jurisdiction: US

text:
 281 Md. 179 (1977)
 377 A.2d 1169
 BOB JOE WARREN AND MICHAEL THOMAS DOYLE
 v.
 STATE OF MARYLAND
 [No. 156, September Term, 1976.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided October 6, 1977.
 The cause was argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and ORTH, JJ.
 Barry J. Renbaum, Assistant Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellants.
 Kathleen M. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Clarence W. Sharp, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
 LEVINE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ELDRIDGE, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 189 infra.
 The sole issue presented in this case is whether an order for probation without judgment, entered pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 292 (b), is a disposition from which an appeal may be taken by the defendant. The Circuit Court for Worcester County (Prettyman, J.) held that such an appeal would not lie. We *181 then granted certiorari and for reasons that follow, we affirm.
 Appellants, Bob Joe Warren and Michael T. Doyle, were tried in the District Court of Maryland, Worcester County, on charges of petty larceny and possession of marihuana. The court found them not guilty of larceny, but guilty of possession. Pursuant to § 292 (b),[1] which provides that the court "may, with the consent of [the defendant] stay the entering of the judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, *182 and place [the defendant] on probation," the District Court withheld the entry of judgment and signed identical orders placing each appellant on supervised probation for one year. Both appellants consented in writing to the entry of the orders, but then noted a timely appeal to the circuit court. The State promptly moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that "a probation before sentence verdict, voluntarily consented to, results in no conviction or judgment and that no appeal will lie." In dismissing the appeal, the court apparently took the view that a sentence must be imposed if a disposition is to constitute an appealable "final judgment." In the view which we take of this case, it is unnecessary to rest our decision on this ground.
 (1)
 Our analysis begins with the observation that appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal causes is dependent upon a statutory grant of power. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 116, 321 A.2d 534 (1974). The provision with which we are concerned here is Code (1974, 1976 Cum. Supp.), § 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which governs appeals from the District Court and provides:
 "A party in a civil case or the defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District Court.... In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended."
 The issue, then, is whether an order for probation without entry of judgment is a "final judgment" within the contemplation of the statute.
 At the outset, we note that § 12-101 (f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines "final judgment" to mean:
 "... a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, *183 including an orphans' court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken."
 This section, however, does not attempt to specify what is an appealable final judgment or order, and leaves that determination to the case law. Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 356, 328 A.2d 362 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 275 Md. 290, 338 A.2d 898 (1975).
 From our prior decisions, it is evident that the rule in Maryland has traditionally prohibited piecemeal disposition of litigation and, subject to exceptions not relevant here, has permitted appeals only from final judgments. As early as 1835, this Court referred to the "well established rule" that no appeal can be prosecuted "until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle, and conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit." Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-13 (1835); accord, United States Fire Ins. v. Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 521, 374 A.2d 896 (1977); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125 A. 177 (1924). Otherwise stated, to be final a judgment must actually settle the rights of the parties, Collins v. Cambridge Hospital, 158 Md. 112, 116, 148 A. 114 (1930), or it must finally settle some disputed right or interest of the parties, Harlan v. Lee, 177 Md. 437, 439, 9 A.2d 839 (1939).
 In addition to arguing that they met these standards, appellants draw upon a test enunciated for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Black in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497 (1943). There, the Court stated that a judgment is final when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Applying this test, the Court held that an order of the District Court suspending the imposition of sentence and placing the defendant on probation after he had been found guilty was an appealable final judgment.
 Appellants contend that here the orders of the District Court constituted final judgments within the traditional *184 meaning of the rule. Thus, they had a full trial on the merits in the District Court, in which they presented and exhausted all of their defenses, and then they were found guilty. Consequently, their right to be free from a finding of guilt has been finally settled. Nor, they argue, will an appeal afford them an opportunity to delay the trial by protracting the litigation. In their view, all that remains to be done is to enforce the probation order, for should the court ever determine that they violated probation, its entry of judgment at that time will be a mere formality.
 To support their contention, appellants also rely heavily on an English case, Oaten v. Auty, [1919] 2 K.B. 278, which we discussed in Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 239 n. 2, 210 A.2d 716 (1965). There the defendant failed to appear for military service, apparently under claim of exemption as a minister of a religious denomination. The trial court was of the opinion that the offense was proved, but believed it inexpedient to inflict any punishment, and therefore dismissed the information. On appeal, five justices, each writing separately, believed the lower court's action to have been an appealable "determination" within the meaning of the applicable statute. The logic which seemed to persuade the justices to hold the determination appealable was perhaps best expressed by Justice Darling:
 "If this appellant cannot appeal a grave injustice might be done.... As far as we know he is a man of high character and position in [the Spiritualists], and it is found against him that he is a man who will not do his duty by his country.... [I]t is said [the trial justices] have taken a course which prevents the appellant appealing and getting rid of the stigma put upon him. If the stigma has been unjustly put upon him it is not surprising that he desires to come here to get the finding altered...." 2 K.B. at 282-83.
 Thus, appellants argue here that a grave injustice may be done if they cannot appeal at this time, since their only remaining option to secure review would be to violate *185 probation in the expectation that the court would enter judgment and impose sentence, thereby ensuring finality.
 Although these arguments have great force, they ignore the legislative intention, which we find clear from the controlling statutes, that § 292 (b) orders for probation without judgment are not to be final judgments within the meaning of the traditional rule. First, § 12-401 (a) expressly provides that appeal lies only from final judgments "entered" by the District Court. Section 292 (b), however, by its very terms, stays the entry of judgment upon the finding of guilt. As a consequence, even assuming arguendo that the determination of guilt is a "final judgment" for purposes of § 12-401, that judgment is not entered in a § 292 (b) disposition and is thus not appealable.
 Moreover, in our view it is not the finding of guilt, but rather a subsequent event  either the successful completion of the probationary period or the revocation of probation  which actually settles the rights of the parties. If, on the one hand, appellants serve their probationary period and are discharged, the proceedings against them will be dismissed without a judgment of conviction  a disposition which they cannot appeal. Cf. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. at 119 (State may not appeal dismissal which it sought or to which it consented). Thereafter, all public criminal records are expunged automatically, and the arrest and conviction may not be so regarded "for purposes of employment, civil rights, or any statute or regulation or license or questionnaire or any other public or private purpose."[2] Nor is discharge under § 292 (b) deemed a conviction for purposes of the disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime. In short, successful completion of probation erases the stigma *186 of criminal conviction, except for those who later violate the law again. See also State v. Jacob, 234 Md. 452, 455, 199 A.2d 803 (1964).
 On the other hand, § 292 (b) expressly provides that when the defendant violates a condition of probation, the court then "may enter a judgment of conviction and proceed as otherwise provided." Since such a disposition finally settles the defendant's guilt, as in an ordinary proceeding, he would then be entitled to appeal. At that time, of course, the defendant would be permitted to challenge any determination made at the original District Court trial, since he would have been afforded no prior opportunity to do so. Cf. Burch v. State, 278 Md. 426, 431, 365 A.2d 577 (1976) (where final judgment is entered upon conviction at original trial, any challenge to that determination must be brought at that time, not when appeal is taken from subsequent revocation of probation).
 The result we reach here accords with decisions of the Supreme Courts of Delaware and Wisconsin. Rash v. State, 318 A.2d 603, 605 (Del. 1974); State v. Ryback, 64 Wis. 2d 574, 219 N.W.2d 263, 267 (1974). In each instance, the court was confronted with the identical question presented here in the context of a statute which, like § 292 (b), was derived from § 407 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. We hold, therefore, that an order for probation without entry of judgment pursuant to Art. 27, § 292 (b) is not a "final judgment entered" in the district court.
 (2)
 Appellants advance an alternative contention based on a statutory modification of the traditional final judgment rule. The essence of their argument is that an order for probation under § 292 (b), even if not a final judgment, is nonetheless appealable pursuant to § 12-401 (a), which provides that "[i]n a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended." We do not find this argument persuasive because, in our view, probation under § 292 (b) is quite different from a suspension of sentence.
 *187 The General Assembly first enacted the provision permitting appeal where imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended to overturn our holding in Symington III v. State, 133 Md. 452, 105 A. 541 (1919), that no appealable final judgment existed where the court suspended sentence. Burch v. State, 278 Md. at 430; Hite v. State, 198 Md. 602, 606-07, 84 A.2d 899 (1951). Appellants reason that since a suspended sentence is appealable, even though it is not a final judgment, the Legislature has manifested an intention that determinations of guilt also should be reviewable immediately where entry of judgment is stayed pursuant to § 292 (b). This policy applies, according to appellants, whether a final judgment is lacking because sentence was suspended or because probation without entry of judgment was ordered pursuant to § 292 (b).
 To bolster their argument, appellants contend that the Legislature could not have intended the consequences which would follow from a holding that § 292 (b) orders for probation are not appealable. As we indicated earlier, the corollary to such a holding  and the State conceded this at oral argument  is that the defendant may appeal the determination of guilt only when the court revokes probation and enters judgment. Since the probationary period may extend as long as five years, see Art. 27, § 641A, an appeal may be delayed until long after witnesses become unavailable or their memories of the events have faded; the problem may be particularly acute where, as here, appeal is by trial de novo.
 As before, appellants' argument is not without force, but is advanced in the wrong forum. The statutory exception carved out from the final judgment rule for appeal following suspension of sentence is specific, and is limited solely to those situations where the sentence in the traditional sense of a fine or prison term is lacking. Missing here is an additional element, the entry of a judgment upon the finding of guilt. Nor is this merely a technical distinction, for though a suspended sentence avoids a fine or prison term, it is also the judgment upon the finding of guilt and the collateral effects of that judgment which the defendant *188 seeks to avoid.[3] Moreover, the General Assembly specifically required that the court obtain the defendant's consent to the staying of the entry of judgment, whereas it need not obtain his consent merely to suspend sentence. Compare Art. 27 § 641A with §§ 292 and 641.
 These distinctions, we are confident, were apparent to the General Assembly when it considered this legislation.[4] Had it intended to authorize immediate appellate review of the dispositions imposed here, it could readily have amended § 12-401 (a) to permit appeals even though entry of judgment was stayed. The Legislature having rejected that course, our role is limited to effectuating its manifest intention. Consequently, we hold that an order for probation without entry of judgment does not fall within the suspended sentence exception to the final judgment rule.[5]
 Order of the Circuit Court for Worcester County affirmed.
 *189 Eldridge, J., dissenting:
 As a result of the trial court's proceedings in the instant case, the guilt of the defendants has been determined, and they have been subjected to a probation order, described by the Supreme Court as "an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the probation intended as a reforming discipline." (Emphasis supplied.) Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1497 (1943).
 The defendants desire appellate review of the proceedings which led to the imposition of this probation order, but the majority concludes that the rights of the defendants are not sufficiently "settled" to give the judgment the finality requisite for the purposes of appeal. The majority relies on the fact that after the defendants have undergone the punishment and discipline of the probation order for the required period of time, the proceedings against them will be dismissed without a "judgment of conviction," and on the fact that a violation of the terms of the order may result in an entry of a "judgment of conviction" and the imposition of still harsher penalties.
 I fail to understand how these subsequent events to which the majority refers change the posture of this case with regard to the bringing of an appeal. Guilt has been determined and discipline imposed. To fasten upon the fact that the proceedings will be dismissed upon what the majority euphemistically refers to as "successful completion of probation" ignores the reality that the probation order itself restricts freedom and imposes discipline, and that "when discipline has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to review." Korematsu v. United States, supra, 319 U.S. at 434.
 The test for finality relied upon by the majority is that set forth long ago by the Court in Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-113 (1835):
 "[N]o appeal can be prosecuted to this Court, until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle and conclude the rights of *190 the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit."
 And later (7 G. & J. at 113):
 "It is time enough for a party to apply to this Court for redress when it is ascertained that he is to be injured by the judgment of which he complains."
 In the instant case, the entry of the order of probation has "settle[d] and conclude[d]" the matter of the defendants' guilt and whether a sanction should be imposed upon them. Instead of continuing to defend against the State's charges, the defendants must undergo the penalty of probation. At the present time, they are "injured by the judgment" of probation. Consequently, the standard for finality enunciated in Boteler & Belt v. State, supra, and in the subsequent decisions by this Court, is clearly met here. The determinations of guilt and the orders imposing the obligations and restrictions incident to probation constitute, within the meaning of Code (1974), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, "final judgments" from which appeals may be taken.
 The majority also relies on what it perceives to be the legislative intention embodied in the language of controlling statutes. Section 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that appeals only lie from final judgments entered in the District Court, while Code (1957, 1976 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 292 (b) stays "the entering of the judgment of guilt." (Emphasis supplied.) The majority concludes that if this "entering of the judgment of guilt" has been stayed, there has been no judgment entered from which an appeal can be taken. This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that the order of probation, which is also a "final judgment," is duly entered.
 An examination of the statutory scheme shows that the statutory language relied upon furnishes no basis for the majority's conclusion. The defendants were determined to have committed an act in violation of Code (1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 287 (a). For such violation, § 287 (e) provides for *191 the imposition of a sentence of up to one year's imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000, or both. The effect of Code (1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 292 (b), is to authorize the staying of an entry of a judgment of guilt under § 287 (e), and, instead, enter a judgment under the terms of § 292 (b), providing for the lesser punishment of probation and, in some circumstances, treatment for drug abuse. Section 292 (b) merely provides for an alternative penalty or punishment. Under the terms of § 292 (b), if the probation order is violated, a judgment of guilt under § 287 may then be entered, but there can be no question that the probation order entered by the court, statutorily possible only upon a determination of guilt by the trial court, constitutes a judgment "entered" by the court.
 An analogous statutory scheme was before this Court in Pritchett v. State, 140 Md. 310, 117 A. 763 (1922), and the Court held that an appeal would lie from the imposition of the lesser alternative penalty. That case involved an appeal from a conviction for non-support under then Art. 27, § 75. The statute provided in pertinent part that upon conviction of non-support, a defendant
 "shall be punished by a fine ... or imprisonment .. . provided, that ... after conviction, instead of imposing the punishment hereinbefore provided ... the court in its discretion ... shall have the power to pass an order ... directing the defendant to pay a certain sum weekly for the space of one year to the wife, and to release the defendant from custody on probation for the space of one year.... If the court be satisfied ... that the defendant has violated the terms of such order, it may forthwith ... sentence him under the original conviction."
 In Pritchett, a defendant was convicted under this statute, and an order to make weekly payments and releasing the defendant on probation was entered. The defendant took an appeal, and the Court, denying a motion to dismiss the *192 appeal on the ground that there was no final judgment, stated (140 Md. at 316, emphasis supplied):
 "The obligation imposed upon the defendant, by the order of the court, to pay to his wife a certain sum of money weekly for the space of one year, instead of the imposition of a fine or imprisonment, or both, as first provided in the act, is in the nature of an alternative penalty or punishment ... and it would be going very far, we think, to hold that the defendant had no right of appeal from the order or judgment of the court, imposing upon him such pecuniary obligation on the ground that it was not a final judgment, when no other punishment could thereafter have been imposed upon him, unless he had failed to comply with the terms of the order."
 The issue in Pritchett v. State, supra, seems to me indistinguishable in principle from that in the instant case, and we should adhere to the holding in that case.
 Although not relied on by the majority, it was also argued by the State that even if the judgment is final, the defendants are nonetheless estopped from an appeal inasmuch as they "consented" to the entry of the order of probation.
 While there is authority in other states for the proposition that consent to a probation order, when the alternative is incarceration, constitutes a concession of the correctness of the trial court's judgment, courts have recently moved away from this theory, noting the obvious coercion under the circumstances. A leading case holding that no appeal lies from the entry of a probation order, Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P.2d 498, 117 A.L.R. 925 (1938), was recently overruled in State v. Heron, 92 Ariz. 114, 115, 374 P.2d 871 (1962), the court stating:
 "The policy ... seems to be that the defendant should be grateful he is not behind bars.... This Court does not take so harsh an attitude."
 *193 In similar circumstances, in State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 514, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965), the Nebraska court stated:
 "Historically, the attitude was that a defendant who asked for and accepted probation, had conceded his guilt and thrown himself on the mercy of the court. Under modern probation provisions and procedures, and our present judicial administration, it would be straining logic to the utmost to assume that where the accused asked for probation, he received it only because of the request. It is almost more difficult to contend that after probation is granted and the order entered, it was not really a judicial determination by the court, but was, instead, inspired by the defendant, and was made with an implied condition that he waives his right to appeal by accepting. Such an historical position ignores the realities of the situation."
 Consent to a judgment in a civil case has often been held to bar an appellant from maintaining an appeal, and this principle was recently applied to the State's attempted appeal in a criminal case where the State had deliberately and voluntarily consented to the judgment. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118-119, 321 A.2d 534 (1974), and cases there cited. However, the circumstances where this principle has been applied are much different from those in the instant case. Here, the "consent" is routinely mandated in all cases involving a judgment of probation under Art. 27, § 292 (b), by the statutory language itself. It is clearly not a voluntary consent but one coerced by the alternative of fine and imprisonment. Therefore, I would reject the State's argument that the statutorily required consent bars the appeal.
 In sum, the District Court's determination that the defendants were guilty of a criminal act and the court's imposition of the penalty of probation, constituted "final judgments" for purposes of appeal. The entry of these probation orders under Art. 27, § 292 (b), being one of the *194 alternative punishments provided by the criminal code, fully met the statutory requirement that an appeal be "from a final judgment entered in the District Court." Section 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Nothing in the statutory language warrants the majority's conclusion that the Legislature intended that criminal defendants be denied a right to appeal a judgment of probation under § 292 (b). Under the majority's holding, a defendant who is found guilty and placed on probation under § 292 (b), who must pay the court costs as the instant defendants did, and who successfully complies with the numerous conditions of probation which interfere with his rights as a free citizen, can never have appellate review of the trial court's proceedings and judgment. I cannot believe that the Maryland General Assembly, which has consistently provided defendants with one absolute right of appeal in criminal cases, intended any such result.
 NOTES
 [1] In its entirety, Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 292 (b) provides:
 "Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under this subheading [the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 276-302] or under any prior law of this State or the laws of the United States or of any other state relating to controlled dangerous substances defined in this subheading, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of any of the offenses specified in this subheading, the court, if satisfied that the best interests of the person and the welfare of the people of this State would be served thereby may, with the consent of such person stay the entering of the judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, and place such person on probation subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as may be appropriate and may in addition require that such person undergo inpatient or outpatient treatment for drug abuse. Upon violation of a term or condition, the court may enter a judgment of conviction and proceed as otherwise provided. Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings against him. Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without a judgment of conviction and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by the law upon conviction of a crime including the additional penalties imposed for second or subsequent convictions under § 293 of this subheading. Discharge and dismissal under this section may occur only once with respect to any person and in addition any public criminal record in any such case shall be expunged upon the satisfactory completion of any such period of probation. Any expunged arrest and/or conviction shall not thereafter be regarded as an arrest or conviction for purposes of employment, civil rights, or any statute or regulation or license or questionnaire or any other public or private purpose, provided that any such conviction shall continue to constitute an offense for purposes of this subheading or any other criminal statute under which the existence of a prior conviction is relevant."
 An order for probation under Art. 27, § 641, which has general application, is similar to an order under § 292 in that the court "stay[s] the entering of judgment, defer[s] further proceedings, and place[s] the person on probation subject to reasonable terms." Like § 292, § 641 provides for discharge of the accused after probation, but unlike § 292, § 641 does not provide for dismissal upon successful completion of probation. Nor does § 641 provide for automatic expungement. The views we express here are, of course, limited to § 292.
 [2] There is one exception: a "conviction" under § 292 (b) continues to constitute an offense for those purposes of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 276-302 and of other criminal statutes "under which the existence of a prior conviction is relevant." Art. 27, § 292 (b). As a corollary to this exception, discharge and dismissal under § 292 (b) "may occur only once with respect to any person." Id. On the other hand, discharge and dismissal under this section is not a conviction for purposes of imposing additional penalties for second or subsequent offenders under Art. 27, § 293.
 [3] all but five states and the federal system, the deprivation of specified civil rights such as the right to vote, to hold public office or to serve on a jury, follows upon either the conviction of or imprisonment for certain crimes. In addition, the record of conviction can have serious collateral consequences, such as inviting disciplinary action within the defendant's occupation or profession...." American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Probation § 4.3 (Tent. Draft 1970).
 [4] The Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, Art. 27, §§ 276-302, of which § 292 (b) is a part, is adapted from the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which has now been enacted, albeit with substantial variations, in all but a handful of states. The model for § 292 (b) is § 407 of the uniform act, which provides in relevant part that "the court, without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the accused, may defer further proceedings and place him on probation." We find it significant that the General Assembly altered the language to provide that the court may "stay the entering of the judgment of guilt." Moreover, the provision for expungement in § 292 (b) does not appear in the model act and was added by the General Assembly. See Ch. 403. Laws of 1970. These changes reflect the Legislature's careful consideration of this provision. It is therefore illogical to contend that the General Assembly intended to treat the stay of entry of judgment as equivalent to suspension of sentence.
 [5] In light of our holding, we need not consider the State's contention that appellants' consent, which is required by the statute, bars the appeal.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 21.1.2019
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 L 18/51
 DECIZIA NR. 1/2018 A CONSILIULUI DE STABILIZARE ȘI DE ASOCIERE
 din 4 decembrie 2018
 privind trecerea la a doua etapă a asocierii între Comunitățile Europene și statele lor membre, pe de o parte, și fosta Republică iugoslavă a Macedoniei, pe de altă parte, în temeiul articolului 5 alineatul (3) din Acordul de stabilizare și de asociere [2019/83]
 CONSILIUL DE STABILIZARE ȘI DE ASOCIERE,
 având în vedere Acordul de stabilizare și de asociere între Comunitățile Europene și statele lor membre, pe de o parte, și fosta Republică iugoslavă a Macedoniei, pe de altă parte (1) (denumit în continuare „acordul”), în special articolul 5 alineatul (3),
 întrucât:
 (1)
 Articolul 5 alineatul (1) din acord prevede o perioadă de tranziție cu o durată de maximum zece ani, împărțită în două etape succesive.
 (2)
 Prima etapă a început la 1 aprilie 2004, care a reprezentat data intrării în vigoare a acordului.
 (3)
 Articolul 5 alineatul (3) din acord prevede, de asemenea, că Consiliul de stabilizare și de asociere urmează să evalueze progresele realizate și să adopte o decizie în ceea ce privește trecerea la a doua etapă și durata acesteia, precum și orice eventuale modificări care trebuie efectuate asupra conținutului dispozițiilor care o reglementează.
 (4)
 Părțile sunt hotărâte să respecte obligațiile care decurg din trecerea la a doua etapă a asocierii.
 (5)
 Fosta Republică iugoslavă a Macedoniei a luat măsurile necesare pentru a asigura respectarea tuturor obligațiilor care decurg din trecerea la a doua etapă,
 ADOPTĂ PREZENTA DECIZIE:
 Articolul 1
 Trecerea la a doua etapă a asocierii dintre Comunitățile Europene și statele lor membre, pe de o parte, și fosta Republică iugoslavă a Macedoniei, pe de altă parte, în temeiul articolului 5 alineatul (3) din acord, produce efecte prin prezenta decizie.
 Articolul 2
 Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare la data adoptării.
 Adoptată la Bruxelles, 4 decembrie 2018.
 Pentru Consiliul de stabilizare și de asociere
 Președintele
 (1) JO L 84, 20.3.2004, p. 13.


type: caselaw

text:
 6.8.2011
 LT
 Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys
 C 232/24
 2011 m. birželio 28 d. Bendrojo Teismo sprendimas byloje ATB Norte prieš VRDT — Bricocenter Italia (BRICO CENTER)
 (Byla T-475/09) (1)
 (Bendrijos prekių ženklas - Protesto procedūra - Vaizdinio Bendrijos prekių ženklo BRICO CENTER paraiška - Ankstesni vaizdiniai Bendrijos prekių ženklai „ATB CENTROS DE BRICOLAGE Brico Centro“ ir „CENTROS DE BRICOLAGE BricoCentro“ - Santykinis atmetimo pagrindas - Galimybė supainioti - Reglamento (EB) Nr. 207/2009 8 straipsnio 1 dalies b punktas)
 2011/C 232/42
 Proceso kalba: italų
 Šalys
 Ieškovė: ATB Norte, SL (Burgosas, Ispanija), atstovaujama pradžioje advokatų P. López Ronda, G. Macias Bonilla, H. Curtis-Oliver ir G. Marín Raigal, po to — advokato F. Brandolini Kujman
 Atsakovė: Vidaus rinkos derinimo tarnyba (prekių ženklams ir pramoniniam dizainui), atstovaujama O. Montalto ir G. Mannucci
 Kita procedūros VRDT Apeliacinėje taryboje šalis, įstojusi į bylą Bendrajame Teisme: Bricocenter Italia Srl (Rocanas, Italija), atstovaujama advokatų G. Ghidini, M. Mergati ir C. Signorini
 Dalykas
 Ieškinys dėl 2009 m. rugsėjo 24 d. VRDT ketvirtosios apeliacinės tarybos sprendimo (byla R 500/2008-4), susijusio su protesto procedūra tarp ATB Norte, SL ir Bricocenter Italia Srl.
 Rezoliucinė dalis
 1.
 Panaikinti 2009 m. rugsėjo 24 d. Vidaus rinkos derinimo tarnybos (prekių ženklams ir pramoniniam dizainui) (VRDT) ketvirtosios apeliacinės tarybos sprendimą (byla R 1048/2008-4) tiek, kiek jame Apeliacinė taryba patenkina Bricocenter Italia Srl pateiktą apeliaciją dėl Bendrijos prekių ženklo paraiškoje nurodytų „reklamos“, „verslo reikalų valdymo“ ir „verslo administravimo“ paslaugų.
 2.
 Atmesti likusią ieškinio dalį.
 3.
 ATB Norte, SL, Bricocenter Italia ir VRDT padengia savo bylinėjimosi išlaidas, patirtas vykstant procesui Bendrajame Teisme.
 (1) OL C 24, 2010 1 30.


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Uppmärksamhetsbrist Hyperaktivitetsstörning: Högre risk för barn i skolan - FRÅGA OM ACTU
 Barn som går in i skolan tidigare är 30% mer benägna att få diagnosen ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). Och detta, även om deras klasskamrater är lite äldre än dem.
 I Frankrike, beroende på födelsedatum för ett barn - och datumet för början av skolåret - kan ett barn ta sina första steg i skolan på två och ett halvt eller tre år. I USA är det samma sak. I vissa stater fastställs registreringsfristen varje år den 1 september.
 Barn födda i augusti och inskrivna i skolan är därför bland de yngsta i sin klass. En ny studie, utförd av forskare vid Harvard Medical School, avslöjar att de är mer benägna att diagnostiseras med ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). Resultaten av denna studie publiceras i New England Journal of Medicine.
 Fler och fler barn under behandling
 I USA har diagnosgraden för ADHD ökat dramatiskt de senaste åren. 2016 behandlades mer än 5% av amerikanska barn för denna typ av störningar, mot 3 till 5% i Frankrike. En ökning beror, enligt experterna, på ett större erkännande av det senare, av en ökning av sjukdomens förekomst eller i vissa fall på felaktiga diagnoser.
 Detta är fallet, enligt forskarna i studien, för de barn som går in i skolan vid en yngre ålder. "Våra resultat antyder möjligheten att ett stort antal barn är överdiagnostiserade och överbehandlade för ADHD eftersom de är relativt omogna jämfört med sina äldre klasskamrater i början av grundskolan." förklarar Timothy Layton, huvudförfattare till studien.
 30% fler diagnoser
 Vid två års ålder är det svårare för ett barn att hålla fast vid och fokusera efter tre år. Detta kan driva lärare och föräldrar till en läkare. Eftersom de tre tecknen på ADHD är uppmärksamhetsunderskott, motorisk hyperaktivitet och impulsivitet.
 För att genomföra sin studie fokuserade forskarna på en stor databas. De jämförde skillnaden i diagnos av hyperaktivitetsstörningar i uppmärksamhetsunderskott enligt födelsemånaden för 407 000 barn, födda mellan 2007 och 2009 och följde fram till 2015. I de stater som har 1 september som tidsfristen för utbildning, barn födda i augusti är 30% mer benägna att få diagnosen ADHD än de som föddes i september (och därför går i skolan senare). Forskare betonar vikten av att ta hänsyn till alla faktorer att tänka på innan de skickar ett barn till en läkare.
 Epilepsi: Depakin som tas under graviditet minskar barnets skolprestanda
 Varför En Läkare? © Copyright 2020 | Uppmärksamhetsbrist Hyperaktivitetsstörning: Högre risk för barn i skolan


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 Avis juridique important
 |
 21984A0323(01)
 Accord entre la Communauté économique européenne et le gouvernement de la République des Seychelles concernant la pêche au large des Seychelles - Protocole entre la Communauté économique européenne et le gouvernement de la République des Seychelles
 Journal officiel n° L 079 du 23/03/1984 p. 0034 - 0037 édition spéciale finnoise: chapitre 4 tome 2 p. 0009 édition spéciale suédoise: chapitre 4 tome 2 p. 0009 édition spéciale espagnole: chapitre 04 tome 3 p. 0037 édition spéciale portugaise: chapitre 04 tome 3 p. 0037 L 149 08/06/1985 P. 0002
 ACCORD entre la Communauté économique européenne et le gouvernement de la république des Seychelles concernant la pêche au large des Seychelles LA COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE EUROPÉENNE, ci-après dénommée «Communauté», et LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DES SEYCHELLES, ci-après dénommé «Seychelles», CONSIDÉRANT, d'une part, l'esprit de coopération résultant de la convention de Lomé et, d'autre part, les relations de bonne coopération entre la Communauté et les Seychelles; CONSIDÉRANT la volonté du gouvernement des Seychelles de promouvoir l'exploitation rationnelle de ses ressources halieutiques par le biais d'une coopération renforcée; RAPPELANT que les Seychelles exercent leur souveraineté ou leur juridiction sur l'étendue des deux cent milles marins au large de leurs côtes, notamment en matière de pêche maritime; COMPTE TENU des travaux de la troisième conférence des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer; DÉTERMINÉS à fonder leurs relations sur un esprit de confiance réciproque et de respect de leurs intérêts mutuels dans le domaine des pêches maritimes; DÉSIREUX d'établir les modalités et les conditions de l'exercice de la pêche présentant un intérêt commun pour les deux parties, CONVIENNENT DE CE QUI SUIT: Article premier Le présent accord a pour objet d'établir les principes et règles qui régiront à l'avenir l'ensemble des conditions de l'exercice de la pêche par les navires battant pavillon d'États membres de la Communauté, ci-après dénommés «navires de la Communauté», dans les eaux relevant, en matière de pêche, de la souveraineté ou la juridiction des Seychelles, ci-après dénommées «zone de pêche seychelloise». Article 2 Le gouvernement des Seychelles permet dans la zone de pêche seychelloise l'exercice de la pêche par les navires de la Communauté conformément au présent accord. Article 3 1. La Communauté s'engage à prendre toutes les mesures appropriées en vue d'assurer le respect par ses navires des dispositions du présent accord et des réglementations régissant les activités de pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise. 2. Les autorités seychelloises notifieront à la Commission des Communautés européennes tout projet de modification desdites réglementations. Article 4 1. Les activités de pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise ne peuvent être exercées par les navires de la Communauté que sur autorisation des autorités seychelloises, octroyée à la demande de la Communauté. 2. Cette autorisation est soumise au paiement de redevances par les armateurs intéressés. 3. Le montant des redevances ainsi que les modes de paiement sont indiqués à l'annexe. Article 5 Les parties s'engagent à se concerter soit directement, soit au sein des organisations internationales, en vue d'assurer la gestion et la conservation des ressources biologiques dans l'océan Indien et notamment pour les espèces hautement migratoires, et à faciliter les recherches scientifiques s'y rapportant. Article 6 En contrepartie des possibilités de pêche accordées au titre de l'article 2, la Communauté participera, dans les conditions et selon les modalités figurant au protocole joint au présent accord, à la réalisation de projets liés au développement du secteur de la pêche aux Seychelles sans préjudice des financements dont bénéficient les Seychelles dans le cadre de la convention de Lomé. Article 7 Les parties conviennent de se consulter en cas de litige concernant l'interprétation ou l'application du présent accord. Article 8 Il est créé une commission mixte chargée de veiller à la bonne application du présent accord. Cette commission se réunit à la demande de l'une des parties contractantes alternativement aux Seychelles et dans la Communauté. Article 9 Aucune disposition du présent accord n'affecte ni ne préjuge en aucune manière les points de vue de chaque partie en ce qui concerne toute question relative au droit de la mer. Article 10 Le présent accord s'applique aux territoires où le traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne est d'application et dans les conditions prévues par ledit traité, d'une part, et au territoire de la république des Seychelles, d'autre part. Article 11 L'annexe et le protocole font partie intégrante du présent accord et, sauf disposition contraire, une référence au présent accord constitue une référence à cette annexe et à ce protocole Article 12 Au cas où les autorités seychelloises décident, en fonction du développement de l'état des stocks, de prendre des mesures de conservation qui affectent les activités des navires de la Communauté, des consultations interviendront entre les parties en vue d'adapter l'annexe visée à l'article 4 et le protocole visé à l'article 6 du présent accord. Article 13 Le présent accord est conclu pour une première période de trois ans à compter de la date de son entrée en vigueur. S'il n'est pas mis fin à l'accord par l'une des parties au moyen d'une notification donnée six mois avant la date d'expiration de cette période de trois ans, il reste en vigueur pour des périodes supplémentaires de deux années, sous réserve qu'une notification de dénonciation n'ait pas été donnée au moins trois mois avant la date d'expiration de chaque période annuelle. Des négociations ont alors lieu entre les parties contractantes pour déterminer d'un commun accord les modifications ou compléments à introduire dans l'annexe ou dans le protocole. Article 14 Le présent accord entre en vigueur à la date à laquelle les parties se notifient l'accomplissement des procédures nécessaires à cet effet. Article 15 Le présent accord, rédigé en double exemplaire en langues allemande, anglaise, danoise, française, grecque, italienne et néerlandaise, chaque texte faisant également foi, est déposé dans les archives du secrétariat général du Conseil des Communautés européennes, qui en remet une copie certifiée conforme à chacune des parties contractantes. ANNEXE Conditions de l'exercice de la pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise pour les navires de la Communauté 1. Les autorités compétentes de la Communauté communiquent périodiquement la liste des navires qui exerceront la pêche en venu de l'accord. 2. Les redevances prévues à l'article 4 de l'accord à la charge des armateurs des navires visés au point 1 sont fixées à 20 Écus par tonne pêchée dans la zone de pêche seychelloise. 3. Un montant de 120 000 Écus est versé dès l'entrée en application de l'accord par les armateurs auprès du Trésor seychellois à titre d'avance sur les redevances. 4. Un décompte provisoire des redevances dues au titre de chaque campagne annuelle est arrêté à la fin de chaque année sur la base des déclarations de captures établies par les armateurs et communiquées simultanément aux autorités seychelloises et aux autorités compétentes de la Commission des Communautés européennes. Le montant correspondant est versé au Trésor seychellois au plus tard le 31 décembre de l'année en cours. Le décompte définitif des redevances dues au titre d'une campagne annuelle est arrêté par les autorités compétentes de la Commission des Communautés européennes, compte tenu des avis scientifiques disponibles et notamment de ceux des experts de la FAO (Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture) et de l'ORSTOM (Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer) établis aux Seychelles, ainsi que de toutes données statistiques pouvant être établies par une organisation internationale de la pêche dans l'océan Indien. Les armateurs reçoivent notification du décompte et disposent d'un délai de trente jours pour se libérer de leurs obligations financières. 5. Tout versement de redevances prévu à la présente annexe sera effectué par l'intermédiaire des autorités compétentes de la Communauté. 6. À la fin de l'application de l'accord, la somme versée à titre d'avance est déduite du dernier paiement ; toutefois, si le montant des sommes dues au titre des activités effectives de pêche au cours de la première année n'atteint pas le montant de cette avance, la somme résiduelle correspondante n'est pas récupérable. 7. Les autorités seychelloises communiquent avant le début de l'application de l'accord les modalités de paiement des redevances et notamment les comptes et les devises à utiliser. 8. Pendant leurs activités de pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise, les navires communiquent à la station radio de Victoria tous les trois jours leur position et leurs prises ainsi qu'à la fin de chaque marée l'état de leurs prises. Sur demande des autorités seychelloises, les navires prennent un observateur à bord. La présence de l'observateur ne doit pas dépasser le temps nécessaire pour effectuer des vérifications des captures par sondage. En outre et sur demande des autorités des Seychelles, les navires peuvent embarquer un marin pêcheur seychellois chargé d'exercer, en sus de ses fonctions de marin, les fonctions d'observateur ; dans l'exercice de ses responsabilités en tant qu'observateur, cet homme d'équipage bénéficiera des facilités d'accès aux lieux et aux documents nécessaires à ces fins. 9. Les autorités des Seychelles détermineront avec les utilisateurs de l'accord les conditions d'utilisation des équipements portuaires. 10. Afin de ne pas nuire à la pêche artisanale seychelloise, la pêche par les senneurs ne sera pas autorisée dans la zone du plateau continental définie par l'isobathe 200 mètres, ainsi que dans la limite de 3 milles marins autour des radeaux placés par les Seychelles. PROTOCOLE entre la Communauté économique européenne et le gouvernement de la république des Seychelles Article premier Au titre de l'article 2 de l'accord et pendant la durée de l'application du présent protocole, limitée à trois ans, les autorisations de pêche dans la zone seychelloise sont accordées à 27 thoniers congélateurs océaniques sans que toutefois le nombre de ces navires exerçant simultanément leur activité ne puisse excéder 18. En outre, et à la demande de la Communauté, ces droits peuvent être complétés par certaines autorisations concernant d'autres catégories de navires de pêche dans les conditions à définir au sein de la commission mixte, à concurrence de l'équivalent de 1 000 tonneaux de jauge brute en moyenne annuelle. Article 2 1. La Communauté participera au financement d'un programme scientifique seychellois destiné à améliorer les connaissances halieutiques concernant la région de l'océan Indien dans laquelle les îles des Seychelles sont situées et notamment celles concernant les espèces hautement migratoires. Cette participation pourra revêtir, à la demande du gouvernement des Seychelles, la forme d'une contribution aux frais de réunions internationales destinées à améliorer lesdites connaissances ainsi que la gestion des ressources halieutiques. 2. Pour la première période d'application de l'accord, cette participation ne pourra dépasser 250 000 Écus. Article 3 Dans l'attente d'une connaissance plus approfondie des ressources halieutiques de la zone seychelloise, la participation financière visée à l'article 6 de l'accord est réglée conformément aux dispositions suivantes: Le montant de la participation visée à l'article 6 de l'accord est fixé forfaitairement à 900 000 Écus au minimum pour la durée du protocole, payables en trois tranches annuelles égales. Ce montant couvre les activités de pêche visées à l'article 1er jusqu'à concurrence, pour ce qui concerne les activités thonières, d'un poids de captures dans la zone seychelloise de 6 000 tonnes par an de thonidés ; si le volume des captures des thonidés effectuées par les navires communautaires dans la zone de pêche seychelloise dépasse cette quantité, le montant susvisé est augmenté en proportion ; toutefois et indépendamment des captures effectivement réalisées, le montant de la compensation financière est plafonné à 3 000 000 d'Écus pour la durée du protocole et payable en trois tranches annuelles égales. ANNEXE Conditions de l'exercice de la pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise pour les navires de la Communauté 1. Les autorités compétentes de la Communauté communiquent périodiquement la liste des navires qui exerceront la pêche en venu de l'accord. 2. Les redevances prévues à l'article 4 de l'accord à la charge des armateurs des navires visés au point 1 sont fixées à 20 Écus par tonne pêchée dans la zone de pêche seychelloise. 3. Un montant de 120 000 Écus est versé dès l'entrée en application de l'accord par les armateurs auprès du Trésor seychellois à titre d'avance sur les redevances. 4. Un décompte provisoire des redevances dues au titre de chaque campagne annuelle est arrêté à la fin de chaque année sur la base des déclarations de captures établies par les armateurs et communiquées simultanément aux autorités seychelloises et aux autorités compétentes de la Commission des Communautés européennes. Le montant correspondant est versé au Trésor seychellois au plus tard le 31 décembre de l'année en cours. Le décompte définitif des redevances dues au titre d'une campagne annuelle est arrêté par les autorités compétentes de la Commission des Communautés européennes, compte tenu des avis scientifiques disponibles et notamment de ceux des experts de la FAO (Organisation pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture) et de l'ORSTOM (Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer) établis aux Seychelles, ainsi que de toutes données statistiques pouvant être établies par une organisation internationale de la pêche dans l'océan Indien. Les armateurs reçoivent notification du décompte et disposent d'un délai de trente jours pour se libérer de leurs obligations financières. 5. Tout versement de redevances prévu à la présente annexe sera effectué par l'intermédiaire des autorités compétentes de la Communauté. 6. À la fin de l'application de l'accord, la somme versée à titre d'avance est déduite du dernier paiement ; toutefois, si le montant des sommes dues au titre des activités effectives de pêche au cours de la première année n'atteint pas le montant de cette avance, la somme résiduelle correspondante n'est pas récupérable. 7. Les autorités seychelloises communiquent avant le début de l'application de l'accord les modalités de paiement des redevances et notamment les comptes et les devises à utiliser. 8. Pendant leurs activités de pêche dans la zone de pêche seychelloise, les navires communiquent à la station radio de Victoria tous les trois jours leur position et leurs prises ainsi qu'à la fin de chaque marée l'état de leurs prises. Sur demande des autorités seychelloises, les navires prennent un observateur à bord. La présence de l'observateur ne doit pas dépasser le temps nécessaire pour effectuer des vérifications des captures par sondage. En outre et sur demande des autorités des Seychelles, les navires peuvent embarquer un marin pêcheur seychellois chargé d'exercer, en sus de ses fonctions de marin, les fonctions d'observateur ; dans l'exercice de ses responsabilités en tant qu'observateur, cet homme d'équipage bénéficiera des facilités d'accès aux lieux et aux documents nécessaires à ces fins. 9. Les autorités des Seychelles détermineront avec les utilisateurs de l'accord les conditions d'utilisation des équipements portuaires. 10. Afin de ne pas nuire à la pêche artisanale seychelloise, la pêche par les senneurs ne sera pas autorisée dans la zone du plateau continental définie par l'isobathe 200 mètres, ainsi que dans la limite de 3 milles marins autour des radeaux placés par les Seychelles. PROTOCOLE entre la Communauté économique européenne et le gouvernement de la république des Seychelles Article premier Au titre de l'article 2 de l'accord et pendant la durée de l'application du présent protocole, limitée à trois ans, les autorisations de pêche dans la zone seychelloise sont accordées à 27 thoniers congélateurs océaniques sans que toutefois le nombre de ces navires exerçant simultanément leur activité ne puisse excéder 18. En outre, et à la demande de la Communauté, ces droits peuvent être complétés par certaines autorisations concernant d'autres catégories de navires de pêche dans les conditions à définir au sein de la commission mixte, à concurrence de l'équivalent de 1 000 tonneaux de jauge brute en moyenne annuelle. Article 2 1. La Communauté participera au financement d'un programme scientifique seychellois destiné à améliorer les connaissances halieutiques concernant la région de l'océan Indien dans laquelle les îles des Seychelles sont situées et notamment celles concernant les espèces hautement migratoires. Cette participation pourra revêtir, à la demande du gouvernement des Seychelles, la forme d'une contribution aux frais de réunions internationales destinées à améliorer lesdites connaissances ainsi que la gestion des ressources halieutiques. 2. Pour la première période d'application de l'accord, cette participation ne pourra dépasser 250 000 Écus. Article 3 Dans l'attente d'une connaissance plus approfondie des ressources halieutiques de la zone seychelloise, la participation financière visée à l'article 6 de l'accord est réglée conformément aux dispositions suivantes: Le montant de la participation visée à l'article 6 de l'accord est fixé forfaitairement à 900 000 Écus au minimum pour la durée du protocole, payables en trois tranches annuelles égales. Ce montant couvre les activités de pêche visées à l'article 1er jusqu'à concurrence, pour ce qui concerne les activités thonières, d'un poids de captures dans la zone seychelloise de 6 000 tonnes par an de thonidés ; si le volume des captures des thonidés effectuées par les navires communautaires dans la zone de pêche seychelloise dépasse cette quantité, le montant susvisé est augmenté en proportion ; toutefois et indépendamment des captures effectivement réalisées, le montant de la compensation financière est plafonné à 3 000 000 d'Écus pour la durée du protocole et payable en trois tranches annuelles égales.


text:
 6.10.2011
 SV
 Europeiska unionens officiella tidning
 L 262/59
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉNS BESLUT
 nr 87/2011
 av den 1 juli 2011
 om ändring av bilaga XX (Miljö) till EES-avtalet
 GEMENSAMMA EES-KOMMITTÉN HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT
 med beaktande av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, ändrat genom protokollet med justeringar av avtalet om Europeiska ekonomiska samarbetsområdet, nedan kallat avtalet, särskilt artikel 98, och
 av följande skäl:
 (1)
 Bilaga XX till avtalet ändrades genom gemensamma EES-kommitténs beslut nr 57/2011 av den 20 maj 2011 (1).
 (2)
 Kommissionens beslut 2011/149/EU av den 7 mars 2011 om historiska luftfartsutsläpp i enlighet med artikel 3c.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/87/EG om ett system för handel med utsläppsrätter för växthusgaser inom gemenskapen (2) bör införlivas med avtalet.
 (3)
 I enlighet med anpassning bb i punkt 21al (Europaparlamentets och rådets 2003/87/EG) i bilaga XX till avtalet har Eftas övervakningsmyndighet tillhandahållit uppgifter om de historiska luftfartsutsläpp som motsvarar flygningar inom och mellan Eftastaternas territorier och mellan Eftastaterna och tredjeländer. Dessa uppgifter har fastställts i samarbete med Eurocontrol enligt samma metod som använts för att beräkna de historiska luftfartsutsläppen i hela EU.
 (4)
 Enligt texten i samma anpassning ska gemensamma EES-kommittén fastställa de historiska luftfartsutsläppen i hela EES genom att lägga till de historiska luftfartsutsläppen från flygningar inom och mellan Eftastaternas territorier och mellan Eftastaterna och tredjeländer till de historiska luftfartsutsläpp i hela EU som anges i artikel 1 i kommissionens beslut 2011/149/EU.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Följande punkt ska införas efter punkt 21apa (kommissionens beslut 2009/450/EG) i bilaga XX till avtalet:
 ”21apb.
 32011 D 0149: Kommissionens beslut 2011/149/EU av den 7 mars 2011 om historiska luftfartsutsläpp i enlighet med artikel 3c.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2003/87/EG om ett system för handel med utsläppsrätter för växthusgaser inom gemenskapen (EUT L 61, 8.3.2011, s. 42)
 Bestämmelserna i beslutet ska inom ramen för detta avtal tillämpas med följande anpassning:
 I artikel 1 ska följande stycken läggas till:
 ’De historiska luftfartsutsläpp som motsvarar flygningar inom och mellan Eftastaternas territorier och mellan Eftastaterna och tredjeländer fastställs till 1 943 935 ton CO2.
 De historiska luftfartsutsläppen i hela EES fastställs till 221 420 279 ton CO2.’ ”
 Artikel 2
 Texten till beslut 2011/149/EU på isländska och norska, som ska offentliggöras i EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning, ska vara giltig.
 Artikel 3
 Detta beslut träder i kraft den 2 juli 2011 under förutsättning att alla anmälningar enligt artikel 103.1 i avtalet har gjorts till gemensamma EES-kommittén (3).
 Artikel 4
 Detta beslut ska offentliggöras i EES-delen av och EES-supplementet till Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den 1 juli 2011.
 På gemensamma EES-kommitténs vägnar
 Kurt JÄGER
 Ordförande
 (1) EUT L 196, 28.7.2011, s. 39.
 (2) EUT L 61, 8.3.2011, s. 42.
 (3) Inga konstitutionella krav angivna.