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Cho Hunhyun (曺薰鉉, Cho Hunhyun, ou Cho Hun-hyeon), né le est un joueur de go professionnel coréen considéré comme l'un des meilleurs au monde. Il a atteint le statut de professionnel en 1962 en Corée du Sud. Il a depuis engrangé plus de 150 titres sur le circuit professionnel. Il a remporté tous les tournois « open » coréens en 1980, 1982 et 1986. Il a également gagné 11 titres internationaux, soit le troisième joueur au monde à atteindre ce niveau derrière Lee Chang-ho (21) et Lee Sedol (15). Il a obtenu la victoire de sa carrière en 1995.
 Biographie
 Jeunesse (1962–1982)
 Cho Hunhyun a commencé à apprendre le go à l'âge de 4 ans et a passé l'examen pour devenir professionnel en 1962.
 En 1963, il a été invité au Japon. Initialement prévu pour être sous l'égide de Kitani Minoru, c'est finalement Segoe Kensaku qui a été son "maître". Segoe est célèbre pour avoir amené Go Seigen au Japon et a également été le maître de Hashimoto Utaro, fondateur de la Kansai Ki-in.
 Cho Hunyun était à l'époque considéré en Corée, mais il a été sous-classé au Japan au kyu à son arrivée.
 Il a passé l'examen japonais de la Nihon Ki-in trois ans plus tard et devint le premier joueur professionnel certifié par deux fédérations de go.
 C'est à ce moment qu'il a été mis en relation avec Fujisawa Hideyuki. Fujisawa devint le mentor de Cho, et les deux hommes ont entretenu une relation d'amitié jusqu'à la mort de Fujisawa en 2009.
 Cho a participé à quelques tournois japonais, finissant deuxième face à Kojima Takaho lors du troisième Shin-Ei.
 En 1972, il est retourné en Corée du Sud pour effectuer ses obligations militaires.
 Il remporte son premier titre en 1973 en battant Kim In lors du Chaegowi. La même année, il perd en finale contre son rival Seo Bongsoo lors du Myungin.
 Depuis 1973, Cho et Seo se sont rencontrés 65 fois dans des finales de tournois, avec 53 victoires pour Cho. Leur confrontation la plus récente s'est déroulée lors de la Coupe Daejoo en 2010.
 Il poursuit ses conquêtes de titres, notamment le Paewang en 1977, un titre qu'il a défendu 16 fois de suite jusqu'en 1992.
 En 1980, il possède neuf titres simultanément : Guksu, Myungin, Wangwi, Kisung, Paewang, Kiwang, Daewang, Jaewang et la Coupe Baccus.
 Cette situation se répètera en 1982 et en 1986, où il gagna 10 et 11 titres respectivement.
 Malgré le fait d'avoir remporté de nombreux titres, il n'est pas considéré comme le meilleur joueur coréen de tous les temps. Cho Chikun, le fameux joueur professionnel reste le favori des médias.
 En 1980, Cho Chikun a effectué un déplacement en Corée du Sud après avoir gagné le titre japonais de Meijin et les deux personnalités ont disputé une rencontre amicale constituée de 2 parties qui se sont déroulées le et le . Les deux parties ont été gagnées par Cho Chikun.
 Cho Hunhyun perd également en 1981 une partie face à Cho Chikun lors de la Coupe Samsung, mais ce fut la dernière face à cet adversaire.
 Premier Coréen Dan
 En 1982, il a été promu au rang de Dan, devenant le premier Coréen à atteindre un tel niveau.
 Il a été l'unique Coréen invité à participer à la première Coupe Ing, dont la participants étaient 9 joueurs de la Nihon Ki-in et 6 joueurs de Chine. Il rencontre O Meien, un joueur d'origine taïwanaise professionnel au Japon. Il gagne la partie et également la partie suivante qui l'oppose à Koichi Kobayashi lors des quarts de finale. Il rencontre un autre joueur professionnel au Japon d'origine taïwanaise Rin Kaiho en demi-finale.
 Elle se déroule en un match en deux parties gagnantes. Cho Hunhyun remporte la demi-finale sans troisième partie et atteint ainsi la finale. Elle l'oppose à Nie Weiping et elle consiste en un match en trois parties gagnantes. Cho remporte les deux premières, Nie les deux suivantes. La dernière partie décisive est remportée par Cho à la suite de l'abandon du Chinois.
 En 1984, il commence à enseigner le go à Lee Chang-ho. Deux ans plus tard, l'élève devient joueur professionnel et commence à rencontrer son maître dans le circuit professionnel. En 1989, Lee Chang-ho le bat pour la première fois en finale pour le Chaegowi. Leur rivalité continue jusqu'en 2003, quand Lee Chang-ho remporte le Myungin.
 En 1992, il est obligé de concéder son titre de Paewang au profit de son élève, titre qu'il avait pourtant conservé 16 ans de suite.
 Palmarès
 Il est le joueur de go coréen ayant obtenu le plus grand nombre de titres (plus de 150), suivi de près par Lee Chang-ho.
 Dans la culture populaire
 Interprété par Lee Byung-hun dans le film (, 2022).
 Références
 Liens externes
 Joueur de go coréen
 Naissance en mars 1953
 Naissance à Mokpo


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AZ ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁG 3071/2015. (IV. 10.) AB VÉGZÉSE. Az Alkotmánybíróság tanácsa alkotmányjogi panasz eljárás tárgyában meghozta a következő. - PDF Ingyenes letöltés
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 1 3071/2015. (IV. 10.) AB végzés 1611 AZ ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁG 3071/2015. (IV. 10.) AB VÉGZÉSE alkotmányjogi panasz visszautasításáról Az Alkotmánybíróság tanácsa alkotmányjogi panasz eljárás tárgyában meghozta a következő végzést: Az Alkotmánybíróság a Kúria Pfv.I /2013/4. számú részítélete, továbbá azzal összefüggésben a Székesfehérvári Városi Bíróság 3.P /2009/18. számú ítélete, valamint a Székesfehérvári Törvényszék l.pf / 2012/10. számú részítélete alaptörvény-ellenességének megállapítására és megsemmisítésére irányuló alkotmányjogi panaszt visszautasítja. Indokolás [1] 1. Az indítványozó gazdasági társaság jogi képviselője útján az Alkotmánybíróságról szóló évi CLI. törvény (a továbbiakban: Abtv.) 27. -a alapján alkotmányjogi panasszal fordult az Alkotmánybírósághoz. [2] Az indítvány arra irányult, hogy az Alkotmánybíróság állapítsa meg a Kúria mint felülvizsgálati bíróság Pfv.I /2013/4. számú részítélete, továbbá azzal összefüggésben a Székesfehérvári Városi Bíróság 3.P /2009/18. számú ítélete, valamint a Székesfehérvári Törvényszék l.pf /2012/10. számú részítélete alaptörvény-ellenességét és semmisítse meg azokat. [3] Kérelme indokolásában az indítványozó az Alaptörvény XIII. cikk (1) bekezdésében rögzített tulajdonhoz való jogának sérelmére hivatkozott. [4] 2. Az alkotmányjogi panasz alapjául szolgáló perben az indítványozó (a per beli felperes) jogelődje és a II. rendű alperes 2000-ben megalapították az I. rendű alperes társasházat. Az adásvételi szerződés, illetve a társasház alapító okirata alapján egyebek mellett a II. rendű alperes külön tulajdonába került a földszinti kapualj és lépcsőház, míg a felperes külön tulajdonába olyan helyiségek, melyeket az említett rendelkezések miatt magából a társasházból nem lehetett megközelíteni. Ezek a helyiségek a szomszédos, szintén az indítványozó jogelődje tulajdonában álló ingatlanból voltak elérhetők. A szerződések megkötésekor a felek nem rendelkeztek arról, hogy az indítványozó jogelődje használhatja-e, és ha igen, mennyiben a II. rendű alperes külön tulajdonába került
 2 1612 kapualjat és lépcsőházat. Az indítványozó jogelődje a szomszédos ingatlanban áruházat üzemeltetett, és a létrejövő társasházban általa tulajdonolt, utcafronti bejárattal nem rendelkező üzletrész, raktár és egyéb helyiségek megközelítése ezen az áruházon keresztül történt; a kapualjat és a lépcsőházat ilyen célra nem használta. Ez az átjárási lehetőség a későbbiekben megszűnt, tehát a helyiségekbe jelenleg nem lehet bejutni. [5] Az indítványozó elsődleges kereseti kérelme arra irányult, hogy a bíróság állapítsa meg, az alapító okirat vonatkozó rendelkezése (a kapu és lépcsőház külön tulajdonba adása) az akkor hatályos társasházi törvény, a társasházról szóló évi CLVII. törvény (továbbiakban: Tht.) 16. (2) bekezdésével ellentétes, s ezért semmis. (A hivatkozott rendelkezés szerint a tulajdonostársak közös célját szolgáló épületrész akkor is közös tulajdonba tartozik, ha az a külön tulajdonba tartozó lakáson belül van). Az elsődleges kérelem elutasítása esetére vagylagosan előterjesztett másodlagos kereseti kérelme a keresettel érintett helyiségek terhére, a külön tulajdonában álló ingatlanrészek javára átjárási szolgalom megállapítására irányult. [6] Az elsőfokú bíróság 3.P /2009/18. számú ítéletével a keresetet mindkét kérelem tekintetében elutasította. A másodfokú bíróság az ítéletet megváltoztatta, az elsődleges kereseti kérelemnek helyt adva megállapította az alapító okirat érvénytelenségét, az érintett helyiségeket a társasház közös tulajdonát feltüntető részbe sorolta, és rögzítette a tulajdoni hányadok ennek következtében módosuló arányait. Az alperesek kérelmére felülvizsgálati bíróságként eljáró Kúria az Pfv.IX /2011/6. számú végzésével a jogerős ítéletet hatályon kívül helyezte és a másodfokú bíróságot új eljárásra és új határozat hozatalára utasította. Indokolásában a Kúria kifejtette, hogy az alapító okirat az alapítók szerződése, melyben a Tht a alapján érvényesül a szerződési szabadság. Mivel az alapítók szándéka szerint a kérdéses helyiségek megközelítése a szomszédos áruházon keresztül történt, ellenkező esetben az adásvételi szerződés megkötésére, társasház alapítására nem került volna sor, így nem állapítható meg, hogy a konkrét ügyben a kapualj és a lépcsőház közös célt szolgáló helyiségek lennének. Erre tekintettel az alapító okirat a Kúria szerint nem sértett kógens jogszabályi rendelkezést, ezért az nem érvénytelen. Mivel azonban a másodfokú bíróság eltérő jogi álláspontja miatt nem vizsgálta a felperes másodlagos kereseti kérelmét, a Kúria a másodfokú bíróságot új eljárásra utasította. [7] Az indítványozó a Kúria végzése ellen tulajdonjogának sérelmére hivatkozva alkotmányjogi panaszt nyújtott be, amelyet az Alkotmánybíróság 3328/2012. (XI. 12.) AB végzésében arra tekintettel utasított vissza, hogy a kúriai végzés nem
 3 3071/2015. (IV. 10.) AB végzés 1613 volt az ügy érdemében hozott ítéletnek, sem az eljárást befejező egyéb döntésnek tekinthető. Az Alkotmánybíróság azt is leszögezte, hogy Az alkotmány jogi panasz benyújtásának lehetősége csak a megismételt másodfokú eljárásban az ügy érdemét érintően hozott döntés ellen nyílik majd meg. {3328/2012. (XI. 12.) AB végzés, Indokolás [5]}. [8] A megismételt eljárásban a másodfokú bíróság l.pf /2012/10. számú részítéletében úgy változtatta meg az ítéletet, hogy a perköltséggel kapcsolatos rendelkezések kisebb megváltoztatása mellett helybenhagyta az elsőfokú bíróság ítéletének elsődleges kereseti kérelmet elutasító rendelkezését, a másodlagos kereseti kérelem tekintetében pedig hatályon kívül helyezte azt, és az elsőfokú bíróságot új eljárás lefolytatására és új határozat hozatalára utasította. A részítélet ellen ezt követően a felperes fordult felülvizsgálati kérelemmel a Kúriához, kérve annak megváltoztatását, és az elsődleges kereseti kérelemnek helyt adó ítélet meghozatalát, továbbra is az érintett helyiségek közös célt szolgáló rendeltetését, és ennek okán a Tht. kógens szabályának sérelmét állítva. A Kúria a támadott részítéletében a másodfokú bíróság jogerős részítéletét hatályában fenntartotta. [9] Az indítványozó szerint a Kúria részítélete a tulajdonhoz való jogát [Alaptörvény XIII. cikk (1) bekezdés] sérti. Álláspontja szerint a szerződési szabadság Ptk.-beli általános szabályozásához képest a Tht. általa hivatkozott rendelkezése a jelen ügyben is speciális szabálynak minősül, ezért a bíróságoknak a jogvita eldöntése során azt kellett volna alkalmaznia. Az indítványozó szerint a lex specialis derogat legi generali elv az eljáró bíróságok által szerinte fordítottan történő alkalmazása jogellenes, ezért végső soron a tulajdonhoz való joga sérelméhez vezet. Mindezekre tekintettel az Abtv a alapján a Kúria részítélete valamint azzal összefüggésben az indítványa kiegészítésében megjelölt korábbi bírósági ítélet és részítélet megsemmisítését kérte. [10] 3. Az Alkotmánybíróság megállapította, hogy az alkotmányjogi panasz a befogadhatóság formai feltételeinek megfelel. Az indítványozó a Kúria felülvizsgálati eljárásban hozott részítélete mely az elsődleges kereseti kérelem tekintetében az ügy érdemében hozott döntésnek minősül ellen az alkotmányjogi panaszt az elsőfokú bíróságnál az Abtv. 30. (1) bekezdésében írt 60 napos határidőn belül terjesztette elő, továbbá az alkotmányjogi panasz megfelel az Abtv. 52. (1b) bekezdés a) f) pontjaiban foglalt feltételeknek is. [11] 4. Az Abtv. 56. (2) bekezdése alapján az Alkotmánybíróság megvizsgálta az alkotmányjogi panasz befogadhatóságának törvényben előírt tartalmi
 4 1614 feltéte leit, különösen a 27. szerinti érintettséget, a jogorvoslat kimerítését, valamint a szerinti feltételeket. [12] 4.1. Az Abtv ában meghatározott egyedi ügyben való érintettség megállapítható: az indítványozó a peres eljárásban felperesként vett részt. Az indítványozó az Alaptörvény XIII. cikk (1) bekezdésében rögzített alapvető joga sérelmére hivatkozik, a Kúria felülvizsgálati eljárásban meghozott részítélete ellen pedig további jogorvoslat nem áll rendelkezésre, ezért a panasz az Abtv. 27. a) b) pontjában foglalt követelményeknek is eleget tesz. [13] 4.2. Az Abtv a szerint az Alkotmánybíróság az alkotmányjogi panaszt a bírói döntést érdemben befolyásoló alaptörvény-ellenesség, vagy alapvető alkotmányjogi jelentőségű kérdés esetén fogadja be. Ezzel kapcsolatban az Alkotmány bíróság a következőket állapította meg. [14] A tényállás feltárása, a bizonyítékok mérlegelése és ennek alapján a következtetések levonása a rendes bíróságok feladata, amely önmagában alkotmányossági kérdést nem vet fel. [15] Az indítványozó az eljáró bíróságok azzal kapcsolatos jogi álláspontját vitatja, miszerint a Ptk. és a Tht. rendelkezéseinek egymáshoz való viszonyából ügyében nem következik, hogy az érintett helyiségek tekintetében a közös célt szolgáló jelleg megállapítható lenne, ezért a Tht. kógens rendelkezése alkalmazásának, illetve az alapján az adásvételi szerződés és a társasház alapító okirata érvénytelensége megállapításának lenne helye. [16] Az Alkotmánybíróság ezért megállapította, hogy a benyújtott alkotmányjogi panasz valójában az ügyben hozott, és az indítványozó mint felperes számára kedvezőtlen bírósági döntések az ügyben alkalmazandó jogszabállyal kapcsolatos megállapításainak tartalmi, és nem alkotmányossági kritikája. A tényállás tisztázása és a jogi következmények megállapítása a bíróságok feladata. Erre tekintettel az indítványozó által az alkotmányjogi panaszban felvetettek nem minősülnek az Abtv a szerinti alapvető alkotmányjogi jelentőségű kérdésnek, sem a bírói döntést érdemben befolyásoló alaptörvényellenességnek. [17] Az Alkotmánybíróság jelen ügyben is hangsúlyozza: Az Alkotmánybíróság az Alaptörvény 24. cikkének (1) bekezdése alapján az Alaptörvény védelmének legfőbb szerve. A (2) bekezdés d) pontja értelmében alkotmányjogi panasz alapján felülvizsgálja a bírói döntésnek az Alaptörvénnyel való összhangját. Az alkotmányjogi panasz jellegének megfelelően a testület hatáskörébe a bírói döntéseknek kizárólag az alkotmányossági szempontú vizsgálata tartozik.
 5 3071/2015. (IV. 10.) AB végzés 1615 Ebből következően az alkotmányjogi panasz nem tekinthető a bírósági szervezeten belül jogorvoslattal (már) nem támadható bírói határozatok által okozott valamennyi jogsérelem orvoslása eszközének, azaz ez a jogvédelem nem jelenti a rendes bíróságok jogalkalmazási gyakorlatának általános felülvizsgálatát, aminek következtében az Alkotmánybíróság burkoltan negyedfokú bírósággá válna. A jogszabályokat a bíróságok értelmezik, az Alkotmánybíróság csak az értelmezési tartomány alkotmányos kereteit jelölheti ki, ami nem adhat alapot számára minden olyan esetben történő beavatkozásra, amikor vélt vagy esetleg valós jogszabálysértő jogalkalmazásra került sor. {3198/2013. (X. 22.) AB végzés, Indokolás [22]} [18] Mindezek alapján az Alkotmánybíróság megállapította, hogy mivel az alkotmányjogi panasz nem felel meg az Abtv ában írott feltételeknek, annak befogadására nincs lehetőség. Az Alkotmánybíróság ezért a kérelmet az Abtv. 47. (1) bekezdése, 50. -a és az 56. (1) (3) bekezdései, valamint az Ügyrend 5. (1) és (2) bekezdései alapján eljárva az Ügyrend 30. (2) bekezdés a) pontja alapján visszautasította. Budapest, március 30. Dr. Lévay Miklós s. k., tanácsvezető alkotmánybíró Dr. Dienes-Oehm Egon s. k., Dr. Lenkovics Barnabás s. k., Dr. Salamon László s. k., alkotmánybíró alkotmánybíró előadó alkotmánybíró Dr. Szalay Péter s. k., alkotmánybíró Alkotmánybírósági ügyszám: IV/1545/2014.
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 3018/2015. (I. 27.) AB végzés 1139 AZ ALKOTMÁNYBÍRÓSÁG 3018/2015. (I. 27.) AB VÉGZÉSE alkotmány jogi panasz visszautasításáról Az Alkotmány bíróság tanácsa alkotmány jogi panasz tárgyában meghozta a következő


type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 |
 52015PC0098
 Návrh ROZHODNUTÍ RADY o hlavních směrech politik zaměstnanosti členských států /* COM/2015/098 final - 2015/0051 (NLE) */
 DŮVODOVÁ ZPRÁVA
 Smlouva o fungování Evropské
 unie stanoví, že členské státy považují své hospodářské politiky a
 podporu zaměstnanosti za věc společného zájmu a koordinují své
 činnosti v rámci Rady. Ve dvou různých článcích Smlouva stanoví,
 že Rada přijme návrh hlavních směrů hospodářských politik
 členských států (článek 121) a hlavní zásady politiky
 zaměstnanosti (článek 148), a upřesňuje, že hlavní zásady
 politiky zaměstnanosti musí být slučitelné s hlavními směry
 hospodářských politik. S ohledem na tento právní základ jsou hlavní zásady
 politiky zaměstnanosti a hlavní směry hospodářských politik
 předkládány jako dva různé, ale vzájemně propojené právní
 nástroje:
 ·
 doporučení Rady o hlavních směrech
 hospodářských politik členských států a Unie – část I integrovaných
 hlavních směrů,
 ·
 rozhodnutí Rady o hlavních směrech politik
 zaměstnanosti členských států – část II integrovaných
 hlavních směrů.
 Tyto hlavní směry politik
 byly poprvé přijaty společně („integrovaný balíček“)
 v roce 2010 a bezprostředně přispívají k plnění
 strategie Evropa 2020. V roce 2010 bylo rovněž rozhodnuto,
 že integrované hlavní směry by měly zůstat až do roku
 2014 v zásadě stabilní. Zatímco hlavní směry hospodářských
 politik zůstávají v platnosti po jakoukoli dobu, hlavní směry
 politiky zaměstnanosti se musí vypracovávat každý rok.
 Hlavní směry politik
 kromě toho vymezují rozsah a směr koordinace politik
 členských států a rovněž poskytují základ pro doporučení
 pro jednotlivé země v příslušných oblastech.
 Cílem stávajícího souboru
 „integrovaných hlavních směrů“ je podpořit strategii Evropa 2020
 v kontextu nového přístupu k tvorbě hospodářských politik,
 který staví na investicích, strukturálních reformách a fiskální
 odpovědnosti, jak je uvedeno v roční analýze růstu na rok
 2015 vypracované Komisí. Integrované hlavní směry mají zároveň
 přispět k dosažení inteligentního a udržitelného růstu
 podporujícího začlenění a cílů evropského semestru pro
 koordinaci hospodářských politik.
 „Integrované hlavní směry“ jsou tyto:
 Hlavní směr 1: Podpora
 investic
 Hlavní směr 2: Posílení
 růstu prováděním strukturálních reforem
 Hlavní směr 3: Odstranění
 základních překážek pro růst a zaměstnanost na úrovni EU
 Hlavní směr 4: Zlepšení
 udržitelnosti a prorůstové orientace veřejných financí
 Hlavní směr 5: Podpora poptávky
 po pracovní síle
 Hlavní směr 6: Zlepšení
 nabídky práce a dovedností
 Hlavní směr 7: Zlepšení
 fungování trhů práce
 Hlavní směr 8: Zajištění spravedlnosti, boj s
 chudobou a prosazování rovných příležitostí
 2015/0051 (NLE)
 Návrh
 ROZHODNUTÍ RADY
 o hlavních směrech politik
 zaměstnanosti členských států
 RADA EVROPSKÉ UNIE,
 s ohledem na Smlouvu o fungování Evropské
 unie, a zejména na čl. 148 odst. 2 této smlouvy,
 s ohledem na návrh Evropské komise,
 s ohledem na stanovisko Evropského parlamentu[1],
 s ohledem na stanovisko Evropského
 hospodářského a sociálního výboru[2],
 s ohledem na stanovisko Výboru regionů[3],
 s ohledem na stanovisko Výboru pro
 zaměstnanost,
 vzhledem k těmto důvodům:
 (1) Členské státy a Unie by
 měly pracovat na rozvoji koordinované strategie zaměstnanosti a
 zejména na podpoře kvalifikace, vzdělání a přizpůsobivosti
 pracovníků a schopnosti trhů práce reagovat na hospodářské
 změny, aby dosáhly cílů plné zaměstnanosti a společenského
 pokroku stanovených v článku 3 Smlouvy o Evropské unii. Členské státy
 mají považovat podporu zaměstnanosti za věc společného zájmu a
 koordinovat své odpovídající činnosti v rámci Rady, přičemž
 přihlížejí k vnitrostátním zvyklostem, které se týkají odpovědnosti
 sociálních partnerů.
 (2) Unie musí bojovat proti
 sociálnímu vyloučení a diskriminaci, zajistit rovný přístup
 k základním právům a prosazovat sociální spravedlnost
 a ochranu. Unie by při vymezování a provádění svých politik
 a činností měla přihlížet k požadavkům spojeným
 se zárukou přiměřené sociální ochrany a bojem proti
 sociálnímu vyloučení a vysokou úrovní všeobecného a odborného
 vzdělávání.
 (3) Hlavní zásady politiky
 zaměstnanosti jsou slučitelné s hlavními směry
 hospodářských politik.
 (4) Členské státy by
 měly považovat své hospodářské politiky za věc společného
 zájmu a měly by je koordinovat v rámci Rady. Hlavní zásady
 politiky zaměstnanosti a návrh hlavních směrů
 hospodářských politik členských států by měly být
 přijaty Radou jako vodítko pro politiky členských států
 a Unie.
 (5) Unie v souladu
 s ustanoveními Smlouvy vytvořila a provádí nástroje pro
 koordinaci politik zaměřené na fiskální politiku
 a makrostrukturální politiky. Evropský semestr kombinuje různé
 nástroje v souhrnném rámci pro integrovaný mnohostranný hospodářský
 a rozpočtový dohled. Jak je uvedeno v roční analýze růstu
 pro rok 2015 vypracované Komisí, zefektivněním evropského semestru
 a zvýšením úsilí při provádění činností v rámci evropského
 semestru se dále zlepší jeho fungování.
 (6) Finanční
 a hospodářská krize odhalila a posílila významné nedostatky v
 ekonomice Unie a jejích členských států. Mimoto zdůraznila
 vzájemnou provázanost ekonomik a trhů práce členských
 států. V dnešní době je zásadním úkolem posunout Unii na úroveň
 silného a udržitelného růstu podporujícího začlenění
 a vytváření pracovních příležitostí. To vyžaduje koordinovaná
 a ambiciózní politická opatření jak na úrovni Unie, tak
 na vnitrostátní úrovni, jež budou v souladu s ustanoveními
 Smlouvy a se správou ekonomických záležitostí Unie. Tato opatření by
 měla být kombinací opatření na straně nabídky
 a poptávky a měla by zahrnovat podporu investic, obnovený závazek ke
 strukturálním reformám a výkon fiskální odpovědnosti.
 (7) Členské státy
 a Unie by měly také řešit sociální dopady krize a usilovat
 o vytvoření soudržné společnosti, jejíž členové jsou schopni
 předjímat a zvládat změny a mohou se aktivně podílet na
 životě společnosti a na fungování ekonomiky. Měl by být
 zajištěn přístup a příležitosti pro každého a snížena chudoba
 a sociální vyloučení, a to zejména zajištěním účinného
 fungování trhů práce a systémů sociálního zabezpečení a
 odstraněním překážek omezujících účast na trhu práce.
 Členské státy by rovněž měly zajistit, aby
 z hospodářského růstu měli prospěch všichni
 občané a všechny regiony.
 (8) Opatření, jež jsou
 v souladu s hlavními zásadami a směry politik, významně
 přispívají k dosažení cílů strategie Evropa 2020. Hlavní zásady
 a směry politik představují integrovaný soubor evropských
 a vnitrostátních politik, jež by členské státy a Unie měly
 provádět, aby bylo dosaženo příznivých vedlejších účinků
 koordinovaných strukturálních reforem a vhodné celkové kombinace
 hospodářských politik a zajistil se soustavnější přínos
 evropských politik pro cíle strategie Evropa 2020.
 (9) I když jsou tyto hlavní
 zásady a směry určeny členským státům a Unii,
 měly by se provádět ve spolupráci se všemi vnitrostátními,
 regionálními a místními orgány, do níž by se měly intenzivně
 zapojovat parlamenty, jakož i sociální partneři a zástupci
 občanské společnosti.
 (10) Hlavní směry
 hospodářských politik poskytují členským státům vodítka, pokud
 jde o provádění reforem, s ohledem na jejich vzájemnou
 provázanost a v souladu s Paktem o stabilitě
 a růstu. Hlavní směry by měly být základem pro veškerá
 specifická doporučení, která Rada přijímá pro konkrétní členský
 stát,
 PŘIJALA TOTO ROZHODNUTÍ:
 Článek 1
 Hlavní směry politik zaměstnanosti
 členských států se přijímají ve znění uvedeném v
 příloze. Tyto hlavní směry jsou součástí „integrovaných hlavních
 směrů“.
 Článek 2
 Hlavní směry uvedené v příloze
 se zohlední v politikách zaměstnanosti a v programech reforem
 členských států, které by měly být hlášeny v souladu
 s čl. 148 odst. 3 Smlouvy.
 Toto rozhodnutí je určeno členským
 státům.
 V Bruselu dne
 Za
 Radu
 předseda
 [1] Úř. věst. C ..., ..., s. ... .
 [2] Úř. věst. C ..., ..., s. ... .
 [3] Úř. věst. C ..., ..., s. ... .


type: caselaw

text:
 8.12.2007
 DE
 Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union
 C 297/5
 Urteil des Gerichtshofs (Zweite Kammer) vom 4. Oktober 2007 — Naipes Heraclio Fournier S.A./Harmonisierungsamt für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle), France Cartes SAS
 (Rechtssache C-311/05 P) (1)
 (Rechtsmittel - Verordnung (EG) Nr. 40/94 - Gemeinschaftsmarke - Bildmarken mit der Darstellung eines „Schwertes“, eines „Stab-Reiters“ und eines „Schwert-Königs“ eines Kartenspiels - Nichtigerklärung der Marke)
 (2007/C 297/07)
 Verfahrenssprache: Spanisch
 Parteien
 Rechtsmittelführerin: Naipes Heraclio Fournier S.A. (Prozessbevollmächtigte: E. Armijo Chávarri und A. Castán Pérez-Gómez, abogados)
 Andere Beteiligte am Verfahren: Harmonisierungsamt für den Binnenmarkt (Marken, Muster und Modelle) (Bevollmächtigte: O. Montalto, I. de Medrano Caballero und O. Mondéjar), France Cartes SAS (Prozessbevollmächtigter: C. de Haas, avocat)
 Gegenstand
 Rechtsmittel gegen das Urteil des Gerichts erster Instanz (Dritte Kammer) vom 11. Mai 2005, Naipes Heraclio Fournier/HABM (Streithelferin: France Cartes SAS) (Verbundene Rechtssachen T-160/02 bis T-162/02), mit dem das Gericht die Klagen gegen drei Entscheidungen der Zweiten Beschwerdekammer des Harmonisierungsamts für den Binnenmarkt (HABM) vom 28. Februar 2002 abgewiesen hat, durch die Anträgen der France Cartes SAS auf Nichtigerklärung der drei Bildmarken der Rechtsmittelführerin stattgegeben worden war
 Tenor
 1.
 Das Rechtsmittel wird zurückgewiesen.
 2.
 Die Naipes Heraclio Fournier S.A. trägt die Kosten.
 (1) ABl. C 243 vom 1.10.2005.


jurisdiction: US

text:
The decree appealed from is one setting aside a deed of trust made for the benefit of the grantor for life, with remainders in the principal to remote relatives and friends and a church, to the exclusion of his wife and children. The children are complainants in a bill brought after the death of the grantor, and also after the death of his wife, to set aside the deed; and they contend that the grantor was at the time of execution mentally incapable of making such a deed, and that its execution was procured by undue influence exerted upon him by the grantees. The deed was executed on January 23rd, 1923, and there was testimony of unusual conduct on the grantor's part in 1920 and shortly before, confinement in a hospital for the insane for the first six months of 1920, and some unusual conduct after 1920; and, on the other hand, testimony of actual management of business transactions in a capable manner in 1921 and 1922, sales of property in conjunction with the wife, and a division of property and separation agreement made with her in 1922. On the testimony in the case this court has come to the conclusion that the averments of incompetency and undue influence have not been proved.
 Benjamin F. Thomas, Sr., the grantor, was a farmer, and from 1906 to 1920 had lived with his family on a farm near Brooklyn, in Anne Arundel County. In 1915 he made a will, which he never later destroyed or expressly revoked, giving his property to his wife for life with remainders to his children. And testimony of friends was to the effect that the father, mother, and children all lived together congenially, up to this time, at least. In 1917, Thomas suffered a stroke of paralysis, from which he seems to have recovered physically, but there was some testimony of a change in attitude toward his wife and children, and testimony of talkativeness, dwelling on trifles, and a disposition to tell his troubles and ask advice of any one, so that men avoided talking with him. Some of the testimony seems to show that similar conduct was observable before 1917, to some extent. And there was testimony of persons who saw him frequently *Page 232
 during the last two years of his life that he talked much of trifling things, not sensibly, that he carried about with him a collection of newspaper clippings, and tried to engage others in conversation on them, that he entered too freely in private rooms in houses where he boarded, and took his choice of family chairs, and that he made a practice of attending funerals, not always of relatives or friends, and when he did attend was heedlessly noisy and had to be quieted for the services. All testimony of the wife and children as to actions or statements of the grantor was excluded under the provisions of article 35, section 3, of the Code, as was also the testimony of the grantees on their side to actions and statements later, and the effect of this, of course, has been to exclude from the case the testimony of those who have knowledge of most of the facts bearing on the questions presented. We cannot, of course, conjecture what this testimony might have proved or failed to prove. And taking the testimony as it stands, while it naturally raises a question of competency, we do not see that it shows peculiar conduct which we might say was inconsistent with competency; it does not appear to be such as cannot be met with in competent men. Common experience teaches us that a considerable degree of peculiarity, eccentricity, unreasonableness, pettiness, or deviation from ordinary, normal conduct, may be associated with sufficient ability to make an ordinary deed, contract or gift, and sometimes with extraordinary ability. And this fact the law recognizes fully, although there is often a tendency to lose sight of it in court. As Judge Pearce said in Jones v. Collins, 94 Md. 403, 409, in considering an instruction prayed on testamentary capacity, "the test is not whether the testator is `entirely sane,' but whether he is `of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract.'" There may be a difference. Brashears v. Orme,93 Md. 442, 449; Wood v. Hankey, 133 Md. 389, 394; Mecutchen v.Gigous, 150 Md. 79, 87. The fact that after such a long life without serious family dissension — so far as appears now — the man fell out with all his family, is another fact to be weighed against competency, for *Page 233
 habit if not affection usually holds a family of normal people together at that stage; but the evidence is not sufficient to enable a court to estimate the weight of this. Possibly the father may have had some grievance, and that possibility must be allowed for. He himself complained of his family on different grounds, some of them seeming petty and unreasonable, and all referring to some only and not all of those with whom he quarreled; in the hospital he said that he had nothing to do with his wife for years because of a dispute over the method of milking a cow, and again complained that his daughter hid his blanket. Later, long after leaving the hospital, he said friction had arisen from the insistence of his sons upon taking charge of the farm and running it on modern methods. In reviewing these complaints, trifling as they sound, we have to bear in mind a common capacity in sane people, especially people living more or less shut-in lives, to magnify trifles and to make petty complaints in family quarrels.
 The opinions expressed by physicians who examined the man for his competency are much more important.
 In December, 1920, Dr. Brawshaw of Anne Arundel County took the grantor to be examined by Dr. Spear of Baltimore, an alienist, and, upon the history given and a comparatively slight personal examination permitted, Dr. Spear certified that the man was incompetent and should be confined, and, upon a like certificate from Dr. Herring, Thomas was taken to Spring Grove State Hospital for the insane. No evidence is given of Dr. Herring's examination. Dr. Spear was permitted to make his examination of the man only on the street, as the man was sitting in an automobile, because the man would not go into the doctor's office. The doctor found him suffering with hardened arteries, seventy-one years old, and expressing antipathy to his family; and, putting these facts together with the history given, but which was excluded from the trial as hearsay evidence, Dr. Spear concluded the man had become insane, or sustained a senile breakdown, as a result of the processes of age, manifested physically in arterio-sclerosis. At the hospital *Page 234
 the superintendent, Dr. Wade, and the admitting physician, Dr. Garrett, made more thorough examinations and came to the same conclusion as that of Dr. Spear. More specifically Dr. Wade testified that they found Thomas suffering from a senile psychosis, paranoid type, delusions and hallucinations, with well-marked arterio-sclerosis. In addition to the history given him, Dr. Wade observed for himself a loss of memory for recent occurrences, an antagonism to his family, based by the patient on the trifling or petty grounds already recited. Dr. Wade added that the man blamed his wife and children for his confinement, and that was the subject of his conversation in the hospital. Dr. Garrett's examination, like Dr. Spear's, was based upon more limited personal observations and more largely upon the history of the case, which was excluded from the evidence. It being the opinion of these three physicians that Thomas was incompetent when he entered and remained in the hospital, in 1920 and 1921, they were asked their opinion further on the probabilities as to the condition with which this case is finally concerned, the condition in January, 1923, and all agreed in an opinion that the condition they observed was permanent in its nature and progressive, and that the grantor would not possess the requisite capacity at the time of executing the deed in 1923. As one of the physicians expressed it, the condition was the result of age, and the man could not grow younger. Dr. Spear expressed a readiness to base this conclusion on his examination of the man irrespective of the history given. An expert called by the defense, Dr. Taneyhill, expressed an opinion that nothing in the sclerotic condition described in the evidence or in the other symptoms mentioned in court would differentiate this man from many other men of the same age, or justify a conclusion that there was a permanent, progressive mental impairment, that, on the other hand, the condition described might improve, as such a condition often does.
 In June, 1921, upon being brought before the court on a writ of habeas corpus, sued out by Edward F. Callis, Thomas was released after a conference between the court and Dr. *Page 235
 Wade, but without any adjudication upon the question of insanity. While at the hospital, he was one of the patients allowed to move about, and he visited freely at the house of Miss Bertha McFee, one of the beneficiaries under the deed of 1923, in Catonsville, near which the hospital is situated, and there he met the other beneficiaries, George R. Callis, 3d., a third cousin, and Edward F. Callis, a first cousin, uncle of George R. Callis. Miss McFee is stated to be a sister of one Callis. George R. and Edward F. Callis had made two visits each to the Thomas farm, principally on gunning trips, and they were only slightly known to the family, even to the father, before 1920. The members of the family had never known Miss McFee.
 After his release from the hospital, Thomas boarded at various places in Baltimore City, avoiding his family. There was testimony that two of the sons tried to persuade him to go home with them but failed. The defendants showed that in September, 1921, Thomas and his wife united in the sale of four acres of land which had been added to their farm by recession of the waters of the Patapsco River, and, of course, executed a deed jointly, acknowledging it before a notary public. And dealers in real estate, called for the defendants, testified that in 1921 he took up with them the sale of the farm itself and ultimately effected a sale of it, and exhibited ordinary and sufficient business capacity in the transaction. He talked with Theophilus White and John K. Culver, president and treasurer of a Brooklyn-Curtis Bay Land Company, had them visit the farm several times, and discussed development or sale there with them and also with Mrs. Thomas. In 1922 he made many visits to the offices of the Continental Trust Company of which Mr. White was a vice-president, talked in an ordinary business-like way of the farm, his (Thomas') price, and terms on which he would sell, held out for a greater price than White offered, and finally obtained his price. The sale was consummated at a conference at the Title Guarantee and Trust Company, of Baltimore, at which Thomas and his wife were both present and represented by different attorneys. And all through these *Page 236
 negotiations and dealings Thomas, according to the testimony, appeared to be an ordinary competent man, and was accepted as such. On the same day Thomas and Mrs. Thomas united in executing an agreement in which they acknowledged an equal division of the proceeds of the sale of the farm, and released each other from claims or demands for support or otherwise.
 The deed of trust was executed eight months later. George R. Callis, after having made an appointment with an attorney, Mr. Knapp, went with the grantor and turned him over to Mr. Knapp, who had a series of conferences with Thomas and as a result prepared the deed. Thomas appears to have explained that he wanted to dispose of all his property, retaining the income for life, and giving remainders as they were finally given, excluding his wife and children from participation. He explained that he had had friction with his family arising from the desire of the sons to take over the management of the farm, and that the Callises and Miss McFee had befriended him while he was confined to the hospital, he having visited at their house nearly every day, and Edward P. Callis having been finally instrumental in having him released. The deed, when prepared, was read and explained to Thomas, and then, in view of his previous confinement, Mr. W. Harry Noeth, an attorney, notary public, and officer of the Maryland Title Company, at the instance of Mr. Knapp, took the grantor into the title company's office and questioned him separately on his knowledge and understanding of what he was about to do. Thomas explained that the purpose of the deed was to do what it did do, exclude his wife and children. And the attorneys then had him execute the deed.
 It is an irrevocable gift, with directions to the trustee named to pay over the net income to the grantor for life and part of the corpus, if necessary for the grantor's maintenance and support, and denying to the grantor all power to charge or anticipate any part. The remainder to the church was conditioned upon the survival of Dr. R.S. Coe and his continuance as pastor of the church, and testimony showed that *Page 237
 the Dr. Coe who had been pastor had left the church two years before, and that his name was Samuel W. Coe. There was testimony given, also, that three years after execution of the deed the grantor expressed an understanding that it was revocable, and said he thought of revoking it because he felt the trustee was not giving him as much money as he should. The grantor was struck by an automobile and killed on January 6th, 1926.
 It appears to us on the whole testimony that this grantor, at the time of execution of the deed, was a man of some peculiarities of conduct, not necessarily indicative of such weakness as to render him incompetent to execute the deed, that, however his condition may have appeared in 1920 and early in 1921, he did in 1921 and 1922, contrary to the past fears of the physicians, actually conduct business dealings with business men and attorneys in a capable manner, without conveying to their minds any suggestion that he might be incapable and that therefore their transactions might be invalid, and that his wife, who probably knew his condition more intimately than any one else, united in business transactions with him. It is conceivable that the wife would in this be doing only what others advised, but that means that these others and her attorneys did not consider that there was any obstacle in the husband's mental condition. The past fears of the physicians appear to us from these facts to have been contradicted by the actual outcome, and we doubt whether with that outcome before them they would upon an examination in 1923 have pronounced the man incompetent.
 The deed itself seems a somewhat strange instrument because of its preference of recent friends, its lack of any power of revocation, and its attempt to restrict the grantor's own power of anticipation and alienation, provisions which seem to go beyond the grantor's purposes and benefit the remaindermen. It may be considered an improvident and unwise deed. But the grantor was old and might desire the protection of restricting clauses, and some allowance must be made for an attorney's choice of means to accomplish the grantor's purposes. And as to the exclusion of the family, *Page 238
 it is to be remembered that this was not the first instrument made in consequence of the family dissension. The separation agreement, in which the wife joined, was an earlier settlement upon the basis of the quarrel, and, so far as the wife was concerned, might have been considered a consummation of it to which the later deed disregarding the wife was a natural sequel. We think it cannot be said to indicate mental incompetency in the grantor.
 On the whole evidence, therefore, while there is matter for consideration and perhaps for suspicion on the question, there seems to be insufficient basis for a judicial finding of fact that this grantor was incapable of executing a deed such as this in January, 1923.
 On the question of procurement of the deed by the exercise of undue influence, the deed itself is the only substantial evidence to be considered. There is no evidence of dealings between the grantor and the beneficiaries in relation to the transaction, except the one fact that George R. Callis made an appointment with an attorney for the grantor and took him to the attorney's office. The provisions of the deed do, we think, arouse a suspicion, and possibly an expectation, that the full facts would show its procurement by undue influence, for they appear to restrict the grantor's further rights in his property further than necessary for the purpose he stated, and these restrictions are for the benefit of the remaindermen. And when it is recalled that the grantor was a man who impressed some as weak, the suspicion and expectation may be increased. But the court must have more than ordinary suspicion to act on. The case is not one in which the parties stood in a confidential relation, so that the grantees are required to disprove the exercise of undue influence; it does not appear that any influence the remaindermen might have exercised by reason of the friendship and hospitality they gave the man two years before, while he was confined in the hospital, continued up to the time of the deed. And it is conceivable that this deed might have been made by an old man to his friends; and, that being so, it cannot be said that its provisions, coupled with the fact that one of the friends *Page 239
 took him to an attorney, show the exercise of undue influence. Against a judicial finding now of such influence there would be the fact of the careful private questioning to which the man was put without disclosing any lack of volition on his own part; and such an inquiry at the time, if conducted honestly and thoroughly, would be much more dependable than one conducted after the grantor's death through witnesses pro and con, and so is persuasive. Henry v. Leech, 123 Md. 436. For these reasons we conclude we cannot find procurement of the deed by the exercise of undue influence to be established as a fact.
 Decree reversed and bill of complaint dismissed, with costs tothe appellants.


text:
1. detsember Vaata, ma tulen varsti ning toon igaühele palga, ma tasun igaühele tema tegude järgi. Mina olen A ja O, esimene ja viimane, algus ja ots! Ilm 22:12-13 Ps 72:1,13–19;Lk 3:7–14;Jr 30:18–22;
 2. detsember Hea ja õiglane on Issand; sellepärast Ta õpetab patustele õiget teed. Ps 25:8 Ps 79:9–10a,11,13;Mt 27:27–30;Hs 37:24–28;
 3. detsember Issand, anna mulle teada oma teed, õpeta mulle oma teeradu! Ps 25:4 Ps 42:2–6;Hb 8:7–12;
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;Hg 2:1–9
 4. detsember Jeesus ütleb: "Teie niuded olgu vöötatud ja lambid põlegu ja teie olge inimeste sarnased, kes ootavad oma isandat pulmapeolt koju, et kui ta tulles koputab, võiksid nad kohe talle ukse avada." Lk 12:35-36
 Advendiaja 2. pühapäev Sinu Kuningas tuleb kirkuses - Tõstke oma pea ja vaadake üles, sest teie lunastus läheneb! Lk 21:28 KLPR 177 Ps 80:2-3,15–16(17–18)19–20;Js 35:3–6;Hb 10:35–39;Lk 12:35–40 Kõigeväeline, halastaja Jumal, luba, et ajalikud askeldused ei takistaks meil vastu võtta Sinu Poega. Kingi meile taevast tarkust, mis juhiks meid osadusse Kristusega; kes koos Sinuga Püha Vaimu ühtsuses elab ja valitseb igavesest ajast igavesti.
 Lisalugemine: Brk 4:36–5:9
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;Js 26:7–12
 5. detsember Sina, Iisraeli karjane, võta kuulda! Ärata oma vägevus ning tule meid päästma! Ps 80:2-3 Ps 74:1–2,9–21;Jr 23:19–22;Js 64:1–3;
 08.59 15.24
 6. detsember Jumal ise tuleb ja päästab teid. Js 35:4 Ps 14;Ilm 2:12–17;Js 59:15b–20;
 7. detsember Meie ei ole need, kes taganevad hukatuseks, vaid need, kes usuvad ja päästavad hinge. Hb 10:39 Ps 102:2–19;Ilm 1:4–8;Js 30:27–30;
 viimane_veerand 11.03
 8. detsember Ma rõõmustasin, kui mulle öeldi: „Lähme Issanda kotta!“ Ps 122:1 Ps 72:1,13–19;Ilm 3:7–13;Jr 31:2–7;
 9. detsember Me ei tagane Sinust! Elusta meid, siis me kuulutame Sinu nime! Ps 80:19 Ps 79:9–10a,11,13;Mt 26:62–66;Sk 2:10–17;
 10. detsember Teile läheb vaja kannatlikkust, et te Jumala tahtmist täites saaksite kätte tõotuse. Hb 10:36 Ps 42:2–6;1Ts 4:13–18;
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;Js 45:1–8
 09.07 15.21
 11. detsember "Tõesti, ma ütlen teile, naisest sündinute seast ei ole tõusnud suuremat Ristija Johannesest, aga väikseim taevariigis on suurem temast." Mt 11:11
 Advendiaja 3. pühapäev Valmistage Issandale teed - Valmistage Issanda teed; vaata, Issand Jumal tuleb jõuliselt! Js 40:3a,10a KLPR 10 Ps 85:9–14;Ml 3:23–24;2Pt 1:19–21;Mt 11:11–19 (või Jh 1:35–37) Issand, kuule meie palveid ja too valgust meie südame pimedusse, et me näeksime takistusi, mis tuleb kõrvaldada Sinu Poja tulemise teelt! Kingi meile jõudu meeleparanduseks ja anna usku evangeeliumi tõotustesse. Seda palume Jeesuse Kristuse, Sinu Poja, meie Issanda läbi.
 Lisalugemine: Srk 17:25–32
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;Js 1:2–9
 12. detsember Valmistage kõrbes Issanda teed, tehke lagendikul maantee tasaseks meie Jumalale! Js 40:3 Ps 74:1–2,9–21;Lk 3:1–6;Jr 4:1–4;
 13. detsember Vaata, ma läkitan teile prohvet Eelija, enne kui tuleb Issanda päev, suur ja kardetav. Ja Tema pöörab vanemate südamed jälle laste poole ja laste südamed vanemate poole. Ml 3:24 Ps 14;Mt 3:7–12;Sf 3:1–13;
 14. detsember Iialgi pole ühtegi prohvetiennustust esile toodud inimese tahtel, vaid Pühast Vaimust kantuina on inimesed rääkinud, saades sõnumi Jumala käest. 2Pt 1:21 Ps 102:2–19;Mk 9:11–13;Js 56:1–8;
 täiskuu 02.05
 09.12 15.20
 15. detsember Jumal, uuenda meie olukord ja lase paista oma pale, siis oleme päästetud! Ps 80:4 Ps 72:1,13–19;Gl 3:21–23;Js 62:6–7;
 16. detsember Ma tahan kuulda, mida Jumal, Issand, räägib. Sest Tema kuulutab rahu oma rahvale ja ütleb oma vagadele, et nad ei pöörduks alpuse poole. Õigus käib Tema eel ja järgib Tema samme. Ps 85:9,14 Ps 79:9–10a,11,13;Jh 19:17–22;Js 44:21–27;
 17. detsember Kui Jeesus läks neist mööda, ütles Johannes talle otsa vaadates: „Vaata, see on Jumala Tall.“ Ja mõlemad jüngrid kuulsid, mida ta ütles, ja läksid Jeesusega kaasa. Jh 1:36-37 Ps 42:2–6;Js 45:22–25;
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;Js 40:9–11
 09.15 15.20
 18. detsember Ennäe, neitsi jääb lapseootele ja toob ilmale poja, ja Teda hüütakse nimega Immaanuel, see on tõlkes: Jumal on meiega. Mt 1:23
 Advendiaja 4. pühapäev Issand on lähedal - Olge ikka rõõmsad Issandas! Taas ma ütlen: Olge rõõmsad! Issand on ligidal! Fl 4:4,5b KLPR 7 Ps 130:5–8 (või Ps 102:14,16-17,20-22);1Ms 21:1–7;Hb 6:13–19;Mt 1:18–24 Kõigeväeline Jumal, Sina ülendad alandlikke ja oled Neitsi Maarja oma Poja emaks valinud: lase tema rõõmul ka meie südameid elustada, et me koos Maarjaga kiidaksime ja ülistaksime Sinu halastust. Seda palume Jeesuse Kristuse, Sinu Poja, meie Issanda läbi.
 Lisalugemine: Srk 42:15–25
 Õhtul: Ps 24:1–6;1Aj 16:8–17
 19. detsember Oota Jumalat, sest ma tahan Teda veel tänada Ta palge abi eest! Ps 42:6 Ps 74:1–2,9–21;1Ms 17:15–22;Hb 11:11–12;
 20. detsember Saara jäi lapseootele ja tõi Aabrahamile poja ilmale ta vanas eas, määratud ajal, millest Jumal temaga oli rääkinud. 1Ms 21:2 Ps 14;Js 35:1–2;Hb 6:7–12;
 09.18 15.20
 21. detsember Jumal ütles: „Tõesti, õnnistades õnnistan ma sind ja rohkendades rohkendan ma sind!” Ja nõnda, olles pikameelne, koges Aabraham tõotuse täitumist. Hb 6:14-15 Ps 102:2–19;2Sm 7:1–5,11b–16;2Sm 7:17–22;
 viimane_veerand 03.56
 talv 12.44
 22. detsember Tema tõstab tähtsusetu põrmust, Tema ülendab viletsa tuhaasemelt, pannes neid istuma õilsate juurde ja lastes neid pärida aujärgi. 1Sm 2:8 Ps 72:1,13–19;Ha 3:17-18;Js 12:4-6;
 09.19 15.21
 23. detsember Ma ootan Issandat, mu hing ootab, ja ma loodan Tema sõna peale. Mu hing ootab Issandat enam kui valvurid hommikut, kui valvurid hommikut. Ps 130:5-6 Ps 79:9–10a,11,13;Lk 2:34–35;Lk 1:68–70;
 24. detsember Vaata, pimedus katab maad ja pilkane pimedus rahvaid, aga sinu kohal koidab Issand ja sinu kohal nähakse Tema auhiilgust. Js 60:2
 Jõuluõhtu ehk jõululaupäev Vaata, ma kuulutan teile suurt rõõmu! KLPR 21 Ps 36:6-10;Js 11:1-9;1Jh 1:1-7;Lk 2:1-14(15-20) Püha Jumal, Sina oled imelisel viisil täitnud oma tõotused, lastes Iisai kännust tõusta võrsel ja kinkides meile Petlemma sõimes imelise lapse, maailma Päästja. Anna meile elu Tema elust, et meie südames puhkeks uue elu võrse ja me kannaksime armastuse ja rahu vilja. Seda palume Jeesuse Kristuse, meie Issanda läbi.
 Hommikul: Ps 42:2-6;1Ms 3:1–6,14–24
 25. detsember Ingel ütles karjastele: „Ärge kartke! Sest vaata, ma kuulutan teile suurt rõõmu, mis saab osaks kogu rahvale, et teile on täna sündinud Taaveti linnas Päästja, kes on Issand Kristus." Lk 2:10-11
 Kristuse sündimise püha ehk 1. jõulupüha Sõna sai lihaks - Sõna sai lihaks ja elas meie keskel, ja me nägime Tema kirkust. Jh 1:14 KLPR 31 Ps 100;Js 52:7–10 (või Js 11:1–9);Hb 1:1–3(4–12) (või 1Jh 4:9–16);Jh 1:1–14 Kõigeväeline Jumal, Sa oled inimese imeliselt loonud ja veelgi imelisemalt uuendanud. Luba meil osa saada Sinu Poja jumalikkusest, kes võttis meie inimliku kuju. Seda palume Jeesuse Kristuse, meie Issanda läbi, kes koos Sinuga Püha Vaimu ühtsuses elab ja valitseb igavesest ajast igavesti.
 Õhtul: Ps 98:1-4;Rm 1:2-4;Lk 2:8-20
 26. detsember Jeesus ütleb: "Igaüht, kes mind tunnistab inimeste ees, teda tunnistab ka Inimese Poeg Jumala inglite ees." Lk 12:8
 Esimärter Stefanose päev ehk tehvanipäev Kristuse tunnistajad - Kallis on Issanda meelest Tema vagade surm. Sinule ma ohverdan tänuohvreid ja hüüan appi Issanda nime. Ps 116:15,17 KLPR 35 Ps 119:41–48;2Aj 24:18–21;Ap 6:8,11–15; 7:51–60;Lk 12:8–12 Halastaja Isa, Sina andsid Esimärter Stefanosele jõudu seista kindlalt oma kannatustes ja palvetada nende eest, kes ta kividega surnuks viskasid. Lase meilgi osa saada Sinu armastusest, et me suudaksime armastada oma vaenlasi ja nende eest palvetada. Seda palume Jeesuse Kristuse, meie Issanda läbi, kes koos Sinuga Püha Vaimu ühtsuses elab ja valitseb igavesest ajast igavesti.
 Õhtul: Ps 127;Kl 1:15-20
 Õhtul: Ps 128 2Jh 1-6,9 (või Õp 2:1-11)
 Õhtul: Ps 132:11-17 Ilm 12:1-6
 29. detsember Issanda käest on see tulnud, see on imeasi meie silmis. Ps 118:23 Ps 133;Ap 10:34–36;1Tm 3:16;
 noorkuu 08.53
 30. detsember Kõik ilmamaa otsad on näinud meie Jumala päästet. Ps 98:3 Ps 134;Fl 2:5–11;2Kr 8:9;
 31. detsember Issand hoiab sind kõige kurja eest, Tema hoiab sinu hinge. Issand hoiab su minemist ja su tulemist nüüd ja igavesti. Ps 121:7-8
 Vana-aasta Meie aeg on Issanda kätes - Sinu käes, Issand, on kõik mu ajad. Ps 31:16 KLPR 47 Ps 121;Nl 3:22–26 (või Kg 3:1–8 või 1Sm 7:12);1Pt 1:22–25 (või Ilm 2:1–5);Lk 13:6–9 (või Mt 16:1–4 või Lk 21:25–36) Jumal ja meie Issanda Jeesuse Kristuse Isa. Sinu aastad ei lõpe ja Sinu arm on igal päeval uus: lase oma Vaimu valgusel uuendada meie elu, elusta meie süda ja anna valgust meie meeltele, et me võiksime astuda uude aastasse rõõmsa kuulekuse ja kindla usuga. Seda palume Kristuse, meie Issanda läbi.
 Lisalugemine: Trk 1:1-6
 Hommikul: Ps 33:13-22;2Ms 1:8-10,15-21
 09.19 15.30


text:
 6.11.2019
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 285/7
 IZVEDBENA UREDBA KOMISIJE (EU) 2019/1853
 z dne 5. novembra 2019
 o spremembi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1210/2003 o nekaterih posebnih omejitvah gospodarskih in finančnih odnosov z Irakom
 EVROPSKA KOMISIJA JE –
 ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
 ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1210/2003 z dne 7. julija 2003 o nekaterih posebnih omejitvah gospodarskih in finančnih odnosov z Irakom in razveljavitvi Uredbe (ES) št. 2465/96 (1) in zlasti člena 11(b) Uredbe,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 (1)
 V Prilogi III k Uredbi (ES) št. 1210/2003 so našteta javna telesa, korporacije in agencije ter fizične in pravne osebe, telesa in entitete nekdanje iraške vlade, za katere v skladu z navedeno uredbo velja zamrznitev sredstev in gospodarskih virov, ki so se 22. maja 2003 nahajali zunaj Iraka.
 (2)
 Odbor za sankcije Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov je 30. oktobra 2019 sklenil črtati dva vnosa s seznama oseb ali entitet, za katere velja zamrznitev sredstev in gospodarskih virov.
 (3)
 Prilogo III k Uredbi (ES) št. 1210/2003 bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
 SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
 Člen 1
 Priloga III k Uredbi (ES) št. 1210/2003 se spremeni v skladu s Prilogo k tej uredbi.
 Člen 2
 Ta uredba začne veljati dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
 Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah.
 V Bruslju, 5. novembra 2019
 Za Komisijo
 V imenu predsednika
 Vodja službe za instrumente zunanje politike
 (1) UL L 169, 8.7.2003, str. 6.
 PRILOGA
 V Prilogi III k Uredbi (ES) št. 1210/2003 se črtata naslednja vnosa:
 „183
 STATE ORGANIZATION FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS (alias GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR IRRIGATION PROJECTS). Addresses: (a) Northgate, Karanteena, P.O. Box 148, Baghdad, Iraq; (b) Al-Muadham, near Engineering College, P.O. Box 14186, Baghdad, Iraq.
 184
 STATE ORGANIZATION FOR LAND RECLAMATION (alias (a) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR PLANTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECLAIMED LANDS, (b) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR EXECUTION OF LAND RECLAMATION CONTRACTS, (c) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR LAND RECLAMATION OF CENTRAL AND NORTHERN AREAS, (d) GENERAL ESTABLISHMENT FOR LAND RECLAMATION OF SOUTHERN AREAS). Addresses: (a) Amiriya, Abu Gharib, P.O. Box 6161, Baghdad, Iraq; (b) P.O. Box 6061, Aamrlya 7, Nisan, Iraq; (c) P.O. Box 609, Al-Sadoon St., Baghdad, Iraq; (d) P.O. Box 27, Wasit Province, Kut, Iraq.“


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text:
 9.10.2017
 PL
 Dziennik Urzędowy Unii Europejskiej
 C 338/7
 Wniosek o wydanie orzeczenia w trybie prejudycjalnym złożony przez Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Włochy) w dniu 6 lipca 2017 r. – Enel Energia SpA/Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato i in.
 (Sprawa C-408/17)
 (2017/C 338/07)
 Język postępowania: włoski
 Sąd odsyłający
 Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio
 Strony w postępowaniu głównym
 Strona skarżąca: Enel Energia SpA
 Strona pozwana: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni
 Pytania prejudycjalne
 1)
 Czy „ratio” dyrektywy „ogólnej” 2005/29/WE (1), rozumianej jako „siatka zabezpieczająca” dla ochrony konsumentów, jak też w szczególności jej motyw 10, art. 3 ust. 4 i art. 5 ust. 3 sprzeciwiają się normie krajowej, która sprowadza ocenę poszanowania konkretnych obowiązków przewidzianych w dyrektywach sektorowych 2009/72/WE (2) i 2009/73/WE (3) dla ochrony użytkowników w ramach stosowania dyrektywy ogólnej 2005/29/WE o nieuczciwych praktykach handlowych, wykluczając w konsekwencji interwencję organu sektorowego – w niniejszym wypadku AEEGSI – mającą na celu zwalczanie naruszeń dyrektywy sektorowej w każdym wypadku, w którym naruszenie mogłoby stanowić również nieprawidłową lub nieuczciwą praktykę handlową?
 2)
 Czy zasadę lex specialis, o której mowa w art. 3 ust. 4 dyrektywy 2005/29/WE, należy postrzegać jako zasadę regulującą stosunki między uregulowaniami (uregulowanie ogólne i uregulowanie sektorowe) czy jako regulującą stosunki między normami (normy ogólne i normy szczególne) lub też stosunki między niezależnymi organami powołanymi do regulacji i monitorowania danych sektorów?
 3)
 Czy pojęcie „kolizji” w art. 3 ust. 4 dyrektywy 2005/29/WE można uznać za spełnione tylko w wypadku radykalnej sprzeczności między przepisami dotyczącymi nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych i innymi normami prawa Unii, które regulują szczególne aspekty praktyk handlowych, czy też wystarczy, by rozpatrywane normy ustanawiały regulację różniącą się od uregulowania dotyczącego nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych, która prowadzi do kolizji norm w odniesieniu do danego stanu faktycznego?
 4)
 Czy pojęcie przepisów prawnych Wspólnoty, o którym mowa w art. 3 ust. 4 dyrektywy 2005/29/WE, odnosi się tylko do przepisów zawartych w rozporządzeniach i dyrektywach europejskich oraz przepisów bezpośrednio ich transponujących czy też obejmuje również przepisy ustawowe i wykonawcze wdrażające zasady prawa europejskiego?
 5)
 Czy zasada lex specialis, przewidziana w motywie 10 i w art. 3 ust. 4 dyrektywy 2005/29/WE, oraz art. 37 dyrektywy 2009/72/WE i art. 41 dyrektywy 2009/73/WE sprzeciwiają się interpretacji odpowiednich krajowych przepisów transponujących w ten sposób, że w każdym wypadku, w którym w sektorze reglamentowanym, który podlega sektorowemu reżimowi prawa ochrony konsumentów przyznającemu uprawnienia regulacyjne i uprawnienia do nakładania kar organowi sektorowemu, wystąpi zachowanie objęte pojęciem „praktyki agresywnej” w rozumieniu art. 8 i 9 dyrektywy 2005/29/WE lub „agresywnej w każdych okolicznościach” w rozumieniu załącznika I do dyrektywy 2005/29/WE, ma zawsze zastosowanie uregulowanie ogólne dotyczące nieuczciwych praktyk i to również wtedy, gdy istnieje uregulowanie sektorowe przyjęte dla ochrony (tychże) konsumentów i oparte na przepisach prawa Unii, które w sposób wyczerpujący reguluje wspomniane „praktyki agresywne” i „agresywne w każdych okolicznościach” lub w każdym razie „praktyki nieprawidłowe lub nieuczciwe”?
 (1) Dyrektywa 2005/29/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 11 maja 2005 r. dotycząca nieuczciwych praktyk handlowych stosowanych przez przedsiębiorstwa wobec konsumentów na rynku wewnętrznym oraz zmieniająca dyrektywę Rady 84/450/EWG, dyrektywy 97/7/WE, 98/27/WE i 2002/65/WE Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady oraz rozporządzenie (WE) nr 2006/2004 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady („Dyrektywa o nieuczciwych praktykach handlowych”) (Dz.U. L 149, s. 22).
 (2) Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2009/72/WE z dnia 13 lipca 2009 r. dotycząca wspólnych zasad rynku wewnętrznego energii elektrycznej i uchylająca dyrektywę 2003/54/WE (Dz.U. L 211, s. 55).
 (3) Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2009/73/WE z dnia 13 lipca 2009 r. dotycząca wspólnych zasad rynku wewnętrznego gazu ziemnego i uchylająca dyrektywę 2003/55/WE (Dz.U. L 211, s. 94).


type: contracts

text:
 21.10.2010
 BG
 Официален вестник на Европейския съюз
 L 277/31
 РЕШЕНИЕ No 3/2010 НА СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЯ КОМИТЕТ ЕС—ШВЕЙЦАРИЯ
 от 1 октомври 2010 година
 за изменение на приложение Б към Споразумението между Европейската общност и Конфедерация Швейцария за сътрудничество в областта на статистиката
 (2010/627/ЕС)
 СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЯТ КОМИТЕТ ЕС—ШВЕЙЦАРИЯ,
 като взе предвид Споразумението между Европейската общност и Конфедерация Швейцария за сътрудничество в областта на статистиката (1), и по-специално член 4, параграф 4 от него,
 като има предвид, че:
 (1)
 Споразумението между Европейската общност и Конфедерация Швейцария за сътрудничество в областта на статистиката (наричано по-долу „Споразумението“) влезе в сила на 1 януари 2007 г. и съдържа приложение Б относно правилата за финансовата вноска на Швейцария.
 (2)
 Опитът, натрупан от началото на изпълнение на споразумението, показа необходимостта от опростяване на финансовото му прилагане и от намаляване на съответстващата административна тежест. Поради тази причина приложение Б следва да бъде преразгледано,
 ПРИЕ НАСТОЯЩОТО РЕШЕНИЕ:
 Член 1
 Приложение Б към споразумението се заменя с текста от приложението към настоящото решение.
 Член 2
 Настоящото решение влиза в сила в деня на приемането му.
 Съставено в София на 1 октомври 2010 година.
 За Съвместния комитет
 Ръководител на делегацията на ЕС
 Walter RADERMACHER
 Ръководител на делегацията на Швейцария
 Jürg MARTI
 (1) ОВ L 90, 28.3.2006 г., стр. 2.
 ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ
 „ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ Б
 ФИНАНСОВИ ПРАВИЛА ЗА ВНОСКАТА НА ШВЕЙЦАРИЯ, ПОСОЧЕНИ В ЧЛЕН 8
 1. Определяне на финансовото участие
 1.1.
 Швейцария участва финансово в статистическата програма на Европейския съюз под формата на вноска на годишна база.
 1.2.
 Тази вноска се основава на два компонента:
 —
 общо разходи на Евростат [Разходи],
 —
 брой на държавите-членки в Европейския съюз [# Членове].
 1.3.
 Финансовата вноска е: [Разходи]/[# Членове]
 1.4.
 Тези компоненти се определят, както следва:
 1.4.1.
 Компонентът „Общо разходи на Евростат“ се определя на 85 % от размера на бюджетните кредити за поети задължения в областта на политиката „Статистика“ (дял 29) от бюджета на Европейския съюз съгласно номенклатурата за бюджетирането въз основа на дейности. Той включва разходи за управление и подкрепа на дейностите в областта на политиката „Статистика“ (разходи във връзка със заетия персонал, външния персонал и други разходи по управлението, сградите и свързаните с тях разходи и разходи за подкрепа на дейностите) и финансовите средства с оглед изготвянето на статистическа информация. [Разходи]
 1.4.2.
 Компонентът „Брой на държавите-членки“ се определя като броя на държавите-членки на Европейския съюз към 1 януари от съответната година. [# Членове]
 1.5.
 Непосредствено след приемането на предварителния проектобюджет на Европейския съюз за съответната година се извършва предварително изчисление на финансовата вноска. Окончателното изчисляване се прави непосредствено след приемането на бюджета за съответната година.
 2. Процедури във връзка с плащането
 2.1.
 Най-късно на 15 юни всяка финансова година Комисията отправя към Швейцария покана за плащане на средства в размер на вноската ѝ по споразумението. Тази покана за плащане на средствата предвижда внасяне на вноската не по-късно от 15 юли. Всяко забавяне в отправянето на поканата за плащане на средствата води до съответно отлагане на датата за плащане, така че периодът за плащане да бъде най-малко тридесет дни.
 2.2.
 Вноската на Швейцария се определя и заплаща в евро.
 2.3.
 Швейцария плаща своята вноска по споразумението съгласно графика в точка 2.1. При забавяне на плащането се начисляват лихви, като в такъв случай лихвеният процент е този, който Европейската централна банка прилага за основните си операции по рефинансиране, както е публикуван в серия С на Официален вестник на Европейския съюз, и в сила към първия календарен ден от месеца на падежа, увеличен с 1,5 процентни пункта. Така увеличеният лихвен процент се прилага за целия период на забавянето. Същевременно лихвите се дължат само по отношение на вноските, които са платени след повече от трийсет дни след датата по графика за плащане, посочен в точка 2.1.
 2.4.
 Разходите на представителите и експертите на Швейцария, които участват в заседанията, свикани от Комисията в рамките на споразумението, не се възстановяват от Комисията. Както е посочено в член 6, параграф 2, разходите, свързани с командироването в Евростат на швейцарски служители, се поемат изцяло от Швейцария.
 При споразумение между Евростат и Швейцарската федерална статистическа служба Швейцария може да приспада от финансовата си вноска разходите за командированите национални експерти. Максималният размер, който може да се приспадне по отношение на всеки служител, не надвишава максималната сума, приспадана за служители от държави от ЕИП-ЕАСТ, които са командировани в Евростат съгласно споразумението за ЕИП. Тази сума се договаря на годишна база от Съвместния комитет.
 2.5.
 Извършените от Швейцария плащания се вписват като бюджетен приход в съответстващия бюджетен ред на приходната част на общия бюджет на Европейския съюз. Финансовият регламент (1), приложим за общия бюджет на Европейските общности, се прилага за управлението на бюджетните кредити.
 3. Условия по отношение на изпълнението
 3.1.
 Като общо правило финансовата вноска на Швейцария съгласно член 8 не се променя през съответната финансова година.
 3.2.
 При приключване на сметките, свързани с всяка финансова година (n), в контекста на съставяне на сметката за приходите и разходите Комисията извършва корекция на сметките по отношение на участието на Швейцария, като взема предвид измененията в резултат на прехвърляне, анулиране и пренасяне или допълнения и изменения на бюджета през финансовата година. Тази корекция се извършва в рамките на изготвяне на бюджета за следваща година (n + 2) и се отразява в поканата за плащане на средствата.
 4. Информация
 4.1.
 Най-късно до 31 май всяка финансова година (n + 1) разчетът за бюджетните кредити за оперативните и административните финансови задължения на Евростат, свързани с предходната финансова година (n), се изготвя и изпраща на Швейцария за информация съгласно формàта на сметката за приходите и разходите на Комисията.
 4.2.
 Комисията съобщава на Швейцария всички други общи финансови данни във връзка с Евростат, които са предоставени на разположение на държавите от ЕИП-ЕАСТ.
 (1) Регламент (ЕО, Евратом) No 1605/2002 на Съвета от 25 юни 2002 г. относно Финансовия регламент, приложим за общия бюджет на Европейските общности (ОВ L 248, 16.9.2002 г., стр. 1), последно изменен с Регламент (ЕО) No 1525/2007 на Съвета (ОВ L 343, 27.12.2007 г., стр. 9).“