by mala byť dostatočne pružná, aby umožnila priamy prístup používateľov k väčšine relevantných databáz pre vybavenie námorných lodí.
 (8)Formát kódovania požadovaných informácií na nosiči údajov by mal vychádzať z noriem ISO. Tento formát by mal takisto umožňovať kódovanie dodatočných informácií zo strany výrobcov, najmä preto, že výrobcovia by mali mať možnosť umiestniť na nosič údajov ďalšie bezpečnostné prvky, aby mohli lepšie identifikovať falšované výrobky.
 (9)Vybavenie námorných lodí s elektronickými štítkami, ktoré nahrádzajú značku zhody, by malo byť označené vhodným symbolom, aby sa dalo ľahko vyhľadať pri vizuálnej kontrole.
 (10)Opatrenia stanovené v tomto nariadení sú v súlade so stanoviskom Výboru pre bezpečnosť na mori a pre zabránenie znečisťovania z lodí („COSS“),
 PRIJALA TOTO NARIADENIE:
 Článok 1
 Na účely tohto nariadenia sa uplatňuje toto vymedzenie pojmov:
 1. „elektronický štítok“ je označenie rádiofrekvenčnou identifikáciou („RFID“) alebo kódom matice údajov;
 2. „identifikátor aplikácie“ je číselný prefix používaný na vymedzenie významu a formátu jednotlivých kódovaných údajov.
 Článok 2
 Výrobcovia vybavenia námorných lodí môžu použiť tieto elektronické štítky tak, ako sa uvádza v prílohe:
 a) štítky RFID trvalo pripevnené na vybavení námorných lodí;
 b) opticky čitateľné štítky obsahujúce kódy matice údajov trvalo pripevnené na vybavení námorných lodí alebo
 c) opticky čitateľné štítky obsahujúce kódy matice údajov trvalo vyznačené na vybavení námorných lodí.
 Článok 3
 Elektronické štítky RFID, ktoré nahrádzajú značku zhody, sú viditeľne, čitateľne a nezmazateľne označené symbolom uvedeným v bodoch 3.1 alebo 3.2 prílohy, a to buď priamo na štítkoch alebo v ich blízkosti.
 Vybavenie námorných lodí s opticky čitateľnými štítkami obsahujúcimi kódy matice údajov, ktoré nahrádzajú značku zhody, sú viditeľne, čitateľne a nezmazateľne označené symbolom uvedeným v bode 3.3 prílohy, a to buď priamo na štítkoch alebo v ich blízkosti.
 Článok 4
 Toto nariadenie nadobúda účinnosť dvadsiatym dňom po jeho uverejnení v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.
 Toto nariadenie je záväzné v celom rozsahu a priamo uplatniteľné vo všetkých členských štátoch.
 V Bruseli 19. 4. 2018
 Za Komisiu
 predseda
 Jean-Claude JUNCKER
 (1)
 Ú. v. EÚ L 257, 28.8.2014, s. 146.
 (2)
 Výzva Európskej komisie GR pre mobilitu a dopravu na predloženie ponúk č. MOVE/D2/2015 – 372 V1.0 – „Možnosť zavedenia elektronického štítku ako doplnku alebo náhrady značky zhody na vybavení námorných lodí“.
 ---documentbreak---
 PRÍLOHA
 1.Identifikácia vybavenia námorných lodí
 1.1.Elektronické štítky pre vybavenie námorných lodí zahŕňajú elektronicky čitateľnú identifikáciu rádiofrekvenčnou identifikáciou („RFID“) alebo opticky čitateľným kódom matice údajov, ktorý obsahuje tieto informácie:
 a)
 vhodný identifikátor aplikácie v súlade s normou ISO/IEC 15434:2006 a ISO/IEC 15418:2016 využívajúci identifikátor údajov ASC MH10 alebo identifikátor aplikácie GS1;
 b)
 typ modulu(-ov) posudzovania zhody uvedený v prílohe II k smernici 2014/90/EÚ použitý na posudzovanie zhody [jeden abecedný znak];
 c)
 identifikačné číslo notifikovaného orgánu pridelené Komisiou v súlade s bodom 3.1 prílohy IV k smernici 2014/90/EÚ [4 čísla];
 d)
 číslo(-a) overenia jednotky (modul G) alebo certifikátov EÚ skúšky typu a zhody s typom (modul B a D, E alebo F) [maximálne 20 alfanumerických znakov].
 1.2.Okrem informácií poskytnutých v súlade s bodom 1.1 môžu elektronické štítky obsahovať aj informácie, ktoré sa týkajú čísla miesta výroby, kód výrobku, číslo šarže alebo sériové číslo a/alebo dodatočné informácie určené výrobcom v súlade s normou ISO/IEC 15434:2006 [s použitím identifikátorov údajov ASC MH10 alebo identifikátorov aplikácie GS1].
 1.3.Príklady:
 Moduly B + D: [pozri bod 1.2] + ([vhodný identifikátor]) B 0575 40123 + D 0038 040124
 Moduly B + E: [pozri bod 1.2] + ([vhodný identifikátor]) B 0575 40123 + E 0038 040125
 Moduly B + F: [pozri bod 1.2] + ([vhodný identifikátor]) B 0575 40123 + F 0038 040126
 Modul G: [pozri bod 1.2] + ([vhodný identifikátor]) G 0575 040126.
 2.Elektronické štítky
 2.1.Štítky RFID
 Transpondéry RFID sa musia prevádzkovať vo frekvenčnom rozsahu od 860 MHz do 960 MHz v súlade s normou ISO/IEC 18000–6: 2004 typ C.
 Elektronický štítok musí byť pevne a trvalo pripevnený na príslušné vybavenie námorných lodí tak, aby sa zabezpečilo, že elektronický štítok bude čitateľný, ako sa určilo, počas očakávanej životnosti vybavenia námorných lodí.
 2.2.Kódy matice údajov
 Kódy matice údajov musia byť v súlade s normou ISO/IEC 16022:2006.
 Elektronický štítok musí byť vyznačený alebo pevne a trvalo pripevnený na príslušné vybavenie námorných lodí tak, aby sa zabezpečilo, že elektronický štítok bude čitateľný, ako sa určilo, počas očakávanej životnosti vybavenia námorných lodí.
 3.Symboly
 3.1.
 3.2.
 3.3.


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Vincent Lambert : chronologie complète d’une affaire évitable · Blog · tooyoo
 Depuis le début de l’année 2019, l’affaire Vincent Lambert est revenue sur le devant de la scène médiatique. Acharnement thérapeutique ou euthanasie illégale ? Le sort de ce quadragénaire dans le coma déchaîne les passions. Retour sur les événements majeurs et les dates importantes de l’affaire Vincent Lambert.
 Pour saisir tous les enjeux et le conflit familial qui entoure Vincent Lambert, il paraît judicieux de poser quelques éléments de sa jeunesse et de la vie de ses proches.
 Biographie de Vincent Lambert et de sa famille
 Né le 20 septembre 1976, Vincent est le fils de Viviane Philippon et de Pierre Lambert, alors amants et mariés avec d’autres. Né Philippon, Vincent sera élevé par Viviane et son époux jusqu’à l’âge de 6 ans.
 Il sera ensuite reconnu par son père biologique, Pierre, et prendra le nom de Lambert au moment où les amants décident d’officialiser leur relation et de se marier ensemble.
 Pierre et Viviane sont des catholiques pratiquants et très traditionnels. Notons par exemple que Pierre Lambert est gynécologue et qu’il s’est opposé à l’avortement. Viviane, elle, est présentée comme proche de la Fraternité sacerdotale Saint-Pie X, décrite comme intégriste et d’extrême droite. Les parents nient que leur foi ait une influence sur leur combat, comme le disait Viviane Lambert au Parisien, en 2015 : « ... Si je n'avais pas eu la foi, je l'aurais défendu de la même façon. [Elle] ne m'a pas rendu aveugle. »
 A 12 ans, Vincent Lambert est envoyé dans un pensionnat religieux, géré par la même Fraternité Saint-Pie X.
 Vincent finira par s’émanciper de ce milieu très traditionnel « discrètement » et « sans déranger personne » selon ses proches. Devenu infirmier en psychiatrie, il rencontre Rachel, étudiante en psychiatrie, qu’il épousera en 2007. Ensemble, ils auront une fille.
 Le 29 septembre 2008, alors qu’il se rend au travail pour son service de garde, Vincent Lambert est victime d’un accident de la route. Avec un traumatisme crânien massif et dans un état tétraplégique, on plonge rapidement Vincent Lambert dans un coma artificiel.
 Au réveil, il est dans un état de conscience minimale (dit de paucirelationnel). Son demi-frère, David Philippon raconte : « Vincent a ouvert les yeux, on s’est dit : “Ça y est, il revient à nous.” (...) On s’est aperçus que sa présence n’était pas là (sic). »
 Dès mars 2009, et pendant trois mois, Vincent Lambert est traité avec de la kinésithérapie motrice et stimulatrice, au centre d’éveil de Berck sur mer.
 Le 23 juin 2009, Vincent Lambert est transféré au CHU de Reims. Après plusieurs changements internes, c’est le Dr. Éric Kariger qui supervisera son cas, au sein de l’unité de soins palliatifs.
 En juillet 2011, Vincent rentre au Coma Science Group de Liège pour un bilan diagnostique. Après examens, le centre confirme que M. Lambert est dans un état de « conscience minimale plus ». Selon les experts, le patient est capable de ressentir la douleur et les émotions. Ils notent une réponse à un contrôle volontaire de la respiration. Ils recommandent « d’envisager la mise en place d’un code de communication avec le patient ». Plusieurs expertises ultérieures confirmeront le caractère irréversible de son état.
 Mais Vincent Lambert est stable. Il n’est branché à aucune machine. Il est nourri artificiellement, car incapable d’avaler des aliments.
 De retour à Reims, Vincent Lambert reçoit 97 séances d’orthophonie entre avril et septembre 2012. Le but étant de créer le code de communication précitée, mais c’est un échec.
 Dans les mois qui suivent, le personnel soignant perçoit des signes comportementaux de la part de Vincent Lambert. Ces signes sont interprétés comme des oppositions à la toilette, et donc un refus de vivre.
 En décembre, voyant que la situation neurologique de M. Lambert n’évolue pas, le Dr. Kariger met en place une réflexion collégiale autour des soins à prodiguer au patient. L’alimentation et l’hydratation artificielles pourraient être considérées comme « une obstination déraisonnable », selon le code de la santé publique. Rachel, la femme de Vincent, participe à ce processus.
 Le 10 avril 2013, suite à la réflexion entreprise, le Dr. Kariger décide de l’arrêt de l’alimentation artificielle et de la diminution de l’hydratation de Vincent Lambert. On lui donne des sédatifs pour éviter qu’il souffre. Ses parents ne sont pas au courant de ce qui est en train de se passer.
 Viviane et Pierre Lambert apprennent la nouvelle, « par hasard », quelques jours après l’arrêt de l’alimentation de Vincent. Avec l’aide de deux des huit frères et sœurs, ils demandent l’intervention du tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne.
 La cour ordonne la reprise de l’alimentation et de l’hydratation. En effet, la justice a estimé qu’au-delà de sa femme, la famille aurait dû être consultée. D’autant plus, que Vincent Lambert n’a pas laissé directives anticipées claires, ni désignées un représentant médical. Rachel fera appel de cette décision, en vain. Nous sommes le 11 mai 2013, une terrible bataille juridique commence.
 Avant de s’intéresser aux nombreuses procédures judiciaires qui ont entouré l’hospitalisation de Vincent Lambert, il faut bien comprendre ce que dit la loi française. Le texte qui régit les dispositions médicales pour les malades en fin de vie est la loi Leonetti. Entrée en vigueur en 2016, elle permet la « sédation profonde et continue jusqu’au décès » des personnes en phase terminale. Pour éviter l’acharnement thérapeutique, le texte prévoit l’arrêt des soins, en cas d’« obstination déraisonnable ». C’est-à-dire que les soins seraient « inutiles, disproportionnés ou lorsqu’ils n’ont d’autre effet que le seul maintien artificiel de la vie ».
 Cet arrêt des soins peut être demandé par le patient (s’il en est capable ou s’il a des directives anticipées) ou, à défaut, le médecin.
 Dans le cas de Vincent Lambert, il s’agit donc de savoir si les soins prodigués — alimentation et hydratation artificielles, Vincent n’étant pas relié à une autre machine — rentrent dans le cadre de l’« obstination déraisonnable ». Pour le corps médical, Rachel (la femme) et François (le neveu) Lambert, la réponse est et restera toujours oui.
 Pour Viviane (la mère), Pierre (le père) et Anne (une des sœurs) Lambert, ainsi que David Philippon (un demi-frère), la réponse est non. Selon eux, Vincent n’est pas en fin de vie, mais lourdement handicapé. L’arrêt des soins correspond donc à « un meurtre », puisqu’il ne rentrerait pas dans le cadre de la loi Leonetti. Ils réclament que Vincent soit transféré dans un service et établissement spécialisé pour les handicapés, au lieu de rester dans une unité de soins palliatifs.
 Source : France 3 Régions
 L’autre argument avancé par les partisans d’un arrêt des soins est la volonté de Vincent Lambert. S’il n’a pas rempli de directives anticipées, il aurait déjà fait part de son opposition à un acharnement thérapeutique à sa femme, Rachel, l’année de leur mariage : « plutôt être piqué que de rester en vie comme un légume. » Les parents, eux, contestent ces propos.
 C’est cette différence de vision qui va rythmer les actions en justices initiées en 2013, près de 5 ans après l’accident de Vincent.
 En septembre de la même année, la famille, cette fois au complet, est convoquée par l’hôpital de Reims pour réengager l’arrêt des soins. Il sera décidé en décembre, contre l’avis de certains des membres de la famille, que les soins doivent être arrêtés le 16 janvier 2014.
 Ce jour-là, le tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne, saisi par les parents de Vincent, demande de poursuivre les soins. Pour la justice, « la poursuite du traitement n’était ni inutile ni disproportionnée et n’avait pas pour objectif le seul maintien artificiel de la vie ». La justice ajoute que l’équipe médicale s’est trompée dans le jugement de la volonté du patient.
 La chambre de Vincent est désormais sécurisée, comme le décrit le Dr. Kraiger dans un livre sorti en 2015 : « Le CHU installe une caméra à l’entrée (...), une serrure capable de tracer les entrées et les sorties (...) un hublot dans sa porte de façon à pouvoir l’observer sans l’ouvrir. Des rondes sont organisées. Les visiteurs sont obligés de passer nous voir. Nous vérifions leur identité, conservons leur carte d’identité le temps de la visite ».
 Le 27 janvier 2014, cinq des frères et sœurs de Vincent, qui n’étaient jusque-là pas impliqués dans les procédures légales, demandent à la ministre de la Santé de l’époque, Marisol Touraine, que le CHU fasse appel de la décision judiciaire du 16 janvier. C’est la première tentative de politiser l’affaire Vincent Lambert. Ce ne sera pas la dernière.
 Rachel et François Lambert, ainsi que le CHU de Reims saisissent finalement le Conseil d’État (la plus haute instance juridique française). Ce dernier demande une expertise médicale de trois médecins spécialistes et des « observations écrites » de la part de l’Académie de médecine, du Comité consultatif national d’éthique, du Conseil de l’Ordre des médecins et de Jean Leonetti (député qui a donné son nom à la loi sur la fin de vie).
 L’expertise devra dire si Vincent Lambert :
 Est dans une situation irréversible
 Peut communiquer avec son entourage
 À des réactions qui peuvent être considérées comme un refus des soins
 Pour les parents de Vincent Lambert, cette mission « est biaisée : on ne décide pas de la vie d’un homme sur le caractère irréversible de ses lésions ou sur sa capacité à communiquer. »
 Le rapport des experts sera rendu le 26 mai. Il conclut que :
 Vincent Lambert est dans un état végétatif irréversible
 Ce qui correspond à une dégradation, comparé à son état de 2011, où le Coma Science Group de Liège avait observé des changements de son état de conscience. Au vu de la gravité des lésions de Vincent Lambert, et du long laps de temps depuis son accident, son état est considéré comme irréversible.
 Les mesures prises pour tenter de communiquer avec Vincent Lambert ont échoué
 On parle ici des 97 séances d’orthophonie suivies entre avril et septembre 2012.
 Les réactions de Vincent Lambert semblent ne pas être conscientes
 Il n’est pas possible, selon les experts, d’interpréter les comportements du patient comme traduisant une volonté, ou non, de vivre.
 Le 24 juin, se basant sur le rapport, le Conseil d’État estime que la décision du CHU d’arrêter les soins est légale. Cela annule donc le jugement du tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne, prononcé en janvier.
 La veille, les parents de Vincent Lambert ont saisi la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) : ils craignaient que le verdict leur soit défavorable. Quelques heures après le jugement seulement, l’instance européenne suspend la décision du Conseil d’État, en attendant de pouvoir évaluer le fond de l’affaire.
 La Cour interdit également que le patient soit déplacé, par exemple dans un pays où l’euthanasie serait légale.
 L’appréciation de la CEDH tombera presque une année plus tard, le 5 juin 2015. Entre temps, devant la complexité de l’affaire, c’est la Grande chambre qui a repris l’affaire « Lambert et autres contre France ».
 Avec 12 voix pour et 5 contre, la Cour européenne estime que l’arrêt des soins ne viole pas la convention des droits de l’Homme.
 Les parents de Vincent Lambert font recours auprès de la CEDH, qui le rejettera, faute d’éléments nouveaux.
 Les soins peuvent donc être à nouveau arrêtés. Entre temps, au CHU de Reims, le Dr. Kariger a cédé sa place au Dr. Daniéla Simon. Celle-ci convoque la famille le 15 juillet pour lancer le processus collégial d’arrêt des soins.
 Viviane et Pierre Lambert s’y opposent et portent plainte pour « tentative d’assassinat et séquestration » contre le CHU et le personnel s’occupant de leur fils.
 Le 23 juillet, lors d’un nouveau conseil de famille, le CHU de Reims décide de suspendre la procédure d’arrêt des soins. Pour l’hôpital, le contexte est trop tourmenté, que ce soit pour le patient ou l’équipe soignante. Les médecins veulent le retour d’« un échange serein ». Pour cela, ils comptent demander à la justice de désigner un représentant légal pour Vincent Lambert.
 Pour Rachel et François Lambert, respectivement la femme et le neveu de Vincent, cette décision est un coup dur. En pleurs, elle déclarera à la presse : « La Cour européenne et le Conseil d’État s’étaient prononcés, et j’espérais la fin de ce parcours judiciaire. »
 Les parents de Vincent, eux, font part de leur « grand soulagement ».
 C’est du côté des partisans de l’arrêt des soins qu’arrive la salve juridique suivante. François Lambert saisit le tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne pour que le CHU de Reims soit obligé d’appliquer la décision du Dr. Kariger. En vain : la justice estime que c’est au médecin traitant actuel de décider de l’arrêt ou non des soins. François fait recours de cette décision auprès de la cour administrative d’appel de Nancy.
 Quoiqu’il en soit, nous sommes le 9 octobre 2015 et il faut attendre que le représentant légal de Vincent Lambert soit nommé par la justice.
 Ce sera chose faite le 10 mars 2016. Si le procureur de la République recommandait un tuteur extérieur à l’entourage de Vincent Lambert, la juge des tutelles désigne Rachel, sa femme, qui est favorable à l’arrêt des soins.
 Les parents de Vincent Lambert contesteront contre ce choix, en faisant appel plusieurs fois. Mais le 8 juillet, et le 8 décembre, Rachel sera confirmée comme tutrice principale de son mari par la justice.
 Entre temps, le 16 juin 2016, la cour administrative d’appel de Nancy a rendu son verdict et a donné raison à François Lambert, le neveu. La décision du 9 octobre 2015 est annulée. Les médecins doivent donc reprendre la procédure collégiale d’arrêt des soins
 Pourtant, rien ne bougera jusqu’au 12 octobre. À cette date, François Lambert saisit le Conseil d’État pour protester contre l’inaction du CHU de Reims, malgré la décision de Nancy.
 Selon les parents de Vincent Lambert, le 5 décembre 2016, ce dernier aurait tenté de vocaliser plusieurs fois devant eux, ainsi que devant deux aide-soignantes « qui en ont été impressionnées ». Tout au long de l’affaire, ses parents — ainsi que le comité de soutien à Vincent — vont tenter de prouver que celui-ci peut encore être conscient, à l’aide de photos, de déclarations ou des vidéos.
 Le corps médical, de son côté, parlera de manipulation, argumentant que « ces malades sont effectivement perturbants. On a le sentiment qu’ils réagissent à leur environnement, puisque toutes les informations sensorielles arrivent à leurs cerveaux (...) Les meilleurs experts ont donné un regard sur cette situation. Et malheureusement, le diagnostic et le pronostic qui ont été confirmés c’est l’état végétatif grave et irréversible. »
 Après avoir attaqué le CHU de Reims en décembre 2016 pour « délaissement de personne hors d’état de se protéger », les parents de Vincent Lambert commencent leur année 2017 par un rejet de la cour d’appel de Reims, puis celle de cassation. Alors qu’ils réclamaient le transfert de leur fils dans un établissement spécialisé, la justice estime que seule Rachel — tutrice légale — peut effectuer une demande de transfert.
 De son côté, François Lambert (le neveu de Vincent) s’impatiente que rien ne bouge malgré sa victoire en justice du 16 juin dernier. Il écrit au président François Hollande pour qu’il prenne position dans cette affaire. Ce dernier répond publiquement que « ce ne peut pas être le président de la République qui en décide : c’est l’équipe médicale, c’est avec la famille ».
 Au CHU de Reims, le Dr. Simon est remplacé par le Dr. Vincent Sanchez, au mois de février. Mais rien n’évoluera jusqu’en juillet 2017s. Le mercredi 19, le Conseil d’État, saisi 9 mois plus tôt par François Lambert, estime que la suspension de la procédure d’arrêt des soins est illégale.
 C’est en septembre 2017 que l’hôpital relancera une nouvelle procédure collégiale pour arrêter les soins. Les parents de Vincent Lambert feront recours auprès du Conseil d’État, mais perdront en janvier 2018. Dans l’intervalle, d’autres procédures judiciaires leur seront défavorables, alors qu’ils réclamaient de pouvoir consulter le dossier médical de leur fils et de le faire transférer dans un autre établissement.
 Le 9 avril 2018, après la quatrième procédure collégiale, le Dr. Sanchez annonce que les traitements (nutrition et hydratation) seront arrêtés dans les 10 jours.
 Deux jours plus tard, Viviane Lambert, la mère de Vincent, écrit une lettre ouverte à Emmanuel Macron dans le Figaro. Elle réclame que son fils ne meure pas « affamé et déshydraté ».
 Le 18 avril, c’est au tour de 70 médecins de publier une tribune dans le Figaro également, pour dénoncer une « euthanasie qui ne dit pas son nom ».
 Le 20 avril, le tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne demande qu’un nouveau rapport soit fait par trois experts après que les parents de Vincent Lambert ont contesté en justice cette quatrième tentative d’arrêt des soins.
 Le 6 juin, les parents sont déboutés par le même tribunal alors qu’ils contestent le choix des experts.
 Le 10 juin, les trois experts désignés abandonnent, estimant qu’ils ne pourront pas résister aux « tentatives de manipulations et aux critiques diverses ». Trois nouveaux experts sont désignés le 2 juillet.
 Ils rendront leur analyse le 22 novembre. Leur rapport confirme l’« état végétatif chronique irréversible » de Vincent Lambert. Selon eux, « la limitation extrême ou totale de ses capacités d’accès à la conscience, de communication, de motricité, d’expression de sa personnalité, l’altération irréversible de son image lui porte atteinte à un point qui n’est pas acceptable par lui-même et par son épouse et tutrice. » Ils indiquent cependant que ses « besoins fondamentaux primaires ne relèvent pas de l’acharnement thérapeutique ou d’une obstination déraisonnable » et que sa situation « n’appelle aucune mesure d’urgence ».
 La justice doit trancher le 19 décembre 2018, pour savoir si oui ou non les soins peuvent/doivent être arrêtés. Suite à un nouveau recours des parents de Vincent Lambert, la décision tombe le 31 janvier 2019 : Le tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne valide la procédure d’arrêt des soins. Pour les juges, les traitements s’apparentent bien à de « l’obstination déraisonnable » au sens de la loi Leonetti. Selon eux, « la volonté de Vincent Lambert de ne pas être maintenu en vie dans l’hypothèse où il se trouverait dans l’état qui est le sien depuis dix ans est établie ».
 Les parents de Vincent Lambert font recours auprès du Conseil d’État, qui leur donnera tort le 24 avril 2019. C’est alors vers la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme que Viviane et Pierre se tournent le 30 avril, mais perdent encore : la décision du Conseil d’État est confirmée.
 Ils alertent alors le Comité des droits des personnes handicapées de l’ONU (CDPH) qui demande à la France — le 3 mai — de ne pas interrompre l’alimentation et l’hydratation de Vincent Lambert. En effet, le pays a signé une convention sur les droits des personnes handicapées qui pourrait être enfreinte.
 Le CDPH estime devoir étudier le dossier plus en profondeur. D’ici à ce que cela soit fait, les soins doivent être maintenus provisoirement. Le CDPH n’étant pas une entité juridique, il ne peut cependant pas imposer sa décision.
 Le 10 mai, le Dr. Sanchez avertit la famille de Vincent Lambert : les soins seront arrêtés le 20 mai. Le 15 mai, le tribunal administratif de Paris rejette une demande des parents qui exigent le maintien des soins, d’ici à une prise de position du Comité des droits des personnes handicapées de l’ONU.
 Le 20 mai, les soins sont arrêtés. La Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme rejette un recours des parents de Vincent Lambert, n’ayant pas d’éléments nouveaux depuis sa dernière prise de position.
 Dans la soirée, l’affaire Vincent Lambert vit un rebondissement inattendu : la cour d’appel de Paris ordonne la reprise de l’alimentation et de l’hydratation. Selon la justice, la France doit respecter les mesures demandées par le CDPH, en attente de leur étude de la situation.
 Le gouvernement se tourne alors vers la Cour de cassation, contre cette décision. Le 28 juin, la Cour de cassation casse et annule le jugement de la cour d’appel de Paris, sans renvoi. C’est-à-dire que plus aucune procédure judiciaire ne pourra s’opposer à l’arrêt des soins de Vincent Lambert. L’avocat de Rachel, sa femme, parle de « point final à cette affaire. »
 Le 2 juillet, le Dr. Sanchez annonce la reprise du processus d’arrêt des soins. Le lendemain, les parents de Vincent Lambert tenteront un ultime recours contre le tribunal administratif de Châlons-en-Champagne pour faire appliquer la demande du Comité international des droits des personnes handicapées de l’ONU de lui laisser étudier le dossier. Ce recours sera rejeté.
 Le vendredi 5 juillet, Viviane et Pierre déposent plainte contre le Dr. Sanchez pour tentative de meurtre. Le médecin sera auditionné durant le week-end, sans être placé en garde à vue.
 Le 8 juillet, ses parents mettent un point final à l’affaire Vincent Lambert, du moins sur l’aspect médical. En effet, ils annonçant qu’ils ne déposeront plus de recours contre l’arrêt des soins. Ils se disent résignés.
 La seule procédure juridique encore ouverte est donc l’enquête contre le Dr. Sanchez pour homicide volontaire.
 Le 11 juillet 2019, Vincent Lambert est décédé.
 Si l’affaire Vincent Lambert prend véritablement fin au moment de la fin des procédures légales, celle-ci a montré la difficulté d’apprécier certains cas. Surtout en l’absence de directives anticipées, lorsque la famille n’arrive pas à s’entendre. Il y a tout de même une chose sur laquelle tout le monde (médecins ; magistrats ; experts ; journalistes et membres de la famille de Vincent) est tombé d’accord.
 L’affaire Vincent Lambert a dépassé le cadre médical. Il s’agit aussi d’une vision de ce qu’est la qualité de vie. Et de mort.
 Pour aller plus loin, nous vous proposons de rédiger vos propres directives anticipées afin d’éviter une nouvelle affaire Vincent Lambert.


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text:
Franjo Hocenski (zvan Hoc s dugosilaznim naglaskom; 1945. – Osijek, 11. siječnja 2005.), političar i srednjoškolski profesor matematike i fizike. Radio 36 godina u nekadašnjem EMŠC-u i Trgovačkoj školi, u kojoj je bio voditelj i pomoćnik ravnatelja.
 Bio je jedan od utemeljitelja Slavonsko-baranjske hrvatske stranke (SBHS) i vijećnik Skupštine Osječko-baranjske županije u sazivu 1993. godine te prvi predsjednik Vijeća osječke Gradske četvrti Gornji grad. Godine 2001. napustio je SBHS i neuspješno se okušao na lokalnim izborima kao nezavisni kandidat za gradonačelnika Osijeka. Kasnije je osnovao Udrugu građana Nezavisni Slavonije i Baranje, koja okuplja brojne srednjoškolske profesore. Bit će upamćen po inicijativi da se sjedište Đakovačko-srijemske biskupije iz Đakova preseli u Osijek ili da se bar u Osijeku utemelji ured pomoćnog biskupa.
 Izvor: Željka Rački: "Idealist i zagovornik središta biskupije u Osijeku", "Osječki dom", VI, 643, 1 - Osijek, 13-14. I. 2005.
 Hocenski, Franjo


text:
Echinocactus platyacanthus, Vrsta kaktusa iz središnjeg Meksika klasificiranog tribusu Cacteae. Može narasti do 2.5 metra visine i 1.5 metara u širinu. Cvjetovi su žute boje.
 Koristi ga se u izradi tradsicionalnih slastica poznatih pod imenom "dulce de biznaga" ili "acitrón", što glavna je prijetnja opstanku ove vrste.
 Sinonimi
 Echinocactus arachnoideus Scheidw.
 Echinocactus aulacogonus Lem.
 Echinocactus aulacogonus var. diacopaulax Lem.
 Echinocactus ghiesbreghtianus Lem.
 Echinocactus grandis Rose
 Echinocactus grandis subsp. polycormus Ríha & Tabasco
 Echinocactus helophorus Lem.
 Echinocactus helophorus var. laevior Lem.
 Echinocactus helophorus var. longifossulatus Lem.
 Echinocactus ingens Zucc. ex Pfeiff.
 Echinocactus ingens var. helophorus (Lem.) K.Schum.
 Echinocactus ingens var. saltillensis (Poselg.) K.Schum.
 Echinocactus ingens var. subinermis K.Schum.
 Echinocactus ingens var. viznaga (Hook.) K.Schum.
 Echinocactus ingens f. viznaga (Hook.) Voss
 Echinocactus irroratus Scheidw.
 Echinocactus karwinskii Zucc. ex Pfeiff.
 Echinocactus macracanthus de Vriese
 Echinocactus minax Lem.
 Echinocactus minax var. laevior Lem.
 Echinocactus oligacanthus Mart. ex Pfeiff.
 Echinocactus palmeri Rose
 Echinocactus platyacanthus var. palmeri (Rose) H.P.Kelsey & Dayton
 Echinocactus platyceras Lem.
 Echinocactus saltillensis Poselg.
 Echinocactus tuberculatus Link & Otto
 Echinocactus tuberculatus var. spiralis DC.
 Echinofossulocactus helophorus (Lem.) Lawr.
 Echinofossulocactus karwinskianus Lawr.
 Echinofossulocactus platyceras (Lem.) Lawr.
 Melocactus ingens Karw. ex Pfeiff.
 Melocactus platyacanthus Link & Otto
 Melocactus tuberculatus Link & Otto
 Vanjske poveznice
 Izvori
 Echinocactus
 Flora središnjeg Meksika
 Flora sjeveroistočnog Meksika
 Flora jugozapadnog Meksika


type: contracts

text:
 15.7.2010
 CS
 Úřední věstník Evropské unie
 L 181/19
 ROZHODNUTÍ SMÍŠENÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 51/2010
 ze dne 30. dubna 2010,
 kterým se mění příloha XIII (Doprava) a příloha XIV (Hospodářská soutěž) Dohody o EHP
 SMÍŠENÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 s ohledem na Dohodu o Evropském hospodářském prostoru, ve znění Protokolu o úpravě Dohody o Evropském hospodářském prostoru (dále jen „Dohoda“), a zejména na článek 98 této dohody,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1)
 Rozhodnutím Smíšeného výboru EHP č. 33/2010 ze dne 12. března 2010 byla změněna příloha XIII Dohody (1).
 (2)
 Rozhodnutím Smíšeného výboru EHP č. 156/2006 ze dne 8. prosince 2006 byla změněna příloha XIV Dohody (2).
 (3)
 Nařízení Komise (ES) č. 906/2009 ze dne 28. září 2009 o použití čl. 81 odst. 3 Smlouvy na určité kategorie dohod, rozhodnutí a jednání ve vzájemné shodě mezi společnostmi liniové dopravy (konsorcii) (3) by mělo být začleněno do Dohody.
 (4)
 Platnost nařízení Komise (ES) č. 823/2000 (4), které je začleněno do Dohody, uplynula dne 25. dubna 2010, a proto by mělo být v Dohodě zrušeno,
 ROZHODL TAKTO:
 Článek 1
 V příloze XIII Dohody se za bod 10 (nařízení Rady (EHS) č. 2988/74) vkládá nový bod, který zní:
 „10a.
 32009 R 0906: nařízení Komise (ES) č. 906/2009 ze dne 28. září 2009 o použití čl. 81 odst. 3 Smlouvy na některé kategorie dohod, rozhodnutí a jednání ve vzájemné shodě mezi společnostmi liniové dopravy (konsorcii) (Úř. věst. L 256, 29.9.2009, s. 31) (5).
 Článek 2
 Příloha XIV Dohody se mění takto:
 Bod 11c (nařízení Komise (ES) č. 823/2000) se nahrazuje tímto:
 „32009 R 0906: nařízení Komise (ES) č. 906/2009 ze dne 28. září 2009 o použití čl. 81 odst. 3 Smlouvy na některé kategorie dohod, rozhodnutí a jednání ve vzájemné shodě mezi společnostmi liniové dopravy (konsorcii) (Úř. věst. L 256, 29.9.2009, s. 31).
 Pro účely Dohody se nařízení upravuje takto:
 V článku 1 se slova „přístavů Společenství“ nahrazují slovy „přístavů na území, na které se vztahuje Dohoda o EHP“.“
 Článek 3
 Znění nařízení (ES) č. 906/2009 v islandském a norském jazyce, která mají být zveřejněna v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie, jsou platná.
 Článek 4
 Toto rozhodnutí vstupuje v platnost dnem 1. května 2010 za předpokladu, že Smíšenému výboru EHP jsou učiněna veškerá oznámení podle čl. 103 odst. 1 Dohody (6). Použije se ode dne 26. dubna 2010.
 Článek 5
 Toto rozhodnutí se zveřejňuje v oddíle EHP a v dodatku EHP Úředního věstníku Evropské unie.
 V Bruselu dne 30. dubna 2010.
 Za Smíšený výbor EHP
 předseda
 Alan SEATTER
 (1) Úř. věst. L 143, 10.6.2010, s. 28.
 (2) Úř. věst. L 89, 29.3.2007, s. 31.
 (3) Úř. věst. L 256, 29.9.2009, s. 31.
 (4) Úř. věst. L 100, 20.4.2000, s. 24.
 (5) Uvádí se pouze pro informaci; pro účely uplatňování viz příloha XIV Hospodářská soutěž.“
 (6) Nebyly oznámeny žádné ústavní požadavky.


text:
 Biografia
 Ha praticato l'atletica leggera a livello nazionale nel lancio del disco, disciplina nella quale partecipò ai campionati nazionali under 23 nel 2016, e sino al livello juniores anche nel getto del peso e negli ostacoli.
 Gareggia nel bob dal 2018 come pilota per la squadra nazionale tedesca e debuttò in Coppa Europa nel gennaio del 2019, competizione nella quale giunse terzo nella classifica generale del bob a due al termine della stagione 2020/21. Si distinse nelle categorie giovanili conquistando una medaglia d'oro ai mondiali juniores, vinta nel bob a due ad Sankt Moritz 2021, più due d'argento colte nella categoria under 23 a Winterberg 2020 in entrambe le specialità. Vinse inoltre due medaglie di bronzo nel bob a due agli europei juniores, ottenute nelle edizioni di Sigulda 2019 e Schönau am Königssee 2021, mentre a a Innsbruck 2020 vinse l'oro a quattro e il bronzo a due nella categoria under 23.
 Esordì in Coppa del Mondo nell'annata 2020/21, il 19 dicembre 2021 a Innsbruck, dove chiuse la gara di bob a due al quarto posto; centrò il suo primo podio il giorno successivo nella stessa località, cogliendo la terza piazza nella gara biposto in coppia con Marcel Kornhardt. Detiene quale miglior piazzamento in classifica generale il diciottesimo posto nel bob a due.
 Prese parte ai campionati mondiali di Altenberg 2021, dove vinse al debutto la medaglia di bronzo nel bob a due in coppia con Christian Röder.
 Palmarès
 Mondiali
 1 medaglia:
 1 bronzo (bob a due ad Altenberg 2021).
 Mondiali juniores
 1 medaglia:
 1 oro (bob a due a Sankt Moritz 2021).
 Mondiali juniores under 23
 2 medaglie:
 2 argenti (bob a due, bob a quattro a Winterberg 2020).
 Europei juniores
 2 medaglie:
 2 bronzi (bob a due a Sigulda 2019; bob a due a Schönau am Königssee 2021).
 Europei juniores under 23
 2 medaglie:
 1 oro (bob a quattro a Innsbruck 2020);
 1 bronzo (bob a due a Innsbruck 2020).
 Coppa del Mondo
 Miglior piazzamento in classifica generale nel bob a due: 18o nel 2020/21.
 1 podio (nel bob a due):
 1 terzo posto.
 Coppa Europa
 Miglior piazzamento in classifica generale nel bob a due: 3o nel 2020/21.
 Miglior piazzamento in classifica generale nel bob a quattro: 9o nel 2019/20.
 Miglior piazzamento in classifica generale nella combinata maschile: 6o nel 2019/20.
 7 podi (5 nel bob a due, 2 nel bob a quattro):
 4 vittorie (tutte nel bob a due);
 3 terzi posti (1 nel bob a due, 2 nel bob a quattro).
 Altri progetti
 Collegamenti esterni


text:
 EUROOPA
 KOMISJON
 Brüssel, 28.5.2015
 COM(2015) 225 final
 2015/0116 (NLE)
 Ettepanek:
 NÕUKOGU OTSUS,
 millega määratakse kindlaks Euroopa Liidu nimel EMP ühiskomitees võetav seisukoht
 seoses EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 (koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool
 nelja vabadust) muutmisega
 (eelarveread 02 03 01 ja 12 02 01)
 ET ET
 ---pagebreak--- SELETUSKIRI
 1. ETTEPANEKU TAUST
 Nõutava õiguskindluse ja siseturu ühtsuse tagamiseks peab EMP ühiskomitee pärast
 asjaomaste ELi õigusaktide vastuvõtmist integreerima need võimalikult kiiresti Euroopa
 Majanduspiirkonna lepingusse ja lubama EMP EFTA riikidel osaleda ka EMPd käsitlevates
 ELi meetmetes ja programmides.
 2. KONSULTEERIMINE HUVITATUD ISIKUTEGA JA MÕJU HINDAMINE
 EMP ühiskomitee otsuse eelnõu (mis on lisatud nõukogu otsuse ettepanekule) eesmärk on
 muuta EMP lepingu teatavates valdkondades väljaspool nelja vabadust tehtavat koostööd
 käsitlevat protokolli nr 31, et jätkata EMP lepingu osaliste koostööd ELi üldeelarvest
 rahastatavate meetmete raames rubriikides „Siseturu toimimine ja selle arendamine eelkõige
 teavitamise, tõendamise ja valdkondliku lähendamise küsimustes” ning „Siseturu
 rakendamine ja arendamine”.
 3. ETTEPANEKU ÕIGUSLIK KÜLG
 Nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 2894/94 (Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingu rakendamise korra
 kohta) artikli 1 lõikega 3 on ette nähtud, et nõukogu kehtestab komisjoni ettepanekul
 seisukoha, mis tuleb liidu nimel selliste otsuste suhtes võtta.
 Komisjon esitab nõukogule EMP ühiskomitee otsuse eelnõu, et nõukogu kiidaks selle heaks
 kui liidu seisukoha. Komisjon loodab, et ta saab seisukoha EMP ühiskomitees esitada
 esimesel võimalusel.
 ET 2 ET
 ---pagebreak--- 2015/0116 (NLE)
 Ettepanek:
 NÕUKOGU OTSUS,
 millega määratakse kindlaks Euroopa Liidu nimel EMP ühiskomitees võetav seisukoht
 seoses EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 (koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool
 nelja vabadust) muutmisega
 (eelarveread 02 03 01 ja 12 02 01)
 EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingut, eriti selle artiklit 114 koostoimes artikli 218
 lõikega 9,
 võttes arvesse nõukogu 28. novembri 1994. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 2894/94 Euroopa
 Majanduspiirkonna lepingu rakendamise korra kohta,1 eriti selle artikli 1 lõiget 3,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Komisjoni ettepanekut
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1) Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna leping2 (edaspidi „EMP leping”) jõustus 1. jaanuaril
 1994.
 (2) Kooskõlas EMP lepingu artikliga 98 võib EMP ühiskomitee oma otsusega muu hulgas
 muuta EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 (edaspidi „protokoll nr 31”).
 (3) EMP lepingu protokoll nr 31 sisaldab sätteid koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades
 väljaspool nelja vabadust.
 (4) On asjakohane jätkata EMP lepingu osaliste koostööd ELi üldeelarvest rahastatavate
 meetmete raames rubriikides „Siseturu toimimine ja selle arendamine eelkõige
 teavitamise, tõendamise ja valdkondliku lähendamise küsimustes” ning „Siseturu
 rakendamine ja arendamine”.
 (5) Seetõttu tuleks muuta EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31, et kõnealune laiendatud koostöö
 saaks jätkuda ka pärast 31. detsembrit 2014.
 (6) EMP ühiskomitees võetav Euroopa Liidu seisukoht peaks põhinema lisatud otsuse
 eelnõul,
 ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 (koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool nelja
 vabadust) muutmise suhtes EMP ühiskomitees Euroopa Liidu nimel võetav seisukoht põhineb
 käesolevale otsusele lisatud EMP ühiskomitee otsuse eelnõul.
 1
 EÜT L 305, 30.11.1994, lk 6.
 2
 EÜT L 1, 3.1.1994, lk 3.
 ET 3 ET
 ---pagebreak--- Artikkel 2
 Käesolev otsus jõustub selle vastuvõtmise kuupäeval.
 Brüssel,
 Nõukogu nimel
 eesistuja
 ET 4 ET
 ---documentbreak--- EUROOPA
 KOMISJON
 Brüssel, 28.5.2015
 COM(2015) 225 final
 ANNEX 1
 LISA
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS nr .../2015,
 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 koostöö kohta teatavates
 valdkondades väljaspool nelja vabadust
 järgmise dokumendi juurde:
 ettepanek: nõukogu otsus,
 millega määratakse kindlaks Euroopa Liidu nimel EMP ühiskomitees võetav seisukoht
 seoses EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 (koostöö kohta teatavates valdkondades väljaspool
 nelja vabadust) muutmisega
 (eelarveread 02 03 01 ja 12 02 01)
 ET ET
 ---pagebreak--- LISA
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS nr .../2015,
 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31 koostöö kohta teatavates
 valdkondades väljaspool nelja vabadust
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut (edaspidi „EMP leping”), eriti selle
 artikleid 86 ja 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1) On asjakohane jätkata EMP lepingu osaliste koostööd ELi üldeelarvest rahastatavate
 Euroopa Liidu meetmete raames, mis on seotud siseturu rakendamise, toimimise ja
 arendamisega.
 (2) Seetõttu tuleks muuta EMP lepingu protokolli nr 31, et kõnealune laiendatud koostöö
 saaks jätkuda pärast 31. detsembrit 2014,
 ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 EMP lepingu protokolli nr 7 artiklit 31 muudetakse järgmiselt.
 1. Pärast lõiget 9 lisatakse järgmine lõige:
 „10. Alates 1. jaanuarist 2015 osalevad EFTA riigid Euroopa Liidu meetmetes, mis
 on seotud Euroopa Liidu 2015. aasta üldeelarvesse kantud järgmiste
 eelarveridadega:
 - eelarverida 02 03 01: „Siseturu toimimine ja selle arendamine eelkõige
 teavitamise, tõendamise ja valdkondliku lähendamise küsimustes”;
 - eelarverida 12 02 01: „Siseturu rakendamine ja arendamine”.”
 2. Lõigetes 3 ja 4 asendatakse sõnad „lõiked 5 kuni 9” sõnadega „lõiked 5 kuni 10”.
 Artikkel 2
 Käesolev otsus jõustub järgmisel päeval pärast seda, kui on esitatud kõik EMP lepingu artikli
 103 lõike 1 kohased teated∗.
 Seda kohaldatakse alates 1. jaanuarist 2015.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 ∗
 [Põhiseadusest tulenevaid nõudeid ei ole nimetatud.] [Põhiseadusest tulenevad nõuded on nimetatud.]
 ET 2 ET
 ---pagebreak--- Brüssel,
 EMP ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja
 EMP ühiskomitee
 sekretärid
 ET 3 ET


text:
Las elecciones legislativas de Argentina de 1862 se realizaron el 12, 13 y 14 de abril del mencionado año para renovar la totalidad de la Cámara de Diputados, cámara baja del Congreso de la Nación Argentina. Córdoba tuvo elecciones desfasadas el 25, 26 y 27 de abril, y Salta el 22, 23 y 24 de abril. Las elecciones en La Rioja se realizaron en 1864. Fueron las primeras elecciones después de la disolución del Congreso el 12 de diciembre de 1861 y la unificación del Estado de Buenos Aires y la Confederación Argentina luego de la Batalla de Pavón.
 Bancas a elegir
 Resultados por provincia
 Diputados suplentes
 Elecciones parciales
 Véase también
 Elecciones presidenciales de Argentina de 1862
 Elecciones al Senado de Argentina de 1862
 Referencias
 Bibliografía
 Elecciones legislativas de Argentina
 Elecciones en Argentina en 1862


text:
17. 12 . 73 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. L 347/ 13
 DEN BLANDEDE KOMITES BESLUTNING Nr. 9/73
 om supplering og ændring af artiklerne 24 og 25 i Protokol nr. 3 vedrørende definitionen
 af begrebet »varer med oprindelsesstatus « og metoderne for administrativt samarbejde
 DEN BLANDEDE KOMITE HAR de toldbestemmelser, der er i kraft i Østrig eller i
 de to andre lande, og som er omhandlet i over
 enskomstens artikel 3 , stk. 1 , for :
 under henvisning til overenskomsten mellem Det
 europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab og republikken
 Østrig undertegnet i Bruxelles den 22 . juli 1972, a ) varer, der opfylder betingelserne i denne pro
 tokol, og for hvilke der er udstedt et vare
 under henvisning til Protokol nr. 3 vedrørende defi certifikat, hvoraf det fremgår, at alene i Øst
 nitionen af begrebet » varer med oprindelsesstatus « rig eller i de to førnævnte lande eller i de
 og metoderne for administrativt samarbejde, i det fem andre i artikel 2 i denne protokol nævnte
 følgende benævnt protokol nr. 3 , især artikel 28 , og lande har opnået oprindelsesstatus eller har
 gennemgået yderligere forarbejdning;
 ud fra følgende betragtninger :
 b ) varer, der opfylder betingelserne i denne pro
 Den blandede Komités afgørelse nr. 6/73 af 6. februar tokol , undtagen varer henhørende under ka
 1973 har indført visse ændringer i artikel 25, stk. 1 , pitlerne 50 - 62, og for hvilke der er udstedt
 i Protokol nr. 3 for at undgå, at der på bekostning et varecertifikat, hvoraf det fremgår :
 af varer med oprindelsesstatus i henhold til overens
 komsten af 22. juli 1972 sker forskydninger i forsy
 ningskilderne, som vil kunne finde sted, indtil told er 1 . at de er fremstillet ved forarbejdning af
 afskaffet mellem Fællesskabet i dets oprindelige ud varer, som på tidspunktet for deres udfør
 strækning og Irland på den ene side og Østrig på sel fra Fællesskabet i dets oprindelige ud
 den anden side ; den nævnte afgørelse har følgelig strækning eller fra Irland allerede dér hav
 ændret artiklerne 23 og 24 ; de opnået oprindelsesstatus,
 det er under hensyntagen til, at der opstår yderligere 2. og at merværdien, erhvervet i Østrig, i de
 risiko for sådanne forskydninger i forsyningskilderne, to førnævnte lande eller i de fem andre
 nødvendigt at indføre nye ændringer i bestemmel i artikel 2 i denne protokol nævnte lande,
 serne i artikel 25 , stk. 1 , i Protokol nr. 3 , udgør 50 % eller mere af værdien af disse
 varer ;
 BESLUTTET :
 c) varer, der opfylder betingelserne i denne pro
 tokol, og som er anført i kolonne 2 nedenfor,
 og for hvilke, der er udstedt et varecertifikat,
 Artikel 1
 hvoraf det fremgår, at de er fremstillet ved
 forarbejdning af varer, der er anført i kolonne
 Artikel 25 , stk. 1 , i protokol affattes således : 1 omstående og som på tidspunktet for deres
 udførsel fra Fællesskabet i dets oprindelige
 » 1 . Ved indførsel i Østrig eller i Danmark eller udstrækning eller fra Irland allerede dér havde
 i Det forenede Kongerige gælder fordelene ifølge opnået oprindelsesstatus .
 ---pagebreak--- Nr. L 347/ 14 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 17 . 12. 73
 Kolonne 1 Kolonne 2
 Anvendte materialer Fremstillede varer
 1. ex 11.08 Stivelse fremstillet på basis af majs eller ex 35.05 Stivelsesklister
 kartofler
 2. 73.12 Bånd af jern og stål, varmt eller koldt 73.18 Rør og røremner, af jern og stål (undtagen
 valsede rør henhørende under pos . 73.17 og 73.19)
 3. 74.01 Kobbersten ; ubearbejdet kobber også 74.03 Stænger, profiler og tråd, af kobber
 raffineret ; affald og skrot af kobber
 74.04 Plader og bånd, af kobber
 74.05 Folie af kobber med en tykkelse (uden
 underlag) af højst 0,15 mm, også mønster
 presset, tilskåret, perforeret, overtrukket,
 med påtryk eller med underlag af papir
 eller andet forstærkningsmateriale
 74.06 Pulver og skæl , af kobber
 74.07 Rør, røremner og hule stænger, af kobber
 74.08 Rørfittings af kobber, (f.eks . rørknæ,
 muffer og flanger)
 74.10 Snoet tråd , kabler, tovværk , flettede
 bånd o . lign. af kobbertråd (undtagen
 isoleret tråd m.v. til elektrisk brug)
 85.23 Isolerede (herunder lakerede eller anodi
 serede) elektriske ledninger, tråde, kabler,
 skinner, bånd o. lign. (herunder koaksial
 kabler), forsynet med forbindelsesdele
 4. 75.01 Nikkelsten, nikkelspeis og andre mellem 75.02 Stænger, profiler og tråd, af nikkel
 produkter fra nikkelfremstillingen ; ube
 arbejdet nikkel (undtagen de under pos . 75.03 Plader, bånd og folie , af nikkel ; pulver
 75.05 hørende anoder) ; affald og skrot, og skæl, af nikkel
 af nikkel
 75.04 Rør, røremner, hule stænger og rør
 fittings (f.eks. rørknæ, muffer og flanger),
 af nikkel
 5. ex 85.24 Kulelektroder ex 85.24 Grafitelektroder
 6. Materialer, der ikke henhører under kapitlerne 50 Alle varer henhørende under kapitlerne 50 til 62
 til 62
 7. ex kapit - Fibre, garn, monofilamenter og strimler Alle varer, henhørende under kapitlerne 50 til 62 , der
 lerne 50 af tekstilmaterialer undtagen de tekstil består af to eller flere tekstilmaterialer
 til 57 materialer, der, beregnet efter vægt,
 udgør varens hovedbestanddel , forudsat
 at deres vægt højst udgør 10% af den
 samlede vægt af alle de tekstilmaterialer,
 der indgår i den færdige vare
 8. ex kapit Garner ex 60.04 Underbeklædningsgenstande, komplette
 lerne 50 og færdige til brug
 til 59
 ex 60.05 Yderbeklædningsgenstande og andre va
 rer ( undtagen tæpper) komplette og fær
 dige til brug
 ---pagebreak--- 17 . 12. 73 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. L 347/ 15
 Kolonne 1 Kolonne 2
 Anvendte materialer Fremstillede varer
 9. ex kapit - Vævet stof, ubroderet, forudsat at stoffets ex 62.02 Følgende broderede varer : dækketøj , gar
 lerne værdi ikke overstiger 50% af værdien af diner, bordløbere, betræk til stole, arm
 50 til 59 den færdige vare lænsbetræk og pudebetræk (undtagen
 sengelinned) og udstyrsartikler til brug
 i kirker o.lign .
 10. ex kapit - Besætningsartikler og tilbehør (undtagen Alle varer henhørende under kapitel 60, pos. 60.01 —61.04,
 lerne for) 61.06, 61.07, 61.09—61.11 (komplette og færdige til brug),
 50 til 62 61.05 (komplette og færdige til brug) samt varer henhørende
 under pos. 61.08 og kapitel 62
 11 . ex 57.07 Garn af sisal ex 58.02 Gulvtæpper (herunder gulvløbere og måt
 ter) af sisal
 12. 50.03 Affald af natursilke (herunder schappe
 silke og bourettesilke og kokoner, der er
 uanvendelige til afhaspning, samt opkrad
 sede klude)
 Alle varer, henhørende under kapitlerne 50 til 62
 56.03 Affald af kemofibre (herunder garnaffald
 og opkradsede klude), ikke kartet,
 kæmmet eller på anden måde beredt til
 spinding
 13 . 53.05 Uld og andre dyrehår (fine eller grove), Alle varer henhørende under kapitlerne 50 til 67
 kartet eller kæmmet
 14 . ex 56.01 Korte syntetiske kemofibre, ikke kartede, Alle varer henhørende under kapitlerne 50 til 57 und
 kæmmede eller på anden måde beredte tagen pos. 56.04. Korte kemofibre og affald af kemo
 til spinding fibre, kartede, kæmmede eller på anden måde beredt
 til spinding
 ex 56.02 Bånd (tow) til fremstilling af korte Følgende varer henhørende under kapitlerne 58 til 62 :
 syntetiske kemofibre ex 59.01 : Hygiejnebind
 ex 59.04 : Sejlgarn, reb og tovværk, også flettet
 ( undtagen enkelttrådet garn af endeløse
 syntetiske kemofibre)
 15. ex 56.01 Fibre og bånd (tow) af polypropylen, på ex 59.02 Nålefilt, også imprægneret eller overtruk
 ex 56.02 betingelse af, polypropylenfibrenes værdi ket
 ikke overstiger 40 % af den færdige vares
 værdi
 16 . ex kapit Garner ex 50.09 Vævet stof, farvet , indeholdende mindst
 lerne 80 vægtprocent natursilke ( undtagen
 50 til 57 bourettesilke)
 ex 51.04 Vævet stof af endeløse kemofibre med
 flockprint
 ex 55.09 Andre vævede stoffer af bomuld med flock
 print
 ex 55.09 Organdistoffer, blegede samt mercerise
 rede og mønsterprægede
 ex 56.07 Vævet stof af korte kemofibre (eller af
 affald af kemofibre), med flockprint
 58.01 Gulvtæpper (herunder gulvløbere og måt
 ter) knyttede, også konfektionerede
 ex 59.01 Hygiejnebind
 ---pagebreak--- Nr. L 347/ 16 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 17. 12 . 73
 Kolonne 1 Kolonne 2
 Anvendte materialer Fremstillede varer
 ex 59.15 Brandslanger og lignende slanger af teks
 til , i hvilke indholdet af hør eller hamp
 eller begge tilsammen udgør mindst 50
 vægtprocent af tekstilmaterialet
 ex 59.17 Sigteflor
 ex 59.17 Andre artikler af tekstil til teknisk brug
 undtagen af den i bestemmelse 5a til
 kapital 59 angivne art
 ex 60.03 Strømper, understrømper, sokker, ankel
 sokker, o . lign. varer, komplette og fær
 dige til brug
 ex 60.06 Varer af den i pos. 60.02 til 60.05 om
 handlede art, elastiske eller gummerede
 17. ex kapit - Enkelttrådet garn 59.05 Knyttede netstoffer af sejlgarn , reb og tov
 lerne 50 til 59 værk, også i tilskårne stykker eller kon
 fektionerede ; færdige fiskenet af garn ,
 sejlgarn , reb og tovværk
 59.06 Andre varer fremstillet af garn , sejlgarn ,
 reb og tovværk (bortset fra tekstilstoffer
 og varer deraf)
 18 . ex kapit- Enkelttrådet garn ex 58.08 Netstoffer, med regelmæssige kvadratiske
 lerne 55 til 56 eller rhombeformede masker, knyttede i
 hjørnerne , udelukkende af bomuld eller
 af syntetiske kemofibre
 19. ex 51.01 Garn af endeløse syntetiske kemofibre, ex 58.08 Netstoffer, med regelmæssige kvadratiske
 ikke i detailsalgsoplægninger eller rhombeformede masker, knyttede i
 hjørnerne, udelukkende af bomuld eller
 af syntetiske kemofibre
 ex 51.02 Monofilamenter, strimler (kunstige strå ex 59.04 Sejlgarn , reb og tovværk , også nettet, und
 o. lign.) og imiteret catgut af syntetisk tagen enkelttrådet garn af endeløse
 kemofibermateriale syntetiske kemofibre
 59.05 Knyttede netstoffer af sejlgarn, reb og
 tovværk, også i tilskårne stykker eller kon
 fektionerede ; færdige fiskenet af garn,
 sejlgarn , reb og tovværk
 59.06 Andre varer fremstillet af garn, sejlgarn ,
 reb og tovværk ( bortset fra tekstilstoffer
 og varer deraf)
 20. ex 51.01 Garn, monofilamenter Strimler (kunstige 58.06 Vævede etiketter, emblemer o.lign ., ikke
 ex 51.02 strå o.lign.) og imiteret catgut af kob broderede, i løbende længder eller til
 ex 56.05 berrayon (cuprammoniumrayon) skårne stykker
 21 . ex 51.02 Monofilamenter af polyestere ex 59.17 Stoffer ( bortset fra vævet tekstilfilt) af en
 art, der almindeligvis anvendes i maskiner
 og apparater til fremstilling og efterbe
 handling af papir og pap, herunder rør
 formede eller endeløse varer
 ---pagebreak--- 17 . 12 . 73 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. L 347/ 17
 Kolonne 1 Kolonne 2
 Anvendte materialer Fremstillede varer
 22. ex kapitlerne V ævet stof og andre varer undtagen 59.10 Linoleum med tekstilunderlag til enhver
 50 til 59 varer henhørende under pos. 59.10 og anvendelse , også i tilskårne stykker ; gulv
 59.11 bel ægningsmateriale bestående af tekstil
 underlag med anden belægning end lino
 leumsmasse , også i tilskårne stykker
 ex 59.11 Plader og bånd af ekspanderet gummi ,
 skumgummi eller svampegummi i for
 bindelse med tekstilstof
 23 . ex kapitlerne Vævet stof (undtagen for), på betingelse ex 61.01 Yderbeklædningsgenstande til mænd og
 50 til 59 af, at stoffets værdi (uden for, besæt drenge, komplette og færdige til brug
 ningsartikler og tilbehør ikke medregnet)
 ikke overstiger 45 % af den færdige vares ex 61.02 Følgende yderbeklædningsgenstande til
 værdi kvinder, piger og småbørn , komplette og
 færdige til brug : kjoler, nederdele, jakker,
 slacks ( undtagen slacks, som er fremstillet
 af stoffer henhørende under pos . 55.08 el
 ler 55.09), kostumer (sammensat af en
 jakke og en nederdel eller en jakke og et
 par benklæder) og damefrakker
 24 . ex kapitlerne Vævet stof og trikotagestof, på betingelse ex 61.09 Brystholdere, korsetter, korseletter, taille
 50 til 60 af, at stoffets værdi ikke overstiger 40 % korsetter, hofteholdere og lignende un
 af den færdige vares værdi derbeklædningsgenstande, der anvendes
 som støtte for dele af kroppen, komplette
 og færdige til brug
 Bestemmelserne i dette stykke finder kun anvendelse på de varer, som i medfør af
 reglerne i denne overenskomst med tilhørende protokoller, drager fordel af afskaffelse
 af told ved udløbet af den toldafviklingsperiode, der er fastsat for hver vare. Bestemmel
 serne finder ikke anvendelse efter udløbet af den toldafviklingsperiode, der er fastsat
 for hver vare .«
 Artikel 2
 1 . Artikel 24, stk. 1 , i protokol nr. 3, affattes således :
 » 1 . Det skal i givet fald fremgå af varecertifikaterne, at de varer, som de vedrører,
 har opnået oprindelsesstatus og har gennemgået yderligere forarbejdning under de i
 artikel 25 , stk. 1 , nævnte betingelser indtil den dato, fra hvilken tolden på disse
 varer vil være fjernet mellem Fællesskabet i dets oprindelige udstrækning og Irland
 på den ene side og Østrig på den anden side.«
 2. Note 12 — ad artiklerne 24 og 25 — i bilag I til protokol nr. 3 ophæves .
 Artikel 3
 Den blandede Komités beslutning nr. 6/73 af 6. februar 1973 erstattes af denne af
 gørelse.
 Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 20 . august 1973 .
 På Den blandede Komités vegne
 R. REITERER
 Formand
 Sekretærerne
 H. MICHITSCH A. SLINGERLAND


text:
 23.2.2006
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 L 53/51
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE OTSUS
 nr 151/2005,
 2. detsember 2005,
 millega muudetakse EMP lepingu XIII lisa (transport)
 EMP ÜHISKOMITEE,
 võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, mida on muudetud Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut kohandava protokolliga, edaspidi “leping”, eriti selle artiklit 98,
 ning arvestades järgmist:
 (1)
 Lepingu XIII lisa on muudetud EMP ühiskomitee otsusega nr 122/2005 (1).
 (2)
 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 16. detsembri 2002. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 2320/2002, millega kehtestatakse tsiviillennundusjulgestuse valdkonna ühiseeskirjad, (2) on koos riigispetsiifiliste kohandustega inkorporeeritud lepingusse EMP ühiskomitee otsusega nr 61/2004.
 (3)
 Komisjoni 24. mai 2005. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 781/2005, millega muudetakse määrust (EÜ) nr 622/2003, millega nähakse ette meetmed lennundusjulgestuse ühiste põhistandardite rakendamiseks, (3) tuleb inkorporeerida lepingusse.
 (4)
 Komisjoni 6. juuni 2005. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 857/2005, millega muudetakse määrust (EÜ) nr 622/2003, millega nähakse ette meetmed lennundusjulgestuse ühiste põhistandardite rakendamiseks, (4) tuleb inkorporeerida lepingusse,
 ON TEINUD JÄRGMISE OTSUSE:
 Artikkel 1
 Lepingu XIII lisa punkti 66i (komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 622/2003) lisatakse järgmised taanded:
 “—
 32005 R 0781: komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 781/2005 (ELT L 131, 25.5.2005, lk 24),
 —
 32005 R 0857: komisjoni määrus (EÜ) nr 857/2005 (ELT L 143, 7.6.2005, lk 9).”
 Artikkel 2
 Määruste (EÜ) nr 781/2005 ja (EÜ) nr 857/2005 islandi- ja norrakeelne tekst, mis avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP kaasandes, on autentsed.
 Artikkel 3
 Käesolev otsus jõustub 3. detsembril 2005. aastal, tingimusel et kõik lepingu artikli 103 lõikele 1 vastavad teated on edastatud EMP ühiskomiteele (5).
 Artikkel 4
 Käesolev otsus avaldatakse Euroopa Liidu Teataja EMP osas ja EMP kaasandes.
 Brüssel, 2. detsember 2005
 EMP ühiskomitee nimel
 eesistuja
 Tema Kõrgus Liechtensteini prints NIKOLAUS
 (1) ELT L 339, 22.12.2005, lk 30.
 (2) EÜT L 355, 30.12.2002, lk 1. Määrust on muudetud määrusega (EÜ) nr 849/2004 (ELT L 158, 30.4.2004, lk 1, parandatud väljaandes ELT L 229, 29.6.2004, lk 3).
 (3) ELT L 131, 25.5.2005, lk 24.
 (4) ELT L 143, 7.6.2005, lk 9.
 (5) Põhiseadusest tulenevaid nõudeid ei ole esitatud.