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♦ › Podatnik › 0114-KDIP1-2.4012.682.2018.1.IG
 Wnioskodawca dokonując sprzedaży Nieruchomości, nie będzie działał w charakterze podatnika podatku VAT, będzie jedynie korzystać z przysługującego prawa do rozporządzania własnym majątkiem. Sprzedaż Nieruchomości nie będzie podlegać opodatkowaniu podatkiem od towarów i usług.
 Na podstawie art. 13 § 2a, art. 14b § 1 ustawy z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. Ordynacja podatkowa (Dz. U. z 2018 r., poz. 800, z późn. zm.), Dyrektor Krajowej Informacji Skarbowej stwierdza, że stanowisko Wnioskodawcy przedstawione we wniosku z dnia 9 października 2018 r. (data wpływu 17 października 2018 r.), o wydanie interpretacji przepisów prawa podatkowego dotyczącej podatku od towarów i usług w zakresie uznania planowanej czynności sprzedaży działki za czynność podlegającą opodatkowaniu – jest prawidłowe.
 W dniu 17 października 2018 r. wpłynął ww. wniosek o wydanie interpretacji indywidualnej dotyczącej podatku od towarów i usług w zakresie uznania planowanej czynności sprzedaży działki za czynność podlegającą opodatkowaniu.
 Wnioskodawca zamierza zbyć na rzecz Sp. z o.o. prawo własności części nieruchomości, położonej na działce oznaczonej w ewidencji gruntów numerem 313/1 dla której Sąd Rejonowy prowadzi księgę wieczystą.
 Wnioskodawca nabył Nieruchomość w dniu 14 lipca 2005 r. od osoby fizycznej niebędącej podatnikiem podatku od towarów i usług.
 Wnioskodawca jest żonaty, przy czym w jego związku małżeńskim obowiązuje umowna rozdzielność majątkowa. Nieruchomość stanowi i stanowiła w momencie jej nabycia element majątku osobistego Wnioskodawcy.
 Nieruchomość w momencie nabycia była nieruchomością rolną oraz nie była objęta planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego, jak również nie została wydana dla niej decyzja o warunkach zabudowy ani pozwolenie na budowę jakiegokolwiek obiektu.
 Nieruchomość ta nie została nabyta przez Wnioskodawcę w związku z wykonywaniem działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT, w tym w szczególności nie została nabyta z zamiarem jej dalszej odsprzedaży w wykonaniu tej działalności. Wnioskodawca nie prowadził na Nieruchomości działalności gospodarczej, bowiem stanowiła ona prywatny majątek Wnioskodawcy.
 W 2015 r. Urząd Gminy objął przedmiotową Nieruchomość miejscowym planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego. Nieruchomość znajduje się w jednostkach oznaczonych jako: tereny produkcji, tereny obsługi komunikacji samochodowej, tereny obsługi infrastruktury technicznej, drogi klasy lokalnej, droga klasy dojazdowej, droga dojazdowa do gruntów rolnych.
 W związku z powyższym, aktualnie sprzedawana Nieruchomość nie stanowi nieruchomości rolnej w rozumieniu ustawy z dnia 11 kwietnia 2003 r. o kształtowaniu ustroju rolnego (Dz. U. z 2018 r., poz. 1405 ze zm.) oraz art. 461 ustawy z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks cywilny (Dz. U. z 2018 r., poz. 1025 ze zm.).
 Sprzedaż Nieruchomości zostanie dokonana za wynagrodzeniem.
 Wnioskodawca zbywając Nieruchomość, nie będzie działał w ramach wykonywanej działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT. Zbycie Nieruchomości ma charakter incydentalny i w rezultacie prowadzi do wyzbycia się części majątku osobistego. Wnioskodawca pragnie wskazać, że nie podejmował żadnej aktywności w przedmiocie zbycia Nieruchomości, tj. działań wykraczających poza zakres zwykłego zarządu majątkiem prywatnym, w szczególności nie występował o wydanie decyzji o warunkach zabudowy, nie uzbrajał terenu Nieruchomości oraz nie podejmował działań marketingowych ukierunkowanych na zbycie Nieruchomości. Wnioskodawca pragnie podkreślić, że to Spółka - w związku z zamiarem realizacji inwestycji, obejmującej również działki sąsiadujące z Nieruchomością - wystąpiła do Wnioskodawcy z ofertą zakupu Nieruchomości.
 Należy również wskazać, że Wnioskodawca od momentu nabycia Nieruchomości w 2005 r., nie dokonywał żadnych istotnych ingerencji w stan fizyczny (faktyczny), jak i prawny Nieruchomości. W szczególności nie dokonywano żadnych czynności mających na celu umożliwienie albo ułatwienie sprzedaży Nieruchomości, a także nie podejmowano żadnych działań w celu uatrakcyjnienia Nieruchomości dla potencjalnych kupujących. Wnioskodawca nie uzbroił ani nie ogrodził działki, w skład której wchodzi Nieruchomość.
 Na marginesie Wnioskodawca pragnie wskazać, że jest wspólnikiem spółki cywilnej. Należy jednak nadmienić, że wspólnicy przedmiotowej spółki cywilnej prowadzą działalność w innym miejscu (niż miejsce położenia Nieruchomości) oraz w zakresie niezwiązanym w jakikolwiek sposób z Nieruchomością (tj. w branży gastronomicznej - prowadzona jest restauracja). Spółka cywilna jest zarejestrowanym podatnikiem VAT (jako podatnik VAT czynny).
 Czy sprzedaż Spółce Nieruchomości przez Wnioskodawcę będzie podlegać opodatkowaniu VAT?
 Zdaniem Wnioskodawcy, sprzedaż Nieruchomości nie będzie podlegać opodatkowaniu VAT, bowiem Wnioskodawca nie będzie działał w ramach przedmiotowej transakcji jako podatnik VAT.
 Zgodnie z art. 15 ust. 1 Ustawy z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Dz. U. z 2018 r. poz. 2174, z późn. zm.), zwanej ustawą o VAT, podatnikami są osoby prawne, jednostki organizacyjne niemające osobowości prawnej oraz osoby fizyczne, wykonujące samodzielnie działalność gospodarczą w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT, bez względu na cel i rezultat takiej działalności. Stosownie do art. 15 ust. 2 Ustawy VAT, działalność gospodarcza na gruncie VAT powinna być rozumiana jako działalność obejmująca działalność producentów, handlowców lub usługodawców, w tym podmiotów pozyskujących zasoby naturalne oraz rolników, a także działalność osób wykonujących wolne zawody. Działalność gospodarcza obejmuje w szczególności czynności polegające na wykorzystywaniu towarów lub wartości niematerialnych i prawnych w sposób ciągły dla celów zarobkowych.
 Natomiast w przypadku, gdy osoby fizyczne dokonują sprzedaży, przekazania, bądź darowizny towarów stanowiących część ich majątku osobistego, tj. majątku, który nie został nabyty w celu jego odsprzedaży w ramach prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej (w rozumieniu przepisów Ustawy VAT), bądź wykonywania innych czynności w ramach działalności gospodarczej w świetle tejże Ustawy, to osoby takie nie powinny być uznane za podatników VAT z tytułu tego typu transakcji. Jako że sprzedaż składników majątku stanowi jeden z podstawowych przejawów wykonywania prawa własności, sprzedaż składników należących do majątku osobistego nie powinna zostać uznana za dokonaną w ramach prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu przepisów Ustawy VAT. Zatem, należy odróżnić sytuacje, w których dany podmiot dokonuje określonych czynności w odniesieniu do majątku osobistego, tj. w odniesieniu do towarów nabytych w celu innym niż wykonywanie działalności gospodarczej od sytuacji, gdy działa w ramach jej prowadzenia.
 Zgodnie ze stanowiskami prezentowanymi przez organy podatkowe w wydawanych interpretacjach nie jest podatnikiem podatku od towarów i usług ten, kto jako osoba fizyczna dokonuje jednorazowych lub okazjonalnych transakcji, za które nie jest przewidziana ściśle regularna zapłata oraz nie prowadzi zorganizowanej, czy zarejestrowanej działalności gospodarczej, a tylko np. wyzbywa się majątku osobistego. Dokonywanie określonych czynności incydentalnie, poza sferą prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej, również nie pozwala na uznanie danego podmiotu za podatnika w zakresie tych czynności. (tak np. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu w interpretacji z dnia 20 maja 2014 r., sygn. ILPP1/443-214/14-4/JSK).
 Konsekwentnie, aby ustalić czy transakcja będąca przedmiotem zapytania Wnioskodawcy podlega opodatkowaniu VAT, należy przeanalizować, czy Wnioskodawca dokonując sprzedaży Nieruchomości działa jako podatnik VAT, tj. w ramach swojej działalności gospodarczej (w rozumieniu przepisów Ustawy VAT).
 Jak podkreśla się w orzecznictwie Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej [TSUE], w zakresie zbadania czy sprzedający występuje w związku ze sprzedażą działki jako podatnik VAT, istotne jest zaangażowanie aktywów (środków) danego podmiotu, mogących wskazywać, że działa on jak profesjonalny handlowiec (w takim zakresie, jak np. w przypadku pośrednictwa w obrocie nieruchomościami - por. TSUE w wyroku z dnia 15 września 2011 r. w połączonych sprawach C 180/10 i C-181/10 Jarosław Słaby v. Minister Finansów (C-180/10) oraz Emilian Kuć i Halina Jeziorska-Kuć v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Warszawie (C-181/10)). W przypadku sprzedaży działek, wg TSUE kluczowymi elementami wskazującymi na profesjonalny charakter działań danego podmiotu, może być np. uzbrojenie terenu lub prowadzenie działań marketingowych mających na celu sprzedaż działek. Okoliczności przemawiające za tym, że dany podmiot działa aktywnie w zakresie obrotu nieruchomościami, mogą dotyczyć również podejmowanych starań o uchwalenie planu zagospodarowania przestrzennego lub wydania decyzji o warunkach zabudowy.
 Należy podkreślić, iż powyższe stanowisko TSUE, co do uznania sprzedaży nieruchomości za dokonaną w ramach prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT koresponduje z poglądami organów podatkowych wyrażanymi w wydawanych indywidualnych interpretacjach podatkowych. Przykładowo w interpretacji z dnia 6 czerwca 2013 r. (sygn. IPPP3/443-293/13-2/MKw) Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Warszawie stwierdził, iż „W świetle definicji zawartej w art. 15 ustawy o podatku od towarów i usług, dla uznania określonych zachowań danego podmiotu za działalność gospodarczą istotne znaczenie ma ich zorganizowany charakter. Przy czym, taka działalność wystąpi również w przypadku wykorzystywania towarów lub wartości niematerialnych i prawnych w sposób ciągły dla celów zarobkowych. Zatem dostawa towarów (w tym gruntów) będzie podlegała opodatkowaniu podatkiem od towarów i usług w sytuacji, gdy działaniom podmiotu dokonującego tej dostawy, można przypisać znamiona prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej, co w efekcie przesądza o uzyskaniu przez niego statusu podatnika. Dodatkowo należy wskazać, że działalność gospodarcza powinna cechować się stałością, powtarzalnością i niezależnością jej wykonywania, bowiem związana jest z profesjonalnym obrotem gospodarczym. Ponadto w kwestii opodatkowania dostawy gruntów istotne znaczenie ma fakt czy w świetle zaprezentowanego we wniosku zdarzenia przyszłego Wnioskodawca w celu dokonania sprzedaży gruntu podjął aktywne działania w zakresie obrotu nieruchomościami, angażując środki podobne do wykorzystywanych przez producenta, handlowca i usługodawców w rozumieniu art. 15 ust. 2 ustawy, co skutkuje koniecznością uznania go za podmiot prowadzący działalność gospodarczą w rozumieniu tego przepisu, a więc za podatnika podatku od towarów i usług, czy też sprzedaż nastąpiła w ramach zarządu majątkiem prywatnym”.
 W interpretacji indywidualnej z dnia 29 stycznia 2014 r. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Warszawie (sygn. IPPP2/443-1214/13-5/DG) potwierdził, że „Z zawartego we wniosku opisu sprawy nie wynika taka aktywność Zainteresowanej, która wykraczałaby poza ramy czynności związanych ze zwykłym wykonywaniem prawa własności. W niniejszej sprawie Wnioskodawczyni nie podjęła ciągu działań (takich jak: nabycie terenu przeznaczonego pod zabudowę, uzbrojenie terenu, jego podział, ogrodzenie działek, aktywne i wszechstronne poszukiwanie nabywców itd.), które wskazywałyby na aktywność w zakresie obrotu nieruchomościami. A zatem, w rozpatrywanej sprawie brak jest przesłanek pozwalających uznać Zainteresowaną za podatnika w rozumieniu art. 15 ust. 1 ustawy, prowadzącego działalność gospodarczą, w myśl art. 15 ust. 2 ustawy, polegającą na handlu nieruchomościami”.
 Wnioskodawca pragnie także podkreślić, że niezależnie od jego woli uchwalono miejscowy plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego obejmujący również Nieruchomość. W rezultacie, Wnioskodawca nie występował o wydanie decyzji o warunkach zabudowy. W ocenie Wnioskodawcy powyższe potwierdza, że Wnioskodawca z tytułu sprzedaży Nieruchomości nie będzie działał w charakterze podatnika VAT.
 W konsekwencji, mając na uwadze przedstawione powyżej argumenty, Wnioskodawca z tytułu transakcji sprzedaży Nieruchomości nie powinien być traktowany jako podatnik prowadzący działalność gospodarczą w rozumieniu przepisów Ustawy VAT (na marginesie Wnioskodawca wskazuje, że sprzedaż Nieruchomości opodatkowana będzie podatkiem od czynności cywilnoprawnych ze stawką 2%, przy czym podatnikiem z tego tytułu będzie Spółka jako kupujący).
 Powyżej zaprezentowane stanowisko potwierdzają liczne interpretacje organów podatkowych, m.in.:
 Interpretacja Dyrektora Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu z dnia 19 maja 2014 r. (sygn. ILPP5/443-50/14-4/PG), w której stwierdzono, iż „Uwzględniając przywołane wyżej przepisy oraz orzecznictwo należy stwierdzić, że w rozpatrywanej sprawie brak jest podstaw do uznania Zainteresowanego - w związku ze sprzedażą opisanej we wniosku nieruchomości gruntowej - za podatnika podatku od towarów i usług. Co prawda Wnioskodawca zamierza dokonać podziału przedmiotowego gruntu na mniejsze działki oraz zamieszczać ogłoszenia o ich sprzedaży, jednakże powyższych zdarzeń (stanowiących pojedyncze z okoliczności przykładowo wskazanych w orzeczeniu w sprawach C-180/10 i C-181/10) nie można uznać za środki zbliżone do tych jakie podejmują podmioty zajmujące się profesjonalnie obrotem nieruchomościami, lecz za zwykły zarząd prywatną nieruchomością. Zainteresowany nie zamierza bowiem ponieść nakładów związanych z przygotowaniem działek do sprzedaży, nie wnioskował też w jakikolwiek sposób o objęcie nieruchomości planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego. Ponadto przedmiotowe grunty nie są i nie były udostępniane innym podmiotom na podstawie umów cywilnoprawnych jak też nigdy nie były związane z prowadzoną działalnością gospodarczą. (...) W rozpatrywanej sprawie sprzedaż działek można uznać za czynność związaną ze zwykłym wykonywaniem prawa własności. Zainteresowany dokonując dostawy działek będzie korzystać z przysługującego mu prawa do rozporządzania własnym majątkiem, która to czynność oznacza działanie w sferze prywatnej, do której unormowania ustawy o podatku od towarów i usług nie mają zastosowania”.
 Interpretacja Dyrektora Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu z dnia 16 maja 2014 r. (sygn. ILPP4/443-72/14-4/ISN), zgodnie z którą: „Z orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej z dnia 15 września 2011 r. w sprawach połączonych Jarosław Słaby przeciwko Ministrowi Finansów (C-180/10) oraz Emilian Kuć i Halina Jeziorska-Kuć przeciwko Dyrektorowi Izby Skarbowej w Warszawie (C-181/10) wynika, że czynności związane ze zwykłym wykonywaniem prawa własności nie mogą same z siebie być uznawane za prowadzenie działalności gospodarczej. Sama liczba i zakres transakcji sprzedaży nie mogą stanowić kryterium rozróżnienia między czynnościami dokonywanymi prywatnie, które znajdują się poza zakresem zastosowania Dyrektywy, a czynnościami stanowiącymi działalność gospodarczą. Podobnie - zdaniem Trybunału - okoliczność, że przed sprzedażą zainteresowany dokonał podziału gruntu na działki w celu osiągnięcia wyższej ceny łącznej. Całość powyższych elementów może bowiem odnosić się do zarządzania majątkiem prywatnym zainteresowanego.(...) W związku z powyższym, Wnioskodawca sprzedając przedmiotowe działki będzie korzystał z przysługującego mu prawa do rozporządzania majątkiem osobistym, zatem czynność ta nie będzie oznaczać wykonywania działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu art. 15 ust. 2 ustawy. Brak tego statusu pozbawi Zainteresowanego cech podatnika podatku VAT, o którym mowa w art. 15 ust. 1 ustawy, w zakresie planowanej sprzedaży działek, a dostawie działek cech czynności opodatkowanej, o której mowa w art. 5 ust. 1 pkt 1 ustawy”.
 Wnioskodawca wskazuje, że nie nabył Nieruchomości w ramach prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej (w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT), w tym w szczególności w celu jej dalszej odsprzedaży. Sprzedaż Nieruchomości nastąpi po 13 latach od jej zakupu. Ze względu na fakt, że zmieniło się przeznaczenie Nieruchomości ze względu na uchwalony plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego, niemożliwe było już ewentualne prowadzenie działalności rolniczej na tej Nieruchomości. Co więcej, w związku z faktem, że Nieruchomość została nabyta do majątku osobistego Wnioskodawcy, a jego działalność w zakresie sprzedaży Nieruchomości nie będzie miała charakteru profesjonalnego tj. w szczególności nie dokonano uzbrojeń terenu, jego ogrodzenia, nie prowadzono żadnych działań marketingowych w celu jej sprzedaży, a także nie podejmowano starań o uchwalenie planu zagospodarowania przestrzennego lub wydania decyzji o warunkach zabudowy, w ocenie Wnioskodawcy, Wnioskodawca nie działa w tym zakresie jako podatnik VAT prowadzący działalność gospodarczą w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT.
 W konsekwencji, zdaniem Wnioskodawcy, w związku z tym, iż Wnioskodawca nie działa w ramach przedmiotowej transakcji w charakterze podatnika prowadzącego działalność gospodarczą w rozumieniu przepisów Ustawy VAT, sprzedaż Nieruchomości nie powinna podlegać opodatkowaniu VAT.
 Z opisu sprawy wynika, że Wnioskodawca za wynagrodzeniem zamierza zbyć prawo własności części nieruchomości.
 Wnioskodawca nabył Nieruchomość od osoby fizycznej niebędącej podatnikiem podatku od towarów i usług.
 Nieruchomość stanowi i stanowiła w momencie jej nabycia element majątku osobistego Wnioskodawcy. Nieruchomość w momencie nabycia była nieruchomością rolną oraz nie była objęta planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego, jak również nie została wydana dla niej decyzja o warunkach zabudowy ani pozwolenie na budowę jakiegokolwiek obiektu. Nieruchomość ta nie została nabyta przez Wnioskodawcę w związku z wykonywaniem działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT, w tym w szczególności nie została nabyta z zamiarem jej dalszej odsprzedaży w wykonaniu tej działalności. Wnioskodawca nie prowadził na Nieruchomości działalności gospodarczej, bowiem stanowiła ona prywatny majątek Wnioskodawcy.
 Wnioskodawca wskazał, że jest wspólnikiem spółki cywilnej, ale wspólnicy przedmiotowej spółki cywilnej prowadzą działalność w innym miejscu niż miejsce położenia Nieruchomości oraz w zakresie niezwiązanym w jakikolwiek sposób z Nieruchomością (w branży gastronomicznej).
 W 2015 r. Urząd Gminy objął przedmiotową Nieruchomość miejscowym planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego.
 Wnioskodawca zbywając Nieruchomość, nie będzie działał w ramach wykonywanej działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu Ustawy VAT. Zbycie Nieruchomości ma charakter incydentalny i w rezultacie prowadzi do wyzbycia się części majątku osobistego. Wnioskodawca wskazał, że nie podejmował żadnej aktywności w przedmiocie zbycia Nieruchomości, tj. działań wykraczających poza zakres zwykłego zarządu majątkiem prywatnym, w szczególności nie występował o wydanie decyzji o warunkach zabudowy, nie uzbrajał terenu Nieruchomości oraz nie podejmował działań marketingowych ukierunkowanych na zbycie Nieruchomości. Wnioskodawca podkreślił, że to Spółka - w związku z zamiarem realizacji inwestycji, obejmującej również działki sąsiadujące z Nieruchomością - wystąpiła do Wnioskodawcy z ofertą zakupu Nieruchomości.
 Wnioskodawca od momentu nabycia Nieruchomości w 2005 r., nie dokonywał żadnych istotnych ingerencji w stan fizyczny - faktyczny, jak i prawny Nieruchomości. W szczególności nie dokonywano żadnych czynności mających na celu umożliwienie albo ułatwienie sprzedaży Nieruchomości, a także nie podejmowano żadnych działań w celu uatrakcyjnienia Nieruchomości dla potencjalnych kupujących. Wnioskodawca nie uzbroił ani nie ogrodził działki, w skład której wchodzi Nieruchomość.
 Wątpliwości Wnioskodawcy dotyczą kwestii czy sprzedaż Nieruchomości będzie podlegać opodatkowaniu VAT.
 Analiza sprawy w kontekście powołanych przepisów oraz wyroku TSUE z dnia 15 września 2011 r. w sprawach C-180/10 i C-181/10 prowadzi do wniosku, że sprzedaż przedmiotowej Nieruchomości nie będzie podlegała opodatkowaniu podatkiem od towarów i usług, gdyż brak jest przesłanek, aby w związku z tą transakcją uznać Wnioskodawcę za podatnika tego podatku.
 Pomimo, że grunt spełnia definicję towaru, o którym mowa w art. 2 pkt 6 ustawy o podatku od towarów i usług, to nie można uznać, że przy dokonywaniu sprzedaży Nieruchomości Wnioskodawca będzie działał w charakterze handlowca, o którym mowa w art. 15 ust. 1 ustawy.
 Należy stwierdzić, że w przedstawionych we wniosku okolicznościach, Wnioskodawca nie podejmował aktywnych działań w celu sprzedaży Nieruchomości, które wykraczałyby poza ramy czynności związanych ze zwykłym wykonywaniem prawa własności. Jak wskazano Wnioskodawca nie podejmował żadnej aktywności w przedmiocie zbycia Nieruchomości. Wnioskodawca nie dokonywał żadnych czynności mających na celu umożliwienie albo ułatwienie sprzedaży Nieruchomości, a także nie podejmował żadnych działań w celu uatrakcyjnienia Nieruchomości dla potencjalnych kupujących. Wnioskodawca od momentu nabycia Nieruchomości w 2005 r., nie dokonywał żadnych istotnych ingerencji w stan fizyczny (faktyczny), jak i prawny Nieruchomości. Wnioskodawca nie występował o wydanie decyzji o warunkach zabudowy, nie uzbrajał terenu Nieruchomości oraz nie podejmował działań marketingowych ukierunkowanych na zbycie Nieruchomości. Wnioskodawca nie uzbroił ani nie ogrodził działki, w skład której wchodzi Nieruchomość. Jak wskazano Nieruchomość nie została nabyta przez Wnioskodawcę w związku z wykonywaniem działalności gospodarczej w rozumieniu ustawy VAT, w tym w szczególności nie została nabyta z zamiarem jej dalszej odsprzedaży w wykonaniu tej działalności. Wnioskodawca nie prowadził na Nieruchomości działalności gospodarczej. Jedynie w 2015 r. Urząd Gminy objął przedmiotową Nieruchomość miejscowym planem zagospodarowania przestrzennego.
 Zatem, mając na uwadze wskazane informacje należy stwierdzić, że Wnioskodawca nie podjął ciągu działań, które wskazywałyby na aktywność w zakresie obrotu nieruchomościami.
 Tym samym Wnioskodawca dokonując sprzedaży przedmiotowej Nieruchomości, nie będzie działał w charakterze podatnika podatku VAT, a będzie jedynie korzystać z przysługującego prawa do rozporządzania własnym majątkiem. W konsekwencji sprzedaż przedmiotowej Nieruchomości nie będzie podlegać opodatkowaniu podatkiem od towarów i usług.
 0114-KDIP1-2.4012.682.2018.1.IG
 0114-KDIP1-1.4012.665.2018.1.AM | Interpretacja indywidualna
 0114-KDIP1-1.4012.627.2018.3.RR | Interpretacja indywidualna
 ILPP1/443-214/14-4/JSK | Interpretacja indywidualna
 ILPP4/443-72/14-4/ISN | Interpretacja indywidualna
 ILPP5/443-50/14-4/PG | Interpretacja indywidualna
 IPPP2/443-1214/13-5/DG | Interpretacja indywidualna


type: wikipedia

text:
Is é Iúr Cinn Trá nó Cathair an Iúir (Béarla: Newry) an ceathrú cathair is mó i dTuaisceart Éireann de réir daonra, i ndiaidh Bhéal Feirste, Dhoire Choilm Cille agus Lios na gCearrbhach. Tá tuairim agus 28,000 duine ann (pobal an tSrutháin san áireamh). I ndeisceart Chontae an Dúin/Chontae Ard Mhacha atá sé, agus é timpeall 40 míle ó Bhéal Feirste agus 60 míle ó Bhaile Átha Cliath.
 Bunaíodh é sa bhliain 1144 in aice le mainistir Chistéirseach.
 Bhronn Muirechertach Mac Lochlainn, Rí Chineál Eoghain agus Ardrí Éireann (c. 1154 - 1156), breis talún ar na Cistéirsigh le Chairt nó Donatio, rud a rinne sé tar éis dó dul i gcomhairle le Mael Maedoc, Easpag Ard Mhacha. Tá an cháipéis sin ar taispeáint in Iarsmalann na Cathrach.
 Chuaigh fás ar Iúr Cinn Trá mar bhaile margaidh agus garastúin, agus rinneadh longphort de sa bhliain 1742 nuair a nasc an chéad chanáil in Éirinn le Loch nEathach é. I Mí Mhárta 2002 d'fhógair an Bhanríon Eilís II Iúr Cinn Trá ina chathair.
 Áirítear Ardeaglais Chaitliceach Iúr Cinn Trá agus Halla na Cathrach ar mhórfhoirgnimh na cathrach. Tá iarsmalann agus ionad éalaíon ann freisin. Díol spéise é Halla an Bhaile mar gur tógadh é os cionn na habhann atá ina críoch ag Contae an Dúin agus ag Contae Ard Mhacha.
 Riarachán
 Tá Comhairle an Iúir agus Mhúrn freagrach as riarachán logánta an cheantair. Is iad Oifigí na Comhairle, Rae Mhuineacháin, príomhionad riaracháin na Comhairle. Tá na ranna a leanas lonnaithe ar Rae Mhuineacháin:
 Roinn an Chléirigh
 Riarachán
 Airgeadas
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 Sláinte Chomhshaoil
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 Stair
 Iúr Cinn Trá
 Is é Naomh Pádraig an chéad duine a bhfuil iomrá air i scéal an Iúir de réir an tseanchais. Deirtear gurb eisean a chuir crann iúir ag ceann na trá i nGleann Rí, agus gur as sin a ainmníodh an bhaile.
 Bunaíodh an Mhainistir Chistéirseach sa bhliain 1144. Fuair an Mhainistir cairt ó Mhuircheartach Mac Lochlainn, Ardrí Éireann, sa bhliain 1157, an t-aon chairt dá cineál a bhfuil cóip di ar marthain go dtí an lá inniu.
 Teaghlach Bagenal
 Scoireadh an Mhainistir sa bhliain 1545. Ghlac Nicholas Bagenal, an t-eachtránaí Sasanach, seilbh ar Theach an Aba, agus dhaingnigh sé an baile. I gceann tamaill rinneadh Marascal na hÉireann de. Ba chorrach é réimeas mhuintir Bagenal san Iúr i gcúrsaí cogaidh agus polaitíochta. Ghlac Conn Mag Aonghusa seilbh ar an bhaile sa bhliain 1641, ach ghéill sé don Choirnéal Venables, ceannasaí de chuid Chromail sa bhliain 1649. Loisc Diúc Bheirbhic an baile sa bhliain 1689 le linn Chogadh an Dá Rí. Fuair an duine deireanach de Mhuintir Bagenal bás sa bhliain 1712.
 Atógáil an Bhaile san 18ú Céad
 Ba é ceantar an Iúir an príomhbhealach isteach i gCúige Uladh, agus dá bhrí sin atógadh an bhaile.
 Leag Iarla Hillsborough plean úr amach don bhaile, agus é ag tarraingt lár an bhaile síos ó na hardáin chun riasca an ghleanna. Ba í Sráid Hill cnámh droma an bhaile de réir an phlean seo agus trí chearnóg ann, ach sa deireadh níor tógadh ach dhá cheann, Cearnóg Margaret agus Cearnóg Marcus. Tá Páirc Cholmáin le fáil san áit a raibh an tríú cearnóg le tógáil. Tógadh tithe arda galánta ar Shráid Hill agus tithe stóir cois abhann agus ar chéanna na canála.
 Canáil an Iúir
 Sa bhliain 1742 cuireadh canáil Loch nEathach i gcrích agus tháinig ráthúnas ar an Iúir de bharr díol agus ceannach earraí ó chúlchríocha leathana an bhaile. Tógadh foirgnimh bhreátha phríobháideacha, phoiblí agus thráchtala dá bharr agus cuid mhaith acu ann go fóill. Sa bhliain 1777 bhí an tIúr ar an gceathrú baile ba mhó in Éirinn. Bhí borradh faoi thionscal an lín agus bhí minearraí gloine agus gloine ghearrtha á ndéanamh ann. Bhí clódóirí ann agus clóbhualadh saothair le Voltaire, agus le Jean Rousseau.
 Cúrsaí tionsclaíochta sa 19ú haois
 Ísllú céime a thug an bóthar iarainn don bhaile. Laghdaigh trácht na canála go mór agus thug Béal Feirstr an báire léi i gcúrsaí tráchtála. Mar sin féin, rinneadh dul chun cinn: rinneadh longchanáil nua ó Dhuga Albert amach chun na farraige, rud a mheall ceannaithe guail. Le linn Chogadh Cathartha Mheiricea bhí ganntanas cadáis ar fud an domhain agus ba bheag an mhoill ar an Iúr agus ar an Sruthán dul i mbun líon a shníomh.
 San 20ú Céad
 Sa bhliain 1881 bhí 15,590 duine ina gcónaí ar an Iúr, ach laghdaigh an daonra as sin amach anuas go dtí na seascaidí, rud a bhain le druideadh na canála, na muilte, an trambhealaigh agus an iarnróid. Ach i ndeireadh na 1970í cuireadh airgead isteach sa chumarsáid, in áiseanna shláinte agus san oideachas, rud a rinneadh beag beann ar na Trioblóidí agus a ghríosaigh daoine chun cuideachtaí nua idirnáisiúnta a chur ar bun ar nós Shaotharlann Norbrook agus Glen Dimplex.
 Inniu
 Tá an baile ag fás fós agus daonra 25,000 duine ann. Tá sráideanna nua-aimseartha ann, ionaid siopadóireachta agus óstáin. Tá na teicneolaíocht nua agus an treallús ag coinneáil na cathrach chun tosaigh i ngeilleagar na hÉireann.
 Daoine
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 Gerard Murphy
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 Seán Hillen
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 Kieran Cunningham
 Terence 'Banjo' Bannon
 Danny McAlinden
 Matthew Russell
 W. J. Barre
 The Four of Us.
 Tíreolaíocht
 Spórt
 Sacar
 Newry City F.C. a imríonn ins na [The Showgrounds (Newry)|Showgrounds]].
 CLG
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 Rugby Union
 Newry RFC play their home games at Telford Park on the outskirts of the city.
 Iompar
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 An Chéad Eaglais Phreispitéireach (Neamh-aontaithe) - pobal de chuid Eaglais Phreispitéireach Neamh-aontaithe na hÉireann.
 Tagairtí
 Naisc sheachtracha
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 Comhairle an Iúir agus Mhúrn
 Féach freisin
 Cathracha Thuaisceart Éireann
 Bailte i gContae an Dúin
 Bailte i gContae Ard Mhacha


type: caselaw

jurisdiction: US

text:
 796 A.2d 75 (2002)
 368 Md. 480
 MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION,
 v.
 Knowlton R. ATTERBEARY.
 No. 76, Sept. Term 2001.
 Court of Appeals of Maryland.
 April 9, 2002.
 *77 Valerie Johnston Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Glen Burnie, for petitioner/cross-respondent.
 Reginald W. Bours, III (Reginald W. Bours, III, P.C., on brief), Rockville, for respondent/cross-petitioner.
 Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
 *76 BATTAGLIA, Judge.
 Petitioner, Motor Vehicle Administration (hereinafter "MVA"), asks us to consider what constitutes a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test in light of the two hour time limitation for such tests imposed by Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Section 10-303 of the Courts *78 and Judicial Proceedings Article, where the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated has expressed a desire to consult with an attorney prior to making a test decision. Respondent, Knowlton Atterbeary, filed a cross-petition requesting consideration of what conduct constitutes driving or attempting to drive for purposes of triggering the implied consent provisions of Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol.), Section 16-205.1(a)(2) of the Transportation Article.
 I. Facts
 In the early morning hours of April 22, 2000, the Montgomery County Police received a call from fire and rescue personnel requesting assistance with an individual, later determined to be the respondent, Atterbeary, who was slumped behind the wheel of his car at 3121 Automotive Boulevard in front of the Herb Gordon Oldsmobile dealership. Montgomery County Police Officers Mondini and Williams responded to the call. Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Mondini observed Atterbeary sitting in the driver's seat of his Mercedes with the keys in the ignition, the engine running, and the dome light illuminated. Officer Mondini was advised by the Fire/Rescue personnel that they had attempted to speak to Atterbeary, but that he refused to get out of his car and would only roll down the window about an inch. Officer Mondini iterated his need to speak with Atterbeary twice, after which Atterbeary rolled down the window far enough for the officer to reach inside and unlock the door. Officer Mondini noticed Atterbeary's slurred speech and bloodshot eyes as well as a strong odor of alcohol emanating from him.
 Officer Mondini attempted to administer several field sobriety tests to Atterbeary, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, and one-leg stand, to no avail. Each time the officer gave the instruction to perform the test, Atterbeary responded that he did not understand. When the officer repeated the instructions, Atterbeary said he could not hear the officer. After the third attempt at clarifying the instructions, Atterbeary performed each test and failed them. Thereafter, Officer Mondini took Atterbeary to the police station in Silver Spring.
 At the police station, according to the testimony of Officer Mondini, the officer read the DR-15 Form[1] to Atterbeary, and *79 Atterbeary indicated his willingness to take the breathalizer test. The officer then asked Atterbeary to sign the consent provision on the DR-15 Form acknowledging his willingness to submit to the test. At that point, Atterbeary stated that he did not understand the DR-15 Form and wanted to read it for himself. Officer Mondini gave the form to Atterbeary and then left the room for several minutes. After Officer Mondini returned, Atterbeary informed the officer that he wished to speak to an attorney. When Officer Mondini asked Atterbeary for the name and number of the attorney, Atterbeary stated that he did not have one at the moment. Officer Mondini stated that he asked "him again to sign [the form] and he refused to sign it, which to me he refused to take the breath test." Officer Mondini then asked Atterbeary several routine questions, such as his date of birth and social security number, as part of the officer's completion of the DR-15A Form.[2] Atterbeary responded to each question by stating that he wanted to speak to an attorney. In response to each of the unanswered questions on the DR-15A Form, Officer Mondini filled in the word "refused."[3]
 On the form, Officer Mondini had initially checked the box which stated that Atterbeary agreed to submit to an alcohol concentration test, but then crossed it out and marked the refusal box instead. No attempt was ever made to administer the breathalyzer test to Atterbeary. Officer Mondini issued a citation to Atterbeary for driving while intoxicated, called him a cab and released him.
 Atterbeary requested and hearings were held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on July 26 and October 24, 2000.[4] At the hearings, Atterbeary objected to entering Officer Mondini's certification in evidence, because he asserted that the certification did not adequately describe the location of the offense other than to state that it took place in Montgomery County. He argued, therefore, that the MVA had failed to make a prima facie showing that Atterbeary was driving or attempting to drive on a public highway or private property used by the public in general. Throughout his testimony, Atterbeary also maintained that he never refused to sign *80 the form or refused to take a breathalyzer test.
 In his findings of fact, the ALJ stated:
 Licensee asserts that road where he was approached by officer is a private road. I disagreeevidence by officer and by photo is that it is a public road used by the public in general. Licensee asked for an attorney. When asked for name & phone number he said he did not have one at the moment. I conclude Licensee did not have an attorney to call. Thereafter licensee kept answering he wanted to talk with an attorney to all questions. I conclude therefore he refused to take the test.
 He concluded that Officer Mondini had a reasonable basis pursuant to Section 16-205.1 of the Maryland Transportation Article to believe that Atterbeary was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol, and that at the time of the incident, Atterbeary was located on a highway or private property which was used generally by the public.
 Atterbeary filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the ALJ's decision in the Circuit Court for Howard County[5] pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Section 10-222 of the State Government Article. The Circuit Court found that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Atterbeary was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated on a public road. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court concluded that Officer Mondini had acted in haste in determining that Atterbeary had refused the breathalyzer test:
 With regard, however, to the reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, I think Officer Mondini, in plain English, and no pun intended, jumped the gun. I think the evidencethere is no evidence in the transcript that says, look, we need to get a breathalyzer operator in here. We need to have x-amount of minutes in order to start up the machine and so forth. There is no question that an individual can thwart or attempt to thwart the giving of the intoximeter test or other breath test or test by blood, by pushing the two-hour limit. But there is no evidence of that here.
 In other words, there is no testimony that I found in the record that where Officer Mondini said, look, we went back to the Silver Spring station, but I would have, at that hour of the morning, I would have had to call in an intoximeter person, and I told the defendant that that's going to take 22 minutes, approximately, and it's going to take x-amount of minutes to start up the machine, et cetera, et cetera. There is nothing in there. So when you take a look at the time of arrest, and the time that the officer determined a refusal, it was just too quick.
 And, therefore, the Court, while it agrees that the State has no obligation to provide information specific to an arrestee of a name, or address, or phone number of an attorney, basically, in my opinion, Officer Mondini should have said, you know, Mr. Atterbeary, here's the phone, call whoever you want. And if Mr. Atterbeary could not get in touch with an attorney, the officer should have said, Mr. Atterbeary, I need to have your election by X and X time. I have *81 to take the test within the two hours. And if you don't tell me by such a[nd] such a time, that's going to thwart that, and I have to then count that as [a] refusal. Basically, Officer Mondini just went too fartoo fast, I should say. It may have been the same outcome, but I don't know that. So on that issue it's reversed.
 Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, the Circuit Court entered an order reversing the ALJ's decision to suspend Atterbeary's license, and remanded the matter to the MVA for adjustment in compliance with the order.
 MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari and Atterbeary filed a conditional cross petition for writ of certiorari. We granted both petitions, Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Atterbeary, 365 Md. 472, 781 A.2d 778 (2001) in order to consider the following questions, which we have rephrased:
 1. Where a suspected drunk driver orally indicates his willingness to submit to a test of blood alcohol concentration under Section 16-205.1 of the Maryland Transportation Article, and then repeatedly requests to speak with an attorney prior to signing a form consenting to such a test, does his subsequent conduct vitiate his earlier consent?
 2. Was an occupant of a vehicle in actual physical control of a vehicle constituting driving or attempting to drive under Section 16-205.1 where the occupant was found awake, behind the wheel of the car with the engine running and parked along the side of a public road when the police responded to the scene?
 3. Does a police officer have "reasonable grounds" under Section 16-205.1 to forcibly investigate the condition of a motorist who is "slumped over the wheel" of a parked vehicle?
 Based on our responses to the first two questions presented for our review, we need not consider the third issue.
 II. Discussion
 A. Standard of Review
 Section 10-222 of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code, permits the following actions upon judicial review of the administrative agency's decision:
 (1) remand the case for further proceedings;
 (2) affirm the final decision; or
 (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision:
 (i) is unconstitutional;
 (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
 (iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
 (iv) is affected by any other error of law;
 (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
 (vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
 Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Gov't. Art. Upon judicial review, the Circuit Court is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the agency's findings of fact and whether the agency's conclusions of law were correct. See Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68, 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999)(quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)). In *82 reviewing the administrative agency's decision, we apply the same statutory standards as the Circuit Court. See Maryland Div. of Labor and Ind. v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001)(quoting Gigeous v. E. Correctional Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495, 769 A.2d 912, 921 (2001)).
 B. What Constitutes A Refusal
 We now turn our attention to the merits of MVA's question of what constitutes a refusal to take a blood alcohol concentration test under Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. While the Circuit Court emphasized the time constraints of the testing procedure in determining whether a refusal occurred, we will decide the issue based upon what constitutes a refusal to take the test, which, in this case did not occur.
 Section 16-205.1(a)(2) sets forth the general testing policy applicable to individuals who are suspected of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated:
 Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title.
 Md.Code, § 16-205.1(a)(2) of the Transp. Art. (1977,1999 Repl.Vol.).[6]
 Section 10-303(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article imposes time limitations on obtaining blood alcohol concentration test results from suspected drunk drivers:
 (a) Alcohol concentration.(1) A specimen of breath or 1 specimen of blood may be taken for the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration.
 (2) For the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration, the specimen of breath or blood shall be taken within 2 hours after the person accused is apprehended.
 "We have consistently recognized that the statutory provisions enacted to enforce the State's fight against drunken driving, namely Md.Code ... § 10-302 to -309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, were enacted for the protection of the public and not primarily for the protection of the accused." Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 464, 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991); see State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 477, 436 A.2d 420, 427 (1981), *83 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207, 105 S. Ct. 1170, 84 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1985).
 The DR-15 Form, which Officer Mondini read to Atterbeary and which Atterbeary later read for himself, advises individuals suspected of driving while intoxicated of the consequences of refusing to submit to testing for blood alcohol concentration. There is an automatic 120-day suspension for a test refusal. See Md.Code § 16-205.1(b) of the Transp. Art. If an individual submits to the test and the result is an alcohol concentration in excess of the statutory limit, the suspension for a first offense is forty-five days, or ninety days for a second or subsequent offense.[7]See id. The language of the statute, which allows suspects to withdraw initial refusals to take the test, reflects the legislative policy in favor of obtaining test results:
 (g) Withdrawal of initial refusal to take test; subsequent consent.(1) An initial refusal to take a test that is withdrawn as provided in this subsection is not a refusal to take a test for the purposes of this section.
 (2) A person who initially refuses to take a test may withdraw the initial refusal and subsequently consent to take the test if the subsequent consent:
 (i) Is unequivocal;
 (ii) Does not substantially interfere with the timely and efficacious administration of the test; and
 (iii) Is given by the person:
 1. Before the delay in testing would materially affect the outcome of the test; and
 2. A. For the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration, within 2 hours of the person's apprehension;...
 Md.Code, § 16-205.1(g) of the Transp. Art.; see Embrey v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 339 Md. 691, 697, 664 A.2d 911, 914 (1995)(quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Vermeersch, 331 Md. 188, 194, 626 A.2d 972, 975 (1993)). A person, nevertheless, cannot be compelled to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. See Md.Code, § 10-309, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.[8]
 Although Section 16-205.1 does not specifically provide that an individual suspected of or arrested for drunk driving has a right to confer with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test, we have held:
 the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, requires that a person under detention for drunk driving must, on request, be permitted *84 a reasonable opportunity to communicate with counsel before submitting to a chemical sobriety test, as long as such attempted communication will not substantially interfere with the timely and efficacious administration of the testing process.
 Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 717-18, 481 A.2d 192, 200 (1984). The limited right to confer or attempt to confer with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test as announced in Sites was not meant to give suspected drunk drivers the ability to postpone administration of the test in order to achieve more favorable results. See Sites, 300 Md. at 714, 481 A.2d at 198 (quoting People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353 (1968))("The privilege of consulting with counsel concerning the exercise of legal rights, should not, however, extend so far as to palpably impair or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losing their licenses."). Rather, we explicitly stated:
 if counsel cannot be contacted within a reasonable time, the arrestee may be required to make a decision regarding testing without the advice of counsel. We emphasize that in no event can the right to communicate with counsel be permitted to delay the test for an unreasonable time since, to be sure, that would impair the accuracy of the test and defeat the purpose of the statute.
 Id. at 718, 481 A.2d at 200. Thus, our decision in Sites only recognized a due process right so that an individual who requests to consult with counsel for the purpose of receiving advice as to whether to submit to a breathalyzer test, must be permitted a reasonable opportunity to do so. See id. at 712, 481 A.2d at 197 (explaining that prior to being formally charged, there can be no attachment of the
 Sixth Amendment right to counsel)(citing Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 474 A.2d 1305 (1984)); see also Darrikhuma v. State, 81 Md.App. 560, 571, 568 A.2d 1150, 1155 (1990)(explaining that under the holdings of Sites and Brosan v. Cochran, infra, 307 Md. 662, 516 A.2d 970 (1986), "a person arrested for drunk driving has a right to consult with an attorney prior to formulating a decision on whether or not to take a breathalyzer testif that person makes such a request to consult with an attorney")(emphasis in original). Accordingly, "[w]e recognized in Sites neither a right of counsel in the Fifth nor Sixth Amendment sense, but rather a deprivation of the right of due process by the unnecessary denial of a specific request for counsel." McAvoy 314 Md. at 519, 551 A.2d at 880.
 In order to protect the licensee's due process right, the right to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test must be meaningful and comport with traditional notions of essential fairness. While there still exists an unrelenting desire "to rid our highways of the drunk driver menace," Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 370, 488 A.2d 171, 175 (1985), a "default" refusal to submit to the test cannot be permitted to stand on these facts.
 There is no bright line rule which will effectively ensure that the due process right to communicate with counsel prior to submitting to a breathalyzer test as recognized in Sites is heeded in all circumstances without risking being overbroad or under-inclusive. Instead, determining whether an individual has been denied his or her due process right to communicate with counsel prior to submitting to a breathalyzer test requires a case-by-case analysis of the facts and circumstances involved. See Sites, 300 Md. at 718, 481 A.2d at 200.
 *85 We have provided some guidance as to what types of communication would be considered an exercise of the Sites due process right to communicate with counsel. For example, in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662, 516 A.2d 970 (1986), we held that an individual who timely requests to consult with an attorney and have the attorney administer an independent breathalyzer test may do so in order to make an informed decision as to whether to submit to the test administered by the police. Brosan, 307 Md. at 673-74, 516 A.2d at 976. We further commented that the Sites due process right may encompass telephonic contact and / or face-to-face consultation. See id. at 669, 516 A.2d at 974. The due process right, however, does not confer upon suspects the right to be informed that they can have a preliminary test performed by a non-law enforcement person prior to deciding whether to submit to the official test administered by the police. See Darrikhuma, 81 Md.App. at 572-74, 568 A.2d at 1155-57. Nevertheless, we note that in requesting to confer with counsel, a suspected drunk driver may seek advice upon any aspect of the DR-15 Form, which in addition to advising individuals of the consequences of a test refusal, sets forth the sanctions for having a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the statutory limit, explains the administrative review process, and advises of the potential disqualification of a suspected drunk driver's Commercial Driver's License for a test refusal.
 In our analysis of the case at bar, the determinative question is whether Officer Mondini's conclusion that Atterbeary's unwillingness to sign the form and his repeated requests for an attorney constituted a refusal to submit to the test, is correct. At the hearing before the ALJ, Officer Mondini testified that Atterbeary initially said he would take the breathalyzer test. Atterbeary, however, thereafter asked to speak to an attorney after he read the DR-15 Form. When the officer asked for Atterbeary's attorney's name and telephone number, Atterbeary stated he did not have an attorney at the moment. Officer Mondini continued to ask Atterbeary to sign the form, and each time Atterbeary asked to speak with a lawyer. As indicated in the record, approximately twenty minutes elapsed from the time Atterbeary orally stated that he would submit to the breathalyzer test to the point in time where Officer Mondini determined that Atterbeary's refusal to sign the form constituted a refusal to take the test. Atterbeary challenges this determination-he states that he never refused to take the breathalyzer test.
 As in every case, the MVA bears the burden of proving that Atterbeary refused to take the breathalyzer test through his conduct. See Borbon v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 345 Md. 267, 280, 691 A.2d 1328, 1334 (1997). A refusal of a breathalyzer or other chemical analysis test "is complete at the moment it is communicated to the officer." Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 348, 643 A.2d 442, 445 (1994).
 In the present case, the officer equated Atterbeary's unwillingness to sign the form with a refusal to take the test. Atterbeary's decision to refrain from signing the form before having the opportunity to consult with an attorney, however, did not change the fact that he had orally agreed to submit to the test before reading the DR-15 Form for himself, and consent is implied in the statute. The statute itself contains no language imposing an express written consent requirement. There is absolutely no language reflecting any intent on the part of the Legislature to mandate that a driver must signify consent on a written form. Rather, individuals who drive in Maryland are "deemed to have *86 consented ... to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive" under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Md.Code, § 16-205.1(a)(2) of the Transp. Art.
 The MVA advocates that an individual's consent or refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test must be reduced to writing for the purpose of providing evidentiary proof. Although a written statement may serve as strong evidence of the drunk driving suspect's willingness or unwillingness to submit to the test and potentially makes easier the MVA's ability to make a prima facie case before an ALJ, we decline to impose such a requirement. In the context of a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in custodial interrogations, which are subject to closer scrutiny than the present case because of constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the Miranda decision did not hold that "an express statement is indispensable to a finding of waiver." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 292 (1979)("An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.") Thus, a person may waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination after orally receiving his or her Miranda warnings and orally indicating a willingness to make a statement. See In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 526-29, 248 A.2d 364, 368-69 (1968)(finding a knowing and intelligent waiver where defendant orally received his Miranda warnings and orally waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retain appointed counsel); State v. Purvey, 129 Md.App. 1, 17-19, 740 A.2d 54, 63-64 (1999)(finding that for a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination it is unnecessary to reduce the waiver of rights and subsequent statement to writing).
 Both parties agree that Atterbeary orally agreed to submit to the breathalyzer test. Once Atterbeary requested to read the DR-15 Form and stated that he wanted to consult with counsel, Officer Mondini never asked Atterbeary if he still wished to take the test; the officer only asked Atterbeary to sign the form. Similarly, no attempts were made to administer the test to Atterbeary. Based on this record, it would appear that any refusal to obtain breathalyzer test results was due to the officer's haste in concluding for himself that Atterbeary had withdrawn his initial consent and now refused to submit based on his invocation of the Sites right to counsel, rather than from either an express or implied refusal on the part of Atterbeary.
 In rendering his decision, the ALJ determined that Atterbeary had refused to take the test because he asked for an attorney in response to all questions put to him:
 Licensee asked for an attorney. When asked for name & phone number he said he did not have one at the moment. I conclude Licensee did not have an attorney to call. Thereafter licensee kept answering he wanted to talk with an attorney to all questions. I conclude therefore he refused to take the test.
 In so doing, the ALJ failed to acknowledge that Atterbeary had declared that he would submit to the test. Instead, the ALJ concluded that based on Atterbeary's repeated requests to speak with an attorney that he thereby refused to take the breathalyzer test. Logical reasoning simply cannot be strained in order to support such a leap, for when an individual chooses to exercise his or her right to contact counsel under Sites, the decision to do so *87 is, at that point, neither necessarily a conditional nor a per se refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test. As noted earlier at supra page 85, the DR-15 Form addresses many matters in addition to the consent to take the test. Atterbeary's request to speak to an attorney, without more, may not logically or exclusively be construed to relate only to the testing reference in the form advisement and, thus, be interpreted as an implied refusal of consent to be tested or a withdrawal of consent. The exercise of the Sites right may be treated separately and distinctly from the assessment of whether an individual has refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.[9] Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of this case, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Atterbeary refused to submit to the breathalyzer test.
 C. Driving or Attempting to Drive Under Section 16-205.1(a)(2).
 Respondent's primary contention in his cross-appeal is that he was not driving or attempting to drive as set forth in Section 16-205.1(a)(2) at the time Officer Mondini responded to the fire and rescue call at 3121 Automotive Boulevard because he was legally parked on the side of the road and not moving the vehicle. On this basis, he asserts that the implied consent provision for blood alcohol content testing was not triggered by this incident.[10] We disagree with respondent's contention, however, because Officer Mondini responded to the scene and found respondent sitting awake in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and the car engine running.
 The statute defines the term "drive" as used throughout Maryland's vehicle law as meaning "to drive, operate, move, or be in actual physical control of a vehicle, including the exercise of control over or the steering of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle." Md.Code, § 11-114 of the Transp. Art. (emphasis added). Respondent urges that our decision concerning what constitutes being in "actual physical control of a vehicle" as set forth in Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d 1019 (1993) controls our decision in this case and mandates the conclusion that Atterbeary was not driving or attempting to drive his vehicle at the time of his arrest.
 The facts of the case sub judice are distinguishable from our decision in Atkinson. In Atkinson, the appellant was parked lawfully on the side of the road, sleeping, with the keys in the ignition but the engine not running. Id. at 202, 627 *88 A.2d at 1020. Based on those facts, we held that Atkinson was not in "actual physical control" over the vehicle at the time of his arrest, and thus, could not be driving or attempting to drive his vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 215, 627 A.2d at 1027 ("We believe that the General Assembly, particularly by including the word `actual' in the term `actual physical control,' meant something more than merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle with the ignition off."). We provided the following rationale for our holding:
 Neither the statute's purpose nor its plain language supports the result that intoxicated persons sitting in their vehicles while in possession of their ignition keys would, regardless of other circumstances, always be subject to criminal penalty.... Although the definition of "driving" is indisputably broadened by the inclusion in § 11-114 of the words "operate, move, or be in actual physical control," the statute nonetheless relates to driving while intoxicated. Statutory language, whether plain or not, must be read in its context.... In this instance, the context is the legislature's desire to prevent intoxicated individuals from posing a serious public risk with their vehicles. We do not believe the legislature meant to forbid those intoxicated individuals who emerge from a tavern at closing time on a cold winter night from merely entering their vehicles to seek shelter while they sleep off the effects of alcohol. As long as such individuals do not act to endanger themselves or others, they do not present the hazard to which the drunk driving statute is directed. Thus, rather than assume that a hazard exists based solely upon the defendant's presence in the vehicle, we believe courts must assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case.
 Id. at 212-13, 627 A.2d at 1025-26 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
 In reaching our holding in Atkinson, we set forth six factors which must always be taken into account when assessing the potential danger presented by the various circumstances of each case:
 1) whether or not the vehicle's engine is running, or the ignition on;
 2) where and in what position the person is found in the vehicle;
 3) whether the person is awake or asleep;
 4) where the vehicle's ignition key is located;
 5) whether the vehicle's headlights are on;
 6) whether the vehicle is located in the roadway or is legally parked.
 Id. at 216, 627 A.2d at 1027. No one factor will be dispositive of whether an individual was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. Id. at 216, 627 A.2d at 1028.
 Thus, we review the ALJ's decision in light of the six factors for assessing whether an individual was in "actual physical control" as annunciated in Atkinson. The record before the ALJ demonstrated that at the time Officer Mondini arrived on the scene, Atterbeary was not simply passively sitting in his car sleeping off his intoxication outside of a tavern. It is undisputed that upon the officer's arrival, respondent was awake and seated in his parked car on Automotive Boulevard outside of a car dealership with the engine running. Officer Mondini acknowledged that the car had power windows and that he had been informed by the fire and rescue personnel that they had asked Atterbeary to open the window. The record does not indicate whether the engine of Atterbeary's vehicle was running when fire and rescue responded to the scene, nor did Atterbeary state whether he had only started the ignition at *89 the request of the fire and rescue personnel for the sole purpose of lowering his window.
 The circumstances of the present case are also distinguishable from the hypothetical scenarios posed in Atkinson where an individual leaves a tavern intoxicated and proceeds to sleep off the intoxication in a legally parked car in the parking lot of the drinking establishment. See Atkinson, 331 Md. at 212, 627 A.2d at 1025-26. Rather, we must consider "what the evidence showed [Atterbeary] was doing or had done, and whether these actions posed an imminent threat to the public." See id. at 216-17, 627 A.2d at 1028.
 In the present case, because Atterbeary was sitting in the driver's seat, awake, and with the engine running, he was capable of attempting to drive his vehicle at the time the officers arrived at Automotive Boulevard. Atterbeary was not taking shelter passively in his car while sleeping off the effects of his inebriation. To the contrary, the facts of this case provide strong indicia that Atterbeary posed an imminent threat to public safety. We conclude, therefore, that the record provided a sufficient basis for the ALJ to determine that Officer Mondini had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Atterbeary had been in "actual physical control" of the vehicle upon his arrival at the scene as used in the statutory definition of the term "to drive," thereby triggering the implied consent testing provision of Section 16-205.1(a)(2). See Gore v. State, 74 Md.App. 143, 149, 536 A.2d 735, 738 (1988)(holding that appellant was driving where the evidence showed that although the driver was not moving the vehicle at the time of the officer's arrival, "the car key was in the ignition in the `on' position, with the alternator/battery light lit; that the gear selector was in the "drive" position; and that the engine was warm to the touch").
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court for Howard County.
 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
 NOTES
 [1] The DR-15 Form, sometimes referred to as The Advice of Rights and Administrative Penalties for Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test statement, is derived from Section 16-205.1(b) of the Maryland Transportation Article; it provides in part:
 You have been stopped or detained and reasonable grounds exist to believe that you have been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated; under the influence of alcohol; so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance that you could not drive a vehicle safely; or in violation of an Alcohol Restriction.
 In this state, any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle, including a commercial motor vehicle, on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general, is deemed to have consented to take a chemical test to determine the alcohol concentration, or a blood test to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content of the person. The chemical test shall be at no cost to you. A test of blood shall be administered if the breath test equipment is unavailable, a test is required to determine the drug or controlled dangerous substance content, or if your injuries require medical treatment. The results of such test or a refusal of such test may be admissible as evidence in any criminal prosecution.
 * * *
 You have the right to refuse to submit to the test. If you refuse: The Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) will be notified of your chemical test refusal; your Maryland (MD) driver's license shall be confiscated; an Order of Suspension issued, and if eligible, a temporary license issued, valid for 45 days. An Administrative suspension shall be imposed by the MVA against your MD driver's license or driving privilege if you are a non-resident. The suspension shall be 120 days for a first offense and 1 year for a second or subsequent offense. You will be ineligible for modification of the suspension or issuance of a restrictive license; except in certain circumstances, a test refusal suspension may be modified and a restrictive license issued, if you agree to participate in the Ignition Interlock Program for at least 1 year.
 [2] The DR-15A Form contains general factual information about the suspected drunk driver and the incident giving rise to the arrest.
 [3] Officer Mondini also stated that Atterbeary refused to sign a provision contained on the "Officer's Certification and Order of Suspension" form which would have permitted Atterbeary to have a temporary license for either forty-five days or until completion of an administrative hearing on the issue, whichever occurs first. Atterbeary maintained that Officer Mondini never asked him to sign such a provision.
 [4] At the conclusion of the initial hearing on July 26, 2000, the ALJ decided to continue the proceedings and call Officer Mondini to take additional testimony. The subsequent hearing was not held until October 24, 2000.
 [5] Although the incidents at issue in this matter occurred in Montgomery County, the provision governing judicial review states, "[u]nless otherwise required by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed with the circuit court for the county where any party resides or has a principal place of business." Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(c) of the State Gov't. Art. Atterbeary met the conditions of the statute in order to file in Howard County.
 [6] Section 16-813, which applies to individuals who hold licenses to operate commercial vehicles, provides:
 (a) Driving, operating, etc., of vehicle prohibited.An individual may not drive, operate, or be in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while the individual has any alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath.
 (b) Refusal to take chemical test.A person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while having alcohol in the person's system or who, subject to § 16-205.1 of this title, refuses to take a chemical test to determine the alcohol concentration, shall be placed out-of-service for the 24-hour period immediately following the time the police officer or employer detects alcohol in the driver's blood or breath.
 [7] The threshold blood alcohol level for suspension of a drivers license was reduced from 0.10 to 0.08 by Chapters 4 and 5 of the 2001 Maryland Laws. See Md.Code (1977, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.) § 16-205.1(b) of the Transp. Art. We refer to the older version of the law as explicated in the DR-15 Form provided to Atterbeary because the revised version did not take effect until September 30, 2001, and the General Assembly clearly stated that the alterations were to be construed only prospectively. See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 4 and 5, § 2.
 [8] There are exceptions to the rule against compulsion which apply in limited circumstances. A person will be compelled to take the test when the individual was involved in a motor vehicle accident causing death or life threatening injuries to another and the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving or attempted to drive while intoxicated. See Md.Code, § 16-205.1(c) of the Transp. Art. In addition, Section 10-305(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides, "[a]ny person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of test refusal shall be deemed not to have withdrawn consent," and thus may be compelled to submit to a test under Section 16-205.1(d) of the Transportation Article.
 [9] In its decision below, the Circuit Court emphasized the importance of making meaningful an individual's exercise of the Sites right. Although mindful that suspected drunk drivers may "thwart or attempt to thwart the giving of the intoximeter test ... by pushing the two-hour limit," the court found that depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, an officer may have to take steps to help facilitate the individual's expressed desire to contact an attorney. For example, the court recognized that while "the State has no obligation to provide information specific to an arrestee of a name, or address, or phone number of an attorney," the officer should have made available to Atterbeary a phone book and a phone to use to place a call to whomever could help him.
 [10] As a tangential issue, respondent argues that Automotive Boulevard is not a highway or "private property that is used by the public in general" on behalf of his assertion that the implied consent provision of Section 16-205.1(a)(2) was not triggered by his conduct. The record before the ALJ disclosed that Automotive Boulevard originates at Briggs Chaney Road, and serves as a common road running between multiple automobile dealerships, a carwash, and one or more automobile servicing centers located along the thoroughfare. Thus, it was proper to conclude that respondent's presence on Automotive Boulevard satisfied the location requirements set forth in Section 16-205.1(a)(2).


text:
Proverbele latine sunt proverbe și zicători create sau transmise de romani, ori apărute după decăderea civilizației romane în alte culturi, care au considerat că limba latină este un mediu potrivit pentru transmiterea acestor învățături.
 Vezi și
 Listă de locuțiuni în limba latină
 Proverbe
 Proverbe românești
 Limba latină
 Legături externe
 Proverbe latine la Wikicitat
 Expresii juridice
 Pagina principală Wikicitat în limba română
 Proverbe
 Cuvinte și expresii în limba latină


jurisdiction: EU

text:
 4.7.2009
 RO
 Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene
 C 153/17
 Hotărârea Curții (Camera a șasea) din 19 mai 2009 — Comisia Comunităților Europene/Irlanda
 (Cauza C-532/08) (1)
 (Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către un stat membru - Directiva 2005/60/CE - Spălare de bani și finanțare a terorismului - Netranspunere în termenul prevăzut)
 2009/C 153/34
 Limba de procedură: engleza
 Părțile
 Reclamantă: Comisia Comunităților Europene (reprezentanți: P. Dejmek și A. A. Gilly, agenți)
 Pârâtă: Irlanda (reprezentant: D. O'Hagan, agent)
 Obiectul
 Neîndeplinirea obligațiilor de către un stat membru — Neadoptarea în termenul stabilit a dispozițiilor necesare pentru a se conforma Directivei 2005/60/CE a Parlamentului și a Consiliului din 26 octombrie 2005 privind prevenirea utilizării sistemului financiar în scopul spălării banilor și finanțării terorismului (OJ 2005 L 309, p. 15, Ediție specială, 09/vol. 2, p. 214)
 Dispozitivul
 1)
 Prin neadoptarea actelor cu putere de lege și a actelor administrative necesare pentru a se conforma Directivei 2005/60/CE a Parlamentului și a Consiliului din 26 octombrie 2005 privind prevenirea utilizării sistemului financiar în scopul spălării banilor și finanțării terorismului, Irlanda nu și-a îndeplinit obligațiile care îi revin în temeiul acestei directive.
 2)
 Obligă Irlanda la plata cheltuielilor de judecată.
 (1) JO C 32, 7.2.2009.


text:
Il deposito a risparmio è la forma più tradizionale di raccolta del risparmio da parte degli Istituti di credito. Destinato essenzialmente ai privati, il deposito a risparmio viene utilizzato soprattutto come destinazione temporanea del denaro, onde evitare la custodia personale di somme anche consistenti in contanti, in attesa di un utilizzo dello stesso, sia per le necessità quotidiane che per eventuali investimenti in forme diverse più redditizie.
 Caratteristiche principali
 Il deposito a risparmio è caratterizzato solitamente dalla presenza, per la registrazione delle operazioni effettuate, del cosiddetto libretto, un documento rilasciato dalla banca al depositante sul quale vengono registrate progressivamente le diverse operazioni e la cui presentazione allo sportello è necessaria per l'effettuazione delle operazioni bancarie.
 Un libretto a risparmio può essere sia nominativo che al portatore:
 nel caso di un libretto nominativo, lo stesso riporta le generalità di uno o più titolari, i quali sono i soli ad avere facoltà di operare (salvo il caso in cui sia stata concessa una delega ad un terzo), e contempla la possibilità di stabilire limiti operativi, quali ad esempio la necessità della firma congiunta di più titolari, ovvero di uno dei titolari e di almeno uno degli altri, essendo strettamente necessaria la presenza del primo.
 nel caso di un libretto al portatore, lo stesso può essere distinto dagli altri, oltre che da un numero progressivo assegnato dalla banca, anche da una denominazione, che può anche essere di fantasia; l'operatività in questo caso è consentita a chiunque presenti materialmente allo sportello il libretto stesso. Nei libretti al portatore l'importo non potrà essere pari o superiore a 1.000,00 euro (DL 6.12.2011 n. 201)
 Pur essendo stato concepito per l'utilizzo da parte delle persone fisiche, è consentita l'intestazione nominativa di un deposito a risparmio anche ad enti e società regolarmente costituiti (persone giuridiche).
 Un deposito a risparmio può essere libero oppure vincolato:
 un deposito libero presenta una possibilità illimitata di operare da parte del titolare o del portatore, senza alcun limite che non sia quello dell'effettiva disponibilità.
 un deposito vincolato appone sulle somme depositate un vincolo temporale, ovvero la necessità che i fondi rimangano depositati per un certo lasso di tempo prima di poter essere prelevati dal titolare o dal portatore; a fronte di questa limitazione, le banche concedono un tasso d'interesse superiore a quello sul deposito libero.
 Contrariamente al conto corrente di corrispondenza, il deposito a risparmio non contempla la possibilità di emettere assegni a valere sulla disponibilità, e non consente di operare, anche solo con sconfinamenti temporanei, in maniera tale da rendere negativo il saldo contabile del deposito.
 Operatività moderna
 Pur avendo mantenuto la gran parte delle proprie caratteristiche storiche, il deposito a risparmio ha avuto a partire dagli anni settanta una certa evoluzione, onde poter meglio andare incontro alle mutate necessità della clientela bancaria.
 In particolare:
 è stato progressivamente consentito il deposito di assegni tratti a favore del titolare, sempre con la clausola del salvo buon fine, contrariamente a quanto avveniva in passato quando l'operatività era consentita esclusivamente per contanti.
 accanto a questo, è stata attivata la possibilità di ricevere bonifici accreditati sul deposito stesso e registrati sull'apposito libretto in un momento successivo, ovvero alla prima presentazione dello stesso allo sportello; tipico esempio di questo tipo di utilizzo è l'accredito della retribuzione o della pensione.
 è possibile inoltre utilizzare il deposito a risparmio per l'addebito periodico di pagamenti ripetitivi, quali utenze, rate di finanziamenti o canoni di locazione.
 è stata estesa anche ai depositi a risparmio la possibilità di essere utilizzati come base tecnica per altre operazioni bancarie, in particolare operazioni in titoli: l'acquisto e la vendita di titoli (quasi sempre ad esclusione delle azioni), il ricevimento del controvalore del titolo all'atto del rimborso o delle cedole periodiche rappresentative degli interessi, richiede ad oggi la presenza di un rapporto bancario d'appoggio, essendo ormai la quasi totalità dei titoli dematerializzati, ossia non esistendo più il titolo cartaceo rappresentante la quota di una società per azioni (azione) oppure la quota di un debito contratto da un'emittente (obbligazione).
 Note
 Voci correlate
 Apertura di credito in conto bancario
 Assegno
 Area unica dei pagamenti in euro
 Bonifico
 Carta di pagamento
 Conto corrente
 Conto di deposito
 Corsa agli sportelli
 Coordinate bancarie
 Commissione massimo scoperto
 Deposito (diritto)
 Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi
 Giorni di valuta
 Servizi bancari
 Diritto bancario


type: other

text:
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