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Skat.dk: C.C.2.2.1.12 Interessenter og partredere
 Dette afsnit indeholder en kort beskrivelse af, hvad et interessentskab er, og en beskrivelse af regler og praksis om interessenters skattemæssige fradragsret. Afsnittet indeholder også en beskrivelse af partrederes skattemæssige fradragsret.
 Beskrivelse af interessentskaber
 Interessentskabet skatteretligt, transparens og deltagerbeskatning
 Interessenters fordeling af indtægter og udgifter
 Interessenters fradrag som følge af den solidariske hæftelse
 Hvis medinteressenten har hævet for meget
 Hvis partrederen påtager sig solidarisk hæftelse
 C.C.3.3 om kommanditisters skattemæssige forhold
 C.C.3.3.3 om deltagere i partnerselskaber (P/S)
 C.C.3.1 og C.C.3.2 om anpartsvirksomhed, herunder projekter og kommanditister
 C.C.6.6 om indtræden i og udtræden af interessentskaber.
 Et interessentskab (I/S) er en virksomhed med to eller flere deltagere. Deltagerne kaldes interessenter og kan være både fysiske personer og juridiske personer, fx selskaber og kommuner m.fl.
 Interessentskabet er en juridisk person, en selvstændig enhed. Det betyder fx, at interessentskabet ejer aktiverne og kan indgå aftaler. Deltagerne ejer en ideel andel af interessentskabets aktiver og passiver, som svarer til interessentskabsandelen.
 Om definition på interessentskaber, se lov om visse erhvervsdrivende virksomheder § 1, stk. 2, og § 2, stk. 1.
 Interessentskaber er karakteriseret ved, at de enkelte deltagere hæfter personligt, ubegrænset og solidarisk for interessentskabets forpligtelser.
 Personlig hæftelse betyder, at de enkelte interessenter hæfter med alt, hvad de ejer og kommer til at eje.
 Ubegrænset hæftelse
 Ubegrænset hæftelse betyder, at hver enkelt interessent hæfter for alle interessentskabets forpligtelser.
 Solidarisk hæftelse betyder, at interessenterne hæfter "en for alle og alle for en", sådan at kreditorerne kan gøre deres fulde krav gældende mod hver enkelt deltager, indtil det er betalt.
 Skatteretligt betragtes selskabet ikke som et selvstændigt skattesubjekt. Derfor beskattes interessentskabets overskud og underskud med en andel hos hver enkelt interessent.
 Når beskatningen sker hos den enkelte deltager og ikke hos selskabet, kaldes det transparens (gennemsigtighed). En skattemæssigt transparent enhed er en juridisk person, der efter danske skatteregler ikke er et selvstændigt skattesubjekt.
 Om den nærmere afgrænsning af interessentskaber over for selvstændige skattesubjekter, se afsnit C.D.1.1.12 Andre foreninger. I dette afsnit beskrives bl.a. de kriterier, der indikerer, at der er tale om et interessentskab.
 Indkomstopgørelsen sker i øvrigt hos de enkelte interessenter efter skattelovgivningens almindelige regler, herunder om fradrag for driftsomkostninger og driftstab.
 Ved lov nr. 682 af 8. juni 2017 om ændring af personskatteloven og virksomhedsskatteloven (Kildeartsbegrænsning af underskud fra fysiske personers investeringer i visse anpartsprojekter) blev der indført kildeartsbegrænsning af underskud fra fysiske personers deltagelse i visse skattemæssigt transparente selskaber (10-mandsprojekter). Se afsnit C.C.3.3.2 Kommanditisters indkomstopgørelse om kildeartsbegrænsning af underskud om denne regel, herunder om lovens virkningstidspunkt.
 Ved lov nr. 684 af 8. juni 2017 om ændring af ligningsloven (Kvalifikation af selvstændig erhvervsvirksomhed ved deltagelse i et skattemæssigt transparent selskab) (L194) blev der indsat en ny paragraf 4 i ligningsloven.
 Efter bestemmelsen i LL § 4 er deltagelse i et skattemæssigt transparent selskab ikke længere i sig selv tilstrækkeligt til, at deltagerens indkomst fra det skattemæssigt transparente selskab kan anses for indkomst ved selvstændig erhvervsvirksomhed.
 Bestemmelsen har virkning for indkomstår, der påbegyndes den 1. januar 2018 eller senere.
 Se om xLL § 4 xi afsnit C.C.1.2.4 Selvstændigt erhvervsdrivende ved deltagelse i et skattemæssigt transparent selskab.
 Interessenterne ejer hver en ideel andel af interessentskabets aktiver og passiver. Størrelsen af denne andel har betydning for interessentens afskrivningsret og opgørelse af anskaffelses- og afståelsessummer mv.
 Fordelingen af interessentskabets løbende over- eller underskud sker ikke nødvendigvis hos interessenterne i forhold til deres ejerandel. Interessenterne kan have aftalt at anvende en anden fordeling af indkomsten, hvor der fx tages hensyn til arbejdsindsats eller indskudt kapital. Hvis der ikke er aftalt andet, fordeles indkomsten lige.
 Hvis der ikke er aftalt noget om fordelingen af underskuddet, fordeles det på samme måde som overskuddet.
 Hvis fordelingen af over- eller underskud ikke er sagligt begrundet, kan skattemyndighederne tilsidesætte aftalen. Se LSRM 1974, 155 LSR og Østre Landsrets dom i Skd. 1983.67.402 forudsætningsvis. I SKM2013.396.BR forelå der ikke nogen fordelingsaftale, og retten fandt, at skatteyderen ikke havde ført bevis for, at han ejede en mindre del af virksomheden end de 50 pct., som var skønnet af skattemyndighederne.
 Hvor en interessent i kraft af det solidariske ansvar over for kreditorerne må afholde mere end sin forholdsmæssige andel af et underskud, vil han som regel have fradrag også for denne del, hvis han lider et tab af den grund. Dette tab kan skyldes, at medinteressenten ikke kan indfri interessentens regreskrav.
 Interessenten kan trække tabet fra efter reglerne i kursgevinstloven, når det er endeligt konstateret.
 Hvis interessenten er et selskab, er der som udgangspunkt fradragsret for tabet efter KGL § 3. Se afsnit C.B.1.3.3.2.
 Hvis interessenten er en fysisk person, kan tab på en fordring trækkes fra efter KGL § 14. Tab skal efter denne bestemmelse trækkes fra i kapitalindkomsten. Der gælder en bagatelgrænse på 2.000 kr. Reglen gælder kun for fordringer, der er erhvervet den 27. januar 2010 eller senere. Se afsnit C.B.1.4.2.2. Tab på fordringer, der er opstået/erhvervet før den 27. januar 2010, kan ikke trækkes fra.
 Hvis den fysiske persons tab på et regreskrav er erhvervet i tilknytning til den erhvervsmæssige drift af virksomheden, vil det også være omfattet af KGL § 17. I denne situation bestemmer § 17, at reglerne i SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a, anvendes. Det skal altså vurderes, om tabet har karakter af driftsomkostning (eller driftstab). Se afsnit C.B.1.4.2.4.
 KGL § 17 handler også om fradrag for tab på fordringer, som er erhvervet som led i vederlagsnæring.
 Hvis tabet er omfattet af KGL § 17, kan det derfor trækkes fra i den personlige indkomst uden bagatelgrænse.
 Eksempler på fradrag som følge af solidarisk hæftelse
 En skatteyder, der drev en byggevirksomhed med en medinteressent, måtte i forbindelse med virksomhedens ophør betale samtlige interessentskabets kreditorer. Landsretten fandt, at interessentskabets underskud var opstået løbende ved, at der var afholdt udgifter, som havde været nødvendige for interessentskabets drift. Skatteyderen kunne derfor trække det lidte tab fra ved opgørelsen af sin (personlige) indkomst. Se Østre Landsrets dom i skd. 1984.68.38.
 En arkitekt drev erhvervsmæssig udstykningsvirksomhed sammen med en murermester. Murermesteren, drev også selvstændig murermestervirksomhed, som kom i økonomiske vanskeligheder. Det daværende toldvæsen gjorde derfor udlæg i hans anpart i interessentskabet. For at undgå, at udstykningsvirksomheden måtte standse med tab, var arkitekten gået med til, at interessentskabet optog lån og betalte gælden til toldvæsenet. Da der var den nødvendige forbindelse mellem den tabsgivende disposition og den løbende indtægtserhvervelse, kunne arkitekten ved opgørelsen af sin (personlige) indkomst trække det tab fra, der var opstået i forbindelse med kompagnonens insolvens. Se LSRM 1982, 82 LSR.
 Hvis tabet ikke skyldes den solidariske hæftelse over for kreditorerne men derimod, at medinteressenten har hævet for meget i selskabet, må tabet normalt anses for et tab på udlån, som er foretaget uden for interessentskabets normale drift.
 Tabet kan ikke trækkes fra efter KGL § 17, og kun efter KGL § 14, hvis det er endeligt konstateret. Bestemmelsen gælder dog ikke for tab på fordringer mellem nærtstående eller for hovedaktionærers fordringer på deres selskaber.
 Se afsnit C.B.1.4.2.2 om KGL § 14 og afsnit C.B.1.3.3.2 om selskabers fradrag efter KGL § 3.
 Eksempler: Tab ikke led i interessentskabet drift (normal driftsrisiko)
 Eksemplerne er fra ældre praksis, hvor fradrag er blevet nægtet. Efter den nugældende KGL § 14, kan der dog være fradrag for tilsvarende fordringer. Tabet vil derimod ikke kunne trækkes fra efter KGL § 17 eller § 3, fordi fordringen ikke har tilknytning til den erhvervsmæssige drift af virksomheden:
 To medinteressenters uberettigede hævninger af interessentskabets midler blev ikke anset for at være foretaget som led i driften af interessentskabet, men derimod med det formål at dække medinteressenternes privatforbrug. Kassekreditten blev indfriet af interessenten i dennes egenskab af solidarisk ansvarlig meddebitor. Fordringerne mod medinteressenterne blev anset for uerholdelige. Højesteret afviste fradrag og bemærkede, at tab, der udspringer af, at interessenterne hæver penge til privatforbrug ved at trække checks på interessentskabets kassekreditkonti, falder uden for rammerne af en naturlig driftsrisiko ved erhvervskonti i interessentskabsform. Se TfS 2000, 362 HRD.
 En advokat led tab på grund af en medinteressents uberettigede hævninger. Efter interessenternes aftale skulle interessentskabets overskud fordeles i forhold til parternes indtjening, uanset om den enkelte interessent på den måde opnåede et sædvanligt arbejdsvederlag. Den senere udtrådte medinteressent havde derfor ikke ret til at foretage større acontohævninger på den fælles kassekredit, end hans indtjening betingede. Interessenterne havde mulighed for og var i kraft af interessentskabskontrakten berettiget til løbende at kontrollere både medinteressenternes indtjening og hævningerne på den fælles kassekredit. De uberettigede hævninger var derfor ikke en naturlig driftsrisiko ved deltagelse i interessentskabet. Derfor, og fordi interessentskabet i øvrigt gennem alle årene gav overskud, kunne skatteyderens tab ikke anses som en fradragsberettiget driftsomkostning efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a. Se TfS 1997, 619 ØLD.
 En interessent, A, havde lidt et tab, fordi en medinteressent, B, ikke kunne indfri sin negative kapitalkonto. B havde hævet mere, end han havde krav på efter sin overskudsandel. A påstod, at B's hævninger var rimeligt begrundede i driftsresultaterne og arbejdsindsatsen, og at de derfor var et løbende led i indtægtserhvervelsen for interessentskabet. Landsretten fandt derimod, at B havde hævet mere, end han havde krav på, og at han på den måde havde fået et lån ved træk på kapitalkontoen. Dette lån var ikke et led i den løbende indkomsterhvervelse for interessentskabet, og A's tab var derfor et formuetab, som ikke kunne trækkes fra efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a. Se TfS 1999, 685 VLD.
 I forbindelse med, at en interessent udtrådte af et interessentskab, blev der konstateret et tab, selvom interessentskabet i den givne periode havde haft overskud. Tabet var en følge af, at den udtrædende interessent havde foretaget så store hævninger i selskabet, at han ved sin udtræden ikke var i stand til at betale den del af gælden, der ifølge parternes aftale påhvilede ham. På grund af den solidariske hæftelse led en anden interessent derfor et tab. Landsskatteretten fandt, at tabet ikke var tab på en fordring, der havde tilknytning til driften af interessentskabet, men et formuetab, der var indkomstopgørelsen uvedkommende. Se TfS 1996, 256 LSR.
 Partrederier er en særlig virksomhedstype, som kun kan anvendes af flere personer, der ejer et skib i fællesskab. Reglerne om partrederier findes i sølovens §§ 101-108 og sølovens kapitel 2 om registrering i Skibsregistret. (Lov om erhvervsdrivende virksomheder gælder ikke for partrederier).
 Deltagere i partrederier, partredere, hæfter ikke solidarisk, men pro rata, dvs. i forhold til deres ejerandel. Partrederiets kreditorer har derfor ikke nogen selskabsformue at søge sig fyldestgjort i, men bliver særkreditorer hos hver enkelt partreder for dennes del af gælden.
 Partrederier er skattemæssigt transparente ligesom interessentskaber, og beskatningen foregår hos de enkelte partredere efter samme principper som for interessenter. Se dog nedenfor om den særlige situation, der opstår hvis partrederen påtager sig solidarisk hæftelse og betaler medpartrederens andel af udgifter.
 Praksis vedrørende partrederes fradrag
 Fradrag for tab og omkostninger på grund af en bestyrende reders besvigelse over for et partrederi kunne trækkes fra efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a. Landsskatteretten fandt, at tabet som følge af besvigelsen og advokatomkostningerne i den anledning kunne trækkes fra, fordi tabet var et udslag af en normal driftsrisiko ved partrederi. Landsskatteretten lagde vægt på, at de øvrige redere, kort tid efter mistanken om sammenblanding af den bestyrende reders privatøkonomi og partsrederiets økonomi, gennemgik regnskaberne og opdagede besvigelserne. Fordringen imod den bestyrende reder blev anset for at være uerholdelig. Se SKM2002.184.LSR.
 Hvis partrederen - selvom han hæfter pro rata - betaler medpartrederens gæld, kan udgiften som udgangspunkt kun trækkes fra, hvis partrederen er retligt forpligtet til dække udgiften.
 En partreder, der i almindelighed hæfter pro rata, havde påtaget sig solidarisk hæftelse for bankgælden, der stammede fra køb og drift af partrederiets fiskekutter. Højesteret fandt, at det tab, som partrederen i kraft af det solidariske ansvar led ved at indbetale for en af de andre partredere, var fradragsberettiget. Højesteret udtalte, at den omstændighed, at hæftelsen beroede på en aftale, ikke gav grundlag for at behandle tabet anderledes end et tilsvarende tab, som lides af en interessent i et interessentskab. Se TfS 1989, 506 HRD.
 En partreder havde frivilligt betalt medpartrederens del af gælden. De udgifter han havde dækket, var imidlertid betalinger til kreditorer, som han havde kunnet henvise til at søge fyldestgørelse efter reglerne om pro rata-hæftelse. Landsretten nægtede derfor partrederen fradragsret for beløbet, fordi han ikke var retligt forpligtet til at hæfte solidarisk. Se TfS 1991, 487 VLD.
 Se også TfS 1984, 152 VLD og TfS 1991, 476 TSS.
 Hvis partrederens betaling af den anden partreders gæld udløser et regreskrav mod denne, som må anses for tabt, vil forholdet evt. kunne være omfattet af KGL § 14 om fysiske personers tab på fordringer eller KGL § 3 om selskabers tab på fordringer. Se ovenfor under tab på regreskrav på medinteressenter.
 En interessent måtte indfri en kassekredit i kraft af den solidariske hæftelse.
 Tabet, som skyldtes, at to medinteressenter uberettiget havde hævet af interessentskabets midler, blev ikke anset for at være sket som led i driften af interessentskabet, men med det formål, at dække medinteressenternes privatforbrug. Højesteret bemærkede, at tab, der udspringer af, at interessenterne hæver penge til privatforbrug ved at trække checks på interessentskabets kassekreditkonti, falder uden for rammerne af en naturlig driftsrisiko ved erhvervskonti i interessentskabsform.
 TfS 1989, 506 HRD
 Fradrag godkendt. Partreder
 En partreder, der i almindelighed hæfter pro rata, havde påtaget sig solidarisk hæftelse for bankgælden, der stammede fra køb og drift af partrederiets fiskekutter.
 Højesteret fandt, at det tab, som partrederen i kraft af det solidariske ansvar led ved at indbetale for en af de andre partredere, var fradragsberettiget.
 Retten udtalte, at den omstændighed, at hæftelsen beroede på en aftale, ikke gav grundlag for at behandle tabet anderledes end et tilsvarende tab, som lides af en interessent i et interessentskab.
 UfR 1959, 69 HRD
 En skatteyder havde afholdt advokat- og revisorudgifter på grund af uoverensstemmelser med en medinteressent i forbindelse med opløsning af interessentskabet og overdragelse af aktiverne heri til et aktieselskab, som var ejet af interessenterne.
 Skatteyderen gjorde gældende, at udgifterne var afholdt for at sikre og vedligeholde hans indkomst som direktør og bestyrelsesmedlem i selskabet. Denne indkomst var langt større end aktieudbyttet.
 Ministeriet gjorde gældende, at udgiften primært var afholdt for at sikre skatteyderens formueinteresser, nemlig fordelingen af aktierne i det nystiftede selskab. Højesteret nægtede fradrag med den begrundelse, at udgiften måtte anses for at vedrøre formuen og kun indirekte havde betydning for skatteyderens indkomst.
 Retten lagde til grund, at skatteyderen havde deltaget i driften af en uregistreret virksomhed som en form for interessent.
 Der forelå ikke nogen fordelingsaftale, og retten fandt, at skatteyderen ikke havde ført bevis for, at han alene ejede en mindre del af virksomheden end de skønnede 50 pct., som skattemyndighederne havde lagt til grund.
 Dommen stadfæster SKM2013.396.BR.
 SKM2004.154.VLR
 Regreskrav. Fradrag nægtet.
 Skatteyderen havde ikke bevist, at han havde et krav mod en medinteressent, og havde derfor heller ikke bevist, at han havde lidt et fradragsberettiget tab.
 TfS 1999, 685 VLD
 Uberettiget hævning.
 A drev revisionsfirma med sin søn B. A led et tab, fordi B, ikke kunne indfri sin negative kapitalkonto. B havde hævet mere, end han havde krav på efter sin overskudsandel. A påstod, at B's hævninger var rimeligt begrundede i driftsresultaterne og arbejdsindsatsen, og at de derfor var et løbende led i indtægtserhvervelsen for interessentskabet. Landsretten fandt derimod, at B havde hævet mere, end han havde krav på, og at han på den måde havde fået et lån ved træk på kapitalkontoen. Dette lån var ikke et led i den løbende indkomsterhvervelse for interessentskabet. A's tab var derfor et formuetab, som ikke kunne trækkes fra efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a.
 En advokats tab som følge af en medinteressents uberettigede hævninger på kassekreditten. Retten anså ikke hævningerne som en naturlig driftsrisiko ved deltagelse i interessentskabet. Tabet var derfor ikke en fradragsberettiget driftsomkostning.
 TfS 1991, 487 VLD
 Fradrag nægtet. Partreder. Solidarisk hæftelse.
 En partreder havde frivilligt betalt medpartrederens del af gælden. De udgifter han havde dækket, var imidlertid betalinger til kreditorer, som han havde kunnet henvise til at søge fyldestgørelse efter reglerne om pro rata-hæftelse. Landsretten nægtede derfor partrederen fradragsret for beløbet, fordi han ikke var retligt forpligtet til at hæfte solidarisk.
 TfS 1987, 316 VLD
 En interessent overtog i forbindelse med interessentskabets opløsning medinteressentens personlige firma.
 Retten fandt, at overtagelsen ikke var nødvendig for at sikre fortsættelsen af interessentens eget personlige firma. Derfor kunne en eftergivelse af et tilgodehavende, der opstod som led i handelen, hverken trækkes fra som driftsomkostning eller som driftstab.
 TfS 1984, 152 VLD
 (Skd. 1984.71.713)
 Fradrag nægtet. Partreder.
 En partreder indfriede 3 insolvente partrederes gæld til et skibsværft.
 Landsretten lagde til grund, at dette var sket for at få skibet frigivet til salg, og at partrederen betalte gælden, fordi han ønskede at udtræde af rederiet på grund af det løbende driftsunderskud.
 Tabet havde derfor ikke en sådan forbindelse med den løbende drift, at det kunne trækkes fra efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a, eller dennes analogi.
 Tabet kunne heller ikke påvirke opgørelsen af fortjenesten ved salg af skibet som en handelsomkostning.
 Skd. 1984.68.38
 Fradrag godkendt.
 En skatteyder, der drev en byggevirksomhed med en medinteressent, måtte i forbindelse med virksomhedens ophør betale samtlige interessentskabets kreditorer. Landsretten fandt, at interessentskabets underskud var opstået løbende ved, at der var blevet afholdt udgifter, som havde været nødvendige for interessentskabets drift. Skatteyderen kunne derfor trække tabet fra ved sin indkomstopgørelse.
 Skd. 1983.67.402
 Fradrag godkendt
 En dyrlæge og en landmand forpagtede i fællesskab tre landbrugsejendomme. Det blev anerkendt, at parterne (interessenterne) ved den indbyrdes fordeling kunne forøge driftsunderskuddet med arbejdsvederlag og forrentning af kapitalindeståendet, fordi fordelingen af disse poster var sagligt begrundet, og der ikke forelå omgåelseshensigt.
 Fradrag blev godkendt
 for tab og omkostninger som følge af en bestyrende reders besvigelse over for et partrederi. Landsskatteretten fandt, at tabet som følge af besvigelsen samt advokatomkostninger i den forbindelse kunne trækkes fra, fordi tabet var et udslag af en normal driftsrisiko ved partrederi. Landsskatteretten lagde vægt på, at de øvrige redere kort tid efter mistanken om sammenblanding af den bestyrende reders privatøkonomi og partrederiets økonomi gennemgik regnskaberne og opdagede besvigelserne. Fordringen imod den bestyrende reder måtte anses for at være uerholdelig.
 Fradrag nægtet. Ikke driftsomkostning.
 Tilbagebetaling af et formidlingshonorar, der var modtaget fra de øvrige interessenter som betaling for formidling af deltagelse i et leasingarrangement (10-mandsprojekt), var ikke fradragsberettiget efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a.
 Landsskatteretten fandt, at skatteyderens tilbagebetaling af interessenternes indbetalinger til interessentskabet ikke kunne anses for at være udslag af en almindelig driftsrisiko, og at afholdelsen af udgiften således ikke havde en naturlig, driftsmæssig begrundelse.
 Landsskatteretten lagde særlig vægt på, at leasingarrangementet var et typisk 10-mandsprojekt, der ifølge praksis ikke godkendes i skattemæssig henseende.
 Det var videre Landsskatterettens opfattelse, at skatteyderen ikke havde en aktuel, driftsmæssig begrundelse for at afholde udgiften i 1998, idet der på dette tidspunkt ikke forelå nogen drift af en erhvervsmæssig virksomhed, som udgiften kunne relateres til.
 TfS 1996, 256 LSR
 I forbindelse med, at en interessent udtrådte af et interessentskab, blev der konstateret et tab, selvom interessentskabet havde haft overskud. Tabet skyldtes, at den udtrædende interessent havde foretaget så store hævninger i selskabet, at han ved sin udtræden ikke var i stand til at betale den del af gælden, der ifølge parternes aftale påhvilede ham.
 På grund af den solidariske hæftelse led en anden interessent derfor et tab. Landsskatteretten fandt, at tabet ikke var tab på en fordring, der havde tilknytning til driften af interessentskabet, men et formuetab, der var indkomsten uvedkommende.
 LSRM 1982, 82 LSR
 En arkitekt drev erhvervsmæssig udstykningsvirksomhed sammen med en murermester. Murermesteren, der også drev selvstændig murermestervirksomhed, kom i økonomiske vanskeligheder, og det daværende toldvæsen gjorde udlæg i hans anpart i interessentskabet.
 For at undgå, at udstykningsvirksomheden måtte standse med tab, var arkitekten gået med til, at interessentskabet optog lån og betalte gælden til toldvæsenet.
 Da murermesteren døde, overtog arkitekten hele virksomheden og trak det tab fra, han ikke kunne få dækket i boet. Han gjorde gældende, at han havde været tvunget til at indfri gælden for at undgå større tab ved, at virksomheden standsede.
 Landsskatteretten fandt, at der var en sådan fornøden forbindelse mellem den tabsgivende disposition og arkitektens løbende indtægtserhvervelse, han kunne trække tabet fra.
 LSRM 1981, 205 LSR
 Landsretten fandt, at klagerens tab vedrørende medejerens underskudsandel var et fradragsberettiget driftstab efter SL § 6, stk. 1, litra a, fordi underskuddet havde forbindelse med interessentskabets drift, og klageren havde hæftet solidarisk for medejerens underskudsandel.
 LSRM 1974, 155 LSR
 Ved afviklingen af et interessentskab havde en grosserer fratrukket et beløb, der var betalt til dækning af medinteressentens underskud. Da driftsresultatet i tidligere år havde været fordelt ligeligt, fandt landsskatteretten ikke grundlag for at godkende skævdelingen af driftsresultatet.
 LSRM 1971, 38 LSR
 To parter i et interessentskab indgik, efter flere år med underskud i interessentskabet, en tillægsaftale om at den ene interessent ville dække medinteressentens del af driftsunderskuddet for at undgå at ophæve interessentskabet pga. insolvens. Interessentskabets underskud blev i de følgende år fuldt ud dækket af interessenten, som foretog fradrag for sin egen og for medinteressentens andel af underskuddet. Landsskatteretten var enig med Skatterådet i, at interessenten ikke kunne fratrække mere end halvdelen af underskuddet, fordi de dækkede underskud måtte betragtes som lån til medinteressenten, og i, at disse lån ikke kunne anses for at være endeligt tabt.
 LSRM 1956, 28 LSR
 En skatteyder, der havde drevet virksomhed med to medinteressenter, havde fratrukket et tab, der var opstået ved, at en medinteressent havde hævet mere end det, han kunne efter sin andel i virksomheden. Virksomhedens regnskab viste, at medinteressentens underskudssaldo udelukkende skyldtes overtræk til privatforbrug. Tabet måtte betragtes som et lån til den pågældende medinteressent uden forbindelse med virksomhedens drift, og var derfor ikke fradragsberettiget.
 TfS 1991, 476 TSS
 Fradrag nægtet. Solidarisk hæftelse.
 Et partrederi bad om bindende forhåndsbesked om, hvorvidt et tab på en partreders manglende overholdelse af sin indbetalingsforpligtelse kunne trækkes fra af de øvrige partredere - uden at partrederiet var ophørt.
 Ligningsrådet udtalte, at der kun blev tilført rederiet driftskapital fra de øvrige partredere som følge af manglende likviditet på grund af en partreders manglende betalingsevne.
 Dette tab vedrørte partredernes økonomiske mellemværende i relation til indkomstkilden og var derfor ikke fradragsberettiget i den skattepligtige indkomst.
 Partrederiet havde købt et skib, og købesummen fordeltes på 100 anparter, så der skulle indbetales 20 % kontant i forhold til andelene i skibet. Hvis der opstod et behov for yderligere likvide midler, skulle der indbetales det nødvendige beløb - ligeledes i forhold til anparterne.
 Partrederiet optog lån i Danmarks Skibskreditfond og partrederne, der ellers hæfter pro rata, hæftede solidarisk for dette lån. Hvis driften af skibet gav underskud, skulle der indbetales yderligere beløb, bl.a. til betaling af renter og afdrag til Danmarks Skibskreditfond.
 Ligningsrådet udtalte, at et tab som følge af denne hæftelse først ville kunne konstateres endeligt, når partrederiet ophørte, og det ved konkurs, inkasso eller på lignende måde var konstateret, at regreskravet mod en solidarisk hæftende partreder var værdiløst.
 Hvis det i den forbindelse kunne konstateres, at partrederiets underskud var opstået løbende ved at der var afholdt af udgifter, der var nødvendige for driften, ville de øvrige partredere på dette tidspunkt kunne trække det lidte tab fra som et driftstab.
 Bindende forhåndsbesked.


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 23.3.2013
 FI
 Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti
 C 86/16
 Unionin yleisen tuomioistuimen määräys 29.1.2013 — Unindustria ym. v. komissio
 (Asia T-273/00) (1)
 (Kumoamiskanne - Valtiontuki - Venetsian ja Chioggian alueille sijoittautuneiden yritysten sosiaalikulujen alentaminen - Päätös, jolla tukijärjestelmä todetaan yhteismarkkinoille soveltumattomaksi ja jolla maksettu tuki määrätään perittäväksi takaisin - Kanne, joka on selvästi täysin perusteeton)
 2013/C 86/25
 Oikeudenkäyntikieli: italia
 Asianosaiset
 Kantajat: Unione degli industriali della provincia di Venezia (Unindustria) (Venetsia, Italia), Comitato ”Venezia vuole vivere” (Venetsia), Siram SpA (Milano, Italia), Fiorital Srl (Venetsia), Jesurum di M. e A. Levi Morenos Sas (Venetsia), Grafiche Veneziane Srl (Venetsia), Cantiere navale De Poli SpA (Pellestrina, Italia), Aive Srl (Marcon, Italia), Bortoli Ettore Srl (Venetsia), Tessuti Artistici Fortuny SpA (Venetsia), Lorenzo Rubelli SpA (Venetsia), Tecnomare SpA (Venetsia) ja Arsenale Venezia SpA (Venetsia) (edustajat: asianajajat A. Vianello, M. Merola ja A. Sodano)
 Vastaaja: Euroopan komissio (asiamies: V. Di Bucci, avustajanaan asianajaja A. Dal Ferro)
 Väliintulija, joka tukee kantajien vaatimuksia: Italian tasavalta (asiamiehet: aluksi U. Leanza, sitten I. Braguglia, sitten R. Adam ja lopuksi I. Bruni, avustajinaan avvocato dello Stato G. Aiello ja avvocato dello Stato P. Gentili)
 Oikeudenkäynnin kohde
 Sosiaaliturvamaksujen alentamista koskevien lakien nro 30/1997 ja nro 206/1995 mukaisista Venetsian ja Chioggian alueella sijaitseviin yrityksiin kohdistuvista tukitoimenpiteistä 25.11.1999 tehdyn komission päätöksen 2000/394/EY (JO 2000, L 150, s. 50) kumoamista koskeva kanne
 Määräysosa
 1)
 Euroopan komission esittämä oikeudenkäyntiväite käsitellään pääasian yhteydessä.
 2)
 Kanne hylätään selvästi täysin perusteettomana.
 3)
 Unione degli industriali della provincia di Venezia (Unindustria), Comitato ”Venezia vuole vivere”, Siram SpA, Fiorital Srl, Jesurum di M. e A. Levi Morenos Sas, Grafiche Veneziane Srl, Cantiere navale De Poli SpA, Aive Srl, Bortoli Ettore Srl, Tessuti Artistici Fortuny SpA, Lorenzo Rubelli SpA, Tecnomare SpA ja Arsenale Venezia SpA vastaavat omista oikeudenkäyntikuluistaan, ja ne velvoitetaan korvaamaan komission oikeudenkäyntikulut.
 4)
 Italian tasavalta vastaa omista oikeudenkäyntikuluistaan.
 (1) EUVL C 355, 9.12.2000.


type: legislation

jurisdiction: US

text:
 110 HRES 626 IH: Censuring the President and the Attorney
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2007-08-03
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 IV
 110th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 H. RES. 626
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 August 4, 2007
 Mr. Hinchey (for
 himself, Ms. Baldwin,
 Mr. Capuano,
 Mr. Cohen,
 Mr. Davis of Illinois,
 Mr. Farr, Mr. Filner, Mr.
 Grijalva, Mr. Hall of New
 York, Mr. Honda,
 Ms. Kaptur,
 Mr. Kucinich,
 Ms. Lee, Mrs. Maloney of New York,
 Mr. Moran of Virginia,
 Mr. Pastor,
 Ms. Schakowsky,
 Ms. Watson,
 Ms. Shea-Porter, and
 Mr. Rothman) submitted the following
 resolution; which was referred to the
 Committee on the Judiciary
 RESOLUTION
 Censuring the President and the Attorney
 General.
 1.Basis for censure
 (a)National
 Security Agency wiretappingThe House of Representatives finds
 the following:
 (1)Congress passed
 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and
 in so doing provided the executive branch with clear authority to wiretap
 suspected terrorists inside the United States.
 (2)Section 201 of
 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 states that it and the
 criminal wiretap law are the exclusive means by which electronic
 surveillance may be conducted by the United States Government, and
 section 109 of that Act makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without
 complying with this statutory authority.
 (3)The Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 both permits the Government to initiate
 wiretapping immediately in emergencies as long as the Government obtains
 approval from the court established under section 103 of the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 72 hours of
 initiating the wiretap, and authorizes wiretaps without a court order otherwise
 required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the first 15
 days following a declaration of war by Congress.
 (4)The Authorization
 for Use of Military Force that became law on September 18, 2001 (Public Law
 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), did not grant the President the power to
 authorize wiretaps of Americans within the United States without obtaining the
 court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
 1978.
 (5)The President's
 inherent constitutional authority does not give him the power to violate the
 explicit statutory prohibition on warrantless wiretaps in the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
 (6)George W. Bush,
 President of the United States, authorized the National Security Agency to
 wiretap Americans within the United States without obtaining the court orders
 required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for more than 5
 years.
 (7)Alberto R.
 Gonzales, as Attorney General of the United States and as Counsel to the
 President, reviewed and defended the legality of the President’s authorization
 of wiretaps by the National Security Agency of Americans within the United
 States without the court orders required by the Foreign Intelligence
 Surveillance Act of 1978.
 (8)President George
 W. Bush repeatedly misled the public prior to the public disclosure of the
 National Security Agency warrantless surveillance program by indicating his
 Administration was relying on court orders to wiretap suspected terrorists
 inside the United States.
 (9)Alberto R.
 Gonzales misled Congress in January 2005 during the hearing on his nomination
 to be Attorney General of the United States by indicating that a question about
 whether the President has the authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps in
 violation of statutory prohibitions presented a hypothetical
 situation, even though he was fully aware that a warrantless
 wiretapping program had been ongoing for several years.
 (10)In statements
 about the supposed need for the National Security Agency warrantless
 surveillance program after the public disclosure of the program, President
 George W. Bush falsely implied that the program was necessary because the
 executive branch did not otherwise have authority to wiretap suspected
 terrorists inside the United States.
 (11)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales, despite his admitted awareness that congressional critics
 of the program support wiretapping terrorists in accordance with the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, attempted to create the opposite
 impression by making public statements such as [s]ome people will argue
 that nothing could justify the Government being able to intercept conversations
 like the ones the Program targets.
 (12)President George
 W. Bush inaccurately stated in his January 31, 2006, State of the Union address
 that [p]revious Presidents have used the same constitutional authority I
 have, and federal courts have approved the use of that authority., even
 though the Administration has failed to identify a single instance since the
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 became law in which another
 President has authorized wiretaps inside the United States without complying
 with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal court
 has evaluated whether the President has the inherent authority to authorize
 wiretaps inside the United States without complying with the Foreign
 Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
 (13)At a Senate
 Judiciary Committee hearing on February 6, 2006, Attorney General Alberto R.
 Gonzales defended the President’s misleading statements in the January 31,
 2006, State of the Union address.
 (14)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales has misled Congress and the American people repeatedly by
 stating that there was no serious disagreement among Government officials
 about or relate[d] to the National Security
 Agency program confirmed by the President.
 (15)According to
 testimony from former Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Alberto R. Gonzales,
 while serving as Counsel to the President, participated in a visit to
 then-Attorney General John Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of the hospital
 in an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to overturn the decision by Mr. Comey,
 then serving as Acting Attorney General due to Mr. Ashcroft’s illness, not to
 certify the legality of a classified intelligence program, in what Mr. Comey
 described as an effort to take advantage of a very sick
 man.
 (b)Detainee and
 torture policyThe House of Representatives finds the
 following:
 (1)The United States
 is a party to the Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and the
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 (2)Common Article 3
 of the Geneva Conventions requires that detainees in armed conflicts other than
 those between nations shall in all circumstances be treated
 humanely, and the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners
 of War provides additional protections for detainees who qualify as
 prisoners of war.
 (3)United States law
 criminalizes any act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
 mental pain or suffering under sections 2340 and 2340A of title 18,
 United States Code, and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and recognizes the
 gravity of such offenses by further providing for civil liability under the
 Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act.
 (4)In a draft
 memorandum dated January 25, 2002, Alberto R. Gonzales, in his capacity as
 Counsel to the President, argued that the protections of the Third Geneva
 Convention should not be afforded to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and
 described provisions of the Convention as quaint and
 obsolete.
 (5)The January 25,
 2002, memorandum by then-Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales cited
 reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution as a
 positive consequence of disavowing the Geneva Conventions’
 applicability, asserting that such a disavowal would provide a solid
 defense to any future prosecution in the event a prosecutor brought
 charges under the domestic War Crimes Act.
 (6)Secretary of
 State Colin Powell responded in a January 26, 2002, memorandum that such an
 attempt to evade the Geneva Conventions would reverse over a century of
 U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the
 protections of the rule of law for our troops.
 (7)Despite the
 warnings of the Secretary of State and in contravention of the language of the
 Third Geneva Convention, President George W. Bush announced on February 7,
 2002, that—
 (A)he did not
 consider the Convention to apply to al Qaeda fighters; and
 (B)Taliban detainees
 would not be entitled to prisoner of war status under the
 Convention, despite the fact that Article 5 of the Convention and United States
 Army regulations expressly require such determinations to be made by a
 competent tribunal.
 (8)The Supreme
 Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
 Conventions applies to Taliban forces and al Qaeda forces, and characterized a
 central legal premise by which the President sought to avoid the obligations of
 international law as erroneous.
 (9)Alberto R.
 Gonzales, acting as Counsel to the President, solicited and accepted the August
 1, 2002, Office of Legal Counsel memorandum entitled Standards of
 Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, which took the
 untenable position that mere infliction of pain is not
 torture unless the victim ... experiences intense pain or
 suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated
 with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent
 damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely
 result..
 (10)According to the
 Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee
 Interrogation Techniques (the Church Report), issued on
 March 7, 2005, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002,
 authorized the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh interrogation
 techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual, including stress positions,
 hooding, the use of military dogs to exploit phobias, prolonged isolation,
 sensory deprivation, and forcing Muslim men to shave their beards.
 (11)According to the
 Article 15–6 Investigation of CJSOTF–AP [Combined Joint Special
 Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula] and 5th SF [Special Forces] Group
 Detention Operation (Formica Report) and Department of Defense
 documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, Guantanamo Bay
 detainees were chained to the floor, subjected to loud music, fed only bread
 and water, and kept for some period of time in cells measuring 4 feet by 4 feet
 by 20 inches.
 (12)The March 2004
 investigative report of Major General Antonio Taguba documented
 sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses against detainees
 at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, including sexual and physical abuse, the
 threat of torture, the forcing of detainees to perform degrading acts designed
 to assault their religious identity, and the use of dogs to frighten
 detainees.
 (13)According to
 Department of Defense documents released under the Freedom of Information Act,
 the United States Armed Forces held certain Iraqis as ghost
 detainees, who were not accounted for and were hidden
 from the observation of the International Committee of the Red Cross
 (ICRC).
 (14)Military autopsy
 reports and death certificates released pursuant to the Freedom of Information
 Act revealed that at least 39 deaths, and probably more, have occurred among
 detainees in United States custody overseas, approximately half of which were
 homicides and 7 of which appear to have been caused by
 strangulation, “asphyxiation” or fatal blunt force
 injuries.
 (15)On September 6,
 2006, President George W. Bush stated that he had authorized the incommunicado
 detention of certain suspected terrorist leaders and operatives at secret sites
 outside the United States under a separate program operated by
 the Central Intelligence Agency.
 (16)President George
 W. Bush has authorized the indefinite detention, without charge or trial, of
 more than 700 individuals at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the ground that they
 are enemy combatants and therefore may be held until the
 cessation of hostilities under the laws of war.
 (17)Department of
 Justice lawyers, representing President George W. Bush and the Department of
 Defense in a Federal lawsuit brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took
 the unprecedented position that the term enemy combatant could
 in theory justify the indefinite detention of a little old lady in
 Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is [a] charity that helps
 orphans in Afghanistan but is really a front to finance al-Qaeda
 activities and a person who teaches English to the son of an al
 Qaeda member.
 (18)After the
 Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush rejected the claim that an
 alleged enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without
 any meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation, the Deputy Secretary
 of Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, creating Combatant Status
 Review Tribunals (CSRTs) for the stated purpose of review[ing]
 the detainee’s status as an enemy combatant.
 (19)Such
 Order—
 (A)did not allow
 detainees to be represented by counsel in Combatant Status Review Tribunal
 proceedings, but instead specified that a military officer would
 be assigned to assist[ ] each detainee and required such
 military officers to inform the detainees that I am neither a lawyer nor
 your advocate, and that [n]one of the information you provide me
 shall be held in confidence;
 (B)allowed the
 detainee to be excluded from attendance during review proceedings involving
 testimony or other matters that would compromise national security if
 held in the presence of the detainee;
 (C)allowed the
 decision-maker to rely on hearsay evidence and specified that [t]he
 Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would apply in a court
 of law; and
 (D)specified that
 there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s
 evidence.
 (20)The Government
 has relied on the above procedures to deprive individuals of their liberty for
 an indefinite period of time without a meaningful opportunity to confront and
 rebut the evidence on which that detention is predicated.
 (21)President George
 W. Bush and the Department of Defense designated at least 2 United States
 citizens as enemy combatants, claimed the right to detain them
 indefinitely on United States soil without charge and without access to
 counsel, and argued that allowing meaningful judicial review of their detention
 would be constitutionally intolerable.
 (22)The Supreme
 Court established in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that meaningful review by a neutral
 decisionmaker of the detention of United States citizens is constitutionally
 required, that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a citizen’s
 liberty ... is very real, and that the Constitution mandates that a
 United States citizen be given a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s
 enemy combatant designation.
 (23)The
 administration, having consistently claimed that according United States
 citizens designated as enemy combatants the due process
 protections accorded to criminal defendants in civilian courts would jeopardize
 national security interests of the utmost importance, elected to pursue
 criminal charges against alleged enemy combatant Jose Padilla in
 a civilian court after holding him in military custody for 3 years.
 (24)The
 administration, having contended that alleged enemy combatant
 and United States citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi was so dangerous that merely
 allowing him to meet with counsel jeopardizes compelling national
 security interests because he might pass concealed messages
 through unwitting intermediaries, released Mr. Hamdi from custody after
 3 years and allowed him to return to Saudi Arabia.
 (25)President George
 W. Bush issued Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention,
 Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
 Terrorism, which authorized the creation of military tribunals to try
 suspected al Qaeda members and other international terrorist suspects for
 violations of the law of war.
 (26)Alberto R.
 Gonzales, as Counsel to the President, in a November 30, 2001, newspaper
 editorial, defended these military tribunals and misleadingly represented that
 they would have adequate procedural safeguards, by stating: “Everyone tried
 before a military commission will know the charges against him, be represented
 by qualified counsel and be allowed to present a defense.”.
 (27)The military
 tribunals’ procedural rules as outlined in Military Commission Order No. 1,
 issued on March 21, 2002, and as subsequently amended—
 (A)permitted the
 accused and his civilian counsel to be excluded from any part of the proceeding
 that the presiding officer decided to close, and never learn what was presented
 during that portion of the proceeding;
 (B)permitted the
 introduction of any evidence that the presiding officer determined would have
 probative value to a reasonable person, thereby permitting the admission of
 hearsay and evidence obtained through undue coercion; and
 (C)restricted
 appellate review of the commissions to a panel appointed by the Secretary of
 Defense, followed by review by the Secretary of Defense and a final decision by
 the President, with no provision for direct appeal to the Federal courts for
 review by civilian judges.
 (28)Nearly 5 years
 after the military order was signed, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
 struck down the military commissions as unlawful, finding that—
 (A)the military
 commissions as constituted were not expressly authorized by any congressional
 act, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the Uniform Code of
 Military Justice (UCMJ), and the Detainee Treatment Act;
 (B)the military
 commission procedures violated the UCMJ, which mandates that rules governing
 military commissions be as similar to those governing courts-martial as
 practicable, and which affords the accused the right to be
 present;
 (C)the military
 commission procedures violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
 which is part of the law of war under UCMJ Article 21 and
 requires trial in a regularly constituted court affording all the
 judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
 peoples.
 (29)President George
 W. Bush sought to prevent the Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judicial
 review of their indefinite confinement by claiming that the writ of habeas
 corpus was categorically unavailable to non-citizens held at Guantanamo
 Bay.
 (30)The Supreme
 Court in Rasul v. Bush squarely rejected this claim, holding that the legal
 precedent on which the President relied plainly does not preclude the
 exercise of [statutory habeas] jurisdiction over the detainees’ claims,
 and that the general presumption against extraterritorial application of a
 statute, cited by the President, “certainly has no application” with respect to
 detainees at Guantanamo Bay where the United States exercises complete
 jurisdiction and control.
 (c)United States
 Attorney firings and executive privilegeThe House of
 Representatives finds the following:
 (1)At least 9 United
 States Attorneys were told in 2006 that they must step down under the authority
 of President George W. Bush, who had the final decision-making power in
 terminating the employment of United States Attorneys.
 (2)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales and subordinates under his supervision repeatedly misled
 Congress and attempted to block legitimate congressional oversight efforts
 concerning the firing of at least nine United States Attorneys.
 (3)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales repeatedly obscured the true scope of the firings,
 originally declining to cite a specific number of individuals fired in his
 testimony on January 18, 2007, acknowledging only seven in his USA Today op-ed
 published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging eight firings in his testimony on
 April 19, 2007, tacitly conceding there had been nine individuals fired in his
 testimony on May 10, 2007, and testifying on July 24, 2007, that there
 may have been others but he did not know the exact number.
 (4)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales initially characterized the firings as an overblown
 personnel matter, claiming that the United States Attorneys had lost
 his confidence and were fired for performance reasons when many
 of those same individuals had received only the highest performance reviews
 prior to their dismissal.
 (5)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales testified before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he
 would never, ever make a change in a United States attorney for
 political reasons, but in later testimony on April 19, 2007, and July
 24, 2007, admitted that he does not know who selected each individual United
 States Attorney for firing or why they were included on the list of United
 States Attorneys to be fired.
 (6)Prior to their
 selection for firing, both former New Mexico United States Attorney David
 Iglesias and former Washington United States Attorney John McKay received
 inappropriate phone calls from Members of Congress or their staffs regarding
 ongoing, politically sensitive investigations and the White House received
 complaints about the manner in which they were conducting those
 investigations.
 (7)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales testified before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he
 would not fire a United States Attorney if it would in any way
 jeopardize an ongoing serious investigation, but later testified, as
 did his subordinates, that concerns about whether ongoing investigations would
 be jeopardized were not explored prior to the firings and were specifically
 ignored when some fired United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their
 departure dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing investigations.
 (8)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on March 13, 2007, that he was not
 involved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any discussions about what
 was going on regarding the process leading up to the firing of the
 United States Attorneys, but later testimony from his subordinates and
 documents released by the Department of Justice indicate that the Attorney
 General was, in fact, regularly briefed on the process and did receive at least
 one memo in November 2005 regarding the planned firings.
 (9)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales publicly stated on May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney
 General Paul McNulty’s participation in the firing of the United States
 Attorneys was of central importance to the validity of the process and to the
 Attorney General’s decision to fire the specific individuals, but he had
 previously testified on April 19, 2007, that he did not discuss the process
 with Mr. McNulty prior to firing the United States Attorneys, and that
 looking back ... I would have had the deputy attorney general more
 involved, directly involved.
 (10)Attorney General
 Alberto R. Gonzales testified on May 10, 2007, that, after the start of the
 congressional investigation into the firings, he had refrained from discussing
 the firings with anyone involved because he did not want to interfere with the
 ongoing investigations, but former White House Liaison for the Department of
 Justice, Monica Goodling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney General
 spoke with her in late March of 2007 and laid out ... his general
 recollection ... of some of the process regarding the replacement of the United
 States Attorneys.
 (11)Former White
 House Liaison for the Department of Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified on
 May 23, 2007, that she did not respond to what Attorney General Alberto R.
 Gonzales said about his recollection because I did not know if it was
 appropriate for us to both be discussing our recollections of what had
 happened, and I just thought maybe we shouldn't have that
 conversation.
 (12)President George
 W. Bush has consistently stonewalled congressional attempts at oversight by
 refusing to turn over White House documents relating to the firing of at least
 9 United States Attorneys and refusing to allow current or former White House
 officials to testify before Congress on this matter, based on an excessively
 broad and legally insufficient assertion of executive privilege.
 (13)President George
 W. Bush has asserted executive privilege in refusing even to turn over
 correspondence between non-Executive Branch officials and White House officials
 concerning the firings of at least 9 United States Attorneys, even though such
 communications could not reasonably be classified as falling within the
 privilege.
 (14)President George
 W. Bush has directed at least two staff members, former and current, to ignore
 congressional subpoenas altogether, ordering former Counsel to the President
 Harriet Miers and current Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to the
 President Karl Rove not to appear at Congressional oversight hearings based on
 the assertion that immediate presidential advisors are immune from
 compelled Congressional testimony about matters that arose during [their]
 tenure, rather than simply instructing them to refrain from answering
 questions that might be covered by a proper assertion of executive
 privilege.
 (15)President George
 W. Bush has refused to work to find a compromise with Congress or otherwise
 accommodate legitimate congressional oversight efforts, disregarding the proper
 relationship between the executive and legislative branches and demonstrating a
 belief that he and his Administration are above oversight and the rule of
 law.
 (d)Misleading
 statements on the USA Patriot ActThe House of Representatives
 finds the following:
 (1)President George
 W. Bush made misleading claims during the course of the Administration’s 2005
 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, by suggesting that Federal
 officials did not have access to the same tools to investigate terrorism as
 they did to investigate other crimes.
 (2)In 2005 the
 Federal Bureau of Investigation transmitted to Attorney General Alberto R.
 Gonzales multiple reports of violations of law in connection with provisions of
 the USA PATRIOT Act and related authorities, including unauthorized
 surveillance and improper collection of communications data that were serious
 enough to require notification of the President’s Intelligence Oversight
 Board.
 (3)Despite these
 reports, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales told Congress and the American
 people in the course of the Administration’s 2005 campaign to reauthorize the
 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 that [t]he track record established over the
 past three years has demonstrated the effectiveness of the safeguards of civil
 liberties put in place when the Act was passed, that [t]here has
 not been one verified case of civil liberties abuse, and that no
 one has provided me with evidence that the Patriot Act is being abused or
 misused.
 (4)The United States
 Department of Justice sent a 10-page letter to Congress dated November 23,
 2005—
 (A)stating that a
 November 6, 2005, Washington Post story detailing the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation’s use of National Security Letters was a materially
 misleading portrayal full of distortions and factual
 errors;
 (B)defending its use
 of National Security Letters by pointing to the Department’s robust
 mechanisms for checking misuse, “significant internal oversight and
 checks,” and reports to Congress regarding the number of National Security
 Letters issued; and
 (C)stating that the
 November 6, 2005, Washington Post story was inaccurate in stating that
 The FBI now issues more than 30,000 National Security Letters a year, ...
 a hundredfold increase over historic norms..
 (5)On March 9, 2007,
 the Inspector General for the United States Department of Justice issued a
 report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of National Security
 Letters from 2003 through 2005—
 (A)that the
 Inspector General said found widespread and serious misuse of the FBI’s
 national security letter authorities that in many instances ...
 violated NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, or the FBI’s own internal
 policies, and found that the FBI did not provide adequate
 guidance, adequate controls, or adequate training on the use of these sensitive
 authorities; and
 (B)that indicated
 the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued approximately 39,000 National
 Security Letter requests in 2003, 56,000 National Security Letter requests in
 2004, and 47,000 National Security Letter requests in 2005.
 (6)The United States
 Department of Justice sent a letter on March 9, 2007, to Congress, admitting
 that it had determined that certain statements in our November 23, 2005
 letter need clarification in light of the Inspector General’s findings
 and that the reports [The Department of Justice] provided Congress in
 response to statutory reporting requirements did not accurately reflect the
 FBI’s use of NSLs.
 (e)Signing
 statementsThe House of Representatives finds the
 following:
 (1)President George
 W. Bush has lodged more than 800 challenges to duly enacted provisions of law
 by issuing signing statements that indicate that the President does not believe
 he must comply with such provisions of law.
 (2)Such signing
 statements effectively assign to the executive branch alone the decision
 whether to fully comply with the laws that Congress has passed.
 (3)On December 30,
 2005, President George W. Bush signed the Department of Defense Emergency
 Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
 Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, title X of which prohibits the Government from
 subjecting any individual in the custody or under the physical control
 of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical
 location to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
 punishment.
 (4)President George
 W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he
 did not have to comply with the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and
 degrading treatment, stating: “The executive branch shall construe Title X in
 Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the
 constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
 branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
 limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared
 objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of
 protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.”.
 (5)On March 9, 2006,
 President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
 Act of 2005, which requires that the executive branch furnish reports to
 Congress on certain surveillance activities.
 (6)President George
 W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he
 did not have to comply fully with these reporting requirements, stating: “The
 executive branch shall construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for
 furnishing information to entities outside the executive branch, such as
 sections 106A and 119, in a manner consistent with the President's
 constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to
 withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations,
 national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the
 performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.”.
 (7)On December 20,
 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement
 Act, which protects certain classes of sealed domestic mail from being opened
 except in specifically defined circumstances.
 (8)President George
 W. Bush issued a signing statement to such Act that suggested he believed he
 did not have to comply with this provision, stating: “The executive branch
 shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by subsection 1010(e)
 of the Act, which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise
 sealed against inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent
 permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such
 as to protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need
 for physical searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence
 collection.”
 (9)The American Bar
 Association Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of
 Powers Doctrine concluded that President George W. Bush’s misuse of signing
 statements weaken[s] our cherished system of checks and balances and
 separation of powers.
 2.Censure by the
 House of RepresentativesThe
 House of Representatives censures George W. Bush, President of the United
 States, and Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, and
 condemns their lengthy record of—
 (1)undermining the
 rule of law and the separation of powers;
 (2)disregarding
 statutes, treaties ratified by the United States, and the Constitution;
 and
 (3)repeatedly
 misleading the American people.