text:
Up-898/05
 ECLI:SI:USRS:2006:Up.898.05
 Ustavna pritožba zoper sklep Vrhovnega sodišča št. I Up 508/2005 z dne 29. 6. 2005 v zvezi s sklepom Upravnega sodišča, Oddelka v Mariboru, št. U 492/2004 z dne 11. 3. 2005
 Ustavna pritožba zoper sklep Vrhovnega sodišča št. I Up 508/2005 z dne 29. 6. 2005 v zvezi s sklepom Upravnega sodišča, Oddelka v Mariboru, št. U 492/2004 z dne 11. 3. 2005 se ne sprejme.
 Upravnemu sodišču, ki je zavrglo tožbo, ker je glede na podatke v upravnem spisu o vročitvi drugostopne upravne odločbe in glede na datum vložitve tožbe, očitno pretekel zakonski rok za vložitev tožbe, ni mogoče očitati kršitve 22. in četrtega odstavka 15. člena Ustave.
 Up-898-05.pdf
 Up-898/05-7
 Ustavno sodišče je v postopku za preizkus ustavne pritožbe A. A. iz Ž. na seji senata dne 20. junija 2006 in v postopku po četrtem odstavku 55. člena Zakona o Ustavnem sodišču (Uradni list RS, št. 15/94)
 1. Upravno sodišče je s sklepom, navedenim v izreku, zavrglo tožbo pritožnika zoper odločbo Ministrstva za okolje, prostor in energijo (v nadaljevanju MOPE) št. 363-01-15/2004[1] z dne 20. 10. 2004, s katero je to odpravilo delno odločbo Upravne enote Maribor št. 363-05-5/93- 343 z dne 26. 2. 2004. Upravna enota je z navedeno delno odločbo denacionalizacijskim upravičencem vrnila del podržavljenega premoženja v obliki odškodnine v obveznicah Slovenske odškodninske družbe, del denacionalizacijskega zahtevka pa je bil zavrnjen. Upravno sodišče je tožbo zavrglo, ker je štelo, da je bila vložena prepozno. Pri tem je navedlo, da iz upravnega spisa izhaja, da je bila odločba upravnega organa druge stopnje pritožniku vročena dne 30. 10. 2004, tožba pa je bila oddana priporočeno na pošto dne 3. 12. 2004, torej po izteku zakonskega roka. Vrhovno sodišče je zavrnilo pritožbo pritožnika zoper tako odločitev Upravnega sodišča in potrdilo sklep nižjega sodišča o zavrženju tožbe. Strinjalo se je z ugotovitvijo Upravnega sodišča o tem, kdaj je bila pritožniku vročena odločba, ki jo je izpodbijal v upravnem sporu. Navedlo je tudi, da pritožnik niti ni ugovarjal, da te odločbe ni prejel dne 30. 10. 2004.
 2. Pritožnik v ustavni pritožbi zatrjuje, da je navedeno odločbo upravnega organa druge stopnje prejel dne 3. 11. 2004, zaradi česar naj bi bila tožba, oddana na pošto dne 3. 12. 2004 pravočasna, in bi jo sodišče moralo obravnavati vsebinsko. Pri zatrjevanju pravočasne vložitve tožbe se sklicuje na vročilnico, ki naj bi dokazovala, da je odločbo upravnega organa druge stopnje prevzel na sedežu Upravne enote dne 3. 11. 2004. Sodiščema očita kršitev 22. člena in četrtega odstavka 15. člena Ustave. Pri zatrjevanju kršitve 22. člena Ustave še navaja, da ga Upravno sodišče ni seznanilo, da bo o pritožbi odločalo Vrhovno sodišče. Temu pa očita tudi, da sklep ne vsebuje pravnega pouka o vložitvi ustavne pritožbe.
 3. Odločitev Upravnega sodišča, da zavrže tožbo pritožnika, je odločitev procesnopravne narave. Pravilnosti take odločitve Ustavno sodišče praviloma ne preizkuša. Z vidika zatrjevane kršitve pravice do enakega varstva pravic (22. člen Ustave) bi odločitev o zavrženju tožbe lahko pomenila kršitev Ustave takrat, kadar bi bila tako očitno napačna, da bi ji lahko očitali samovoljnost. V pritožnikovem primeru bi tak očitek lahko bil podan, če Upravno sodišče za zavrženje tožbe v podatkih v spisu ne bi imelo podlage ter če svoje odločitve ne bi pojasnilo. Smiselno enako velja za odločitev Vrhovnega sodišča.
 4. Ustavno sodišče je pridobilo spis zadeve, v kateri sta bila izdana izpodbijana sklepa. Na hrbtni strani odločbe MOPE št. 363-01-15/2004 z dne 20. 10. 2004, ki se nanaša na delno določbo Upravne enote Maribor št. 363-05-5/93-343 z dne 26. 2. 2004 (in je shranjena pod oznako "sod21"), ni vročilnice s podpisom pritožnika z datumom 3. 11. 2004. Na hrbtni strani te odločbe drugostopnega upravnega organa sta prilepljeni vročilnici s podpisom osebe iz Slovenske odškodninske družbe (z datumom 2. 11. 2004) in pritožnika z datumom 30. 10. 2004. Vročilnica s podpisom pritožnika z datumom 3. 11. 2004 je prilepljena na odločbi MOPE št. 363-01-15/2004 (shranjeni pod oznako "sod19") z dne 20. 10. 2004, ki se nanaša na dopolnilno odločbo Upravne enote Maribor št. 36305-5/93-343 z dne 26. 7. 2004.
 5. Tožba, o kateri je odločalo Upravno sodišče, je bila oddana na pošto s priporočeno pošiljko 3. 12. 2004. Ob upoštevanju tega datuma (ki ni sporen) in glede na prej navedeni podatek o datumu vročitve izpodbijane odločbe drugostopnega upravnega organa (30. 10. 2004) je torej sodišče, glede na zakonski rok za vložitev tožbe, imelo podlago za svojo odločitev. Pritožniku pa je tudi pojasnilo, da je treba tožbo, ki je bila vložena po preteku 30 dnevnega roka, zavreči. Enaka pojasnila pa je dalo tudi Vrhovno sodišče. Tako se izkaže pritožnikov očitek o kršitvi 22. člena Ustave kot neutemeljen. Ker je bila tožba zavržena zaradi procesnih razlogov, tudi ni moglo priti do kršitve četrtega odstavka 15. člena Ustave, ki zagotavlja varstvo človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin pri vsebinski obravnavi uporabljenih pravnih sredstev.
 6. Ker očitno ne gre za kršitev človekovih pravic, kot jih zatrjuje pritožnik, Ustavno sodišče njegove pritožbe ni sprejelo v obravnavo.
 7. Senat Ustavnega sodišča je sprejel ta sklep na podlagi prve alineje drugega odstavka 55. člena Zakona o Ustavnem sodišču (v nadaljevanju ZUstS) in tretje alineje tretjega odstavka 46. člena Poslovnika Ustavnega sodišča (Uradni list RS, št. 93/03 in 98/03 – popr.) v sestavi: predsednica senata Milojka Modrijan ter člana dr. Janez Čebulj in Lojze Janko. Sklep je sprejelo soglasno. Ker senat ustavne pritožbe ni sprejel, je bila zadeva v skladu z določbo četrtega odstavka 55. člena ZUstS predložena drugim sodnicam in sodnikom Ustavnega sodišča. Ker se za sprejem niso izrekli trije od njih, ustavna pritožba ni bila sprejeta v obravnavo.
 [1]Odločba je shranjena z oznako "sod21".
 US26270


type: wikipedia

text:
José Júlio Marques Leitão de Barros GOC • ComSE (Lisboa, Santa Isabel, – Lisboa, São Mamede, ) foi um professor, cineasta, jornalista, dramaturgo e pintor português, que se distingue dos da sua geração pelo sentido estético das suas obras e por antecipar, sem bases teóricas, todo um movimento cinematográfico que se dedicou à prática da antropologia visual. É o autor da primeira docuficção portuguesa e segunda etnoficção mundial na história do cinema (Maria do Mar, 1930), tendo sido Moana (1926), de Robert Flaherty, a primeira.
 Biografia
 Filho de Joaquim José de Barros, militar, primeiro-tenente da Armada, do Porto, e de sua mulher D. Júlia Amélia Marques Leitão, de Lisboa. O seu irmão Carlos Joaquim Marques Leitão de Barros foi também tenente, Cavaleiro e Oficial da Ordem Militar de Avis e Oficial da Ordem de Benemerência, e a sua irmã Teresa Emília Marques Leitão de Barros foi Dama da Ordem Militar de Sant’Iago da Espada.
 Frequentou a Faculdade de Ciências e também a Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Depois de concluir um curso da Escola Normal Superior de Lisboa, foi professor do ensino secundário (desenho, matemática). Tirou também o curso de arquitectura na Escola de Belas-Artes. Expôs várias obras de pintura em museus portugueses, em Espanha, no Museu de Arte Contemporânea de Madrid e ainda no Brasil.
 Casou em Oeiras, a 17 de Agosto de 1923, com Helena Roque Gameiro, artista plástica e filha do aguarelista Alfredo Roque Gameiro, com quem teve dois filhos, José Manuel e Maria Helena.
 Dramaturgo, peças suas subiram à cena em Lisboa, no Teatro Nacional e noutras salas. Cenógrafo, responsabilizou-se pela montagem de muitas peças. Jornalista, dirigiu a revista Notícias Ilustrado (1928-1935) e colaborou, por exemplo, nos jornais O Século, A Capital, e ABC, na revista Contemporânea (1915-1926). Fundou e dirigiu O Domingo Ilustrado (1925-1927), e Século Ilustrado. O seu nome consta da lista de colaboradores da revista de cinema Movimento (1933-1934) e também no Boletim do Sindicato Nacional dos Jornalistas (1941-1945). Foi o principal animador da construção dos estúdios da Tobis Portuguesa, concluídos em 1933 em conjunto com a qual realizou mais tarde, em 1966, o filme "A Ponte Salazar sobre o Rio Tejo em Portugal".
 Celebrizado pela sua carreira cinematográfica, Leitão de Barros deixou também marcas duradouras no jornalismo português. Em 1938, foi protagonista de uma longa entrevista à rainha Dona Amélia em Paris, publicada nas páginas de "O Século" e "O Século Ilustrado". A peça terá sido um instrumento de propaganda para aproximar a rainha viúva do Estado Novo e a monarca aproveitou a oportunidade para gabar algumas das obras do salazarismo. Anos antes, em 1932, quando ainda trabalhava no "Notícias Ilustrado", Leitão de Barros protagonizou outro caso célebre, dando cobertura à alegação infantil de que um sósia de António Oliveira Salazar estava representado nos Painéis de São Vicente. A informação foi relatada entusiasticamente pelo suplemento do Diário de Notícias, conferindo uma aura providencial ao ditador. Organizou, a partir de 1934, vários cortejos históricos e marchas populares das Festas da Cidade, actividade que regularmente manteve durante a década seguinte. Foi secretário-geral da Exposição do Mundo Português e responsável pela organização da ‘’Feira Popular’’ de Lisboa (1943). Foi director da Sociedade Nacional de Belas-Artes.
 Interessou-se entretanto pelo cinema: Malmequer e Mal de Espanha (1918) foram os seus primeiros filmes. Neles se salientam duas tendências: a evocação histórica dos temas e a crónica anedótica. Assimilou, por influência de Rino Lupo, o conceito de filme pictórico, desenvolvido por Louis Feuillade, o do Film Esthétique, e depois algumas das ideias formais do cinema soviético teorizadas por Eisenstein.
 Com o documentário Nazaré (1927), retomando um tema já explorado pelo francês Roger Lion em 1923, registou aspectos de rude beleza plástica e de aguda observação humana, tal como no filme Lisboa, Crónica Anedótica de uma Capital (1930), em que misturou actores conhecidos com a gente da rua, antecipando assim tendências modernas. No mesmo ano, rodou ainda na Nazaré a Maria do Mar. Depois filmou A Severa (1931), o primeiro filme sonoro português. Ala Arriba! (1942), escrito por Alfredo Cortês, apresentava os pescadores da Póvoa de Varzim com uma força dramática pouco vulgares. A Bienal de Veneza deu-lhe um dos seus prémios. Seria, a partir dos anos sessenta, um dos cineastas preferidos do regime. Publicou também Elementos de História de Arte e, em livro, Os Corvos (crónicas publicadas no jornal Diário de Notícias).
 A 4 de Setembro de 1935 foi feito Comendador da Ordem Militar de Sant'Iago da Espada e a 4 de Março de 1941 foi feito Grande-Oficial da Ordem Militar de Cristo.
 Uma vasta obra e fervilhantes décadas de produção marcaram a vida deste homem, desde a aquarela ao cinema, passando pelo ensino e arquitectura. Aos 70 anos, viria a falecer de um tumor retroperitoneal, na sempre sua cidade, em 1967, estando sepultado no Cemitério dos Prazeres.
 Filmografia
 Mal de Espanha (1918)
 O Homem dos Olhos Tortos (1918) (inacabado)
 Malmequer (1918)
 Sidónio Pais - Proclamação do Presidente da República (1918) (esta obra não sobreviveu)
 Nazaré, Praia de Pescadores (1929) (perdeu-se a 2a parte do filme)
 Festas da Curia (1927)
 Lisboa (1930)
 Maria do Mar (1930)
 A Severa (1931)
 As Pupilas do Senhor Reitor (1935)
 Bocage (1936)
 Las Tres Gracias (1936)
 Maria Papoila (1937)
 Legião Portuguesa (1937)
 Mocidade Portuguesa (1937)
 Varanda dos Rouxinóis (1939)
 A Pesca do Atum (1939)
 Ala-Arriba! (1942)
 A Póvoa de Varzim (1942)
 Inês de Castro (1944)
 Camões (1946) realizador
 Vendaval Maravilhoso (1949) realizador, co-autor
 Comemorações Henriquinas (1960)
 A Ponte da Arrábida Sobre o Rio Douro (1961)
 Escolas de Portugal (1962)
 A Ponte Salazar Sobre o Rio Tejo (1966)
 Ver também
 Cinema de Portugal
 Bibliografia
 Corvos, ilustrações de João Abel Manta, Lisboa, Emp. Nac. de Publicidade, 1960, p. 276.
 Enciclopédia Luso-Brasileira de Cultura (20 volumes) - secretariado por MAGALHÃES, António Pereira; OLIVEIRA, Manuel Alves, 1a ed., Lisboa, editorial Verbo, vol.3, 1973, p. 729.
 `Leitão de Barros A Biografia Roubada, por Joana leitão de Barros e Ana Mantero,Bizâncio, 2019
 Ligações externas
 Leitão de Barros em Cinema Português do Centro Virtual Camões.
 Leitão de Barros no Centro de Língua Portuguesa da Universidade de Hamburgo.
 do Futuro: Leitão de Barros, por João Marchante, na Alameda Digital.
 Leitão de Barros, O Renascentista que viveu no séc. XX e foi esquecido pelas voltas de História, por José Couto Nogueira e Pedro Marques dos Santos, Sapo, 21 dez 2019
 Biografia de Leitão de Barros revela cineasta “desajeitado nos corredores do poder”, Expresso, 13.09.2019
 Naturais de Lisboa
 Professores de Portugal
 Cineastas de Portugal
 Jornalistas de Portugal
 Dramaturgos de Portugal
 Pintores de Portugal
 Comendadores da Ordem Militar de Sant'Iago da Espada
 Grandes-Oficiais da Ordem Militar de Cristo
 Personalidades LGBT de Portugal


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 24.1.2013
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 L 21/48
 ROZHODNUTIE SPOLOČNÉHO VÝBORU EHP
 č. 198/2012
 z 26. októbra 2012,
 ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa príloha II (Technické predpisy, normy, skúšky a certifikácia) k Dohode o EHP
 SPOLOČNÝ VÝBOR EHP,
 so zreteľom na Dohodu o Európskom hospodárskom priestore (ďalej len „Dohoda o EHP“), a najmä na jej článok 98,
 keďže:
 (1)
 Nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 207/2012 z 9. marca 2012 o elektronických pokynoch na používanie zdravotníckych pomôcok (1), sa má začleniť do Dohody o EHP.
 (2)
 Príloha II k Dohode o EHP by sa preto mala zodpovedajúcim spôsobom zmeniť a doplniť,
 PRIJAL TOTO ROZHODNUTIE:
 Článok 1
 Za bod 8 (rozhodnutie Komisie 2010/227/EÚ) kapitoly XXX prílohy II k Dohode o EHP sa vkladá tento bod:
 „9.
 32012 R 0207: nariadenie Komisie (EÚ) č. 207/2012 z 9. marca 2012 o elektronických pokynoch na používanie zdravotníckych pomôcok (Ú. v. EÚ L 72, 10.3.2012, s. 28).“
 Článok 2
 Znenie nariadenia (EÚ) č. 207/2011 v islandskom a nórskom jazyku, ktoré sa uverejní v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie, je autentické.
 Článok 3
 Toto rozhodnutie nadobúda účinnosť 1. novembra 2012 pod podmienkou, že Spoločnému výboru EHP boli doručené všetky oznámenia podľa článku 103 ods. 1 Dohody o EHP (2).
 Článok 4
 Toto rozhodnutie sa uverejní v oddiele EHP Úradného vestníka Európskej únie a v dodatku EHP k Úradnému vestníku Európskej únie.
 V Bruseli 26. októbra 2012
 Za Spoločný výbor EHP
 predseda
 Atle LEIKVOLL
 (1) Ú. v. EÚ L 72, 10.3.2012, s. 28.
 (2) Ústavnoprávne požiadavky neboli oznámené.


type: other

jurisdiction: US

text: b' SIGAR Special Inspector General for\n Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n\n SIGAR Audit 13-4\n\n\n AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY: CONTROLS OVER\n FUEL FOR VEHICLES, GENERATORS, AND\n POWER PLANTS NEED STRENGTHENING TO\n PREVENT FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE\n\n\n\n\n J A NU A RY\n 2013\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability\n\x0cSIGAR\n January 2013\n AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY: CONTROLS OVER FUEL FOR VEHICLES,\n GENERATORS, AND POWER PLANTS NEED STRENGTHENING TO\n PREVENT FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE\n\n\nSpecial Inspector General for SIGAR AUDIT 13-4\n\nAfghanistan Reconstruction\nWHAT SIGAR REVIEWED WHAT SIGAR FOUND\nSince 2005, Congress has appropriated CSTC-A lacked sufficient accountability in the process\nmore than $50 billion to train, equip, and used to order, receive, and pay for POL for ANA vehicles,\nsustain the Afghan National Security Forces generators, and power plants. This lack of\n(ANSF), which include the Afghan National accountability increases the risk that U.S. funds and\nArmy (ANA) and Afghan National Police. The fuel will be stolen. Specifically, SIGAR found that\nNATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A records relating to fuel purchases paid\nCombined Security Transition Command-\n for between March 2010 to February 2011 were\nAfghanistan (CSTC-A) has primary\n missing;\nresponsibility for purchasing ANA\xe2\x80\x99s\npetroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s data on fuel purchases covering the\nworks with top-level (above-Corp) ANA and period March 2011 to March 2012, was\nMinistry of Defense (MOD) officials. The inaccurate and incomplete; and\nInternational Security Assistance Force Joint \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A could not account for fuel that was\nCommand provides oversight and spilled or lost.\nassistance to operational and tactical\n In addition, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s processes for price approval,\ncommands. The MOD is responsible for\n ordering, receipt, delivery and payment of fuel were\nrequesting, distributing and accounting for\n beset by major vulnerabilities. For example:\nANA fuel.\nThis report assesses (1) internal controls to \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A approved payments for fuel without\naccount for ANA POL and prevent fraud, verifying vendors\xe2\x80\x99 statements that they had\nwaste, and abuse; (2) whether funding made deliveries in full and of acceptable quality.\nrequests for ANA POL were based on \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A fuel orders were not based on required\naccurate data; and (3) CSTC- A\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to\nensure the MOD has sufficient capacity to\nmanage the purchase, delivery, storage,\nand consumption of ANA POL following the\ndrawdown of U.S. and coalition forces by\nthe end of 2014. SIGAR obtained data and\nmet with officials from the International\nSecurity Assistance Force, CSTC-A, Task\nForce 2010, the Department of Defense\nInspector General, U.S. Army Audit Agency,\nand the Defense Logistics Agency. This\nreport builds on a September 2012 interim\nreport and alert letter. SIGAR conducted\nthis work in Kabul, Afghanistan from\nFebruary 2012 to January 2013 in\naccordance with generally accepted\ngovernment auditing standards.\n\n ANA 2,700 liter (700 gallons) fuel truck at Pol-e-Charkhi on May 23,\n 2012.\n\n\n For more information contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.\n\x0c consumption data and, for power\n Estimated Current and Anticipated Annual\n plants, the fuel orders did not follow\n ANA POL Funding Requirements\n the authorized process.\n (in million USD)\nSecond, SIGAR found that CSTC-A based its\nestimates for funding on unsupported data,\nwhich potentially overstates actual\nrequirements. The approximately $2.8\nbillion that CSTC-A estimates will be\nnecessary to fund purchases of ANA POL\nbetween fiscal years 2014 and 2018 are\nbased on questionable calculations. In\naddition, SIGAR estimates that CSTC-A\nshould have more than $266 million of\nfiscal year 2012 funds still available to\npurchase fuel in fiscal year 2013.\nLastly, despite concerns about ANA\xe2\x80\x99s\ncapacity to purchase fuel, CSTC-A plans to\ndirectly contribute more than $1 billion in\nU.S. funds to the Afghan government to\npurchase ANA fuel over the next 6 years.\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s assessments of MOD\xe2\x80\x99s capacity,\ncoupled with SIGAR and the Army Audit\nAgency reports, have questioned whether\nMOD can adequately serve as a steward of\npublic resources.\n\n\n\n Source: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund enacted\n amount for fiscal year 2012, CSTC-A request for fiscal\n year 2013, and CSTC-A estimates for fiscal years 2014.\n\n\n\n\n WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS\n SIGAR makes six recommendations to the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A. Specifically,\n SIGAR recommends three actions to improve accountability of U.S. funds and\n purchased fuel through full compliance with required MOD logistics processes; two\n actions to develop more realistic fuel budget requests and future year funding\n estimates, with the potential for realizing substantial savings immediately and in the\n future; and one action to assure proper stewardship and transparency of U.S. funds\n and fuel purchases when fuel management responsibility is transferred to the MOD.\n CSTC-A generally concurred with the recommendations and provided comments,\n which are reproduced in this report.\n\n\n\n\nFor more information contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.\n\x0cJanuary 24, 2013\n\n\nThe Honorable Leon E. Panetta\nSecretary of Defense\n\nGeneral James N. Mattis\nCommander, U.S. Central Command\n\nGeneral John R. Allen\nCommander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and\n Commander, International Security Assistance Force\n\nLieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger\nCommanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/\n Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\n\n\nThis report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan\nReconstruction\xe2\x80\x99s (SIGAR) audit of the Afghan National Army\xe2\x80\x99s (ANA) logistics capability for\npetroleum, oil, and lubricants. This report also expands on the issues discussed in our interim\nreport (SIGAR 12-14) and alert letter (SIGAR Alert Letter 12-2), issued September 10, 2012.\nThis report includes six recommendations to the Commanding General, CSTC-A, designed to\nimprove the fuel purchasing process.\nWhen preparing the final report, we considered comments from CSTC-A, which are reproduced\nin appendix III along with SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s responses to them. CSTC-A and U.S. Army Central generally\nconcurred with all six recommendations. SIGAR conducted this audit under the authority of\nPublic Law No. 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector\nGeneral Reform Act of 2008 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing\nstandards.\n\n\n\n\nJohn F. Sopko\nSpecial Inspector General\n for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\x0c TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nBackground ........................................................................................................................................................... 3\n\nWeaknesses in ANA Fuel Ordering, Delivery, and Payment Processes Increase Risk of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse\n ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s Estimates For Funding Are Based on Unsupported Data and Potentially Overstated ......................... 11\nDespite Concerns about ANA\xe2\x80\x99s Capacity to Purchase Fuel, CSTC-A Intends to Provide the Afghan Government\n with $1 Billion in Direct Funding ................................................................................................................ 12\nConclusion.......................................................................................................................................................... 13\nRecommendations ............................................................................................................................................. 13\nAgency Comments .............................................................................................................................................. 14\nAppendix I - Scope and Methodology.................................................................................................................. 15\nAppendix II - Additional Audit Information........................................................................................................... 17\nAppendix III - Comments from the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan ................................. 20\nAppendix IV - Comments from U.S. Army Central................................................................................................ 29\nAppendix V - Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... 31\n\n\nTABLES\n\nTable 1 - SIGAR Summary of Reported Potential Fuel Theft Incidents .................................................................. 8\nTable I - Results of Internal Control Tests ........................................................................................................... 17\nTable II - Summary of Annual Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ANA Fuel Budget and Financial Data for Fiscal\n Years 2007-2018 (in millions) ................................................................................................................... 19\n\n\nFIGURES\n\nFigure 1 - Annual Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and Other Funding for ANA POL (in million USD) ................. 4\nFigure 2 - Percentage of Requested Documents Provided for 150 Fuel Orders between March 2011 and March\n 2012, by Form............................................................................................................................................... 6\nFigure 3 - Example of One Vendor\xe2\x80\x99s Average Fuel Price for April 2012 ................................................................. 9\nFigure 4 - ANA Fuel Ordering Process ................................................................................................................. 10\nFigure I - Timeline of ANA Fuel Documentation and Key Audit Events................................................................ 18\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page i\n\x0cABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS\n\n ANA Afghan National Army\n ANSF Afghan National Security Forces\n CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\n\n DOD Department of Defense\n MMC-A Material Management Center-Army\n MOD Ministry of Defense\n\n POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants\n SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page ii\n\x0cThe Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)1 is responsible for equipping and training\nthe Afghan National Army (ANA) through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This fund was created by\nCongress to provide the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with equipment, supplies, services, and\ntraining, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General reported significant concerns with the logistical readiness\nof the ANA, and other U.S. government audits and investigative units have cited significant concerns with the\npurchase of fuel for ANSF and Coalition Forces across Afghanistan. Specifically, in December 2011, the DOD\nInspector General assessed that U.S. and coalition efforts to develop sustainable ANA logistics had been\ndeficient in several areas including, among other things, fuel accountability and management internal\ncontrols. 2\nIn September 2012, SIGAR issued an interim report on ANA petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) that addressed\nconcerns on the impending transition of fuel responsibilities and funds to the Afghan government beginning\nJanuary 1, 2013. 3 Specifically, we found that\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A does not have a valid method to estimate fuel requirements, and proposed ANA POL funding\n amounts are not supported by a systematic process to determine actual fuel needs; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A has not addressed compliance and accountability challenges within the entire ANA fuel\n process.\nAlso in September 2012, we issued an alert letter addressing the possible destruction of financial documents\nfrom ANA POL purchases. 4 The letter discussed the alleged shredding of ANA POL payment records totaling\nnearly $475 million from October 2006 to February 2011. Subsequently, CSTC-A officials stated that a\nportion of these payment records\xe2\x80\x94dating from March 2010 through February 2011\xe2\x80\x94were actually converted\nto electronic media but, as of December 2012, CSTC-A had not located the electronic copies. We also\nconducted a separate investigation into the alleged document shredding and confirmed that two CSTC-A fuel\nordering officers had shredded fuel records for the period of March 2010 through February 2011, citing\nefficiency and saving physical storage space as factors in deciding to scan and shred the documents. Although\nwe found no evidence of criminal activity, we noted that the failure to retain these records violated certain\nfederal regulations and DOD orders. 5\nThis audit, which builds on our earlier interim report and alert letter, assesses U.S. efforts to develop ANA\xe2\x80\x99s\ncapability to acquire, distribute, and account for POL supplies to its forces. Specifically, this audit assesses\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the internal controls in place to provide accountability for ANA POL and to prevent fraud, waste, and\n abuse;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 the extent to which CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s funding requests for ANA POL are based on accurate requirements data;\n and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to ensure the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) has sufficient capacity to manage the\n purchase, delivery, storage, and consumption of ANA POL following the drawdown of U.S. and coalition\n forces by the end of 2014.\n\n\n\n1 CSTC-A is a joint command with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. Because CSTC-A distributes and manages all\nU.S. funding to support the ANSF, this report refers to CSTC-A.\n2 DOD IG Special Plans and Operations: Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics\nSustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army, dated December 9, 2011 (Report No. DODIG-2012-028).\n3 Interim Report on Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants, dated September 10, 2012 (SIGAR 12-14).\n\n4 \xe2\x80\x9cDestruction of Operation Enduring Freedom Financial Documents Related to ANA POL Audit,\xe2\x80\x9d dated September 10, 2012\n(SIGAR Alert Letter 12-2).\n5 Afghan National Army: $201 Million in DOD Fuel Purchases Still Unaccounted For because Records Were Shredded,\nDecember 20, 2012 (SIGAR Investigative Report 13-1).\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 2\n\x0cTo accomplish our objectives, we reviewed relevant MOD guidance and financial and fuel-related\ndocumentation and interviewed officials at the International Security Assistance Force, CSTC-A, DOD Inspector\nGeneral, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and Task Force 2010. 6 We reviewed a sample of\nANA paid fuel orders for the 13-month period from March 2011 to March 2012. We conducted our work in\nKabul, Afghanistan from February to December 2012, in accordance with generally accepted government\nauditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is in appendix I.\n\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nSince 2005, Congress has appropriated almost $50.7 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to train,\nequip and sustain the ANSF, which include the ANA and the Afghan National Police. The appropriation includes\nfunding for diesel, aviation, and packaged fuels, which CSTC-A purchases for the ANA.\nSince 2007, CSTC-A has established and managed 10 blanket purchase agreements with vendors to provide\nfuel. In April 2012, CSTC-A noted that vendors delivered fuel to 754 ANSF fuel locations throughout\nAfghanistan, of which 254 were ANA facilities, including: two national depots in Kabul, six Regional Logistic\nSupport Centers, and 26 power plants. Once vendors deliver CSTC-A-ordered fuel, the ANA is responsible for\nthe allocation, storage, and consumption of all fuel intended for vehicles, generators, and power plants. CSTC-\nA and the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command provide limited oversight and accountability\nof fuel. CSTC-A works with ANA national and regional (above-Corps) levels and the Joint Command with Corps\nand below-Corps ANA units; the Joint Command also provides oversight and assistance to operational and\ntactical commands. Although CSTC-A manages blanket purchase agreements, Kabul Regional Contracting\nCenter\xe2\x80\x95within CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command\xe2\x80\x95approves and issues the agreements.\nIn April 2009, CSTC-A created a checkbook\xe2\x80\x95in Microsoft Access\xe2\x80\x95to record details of fuel orders received from\nANA units and power plants. Checkbook entries by fuel ordering officers include delivery location, order\nnumber, point of contact, type of fuel, invoice number, and other detailed information related to each order\nreceived. CSTC-A stated the fiscal year 2013 budget request and its estimates for fiscal years 2014-2018 are\nbased on the prior years\xe2\x80\x99 fuel orders in the checkbook.\n\nFunding for the Afghan National Army\xe2\x80\x99s Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants\n\nCongress authorizes CSTC-A to use a portion of Afghanistan Security Forces Funds for the purchase of fuel for\nANA vehicles, generators, and power plants. During fiscal years 2007 through 2012, DOD received more than\n$1.1 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund assistance for POL, including $429 million in fiscal year 2012\nalone. For fiscal year 2013, DOD has requested $343 million to fund ANA POL, with$123 million (for jet fuel\nand kerosene) expected to be provided by international donors. 7\nFor fiscal years 2014 through 2018, CSTC-A proposes to increase the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund portion\nof the ANA POL budget to $555 million. Starting in 2013, CSTC-A plans to provide one-third of this funding\ndirectly to the Afghan government for it to purchase POL for the ANA itself. 8 Figure 1 provides a breakdown of\n\n\n\n6Task Force 2010 provides commanders and acquisition teams with situational understanding regarding the flow of\ncontract funds and property losses and recommends actions to deny power brokers, criminal networks, and insurgents the\nopportunity to benefit from the stolen property or illicit revenue.\n7 DOD funded jet fuel and kerosene at $123 million for fiscal year 2012.\n8 On June 13, 2012, CSTC-A introduced its plan to begin directing two-thirds of its funding from the Afghanistan Security\nForces Fund to the Afghan government starting January 1, 2013. However, at the initial Bulk Fuel Transition Executive\nCommittee meeting on September 12, 2012, CSTC-A proposed a change in direct contributions. Instead of providing two-\nthirds of the funds directly to the Afghan government, only one-third will initially be provided in direct funding with a\nproposed earliest starting date of March 2013.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 3\n\x0cannual ANA POL amounts received between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, requested for fiscal year 2013, and\nestimated for fiscal years 2014-2018.\n\n\n\nFigure 1 - Annual Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and Other Funding for ANA POL (in million USD)\n\n\n\n\nSource: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund section of annual Army fiscal year budget justifications, with enacted amounts\nthrough fiscal year 2012, requested for fiscal year 2013, and estimated for fiscal years 2014-18.\n\n\nMinistry of Defense Logistics and Fuel Decrees\n\nMOD issued decrees on procedures for ANA logistical operations, including POL. Additionally, the MOD Tashkil\nis the master ANA document listing authorized numbers of ANA personnel and equipment in military units\nthroughout Afghanistan. MOD decrees serve as the basis for logistics regulations in Afghanistan and regulate\npolicy and support procedures, materiel accountability, and POL management. The required processes and\nforms specified in MOD Decree 4.6 are intended to maintain accurate records of fuel orders, issues and\nreceipts throughout the POL procurement process. The MOD has issued three decrees that specify policies,\nprocedures, and forms to be used for ANA POL logistics operations:\nDecree 4.0, Supported and Supporting Unit Logistics Policy and Support Procedures establishes ANA logistics\nprocedures, formats, and forms to be used.\nDecree 4.2, Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures outlines accountability policies and procedures for\nall categories of materiel, equipment and supplies, and real property.\nDecree 4.6, ANA POL Section Organization, Responsibilities, and Procedure describes the organization,\nresponsibilities, and procedures for ANA POL activities. Four of the key MOD forms required by this decree are\nlisted below:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 MOD Form 14\xe2\x80\x95Materiel Request Form (used to request fuel);\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 4\n\x0c \xe2\x80\xa2 MOD Form 8\xe2\x80\x95Materiel Receiving Report (used as a fuel receipt form at national and regional ANA\n depots. The form includes documentation of fuel quantity delivered);\n \xe2\x80\xa2 MOD Form 9\xe2\x80\x95ANA Issue and Turn-In Document (used for fuel issue to ANA non-depot locations from\n ANA depots. The form includes documentation of quantity of fuel delivered); and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 MOD Form 32\xe2\x80\x95Monthly Fuel Consumption Report, which consolidates daily receipt and consumption\n from (a) inventory reconciliation forms (MOD Form 1235 and 1237) and (b) vehicle fuel point issue\n document (MOD Form 3643), and compares monthly beginning and ending fuel balances to physical\n inventory to indicate variances.\nMOD Decree 4.6 requires ANA units to request fuel based on documented consumption using MOD forms 14\nand 32. ANA units are required to send requests to the Regional Logistics Support Command, which will then\nsubmit the request to Material Management Center-Army (MMC-A), the command and control center for the\nMOD Logistics Command. MMC-A approves and validates fuel requests, including checking against the unit\xe2\x80\x99s\nauthorized fuel allocation9 and accompanied by a MOD Form 32. Once MMC-A approves a request, MMC-A\nsends the fuel request to national depots to fill the order or submits it to CSTC-A to order from vendors.\nHowever, as discussed in the report, requests are sent directly to CSTC-A, circumventing the MMC-A process,\nwith CSTC-A purchasing the fuel for vendors to deliver to the requesting ANA location without MMC-A approval.\n\nTransitioning Responsibility for Afghan National Army Logistics to the Ministry of Defense\n\nCSTC-A is coordinating with the MOD to equip the ANSF, build the logistics system, and train logisticians,\nincluding POL. CSTC-A intends to build the MOD capacity to assume responsibility for all national logistics and\nmaintenance, including ANA POL. CSTC-A plans to begin contributing funds directly to the MOD for the\npurchase of ANA POL as early as March 2013. To improve accountability over ANA POL, CSTC-A revised one\nblanket purchase agreement to implement the use of seals to provide evidence of any tampering of fuel\ndeliveries, require the use of flow meters, and clarify that responsibility for equipment for tests rests with\nreceiving entity. CSTC-A also plans to, among other things, reduce the number of ANSF fuel delivery sites from\n754 to 98, from which fuel will be further distributed throughout Afghanistan.\n\n\nWEAKNESSES IN ANA FUEL ORDERING, DELIVERY, AND PAYMENT PROCESSES\nINCREASE RISK OF FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE\n\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s Data on Fuel Orders is Inaccurate and Incomplete\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s checkbook, a database of fuel records starting in April 2009, contains data on fuel order numbers\nand dates, delivery dates, quantities, prices, and invoice numbers. However, we found that the checkbook had\nerrors, including fuel delivery dates that pre-dated corresponding fuel orders, duplicate entries, and missing\ndata fields.\nTo test the checkbook\xe2\x80\x99s completeness and accuracy, we randomly selected 150 out of 2,922 fuel orders paid\nover a 13-month period from March 2011 through March 2012. The 150 orders totaled $13.9 million out of\nthe total $238 million in paid fuel orders that occurred between these dates. For these 150 orders, we\nrequested the full set of supporting documentation, which should have included 8 supporting MOD, DOD, and\nvendor forms and documents for each order, totaling approximately 1,200 documents. Prior to our interim\nreport in September 2012, we received partial documentation for about half of the 150 fuel orders in our\nsample and no documentation for the remaining orders. Following our interim report and our September 13,\n2012 testimony, CSTC-A provided us with partial documentation for nearly all remaining fuel orders.\n\n\n\n9 Requests are checked to ensure that they do not exceed a unit\xe2\x80\x99s authorized fuel allocation by more than 10 percent.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 5\n\x0cIn our review of these 150 fuel orders, we found\n \xe2\x80\xa2 681 problems\xe2\x80\x95or exceptions\xe2\x80\x95within the documentation. Exceptions include, among other things,\n delivery tickets that were not signed by ANA recipients or delivery drivers, fuel orders not signed by\n MMC-A, or no ANA documentation of fuel quality or quantity reported by vendors;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 missing delivery tickets\xe2\x80\x95which are required by the blanket purchase agreements to support quantities\n of fuel specified on paid invoices\xe2\x80\x95for 32 orders;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 missing invoices for 2 orders; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 missing DD 250 forms (DOD\xe2\x80\x99s Material Inspection and Receiving Report, which documents, among\n other things, DOD acknowledgement of receipt of material) for 3 orders.\nIn total, CSTC-A could only provide the complete set of documents for 4 of the 150 orders. Of the remaining\n146 orders, we found incomplete documentation (for example, a missing MOD form) and exceptions in the\nprovided documentation (for example, a missing signature). Figure 2 illustrates, by percentage, the presence\nof each form required to be in a full set of documentation in our sample of 150 fuel orders.\n\nFigure 2 - Percentage of Requested Documents Provided for 150 Fuel Orders between March 2011 and\nMarch 2012, by Form.\n\n\n\n\nSource: SIGAR analysis of documentation provided for 150 fuel orders.\n\nFurthermore, CSTC-A failed to reconcile checkbook-recorded orders with payments to vendors made by\nDefense Finance and Accounting Services, which maintains DOD\xe2\x80\x99s financial management systems and its\naccounting operations. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that periodic\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 6\n\x0ccomparison of resources with the recorded accountability\xe2\x80\x94such as invoices and other documentation\xe2\x80\x94should\nbe made to help reduce the risk of errors, fraud, misuse, or unauthorized alteration. 10 CSTC-A officials were\nnot reconciling any orders or payments for the 13-month period until June 2012, 4 months into SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s audit.\nCSTC-A did not enforce reconciliation standards and has not established standard operating procedures for\nfuel ordering officers to follow. Such guidance would have assisted in reducing missing information within the\ncheckbook as well as helped ensure that orders, invoices, and payments were consistent. Our review of the\ncheckbook also found incomplete transactions. For example, we identified 1,147 fuel orders with missing\ninvoice numbers totaling $36 million. As a result, information within the checkbook is incomplete, increasing\nthe risk that funds and purchased fuel have been subject to fraud, waste, and abuse.\n\nCSTC-A Lacks 12 Months of Fuel and Payment Records\nIn our September 2012 alert letter, we stated that CSTC\xe2\x80\x90A did not have any records of fuel purchase and\npayment information prior to March 2011 because, according to CSTC\xe2\x80\x90A, all ANA POL financial records totaling\nnearly $475 million from fiscal year 2007 through February 2011 had been shredded in violation of DOD and\nDepartment of the Army policies. Federal internal control standards state that all documentation and records\nshould be properly managed, maintained, and be readily available for examination. 11 In addition, the DOD\nFinancial Management Regulation states that all original disbursing office records and associated papers as\nwell as supporting documentation should be kept for 6 years and 3 months, consistent with the National\nArchives and Records Administration General Records Schedule 6. 12 Subsequent to our September 2012 alert\nletter, CSTC-A made available ANA POL financial records from fiscal year 2007 to February 2010. However,\npaid fuel records from March 2010 through February 2011 remain missing. The previous CSTC-A fuel ordering\nofficers stated these records were shredded after converting the original hard copies to electronic media. To\ndate, however, CSTC-A has not located the electronic copies.\n\nCSTC-A Has No Records of Spilled or Lost Fuel\nCSTC-A does not monitor whether fuel it purchased for the ANA is stolen or lost to spillage or mishaps.\nAccording to MOD guidance, safeguards must be in place to defend against theft. Furthermore, ANA units are\nrequired to control spills through a prevention program and report any spillage to the MOD.\nWe found, however, that although CSTC-A was notified of three potential theft cases, the fuel ordering officer\ndid not have a clear path forward to resolve cases. For example, a fuel ordering officer reported to CSTC-A, the\nU.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Task Force 2010 that fuel ordered for the two power plants was not being\nreceived (see table 1). The CSTC-A fuel ordering officer did not have clear guidance on how to address\nallegations, and there was no evidence of actions taken to investigate or resolve the incidents by identifying\nlosses or fraudulent activity. Further, ANA units did not prepare spillage and mishap reports, so CSTC-A could\nnot investigate potential discrepancies. As a result, accountability for fuel after purchase is weak and permits\nopportunities for theft and significant losses.\n\n\n\n\n10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1,\nNovember 1999.\n11 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.\n12 DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 5, Chapter 21, December 2010.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 7\n\x0c Table 1 - SIGAR Summary of Reported Potential Fuel Theft Incidents\n\n Quantity Ordered Quantity Delivered Variance\n ANA Location\n (Liters) (Liters) (Liters)\n\n Kabul (PEC Power plant) 500,000 196,800 303,200\n\n Paktiya (Gardez Power Plant) 299,535 29,500 270,035\n\n Camp Leatherneck (Shorabak) 160,000 144,440 15,560\n Source: SIGAR Review of emails reporting fuel theft and related issues provided by Task Force 2010.\n\n\nWeaknesses Exist in U.S. Processes to Purchase, Deliver, and Pay for Fuel\n\nKabul Regional Contracting Center Limited Competition and Did Not Independently Verify Fuel Prices, Risking Increased Cost to\nthe U.S. Government\nThe Kabul Regional Contracting Center established blanket purchase agreements with 10 vendors but, as of\nOctober 2012, only 2 were in use, resulting in limited competition. These agreements limit the ability of the\nU.S. government to compel a vendor to fill a fuel order, as vendors are not obligated to respond to a call placed\nagainst it. The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that blanket purchase agreements should be established\nwith more than one supplier to provide \xe2\x80\x9cmaximum practicable competition.\xe2\x80\x9d13 Furthermore, competition\nprovisions for blanket purchase agreements require that ordering officers rotate purchases among vendors\nthat provide the same supplies/services at virtually the same prices. Of the two vendors currently in use, one\nsolely provides aviation fuel and the other solely provides petroleum-based fuel, such as diesel. This has left\neach vendor with de facto monopolies for aviation and ground fuel, significantly raising the possibility that the\nbest price for either type of fuel will not be received. 14\nIn addition, the Kabul Regional Contracting Center approved vendors\xe2\x80\x99 prices for liters of fuel based on\nunverified cost justifications. The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that the contracting officer that\nentered into the blanket purchase agreement shall maintain awareness of changes in market conditions,\nsources of supply and other pertinent factors. 15 In the case of ANA fuel, vendors submit a price justification\nspreadsheet to the contracting center on a monthly basis. This spreadsheet details the various costs\ncomprising the final fuel price. The contracting center provided us with an example of a vendor-reported\njustification, showing what the vendor charged for Afghan Oil Authority fees, customs duties, transportation\ncosts and other fees (see figure 3, with price per liter converted to gallons). These fees are rolled up into a\nsingle, price per liter and submitted on a monthly basis to the contracting center. The contracting center only\nbegan requiring price justifications in January 2012. In addition, we found that the center relies on the vendor-\nprovided price justification with little or no independent verification of its accuracy or comparison with market\nprices. For example, according to a contracting official, he \xe2\x80\x9cmisleads\xe2\x80\x9d the vendor into believing the contracting\ncenter will independently verify vendors\xe2\x80\x99 prices with Platts Energy News\xe2\x80\x94a source for energy information.\nHowever, the contracting center does not, in fact, have access to Platts Energy News.\n\n\n\n\n13 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 13.303-2(c)(1).\n14In November 2012, CSTC-A stated that one of the two BPAs was closed and BPAs were issued to seven additional\nvendors.\n15 Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 13.303-6.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 8\n\x0cFigure 3 - Example of One Vendor\xe2\x80\x99s Average Fuel Price for April 2012\n\n\n\n\nSource: SIGAR Analysis (difference due to rounding error)\n*All costs are vendor reported.\n\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s Fuel Orders Are Not Based on Fuel Consumption Data and Do Not Follow Ministry of Defense Procedure\nAs established by MOD Decree 4.6, the ANA requests fuel using MOD Form 14\xe2\x80\x94a materiel request form used\nto order fuel. To justify the requested fuel, this form is to be accompanied by a MOD Form 32, which\ndocuments fuel consumption. These forms are submitted by ANA units to the Afghan MMC-A for approval after\nverifying the orders do not exceed approved fuel allocations. The Afghan MMC-A is also supposed to receive\nand approve orders for fuel from power plants.\nHowever, in our sample of 150 fuel orders, we found that 80 orders did not include the required MOD Form 14\nand 42 of the remaining 70 forms lacked the required MMC-A signatures in violation of procedures established\nby the MOD decree. According to one fuel ordering officer, MOD took too long to process fuel requests, leading\nCSTC-A to exclude the Afghan MMC-A from the process. CSTC-A issued all fuel to power plants without MOD\nForms 14 or MMC-A authorization. Such a bypass of Afghan authority may risk duplicate fuel orders as CSTC-A\npushes fuel to power plants based on contractor-reported re-order points. Figure 4 illustrates the appropriate\nfuel ordering process as well as the actual process that was used in violation of the MOD decree.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 9\n\x0cFigure 4 - ANA Fuel Ordering Process\n\n\n\n\nSource: SIGAR Analysis Based on CSTC-A and MOD documentation.\n\nWith regard to fuel consumption, 120 of the 150 fuel orders did not have the required MOD Form 32\ndocumenting fuel consumption. Five of the remaining 30 fuel orders that did contain the form lacked specific\nconsumption data. In total, CSTC-A authorized over $11.1 million of the $13.9 million in fuel orders in our\nsample that were not supported by consumption data and were not approved by the Afghan government.\nAs a result of SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s findings over the course of our audit, CSTC-A issued fragmentary orders16 to strengthen\nadherence to the fuel ordering process established by MOD Decree 4.6 and improve controls. Specifically, in\nMay 2012, CSTC-A issued a fragmentary order to, among other things, require MOD Forms 14 and 32 to be\nsubmitted to CSTC-A monthly to support fuel orders submitted for payment. CSTC-A issued a follow-on\nfragmentary order in September 2012 that added language to reinforce MOD Decree 4.6 requirements and\nstipulate that units will not be eligible to receive fuel and the MOD Forms 14 will be rejected if MOD Forms 32\n(documenting consumption) is not on file.\n\nCSTC-A Does Not Verify Quantity or Quality of Delivered Fuel\nMOD Decree 4.6 requires ANA units to prepare MOD forms to document receipt and distribution of fuel, but\nCSTC-A is not required to use these MOD forms (8 and 9, used to document fuel quantity delivered and\ndistributed) when ordering or acknowledging receipt of the vendor-reported fuel quantity and quality delivered.\nAlso, SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s test found 88 instances where invoices were paid without proof of quality on the delivery ticket.\nBlanket purchase agreements also require quantity and quality controls, including requirements that the\ncontractor provide lab reports of fuel quality for all shipments on at least a monthly basis as well as to further\ncertify that delivered fuel is free of contaminants. A current fuel ordering officer stated that required lab\nreports are not realistic in Afghanistan due to the absence of labs. In our sample of 150 fuel orders, we found\nthat CSTC-A could not provide the required MOD forms documenting receipt of vendor-reported fuel for 99\norders (66 percent).\n\n\n\n16A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written, or digital) usually issued on a day-to-\nday basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in the basic operation order. It is issued after an\noperation order to change or modify that order.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 10\n\x0cCSTC-A Exceeded Agreement-Imposed Fuel Ordering Limits and Lacks Separation of Duties in Fuel Ordering and Payment\nThe agreements established by the Kabul Regional Contracting Center, which were in effect during our audit,\nauthorize CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s fuel ordering officer to place orders up to $500,000 and require that any orders exceeding\nthat figure be placed instead by the contracting officer. However, we found 39 paid fuel orders in the\ncheckbook that were placed by CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s fuel ordering officers that exceeded $500,000, including one for\n$768,000. Seven of these 39 orders occurred on a single day in January 2012. CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s fuel ordering officer\ndid not provide us with documentation to justify exceeding the $500,000 limit. As a result, the fuel ordering\nofficer placed unauthorized fuel purchases and committed U.S. funds above the limit authorized in the\nagreements, potentially exposing those funds to fraud, waste, and abuse.\nWe also found that a CSTC-A fuel ordering officer was responsible for fuel ordering, reporting, and payment\nprocesses. Internal control standards state that no one person should control all key aspects of a transaction\nor event to reduce the risk of error or fraud. Instead, responsibilities for authorizing, processing, recording, and\nreviewing transactions, as well as handling related assets, should be separated.17 However, we found 147\ninstances where the same fuel ordering officer placed a fuel order with a vendor, updated the checkbook, and\nacknowledged fuel quality and quantity delivered to initiate vendor payment. A payment system based so\nheavily on a single individual leaves the U.S. government open to increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.\n\n\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99S ESTIMATES FOR FUNDING ARE BASED ON UNSUPPORTED DATA AND\nPOTENTIALLY OVERSTATED\n\nThe approximately $2.8 billion that CSTC-A estimates will be necessary to fund purchases of ANA POL between\nfiscal years 2014 and 2018 are based on questionable calculations. Specifically, funding estimates were not\nbased on known fuel consumption. Instead, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s funding estimates were based on fuel orders in which\nSIGAR found significant control issues, including inconsistent use of MOD delivery forms, consumption forms\nand approvals by MMC-A. CSTC-A, in April 2012, told SIGAR that 254 ANA locations received fuel, but could not\nprovide us with a list of these locations until July 2012, when it offered a list of 188 sites. 18 CSTC-A did not\nhave consumption data or reliable information on ANA vehicles and generators, but nonetheless increased its\nestimate of the funding needed to fulfill these fuel requirements from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2018.\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s method for estimating future fuel requirements and the funding required to fulfill these requirements\nis not clear to us. According to a CSTC-A official, a single month\xe2\x80\x99s fuel ordering data from March 2012 was\nused to calculate fuel requirements for all of fiscal year 2013. The fiscal year 2013 budget request then\nformed the basis for CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s fiscal years 2014 through 2018 funding estimates. In its response to our\nSeptember 2012 interim report, CSTC-A stated that fiscal year 2012 expenditures are anticipated to be\napproximately $480 million for ANA POL, based on fuel orders placed from August 2011 through July 2012,\nrather than on the single month of March 2012. However, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s supporting documentation does not\nsupport this statement. The 12 months of fuel orders CSTC-A cites totaled $493.5 million for all of the ANSF\nand $338.3 million for ANA, raising concerns about the basis for CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s $480 million estimate.\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s problems in estimating fuel requirements are evident in the fact that 9 months into fiscal year 2012,\nCSTC-A was still using fiscal year 2011 funds. SIGAR estimates that by January 2013, 3 months into fiscal year\n2013, CSTC-A will have more than $266 million available in fiscal year 2012 funds for fiscal year 13 fuel\norders. This raises the question as to whether CSTC-A requires its full fiscal year 2013 funding request.\n\n\n\n17 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.\n18 In October 2012, the CSTC-A fuel ordering officer told us that the reduction of ANA fuel locations receiving direct\ndeliveries from vendors was ongoing but noted that direct deliveries were still being made to approximately 240 ANA fuel\nlocations.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 11\n\x0cDESPITE CONCERNS ABOUT ANA\xe2\x80\x99S CAPACITY TO PURCHASE FUEL, CSTC-A\nINTENDS TO PROVIDE THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WITH $1 BILLION IN DIRECT\nFUNDING\n\nSIGAR has raised concerns about CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s fuel accountability, and the Army Audit Agency has reported\nconcerns about controls over CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s direct contributions to the Afghan government. Assessments of MOD\nand ANA, through the Capability Milestone ratings system, suggest that MOD is not ready to assume sole\nresponsibility for POL, especially with concerns about the accountability and transparency of the use of prior\ndirect contributions to the Afghan government. Nevertheless, CSTC-A is proceeding with plans to directly\nprovide at least $1 billion to the Afghan government between early 2013 and fiscal year 2018 for MOD to\npurchase its own fuel. 19\nIn 2012, the Army Audit Agency observed that direct contributions are inherently high risk due in large part to\nprocedural and cultural difference between the U.S. and Afghan governments. As noted above, we also raised\nconcerns about fuel accountability and the feasibility of increasing direct contributions in an interim report and\ntwo congressional testimonies on the subject in September 2012. As noted previously, CSTC-A plans to\nprovide direct contributions of one-third of its ANA POL budget to the Afghan government, which\xe2\x80\x95according to\nestimates through fiscal year 2018\xe2\x80\x95total more than $1 billion over the next 6 years.\nIn addition to external agency reports, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s Capability Milestone rating system, which CSTC-A uses to\nassess the abilities and capacity of MOD on a quarterly basis, suggested weaknesses in MOD and ANA logistics\ncapacity. Further, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s standard operating procedures state that it must conduct a risk assessment prior\nto direct contributions and that this assessment must include a \xe2\x80\x9cdeliberate examination of the risk to overall\ncapacity development, the security mission, and the stewardship of public resources.\xe2\x80\x9d In April 2011, CSTC-A\nreported that MOD logistics, which includes fuel management and the MMC-A, still requires \xe2\x80\x9csome coalition\nassistance.\xe2\x80\x9d However, as of February 2012, DOD assessed a national-level logistics entity as still requiring\nsome coalition assistance, as well as giving MOD accountability, visibility, and department support for the\nAfghan Air Force 20 and ground force command operations the lowest rating of \xe2\x80\x9cthe department exists but\ncannot accomplish its mission.\xe2\x80\x9d This raises questions about whether MOD can adequately serve as a steward\nof public resources, as is necessary according to CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s own standard operating procedures for direct\ncontributions. As a result, CSTC-A may contradict its own standard operating procedures\xe2\x80\x94which require\nrecipients to demonstrate appropriate stewardship of public resources\xe2\x80\x94by beginning to provide funds directly\nto the Afghan government. This direct funding will be in spite of its own assessments and those of the Army\nAudit Agency, which question the readiness and controls, respectively, of MOD.\n\n\n\n\n19 Direct contributions became part of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund after a statement on May 12, 2010, by\nPresidents Obama and Karzai reaffirmed the need to further direct U.S. assistance through the Afghan government.\nPursuant to this effort, DOD developed a program to provide funding directly to the ministries. Based on a DOD report on\nprogress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, DOD approved operating guidelines for providing Afghanistan Security\nForces Funds directly to the Afghanistan security ministries through the Ministry of Finance.\n20According to CSTC-A, the total POL funding requirement for the Afghan Air Force will be over $457 million for fiscal years\n2014 to 2018.\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 12\n\x0cCONCLUSION\n\nSuccessful management of POL, particularly fuel for vehicles, generators, and power plants, is critical to\nensuring effective logistics capability for ANA. However, CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s current process for managing the supply of\nPOL to ANA lacks the necessary accountability and leaves U.S. funds vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s problems successfully managing ANA POL include, among other things, failing to keep complete and\naccurate records, not following up on potential theft or tracking loss of fuel due to spillage or mishap, failing to\nfollow established fuel ordering procedures, not verifying fuel deliveries, and limiting competition among\nvendors thereby potentially exposing the U.S. government to increased fuel costs. Moreover, by basing its\nfuture years\xe2\x80\x99 funding estimates on prior fuel ordering activities rather than a systematic analysis of fuel\nrequirements for ANA vehicles, generators, and power plants, CSTC-A risks overstating the amount of funding\nthat will be necessary in the future. Despite these problems, CSTC-A continues to press forward with\nsubstantially increasing annual ANA POL budgets without validating fuel needs and plans to provide billions of\ndollars over the next several years directly to the Afghan government for the purchase of ANA POL. Given that\nCSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s current process for ordering, delivering, and paying for fuel lacks the necessary accountability to\nprotect U.S. funds from fraud, waste, and abuse, we are not confident that an Afghan-managed process would\nlead to greater accountability\xe2\x80\x94particularly given the extensive problems with Afghan logistics capacity we and\nothers have repeatedly identified.\n\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n\nTo improve accountability of U.S. funds and purchased fuel, we recommend that the Commanding General,\nNATO Training Missions-Afghanistan/CSTC-A:\n 1. Comply with existing DOD regulations to retain original or electronic records in order to prevent\n destroyed or unavailable records.\n 2. Develop a process to identify, investigate, and resolve differences between quantities of fuel ordered\n and quantities of fuel delivered and any allegations of fuel theft.\n 3. In coordination with plans being developed for the Afghan government, immediately develop an action\n plan to improve the fuel process from price approval, ordering, delivery, receipt, and payment of fuel\n to better account for U.S. funds and to assure fuel is appropriately purchased, received, and\n consumed by ANA forces. Such a plan should include, but not be limited to:\n a. Improving methods for ensuring the price paid for fuel is commensurate with market\n conditions and for verifying that costs charged to the U.S. government for such items as\n Afghan government fees are allowable;\n b. Ensuring that all fuel orders are authorized by the Afghan MMC-A and the required MOD forms\n 32 and 14 are maintained and used to support consumption and fuel requirements;\n\n c. Ensuring that CSTC-A rejects all fuel orders not authorized by the Afghan MMC-A;\n d. Developing controls to assure that fuel ordering officers cannot exceed fuel ordering limits\n established by blanket purchase agreements without evidence of contracting officer approval;\n\n e. Developing controls to assure the use of MOD Forms 8 and 9 to verify the quantity and quality\n of vendor-reported fuel delivered to ANA;\n f. Developing safeguards to ensure CSTC-A fuel ordering responsibilities are separated and no\n one person has control over ordering, acknowledging receipt, and authorizing payment;\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 13\n\x0c g. Implementing standard operating procedures for reconciling fuel orders with receipts,\n invoices, and payments made by Defense Finance and Accounting Services; and\n h. Retaining the appropriate supporting documentation for all fuel orders.\nTo more realistically estimate its budget requests and future years\xe2\x80\x99 funding estimates for fuel, we recommend\nthat the Commanding General, NATO Training Missions-Afghanistan/CSTC-A:\n 4. Establish the fiscal year 2013 funding level at the fiscal year 2012 ANA funding level of $306 million\n and use along with the remaining available fiscal year 2012 appropriated ANA fuel funds to meet the\n ANA fuel requirement for fiscal year 2013.\n 5. Systematically analyze ANA fuel consumption in order to reformulate its funding estimates for fiscal\n years 2014 to 2018 based on validated ANA fuel requirements rather than prior years\xe2\x80\x99 fuel ordering\n activities.\nTo assure proper stewardship and transparency of U.S. funds and fuel purchases in the future, we recommend\nthat the Commanding General, NATO Training Missions-Afghanistan/CSTC-A:\n 6. Revise CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s strategy for providing direct contributions to the Afghan government for future fuel\n purchases until MOD demonstrates transparency and accountability without coalition assistance. For\n example, CSTC-A could begin with a small amount of direct contributions to purchase fuel for specific\n units and/or power plants and then adjust upwards based upon assessments of MOD capacity and\n accountability of fuel ordered, delivered, and consumed.\n\n\n\n\nAGENCY COMMENTS\n\nCSTC-A and U.S. Army Central generally concurred with all six recommendations and provided written\ncomments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendices III and IV. NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it\nconcurred with our recommendations and described actions it has taken or will take to address them. In\nparticular, CSTC-A noted that it shares our concerns for MOD transparency and accountability and will initiate\nprocedures, including incremental funding and monthly audits, to minimize corruption and provide more\noversight as it transitions fuel funding and responsibility to MOD.\nHowever, some of CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s comments either did not reflect the intent of our recommendation or made\nassertions with which we disagree or cannot verify before issuing this report. For example, we disagree that\nusing the vendor delivery ticket alone verifies that quantity ordered equals quantity delivered. The vendor fills\nout the delivery ticket and does not include supporting documentation from a meter reading, scale, or other\nproof of the actual fuel quantity delivered. CSTC--A further states that fuel is off-loaded after the recipient\nverifies that the fuel passed quality tests, however, we found numerous instances of no evidence that quality\ntests were performed for the selected 150 paid fuel orders that we tested.\nFurthermore, CSTC-A concurred with our recommendation to use the fiscal year 2012 ANA budget, but only as\na starting baseline\xe2\x80\x94along with other factors\xe2\x80\x94to establish the fiscal year 2013 budget. However, as noted in\nour report, CSTC-A estimated fiscal year 2013 ANA expenditures at $480 million without providing\ndocumentation to support that amount. Further, more than $266 million in fiscal year 2012 funds will still be\navailable to use along with the recommended $306 million for fiscal year 2013. Therefore, we continue to\nrecommend that the fiscal year 2013 budget should not be increased beyond that of fiscal year 2012\nOur specific responses to CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s and U.S. Army Central\xe2\x80\x99s comments and actions are also included in\nappendices III and IV.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 14\n\x0cAPPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\nIn February 2012, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) initiated\nan audit of the Afghan National Army\xe2\x80\x99s (ANA) logistics capability regarding petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).\nSIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s overall objective was to assess U.S. efforts to develop ANA\xe2\x80\x99s capability to acquire, distribute, and\naccount for POL supplies to its forces. This report assesses (1) the internal controls in place to provide\naccountability for ANA POL and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) the extent to which the NATO Training\nMissions-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan\xe2\x80\x99s (CSTC-A) funding requests for\nANA POL are based on accurate requirements data; and (3) CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s efforts to provide direct contributions to\nthe Afghan government. Although CSTC-A recorded fuel orders in a checkbook beginning in 2009, the\ncheckbook did not contain complete information and source documentation was not available for orders\nplaced between March 2010 and February 2011. As a result, we limited the scope of our audit to evaluate the\ninternal controls in place to account for POL to paid ANA fuel orders placed for the 13-month period from\nMarch 2011 to March 2012.\nTo assess compliance with MOD guidance and evaluate the sufficiency of internal controls, we reviewed MOD\npolicies and procedures and related Department of Defense (DOD) guidance including the use of required\nMOD and DOD forms and other documentation to determine if ANA is following established POL guidance. We\nalso analyzed CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s ANA POL budgetary and financial data and summarized quantities and resources\nneeded and available. We interviewed CSTC-A, Kabul Regional Contracting Center, and Task Force 2010\nofficials and CSTC-A advisors to obtain an understanding MOD/ANA logistics. We analyzed the processes and\ncontrols in place and reporting/reconciliation processes, including resolution of variances. We performed data\nmining techniques on CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s checkbook and our audit population of 2,922 paid fuel orders to identify trends\nand irregularities, and followed up to address issues with CSTC-A. We considered Defense Logistics Agency,\nArmy Audit Agency, Task Force 2010 reports to determine the level of risk associated with ANA POL. We also\nreconciled fuel orders with DFAS payments and summarized fuel theft reports received by Task Force 2010 to\nassess the sufficiency of CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s actions taken on the reports.\nAs part of evaluating the sufficiency of internal controls in place to account for POL, we randomly selected a\nsample from CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s checkbook of 150 paid fuel orders from a population of 2,922 paid fuel orders placed\nduring the period from March 2011 through March 2012. We calculated our sample size at a 95-percent\nconfidence level with a 5-percent tolerable deviation rate from a population of 2,922 using Interactive Data\nExtraction and Analysis sample generation software. In calculating this sample, we assumed a 2-percent\nexpected deviation rate. The sample represented a total volume of approximately 8.3 million liters with a total\nvalue of approximately $13.9 million. We requested and reviewed MOD forms, invoices, Defense Finance and\nAccounting Services computer-processed payment data, Material Inspection and Receiving Reports (DD 250),\nvendor delivery tickets, and monthly approved fuel rates for the 150 sample items. Although we exceeded the\nmaximum tolerable deviation errors, we completed the test work of the sample items to obtain a more\naccurate picture of ANA POL operations throughout the country for the 13-month audit period.\nTo determine the funding levels needed to meet ANA POL requirements, we examined DOD\xe2\x80\x99s fiscal year 2012\nand 2013 budget and the supporting documentation used to estimate annual funding levels.\nTo determine the status of the CSTC-A efforts to develop ANA\xe2\x80\x99s capacity to manage POL direct contributions,\nwe (i) analyzed CSTC-A reported issues and DOD Inspector General audit reports and (ii) interviewed\nlogistics/POL officials at CSTC-A, Task Force 2010, and Defense Logistics Agency to obtain the status of\nidentified challenges and issues to develop a capable and sustainable ANA POL processes. We reviewed and\nanalyzed MOD logistics and ANA POL policies and procedures, blanket purchase agreements, and CSTC-A and\nTask Force 2010 POL presentation slides.\nTo assess the reliability of our population of paid ANA fuel orders, we (i) reviewed the fuel orders in CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s\nfuel ordering office\xe2\x80\x99s and Kabul Regional Contracting Center\xe2\x80\x99s checkbooks and the Defense Finance and\nAccounting Services\xe2\x80\x99 computer-generated payment data, (ii) performed data mining procedures, and (iii) traced\nfuel orders to source documents. Subsequent to our reconciliations and verification of revisions made to the\ncheckbook during the period from March 2011 through March 2012, we determined that the audit population\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 15\n\x0cwas sufficiently reliable and the needed documentation was available, given the research questions and\nintended use of the data. We also assessed internal controls over the ANA POL processes and considered\nallegations of fraud through review of CSTC-A briefings and documentation of fuel contracts, orders, and\npayments. The results of our reconciliation and assessments are included in the body of this report.\nWe conducted work in Kabul, Afghanistan from February 2012 to January 2013 in accordance with generally\naccepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to\nobtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on\nour audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and\nconclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of Special Inspector General\nfor Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110\xe2\x80\x90181, as amended, the Inspector\nGeneral Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 16\n\x0cAPPENDIX II - ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION\n\n Table I - Results of Internal Control Tests\n Description Number Liters Amount\n\n Audit Population 2,922 139,471,572 $237,966,042\n\n Sample Size 150 8,287,539 $13,878,966\n\n Test Results \xe2\x80\x93 Missing Forms and Exceptions:\n\n Missing Forms (38 percent of sample documents):\n\n MOD Form 32 120 6,422,718 $10,433,764\n\n MOD Form 14 80 2,838,083 $4,704,471\n\n MOD Forms 8/9 99 4,077,400 $6,996,323\n\n Vendor Delivery Tickets 32 1,424,074 $2,540,860\n\n Vendor Invoice 2 200,000 $306,000\n\n DOD Form DD250 3 260,000 $399,600\n\n Vendor Price List 81 2,871,745 $4,769,596\n\n Blanket Purchase Agreement Payment Call 13 278,051 $464,372\n\n Exceptions Noted (35 percent of sample document):\n\n MOD Form 14/fuel order not processed through depots 24 3,751,416 $5,969,271\n\n Fuel order not signed by MMC-A 42 4,397,143 $7,078,603\n\n Delivery Ticket not signed by ANA receiver 3 65,092 $131,230\n\n Delivery Ticket not signed by driver 106 6,456,786 $10,533,498\n\n No proof of vendor quality 88 4,674,170 $7,577,358\n\n ANA did not document fuel quantity 51 4,273,178 $6,798,993\n\n ANA did not document fuel quality 51 4,273,178 $6,798,993\n\n Vendor quality not acknowledged 140 6,881,248 $11,389,843\n\n No separation for fuel duties 147 8,065,578 $13,395,715\n\n Invoice and approved fuel rate did not agree 15 n/a $38,402\n\n Fuel order not based on actual consumption 5 456,943 $751,401\n\n Fuel not reconciled to actual inventory 7 509,727 $848,607\n\n Source: SIGAR analysis of detailed audit test results.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 17\n\x0c Figure I - Timeline of ANA Fuel Documentation and Key Audit Events\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4/Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 18\n\x0c Table II - Summary of Annual Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ANA Fuel Budget and Financial Data for\n Fiscal Years 2007-2018 (in millions)\n Fiscal Year Enacted/Requesteda Obligationsb Disbursementsc\n\n $12.2 $107.0 $102.1\n 2007\n $53.1 $115.9 $105.8\n 2008\n $174.8 $127.3 $42.3\n 2009\n $293.3 $252.6 $246.1\n 2010\n $190.0 $274.1 $216.5\n 2011\n $428.8 $ - $ -\n 2012\n $343.1 $ - $ -\n 2013\n $574.9 $ - $ -\n 2014\n $555.0 $ - $ -\n 2015\n $555.0 $ - $ -\n 2016\n $555.0 $ - $ -\n 2017\n $555.0 $ - $ -\n 2018\n Source: CSTC-A Finance Office through May 2012 and Afghanistan Security Forces Fund fiscal year 2007 through 2013\n budget justifications.\n\n Notes:\n aAfghanistanSecurity Forces Fund funding level estimated to meet annual ANA POL requirements; fiscal years 2007\n through 2012 amounts were enacted in annual DOD appropriations.\n bAmount actually obligated to meet ANA fuel requirement.\n\n cPayment of obligated funds for submitted invoices for fuel amounts purchased and delivered.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 19\n\x0cAPPENDIX III - COMMENTS FROM THE COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION\nCOMMAND-AFGHANISTAN\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 20\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 21\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 22\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 23\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 24\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 25\n\x0cSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 26\n\x0c SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Response to CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s January 2, 2013 Memorandum\n 1. We agree that the MOD forms are the property of the Afghan government and should be maintained by\n the MOD. However, we continue to believe that the MOD forms can act as tools for CSTC-A to\n independently review and verify fuel orders, deliveries, and consumption to improve accountability and\n controls.\n 2. We disagree with CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s assertion that the vendor delivery ticket alone verifies that quantity ordered\n equals quantity delivered. The vendor fills out the delivery ticket and does not include supporting\n documentation from a meter reading, scale, or other proof of the actual fuel quantity delivered. Further,\n CSTC-A has not had officials who could independently confirm delivery at all of the reported locations.\n CSTC-A further states that, upon verification by the recipient that the fuel passes quality tests, the fuel is\n off-loaded. However, we found numerous instances of no evidence that quality tests were performed for\n the selected 150 paid fuel orders that we tested. During our audit, CSTC-A also reported to us that fuel\n testing kits were too advanced for Afghanistan, and more basic kits would need to be ordered.\n Additionally, CSTC-A stated that discrepancy issues are immediately addressed to the COR and that\n CSTC-A will report, through its Inspector General, alleged or suspected fuel theft incidents to three\n organizations dedicated to fight Afghan vendor corruption. However, we were not provided any evidence\n of such discrepancy issues or referrals.\n 3a. We agree that the contracting officer at CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command is\n responsible for negotiating and approving fuel prices. However, as noted in our report, we did not\n receive evidence of review and approval of fuel prices.\n 3b. To clarify the intent of our recommendation, we have updated this to state \xe2\x80\x9cmaintained and used to\n support consumption and fuel requirements.\xe2\x80\x9d CSTC-A stated that since September 2012, coalition\n advisors at MMC-A ensure that MOD forms accompany each order and that all orders lacking supporting\n documentation are rejected. CSTC-A told us, however, that a single Afghan contractor at MMC-A\n reviewed ANA fuel orders prior to sending forward to CSTC-A. We did not receive information on how the\n contractor verifies MMC-A approval of each fuel request or the level of CSTC-A oversight of contractor.\n 3c. CSTC-A stated that coalition advisors at MMC-A ensure that MOD forms accompany each order and are\n reviewed against authorized fuel allocations. As noted, CSTC-A informed us that a single Afghan\n contractor was resident at MMC-A to review fuel orders prior to forwarding to CSTC-A.\n 3d. CSTC-A stated that it undertakes appropriate administrative checks to ensure that fuel orders do not\n exceed BPA limits. We noted that the specific administrative actions need to be clearly identified to\n ensure that fuel orders placed by fuel ordering officers do not exceed BPA limits without evidence of the\n required contracting officer approval.\n 3e. CSTC-A stated that its use of delivery tickets conforms to Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart\n 32.905. However, our review of this clause found no language related to vendor-reported delivery\n tickets, including guidance as to whether such tickets are appropriate support for payment of an invoice.\n Specifically, the clause states that supporting documentation for authorizing payment should include\n quantities of supplies received and accepted, the date that a designated Government official accepted\n the supplies or approved the progress payment, and the signature of this designated official. However,\n as noted in the report findings, we found multiple instances where delivery tickets were not signed by\n the ANA and the vendor\xe2\x80\x99s driver and the delivery tickets generally lacked proof of fuel quality. The\n delivery tickets reviewed found no notation of a \xe2\x80\x9cdesignated Government official\xe2\x80\x9d or that designated\n officials accepted the fuel or other independent verification of vendor-reported fuel quality and quantity.\n CSTC-A commented that the use of MOD Forms 8 and 9 is not the \xe2\x80\x9coptimal solution.\xe2\x80\x9d We disagree, as\n the MOD Decree requires these forms, which can help document fuel quantity. Such a step can help\n CSTC-A improve accountability and develop capacity within the ANA and MOD.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 27\n\x0c 3f. CSTC-A stated that receipt of fuel delivery is performed by personnel assigned to MMC-A and verified by\n CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s contractors, and that this verification is done under the supervision of coalition advisors.\n However, CSTC-A officials told us that only one Afghan contractor works at MMC-A, and this contract\n began in August 2011. As a result, the level of verification between 2007 and August 2011 is unclear.\n Due to the apparent reliance on this individual, CSTC-A should determine the proper separation of duties\n to ensure orders from CSTC-A\xe2\x80\x99s contractor at MMC-A are accurate.\n 3g. CSTC-A stated that \xe2\x80\x9corder reconciliation is performed on a monthly basis upon receipt of monthly\n invoices from vendors\xe2\x80\xa6and performed by the COR.\xe2\x80\x9d However, CSTC-A did not regularly reconcile orders\n and payments until June 2012\xe2\x80\x945 years into funding of ANA POL. We did not verify the continued\n reconciliations by fuel ordering officers (contracting officer representative) because any subsequent\n monthly reconciliations took place after our audit period.\n 4. CSTC-A generally concurred with our recommendation to use the fiscal year 2012 ANA budget, but only\n as a starting baseline to establish the fiscal year 2013 budget. CSTC-A added that other factors must be\n considered to develop the fiscal year 2013 budget. However, as noted in our report, CSTC-A estimated\n fiscal year 2013 ANA expenditures at $480 million without providing documentation to support that\n amount. Further, more than $266 million in fiscal year 2012 funds will still be available to use along\n with the recommended $306 million for fiscal year 2013. Therefore, we continue to recommend that\n the fiscal year 2013 budget should not be increased beyond that of fiscal year 2012.\n 5. CSTC-A stated that its advisors have directed MOD to implement a fuel allocations requirement for all\n MOD units that is justifiable and meets operational requirements, but added that MOD leadership was\n not able to provide adequate fuel allocation data and detailed some flaws with what was reported. In\n November 2012, we saw a draft model of the allocation procedures, originally expected to be rolled out\n in December 2012. We did not assess the procedures because they had not been finalized during the\n course of our fieldwork. We reiterate the need to validate any funding levels estimated to meet ANA fuel\n requirements.\n 6. CSTC-A stated that it shares our concerns with fuel transparency and accountability and noted it will\n begin to transfer one-third of all fuel funding and responsibilities to the MOD in 2013 and the remaining\n two-thirds in 2014 based upon demonstrated success. CSTC-A also commented that it will incrementally\n disburse funds and conduct monthly audits. We believe that, at a minimum, such audits should include\n the verification of vendor fuel orders and vendor-reported deliveries to MOD forms and reconciliation of\n (a) contributions to MOD payments and remaining balances; (b) fuel orders to vendor deliveries and\n MoD payments; and (c) vendor deliveries to ANA distribution, consumption, losses, and remaining\n inventory. Further, CSTC-A should assure that the sources of information and systems are reliable.\n Lastly, CSTC-A noted that MOD will assume control of diesel fuel for two of the seven ANA Corps but did\n not detail which two these will be. CSTC-A appears to limit its definition of \xe2\x80\x9cresponsibility\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9ccontrol\xe2\x80\x9d\n to be areas other than financing, which CSTC-A assumes it will support until at least 2018. We believe\n that full and complete Afghan \xe2\x80\x9ccontrol\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cresponsibility\xe2\x80\x9d will not exist until the Afghan government\n can generate its own financing to meet its security mission.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 28\n\x0cAPPENDIX IV - COMMENTS FROM U.S. ARMY CENTRAL\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 29\n\x0c SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Response to U.S. Army Central\xe2\x80\x99s December 27, 2012 Memorandum:\n 1. U.S. Army Central commented that CSTC-A may have \xe2\x80\x9cno other alternative\xe2\x80\x9d than to base budget requests\n on fuel orders because the needed consumption data may not exist. We disagree. Reliance on fuel\n orders without factoring battle losses and theft, in an environment riddled with vulnerabilities as detailed\n in this report would expose U.S. dollars to a high risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. We believe that CSTC-A\n must take significant steps to gain insight into actual consumption and losses to assure proper\n stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 30\n\x0cAPPENDIX V - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS\n\nNicolas \xe2\x80\x9cNick\xe2\x80\x9d Torres, Senior Audit Manager\nSteven Haughton, Auditor-in-Charge\nChristina Andersson, Senior Analyst\nDinusha Jayasinghe, Senior Auditor\n\n\nThe following staff provided analytical support:\nGreg Paige, Forensic Auditor\nMia Bonarski, Communication Analyst/Graphics\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 31\n\x0c This audit report was conducted under project\n code SIGAR-054A.\n\n\n\n\nSIGAR Audit 13-4 / Afghan National Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Capability Page 32\n\x0c The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan\n SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Mission Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the\n reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and\n objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of\n taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate\n and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and\n recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and\n other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and\n funding decisions to:\n \xe2\x80\xa2 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction\n strategy and its component programs;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 improve management and accountability over funds\n administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their\n contractors;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 improve contracting and contract management\n processes;\n \xe2\x80\xa2 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and\n \xe2\x80\xa2 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.\n\n\n Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s Web\n site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports,\n Reports and Testimonies testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.\n\n\n\n\n To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of\nTo Report Fraud, Waste, and fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR\xe2\x80\x99s\n Abuse in Afghanistan hotline:\n Reconstruction Programs \xe2\x80\xa2 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phone International: +1-866-329-8893\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378\n \xe2\x80\xa2 U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065\n\n\n\n\n Public Affairs Officer\n Public Affairs\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Phone: 703-545-5974\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil\n \xe2\x80\xa2 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs\n 2530 Crystal Drive\n Arlington, VA 22202\n\x0c'


type: legislation

text:
 1.3.2017
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 54/2
 IZVEDBENA UREDBA KOMISIJE (EU) 2017/356
 z dne 15. februarja 2017
 o odobritvi spremembe specifikacije za ime, vpisano v registru zaščitenih označb porekla in zaščitenih geografskih označb, ki ni manjša (Rheinisches Zuckerrübenkraut/Rheinischer Zuckerrübensirup/Rheinisches Rübenkraut (ZGO))
 EVROPSKA KOMISIJA JE –
 ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
 ob upoštevanju Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. novembra 2012 o shemah kakovosti kmetijskih proizvodov in živil (1) ter zlasti člena 52(2) Uredbe,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 (1)
 Komisija je v skladu s prvim pododstavkom člena 53(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012 proučila zahtevek Nemčije za odobritev spremembe specifikacije za zaščiteno geografsko označbo „Rheinisches Zuckerrübenkraut“/„Rheinischer Zuckerrübensirup“/„Rheinisches Rübenkraut“, registrirano v skladu z Izvedbeno uredbo Komisije (EU) št. 628/2012 (2).
 (2)
 Ker zadevna sprememba ni manjša v smislu člena 53(2) Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012, je Komisija v skladu s členom 50(2)(a) navedene uredbe zahtevek za spremembo objavila v Uradnem listu Evropske unije
 (3).
 (3)
 Ker v skladu s členom 51 Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012 Komisija ni prejela nobenega ugovora, bi bilo treba spremembo specifikacije odobriti –
 SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
 Člen 1
 Sprememba specifikacije, objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije v zvezi z imenom „Rheinisches Zuckerrübenkraut“/„Rheinischer Zuckerrübensirup“/„Rheinisches Rübenkraut“ (ZGO), se odobri.
 Člen 2
 Ta uredba začne veljati dvajseti dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
 Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah.
 V Bruslju, 15. februarja 2017
 Za Komisijo
 V imenu predsednika
 Phil HOGAN
 Član Komisije
 (1) UL L 343, 14.12.2012, str. 1.
 (2) Izvedbena uredba Komisije (EU) št. 628/2012 z dne 6. julija 2012 o vpisu imena v register zaščitenih označb porekla in zaščitenih geografskih označb (Rheinisches Zuckerrübenkraut/Rheinischer Zuckerrübensirup/Rheinisches Rübenkraut (ZGO)) (UL L 182, 13.7.2012, str. 10).
 (3) UL C 403, 1.11.2016, str. 9.


text:
 20.4.2012
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 108/15
 РЕГЛАМЕНТ ЗА ИЗПЪЛНЕНИЕ (ЕC) No 338/2012 НА КОМИСИЯТА
 от 19 април 2012 година
 относно издаването на лицензии за внос, за които са подадени заявления през първите седем дни на месец април 2012 г. в рамките на тарифната квота за висококачествено говеждо месо, управлявана съгласно Регламент (ЕО) No 620/2009
 ЕВРОПЕЙСКАТА КОМИСИЯ,
 като взе предвид Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз,
 като взе предвид Регламент (ЕО) No 1234/2007 на Съвета от 22 октомври 2007 г. за установяване на обща организация на селскостопанските пазари и относно специфични разпоредби за някои земеделски продукти („Общ регламент за ООП“) (1),
 като взе предвид Регламент (ЕО) No 1301/2006 на Комисията от 31 август 2006 г. за определяне на общи правила за управление на тарифните квоти за внос на земеделски продукти, които се управляват чрез система на лицензии за внос (2), и по-специално член 7, параграф 2 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 Регламент (ЕО) No 620/2009 на Комисията от 13 юли 2009 г. за управление на тарифна квота за внос на висококачествено говеждо месо (3) определя подробни правила за подаване на заявления и издаване на лицензии за внос.
 (2)
 В член 7, параграф 2 от Регламент (ЕО) No 1301/2006 се посочва, че когато количествата, обхванати от заявленията за лицензии, превишават наличните количества за периода на тарифната квота за внос, следва да бъде определен коефициент на разпределение, който се прилага за количествата, обхванати от всяко заявление за лицензия. Заявленията за лицензии за внос, подадени съгласно член 3 от Регламент (ЕО) No 620/2009 в периода от 1 до 7 април 2012 г., превишават наличните количества. Поради това следва да се определи до каква степен могат да се издават лицензии за внос, като се определи коефициентът на разпределение,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩИЯ РЕГЛАМЕНТ:
 Член 1
 Към заявленията за лицензии за внос, които се отнасят за квота с пореден номер 09.4449 и са подадени съгласно член 3 от Регламент (ЕО) No 620/2009 в периода от 1 до 7 април 2012 г., се прилага коефициент на разпределение в размер на 0,408411 %.
 Член 2
 Настоящият регламент влиза в сила в деня след публикуването му в Официален вестник на Европейския съюз.
 Настоящият регламент е задължителен в своята цялост и се прилага пряко във всички държави-членки.
 Съставено в Брюксел на 19 април 2012 година.
 За Комисията, от името на председателя,
 José Manuel SILVA RODRÍGUEZ
 Генерален директор на Генерална дирекция „Земеделие и развитие на селските райони“
 (1) ОВ L 299, 16.11.2007 г., стр. 1.
 (2) ОВ L 238, 1.9.2006 г., стр. 13.
 (3) ОВ L 182, 15.7.2009 г., стр. 25.