type: legislation

jurisdiction: EU

text:
 11.12.2018
 SL
 Uradni list Evropske unije
 L 314/1
 IZVEDBENA UREDBA SVETA (EU) 2018/1931
 z dne 10. decembra 2018
 o izvajanju člena 9 Uredbe (ES) št. 1183/2005 o uvedbi določenih posebnih omejevalnih ukrepov za osebe, ki kršijo embargo na orožje glede Demokratične republike Kongo
 SVET EVROPSKE UNIJE JE –
 ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
 ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1183/2005 z dne 18. julija 2005 o uvedbi določenih posebnih omejevalnih ukrepov za osebe, ki kršijo embargo na orožje glede Demokratične republike Kongo (1), ter zlasti člena 9 Uredbe,
 ob upoštevanju predloga visokega predstavnika Unije za zunanje zadeve in varnostno politiko,
 ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
 (1)
 Svet je 18. julija 2005 sprejel Uredbo (ES) št. 1183/2005.
 (2)
 Po pregledu avtonomnih omejevalnih ukrepov, določenih v členu 2b Uredbe (ES) št. 1183/2005, bi bilo treba spremeniti utemeljitev za osem oseb na seznamu iz Priloge Ia k Uredbi (ES) št. 1183/2005. Poleg tega bi bilo treba posodobiti informacije o vseh osebah na seznamu iz navedene priloge.
 (3)
 Prilogo Ia k Uredbi (ES) št. 1183/2005 bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti –
 SPREJEL NASLEDNJO UREDBO:
 Člen 1
 Seznam iz Priloge Ia k Uredbi (ES) št. 1183/2005 se nadomesti s seznamom iz Priloge k tej uredbi.
 Člen 2
 Ta uredba začne veljati dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
 Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah.
 V Bruslju, 10. decembra 2018
 Za Svet
 Predsednica
 F. MOGHERINI
 (1) UL L 193, 23.7.2005, str. 1.
 PRILOGA
 „PRILOGA Ia
 SEZNAM OSEB, SUBJEKTOV IN ORGANOV IZ ČLENA 2b
 A. Osebe
 Ime
 Informacije za ugotavljanje istovetnosti
 Razlog za uvrstitev na seznam
 Datum uvrstitve na seznam
 1.
 Ilunga Kampete
 tudi Gaston Hughes Ilunga Kampete; tudi Hugues Raston Ilunga Kampete.
 Datum rojstva: 24.11.1964.
 Kraj rojstva: Lubumbaši (DR Kongo).
 Številka vojaške osebne izkaznice: 1-64-86-22311-29.
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 69, avenue Nyangwile, Kinsuka Mimosas, Kinshasa/Ngaliema, RDC.
 Kot poveljnik republikanske garde (GR) je bil Ilunga Kampete odgovoren za enote GR, nameščene na terenu, in sodeloval pri nesorazmerni uporabi sile in nasilni represiji septembra 2016 v Kinšasi. V tej funkciji je Ilunga Kampete torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju in izvajanju dejanj, ki pomenijo hude kršitve človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 12.12.2016
 2.
 Gabriel Amisi Kumba
 tudi Gabriel Amisi Nkumba; „Tango Fort“; „Tango Four“.
 Datum rojstva: 28.5.1964.
 Kraj rojstva: Malela (DR Kongo).
 Številka vojaške osebne izkaznice:
 1-64-87-77512-30. Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 22, avenue Mbenseke, Ma Campagne, Kinshasa/Ngaliema, RDC.
 Bivši poveljnik 1. obrambnega območja kongovske vojske (FARDC), katere sile so bile udeležene pri nesorazmerni uporabi sile in nasilni represiji septembra 2016 v Kinšasi. V tej funkciji je Gabriel Amisi Kumba torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju in izvajanju dejanj, ki pomenijo hude kršitve človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 Julija 2018 je bil Gabriel Amisi Kumba imenovan za namestnika načelnika štaba kongovskih oboroženih sil (FARDC), odgovoren za operacije in obveščevalne dejavnosti.
 12.12.2016
 3.
 Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo
 Datum rojstva: 8.3.1973.
 Kraj rojstva: Lubumbaši (DR Kongo).
 Št. potnega lista: OB0260335
 (veljavnost od 15.4.2011 do 14.4.2016).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 2, avenue des Orangers, Kinshasa/Gombe, RDC.
 Kot poveljnik protiizgredne enote Légion Nationale d'Intervention kongovske nacionalne policije je bil Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo odgovoren za nesorazmerno uporabo sile in nasilno represijo septembra 2016 v Kinšasi. V tej funkciji je Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju in izvajanju dejanj, ki pomenijo hude kršitve človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 Julija 2017 je bil Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo imenovan za poveljnika enote kongovske nacionalne policije, ki je odgovorna za varovanje institucij in visokih uradnikov.
 12.12.2016
 4.
 Celestin Kanyama
 tudi Kanyama Tshisiku Celestin; Kanyama Celestin Cishiku Antoine; Kanyama Cishiku Bilolo Célestin;
 Esprit de mort.
 Datum rojstva: 4.10.1960.
 Kraj rojstva: Kananga (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Št. potnega lista: OB0637580
 (veljavnost od 20.5.2014 do 19.5.2019).
 Imetnik schengenskega vizuma št. 011518403, izdanega 2.7.2016.
 Naslov: 56, avenue Usika, Kinshasa/Gombe, RDC.
 Kot komisar kongovske nacionalne policije (PNC) je bil Celestin Kanyama odgovoren za nesorazmerno uporabo sile in nasilno represijo septembra 2016 v Kinšasi. V tej funkciji je Celestin Kanyama torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju in izvajanju dejanj, ki pomenijo hude kršitve človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 Celestin Kanyama je bil julija 2017 imenovan za generalnega direktorja šol za usposabljanje nacionalne policije.
 12.12.2016
 5.
 John Numbi
 tudi John Numbi Banza Tambo; John Numbi Banza Ntambo; Tambo Numbi.
 Datum rojstva: 16.8.1962.
 Kraj rojstva: Jadotville-Likasi-Kolwezi (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 5, avenue Oranger, Kinshasa/Gombe, RDC.
 Nekdanji generalni inšpektor kongovske nacionalne policije, John Numbi, je sodeloval zlasti v kampanji nasilnega ustrahovanja v času guvernerskih volitev v štirih nekdanjih provincah Katanga marca 2016 ter je kot tak odgovoren za oviranje sporazumne in miroljubne rešitve, ki bi omogočila izvedbo volitev v DR Kongo. John Numbi je bil julija 2018 imenovan za generalnega inšpektorja kongovskih oboroženih sil (FARDC).
 12.12.2016
 6.
 Roger Kibelisa
 tudi Roger Kibelisa Ngambaswi.
 Datum rojstva: 9.9.1959.
 Kraj rojstva: Fayala (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 24, avenue Photopao, Kinshasa/Mont Ngafula, RDC.
 Kot direktor za notranje zadeve v nacionalni obveščevalni službi (ANR) Roger Kibelisa sodeluje v kampanji nasilnega ustrahovanja, ki jo izvajajo pripadniki nacionalne obveščevalne službe proti članom opozicije, vključno s samovoljnimi aretacijami in zadržanji. Roger Kibelisa je torej spodkopal pravno državo in oviral sporazumno in miroljubno rešitev, ki bi omogočila izvedbo volitev v DR Kongo.
 12.12.2016
 7.
 Delphin Kaimbi
 tudi Delphin Kahimbi Kasagwe; Delphin Kayimbi Demba Kasangwe; Delphin Kahimbi Kasangwe; Delphin Kahimbi Demba Kasangwe; Delphin Kasagwe Kahimbi.
 Datum rojstva: 15.1.1969 (ali: 15.7.1969).
 Kraj rojstva: Kiniezire/Goma (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Diplomatski potni list št.: DB0006669 (veljavnost od 13.11.2013 do 12.11.2018).
 Naslov: 1, 14eme rue, Quartier Industriel, Linete, Kinshasa, RDC.
 Nekdanji vodja vojaške obveščevalne službe (ex-DEMIAP), dela nacionalnega operativnega centra, poveljniške in nadzorne strukture, ki je odgovorna za samovoljne aretacije in nasilno represijo septembra 2016 v Kinšasi, ter odgovoren za sile, ki so sodelovale pri ustrahovanju in samovoljnih aretacijah, s tem pa ovirale sporazumno in miroljubno rešitev, ki bi omogočila izvedbo volitev v DR Kongo. Delphin Kaimbi je bil julija 2018 imenovan za pomočnika načelnika štaba v okviru generalštaba FARDC in je odgovoren za obveščevalne dejavnosti.
 12.12.2016
 8.
 Evariste Boshab, nekdanji podpredsednik vlade in minister za notranje in varnostne zadeve
 tudi Evariste Boshab Mabub Ma Bileng.
 Datum rojstva: 12.1.1956.
 Kraj rojstva: Tete Kalamba (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Številka diplomatskega potnega lista: DP0000003 (veljavnost od 21.12.2015 do 20.12.2020).
 Veljavnost schengenskega vizuma potekla 5.1.2017.
 Naslov: 3, avenue du Rail, Kinshasa/Gombe, RDC.
 Evariste Boshab je bil med decembrom 2014 in decembrom 2016 kot podpredsednik vlade in minister za notranje in varnostne zadeve uradno odgovoren za policijske in varnostne službe ter usklajevanje dela guvernerjev provinc. V tej funkciji je bil odgovoren za aretacije aktivistov in pripadnikov opozicije, pa tudi za prekomerno uporabo sile, tudi med septembrom 2016 in decembrom 2016 v odziv na demonstracije v Kinšasi, ko so varnostne službe ubile ali poškodovale številne civiliste. Evariste Boshab je torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju ali storitvi dejanj, ki pomenijo hudo kršitev človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 29.5.2017
 9.
 Alex Kande Mupompa, nekdanji guverner province Osrednji Kasai
 tudi Alexandre Kande Mupomba; Kande-Mupompa.
 Datum rojstva: 23.9.1950.
 Kraj rojstva: Kananga (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: Državljan DR Kongo in Belgije.
 Številka potnega lista DR Kongo: OP0024910 (veljavnost od 21.3.2016 do 20.3.2021).
 Naslova:
 Messidorlaan 217/25, 1180 Uccle, Belgija.
 1, avenue Bumba, Kinshasa/ Ngaliema, RDC.
 Alex Kande Mupompa je bil kot guverner province Osrednji Kasai do oktobra 2017 odgovoren za prekomerno uporabo sile, nasilno represijo in izvensodne usmrtitve, ki so jih v tej provinci od avgusta 2016 zagrešile varnostne sile in kongovska nacionalna policija, vključno z uboji na ozemlju Dibaye februarja 2017.
 Alex Kande Mupompa je torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju ali storitvi dejanj, ki pomenijo hudo kršitev človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 29.5.2017
 10.
 Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda, nekdanji guverner province Haut Katanga (Zgornja Katanga)
 Datum rojstva: 17.5.1963.
 Kraj rojstva: Kashobwe (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 7891, avenue Lubembe, Quartier Lido, Lubumbashi, Haut-Katanga, RDC.
 Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda je bil kot guverner province Haut Katanga (funkcijo je opravljal do aprila 2017) odgovoren za prekomerno uporabo sile in nasilno represijo v tej provinci, ki so jo izvajale varnostne sile in kongovska nacionalna policija, tudi med 15. in 31. decembrom 2016, ko so se varnostne sile, vključno z agenti PNC, z uporabo smrtonosne sile odzvale na proteste v Lubumbashiju ter pri tem ubile 12 in ranili 64 civilistov.
 Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda je torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju ali storitvi dejanj, ki pomenijo hudo kršitev človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 29.5.2017
 11.
 Lambert Mende, minister za komunikacijo in medije ter predstavnik vlade za javnost
 tudi Lambert Mende Omalanga.
 Datum rojstva: 11.2.1953.
 Kraj rojstva: Okolo (DR Kongo).
 Številka diplomatskega potnega lista: DB0001939 (veljavnost od 4.5.2017 do 3.5.2022).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 20, avenue Kalongo, Kinshasa/Ngaliema, RDC.
 Lambert Mende je od leta 2008 minister za komunikacije in v tej funkciji odgovoren za uporabo represivne medijske politike, ki krši pravico do svobode izražanja in obveščanja ter spodkopava sporazumno in mirno rešitev v smeri volitev v DR Kongo. Odlok, ki ga je sprejel 12. novembra 2016, tujim medijskim hišam omejuje oddajanje iz DR Kongo.
 V nasprotju s političnim dogovorom, sklenjenim 31. decembra 2016 med predsedniško večino in opozicijskimi strankami, številne medijske hiše oktobra 2018 še vedno niso začele ponovno oddajati.
 Lambert Mende je v funkciji ministra za komunikacije in medije tako odgovoren za oviranje sporazumne in mirne rešitve v smeri volitev v DR Kongo, tudi z represijo.
 29.5.2017
 12.
 Brigadni general Eric Ruhorimbere, namestnik poveljnika 21. vojaškega okrožja (Mbuji-Mayi)
 tudi Eric Ruhorimbere Ruhanga; Tango Two; Tango Deux.
 Datum rojstva: 16.7.1969.
 Kraj rojstva: Minembwe (DR Kongo).
 Številka vojaške osebne izkaznice: 1-69-09-51400-64.
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Številka potnega lista DR Kongo: OB0814241.
 Naslov: Mbujimayi, Kasai Province, RDC.
 Eric Ruhorimbere je kot namestnik poveljnika 21. vojaškega okrožja od septembra 2014 do julija 2018 odgovoren za prekomerno uporabo sile in izvensodne usmrtitve, predvsem pripadnikov milice Nsapu ter žensk in otrok, ki jih izvajajo sile FARDC.
 Eric Ruhorimbere je torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju ali storitvi dejanj, ki pomenijo hudo kršitev človekovih pravic v DR Kongo. Eric Ruhorimbere je bil julija 2018 imenovan za poveljnika operativnega sektorja „Nord Equateur“.
 29.5.2017
 13.
 Ramazani Shadari, nekdanji podpredsednik vlade in minister za notranje in varnostne zadeve
 tudi Emmanuel Ramazani Shadari Mulanda; Shadary.
 Datum rojstva: 29.11.1960.
 Kraj rojstva: Kasongo (DR Kongo).
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Naslov: 28, avenue Ntela, Mont Ngafula, Kinshasa, RDC.
 Ramazani Shadari je bil do februarja 2018 kot podpredsednik vlade in minister za notranje in varnostne zadeve uradno odgovoren za policijske in varnostne službe ter usklajevanje dela guvernerjev provinc. V tej funkciji je bil odgovoren za aretacije aktivistov in članov opozicije, pa tudi za prekomerno uporabo sile, kot se kaže v nasilnem zatrtju pripadnikov gibanja Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) v osrednjem Kongu, za represijo januarja in februarja 2017 v Kinšasi ter prekomerno uporabo sile in nasilne represije v provincah Kasai.
 V tej funkciji je Ramazani Shadari torej sodeloval pri načrtovanju, vodenju ali storitvi dejanj, ki pomenijo hudo kršitev človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 Ramazani Shadari je bil februarja 2018 imenovan za stalnega sekretarja Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et le développement (PPRD).
 29.5.2017
 14.
 Kalev Mutondo, vodja (uradno generalni sekretar) nacionalne obveščevalne službe (ANR)
 tudi Kalev Katanga Mutondo, Kalev Motono, Kalev Mutundo, Kalev Mutoid, Kalev Mutombo, Kalev Mutond, Kalev Mutondo Katanga, Kalev Mutund.
 Datum rojstva: 3.3.1957.
 Državljanstvo: DR Kongo.
 Številka potnega lista: DB0004470 (izdan: 8.6.2012 – iztek veljavnosti: 7.6.2017).
 Naslov: 24, avenue Ma Campagne, Kinshasa, RDC.
 Kalev Mutondo je kot vodja nacionalne obveščevalne službe (ANR) z dolgoročnim mandatom vpleten v in odgovoren za samovoljne aretacije in pridržanja pripadnikov opozicije, aktivistov civilne družbe in drugih, pa tudi slabo ravnanje z njimi. Iz tega sledi, da krši načelo pravne države in ovira sporazumno in miroljubno rešitev za izvedbo volitev v DR Kongo, sodeluje pa tudi pri načrtovanju ali vodenju dejanj, ki pomenijo hude kršitve človekovih pravic v DR Kongo.
 29.5.2017
 B. Subjekti
 [...]
 “.


type: caselaw

text:
 27.7.2015
 SK
 Úradný vestník Európskej únie
 C 245/12
 Návrh na začatie prejudiciálneho konania, ktorý podal Curtea de Apel Cluj (Rumunsko) 25. mája 2015 – trestné konanie proti Niculaieovi Aurelovi Bob-Dogimu
 (Vec C-241/15)
 (2015/C 245/15)
 Jazyk konania: rumunčina
 Vnútroštátny súd, ktorý podal návrh na začatie prejudiciálneho konania
 Curtea de Apel Cluj
 Účastník trestného konania pred vnútroštátnym súdom
 Niculaie Aurel Bob-Dogi
 Prejudiciálne otázky
 1.
 Vzťahuje sa výraz „zatykač“ na účely uplatnenia článku 8 ods. 1 písm. c) rámcového rozhodnutia Rady [2002/584/SVV] (1) na vnútroštátny – interný – príkaz na zatknutie, vydaný podľa pravidiel trestného konania vydávajúceho členského štátu, ktorý je z tohto dôvodu odlišný od európskeho zatykača?
 2.
 V prípade kladnej odpovede na prvú prejudiciálnu otázku, môže byť neexistencia vnútroštátneho – interného – príkazu na zatknutie implicitným dôvodom pre nevykonanie európskeho zatykača?
 (1) Rámcové rozhodnutie Rady 2002/584/SVV z 13. júna 2002 o európskom zatykači a postupoch odovzdávania osôb medzi členskými štátmi (Ú. v. ES L 190, s. 1; Mim. vyd. 19/006, s. 34).


type: other

text:
Centrum Druku - wybór specjalistów - HP kartridż C8772EE (magenta) nr 363
 • kod producenta: C8772EE#BA3
 • pojemność: 3.5 ml
 • koszt wydruku: 19.07 gr/str. A4 (wg normy producenta, wydruk ciągły)
 Oryginalny kartridż C8772EE, przeznaczony do urządzeń HP. Wydajność: 350 stron A4 Pojemność: 3.5 ml Kolor: magenta zgodny z: Photosmart 8250, Photosmart D7160, Photosmart D7360, Photosmart C6180, PhotoSmart 3210, Photosmart 3310, Photosmart D6160, PhotoSmart D7360, PhotoSmart 3320,Photosmart C5180, photosmart c7180, Photosmart C7280, Photosmart C6280, Photosmart C8180,...
 2011-01-13 17:05:02
 najlepsza firma produkujaca materialy eksploatacyjne, nie ma co sie oszuiwac ze jakikolwiek zamiennik da podobno jakosc
 19,07 gr/str. A4 (wg normy producenta, wydruk ciągły)
 Oryginalny kartridż C8772EE, przeznaczony do urządzeń HP.
 zgodny z: Photosmart 8250, Photosmart D7160, Photosmart D7360, Photosmart C6180, PhotoSmart 3210, Photosmart 3310, Photosmart D6160, PhotoSmart D7360, PhotoSmart 3320,Photosmart C5180, photosmart c7180, Photosmart C7280, Photosmart C6280, Photosmart C8180, Photosmart D7460, Photosmart D7260, PSC 3210
 Zobacz również: Xerox podajnik dodatkowy do Phaser 6110 MFP (97S03794), HP duplex do 4345 (Q5969A), Lexmark pamięć flash 64 MB (1021209), Canon tusz BCI-1421C (cyan), Epson AcuLaser M8000DN, Xerox Phaser 3155, Tetenal TETENAL Duo Print Paper 100 arkuszy A3+ (131713), Lambda taśma zamiennik S015352 (black) LAM, Ecojet toner zamiennik CLT-Y4072 (yellow) ECO, Ecojet tusz zamiennik LC-900BK (black) ECO, Zebra GX420d rev2, 8 dots/mm, 203 dpi, cutter, EPL, ZPL, multi-IF (GX42-202522-000), Printé toner zamiennik 44469705 (magenta) PRI, HP CarePack - 5 lat w miejscu instalacji (HP581E), Black Point tusz zamiennik F6U68AE (black) BP, Canon skaner T36 (CF3421V854)


type: wikipedia

text:
Aramejci su jedan od semitskih naroda, koji je obitavao Mezopotamiju, to jest područje današnjeg Iraka, Sirije, Irana i dijela Turske. Kroz drevnu povijest u više su navrata imali svoju državu, dok se nisu stopili s okolnim narodima. U bizantsko doba još je na Bliskom istoku većinski dio naroda govorio aramejskim jezikom, koji se postupno razvio u oblik koji se u znanosti obično naziva starosirski jezik sa svoja dva različita pisma. Budući da su Aramejci po vjeroispovijesti kršćani (većina pripada Sirskoj pravoslavnoj Crkvi ili Asirskoj Crkvi Istoka), a države koje su nastale nakon pada Bizanta, onda i Turskog Carstva preuzele su muslimansku vjeroispovijest, Aramejci su kroz povijest bili u podređenom položaju kao manjina, tako da su neki prešli na islam, drugi su kao kršćani nastavili živjeti u svojim krajevima, a dio je emigrirao na Zapad. Danas Aramejaca, ili točnije rečeno, pripadnika ovih Crkava aramejskoga jezika, ima po cijelom svijetu, dijelom u Europi, i to u Njemačkoj, Švicarskoj i Švedskoj, u Izraelu, a dijelom i u SAD-u.
 Poveznice
 Aramejski jezik
 Asirci
 Aramejci
 Stari narodi i civilizacije


type: contracts

text:
 7.1.2012
 PT
 Jornal Oficial da União Europeia
 L 4/21
 Só os textos originais UNECE fazem fé ao abrigo do direito internacional público. O estatuto e a data de entrada em vigor do presente regulamento devem ser verificados na versão mais recente do documento UNECE comprovativo do seu estatuto, TRANS/WP.29/343, disponível no seguinte endereço:
 http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29fdocstts.html
 Alterações de 2010 ao Regulamento n.o 77 da Comissão Económica das Nações Unidas para a Europa (UNECE) — Disposições uniformes relativas à homologação das luzes de estacionamento dos veículos a motor
 Alterações ao Regulamento n.o 77 publicado no JO L 130 de 28.5.2010.
 Integra:
 Suplemento 13 à versão original do regulamento — Data de entrada em vigor: 9 de dezembro de 2010
 Suplemento 14 à versão original do regulamento — Data de entrada em vigor: 26 de junho de 2011
 Alterações ao Índice
 O Índice passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «...
 ANEXOS
 Anexo 1 —
 Comunicação relativa à concessão, extensão, recusa ou revogação de uma homologação ou à cessação definitiva da produção de um tipo de luz de estacionamento nos termos do Regulamento n.o 77
 Anexo 2 —
 Exemplos de disposições de marcas de homologação
 Anexo 3 —
 Ângulos mínimos exigidos para a distribuição da luz no espaço
 Anexo 4 —
 Medições fotométricas
 Anexo 5 —
 Requisitos mínimos relativos aos procedimentos de controlo da conformidade da produção
 Anexo 6 —
 Requisitos mínimos relativos à recolha de amostras por um inspector»
 Alterações ao texto principal do regulamento
 Aditar um novo ponto 6.3.3 com a seguinte redacção:
 «6.3.3.
 Um módulo de iluminação deve concebido de tal modo que, independentemente da utilização de ferramenta(s), não possa ser mecanicamente permutável com qualquer outra fonte de luz substituível homologada.»
 Os n.os 8 a 8.2 passam a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «8. MÉTODO DE ENSAIO
 8.1.
 Todas as medições, tanto fotométricas como colorimétricas, devem ser feitas:
 8.1.1.
 No caso de uma luz com uma fonte luminosa substituível, se não for fornecida por um dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa, com uma lâmpada de incandescência normalizada incolor ou de cor da categoria prescrita para o dispositivo, alimentada com a tensão necessária para produzir o fluxo luminoso de referência requerido para essa categoria de lâmpada de incandescência.
 8.1.2.
 No caso de uma luz equipada com fontes luminosas não substituíveis (lâmpadas de incandescência e outras), a 6,75 V, 13,5 V ou 28,0 V, respectivamente.
 8.1.3.
 No caso de um sistema que utilize um dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa que faça parte integrante da luz (1), aplicar aos terminais de entrada da luz a tensão declarada pelo fabricante ou, caso esta não seja indicada, aplicar 6,75 V, 13,5 V ou 28,0 V, respectivamente.
 8.1.4.
 No caso de um sistema que utilize um dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa que não faça parte integrante da luz, aplicar a tensão declarada pelo fabricante aos terminais de entrada da luz.
 8.2.
 O laboratório de ensaio deve exigir ao fabricante o dispositivo de comando electrónico da fonte luminosa necessário para alimentar a fonte luminosa e as funções aplicáveis.
 Inserir os novos pontos 8.3 e 8.4 com a seguinte redacção:
 «8.3.
 A tensão a aplicar à luz deve ser anotada no formulário de comunicação constante do anexo 1 do presente regulamento.
 8.4.
 Devem ser determinados os limites da superfície aparente na direcção do eixo de referência de um dispositivo de sinalização luminosa.»
 O n.o 9 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «9. COR DA LUZ EMITIDA
 A cor da luz emitida dentro do campo da grelha de distribuição da luz definida no anexo 4, n.o 2, deve ser vermelha, branca ou âmbar. Deve ser aplicado o método de ensaio descrito no n.o 8 do presente regulamento para verificar estas características colorimétricas. Fora deste campo, não deve observar-se qualquer variação brusca.
 Todavia, para as luzes equipadas com fontes luminosas não substituíveis (lâmpadas de incandescência e outras), as características colorimétricas devem ser verificadas com as fontes luminosas presentes na luz, em conformidade com o disposto nos pontos pertinentes do n.o 8.1 do presente regulamento.»
 O ponto 12.2 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «12.2.
 Devem ser cumpridas as prescrições mínimas aplicáveis aos procedimentos de controlo da conformidade da produção constantes do anexo 5 do presente regulamento.»
 O ponto 12.3 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «12.3.
 Devem ser cumpridas as prescrições mínimas enunciadas no anexo 6 do presente regulamento, no que se refere à recolha de amostras por parte de um inspector.»
 Alterações aos anexos
 No anexo 1, o n.o 9 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «9.
 Descrição sucinta:
 [...]
 Condições geométricas de instalação e variantes conexas, se aplicável:
 Aplicação de um dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa/comando de intensidade variável:
 a)
 faz parte da luz: sim/não/não aplicável (2)
 b)
 não faz parte da luz: sim/não/não aplicável (2)
 Tensão(ões) de entrada fornecida(s) por um dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa/comando de intensidade variável:
 Fabricante e número de identificação do dispositivo de comando electrónico de fonte luminosa/comando de intensidade variável (nos casos em que o dispositivo de comando da fonte luminosa faz parte da luz, mas não está integrado no mesmo corpo da luz):»
 O título do anexo 2 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «EXEMPLOS DE DISPOSIÇÕES DE MARCAS DE HOMOLOGAÇÃO»
 No anexo 4, o ponto 3.1 passa a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «3.1.
 No caso das fontes luminosas não substituíveis (lâmpadas de incandescência e outras):
 com as fontes luminosas presentes na luz, em conformidade com o ponto pertinente do n.o 8.1 do presente regulamento.»
 O anexo 5 é suprimido.
 O (antigo) anexo 6 é renumerado como anexo 5.
 No (novo) anexo 5, o n.os 2.4 e 2.5 passam a ter a seguinte redacção:
 «2.4.
 Características fotométricas medidas e registadas
 As amostras de luzes são submetidas a medições fotométricas relativas aos valores mínimos nos pontos enunciados no anexo 4 e com as coordenadas cromáticas exigidas.
 2.5.
 Critérios de aceitabilidade
 O fabricante é responsável por ...
 Os critérios de aceitabilidade devem ser de molde a garantir que, com um nível de confiança de 95 %, seja de 0,95 a probabilidade mínima de aprovação num controlo aleatório por amostragem, em conformidade com o disposto no anexo 6 (primeira amostragem).»
 O (antigo) anexo 7 é renumerado como anexo 6.
 (1) Para efeitos do presente regulamento, «que faça parte da luz» significa que o comando está fisicamente integrado no corpo da luz, ou que é externo, separado ou não do corpo da luz, mas é fornecido pelo fabricante da luz como parte do sistema luminoso. As condições de funcionamento e de instalação desses sistemas adicionais serão definidas por disposições especiais.»


jurisdiction: US

text: b"STRATEGIC ASSET MANAGEMENT\nPROGRAM:\nOpportunities to Improve Implementation and Lessons\nLearned\n\n\n\n\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012 | May 31, 2012\n\x0c NATIONAL RAILROAD\n PASSENGER CORPORATION\n Office of Inspector General\n\n\nMemorandum\nTo: Dee Waddell, Acting Chief Information Officer\n DJ Stadtler, Vice President, Operations\n Gordon Hutchinson, Acting Chief Financial Officer\n Jeff Martin, Chief Logistics Officer\n\nFrom: David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General, Audits\n\nDate: May 31, 2012\n\nSubject: Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to Improve Implementation\n and Lessons Learned (Report No. OIG-E-2012-012)\n\nWe have completed our evaluation of the Strategic Asset Management (SAM) Release\n1a (R1a) implementation. As you know, the SAM program is one of the company\xe2\x80\x99s\nhighest-cost and most significant information technology enhancement efforts. This\nprogram, at an estimated cost of more than $193 million, is expected to help Amtrak\ntransform and improve key business areas; implement best practices; integrate business\nprocesses; and provide timely information for financial reporting, management\ndecision-making, and optimizing financial and operational performance.\n\nWe reviewed SAM\xe2\x80\x99s pre-implementation efforts and issued audit reports on that work\nin January 20111 and June 2011.2 We found gaps in the design of the controls that did\nnot fully mitigate the financial and operational risks. Also, we identified several gaps in\ntesting and contingency plans, and recommended that management conduct additional\ntesting and resolve issues with interfaces, data conversion, network infrastructure, and\ncontingency plans. While management agreed with most of our recommendations and\n\n\n\n1 Strategic Asset Management Program Controls Design Is Generally Sound, But Improvements Can Be Made\n (Report No. 105-2010, January 14, 2011).\n2 Strategic Asset Management Program: Further Actions Should Be Taken To Reduce Business Disruption Risk\n\n (Report No. 001-2011, June 2, 2011).\n\x0c 2\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\nadded some tests, it nevertheless decided to deploy the system and correct problems as\nthey arose, rather than delay deployment.\n\nAfter being implemented in June 2011, SAM experienced greater than expected\nimplementation issues, causing business inefficiencies, including negative effects on\ndaily business operations, and relationships with business partners and vendors. Given\nthe program\xe2\x80\x99s cost and importance, we initiated this evaluation to help identify ways to\nimprove R1a implementation results, and avoid future information technology (IT)\nimplementation issues.\n\nThe specific objectives of our work were to (1) provide the status of ongoing efforts to\nresolve SAM implementation (SAM R1a post go-live) issues, (2) identify the causes of\nSAM implementation issues, and (3) provide recommendations based on lessons\nlearned to help improve the SAM implementation, and IT system implementations in\ngeneral. For a discussion of our evaluation scope and methodology, see Appendix I.\n\n\nSUMMARY OF RESULTS\nAlthough program managers anticipated a certain level of implementation issues, the\nnumber, significance, cost, and time needed to address them all have been greater than\nanticipated. The fact that significant issues continue to surface indicates that the system\nis not yet stable. As a result, the company is still dealing with adverse impacts on\nbusiness operations and financial performance some 9 months after deployment.\n\nThis situation occurred primarily due to design and configuration shortfalls, insufficient\nrequirements-gathering and testing, inadequate training, and underdeveloped user-\nsupport organization. Organizational silos and communication gaps also contributed to\nthe implementation issues. The complexity of the design approach was an underlying\ncontributor to the issues in each area.\n\nThe dedicated work of many business users and the SAM team has helped to address\nmany implementation issues. Nonetheless, challenges remain, and the time frame and\ncost needed to stabilize the new system, realize its benefits, and transform business\nprocesses are uncertain. The attached briefing (Appendix II) provides the detailed\nresults of our work and the specific recommendations that are summarized below.\n\x0c 3\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\nSTATUS OF SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION\nEnlarged Scope of IT Issues. The number of problems categorized as critical has doubled\nin fewer than 4 months\xe2\x80\x94from 19 helpdesk tickets on October 17, 2011, to 38 on\nFebruary 8, 2012. To Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s credit, about 2,800 tickets have been closed since\nSeptember 1, 2011, but others remain open as new issues continue to arise. The total\nnumber of outstanding issues (open tickets) has increased from 679 on September 19,\n2011, to 743 on January 11, 2012.\n\nIncreased Cost. The SAM R1a program was originally estimated to cost $135 million,\nand was revised upward to $183 million in March 2011. The actual cost reached more\nthan $189 million in December 2011, and it is expected to rise to over $193 million by\nSeptember 30, 2012.\n\nExtended Time. Program managers initially expected the system to be stabilized by\nJanuary 31, 2012. However, many issues remain to be resolved. While progress is being\nmade, a milestone date has not been set for fully stabilizing the system, and a\ncontractor, Accenture, continues to provide post-production support.\n\n\nCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES\nDesigning and implementing a new system while changing business processes is a\ncomplex and challenging undertaking. Difficult choices had to be made between\nimplementing SAP\xe2\x80\x99s3 standard functionality (an industry best practice), and\ncustomizing it to fit old business processes. However, as we reported in June 2011,\norganizational resistance caused a breakdown in the established governance processes.\nProgram sponsors deviated from a well-conceived \xe2\x80\x9cSAP-Maximo only\xe2\x80\x9d4 design strategy\nto a more complex \xe2\x80\x9cBest of Breed\xe2\x80\x9d solution (i.e., choosing different software\napplications based on their areas of specialization such as finance and procurement).\nThat decision contributed significantly to the greater than expected volume of SAM\n\n\n3\n SAP (ERP) software processes enterprise-wide data from various business areas such as finance, procurement,\n human resources, payroll, and sales and distribution.\n4\n SAP-Maximo only strategy was to implement and use SAP (ERP) software to support Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s back office\n processes such as finance and procurement, and Maximo to support Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s core business operations such as\n maintenance of rail infrastructure and train equipment. Maximo Asset Management software unifies\n comprehensive asset life cycle and maintenance management on a single automated database. The Engineering\n department currently uses Maximo to manage rail infrastructure activities.\n\x0c 4\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\nimplementation issues that are continuing. The primary causes and effects of these\nissues are discussed below.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Design Deficiencies, Configuration, and Interface Issues. The SAM system design\n was complex and involved the integration of multiple systems. This factor,\n combined with deficiencies in the technical design, configuration, and complex\n interfaces among the 32 partner systems, caused confusion and workarounds that\n circumvented system controls.\n\n For example, duplicate and incorrect payroll payments were made to many\n employees because the code modification in the Labor Management System was\n faulty and inadequately tested. According to Amtrak officials, the company made\n duplicate and advance payments of about $13 million to some 14,000 employees.\n Since implementation, Payroll has incurred unplanned expenses and has had to hire\n outside consultants to help with reconciliation. Payroll is still attempting to reconcile\n and collect about $4 million from about 7,250 employees.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Business Requirements-Gathering Shortfalls. Business requirements were not fully\n understood or complete requirements were not gathered in areas such as inventory\n management and reporting. As a result, new system design and business processes\n were either not built or were built incorrectly, leading to operational inefficiencies\n and ineffectiveness. According to SAM management, the program relied on subject-\n matter experts to ensure that needed functionality was built into the system.\n\n For example, according to Amtrak officials, business-critical reports (32) were\n initially not fully developed and delivered. The reporting gap had multiple impacts,\n including incomplete billing to several commuter railroads and unreconciled\n inventory levels, which delayed repairs to some train equipment. Further, a lack of\n reporting has hindered employees\xe2\x80\x99 ability to fully understand how the new\n processes work and to make informed business decisions in a timely manner.\n Additionally, inventory accuracy issues had a negative impact on the\n accomplishment of the work on the independent audit of Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s financial\n statements. According to senior finance officials, these issues were a factor in the\n $400,000 audit cost increase. This issue is closed.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Insufficient Testing. While many aspects of the system were tested, significant gaps\n in testing existed. Several end-to-end business processes and SAM impacted system\n interfaces in Procurement, Materials Management, Finance, Operations, and Human\n\x0c 5\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n Resources were not fully tested in a manner that adequately simulated business-case\n scenarios.\n\n For example, the procure-to-pay process was not tested with a sufficient number of\n representative sample transactions from (1) creating non-inventory material\n requisition purchases, (2) their conversion to purchase orders in Ariba5, (3) entering\n the receipts of the materials against these orders in Ariba, and (4) replicating the\n orders and receipts in SAP so a three-way match with invoices for vendor payments\n could be accomplished. Consequently, non-inventory order items were not being\n electronically received by the requisitioners, causing delays in payments to vendors.\n Accounts Payable had to circumvent the automated three-way match control in SAP\n so that vendors could be paid on time; but as a result, Amtrak runs the risk of\n paying duplicate and fraudulent vendor invoices. This issue remains open.\n\n In addition, fixes were being implemented without sufficient testing and full\n understanding of business impact, thereby creating inefficiencies as the SAM team\n had to fix the fixes.\n\n For example, [Issue] as part of the SAM implementation, unpaid expense purchase\n orders were transferred from the legacy AAMPS (the legacy procurement system) to\n SAP. Users could not perform electronic receipt of items against the transferred\n orders because the Accenture employee who transferred the orders in SAP\n identified himself as the creator of these orders. The automated controls in SAP\n require that only the creator of an order can receive items against that order. [Fix]\n The Accenture employee updated the SAP configuration to allow cost-center\n managers to receive items against the orders. [Issue] Most cost-center managers are\n executives or high-level managers, not the staff who create the orders and receive\n the items. [Fix] A special program was executed in SAP to bypass the authorization\n control to automatically receive these orders. This issue remains open.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Training Not Fully Tailored to Needs. While some users found SAM training\n beneficial, others reported that the training was at too high a level, and not specific\n and/or relevant to performing their daily job duties. Further, users were trained on a\n system that was not fully developed and did not contain relevant test data that\n\n\n5\n Ariba software automates procurement business functions, such as spend management, contract management and\n supplier management. Amtrak is currently using Ariba for purchase requisitioning and ordering, travel and\n expense, procurement cards, and payment requests.\n\x0c 6\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n represented their daily business transactions. Furthermore, users were trained in\n SAP but not in the interfacing systems.\n\n For example, the training system included only one material item, Acela windshield\n wiper blades, in the list of items available for ordering. But Amtrak acquires\n different types of materials and services requiring different procurement processes.\n As a result, users were not well-prepared to properly use the system\xe2\x80\x99s different\n procurement processes. Management is considering follow-up training courses.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Organizational Silos and Gaps in Communication. Not all business process owners\n are working effectively together to resolve implementation issues. For example,\n owners of new end-to-end business processes have not been identified, which limits\n the ability to hold managers accountable. According to Accounts Payable\n employees, certain buyers in the Procurement area were not responsive to their\n requests to work jointly in resolving vendor payment issues. While organizational\n silos and communication gaps are slowing down efforts to change the management\n culture and transform business areas, employees have pulled together to keep the\n business processes running despite implementation issues. Management continues\n to address this issue.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 SAM Support Organization Not Ready. The SAM Center of Expertise (CoE) is not\n fully functional to support the implemented environment. The CoE continues to\n operate at less than planned capability and capacity. For example, before\n implementation, CoE planned to hire up to 71 staff, but as of January 2012, it had\n hired about 20 employees and 10 contractors. The center still lacks the necessary\n personnel, competencies, and disciplined processes to adequately address post-\n hyper-care6 issues without costly technical support from Accenture. Consequently,\n in the interim, problem resolution is taking longer and having a negative impact on\n employee productivity. This issue remains open.\n\n\nSUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS\nDetailed recommendations appear on pages 26-29 in Appendix II. In summary:\n\n\n\n6 Hyper-care, using Accenture personnel, was designed to provide intensive assistance to users in fixing\n issues for 3 months after R1a was implemented in early June 2011.\n\x0c 7\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\nIn the short-term, we recommend that SAM sponsors\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 develop a plan to resolve all outstanding break-fix issues,\n\xef\x82\xa7 prevent new break-fix issues by proper testing in an operational environment,\n\xef\x82\xa7 reassess the strategy and structure of the Center of Expertise, and\n\xef\x82\xa7 eliminate workarounds or establish mitigating controls to prevent or detect fraud,\n waste, and abuse.\nOnce the system is stabilized, we recommend that SAM sponsors\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 redesign processes where necessary;\n\xef\x82\xa7 identify the managers responsible and accountable for end-to-end processes;\n\xef\x82\xa7 align the staff reporting structure and/or develop documented business rules to\n improve the collaboration, economy, and efficiency of the processes;\n\xef\x82\xa7 assess whether the new business processes are delivering expected results and cost\n benefits; and\n\xef\x82\xa7 pursue a well-conceived \xe2\x80\x9cSAP-Maximo only\xe2\x80\x9d strategy to reduce complexity in\n future releases of SAM implementation.\n\nFor ongoing and future system implementation programs, based on lessons learned\nfrom SAM R1a implementation, we recommend that the Chief Information Officer\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 develop testing policies and procedures that provide for independent reviews and\n reporting of the adequacy of test plans and results to be sent to the steering\n committee,\n\xef\x82\xa7 develop and enforce standards for gathering and documenting detailed user\n requirements in developing new systems, and\n\xef\x82\xa7 improve training programs by tailoring them to employees\xe2\x80\x99 job responsibilities and\n addressing end-to-end business processes, and develop plans to train new\n employees on critical business systems and processes relevant to their assigned\n duties.\n\n\nMANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG ANALYSIS\n\nOn April 5, 2012, we provided Amtrak officials a draft of this report for their review\nand comments. Management agreed with all our recommendations, and cited ongoing\n\x0c 8\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\nand planned actions. If properly implemented, the cited actions should address the\nintent of our recommendations.\n\nManagement\xe2\x80\x99s complete comments are in Appendix III. Management also provided\ntechnical comments on certain aspects of the report for our consideration. We\nconsidered these comments and incorporated them into this report where appropriate.\n\x0c 9\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n\n Appendix I\n\n SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We visited the mechanical and materials control facilities at Ivy City (Washington,\n D.C.), Los Angeles, Beech Grove (Indiana), and Boulden (Delaware).\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We interviewed 59 employees, including business users in Finance, Procurement,\n Materials Management, Mechanical, and Engineering; and key members of the SAM\n implementation team. Interviewees ranged from field employees to executives in all\n SAM-affected business areas.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We reviewed relevant documentation, including post-go-live status updates. We did\n not perform any substantive system testing.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We conducted our evaluation from August 2011 through May 2012.\n\n\nUse of Computer-Processed Data\nDuring our review, we used computer\xe2\x80\x90processed data obtained from the IT department\non the cost of the SAM R1a implementation program and the number of outstanding\npost-go-live issues. We did not validate the data, but found that this information was\ngenerally accurate and reliable when compared with testimonial evidence obtained\nfrom our interviews. We therefore relied on this computer\xe2\x80\x90processed data to accomplish\nour evaluation objectives.\n\n\nInternal Controls\nIn conducting this evaluation, we reviewed Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s internal controls related to the\nperformance of SAM R1a post-go-live issues resolution. The weaknesses and gaps in\nthese controls that we identified are discussed in the body of this report.\n\x0c 10\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n\n\nPrior Coverage\nWe reviewed the following prior audit reports and used information from them in\nconducting our analysis of issues:\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Strategic Asset Management Program: Further Actions Should Be Taken To Reduce\n Business Disruption Risk (Report No. 001-2011, June 2, 2011)\n\n Our audit objective was to determine whether the implementation approach of SAM\n R1a effectively addressed business disruption risks. We identified several gaps in\n the testing and contingency plans. Left unaddressed, these gaps leave Amtrak\n vulnerable to business disruptions that could reduce revenues, increase costs, and\n negatively affect customer service. We recommended that Amtrak conduct\n additional testing; resolve issues with interfaces, data conversion, network\n infrastructure, and contingency plans; and involve Process Leadership Team\n members in making a go/no-go decision to move forward with the R1a deployment.\n While management agreed with most of our recommendations and added some\n tests, it decided to deploy the system and correct problems as they arose, rather than\n delay deployment.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Strategic Asset Management Program Controls Design Is Generally Sound, But\n Improvements Can Be Made (Report No. 105-2010, January 14, 2011)\n\n We concluded that the design of the automated controls to mitigate financial risks in\n SAM R1a was generally sound. However, we found gaps in the design of the\n controls that did not fully mitigate the financial and operational risks. These gaps\n put Amtrak at risk of not fully realizing the potential benefits from SAM. In\n particular, a lack of adequate controls can lead to inaccurate financial reporting,\n vulnerability to fraud, and inefficient business operations. We recommended that\n Amtrak complete certain automated control design tasks before the April 2011 R1a\n implementation, and expand the scope of the control design process to include\n controls that fully address financial and operational risks in all affected business\n areas. Management agreed with these recommendations and assigned\n responsibilities to appropriate individuals to take timely action to address them.\n\x0c 11\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n Appendix II\n\n BRIEFING\n\nOn February 28, 2012, we provided a briefing summarizing the results of our work to\nInformation Technology, Finance, Operations, and Procurement department officials.\nThe following slides are updated based on management input received during and after\nthe briefing.\n\x0cAppendix II\n\n\nStrategic Asset Management Program:\nOpportunities to Improve Implementation\nand Lessons Learned\n\n\n May 31, 2012\n\x0cPROGRAM SIGNIFICANCE\n\xef\x82\xa7 In June 2011 Amtrak implemented the first segment of the Strategic Asset\n Management (SAM) program\xe2\x80\x94one of the company\xe2\x80\x99s highest-cost and most\n significant information technology (IT) enhancement efforts. SAM is expected to\n help Amtrak transform and improve key business areas; implement best practices;\n integrate business processes; and provide timely information for financial\n reporting, management decision-making, and optimizing financial and operational\n performance. The program\xe2\x80\x99s first segment\xe2\x80\x94 referred to as Release 1a (R1a)\xe2\x80\x94 is\n estimated to cost more than $193 million.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Given its cost and importance to business operations, we reviewed SAM\xe2\x80\x99s pre-\n implementation efforts and issued audit reports on that work in January and June\n 2011. After going live in June 2011, SAM experienced greater than expected\n implementation issues, causing business inefficiencies, including negative effects\n on daily business operations, and relationships with business partners and vendors.\n\n\n\n 2\n\x0cREPORTING OBJECTIVES\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Provide the status of ongoing efforts to resolve SAM\n implementation (SAM R1a post-go-live) issues\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Identify the causes of SAM implementation issues\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Provide recommendations based on lessons learned to help\n improve the SAM implementation and IT system implementations\n in general\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\x0cSCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We visited the mechanical and materials control facilities at Ivy City\n (Washington, DC), Los Angeles, Beech Grove (Indiana), and Boulden\n (Delaware).\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We interviewed 59 employees, including business users in Finance,\n Procurement, Materials Management, Mechanical, and Engineering; and\n key members of the SAM implementation team. Interviewees ranged\n from field employees to executives in all SAM-affected business areas.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We reviewed relevant documentation, including post-go-live status\n updates. We did not perform any substantive system testing.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 We conducted our evaluation from August 2011 through May 2012.\n\n\n 4\n\x0cSTATUS OF SAM IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES\nWhile managers anticipated a certain level of SAM R1a implementation issues, the number, significance,\ncost, and time needed to address them all have been greater than anticipated.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 At an October 2011 Board meeting, IT department stated it would close all critical items (Severity 1 and 2) by\n November 18, 2011. However, according to the SAM team, the intent of the Board briefing was to indicate that\n the post-production support requirement in the Accenture contract would be closed and transitioned to\n Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s SAM Center of Expertise (CoE) within that time frame. They expected some critical items to remain\n open after that time. However, the number of critical items doubled from 19 on October 17, 2011 to 38 on\n February 8, 2012. Accenture, the contractor, also continues to provide post-production support.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 SAM R1a was originally estimated to cost $135 million, and was revised upward to $183 million in March 2011.\n The actual cost reached more than $189 million in December 2011, and is expected to rise to over $193\n million by September 30, 2012.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Program managers initially expected the system to be stabilized by January 31, 2012. However, many issues\n remain to be resolved. While progress is being made, a milestone date has not been set for fully stabilizing the\n system.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 The dedicated work of many business users and the SAM team has helped to address many implementation\n issues. Nonetheless, significant issues remain in Procurement, Operations (primarily Materials Management),\n Finance (primarily Accounts Payable), and Reporting. All of these are having a negative impact on the efficiency\n and effectiveness of business processes, including (1) timely availability of materials, (2) accuracy of material\n orders, (3) timeliness of vendor payments, (4) proper categorization of cost data, and (5) adequacy of\n information for decision-making.\n 5\n\x0cSTATUS (continued)\nThe SAM team and business users continue to work to resolve outstanding issues and to stabilize the\nsystem. To Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s credit, about 2,800 tickets have been closed since September 1, 2011, but others\nremain open as new issues continue to arise. As seen in the figure below, the number of outstanding issues\nhas increased slightly since November 21, 2011.\n\n\n Break-Fix\n SAM Total Open Tickets Trend\n 800 743 Enhancement\n 724\n 713\n 679\n 700 659 Security\nNumber of Tickets by Type\n\n\n\n\n 600 Data\n\n 500\n Training Request\n 400\n Training\n 300\n Performance\n 200\n Legal/FOIA\n 100\n Planned\n 0 Maintenance\n Sep 19 Oct 18 Nov 21 Dec 19 Jan 11\n Source: Amtrak IT\n\n\n 6\n\x0cSTATUS (continued)\nThe figure below shows that the number of system functionality (break-fix) issues and data\nconversion/reliability issues generally increased in these 5 months.\n\n SAM Open Break-Fix and Data Tickets Trend\n\n 400 374 372 Procurement\n Finance\n 350 328\n Operations\n Number of Tickets by Category\n\n\n\n\n 300\n 300 288\n Reporting\n 250 HR\n Other\n 200\n Other = Total\n 150 number\n of tickets in\n 100 \xe2\x80\x9cTechnical\n Development\xe2\x80\x9d\n 50 and\n \xe2\x80\x9cHelp Desk\xe2\x80\x9d\n 0 categories\n Sep 19 Oct 18 Nov 21 Dec 19 Jan 11\n\n Source: Amtrak IT\n\n\n\n 7\n\x0cCAUSES OF SAM IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES\nThe program sponsors deviated from a well-conceived \xe2\x80\x9cSAP-Maximo only\xe2\x80\x9d design strategy to a more complex \xe2\x80\x9cBest of\nBreed\xe2\x80\x9d solution (choosing different software applications based on their areas of specialization such as finance and\nprocurement). This was an underlying contributor to these SAM implementation issues:\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Design Deficiencies, Configuration, and Interface Issues. The SAM system design was complex and involved the\n integration of multiple systems. This factor, combined with deficiencies in the technical design, configuration, and\n complex interfaces among the 32 partner systems, caused confusion and workarounds that circumvented system\n controls.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Business Requirements-Gathering Shortfalls. Business requirements were not fully understood or complete\n requirements were not gathered in areas such as inventory management and reporting.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Insufficient Testing. While many aspects of the system were tested, significant gaps in testing existed. For\n example, several end-to-end business processes in Procurement, Materials Management, Finance, Operations, and\n Human Resources were not fully tested in a manner that adequately simulated business-case scenarios.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Training Not Fully Tailored to Needs. While some users found SAM training beneficial, others reported that the\n training was at too high a level, and not specific and/or relevant to performing their daily job duties.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Organizational Silos and Gaps in Communication. Not all business process owners are working effectively together\n to resolve implementation issues. Communication gaps are slowing down efforts to change the management\n culture and transform business processes. However, employees have pulled together to keep the business\n processes running despite implementation issues.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 SAM Support Organization Not Ready. The SAM Center of Expertise (CoE) is not fully functional to support the\n implemented environment. The CoE continues to operate at less than planned capability and capacity. As a result,\n Amtrak continues to rely on costly Accenture contractor support.\n\n 8\n\x0cDesign Deficiencies, Configuration, and Interface Issues\nMultiple systems with complex interfaces left business users confused and frustrated.\nIn some cases, to keep the business running, users have employed manual\nworkarounds, but these are prone to error and create increased vulnerabilities to\nfraud, waste, and abuse. For the examples cited below, we note whether the issue is\ncurrently open or closed.\n\xef\x82\xa7 The complicated interface between SAP and Ariba has created business process\n efficiency and effectiveness issues.\n Example:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 Construction and expense material requisition types are generated in Ariba; however,\n expense materials must be electronically received in Ariba and construction materials must\n be electronically received in SAP. So, if an employee makes an error while creating the\n requisition by selecting construction instead of an expense requisition type, Ariba will not\n allow the electronic receipt of materials, and the three-way match control will block the\n vendor payment. Open\n\n\n\n 9\n\x0cDesign Deficiencies, Configuration, and Interface Issues\n(continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 Some critical business information such as regular and blanket purchase order data\n was not transferred from AAMPS (the legacy procurement system) to Ariba and SAP.\n Similarly, some business data was not properly checked for accuracy or\n consolidation before being transferred into Ariba and SAP.\n Example:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 When material order data from AAMPS was transferred into Ariba and SAP, the line numbers\n did not always match between Ariba and SAP. This has created confusion and errors in\n downstream processes, such as receiving materials and paying vendors. Open\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Issues were found in the design and configuration of the new system and processes.\n Examples:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 New account code blocks (profit/cost center, internal order, work breakdown structure, and\n general ledger account) were not created or mapped correctly. This affects all business areas.\n Significant impacts include the company\xe2\x80\x99s ability to analyze actual vs. budgeted expenses by\n cost center, appropriately capture capital vs. operating expenses, and properly allocate\n overhead for contract and reimbursable work. Open\n 10\n\x0cDesign Deficiencies, Configuration, and Interface Issues\n(continued)\n \xef\x82\xa7 Requisitions were not properly transferring between Ariba and SAP for reasons such as\n improper and incomplete data elements. In addition, different requisitions for the same\n material could not be combined as an \xe2\x80\x9caggregated requisition\xe2\x80\x9d to obtain better\n pricing/discounts from the vendor. This functionality was not configured correctly as\n designed. As a result, purchase orders were being delayed for submission to vendors and\n materials were not being received in a timely manner. Open\n \xef\x82\xa7 Processing and payment of utility bills, commissary invoices, and claims were automated\n before SAM went live. The new system did not include automation of these processes; as a\n result, they are now processed manually, causing resource constraints and employee fatigue\n that creates the potential for errors. Open\n \xef\x82\xa7 Duplicate and incorrect payroll payments were made to many employees because the code\n modification in the Labor Management System (LMS) was faulty. According to Amtrak\n officials, the company made duplicate and advance payments of about $13 million to\n some14,000 employees. Since implementation, Payroll has incurred unplanned expenses and\n has had to hire outside contractors to help with reconciliation. Payroll is still attempting to\n reconcile and collect about $4 million from about 7,250 employees. Open\n \xef\x82\xa7 The approval workflow process in Ariba did not work properly because cost centers were not\n correctly assigned to appropriate managers. As a result, invoices were approved and paid\n without appropriate managerial review. Closed\n 11\n\x0cBusiness Requirements-Gathering Shortfalls\n\xef\x82\xa7 The implementation approach focused on standard SAP functionality for \xe2\x80\x9cTo-Be\xe2\x80\x9d\n processes, an industry best practice. However, \xe2\x80\x9cAs-Is\xe2\x80\x9d processes were not\n documented, which is a standard practice. Consequently, the required information\n to fully understand the unique business requirements in some areas was not\n gathered. As a result, new system design and business processes were either not\n built or were built incorrectly, leading to operational inefficiencies and\n ineffectiveness. According to SAM management, the program relied on subject-\n matter experts to ensure that needed functionality was built into the system.\n Examples:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 According to Amtrak officials, business-critical reports (32) were initially not fully\n developed and delivered. The reporting gap had multiple impacts, including incomplete\n billing to several commuter railroads and unreconciled inventory levels, which delayed\n repairs to some train equipment. Further, a lack of reporting has hindered employees\xe2\x80\x99\n ability to fully understand how the new processes work and to make informed business\n decisions in a timely manner. Closed\n\n\n\n 12\n\x0cBusiness Requirements-Gathering Shortfalls (continued)\n \xef\x82\xa7 The SAP material master database did not include many inventory items required by\n mechanics. To reduce inventory levels, inventory lists at each location were based on\n items consumed in the previous 18 months. In retrospect, this time frame was too\n short because many inventory items have a consumption period longer than 18\n months. Inventory accuracy issues also had a negative impact on the accomplishment\n of the independent audit of Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s financial statements. According to senior finance\n officials, these issues were a factor in the $400,000 audit cost increase. Closed\n \xef\x82\xa7 \xe2\x80\x9cKitting\xe2\x80\x9d functionality delivered did not meet business needs. Kitting is the process of\n gathering and delivering to the work site all required inventory parts as a kit to\n perform a specific job, such as brake replacement. It was assumed that when\n mechanics ordered a kit out of Spear, the request would come to SAP as a kit in a\n single line. However, requests from Spear came as separate line items for each part in\n the kit. These material request line items got mixed in with other requests, and\n material controls staff had to assemble the kits manually. This inefficient process\n caused errors and delays in delivering the kits to the mechanics. Closed\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\x0cBusiness Requirements-Gathering Shortfalls (continued)\n \xef\x82\xa7 The need to create required account codes for users was not adequately documented. As a\n result, many necessary account codes were not established prior to implementation. After\n implementation, in the absence of complete codes, users resorted to substitute account\n codes that allowed them to charge expenses. The \xe2\x80\x9cinternal order\xe2\x80\x9d data element identifies\n the work being performed. We were informed that train engineers were charging their time\n for running work trains to incorrect internal orders, which could cause inappropriate\n accounting of the project costs shared with Amtrak\xe2\x80\x99s partners. Closed\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Many key business managers were not involved in the user requirements-\n gathering process.\n Examples:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 Materials Management managers from Central and Western regions were not adequately\n involved in the user requirements-gathering process.\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 New system and business processes for the Accounts Payable area were designed mainly\n by subject-matter experts who were part of the SAM team. Closed\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\x0cInsufficient Testing\nOne significant cause of implementation issues stemmed from gaps in system\ntesting prior to implementation. This was primarily due to gaps in the testing plan,\ncompounded by the inherent complexity of the system design. The vast majority of\ninterviewees stated that testing of the new system was insufficient. Actions are\nongoing to fix these implementation issues. Gaps in testing included the following:\n\xef\x82\xa7 Revised end-to-end business processes were not adequately tested.\n\n Example:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 The procure-to-pay process was not tested with a sufficient number of representative\n sample transactions from (1) creating non-inventory material requisition purchases, (2)\n their conversion to purchase orders in Ariba, (3) entering the receipts of the materials\n against these orders in Ariba, and (4) replicating the orders and receipts in SAP so a three-\n way match with invoices for vendor payments could be accomplished. Open\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\x0cInsufficient Testing (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 Certain business processes were not tested. In addition, several tested scenarios did not\n work initially after implementation because they did not include comprehensive data on\n real business transactions.\n\n Example:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 All blanket purchase orders were set up in SAP with a fixed price per unit. However, this\n configuration created issues for blanket order purchases where the price fluctuates daily, such as\n with fuel. When fuel prices went up, vendor invoice payments were blocked by the system because\n the invoice amounts were higher than the receipt amounts. This caused delays in payments to\n vendors. When blocked invoices were cleared, the system inaccurately showed those transactions as\n overpayments in SAP. Closed\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Not all SAM impacted systems were tested.\n\n Example:\n\n \xef\x82\xa7 The BusinessObjects Planning and Consolidation (BPC) and Amtrak Performance Tracking (APT)\n systems, downstream systems that receive cost data from SAP, were not properly tested to ensure\n that correct and accurate information was passed among the systems. Consequently, the allocation\n of costs among train routes for June 2011 was delayed until March 2012. Closed\n\n\n 16\n\x0cInsufficient Testing (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 Inadequate interface testing resulted in data that was transferred from one system\n not being received correctly or being rejected by another system. In particular, data\n transfer among SAP, Ariba, Exacta, and Spear systems had multiple data-transfer\n issues.\n Example:\n \xef\x82\xa7 Parts available at a warehouse could not be released to mechanics because inventory\n requests made by the mechanic were lost when data were transferred between SAP and\n Exacta. Data files that sent the inventory-release requests from SAP to Exacta in 1-minute\n intervals used the same file name and, as a result, overwrote the first inventory request file\n with the next one. This issue also points to inadequate system data volume testing. Closed\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Key business users stated that they were not actively involved in testing new\n processes and system interfaces before implementation. However, they report that\n they are now satisfied with their involvement in correcting implementation issues.\n Examples:\n \xef\x82\xa7 Materials Management\n \xef\x82\xa7 Accounts Payable\n \xef\x82\xa7 Payroll Closed\n 17\n\x0cInsufficient Testing (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 Fixes were being implemented without sufficient testing and full understanding of business\n impact, thereby creating inefficiencies, as the SAM team had to fix the fixes.\n Examples:\n \xef\x82\xa7 [Issue] As part of SAM implementation, unpaid expense purchase orders were transferred\n from the legacy AAMPS system to SAP. Users could not perform electronic receipt of items\n against the transferred orders because the Accenture employee who transferred the orders in\n SAP identified himself as the creator of these orders. The automated controls in SAP require\n that only the creator of an order can receive items against that order. [Fix] The Accenture\n employee updated the SAP configuration to allow cost-center managers to receive items\n against the orders. [Issue] Most cost-center managers are executives or high-level\n managers, not the staff who create the orders and receive the items. [Fix] A special program\n was executed in SAP to bypass the authorization control to automatically receive these\n orders. Open\n \xef\x82\xa7 [Issue] In response to a concern expressed by a senior executive regarding a potential cash\n flow problem in the near future, [Fix] all vendor and employee expense payments were\n blocked. [Issue] According to Amtrak officials, the block payment change created a complex\n system issue corrupting many related orders, and preventing about 1,900 invoices from\n being paid in a timely manner. [Fix] The resulting issues could only be corrected with outside\n help from SAP experts. It was later determined that cash flow was not a critical problem.\n Closed\n 18\n\x0cTraining Not Fully Tailored to Needs\nSAP is a labor-intensive application that requires more data entry than the legacy\napplications it replaced, but has stronger financial controls. Users are expected to\npossess certain levels of technical and business knowledge and skills needed to enter\ncorrect data in the right fields. Not all users had the right mix of knowledge and skills in\ncertain business areas. As a result, substantial training and preparation for this\nsignificant change was needed. However, the training that was provided was less than or\ndifferent from what was required.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Most users interviewed stated that training was at too high a level, not specific,\n and/or not relevant to performing their daily duties. It did not convey pertinent\n information to crosswalk users from the old business processes to the new ones.\n\xef\x82\xa7 Users were trained on a system that was not fully developed. The complete system\n solution was not developed prior to users\xe2\x80\x99 receiving training. Further, the training\n system did not contain relevant test data that represented users\xe2\x80\x99 daily business\n transactions. For example, the training system included only one material item, Acela\n windshield wiper blades, in the list of items available for ordering. But Amtrak\n acquires different types of materials and services requiring different procurement\n processes.\n 19\n\x0cTraining Not Fully Tailored to Needs (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 Users stated that while trainers were well aware of SAP\xe2\x80\x99s standard functionalities,\n they did not necessarily understand how to use these functionalities in the \xe2\x80\x9cTo-\n Be\xe2\x80\x9d processes.\n\xef\x82\xa7 Users were trained in SAP but not in the interfacing systems. For example,\n requisitioners are now required to D\n electronically\n RAFT receive expense materials over\n $10,000 in eTrax. Even though most employees are familiar with eTrax, they\n were unaware of this new functionality and the business requirement. This was\n one of the reasons for a severe backlog of vendor payments. Accounts Payable\n has resorted to automatically receiving these orders in SAP using a specialized\n program as a workaround. Automatically receiving materials to pay vendors can\n result in improper payments, waste, and fraud, such as paying vendors for\n materials never received. This issue is still open and the SAM team is planning to\n provide additional training.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\x0cTraining Not Fully Tailored to Needs (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 End-to-end business processes were not fully documented. This information\n could have helped users understand the flow of transactions. Consequently,\n users have struggled to understand new processes and what is expected of\n them. For example, the position responsible for monitoring a critical Goods\n Receipt/Invoice Receipt reconciliation account was not identified. The lack of\n monitoring of receipts partly contributed to late vendor payments.\n\xef\x82\xa7 Issues raised during training were not fully addressed. For example, user\n concerns such as different units of measure among SAP, Ariba, and Spear\n pointed to gaps in requirements-gathering but were not adequately followed up.\n Lack of adequate follow-up on these gaps allowed the issues to continue into\n production.\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\x0cOrganizational Silos and Communication Gaps\n\xef\x82\xa7 SAM\xe2\x80\x99s plan to integrate business processes that currently span multiple functional areas is\n expected to provide operational transparency to different departments. For example, by\n integrating procurement and inventory management functions, significant savings were\n projected from optimizing inventory levels. Similarly, the work order management process\n is being tightly integrated from the creation of work orders in Maximo to the requisition\n and procurement of materials and the payment to vendors in SAP to achieve savings.\n However, owners of new end-to-end business processes have not been identified, which\n limits the ability to hold managers accountable. Users noted that in some instances, it was\n difficult to resolve SAM implementation issues because some employees resisted resolving\n issues that were outside of their areas of responsibility. For example, the procure-to-pay\n ownership process is fragmented. Procurement and Materials Management employees\n report to the Chief Logistics Officer, while Accounts Payable employees report to the\n Controller. Procurement employees use Ariba, while Materials Management and Accounts\n Payable employees use SAP. Without a single owner of the entire procure-to-pay process,\n the employees involved were not always working effectively together in resolving\n implementation issues. According to Accounts Payable employees, certain buyers in the\n Procurement area were not responsive to their requests to work jointly in resolving vendor\n payment issues.\n\n\n 22\n\x0cOrganizational Silos and Communication Gaps (continued)\n\xef\x82\xa7 While organizational silos and communication gaps are slowing efforts to change\n the management culture and transform business areas, employees have generally\n pulled together to keep business processes running despite implementation\n issues. Employees have put in long hours to make sure that vendors get paid and\n parts are available for equipment repairs.\n\n In particular, Materials Management and Mechanical employees worked in\n different data systems. Yet they became understanding of each other\xe2\x80\x99s problems\n in dealing with material unavailability issues. In addition, most SAM-affected\n employees we interviewed expressed their receptiveness to change.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\x0cSAM Support Organization Not Ready\n\xef\x82\xa7 Some progress has been made in building up the SAM support center, called the Center\n of Expertise (CoE). However, the center still lacks the necessary personnel, associated\n competencies, and disciplined processes to adequately address post-hyper-care issues\n without costly technical support from Accenture.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 The transition from Accenture hyper-care to CoE has not been completed. Accenture\n resources are still supporting SAM-related systems, while CoE is not fully staffed to\n complete the knowledge transfer.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 Certain key executives stated that timely and adequate staffing of CoE was critical to SAM\n stabilization and routine operations. However, CoE has faced challenges in attracting and\n retaining permanent staff, resulting in most positions being filled by contractors. Before\n implementation, CoE planned to hire up to 71 staff, but as of January 2012, it had hired\n about 20 employees and 10 contractors. According to SAM management, restrictions on\n hiring and recent turnover in the Chief Information Officer\xe2\x80\x99s position have resulted in\n delays in filling vacancies. Further, the high turnover of contractors has resulted in critical\n skill shortages and the loss of knowledge within CoE.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 A consistent, ongoing SAP training program for CoE staff has not been developed.\n\n 24\n\x0cCONCLUSIONS\n\xef\x82\xa7 Designing and implementing a new system while changing business processes is a\n complex and challenging undertaking. Difficult choices had to be made between\n implementing SAP\xe2\x80\x99s standard functionality (an industry best practice), and\n customizing it to fit old business processes.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 However, as we reported in June 2011, organizational resistance caused a\n breakdown in the established governance processes. Program sponsors deviated\n from a well-conceived \xe2\x80\x9cSAP-Maximo only\xe2\x80\x9d design strategy to a more complex \xe2\x80\x9cBest\n of Breed\xe2\x80\x9d solution. That decision significantly increased the system\xe2\x80\x99s complexity and\n risks. Further, adequate time and effort were not devoted to properly testing the new\n system to help minimize implementation issues. As a result, the R1a implementation\n has cost more, taken longer, and experienced greater technical issues than\n anticipated.\n\n\xef\x82\xa7 The dedicated work of many business users and the SAM team has helped to\n address many implementation issues. Nonetheless, challenges remain; and the time\n frame and cost needed to stabilize the new system, realize its benefits, and\n transform business processes are uncertain.\n\n 25\n\x0cRECOMMENDATIONS\nWe recommend that SAM sponsors \xe2\x80\x93 the Chief Information Officer, Chief Financial Officer,\nChief Logistics Officer and Vice President of Operations - take the following actions to\nhelp improve SAM stabilization:\n\n1. Develop a plan with milestones to resolve all outstanding break-fix issues by\n addressing their root causes.\n\n2. Prevent new break-fix issues by proper testing in an operational environment.\n\n3. Given the delays in building a fully functional Center of Expertise, reassess the\n strategy and structure to address the process, capacity, and capability gaps that exist\n there; and the transition of system support activities from Accenture to CoE.\n\n4. Identify and review the use of workarounds to ensure that they do not become\n permanent business processes. The review should include determining whether the\n cost/benefit of fixing the issue significantly outweighs the cost/benefit of maintaining\n the workaround processes. The review should also determine the need to establish\n mitigating controls to prevent or detect fraud, waste, and abuse, where workaround\n processes are currently being used.\n 26\n\x0cRECOMMENDATIONS (continued)\nOnce the system is stabilized, we recommend that SAM sponsors:\n\n5. Redesign processes, where necessary, to achieve expected results and\n cost benefits. For all processes, identify the managers responsible and\n accountable for end-to-end processes.\n\n6. Align the staff reporting structure and/or develop documented\n business rules to improve the collaboration, economy, and efficiency of\n the processes.\n\n7. Assess whether the new automated and manual business processes are\n delivering expected results and cost benefits once the system is\n stabilized.\n\n8. Pursue a well-conceived \xe2\x80\x9cSAP-Maximo only\xe2\x80\x9d strategy to reduce\n complexity in future releases of SAM implementation.\n\n 27\n\x0cRECOMMENDATIONS (continued)\nBased on lessons learned from SAM R1a implementation, we recommend that the Chief Information\nOfficer take the following actions for all ongoing and future major IT implementations:\n\n9. Develop testing policies and procedures to provide for a decision-making process that includes\n independent reviews of test plans and results before the plans are approved and after they are\n executed. The independent reviewers must certify to the steering committee the plan\xe2\x80\x99s\n completeness and test results to help provide assurance that implementation will be successful.\n Review of the plan\xe2\x80\x99s completeness should include but not be limited to:\n\n a. testing of end-to-end business processes, all system interfaces, and data that represent a\n broad cross-section of daily user transactions and business scenarios;\n\n b. quality and reliability of all transferred data;\n\n c. regression and volume testing of the new system; and\n\n d. involvement of key business users who are independent of project team members in user\n acceptance testing and approval.\n\n10. Develop and enforce standards for documenting \xe2\x80\x9cAs-Is\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cTo-Be\xe2\x80\x9d business processes at an\n appropriate level of detail, and gather detailed user requirements in developing new systems.\n For each program, IT should involve an adequate number of subject-matter experts and\n process owners during the requirements analysis, design, and testing phases.\n 28\n\x0cRECOMMENDATIONS (continued)\n11. To improve training programs for implementing new systems, the IT department -\n with the assistance of business owners - should\n\n a. develop training materials that document end-to-end business processes to help\n users understand the flow of transactions and their roles in the process,\n\n b. tailor training to employees\xe2\x80\x99 job responsibilities,\n\n c. include training on all related systems affected by the new business processes;\n\n d. deliver training only after the system is fully developed,\n\n e. pair trainers with subject-matter experts who are intimately familiar with the \xe2\x80\x9cAs-\n Is\xe2\x80\x9d and \xe2\x80\x9cTo-Be\xe2\x80\x9d business processes to crosswalk users from old to new processes,\n and\n\n f. assess the need for post-implementation training.\n\n12. On an ongoing basis, develop plans to train new employees on critical business\n systems and processes relevant to their assigned duties.\n\n\n 29\n\x0c 12\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\nStrategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n Appendix III\n\n MANAGEMENT COMMENTS\n\x0c 13\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\nStrategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\x0c 14\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\nStrategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\x0c 15\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\nStrategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\x0c 16\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\nStrategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\x0c 17\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n Appendix IV\n\n ABBREVIATIONS\n\n\nAAMPS Amtrak Accounting Materials and Procurement System\n\nCoE Center of Expertise\n\nERP Enterprise Resource Planning\n\nIT Information Technology\n\nLMS Labor Management System\n\nOIG Office of Inspector General\n\nSAM Strategic Asset Management\n\nSAP Systems Applications and Products\n\x0c 18\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n Appendix V\n\n OIG TEAM MEMBERS\n\nDavid R. Warren Assistant Inspector General, Audits\n\nVipul Doshi Senior Director, Audits\n\nVijay Chheda Audit Manager\n\nMike Baker Senior Auditor, IT\n\nAsha Sriramulu Senior Auditor, IT\n\nMichael P. Fruitman Principal Communications Officer\n\x0c 19\n Amtrak Office of Inspector General\n Strategic Asset Management Program: Opportunities to\n Improve Implementation and Lessons Learned\n Report No. OIG-E-2012-012, May 31, 2012\n\n OIG MISSION AND CONTACT INFORMATION\nAmtrak OIG\xe2\x80\x99s Mission Amtrak OIG\xe2\x80\x99s mission is to\n conduct and supervise independent and objective\n audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations\n relating to Amtrak programs and operations;\n promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency\n within Amtrak;\n prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in\n Amtrak's programs and operations; and\n review and make recommendations regarding\n existing and proposed legislation and regulations\n relating to Amtrak's programs and operations.\n\nObtaining Copies of OIG Available at our website: www.amtrakoig.gov.\nReports and Testimony\n\nTo Report Fraud, Waste, Report suspicious or illegal activities to the OIG Hotline\nand Abuse (you can remain anonymous):\n\n Web: www.amtrakoig.gov/hotline\n Phone: 800-468-5469\n\nCongressional and E. Bret Coulson, Senior Director\nPublic Affairs Congressional and Public Affairs\n Mail: Amtrak OIG\n 10 G Street, N.E., 3W-300\n Washington, DC 20002\n Phone: 202-906-4134\n Email: bret.coulson@amtrakoig.gov\n\x0c"


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