type: wikipedia

text:
Geórgios Seitarídis (kreeka Γιούρκας Σειταρίδης; sündinud 4. juunil 1981 Pireuses), tuntud nimega Gioúrkas, on Kreeka jalgpallikoondise endine kaitsja, Euroopa meister (2004).
 Kreeka rahvuskoondises mängis Seitaridis aastatel 2002–2010 kokku 72 mängu. Debüüt koondises oli 2002. aasta veebruaris, kui mängiti Rootsiga.
 Klubid
 1998–2001 PAS Giannena
 2001–2004 Panathinaikόs
 2004–2005 FC Porto
 2005–2006 Moskva Dünamo
 2006–2009 Madridi Atlético
 2009–2013 Panathinaikos
 Saavutused
 2004 Euroopa meister
 2004 Kreeka meister
 2004 Kreeka karikas
 2004 Portugali Superkarikas
 Isiklikku
 Georgios Seitaridis on 185 cm pikk ja kaalub 79 kg.
 Kreeka jalgpallurid
 PAE Panathinaikόse jalgpallurid
 FC Porto mängijad
 FC Moskva Dinamo mängijad
 Madridi Atlético mängijad
 Sündinud 1981


type: contracts

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 Avis juridique important
 |
 11957A/PRO/CJ/15
 Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atómica (Tratado CEEA - Euratom), Protocolo relativo ao Estatuto do Tribunal de Justiça da Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atómica, Título II - Organização, Artigo 15o
 Artigo 15 .(*). (*) Texto da redacção que lhe foi dada pelo artigo 20 . do AA DK/IRL/RU.O Tribunal só pode reunir validamente com número ímpar de juízes. As deliberações do Tribunal, quando reunido em sessão plenária, são válidas se estiverem presentes sete juízes. As deliberações das secções só são válidas se forem proferidas por três juízes; em caso de impedimento de um juiz de uma secção, pode ser chamado um juiz de outra secção, nas condições estabelecidas no regulamento processual.


text:
Big Fun – podwójny album, na który złożyły się utwory nagrane przez Milesa Davisa pomiędzy listopadem 1969 r. a czerwcem 1972 r. oraz wydany przez firmę nagraniową Columbia w 1974 roku.
 Charakter albumu
 Wydanie tego albumu w 1974 r. przyjęto dość krytycznie ze względu na to, że właściwie album składał się z niewydanych wcześniej sesji nagraniowych – przeważnie do Bitches Brew, czyli Davis nie miał nowego materiału.
 Album – dzięki różnym składom grup nagrywających utwory – jest bardzo różnorodny. Znalazły się tu aż cztery utwory z wykorzystaniem sitaru, tambury i tabli. Prawdopodobnie były to jedyne sesje, w których owe trzy indyjskie instrumenty wystąpiły obok siebie. Uatrakcyjniły one tkankę brzmieniową i rytmiczną tych kompozycji.
 Płyta ta jest także okazją do posłuchania i porównania gry starszych muzyków Davisa – jak Hancock, Shorter, John McLaughlin, Chick Corea – z nowymi, takimi jak Lonnie Smith, Al Foster, Sonny Fortune, Carlos Garnett...
 Pojawili się także w tych nagraniach muzycy spoza kręgu jazzowego czy nawet rhythmandbluesowego (jak np. Michael Henderson). Są to Harvey Brooks i Billy Hart. Harvey Brooks zdobył sobie sławę jednego z najlepszych basistów rocka, country i studiów nagraniowych.
 Wydanie na dwóch dyskach poszerzyło wiedzę słuchaczy o okresie 1969–1972 w muzyce Davisa, gdyż dodano cztery nowe utwory nagrane w tym czasie i nigdzie nieopublikowane.
 Muzycy
 Miles Davis – trąbka
 Steve Grossman – saksofon sopranowy I 1, 4; II 1, 3, 4;
 Sonny Fortune – saksofon sopranowy i flet I 2;
 Carlos Garnett – saksofon sopranowy I 2;
 Wayne Shorter – saksofon sopranowy I 3; II 2;
 Bennie Maupin – klarnet basowy I 1, 2, 3, 4; II 2, 3, 4;
 John McLaughlin – gitara I 1, 3, 4; II 1, 3, 4;
 Herbie Hancock – elektryczne pianino I 1; II 4(kl);
 Chick Corea – elektryczne pianino I 1, 3(kp), 4; II 2, 3, 4(kp);
 Joe Zawinul – elektryczne pianino I 3(kl); II 2; organy II 2;
 Lonnie Smith – pianino I 2;
 Harold I. Williams – pianino I 2;
 Larry Young – organy i czelesta I 4; II 3;
 Khalil Balakrishna – elektryczny sitar I 1, 4; II 3, 4; hinduskie instrumenty II 2;
 Bihari Sharma – tambura I 1, 4; II 3, 4;
 Ron Carter – gitara basowa I 1; II 4;
 Harvey Brooks – gitara basowa I 1, 4; II 2, 3, 4;
 Michael Henderson – gitara basowa I 2;
 Dave Holland – gitara basowa I 3, 4; II 1, 2, 3;
 Bill Cobham – perkusja I 1, 4; II 2, 3, 4; trójkąt I 3; II 4;
 Al Foster – perkusja I 2;
 Billy Hart – perkusja I 2;
 Jack DeJohnette – perkusja I 3, 4; II 1, 2, 3;
 Badal Roy – tabla I 2;
 Airto Moreira – instrumenty perkusyjne I 1, 3; II 2; cuica I 3, 4; II 3, 4; berimbau I 4; II 3, 4; hinduskie instrumenty II 2;
 James "Mtume" Forman – afrykańskie bębny I 1;
 Lista utworów
 CD
 Płyta pierwsza (I)
 „Great Expectations” – 27:23
 „Ife” – 21:34
 „Recollections” – 18:55
 „Trevere” – 5:55
 Płyta druga (II)
 „Go Ahead John” – 28:27
 „Lonely Fire” – 21:25
 „The Little Blue Frog” – 9:10
 „Yaphet” – 9:39
 Album analogowy (winyl)
 Płyta pierwsza
 Strona pierwsza
 „Great Expectations”
 Strona druga
 „Ife”
 Płyta druga
 Strona trzecia
 „Go Ahead John”
 Strona czwarta
 „Lonely Fire”
 Opis płyty
 Płyta analogowa (winylowa)
 Producent – Teo Macero
 Inżynier dźwięku – Stan Tonkel, Frank Laico
 Miksowanie – Russ Payne, Stan Weiss, John Guerriere
 Daty nagrania – 19 listopada 1969 (I 1; II 4)* 28 listopada 1969 (I 4; II 2, 3) * 6 lutego 1970 (I 3) * 3 marca 1970 (II 1) * 12 czerwca 1972 (I 2).
 Miejsce nagrania – Columbia Studio E, Nowy Jork
 Czas albumu – CD 1: 1 godz. 13 min. 7 sek.; CD 2: 1 godz. 8 min. 37 sek.; razem: 2 godz. 21 min. 44 sek. * płyta 1: 48 min. 57 sek.; płyta 2: 49 min. 48 sek.; razem: 1 godz. 38 min. 5 sek.
 Data wydania – 19 kwietnia 1974
 Okładka – Corky McCoy
 Firma nagraniowa – Columbia
 Wznowienie na CD
 Producent – Bob Belden
 Cyfrowy remastering – Seth Foster
 Studio – Sony Music Studios, Nowy Jork
 Dyrektor projektu – Seth Rothstein
 Kierownik artystyczny – Cozbi Sanchez-Cabrera
 Koordynator A & R – Patti Matheny i Darren Salmieri
 Legacy A & R – Steve Berkowitz
 Projekt – Randall Martin
 Fotografie we wkładce – Urve Kuusik
 Firma nagraniowa – Columbia/Legacy
 Numer katalogowy – C2K 65140
 ©1974, 2000 Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.
 Przypisy
 Linki zewnętrzne
 ang.
 Albumy jazzowe
 Albumy muzyczne wydane w roku 1974
 Albumy Milesa Davisa
 Albumy Columbia Records


type: other

text:
 Sentencia 2005-0006 de 14 de octubre 2010
 SENTENCIA 2005-00006 DE 14 DE OCTUBRE DE 2010
 CONTENIDO:FONDO DE EMPLEADOS. LOS ORGANISMOS DE SEGUNDO GRADO QUE SE CREEN POR LOS FONDOS DE EMPLEADOS PARA CAPTAR AHORRO DE SUS ENTIDADES ASOCIADAS Y OTORGARLES CRÉDITOS, PUEDEN TENER POR OBJETO LA PRESTACIÓN DEL SERVICIO DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO A LAS ENTIDADES ASOCIADAS QUE LOS CONSTITUYAN, ESTO ES, A LOS FONDOS DE EMPLEADOS, SIN QUE POR ELLO SE TRANSFORMEN EN ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS O ESTÉN OBLIGADAS LEGALMENTE A CONSTITUIRSE COMO TALES.
 TEMAS ESPECÍFICOS:ACCIÓN DE NULIDAD Y RESTABLECIMIENTO DEL DERECHO, ASOCIACIONES, FONDO DE EMPLEADOS
 Sentencia 2005-0006 de 14 de octubre 2010
 Rad.: 11001-03-27-000-2005-00006-00
 Radicación: 11001-03-27-000-2005-00006-00
 Actora: Asociación Nacional de Fondos de Empleados Analfe.
 Los actos administrativos cuya nulidad se pretende, son el Oficio 7000 311 2004 de fecha 27 de mayo de 2004, Suscrito por el Superintendente Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, dirigido al Presidente de Analfe, mediante el cual se ordenó el desmonte de la actividad financiera que venía desarrollando dicha asociación, especialmente en lo relacionado con la captación de ahorros y la colocación de créditos, y la Resolución 468 de 6 de agosto de 2004, dictada por el mismo funcionario, mediante la cual se resolvió el recurso de reposición interpuesto contra dicho oficio, confirmando la orden anteriormente referida, la cual cobró fuerza ejecutoria el día 17 de agosto de 2004.
 Se trata de establecer si las entidades de segundo grado creadas por los fondos de empleados en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 44 del decreto 1481 de 1989, “por el cual se determinan la naturaleza, características, constitución, regímenes interno, de responsabilidad y sanciones, y se dictan medidas para el fomento de los fondos de empleados.” se encuentran jurídicamente habilitadas o no para captar ahorros de sus asociados y proceder a su posterior colación mediante el otorgamiento de créditos.
 Antes de abordar el análisis de la problemática planteada en la demanda, es preciso establecer si al configurarse el decaimiento de los actos demandados ante la desaparición de los fundamentos fácticos que dieron lugar a su expedición, enerva la posibilidad de que la Sala se pronuncie sobre el fondo de la controversia; y en segundo lugar, si el Oficio 7000-311- 2004 de fecha 27 de mayo de 2004, suscrito por el Superintendente Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, es susceptible de ser demandado ante esta jurisdicción.
 Con respecto a la primera inquietud, la Sala considera que la desaparición de los fundamentos fácticos que sirvieron de justificación a los actos acusados, no impide a la Sala proferir una decisión de mérito con respecto a su legalidad, pues lo cierto es que hasta antes de la consolidación de dicho fenómeno, los actos administrativos demandados produjeron efectos jurídicos mientras estuvieron en vigor. Por las razones expuestas, resulta totalmente claro para la Sala que no existe ningún impedimento para que se profiera un pronunciamiento de fondo sobre las pretensiones de la demanda.
 Por otra parte, en reiteradas ocasiones se ha dicho que los oficios solamente tienen el carácter de actos demandables ante esta jurisdicción, cuando crean, modifican o extinguen una situación jurídica de carácter general o particular, esto es, cuando producen efectos jurídicos abstractos o concretos, mas no así cuando constituyen meros actos de comunicación.
 En el caso bajo examen, es claro para la Sala que los actos demandados participan de las características propias de un acto administrativo, al “ordenar” a la entidad demandante el desmonte de la actividad financiera, especialmente en lo relacionado con la captación de ahorros y la colocación de créditos, y al señalarle la obligación de presentar un plan de ajuste dentro del término perentorio que allí se establece, con respecto a la devolución de los ahorros recibidos y a la aplicación de los correctivos que la situación amerita. Como se puede apreciar, el oficio demandado contiene una declaración de voluntad de la administración emitida por el Superintendente Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y la Forma Asociativa Solidaria en ejercicio de sus funciones, capaz de producir efectos jurídicos, lo cual es más que suficiente para colegir que el oficio en cuestión constituye sin lugar a dudas un verdadero acto administrativo, que como tal se encuentra sujeto al control de esta jurisdicción.
 A propósito del tema, la Sala en providencia calendada el 26 de octubre de 1995, de manera asertiva señaló que “(...) la enumeración de actos demandables que hace el inciso 3o del artículo 14 del Decreto-Ley 2304 de 1989 (subrogatorio del CCA, art. 84) no es taxativa y los conceptos [léase “oficios” para los fines de este proceso] son enjuiciables en la medida en que contengan una decisión capaz de producir efectos jurídicos y emanen de una entidad pública o persona privada que cumpla funciones administrativas”(1).
 4. Referentes normativos.
 Con el objeto de poder realizar el estudio de legalidad de los actos acusados, se hace necesario tener en cuenta los siguientes preceptos, cuyo texto es del siguiente tenor:
 ART. 29.—El debido proceso se aplicará a toda clase de actuaciones judiciales y administrativas. (...).
 Decreto 1481 de 1989, “por el cual se determinan la naturaleza, características, constitución, regímenes interno, de responsabilidad y sanciones, y se dictan medidas para el fomento de los fondos de empleados”.
 ART. 22.—Servicios de ahorro y crédito. Los fondos de empleados prestarán los servicios de ahorro y crédito en forma directa y únicamente a sus asociados, en las modalidades y con los requisitos que establezcan los reglamentos y de conformidad con lo que dispongan las normas que reglamenten la materia.
 ART. 44.—Asociación de fondos. Los fondos de empleados podrán asociarse entre si para constituir organismos de segundo grado con el fin de prestar servicios de carácter económico, de asistencia técnica y de beneficio social a las entidades asociadas, y para ejercer su representación. Estos organismos se constituirán con no menos de cinco (5) fondos de empleados.
 Los organismos a que se refiere el inciso anterior podrán crear organismos de tercer grado para las acciones de representación y defensa de los fondos de empleados y su constitución podrá efectuarse con un mínimo de doce (12) organismos de segundo grado.
 En los estatutos de los organismos de segundo o tercer grado podrá establecerse un poder de decisión proporcional al número de asociados que posea cada entidad asociada, al volumen de sus operaciones con el organismo de grado superior o a una combinación de los anteriores factores. A estos organismos les serán aplicables, en lo pertinente, las normas legales previstas para los fondos de empleados.
 Ley 454 de 1998, “Por la cual se determina el marco conceptual que regula la Economía Solidaria, se transforma el Dancoop en el Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Economía Solidaria, se crea la Superintendencia de la Economía Solidaria, se crea el Fondo de Garantías para las Cooperativas Financieras y de Ahorro y Crédito, se dictan normas sobre la actividad financiera de las entidades de naturaleza cooperativa y se expiden otras disposiciones”
 ART. 2o—Definición. Para efectos de la presente Ley denominase economía solidaria al sistema socioeconómico, cultural y ambiental conformado por el conjunto de fuerzas sociales organizadas en formas asociativas identificadas por prácticas autogestionarias solidarias, democráticas y humanistas, sin ánimo de lucro para el desarrollo integral del ser humano como sujeto, actor y fin de la economía.
 PAR.—En concordancia con las previsiones del artículo 335 de la Constitución Política, la Superintendencia encargada de la vigilancia de la entidad infractora, adelantará las medidas cautelares establecidas en el numeral lo. del artículo 108 del Estatuto Orgánico del Sistema Financiero respecto de las entidades que adelanten actividad financiera sin haber recibido la autorización pertinente, sin perjuicio de lo previsto en el numeral 3o del artículo 208 del mismo ordenamiento.
 ART. 35.—Adopción de decisiones. Habiéndose dado oportunidad a los interesados para expresar sus opiniones, y con base en las pruebas e informes disponibles, se tomará la decisión que será motivada al menos en forma sumaria si afecta a particulares
 Las notificaciones se harán conforme lo dispone el capítulo X de este título
 También puede pedirse que se declare la nulidad de las circulares de servicio y de los actos de certificación y registro(2).
 Además de las normas que se acaban de reproducir, no huelga transcribir también, en lo pertinente, los siguientes apartes del artículo 10 del Decreto 186 de 2004, “Por el cual se modifica la estructura de la Superintendencia de la Economía Solidaria”, en donde se señalan las funciones a cargo del Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y de la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, por tratarse de la autoridad administrativa que profirió los actos demandados. En ese artículo se prescribe lo siguiente:
 ART. 10.—La Delegatura para la Supervisión del Ahorro y de la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, tendrá las siguientes funciones:
 Antes de efectuar cualquier consideración con respecto a la legalidad de los actos acusados, resulta oportuno desmentir las afirmaciones de la parte actora con respecto a la supuesta omisión en que incurrió el Superintendente Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y de la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, al dejar de mencionar los fundamentos jurídicos que sirven de sustento a dichas determinaciones.
 En efecto, mientras en el texto del oficio DSR-7000 311 2004 de fecha 25 de mayo de 2004 se invocan como fundamentos normativos el artículo 44 del Decreto 1481 de 1989, los artículos 34 y 39 de la Ley 454 de 1998 y el artículo 10 del Decreto 186 de 2004, en la Resolución 468 del 6 de agosto de 2004 se hace expresa alusión al artículo 10 numeral 16 del Decreto 186 de 2004, al artículo 50 del Código Contencioso Administrativo , a los artículos 22 y 44 del Decreto 1481 de 1989 y al capítulo octavo, título cuarto de la Circular Externa 7 de 2003, conocida como Circular Básica Jurídica. Por lo mismo, las afirmaciones del actor en relación con el punto adolecen por completo de sustento.
 En segundo término, la simple lectura de los apartes del artículo 10 del Decreto 186 de 2004, “Por el cual se modifica la estructura de la Superintendencia de la Economía Solidaria”, permiten observar que la decisión administrativa contenida en los actos demandados, fue adoptada por autoridad competente.
 Ahora bien, con respecto a la objeción principal, es decir, la que concierne a la supuesta imposibilidad de que las asociaciones de segundo grado constituidas por los fondos de empleados, se ocupen de la prestación de servicios de ahorro y crédito con destino a los fondos asociados, la Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo comparte el criterio expresado por la Sala de Consulta y Servicio Civil de esta misma corporación, el 19 de agosto de 2004, en donde adujo lo siguiente:
 “3. Asociación de fondos de empleados. (...) El régimen legal actual de los fondos de empleados permite la asociación entre sí con el fin de prestar servicios de carácter económico, de asistencia técnica y de beneficio social a las entidades asociadas —organismos de segundo grado— (D.L.1481/89, art. 44). (...)] (...) (A) las asociaciones de segundo grado y a las gremiales se les aplican, de manera general, las normas legales previstas para los fondos de empleados, sin embargo respecto del objeto de cada una de ellas, es decir de las actividades que están habilitadas a desarrollar, existen diferencias obvias: las primeras desarrollan actividades económicas y las segundas de defensa gremial. De modo que la asociación de los fondos de empleados entre sí, para la realización de actividades económicas de intermediación financiera, mantiene su régimen especial de ahorro y crédito —art. 44—, cuya prestación debe realizarse en forma directa y exclusivamente con sus asociados —art. 22 ibídem—, de tal manera que en el caso de constituirse asociaciones de fondos que tengan por objeto tal servicio, éste ha de cumplirse en las mismas condiciones en que la realizan los fondos y, en consecuencia, no podrá desarrollarse tal actividad financiera con terceros. Ahora bien, como el régimen especial aplicable a los fondos de empleados sólo consagra disposiciones particulares respecto del ejercicio de la actividad financiera en lo relativo al servicio de ahorro y crédito ya analizado, deben determinarse las normas complementarias de remisión o generales a las cuales deben sujetarse para el desarrollo de otras actividades financieras, contenidas en las leyes 454 de 1998 y 79 de 1988, que permiten a las entidades de economía solidaria desplegarlas a través de entidades especializadas. De acuerdo a la remisión del artículo 58 ibídem, los fondos de empleados pueden asociarse para constituir organismos de segundo grado con cooperativas, las cuales pueden ser cooperativas de ahorro y crédito, cooperativas financieras, instituciones financieras de naturaleza cooperativa o cooperativas multiactivas o integrales, conforme lo autoriza el artículo 39 de la Ley 454 para realizar actividad financiera (...). El escrito de adición a la consulta inquiere si los organismos de segundo grado que se creen por los fondos de empleados pueden captar ahorro de sus entidades asociadas y otorgarles créditos, sin constituirse en entidades financieras. Sobre el particular es aplicable el artículo 41 de la Ley 454 que dispone: “Cooperativas de ahorro y crédito. Son cooperativas de ahorro y crédito los organismos cooperativos especializados cuya función principal consiste en adelantar actividad financiera exclusivamente con sus asociados(3), su naturaleza jurídica se rige por las disposiciones de la Ley 79 de 1988 y se encuentran sometidas al control, inspección y vigilancia de la Superintendencia de la Economía Solidaria”. Al efecto debe señalarse que este precepto, en armonía con la autorización de asociación contenida en el artículo 44 del Decreto-Ley 1481 de 1989 ya analizada, permite que los organismos de segundo grado constituidos por los fondos de empleados puedan tener por objeto la prestación de servicios de carácter económico —entre los cuales se encuentra el desarrollo de la actividad de ahorro y crédito— “a las entidades asociadas”, esto es, que la asociación puede darse entre fondos de empleados o con otras entidades del sector solidario o no, pero siempre que la actividad a desarrollar sea la de ahorro y crédito, lo cual implica que no se produce cambio de la naturaleza y fines de los fondos y, por tanto, no hay lugar a su transformación en entidades financieras ni surge la obligación legal de constituirse como tales.” (Las negrillas son propias del texto)(4).
 A partir de las consideraciones que anteceden, la Sala concluyó en forma categórica lo siguiente:
 5. Los organismos de segundo grado que se creen por los fondos de empleados para captar ahorro de sus entidades asociadas y otorgarles créditos, pueden tener por objeto la prestación del servicio de ahorro y crédito “a las entidades asociadas” que los constituyan, esto es, a los fondos de empleados, sin que por ello se transformen en entidades financieras o estén obligadas legalmente a constituirse como tales. (Las negrillas son propias del texto)
 En consecuencia, sin necesidad de mayores consideraciones, vale concluir que el cargo propuesto tiene vocación de prosperidad, de allí que la Sala deba despachar las pretensiones de la demanda, como en efecto lo hará en la parte resolutiva de esta providencia.
 1. DECLÁRASE la nulidad del Oficio 7000 311 2004 de fecha 27 de mayo de 2004 y de la Resolución 468 de 6 de agosto de 2004, expedidos por el Superintendente Delegado para la Supervisión del Ahorro y de la Forma Asociativa Solidaria, de conformidad con las razones expuestas en la presente providencia.
 2. Como consecuencia de lo anterior y a manera de restablecimiento del derecho, DECLÁRASE que la Asociación Nacional de Fondos de Empleados —Analfe—, puede captar ahorros provenientes de los fondos de empleados afiliados a dicha asociación y a colocar créditos entre tales entidades, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 22 y 44 del Decreto-Ley 1481 de 1989.
 (1) Vid. Consejo de Estado, Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Primera, Sentencia de 26 de octubre de 1995, Radicación 3088, Consejero ponente: Ernesto Rafael Ariza Muñoz.
 (2) Subrogado, por el artículo 14 del Decreto 2304 de 1989.
 (3) Mediante Sentencia C- 201/01 la Corte Constitucional dictó sentencia inhibitoria respecto del aparte subrayado.
 (4) Consejo de Estado, Sala de Consulta y Servicio Civil, pronunciamiento calendado el 19 de agosto de 2004 (Radicación 1582), Consejero Ponente: Flavio Augusto Rodríguez Arce.


type: caselaw

text:
 30.6.2012
 MT
 Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea
 C 194/2
 Sentenza tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja (Ir-Raba’ Awla) tal-10 ta’ Mejju 2012 — Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea vs Ir-Repubblika tal-Estonja
 (Kawża C-39/10) (1)
 (Nuqqas ta’ Stat li jwettaq obbligu - Moviment liberu tal-ħaddiema - Taxxa fuq id-dħul - Tnaqqis - Pensjonijiet tal-irtirar - Impatt fuq il-pensjonijiet ta’ ammont baxx - Diskriminazzjoni bejn persuni taxxabbli residenti u dawk li ma humiex residenti)
 2012/C 194/02
 Lingwa tal-kawża: l-Estonjan
 Partijiet
 Rikorrenti: Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea (rappreżentanti: W. Mölls, K. Saaremäel-Stoilov u R. Lyal, aġenti)
 Konvenuta: Ir-Repubblika tal-Estonja (rappreżentant: M. Linntam, aġent)
 Intervenjenti insostenn tal-konvenuta: Ir-Renju ta’ Spanja (rappreżentanti: M. Muñoz Pérez u A. Rubio Gonzáles, aġenti), Ir-Repubblika Portugiża (rappreżentant: L. Inez Fernandes, aġent), Ir-Renju tal-Isvezja (rappreżentant: A. Falk, aġent), Ir-Renju Unit tal-Gran Brittanja u l-Irlanda ta’ Fuq (rappreżentant: S. Ossowski, aġent), Ir-Repubblika Federali tal-Ġermanja (rappreżentanti: J. Möller, C. Blaschke u B. Klein, aġenti)
 Suġġett
 Nuqqas ta’ Stat li jwettaq obbligu — Ksur tal-Artikolu 45 TFUE u tal-Artikolu 28 tal-Ftehim ŻEE — Taxxa fuq id-dħul tal-pensjonijiet tal-irtirar — Leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li ma tipprovdix għall-possibbiltà li tingħata eżenzjoni mit-taxxa fuq id-dħul lill-persuni li ma humiex residenti u li d-dħul totali tagħhom huwa tant baxx li kienu jibbenefikaw mill-eżenzjoni mit-taxxa fuq id-dħul li kieku kienu persuni taxxabbli residenti
 Dispożittiv
 (1)
 Billi teskludi lill-persuni rtirati mhux residenti mill-benefiċċju tat-tnaqqis previst mil-Liġi dwar it-taxxa fuq id-dħul (tulumaksuseadus) tal-15 ta’ Diċembru 1999, kif emendata bil-Liġi tas-26 ta’ Novembru 2009, meta, fid-dawl tal-ammont baxx tal-pensjonijiet tagħhom, dawn il-persuni ma humiex, skont il-leġiżlazzjoni fiskali tal-Istat Membru ta’ residenza, taxxabbli f’dan l-Istat tal-aħħar, ir-Repubblika tal-Estonja naqset milli twettaq l-obbligi tagħha taħt l-Artikoli 45 TFUE u 28 tal-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, tat-2 ta’ Mejju 1992.
 (2)
 Ir-Repubblika tal-Estonja hija kkundannata għall-ispejjeż.
 (3)
 Ir-Renju ta’ Spanja, ir-Repubblika Portugiża, ir-Renju tal-Isvezja, ir-Renju Unit tal-Gran Brittanja u l-Irlanda ta’ Fuq kif ukoll ir-Repubblika Federali tal-Ġermanja għandhom ibatu l-ispejjeż rispettivi tagħhom.
 (1) ĠU C 63, 13.3.2010.


text:
 30.3.2006
 HU
 Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja
 L 92/24
 AZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG 5/2006 HATÁROZATA
 (2006. január 27.)
 az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodás II. mellékletének (Műszaki előírások, szabványok, vizsgálatok és tanúsítás) módosításáról
 AZ EGT-VEGYESBIZOTTSÁG,
 tekintettel az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodás kiigazításáról szóló jegyzőkönyvvel módosított, az Európai Gazdasági Térségről szóló megállapodásra (a továbbiakban: a megállapodás) és különösen annak 98. cikkére,
 mivel:
 (1)
 A megállapodás II. mellékletét a 2005. december 2-i 145/2005 EGT-vegyesbizottsági határozat (1) módosította.
 (2)
 Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács csomagolásról és a csomagolási hulladékról szóló 94/62/EK irányelve szerinti adatbázisrendszerre vonatkozó formátumok létrehozásáról szóló, 2005. március 22-i 2005/270/EK bizottsági határozatot (2) bele kell foglalni a megállapodásba.
 (3)
 A 2005/270/EK határozat hatályon kívül helyezi a megállapodásba foglalt 97/138/EK bizottsági határozatot (3), amely ebből következően a megállapodást illetően hatályát veszti,
 A KÖVETKEZŐKÉPPEN HATÁROZOTT:
 1. cikk
 A megállapodás II. mellékletének XVII. fejezete a következőképpen módosul:
 1.
 A 7b. pont (97/138/EK bizottsági határozat) szövegét el kell hagyni.
 2.
 A 7d. pont (2001/171/EK bizottsági határozat) után az alábbi pontot kell beilleszteni:
 „7e.
 32005 D 0270: A Bizottság 2005. március 22-i 2005/270/EK határozata az Európai Parlament és a Tanács csomagolásról és a csomagolási hulladékról szóló 94/62/EK irányelve szerinti adatbázisrendszerre vonatkozó formátumok létrehozásáról (HL L 86., 2005.4.5., 6. o.)”.
 2. cikk
 A 2005/270/EK határozatnak az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-kiegészítésében közzéteendő izlandi és norvég nyelvű szövege hiteles.
 3. cikk
 Ez a határozat 2006. január 28-án lép hatályba, amennyiben a megállapodás 103. cikkének (1) bekezdésében előírt összes értesítést eljuttatták az EGT-Vegyesbizottsághoz (4).
 4. cikk
 Ezt a határozatot az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapjának EGT-re vonatkozó részében és EGT-kiegészítésében kell közzétenni.
 Kelt Brüsszelben, 2006. január 27-én.
 az EGT-Vegyesbizottság részéről
 az elnök
 R. WRIGHT
 (1) HL L 53., 2006.2.23., 42. o.
 (2) HL L 86., 2005.4.5., 6. o.
 (3) HL L 52., 1997.2.22., 22. o.
 (4) Alkotmányos követelmények fennállását nem jelezték.


text:
25.8.2007
 IT
 Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea
 C 199/5
 Sentenza della Corte (Seconda Sezione) 5 luglio 2007 — Commissione delle Comunità europee/Repubblica italiana
 (Causa C-255/05) (1)
 (Inadempimento di uno Stato - Valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti - Recupero dei rifiuti - Realizzazione della «terza linea» dell'inceneritore di rifiuti di Brescia - Pubblicità della domanda di autorizzazione - Direttive 75/442/CEE, 85/337/CEE e 2000/76/CE)
 (2007/C 199/07)
 Lingua processuale: l'italiano
 Parti
 Ricorrente: Commissione delle Comunità europee (rappresentanti: M. Konstantinidis, agente, F. Louis e A. Capobianco, avvocati)
 Convenuta: Repubblica italiana (rappresentanti: I. M. Braguglia, agente, M. Fiorilli, avvocato)
 Interveniente: Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord (rappresentanti: T. Harris, agente, J. Maurici, barrister)
 Oggetto
 Inadempimento di uno Stato — Violazione degli artt. 2, n. 1, e 4, n. 1, della direttiva del Consiglio 27 giugno 1985, 85/337/CEE, concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici e privati (GU L 175, pag. 40), come modificata dalla direttiva 3 marzo 1997, 97/11/CE (GU L 73, pag. 5) — Violazione dell'art. 12, n. 1, della direttiva del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio 4 dicembre 2000, 2000/76/CE, sull'incenerimento dei rifiuti (GU L 332, pag. 91) — Autorizzazione concessa senza valutazione e senza pubblicazione della domanda preliminare di autorizzazione — Realizzazione di una «terza linea» di incenerimento dei rifiuti da parte della ASM di Brescia SpA
 Dispositivo
 1)
 Non avendo sottoposto, prima della concessione dell'autorizzazione alla costruzione, il progetto di una «terza linea» dell'inceneritore appartenente alla società ASM Brescia Spa alla procedura di valutazione di impatto ambientale prevista dagli artt. da 5 a 10 della direttiva del Consiglio 27 giugno 1985, 85/337/CEE, concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale di determinati progetti pubblici o privati, come modificata dalla direttiva del Consiglio 3 marzo 1997, 97/11/CE, la Repubblica italiana è venuta meno agli obblighi ad essa derivanti dagli artt. 2, n. 1, e 4, n. 1, di tale direttiva.
 2)
 Non avendo reso accessibile in uno o più luoghi aperti al pubblico la comunicazione di inizio attività della «terza linea» del detto inceneritore per un adeguato periodo di tempo affinché il pubblico potesse esprimere le proprie osservazioni prima della decisione dell'autorità competente e non avendo messo a disposizione del pubblico stesso le decisioni relative a tale comunicazione insieme ad una copia dell'autorizzazione, la Repubblica italiana è venuta meno agli obblighi ad essa incombenti in forza dell'art. 12, n. 1, della direttiva del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio 4 dicembre 2000, 2000/76/CE, sull'incenerimento dei rifiuti.
 3)
 La Repubblica italiana è condannata alle spese.
 4)
 Il Regno Unito di Gran Bretagna e Irlanda del Nord sopporta le proprie spese.
 (1) GU C 205 del 20.8.2005.


text:
 5.9.2016
 ET
 Euroopa Liidu Teataja
 C 326/15
 Eelotsusetaotlus, mille on esitanud Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaaria) 21. juunil 2016 – Balgarska energiyna borsa AD (BEB) versus Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane (KEVR)
 (Kohtuasi C-347/16)
 (2016/C 326/26)
 Kohtumenetluse keel: bulgaaria
 Eelotsusetaotluse esitanud kohus
 Administrativen sad Sofia-grad
 Põhikohtuasja pooled
 Kaebaja: Balgarska energiyna borsa AD (BEB)
 Vastustaja: Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane (KEVR)
 Eelotsuse küsimused
 1.
 Kas Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta direktiivi 2009/72/EÜ (1), mis käsitleb elektrienergia siseturu ühiseeskirju ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks direktiiv 2003/54/EÜ, artikli 9 lõike 1 punkti b alapunktidega i ja ii on kooskõlas, et üks ja sama isik on sõltumatu põhivõrguettevõtja ainuosanik ja selle äriühingu ainuosanik, kelle põhitegevusala on elektrienergia tootmine ja edastamine?
 2.
 Kas Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta direktiivi 2009/72/EÜ, mis käsitleb elektrienergia siseturu ühiseeskirju ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks direktiiv 2003/54/EÜ, artikli 9 lõike 1 punkti b alapunktidega i ja ii on kooskõlas, et üks ja sama isik kontrollib otseselt või kaudselt sõltumatut põhivõrguettevõtjat ning elektrienergia tootmise ja tarnimisega tegelevat ettevõtjat?
 3.
 Kas Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta direktiivi 2009/72/EÜ, mis käsitleb elektrienergia siseturu ühiseeskirju ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks direktiiv 2003/54/EÜ, artikli 9 lõike 1 punktidega c ja d on kooskõlas, et üks ja sama isik määrab sõltumatu põhivõrguettevõtja järelevalvenõukogu liikmed (kes omakorda valivad juhatuse) ning elektrienergia tootmise ja tarnimisega tegeleva ettevõtja direktorite nõukogu liikmed?
 4.
 Kas Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta direktiiviga 2009/72/EÜ, mis käsitleb elektrienergia siseturu ühiseeskirju ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks direktiiv 2003/54/EÜ, Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta määrusega (EÜ) nr 714/2009 (2) võrkudele juurdepääsu tingimuste kohta piiriüleses elektrikaubanduses ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks määrus (EÜ) nr 1228/2003 (3), komisjoni 24. juuli 2015. aasta määrusega (EL) nr 1222/2015 (4), millega kehtestatakse võimsuse jaotamise ja ülekoormuse juhtimise suunised, ning Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 25. oktoobri 2011. aasta määrusega (EL) nr 1227/2011 (5) energia hulgimüügituru terviklikkuse ja läbipaistvuse kohta on kooskõlas piirata isikute hulka, kellele väljastatakse teatavas piirkonnas elektrienergia edastamise litsents?
 5.
 Eespool esitatud küsimustele jaatava vastuse andmisel ja [tuginedes sellele, et] [energiaseaduse (Zakon na energetikata)] artikli 43 lõike 1 punkti 1 kohaselt on Bulgaaria Vabariigi territooriumil elektrienergia edastamiseks väljastatud ainult üks litsents: kas lähtuda tuleb sellest, et esineb huvide konflikt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 13. juuli 2009. aasta direktiivi 2009/72/EÜ, mis käsitleb elektrienergia siseturu ühiseeskirju ning millega tunnistatakse kehtetuks direktiiv 2003/54/EÜ, [põhjenduse 12] tähenduses?
 6.
 Kas lähtuda tuleb sellest, et [energiaseaduse] artikli 43 lõike 1 punkt 1 piirab konkurentsi ELTL artiklite 101 ja 102 tähenduses, kuna see näeb ette, et riigi territooriumil elektrienergia edastamiseks väljastatakse ainult üks litsents?
 (1) ELT L 211, lk 55.
 (2) ELT L 211, lk 15.
 (3) Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 26. juuni 2003. aasta määrus (EÜ) nr 1228/2003, milles käsitletakse võrkudele juurdepääsu tingimusi piiriüleses elektrikaubanduses (ELT L 176, lk 1, ELT eriväljaanne 12/002, lk 175).
 (4) ELT L 197, lk 24.
 (5) ELT L 326, lk 1.


jurisdiction: US

text:
 910 A.2d 376 (2006)
 2006 ME 136
 Fern DOWLING
 v.
 BANGOR HOUSING AUTHORITY.
 Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
 Argued: May 8, 2006.
 Decided: November 28, 2006.
 *378 Carl E. Kandutsch (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Bangor, for plaintiff.
 Edward W. Gould (orally), Gross, Minsky & Mogul, P.A., Bangor, for defendant.
 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
 Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, and ALEXANDER, JJ.
 Concurrence/Dissent: LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
 CLIFFORD, J.
 [¶ 1] Fern Dowling appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Hjelm, J.) affirming the decision of the Bangor Housing Authority to terminate Dowling's "Section 8" rental subsidy issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f (Law Co-op. 2001). Dowling contends that the Authority improperly considered hearsay evidence, and that there is insufficient record evidence to support the Authority's *379 decision to terminate her rental subsidy. We affirm the judgment.
 I. BACKGROUND
 [¶ 2] In 2002, Fern Dowling was approved for participation in the Federal Housing Assistance Payments Program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1437-1440 (Law Co-op. 2001), also known as the "Section 8" rental subsidy program. Section 8 participants are low-income families who are eligible for federal rental subsidies. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f. Section 8 housing is administered by local housing authorities pursuant to federal statutes and regulations. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f(b). The Bangor Housing Authority is one such local authority that administers Section 8 housing.[1] In administering the federal Section 8 program, the Authority enters into contracts with private landlords, owners of existing dwellings, to subsidize the monthly rent of low-income participants. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f(b)(1).
 [¶ 3] In September of 2003, Dowling entered into an Authority-approved lease agreement with landlord Robert Wortman Sr. to lease a mobile home in a mobile home park in Bangor. The lease with Wortman provided that Dowling's rent included all utilities.
 [¶ 4] Dowling had previously signed a document entitled "Things You Should Know," stating that paying any amounts outside the lease provisions is considered fraud, and that if she is required to pay any amounts outside the rent, she must obtain a written explanation for such charges. The document also notified Dowling of her obligation to report any fraud or abuse to the Authority. Even though Dowling knew that the Section 8 program requires that all utilities be included in the rent, she later entered into a side agreement with Wortman, unknown to the Authority, pursuant to which Dowling paid Wortman an additional monthly amount equivalent to the cost of Dowling's electric bill, in exchange for which Dowling moved into a better mobile home than the one she initially contracted to rent. Dowling paid Wortman pursuant to the side agreement from September of 2003 until May of 2004 without informing the Authority.
 [¶ 5] In May of 2004, Wortman began forcible entry and detainer proceedings against Dowling pursuant to 14 M.R.S. §§ 6001-6016 (2005) by serving her with a notice to quit the premises. It was then that Dowling first notified Sally McDonald, a Section 8 housing coordinator for the Authority, about her side agreement with Wortman.
 [¶ 6] In June of 2004, McDonald notified Dowling by letter that her Section 8 rental subsidy was terminated for noncompliance with Section 8 regulations pursuant to 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551, 982.552 (2006).[2] Dowling *380 appealed the decision to terminate her from the program, and a subsidy termination hearing was conducted by a hearing officer in July of 2004. Dowling, who was represented by counsel, was the only witness who testified at the hearing. She admitted to participating in the side agreement, and testified that it was initiated by Wortman.
 [¶ 7] The hearing officer also reviewed and took into account the notes kept by McDonald, including the notes of the conversation McDonald had with Wortman's son about the side agreement between Wortman and Dowling. Those notes reflected that Wortman's son told McDonald that it was Dowling who initiated the side agreement. Following the hearing, the hearing officer concluded (1) that Dowling's failure to inform the Authority of her side agreement with Wortman violated the information disclosure mandate of section 982.551(b), and (2) that the side agreement in which Dowling participated constituted fraud in violation of section 982.551(k). The Authority terminated Dowling's Section 8 subsidy.
 [¶ 8] Dowling petitioned for review of the Authority's decision in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The court remanded the matter to the Authority for further findings and conclusions, but retained jurisdiction over the matter while awaiting those further findings. Following the hearing officer's issuance of such further findings and conclusions as requested by the court, which included a finding that it was Dowling who initiated the side agreement, the court affirmed the decision of the Authority. Dowling then filed this appeal.
 II. DISCUSSION
 [¶ 9] When, as here, the Superior Court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity, we review directly the decision of the Authority for "abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not supported by the substantial evidence in the record." Phaiah v. Town of Fayette, 2005 ME 20, ¶ 8, 866 A.2d 863, 866 (quotation marks omitted). In order to vacate an agency's decision, we must determine that no competent record evidence exists to support the decision. Id.
 [¶ 10] Dowling contends that (1) the hearing process employed by the Authority violated federal regulations and her due process rights because the Authority failed to produce a witness for cross-examination; (2) the Authority's finding that she violated Section 8 program requirements by not providing required information was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the Authority's finding that she committed fraud by initiating the side agreement was not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the Authority erred in terminating Dowling's Section 8 subsidy as a sanction.
 A. The Housing Authority's Failure to Produce a Witness
 [¶ 11] Dowling relies on 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2005) to argue that any witness whose testimony is to be relied upon by the Authority must be produced *381 in person by the Authority and be subjected to questioning by the Section 8 participant. She contends that the Authority violated section 982.555(e)(5), as well as her right of procedural due process, when it considered McDonald's notes about the conversation McDonald had with Wortman about the side agreement without producing Wortman himself for cross-examination by Dowling.
 [¶ 12] "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard," including "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witness and by presenting [her] own arguments and evidence orally." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) (quotation marks omitted). Due process considerations are indeed implicated in the termination of a welfare subsidy, and the process that is due "must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." Id. at 268-69, 90 S. Ct. 1011. In the case of termination of a Section 8 subsidy, due process is fulfilled by an informal, pre-termination evidentiary hearing at which the participant in the rental assistance program is present and may be represented by counsel. Id. at 270-71, 90 S. Ct. 1011; see 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. Within the context of such informal hearings, both the Authority and the participant "must be given the opportunity to present evidence, and may question any witnesses." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5).
 [¶ 13] Dowling, however, never objected to the Authority's consideration of McDonald's notes. Assuming that Dowling did have the right to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the Authority relied, we have nevertheless held in a variety of contexts that a party may fail to preserve rights, including those of constitutional import. See Berg v. Bragdon, 1997 ME 129, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d 1212, 1214 ("We have stated that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally unpreserved. We have applied this rule consistently whether the alleged right is constitutional or based on the common law.") (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Irving Oil Corp. v. Me. Aviation Corp., 1998 ME 16, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 872, 874 ("Because [the defendants] failed to preserve the issue in the Superior Court, we will not review it on appeal even though it is one of constitutional dimension."). Because Dowling failed to object at the Authority's administrative hearing to the admission of the notes taken by McDonald of her conversation with Wortman's son, Dowling's challenge to the admission of those notes is unpreserved for appellate review.
 B. Dowling's Failure to Supply Required Information
 [¶ 14] The Authority is authorized to terminate a Section 8 recipient's eligibility for failure to "supply any information that the [Authority] or [the Department of Housing and Urban Development] determines is necessary in the administration of the program," or for failure to supply "true and complete" information. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(b)(1), (4), 982.552(c)(1)(i). "Information" within the meaning of section 982.551(b) is defined as "any requested certification, release or other documentation." 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)(1). In this case, the Authority found that Dowling violated this requirement by failing to disclose to it the existence of the side agreement with Wortman.
 [¶ 15] The Authority's finding is supported by Dowling's own testimony during the hearing before the Authority that, although *382 she was aware that the Section 8 program required that all utilities be included in her rent, she did not disclose the side agreement to the Authority because she was afraid to do so, she "did not want to be homeless again," and she "was settled in . . . [and] very happy, very comfortable." Further, Dowling had previously signed the "Things You Should Know" document in which she was informed of her duty to report any type of Section 8 abuse to the Authority. Thus, the Authority's determination that Dowling failed to supply all information necessary to administering her Section 8 eligibility, i.e. the existence of an unapproved side agreement with her landlord, is amply supported by the evidence.
 C. Dowling's Commission of Fraud by Participation in the Side Agreement
 [¶ 16] Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(k), the recipient of a Section 8 subsidy "must not commit fraud, bribery or any other corrupt or criminal act in connection with the programs." 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(k). The definition of "fraud" is not provided in any of the relevant statutes or regulations regarding Section 8 rental subsidies. Nevertheless, Dowling, the Authority, and the Superior Court analyzed the definition of fraud in sections 982.551(k) and 982.552(c)(1)(iv) with reference to Maine's common law tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. Fraudulent misrepresentation occurs when someone:
 (1) makes a false representation (2) of a material fact (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, and (5) the plaintiff justifiably relies upon the representation as true and acts upon it to [her] damage. . . . Reliance is unjustified only if the plaintiff knows the representation is false or its falsity is obvious to [her].
 Francis v. Stinson, 2000 ME 173, ¶ 38, 760 A.2d 209, 217 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
 [¶ 17] In this case, the evidence supports a finding that Dowling committed each element of fraudulent misrepresentation, including the evidence that Dowling falsely represented to the Authority that she was complying with Section 8 eligibility requirements by continuing to benefit from the program without disclosing her participation in an unapproved side agreement with her landlord; that she had actual knowledge that she was not complying with the program by participating in the side agreement for several months; that she secretly participated in the side agreement in order to obtain better housing and/or in order to avoid moving again; and that in reliance on its understanding that Dowling was complying with Section 8 requirements, the Authority continued to subsidize Dowling's rent. Thus, sufficient evidence exists to support the Authority's finding of fraud.
 D. The Sanction Imposed by the Authority
 [¶ 18] Finally, the dissent articulates Dowling's contention that the Authority imposed the ultimate sanction of termination of her subsidy based largely on its finding that she initiated the agreement, as opposed to her mere participation in the agreement, which finding, Dowling argues, is not supported by substantial evidence because it is based only on the hearsay notes of McDonald. We disagree.
 [¶ 19] The Authority is vested with the power to terminate subsidy assistance for the commission of any act of fraud pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(iv), or for violation of any program obligation pursuant to section 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i) *383 (2005). The evidence revealed that Dowling failed to uphold her obligation to supply true and complete information by failing to disclose the side agreement to the Authority. Further, Dowling concedes that she committed at least a program violation by participating in the side agreement; that participation in the side agreement supports the Authority's finding of fraud within the meaning of the regulations. Accordingly, the Authority had the power to terminate Dowling's subsidy for either her failure to supply information about the side agreement or for her participation in it, and certainly for both.
 [¶ 20] Moreover, there is little support in the record for Dowling's contention, articulated in the dissent, that the Authority's decision to terminate Dowling's subsidy was largely dependent on its finding that she initiated the side agreement. The Authority's initial decision, expressed in a letter to Dowling dated July 22, 2004, which was issued after the hearing at which McDonald's notes were admitted, informed Dowling that it was terminating her subsidy pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.551, and went on to quote portions of that section, including the portion related to failure to supply required information. The letter further stated that "[a]ll Section 8 tenants during orientation are warned that they are committing fraud if they enter into a side agreement with a landlord to pay him more than the [contract provides]," and that Dowling was "equally responsible for entering into a side agreement with Mr. Wortman and failing to report that information to [the Authority] because it was favorable to [her] at that time." (Emphases added.) Although the letter did mention Wortman's version of the story that Dowling approached him to initiate the side agreement, the letter did not indicate that the initiation of the side agreement was, by itself, the finding on which the termination of her subsidy is based. Indeed, as the quotes above illustrate, it was Dowling's mere participation in the side agreement that was the focus of the letter terminating her subsidy. It was only after the Superior Court remanded the matter back to the Authority for further findings and conclusions that the Authority specifically found that Dowling initiated the side agreement with Wortman.
 [¶ 21] Further, the Authority's April 2005 decision does not state that it was Dowling's initiation of the side agreement, as opposed to the fact of her participation in the agreement, that was the basis of the Authority's termination of her subsidy. The April 2005 decision lists a series of numbered factual findings, and also sets out the legal conclusions of the Authority, including Dowling's sanction. The Authority's conclusions include: (1) that Dowling "failed to supply [the Authority with] information required of her which is necessary for the administration of the Section 8 program in violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b)"; (2) that "side agreements such as the one between Ms. Dowling and Mr. Wortman are illegal and are considered fraudulent"; (3) that "Ms. Dowling was . . . aware that the side agreement which she entered was considered fraud"; and (4) that despite Dowling's obligation to report such agreements to the Authority, "she concealed that agreement from the . . . Authority and failed to report it. Her failure to report this agreement prevented the . . . Authority from discovering the agreement, and taking any appropriate action regarding Mr. Wortman." (Emphasis added.) Finally, the Authority's final conclusion and imposition of the sanction states:
 HUD regulations set forth at 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)[(1)](i) and (iv) specifically provide that a [Housing Authority] may terminate assistance if the recipient violates *384 any program obligations set forth at 24 C.F.R. § 982.551, or if the recipient commits fraud. By entering into this fraudulent agreement and refusing to disclose it to the Housing Authority, I conclude that Ms. Dowling violated 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(b) and (k) and that her assistance should be terminated as a result.
 [¶ 22] These conclusions are replete with references to Dowling's failure to disclose the existence of the side agreement to the Authority, as well as her fraudulent participation in the side agreement. Nowhere among the Authority's conclusions, including its ultimate conclusion and sanction, is there any explicit reliance on Dowling's initiation of the side agreement. Dowling's contention that the sanction of termination of her Section 8 subsidy was based on her initiation of, as opposed to her participation in and her failure to disclose, the side agreement is not supported by the language of the decision. See Poland v. Webb, 1998 ME 104, ¶ 10, 711 A.2d 1278, 1280 (noting that we review a fact-finder's factual findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party).
 [¶ 23] Moreover, the evidence on which the Authority based its finding that Dowling initiated the side agreement  the notes of McDonald's conversation with the landlord's son  were considered by the Authority without objection from Dowling. The applicable federal regulations themselves provide that "[e]vidence may be considered without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5) (2005). Furthermore, the rules of evidence, including those regarding hearsay, do not apply in proceedings for the imposition of a sanction, a concept long reflected in M.R. Evid. 1101(b)(4).[3] In determining a criminal sentence, a court may consider information based on investigations and reports conducted by agency officials. See State v. Rosa, 575 A.2d 727, 731 (Me.1990). Information from newspaper articles may also be subject to the sentencing court's consideration. See State v. Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Me.1994). Thus, the consideration of hearsay evidence in determining an appropriate sanction, criminal or administrative, by the sanctioning authority or court is permissible.
 [¶ 24] Although Dowling argues that the sanction imposed on her for her participation in the side agreement and her failure to disclose that agreement to the Authority is unduly harsh, pursuant to section 982.552(c)(1)(i), (iv), the Authority is empowered to terminate subsidy assistance in such circumstances. The Authority "may consider all relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of denial or termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or failure" in determining the appropriate sanction. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i). The weight to be given to such mitigating factors, however, is within the discretion of the Authority. In this case, the Authority concluded that it "[did] not find that any such [mitigating] circumstances in this case would justify refraining from terminating Ms. Dowling's assistance." Participation in an improper side agreement with a landlord for a period of eight months and failing to disclose the agreement *385 to the Authority, with knowledge that such action violated the tenant's obligations for Section 8 eligibility, is sufficiently serious to merit termination of the subsidy. Because the Authority has power to terminate rental subsidies, and because its findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Authority neither erred nor acted beyond its discretion in terminating Dowling's subsidy.
 The entry is:
 Judgment affirmed.
 LEVY, J., with whom SILVER, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
 [¶ 25] I join in the Court's opinion except with respect to part D concerning the sanction that was imposed by the Authority against Dowling. The hearing officer recommended that the ultimate sanction  termination from Section 8 housing assistance  be imposed based largely on his finding that Dowling had initiated the fraudulent side agreement she had with her former landlord, Robert Wortman Sr. Because this finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, the judgment should be vacated and the Authority required to reconsider the appropriate sanction.
 A. The Decision to Terminate Dowling's Section 8 Housing Assistance
 [¶ 26] If a tenant violates any program obligations set forth in the federal regulations, a housing authority may, but is not required to, terminate the tenant's Section 8 assistance. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551, 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2006). The regulations provide that before imposing a sanction for a violation, a public housing authority may consider:
 [A]ll relevant circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of denial or termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or failure.
 Id. § 982.552(c)(2)(i).
 [¶ 27] In this case, the hearing officer's decision acknowledged the discretion afforded by section 982.552(c)(2)(i), but he concluded that no mitigating circumstances existed, in part, because "her participation in this arrangement allowed her to live in a unit which she preferred to the original unit offered by Mr. Wortman." This finding refers to the prior finding that Dowling had initiated the side agreement with Wortman "[i]n order to have the opportunity to move into a more favorable rental unit."
 [¶ 28] Dowling was the only witness at the administrative hearing. She admitted to participating in the side agreement with Wortman, explaining that Wortman had come to her house and proposed the side agreement, and that she only agreed to it because she feared that she and her young son would be evicted by Wortman and left homeless if she refused the arrangement.
 [¶ 29] The only support in the administrative record for the hearing officer's finding that Dowling initiated the side agreement was an entry in the handwritten notes of Sally McDonald, an employee of the Authority. The entry appears to be based on a telephone or in-person discussion McDonald had with Wortman's son, Robert Wortman Jr.:
 6/9/04 Spoke with Bob Wortman, Jr. He stated that [Dowling] had requested that his father Bob Sr. charge the $600 and she would pay the utilities directly to them. They were not going to let her have the unit because the Rent Reasonable was below fair market.
 *386 [¶ 30] Apart from Dowling's testimony and McDonald's handwritten note, there was no other evidence concerning whether Dowling initiated the side agreement to obtain a better unit, or whether Wortman initiated the side agreement and Dowling felt compelled to accept it because she feared becoming homeless if she refused. The question thus presented is whether the entry in McDonald's handwritten notes is substantial evidence that supports the finding that Dowling initiated the side agreement.
 B. Uncorroborated Hearsay Evidence and the Substantial Evidence Test
 [¶ 31] Courts uphold administrative findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. See Phaiah v. Town of Fayette, 2005 ME 20, ¶ 8, 866 A.2d 863, 866. Administrative findings are reviewed to determine whether "a reasonable mind would rely on that evidence as sufficient support for a conclusion." Forbes v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 9, ¶ 6, 763 A.2d 1183, 1186.
 [¶ 32] We have previously had occasion to apply the substantial evidence standard in cases involving challenges to administrative findings based entirely on hearsay. In Keller v. Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission, 477 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Me.1984), we considered whether the plaintiff's double hearsay evidence of a telephone call between his friend and an unidentified Commission employee was admissible pursuant to the evidentiary standard of the Maine Administrative Procedures Act. We concluded that the double hearsay, although not inadmissible, did not satisfy the substantial evidence standard without additional corroborating evidence in the form of the employee's or the friend's testimony. Id.; see also Heal v. Me. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 447 A.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Me.1982).
 [¶ 33] More recently, in State v. James, 2002 ME 86, 797 A.2d 732, we addressed the importance of assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence when determining the weight it should be given in probation revocation hearings.[4] We noted in James that a variety of factors should be considered, including: (1) "whether the hearsay evidence is corroborated, in whole or part, by live testimony presented at the . . . hearing or an admission"; (2) "the source of the hearsay, including the potential for bias or motive to fabricate"; and (3) "whether the hearsay evidence is sufficiently detailed." Id. ¶ 15, 797 A.2d at 737. The James criteria comport with the approaches adopted by various courts that have grappled with the question of the role of hearsay when applying the substantial evidence standard in connection with administrative proceedings.[5]
 *387 [¶ 34] Our review of administrative findings based exclusively on hearsay evidence must recognize the need for informality in administrative proceedings, but also the imperative that agency proceedings should not degenerate to the point where critical findings are based exclusively on hearsay evidence that carries no indicia of reliability. The suggestion in the majority opinion that administrative proceedings are comparable to criminal sentencing hearings is, in my view, mistaken because criminal sentencing hearings are not subject to the substantial evidence standard. If we permit agency decisions to rest on nothing more than newspaper articles, a possibility suggested by the majority opinion, the substantial evidence test will be rendered meaningless.
 [¶ 35] Accordingly, whether hearsay evidence is, standing alone, substantial evidence that can support administrative findings must be resolved on a case-by-case basis and in a manner that is consistent with the goal of promoting informal hearing processes that remain true to the overriding goal of fundamental fairness. The substantial evidence test is not an exacting standard and it does not impose an undue burden on administrative decision-makers. Yet the standard serves an important societal function by providing a modest degree of assurance that important decisions affecting the lives of individuals will be based on something more than unsubstantiated rumor or attenuated third-hand information.
 C. The Uncorroborated Hearsay Evidence in This Case
 [¶ 36] Applying the James criteria, the brief entry in Sally McDonald's notes that *388 characterizes Dowling as the initiator of a fraudulent side agreement does not rise to the level of substantial evidence.
 [¶ 37] First, the multi-level hearsay evidence was neither sworn, nor corroborated by any testimony or other evidence. The statement attributed to Wortman appears to have been made to his son, who then reported it to McDonald, who then recorded it in her notes.
 [¶ 38] Second, the source of the hearsay had a substantial potential for bias or motive to fabricate. Wortman had a motive to blame Dowling for the side agreement because his participation in the agreement was itself a violation of the rules and put his own interests as a Section 8 landlord at risk.[6]
 [¶ 39] Third, the brief entry in McDonald's notes provides no details with which to meaningfully assess the accuracy of the statement attributed to Wortman. In addition, the administrative record provides no basis for us to presume the reliability of the written records of the Authority's employees. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (treating written medical reports prepared by independent medical examiners in connection with a "vast" administrative process as having an indicia of reliability).
 [¶ 40] The evidence supporting the finding that Dowling initiated the side agreement is decidedly insubstantial, and the hearing officer's adoption of that evidence as a finding was in error. The Authority's ultimate decision to terminate Dowling's participation was undoubtedly influenced by the hearing officer's rejection of her claim that she was coerced into accepting the side agreement and his finding that she had initiated the side agreement for her own benefit. Any error regarding this critical finding cannot be excused as harmless.
 [¶ 41] The Authority should be required to reconsider the sanction in this case and, in particular, whether Dowling's participation in the side agreement justifies the complete termination of her Section 8 benefits. In doing so, the Authority would have the opportunity to also consider other relevant information that the hearing officer failed to address pursuant to section 982.552(c)(2)(i), including "the effects of . . . termination of assistance" on Dowling's young son as a "family member[] . . . not involved in the action or failure." 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i). The judgment should be vacated and this case remanded to the Authority.
 NOTES
 [1] The Authority was created pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4721, and has "all the powers necessary to carry out its functions, including the power to sue and be sued." Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth., 656 A.2d 1200, 1201 n. 2 (Me. 1995); see 30-A M.R.S. §§ 4721(1), 4741(1) (2005).
 [2] Section 982.551 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs many of the obligations of a Section 8 program participant in order to be eligible to participate in the subsidy program. It provides, in pertinent part:
 (a) Purpose. This section states the obligations of a participant family under the program.
 (b) Supplying required information.  (1) The family must supply any information that the PHA or HUD determines is necessary in the administration of the program. . . . "Information" includes any requested certification, release or other documentation.
 . . . .
 (4) Any information supplied by the family must be true and complete.
 . . . .
 (k) Fraud and other program violation. The members of the family must not commit fraud, bribery or any other corrupt or criminal act in connection with the programs.
 24 C.F.R. § 982.551 (2005). The Authority is authorized to terminate subsidy assistance "[i]f the family violates any family obligations under the program (see § 982.551)" or "[i]f any member of the family has committed fraud, bribery, or any other corrupt or criminal act in connection with any Federal housing program." 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i), (iv) (2005).
 [3] "The rules other than those with respect to privileges do not apply in . . . proceedings for sentencing. . . ." M.R. Evid. 1101(b)(4).
 [4] In State v. James, the defendant's probation officer, who was away on vacation when the alleged probation violations occurred, testified about the results of an intoxilyzer test and conversations with another probation officer and the arresting police officer regarding conduct by the defendant. 2002 ME 86, ¶¶ 4-6 & n. 3, 797 A.2d 732, 733-34. The trial court overruled the defendant's hearsay objections and found that James had violated his probation. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 797 A.2d at 734. On appeal, we concluded that this evidence lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, and because this was the only evidence presented by the State, we vacated the judgment. Id. ¶¶ 16-19, 797 A.2d at 737-38.
 [5] Most notably, in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971), the Supreme Court concluded that written reports by licensed physicians may constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding adverse to a claimant seeking Social Security disability benefits. The Court considered a range of factors in concluding that the hearsay was reliable and had probative value, including the following: (1) the identity of the physicians was known and, as independent examiners, they could not be ascribed an "interest on their part in the outcome of the administrative proceeding beyond the professional curiosity a dedicated medical man possesses," id. at 403, 91 S. Ct. 1420; (2) the "vast workings of the social security administrative system make for reliability and impartiality in the consultant reports," id.; (3) the reports were based on an actual examination of the claimant and accepted medical procedures, id. at 403-04, 91 S. Ct. 1420; (4) the reports addressed a comprehensive range of examinations to which the claimant was subjected, id. at 404, 91 S. Ct. 1420; (5) the reports were independent of one another, but were not inconsistent, id.; (6) the claimant could have subpoenaed the physicians if he had wished, id. at 404-05, 91 S. Ct. 1420; (7) medical reports have been admitted in judicial proceedings as an exception to the hearsay rule, id. at 405, 91 S. Ct. 1420; (8) courts have traditionally accepted the use of written medical reports in Social Security disability cases, id. at 405-06, 91 S. Ct. 1420; and (9) given the magnitude of disability claim hearings conducted each year, the cost of providing live testimony by examining physicians "would be a substantial drain on the trust fund and on the energy of physicians already in short supply," id. at 406, 91 S. Ct. 1420.
 The federal circuit courts have applied the indicia of reliability highlighted in Perales as multi-factor analyses. See R.P. Carbone Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 166 F.3d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1998); Keller v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir.1991); Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190-91 (D.C.Cir.1980); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149-50 (9th Cir.1980); Sch. Bd. v. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 525 F.2d 900, 906 (5th Cir.1976). State courts have also adopted this general approach to determine under what circumstances uncorroborated hearsay can satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. See Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 666 N.E.2d 468, 474 (1996); Indus. Claims Appeals Office v. Flower Stop Mktg. Corp., 782 P.2d 13, 17-19 (Colo.1989); Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa. 588, 427 A.2d 631, 639-43 (1981). A number of states require that evidence satisfies even higher standards of reliability in administrative hearings than the standards articulated in Perales. See, e.g., Bean v. Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 290 Mont. 496, 965 P.2d 256, 260 (1998); Gehin v. Wis. Group Ins. Bd., 278 Wis. 2d 111, 692 N.W.2d 572, 590 (2005). Thus, standing alone, hearsay evidence may satisfy the substantial evidence test only if it carries with it some indicia of reliability.
 [6] The record does not reflect whether Wortman was sanctioned by the Authority for his participation in the agreement.


type: legislation

text:
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 1.7.2020.
 COM(2020) 273 final
 2020/0131(NLE)
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje u ime Europske unije treba zauzeti u Odboru za trgovinu osnovanom na temelju Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane, u pogledu izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe
 OBRAZLOŽENJE
 1.Predmet prijedloga
 Ovaj Prijedlog odnosi se na odluku o utvrđivanju stajališta koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije u Odboru za trgovinu osnovanom na temelju Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane, u pogledu izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe Sporazumu.
 2.Kontekst prijedloga
 2.1.Razlozi i ciljevi prijedloga
 Vijeće je 12. lipnja 2002. ovlastilo Komisiju da otvori pregovore o sporazumima o gospodarskom partnerstvu (SGP-ovi) sa zemljama AKP-a.
 Unija je 30. srpnja 2009. potpisala Privremeni sporazum o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane („Sporazum”), kojim se uspostavlja okvir za sporazum o gospodarskom partnerstvu
 1
 . Sporazum ima sljedeće ciljeve:
 (a)omogućiti pacifičkim državama da iskoriste poboljšani pristup tržištu koji nudi EU;
 (b)promicati održiv razvoj i postupnu integraciju pacifičkih država u svjetsko gospodarstvo;
 (c)uspostaviti područje slobodne trgovine između stranaka na temelju zajedničkog interesa postupnom liberalizacijom trgovine u skladu s primjenjivim pravilima WTO-a i načelom asimetrije, uzimajući u obzir posebne potrebe i ograničenja kapaciteta pacifičkih država, u smislu razina i vremenskog okvira za obveze;
 (d)uspostaviti odgovarajuće mehanizme rješavanja sporova; i
 (e)uspostaviti odgovarajuće institucionalne mehanizme.
 Papua Nova Gvineja privremeno primjenjuje Sporazum od 20. prosinca 2009., a Republika Fidži od 28. srpnja 2014.
 Člankom 80. Sporazuma predviđa se da ostali pacifički otoci mogu pristupiti Sporazumu na temelju ponude za pristup tržištu u skladu s člankom XXIV. GATT-a iz 1994. U skladu s tim Nezavisna Država Samoa pristupila je Sporazumu 21. prosinca 2018.
 2
 i privremeno ga primjenjuje od 31. prosinca 2018. U tijeku su postupci stranaka u vezi s pristupanjem Salomonovih Otoka i Kraljevine Tonge, koji su izrazili interes za pristupanje Sporazumu.
 Nakon pristupanja Nezavisne Države Samoe Sporazumu potrebno je unijeti tehničke izmjene u Sporazum kako bi se njezina ponuda za pristup tržištu uvrstila u Prilog II. Sporazumu.
 2.2.Odbor za trgovinu SGP-a
 Člankom 68. SGP-a osniva se Odbor za trgovinu, koji se sastoji od predstavnika stranaka (EU i pacifičke države).
 Odbor za trgovinu rješava sva pitanja koja su bitna za provedbu Sporazuma. U obavljanju svojih funkcija Odbor za trgovinu može:
 (f)osnovati i nadgledati posebne odbore ili tijela potrebne za provedbu Sporazuma;
 (g)sastati se u svako doba koje stranke dogovore;
 (h)razmatrati sva pitanja iz Sporazuma i poduzimati odgovarajuće radnje u obavljanju svojih funkcija; i
 (i)donositi odluke ili davati preporuke u slučajevima predviđenima Sporazumom.
 2.3.Predviđena odluka Odbora za trgovinu SGP-a
 Odbor za trgovinu SGP-a na svojem je sedmom sastanku održanom 3. i 4. listopada 2019. donio preporuku strankama Sporazuma za, među ostalim, izmjenu Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe. Potrebne izmjene uključuju dodavanje ponude Samoe za pristup tržištu u Prilog II. Sporazumu.
 Člankom 13. Sporazuma predviđa se da Odbor za trgovinu sporazumom može izmijeniti Prilog II. Sporazumu na bilo koji način koji se smatra prikladnim.
 U skladu s tim, tijekom svojeg osmog sastanka XX. XX. XX. Odbor za trgovinu SGP-a treba donijeti odluku o unošenju potrebne tehničke izmjene u Sporazum kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe.
 3.Stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije
 Predloženom odlukom Vijeća utvrđuje se stajalište koje treba zauzeti u ime Unije o donošenju predložene izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir nedavno pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe.
 Stajalište se temelji na nacrtu odluke Odbora za trgovinu o izmjeni Sporazuma, koji je priložen nacrtu odluke Vijeća.
 Predmet predviđene preporuke odnosi se na trgovinsku politiku, područje za koje Unija ima isključivu vanjsku nadležnost na temelju članka 3. stavka 2. UFEU-a.
 4.Pravna osnova
 4.1.Postupovna pravna osnova
 4.1.1.Načela
 Člankom 218. stavkom 9. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije (UFEU) predviđeno je donošenje odluka kojima se utvrđuju „stajališta koja u ime Unije treba donijeti tijelo osnovano na temelju sporazuma kada je to tijelo pozvano donositi akte koji proizvode pravne učinke, uz iznimku akata kojima se dopunjuje ili mijenja institucionalni okvir sporazuma”.
 Pojmom „akti koji proizvode pravne učinke” obuhvaćeni su akti koji proizvode pravne učinke na temelju pravila međunarodnog prava kojima se uređuje predmetno tijelo. Obuhvaća i instrumente koji nemaju obvezujući učinak na temelju međunarodnog prava, ali im je namjena da „presudno utječu na sadržaj propisa koje donese zakonodavac Unije”.
 4.1.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 Odbor za trgovinu tijelo je osnovano Sporazumom o gospodarskom partnerstvu.
 Izmjena koju treba donijeti Odbor za trgovinu proizvodi pravne učinke. Nakon donošenja predviđena izmjena bit će obvezujuća na temelju međunarodnog prava u skladu s člankom 13. Sporazuma.
 Predviđenom izmjenom ne dopunjuje se ni ne mijenja institucionalni okvir Sporazuma.
 Stoga je postupovna pravna osnova predložene odluke članak 218. stavak 9. UFEU-a.
 4.2.Materijalnopravna osnova
 4.2.1.Načela
 Materijalnopravna osnova odluke na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a prije svega ovisi o cilju i sadržaju predviđene preporuke o kojoj se zauzima stajalište u ime Unije. Ako predviđena preporuka ima dva cilja ili dva elementa te ako se može utvrditi da je jedan od tih ciljeva ili elemenata glavni, a drugi samo sporedan, odluka na temelju članka 218. stavka 9. UFEU-a mora se temeljiti na samo jednoj materijalnopravnoj osnovi, to jest onoj koju zahtijeva glavni ili prevladavajući cilj ili element.
 4.2.2.Primjena u predmetnom slučaju
 Cilj i sadržaj predviđene preporuke odnosi se na zajedničku trgovinsku politiku.
 Stoga je materijalnopravna osnova predložene odluke članak 207. stavak 4. prvi podstavak UFEU-a.
 4.3.Zaključak
 Pravna osnova predložene odluke trebao bi biti članak 207. stavak 4. prvi podstavak u vezi s člankom 218. stavkom 9. UFEU-a.
 5.Objava predviđene preporuke
 S obzirom na to da će se odlukom Odbora za trgovinu izmijeniti Sporazum o gospodarskom partnerstvu, primjereno ga je nakon donošenja objaviti u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 2020/0131 (NLE)
 Prijedlog
 ODLUKE VIJEĆA
 o stajalištu koje u ime Europske unije treba zauzeti u Odboru za trgovinu osnovanom na temelju Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane, u pogledu izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe
 VIJEĆE EUROPSKE UNIJE,
 uzimajući u obzir Ugovor o funkcioniranju Europske unije, a posebno njegov članak 207. stavak 4. prvi podstavak u vezi s člankom 218. stavkom 9.,
 uzimajući u obzir prijedlog Europske komisije,
 budući da:
 (1)Unija je 30. srpnja 2009. potpisala Privremeni sporazum o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane
 3
 („Sporazum”), kojim je uspostavljen okvir za Sporazum o gospodarskom partnerstvu. Papua Nova Gvineja privremeno primjenjuje Sporazum od 20. prosinca 2009., a Republika Fidži od 28. srpnja 2014.
 (2)Člankom 80. Sporazuma predviđa se da ostali pacifički otoci mogu pristupiti Sporazumu na temelju ponude za pristup tržištu u skladu s člankom XXIV. GATT-a iz 1994. U skladu s tim Nezavisna Država Samoa pristupila je Sporazumu 21. prosinca 2018.
 4
 i privremeno ga primjenjuje od 31. prosinca 2018.
 (3)Člankom 68. Sporazuma predviđa se da Odbor za trgovinu rješava sva pitanja bitna za provedbu Sporazuma.
 (4)Odbor za trgovinu SGP-a na svojem je sedmom sastanku održanom 3. i 4. listopada 2019. donio preporuku strankama Sporazuma za, među ostalim, izmjenu Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe. Potrebne izmjene uključuju dodavanje ponude Samoe za pristup tržištu u Prilog II. Sporazumu.
 (5)Člankom 13. Sporazuma predviđa se da Odbor za trgovinu sporazumom može izmijeniti Prilog II. Sporazumu na bilo koji način koji se smatra prikladnim.
 (6)Osmi sastanak Odbora za trgovinu treba se održati XX. XX. 2020. i na njemu će Odbor moći, u skladu s člankom 13. Sporazuma, unijeti tehničku izmjenu u Sporazum kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe.
 (7)Unija bi trebala utvrditi stajalište koje treba zauzeti na osmom sastanku Odbora za trgovinu u pogledu predviđene odluke.
 (8)Stajalište Unije na osmom sastanku Odbora za trgovinu trebalo bi se stoga temeljiti na priloženom nacrtu odluke,
 DONIJELO JE OVU ODLUKU:
 Članak 1.
 Stajalište koje u ime Unije treba zauzeti na osmom sastanku Odbora za trgovinu u pogledu izmjene Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe, temelji se na nacrtu odluke Odbora za trgovinu priloženom ovoj Odluci.
 Članak 2.
 Odluka Odbora za trgovinu nakon donošenja se objavljuje u Službenom listu Europske unije.
 Članak 3.
 Ova Odluka stupa na snagu na dan donošenja.
 Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu,
 Za Vijeće
 Predsjednik
 (1)
 Odluka Vijeća od 13. srpnja 2009. o potpisivanju i privremenoj primjeni Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane (SL L 272, 16.10.2009., str. 1.).
 (2)
 SL L 333, 28.12.2018., str. 1.
 (3)
 Odluka Vijeća 2009/729/EZ od 13. srpnja 2009. o potpisivanju i privremenoj primjeni Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane (SL L 272, 16.10.2009., str. 1.).
 (4)
 SL L 333, 28.12.2018., str. 1.
 ---documentbreak---
 EUROPSKA KOMISIJA
 Bruxelles, 1.7.2020.
 COM(2020) 273 final
 PRILOG
 Prijedlogu odluke Vijeća
 o stajalištu koje u ime Europske unije treba zauzeti u Odboru za trgovinu osnovanom na temelju Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane, u pogledu izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe
 DODATAK
 NACRT
 ODLUKE br. XX/2020 ODBORA ZA TRGOVINU OSNOVANOG PRIVREMENIM SPORAZUMOM O PARTNERSTVU IZMEĐU EUROPSKE ZAJEDNICE, S JEDNE STRANE, I PACIFIČKIH DRŽAVA, S DRUGE STRANE
 od ...
 u pogledu izmjene Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe
 ODBOR ZA TRGOVINU,
 uzimajući u obzir Privremeni sporazum o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane
 1
 („Sporazum”), koji je potpisan u Londonu 30. srpnja 2009. i kojim je uspostavljen okvir za Sporazum o gospodarskom partnerstvu, a posebno njegove članke 13. i 68.,
 budući da:
 (1)Nezavisna Država Samoa podnijela je 5. veljače 2018. ugovornim strankama zahtjev za pristupanje, zajedno s ponudom za pristup tržištu u skladu s člankom XXIV. GATT-a iz 1994. Samoa je pristupila Sporazumu 21. prosinca 2018. i privremeno ga primjenjuje od 31. prosinca 2018.
 (2)Člankom 68. Sporazuma predviđa se da Odbor za trgovinu rješava sva pitanja bitna za provedbu Sporazuma.
 (3)Odbor za trgovinu SGP-a na svojem je sedmom sastanku održanom 3. i 4. listopada 2019. donio preporuku strankama Sporazuma za, među ostalim, izmjenu Sporazuma kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Nezavisne Države Samoe. Potrebne izmjene uključuju dodavanje ponude Samoe za pristup tržištu u Prilog II. Sporazumu.
 (4)Člankom 13. Sporazuma predviđa se da Odbor za trgovinu sporazumom može izmijeniti Prilog II. Sporazumu na bilo koji način koji se smatra prikladnim,
 DONIO JE OVU ODLUKU:
 Tekst dogovorene ponude za pristup tržištu Nezavisne Države Samoe utvrđen u Prilogu ovoj Odluci dodaje se u Prilog II. Sporazumu.
 Sastavljeno u ...
 Za Odbor za trgovinu
 U ime Unije
 U ime pacifičkih država
 PRILOG
 CARINSKE PRISTOJBE KOJE SE PRIMJENJUJU NA UVOZ U NEZAVISNU DRŽAVU SAMOU (SL L 333, 28.12.2018., str. 1.).
 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2018:333:TOC
 (1)
 Odluka Vijeća 2009/729/EZ od 13. srpnja 2009. o potpisivanju i privremenoj primjeni Privremenog sporazuma o partnerstvu između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i pacifičkih država, s druge strane (SL L 272, 16.10.2009., str. 1.).


text:
 12.1.2015
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 C 7/56
 Skarga wniesiona w dniu 24 października 2014 r. – ZZ przeciwko Komisji
 (Sprawa F-119/14)
 (2015/C 007/71)
 Język postępowania: francuski
 Strony
 Strona skarżąca: ZZ (przedstawiciele: adwokaci L. Levi i A. Blot)
 Strona pozwana: Komisja
 Przedmiot i opis sporu
 Stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji Komisji kończącej postępowanie w sprawie powołania skarżącej na urzędnika wszczęte w następstwie wpisania jej na listę rezerwy kadrowej, po tym, jak poinformowano ją, że zainteresowana dyrekcja generalna wyraziła zgodę na jej zatrudnienie, i po tym, jak uznano, że jej doświadczenie zawodowe nie jest wystarczające.
 Żądania strony skarżącej
 —
 stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji z dnia 17 grudnia 2013 r., na podstawie której dyrekcja generalna Zasoby Ludzkie i Bezpieczeństwo (DG HR) Komisji, działając jako organ powołujący (AIPN) odmówił zatrudnienia skarżącej jako urzędnika dyrekcji generalnej Sprawiedliwość i sprawy wewnętrzne (DG JUST);
 —
 stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji AIPN z dnia 14 lipca 2014 r. oddalającej zażalenie wniesione przez skarżąca na decyzję AIPN z dnia 17 grudnia 2013 r.;
 —
 zasądzenie od pozwanej kwoty 26 132,85 EUR wraz z odsetkami za zwłokę oraz nakazanie uiszczenia składek na system emerytalny od września 2013 r.
 —
 zasądzenie od Komisji kwoty 1 EUR tytułem zadośćuczynienia za krzywdę;
 —
 obciążenie Komisji całością kosztów postępowania.


text:
 7.11.2016
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 410/9
 Acțiune introdusă la 9 septembrie 2016 – Comisia Europeană/Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului
 (Cauza C-489/16)
 (2016/C 410/10)
 Limba de procedură: franceza
 Părțile
 Reclamantă: Comisia Europeană (reprezentanți: J. Hottiaux, G. von Rintelen, agenți)
 Pârât: Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului
 Concluziile reclamantei
 —
 Constatarea faptului că, prin neadoptarea, pană la 16 iunie 2015, a actelor cu putere de lege și a actelor administrative pentru a se conforma Directivei 2012/34/UE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 21 noiembrie 2012 privind instituirea spațiului feroviar unic european (JO L 343 din 14.12.3012, p. 32) sau, în orice caz, prin necomunicarea acestor dispoziții Comisiei, Marele Ducat al Luxemburgului nu și-a îndeplinit obligațiile care îi revin în temeiul articolului 64 alineatul (1) primul paragraf din directiva menționată;
 —
 obligarea Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului, conform articolului 260 alineatul (3) TFUE, la plata unei penalități cu titlu cominatoriu în cuantum de 8 710 euro pe zi începând de la data pronunțării hotărârii în prezenta cauză pentru neîndeplinirea obligației de a comunica măsurile de transpunere a Directivei 2012/34/UE;
 —
 obligarea Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 Motivele și principalele argumente
 Termenul pentru transpunerea directivei a expirat la 16 iunie 2015.
 Din diferitele răspunsuri ale Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului, în special din răspunsul la avizul motivat, reiese că, la peste un an de la expirarea termenului de transpunere prevăzut de directivă, Marelui Ducat al Luxemburgului nu adoptase măsurile impuse.
 Determinarea sancțiunii în temeiul articolului 260 alineatul (3) TFUE se întemeiază pe cele trei criterii aplicate în cadrul articolului 260 alineatul (2) TFUE, și anume gravitatea încălcării, durata acesteia și necesitatea asigurării unui efect disuasiv al sancțiunii pentru evitarea recidivei.