text:
 EUROPEISKA KOMMISSIONEN
 Bryssel den 20.1.2022
 COM(2022) 20 final
 2022/0010(BUD)
 Förslag till
 EUROPAPARLAMENTETS OCH RÅDETS BESLUT
 om utnyttjande av Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare efter en ansökan från Spanien – EGF/2021/006 ES/Cataluña automotive
 MOTIVERING
 BAKGRUND TILL FÖRSLAGET
 1.De bestämmelser som gäller för ekonomiska bidrag från Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare (EGF) fastställs i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2021/691 av den 28 april 2021 om Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare (EGF) och om upphävande av förordning (EU) nr 1309/2013
 1
 (nedan kallad EGF-förordningen).
 2.Den 23 september 2021 lämnade Spanien in ansökan EGF/2021/006 ES/Cataluña automotive om ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF, efter uppsägningar inom den ekonomiska sektor som i Nace rev. 2 klassificeras som huvudgrupp 29 (Tillverkning av motorfordon, släpfordon och påhängsvagnar) i Nuts 2-regionen Cataluña (ES51) i Spanien.
 3.Efter en bedömning av denna ansökan har kommissionen i enlighet med alla tillämpliga bestämmelser i EGF-förordningen dragit slutsatsen att villkoren för beviljande av ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF är uppfyllda.
 SAMMANFATTNING AV ANSÖKAN
 Ansökan om bidrag från EGF
 EGF/2021/006 ES/Cataluña automotive
 Medlemsstat
 Spanien
 Region eller regioner som berörs (Nuts
 2
 2)
 Cataluña (ES51)
 Dag för inlämnande av ansökan
 23 september 2021
 Dag för bekräftande av att ansökan mottagits
 29 september 2021
 Dag för begäran om ytterligare uppgifter
 7 oktober 2021
 Tidsfrist för inlämning av ytterligare uppgifter
 29 oktober 2021
 Tidsfrist för slutförande av bedömningen
 20 januari 2022
 Insatskriterium
 Artikel 4.2 b i EGF-förordningen
 Antal berörda företag
 10
 Ekonomisk(a) sektor(er)
 (huvudgrupp enligt Nace rev. 2)
 3
 Huvudgrupp 29 (Tillverkning av motorfordon, släpfordon och påhängsvagnar)
 Referensperiod (sex månader)
 1 januari 2021–1 juli 2021
 Antal uppsägningar under referensperioden (a)
 346
 Antal uppsägningar före eller efter referensperioden (b)
 359
 Totalt antal uppsägningar (a + b)
 705
 Totalt antal stödberättigade bidragsmottagare
 705
 Totalt antal berörda bidragsmottagare
 450
 Budget för individanpassade tjänster (EUR)
 3 138 300
 Budget för genomförande av EGF
 4
 (EUR)
 150 119
 Total budget (EUR)
 3 288 419
 Bidrag från EGF (85 %) (EUR)
 2 795 156
 BEDÖMNING AV ANSÖKAN
 Förfarande
 4.Den 23 september 2021 lämnade Spanien in ansökan EGF/2021/006 ES/Cataluña automotive, dvs. inom tolv veckor från den dag då insatskriterierna i artikel 4 i EGF-förordningen var uppfyllda. Kommissionen bekräftade den 29 september 2021 att den mottagit ansökan och begärde ytterligare uppgifter från Spanien den 7 oktober 2021. Spanien lämnade in dessa ytterligare uppgifter inom 15 arbetsdagar räknat från den dag då begäran gjordes. Tidsfristen på 50 arbetsdagar från och med den dag då den fullständiga ansökan har mottagits, inom vilken kommissionen bör slutföra sin bedömning av huruvida ansökan uppfyller villkoren för ekonomiskt bidrag, löper ut den 20 januari 2022.
 Formella krav på ansökan
 Berörda företag och bidragsmottagare
 5.Ansökan gäller 346 uppsagda arbetstagare vars verksamhet har upphört inom den ekonomiska sektor som i Nace rev.2 klassificeras som huvudgrupp 29 (Tillverkning av motorfordon, släpfordon och påhängsvagnar). Arbetstagarna blev uppsagda i Nuts 2-regionen Cataluña (ES51).
 Företag och antal uppsägningar under referensperioden
 Aludyne Automotive Spain, SLU
 3
 Gruau Ibérica, SLU
 7
 Bosch Sistemas de Frenado, SLU
 13
 Magna Seating Spain SLU
 1
 Continental Automotive Spain, SA
 156
 Nobel Plastiques Iberia, SA
 68
 Faurecia Interior Systems España, SAU
 71
 Robert Bosch España (Castellet-fabriken)
 8
 Fico Transpar, SA
 10
 U-Shin Spain, SLU
 9
 Totalt antal företag: 10
 Totalt antal uppsägningar:
 346
 Totalt antal egenföretagare vars verksamhet har upphört:
 0
 Totalt antal stödberättigade arbetstagare och egenföretagare:
 346
 Insatskriterier
 6.Spaniens ansökan lämnades in enligt insatskriteriet i artikel 4.2 b i EGF-förordningen, enligt vilket det krävs att verksamheten upphör för minst 200 uppsagda arbetstagare under en referensperiod på sex månader vid företag som verkar inom samma ekonomiska sektor enligt huvudgrupperna i Nace rev. 2 och är belägna i en region eller två angränsande regioner på Nuts 2-nivå i en medlemsstat. Ansökan gällde 346 uppsagda arbetstagare i Nuts 2-regionen Cataluña (ES51).
 7.Referensperioden för ansökan är sex månader och löper från den 1 januari 2021 till den 1 juli 2021.
 Beräkning av uppsägningar och verksamheter som upphör
 8.Tidpunkten för när de uppsagda arbetstagarnas verksamhet upphörde under referensperioden har beräknats från den dag då anställningsavtalet de facto avslutades eller upphörde att gälla.
 Stödberättigade bidragsmottagare
 9.Utöver de ovannämnda arbetstagarna omfattar de stödberättigade bidragsmottagarna även 359 uppsagda arbetstagare vars verksamhet upphörde före eller efter referensperioden på sex månader. Alla dessa arbetstagare upphörde med sin verksamhet inom sex månader före referensperiodens början den 1 januari 2021 eller mellan referensperiodens slut och dagen före antagandet av detta förslag. Det går att fastställa ett tydligt orsakssamband med den händelse som ledde till att verksamheten upphörde för de uppsagda arbetstagarna under referensperioden.
 10.Det totala antalet stödberättigade bidragsmottagare är 705.
 Beskrivning av de händelser som ledde till att arbetstagarna sades upp och verksamheten upphörde
 11.Den händelse som föranledde uppsägningarna är Nissans beslut att upphöra med sin verksamhet och lägga ner sin anläggning i Katalonien.
 12.Den 27 maj 2020 lade Renault, Nissan och Mitsubishi fram sin nya strategiska plan baserad på ett system med ledarföretag och följarföretag och komplementaritet mellan företagen. Varje företag ska fokusera på en viss typ av fordon per produktsegment, dvs. ledarföretaget tillverkar först ett moderfordon och sedan systerfordon med stöd av följarföretagen. Varje företag kommer också att fokusera på sina kärnregioner. Enligt detta system ska Nissan fokusera på Kina, Nordamerika och Japan, Renault på Europa, Ryssland, Sydamerika och Nordafrika och Mitsubishi på Sydostasien och Oceanien
 5
 . Dagen efter bekräftade Nissan att man till följd av att EU:s marknadsandel av den globala produktionen av personbilar blir allt mindre
 6
 kommer att minska sin närvaro i Europa
 7
 för att istället fokusera på mer lönsamma marknader. Nissan meddelade också att företaget planerade att lägga ner sin fabrik i Barcelona
 8
 . Nedläggningen hade slutförts i slutet av 2021.
 13.De företag som anges i punkt 5 var leverantörer till Nissan. Beskedet om Nissans nedläggning ledde till att vissa av dessa leverantörer delvis lade ner sin verksamhet (t.ex. Faurecia
 9
 och Continental) och att deras personalstyrka minskade med 31–53 %. Andra leverantörer stängde helt och hållet, t.ex. Aludyne
 10
 , Magna Seating
 11
 och Robert Bosch
 12
 .
 Förväntad inverkan av uppsägningarna för den lokala, regionala eller nationella ekonomin och sysselsättningen
 14.Bilindustrin är Kataloniens tredje viktigaste sektor (efter kemikalieindustrin och livsmedelsindustrin), både vad gäller omsättning och antal sysselsatta. Omsättningen i bilindustrin (23,8 miljarder euro) motsvarar över 10 % av regionens BNP
 13
 . Sektorn tillhandahåller omkring 143 000 arbetstillfällen (direkta, indirekta och sekundära) vilket utgör 4,2 % av sysselsättningen i Katalonien enligt uppgifter från CIAC (Clúster de la Indústria d’Automoció de Catalunya)
 14
 .
 15.De uppsägningar som omfattas av ansökan har skett i fyra distrikt i provinsen Barcelona (Barcelonès, Alt Penedés, Baix Llobregat och Vallés Oriental) där det finns ett stort antal bilföretag. Antalet förlorade arbetstillfällena i dessa regioner ökade under perioden 2018–2020.
 Uppsägningar i Barcelonès, Alt Penedés, Baix Llobregat och Vallés Oriental (2017=0)
 Källa: Kataloniens offentliga arbetsförmedling (SOC)
 15
 16.Antalet arbetstagare som sades upp inom ramen för kollektiva uppsägningar mellan januari och juni 2021 i Katalonien (7 993) överstiger redan antalet uppsagda arbetstagare under 2020 (7 936)
 16
 . Nästan 50 % av uppsägningarna under första halvåret 2021 skedde inom bilindustrin, som är den sektor som påverkats mest av ökningen av kollektiva uppsägningar.
 17.Nedläggningen av Nissans fabrik i Barcelona resulterade i över 2 500 direkta uppsägningar och 8 000 förlorade arbetstillfällen hos Nissans leverantörer (3 000 bland de främsta leverantörerna som förhandlar direkt med fordonstillverkarna och ytterligare 5 000 bland de mindre leverantörerna)
 17
 . Arbetsgivarorganisationen Pimec uppskattar den negativa effekten av nedläggningen av Nissans fabrik i Barcelona till 3 600 miljoner EUR, vilket motsvarar 2,6 % av värdet av denna industrisektor i Katalonien
 18
 .
 Tillämpning av EU:s kvalitetskriterier för planering för förändringar och omstruktureringar
 18.Spanien har beskrivit hur de rekommendationer som fastställs i EU:s kvalitetskriterier för planering för förändringar och omstruktureringar har beaktats i det här fallet. Spanien framhåller att omstruktureringsprocesserna övervakas av offentliga organ, som hanterar ansökningarna om kollektiva uppsägningar. Dessa organ har dock inte möjlighet att godkänna eller avslå ansökningar. Däremot kan de inrätta program för att främja skapandet av arbetstillfällen i samarbete med lokala organ eller offentlig-privata organ (som ansvarar för omplacering av arbetskraft).
 19.Inför uppsägningarna deltar arbetsmarknadens parter, företagen och arbetstagarrepresentanterna i enlighet med nationell lagstiftning i förhandlingar i syfte att nå en överenskommelse om uppsägningarna och de omställningsplaner som alla företag som säger upp minst 50 arbetstagare samtidigt måste tillhandahålla. Genom omställningsplanerna erbjuds arbetstagarna stöd i arbetssökandet, yrkesvägledning och utbildning. Planerna genomförs under sex månader. Kataloniens offentliga arbetsförmedling tillhandahåller omplaceringstjänster till de uppsagda arbetstagare som inte har rätt till en omställningsplan.
 20.De största arbetstagar-, arbetsgivar- och näringslivsorganisationerna i Katalonien – Comisiones Obreras, UGT, Fomento del Trabajo Nacional (FOMENT) och PIMEC – analyserade framtidsutsikterna för den regionala arbetsmarknaden och vilka färdigheter som behövdes i de företag som sökte arbetskraft. Dessa arbetsmarknadsparter ingick i den arbetsgrupp som inrättats för att fastställa det åtgärdspaket som omfattas av ansökan om medfinansiering från EGF.
 Komplementaritet med åtgärder som finansieras med nationella medel eller unionsmedel
 21.Spanien har bekräftat att de åtgärder som beskrivs nedan och som beviljas ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF inte kommer att få ekonomiskt bidrag från något annat av unionens finansieringsinstrument.
 22.Det samordnade paketet med individanpassade tjänster utgör ett komplement till de åtgärder som finansieras med andra nationella medel eller EU-medel, såsom de allmänna tjänster som tillhandahålls av den offentliga arbetsförmedlingen (stöd i arbetssökandet, yrkesrådgivning och utbildning).
 Samråd med de berörda bidragsmottagarna eller deras företrädare eller med arbetsmarknadens parter samt lokala och regionala myndigheter
 23.Spanien har uppgett att flera aktörer stödde ansökan om bidrag från EGF. En arbetsgrupp bestående av företrädare för bland annat den offentliga arbetsförmedlingen, CIAC och ACCIÓ (Agència per la Competitivitat de l'Empresa)
 19
 upprättades. Arbetsgruppen sammanträdde varannan vecka från och med den 30 juli 2020 till och med den 14 december 2020. Arbetsmarknadens parter (se punkt 20) deltog också i processen. Vid ett möte den 26 november 2020 uttryckte arbetsmarknadens parter officiellt sitt stöd för de EGF-åtgärder som kommer att erbjudas f.d. arbetstagare hos Nissans underleverantörer.
 Berörda bidragsmottagare och föreslagna åtgärder
 Berörda bidragsmottagare
 24.Totalt förväntas 450 uppsagda arbetstagare delta i åtgärderna. Fördelningen av arbetstagarna efter kön, åldersgrupp och utbildningsnivå är följande:
 Kategori
 Förväntat antal
 bidragsmottagare
 Kön
 Män
 250
 (55,6 %)
 Kvinnor
 200
 (44,4 %)
 Ickebinära
 0
 (0,0 %)
 Åldersgrupp
 Under 30 år
 16
 (3,5 %)
 30–54 år
 277
 (61,6 %)
 Över 54 år
 157
 (34,9 %)
 Utbildningsnivå
 Högst grundskoleutbildning
 20
 227
 (50,4 %)
 Gymnasial
 21
 eller eftergymnasial utbildning
 22
 108
 (24,0 %)
 Högre utbildning
 23
 115
 (25,6 %)
 Föreslagna åtgärder
 25.De individanpassade tjänster som kommer att erbjudas de uppsagda arbetstagarna består av följande åtgärder:
 –Informations- och introduktionsmöte. Vid detta möte ges arbetstagarna allmän information om rådgivningstjänster och utbildningsprogram samt olika bidrag och incitament, och deras kompetens och erfarenhet kartläggs. Eftersom åtgärderna genomförs i samarbete med CIAC (Clúster de la Indústria d’Automoció de Catalunya) kan arbetstagarna få hjälp med att kartlägga sina karriärmöjligheter inom bilindustrin och besluta om de ska utveckla sin kompetens för att kunna fortsätta att arbeta inom bilindustrin eller omskola sig för att kunna söka arbete inom andra sektorer.
 –Förberedande seminarier. Vid dessa seminarier fokuserar man på olika metoder för och aspekter av arbetssökande t.ex. att skriva ett CV, anställningsintervjuer och gruppdynamik. Detta kompletteras av mer ingående information om omplacering, om sektorer som kräver tillstånd eller intyg om yrkesmässig kompetens, certifiering av kompetenser och mjuka färdigheter som förvärvats i arbetet. För de arbetstagare som överväger att starta eget finns det workshoppar om hur man skapar ett företag.
 –Arbetstagarna kommer att kunna få yrkesvägledning genom bilaterala möten med en rådgivare. Tillsammans med rådgivaren kommer arbetstagarna att utarbeta en individanpassad plan för anställning eller egenföretagande. I samband med dessa möten kommer också eventuella utbildningsbehov att fastställas.
 –Utbildning. Detta omfattar 1) utbildning i övergripande kompetenser, såsom personlig utveckling, förebyggande av arbetsrelaterade risker, främmande språk och utbildning som utbildare, 2) yrkesinriktad utbildning för omskolning i syfte att tillgodose behov som har konstaterats på den lokala arbetsmarknaden, såsom underhåll av byggnader och stadsutrustning, lagerarbete, lagerlogistik, HACCP
 24
 , livsmedelssäkerhet, livsmedelshantering osv. samt 3) yrkesinriktad utbildning för kompetensutveckling för att tillgodose kompetensbehoven inom bilsektorn, t.ex. svetsteknik (TIG
 25
 , MIG/MAG
 26
 , automatisk svetsning, specialsvetsning osv.), industridesign (två- och tredimensionell mekanisk design, CAD, integrering med CAD- och CAM-system
 27
 osv.), maskinbearbetning (CNC-programmering
 28
 , tolkning av CNC-ritningar, CNC-operatör, ställare osv.) och underhåll (elektrisk, hydraulisk och pneumatisk automatisering, programmerbara automationer, underhåll av rullande system och överföringssystem, underhåll av hybridfordon och elfordon osv.) och 4) praktikplatser på företag. Dessa åtgärder syftar till att möjliggöra utbildning i en verklig arbetsmiljö.
 –Stöd till entreprenörskap. För att utveckla bärkraftiga företagsprojekt får arbetstagare som är intresserade av att bli egenföretagare stöd i form av utbildning och individanpassad handledning under hela processen med att starta företaget. Detta kan omfatta planering, genomförbarhetsstudier, affärsplaner, hjälp med att identifiera finansieringsmöjligheter osv.
 –Skapande av företag. Arbetstagare som startar eget företag eller verksamhet som egenföretagare får upp till 5 000 euro för att täcka etableringskostnaderna.
 –Intensivt stöd i arbetssökandet som inkluderar sökande efter lokala och regionala sysselsättningsmöjligheter (även för egenföretagare) och jobbmatchning.
 –Handledning efter att arbetstagaren har fått nytt arbete. Arbetstagare som återinträder på arbetsmarknaden får handledning under de första månaderna för att förebygga eventuella problem som kan uppstå i deras nya arbete.
 –Incitament. Det finns ett antal olika incitament. 1) Bidrag till pendlingsutgifter planeras. Beloppet beräknas per deltagandedag och kommer att ta hänsyn till om pendlingen är lokal eller sker mellan olika städer. 2) Omställningsincitament. De som återgår till arbetslivet får 350 EUR per månad under en period på högst tre månader. Incitamentet är utformat för att uppmuntra till snabb återanställning och få äldre arbetstagare att stanna kvar på arbetsmarknaden. 3) Bidrag till praktik Arbetstagare som har praktikplats på ett företag får 10 EUR per timmes praktik. 4) Bidrag till personer med omsorgsansvar Arbetstagare med omsorgsansvar (barn, äldre eller personer med funktionsnedsättning) får upp till 20 EUR per dag som de deltar i åtgärderna. Bidraget ska täcka de extrakostnader som uppstår för deltagare med omsorgsansvar som deltar i åtgärderna.
 26.Åtgärderna har planerats så att de är förenliga med Spaniens strategi för en cirkulär ekonomi
 29
 och Kataloniens strategi för hållbar utveckling
 30
 . Den övergripande utbildningen om digitala färdigheter och en del av den planerade kompetensutvecklingen och omskolningen uppfyller kravet på att förmedla de färdigheter som krävs i den digitala industriella tidsåldern och i en resurseffektiv ekonomi, i enlighet med artikel 7.2 i EGF-förordningen. För detta ändamål har följande studier beaktats: Capacitats i tecnologies vinculades a la indústria 4.0 a Catalunya
 31
 och Competències i necessitats formatives del sector de l’automoció a Catalunya
 32
 .
 27.De föreslagna åtgärderna utgör aktiva arbetsmarknadsåtgärder som är stödberättigande enligt artikel 7 i EGF-förordningen. Dessa åtgärder ersätter inte passiva socialskyddsåtgärder.
 28.När det gäller de åtgärder som redan vidtagits för att hjälpa de uppsagda arbetstagarna har Spanien meddelat att de arbetstagare som har rätt till en omställningsplan
 33
 redan har fått en sådan och att den offentliga arbetsförmedlingen har gett dem tillgång till sina allmänna tjänster (stöd i arbetssökandet, yrkesrådgivning och utbildning).
 29.Spanien har lämnat de uppgifter som krävs om åtgärder som de berörda företagen är tvungna att vidta enligt nationell rätt eller kollektivavtal. Spanien har bekräftat att ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF inte kommer att ersätta sådana åtgärder.
 Beräknad budget
 30.De beräknade sammanlagda kostnaderna uppgår till 3 288 419 EUR, vilket innefattar utgifter för individanpassade tjänster på 3 138 300 EUR och utgifter för förberedande åtgärder, förvaltning, information och marknadsföring samt kontroll och rapportering på 150 119 EUR.
 31.Ansökan om ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF uppgår till sammanlagt 2 795 156 EUR (85 % av de sammanlagda kostnaderna).
 32.Den offentliga arbetsförmedlingen står för den nationella förfinansieringen och medfinansieringen.
 Åtgärder
 Beräknat antal deltagare
 Beräknad kostnad per deltagare
 (EUR)
 34
 Beräknade sammanlagda kostnader
 (EUR)
 35
 Individanpassade tjänster (åtgärder enligt artikel 7.2 a i EGF-förordningen)
 Allmän information till stödberättigade bidragsmottagare och introduktionsmöte
 (acogida y diagnóstico inicial)
 450
 70
 31 500
 Förberedande seminarier
 (medidas de sensibilización-talleres preparatorios)
 200
 250
 50 000
 Yrkesvägledning
 (programa de orientación laboral)
 450
 472
 212 500
 Utbildning
 (programa de formación)
 400
 3 104
 1 241 500
 Stöd till entreprenörskap
 (escuela de emprendedores y asesoría del emprendedor)
 50
 1 300
 65 000
 Skapande av företag
 (incentivo a la constitución de negocios)
 20
 5 000
 100 000
 Intensivt stöd i arbetssökandet
 (prospección laboral)
 300
 1 300
 390 000
 Handledning efter att arbetstagaren har fått nytt arbete
 (seguimiento en el empleo)
 200
 250
 50 000
 Delsumma a:
 Andel av paketet med individanpassade tjänster
 –
 2 140 500
 (68,21 %)
 Bidrag och incitament (åtgärder enligt artikel 7.2 b i EGF-förordningen)
 Incitament
 (beca desplazamiento, insercción laboral por cuenta aj ena, conciliación, y beca prácticas en empresa)
 450
 2 217
 997 800
 Delsumma b:
 Andel av paketet med individanpassade tjänster
 –
 997 800
 (31,79 %)
 Åtgärder enligt artikel 7.5 i EGF-förordningen
 1. Förberedande åtgärder
 –
 14 678
 2. Förvaltning
 –
 85 087
 3. Information och marknadsföring
 –
 35 615
 4. Kontroll och rapportering
 –
 14 739
 Delsumma c:
 Andel av de sammanlagda kostnaderna:
 –
 150 119
 (4,57 %)
 Sammanlagda kostnader (a + b + c):
 –
 3 288 419
 Bidrag från EGF (85 % av de sammanlagda kostnaderna)
 –
 2 795 156
 33.Kostnaderna för de åtgärder som enligt ovanstående tabell omfattas av artikel 7.2 b i EGF-förordningen överstiger inte 35 % av de sammanlagda kostnaderna för det samordnade paketet med individanpassade tjänster. Spanien har bekräftat att dessa åtgärder förutsätter att de berörda bidragsmottagarna aktivt söker arbete eller deltar i utbildning.
 34.Spanien har bekräftat att kostnaderna för investeringar i egenföretagande, skapande av företag och anställdas övertagande av företag inte kommer att överstiga 22 000 EUR per bidragsmottagare.
 Period under vilken utgifterna är stödberättigande
 35.Spanien började erbjuda de individanpassade tjänsterna till de berörda bidragsmottagarna den 17 januari 2022. Utgifterna för åtgärderna kommer därför att berättiga till ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF från och med den 17 januari 2022 till och med 24 månader efter den dag då finansieringsbeslutet träder i kraft.
 36.Spanien började få administrativa kostnader för genomförandet av EGF den 30 juli 2020. Utgifterna för förberedande åtgärder, förvaltning, information och marknadsföring samt kontroll och rapportering ska därför berättiga till ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF från och med den 30 juli 2020 till och med 31 månader efter den dag då finansieringsbeslutet träder i kraft.
 Förvaltnings- och kontrollsystem
 37.Ansökan innehåller en beskrivning av förvaltnings- och kontrollsystemet och av de berörda organens skyldigheter. Spanien har meddelat kommissionen att det ekonomiska bidraget kommer att förvaltas och kontrolleras av samma organ som förvaltar och kontrollerar bidraget från Europeiska socialfonden+. Den offentliga arbetsförmedlingen kommer att vara den förvaltande myndighetens förmedlande organ.
 Den berörda medlemsstatens åtaganden
 38.Spanien har gett alla nödvändiga garantier för att
 –principerna för likabehandling och icke-diskriminering kommer att följas i fråga om vilka som ska få ta del av de föreslagna åtgärderna och genomförandet av dem,
 –de krav som rör kollektiva uppsägningar i den nationella lagstiftningen och i EU-lagstiftningen är uppfyllda,
 –de företag som sagt upp arbetstagare och därefter fortsatt sin verksamhet har uppfyllt sina rättsliga förpliktelser och har vidtagit vederbörliga åtgärder med tanke på sina arbetstagare,
 –all dubbelfinansiering kommer att förhindras,
 –det ekonomiska bidraget från EGF kommer att vara förenligt med unionens förfaranderegler och materiella regler för statligt stöd.
 BUDGETKONSEKVENSER
 Budgetförslag
 39.Det högsta årliga beloppet för EGF får i enlighet med artikel 8 i rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 av den 17 december 2020 om den fleråriga budgetramen 2021–2027
 36
 inte överstiga 186 miljoner EUR (i 2018 års priser).
 40.Efter att ha prövat om ansökan uppfyller villkoren i artikel 13.1 och 13.2 i EGF-förordningen och tagit i beaktande antalet berörda bidragsmottagare, de föreslagna åtgärderna och de beräknade kostnaderna, föreslår kommissionen att EGF utnyttjas för utbetalning av ett ekonomiskt bidrag på 2 795 156 EUR, vilket motsvarar 85 % av de sammanlagda kostnaderna för de åtgärder som föreslagits i ansökan.
 41.Förslaget till beslut om att utnyttja EGF kommer att antas av Europaparlamentet och rådet, såsom föreskrivs i punkt 9 i det interinstitutionella avtalet av den 16 december 2020 mellan Europaparlamentet, Europeiska unionens råd och Europeiska kommissionen om budgetdisciplin, samarbete i budgetfrågor och sund ekonomisk förvaltning samt om nya egna medel, inbegripet en färdplan för införandet av nya egna medel
 37
 .
 Anknytande rättsakter
 42.Samtidigt med detta förslag till beslut om utnyttjande av EGF kommer kommissionen att förelägga Europaparlamentet och rådet ett förslag om överföring av ett belopp på 2 795 156 EUR till den berörda budgetposten.
 43.Samtidigt som kommissionen antog detta förslag till beslut om utnyttjande av EGF antogs även ett beslut om ekonomiskt bidrag som utgör ett finansieringsbeslut i den mening som avses i artikel 110 i budgetförordningen
 38
 . Finansieringsbeslutet ska träda i kraft samma dag som kommissionen underrättas om att Europaparlamentet och rådet har godkänt budgetöverföringen.
 2022/0010 (BUD)
 Förslag till
 EUROPAPARLAMENTETS OCH RÅDETS BESLUT
 om utnyttjande av Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare efter en ansökan från Spanien – EGF/2021/006 ES/Cataluña automotive
 EUROPAPARLAMENTET OCH EUROPEISKA UNIONENS RÅD HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT
 med beaktande av fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt,
 med beaktande av Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) 2021/691 av den 28 april 2021 om Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare (EGF) och om upphävande av förordning (EU) nr 1309/2013
 39
 , särskilt artikel 15.1,
 med beaktande av det interinstitutionella avtalet av den 16 december 2020 mellan Europaparlamentet, Europeiska unionens råd och Europeiska kommissionen om budgetdisciplin, samarbete i budgetfrågor och sund ekonomisk förvaltning samt om nya egna medel, inbegripet en färdplan för införandet av nya egna medel
 40
 , särskilt punkt 9.
 med beaktande av Europeiska kommissionens förslag, och
 av följande skäl:
 (1)Målen för Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare (EGF) är att visa solidaritet och främja varaktig sysselsättning på anständiga villkor i unionen genom att erbjuda stöd till uppsagda arbetstagare och egenföretagare vars verksamhet har upphört i samband med omfattande omstruktureringar, och hjälpa dem att återgå till varaktig sysselsättning på anständiga villkor så snart som möjligt.
 (2)Det högsta årliga beloppet för EGF får i enlighet med artikel 8 i rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093
 41
 inte överstiga 186 miljoner EUR (i 2018 års priser).
 (3)Den 23 september 2021 lämnade Spanien in en ansökan om ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF efter uppsägningar av arbetstagare i den ekonomiska sektor som i den statistiska näringsgrensindelningen Nace
 42
 rev. 2 klassificeras som huvudgrupp 29 (Tillverkning av motorfordon, släpfordon och påhängsvagnar) i Nuts
 43
 2-regionen Cataluña (ES51) i Spanien. Ansökan kompletterades med ytterligare uppgifter i enlighet med artikel 8.5 i förordning (EU) 2021/691. Ansökan uppfyller villkoren för ekonomiskt bidrag från EGF enligt artikel 13 i förordning (EU) nr 2021/691.
 (4)EGF bör därför utnyttjas för att tillhandahålla det ekonomiska bidrag på 2 795 156 EUR som Spanien ansökt om.
 (5)För att minimera den tid det tar att bevilja bidrag från EGF bör detta beslut tillämpas från och med den dag då det antas.
 HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE.
 Artikel 1
 Europeiska fonden för justering för globaliseringseffekter för uppsagda arbetstagare ska belastas med 2 795 156 EUR i åtagande- och betalningsbemyndiganden ur Europeiska unionens allmänna budget för budgetåret 2022.
 Artikel 2
 Detta beslut träder i kraft samma dag som det offentliggörs i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning. Det ska tillämpas från och med den [datum för antagandet]
 44*.
 Utfärdat i Bryssel den
 På Europaparlamentets vägnar
 På rådets vägnar
 Ordförande
 Ordförande
 (1)
 EUT L 153, 3.5.2021, s. 48.
 (2)
 Kommissionens delegerade förordning 2019/1755 av den 8 augusti 2019 om ändring av bilagorna till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1059/2003 om inrättande av en gemensam nomenklatur för statistiska territoriella enheter (Nuts) (EUT L 270, 24.10.2019, s. 1).
 (3)
 EUT L 393, 30.12.2006, s. 1.
 (4)
 I enlighet med artikel 7.5 i förordning (EU) nr 2021/691.
 (5)
 Groupe Renault – Alliance, pressmeddelande av den 27 maj 2020
 https://www.elmundo.es/motor/2020/05/27/5ece193ffc6c83c0408b4596.html
 .
 (6)
 Enligt OICA (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers) har EU under de senaste två årtiondena (1999–2019) stadigt förlorat marknadsandelar när det gäller produktion av personbilar. Under 1999 var EU världsledande, med 40,7 % av den globala bilproduktionen. Under 2019 hade EU:s marknadsandel minskat till 23,6 %.
 (7)
 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nissan-restructuring-exclusive-idUSKBN22R1NX
 .
 (8)
 https://latribunadeautomocion.es/2020/05/uchida-nissantenemos-la-intencion-de-cerrar-barcelona-en-diciembre-de-2020/?v=d3dcf429c679
 .
 (9)
 Totalt antal uppsagda arbetstagare 160, varav 89 under perioden juni–december 2020 och 71 under referensperioden januari–juli 2021.
 (10)
 Aludyne sade upp hela sin arbetsstyrka, varav 79 arbetstagare under perioden juni–december 2020 och tre under referensperioden.
 (11)
 Magna Seating Spain sade upp hela sin arbetsstyrka varav 57 arbetstagare under perioden juni–december 2020 och en under referensperioden.
 (12)
 Robert Bosch España (Castellet-fabriken) sade upp hela sin arbetsstyrka, varav 293 arbetstagare under perioden juni–december 2020 och åtta under referensperioden.
 (13)
 https://www.economiadigital.es/empresas/nissan-industria-catalana-pierde-3600-millones-cierre_20067534_102.html
 .
 (14)
 CIAC
 är en ideell organisation för företag i Katalonien som har kopplingar till bilindustrin och som har forsknings-, utvecklings- och innovationsverksamhet. Huvudsyftet med CIAC är att stärka bilindustrins konkurrenskraft.
 (15)
 Servei Públic d'Ocupació de Catalunya
 .
 (16)
 https://www.elperiodico.com/es/economia/20210611/ola-repunta-catalunya-7-993-11816139.
 (17)
 https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20201111/49392567462/nissan-barcelona-crisis-impacto-cierre-fabricas-plantas.html
 (18)
 https://www.economiadigital.es/empresas/nissan-industria-catalana-pierde-3600-millones-cierre_20067534_102.html
 (19)
 ACCIÓ är en katalansk organisation som främjar företagens konkurrenskraft.
 (20)
 ISCED 0-2.
 (21)
 ISCED 3.
 (22)
 ISCED 4.
 (23)
 ISCED 5-8.
 (24)
 Faroanalys och kritiska styrpunkter (HACCP) är en internationellt erkänd metod för att identifiera och hantera livsmedelssäkerhetsrelaterade risker.
 (25)
 Gasvolframsvetsning.
 (26)
 Gasmetallbågsvetsning med inert skyddsgas (MIG) respektive aktiv skyddsgas (MAG).
 (27)
 CAD står för datorstödd konstruktion (computer-aided design) och CAM för datorstödd tillverkning (computer-aided manufacturing).
 (28)
 CNC-programmering (Computer Numerical Control Programming) används av tillverkare för att skapa programinstruktioner för datorer för styrning av ett maskinverktyg. CNC-programmering är en viktig del i tillverkningsprocessen och förbättrar såväl automatiseringen som flexibiliteten.
 (29)
 https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/calidad-y-evaluacion-ambiental/temas/economia-circular/estrategia/
 .
 (30)
 Estrategia para el desarrollo sostenible de Cataluña
 .
 (31)
 Capacitats i tecnologies vinculades a la indústria 4.0 a Catalunya
 .
 (32)
 Competències i necessitats formatives del sector de l’automoció a Catalunya
 .
 (33)
 Företag som säger upp minst 50 arbetstagare samtidigt måste tillhandahålla omställningsplaner. Genom omställningsplanerna erbjuds arbetstagarna stöd i arbetssökandet, yrkesvägledning och utbildning. Planerna genomförs under sex månader.
 (34)
 För att undvika decimaler har de beräknade kostnaderna per arbetstagare avrundats. Avrundningen påverkar dock inte den sammanlagda kostnaden för varje åtgärd, utan kostnaden är densamma som i Spaniens ansökan.
 (35)
 Beloppen har avrundats och därför stämmer totalsumman inte helt.
 (36)
 EUT L 433 I, 22.12.2020, s. 11.
 (37)
 EUT L 433 I, 22.12.2020, s. 29.
 (38)
 Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 av den 18 juli 2018 om finansiella regler för unionens allmänna budget, om ändring av förordningarna (EU) nr 1296/2013, (EU) nr 1301/2013, (EU) nr 1303/2013, (EU) nr 1304/2013, (EU) nr 1309/2013, (EU) nr 1316/2013, (EU) nr 223/2014, (EU) nr 283/2014 och beslut nr 541/2014/EU samt om upphävande av förordning (EU, Euratom) nr 966/2012 (EUT L 193, 30.7.2018, s. 1).
 (39)
 EUT L 153, 3.5.2021, s. 48.
 (40)
 EUT L 433 I, 22.12.2020, s. 29.
 (41)
 Rådets förordning (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 av den 17 december 2020 om den fleråriga budgetramen 2021–2027 (EUT L 433 I, 22.12.2020, s. 11).
 (42)
 Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1893/2006 av den 20 december 2006 om fastställande av den statistiska näringsgrensindelningen Nace rev. 2 och om ändring av rådets förordning (EEG) nr 3037/90 och vissa EG-förordningar om särskilda statistikområden (EUT L 393, 30.12.2006, s. 1).
 (43)
 Kommissionens delegerade förordning 2019/1755 av den 8 augusti 2019 om ändring av bilagorna till Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1059/2003 om inrättande av en gemensam nomenklatur för statistiska territoriella enheter (Nuts) (EUT L 270, 24.10.2019, s. 1).
 (44)
 *
 Datumet förs in av Europaparlamentet före offentliggörandet i EUT.


type: other

text:
Vila Nova de Poiares - Aviso 2a Alteração - 1a Revisão PDM
 2a Alteração à 1a revisão do Plano Diretor Municipal
 Torna-se público que a Câmara Municipal de Vila Nova de Poiares, na sua reunião ordinária de 4/10/2019, deliberou por unanimidade, proceder à abertura de discussão pública da alteração supra referida, concluída que está a fase de Acompanhamento, em obediência ao disposto nos números 1 e 2 do artigo 89o do D.L. 80/2015 de 14/5, para atender a eventuais observações, sugestões ou reclamações a qua haja lugar, ou ainda a pedidos de esclarecimentos, nos termos do no3 do mesmo artigo 89o.
 A proposta, o parecer final da CCDRC, e demais elementos do procedimento (nomeadamente, termos de referência, relatório, regulamento, relatório de não sujeição a avaliação ambiental), estão disponíveis para consulta nos Serviços de Ordenamento Urbanístico da Câmara Municipal, das 9h00 às 12h00, e das 14h00 às 17h00. Igualmente podem ser consultados através dos ficheiros abaixo disponibilizados.
 O prazo de discussão pública é de 30 dias seguidos e inicia-se no dia seguinte ao da publicação do presente Aviso no Diário da República, ou do dia seguinte ao do da publicação nos jornais se este for posterior.
 As participações de observações, sugestões, reclamações ou esclarecimentos, deverão ser apresentados por escrito, dentro do prazo considerado.
 Torna-se público que a Câmara Municipal de Vila Nova de Poiares, em Sessões de Câmara realizadas em 1/2/2019 e 1/3/2019 deliberou:
 Em 1/2/2019:
 a) Que de acordo com o disposto no no1 do artigo 119o, articulado com o disposto no no1 do artigo 76o, ambos do Regime Jurídico dos Instrumentos de Gestão Territorial (D.L. 80/2015 de 14/5) que seja iniciado o procedimento da 2a alteração à 1a revisão do Plano Diretor Municipal atualmente em vigor (1a Revisão, publicada no Diário da República da 2a série no 10 de 15 de janeiro de 2014), com redação conferida pela 1a alteração à 1a revisão, publicada no D.R. da 2a série no 166 de 29 de agosto de 2018, à qual foram presentes os elementos que se pretendem alterar constituídos pela proposta de nova redação de alguns artigos do regulamento, atualmente vigente, além de relatório da alteração e termos de referência.
 b) Estabelecer nos termos da mesma disposição legal do já referido artigo 76o o prazo de seis meses para elaboração das alterações, com exclusão das consultas a outras entidades.
 c) Estabelecer nos termos do disposto no no2 do artigo 88o do D.L. 80/2015, um prazo de 15 dias a contar do dia seguinte ao do da publicação do anuncio da presente deliberação no Diário da República para formulação de sugestões e para apresentação de informação sobre quaisquer questões que possam ser consideradas no âmbito deste procedimento.
 Em 1/3/2019:
 Aprovar no seguimento da deliberação de 1/2/2019 que se mantem, o Relatório de não sujeição a avaliação ambiental estratégica, mantendo todos os aspetos da deliberação anterior.
 Os elementos documentais que fundamentam a ação pretendida, podem ser consultados na página da Internet do Município, bem como no balcão único do Município, das 9h00 às 12h00 e das 14h00 à 17h00 e as sugestões e informações acima referidas, podem ser apresentadas por qualquer das formas disponíveis, e dentro dos prazos a seguir indicados de 15 dias a contar do estabelecido na alínea c) ou 15 dias apos o dia de publicação do aviso na comunicação social se for posterior.
 As sugestões ou observações deverão ser apresentadas por escrito.
 Urbanismo Editais/2019


type: wikipedia

text:
31 Μαρτίου | 1 Απριλίου | 2 Απριλίου
 Η 1η Απριλίου είναι η 91η ημέρα του έτους κατά το Γρηγοριανό ημερολόγιο (92η σε δίσεκτα έτη). Υπολείπονται 274 ημέρες.
 Γεγονότα
 286 – Ο Ρωμαίος αυτοκράτορας Διοκλητιανός ανακηρύσσει τον Μαξιμιανό συναυτοκράτορα με το βαθμό του Αυγούστου και του δίνει τον έλεγχο των δυτικών επαρχιών της Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας.
 457 – Ο Μαϊοριανός ανακηρύσσεται αυτοκράτορας της Δυτικής Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας από το ρωμαϊκό στρατό.
 527 - Ο Βυζαντινός αυτοκράτορας Ιουστίνος Α ́ ονομάζει τον ανιψιό του, Ιουστινιανό Α ́, συναυτοκράτορα και διάδοχο του θρόνου.
 1545 - Ιδρύεται το Ποτοσί στη Βολιβία, μετά την ανακάλυψη μεγάλων κοιτασμάτων αργύρου στην περιοχή.
 1625 - Ένας συνδυασμένος στόλος 52 ισπανικών και πορτογαλικών πλοίων αρχίζει την ανακατάληψη της Μπαΐα από τους Ολλανδούς.
 1789 - Στη Νέα Υόρκη, η Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων (ΗΠΑ) συνέρχεται για πρώτη φορά σε απαρτία.
 1867 – Η Σιγκαπούρη γίνεται βρετανική αποικία του στέμματος.
 1908 - Σχηματίζεται η Εδαφική Δύναμη (που το 1920 μετονομάστηκε σε Εφεδρικός Στρατός) ως εθελοντική εφεδρική δύναμη του βρετανικού στρατού.
 1914 – Ο Εμμανουήλ Μπενάκης γίνεται δήμαρχος Αθηναίων.
 1918 – Ιδρύεται η Βασιλική Πολεμική Αεροπορία (Βρετανία).
 1924 – Ο Αδόλφος Χίτλερ καταδικάζεται σε πέντε χρόνια φυλάκιση για τη συμμετοχή του στο «Πραξικόπημα της μπιραρίας», αλλά θα εκτίσει μόνο εννέα μήνες στη φυλακή. Κατά τη διάρκεια αυτής της περιόδου γράφει το βιβλίο Ο Αγών μου.
 1933 - Οι πρόσφατα εκλεγμένοι Ναζί διοργανώνουν υπό τον Γιούλιους Στράιχερ ένα μονοήμερο μποϊκοτάζ όλων των εβραϊκών επιχειρήσεων της Γερμανίας, εγκαινιάζοντας μία σειρά αντισημιτικών πράξεων.
 1936 - Η Ορίσα γίνεται πολιτεία της Ινδίας.
 1937 - Ισπανικός Εμφύλιος: Η Χαέν στην Ισπανία βομβαρδίζεται από γερμανικές φασιστικές δυνάμεις που υποστηρίζουν τους εθνικιστές του Φρανθίσκο Φράνκο.
 1948 – Οι Νήσοι Φερόες αποκτούν την αυτονομία τους από τη Δανία.
 1955 – Η οργάνωση ΕΟΚΑ ξεκινά ένοπλο αγώνα για ανεξαρτησία της Κύπρου από το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο και ένωση με την Ελλάδα.
 1960 - Ο δορυφόρος TIROS-1 μεταδίδει την πρώτη τηλεοπτική εικόνα από το διάστημα.
 1969 - Συνωστισμός αρχηγών κρατών και πολιτικών ηγετών από όλο τον κόσμο στην Ουάσινγκτον για την κηδεία του Ντουάιτ Αϊζενχάουερ.
 1976 – Ιδρύεται η εταιρεία πληροφορικής Apple.
 1979 – Εγκαθιδρύεται το θεοκρατικό κράτος του Ιράν, μετά την ιρανική επανάσταση υπό τον Αγιατολάχ Χομεϊνί.
 2001 – Ο πρώην πρόεδρος της Ομοσπονδιακής Δημοκρατίας της Γιουγκοσλαβίας Σλόμπονταν Μιλόσεβιτς παραδίνεται στις ειδικές δυνάμεις, για να δικαστεί ως εγκληματίας πολέμου.
 Γεννήσεις
 1282 – Λουδοβίκος Δ ́ της Βαυαρίας, αυτοκράτορας της Αγίας Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας
 1347 - Ίνγκεμποργκ της Δανίας, δούκισσα του Μεκλεμβούργου
 1753 - Ζοσέφ Ντε Μεστρ, Γάλλος φιλόσοφος
 1776 – Σοφί Ζερμαίν, Γαλλίδα μαθηματικός
 1809 – Νικολάι Γκόγκολ, Ρώσος συγγραφέας
 1815 – Όττο φον Μπίσμαρκ, Γερμανός πολιτικός
 1868 - Εντμόν Ροστάν, Γάλλος συγγραφέας
 1873 – Σεργκέι Ραχμάνινοφ, Ρώσος συνθέτης και πιανίστας
 1883 – Λον Τσάνεϊ, Αμερικανός ηθοποιός
 1885 - Γουάλας Μπίρι, Αμερικανός ηθοποιός
 1894 - Ρουκιγιέ Σαμπιχά Σουλτάν, Οθωμανή πριγκίπισσα
 1902 – Μαρία Πολυδούρη, Ελληνίδα ποιήτρια
 1908 - Αβραάμ Μάσλοου, Αμερικανός ψυχολόγος
 1913 – Μέμος Μακρής, Έλληνας γλύπτης
 1918 - Γιαν Καντάρ, Σλοβάκος σκηνοθέτης
 1918 - Δημήτριος Ομπολένσκυ, Ρώσος ιστορικός
 1920 – Τοσίρο Μιφούνε, Ιάπωνας ηθοποιός
 1927 – Φέρεντς Πούσκας, Ούγγρος ποδοσφαιριστής
 1929 – Μίλαν Κούντερα, Τσέχος συγγραφέας
 1934 - Πασκάλ Ρακοτομάβο, πρωθυπουργός της Μαδαγασκάρης
 1937 – Γιλμάζ Γκιουνέι, Τούρκος ηθοποιός και σκηνοθέτης
 1946 – Νικήτας Κακλαμάνης, Έλληνας πολιτικός
 1947 - Χριστίνα Σπυράκη, Ελληνίδα ιατρός και πολιτικός
 1949 - Τζιλ Σκοτ-Χίρον, Αμερικανός μουσικός
 1963 - Γιάννης Σαββιδάκης, Έλληνας τραγουδιστής
 1964 - Θύμιος Γκογκίδης, Έλληνας τραγουδιστής και ακορντεονίστας
 1976 - Κλάρενς Ζέεντορφ, Ολλανδός ποδοσφαιριστής
 1976 - Ντέιβιντ Ογιελόβο, Άγγλος ηθοποιός
 1978 – Αντόνιο ντε Νίγκρις, Μεξικανός ποδοσφαιριστής
 1980 – Ράντυ Όρτον, Αμερικανός παλαιστής
 1981 - Αντώνης Φώτσης, Έλληνας καλαθοσφαιριστής
 1982 - Αντρέας Τόρκιλντσεν, Νορβηγός ακοντιστής
 1983 - Σεργκέι Λάζαρεφ, Ρώσος τραγουδιστής
 1986 – Νίκος Κουρτίδης, Έλληνας αρσιβαρίστας
 Θάνατοι
 305 - Πάπας Μαρκελλίνος
 996 - Πάπας Ιωάννης ΙΕ ́
 1046 - Γοδεφρείδος, κόμης του Γκατινέ
 1205 – Αμωρί Β ́, βασιλιάς της Ιερουσαλήμ
 1412 - Αλβέρτος, βασιλιάς της Σουηδίας
 1441 - Λευκή Α ́, βασίλισσα της Ναβάρρας
 1547 - Μαρία του Λουξεμβούργου, κόμισσα του Βαντόμ, Γαλλίδα ευγενής
 1548 - Σιγισμούνδος Α ́, βασιλιάς της Πολωνίας
 1709 - Ερρίκος Γ ́, πρίγκιπας του Κοντέ
 1865 - Αντώνιος Κριεζής, Έλληνας πολιτικός και αγωνιστής
 1865 – Τζουντίτα Πάστα, Ιταλίδα υψίφωνος
 1890 - Αλεξάντερ Μοζαΐσκι, Ρώσος ναύαρχος
 1901 - Φρανσουά - Μαρί Ραούλ, Γάλλος χημικός
 1918 - Πάβελ φον Ρένενκαμπφ, Ρώσος στρατιωτικός
 1920 - Ευμένιος Ξηρουδάκης, μητροπολίτης Κρήτης
 1922 – Κάρολος Α ́, αυτοκράτορας της Αυστροουγγαρίας
 1941 - Ιππόλυτος Ντηλέαι, Βέλγος αγιολόγος
 1947 – Γεώργιος Β ́, βασιλιάς της Ελλάδας
 1952 - Φέρεντς Μολνάρ, Ούγγρος συγγραφέας
 1968 – Λεβ Λαντάου, Ρώσος φυσικός
 1972 - Θανάσης Απάρτης, Έλληνας γλύπτης
 1976 – Μαξ Ερνστ, Γερμανός καλλιτέχνης
 1984 - Μάρβιν Γκέι, Αμερικανός τραγουδιστής
 1987 - Δημήτρης Ιωαννόπουλος, Έλληνας θεατρικός συγγραφέας, σκηνοθέτης και σεναριογράφος
 1988 - Δημήτρης Μαλαβέτας, Έλληνας ηθοποιός
 1993 - Χουάν, Κόμης της Βαρκελώνης
 1996 - Νίκος Τζόγιας, Έλληνας ηθοποιός
 2002 – Σίμο Χέιχε, Φινλανδός σκοπευτής
 2004 – Γιάννης Κυράστας, Έλληνας ποδοσφαιριστής και προπονητής
 2006 – Μαρίκα Μπότση, Ελληνίδα πολιτικός
 2010 – Τζαννής Τζαννετάκης, Έλληνας πολιτικός
 2013 - Κάρεν Μούιρ, Νοτιοαφρικανή κολυμβήτρια
 2014 - Ζακ Λε Γκοφ, Γάλλος ιστορικός και συγγραφέας
 2015 - Μιζάο Οκάουα, Γιαπωνέζα υπεραιωνόβια
 2017 - Γεβγκένι Γεφτουσένκο, Ρώσος συγγραφέας
 Αργίες και εορτές
 Επέτειος Έναρξης του αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ (1955 - 1959)
 Πρωταπριλιά
 Ορθόδοξο εορτολόγιο
 Εξωτερικοί σύνδεσμοι
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type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 302 Md. 649 (1985)
 490 A.2d 701
 BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, INC.
 v.
 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.
 No. 111, September Term, 1984.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 10, 1985.
 Paul J. Redmond, Towson, for appellant.
 Amy S. Scherr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
 Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE and RODOWSKY, JJ., CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned, and ALAN M. WILNER, Associate Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, Specially Assigned.
 CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.
 This case began almost eight years ago, prompted by the amendment of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law to conform to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. See Acts 1977, Ch. 919.[1]Compare Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.) Art. 95A, § 20(g)(7)(v)B and C and 26 U.S.Code § 3309(b)(1)(A) and (B) and (2) (1982). Subparagraphs B and C of § 20(g)(7)(v) of the Maryland Law as amended designate two of the types of employment which are not included in the Law:
 B. Service by an individual in the employ of ... an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches;
 C. Service by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a religious order in the exercise of duties required by that order.
 Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, Inc. (Lutheran) is composed of Lutheran Churches, each of which is a member of the Missouri Synod. Lutheran, separately incorporated, operates the Baltimore Lutheran High School (the School). Lutheran thought that the School was "operated primarily for religious purposes" and in November 1977 sought a ruling from the Employment Security Administration[2] to that effect so that persons who performed services for the School would be exempt from the provisions of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Lutheran was partially successful in its effort. The Executive Director of the Employment Security Administration determined that those persons meeting the qualifications of subparagraph C who performed services for the School were exempt from unemployment insurance coverage.[3] But the Executive Director also determined that those persons who performed services for the School, other than those qualified under subparagraph C, were subject to unemployment coverage as not exempt under subparagraph B. He instructed the Division of Unemployment Insurance to take action accordingly. Lutheran was aggrieved by the latter determination. It took the issue to the Board of Appeals (Board I). The Board, however, reached the same determination as had the Executive Director. Lutheran looked to the Superior Court of Baltimore City; that court affirmed the Board. Lutheran was not assuaged. It noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.[4] We issued a writ of certiorari before decision by that court and reported our decision in Employ. Sec. v. Balto. Lutheran H.S., 291 Md. 750, 436 A.2d 481 (1981) (Lutheran H.S. I). We remanded the case to the Board of Appeals (Board II)[5] without affirmance or reversal.
 Our decision in Lutheran H.S. I was rendered in the light of St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 101 S. Ct. 2142, 68 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1981). St. Martin concerned the unemployment tax status under § 3309(b) of the Federal Act and under the complementary South Dakota statute of those schools which had no legal identity separate from a church, 451 U.S. at 782-83 n. 12, 101 S. Ct. at 2148-49 n. 12. We recognized that St. Martin is not dispositive of the claim here because Lutheran is separately incorporated and operates the School. Lutheran H.S. I, 291 Md. at 756, 436 A.2d 481. It was clear under St. Martin, however, that in order for Lutheran to establish an exemption, it must, as a separately incorporated organization,
 satisfy the requirements of § 3309(b)(1)(B) [of the Federal Act and § 20(g)(7)(v)B of the complementary Maryland Law]: (1) that the organization "is operated primarily for religious purposes," and (2) that it is "operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches." 451 U.S. at 782-783 n. 12, 101 S. Ct. at 2148-49 n. 12.
 Therefore, the initial question before us was the first requirement of the statutes  whether Lutheran operates the School primarily for religious purposes.[6]Lutheran H.S. I, 291 Md. at 757, 436 A.2d 481.
 St. Martin did not articulate the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a school run by an independently incorporated organization was operated primarily for religious purposes. We found in Lutheran H.S. I, however, that in applying standards in other contexts, the Supreme Court has identified appropriate factors. Id. at 757, 436 A.2d 481. We reviewed the relevant decisions of the Court, id. at 757-761, 436 A.2d 481, and set out those factors that appropriately may be taken into account, id. at 761, 436 A.2d 481. We applied them to the operation of the School. We set out in detail, as disclosed by the record, the composition of Lutheran, the supervision of the School and its funding, the purpose of the Association, the composition of the student body and the faculty of the School, the standards and the requirements of its educational process, and the part religion plays therein. Id. at 761-765, 436 A.2d 481. We observed:
 There was much evidence intended to show that religious indoctrination permeates the educational process within Lutheran High. However, there was no evidence to show the nature of the mandatory chapel services. There was no evidence to show whether the religion courses taught at the school were devoted to deepening religious experiences in the particular faith rather than teaching a range of human religious experiences as an academic discipline. In addition, while there was testimony that religion is taught in every nontheological course, and that each faculty member is trained to teach all subjects from a Christian viewpoint according to the doctrine enunciated by the Synod, no details were provided as to the impact of religion on the instructional methods employed and the substantive content presented. More particularly, no teacher presented any evidence to show how teaching a nontheological course from a Christian viewpoint and according to the standards established by the Synod, differed from teaching such a course according to the academic requirements of the subject matter and the standards established by the State Department of Education. Finally, there was no evidence to show whether the school subscribes to and follows the principles of academic freedom. Id. at 765, 436 A.2d 481.
 We declared:
 [I]n order to determine whether a school is operated primarily for educational rather than religious purposes, it is necessary to consider whether courses are taught in "an `atmosphere of intellectual freedom' ... `without religious pressures,'" Roemer [v. Board of Public Works of Maryland], 426 U.S. [736,] 756, 96 S.Ct. [2337, 2349, 49 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1976)], and according to the principles of academic freedom. In the absence of evidence to show the substantive content of both theological and nontheological courses, and the instructional methods employed in these courses, there is no basis upon which to make this determination. Id. at 766, 436 A.2d 481.
 We concluded, "Manifestly, in reaching its conclusion, the Board did not take all of the appropriate factors into account." Id. Although to that point, Lutheran had failed to prove its claim that the School was operated primarily for religious purposes, we believed that, in the circumstances, the purposes of justice would be advanced by permitting further proceedings. We therefore remanded the case to the Board of Appeals without affirmance or reversal, giving Lutheran the opportunity to fill the gaps in the evidence we had noticed and affording the Board the opportunity to reassess Lutheran's claim by applying, in the light of the entire record, the standard and the appropriate factors we had set forth. Id.
 Board II conducted a plenary hearing as directed. Whereupon it held:
 Services performed for Baltimore Lutheran High School by persons who are not ministers of religious education are engaged in covered employment within the meaning of § 20(g)(7)(v)B of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law and 26 U.S.C. Section 3309(b)(1)(B).
 Board II expressly affirmed the determinations of the Executive Director and of Board I. Lutheran appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. That court affirmed Board II. Lutheran appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and again we granted certiorari before decision by the intermediate court.
 The key to the appeal now being considered is whether the School is operated primarily for religious purposes.[7] Three separate and distinct administrative bodies have answered this question in the negative. Their decisions have been affirmed by two circuit courts. We must decide initially, within the limits of our authority, whether the decision shall stand.
 It is apparent from the decisions of Board II and the Circuit Court of Baltimore County that neither of them believed that Lutheran had adequately met its burden of filling the evidentiary gaps.[8] In reaching its decision, Board II adopted, with two exceptions, the findings of fact made by Board I as set out in Lutheran H.S. I at 761-765, 436 A.2d 481.[9] The Board made additional factual findings which were supported by the evidence adduced before it. Board II then applied all the factual findings to the appropriate factors set out in Lutheran H.S.I.[10] Board II concluded that the School was not operated primarily for religious purposes. "The primary purpose of Lutheran High School," it decided, "is to operate a secondary school and impart a secondary education to its students."
 At the hearing before Board II on remand the only witness produced by Lutheran was Allan Schmidt, the Principal of the School. We are in accord with the comments of the judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County regarding his testimony.
 A thorough reading of the record in the second hearing indicates that the Board attempted to "consider whether the courses are taught `in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom' ... `without religious pressures' (citation omitted) and according to the principle of academic freedom." [citing to Lutheran H.S. I] at 766 [436 A.2d 481]. However, the Board's efforts were frustrated when the only testimony introduced was that offered by Mr. Schmidt. The principal was vague and conclusory as to whether the secular courses were taught "according to the principles of academic freedom." Id. at 766 [436 A.2d 481]. When asked to give examples of how the secular classes were taught, Mr. Schmidt stated that in many instances when a teacher noticed that a student was having trouble academically, personally or was a disciplinary problem, the Bible would often be used to give guidance. The principal also relies on the presence of the Lutheran teachers in the classroom to impose religious pressure on students.
 The judge deemed the statements of Schmidt to be "insufficient to show the Board that classes were not taught in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom"; in other words, Schmidt did not show that intellectual or academic freedom was overwhelmed by religious pressure. The judge noted this Court's suggestion that the Board consider testimony from teachers of secular subjects, but Lutheran did not offer such testimony for the consideration of the Board. In short, the judge opined, although "[t]he Board considered what little new evidence was brought before it in the second hearing," Lutheran did not meet its burden of producing evidence legally sufficient to show that the School was operated primarily for religious purposes. He affirmed the decision of Board II.
 The scope of review of a final decision of an administrative agency is the same in substance whether the agency is under the Administrative Procedure Act or excluded from it under Md.Code (1984) § 10-202 of the State Government Article. Judicial review of the actions of agencies which are included in the Administrative Procedure Act is as prescribed by SG § 10-215.[11] For the most part, the scope of judicial review of the decisions of agencies which are excluded from the Administrative Procedure Act is separately set out in various statutes.[12] Thus, the judicial review of decisions of the administrative body of concern here, the Board of Appeals of the Department of Employment and Training, excluded from the Administrative Procedure Act, SG § 10-202(a)(3)(iii), appears in Art. 95A, § 7(h). It provides, in relevant part:
 Any party aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Appeals may secure judicial review thereof by appeal to the circuit court of the county.... In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Board of Appeals as to the facts, if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record, and in the absence of fraud,[[13]] shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.... An appeal may be taken from the decision of the circuit court of the county to the Court of Special Appeals in the same manner, but not inconsistent with the provisions of this article, as is provided in civil cases.
 The substantiality of the evidence is the common denominator of the scope of judicial review with respect to all administrative agencies. Hammond, C.J., speaking for a majority of this Court in Insurance Comm'r v. Nat'l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 236 A.2d 282 (1967), summed it up in this way:
 Whichever of the recognized tests the court uses  substantiality of the evidence on the record as a whole, clearly erroneous, fairly debatable or against the weight or preponderance of the evidence on the entire record  its appraisal or evaluation must be of the agency's fact-finding results and not an independent original estimate of or decision on the evidence. The required process is difficult to precisely articulate but it is plain that it requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere with the agency's factual conclusions under any of the tests, all of which are similar. There are differences but they are slight and under any of the standards the judicial review essentially should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment. Id. at 309-310, 236 A.2d 282.
 That is to say, a reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency, but it must not itself make independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Of course, a reviewing court may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law. Therefore, ordinarily, the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.
 In Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 390 A.2d 1119 (1978), Eldridge, J., speaking for the Court and citing and quoting from cases within and without the State, treatises and law journals, discussed the meaning and application of "substantial evidence." He observed that "substantial evidence" has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The scope of review is limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. In applying the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. The reviewing court also must review the agency's decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity. Furthermore, not only is it the province of the agency to resolve conflicting evidence, but where inconsistent inferences from the same evidence can be drawn, it is for the agency to draw the inferences. Id. at 512-513, 390 A.2d 1119. We affirmed the views expressed in Nat'l Bureau and Bulluck in P.G. Doctor's Hosp. v. HSCR Comm'n, 302 Md. 193, 200-202, 486 A.2d 744 (1985) and even more recently in Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Ins. Comm'r, 302 Md. 411, 418, 488 A.2d 942 (1985).
 Lutheran has apparently overlooked the limited scope of judicial review of administrative agencies for it does not argue in terms of the function of the reviewing court. It posits that the testimony of Schmidt was "clear and convincing," but obviously the Board did not find the testimony clear enough or convincing enough to establish to its satisfaction that the School was operated primarily for religious purposes. Lutheran sets out six reasons which it claims will prove that the School was so operated. These reasons, however, are actually factual findings now suggested by Lutheran, but the Board did not make these findings. It seems that Lutheran would have us act as a trier of fact. This we may not do.
 Lutheran argues that Board II ignored certain testimony presented to it, but the record reflects otherwise. Contrary to Lutheran's contention, the record shows that the Board considered the mandatory chapel services, the Lutheran philosophy of education, the use of the Bible in the classroom and the effect of the teachers' Christian beliefs in the methodology of education and on classroom content. This evidence, however, did not persuade Board II that the School's primary purpose was religious.
 On our review of the entire record, we believe that a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the conclusion that the School was not operated primarily for religious purposes. Therefore, since a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board, and since the court must review the Board's decision in the light most favorable to the Board (the Board's decision is prima facie correct and carries the presumption of validity), the decision of Board II must be left undisturbed. Furthermore, even if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the factual findings made by Board II in the exercise of its function as the trier of fact, that is, it could be inferred that the School was or was not primarily religious, it is for the Board to draw the inference, not the reviewing court. We have followed this principle in the past, see, e.g., Comptroller v. Haskin, 298 Md. 681, 472 A.2d 70 (1984), and we shall continue to do so.
 In reaching its decision, Board II followed the standard and applied the factors we set out in Lutheran H.S.I. Therefore, it made no error of law. We hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County did not err, absent a constitutional impediment, in affirming the decision of Board II.
 Lutheran presented a conditional question in its petition for a writ of certiorari. If we held that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County was correct in upholding the decision of Board II that employees of the School were not exempt from unemployment insurance coverage, then Lutheran would have us consider whether § 20(g)(7)(v)B of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law was constitutionally valid as applied to Lutheran.[14] Inasmuch as we have affirmed the decision of Board II, the conditional question has surfaced.
 We did not reach the constitutional issue in Lutheran H.S.I. See 291 Md. at 754 n. 2, 436 A.2d 481. Board II only impliedly indicated that the laws were constitutional by finding that they did not result in excessive governmental entanglement with religion. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County made an express holding that Maryland's Unemployment Insurance Law was constitutionally valid as applied to Lutheran. The constitutional provision involved is the First-Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that no law shall be made "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ...." See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S. Ct. 870, 872, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
 We need look only to United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 71 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1982) to resolve Lutheran's constitutional claim with respect to the free exercise of religion. Lee was primarily concerned with social security taxes but there is such an affinity between those taxes and unemployment insurance taxes as to make Lee dispositive. The court noted in Lee:
 The Social Security Act and its subsequent amendments provide a system of old-age and unemployment benefits. 26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). These benefits are supported by various taxes, including, relevant to this appeal, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes. The FICA tax is a tax paid in part by employees through withholding, 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976 ed., Supp. III), and in part by employers through an excise tax. 26 U.S.C. § 3111 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The FUTA tax is an excise tax imposed on employers. 26 U.S.C. § 3301. Both taxes are based on the wages paid to employees, and the recordkeeping and transmittal of funds are obligations of the employer. Only the FICA tax is collected from self-employed individuals. Id. at 254 n. 1, 102 S. Ct. at 1053 n. 1.
 Lee was a member of the Old Order Amish and he hired other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He failed to file the quarterly social security tax returns required of employers, withhold social security taxes from his employees, or pay the employer's share of social security taxes. The Internal Revenue Service assessed him for unpaid employment taxes. He paid a small amount and sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for a refund, claiming that imposition of social security taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and those of his Amish employees. The District Court held that the statutes requiring Lee to pay social security and unemployment insurance taxes were unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court thought otherwise and reversed the judgment of the District Court. Id. at 254-256, 102 S. Ct. at 1053-1055.
 In holding that Lee was not entitled to an exemption, the Supreme Court recognized the Amish belief "that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system." Id. at 257, 102 S. Ct. at 1055. The Court accepted Lee's "contention that both payment and receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith. Because the payment of taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with their free exercise rights." Id. But that did not end the inquiry. The Court noted, "Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional." Id. It declared, "The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." Id. at 257-258, 102 S. Ct. at 1055. The Court described the social security system and concluded that "the Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system is very high." Id. at 258-259, 102 S. Ct. at 1056. It further found that accommodating the Amish belief would "unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest." Id. at 259, 102 S. Ct. at 1056. It said: "To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would `radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.'" Id. at 259, 102 S. Ct. at 1056; quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606, 81 S. Ct. 1144, 1147, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1961) (other citations omitted).
 Lutheran's position is far weaker than was that of Lee. In Lee, as we have seen, the Court took off from the premise that compulsory participation in the social security system interfered with the free exercise rights of the Amish. Lutheran, however, does not make such a claim. There is no suggestion that compulsory participation in the unemployment insurance scheme would, in itself, conflict with the tenets of Lutheran's faith. Nor does Lutheran allege that there is a religiously based obligation for members of the Lutheran faith to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the unemployment insurance laws. Nevertheless Lutheran urges that the refusal to grant it an exemption would unconstitutionally burden its exercise of religion in that it would interfere with the management of the School. Lack of an exemption would adversely affect Lutheran's desire to employ teachers "who satisfactorily communicate the doctrine of the Synod" and would limit its ability "to assign [the School's] employees to activities in furtherance of their religious mission." It would also impose "an administrative and tax cost burden on the operation of an integral part of the religious mission of the association and its member churches." Even if these allegations do burden Lutheran, we do not believe that they amount to an interference with the practice of a legitimate religious belief not justifiable by the compelling governmental interest demonstrated by the Unemployment Insurance Law. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). The interest of the State is clearly set out in the Legislature's Declaration of Policy in § 2 of the Law:
 As a guide to the interpretation and application of this article, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declared that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
 It is clear that this very high State interest is sufficient to override the alleged limitations on Lutheran's religious liberty.
 It is also readily apparent that granting the exemption Lutheran seeks would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the State's interest. The reasons the Court advanced in Lee for its conclusion that accommodating the Amish belief would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest in the social security act are equally applicable here. We summarize the Court's comments in Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-260, 102 S. Ct. at 1056-1057, substituting "unemployment insurance" for "social security."
 In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 [81 S. Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563] (1961), this Court noted that "to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task ... because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing ... prosecution." The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in the area of taxation is that "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference." Braunfeld, supra, at 606 [81 S.Ct. at 1147]. The Court has long recognized that balance must be struck between the values of the comprehensive [unemployment insurance system], ... and the consequences of allowing religiously based exemptions. To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, ... but there is a point at which accommodation would "radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Braunfeld, supra, at 606 [81 S.Ct. at 1147].
 [I]t would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive [unemployment insurance] system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the [unemployment insurance] tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes; the difference  in theory at least  is that the [unemployment insurance] tax revenues are segregated for use only in furtherance of the statutory program. There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the [Unemployment Insurance Law]. If for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.
 The Court concluded, "Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." Lee, 455 U.S. at 260, 102 S. Ct. at 1056.
 We note that the State has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive State program, the practices of those who believe it would interfere with the free exercise of their religion to participate in the unemployment insurance system. This is apparent from the exemptions granted by § 20(g)(7)(v)A and B of Art. 95A.
 Lutheran also invokes the First Amendment prohibition against a "law respecting an establishment of religion...." For a statute to prevail when scrutinized under the establishment clause it must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion; (3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971). See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, ___, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066, 77 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1983); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741, 93 S. Ct. 2868, 2873, 37 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1973). The secular purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Law is apparent  to provide for those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. The Law in no wise is respecting an establishment of religion, nor does it advance or inhibit religion. Lutheran's contention centers on the third prong of the test. It urges that the Law as applied to it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion. This is so because, Lutheran alleges, the Law places on it financial burdens and clerical burdens and burdens in maintaining its doctrinal standards. In answering this contention, we find Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Emp. Div., 298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985) to be most persuasive. Salem College and Academy, Inc., founded in Oregon, is an interdenominational Christian primary and secondary school organized as a nonprofit corporation, exempt from federal income taxes. It claimed, as does Lutheran here, that it was exempt from the obligatory coverage of the State's counterpart to the federal unemployment insurance act. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals that Salem was exempt. We adapt the comments of the Supreme Court of Oregon to the case before us, and largely adopt its reasons in reaching our decision.[15]
 As to financial burdens, the unemployment insurance taxes are "in no way based on activities or resources that are more characteristic of schools than of other kinds of employers or institutions, let alone on a school's religious character or the content of its programs." Salem, 298 Or. at 486, 695 P.2d 25. On the contrary,
 [t]he obligation to provide unemployment coverage focuses solely on the economic and social aspect of the employment relation and the cost that unemployment imposes on the discharged employee and on society.[16]Id.
 In actuality, the unemployment insurance taxes "are financial burdens only in the same sense that the costs of employing paid workers at all are financial burdens; a religious association engaged in the free exercise of workships or other religious activity without employing paid personnel pays no unemployment tax." Id. at 487, 695 P.2d 25. See Art. 95A, § 20(g)(7)(v)C.
 The alleged administrative and clerical burdens such as posting notices, filing reports and keeping payroll records subject to State inspection are also "tailored to the economic aspect of the employment relation and not to any activities peculiarly characteristic either of schools or of religious programs. They are no different in principle from a host of other secular regulatory requirements such as health inspections of cafeteria workers or kitchens, safety inspections of school buses, and licensing of drivers." 298 Or. at 487, 695 P.2d 25.
 Lutheran alleges that, under the Unemployment Insurance Law, it will be unable to maintain the doctrinal standards required of its employees. It will be unable to discharge an employee for failing to meet those standards without opening its doctrines and faith to State scrutiny in protracted and expensive contests over unemployment benefits and administrative determinations that will entangle the State in religion. We answer this in the words of Salem, "This eventuality can adequately be dealt with if and when it happens; we have no reason to believe that discharges of school employees over matters of religious doctrine are so frequent as to require the employer's entire exemption from the unemployment compensation system on that account." Id. In the case before us, Lutheran showed no reason to believe to the contrary.
 Lutheran presents only one question in its brief and that question goes to whether the School was operated primarily for religious purposes. It addresses this in argument I. Argument II invokes the religious freedom guarantees of the First Amendment. This argument is not in response to a question presented in the brief, see Md. Rule 831 c 2, but does cover question 2 in Lutheran's petition for a writ of certiorari. We have answered that argument. The brief also contains an argument III which is not in response to either a question in the petition or a question in the brief. Argument III is headed:
 The court by differentiating "between separately incorporated" and "not separately incorporated schools," creates a classification which unconstitutionally differentiates between two christian schools simply because of their form of worship.
 We do not know to what "court" Lutheran refers. St. Martin, supra, as we have seen, made such a distinction, and we recognized the St. Martin holding in Lutheran H.S. I, supra, but neither of these cases are even cited in Lutheran's brief. Lutheran does not specify the constitutional provision which it baldly states the differentiation violates. Nor does it make clear, if the differentiation is constitutionally repugnant, why it should be afforded relief.
 It may be that Lutheran believes that the St. Martin distinction brings into play equal protection of the laws or substantive due process. The State so construes Lutheran's argument. If so, the point was never raised and decided below and we need not address it. Md. Rule 885. In any event the only two cases Lutheran cites in support of its position, whatever it may be, are of no help. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) is quoted by Lutheran, without page reference, as simply stating that "freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.... The Religion Clauses safeguard the free exercise of the chosen form of worship." This homily does nothing to advance Lutheran's cause. Lutheran also looks to Patch Enterprises, Inc. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D.Fla. 1978). It declares that the Patch court said that "any form of state legislation creating discriminatory classifications that concerns fundamental constitutional rights, or whose defining criteria are inherently suspect, or that are unnecessarily restrictive and unreasonably related to the legislation's purported purpose, is subject to challenge and examination as a denial of equal protection of the law." Patch also said:
 In enacting socio-economic, general welfare legislation, states and their subdivisions have a wide latitude of discretion to select implementing classifications.... The overall requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, however, is that the statutory line that draws distinctions and classifications is a rational one, bearing "some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." Id. at 1079-1080.
 It is apparent from Art. 95A, § 2 that the Unemployment Insurance Law has a legitimate state purpose. Within that statute the distinction between a school which has no identity beyond that of a church, and a school which has a separate legal existence serves the legitimate state purpose of assuring that the Unemployment Insurance Law will be uniformly administered and that the taxes will be paid by those organizations with a separate legal existence from a church unless that organization was operated primarily for religious purposes. Even if Lutheran's third argument were properly before us and construed in a manner most favorable to Lutheran, it has no merit. There is a rational basis for the challenged differentiation in any event and equal protection of the laws is not denied thereby.
 The bottom line is:
 When followers of a particular sect enter into a commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261, 102 S. Ct. at 1057.
 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
 APPENDIX A
 The expression by Board II of the application of the facts adopted and found by it to the appropriate factors is as follows:
 Regarding the nature of the mandatory chapel services, the Board finds that these are worship services which are held once a week and are required of all students. Regarding the nature of the religious courses taught, the Board finds as a fact that these courses are devoted to deepening the student's Christian faith from the viewpoint of the Lutheran Church. These courses are not designed as academic and dispassionate studies of various religious doctrines. They are taught by two teachers specifically recruited for religious instruction who specialize in this area and are not even accredited as teachers by the Maryland State Department of Education.
 The Board finds as a fact that there is little or no religious impact on the content of the non-theological courses taught. Although the philosophy of education of the school (and that of the principal of the school), is that the Bible is the primary textbook used in all classes, the Petitioner [(Lutheran)] was unable to demonstrate any concrete way in which the text of the Bible had an impact upon the content of any non-theological course.
 The Board has carefully considered whether the fact that the school principal states that evolution is not taught at the school shows a biblical impact upon a non-theological course. The Board concludes, however, that it does not. The testimony on this aspect of the case was that, while the school does not "teach" evolution, it does impart to the students the knowledge of what the theory of evolution consists. The Board is unable to discern any difference, at the high school level, between teaching a scientific theory as a theory and letting the students know of what the theory consists. The other factor cited by the Petitioner, purportedly to show that there is no such thing as a non-theological course, is that each course is taught from or by a Christian teacher. For reasons which will be elaborated on below, the Board does not perceive that the fact that the teacher is a Christian has that great an effect on the substantive content of the courses taught.
 The Board also discerns no significant religious impact on the instructional methods used in a non-theological courses. Beyond the bald statement that all methodology is subservient to Lutheran Christian doctrine, the testimony concerning the methods was extremely vague. The Board finds two factors significant in coming to the conclusion, as it does, that there is no significant religious impact on the content of the non-theological courses.
 First, the only specific religious components of the non-theological courses noted were that these courses may be interrupted for prayer for someone who may have a relative who is sick and that the classes may be interrupted for the teacher to read a portion of the Bible to a student who is having difficulties. The significant fact in both of these areas is that both of these activities consist of interruptions. The Board will not find a significant impact on the substantive content of a non-theological high school course based on interruptions which may occur during the classes.
 Second, the Petitioner's primary contention in regard to the non-theological courses is that the mere presence of Lutheran Christian teachers has an intangible effect on the students. The Petitioner states that their biggest task is to stay away from the interference with the workings of the Holy Spirit between the teachers and students. The Board is not doubting the sincerity of the Petitioner's witness, nor the efficacy of this method at all, but the Board is unwilling to adjudicate a case under the tax laws of Maryland based on a difference in instructional methods which is wholly intangible. The Board notes that, were the mere presence of a Christian teacher sufficient to make a non-theological course into a theological course, any public school employing a Christian teacher would be promoting the establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Surely, some more concrete effect on methodology must be proven in order to show that a particular class is religiously oriented.
 NOTES
 [1] The State Law was amended to conform to the Federal Law to fulfill all the conditions for federal certification of the State Law. Federal certification assured that Maryland employers would be eligible for a substantial tax credit and that the State would receive federal funding for its Employment Security Administration.
 [2] When this proceeding was instituted the Unemployment Insurance Law was administered by the Employment Security Administration, a part of the Department of Human Resources. Acts 1983, Ch. 64 placed the administration of the Law under the Department of Employment and Training. Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum. Supp.) Art. 95A, § 11(a) and (b). The caption of the case sub judice has not been amended to reflect this change.
 [3] This conclusion was also reached and affirmed during the review proceedings leading to the appeal we now consider. As it is not challenged, it is not before us. We do not address it further.
 [4] The appeal to the Superior Court of Baltimore City involved schools in addition to the Baltimore Lutheran High School. Board I, at the same time it made its determination that Lutheran was not entitled to an exemption, held that certain Jewish day and Sunday schools and certain Catholic parochial and private schools were entitled to an exemption. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of Board I, resulting in appeals to the Court of Special Appeals by the Employment Security Administration and by Lutheran. Only Lutheran's case is before us on this appeal.
 [5] The members of Board I and the members of Board II were not the same. The same Appeal Counsel, however, represented both Boards.
 We note that Board II also concluded that the School was supervised and controlled by a church or convention or association of churches. Thus, the School met the second requirement of § 3309(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Act and § 20(g)(7)(v)B of the Maryland Law. This holding is not challenged.
 [6] With respect to the second requirement of the statutes see note 5 supra.
 [7] Lutheran presents this question in its petition for a writ of certiorari:
 Whether the Circuit Court was correct in upholding the decision by the Board of Appeals that services rendered by all employees of the Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, Inc. who are not installed ministers, are not exempt from coverage by Article 95A, Section 20(g)(7)(v)(B), Maryland Annotated Code, as amended, since the Baltimore Lutheran High School is not operated primarily for religious purposes.
 [8] Lutheran set forth in its petition for a writ of certiorari that the purpose of the further proceedings directed by Employ. Sec. v. Balto. Lutheran H.S., 291 Md. 750, 436 A.2d 481 (1981) was to obtain evidence covering three areas: (1) the presence of academic freedom; (2) the substantive content of both theological and nontheological courses; and (3) the instructional methods used.
 The appellee-respondent sees the mandate of this Court as providing the opportunity for evidence to be adduced "(1) regarding the nature of mandatory chapel services; (2) on whether courses taught were `devoted to deepening religious experiences in a particular faith rather than teaching a range of human religions as an academic discipline;' (3) on details as to the impact of religion on instructional methods and substantive content of courses; (4) on the degree of academic freedom; and (5) from teachers as to the difference in instructional methods of teaching non-theological courses from a Christian viewpoint than according to the academic standards of the subject matter."
 [9] Board II noted that the tuition range of the School at the time of its decision was $1,050 to $1,900 and that the daily classes consisted of seven 45 minute courses, one of which was specifically designated as a religious class.
 It seems that Lutheran does not challenge the adopted factual findings as amended.
 [10] The factual findings and their application by Board II are set out verbatim in Appendix A of this opinion.
 [11] According to the Revisor's Note "[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 41, § 255" of Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.).
 [12] See, for example, the following articles and sections of the Md. Code: Art. 48A, § 40 (Insurance Commissioner); Art. 78, § 97 (Public Service Commission); Art. 81, § 229(o) (Maryland Tax Court); Art. 101, § 56 (Workmen's Compensation Commission).
 [13] There is no allegation of fraud in the case before us.
 [14] Lutheran's question on this issue, as presented in its petition for certiorari, was
 Whether the court's construction of [Art. 95A, § 20(g)(7)(v)B], subjecting [the School] to coverage, violates the free exercise and establishment clauses of the Maryland and Federal Constitutions?
 In Lutheran's brief, however, the question is argued only in terms of the federal constitution. We shall restrict our discussion accordingly. Md.Rule 846 f.
 [15] Salem College Academy, Inc. v. Emp. Div., 298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985), although speaking primarily in terms of the Oregon Constitution, noted that its reasons also met the Academy's Claim for exemption under the First Amendment. Id. at 487 n. 12, 625 P.2d 25.
 [16] The tax burden is not completely inescapable. The Unemployment Insurance Law allows a nonprofit organization instead of paying the taxes to reimburse the state unemployment compensation fund in amounts equal to the actual unemployment benefits attributed to a claimant's service for the employer. Md.Code, Art. 95A, § 8(d)(2).


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 13.10.2012
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 C 311/9
 2012. július 25-én benyújtott kereset — Plantavis és NEM kontra Bizottság és EFSA
 (T-334/12. sz. ügy)
 2012/C 311/11
 Az eljárás nyelve: német
 Felek
 Felperesek: Plantavis GmbH (Berlin, Németország) és NEM, Verband mittelständischer europäischer Hersteller und Distributoren von Nahrungsergänzungsmitteln & Geseundheitsprodukten e.V. (Laudert, Németország) (képviselő: T. Büttner ügyvéd)
 Alperesek: Európai Bizottság és Európai Élelmiszerbiztonsági Hivatal
 Kérelmek
 A felperesek azt kérik, hogy a Törvényszék:
 —
 semmisítse meg a 432/2012/EU rendelettel (1) és az Európai Bizottság egészségre vonatkozó, engedélyezett és nem engedélyezett állítások jegyzékét tartalmazó EU-nyilvántartásával összefüggésben értelmezett 1924/2006/EK rendeletben (2) megfogalmazott tilalmakat.
 Jogalapok és fontosabb érvek
 Keresetük alátámasztása érdekében a felperesek először azzal érvelnek, hogy az európai jogalkotónak nincs hatásköre a megtámadott rendelet elfogadására.
 Másodszor előadják, hogy az 1924/2006 és 432/2012 rendelet, valamint az élelmiszerekre alkalmazott, tápanyag-összetételre és egészségre vonatkozó állításokat tartalmazó EU-nyilvántartás jogellenesen sértik az élelmiszeriparnak az alapjogok által védett jogi helyzetét, valamint a fogyasztók és a szakmai körök tájékoztatáshoz való jogát. E tekintetben a felperesek különösen azzal érvelnek, hogy aránytalan a megtámadott rendeletekben előírt, tápanyag-összetételre és egészségre vonatkozó állítások tilalma. Ez mindenekelőtt az érdemben helyes, tápanyag-összetételre és egészségre vonatkozó állítások, mint például a „jobb biológiai rendelkezésre állás”, felhasználásának a tilalmára vonatkozik. Továbbá a rendeletek nem alkalmasak a kitűzött cél elérésére, mivel az EFSA és a Bizottság nem állapítottak meg egyértelmű, átlátható és egységes irányvonalat a tudományos normák meghatározásához.
 A felperesek ezenkívül a különböző anyagok és élelmiszeripari vállalkozások differenciálatlan eltérő bánásmódját kifogásolják. A tilalmak nem is szükségesek, mivel a 2003/13/EK irányelv (3) és a 1169/2011/EU rendelet (4) alapján már valamennyi tagállamban tilos az élelmiszerek megtévesztő reklámja.
 (1) A nem a betegségek kockázatának csökkentését, illetve a gyermekek fejlődését és egészségét érintő, élelmiszerekkel kapcsolatos, egészségre vonatkozó, engedélyezett állítások jegyzékének megállapításáról szóló, 2012. május 16-i 432/2012/EU bizottsági rendelet (HL L 136., 1. o.).
 (2) Az élelmiszerekkel kapcsolatos, tápanyag-összetételre és egészségre vonatkozó állításokról szóló, 2006. december 20-i 1924/2006/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet (HL L 404., 9. o.).
 (3) A csecsemők és a kisgyermekek számára készült feldolgozott gabonaalapú élelmiszerekről és bébiételekről szóló 96/5/EK irányelv módosításáról szóló, 2003. február 10-i 2003/13/EK bizottsági irányelv (HL L 41., 33. o.; magyar nyelvű különkiadás 13. fejezet, 31. kötet, 132. o.).
 (4) A fogyasztók élelmiszerekkel kapcsolatos tájékoztatásáról, az 1924/2006/EK és az 1925/2006/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet módosításáról és a 87/250/EGK bizottsági irányelv, a 90/496/EGK tanácsi irányelv, az 1999/10/EK bizottsági irányelv, a 2000/13/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv, a 2002/67/EK és a 2008/5/EK bizottsági irányelv és a 608/2004/EK bizottsági rendelet hatályon kívül helyezésérő szóló, 2011. október 25-i 1169/2011/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet (HL L 304., 18. o.).


text:
Добрин е село в Североизточна България. То се намира в община Крушари, област Добрич.
 История
 На 3 км от границите на днешното село Добрин има останки от римска крепост. Там е имало извор. Предполага се, че крепостта е била разположена край стар римски път, по който са минавали множество кервани и са спирали за отдих край извора. Най-вероятно с тези кервани е свързано и турското наименование на село Добрин – Деведжи кьой (превод от турски „камилско село“).
 Българите се появяват тук в края на ХІХ и началото на ХХ век. Първите заселници са овчари от Котелско. Те пристигат в Добруджа с над 5000 глави овце. През 1913 г. Румъния вероломно окупира Добруджа и в Деведжи кьой, както и в останалите добруджански селища, са натрапени чужди управници.
 По време на румънската окупация селцето се нарича Жодеу Камилару, което е буквален превод от турското му название. През 1916 г. окупаторите са прогонени от българската земя.
 Редовни събития
 Събор на 2 май (по старо на Спасов ден).
 Други
 Планира се изграждането на Вятърен парк „Добрин“ в близост до селото.
 Външни препратки
 Села в област Добрич
 Населени места в община Крушари