jurisdiction: US

text:
 247 Md. 265 (1967)
 232 A.2d 256
 SCHUMAN, ET AL.
 v.
 GORDON INVESTMENT CORPORATION
 [No. 324, September Term, 1966.]
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 Decided June 29, 1967.
 *266 The cause was argued before HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES, McWILLIAMS and FINAN, JJ., and reargued before HAMMOND, C.J. and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES, McWILLIAMS and FINAN, JJ.
 Melvin J. Sykes for appellants.
 Edward Azrael, with whom were Azrael & Gann on the brief, for appellee.
 HORNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. FINAN, J. dissents.
 This action brought by a tenant against a landlord and the counteraction brought by the landlord against the tenant presents a question as to which party is entitled to use an exterior wall of the leased premises to advertise their respective business enterprises.
 The tenant is a partnership consisting of David and Leonard Schuman trading as D & L Manufacturing Company (the Schumans or tenants), who are assemblers and distributors of dinette furniture. The landlord is Gordon Investment Corporation (Gordon or landlord), a real estate corporation which owns and leases property to Gordon's of Orleans Street, a related corporation which conducts a restaurant and a seafood carry-out business.
 Gordon was and still is the owner of a complex of restaurants, shops, warehouses and parking lots in the area in Baltimore City bounded by Patterson Park Avenue on the west, *267 Orleans Street on the north, Montford Avenue on the east and Fayette Street on the south. The properties known as 2323-2331 Orleans Street, consisting of a number of interconnecting buildings of varying sizes and heights composing one building, were the last acquired by the owner before the lease was made. A portion of the building fronting on Orleans Street was later razed to make space for a parking lot.
 After the landlord agreed to purchase the Orleans Street properties but before settling for them, Gordon and the Schumans entered into a lease of a portion of the Orleans Street and Montford Avenue properties. At the time the lease was executed no part of the Orleans Street property had been demolished and the brick wall (which is the subject of this controversy) had not been reconstructed as the northern "exterior" wall of the leased premises. The lease was prepared by a real estate broker who was not a lawyer.
 The lease, which was executed on January 30, 1965, provided in relevant part that the landlord would
 "demise and lease unto [the tenants] the premises known as 200-202 North Montford Avenue, also known as rear 2323-2331 Orleans Street, * * * consisting of entire premises, approximately 70 x 150, on two floors totaling approximately 21,000 square feet for a period of five (5) years beginning on the 1st day of March, 1965, and ending on the 28th day of February, 1970, * * *."
 The landlord further agreed to allow the tenants
 "to erect suitable and neat signs on both the Orleans Street entrance and also the Montford Avenue entrance. This shall be in addition to suitable and neat signs placed on the building itself; * * *."
 The lease required the landlord to demolish the buildings on the property known as 204-206 Montford Avenue and convert it into a parking lot for the use of the tenants, but it is silent as to the demolition of that portion of the property fronting on Orleans Street which was to be converted into a parking lot for restaurant customers. Nor did the lease mention what would *268 constitute the north wall of the remaining portion of the Orleans Street property after the demolition of the other portion had been accomplished.
 After the adjacent buildings had been razed, the leased building was completely separated from any other buildings. It had a loading dock on Montford Avenue and faced Orleans Street across the restaurant parking lot. There were alleys on the other two sides. And other than a door facing Orleans Street which the landlord had voluntarily cut through it, the wall was solid masonry.
 Shorty after the tenants took possession, the landlord indicated that he wanted to paint an advertising sign on the outside of the wall facing Orleans Street, but when the tenants objected, he desisted temporarily. About a month later, however, Gordon wrote a letter to the Schumans advising them that a painter had been instructed to paint the wall; that prior to the inception of the lease he understood and still maintained that he did not lease the exterior wall or give them permission to use it; that he leased only the premises consisting of 21,000 square feet of floor space; that he never intended to rent the wall; and that the lease does not so provide.
 When the sign painter started to work, the tenants attempted to have the police stop him but they refused to interfere. The tenants, posing as agents for the owner, then obtained a permit from the city to erect a sign and placed a temporary one over the doorway in the wall. But when the landlord denied authorization, the permit was revoked. Thereafter the Schumans brought suit against Gordon alleging that his sign violated the rights of the tenants and praying injunctive relief and damages. In his answer, Gordon claimed that the parties had reached an understanding during the negotiations for the lease to the effect that the wall was to be used by him to advertise his restaurant. Gordon also filed a cross-bill alleging that while the lease permitted the tenants to place "suitable and neat" signs at the entrances and on the building itself, he had not intended to give the Schumans a "right to use the wall" in question and that they wrongfully interfered with the painting of the Gordon sign and placed their "own unsuitable and ugly sign" on the wall. Among other things, Gordon sought an injunction to restrain *269 the Schumans from interfering with the Gordon sign and from using the wall for their own advertising.
 When the case was heard by the chancellor (Harris, J.), one of the tenants (Leonard Schuman) testified that the parties had agreed that certain buildings were to be torn down and that they were to occupy the remainder of the buildings in their entirety but denied that they had agreed to a reservation of the wall for the advertising purposes of the landlord. Instead, he claimed that the parties discussed only the necessity of the tenants having a suitable sign thereon to enable customers to recognize their place of business.
 On behalf of the landlord, the broker (David Kornblatt) testified that the tenants were not negotiating for the entire premises but for space within the existing building; that when he prepared the lease he had intended to say that "the entire premises consisting of approximately 21,000 square feet" rather than say that the entire premises were to be leased. He further testified that he had told the tenants before the lease was signed that the landlord intended to use a space of thirty feet inside the building as well as the outside wall for his own advertising sign.
 The landlord (David Gordon) also testified that it was his intention to reserve from twenty-five to thirty feet in the building for storage purposes and that he specifically told the Schumans that he wanted to keep the wall for his own use. He also said that he agreed to give the tenants permission to erect a neat and suitable sign for identification purposes but emphasized that he was reserving the use of the large wall.
 On redirect, the tenant denied having agreed that the landlord could use the wall for a sign and stated that had he known that this was his intention he would not have signed the lease.
 After the case was closed, the chancellor having inspected the premises, informed the parties by way of a letter addressed to counsel that it seemed to him that the contentions and interests of both parties would be fairly and reasonably met by allowing the tenants to erect (1) a "suitable and neat" sign (no higher than forty-six inches and no longer than twenty feet) over the door in the wall; (2) a smaller sign on either side of the entrance under the larger sign above it; and (3) a sign *270 on a pole at the entrance to the parking lot on Orleans Street. Thereafter when further discussions as to a settlement were ineffective, the chancellor filed an opinion and decree. The opinion was to the effect that while the landlord had reserved the right to use the exterior wall, the lease allowed the tenants to erect the signs described in the letter. The decree dismissed the bill of complaint, enjoined the tenants, on the cross-bill, from interfering with the painting of the wall by the landlord, and permitted the tenants to erect the specified signs.
 While the tenants presented five and the landlord posed three questions on appeal, only two require serious consideration. They are (i) whether the chancellor erred in admitting and considering parol evidence as to the claimed inconsistencies or ambiguities in the lease; and (ii) if the admission of extrinsic evidence was proper, whether the finding of the chancellor that both parties had a right to use the wall was clearly erroneous.
 (i)
 We think the chancellor was right in deciding the case as he did. Since the lease is indefinite in some respects and contains several uncertainties or ambiguities, extrinsic evidence was admissible to explain its terms. In the first place, the provision allowing the tenants to erect suitable and neat signs at both entrances (the merchandise entrance by way of the loading dock on Montford Avenue and the pedestrian entrance from Orleans Street by way of the restaurant parking lot) and "on the building itself," in addition to at least giving rise to a presumption that the landlord had reserved the remainder of the outside walls for its own use, is uncertain in that it does not specify what type or size of sign could be erected by the tenants or where on the building itself were signs (other than the entrance signs) to be placed. Similarly, the lease is ambiguous in that it is not certain where the "entire premises, approximately 70 x 150, on two floors totaling approximately 21,000 square feet," was located. At the time the lease was executed, the several properties referred to in the lease could have included not only 200-202 Montford Avenue and all of 2323-2331 Orleans Street but also 204-206 Montford Avenue and all of the buildings then standing thereon whereas at the time the *271 leased premises (wherever located) were occupied by the tenants all of the buildings except those remaining on 200-206 Montford Avenue and the remaining portion of those in the "rear" of 2323-2331 Orleans Street had been demolished. Furthermore, the lease does not indicate what portion of the Orleans Street property was to be razed to make space for the parking lot (which was not even mentioned) or what portion thereof would constitute a part of the leased premises. Although construable against the landlord who had it prepared, Kelley Construction Co. v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm., 247 Md. 241, 230 A.2d 672 (1967), and Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329 (1946), other ambiguities throughout the lease are reflected in the attempts the draftsman made to distinguish between the property of the landlord and the premises of the tenants.
 The claim of the tenants, on the basis of what was said in Needle v. Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 A.2d 334 (1946), that they have the exclusive right to the use of the outside wall enclosing the portion of the building covered by the lease for their own advertising, overlooks the fact that the meaning of the lease, without the aid of extrinsic evidence to explain it, does not certainly reveal the intention of the parties. On the other hand, the rule in such circumstances is well settled. In Chesapeake Brewing Co. v. Goldberg, 107 Md. 485, 69 A. 37 (1908), involving the interpretation of an ambiguous lease, it was said (at p. 488):
 "It is of course familiar law that extrinsic evidence is not legally admissible to alter, contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, yet it is equally well settled that when a question arises as to the general intention of the parties, concerning which the instrument is not decisive, proof of independent facts collateral to the instrument, may be admitted."
 Likewise, in Sommers v. Dukes, 208 Md. 386, 118 A.2d 660 (1955), the Court, though recognizing the general rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written agreement, went on to say (at p. 394) that "if any doubt arises from the language of a contract as to the *272 intention of the parties, extraneous evidence may be admitted to aid the court in comprehending its meaning." Also see Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co., 122 Md. 177, 89 A. 399 (1914); United Railway Co. v. Wehr, 103 Md. 323, 63 A. 475 (1906); Stockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 197 (1870). Cf. American Weekly v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 16 A.2d 912 (1940); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 A. 137 (1938); Roberts v. Bonaparte, 73 Md. 191, 20 A. 918 (1890).
 Considering the evidence to the effect that the landlord intended to reserve the exterior wall for his own use, the doubt as to the location of the floor space the tenants were to occupy and the uncertainty of the type and size of the signs and the places they were to be erected, it is clear that the admission of extrinsic evidence to enable the court to determine the real intention of the parties was proper.
 (ii)
 Nor can we say that the findings of the chancellor, who saw and heard the witnesses and had an opportunity to judge their credibility, were clearly erroneous. Maryland Rule 886 a. After hearing the testimony of the tenants, the draftsman of the lease and the landlord, and inspecting the premises, the chancellor concluded that the landlord had reserved the right to use most of the wall for advertising purposes and that the tenants had a right to erect a locative sign (46 inches high and 20 feet long) on the wall of the building over the entrance door in addition to a smaller sign on one side of the entrance and another smaller sign on a pole at the entrance to the parking lot. We think that what the chancellor did was fair and reasonable under the circumstances, particularly that which was decreed with regard to the type, size and location of the tenants' signs.
 In view of our holding as to the admissibility of parol evidence and the effect thereof, we do not reach the question of what, if any, legal presumptions would apply in the absence of the evidence referred to.
 Decree affirmed; appellants to pay the costs.


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Dôležité právne oznámenie
 |
 21998D1119(02)
 Úradný vestník L 310 , 19/11/1998 S. 0003 - 0003
 Rozhodnutie Spoločného výboru EHSč. 23/98z 31. marca 1998,ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa príloha VI (Sociálne zabezpečenie) k Dohode o EHPSPOLOČNÝ VÝBOR EHP,so zreteľom na Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, ktorá bola upravená Protokolom upravujúcim Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore, ďalej označovanú ako "dohoda", a najmä na jej článok 98,keďže príloha VI k dohode bola zmenená a doplnená rozhodnutím Spoločného výboru EHP č. 82/97 z 12 novembra 1997 [1];keďže rozhodnutie č. 158 z 27. novembra 1995 o vzorových tlačivách potrebných na uplatnenie nariadení Rady (EHS) č. 1408/71 a (EHS) č. 574/72 (E 201 až E 215) [2], ktoré prijala administratívna Komisia Európskych spoločenstiev o sociálnom zabezpečení migrujúcich pracovníkov sa má zahrnúť do dohody,ROZHODLA TAKTO:Článok 1Do bodu 3.23 (rozhodnutie č. 130), v prílohe VI k dohode sa pridá táto zarážka:- "— 396 D 0732: rozhodnutie č. 158 z 27. novembra 1995 (E 201 to 215) (Ú. v. ES L 336, 27.12.1996, s. 1)."Článok 2Texty rozhodnutia č. 158 v islandskom a nórskom jazyku, ktoré sú prílohami týchto jazykových verzií tohto rozhodnutia, sú autentické.Článok 3Toto rozhodnutie nadobudne účinnosť 1. apríla 1998, ak boli spoločnému výboru EHP urobené oznámenia podľa článku 103 ods. 1 dohody.Článok 4Toto rozhodnutie bude uverejnené v oddiele EHP a v doplnku EHP k Úradnom vestníku Európskych spoločenstiev.V Bruseli 31. marca 1998Za Spoločný výbor EHPpredsedaF. Barbaso[1] Ú. v. ES L 193, 7.5.1998, s. 11.[2] Ú. v. ES L 336, 27.12.1996, s. 1.--------------------------------------------------


type: caselaw

text:
 9.2.2015
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 46/40
 Unionin yleisen tuomioistuimen tuomio 12.12.2014 – Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades ym. v. komissio
 (Asia T-562/08) (1)
 ((Kilpailu - Kartellit tai muut yhteistoimintajärjestelyt - Parafiinivahamarkkinat - Päätös, jolla todetaan EY 81 artiklan rikkominen - Hintojen vahvistaminen ja markkinoiden jakaminen - Kartellin olemassaoloa koskeva näyttö - Rikkomisen kesto - Sakkojen määrän laskennasta annetut vuoden 2006 suuntaviivat - Yhdenvertainen kohtelu - Syyttömyysolettama - Rikkomisen syyksiluettavuus - Emoyhtiön vastuu kilpailusääntöjen rikkomisista, joihin sen tytäryhtiöt ovat syyllistyneet - Emoyhtiön käyttämä ratkaiseva vaikutusvalta - Olettama siinä tapauksessa, että emoyhtiö omistaa tytäryhtiön kokonaan))
 (2015/C 046/48)
 Oikeudenkäyntikieli: espanja
 Asianosaiset
 Kantajat: Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades SA, aiemmin Repsol Lubricantes YPF y Especialidades SA (Madrid, Espanja), Repsol Petróleo SA (Madrid) ja Repsol SA, aiemmin Repsol YPF SA (Madrid) (edustajat: asianajajat J. M. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate, J. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate ja S. Rivero Mena)
 Vastaaja: Euroopan komissio (asiamiehet: F. Castillo de la Torre, F. Castilla Contreras ja C. Urraca Caviedes)
 Oikeudenkäynnin kohde
 Vaatimus [EY] 81 artiklan ja ETA-sopimuksen 53 artiklan mukaisesta menettelystä 1.10.2008 tehdyn komission päätöksen K(2008) 5476 lopullinen (asia COMP/39.181 – kynttilävaha) kumoamiseksi osittain ja kantajille määrätyn sakon määrän alentamisvaatimus
 Tuomiolauselma
 1)
 Kanne hylätään.
 2)
 Repsol Lubricantes y Especialidades SA, Repsol Petróleo SA ja Repsol SA vastaavat omista oikeudenkäyntikuluistaan, ja ne velvoitetaan korvaamaan Euroopan komission oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 (1) EUVL C 44, 21.2.2009.


text:
 19.12.2013
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 345/21
 ROZHODNUTIE SPOLOČNÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 152/2013
 z 15. júla 2013,
 ktorým sa mení príloha XXII (Právo obchodných spoločností) k Dohode o EHP
 SPOLOČNÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 so zreteľom na Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore (ďalej len „Dohoda o EHP“), a najmä na jej článok 98,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1254/2012 z 11. decembra 2012, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa nariadenie (ES) č. 1126/2008, ktorým sa v súlade s nariadením Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1606/2002 prijímajú určité medzinárodné účtovné štandardy, pokiaľ ide o medzinárodný štandard finančného výkazníctva 10, medzinárodný štandard finančného výkazníctva 11, medzinárodný štandard finančného výkazníctva 12, medzinárodný účtovný štandard 27 (2011) a medzinárodný účtovný štandard 28 (2011) (1), sa má začleniť do Dohody o EHP.
 (2)
 Nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1255/2012 z 11. decembra 2012, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa nariadenie (ES) č. 1126/2008, ktorým sa v súlade s nariadením Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1606/2002 prijímajú určité medzinárodné účtovné štandardy týkajúce sa medzinárodného účtovného štandardu 12, medzinárodných štandardov finančného výkazníctva 1 a 13 a interpretácie 20 Výboru pre interpretáciu medzinárodného finančného výkazníctva (2), sa má začleniť do Dohody o EHP.
 (3)
 Nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1256/2012 z 13. decembra 2012, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa nariadenie (ES) č. 1126/2008, ktorým sa v súlade s nariadením Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1606/2002 prijímajú určité medzinárodné účtovné štandardy, pokiaľ ide o Medzinárodný štandard finančného výkazníctva IFRS 7 a Medzinárodný účtovný štandard IAS 32 (3), sa má začleniť do Dohody o EHP.
 (4)
 Príloha XXII k Dohode o EHP by sa mala preto zodpovedajúcim spôsobom zmeniť,
 PRIJAL TOTO ROZHODNUTIE:
 Článok 1
 V bode 10ba [nariadenie Komisie (ES) č. 1126/2008] prílohy XXII k Dohode o EHP sa dopĺňajú tieto zarážky:
 „—
 32012 R 1254: nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1254/2012 z 11. decembra 2012 (Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 1),
 —
 32012 R 1255: nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1255/2012 z 11. decembra 2012 (Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 78),
 —
 32012 R 1256: nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 1256/2012 z 13. decembra 2012 (Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 145).“
 Článok 2
 Znenie nariadení (EÚ) č. 1254/2012, (EÚ) č. 1255/2012 a (EÚ) č. 1256/2012 v islandskom a v nórskom jazyku, ktoré sa uverejní v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie, je autentické.
 Článok 3
 Toto rozhodnutie nadobúda účinnosť 16. júla 2013 pod podmienkou, že boli doručené všetky oznámenia podľa článku 103 ods. 1 Dohody o EHP (4).
 Článok 4
 Toto rozhodnutie sa uverejní v oddiele EHP Úradného vestníka Európskej únie a v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie.
 V Bruseli 15. júla 2013
 Za Spoločný výbor EHP
 predseda
 Thórir IBSEN
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 1.
 (2) Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 78.
 (3) Ú. v. EÚ L 360, 29.12.2012, s. 145.
 (4) Ústavné požiadavky neboli oznámené.


text:
30.7.2011
 DA
 Den Europæiske Unions Tidende
 C 226/10
 Anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse indgivet af Bundesfinanzhof (Tyskland) den 13. april 2011 — Finanzamt Steglitz mod Ines Zimmermann
 (Sag C-174/11)
 2011/C 226/17
 Processprog: tysk
 Den forelæggende ret
 Bundesfinanzhof
 Parter i hovedsagen
 Sagsøger: Finanzamt Steglitz
 Sagsøgt: Ines Zimmermann
 Præjudicielle spørgsmål
 1)
 Kan den nationale lovgiver i henhold til artikel 13, punkt A, stk. 1, litra g), og/eller artikel 13, punkt A, stk. 2, litra a), i Rådets sjette direktiv 77/388/EØF af 17. maj 1977 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om omsætningsafgift (1) gøre afgiftsfritagelse for ydelser vedrørende ambulant pleje af syge og plejetrængende personer betinget af, at plejeudgifterne for så vidt angår disse foretagender »i det forudgående kalenderår i mindst 2/3 af tilfældene er blevet båret af de lovmæssige sociale sikrings- eller hjælpeinstitutioner fuldt ud eller for den overvejende del« (§ 4, nr. 16, litra e), i Umsatzsteuergesetz 1993 [den tyske momslov af 1993])?
 2)
 Er det henset til princippet om momsens neutralitet relevant ved besvarelsen af dette spørgsmål, at den nationale lovgiver under andre betingelser behandler de samme ydelser som afgiftsfri, såfremt de leveres af officielt anerkendte forbund, der udøver frivilligt samfundsarbejde og selskaber, personsammenslutninger og aktivmasser, som tjener det frivillige samfundsarbejde og er medlem af et socialt forbund (§ 4, nr. 18, i Umsatzsteuergesetz 1993)?
 (1) EFT L 145, s. 1.


type: other

text:
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text: b' July 1, 2002\n\n\n\n\nAcquisition\n\nAllegations to the Defense Hotline on\nthe Management of the Defense\nTravel System\n(D-2002-124)\n\n\n\n\n Department of Defense\n Office of the Inspector General\nQuality Integrity Accountability\n\x0c Additional Copies\n\n To obtain additional copies of this report, visit the Web site of the Inspector\n General of the Department of Defense at www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports or\n contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit of the Audit Followup and\n Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703)\n 604-8932.\n\n Suggestions for Future Audits\n\n To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Audit Followup and\n Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8940 (DSN 664-8940) or\n fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:\n\n OAIG-AUD (ATTN: AFTS Audit Suggestions)\n Inspector General of the Department of Defense\n 400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)\n Arlington, VA 22202-4704\n\n Defense Hotline\n\n To report fraud, waste, or abuse, contact the Defense Hotline by calling\n (800) 424-9098; by sending an electronic message to Hotline@dodig.osd.mil; or\n by writing to the Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900.\n The identity of each writer and caller is fully protected.\n\n\n\n\nAcronyms\nASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,\n Communications, and Intelligence)\nCECOM U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command\nCUI Common User Interface\nDTS Defense Travel System\nJITC Joint Interoperability Test Command\nMTMC Military Traffic Management Command\nPMO Project Management Office\nU.S.C. United States Code\n\x0c\x0c Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense\nReport No. D-2002-124 July 1, 2002\n Project No. D2001FG-0148\n\n Allegations to the Defense Hotline on the Management\n of the Defense Travel System\n\n Executive Summary\n\nWho Should Read This Report and Why? This report concerns those managers who\nare specifically involved with managing the Defense Travel System, as well as those\nmanaging the development of information technology systems. The report discusses the\nneed to determine the appropriateness of the Defense Travel System to provide DoD\nwith an effective travel management process.\n\nBackground. The Defense Travel System was envisioned as a general support system\ndesigned to make business travel quicker, easier, and more efficient by providing\nautomated commercial and Government travel support services to DoD travelers. The\nDefense Travel System was expected to represent the 21st century model of efficiency\nand service, featuring the best practices in industry and plug-and-play components. In\naddition, the Defense Travel System was to be designed to speed and streamline the\nentire cycle of authorization, reservation, and claims processing involved in global DoD\ntravel. In May 1998, the Military Traffic Management Command awarded a firm\nfixed-price, performance-based services contract to TRW Incorporated\xe2\x88\x97 for\napproximately $263.7 million to design and deploy the Defense Travel System. The\nDefense Travel System contract included an aggressive timeline to commence deploying\nthe system to approximately 11,000 sites worldwide within 120 days of the effective\ndate of the contract, with completion approximately 38 months later.\n\nResults. Despite recent actions by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,\nTechnology, and Logistics) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief\nFinancial Officer, the Defense Travel System remains a program at high risk of not\nbeing an effective solution in streamlining the DoD travel management process. The\nDefense Travel System was being substantially developed without the requisite\nrequirements, cost, performance, and schedule documents and analyses needed as the\nfoundation for assessing the effectiveness of the system and its return on investment. In\naddition, planning for security at user sites is incomplete. The additional projected\nfunding for the Defense Travel System Program from FYs 2002 through 2007 was\n$377.1 million. As a result, there was increased risk that the planned additional\ninvestment of $377.1 million to fully develop and implement the Defense Travel\nSystem and the $114.8 million and 6 years of effort already invested will not fully\n\n\xe2\x88\x97\n Formerly BDM International Incorporated.\n\x0crealize all goals to reengineer temporary duty travel, make better use of information\ntechnology, and provide an integrated travel system. The Defense Travel System\nProgram is projected to expend approximately $491.9 million (approximately 87\npercent more than the original contract cost of $263.7 million) and deployment will not\nbe completed until FY 2006, approximately 4 years behind schedule. Managing the\nDefense Travel System as a major automated information system with requisite\ndocumentation and tracking of cost, schedule, performance, and security can reduce the\nprogram risk. Further performance of a cost-effectiveness study of the system will also\nreduce risk. (See the Finding section for details on the audit results.)\n\nManagement Comments and Audit Response. The Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense\n(Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the Acting Principal Director, Deputy Assistant\nSecretary of Defense (Programs) concurred with the intent of the recommendations but\ndisagreed with the draft report recommendation to suspend funding for the Defense\nTravel System until it was determined whether the system was the most cost-effective\nsolution to a streamlined travel process. The Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer agreed with the intent of the report to improve\nthe oversight of the Defense Travel System Program and has already taken action to\nmanage the Defense Travel System as an Acquisition Category IAM program.\nAdditionally, he has tasked the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation to do a\ncost-effectiveness study to determine whether the Defense Travel System program\nshould continue or be terminated. The complete text of the comments is in the\nManagement Comments section of the report. The comments and actions initiated were\nresponsive. We revised the report recommendations because the proposed oversight\nmechanism and cost-effectiveness study will reduce program risk and insert appropriate\ndecision points for deciding whether to continue or terminate the Defense Travel\nSystem.\n\n\n\n\n ii\n\x0cTable of Contents\n\nExecutive Summary i\n\n\nBackground 1\n\n\nObjectives 2\n\n\nFinding\n Management and Implementation of the Defense Travel System 3\n\nAppendixes\n A. Scope and Methodology\n Scope 15\n Methodology 16\n Management Control Program Review 16\n Prior Coverage 17\n B. Summary of Allegations 18\n C. Key Program Events 20\n D. Departmental Policies 21\n E. Report Distribution 23\n\nManagement Comments\n Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 25\n Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 37\n Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programs) 41\n\x0cBackground\n This audit was performed in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline\n concerning management of the Defense Travel System (DTS). See Appendix B\n for a synopsis of each allegation and audit results. Appendix C is an overview\n of key events that have resulted in an ongoing effort to reengineer the DoD\n temporary duty travel process.\n\n Reengineering DoD Temporary Duty Travel. As a result of the\n 1993 National Performance Review, DoD identified travel as an area that\n required reengineering. The DoD Task Force to Reengineer Travel was\n established in July 1994 to conduct a comprehensive and systematic review of\n the DoD travel network using a \xe2\x80\x9cclean sheet of paper\xe2\x80\x9d approach. The DoD\n Task Force to Reengineer Travel concluded that the DoD travel process was\n fragmented, inefficient, expensive to administer, and occasionally impeded\n mission accomplishment. In January 1995, the DoD Task Force to Reengineer\n Travel issued the \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the Department of Defense Task Force to\n Reengineer Travel,\xe2\x80\x9d which addressed three principal causes for the inefficient\n DoD travel system:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 travel policies and programs were focused on compliance with rigid\n rules rather than mission performance,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 travel practices did not keep pace with travel management\n improvements implemented by industry, and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the travel system was not integrated.\n\n DTS Program Management. On December 13, 1995, the Under Secretary of\n Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics1 and the Under Secretary of\n Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum,\n \xe2\x80\x9cReengineering Travel Initiative,\xe2\x80\x9d establishing the Project Management Office\n (PMO) to acquire travel services that would be used DoD-wide and support\n mission requirements, reduce costs, and provide superior customer service. The\n memorandum directed the PMO to report through the Under Secretary of\n Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer to the Under Secretary of\n Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The memorandum also\n tasked the U.S. Transportation Command to provide a single procurement\n entity. As a result, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) was\n designated to procure DTS. DTS was envisioned as a general support system\n designed to make business travel quicker, easier, and more efficient by\n providing automated commercial and Government travel support services to\n DoD travelers. DTS was expected to represent the 21st century model of\n efficiency and service, featuring the best practices in industry and plug-and-play\n\n\n\n1\n Formerly the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).\n\n 1\n\x0c components. Additionally, DTS was to be designed to speed and streamline the\n entire cycle of authorization, reservation, and claims processing involved in\n global DoD travel.\n\n In accordance with the December 1995 guidance, the PMO initiated the DTS\n Program as an acquisition of travel services rather than an acquisition\n investment in information technology. The PMO developed an acquisition plan\n based on using commercial-off-the-shelf software and provided it to the Under\n Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under\n Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer for review. The\n acquisition plan was approved, thereby allowing the PMO to proceed with the\n acquisition of DTS as a travel service.\n\n Contract Award. In May 1998, MTMC awarded a firm fixed-price,\n performance-based services contract to TRW Incorporated (formerly\n BDM International Incorporated) for approximately $263.7 million to design\n and deploy DTS. However, because a protest was filed with the General\n Accounting Office, which was subsequently resolved, the effective date of the\n contract changed from May 1998 to September 1998. The contract specified\n that TRW Incorporated was to be paid a one-time deployment fee of $20 for\n each user, and an initial transaction fee of $5.27 for each travel voucher\n processed upon DTS achieving initial operational capability. However, the DTS\n contract did not define what DTS should accomplish in order to be functionally\n accepted nor did it include a test plan. The DTS contract also included an\n aggressive timeline to commence deploying DTS to approximately 11,000 sites\n worldwide within 120 days of the effective date of the contract, with completion\n approximately 38 months later.\n\n DTS Program Costs. Total DTS Program cost was estimated to be\n $491.9 million. Since December 1995, the PMO has expended approximately\n $114.8 million for the DTS Program from FYs 1996 through 2001. The\n projected funding for the DTS Program from FYs 2002 through 2007 was\n $377.1 million.2 The primary DTS Program costs include development,\n operational testing, and salaries for DoD civilians, contractors, and military\n support.\n\n\n\nObjectives\n The audit objective was to review the allegations made to the Defense Hotline\n and to determine whether the DTS Program was being managed to meet cost,\n schedule, and performance requirements. We also evaluated the management\n control program as it related to the audit objectives. See Appendix A for a\n discussion of the audit scope and methodology, management control program,\n and prior coverage.\n\n\n2\n The $377.1 million includes $190.6 million in operation and maintenance funds and $186.5 million in\nresearch and development funds.\n\n 2\n\x0c Management and Implementation of the\n Defense Travel System\n Despite recent actions by the Under Secretary of Defense for\n Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of\n Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DTS remains at high risk\n for not being an effective solution to streamlining the DoD travel\n management process. DTS has been and was being substantially\n developed without the requisite requirements, cost, performance, and\n schedule documents and analyses needed as the foundation for assessing\n the system\xe2\x80\x99s effectiveness and its return on investment. Specifically,\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the DTS Program is not being managed as intended by the\n Clinger-Cohen Act;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the user requirements community did not develop requirement\n documents such as the mission needs statement or an\n operational requirements document, which are used as the\n basis for selecting an appropriate acquisition strategy for new\n systems;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,\n Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD[C3I]) designated\n DTS as a special interest initiative rather than a major\n automated information system acquisition program;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 DoD management oversight organizations failed to\n appropriately address significant indicators of DTS Program\n implementation problems; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the PMO had not yet accomplished remedial actions directed\n by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of\n Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer in July 2001.\n\n As a result, there was increased risk that the planned additional\n investment of $377.1 million to fully develop and implement DTS and\n the $114.8 million and 6 years of effort already invested will not deliver\n a viable, integrated travel management system. Further, the mandated\n management oversight will not be able to be effectively accomplished\n without the requisite acquisition documents and analyses needed for\n informed decision-making.\n\n\n\nClinger-Cohen Act\n The Clinger-Cohen Act, Public Law 104-106, February 10, 1996, requires that\n managers implement deliberate processes for maximizing value and managing\n the risks associated with the acquisition of information technology. Section\n 3\n\x0c 5002 of Public Law 104-106 (section 1401, title 40, United States Code\n [U.S.C.]) defines information technology as any interconnected system used in\n the automated management of data or information, including software and\n services. Section 5125 (40 U.S.C. 1425) states that the Chief Information\n Officer of executive agencies is responsible for:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 providing advice and other assistance to the head of the executive\n agency and other senior management to ensure that information\n technology is acquired and information resources are managed\n effectively; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 monitoring the performance of information technology programs of\n the executive agency, evaluating the performance of those programs,\n and advising the head of the executive agency whether to continue,\n modify, or terminate a program.\n In addition, section 5127 (40 U.S.C. 1327) requires the head of an executive\n agency to identify any major acquisition program related to information\n technology that has significantly deviated from the cost, performance, or\n schedule goals established for the program in the strategic information resources\n management plan.\n\n The ongoing emphasis in obtaining the full benefits of information technology\n has generated considerable Federal Government and DoD policy and guidance.\n Good business practices dictate that DoD managers implement and follow such\n policy. Appendix D summarizes the information technology, acquisition, and\n security guidance applicable to DTS.\n\n\n\nAcquisition Strategy\n DoD did not manage DTS as an acquisition investment in information\n technology, follow the applicable Office of Management and Budget and DoD\n guidance for information technology acquisitions, or provide the oversight\n needed to ensure that DTS was an effective solution to streamline the DoD\n travel process. Further, DoD did not address indicators that the program was\n experiencing problems.\n\n Information Technology Investments. The Clinger-Cohen Act, along with\n Office of Management and Budget guidance and DoD policy, provide an\n effective framework for managing information technology investments, not just\n when a program is initiated, but continuously throughout the life of the\n program.\n\n From inception, DTS was to be integrated with other systems and share data,\n therefore requiring it to be compliant with acquisition laws and regulations.\n\n In December 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer established the DTS PMO, but did not\n 4\n\x0cdesignate the program as a major automated information system. In June 1997,\nASD (C3I) designated the DTS Program as a special interest initiative. DoD\ndoes not consider special interest initiatives subject to acquisition policy\nrequirements. As of April 2002, after extensive development and total program\ncosts estimated at $491.9 million, DoD still had not designated DTS as a major\nautomated information system. Consequently, the PMO had not prepared\nessential documents in the acquisition process, to include a mission needs\nstatement, an operational requirements document, a life-cycle cost estimate, an\nacquisition program baseline, and a test and evaluation master plan as required\nby the DoD 5000 acquisition policy series.\n\nSecurity. Additionally, DoD Instruction 5200.40, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Information\nTechnology Security Certification and Accreditation Process,\xe2\x80\x9d December 30,\n1997, prescribes standardized procedures to meet DoD system security\ncertification and accreditation requirements when implementing an information\ntechnology system. DoD Components and the PMO have not addressed the\nsecurity requirements for the DTS software at the proposed sites where DTS\nwill be deployed. Specifically, the System Security Authorization Agreement\ndeveloped by the PMO only addresses the certification and accreditation of DTS\nat the contractor site.\n\nProjected Funding. The PMO has requested approximately $377.1 million\neven though it has yet to provide an automated, paperless travel system that\nmeets all DoD temporary duty requirements. The following table identifies\nadditional projected funding requested by the PMO to implement DTS from\nFYs 2002 through 2007.\n\n\n Projected Funding From FYs 2002 Through 2007\n\n Fiscal Operation and Research and Total\n Year Maintenance Funds Development Funds (in millions)\n\n 2002 $61.6 $19.6 $81.2\n 2003 53.8 30.4 84.2\n\n 2004 37.0 32.3 69.3\n\n 2005 12.5 34.1 46.6\n\n 2006 12.7 34.7 47.4\n\n 2007 13.0 35.4 48.4\n\n Totals $190.6 $186.5 $377.1\n\n\nAlthough the PMO originally envisioned that DTS could be deployed without\nany development by using commercial-off-the-shelf products, since the effective\ndate of the contract (September 1998), they have had to do extensive\n 5\n\x0c developmental work. From FYs 2002 through 2007, the PMO expects further\n development costs of approximately $186.5 million to complete development\n necessary to obtain critical functionality of the system, to continue developing\n solutions to integrate the common user interface (CUI)3 and the DoD\n accounting and disbursing systems, and to provide required engineering support\n to implement the system.\n\n Contract Issues. Because fundamental acquisition documents were never\n developed, the DTS contract was not properly structured for the implementation\n of DTS. Officials from the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command\n (CECOM) stated that under a restructured contract, TRW Incorporated would\n be paid a firm-fixed price on a monthly basis for a deployment team responsible\n for implementing DTS.\n\n\n\nIndicators of Problem\n Test and Evaluation. The PMO originally expected to complete testing and\n commence deploying DTS within 120 days of the effective date of the contract,\n with deployment to be completed within 38 months (April 2002). Officials from\n the PMO stated that when testing began in November 1998, they immediately\n recognized that the travel system they envisioned was more cumbersome than\n anticipated. The PMO, in coordination with the DoD Components, developed\n specific test scenarios to test the ability of the TRW Incorporated CUI to meet\n the overall functionality envisioned by DoD. The PMO began testing 326 test\n scenarios to validate the capability of the CUI to accept a trip request, produce a\n \xe2\x80\x9cshould cost\xe2\x80\x9d estimate,4 identify exceptions to policy, and accurately compute a\n final reimbursement voucher. During this phase of testing, several deficiencies\n were identified, including the computation module\xe2\x80\x99s inability to calculate\n temporary duty travel in conjunction with leave and travel that required partial\n payments. By early 1999, it was evident that the commercial-off-the-shelf\n software required major development and modifications in order to meet DoD\n requirements.\n The second phase of testing included validating 230 test scenarios to\n demonstrate full system functionality, including external interfaces, of the CUI\n in a controlled environment prior to conducting operational tests at DoD sites.\n At the completion of this phase of testing, 87 \xe2\x80\x9ccritical\xe2\x80\x9d discrepancies were\n identified. Of the 87 discrepancies, the PMO determined that 15 were\n associated with functionality that could be addressed in future releases of DTS.\n The remaining 72 discrepancies would be corrected in software and business\n process updates. Each new release and software update required more\n development and modifications.\n3\n The CUI represents the automation that integrates the necessary functions of DTS and provides an\ninterface to other systems involved in the travel process including the Defense Electronic Business\nExchange, DoD Accounting and Disbursing Systems, and the DoD Public Key Infrastructure.\n4\n A \xe2\x80\x9cshould cost\xe2\x80\x9d estimate is the standard or baseline amount the Government is willing to pay at the time\na trip is planned and authorized. \xe2\x80\x9cShould cost\xe2\x80\x9d estimates include allowable transportation, lodging, and\nrental car expenses; per diem for meals; and approved reimbursable incidental expenses.\n\n 6\n\x0c The first operational assessment was scheduled to occur from October 23\n through December 22, 2000, at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. As a\n result of 72 discrepancy reports and substantial deployment problems, the PMO\n terminated the operational assessment on November 8, 2000.\n\n A second operational assessment by the Joint Interoperability Test Command\n (JITC) occurred at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, from July 26 to\n August 29, 2001. In a report issued by JITC in October 2001, JITC stated that\n DTS failed to meet certain critical requirements, and as a result, JITC did not\n consider DTS to be an operationally effective system for all DoD Components.\n\n Developmental Requirements. As of April 2002, the PMO had not\n documented the amount or nature of the development required to implement\n DTS, but PMO officials stated that the required development was extensive.\n Because the PMO had recognized that DTS would require extensive\n development by early 1999, the PMO should have informed the Under Secretary\n of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary\n of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of that requirement and the\n need to reconsider the DTS acquisition strategy. By that time, it was clear that\n continuing the DTS initiative as a services acquisition was inappropriate and that\n it should rather be managed as an acquisition investment in information\n technology.\n\n Deployment Plan. Although the PMO originally expected to deploy DTS to\n approximately 11,000 sites, the DTS deployment plan has been reduced to\n approximately 260 sites. The revised deployment schedule includes fielding\n DTS to 10 pilot sites during FY 2002 and to approximately 250 high-volume\n travel sites from FYs 2003 to 2006. Although officials from the PMO stated\n that deploying DTS to approximately 260 sites would include approximately\n 86 percent of all DoD travelers, deployment to even this reduced number of\n sites will not be completed until FY 2006, approximately 4 years behind\n schedule. The PMO and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service have not\n tested all DoD accounting and disbursing systems to ensure an adequate\n interface exists with the CUI. As of April 2002, 27 (71 percent) of the\n approximately 38 DoD accounting and disbursing systems, with which DTS\n may interface, had not been tested.\n\n The PMO should not deploy DTS to any site until DTS is designated a major\n automated information system, all acquisition documents have been completed,\n a program review has been conducted by the Overarching Integrated Product\n Team, and the Milestone Decision Authority has approved the system to\n proceed.\n\n\n\nProgram Oversight\n Special Interest Initiatives. ASD(C3I) did not provide adequate oversight for\n the DTS Program as a special interest initiative. As the DoD Chief Information\n Officer, ASD(C3I) designated the DTS Program as a special interest initiative\n rather than a major automated information system. On June 11, 1997, the\n 7\n\x0cOffice of ASD(C3I) issued a memorandum, \xe2\x80\x9cDesignation of Major Automated\nInformation Systems and Other Special Interest Major Initiatives and Related\nQuarterly Reporting Requirements,\xe2\x80\x9d updating the list of DoD major information\ntechnology investments and special interest initiatives, including the DTS\nProgram.\n\nCongressional Requirements. Congress enacted reform legislation to improve\nthe methods by which Federal agencies select and manage information\ntechnology resources. To comply with congressional requirements, on\nMay 7, 1997, ASD(C3I) was directed to provide oversight and management for\nall DoD information technology investments.\n\n May 1999 Memorandum. On May 5, 1999, the Office of the ASD(C3I)\nissued a memorandum, \xe2\x80\x9cDesignation of Major Automated Information System\nAcquisition Programs/Special Interest Initiatives and Related Oversight\nRequirements,\xe2\x80\x9d providing general guidance for programs designated as special\ninterest initiatives. Specifically, the memorandum required the DoD Chief\nInformation Officer to:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 incorporate into regulatory guidance and oversight processes those\n requirements included in the Clinger-Cohen Act for information\n technology investments; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 tailor management, oversight, and quarterly reporting requirements\n to ensure that warfighter requirements are met.\n\nASD(C3I) did not follow that guidance and did not establish or tailor\nmanagement and oversight requirements for the DTS Program. Specifically,\nASD(C3I) did not require the PMO to:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 submit an acquisition strategy for review and approval; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 coordinate and obtain consensus on acquisition requirements that\n added value to the DTS Program, especially requirements related to\n cost, performance, and schedule.\nASD(C3I) required the PMO to submit quarterly reports that identified the\nprogress and implementation status of the DTS Program. The DTS quarterly\nreports identified program issues affecting DTS milestones, fielding schedules,\nsystem interfaces, and software development. Officials from ASD(C3I) stated\nthey reviewed the DTS quarterly reports to determine whether the DTS Program\nwas satisfactorily progressing. However, officials from ASD(C3I) also stated\nthat the DTS quarterly reports did not always appear to report the \xe2\x80\x9ctrue state\xe2\x80\x9d of\nthe DTS Program. Officials from ASD(C3I) stated that it was not until the\nWhiteman Air Force Base operational assessment was terminated in November\n2000 that they became more involved and interested in the DTS Program.\n\n March 2001 Memorandum. On March 30, 2001, ASD(C3I) issued a\nmemorandum, \xe2\x80\x9cDesignation of Major Automated Information System\nAcquisition Program,\xe2\x80\x9d that updated the May 1999 guidance. The memorandum\nidentified those DoD information systems designated as major automated\ninformation systems subject to DoD acquisition requirements. However, the\n 8\n\x0c memorandum did not address oversight requirements for special interest\n initiatives. Instead, the memorandum stated that ASD(C3I) would issue separate\n guidance on major information technology investments subject to ASD(C3I)\n oversight by the end of FY 2001. During a meeting on November 26, 2001,\n officials from ASD(C3I) stated that they planned to redesignate DTS from a\n special interest initiative to a major acquisition information system. As of\n April 2002, ASD(C3I) had not issued guidance for managing special interest\n initiatives nor had they redesignated DTS as a major acquisition information\n system.\n\n Other Oversight Structures. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer did not adequately address issues\n affecting the implementation of DTS. However, officials from the two Under\n Secretaries of Defense stated that they had provided direct oversight since DTS\n Program inception. Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for\n Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer also stated that the DTS Program was\n subjected to regular flag-level committee meetings that provided oversight for\n the progress of the program.\n\n Senior-Level Working Groups. The DoD Task Force to Reengineer Travel\n established two senior-level committees, an O-8 Steering Group and an\n O-6 Working Group, to serve as focal points for all DoD activities during the\n effort to reengineer DoD travel. The committees included representatives from\n each of the DoD Components; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief\n Financial Officer; ASD(C3I); and the PMO. The committees\xe2\x80\x99 primary function\n was to present issues and concerns related to reengineering DoD travel,\n including implementing the DTS Program, and to resolve those issues and\n concerns. During each committee meeting, a status of the DTS Program was\n presented serious issues affecting deployment, including the need for a viable\n deployment schedule and the necessity for extensive development and testing to\n meet functionality requirements, were often addressed. However, not until\n January 2001 did either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics or the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer recommend that the program be\n reassessed, even though extensive development had been necessary since 1999\n and the deployment timeline defined in the contract had been significantly\n exceeded.\n\n\n\nDirected Actions\n The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and\n the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer expressed\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cand directed specific actions towards the DTS Program after discrepancies were\nidentified during the first operational assessment attempted at Whiteman Air\nForce Base.\n\nJanuary 2001 Memorandum. On January 19, 2001, the Under Secretary of\nDefense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology and the Under Secretary of\nDefense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum, \xe2\x80\x9cDefense\nTravel System Program/Contract Assessment,\xe2\x80\x9d stating that recent deficiencies\nidentified during Phase IIIa acceptance tests raised serious concerns about the\nDTS Program. The memorandum required:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the PMO, in coordination with ASD(C3I), the Defense Information\n Systems Agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the\n Military Departments, the Office of the Deputy Chief Financial\n Officer, and the U.S. Transportation Command, to complete a\n functional assessment of the DTS Program;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 an independent technical assessment that would identify measures\n needed to improve DTS response times; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the Army to determine specific actions necessary for the DTS\n contract based on the results of the functional and technical\n assessments.\n\nThe memorandum also directed that overall functional responsibility be assigned\nto the U.S. Transportation Command.\n\nCompleted Actions. Officials from the PMO stated that they had completed a\nfunctional assessment and had reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for\nAcquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer that DTS is a viable system that will meet\nDoD temporary duty travel requirements. Officials from the PMO stated that\nthey did not prepare a formal written functional assessment, but rather provided\nmultiple briefings with charts to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\nTechnology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. The PMO contracted with an\nindependent contractor to perform a technical assessment to determine whether\nDTS response times met testing requirements. On April 20, 2001, the PMO\nissued a report prepared by the contractor stating that response times met the\ndeveloped acceptance criteria at remote sites. This conclusion was based on\ntests of how infrastructure performance issues could affect DTS response times\nperformed at nine major DoD sites in a controlled test environment.\n\nActions Not Completed. The DTS original contract did not include essential\nelements necessary for the effective acquisition of DTS. Specifically, the DTS\ncontract did not define what DTS was required to accomplish in order for it to\nbe functionally accepted nor did it include a test plan. On April 5, 2001, the\nAssistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) issued a memorandum directing\nCECOM to assume responsibility for the contract from MTMC, to include\nrestructuring the DTS contract. The memorandum also states CECOM should\nbecome responsible for the contract because of its expertise in large information\ntechnology contracts. Officials from CECOM stated that the primary changes to\n 10\n\x0c the contract would include eliminating the one-time deployment fee for each\n user and the initial transaction fee for each travel voucher processed, and\n modifying the method of payment to TRW Incorporated. Officials from\n CECOM stated that TRW Incorporated would be paid a firm-fixed price on a\n monthly basis for a deployment team responsible for implementing DTS.\n Officials from CECOM stated they did not complete restructuring the DTS\n contract until March 29, 2002.\n\n July 2001 Memorandum. On July 17, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense\n for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum, \xe2\x80\x9cDefense Travel\n System,\xe2\x80\x9d which approved proceeding with the DTS Program. The\n memorandum stated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\n Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer would continue to provide policy\n oversight to the DTS Program. However, upon completion of necessary\n contract actions, the U.S. Transportation Command was directed to assume\n responsibility for the DTS Program. The memorandum also directed that DTS\n Program oversight be accomplished in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.2,\n \xe2\x80\x9cOperation of the Defense Acquisition System,\xe2\x80\x9d March 15, 1996 (revised\n January 4, 2001). U.S. Transportation Command or its designee was to be the\n Designated Approval Authority for the DTS system security certification and\n chair the DTS Configuration Control Board. However, a December 11, 2001,\n budget decision delayed transferring DTS Program responsibility to the U.S.\n Transportation Command until FY 2004 to allow the program to be in a full\n deployment mode. The budget decision did not establish an interim authority\n over the DTS Program in place of U.S. Transportation Command to ensure that\n it would adhere to the requirements of DoD Instruction 5000.2 or complete the\n other directed actions detailed in the July 2001 memorandum.\n\n\n\nConclusion\n DoD envisioned that DTS would represent a 21st century model of efficiency\n and service, featuring the best practices in industry and plug-and-play\n components. When fully operational, DTS was expected to provide an\n automated and paperless system that met the needs of nearly 3.5 million active\n duty military, reserve, and DoD civilian travelers. Sound business practices and\n an information technology investment that borders on a half-billion dollars\n dictate a need for a process to assess progress towards established goals,\n especially for cost, performance, schedule, and security. Such a process has not\n been established for DTS. DoD should manage the DTS Program as a major\n automated information system and ensure it meets requirements of the\n Clinger-Cohen Act and Office of Management and Budget and DoD acquisition\n and security policies.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\x0cManagement Comments on the Finding and Audit Response\n PMO Comments. Management comments from the PMO were enclosed with\n the response from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial\n Officer and are reproduced in their entirety along with that response. The PMO\n stated that the report erroneously indicated that the PMO had reduced the\n number of sites that will receive DTS. When fully implemented, DTS will\n provide temporary duty travel services to all of the original 11,000 envisioned\n sites.\n\n Audit Response. According to the PMO, the original plan was to deploy DTS\n to about 11,000 sites worldwide. However, after further consideration and\n research, the PMO determined that it would be able to deploy DTS to about\n 260 high-volume sites that generated 86 percent of all DoD temporary duty\n travel. The 260-site deployment would be accomplished in two phases. The\n PMO also determined that if DTS was deployed to an additional 300-plus sites,\n it would capture approximately 99 percent of all DoD temporary duty travel.\n Version 1 of the DTS deployment plan, October 1, 2001, stated that Phase III\n would be completed by the Services and agencies, which would bear\n responsibility for the leadership and funding of this effort. During the study of\n the DTS Program directed by the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Director, Program Analysis and\n Evaluation should determine the number of sites that are most cost-effective to\n receive DTS.\n\n\n\nRecommendations, Management Comments, and Audit\n Response\n 1. We recommend that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for\n Logistics and Materiel Readiness ensure that the Defense Travel System\n Program be designated as an Acquisition Category IAM program and the\n Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer complete\n the Program, Analysis, and Evaluation study by October 1, 2002, to\n determine whether the Defense Travel System Program should either\n continue or be terminated.\n\n Management Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense\n (Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the Acting Principal Director, Deputy\n Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programs) nonconcurred with the draft report\n recommendation to suspend funding for development and deployment of DTS\n until DoD determines whether DTS is the most cost-effective solution to the\n travel process. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial\n Officer stated the termination would make a major impact on pilot site\n operations and create significant termination costs for DoD. To address the\n audit concerns, the Under Secretary tasked the Director, Program Analysis and\n Evaluation to undertake a cost-effectiveness study for DTS and report the results\n to him no later than October 1, 2002. The Under Secretary agreed with the\n 12\n\x0cintent of the report to improve oversight for DTS and invited the Under\nSecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and ASD(C3I) to\njoin in the study. Further, any future decision to continue or terminate DTS\nwill be contingent upon the Program Analysis and Evaluation findings. The\nDeputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) stated\nthat the DTS remains a viable system for meeting future temporary duty travel\nrequirements while providing broad benefits to DoD. In addition, the Deputy\nUnder Secretary stated that DTS would be designated as an Acquisition\nCategory IAM program and, as such, be subject to the acquisition discipline\npreviously lacking in the program. The Acting Principal Director, Deputy\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Programs) stated that if funds were suspended,\nthe DTS Program would, for all practical purposes, be terminated. Further,\nDTS assessments were conducted during multiple briefings to various\nmanagement levels. The assessment result was the July 17, 2001, memorandum\nsigned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer\nand the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)\nthat approved proceeding with DTS Program implementation.\n\nAudit Response. Management comments were responsive. It was not the\nintent of our recommendation to terminate DTS. We believe the Program\nrequires additional structure, oversight, and an analysis of whether DTS is the\nmost cost-effective solution for the DoD travel process. Planned actions by\nsenior DoD officials, such as their intent to designate the system as an\nAcquisition Category IAM program, their plan to provide additional program\noversight, and their intent to perform a cost-effectiveness study of the system,\nshow concern for the program. Based on the comments, we revised the\nrecommendation in the final report. Additional comments are not required.\n\n2. We recommend that the Project Management Office comply with the\nintent of the Clinger-Cohen Act by managing the Defense Travel System as\na major information technology investment; establishing proper security in\naccordance with DoD Directive 5200.28 and DoD Instruction 5200.40; and\ndeveloping essential acquisition documents needed for effective oversight,\nincluding:\n\n a. a mission needs statement,\n\n b. an operational requirements document,\n\n c. a life-cycle cost estimate,\n\n d. an acquisition program baseline, and\n\n e. a test and evaluation master plan.\n\nManagement Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense\n(Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the Acting Principal Director, Deputy\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Programs) concurred with the recommendation.\nThe Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer stated\nthat he has taken action to manage DTS as an Acquisition Category IAM\nprogram in accordance with DoD 5000 series. The Deputy Under Secretary\n 13\n\x0cstated the recommended actions were those envisioned by the July 17, 2001,\njoint Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and\nthe Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer\nmemorandum. The Acting Principal Director, Deputy Assistant Secretary of\nDefense (Programs) stated his office was in the process of designating DTS an\nAcquisition Category IAM program. Once designated, DTS will be subject to\nall DoD requirements and will be overseen by the Office of the Secretary of\nDefense and Joint Staff as a major automated information system. This\noversight will ensure compliance with DoD guidance, including security\nrequirements addressed in DoD Directive 5200.28 and DoD\nInstruction 5200.40.\n\n3. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,\nTechnology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer; and the Assistant Secretary of\nDefense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) review the\nprogress made by the Project Management Office in implementing\nRecommendation 2., and determine whether the Defense Travel System\nProgram should continue or be terminated.\n\nManagement Comments. The Under Secretary of Defense\n(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense\n(Logistics and Materiel Readiness), and the Acting Principal Director, Deputy\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Programs) concurred with the recommendation.\nThe Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer has\ntasked the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation to undertake a cost-\neffectiveness study for DTS and invited the Under Secretary of Defense\n(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of\nDefense (Programs) to join the study. Findings of the study are to be reported\nby October 1, 2002. Any future decisions to continue or terminate DTS will be\ncontingent on the study\xe2\x80\x99s findings. The Deputy Under Secretary stated program\nprogress will be monitored and decisions made in accordance with the DoD\n5000 series milestone reviews and other key requirements. Further, the\ndecisions contained in the July 17, 2001, memorandum remain valid and that\nany future decision to continue or terminate DTS should be vetted through the\nDoD 5000 series milestone process. The Acting Principal Director stated they\nwould review DTS progress on implementing Recommendation 2. at milestone\nreviews, the first of which is planned for March 2003. The Integrated Product\nTeam will review program progress between milestone reviews. ASD(C3I) will\nserve as the Milestone Decision Authority for the Defense Travel System and\nthe Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer and the\nUnder Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) will be an\nintegral part of the DTS milestone review process.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0cAppendix A. Scope and Methodology\n\n\nScope\n Work Performed. We performed this audit to examine allegations made to the\n Defense Hotline. Specifically, we examined allegations made concerning\n management of the DTS Program.\n\n We analyzed PMO management responsibilities and DoD oversight for the DTS\n Program by:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 visiting, contacting, and conducting interviews with officials from the\n Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,\n and Logistics); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief\n Financial Officer; ASD(C3I); the PMO; MTMC; CECOM; and the\n complainants, all in Arlington, Virginia;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 reviewing various reports for the DTS Program that included cost,\n schedule, and performance parameters;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 reviewing DTS Quarterly Reports submitted to ASD(C3I);\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 evaluating reports submitted by JITC for operational assessments\n conducted at Whiteman Air Force Base and Ellsworth Air Force Base\n to determine the readiness of site-specific operational capabilities in\n preparation for connectivity to the DTS; and\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 reviewing the DTS System Security Authorization Agreement to\n determine whether the certification and accreditation process for DTS\n was adequately completed.\n We also reviewed DoD and Military Department acquisition and security-related\n guidance, memorandums, and reports issued from January 1995 through\n July 2001 to determine whether effective management and adequate oversight\n were provided for the DTS Program. Specifically, we reviewed Public Law\n 104-106, \xe2\x80\x9cThe National Defense Authorization Act of 1996,\xe2\x80\x9d February 10,\n 1996; the DTS \xe2\x80\x9cConcept of Operations,\xe2\x80\x9d May 8, 1998; and the \xe2\x80\x9cReport of the\n DoD Task Force to Reengineer Travel,\xe2\x80\x9d January 1995. We reviewed the\n May 7, 1998, contract (effective date September 1998), contract number\n DAMT01-98-D-1005, its modifications, and supporting documentation. We\n also reviewed a proposed modification to contract number DAMT01-98-D-1005\n that would, in effect, restructure the terms and conditions of the original\n contract. In addition, we evaluated DoD and inter-Service memorandums to\n determine senior DoD management decisions related to reengineering DoD\n temporary duty travel.\n\n\n 15\n\x0c General Accounting Office High-Risk Area. The General Accounting Office\n has identified several high-risk areas in the DoD. This report provides coverage\n of the DoD Systems Modernization high-risk area.\n\n\n\nMethodology\n Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to\n perform this audit.\n\n Audit Dates and Standards. We performed this audit from July 2001 through\n April 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing\n standards. Accordingly, we included tests of management controls considered\n necessary.\n\n Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and\n organizations within DoD and within TRW. Further details are available on\n request.\n\n\n\nManagement Control Program Review\n DoD Directive 5010.38, \xe2\x80\x9cManagement Control (MC) Program,\xe2\x80\x9d August 26,\n 1996, and DoD Instruction 5010.40, \xe2\x80\x9cManagement Control (MC) Program\n Procedures,\xe2\x80\x9d August 28, 1996, require DoD organizations to implement a\n comprehensive system of management controls that provides reasonable\n assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy\n of the controls.\n\n Scope of the Review of the Management Control Program. We reviewed the\n adequacy of management controls in place at the PMO with respect to the\n acquisition and management of a DoD-wide travel system. Specifically, we\n reviewed the PMO business processes and procedures used in acquiring DTS,\n DTS test plans and results, and security procedures in place to ensure the\n accuracy and reliability of data across the system. We reviewed management\xe2\x80\x99s\n self-evaluation applicable to those controls.\n Adequacy of Management Controls. We identified a material management\n control weakness within the PMO. The PMO did not comply with requirements\n applicable to all acquisition programs even though they recognized extensive\n development was necessary to implement the system. Without following DoD\n acquisition procedures, DoD may not adequately accomplish its mission of\n providing a fair and equitable temporary duty travel system for all DoD\n Components. DoD Instruction 5010.40 defines a control weakness as material\n when it impairs fulfillment of essential missions or operations.\n Recommendations 1., 2., and 3., if implemented, should correct the\n weaknesses. A copy of the report will be sent to the senior official in charge of\n management controls in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.\n 16\n\x0c Adequacy of Management\xe2\x80\x99s Self-Evaluation. The PMO identified acquisition\n management, DTS business process and procedures, security planning, and test\n planning as assessable units in its annual statement of assurance. Although\n officials from the PMO identified the above assessable units, they did not\n identify or report the management control weakness identified by the audit.\n\n\n\nPrior Coverage\n No prior coverage has been conducted on DoD efforts to reengineer temporary\n duty travel during the last 5 years.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\x0cAppendix B. Summary of Allegations\n The audit was conducted in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline.\n The following is a summary of the allegations and the specific results of each\n allegation.\n\n Allegation No. 1: The DTS Program experienced mismanagement related to\n meeting cost, scheduling, and performance requirements.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was not substantiated. The PMO was\n initially directed to manage the DTS Program as an acquisition of travel\n services. Although the PMO recognized extensive development was necessary to\n implement DTS, without redirection from the Under Secretary of Defense for\n Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense\n (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, they could not revise their approach and\n manage the program as an investment in information technology. This\n redirection was not forthcoming until January 2001.\n\n Allegation No. 2: The DTS deployment timeline originally developed was\n unrealistic.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was substantiated. The DTS contract\n originally required DTS to begin deployment within 120 days from the effective\n date of the contract (September 1998) and to complete deployment within\n 38 months. The implementation schedule of 120 days was not met because of\n increased development and unexpected testing delays. The PMO does not\n expect full deployment of the DTS to be completed until FY 2006.\n\n Allegation No. 3: DTS failed to achieve system functionality.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was substantiated. The PMO has not\n provided several critical DTS functions, including group travel, centrally billed\n accounts, and debt management. However, officials from the PMO stated that\n these functions were in development and they were planning to address each\n function in future DTS releases.\n\n Allegation No. 4: The primary contractor failed to deliver a help desk function.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was substantiated. As of April 2002, the\n contractor had not provided a comprehensive help desk. Although a help desk\n function was required in the initial contract, specific requirements, such as\n Government and contractor responsibilities, cost, and resources to be used, were\n not addressed. Officials from the PMO and the contractor stated that specific\n requirements were identified and expect an operational help desk function to be\n addressed in the restructured contract.\n\n Allegation No. 5: The PMO made payments for digital signature software that\n failed testing.\n\n\n 18\n\x0c Audit Results: The allegation was not substantiated. On June 9, 1999,\nthe PMO certified that 85 percent of the digital signature software had been\ndeveloped. On October 23, 2000, the digital signature software failed\noperational testing at Whiteman Air Force Base; however, the failure was the\nresult of user error and not a software glitch. On November 3, 2000, after\nminor modifications to the software, the contractor was paid for the remaining\n15 percent of development. Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.232.1,\n\xe2\x80\x9cPayment Clause,\xe2\x80\x9d July 11, 1997, allows the Government to pay a contractor\nthe price stipulated for supplies accepted or services rendered.\n\nAllegation No. 6: The selection of the primary contractor was fraudulent\nbecause of its inability to meet contractual requirements.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was not substantiated. Based on general\nrequirements submitted in the request for proposal, the contractor developed a\nproposal and was subsequently awarded the contract. Shortly after the contract\nwas awarded, the PMO and the contractor realized that significant modifications\nand extensive development were necessary to implement DTS.\n\nAllegation No. 7: A conflict of interest exists between the PMO and the DTS\ncontractors.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was not substantiated. Since the\nallegation was made in July 2000, the PMO has reorganized its management\nstructure. Normal changes in military assignments, DoD civilians leaving the\nPMO for different jobs, and retirement have resulted in new management at the\nPMO. Because former personnel from the PMO were not easily accessible and\nthe complainant was unable to provide further information, we were unable to\nascertain whether a conflict of interest existed.\n\nAllegation No. 8: The PMO paid an additional $7.5 million for commercial-\noff-the-shelf software (DTS-Limited) that included the same format as that used\nfor the full version of DTS.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was substantiated. The PMO provided\nDTS-Limited as a temporary travel system until the contractor could develop the\nfull version of DTS. DTS-Limited was added to the contract by modification\nP00007 on September 30, 1999. This modification required the contractor to\nprovide travel manager software, installation, and processing of 1 million\nvouchers for $6,808,833. In addition, the modification required a\n$650,000 annual maintenance fee. Although DTS-Limited provided DoD a\n\xe2\x80\x9cstopgap\xe2\x80\x9d travel system for sites that required an automated travel system, the\napproximate $7.5 million cost would not have been necessary had the full\nversion of DTS been deployed on schedule.\n\nAllegation No. 9: The roles and responsibilities for two support contractors\nwere unclear.\n\n Audit Results: The allegation was not substantiated. The support\ncontractor\xe2\x80\x99s statement of work provides specific work objectives that were\ndesigned to assist the PMO with program management and software\ndeployment.\n 19\n\x0cAppendix C. Key Program Events\n The following timeline depicts key events occurring from the time a need for\n reengineering DoD travel was identified to present.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\x0cAppendix D. Departmental Policies\n\n\nInformation Technology Guidance\n Office of Management and Budget Guidance. Office of Management and\n Budget Circular No. A-123, \xe2\x80\x9cManagement Accountability and Control,\xe2\x80\x9d\n June 21, 1995, and No. A-130, \xe2\x80\x9cManagement of Federal Information\n Resources,\xe2\x80\x9d February 8, 1996, establish policy governing the management of\n Federal programs, to include the requirements to design a management structure\n to ensure accountability for results.\n\n DoD Directive 8000.1. DoD Directive 8000.1, \xe2\x80\x9cDefense Information\n Management Program,\xe2\x80\x9d October 27, 1992, prescribes management principles\n required for all information management activities, including those related to the\n acquisition of information systems; infrastructures; and resources and services\n to be used for administrative and routine business applications. DoD policy\n requires that accurate and consistent information be made available to decision-\n makers to effectively execute DoD missions. DoD Directive 8000.1 also states\n that a disciplined life-cycle approach should be used to manage information\n systems from their inception through discontinuance. DoD information systems\n should be planned, developed, acquired, and implemented from a DoD-wide\n perspective to ensure consistency of information and processes in and across\n functional areas. Finally, development or modernization of information systems\n should be based on sound business principles by incorporating the evaluation of\n costs and benefits, to include the satisfaction of mission requirements and the\n consistency with life-cycle management policies and procedures.\n\n\n\nAcquisition Guidance\n DoD Directive 5000.1. DoD Directive 5000.1, \xe2\x80\x9cDefense Acquisition,\xe2\x80\x9d\n March 15, 1996 (revised January 4, 2001), describes broad management\n principles applicable to all DoD acquisition programs. The primary objective of\n the policy is to acquire quality products that satisfy the needs of the operational\n user with measurable improvements to mission accomplishment, in a timely\n manner, at a fair and reasonable price. Decision-makers and program managers\n are required to tailor acquisition strategies that:\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 are consistent with common sense;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 conform to sound business management practices;\n\n \xe2\x80\xa2 comply with applicable laws, Defense policies, and regulations;\n and\n\n\n 21\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 address the time-sensitive nature of the user\xe2\x80\x99s requirements to fit\n the particular program.\n\n The acquisition management guidelines in DoD Directive 5000.1 provide for a\n streamlined management structure and event-driven management process that\n emphasizes affordability and risk management that explicitly links milestone\n decisions to demonstrated accomplishments.\n\n DoD Instruction 5000.2. DoD Instruction 5000.2, \xe2\x80\x9cOperation of the Defense\n Acquisition System,\xe2\x80\x9d October 23, 2000 (revised January 4, 2001), implements\n DoD Directive 5000.1. DoD Instruction 5000.2 establishes a simplified and\n flexible management framework for translating mission needs into stable,\n affordable, and well-managed Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major\n Automated Information Systems. In addition, DoD Instruction 5000.2 is\n intended to be tailored to meet the needs of individual programs.\n DoD Regulation 5000.2-R. DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, \xe2\x80\x9cMandatory\n Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated\n Information System Acquisition Programs,\xe2\x80\x9d March 15, 1996 (revised June 10,\n 2001), requires all acquisition programs to establish program goals, thresholds,\n and objectives that identify the minimum cost, schedule, and performance\n parameters for a program throughout its life cycle.\n\n\n\nSecurity Guidance\n DoD Directive 5200.28. DoD Directive 5200.28, \xe2\x80\x9cSecurity Requirements for\n Automated Information Systems,\xe2\x80\x9d March 21, 1988, mandates, as a minimum,\n security procedures that require automated information systems to be accredited.\n A system is considered accredited when the Designated Approving Authority\n makes a formal declaration that a system is approved to operate in a particular\n security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable level of risk.\n It also mandates automated information systems to operate in accordance with\n security safeguards approved by the Designated Approving Authority.\n\n DoD Instruction 5200.40. DoD Instruction 5200.40, \xe2\x80\x9cDoD Information\n Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process,\xe2\x80\x9d December 30,\n 1997, implements DoD Directive 5200.28, assigns responsibility, and prescribes\n procedures for the certification and accreditation of information technology,\n including automated information systems, networks, and sites in DoD. DoD\n Instruction 5200.40 defines a process that standardizes all activities leading to a\n successful accreditation. In addition, DoD Instruction 5200.40 requires the\n program manager, in coordination with the Designated Approving Authority,\n the Certification Authority, and the system user representative, to develop a\n System Security Authorization Agreement for compiling system certification and\n accreditation documentation.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\x0cAppendix E. Report Distribution\n\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense\nUnder Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics\n Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness\nUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer\n Deputy Chief Financial Officer\n Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)\n Program Director, Program Management Office-Defense Travel System\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)\n Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programs)\n\nDepartment of the Army\nAuditor General, Department of the Army\nCommanding General, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command\n\nDepartment of the Navy\nNaval Inspector General\nAuditor General, Department of the Navy\n\nDepartment of the Air Force\nAssistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)\nAuditor General, Department of the Air Force\n\nUnified Commands\nCommander, U.S. European Command\nCommander, U.S. Pacific Command\nCommander, U.S. Joint Forces Command\nCommander, U.S. Southern Command\nCommander, U.S. Central Command\nCommander, U.S. Space Command\nCommander, U.S. Special Operations Command\nCommander, U.S. Transportation Command\n Commander, Military Traffic Management Command\nCommander, U.S. Strategic Command\n\nOther Defense Organization\nDirector, Defense Information Systems Agency\n\n\n 23\n\x0cNon-Defense Federal Organization\nOffice of Management and Budget\n\nCongressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and\n Ranking Minority Member\nSenate Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nSenate Committee on Armed Services\nSenate Committee on Governmental Affairs\nHouse Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations\nHouse Committee on Armed Services\nHouse Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International\n Relations, Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and\n Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform\nHouse Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, Committee on\n Government Reform\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\x0cUnder Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief\nFinancial Officer Comments\n Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 12\n\n\n\n\n 25\n\x0cFinal Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\nRevised\nPage 12\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\x0c27\n\x0c28\n\x0c29\n\x0c30\n\x0c31\n\x0c32\n\x0c33\n\x0c34\n\x0c35\n\x0c36\n\x0cDeputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics\nand Materiel Readiness Comments\n\n\n\n\n 37\n\x0cFinal Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\nRevised\nPage 12\n\n\n\n\n 38\n\x0c39\n\x0c40\n\x0cDeputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programs)\nComments\n Final Report\n Reference\n\n\n\n\n Revised\n Page 12\n\n\n\n\n 41\n\x0c42\n\x0cTeam Members\nThe Finance and Accounting Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for\nAuditing of the Department of Defense prepared this report. Personnel of the Office of\nthe Inspector General of the Department of Defense who contributed to the report are\nlisted below.\n\nPaul J. Granetto\nRichard B. Bird\nKathryn M. Truex\nJacqueline L. Wicecarver\nSean J. Keaney\nVelma E. White\nBrian L. Zimmerman\nTroy R. Zigler\nVansamai Seumsouk\nLisa C. Rose-Pressley\n\x0c'


text:
 12.10.2017
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 263/13
 SKLEP SKUPNEGA ODBORA EGP
 št. 302/2015
 z dne 11. decembra 2015
 o spremembi Priloge II (Tehnični predpisi, standardi, preskušanje in certificiranje) k Sporazumu EGP [2017/1813]
 SKUPNI ODBOR EGP JE –
 ob upoštevanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Sporazum EGP) in zlasti člena 98 Sporazuma EGP,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 (1)
 Izvedbeni sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1751 z dne 29. septembra 2015 o pogojih za izdajo dovoljenja za biocidni proizvod, ki vsebuje bromadiolon, ki jih je predložilo Združeno kraljestvo v skladu s členom 36 Uredbe (EU) št. 528/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (1) je treba vključiti v Sporazum EGP.
 (2)
 Prilogo II k Sporazumu EGP bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
 SPREJEL NASLEDNJI SKLEP:
 Člen 1
 Za točko 12nno (Izvedbeni sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1737) poglavja XV Priloge II k Sporazumu EGP se vstavi naslednja točka:
 „12nnp.
 32015 D 1751: Izvedbeni sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1751 z dne 29. septembra 2015 o pogojih za izdajo dovoljenja za biocidni proizvod, ki vsebuje bromadiolon, ki jih je predložilo Združeno kraljestvo v skladu s členom 36 Uredbe (EU) št. 528/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 256, 1.10.2015, str. 15).“
 Člen 2
 Besedilo Izvedbenega sklepa (EU) 2015/1751 v islandskem in norveškem jeziku, ki se objavi v Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije, je verodostojno.
 Člen 3
 Ta sklep začne veljati 12. decembra 2015 pod pogojem, da so bila predložena vsa uradna obvestila v skladu s členom 103(1) Sporazuma EGP (*1).
 Člen 4
 Ta sklep se objavi v sklopu EGP Uradnega lista Evropske unije in Dopolnilu EGP k Uradnemu listu Evropske unije.
 V Bruslju, 11. decembra 2015
 Za Skupni odbor EGP
 Predsednica
 Oda SLETNES
 (1) UL L 256, 1.10.2015, str. 15.
 (*1) Navedena ni nobena ustavna zahteva.


type: wikipedia

text:
Fräulein - Una fiaba d'inverno è un film commedia del 2016 diretto da Caterina Carone con Lucia Mascino e Christian De Sica
 Trama
 Regina è proprietaria di un albergo ormai chiuso da anni in un villaggio delle Dolomiti. A quarantun'anni, senza marito né figli, acida e sarcastica, Regina è proprio quel che si dice una Fräulein. Nulla sembra cambiare nelle monotone giornate di Regina, passate ad assistere anziani, giocare a scala quaranta con le amiche, Hanna e Nina, e prendersi cura della sua gallina bianca Marilyn, finché un giorno, dopo l'annuncio radio dell'arrivo di una imponente tempesta solare, un misterioso turista sui sessanta, di nome Walter Bonelli, uomo smarrito e infantile, piomba nella sua vita con la pretesa di soggiornare nell'albergo.
 Mentre in paese la tempesta solare inizia ad avere i suoi primi effetti, tra blackout e una crescente sensazione di precarietà tra la gente, l'arrivo del turista nella vita di Regina scatena una tempesta ben più profonda, capace di cambiare radicalmente la sua vita.
 Produzione
 Il film è stato girato quasi interamente sull'altopiano del Renon, in Trentino-Alto Adige, tra gennaio e marzo del 2015.
 Distribuzione
 Il film è stato presentato in anteprima il 13 aprile 2016, in occasione della serata di inaugurazione della 30a edizione del Bolzano Film Festival. La pellicola è stata poi distribuita nelle sale cinematografiche da Videa a partire dal 26 maggio 2016.
 Note
 Collegamenti esterni
 Film girati in Trentino-Alto Adige
 Film commedia