Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, hon. members are aware that it had been the intention of the government if possible to proceed last week with the debate on the Hong Kong inquiry, but it was arranged at the request of the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) on Friday last that the debate would stand over until to-day. The intention of the government had been to proceed by way of a motion to adjourn the house to discuss a matter of urgent public importance, but my hon. friend the leader of the opposition feels that it would be preferable to go through the routine proceedings first, the questions and so on, and to have the debate take place on a motion that the house go into committee of supply. In the circumstances we shall proceed in that way.


Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury):: Will the Prime Minister's notice of motion be reached before that stage?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes.



QUESTIONS

[Stage Direction]
(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk.)

Mr. MAYBANK:: 1.	How many applicants for pension arising from disabilities in service during the present war have been refused pension upon the ground that physical ailments were concealed by them at the time of enlistment?
2.	How many of them have been refused upon the grounds of wilful concealment?


Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre):: No pension has been wholly refused on the grounds that a pre-enlistment condition was concealed or wilfully concealed on enlistment; on the contrary, in accordance with the provisions of section 11 (1) (c) of the Pension Act, pension has been awarded in 388 cases for aggravation only of disabilities resulting from conditions found to have been wilfully concealed on enlistment.


WAR EXCHANGE CONSERVATION ACT- INTERNATIONAL NICKEL COMPANY
Mr. CASTLEDEN:: 1.	What was the amount of the special allowance which was granted for 1941 to the International Nickel Company of Canada for depreciation or depletion under the agreement made with that company under the War Exchange Conservation Act?
2.	By what amount did these allowances decrease the total taxes payable to the treasury by the said company for the year 1941?


Mr. ILSLEY:: 1.	By the agreement made under the terms of the War Exchange Conservation Act the International Nickel Company of Canada was permitted to take a maximum of $5,000,000 special depreciation in 1941.
2.	It is not the practice of the government to disclose in answers to questions the amounts or rates of taxes paid by various taxpayers, but regardless of the rate of taxation paid by this company in 1941 it is the general practice in granting War Exchange Conservation Act agreements to assure that the profits from the expansion of any company's facilities which are made possible by an agreement are sufficient to take care of any special depreciation granted. In the case of International Nickel Company of Canada, as well as in the case of other agreements granted, the project itself and the additional production, with resulting earnings, would not have taken place unless the special depreciation had been granted. There was, therefore, no loss to the treasury in 1941.


RATIONING OF CONFECTIONERY AND SOFT DRINKS ON BASIS OF POPULATION
Mr. BLACK (Cumberland):: 1.	Was the allotment or percentage of rationing or curtailing the quantity of commodities such as confectioneries, soft drinks, chewing
Questions

gum, etc., of towns such as Amherst, Pictou and New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, based upon present population or the population at that time of the 1941 decennial census?
2.	Will allowances be made for recent increases in population?


Mr. ILSLEY:: 1.	Production of commodities, such as confectionery and soft drinks, has been limited^ by the fact that sugar supplies furnished to the industry have been restricted to 70 per cent of the amount of sugar used in 1941. This restriction is based on the supply of sugar used by each industrial user and has no relation to the population, except that, if the population increases, business will presumably increase as well. Such increases in business may be provided for under special powers granted to the supervisor of rationing and the sugar administrator in section 31 of board order No. 150. Rationing by means of coupons gives every citizen of Canada an equal amount of sugar. The wartime prices and trade board has not rationed any of the commodities referred to according to towns or other geographical areas.
2.	See answer to 1.
ASSISTANT GRAIN COMMISSIONERS-FARMERS* COMPLAINTS


Mr. PERLEY:: 1.	What were the salaries and general office expenditures of the assistant grain commissioners in (a) Alberta, (b) Saskatchewan, (c) Manitoba, (d) Ontario, during the crop year 1941-42?
2.	How many complaints from farmers were received by each of the above commissioners in their respective provinces during the above mentioned crop year?
3.	On how many complaints were settlements awarded and what was the total money paid for settlements affected at each office in above provinces during the crop year 1941-42?
4.	What duties were performed by F. J. Rathbone of Fort William, in 1941, and how many grain shipments did he inspect in the above year?


Mr. MacKINNON (Edmonton West):: General
office
Salaries expenditure
1.	Alberta	
$7,500	00	$2,365	21Saskatchewan	7,500	00	1,373	29Manitoba	
7,500	00	942	00Ontario	
7,500	00	990	702.	Alberta	
7Saskatchewan	
2Manitoba	
15Ontario	Nil3.	Settlements awarded:Alberta-2	
$253 97
Settlements affected:
Manitoba-3	 $50 00
4.	(a) Investigations of complaints at eastern elevators on grain shipped from Fort William and Port Arthur, watching car distribution, periodic visits to terminal elevators with chief weighmaster and chief grain inspector, investigation of staff complaints at Fort William and Port Arthur.
(5) Inspection of grain shipments not part of assistant commissioner's duties.


SUGAR IN STORAGE
Mr. DIEFENBAKER:: How many pounds of sugar were in storage in Canada (both wholesale and retail) as on May 1, June 1, and July 1, in each of the years 1938 to 1942, inclusive?


James Angus MacKinnon: Statistics on sugar stocks in wholesale and retail establishments are not collected. The following table shows stocks of raw and refined sugar in refining establishments. Publication of refiners' stocks has been discontinued since January 1, 1942.
Amount of Raw and Refined Sugar in Refineries-May 1, June 1 and July 1, 1938 to 1941
Pounds	Pounds	PoundsMay 1	June 1	July 11938-Raw sugar	144,317,344	145.289,559Refined sugar	
139,755,199	171,932.271	165,200,005Total	316,249,615	310.489,5641939-Raw sugar	110.834,133	134,673,901Refined sugar	138,267,368	149,773,628Total	249,101,501	283,447,5291940-Raw sugar	104,770,235	77,027,404Refined sugar	
121.915,537	117,230,504	120,770,036Total	222,000,739	197,797,4401941-Raw sugar	95.596,427	159,618,127Refined sugar	146.086,162	163.277,767Total	241,682,589	322,895,894
[Mr. P. C. Black.)

Questions


LIGHTHOUSE KEEPERS-SALARY AND COST-OF-LIVING BONUS
Mr. KIRK:: 
Mr. HOWE:: (a)	No.
(b)	They are receiving cost-of-living bonus.


BUOY CONTRACTORS-SALARY AND COST-OF-LIVING BONUS
James Ralph Kirk: Has the government or the Department of Transport given consideration to, (a) the matter of increasing salary of buoy contractors, or (b) granting to buoy contractors a cost-of-living bonus ?


Clarence Decatur Howe: (a) and (b) No. It is the
practice to establish contract prices for buoy services by tender, and not to increase them without a further call. Salaries are not paid.


EXCISE TAX-SOFT DRINKS
Mr. GINGUES:: What are the monthly collections for Canada of the excise tax 25 per cent on soft drinks, since commencement, 23rd May, 1941, to latest month available?
Mr. GIBSON;
	Excise Tax	
1941	collected	
June 	$ 17,385	47July 	
253,043	33August 	
947.379	66September 	
1,004,618	35October 	
762,887	82November 	
635,834	54December 	
596,671	051942	January 	
590,114	22February 	
596,535	28March 	
842,148	53April 	
134,292	04May 	
617,174	25June 	
682,482	67Total 	
$7,680,567	21


POSTMASTERS-COST-OF-LIVING BONUS
James Ralph Kirk: In the matter of the cost-of-living bonus now paid to postmasters, (a) how is the amount of bonus determined; (b) what is the individual net amount paid per month or per quarter to postmasters receiving salary and/or remuneration in the amounts of $100, $300, $500, $1,000, $1,500, $2,000 per year?


Mr. MULOCK:: (a)	Five per cent of commission received on postage stamps sales only.
(b)	As postmasters are paid 5 per cent of commission received on postage stamp sales only the answer to this question would depend on the percentage of the postmaster's total commissions represented by postage stamp sales.


WARTIME HOUSING LIMITED-L. SCOTT
Mr. CARDIFF:: 1.	Is L. Scott employed in Wartime Housing Limited ?
2.	Was he at any time connected with L. C. Scott Construction Company Limited or Eastern Timber Company Limited?
3.	If so, what was or is his interest therein?


Mr. HOWE:: 1.	No.
2.	No. Not connected with and no relation.
3.	Answered by No. 2.
FORT WILLIAM AIRrORT


Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West):: 1.	What is the cost to date of the airport at Fort William?
2.	From whom was the land purchased and at what cost?
3.	What was the cost of the improvements?
4.	Who were the contractors?
5.	What was the total sum paid to the contractors?


Mr. HOWE:: 1.	$198,852.33.
2.	No record of purchase of, or payment for, land originally acquired, but it is understood the municipality of Fort William acquired this at a cost of $40,000.
Additional land required purchased by Department of Transport as follows:-
Municipality of Neebing	
$	500 00Margaret Flanagan	
922	50Canadian National Realties	..	944	00Grand Trunk Pacific Railway.	242	40A. Sears	
1,416	00Vickers Estate	
5,263	70E. F. Noyes Estate	
5,605	00Total for land	$54,893 603.	$143,958.73.4.	Tomlinson Construction Company; E. A. Bell; E. Anderson; City of Fort William; Hydro Electric Power Commission.5.	$72,001.44.
Questions


DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE VESSELS
Mr. REID:: 1.	How many boats or vessels have been disposed of by tLe commission set up in connection with the boats or vessels owned by those of Japanese origin?
2.	How many of such boats or vessels remain to be disposed of?
3.	What was the total amount paid for the boats or vessels disposed of?
4.	What has been the total cost of the commission since its inception?
5.	What has been the total expenditures incurred for repairs made to boats or vessels damaged, including engine repairs?


Mr. MACDONALD (Kingston City):: 1. To July 16th, 1,072.
2. To July 16th, 195.
3.	S958.410.24.
4.	To June 30th, expenditure, $12,505.51; less disposal charges and survey costs payable by vendors, $11,249.34. Net cost of committee since inception to June 30th, $1,256.17.
5.	To June 30th, $2,474.47 paid.


PRESS CENSORSHIP-CENSORSHIP OF SPEECHES IN HOUSE
Mr. CHURCH:: 1.	Who are the press censors in Ottawa and what experience have they for such work?
2.	Who appointed them and what are their salaries and expenses?
3.	Was the debate on the motion of Mr. Roy (Gaspe), on Thursday last, and the speeches of those who addressed the house on it, censored? If so, by whom, why, and under what authority, law statute or usage?
4.	Whose remarks were so censored and for what reason?


Mr. THORSON:: 1.	The two press censors for Canada, now known as chief censor of publications, are Fulgence Charpentier and Wilfrid Eggleston.
Fulgence Charpentier has had fifteen years' experience in newspaper work including ten years as member of the parliamentary press gallery, being successively secretary, vicepresident and president of said body in 192425-26. Mr. Charpentier holds a B.A. degree, served with the Canadian expeditionary forces in 1918, and studied law at Osgoode Hall. He was appointed joint press censor for Canada in February, 1940.
Wilfrid Eggleston has had fifteen years newspaper experience, including nine years as member of the parliamentary press gallery, being successively secretary, vice-president and president of that body in 1932-33-34. He was appointed press censor on November 1, 1939. He became deputy press censor for Canada on February 1, 1940, and was appointed joint press censor for Canada on May 1, 1940.

2.	Appointed by order in council. Fulgence Charpentier receives no salary as censor, these duties being imposed upon him in addition'to those of editor of French Journals of the House of Commons; Wilfrid Eggleston receives $15 a day; both receive their actual and necessary travelling expenses when absent from Ottawa in the discharge of censorship duties.
3.	No. Newspaper correspondents consulted the censors about the propriety of reporting certain remarks made in the debate referred to by Mr. Roy (Gaspe) but were advised that if these remarks were to be permitted by the House of Commons to appear in Hansard, the censors could not refuse to pass them for publication elsewhere.
4.	Answered by No. 3.


PROPOSED B'URTHER DIVERSION OF WATER FROM LAKE MICHIGAN
Mr. CHURCH:: 1.	What action, if any, is the government taking regarding a bill which has been introduced in congress at Washington, by representative Sabath, for the further diversion of 5,000 second cubic feet of water of lake Michigan?
2.	Have any representations been made by Canada to the rivers and harbors committee, or to the state department at Washington, on the subject, advising that such a diversion will by opposed by Canada?
3.	Who is looking after Canada's interests in this matter?
4.	What protection will be afforded to preserve the great lakes levels from further diversions in war-time?
5.	Will an opportunity be afforded to discuss this matter before the adjournment of the house?


Mr. MACKENZIE KING:: 1.	The government is watching the progress of the Bill but is taking no action at present.
2.	No. If representations were made they would be made to the United States State Department and not to the rivers and harbors committee of the House of Representatives. Representative Sabath's bill is one of many that have been introduced in recent years in congress for the purpose of authorizing increased withdrawal of water from lake Michigan. The current bill has not reached a stage in congress at which representations by the Canadian government would appear to be necessary or desirable. The State department is aware that the Canadian government would oppose an increase in the diversion of water from lake Michigan. When a similar bill was being considered by the rivers and harbors committee in 1938, Secretary of State Hull wrote to the committee chairman on March 12, 1938 as follows:
I have no doubt whatever that passage of the bill would cause a very unfavourable reaction

Questions
in Canada and would lead to strong protests by the Canadian government. In the circumstances, I find it necessary in the interests of our relations with Canada, to convey an adverse opinion on the proposed bill.
3.	The Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Legation in Washington.
4.	Canada has a three-fold protection against increased diversion from lake Michigan: First, a United States Supreme Court decree which stands in the way of an increase; second, Canada's rights in international law; third, the common interest of Canada and the United States at all times and especially in war time in the preservation of the levels of the great lakes system.
5.	In the government's view, it is neither necessary nor desirable to have a discussion of this matter before the adjournment.


GASOLINE RATIONING-MARITIME PROVINCES -BULK SHIPMENTS TO DEALERS
Mr. PURDY:: How much gasoline was shipped from bulk plants in New Brunswick to dealers in Quebec during, (a) May, (b) June, in the years 1940, 1941 and 1942?


Clarence Decatur Howe: If I may answer this question it would be that the government has no information. It has not been the policy of the government to give quantities or movements of strategic materials.


Gordon Timlin Purdy: What about the 40 per cent?


Richard Burpee Hanson: I think the intention of the hon. member must have been to point out the differentiation in the rationing as between the two provinces. Quantities of gasoline have been moved in from one province to another and that of course creates confusion and discontent. I believe that was the intention of the hon. member.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Although I do not know of any case, it is possible that quantities have been moved, and they may have been moved the other way. But I do not think we can produce these figures, nor do I think it desirable, if we do obtain them, to give them to the public.


SYNTHETIC RUBBER
Mr. HATFIELD:: 1.	What is the estimated cost of synthetic rubber per pound processed from petroleum products ?
2.	What is the estimated cost of synthetic rubber per pound manufactured from alcohol produced from wheat and other grains at the Canadian market price?


Clarence Decatur Howe: The process of making synthetic rubber is absolutely new, and has never been carried out on a large scale. Therefore estimates of cost of making the product in various ways are not available. Certain figures have been given in the United States, but they are very much at variance. I think it is quite out of the question to attempt to estimate the cost of production.


POST-WAR DISTRIBUTION OF FOODS AND MATERIALS IN WAR RAVAGES COUNTRIES
Mr. REID:: 1.	Has Canada participated in the discussions held between Sir Frederick Leith Ross, economic adviser to the British government and American officials regarding organizing supplies of wheat, dairy products, edible fats, coffee and other foods and materials for distribution in war ravaged countries after cessation of hostilities?
2.	Is a wheat pool being established whereby 100 million bushels of wheat have been set aside for distribution after the war, (.a) if so, what countries have designated their willingness to contribute and, (b) what amount of wheat is being proposed as Canada's contribution to the pool?
3.	Under what agency will this wheat be distributed and, will Canada be represented on any such administrative body?
4.	Under what agency will all food supplies and materials other than wheat be distributed and, will Canada be represented on any such council set up for the distribution of dairy-products, edible fats and other materials?


Mr. MACKENZIE KING:: 1.	Sir Frederick Leith Ross will shortly be arriving in Ottawa. He will engage in discussions with Canadian government officials on matters concerning post-war relief.
2.	It has been agreed to establish a relief pool of 100 million bushels of wheat.
(a)	Canada., the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed to contribute to this pool. The governments of Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States have agreed to make further contributions to the pool when required by the international wheat council in quantities to be determined by them in consultation with the council and on such basis as may be agreed among them.
(b)	25 million bushels.
3.	The international wheat council shall be responsible for the administration of the relief pool and shall, wherever possible, arrange for distribution of relief wheat through such intergovernmental relief body as may be set up and given general responsibility for the distribution of relief. The international

Questions as Orders for Returns
wheat council consists of one or more delegates of each contracting government. Canada is a contracting government under the memorandum of agreement of June 27, 1942.
4.	The nature and composition of such agency has not yet been determined, and is now the subject of inter-governmental consultation.



INQUIRIES WITH RESPECT TO ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Richard Burpee Hanson: In view
of the fact that we appear to be in the last week of the session, and that it would be desirable to have answers to the remaining questions on the order paper, may I ask that they be brought down before we adjourn?


Mr. BRUCE:: In connection with the
same matter I would ask to have returns to questions asked by me and appearing in Votes and Proceedings of July 20. I should like to have those answers to-day, if possible, because they relate to the subject which will be under discussion as the first order of business.



QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS


Mr. CHURCH:: 1.	Has the Department of Naval Affairs a bureau of publicity and press liaison or personnel officers?
2.	If so, where do they work, what are their names, salaries and other emoluments?
3.	What naval experience had they before appointment and what was their last occupation and place of employment?


Mr. MACDONALD (Kingston City):: On July 21 the hon. member for Broadview asked a question respecting the bureau of publicity in the Department of Naval Services. The question does not appear on the order paper to-day, but I should like to treat the question as an order for return and to table an answer at this time.
Return tabled.


R.C.N. AND R.C.N.V.R.-OFFICERS AND RATINGS
Mr. REID:: 1.	How many officers and ratings are in the Royal Canadian Navy?
2.	How many officers and ratings are in the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve?
3.	When a man joins the Canadian navy is he placed in the naval reserve or is he placed directly in the navy, similar to a Canadian joining the army or the air force?
4.	How many, (a) captains, (b) commanders, have been given these ranks in the Royal Canadian Navy since the outbreak of war?

5.	How many have been given similar ranks in the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve since 1939?
6.	In regard to promotions, does the seniority rule apply with respect to promotion and recognized service at sea as against land service in senior appointments?


Angus Lewis Macdonald: Return tabled.


NOVA SCOTIA FISHING INDUSTRY
Mr. GILLIS:: 1.	What are the names and addresses of those processing codfish, pollack, haddock and hake livers in Nova Scotia?
2.	How many pounds of codfish livers did said firms buy or process during 1941 and up to June 30, or to the last reporting period in 1942?
3.	What per cent of medicinal cod livers, as designated by USP standards, did each produce?
4.	What per cent was crude?
5.	What per cent of crude was sold to be made into medicinal?
6.	What per cent was poultry grade?
7.	What price was obtained for each grade?
8.	What per cent of the products of each grade was exported to the United States or other points?
9.	What was paid to the fishermen for the livers at Lunenburg, Halifax, Loekeport, Shelburne, Clark's Harbour, Port LaTour and Yarmouth?
10.	Who were the buyers at these points?
11.	What various prices were offered or paid by buyers at these points?
12.	How many are buying codfish livers in Nova Scotia who do not process them?
13.	What prices do these firms pay the fishermen, and what prices do they get from the processors ?
14.	Who in Nova Scotia are equipped to produce medicinal cod liver oil according to USP standards?
15.	What is the capacity of each of such plants and at what per cent are they operating at the present?
16.	What inspection or supervision is there as to condition of these livers when delivered?
17.	On what basis are prices set?
18.	Has any dealer or processor used pressure to prevent fishermen from selling such livers?
19.	What price is paid for cod livers by (a) Lunenburg Sea Produce, (b) Loekeport Cold Storage Company, and which of these companies produce and market medicinal oil?
20.	What per cent of oil from cod livers should be medicinal grade?
21.	Are haddock, pollack, hake and cod livers of the same value?
22.	What price w'as paid to fishermen selling swordfish livers at Cape Breton points during 1941, and what price did dealers get for same?


PRODUCTION OF FISH LIVER OIL IN NOVA SCOTIA
Mr. POTTIER:: 1. What are the prices being paid to fishermen for cod livers, halibut livers and swordfish livers, at the following points: Westport, Freeport, Digby, Port Maitland, Yarmouth, Pubnico, Woods Harbour, Clark's Harbour, Shelburne,

Motions jor Papers
Lockeport, Liverpool, Lunenburg, Halifax, North Sydney, Glace Bay, and any other point or points on the island of Cape Breton where fish buyers or liver buyers maintain buying depots?
2.	What are the names of the firms or individuals buying livers at Clark's Harbour, Lunenburg and Halifax? If any of these are not processors, to whom do they sell their livers?
3.	What are the names of firms or individuals processing codfish or other livers in Nova Scotia?
4.	What percentage of oil from said livers is medicinal grade? State percentage medicinal oil obtained by each processor? What percentage is known as crude?
5.	What percentage, under modern facilities, of cod livers should be of medicinal grade?
6.	What percentage of the cod liver oil produced in Nova Scotia is shipped to the United States?
7.	What percentage is sold in Canada?
8.	What percentage of crude cod liver oil produced in Canada is sold in the United States?
9.	What percentage is sold in Canada?
10.	What is the price of medicinal cod liver oil in Canada?
11.	What is the price of medicinal cod liver oil in the United States?
12.	What is the price of crude cod liver oil in Canada and the United States?
13.	Has the government made any effort under pure food regulations or otherwise, to improve the quality of cod livers landed at ports where there is a cash market for same?
14.	Has the department any knowledge of fresh fish buyers or buyers of cod livers intimating that, unless they got the fish they would not buy the livers? If so, have they taken any steps to protect the fishermen?
15.	How many buyers are there in Lunenburg? What is the price being paid per bucket of 25 pounds?
16.	What price was paid fishermen at Cape Breton for swordfish livers in 1941, per pound, where were these livers sold by the parties buying them from the fishermen and at what price did they obtain by the pound?


MILITARY SERVICE-INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT- EXEMPTIONS
Mr. CASSELMAN:: 1.	What age classes have actually been instructed to report for, (a) medical examination, (b) training or service, to July 15, 1942, in each of the 13 military districts under the National Resources Mobilization Act?
2.	How many have been instructed to report for (a) medical examinations, (b) training or service, in each age class by districts?
3.	How many exemptions have been granted in each age class by districts?


JAPANESE NATIONALS-BRITISH COLUMBIA
Mr. REID:: 1. How many requests for the use of Japanese labour have been made to the British Columbia security commission by companies or firms in British Columbia?
2.	Have any such requests been granted to persons, companies or firms whose place or places of business are within the prohibited military area of British Columbia?
3.	How many persons of Japanese nationality or origin are at present employed in the greater Vancouver area, including the district of New Westminster?
4.	Were permits given by the British Columbia security commission for the employment of persons of Japanese nationality or origin within the two above named districts and, if so, what are the names of the firms or companies employing such persons of Japanese nationality?
5.	Is the curfew law still in effect for those of Japanese origin or nationality in the greater area of Vancouver and the district of New Westminster?



MOTIONS FOR PAPERS


Mr. CARDIFF:: For a copy of the itemized expense accounts of the field supervisors, J. II. Hoyt, W. B. Nixon and J. E. Phinney, Saint John district, Soldier Settlement Board of Canada, for the year 1941?



CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LIEUT.-COLONEL ALAN COCKERAM AND THE PRIME MINISTER

Mr. STOKES:: For a copy of all letters or other documents dated since July 1, 1942, exchanged between Lieut.-Colonel Alan Cockeram, D.S.O., E.D., and the Prime Minister of Canada.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker,
I should like to draw the attention of the house to something which is rather novel in procedure. Certain gentlemen outside of parliament who for reasons of their own wish to have attention drawn to certain matters write letters-at least some of them do-to the Prime Minister, and then seek to have those letters tabled so that publicity may be given to them, regardless of what they may contain, before there is any debate or discussion on the subject. For my part I propose to be very carefully advised as to whether certain documents should be tabled. We have had one experience of an effort to have communications tabled which contained statements for the reliability and accuracy of which I should not have wished to be responsible, or for even the publicity of which I should have wished to take responsibility. I do not intend therefore to permit a precedent of tabling letters which are sent to me, not so much, if I may say so, for the purpose, in some cases at least, of simply tabling material in the public interest, as of having publicity given to the statements which they contain regardless of how accurate or inaccurate the statements may be.

Long Adjournment

The letter referred to is one which was sent to me, but which also carried the intimation that the leader of the opposition had been furnished with a copy of it. To me it is quite clear that the purpose is to have the communication tabled at this stage in order to serve some ends of publicity which, for my part, I do not think are warranted in existing circumstances. Therefore I would not wish to agree to the tabling of the communication.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It is the
inalienable right of every citizen to write a letter to the Prime Minister, as was done in this instance. It is a public document the minute it is deposited in the mail, because it is written to the Prime Minister in. his capacity as Prime Minister. Therefore if any hon. member desires to ask for its production in the house he has the right to do so, and I do not think the Prime Minister is on sound ground when he takes the position which he has taken this morning. It is a public document, and the public are entitled to see it.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say
to my hon. friend that the Prime Minister has a very great responsibility with respect to documents he tables. I have had some communications slandering my hon. friend in the most violent way.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I have no doubt about that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: And I do not
intend, unless the house so orders, to have those letters tabled here. Someone who has a grievance against some other person writes to the Prime Minister, and then seeks to have world-wide publicity for something which may be wholly libellous. I am going to take the responsibility of making sure-*


Richard Burpee Hanson: Nothing
like that in this.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: -that, before they are tabled, communications which come to me are communications which should properly be tabled. If my hon. friend thinks this particular communication-and this may not be the only one; there may be others- is one with which the country should be acquainted, then he may take the responsibility for the statements it contains, and use them in the course of debate at the right time.


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: I do not know that it is a public document anyway.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I certainly
stand by the position I have taken already and will not assume responsibility for tabling any or every communication that comes to me from outside sources.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That when this house adjourns on completion of current business of the session it stand adjourned until January 27, 1943, provided always that if it appears to the satisfaction of Mr. Speaker, after consultation with His Majesty's government, that the public interest requires that the house should meet at an earlier time during the adjournment, Mr. Speaker may give notice that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the house shall meet at the time stated in such notice, and shall transact its business as if it had been duly adjourned to that time.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Mr. Speaker, I am not dissenting from the motion, but I should like to make this observation. January 27 is exactly six months from to-day. We have had a very long session, and doubtless hon. members are of the mind that it is time we departed from this place, especially as I think a tremendous amount of time has been wasted in the needless debate of political matters. I am not objecting to the great length of the adjournment, but I should like to suggest to the right hon. gentleman that if in our opinion the condition of affairs is such that we think there should be an earlier resumption of parliament, he should give full consideration to such representations as we may make in that regard, and, if possible, accede to them. In the course of the next six months there may arise very important circumstances which would demand the immediate resumption of parliamentary discussion.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The suggestion of my hon. friend is a reasonable one; indeed it is something I have had in mind all along. I can hardly imagine a situation in which the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) would consider the calling of parliament warranted where I myself would not be likely to entertain a similar view. However, the government has the responsibility of calling the members together either at a definite or some other date, and will have to act, of course, in the light of that responsibility.
With regard to the length of time that parliament has been sitting in the course of the year, it is much longer than the parliament of Westminster has taken, so that perhaps we are erring on the safe side in the motion as it appears.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.

Hong Kong Inquiry

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni):: May I remind the Prime Minister that on July 8, replying to a question in connection with the status of the national hymn or anthem "0 Canada," he said that a statement would be made shortly. Certain bodies are asking about this, and I should like to know if we may have the statement before we adjourn.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Perhaps I might answer my hon. friend at once. As the hon. member has said, there are certain bodies that wish to get an answer to the question as to whether or not the status of "O Canada" should be established at this time. May I say that there are times and seasons for the discussion of all matters, and I should think that at this time of war when there are other more important questions with which parliament has to deal that we might well continue to follow what has become the custom in Canada in recent years of regarding "God Save the King" and "0 Canada" each as national anthems and entitled to similar recognition. That is the position which the government takes and I think it is one which will be generally approved by the country.


Herbert Alexander Bruce: What about "The Maple Leaf Forever"?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: "The Maple Leaf Forever" in some respects is a little out of date, but if my hon. friend would like to add it on occasions to the other two I am sure there will be no objection.



TAXATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. N. J. M. LOCKHART (Lincoln):: Would the Minister of Finance give some answer as soon as possible to the question I asked about the overlapping of July and August payments of excess profits and income taxes? I have had a number of inquiries in this connection.


Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance):: I shall make a statement when the Excess Profits Tax Act is under discussion.
44561-301^



MILITARY SERVICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. R. MacNIOOL (Davenport):: May I ask the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services if, when a list of those who went down with the Spikenard, was ascertained, notict was sent to the Department of National Defence or the Department of National War Services so that the hearts of the parents of those presumed to be dead would not be racked again by having their sons called up for active service? I have a letter in connection with one young man, Samuel C. Walker, 117 Lappin avenue, Toronto, who was reported to have died when the Spikenard sank and last week his parents received a notice that this young man was called up.
Hon. ANGUS L. MACDONALD (Minister of National Defence for Naval Services): I cannot answer my hon. friend definitely on his question whether notification is sent to the Department of National War Services, but I shall find out and give him an answer to-morrow.


Mr. GORDON GRAYDON (Peel):: Following the question asked by the hon. member for Davenport I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence if there is any procedure adopted by the department with respect to notifying the Department of National War Services when a man has enlisted. Instances such as the one brought to the attention of the house by the hon. member for Davenport are prevalent throughout the country. Boys have enlisted, some being overseas, and then notices are received that they should report. I have heard of two instances where the boys were killed on active service and notices to report were received at their homes. Is there not some procedure which could be adopted by which this kind of thing could be eliminated? It is causing considerable distress.


Hon. J. L. RALSTON (Minister of National Defence):: I understand that there is such a procedure. That is all I can say to my hon. friend. He has called attention to it very particularly, and I shall certainly ask about it.



HONG KONG INQUIRY-AMENDMENT OF MR. GREEN TO MOTION FOR COMMITTEE

[Stage Direction]
Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance) moved that the house go into committee of supply.
Hong Kong Inquiry
Mr. H. C. GREEN (Vancouver South):: Mr. Speaker, about seven months ago, on Christmas day to be exact, at Hong Kong, many thousands of miles away from their homeland, a small force of Canadian troops, numbering in all 1,985, after fighting beside the troops of Great Britain and India, were finally forced to surrender. We have had as yet few details of that engagement, but we know that they fought gallantly. We know too that they fought against overwhelming odds, that they fought without air support, and that they fought under other terrible handicaps. At the commencement of my remarks to-day I should like to say something in which I believe every hon. member will join. I wish to praise those men for the gallant stand they made, and to say further that their loved ones in Canada may well be proud of the part they played in the battle for freedom. Let us not overlook that fact.
To-day it is our duty to discuss the report of a commissioner appointed to inquire into the organization, authorization and dispatch of these Canadian troops to Hong Kong-a *commissioner appointed pursuant to a request made by my leader, the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson), for a parliamentary investigation. His request was not granted in that form, but a commissioner was appointed to inquire into the whole situation, and reported early in June, just about seven weeks ago
In fairness to those of us who have to discuss this report to-day I think it should be made clear that we have only the report itself on which to base our remarks. The report proper is a short one of about five-and-a-half pages, with an appendix of fifty pages. This appendix contains certain extracts from the evidence, but does not contain all the evidence; and furthermore it contains in certain cases extracts from cables-not whole cables, but merely extracts. It consists in part of a discussion of the evidence and of arguments, and I think one may say without fear of contradiction that the appendix is really drawn to justify the report of the commissioner. So that to-day, Mr. Speaker, there cannot be a proper and adequate debate, and we are further limited by the secrecy imposed by the commissioner. But some day there will be a free and full discussion, and Canadians will learn the whole story of this expedition.
In the meantime I propose to discuss the report and appendix from the point of view of what lessons can be learned therefrom by the government and by parliament and by the Canadian people, believing, and sincerely
fMr. Usley.3
believing that thereby I may help to prevent a similar or even greater tragedy and may help in increasing the efficiency of the Canadian army.
First of all, the report shows a dangerous lack of understanding of the Japanese and of the actual situation in the Pacific by the war committee of the cabinet, of which the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) is chairman, by defence headquarters, and by the Department of External Affairs, of which the Prime Minister is also head; because obviously from this report each one of those bodies believed that the Japanese would not fight, believed that the Japanese could be overawed by a show of force, believed that the Hong Kong Canadian force was going out to do garrison duty such as the battalions which composed that force had done in Newfoundland and in the West Indies.
I would refer the members of the house to page 15 of the report in support of these contentions, where I quote from evidence given by the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald) when he used these words:
We knew that a good deal of stress was laid in all dealings with Japan on the element of a show of strength-
That belief may or may not be justified in the case of native tribes, although even with them I think it is out of date. But certainly it did not apply in the case of a first-class power like Japan.
Then, at page 4 of the report, we find the attitude of the war committee of the cabinet given in these words:
The moral effect of the expedition might operate as a sensible influence for the preservation of peace there.
In other words, the war committee of the cabinet thought that they could bluff Japan. Well, may I point out to the members that in the last few years there has been far more bluffing by Japan in her relations with Canada than there has been successful bluffing of Japan by Canada.
Then General Crerar, who was chief- of staff at the time, gave his opinion, found at page 20 of the report. It is contained in paragraph 10 of his recommendation to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston), when this proposal to send a force to Hong Kong was first considered officially. That paragraph reads as follows:
As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role.

Hong Kong Inquiry
And the commissioner shows himself to be of the same frame of mind at page 38 of the report where he says, referring to the men from the Midland regiment who were added to this force prior to its departure :
It is true that after April, 1941, the Midland regiment was engaged in defence duties within Canada which interfered with the regular course of their training. At the same time, as I have already indicated, the assumption of coast defence and other duties had peculiar value in developing in the individual soldier the special qualities required for the type of task that they might be expected to perform in Hong Kong.
But what was the actual situation in September of last year? Japan had been fighting on the continent of Asia for nearly ten years. She had an army well led and skilful, and made up of tough and ruthless soldiers, perhaps the most savage killers in any army in the world. They had conquered Manchuria, large portions of China, including Shanghai and Canton, which is near Hong Kong. They had occupied French Indo-China, and obviously the only uncertainty about war between Great Britain and Japan was as to the time it would begin.
The war committee of the cabinet and defence headquarters and the Department of External Affairs should have known that war with Japan was imminent. That fact was well known on Canada's Pacific coast. Out there we had been warned time and again, by Canadians and Britishers returned from the far east, that war was coming. It was so well known, in fact, that when we learned that. the destination of these Canadian lads *was Hong Kong, we shuddered at the deadly risks they ran, and we prayed that they were wTell trained and well equipped and that this would not be another case of bungling by the higher-ups.
May I point out to hon. members of the house that the people on Canada's Pacific coast have been right all through about Japan. They have been right about the keeping out of Japanese from Canada. They have been right about prohibiting the shipment of scrap metal from Canada to Japan. I pointed out to this house in 1939 that a year or two before, I had seen with my own eyes an old Canadian destroyer, His Majesty's Canadian Ship Vancouver, broken up into scrap steel and scrap iron for shipment to Japan, and I protested against that on May 12, 1939. But we got no action by the government. Canadians on *the Pacific coast were also right about the possibility of the invasion of Canada by the Japanese by way of the Aleutians and the mainland of Alaska-and let the government not forget that that danger still exists. We were right about the risks which these men were running in going to Hong Kong. But
here in Ottawa, three thousand miles away from the Pacific ocean, members of the war committee were too busy with their departments to pay the proper attention to these affairs which really mattered; the defence department was too negligent, and the Department of External Affairs was ill-informed or too busy with its appeasement policies to realize the peril.
The report reflects little credit on any one of these bodies. Particularly damning is their failure to appreciate the effect of the change of government in Japan on October 16, 1941. On that day Matsuoka left office and Tojo became premier. Tojo had been for years violently pro-axis. Each of these three bodies I have mentioned should have made it their business at once to find out whether war was likely to follow from the change. The United States knew that the answer was "yes." That will be found at page 16 of the report, which reads as follows:
Mr. Drew urged that from the report of Mr. Justice Roberts touching the occurrences at Pearl Harbour, it is evident the American government in October had in its possession information pointing unequivocally to an early outbreak of hostilities with Japan, and he argued that such information ought to have been in the possession of the Canadian government. The evidence establishes in point of fact that the Canadian government had no such information.
Now we have a joint defence board, with members from the two countries, the United States and Canada. Surely one would have expected that the Canadian representatives would have found out what the Americans knew, through this joint defence board. Apparently they did not. Many Canadian newspapers knew that war was about to break, and the man in the street in Vancouver knew that war was coming upon that change of premiers in Japan. Yet these three groups- the war committee, defence headquarters, and the Department of External Affairs-did not, and we find their attitude stated at page 17 of the report, as follows:
It was known that Tojo was sympathetic with the axis powers and there was an impression-
I repeat that word "impression."
-there was an impression in Ottawa that his accession to power might increase the risk of war in the Pacific. However, shortly after the Japanese cabinet change information reached Ottawa to the effect that the Japanese policy of maintaining peace in the Pacific was likely to be maintained. This view was confirmed on October 26, the day before the expedition sailed, in the message from Canadian military headquarters in London already quoted. These expectations were falsified by the events of December, but the messages would tend to quiet any apprehension that might have arisen.
Hong Kong Inquiry

By the way, this cable from Canadian military headquarters in London is one of the cables from which we have only one sentence, the sentence reading:
Consensus opinion that war in far east unlikely at present.
I demand of the Prime Minister that the whole of that cable be tabled, because I doubt very much whether the rest of the cable will bear out in full the meaning which might be taken from the one sentence.
Therefore it is quite apparent that the authorities in Ottawa were easily lulled into a sense of security on this question of war with Japan, despite the change in the Japanese government on October 16, and the excuse which is given is the same old stock excuse, that the British did not tell us-blaming it on the British government. Actually the British must have known that that change meant war, and I ask the Prime Minister to tell this house whether he too did not know the change in all probability meant war.
I repeat, the report shows a lack of understanding by the war committee, by defence headquarters, and by the Department of External Affairs. I suggest by way of remedy that there be far less departmental and administrative work for the members of the war committee. Their work as a war committee is the most important work in Canada to-day, and they should not be hampered by having to spend so much time on their departments. I suggest also that there should be some sort of foreign affairs section set up in defence headquarters. I assume that that would be an expansion of the intelligence section, but no matter how it is done, Canada should have a defence headquarters that knows what is going on beyond the boundaries of Canada. As for the Department of External Affairs, I suggest that a few hardboiled realists should be added to the staff, which now consists largely of well-trained and highly intelligent young men, but perhaps a little too theoretical.
The second lesson which should be learned from this report is that Canada must think for herself. Some official body here, the war committee or defence headquarters, should have studied the situation at Hong Kong. They should have known that our troops there would have no air support, that the island was crowded with hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of them refugees. They should have known the difficulties about water, and should have considered whether it was sensible and reasonable to send more troops into Hong Kong. Apparently that was not done. I quote from page 14 of the report,

where the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power) who was at that time acting Minister of National Defence, says:
And I do not think there was ever any question really or any discussion as between General Crerar and myself as to any reason why we should not take it on.
That is, the expedition.
It struck me as being the only thing to do, and I suppose it struck General Crerar that way too; at least I took it for granted that it did.
At this stage I would like to pay tribute to the government for one of the grounds on which they decided to send the expedition, and that was that they thought it was Canada's turn to do some fighting. I have no quarrel whatever with that. My point is that the whole situation at Hong Kong should have been reviewed by some body here in Ottawa. If that had been done they would have known the grave risks which these men were running and they would at least have taken care that the force left the shores of Canada with its full equipment and composed of men who had received the maximum of training which could be given in Canada. Instead of that we find that this unfortunate Hong Kong force was treated as in the same category as a garrison being sent to Newfoundland or the West Indies. The arrangements were not even carried through by the senior officials in the Department of National Defence; they were left to directors in the different branches of that department.
We must not depend on others, we must not depend on Great Britain or on the United States to do our thinking for us. Canada must think for herself and form her own opinions and express them. It is so important on questions having to do with the conduct of the war, and it will be even more important on questions having to do with the peace settlement. Let us not forget that fact, that Canada must think these things through herself. Unfortunately we not only did not think for ourselves on this Hong Kong situation, but when tragedy occurred there was a very subtle placing of the blame on Great Britain.
Then the report clearly shows the necessity for giving Canadian troops complete battle training in Canada. The policy has been to give preliminary training here and then finally real battle training in Great Britain. That was done in the last war-in fact it is a hangover from the last war-and may fairly be described as a 1914-18 policy; and despite Hong Kong that policy is still in force.
In the publication "Canada at War" for July, at the bottom of page 9 in the paragraph headed "Ready for Battle Drill," I find this:
At the end of four months, the trained infantryman is ready to go overseas. Highly

Hong Kong Inquiry
educated in modern warfare, he is an individual fighting machine, a potential shock-trooper and commando. Overseas his training is polished up under conditions as near to actual combat as can be simulated.
Obviously that is not adequate. That policy is useless for training troops who have to cross the Pacific. They cannot be sent to Great Britain to get battle training; they must get it on this continent. It is useless for troops who have to go to Alaska, useless for troops defending the coasts of the maritime provinces or of British Columbia, useless for troops who go to Newfoundland or the West Indies. Those troops are entitled to complete battle training just as the troops in Great Britain receive such training. The result of the policy for the Hong Kong force was that, without battle training themselves, they were sent to face seasoned Japanese troops trained in actual warfare over a period of years, and, as I said earlier in my remarks, the most savage killers loose in the world to-day. It was a case of the amateur against the professional. Our troops had not a chance from the minute they left the shores of Canada.


Richard Burpee Hanson: And they were not acclimatized.


Howard Charles Green: As my leader says, they were not acclimatized. They knew themselves that they were not properly trained. Some said so while waiting to embark in Vancouver. That was what they told friends who came to see them off. These troops left the shores of Canada with a feeling of uneasiness about their training. They felt that they had not been given a proper chance to take care of themselves in the battles that might ensue.
The facts with regard to their training will be found on pages 26 to 32 of the report. I do not propose to read extracts. If anyone questions the facts as I give them he will find my statements confirmed on the pages I have indicated. I propose to deal only with the men who had been with the two units, the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, as distinguished from the men who were added to their ranks just before they left for overseas. Perhaps it should be pointed out that about one-quarter of the men who went to Hong Kong were in the latter group, who had been added only in the last few days or weeks.
First of all, what do we find the training to have been with regard to the use of rifles? The Royal Rifles had been firing on the ranges. The Winnipeg Grenadiers did some firing in the short time after they were warned for Hong Kong. The report states that 600 of them did some firing on the ranges just
before leaving-certainly not adequate training for the men in that unit.
Then as regards the Bren gun, of which there are fifty to a unit. The Royal Rifles had fired their Bren guns, but the Winnipeg Grenadiers had not before they left Canada.
As to anti-aircraft machine guns, I can find no reference to the training of the Royal Rifles with that weapon, but the Winnipeg Grenadiers had had no training whatever. Yet they were sent to Hong Kong where there was no air support and where training in the handling of anti-aircraft machine guns would have been of the utmost help.
As regards grenades, that is to say, bombs, the Royal Rifles had practised with dummies, but neither battalion had had any practice with live bombs. The Grenadiers had not even had a dummy bomb before they left Canada. As members who served in the last war know, throwing a bomb is quite different from throwing a baseball. Like the cricket ball, the bomb is thrown with an overhand motion, and Canadians must be carefully trained before they are capable of using bombs effectively.
Next, as to tommy guns, of which there are 42 to a battalion, neither battalion had fired these guns before they left Canada, and they had had only a few to inspect and study.
As to anti-tank rifles, neither battalion had fired them. The Royal Rifles had had no training whatever in the use of this weapon, and the Grenadiers had had four to look at, but with no ammunition; both battalions left Canada without taking any anti-tank rifles with them, presumably because there were none.
As regards two-inch mortars, neither battalion had fired them. The Royal Rifles had had one for purposes of instruction for a period of a month, but the Grenadiers had had none.
Neither battalion had fired any three-inch mortars, although both had studied them. The three-inch mortar is used in much the same way as a piece of artillery and requires different training and different handling. It was vital that these men should have had training with these weapons.
It all adds up to this fact, that these units obviously were only part trained, and the 436 men who were added to the strength of the battalions had had even less training. The particulars of their training will be found at pages 37 to 42 of the report. None of the force had had any real battle training.
The excuse in the report for this sending of untrained men from Canada is, first of all, that they were as well trained as any units
Hong Kong Inquiry

in the dominion. We find that at page 27, in the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Sparling, where he was asked:
Q. Does that properly describe the situation as regard these two battalions?-A. Yes. In my opinion those two were up to the standard of the other units in the country.
Q. As well trained as any other unit?- A. Yes.
At page 33 the commissioner adopts this evidence when he says:
In speaking of the two battalions in question in comparison -with other battalions in Canada in September, 1941, Colonel Sparling said that, from an examination of the training reports, they were the equal of any other unit.
In other words, there were no units in Canada at that time with real battle training, in spite of the fact that Canada had been at war for over two years. That calls for drastic changes to be made without further delay.
The second excuse given by the commissioner is that the troops had time to get, and probably did get, all the rest of their training during the three weeks they were on a crowded ship and the three weeks after they landed. They left Canada on October 27, reached Hong Kong on November 16, and three weeks later, on December 8, the Japanese attack started. General Stuart, the present chief of staff, gave evidence on that point, and I submit to hon. members that his evidence can only be described as fantastic: He was questioned:
Q. Then your opinion is, from what you have said, that any weapon training or anything of that sort that these units may have been short in as laid down in the books, could have been made up prior to the 8th December?-A. I not only think it, I know it.
That appears at page 33, and it shows a smugness which is not good enough if Canada is to build up an efficient army. And the commissioner adopts this evidence, at page 46, where we find these words:
. . . General Crerar's conclusion is justified that on the 8th of December the expeditionary force was in fact fit to meet an attacking force in superior numbers.
And may I point out that these gentlemen who gave evidence really were on trial before this commissioner, yet their opinion evidence was accepted by the commissioner and cited as fact. Further down on page 46 there enters a note of tragedy, a message dealing with Brigadier Lawson, whose life was sacrificed at Hong Kong. The report states:
Before leaving Ottawa, Brigadier Lawson asked for information upon weapons in which the two battalions were not practised so that he could make arrangements for training in those weapons on shipboard.

I point out these statements to hon. members who served in the last war, and ask whether they think there was the slightest possibility of those troops getting training in those weapons during the three weeks they were on the ship and the three weeks after they reached Hong Kong, when they had to get established and look after all the odds and ends that must be attended to upon arrival. Unfortunately this excuse is wishful thinking.
So I repeat, the report clearly shows the necessity of giving Canadian troops complete battle training in Canada, and I suggest that the emphasis should be placed upon commando training for all our troops here. And why can we not have the most modern types of troops, as for example paratroops? That question has been raised time and again in *this house, but there has been delay after delay. I do not know whether or not they arfe being trained now, but I cannot understand why there should have been such a long delay. Some day, perhaps sooner, than we expect, Canadian troops must meet other seasoned Japanese troops; let us make sure that when that time comes they will meet the enemy on equal terms.
Before proceeding further, Mr. Speaker, I should like to advise you that I propose to move an amendment to the motion to go into supply, in the following words:
That all the words after "that" be struck out and the following substituted therefor:
this house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed reveals convincing proof of incapacity on the part of the responsible military authorities and demonstrates the immediate and urgent need for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of National Defence.
The fourth lesson to be learned is this. The report shows that there was careless, haphazard work at defence headquarters. I would refer hon. members to section VII of the report, which begins at page 50 and continues to the end, dealing with mechanical transport. It was decided, after consultation with the British government, who in turn consulted with the general officer commanding at Hong Kong, that the transport to be sent to Hong Kong with this force should consist of 212 vehicles. The list is given at page 50, but I need not repeat it here. Further the British government made this request, also found at page 50:
On October 11, Canadian military headquarters in London cabled details of the equipment and transport to be provided. The cable asked that, in order to effect economy in time

Hong Kong Inquiry
and shipping, as much as possible of the weapons, transport and ammunition should be taken with the troops.
The ship upon which these men were to sail was the Awatea. She was scheduled to sail on October 27, and there was from 10,000 to 20,000 cubic feet of hold space available for the carriage of some of this transport. It was finally decided to take a total of 20 vehicles, comprising two water tanks, six universal carriers and twelve fifteen-cwt. trucks. Those vehicles would have been sufficient to carry the weapons of these troops, but the Awatea sailed on October 27 without them. Three freight cars containing the bulk of this transport arrived in Vancouver the following morning; the fourth car arrived on October 29. There is on doubt that the ship could have been held, had there been proper supervision either from Ottawa or in Vancouver. There is another note of tragedy in this connection, again concerning Brigadier Lawson, which appears at page 52 of the report, where the commissioner says:
In a letter dated November 15, 1941, written on shipboard, Brigadier Lawson complains that "despite my repeated representations at national defence headquarters regarding the necessity for at least a proportion of our transport to accompany us. none of the M.T. (mechanical transport) had apparently arrived at Vancouver by October 27, and it was, therefore, necessary to sail without it. though there were two holds practically empty".
Some attempt is made in the report to excuse this failure. The first is that perhaps all the vehicles could not have been loaded. At page 60 the commissioner says that he does not accept the evidence of Mr. P. B. Cooke, of Vancouver, the general manager of the Canadian-Australian line, to which this ship belonged, and who knows the ship well. He does not accept Mr. Cooke's evidence that it would have been a simple matter to load these twenty vehicles. Instead, he accepts the evidence of Mr. Lockwood, the transport controller, who had never seen the ship and who, like the general staff officers, was in some danger of censure by the commissioner. He accepts Mr. Lockwood's evidence to the effect that only fifteen of these vehicles could have been loaded. Another excuse given is that probably the men in Hong Kong suffered no detriment from the lack of these vehicles. Neither excuse is a real one, but by way of direct condemnation there is a finding at page 58 of the report which reads as follows:
Had Colonel Spearing, when he realized as early as October 10 that the Awatea could not take all the mechanical transport, taken immediate steps then to ascertain the capacity of the ship and, with his knowledge from past experience as to the space required to carry the other equipment and stores, formulated 44561-302
what space would remain, the twenty vehicles could have been despatched in plenty of time to have reached the Awatea in time for loading on October 24. Had this been done I am of opinion on all the evidence that it is highly probable they could have been loaded. I have in mind not only this feature of Colonel Spearing's activity, but his whole evidence, to which I have made reference at some length, and I do not think that he was as alert as he ought to have been. In his post he has undoubtedly moved hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment and, I have no reason to doubt, done it very efficiently, but I think on this occasion, whatever may have been the cause there was some lack of energy.
But the confusion in handling these vehicles and the failure to get them to Vancouver on time cannot be placed upon one scapegoat. The report itself, at page 54, shows that there was a breakdown between two branches at defence headquarters, the quartermaster-general's department and the ordnance branch. That is found in these words:
There was thus a breakdown at this point and up to this time, namely October 14, between these two branches of national defence headquarters-
The report even shows a conflict as to the duties which different officers at defence headquarters thought were theirs. Then it shows that a civilian official, the transport controller, had control of all movements, even of troops. This appears at page 52, in these words:
The office of transport controller was created by an order in council passed November 15, 1939. It was made the duty of this official to determine the preference or priority of movement to be given on the application of governments or private persons of materials, troops, or naval forces between points in Canada.
And this civilian controller of transport stopped the movement of these vehicles on October 15. That will be found at page 51, where we read:
The reason that these shipments did not proceed to Vancouver in accordance with these arrangements was that the shipment was stopped by the controller of transport on October 15, because he was aware that the Awatea had not the capacity for this cargo-
That is, for the whole 212 vehicles.
-and no other vessel was known at that time to be available at Vancouver, either then or in the near future.
He was not' kept informed of the situation by defence headquarters. That was the real reason that the shipment of these vehicles came to be stopped. Then we find at page 55 that Colonel Spearing was in no great hurry to get these vehicles to Vancouver. We find at that page that-
On October 15 Colonel Spearing wrote to the transport controller giving him particulars of the movement, including fifty carloads of

Hong Kong Inquiry

vehicles and spare parts. This was not received by the controller until October 17. _ In the meantime the shipment of all the vehicles had been held up.
And at page 56 we find this with respect to Brigadier Macklin, an officer in the ordnance department:
Not having heard from Mr. Connor-
Who was in the office of the transport controller.
-as to what he had done, Lieutenant Findlay reported to Brigadier Macklin on October 21. Up to this time the latter-
Who I believe is director of mechanization in the branch of the master general of the ordnance.
-had not been told, or did not appreciate, that the shipment of mechanical transport had been held up at all. He says that he thought they were on their way to Vancouver.
And then further down on the same page-


James Layton Ralston: My hon. friend looked at me when he was talking about Brigadier Macklin. He is director of staff duties.


Howard Charles Green: Further down on page 56 we find this statement:
Brigadier Macldin undertook to take care of the question of priority. He did so by acquainting both the commander of the force (Brigadier Lawson) and the staff captain (Captain Bush) with the situation and handed to both of them, on October 22. before they left Ottawa, a memorandum setting out these facts.
I point out these significant words:
From that time forward no one at National Defence headquarters did anything further in connection with these twenty vehicles. This was left in the hands of the transport controller.
And he, as I have mentioned, was a civilian. The war committee and national defence headquarters should not have permitted this force to sail from Vancouver without these vehicles. I understand they could have been acquired from the forces in British Columbia, had there been the proper staff work done here in Ottawa.
This is a sorry story, and I cannot help comparing it with the way that the Canadian corps did business under its great leader, General Sir Arthur Currie. Such slipshod work would not have been tolerated for a moment in the Canadian corps, and there would have been no victories such as the Canadians won in the last war if there had been staff work of the type done in connection with this expedition.
Colonel Spearing has been retired. But is that all that is to be done? The work of Canada's defence headquarters must, I repeat, be efficient. It concerns men's lives, the lives
of hundreds of thousands of Canadians. Perhaps the work of defence headquarters will decide the fate of this nation. Canada is in the hands of the senior officers in the Department of National Defence, and Canadians have the right to insist upon efficiency in that headquarters.
I was much impressed recently by these words in a book entitled "Strategy for Victory," by Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin-I recommend that hon. members read it-appearing at page 58:
The premium, in other words, must be upon efficiency.
He is here dealing with the military leaders of the united nations.
There must be no tolerance of inefficiency. It must be rooted out unmercifully and quickly.
The future security of Canada depends upon the elimination of the cause of past mistakes. We can never fight a war efficiently if mistakes are to be condoned. I suggest that there must be, and at once, a thorough review of the organization of defence headquarters; there must be a review of the methods in that headquarters for coordinating its activities; there must be a review of its relationships with civilian departments and boards and with civilian controllers. This is absolutely necessary if the confidence of the Canadian people in our military leaders is to be retained.
In conclusion, there can be no doubt that Hong Kong has been a tragic event in Canada's history. The only redeeming feature about it is the courage shown by those men. But if the government is willing to act quickly and drastically to remedy the defects in our war machine which this report discloses, then the ill-starred expedition may yet be the means of saving Canada.
I move, Mr. Speaker, in amendment; seconded by the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker):
That all the words after "that" be struck out and the following substituted therefor:
"this house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed reveals convincing proof of incapacity on the part of the responsible military authorities and demonstrates the immediate and urgent need for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of National Defence.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I did not have the opportunity of hearing the entire address just delivered by the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green), but knowing his continuous interest since the beginning of this parliament in all matters affecting the military affairs of this nation, and having regard to the amendment which has been moved, I am sure all

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will have been convinced that his purpose, far from being a partisan one, is solely that of endeavouring to mobilize the forces and the equipment of this nation that they may be utilized most effectively. And while nothing can be done to redeem what took place at Hong Kong, nevertheless we as a nation and as members of the House of Commons should dedicate ourselves to the purpose that in the future those things that did happen shall not occur again.
I am not going to deal with the military side of the matter, but rather with another phase of it, because I believe this is one of the most serious debates which has yet come before the House of Commons. If mistakes have been made, punishment should be meted out. If negligence has taken place, that negligence too should be punished. But there is another issue, and it is the issue with which I intend to deal, so that there may be no duplication in arguments. I refer to the issue in which I believe parliament and the people generally are interested, namely, the preservation of those rights of democracy which in recent years, and particularly since May, 1940, have been diminished day by day and week by week.
This debate should do much to improve the military effort of our nation. What I have in mind is that we have not the whole evidence available. I will say that we have not large portions of it, some of which has to do with reports from the British government, which the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) has stated, as I remember it, that the British government does not desire to produce. We as a parliament have the right to assert the supremacy of this parliament; we have the right to say that this parliament should not be given an expurgated edition of the evidence, that this parliament has the right to know' what the evidence was, and that the press has the right in war time, as have hon. members of this house, to make such fair criticism as may be necessary in order to improve the war effort of this nation.
If there is one thing that has been established as a result of the Chief Justice of Canada having been placed in the position of commissioner in connection with this matter, it is that the time has come when judges of high courts should not be placed in control of royal commissions. I have a record here of the number of royal commissions which have been appointed since 1923. The number is eighty-three, and the fees and expenses to judges total $180,000. This principle is wrong. We are placing the judges in a position where their prerogatives and their independence are denied because of the fact that reports that 44561-302|
they bring down either please or displease one side or the other. If there is one thing to which the people have a right, it is that the entire evidence should be given to them and it is in connection with this phase of the matter that I intend to speak.
The only evidence available to us is such portions of the evidence, taken at the commission sittings held in secret by order in council, as were declared to bear out the conclusions arrived at by the commissioner. What does this mean? It means that parliament has set up a commissioner to investigate, to get the evidence, and to bring the matter before parliament, and then the hands of parliament are tied by a legalistic quibble which amounts to this: parliament created an individual as a commissioner, and parliament must be bound by the findings of that commissioner.
The other day the Prime Minister said that to take a stand like that was to criticize the judiciary of this country. That is not in accordance with the position of affairs at all. Does anyone cast aspersions upon a judge by appealing his judgment? Is a judge fallible when he sits as a judge and infallible when he sits as a commissioner? Are the members of this house able to discuss the evidence? All that they are able to discuss is that part of the evidence which has been chosen by the commissioner to bear out the arguments and conclusions made by the commissioner. What would be the position in a court of law if we were bound in the same way? The plaintiff's action is dismissed and he appeals, which is what is taking place here before parliament, the supreme court of this nation. All the appeal court might have before it is the evidence given for the plaintiff, or such portions as the trial judge believes should be placed before the court of appeal in the interests of the defendant.


James Layton Ralston: The statement which my hon. friend has made is so important and so grave that I feel I should call attention to the fact that whereas my hon. friend says that the only evidence quoted in the appendix was the evidence which supported the findings, the whole argument of the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green), his whole criticism, has been based on the evidence quoted in the appendix. My hon. friend has suggested that the commissioner has selected only certain evidence, but that is the evidence upon which the hon. member for Vancouver South based his argument.


John George Diefenbaker: Apparently the
Minister of National Defence puts forth the argument that it is fit and proper that only a portion of the evidence should be produced.

Hong Kong Inquiry
I refer him to what the present Prime Minister of Great Britain said in the British house on March 20, 1917. The hon. member for Vancouver South founded his argument on the evidence disclosed in the appendix, but my argument is that we should go further and have all the evidence, so that parliament would have before it every point of view, so that nothing would be kept from the people of Canada. That is the position; there is no divergence between us. He has argued his case on the point of view of the evidence that is here, and that is all he can place before us. I am arguing the matter from the point of view of the denial to parliament of its rights. I am protesting against our hands being bound by any commissioner, however high his position in the judiciary may be.
A commission was appointed in Great Britain in 1917 to investigate the Dardanelles expedition, and they brought in an expurgated report. They were unable to tell the whole story, or to place the whole evidence before the parliament of Great Britain, because conditions had not changed in the Dardanelles-The war was still going on there. The same argument does not apply to-day to Hong Kong. It is gone; a great portion of the east is gone, and the argument of national interest cannot apply in this case as it did in the case of the Dardanelles. Here is what Mr. Churchill said:
I am bound to say that I welcome the publication of the report. If the commission had confined themselves to conclusions and to expressions of opinion I think it would hardly have been necessary for me to intervene at all in the debate, except perhaps to urge some general considerations upon the house. But the method which the commission have chosen is to build up a narrative-a very interesting and very exhaustive, although not in all respects a complete narrative-by a great number of clippings and snippings from documents, and by single sentences from the evidence of witnesses, and these have been pieced together with the greatest patience and the greatest skill to form a connected narrative.
I pause to point, out how applicable those words are to the present report. I continue:
I know how earnestly the commission have desired to be fair and just to everyone, but it is a fact that this method which they chose is in conflict with all the accepted principles in regard to documents and evidence, because it is the fundamental principle that if a document is quoted, if an extract from a document is taken, one should know what the context is and if one answer of a witness is cited, that answer can only be judged in relation to the whole of his evidence. I should like the house to observe that these interesting quotations, which are taken from the evidence of witnesses, have in some cases-I might almost say in many cases-attracted more attention and have been the foundation of more comment or criticism in the public press than the carefully weighed and considered conclusions of the (Mr. Diefenbaker.l
commissioners. I cannot see that there was any reasonable halting ground between the commission confining themselves to conclusions and expressions of their opinion, pure and simple, and the general publication of the evidence.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Can my hon. friend tell me who were the commissioners in the case of the Dardanelles inquiry, and whether there were any members of the judiciary on that body?


John George Diefenbaker: I do not believe
there were any members of the judiciary on that commission.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That does not alter the principle at all.


John George Diefenbaker: The principle
asserted by Mr. Churchill, the principle which has been accepted ever since, is that if there is any reference to the evidence, there must be reference to the entire evidence. The other day the Minister of National Defence said that the report of the Roberts commission, which sat in the United States, quoted the evidence-or at least he indicated that; I have his words here. I have before me the report of the Roberts commission, and I point out that in that report it is stated that the evidence is not being quoted, that all that is being done is to arrive at certain conclusions based upon the evidence. That is an altogether different procedure from that adopted in this case.


James Layton Ralston: Did my hon. friend read that report?


John George Diefenbaker: Yes.


James Layton Ralston: Did he not find that there were extracts and snippings from different letters quoted in the report?


John George Diefenbaker: I am going to read what the report -says-not my conclusions. At page 2 the report says:
The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain secret.
That can be understood, because Pearl Harbour is still a great naval base and still the centre of hostilities. The report goes on:
We have, therefore, refrained from quotation of testimony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction.
Then it says at page 3:
All the testimony and evidence received have been considered, and as a result of its deliberations the commission submits the following findings of facts.
There is the position taken generally all the way through.

Hong Kong Inquiry


James Layton Ralston: I am pointing out to my hon. friend that while that is what the commission says, if he will read the report he will find that the commission in various places has cited extracts from documents.


John George Diefenbaker: If the Minister of National Defence can point out where the evidence was referred to directly by quotation,
I am going to ask him to do so when he comes to speak.


James Layton Ralston: I shall do that.


John George Diefenbaker: I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that from the very day this Hong Kong investigation was started, the whole course has been designed to prevent criticism, to conceal the facts in anticipation of what the criticism might be. I am going to refer to the orders in council, in the order in which they were adopted.
The commission was set up by order in council. Then an order in council was passed, and this order in council went further than any other order in council that has been passed even by this government, which is notorious for ruling by order in council, with 25,000 orders in council passed to date. I am going to read this order in council. It is dated March 2, 1942, and says:
Now, therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, and under and by virtue of the powers vested in the governor in council by the War Measures Act, chapter 206 of the revised statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to order and doth hereby order that where under any order of the governor in council heretofore or hereafter made, a commissioner is appointed under the Inquiries Act-
I shall leave out the unnecessary words:
-to inquire into any matter concerning the armed forces of Canada, such commissioner shall have all the immunities enjoyed by any judge of any Superior Court in Canada while exercising his judicial functions, and that any and all powers and authority of any such judge relating to any contempt of court, whether committed in the face of the court or elsewhere, shall be vested in such commissioner in respect of such inquiry.
What does that mean? To me it is the most dangerous interference with the rights of this parliament that has ever been embalmed in an order in council. It denies the right of this parliament to refer to any letter that was sent to the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), to the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Hanson) and the other leaders wherein any portion of the evidence that was taken by the commission is revealed. It gives the power to commit any person, for contempt committed before court or elsewhere, and it vests the commissioner with that power
before or after the completion of the commission. I ask you, sir, whether I went too far when I said that the whole course of the orders in council with reference to this matter was so designed as to prevent any criticism except such criticism as might arise from the text of the report itself.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I interrupt my hon. friend for a moment?


John George Diefenbaker: Yes.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: He is seeking
to have the house believe that the order in council which he has just read was prepared by myself with a view to preventing, in some way or another, free discussion by parliament. May I say to him that the order was passed at the request of the chief justice himself, for his own protection as a commissioner in dealing with the matter into which he was appointed to inquire.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It is open to the other interpretation of intimidation.


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Only to suspicious minds.


John George Diefenbaker: Then it is a remarkable coincidence how well it fits in with the course of events to which I shall refer in a moment. The order in council gives the commissioner power to commit for contempt "for the purpose of enforcing any order made by him concerning any inquiry held in camera in order to safeguard the secrecy thereof." So that power was given on March 2 prevents any member of parliament from referring to any of the evidence, whether it might benefit the enemy or not. Whatever may be the circumstances connected with that order, I cannot understand how the Chief Justice of Canada would be protected from anything said in this house-


Richard Burpee Hanson: Or what protection he needed.


John George Diefenbaker: Or what protection he needed in that regard.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: He needed protection to enforce his own orders with respect to secrecy. Apparently that purpose has been entirely ignored by some others ever since.


John George Diefenbaker: Then why the
necessity for the addition of the words "or elsewhere"?
I go on from there and ask, what kind of a report is this? Why is the evidence being kept secret? Trace the course from last March to date. The order in council was,
47S6
Hong Kong Inquiry

passed on March 2, and no one knew anything about it until April 20, when it was tabled in the house.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The hon. member's leader had as counsel a gentleman who was shown the order the moment it was
passed.


John George Diefenbaker: That is all part of the speech which the Prime Minister may deliver. But I am giving the record. March 2 was the date of the order in council, and like so many other orders in council passed by this government amending or suspending statutes interfering with the rights of free men in this country, it was concealed from parliament until April 20, whether intentionally or un ntentionally.
When I tell you, Mr. Speaker, that in the return brought down the other day we have a record of 360 pages indicating the statutes passed by this parliament which have been amended or suspended by this government in part or in whole, by order in council, since the beginning of the war, some indication is given of how this government is ruling without parliament.
Then came the commissioner's report. Next Colonel Drew wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, to the Leader of the Opposition and to the other leaders, and then he made a comment-perhaps not precisely in this *order-in regard to the report, a comment which by no stretch of the imagination could bring benefit or assistance or comfort to the enemy. What happened? He was prosecuted on a charge of disloyalty. The people of this country became aroused at the autocratic control of the rights of individuals, and the press of this country asserted the doctrine of the freedom of the press as never before. Then what did the government do? It retreated. But it did not retreat by saying that this man was innocent. It did not withdraw the charge as charges are withdrawn in this country against honourable men. It retreated because of the fear of criticism, and the reason given for the withdrawal of the charge was to enable parliament to debate the report. Mr. Speaker, was ever a man acquitted in this country before with the government giving the excuse that the reason was political considerations?
The next incident was a letter from Colonel Drew. The Prime Minister said that that letter would be tabled if there was an hon. member who would assume the responsibility. There was such a member; he assumed the responsibility; and then what did the government do? Did it bring down the letter?


Mr. HOMUTH:: Another retreat.


John George Diefenbaker: Another retreat,
yes.


An hon. MEMBER:: A strategic retreat.


John George Diefenbaker: Another strategic retreat. What did the government do to find out whether parliament, the highest court in this land, supreme within its own realm, eould ask for the production of the letter? The government of Canada went to a lawyer in the city of Montreal and asked him whether he thought the Prime Minister was right when he said he would permit the tabling of the letter. What a course of action against political opponents! Retreats because of public criticism!
The explanation is to be found in Hansard of July 15; it is that the letter cannot be permitted to be brought before parliament because it contravenes an order in council. The reason given by the Prime Minister for being rather diffident about it was that it consisted in part of a criticism of a judge. Mr. Speaker, do either of these explanations appeal? No doubt mistakes will be made in connection with our armed forces in the future as in the past. Members of the opposition and the great press of Canada have endeavoured to ensure, by the publication of the evidence and the letter, that things like this shall not take place again if it is within the power of parliament to prevent it. The government, instead of cooperating to that end, adopted an attitude on this matter of fumbling and bumbling and stumbling; first one course, then another; yet at all times asserting its belief in the freedom of the press and the freedom of parliament and parliamentary criticism.
Just in that connection may I point out that I have in my hand a series of lectures entitled "The Battle of Brains," which is to-day and has been since June, 1941, given to officers and men of the Canadian expeditionary force in order to acquaint them with what we as a nation and as an empire are fighting for. One of the salient features of this book and of the lectures is the statement that this govern^ ment under the Prime Minister has ever asserted the right to freedom of criticism on the part of press and parliament. Yet everything in connection with Hong Kong from the beginning to the end has been an endeavour on the part of the government to prevent the publication of the evidence, to ensure that the people of Canada shall not know the full facts, to prevent the improvement of conditions which might have been improved, had all the evidence been before parliament.
I point out that this series of lectures, designed for the benefit of the men in the army, contains material which is nothing more

Hong Kong Inquiry
nor less than political propaganda paid for by the people of Canada. Do you think. I have no foundation for that statement? I point out first that it states in the introduction:
These lectures are intended as a "Recruit's Course in Democracy" comparable to a "Recruit's Course in Drill" if you like. They are intended to give the officer and the man the common facts of our history, our ideals and our purpose. Above all they are intended to MAKE HIM THINK.
The last three words are not in quotation marks but in capital letters. I turn to lecture IX, and I ask that the principles therein set out be applied in the present instance and that the evidence taken be produced in this parliament, except such portion as in the opinion of the Prime Minister might do harm to this country. I ask, too, that the letters which have been written to the Prime Minister be now produced, so that the people may know what is the situation in so far as the evidence revealed it, not the conclusion or the assortments of evidence which appear in the appendix.
The title of the lecture is "Our Precious Freedom". It is a magnificent lecture. It begins at page 99 in the following words:
Why are we fighting this war? We are fighting for our individual freedom.
Then it asks:
What then, is this freedom?
Here are the examples given for which Canada and the empire fight to-day. First, Greece, the battle of Thermopylae being mentioned-a battle which guaranteed freedom for a thousand years. Then magna charta, another stepping stone in history, and something is said of the struggle for political liberty. Then it tells the story of Bishop Latimer, how he suffered for religious liberty. Finally, after Leonidas, Magna Charta and Bishop Latimer, we have the following about William Lyon Mackenzie:
In our country, Canada, we have witnessed the same fight for freedom. About 120 years ago, an energetic and fearless young Scotsman arrived in Canada with his mother. He came with bare hands but readily established himself by his competence. Very soon he became oppressed by the lack of freedom in Canada.
Later it says this:
Finally ... he was forced to flee to the United States ... it was this sincere and earnest but hot-headed political advocacy and the spirit of self-abnegation inspiring it that helped us win more quickly the freedom which we possess in Canada to-day.
Now, then, listen to this, in a book paid for by the Dominion of Canada for the instruction of the armed forces of this country:
We cherish freedom of speech as our inalienable right. No stronger advocate of the right of the opposition to voice their criticism of the
government is to be found than the present Prime Minister of Canada-the grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie.


Richard Burpee Hanson: And when I criticize him he says I stab him in the back.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say to my hon. friend- '


John George Diefenbaker: No, I wish to finish this now. The lecture goes on:
Freedom Won and Lost The above glimpses of the past give some idea of the sacrifices made by those who, through their courage and their vision, saw the growth of man as one with the development of the free life. Leonidas died in the hope of holding the fine flower of Grecian culture for the continued life of his people; the Magna Charta defined and protected the rights of all men from the highest to the lowest in the land. Latimer, 400 years ago, gave his life for the right of every individual to worship God in his own way and therewith to be allowed help in improving the living conditions of man. It is a mere 120 years ago that William Lyon Mackenzie sacrificed a hard-earned livelihood, his safety, faced imprisonment and exile for the freedom of speech to attack a selfish controlling group.
There is the record. I would ask the Prime Minister this question: Is the record right, in the instructions given to the men in the armed services of this country? If it is, I ask the Prime Minister now to remove the ban from the publication of the Drew letter, remove the ban that was not imposed by this parliament, but was based upon an interpretation by a lawyer, the representative of this government, of an order in council of this government. There is a statement of what freedom means in that booklet. I ask the right hon. gentleman to get up in the house and give us an opportunity to know what the facts are in connection with Hong Kong- not to deny criticism, as criticism has been denied, denied first by order in council which is applicable only to the sittings of the commission and not to the report to parliament.


Mr. FRASER (Northumberland):: Has the hon. member read the Drew letter?


John George Diefenbaker: I do not know
whether my hon. friend has read it or not, but I do know that a member of this house stood up and said that there was nothing in that letter which would be beneficial in any way to the enemy. I refer to the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell).


William Alexander Fraser: But have you read it?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend has been asking me certain questions and I hope I have the right to reply to him.


An hon. MEMBER:: Later.

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William Lyon Mackenzie King: I wish to speak at this point before the hon. member passes on to something else. He has brought my name into this controversy at this moment and is seeking to leave the impression that because this book has been published and contains a reference to William Lyon Mackenzie, that reference has been placed there with my knowledge, and that the book is being circulated with my knowledge and consent.


An hon. MEMBER:: Will the book be withdrawn?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Just a moment. I wish to make it clear that I had no knowledge, in the first place, of the existence of the book, no knowledge of its contents, that I am in no way responsible for the statements that appear in it, though I think the statements he has quoted are correct. Now my hon. friend asks me whether, following the example of William Lyon Mackenzie, I am prepared immediately to do as he proposes. Were I to take the step he suggests I would be doing the very thing which William Lyon Mackenzie did his best to oppose, namely, the undermining of an independent judiciary or of the properly established institutions of the countiy.


Richard Burpee Hanson: The right hon. gentleman cannot hang his hat on the judiciary. It is not in question.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The chief justice of the country is being maligned at the moment by the hon. member who has the floor-


Richard Burpee Hanson: He is not maligning him.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: On a point of order, I contend that the hon. member who has the floor has no right whatever to make any mention of any communications from Mr. Drew which reflect on the chief justice of the country, who acted as commissioner. The amendment moved this afternoon has been carefully drawn. It has been prepared in the light of possible- objection being raised to a question such as is now to the fore. It relates to the evidence which appears in the report. The hon. member who has the floor introduced references to evidence not in the report, and what he says would serve-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Sit down.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: -to reflect upon the Chief Justice of Canada, who was commissioner in this matter, and who was appointed commissioner with the consent of all leaders in this house because he was the tMr. Mackenzie King.]
Chief Justice of Canada. He was made commissioner with the consent of the leader of the opposition-


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is
not a point of order.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: -because it was believed, and rightly believed, that the people of Canada would have confidence in the integrity of the chief justice-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Sit down.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That is a
typically Toiy method, shouting speakers down.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Hear, hear.


Richard Burpee Hanson: The right
hon. gentleman-


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Order. I am
speaking on a point of order and I have the right to do so. I have the right to speak on a point of order, and if hon. gentlemen opposite think they can oppose me on that they are greatly mistaken.


An hon. MEMBER:: The members of this parliament have an obligation


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to give your ruling on the point I raised as to whether any hon. member has the right to bring into this debate at the present time any references that would constitute allegations against the chief justice of the countiy-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: -which are as unfounded and improper as they could possibly be.


Richard Burpee Hanson: The Prime Minister's point of order is based on a false premise. There was absolutely no attack on the judiciary, let alone on the Chief Justice of Canada, and no interpretation of any word spoken will bear that out. What the hon. member who has the floor is asking is that the Prime Minister shall remove the veil of secrecy with which the government seeks to cover up reference to the Drew letter. I submit that there is nothing at all in the point of order because it is based on a false premise.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. SPEAKER:: Order; there is a point
of order before the Chair. I do not think there is any doubt in the minds of all hon. members as to what is the law with regard to any references being made to the chief justice, to judges of the high courts, or to officers in high positions-

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Richard Burpee Hanson: A judge
acting in the capacity of a commissioner?


Georges Parent: I do not think that the
hon. member who has the floor has been attacking, or has intended to attack, the chief justice, or to censure him, but I did find-and as a matter of fact I was about to rise and call the hon. member to order at the moment-that he was referring to the letter and that he made a statement with regard to the contents of that letter. If I recall his words correctly, I gathered that he stated the letter would not impugn the war effort of this country. I may not have his words correctly, but I think that is the essence of what he said. I would point out that the amendment before the house states:
. . . this house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed. . . .
The hon. member has seconded the amendment, and the debate must necessarily be confined to the terms of that amendment as I have it-before me. Therefore, any reference made to something extraneous to the evidence would certainly be out of order.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I would
point out to Your Honour that the hon. member has been interrupted a great deal and much of his time has been taken up with these interruptions. I suggest therefore that he should be given some further time on that account.


Georges Parent: The hon. member who was speaking was interrupted at. about five minutes to one. His time would expire at one minute to one, and I think it will be in order that he be allowed to conclude his remarks. It being one o'clock I now leave the chair.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Let him. finish
now.


Georges Parent: Would the hon. member
prefer to finish now?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: One o'clock.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Finish now.


John George Diefenbaker: I conclude, Mr. Speaker. I thank the house for its courtesy, and I conclude with an appeal to the Prime Minister to allow the evidence to be brought before parliament. I ask him to remove the veil that hides that evidence and so that the people of Canada may know whether the evidence that was given is corroborative of the evidence that wras quoted. Instead of taking the position that a prosecution was withdrawn merely because parliament should be given
an opportunity to debate the matter, make the admission that the reason for the withdrawal of the prosecution was that it was unjustified, and there was no evidence to support it. Produce the record here of what took place. As it stands we have the record of an order in council of March 2; an undertaking on the part of the Prime Minister that he would produce the Drew letter; the next day an alteration in his view; first giving ' the -press of the country permission to publish the letter, and a little later the same day denying that permission under the censorship of this country. These things strike at the root of the freedom of the individual, and above all at the freedom of the press and the supremacy of this parliament to deal with its own affairs. Only the other day this house witnessed an incident following which the press reported that I was howled down. These things, I suggest, are not proper for parliament at any time, least of all in time of war. I have tried to present my argument fairly, and I call upon the Prime Minister of this country to be true to the eulogy given him in the book of instructions which is issued to make Canadians in the armed forces think.
At one o'clock the house took recess.
The house resumed at three o'clock.


Mr. T. C. DOUGLAS (Weyburn):: Mr. Speaker, I cannot think of any debate in which I take part more reluctantly than I do in the one in which we are now engaged. That is because to me the men who were involved in this Hong Kong expedition were more than mere figures. It was my high privilege to know some of them personally, and numbered some of them among my closest and dearest friends. I would therefore hesitate to do anything or to say anything which would seem to be using their present plight for the purpose of indulging in political wrangling.
I should like to take part in this debate and see the debate on a whole conducted as though the men who now rot in Japanese internment camps were in these galleries. I feel certain that if they were listening to the discussions in the house they would expect that those of us in opposition ought not to use this incident as a political football. I think, secondly, they would expect that the government would not allow this investigation into the Hong Kong affair to develop into a whitewash. And above all they would ask that we should benefit by the experience
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through which they have passed, and if possible learn some lessons so that there might be no more Hong Kongs in the future.
It has been said in some places that there is no value in discussing this report, that nothing is to be gained by raking up the past. I agree with that, perfectly; but if from the past we can learn something for the future, if from the past we can learn something which will enable us in the future to handle more efficiently and more effectively the dispatch of troops overseas, then both the investigation and the discussion in the house will have been worth while.
It is only natural that the public should be somewhat suspicious about the whole matter. At first the discussion indicated that there was to be a parliamentary investigation. Then it was decided that there should be an investigation by royal commission. Then it was announced that the investigation would be held in camera. Following the publishing of the report and the appendix a statement was made by Colonel George A. Drew, and following that he was to be prosecuted under the defence of Canada regulations. Then after that a letter was sent by that gentleman to the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), which the Prime Minister offered to table and [DOT] later refused to table. All these things, it seems to me, have given the public cause to feel that probably we have not dealt with this matter in the frank and open manner in which we ought to have proceeded. The government would therefore be well advised to reconsider its position, and, with the exception of the correspondence from Great Britain, which the United Kingdom does not wish to have published, should decide that the rest of the evidence ought to be placed on the table of the house. I believe that would do more to arrest suspicion and to give us an opportunity of examining all the facts than any other single thing the government could do.
I come now to the report itself. May I say at once that to me there is a distinct difference between the Chief Justice of Canada in his judicial capacity and that gentleman when he is commissioner sitting as head of a royal commission. As commissioner he would not enjoy the immunities which belong to his official office. To me he is not sacrosanct. When he leaves the bench to take the position of commissioner of a royal commission he places himself in a position where he gives opinions on a very controversial subject, and we have the right to criticize or to differ from him as the case may be. If that is to be considered contempt of court, then I say to the government: Let them make the best of it. So far as I am

concerned I do not intend to treat the commissioner as though he had any judicial immunity.
Before discussing the report I should like to say that I read it and made a study of it while I was in western Canada attending military camp, and I did so without having seen the letter sent to the Prime Minister by Colonel Drew. The evidence which convinced me before ever seeing that letter was the evidence contained in the appendix of the report.
To my mind this report is one of the most amazing documents I ever read, and particularly the appendix to it. In the strict sense of the word the appendix is not an appendix at all. It gives two fragmentary documents, but it does not give a list of tabled documents. What it does give is a counsel's brief in defence of the government's action. It states a series of facts and then draws from those facts what to my mind are the most unwarranted conclusions. On page 3 of the report it is stated:
A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appear in the appendix hereto which is to be considered as part of my report.
"A full statement of the facts and full discussion of the evidence" does not appear. All that appear are merely such facts as are required to bolster the position taken in the report. The only documents produced are fragmentary in character and are quoted in substantiation of a position which had already been taken by the commissioner.
I should like to deal with the report under the headings which the commissioner himself has set up. The first one is the decision to send an expeditionary force overseas. On page 4 the commissioner draws attention to the fact that Mr. Drew, who was counsel for the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson), submitted that in view of the change of government in Japan, this government ought to have been warned of the impending outbreak of hostilities. The commissioner does not agree with that, and he makes statements in regard to that in several places in the report. Speaking of the chief of the general staff, he says this, as appears on page 21 of the report:
While war with Japan was not, he thought, imminent, he realized that it was a contingency which must be taken into account.
On page 46 he says:
We should remind ourselves once again that in October, 1941. there were no hostilities in the Pacific and the best informed opinion available to the Canadian authorities was that hostilities would not arise in the near future.
In substantiation of that, the commissioner drew attention to exhibit 45, which appears on page 61. The exhibit shown here is only

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a sentence or part of the ninth paragraph of a document sent to this government by the government of the United Kingdom. It seems to me that either all that document ought to have been quoted, or none of that document ought to have been quoted. It is a most unfair proceeding to take a single sentence out of its context and submit it as evidence before a royal commission.
The main fact has not been touched, and it is this: according to the report of the Roberts commission which investigated the Pearl Harbour catastrophe, the intelligence service of the United States knew on October 16 that hostilities were likely to break out in the Pacific, and word of this was forwarded to their army and navy commands. One of two things must be assumed, Either the British intelligence knew this or they did not know. If the British intelligence knew this, was it or was it not conveyed to the Canadian government? If it was conveyed to the Canadian government, why did not the Canadian government take some action in that regard and adopt a procedure in sending troops overseas with that fact in mind? If the British government did not convey that information to the Canadian government, then have we the proper machinery to establish a liaison between the war office in London and the Department of National Defence?
Somebody blundered, and the commissioner does not say who. But I want to say in all seriousness that the people of Canada will not permit Canada to be treated as an overgrown colony. We are not to be treated merely as someone to be given information when and if it suits the purpose of the British war office. If the British war office had that information, it should have been conveyed to the Canadian government. If they did not convey it or did not have it, then what facilities are being set up by the Department of National Defence to acquaint itself with the theatres of war into which Canadian troops may have to go?
I turn now to the next section of the report, in which the commissioner deals with the units that were selected. He points out that the two particular units were selected because they were not attached to any particular division; to have done otherwise would have meant breaking into a division already established and would have upset the plans of the Department of National Defence. The two units selected were the Royal Rifles of Quebec and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. I shall not weary the house by quoting again what was quoted this morning by the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green), but the report shows that the men in both these units had never fifed a two-inch mortar, a threeinch mortar, an anti-tank rifle, an anti-aircraft machine gun, a sub-machine gun, or a rifle grenade; nor had they thrown a live hand grenade. I refer to page 5, where it is stated:
The Royal Rifles had the three-inch mortar for training purposes at least as early as April, 1941. Although they had no ammunition, the mortar platoon was trained in its mechanism and use, tactically as well as otherwise. The mortar platoon of the Winnipeg Grenadiers was also trained in the mechanism and use of the same weapon; and further enjoyed the advantage of having, even before leaving for the West Indies, a number of anti-tank rifles (without ammunition) for training.
In this connection I refer to pages 26 and 27 of the appendix, where Brigadier Earnshaw was asked these questions and gave these answers:
Q. Can we put it this way, that it was fully equipped as a battalion in all respects?-A. Yes, except, of course, that it did not have certain weapons, but neither did any other battalion.
Then from the same page I quote:
The Royal Rifles had at all times their full share of rifles and bayonets, an adequate supply of light machine guns (both Bren and Lewis) and pistols, and their full scale of transport vehicles. They had one two-inch mortar for instructional purposes; but with this exception, they had no two-inch mortars, or anti-tank rifles.
And from page 27:
One gun was given to each company. Ammunition both for the three-inch mortars, as well as for the tommy-gun, was lacking. There were no live grenades in Newfoundland for practice purposes and training in grenade throwing was done with dummy grenades.
Then the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Sparling is quoted on the same page as follows:
The Winnipeg Grenadiers did not have dummy grenades, whereas the Royal Rifles and other units had dummy grenades.
On pages 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 the whole story is set out. It says on page 28:
Practice in firing the tommy-gun was not possible to Canadian battalions before October, 1941, as they have only recently been equipped with them.
Speaking of the Royal Rifles of Quebec, he says this on page 29:
The battalion also had two anti-tank rifles for training purposes and was equipped with rifles and revolvers. Individual training with rifles had been completed. Prior to May, 1940, the training with these rifles did not include firing at outdoor ranges.
And further down on the same page this is stated:
With regard to musketry, this report states that all the battalion had fired Part I on the miniature range, but had not fired their classification with service rifles.
The members realize what that means, of ourse. Firing with a -22 rifle on an indoor
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range is a very different thing from asking men to fire on an outdoor range with a service rifle and ammunition. The report goes on, at the top of page 30:
The battalion had been issued approximately 18.000 rounds of 1910 ammunition. The poor quality of the ammunition accounted, in the opinion of the commanding officer, for the fact that more did not qualify.
As I read the next two or three pages I am impressed by the statement three or four times made and reiterated that the men constantly indulged in bayonet practice. Well, with 1910 ammunition, and some of the men not having fired a machine gun, it was perhaps a very good thing to practise the use of the bayonet; because it would look as though that was what, they were going to use.
Again, at page 30, I quote:
With regard to the Bren gun, it is stated that: "These guns not being available, training in accordance with S.A.T. vol. 1, pamphlet 4, could not be carried out, but lectures in mechanism have been given with the aid of charts."
Speaking of the anti-tank rifle it says:
As there is no ammunition for this weapon, no actual firing of the gun has been possible.
Then at the bottom of page 31 it is the same story-no sub-machine guns and no anti-tank rifles. It says:
With regard to the seventy-five recruits who had joined the battalion in the West Indies. Colonel Sutcliffe reports that at that time they had received no basic training at all.


An hon. MEMBER:: Read the next line.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: The commissioner goes on to say:
He also appears to have been mistaken with regard to this, as the records of the men concerned show that they spent five weeks at a basic training centre before going to the West Indies.
Then at the top of page 32 he says:
With regard to the anti-aircraft platoon, he says it had been fully instructed in mechanism, drill and tactical handling of both the Lewis and Bren guns, but no firing had been done.
This was not only true of both units, that they had not fired these guns, but the Winnipeg Grenadiers had not fired a light machine gun at all except that just prior to their departure they had used the service rifle and service ammunition on the range.
The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) and the hon. member for Mackenzie (Mr. Nicholson), each had an experience the one of which corroborates the other. The member for Rosetown-Biggar talked to a young soldier here in Ottawa and the hon. member for Mackenzie talked to a young soldier in Winnipeg. Both had been with the

Winnipeg Grenadiers in the West Indies, and both told the same story. They said that only three times had they seen a rifle fired during their stay in the West Indies-once at a rabbit, once at a nazi flag flying over an internment camp, and once by a sentry when someone failed to answer his challenge.
The impression has gone out . that the main objection has been to the fact that a number of recruits were sent with this expedition to Hong Kong who were not fully trained. I do not think that is the most serious aspect of the matter. Had these two, units been well trained in the handling of their platoon weapons, the adding of a few partly trained men, I am inclined to agree,, might not have been so serious. But the fact of the matter is that neither of the units had been adequately trained in the handling of the platoon weapons on which their very lives were to depend. Why I am interested in this is to ask this question:	To what
extent is this "policy being continued? I look,, for instance, at page 33 of the report, where I find this:
Lieutenant-Colonel Sparling . . . said that in his opinion the training of both the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers was far ahead of the units of the second division at the time they proceeded overseas.
In view of wha+ has just been said as to the amount of training which, these men who went to Hong Kong had, what amount of training,. I ask, had been given to the second division when they went overseas? I quote from page 28, where Brigadier Earnsha.w, when asked whether the battalions sent to Hong Kong were equipped, replied:
Yes, except, of course, that it did not have certain weapons, but neither did any other battalion.
Sometimes we hear talk of giving comfort to the enemy,, but I do not know of anything that would give him greater comfort than that. It goes on to tell that the two units had not fired some of the most important platoon weapons, but had fired the sendee rifle only a short time before going overseas. They were in the same position as all the other units, and one officer suggested that they were in a better position than the second division when they went overseas.


James Layton Ralston: My hon. friend is not
interpreting the evidence quite correctly. The evidence he refers to on page 26 reads:
Q. Can we put it this way, that it was fully equipped as a battalion in all respects?-A. Yes, except, of course, that it did not have certain weapons.
That has nothing to do with any question, of the firing of the Bren gun or the rifle.

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Mr. DOUGLAS (Weybum):: But it does
say that neither did any other unit have two-inch mortars.


James Layton Ralston: Right.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: That is correct. Of course, I know that what General McNaughton said, in response to a question, will be quoted. That is on page 43. He was asked this question:
Q. With regard to your answers to questions by my friend Mr. Campbell, he gave to you the figures 43 and 62 of men who had less than sixteen weeks in connection with these two battalions respectively. Could those numbers, in your opinion, be increased without affecting the answer which you gave to His Lordship to any extent?-A. Well, I think I would like to answer it this way, saying that I took the first Canadian division overseas, well on towards 18,000, and not one of them had had that training; not that I was happy, but-
He was interrupted at that point. The two cases are not .parallel. In the first place, General McNaughton took the first division over a few months after the outbreak of this war, but this Hong Kong expedition was being taken over two years after the outbreak of this war. Secondly, General McNaughton took over a division which was to receive extensive training in England.


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Who could tell then?


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: The battle line at that time was well into Flanders. But here an expeditionary force was being sent to Hong Kong into what, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, would be one of the outposts of the British empire and would come under immediate attack by the enemy.
I think it is important that the Minister of National Defence, in making his statement, instead of going into a defence of what has or has not happened, should give this house some assurance as has been asked for already to-day, that Canadian troops to be sent overseas will have received their full battle training here in Canada. We have the food here to feed them, we have the space here, and there is no reason at all why these men cannot be trained in Canada. I have heard certain rumours already with reference to troops going to England recently with a minimum of training, and it seems to me that in the light of the experience we have had with the Hong Kong expedition that practice should be stopped as quickly as possible.
The commissioner makes some reference to the reinforcements which were added to these two units. I shall not go into that in any great detail, because there is a lot to cover. I shall briefly refer to page 44, where Colonel
J. K. Lawson, who was then director of training, sets out in a memorandum what is the standard of training for men going overseas. It seems to me that the commissioner is on veiy weak ground when he says that "the transfers made in October, 1941, were not reinforcements being sent overseas from Canadian training centres within the terms of the general order of August, 1940, and that therefore the order is technically inapplicable."
To take refuge in technicalities is totally beside the point. Whether these men were going as reinforcements from training centres or whether they were attached to a division is not the important thing. The important thing is whether or not these men were adequately trained, not only to defend themselves, but to make use of such protection as the country might afford, before they were sent over into a theatre of war.	.
Nor can we take refuge in the fact that at the bottom of page 44 he says:
General Crerar, who, as chief of the general staff, had been responsible for the general policy expressed in the order of August 18, 1940, was absent from Ottawa during the period when steps were taken to bring the two battalions up to strength.
The fact that General Crerar was out of the city or in the city is not the thing. What this house wanted to know was who was responsible for men being attached to units going overseas who had not had sufficient training to fit them to go into a potential theatre of war.


Mr. MITCHELL:: Did the hon. member read what General McNaughton said about them on page 43?


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Yes, I read what McNaughton said about it. The minister will not expect me to quote all the report unless he is prepared to give me all the time I need.


Humphrey Mitchell: You ought to be fair about it.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I am making my own speech. The minister can make his. If he wants to give me extended time I will read the whole report; if not, I can refer only to what can be contained within forty minutes.
General Stuart, in cross-examination, as appears on page 45, admitted that he wanted to give these men a refresher course. In response to a question by the commissioner, "There was no alternative?" the answer was, "There was no alternative, my lord." Of course an alternative would have been to take units from one of the divisions if these units were better equipped, better trained and more fit. True, it would have upset some
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of the arrangements of the Department of National Defence, but the first consideration ought to have been whether or not these men had been sufficiently trained to warrant putting them into such a dangerous position.
I should like to refer particularly in connection with this question of reinforcements to a matter which affects myself. I note that the commissioner did me the honour of quoting me on page 39 of the appendix. He stated that all the officers had completed their training-that is, reinforcement officers- and he says:
In general, this opinion was confirmed by Mr. T. C. Douglas, M.P., who knew five of these officers and saw them shortly before they left for Hong Kong.
That is one of the things which amazed me most in this report. If the rest of the evidence presented to the commissioner was interpreted with as prejudiced a point of view as the evidence I submitted, I have grave doubts about this report. I went before the commission at the suggestion of counsel for the commission. The commissioner was very kind to me, and seemed to be anxious to get all the facts. I told him what little I knew: that in October, 1940, I went into a reserve officers' training camp with some of these men. These men had thirty days' training in squad drill, ordinary rifle drill, and some elementary mapreading. They had never fired a Bren gun, a machine gun, or pistol when they came out. They went back to civilian occupations and were picked up again next spring and sent to Gordon Head, there to take a four months' course. They were then transferred to the Winnipeg Grenadiers and sent overseas. These officers were naturally perturbed-and I explained this to the commissioner-at the prospect of taking men into action after they themselves had received in total about five months' training, one month as reserve officers and four months to qualify as active officers. They had no knowledge of mortars and only a limited amount of training in the handling of platoon weapons. In giving this evidence I tried to be fair to these men. I went on to point out that these men were not cowards; they were not perturbed about the danger [DOT]to themselves; they were perturbed about the fact that they would be leading men and they doubted if they were qualified to do so. The commissioner interprets my remarks by saying only this:
He stated that they were overjoyed at the prospect of going into more active service and they were satisfied with their training courses as regards the handling of men and general instruction, although they had some uncertainty about their experience in operational manoeuvres.
fMr. T. C. Douglas.]
It is difficult for me to understand that statement in the light of the evidence which I attempted to give.
The commissioner says, at page 46 of the evidence, that of course these men's training could be got up in the three weeks they had on shipboard and three weeks they were to have in Hong Kong. That seems to me a preposterous statement. There were 2,000 men on a ship which originally had been equipped to hold 500. What training could they do? I have not time to read further; I see my time is slipping, but at the bottom of page 46 is a statement of the training which they were able to take-physical training, and lectures. That was not what they needed. Those three weeks could not be used in actual training, only in keeping them physically fit. It is true that they had three weeks in Hong Kong, but I understand that evidence was submitted to the commission in the form of messages from Brigadier Lawson that the greater part of that time was taken in uncrating their equipment and checking it and getting ready for settling into barracks.
I come to the last thing with which I want to deal, if my time will permit me, and that is the transport equipment and the mechanical equipment which was supposed to have gone with this expedition. It is one of the saddest stories, I think, I ever read. It breaks itself into two parts. First, here is a ship, the Awatea, according to the information, capable of holding 75,000 cubic feet of material, and originally 500 persons could have been put into it, as it was equipped for 500. It is sent to accommodate 2,000 men and 125,000 cubic feet of equipment. Had all the men been left at home this ship could have taken only three-fifths of the equipment. Whose responsibility was that? What liaison is there between the government here and the British government? Were representations made to the British government to provide two ships? Was the British government aware of how much space was wanted? Where does the responsibility lie? Do we merely take what is sent to us, put in what we can, and ship it overseas?
When they found that, with the men in this boat, only 10,000 or 15,000 cubic feet of equipment could be taken, an endeavour was made to load what they could, some twenty vehicles. The story of these vehicles is one of the tragedies of public life in Canada. If hon. members will take the trouble to read from pages 51 and 52 up to page 60 they will find that it reads like that comic strip we used to see of Alphonse and Gaston-"After you, my dear Alphonse." Here was Mr. Connor, of the office of the transport controller, Major James and Colonel Spearing, each of whom

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gave evidence that they thought that the other person was responsible. For instance, it appears that no ordnance transport officer was in fact appointed. At the bottom of page 56, speaking of certain arrangements being made:
From that time forward, no one at national defence headquarters did anything further in connection with these twenty vehicles. This was left in the hands of the. transport controller.	[DOT]
The transport controller wired Vancouver, and when he could get no satisfactory answer sent the vehicles on anyway. They arrived too late to go on the ship, and were sent by another ship which never reached the men for whom they were intended.
But to me the most amazing part is the suggestion made by the commissioner on page 8 of the report. He says this:
There is no evidence, however, that the troops suffered through the lack of them,-
Speaking of mechanical equipment-
-or that they were not supplied at Hong Kong.
Then on page 61 we find this amazing statement:
With regard to the six carriers, they are simply a means of getting a Bren gun crew, or mortar crew', across country quickly. They are not fighting vehicles in the sense that a tank is. A truck would serve equally well where there are roads.
Of course, the Japanese were ungentlemanly enough to fight where there were no roads.
Again it is not known whether the British garrison had carriers with which the force could have been, or was supplied, but, even if that were not the case, it cannot be said that the absence of these six carriers would prevent the force from carrying or using their Bren, guns and mortars.
What a preposterous statement! If this mechanical equipment was not necessary, why were the men supplied with it? The only men who could give evidence as to whether or not any suffering followed as a result of this failure to get mechanical equipment to the men are the men themselves. We have no evidence from them. Some British officers who escaped from Hong Kong did go to Chungking, but we have no report from them. No one has told us what suffering was involved. I understand that the only two messages which referred to the matter are from Brigadier Lawson himself, in one of which he says that the water and transport situation was grave, and in the other, later on, that the water and transport situation was very critical.


James Layton Ralston: My hon. friend is incorrect.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: The minister will have plenty of opportunity.


James Layton Ralston: But my hon. friend is stating something that is not in the record There is no such message from Brigadier Lawson.


Richard Burpee Hanson: What is in
his report? Let us see the report.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: That brings the whole thing to the point where I want it. I have good reason to believe-as a matter of fact, if I remember correctly, it was published by the British United Press-that Brigadier Lawson did send a message that the transport and water situation was very critical. Now the minister says that there is no such message.


James Layton Ralston: I said there was no such message from Brigadier Lawson.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Well, that is all the more reason why this evidence should be tabled. The statement was made that there was such a message. The British United Press carried that statement at the time, that the message had come from the Canadian troops, that the water and transport situation was grave, and later on the message was that it was critical. If there is such evidence let us have it. It cannot do any harm now. But it is absolutely preposterous to have it suggested at this time-


Georges Parent: The hon. member's time has expired.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: May I finish the statement? It is absolutely preposterous to suggest that these men who went into-action without the mechanical equipment that should have been supplied them, and under circumstances wherein the water and transport situation was critical, could have gone into action and not suffered as a consequence. I think the government owes it to the relatives of these men, to this parliament and to the country, to table all the evidence in order that we and the government itself may take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that there will not be a repetition of this most unfortunate incident.


Mr. C. E. JOHNSTON (Bow River):: I do not intend at this time to discuss the question whether or not it was a good thing to send these troops to Hong Kong. I am not going to discuss particularly the question whether these troops were as efficiently trained as they should have been, because I think there are members of this house who are more qualified to discuss that matter than I am, officers who actually served in the last war and officers who are now assisting in the training of our troops. It devolves upon them as a duty to their country to stand up and discuss
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the efficiency of the training of these troops. What I want to deal with is the very question that has arisen between the hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) and the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston). The minister gets up and contradicts the hon. member for Weyburn. He says that there was no such message from Brigadier Lawson, as that to which the member for Weyburn referred, and the implication is of course that there may have been a message from somebody else. If it was not from Brigadier Lawson, the Minister of National Defence knows whom it is from and he will not tell. I should think that would be a proper deduction from his remark, and that is exactly the point I am going to make throughout my speech. I say that this inquiry was conducted by a man who was most partial, and when I speak of this-


Georges Parent: Order.


Charles Edward Johnston: I have-


Georges Parent: Order. The hon. member must not impute partiality to the commissioner.


Charles Edward Johnston: Mr. Speaker-


Richard Burpee Hanson: Mr. Speaker, am I to understand by that ruling that Your Honour takes the ground that the capacity of the chief justice as chief justice and his capacity as royal commissioner are indivisible? That would appear to follow from Your Honour's ruling.


Georges Parent: The royal commissioner
in this instance is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and as such he is included among those high personages to whom reference is made in the rule. The hon. member has made the statement that the royal commissioner was partial. Certainly the statement implies that the chief justice, acting as royal commissioner, was partial and therefore prejudiced in his report as submitted to the house, and I must rule that such a statement w'ith regard to the Chief Justice of Canada is not admissible.


Charles Edward Johnston: I will bow to your ruling, Mr. Speaker, but it places me in a very awkward position, because, when I am referring to this report, and to the person who drew it up, I am not referring to the Chief Justice of Canada but to the commissioner who drew the report. All the government has to do. when it does not want criticism of its action, is to appoint a chief justice as the man who draws up its report, and it can come to us and say: You must not criticize him because he is chief justice.
IMr. C. E. Johnston.]
If that is the attitude to be taken, the government is doubly to blame, because it knew, when it appointed this man as the one to conduct the inquiry, that it would prevent us from criticizing the report.


Georges Parent: If the hon. member will permit me, citation 305 of Beauchesne's Parliamentary Rules and Forms states:
All references to judges and courts of justice and to personages of high official station, of the nature of personal attack and censure have always been considered unparliamentary, and the Speakers of the British and Canadian Ilduses have always treated them as breaches of order.
There is no doubt in my mind that the royal commissioner, the Chief Justice of Canada, does fall within that category of high official personages. There is no objection to the hon. member criticizing the report and giving his interpretation or opinion with regard to the findings of the royal commission. But when he proposes to say that the royal commissioner is partial he is in my judgment going beyond the rules of the house, which stipulate that no such statement may be made with regard to such personage as the royal commissioner.


Richard Burpee Hanson: On the point of order, Mr. Speaker, I desire to have it understood that I respectfully dissent from the point of view taken by the Chair. I do not propose to discuss the matter at the moment, but I make that statement. Let me make this position clear. While the rule prevents any hon. member of this house from casting any reflection upon a gentleman occupying a judicial position, in respect to that position, the rule is not to the effect that if that gentleman steps out of his judicial role and accepts a position as royal commissioner under the Inquiries Act, he therefore remains under the rule. If that were so this parliament did wrong in the attacks that were made upon two eminent jurists in connection with the shell investigation, one of whom by the way happened to be Mr. Justice Duff. The findings of the commission, and the commission, were very vigorously denounced by the then Liberal opposition in this house.


James Layton Ralston: Not the commission.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Yes, the
commission. I think if the minister reads it again he will agree with me.
.Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I took down the words which the hon. member used at the time he was referring to the chief justice, and his statement was: "a man who was most partial.'' That was a charge against a man, not a reference to some statement contained

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in a report, or some finding. That was a direct charge against an individual, either as a commissioner or a chief justice; and the charge was that he was a man who was most partial. My hon. friend knows very well that the chief justice was chosen because the leaders of all parties in this house, and I believe all hon. members, believed that the Chief Justice of Canada was the most impartial man who could be chosen for the position of commissioner. So that the hon. member has no right to reflect upon any individual as such. He has made a direct charge against the Chief Justice of Canada.
Let me explain the situation in another way. For the moment let no member forget that this matter is being discussed in the parliament of Canada and assume that we are viewing something which is taking place in the parliament of Great Britain. Does anyone in this house believe that the British House of Commons would allow any hon. member to speak of the Chief Justice of Great Britain as a man who was most partial, one who was not qualified to fill a judicial role?-because that is what it comes to.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That
might depend upon the capacity in which the official was acting.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No one is taking any exception to criticism of the report, or any statement contained in it. An hon. member is perfectly at liberty to say that he thinks a certain statement is right or wrong. But he has no right to say that the chief justice of the country, whether acting as chief justice or as a commissioner, is a man who is most partial, when the country knows him to be the most impartial gentleman who could possibly have been appointed to the position he holds.
And may I point out that what the hon. member is now saying reflects upon Sir Lyman Duff-he is the same person whether filling one position or another-as one who is a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain, one who, because of his exceptional integrity and ability, has been chosen by the British and other governments to serve on international tribunals. It is this gentleman, who has occupied a position second to none in Canada, who is said by the hon. member to be a man who is most partial. I think when my hon. friend the leader of the opposition reflects on the manner in which the bar of the country is likely to view an attack of this kind upon the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, he will feel that perhaps he ought not to support too strongly what the hon. member is saying at the moment.


Richard Burpee Hanson: If I may say a word-


Georges Parent: I have already given my ruling and I do not wish it to be the subject of debate; the rules of the house provide a method by which a ruling may be challenged. I do wish to point out, and this is final so far as my ruling is concerned, that there can be no objection on the part of the Chair or the house to any hon. member interpreting the report as he wishes, or giving his own conclusions or his own opinions. That has been done to-day, and there can be no objection to the hon. gentleman doing it. But there is objection to calling into question the bona fides, or sincerity of, or attributing partiality or prejudice, to the person who acted as commissioner when that person is the Chief Justice of Canada. The rule of the house, which I believe is the same as the rule in the British house, does not permit this to be done.


Richard Burpee Hanson: May I be permitted to say just a word in response to the suggestion of the Prime Minister. I agree in a very substantial degree with the principle for which the right hon. gentleman is contending. I would not have used that language myself, but there does seem to be a confusion of mind with respect to the same gentleman occupying two positions. Certainly the rules are well established with respect to the judiciary, and I hope I may never violate them. With respect to the report of a royal commission, however, we all agree that this is open to attack, but it does not add anything to attach motives to the royal commissioner, though he is acting in a capacity other than that of Chief Justice of Canada. Let us have that understood; for I think the distinction is very clear.


Charles Edward Johnston: I might point out that I was not criticizing the Chief Justice of Canada. The Prime Minister says he has no objection to my discussing the report, so that I shall be content with saying that every man will be judged by his works, and I shall discuss these works.
It is my opinion, having read this report very carefully, that the report is exceedingly biased. When I began my study of this question I did so from a most impartial standpoint. I did not favour those who conducted the inquiry, nor did I give any undue consideration to anything Colonel Drew may have said. I think the report will speak for itself. Just let me give a few illustrations from the report. This was supposed to be a secret inquiry. This point has been mentioned before, but I
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think it will bear repeating. This was supposed to be a secret inquiry into the sending of the expedition to Hong Kong.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It was not supposed to be; it was made secret.


Charles Edward Johnston: It was made a secret inquiry. It started out to be a public inquiry and then became a secret one. The very first to violate that understanding, however, were those who drew up the report, because the report itself quotes from the evidence given at that inquiry. I contend that just as soon as one party to an agreement breaks the rule of secrecy, then the other party has an equal right to quote from the evidence. Therefore it no longer remains a secret inquiry; and if there were no other arguments to advance I would still say that this alone was ample support for my statement that this inquiry should be judged by this house on the evidence that was taken at the inquiry. Let me turn to page 4 of the report itself and read what the commissioner says:
I had the advantage of reading a number of dispatches from the government of the United Kingdom, which I am not at liberty to reproduce, as well as a dispatch from the Canadian military authorities in England, which is reproduced in part, dealing with the probabilities concerning war with Japan, and my conclusion-
It will be noticed that the commissioner is [DOT]drawing a conclusion as a result of having carefully studied these secret documents. I suppose one with a legal mind might say that is all right, that the commissioner was going to make a finding, and I will grant that to be so in this ease. To continue:
-my conclusion is that, having regard to the information of which the government was in possession, derived from the best sources of information open to them, nothing emerged before the departure of the expeditionary force on the 27th of October which could have been considered to be a justification for the withdrawal by Canada from the responsibility she had undertaken. On the contrary, the reasons which prompted the acceptance of the proposal continued to operate with possibly increasing force up to the sailing of the expedition.
Without question I say he referred definitely to those secret communications, and he says that he is going to quote part of them. The [DOT]other part he cannot quote, which is in effect what the Minister of National Defence said a while ago, that there may have been word from somebody, but I won't tell you who it is. Now it leaves the gravest of doubts in the mind of anybody who would read this report that the findings were definitely not based on the facts. When that is the case, certainly the whole report itself should be thrown out.

And in case someone may say: Well, that one was based on a finding, let me read just a little further what he has to say in regard to this secrecy. I want to point out clearly that the very first principle laid down by the commission itself was broken, and therefore the report itself should be thrown out entirely and disregarded, the evidence brought down to the house, and members allowed to decide on the merits of the evidence.
I find this at page 16:
The Canadian government, having no sources of its own of military information in the far east, naturally and necessarily relied upon the government of the United Kingdom for advice as to the military and diplomatic situation there. In September and October, 1941, it was the accepted view, both in England and in Canada, that war with Japan was not imminent, although it was recognized that, to use the words of Major Power, "If war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position."
I suggest to you right there that he is using the secret information that he had to draw up that finding in the first part. But he definitely quotes Major Power. I suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that that is not Major Power's quotation, that that is only part of it and a very insignificant .part of it. And I say that the report misrepresents the truth. Surely nobody could have confidence in this report, having known that. This report is most misleading. I say that in the report the facts are stretched a great deal.
(Mr. Speaker having ruled that certain words be expunged from the record):


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Hear, hear.


Georges Parent: There is another feature I wish to draw to the attention of the house. When the Chair has given a ruling it is not done with the idea of obtaining applause. It is very improper to applaud a ruling from the Chair.


Mr. BLACKMORE:: WTe cannot hear you at all, Mr. Speaker.


Georges Parent: I say that there has been occasional applause after rulings from the Chair. Applause should not be given to rulings from the Chair, because that leaves the appearance that there has been partiality to one point of view.


Charles Edward Johnston: Returning to page 16, and the section which I read in which Major Power is quoted as follows "If war broke out with Japan, the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position", I contend that that section of the quotation of Major Power's words

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was put in there to show that there was no imminent danger from attack from Japan. Let me read further from the quotation from Major Power-


James Layton Ralston: What is my hon. friend reading? Is he reading from the report of the commissioner?


Charles Edward Johnston: No, I am not reading from the report.


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: What is it?


Charles Edward Johnston: This is further evidence of Major Power on that occasion. He says: "I will-"


James Layton Ralston: Order.


An hon. MEMBER:: Go on.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Georges Parent: Order.


Charles Edward Johnston: Who is calling order?


Georges Parent: A point of order was raised.


James Layton Ralston: Yes. My hon. friend, I understood, was reading some portion, or what he alleged was some portion, of the evidence which was not in the record, in reference to the hearings held in camera.


Georges Parent: The Minister of National Defence states that the hon. member is making reference to some portion of the evidence which he alleges-


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Was given by Major Power and is not in the record.


Georges Parent: -is not in the record. The hon. member is referring to some evidence which is not in the report. Is that correct?


Charles Edward Johnston: I was reading evidence from another extract, yes.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


Charles Edward Johnston: It is
exactly the same as the Minister of National Defence did a little while ago.


Georges Parent: I call the hon. member's
attention to the amendment to which he is now speaking. The amendment is:
This house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed-
And so on. The hon. member is entitled to speak only of the evidence which has been disclosed to the house, and not to speak about
evidence of which he has other knowledge. He must confine himself to the evidence disclosed to the house.


Charles Edward Johnston: Speaking
to a point of order, Mr. Speaker, I hope that Your Honour is taking into consideration the fact that much of my time is being taken up on points of order. The reference Your Honour has just read does not say that the evidence which is to be given in this house must be contained in the report.


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Yes.


Charles Edward Johnston: I contend that that is part of the evidence given at the commission.


Georges Parent: The amendment refers to such of the evidence as has been disclosed. What is on the table of the house, what is in possession of the house, is the only evidence that can be disclosed now.


Charles Edward Johnston: Well, Mr. Speaker, that puts the argument on a very onesided basis, does it not? The government has a report here which has been completely whitewashed for their purposes.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Charles Edward Johnston: It is a good report from their point of view.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Georges Parent: The word "whitewashed" should not be used. The meaning of that word is well known to everyone, and its use is a reflection upon the royal commissioner.


Charles Edward Johnston: I am just speaking about the report.


Georges Parent: "Whitewashed" report.


Gordon Graydon: That is just a painter's term.


Charles Edward Johnston: The government has done a beautiful job of this. Now we dare not even refer to the report as being misleading because the government take objection. They appointed the commission, they appointed the chief justice as the head of it, and we dare not criticize him; we dare not criticize the report. The government take very strong exception to anything that is not in their favour. The whole report has that very bearing all the way through, and then the people of Canada, especially the members of parliament, are expected to base a decision on these things when it is fixed so that at least I cannot believe it, and I think there are a large number of the members of this house in the same position. Anyway, I am
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going to say this: on page 16 of the report a quotation by Mr. Power is indicated by quotation marks, and I am going to suggest that that is not what Mr. Power said. When that portion is taken out of the text it changes the meaning entirely.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Charles Edward Johnston: That is my opinion.


Georges Parent: I do not wish to interrupt the hon. gentleman, but as an experienced parliamentarian he must realize that reference to evidence which has been taken from its text can only lead to one conclusion, namely, that the royal commissioner has chosen only those statements which he wished to bolster up or to found his report upon. That is an implication of motive; there is no escape from it. The hon. gentleman is implying motives on the part of the royal commissioner.


Charles Edward Johnston: I assure you that I am not implying motives. I might suggest that I feel sorry for him, but I certainly would not imply any disrespectful motives. The word "bolster" has been used here; why should there be objection to it when I happen to use a similar expression? No exception was taken to it then, and I can hardly see how it is fair that exception should be taken to it now. I know that' your ruling, sir, is right; I suppose it is, because you are always most fair. Let me go on and quote from page 16. I am referring to the report now.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Are you still on that page?


Charles Edward Johnston: I am still on that page. I do not know who put it in here; I must not say who put it in here, but it is quite clear. I quote:
The telegram of October 26 mentioned by General Stuart contains the following: "Consensus opinion that war in far east unlikely at present."
I suppose I shall have to refer to the report again, so that I will turn to page 61 of the report. I fancy I will be correct when I say that here again a partial statement was issued in the report. When a partial statement is taken out of its context and put in as giving a fact and an impression of opinion is based on that portion of the document, it is most misleading. The same words occur at the bottom of page 61. They are called exhibit 45 and they read:
Consensus opinion that war in far east unlikely at present.
Mind you, it says that that is a portion of the ninth paragraph. There were nine other
|Mr. C. E. Johnston.]
paragraphs at least. Here is just a portion; it is not even a complete sentence. Yet the report has that included as something upon which it bases a finding. The unfortunate part of it is that the whole tenor of the report is blaming the British government because the Canadian government did not get sufficient information from them at the proper time; yet there are only extracts of evidence to prove the point, which is entirely contrary to the evidence. I believe it would be contrary to the evidence if we had the evidence here to examine. Do you see, it puts the members of this house in a terrible position. Without question, anybody who reads this report will be so much confused-and probably that was the intention of it-that he can hardly draw a decent conclusion. I think I would be right if I said-


Mr. ROSS (Souris):: Be careful 1


Charles Edward Johnston: Yes, I have to be most careful; I dare not even say the report is biased, because that would cast a reflection on the government. Of course they have protected themselves well. I must congratulate them upon having taken such great precautions. It may be the cause of destroying another 1,500 or 2,000 of our men, but that seems a small consideration for protecting a political party. Let me refer again to the report. In my opinion it is shown that the report is not founded on the total facts as presented to the inquiry. Let me refer to page 59 and then leave it to the judgment of the house whether it is biased or not. This page contains extracts of the evidence given by Mr. Cooke and Mr. Lockwood. When we come to speak, as the Prime Minister did a while ago, about reflecting on any individual, may I suggest that this report reflects a greater degree, should I say of dishonour, on an individual than ever I had hoped or expected to reflect on the Chief Justice of Canada. Look at what page 59 of the report says about a good Canadian citizen. I quote:
There is however the evidence of Mr. Cooke and Mr. Lockwood the controller of transport. Mr. Lockwood is a man of immense experience in the shipping business before the war as well as in his present office. Mr. Lockwood says: -
I will just leave it at that. Let us go to page 60 of the report, and I quote from about the middle of the page:
I accept Mr. Lockwood's evidence. I do not accept Mr. Cooke's evidence-
I suggest that that is a definite reflection on that man's character. I continue:
-that it was a simple matter to load these vehicles and that all could have been loaded. The result is that had these vehicles arrived on October 27 before the ship sailed-

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He does not mention that they arrived half an hour, I think it was, before. According to the facts of the case, Mr. Cooke was much more experienced than Mr. Lockwood. Yet the report sees fit to accept Mr. Lockwood's evidence, and does not accept the other. In effect it says that it was not worth considering, that the fellow did not know what he was talking about. Despite the fact that Mr. Cooke was general manager of the shipping company which owned the ship, despite the fact that Mr. Cooke was the man who knew that ship personally, despite the fact that he had loaded ships of that kind before, despite the fact that he was right at Vancouver when the ship was being loaded, despite the fact that he knew everything in detail in connection with the loading of the ship, the report-I still have to use that word-says that this man's evidence was not worth anything. Instead the commissioner takes Mr. Lockwood's evidence, a man who was in Montreal, who was not in Vancouver, a man who had no knowledge of the ship or of its size or of the capacity of its hold-he knew nothing about the thing and had never seen the ship. Yet the commissioner took his evidence in preference to that of Mr. Cooke. Why? Because he was a government official, no doubt.
With these facts before us I say that no good citizen of Canada, no honest individual, could ever accept this report. No one can tell me as a member of this house to vote for the acceptance of a thing like that. I think it is a disgrace even to ask members of this house to vote for its acceptance. The portion of the evidence that is to be found in this report is so contrary to the actual facts that could be found if the evidence was before the house that I doubt whether even the cabinet accepts the report. There are many things in this report which I think even they do not realize.
Let me make a brief reference to water *carriers, which are referred to on page 60 of the report. As the hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) said a few minutes .ago, this part of the evidence was so shockingly crude that it was almost a waste of time to mention it. Here is what the report says on page 60:
The two water tanks are. of . course, specially built tanks on a chassis. Whether or not the British garrison had a reserve of these vehicles which were made available to the Canadian force cannot be known. Equally it cannot be known whether the force was able to use ordinary trucks for the purpose of carrying water in some sort of receptacle. In the [DOT]absence of evidence, I can make no finding as to whether or not the force suffered from lack cf these two vehicles.
According to other information I am led to believe that there was other evidence before that commission-


Georges Parent: Order. I hope the hon.
gentleman is not going to infringe upon the ruling I have already given. The evidence that we have before the house is the evidence to which the hon. member must confine himself. I have already ruled that he cannot use evidence other than that which is before the house, and I gather from what he is saying that he is going to contradict a statement in the report by other evidence.


Charles Edward Johnston: I did not
intend to quote, Mr. Speaker, from Colonel Drew's letter.


Mr. GRANT:: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member has spoken for forty minutes.


Georges Parent: The hon. gentleman has
not spoken for forty minutes. I think he is entitled to some extra time for the number of interruptions.


Charles Edward Johnston: I thank
you, Mr. Speaker. I have no intention of frightening hon. members across the way by quoting from Colonel Drew's letter, I see they are quite disturbed whenever I pick it up. I do not see why they should be, if the facts are according to the evidence. Colonel Drew acted as legal adviser on that commission, and I have no more reason to say that the facts as contained in his letter are dishonest than I would have to say that the facts contained in this report are dishonest. Certainly I have every right to weigh the one against the other and decide for myself. But apparently the government have scrutinized Colonel Drew's letter veiy closely, so I shall not have to explain it to them. But I would ask the government if they are not aware of evidence to the effect that there was-


Georges Parent: Order. It has been decided that the only evidence which can be referred to is the evidence laid on the table. If the hon. member is asking a question of the government as to other evidence, let me say that it would be just as improper for the members of the government to answer that question as it would be for the hon. member to ask it.


Charles Edward Johnston: The government seems to have this thing tied up pretty tight. Let me say this, Mr. Speaker. Having read that report very carefully, and having also read Colonel Drew's letter very carefully, if I had to choose between the two there is no hesitancy in my mind as to which I would accept. It certainly would not be the re-
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port, because after visiting some camps in this country and seeing how our troops are being trained, and knowing also how government policy has interfered with the production of war materials in this country, I am well convinced that this whole thing needs a going over. No greater disgrace could be put upon this country, and there is nothing which will interfere more with recruiting, than this very report. I do not know of a single factor which will hinder recruiting in this country more than when the people find out that there was such a dire negligence by the heads of the government-by the Minister of National Defence, who, whether he knows it or not, is necessarily the man who must assume responsibility in this matter.
Take, for instance, the transportation of supplies to Vancouver. I do not think there ever was a greater piece of muddling through than that.
In concluding I am just going to say this. The government have done a wonderful job in tying this thing up so that apparently you cannot talk about the report. You cannot talk about what is in it. Yet the government have a lot to answer for. Theirs is the responsibility for the way in which our war effort is conducted, and it is no wonder to me that they have to go to the aircraft industry to start a campaign of morale building, which is costing them thousands of dollars. You cannot build up morale in that way when you break it down in this way, and these things in connection with this Hong Kong expedition will be more effective in breaking down the morale of this country than anything else you could possibly do, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
Some people may say, why mention this report at all? It is a very insignificant incident compared to what happened at Pearl Harbour. I am not so much concerned about the actual happenings at Hong Kong, although I think it was a deadly and dastardly tragedy. I am concerned to see that it does not occur again, but the government is doing everything it possibly can to tie the hands of this parliament so that it cannot find out the facts and cannot insist that there be a reorganization. I am not suggesting that the government or the Minister of National Defence should be kicked out, but I urge that there be a definite reorganization of that department, that it is time that some of these fellows who are seventy-eight years old or thereabouts be relieved of their obligations and replaced by men who are a little more active and probably better conversant with situations in war time. Then our war effort will make better progress.


Georges Parent: It is reported to me that
the hon. gentleman used an expression to the effect that the government had this matter so tied up it could not be discussed. I take that to be a reflection on the Chair.


Charles Edward Johnston: Not at
all, Mr. Speaker.


Mr. REID:: It was a reflection on the
Chair.


Georges Parent: I point out to the house
that we have a motion and an amendment, and the amendment is in express terms. Responsibility for that amendment does not belong to the Chair; it belongs to the hon. member who moved it. The amendment reads:
This house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed. . . .
Therefore the debate must necessarily be confined to the terms of the amendment, and only the evidence which is before the house, and therefore in possession of the house, can be discussed. It is absolutely out of order for any hon. member to introduce evidence which he has of his own knowledge and which is not before the house. I do hope that I shall not have to intervene so frequently as I have done.


Herbert Alexander Bruce: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a
point of order. Apparently the hon. member has been quoting from a letter which was sent to the government. Some time ago in this house the hon. member for North Battleford (Mrs. Nielsen) was required to lay on the table a letter under similar circumstances. 1 ask that the hon. member lay on the table of the house the letter from which he has been quoting this afternoon.


Charles Edward Johnston: I will do
that with pleasure.


Georges Parent: The hon. member may
have been quoting a letter. I do not know what he is quoting from. But he is quoting evidence from some document which is not before the house. The hon. member cannot lay that on the table of the house.


James Layton Ralston: Mr. Speaker, first let me join with some other hon. members in expressing deep regret that this matter has had to be brought up again, in the light of the fact that there are still very many anxious homes throughout Canada. I do not object to its being brought up from the point of view of public policy, or of departmental administration, or of an examination of the work and efforts of the

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government, but I could have hoped that it would be possible to have curtailed the debate and not to have gone into a good many things which, it seems to me, will raise doubts in the minds of those who have already their own anxieties and whose concern will be increased by what has been said here. I want to reassure them, in the words of Mr. Churchill, that the Hong Kong expedition from Canada was an undertaking which accomplished, in part at least, the purpose for which it went, namely the gaining of valuable time. As Mr. Churchill said in his speech in the British House of Commons, not only was the heroic defence of Hong Kong beyond price as an inspiring example of valour and devotion, but it also gained a footing in precious time; and further on in his speech he said:
Whether or not it may prove to have rivalled in that respect the decisive achievement of our forces in Crete, the invader would have gained vital days, if it had been decided to yield the colony without a struggle.
When I am dealing, as I shall in a few minutes, with the matter of the authorization of the force, I should like hon. members and the people of this country to understand that at the time- the expedition was authorized the government had very much in their minds the request of the British government and the desire that the force should be got off promptly. That desire, and satisfaction at our having complied with that request, are expressed in the telegram of October 30, which appears in the report of the commissioner, in which it is said, as to the dispatch of the force at the time it was sent, that the moral effect of its arrival in November would be much greater than it would be two months later. That was one of the reasons for getting the force off promptly, and it may explain to some extent some things to which hon. members have referred, and to which they have a perfect right to refer, which are found in this report.
Let me go back now to the inception of this matter. I made a statement in the house, I believe on January 21, 1942, the last day of last session, upon matters which had come to my attention, because I thought the house was entitled to have information as quickly as I could give it. The leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) accepted it at the time, [DOT]but having considered it further he indicated next day that he had some doubts about it. I believe he characterized it as a subtle statement. I want hon. members to look at the statement which I made and the facts which have come out since and form their own conclusion as to whether the hon. gentleman was justified in so designating it. He referred to that report and suggested a parliamentary
inquiry. It was intimated that a parliamentary inquiry would be granted. Later, a discussion was had, with the result that the Right Hon. Sir Lyman Duff was appointed a royal commissioner, with the consent of all concerned, and acting alone, to consider and take the evidence in connection with this matter and to make the fullest possible inquiry.


Richard Burpee Hanson: It was to be a public inquiry.


James Layton Ralston: As was indicated by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) at the time, the question as to whether the inquiry should be held in camera or in public was a matter wholly for Sir Lyman Duff. As will appear from Hansard, February 19, page 704, the leader of the opposition had been asking whether it would be in camera or not. The Prime Minister indicated that he had no information at that time. The leader of the opposition intimated that he had just had information from the chief justice that it would not be held in public, and asked if that was correct. The Prime Minister said:
I assume it is, too. Neither of us apparently is aware of the facts. However, at the time I asked the chief justice if he would undertake the inquiry I gave him the assurance that the government would not wish to restrict him in any particular, and that it would be for him to decide how the proceedings should be conducted, what assistance he would require in connection with the conduct of the proceedings, and in fact all matters with respect to the commission. I assume if the chief justice has decided to hold the sittings of the commission in secret, as was the case -with the United States inquiry into conditions at Pearl Harbour, he has evidently had the best of reasons for so doing. I do not know that I can say more than that.
There was an indication which apparently came first to my hon. friend that the commission was to be held in secret. May I say to the house-


Richard Burpee Hanson: May I interrupt?


James Layton Ralston: Certainly.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I do not wish to interrupt the minister and this will probably be the last time, but did I not indicate that I thought there was a large body of evidence which ought to be made public?


James Layton Ralston: I will read what my hon. friend said in that connection.
May I add that certainly there are some portions of the evidence to be adduced which would be, in my judgment, of a confidential nature; but there is a large body of evidence which will be produced before the commissioner which, in my view, should be made in public, in
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the public interest, and especially that part relating to the sending of untrained men overseas, and the action of the department and the government in the premises.
The Prime Minister replied. The commissioner was given the fullest possible powers. He alone was the one to determine how that commission should be conducted, and he alone-I say this advisedly-decided that that was the way in which it should be carried on. Someone quoted this morning from the debate on the Dardanelles report. Hon. members will find there a very apt expression with regard to the holding of inquiries of this kind. The point is made that it is difficult to determine at which stage of the evidence secrecy should end and where evidence can be given publicly, because if you have constantly to be changing back and forth, closing the court for five minutes to take this portion of evidence, and opening it again for other evidence, you have a very cumbersome way of proceeding, and it would take not only time but, I should think, a good deal of diligence and acumen as well to determine off the bat what part should be held in secret and what part in public. Therefore I think it is one of the commissioners in connection with the Dardanelles report who refers to that kind of inquiry as a checker-board investigation; you are on the white square one minute and on the black square the next, and it is absolutely impossible to hold an inquiry in that way. I presume that was one of the considerations which influenced his lordship the chief justice to make the ruling that the inquiry should be held as it was. That ruling was public. It appeared in the Ottawa Journal of March 2, the first day that the inquiry was held. I quote:
Hearings of a royal commission appointed to inquire into circumstances surrounding dispatch of the Canadian contingent to Hong Kong opened to-day with Chief Justice Sir Lyman P. Duff presiding as royal commissioner. The sessions are closed to the public and press and no statement on their progress is expected immediately. Hearings originally were scheduled to start last Wednesday but were postponed until to-day because of the illness of Lieut.-Col. George A. Drew, counsel for Conservative house leader Hanson. Mr. Hanson was one of several opposition members of the House of Commons who requested an investigation of the Hong Kong expedition after defence minister Ralston disclosed that a small percentage of the troops comprising the contingent had less than prescribed army training.
Prior to that a statement had been made which appeared editorially in the Globe and Mail of February 26, 1942, from which I shall read only a part. I quote:
In view of the nature of the inquiry and the extent to which details of production, organization, transport and kindred matters are likely

to be produced in evidence, it is obvious that the public cannot possibly be admitted. In order that the commissioner may write a just account of the episode, placing blame where it is due, and exonerating those who have been unreasonably blamed,-
White-washing some would call it.
-and attributing to material factors their proper share in producing the final result, it will be necessary for him to hear many things which the enemy would like to know. It is therefore not merely justifiable but imperative that the evidence be heard in secret.
That is from the Globe and Mail. Perhaps it would be 'well for me to read the whole of this, because it bears out what I am saying:
In acceding to the opposition's demand for an inquiry into the Hong Kong episode, the government has shown good faith. Fair-minded people will be impressed by the fact that Mr. King has entrusted the investigation to an absolutely non-political tribunal, when he might quite easily have appointed a parliamentary commission, weighted down by members of his own party following. The commissioner will be no less a person than the Chief Justice of Canada, Sir Lyman Duff, whose intellectual powers and objectivity of mind are universally known and respected. Sir Lyman Duff has appointed as counsel for the commission an outstanding lawyer, in the person of Roy Kellock, K.C., who enjoys the respect and confidence of his own profession, and whose work in connection with this inquiry will undoubtedly establish him in the public esteem. So careful has the government been to avoid any suggestion of political white-washing that it has recommended Mr. George E. Campbell, K.C., of Montreal, one of the leaders of the Quebec bar and a well-known Conservative, to be counsel for the government. The commissioner has approved the choice and appointed Mr. Campbell to represent the government, thereby assuring a statement of the government's case on its merits, and free entirely from political considerations. The appointment of Colonel Drew as counsel for the opposition brings a leading military critic into the inquiry and makes it certain that all aspects of the case will be explored.
The personnel of the commission offers, of itself, every possible guarantee that the inquiry will be thorough, competent and unbiased, and the public need have no anxiety on that score. Nevertheless, the investigation into the Hong Kong episode is not being conducted for the benefit of the government or of the army. The commission w'as appointed under the Public Inquiries Act, and the commission's findings will be available to the people. In these circumstances, it might be wise for the commissioner to admit the press and the public during the opening stages of the investigation when the terms of reference are discussed, the scope of the inquiry defined, and witnesses named by the various counsel who wish to cross-examine them. In this way the public not only may be satisfied that the inquiry will be impartially conducted and competently managed, but will also know that its scope will be broad enough to include all relevant matters which must be considered when formulating future policy to prevent the repetition of costly mistakes, if it should be found that mistakes were made.

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That was followed by an order in council which has already been tabled. Then there was an editorial in the Montreal Gazette of February 23, 1942, as follows:
Conversion of the parliamentary inquiry into a tribunal hearing, first suggested in these columns a month ago, has met with the approval of all. The presiding judge, Chief Justice Sir Lyman P. Duff, has the complete confidence of the nation. His decision to hold the inquiry in secret-Prime Minister Mackenzie King made it plain on Friday that the decision was Sir Lyman's, not the government's-is obviously wise; he will now be able to demand access to all the facts, including those which military necessity must conceal from the public gaze.
That was the way in which the appointment of the commission was received, both as to its personnel and as to the decision to hold the inquiry in secret. Following that, an order in council was passed, as the Prime Minister says, at the request of the chief justice himself, in order that he might have power to enforce the orders he made as to the secrecy of the hearings. The order in council appears at page 4254 of Hansard. It was given the other night. On page 4255 the chief justice himself is quoted as having said:
I think it desirable, also, to state formally, for the purpose of the record, that this inquiry has from the beginning been held in camera and is, and will henceforth be held in camera. That imports, it is perhaps unnecessary to say, the duty on the part of everybody present to preserve secrecy as to the testimony given, documents produced, and all other evidence placed before the commission, as well as the duty on the part of all persons not knowingly to infringe upon such secrecy.
These were the conditions under which the evidence was given, and they were the conditions under which counsel took part in the inquiry at that time. Previously to that, commission counsel had appeared at the Department of National Defence and had been given every document which was available and which was relevant in connection with the inquiry.
They had full opportunity for two weeks to examine those documents, and during a good deal of that time they had the assistance of officers of the Department of National Defence. The hearings were held, as the report indicates, on twenty-two different days, and the evidence covered more than 2,200 pages. Then April 20 was fixed as the date for the presentation of written argument, but because of the illness of one counsel argument was not presented until May 18. Finally oral argument took place, at which all counsel, whoever they might be, had the fullest opportunity to present their views to this impartial commissioner, who is referred to in these editorials and whose appointment I know met with full acceptance at the hands of the nation generally. Then on June 4, after those arguments were 44561-303
presented, after every possible scintilla of evidence had been discussed, the report was presented; but because of the fact that it contained findings which do not suit certain people in this country, an attack, veiled perhaps but in effect direct, has been made upon the Chief Justice of Canada.
I want to say to you, Mr. Speaker, that the statement made this morning by the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green) to the effect that the appendix was drawn to justify the report, that of the entire evidence only such parts as bear out the conclusions were quoted, is as untrue as it is unworthy of an hon. member of this house.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, on a question of privilege, I think if the minister will read over just what I did say he will find that he has misquoted me very seriously, and I ask him to withdraw his last statement.


James Layton Ralston: I will withdraw my last statement if I incorrectly apprehended what my hon. friend said, but I thought I had taken it down correctly, that of the entire evidence only such parts as bear out the conclusions were quoted. Let me point out to my hon. friend that this morning his whole case was based not on evidence in favour of the government but on evidence which he cited from the report as bearing out his contention that certain things were wrong with the Department of National Defence. If the commissioner had seen fit to quote only such parts of the evidence as suited him, or as would bear out his conclusions, my hon. friend would have no record with regard to Bren guns not having been fired, or two-inch mortars not having been fired, or anything about training. That is all in the report which my hon. friend and his friends are saying is not a correct abstract of the evidence that was given. I say I do not think this country will give a good reception to any suggestion that the Chief Justice of Canada, who is really the first citizen judicially, than whom there is no higher judicial officer on the north American continent, a gentleman who has made a reputation not only for himself but for Canada as a judicial officer, both here and in the old country, has quoted only certain portions of the evidence in order to bolster up his own findings. Sir Lyman Duff's reputation needs no defence at my hands; and when the hon. member for Bow River (Mr. Johnston) sets up his judgment as to what should be the effect of certain documents, I would rather take the judgment of a gentleman who has occupied a judicial post for forty years, who is accustomed to judging evidence, accustomed to weighing words, a man who in thousands of cases has

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had to look at documents, a man who for nine years has occupied the position of Chief Justice of Canada, a man who is impartial, a man who would not do what my hon. friend has done, quote part of the evidence and not the rest of it, in support of something he is alleging against somebody else. I say the people of Canada generally will say that he was a commissioner who took into consideration all the evidence; and time and time again in his findings he says, "On all the evidence I have this to say," not simply on the evidence which was quoted in the appendix, but on all the evidence. I believe the people of Canada generally will say, "Here is a gentleman who has looked at all the evidence, who has heard everything there was to be said"-and I have no doubt there was a good deal said by the gentleman who was nominated at the instance of the leader of the opposition-"and who comes from the inquiry room and says this is his report, this is his judgment with regard to the effect of these documents." I believe the people of Canada will accept that rather than the judgment and opinions of hon. members and some others who, because they are disappointed with the findings, find it necessary to criticize the report.
My colleague the Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent) has just referred me to an editorial which appeared in the Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, of which I had heard but which I had not seen. The editorial states:
The report of Sir Lyman Duff, Chief Justice of Canada, who has been investigating the ill-starred Canadian expedition to Hong Kong, will be received with grateful appreciation but with little surprise here in Quebec, the home city of the Royal Rifles of Canada. The Montreal Gazette, which still tries to make up for lack of circulation in its own vast field by "raiding" other communities, may believe it is rendering national service by rejecting the report and by casting doubt on the ability, if not on the good faith of the distinguished investigator but we doubt whether it will induce many people to take the same view.
The fact that the cadres of the Royal Rifles and of the Winnipeg Grenadiers were filled up at the last moment and that part of the equipment of this expeditionary force never reached its destination called for critical scrutiny in order that any possible weakness in our military organization might be uncovered and corrected. This was recognized by the government which agreed to the appointment of a royal commission at the head of which no more authoritative and experienced presiding officer than the chief justice could have been placed. The commission has done its work without any outside interference and Sir Lyman declares himself to be satisfied with everything that was done except for a certain lack of energy in the quartermaster's department and for the re-routing of a ship carrying Canadian equipment by the United States navy. He adds, in fact, that Canadians can and should be very proud of the 
force which it properly dispatched to Hong Kong at the request of the British government.
There is no uncertainty, reserve or qualification about the Duff findings and it is not apparent what purpose, other than a political one, can be served by trying to go behind it or to appeal from it. Heaven knows the King government has many things to answer for but we have never thought that either it or our high army command was seriously at fault in this particular instance. Our men did their best and are prisoners of war: let us then be proud of them, as the chief justice bids us be, with a pride untroubled by suggestion of scandals that we have assurance on the highest and most competent authority possible are nonexistent. In so far as the Royal Rifles of Canada are concerned, every Quebecer is thankful to Sir Lyman Duff for his complete and ringing vindication of their battle worthiness.
This will be my last reference to the commissioner, Mr. Speaker, except in connection with one other matter; but I think when we get past the tumult and the shouting with regard to this incident-an incident which I regret as much as if not more than any man in this house or in this country-we shall have reason to be thankful for the courage of a man like Sir Lyman Duff, who did not have to take on this job but who did so because he believed it was a matter of public duty and public service; a very exacting duty, concerning which there was no exhilaration whatever. He did not flinch from the work and the trouble involved, because I am sure he believed that at this time it was necessary in the national interest that he should do whatever he was asked to do, in order to see to it that the public administration was carried on in the very best manner possible. The report comes in after all the witnesses have been heard and all the documents have been examined. Those witnesses were presented by his own independent counsel, nominated by him, not nominated by the government- Mr. Kellock and Mr. Fowler, who had no connection of any kind or description with the government. They are the ones who presented and prepared this evidence, which I submit, was open to the fullest examination by counsel nominated by my hon. friend. And do you know what he was nominated for?-to assist the inquiry, according to the report. It was open to him to examine those witnesses, present any other witnesses, and present any other documents, as it was open to counsel for the government.
After that was done, this report of the commissioner was made, which is the subject of discussion this afternoon. Someone said it was a short report. For myself, I thought it was quite long. I would think there was nothing very sketchy about it. The report, proper, is only eight or nine pages, and there is a suggestion that the appendix is something

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else. But may I point out that the original appendix is signed at the top and at the bottom by the commissioner-or it is in the original. The signature is not reproduced here. The commissioner in two different places in his report indicates that the appendix is part of that report.
This is what he says at page 3:
In this, my report proper, I am stating my principal conclusions touching these matters, together with some salient facts. A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appear in the appendix hereto which is to be considered as part of my report.
Could anyone think the appendix is something other than the report? Of course it is not.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Who wrote the appendix?


James Layton Ralston: I would assume the Chief Justice of Canada did and I say to my hon. friend that to suggest anything else is unworthy of him.
The report is clear-cut; the report is vigorous; the report deals with the different points which were raised, which have been raised this morning and which were raised before. The hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) read Mr. Churchill's criticism this morning with regard to a report which had been put together, as was said, by pieces of evidence. He did read the statement which Mr. Churchill made, and that was that Mr. Churchill gave credit to the commissioner for having earnestly desired to be fair. I thought I found the hon. member for Lake Centre making those words his own with regard to this report

a little grudgingly perhaps and a little haltingly. I thought perhaps my hon. friend might have gone farther than that. If he will read the record of the Dardanelles report he will find that that report was criticized as a report-that the findings were criticized, not the facts themselves. There never was any suggestion that the commissioners were other than perfectly fair and unbiased. Indeed, there was no reflection of any kind on the commissioners or on the commission. That was a very different situation from the one which has existed in this house this afternoon and this morning.
Someone made mention of the Roberts report. I think it was the hon. member for Lake Centre who mentioned it, and who intimated that the Roberts report did not quote any documents. It was, he said, simply a statement of facts, without any reference to evidence at all. The question was: Why was not this report made in the same way, and no evidence cited at all?
Well, I hold in my hand a mimeographed copy of the Roberts report. I do not know whether the paging on my copy is the same
as that in the original. But I would point out that at the end of page 5, a letter of January 24, 1941, is cited in part-yes, if you will believe me, in part. That is in the Roberts report which is represented as the way in which reports ought to be made. The statement is:	.
The writer stated: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbour."
Then it quotes another phrase which is used separately altogether, and then it gives a long extract from a letter.
Then at page 9 the commissioners take a similar course, although there is the contention here that that report did not quote1 documents. At page 9 there is a quotation from a bulletin of December 1, 1941. That appears in the Roberts report itself. At page 11 standing operating procedure is cited and quoted in the Roberts report. Then there is another quotation on page 7 of something else. From time to time through the report there are quotation marks to indicate that quotations are being made from documents.
I do not know what those who are lawyers have in mind when they suggest that a judgment must contain all the evidence, or none of it. It seems to me that barristers and lawyers in this house must recognize that not a day passes in which judgments are not handed down which contain statements of certain parts of the evidence, without quoting the whole of it. Those quotations are taken out of the context, if hon. members wish to use that phrase. But in those judgments-quotations are made of part of the evidence;, and then the judgments go on to give their conclusions with regard to that evidence. It would be hopeless if a judge in his judgment, in order to justify his judgment, had to put down in it every word of evidence. The chief justice has done here exactly what he has been doing in the last forty years, and has quoted the evidence which he thought was relevant in connection with particular facts. He has put them in here.
He will say, I am sure, that if you do not think that the evidence before us bears that interpretation, that there is some other interpretation could be placed upon it, that is a matter for this parliament and house to discuss. He does say that in certain documents there is nothing to indicate evidence which would justify the Canadian government in altering its decision and withdrawing its commitments. That is the finding of a man who knows what words mean. That is the finding on the evidence. That is the finding by a man,
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who has read all the evidence and the documents. I do not think that even the opinions of the hon. member for Bow River would be accepted as to the construction of documents, in preference to the opinion of the Chief Justice of Canada, who happened to be the commissioner in this case.
So much for the report, and for the matter of secrecy, and the matter of the citing of the evidence. Surely from the statement made by the hon. member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Mackenzie)-


Howard Charles Green: Do not get me mixed up with him.


James Layton Ralston: I should have said the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green). Surely from the statement made by the hon. member for Vancouver South there is enough for us to discuss, and I am perfectly ready to discuss those matters with which he has dealt.
First, with regard to the matter of authorization of the expedition, I find this at page 4 of the report:
Since however I am required to pass upon the question, it is my duty to say that I have no doubt the course taken by the government was the only course open to them in the .circumstances.
After examining all the evidence bearing on that question, the commissioner says, at page 18:
Thus, after examining all the evidence bearing on the question of the authorization of the expedition, I can find no dereliction of duty or error in judgment either on the part of the government of Canada or of its military advisers, in the decision to accept the proposal of the United Kingdom to send a Canadian force to Hong Kong, and the dispatch of the force pursuant to that 'decision.
That is the situation with regard to authorization. I know many hon. members have been good enough to read the report, .and I apologize for going over it again. But -at the same time I want to show on the record some connected recital of the events which took place. The authorization of the expedition begins with a telegram of September 19 from the British government. The commissioner is not permitted to reproduce that telegram, and I am not permitted to say what was in it. But that telegram is indicated by the action which was taken and the considerations which actuated the war committee-


Charles Edward Johnston: What is the date?


James Layton Ralston: September 19. It is referred to on page 3, I believe, at line 25. If I .happen to refer to the line number, I am
(Mr. Kalston.]
considering these pages as having fifty-five lines, in order that one can easily tell about the position on the page from the line number which I give. The telegram from the British government was dated September 19, and the meeting of the war committee was held on September 23. The war committee considered the matter, and after consideration and discussion a decision was reached that the request of the British government should be acceded to, but in view of the importance of the matter they did me the compliment and courtesy of deciding that 1 be consulted, that my reaction be obtained, and also, of course, that the chief of the general staff be consulted.
Here were the considerations, and I want the house to think of these when they are judging what they would have done under the circumstances. As appears from my own evidence, in my humble judgment it was Canada's turn to help. The other dominions of Australia and New Zealand had been in Abyssinia and Libya, and I am not sure whether I knew at that time that Australia had been in Singapore.


John Ritchie MacNicol: And South Africa.


James Layton Ralston: It seemed to us that
Canada ought to take some share in the garrisoning of the Pacific. I do not think the hon. member for Vancouver South will disagree with that. Australia was assisting in Malaya. It was apparent that the military value of sending two battalions to Hong Kong would be out of all proportion to the numbers involved. It was apparent also that our doing that would have a great moral effect on the far east in more than one way. It would reassure China of Britain's determination to hold Hong Kong if possible. At the same time it did appear-and there were reasons for that-that this very act of increasing the garrison at Hong Kong at that time, even by that small force, might act as a deterrent upon Japan at a time when the situation needed something of that sort. Further than that, it appeared that time was all-important. I knew, and I think it was a matter of common knowledge, that the United States were none too ready to come into the war at that time and that if Canada could deter Japan, even by sending this small force, it was to the advantage of everybody that we should do it. Those were some of the considerations which the war committee had in mind.
I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that it was not just a simple matter of making a haphazard decision; it was a case of deciding something the importance of which was regarded as being

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away out of proportion to the size of the force which would be involved. After I had made my statement, the leader of the opposition rather indicated that he thought and that others thought this was the time when we could not choose to withhold this or withhold that when so much was at stake. Therefore the matter was sent to me-I was away at the time in Los Angeles-and I considered it. I called up the chief of the general staff because 1 realized that military considerations were involved as well. I learned from the chief of the general staff, as appears from a citation from his memorandum given on page 13, that he had definitely recommended that the Canadian army should take this on. I approved the matter on that basis and I advised my colleagues. Later we advised the United Kingdom on September 29.
Remember, Mr. Speaker, that this was at a time when we had not anything from the United Kingdom as to how quickly this force was needed. All they were asking us was whether or not we could supply two battalions, and they were giving us reasons why we should. A couple of months previously, General Crerar, as appears in the report, had a conversation with General Grasett, who had been commander in chief at Hong Kong for two years. General Crerar's evidence with regard to this appears on page 14, line 6, and reads:
So far as general military situation at Hong Kong and prospective problems of its defence against attack were concerned, I had had long discussions in Ottawa, in July or August, 1941, with Major-General Grasett, who was passing through Canada on returning to the United Kingdom and who, until that time, had been commander-in-chief, China command (Hong Kong). Major-General Grasett had filled the appointment of commander-in-chief at Hong Kong for some two years, and until his departure for the United Kingdom had been responsible for the organization of the defences.
Note that, "filled the appointment of commander in chief at Hong Kong for some two years, and until his departure for the United Kingdom had been responsible for the organization of the defences". He was then on his way to the United Kingdom, and that was in July or August, 1941, two months before this request was made. I continue:
In his verbal appreciation of the military situation confronting the Hong Kong garrison in the event of war with Japan, Major-General Grasett informed me during our conversation that the addition of two or more battalions to the forces then at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it.
General Crerar proceeds:

It is evident that Major-General (now [DOT] Lieutenant-General) Grasett presented the same views to the war office and to the chiefs of staff
committee on his return to London, that this appreciation of the situation at Hong Kong, with the need for two additional battalions, was accepted in London and that the request to Canada for the provision of these additional troops immediately followed.
As is well known, Hong Kong has been an outstanding fortress of Britain for a generation. It was a fortress with regard to which studies had been made by all military men. General Crerar in addition had the advantage of this first-hand discussion with the man who had been actually in command at Hong Kong within two months before the expedition was asked for. The general situation at that time is stated on pages 16 and 17 of the report. It is easy to be wise after the event, and I do not say that sarcastically at all. One of the most difficult things, I would imagine, that staffs and those who are directing operations in this war have had to deal with is the possibility of making any reasonable forecast of what will take place. I feel that the house, and perhaps the country, do not realize that we have to get back to conditions as they existed in October, 1941, and not to conditions a3 they exist to-day or after Pearl Harbour. A passage in Mr. Asquith's speech in connection with the Dardanelles report, in Asquithian English but tremendously impressive, helps me to make that point. He said:
It is so easy to make war after the event. Nothing is easier in the world; I can do it myself. It is easy to make war after the event either in the House of Lords or anywhere else-1 when all the doubts and uncertainties and possible contingencies of an undeveloped future are translated into the rigid lineaments of accomplished facts. What you want in dealing with a situation of this kind is a little imagination and perspective, and to put yourself into the position-the actual position-of the men who were dealing on the spot, and at the time, with all the uncertainties of the future in what was going on, and what was likely to happen.
Here was the condition as it appears in the report at the bottom of page 16:
There were, moreover, solid military grounds for a conclusion that even in the event of hostilities the situation of the expeditionary force would not be a hopeless one. The discussion of the military situation at Hong Kong between General Crerar and General Grasett in the late summer of 1941 has already been mentioned. In the third week of September the information thus gained by General Crerar as to the actual military situation in Hong Kong was, excepting the information conveyed in the telegram of September 19, the latest and most authoritative information on that subject available. It was confidently expected that, in the event of war, the British commonwealth would have both the United States and China as active allies. The American Pacific fleet was concentrated at Honolulu and British naval forces in the far east had recently been strengthened by the addition of the battleships the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Japanese forces operating along the Chinese coast
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adjacent to Hong Kong were constantly harassed by Chinese troops. In the event of a Japanese attack on Hong Kong it was considered reasonable to expect that the garrison could be relieved or evacuated from the sea by use of combined British and American naval forces. It was also not unreasonable to expect some assistance from the landward side by the Chinese forces. A telegram from Canadian military headquarters in London, dated October 26, 1941, stated that the Chinese government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, and were prepared to use ten divisions for this effort. Canadian troops would not, therefore, be placed beyond any possible hope of succour. The losses subsequently suffered by the American fleet at Pearl Harbour on December 7, and the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse on December 8 radically altered the situation and gave to the Japanese, for the time being, command of the China seas. The possibility of early relief or evacuation of Hong Kong by sea disappeared.
That was the situation with which we were faced at that time and I want to ask anybody in this house could he have foreseen, or does he think he could have foreseen at that time, that on December 7, three weeks after that force reached Hong Kong, Japan would attack Pearl Harbour and the flames would be lit in the far east?


Richard Burpee Hanson: May I
ask the minister whether he will give consideration in the course of his remarks to the sentence which is found on page 17 of the report, reading as follows:
I am satisfied that nothing occurred between September 29 and October 27-
September 29 was the date on which the decision was made to send the expedition, and October 27 was the date on which it sailed.

that would have furnished any cogent reason for the withdrawal by Canada of the responsibility she had accepted.
I ask the minister that in the light of the information which he himself has.


James Layton Ralston: My hon. friend will realize that I was not here from October 9 until November 4 or 5.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I think that is quite true, but I am asking what he knows about that.


James Layton Ralston: I will deal with that in just a moment.


Charles Edward Johnston: May I ask the minister to connect up the sentence he has just quoted, "Canadian troops would not, therefore, be placed beyond any possible hope of succour" with the statement on page 16 where Major Power is quoted as having
{Mr. Ralston.]
said: "If war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position".


James Layton Ralston: I do not think it has to be connected up with the statement by Major Power.


Charles Edward Johnston: I understood the minister to say that it would be difficult for anyone at that time to foresee that there would be a difficult situation in the far east.


James Layton Ralston: What I asked was, could anybody in this house foresee at that time that there would be an outbreak of hostilities with Japan as early as December 7? The passage I read was to the effect that it was not unreasonable to expect assistance from the Chinese, that we had had a message from the Chinese that, if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, the Chinese would attack in the rear, and might use ten divisions for this effort. The British and United States forces at that time were still extant. The Prince of Wales and the Repulse were still there, and the statement is, and I think it would be the judgment formed by members, that if the Canadian forces were attacked at that time they would not be placed beyond any possible hope of succour. Major Power's statement was:
If war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position.
Nobody suggested that they would not, but they would not be beyond any possible hope of succour. The reason was that the Chinese would be assisting in the rear, and there was also the possibility of evacuation by British and United States naval forces or of reinforcements, whichever might come. But Pearl Harbour on December 7 and the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse on December 8 changed all that. It was a very different situation on December 8 from what it was when the war committee sat on September 23 and decided to send this expedition.
The information which the government has is referred to on page 17 and also on page 4, and that is where my hon. friend clashes with the commissioner with regard to information. I am saying that the commissioner had before him all the messages which were produced by his counsel at that time; that he had full opportunity for examining and reading them; that he had Mr. Drew's suggestions; that the change of government in Japan bringing into power a government notoriously sympathetic to the axis powers had taken place, and with all this before

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him the commissioner comes to the conclusion which was read by the hon. leader of the opposition a few moments ago, in these words:
I am satisfied that nothing occurred between September 29 and October 27 that would have furnished any cogent reason for the withdrawal by Canada of the responsibility she had accepted.
Some communications between the government of Canada aifd the government of the United Kingdom were placed in my hands for my personal perusal. I am at liberty to say that there is nothing in these communications which in my opinion invalidates this view.
If my hon. friend wants my own opinion, I am of exactly the same opinion as the commissioner. My hon. friend and other people may differ, but that is the finding by the commissioner who, as I have said before, knows about the weighing of evidence and knows all the issues involved, and who has before him the contention that Mr. Drew makes; and the commissioner comes to the conclusion I have just quoted and states it in two different places in his report, at pages 4 and 17.


Richard Burpee Hanson: May I venture to ask the minister one more question? He says he agrees with the statement of the commissioner that there was nothing to justify withdrawal. May I ask him if there was not something which would justify reconsideration?


James Layton Ralston: What does my hon. friend mean by reconsideration? That is what I fail to understand. Time and again there is talk of reconsideration. It must be for only one purpose, and that is to quit on the job we have undertaken. I want to know whether my hon. friend or any other member of this house thinks that after having undertaken what we did, the change of government in Japan should have altered our decision in that respect, or should it not rather have called for the most supreme effort and energy on our part to see if that force could not be gotten through just that much quicker in order to see if we might deter Japan and exercise that moral effect which the British wanted to see exercised? There would have been a question mark in the minds not only of the people of Canada but all over the world if we had refused because of a change of government in Japan, and it had come out that we had refused because there might be some risk of fighting. They would have said: The Canadians are quite ready to send their soldiers so long as there is no risk. The Canadian detachment was going as a garrison to Hong Kong, and a garrison means a force prepared to fight if necessary. That is exactly what that Canadian force was going for. The question was whether or not it would be sent immediately, whether or not there might be either a
deferment or possibly a change in the situation. I say that to suggest that there should have been reconsideration meant in effect quitting on the job.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No, no.


Richard Burpee Hanson: A review of the whole situation.


James Layton Ralston: It meant quitting on a job which we had undertaken, and the people of the Dominion of Canada would not have stood for it, neither would my hon. friend. He would have been the first to have said, supposing Pearl Harbour had taken place and he had discovered we had been asked for two battalions, with the suggestion that they would have a great moral effect in the far east, "Why at least did you not try it?" Did the Australians quit in Libya? Did the New Zealanders quit in Crete, although there was some risk there? The Canadians were not going to quit at Hong Kong either.


Richard Burpee Hanson: In justice to myself I should like to say that I made no suggestion of quitting. I made a suggestion of reviewing the position.


James Layton Ralston: That is the same thing.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Not at all.


James Layton Ralston: There has been a lot of talk of that kind. It is to that I referred when I opened my remarks. I deprecate the practice of creating doubts in the minds of the people who have members of their families over there, causing them to wonder whether it would have been better had they not been sent. I say that every man in this house, my hon. friend included, would have done exactly what the Canadian government did. They would not have hesitated a single instant, because quick action was regarded as all important.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I would
have tried to see that they had their equipment.


James Layton Ralston: I will deal later with the matter of equipment. Do not let us get this question of equipment tied up with that of authorization. Let me pause to say that they had their equipment and they had it in full except for three things: anti-tank rifles, which could not be got in this country, 2-inch and 3-inch mortar ammunition, which was being supplied by the British, and not another item of equipment was short except the matter of transport.
So much with respect to the matter of authorization. I submit that the people of Canada, however much they and we all deplore
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the situation which arose in Hong Kong because of the overwhelming forces of the enemy, will agree that the Canadian government should have undertaken that commitment and should have carried it through.
I come now to the matter of the selection of the force, and in connection with that, to the references my hon. friend made to the matter of training. I want the house to recall exactly what the situation was in 1941 with regard to the army programme this country had undertaken. At or about that time it had fulfilled the heaviest overseas army programme which it had ever undertaken in its history. It had undertaken to supply corps troops in thousands, and had done so. It had undertaken to send a third Canadian division overseas, and had done so. It had undertaken to send an armoured division and it was in process of doing so; I believe the last units went the week after the Hong Kong expedition. It had undertaken to send an army tank brigade, and had done that also. In 1941, up to about the first week of November, something like 62,000 men were sent overseas from this country. On September 19, there came the urgent and immediate call, an unexpected extra in connection with our commitments and the other undertakings which we had made and which we had performed. What was to be done?
As I say, the chief of the general staff recommended that Canada should take this on. I approved it. The war committee approved it. I believed the country would approve it. The question was what battalions to send. The chief of the general staff went over the situation, and his was not any haphazard decision. On September 30, as will be observed on page 19 of the report, there was a recommendation of the chief of the general staff, that, he had considered the various battalions which were available for this purpose, two battalions which had to be sent after the tremendous strain there had been on Canada's army effort in 1941, when as everybody knows, equipment was just getting rolling. We took it on and we were going to see it through. Here is the recommendation of General Crerar, a man who had thought over the situation pretty carefully. It is addressed to the minister:
' Pursuant to the recent decision of the goverumciiv to dispatch two rifle battalions to Hong Kong, I have given consideration to the selection of the units for this duty.
2.	As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the dominion in any circumstances.

3.	Further, in order to adhere to the principle of territorial representation, I consider it most desirable that one unit should come from western Canada and the other from eastern Canada.
4.	It would be possible to choose two battalions from the 4th division which would meet the above requirements. But I do not recommend this course. The 4th division has been constituted as a formation for some considerable time. On purely military grounds it would be unsound to disrupt it, if this can be avoided.
5.	Further, I feel that anything which might be construed in the minds of the public, or in the army itself, as the beginning of a break-up of this division would be certain to have an adverse reaction. I may add that these are also the views of the G.O.C. 4th division.
6.	Therefore, I consider the selection of units for Hong Kong should be made from those not forming part of the order-of-battle of the 4th division.
7.	This leaves for consideration the infantry (rifle) battalions now responsible for coast defence and those forming the three brigades of the 6th division, certain of which latter are only now mobilizing, are not trained and must, therefore, be ruled out.
8.	While I do not recommend that the total number of infantry battalions now allocated to coast defence duties should be reduced, it will be satisfactory, from both the operational and training points of view, if the responsibilities of two of these coast defence battalions were to be undertaken, successively, by infantry units from the 4th division and the brigade groups of the 6th division.
May I stop here to explain that what General Crerar is leading to there is this, that if you bring home the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, one of which has been in Newfoundland and the other in Jamaica, he will have to take two units from here to replace them. He suggests that it will be satisfactory from both a national and training point of view if the responsibilities of these coast defence battalions would be undertaken by infantry units from the 4th division and the brigade units of the 6th division.
This would reduce the number of battalions now held in general (mobile) reserve from 13 battalions (4th division plus one infantry brigade of 6th division) to 11 battalions, but this number, in my opinion, should be ample to meet any contingency which may arise in Canada within the next six or more months.
9.	After examining the problem from various aspects, I come to the conclusion that the most suitable selections from amongst the battalions now on coast defence or in the three infantry brigade groups of the 6th division would be:
(a)	The Royal Rifles of Canada-Quebec.
(b)	The Winnipeg Grenadiers-Winnipeg.
10.	As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they

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have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.
11.	In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a period of "semi-overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selection represents both eastern and western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion, while nominally English-speaking, is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French-speaking in character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent. I have spoken to the adjutant-general and there are no administrative difficulties which should prevent the early movement of these two battalions.
He quotes the specifications of efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the dominion in any circumstances, and he says that the duties which they had carried out were not in many respects unlike the task "which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong." He says that the experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role and that both are units of proven efficiency. Moreover, they satisfy the requirement that one should be from the east and the other from the west and that there should be French-Canadian representation. That report came to me, and as I stated in my evidence, the only discussion with General Crerar was as to whether or not it was fair to give some battalion which had been doing coastal defence duties in Canada an opportunity to go overseas, since these two battalions had at least been outside Canada and had had their opportunity. General Crerar really deals with that point in his recommendation and feels that to put these battalions in coast defence duty would affect the morale of these battalions which, as he said, had had semioverseas service. And I approved the recommendation.
Let me give to the house a brief history of the units, taking first the Grenadiers, who were the older of the two. They were mobilized in September, 1939, had been sent to Jamaica in the spring of 1940, and returned in September and October, 1941. As a matter of fact, at the time General Crerar made that recommendation one flight of the Grenadiers, the last, had not actually returned to Canada. It arrived on October 8. The Rifles had been mobilized in July, 1940, had gone to Newfoundland in November and December and had come back in August, 1941.
With regard to experience, some members have referred to the evidence, and I wish to trouble the house to this extent, to look at the evidence which was given with reference
to the service of the Rifles in Newfoundland. It was not merely guard duty that they were doing. They were serving in a potential theatre of war. They were literally on active service, and particularly in the spring of 1941, as appears from the evidence of Colonel Lamb. The commissioner says, at pages 25 and 26:
As was very clearly explained by Colonel Lamb, Canadian troops in Newfoundland are not engaged in mere guard duties; they are serving in a potential theatre of war and their training is more intensive and varied. than that usually received in a training camp in Canada.
Note that: "more intensive and varied than that usually received in a training camp in Canada." Then the report goes on:
On arrival in Newfoundland two companies of the battalion were assigned to duties at the airport and two companies performed duties at the harbour and airplane base. At the airport one company was engaged in manning the outposts; the other in training; the two companies taking these duties from week to week alternately. At the harbour and airplane base the duties consisted in protecting the harbour and examining all incoming ships. At both these stations individual training of the men continued in alternate weeks and the training done, usually by small groups, gave to both officers and men experience valuable in modern warfare. Several witnesses mentioned the changing conditions of war; in this war often small groups of men commanded by a junior officer operate in an isolated position where the enemy is likely to appear from any direction. In this type of warfare it was suggested in evidence that the experience gained in manning outposts in Newfoundland against possible enemy attack, by day or by night, would be peculiarly valuable.
I know the location myself. There were two companies at the airport and two at the harbour, which most hon. members know- and the seaplane base. The two companies at the airport were alternating, training a week and on duty a week. The two companies at the harbour and seaplane base were supplying guards and things of that kind and training in the meantime. Then the battalion moved to St. John's in the spring of 1941 and there concentrated as a unit. To it seven defence localities were assigned, and defence schemes often involving the whole battalion, were devised for each locality. Several of these schemes required in their execution cooperation with the units of the Newfoundland militia. The training reports give evidence of a variety of training manoeuvres including tactical exercises by two or more companies, night exercises, field exercises, training in fieldcraft, section leading, stand-to alarms and so on. There is a unit, concentrated as a unit, in Newfoundland in the spring-it did not leave for home until September-carrying out defence schemes all

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during the summer, training manoeuvres, including tactical and night exercises, field exercises, section leading, stand-to alarms and so on, a fairly comprehensive system not only of training but of practical operations.


James Lester Douglas: Was there
any range work?


James Layton Ralston: I cannot tell my hon.
friend.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Is that
in the report-what the minister has been saying?


James Layton Ralston: It will be found in the
report at pages 25 and 26. With regard to weapon training I would refer hon, members to pages 26 and 27. Anyone who wants to read about weapon training can do so, but let me give the situation. That is the only complaint my hon. friend makes with regard to the Royal Rifles. The situation in connection with weapon training was this. They had no training with anti-tank rifles, but let me remind the house again that anti-tank rifles were not produced in Canada until November, 1941. They did have an anti-tank pool weapon but no anti-tank ammunition because no anti-tank ammunition was produced in this country; and that applies to two-inch and three-inch mortar ammunition at that time. They had been trained in the stripping, assembling, mechanism, and tactical handling of weapons, except with regard to anti-tank rifles; and that applies to mortars, to tommy guns and to the other weapons. The anti-tank rifle they had had for a month. They had been trained in defence schemes and in cooperation with other units, in tactical exercises, night exercises, stand-to alarms, and so on, as I have pointed out, and had been fifteen months together [DOT] as a unit.
I stop here to make this statement with regard to weapon training. It is easy to count on your fingers and say, "You did not fire two-inch or three-inch mortars; you did not fire machine guns; you did not fire anti-tank rifles." Well, you cannot fire these weapons without ammunition. It would be awfully hard to fire them unless you had the ammunition, and there was no such thing in production in Canada at the time. We were just getting into our stride.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Therefore they could not be trained.


James Layton Ralston: The fourth division as
a matter of fact had not fired at that time either the two-inch or the three-inch mortar, or the anti-tank rifles or live grenades. Someone said something about sending the fourth

division. Well, that means that we cannot send a man overseas until he has actually pulled the trigger or dropped a live bomb into the trench mortar, no matter how simple it might be. Someone talked about the complexity of the three-inch mortar. I do not know how much he knows about it, but I would ask him to go to a reserve unit who have a three-inch mortar and see how long it takes to learn the mechanism, dividing it into three pieces, and learning how to adjust the sight, getting the range, turning the screw, and discharging the bomb into the air.
Anyone who thinks the 3-inch mortar is a complex weapon to fire should go out with a reserve unit and see what they do. I was told the other day that instructors came from Long Branch and gave the N.C.O.'s training for a couple of days; then the N.C.O's called out teams of green men who had never seen a mortar and had them out on the range firing the mortar successfully, landing the bombs within two or three hundred yards. We have to carry on this war with the things we have at hand. It must be remembered that 3-inch mortars are not fired by the whole battalion; they are only fired by one platoon of the headquarters company.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: But not the 2-ineh mortar.


James Layton Ralston: I think there are sixteen 2-inch mortars in the whole battalion and as my hon. friend knows they are as simple as the other, or even simpler, because they have an even simpler sight and are fired by releasing the firing-pin instead of dropping in the bomb. They had not fired a 2-inch mortar because we had not the ammunition; at that time no 2-inch ammunition was being produced in Canada. They had not fired tommy-guns because until October, 1941, no ammunition was available. But they had taken down a tommy-gun and put it together; they had done everything that possibly could be done with it. I venture to suggest that A1 Capone or his men never bothered taking many lessons in firing a tommy-gun. I think I have seen some members of parliament on the range firing tommy-guns who had never fired them before, and I think they did pretty well. I would think the best target you could have for your first practice with a tommy-gun would be a bunch of Japs.
I am speaking perhaps more vehemently than I should, Mr. Speaker. I should like these men to have had this training, but I say with all the earnestness that I possess that I do not believe the fact that those troops did not have that firing training, though they knew all about, the tactical handling of the weapons,

Hong Kong Inquiry
the taking down and putting them together, the placing them in the field and how they should be used, was any disqualification against their going to Hong Kong at that particular time and under those circumstances.


Howard Charles Green: What about the Winnipeg Grenadiers?


James Layton Ralston: -and particularly so in view of the fact that the man in command of that force had been director of military training at national defence headquarters.


John Ritchie MacNicol: Would the minister tell the house something with regard to the number of men required to fill each battalion, who were not trained?


James Layton Ralston: I do not intend to forget the Winnipeg Grenadiers. The evidence with respect to them is not as complete, but it is definite that they had not actually fired a Bren gun, as my hon. friend pointed out. The Winnipeg Grenadiers were formed from the reserve battalion to the extent of 50 per cent. I want hon. members to remember that; 50 per cent of these men had come from the reserve battalion, where presumably they had been training for some time once or twice a week. They were not green when they came to the battalion, and it must be remembered that they joined practically on the first day of the war. General Crerar said he talked with Brigadier Kay, who was then Colonel Kay, and who was in command of the battalion in the West Indies. Coloney Kay was putting in his case for these boys to go overseas. At page 29 of the report General Crerar said:
As regards Winnipeg Grenadiers, I had studied the periodic training reports on this unit while in the West Indies, forwarded hy its O.C., which indicated that within the preoccupation of its garrison duties, it was successfully progressing in its tactical and weapons training. I also had first-hand information furnished hy its O.C., Lieutenant-Colonel Kay, who reported to Ottawa in the summer of 1941 to take up appointment as D.A.G. Lieutenant-Colonel Kay then informed me that his unit was ready and restless for more active service, and expressed the hope that it would not be brought back to Canada in the meantime. I advised Lieutenant-Colonel Kay at that time that my reason for return of Winnipeg Grenadiers to Canada was that while it was probably quite fit for garrison responsibilities it would be desirable to give it a short period of unit and refresher training before embodying it in field formations, destined for overseas. As this unit had been mobilized for two years, had experienced and successfully undertaken more independent responsibilities than any other unit in Canada, had been favourably reported upon to me in some detail by its late C.O., Brigadier Kay, its general fitness for active service after a short period of refresher training was specially indicated.
44561-304 J
I want to remind the house that this had been a machine-gun battalion. My hon. friend said something about the 1910 ammunition that was fired. This battalion had fired its practices as a machine-gun battalion with the 1910 ammunition; my hon. friend did not say that. In any event it had fired its practices as a machine-gun battalion. It knew what an automatic weapon was, though it was using a Vickers instead of a Lewis or a Bren gun, as a machine-gun battalion, but that battalion had that practice with automatic weapons. It had done individual, section, platoon and company training. The antiaircraft platoon had practice, and it had two anti-tank rifles. According to a report to the inspector-general, the anti-aircraft platoon was very well trained with the Lewis gun. They had fired the 25-yard classification with the -22 rifle; they had no ammunition for the anti-tank rifle, but with regard to rifles generally the evidence is that 380 men had fired the classification at the St. Charles range before they went down to the West Indies, and that after they came back 600 men, which I presume means all those who were with the battalion but who had not fired previously, fired the classification at the St. Charles range before they left. Here were their duties in the West Indies, from page 30 of the report:
The West Indies island where the battalion was stationed has been an imperial garrison post for more than one hundred years. It is a mountainous island, having two military stations-one at . . . and the other at . . . The Winnipeg Grenadiers made up practically the entire garrison of the island and were charged with tne duty of providing internal security, aid to the civil authorities, and the protection of the island against attack from outside. One company was stationed at all times at . . ., and had very little in the way of garrison duties to perform. It was therefore able to spend practically all its time in training. Because of the mountainous terrain, the training was mainly individual, section, and platoon training and the time was spent in practising mountain warfare. The troops also carried out platoon and company tactical schemes.
At . . . the battalion had heavy garrison duties to perform. These comprised the staffing and guarding of an internment camp, the guarding of detention barracks, and the providing of ship guards on incoming and outgoing vessels in the harbour. The personnel not occupied in guard or regimental duties were given individual training in bayonet fighting, the mechanism and employment of the Bren and Lewis light machine guns and the anti-tank rifle, stalking, the use of cover, fighting patrols and the building of road blocks. In addition to its defence duties, the garrison at . . . was required to have one company available at all times on thirty minutes notice, under the defence scheme of the 'island as laid down by the war office.
Here was a battalion doing individual, section and platoon training, mountain war-
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fare, company tactical schemes, and so on, with the personnel not occupied in guard and regimental duties gaining individual training in bayonet fighting, the mechanism and employment of Bren and Lewis light machine guns, the anti-tank rifle, stalking, the use of cover, fighting patrols and the building of road blocks. Then on page 31 the weapon training is dealt with. I need not trouble the house by reading that, but I think I may sum up that training-and there are those in the house who will know if I am not summing it up correctly-in this way. All ranks had been trained in the Vickers machine gun, and they had fired it. They had trained with and had fired the rifles. They had been given training in the tactical handling and assembling, the taking down and putting together, the carrying and the general dealing with all other *weapons except the two-inch mortar, and it was not until October that the two-inch mortar came into Canadian production. They had no dummy grenades. They had the tactical handling, stripping and assembling of the two-inch and three-inch mortar, and in the Lewis and Bren guns and the Thompson submachine gun.


Howard Charles Green: But they had not fired any of them?


James Layton Ralston: They were in exactly the same position with regard to firing as the Royal Rifles, except that they had not fired the Bren gun. That .was the only difference.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Had they fired their rifles?


James Layton Ralston: Yes, surely.


James Lester Douglas: In Newfoundland?


James Layton Ralston: They fired that rifle on various ranges before they left for Hong Kong.
At six o'clock the house took recess.
After Recess
The house resumed at eight o'clock.



CANADIAN FORCES


Georges Parent: I have the honour to inform the house that a message has been received from the senate informing this house that the senate doth not insist upon the second amendment made to Bill No. 5, an act to provide for the reinstatement in civil employment of discharged members of his majesty's forces, or other designated classes of persons, to which this house had disagreed.



HONG KONG INQUIRY-AMENDMENT OF MR. GREEN TO MOTION FOR COMMITTEE

[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Ilsley for committee of supply and the amendment thereto of Mr. Green.
James Layton Ralston: At six o'clock I was dealing with the training of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, and particularly with the firing practices. I think I had pretty well indicated what had been done with regard to that particular unit, and the training they had had in stripping, handling and assembling, and generally familiarizing themselves with the various weapons which have been mentioned.
At this time I think I should mention what I indicated more generally before the dinner recess, and that is that the manufacture of these new infantry weapons in this war, that is the 2-inch and 3-inch mortars, anti-tank riffles and sub-machine guns, was just getting under way. All of them required brand new manufacturing arrangements.
With regard to ammunition; while we had some of what might be called training guns, a few training weapons, we had no ammunition. With regard to the sub-machine guns the first issues for ammunition for training began in September, 1941. It will be remembered that this unit went in October. The ammunition was for training. Therefore training ammunition was not available for these or any other units in Canada up to that time. It will also be remembered that these units were just coming back from Newfoundland and the West Indies.
With regard to anti-tank rifle ammunition, the training ammunition was not generally available until after the departure of the force. As I indicated this afternoon, anti-tank rifles themselves were not produced in Canada until November, 1941.
With regard to the 3-inch mortar ammunition, it was not available in Canada until March of this year. With regard to the 2-inch mortar, training ammunition was not available until the departure of the force. Live grenades were not available from Canadian production until April, 1942.
Therefore the house will see with regard to the actual firing practice in those weapons that if one is to hold the force until the actual firing is done, this would simply mean that in respect of some of those weapons we could not send a force outside Canada. As I have already said, speaking of the 3-inch and 2-inch mortars, the use of those weapons is not regarded by men who are familiar with the subject as being an intricate matter. As a

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matter of fact, training is now being done by reserve units in respect of these weapons in a very, very short time. I indicated this afternoon that in respect of the 3-inch mortars, first the instructors taught the non-commissioned officers, and then men who had not even seen it were firing the 3-inch mortar the same day with comparatively good results.
I said this afternoon that the full establishment of 2-inch mortars was sixteen. As a matter of fact, it was only twelve, as I understand it, at that particular time. The establishment was later increased to sixteen; that was done a short time ago.
I should like just to sum up with regard to the training of both these battalions. All ranks were trained in the assembling, stripping, mechanism, and tactical handling of all weapons, except to this extent; the Grenadiers had no 2-inch mortars or dummy grenades; the rifles had no training with antitank rifles, although they had had one as I said, for one month.
With regard to training, the Royal Rifles had training at the airport and at the harbour and at the seaplane base in Newfoundland. They also had training at St. John's in seven defence localities, in defence schemes, cooperation schemes, training manoeuvres, tactical exercises, night exercises, field exercises, training in fieldcraft, section leading, stand-to alarms, and so on.
The Grenadiers were at two stations in the West Indies, one where they had very light routine duties, and spent practically all their time in training. They had individual, section and platoon training, mountain warfare, platoon and company schemes. At the other station, where they had heavier garrison duties, they had internment camps staff and guard, detention guards, ships guards, individual training, the mechanism and employment of light machine guns, anti-tank rifles and so on. And I should have said this afternoon that one company was on the alert at thirty-minute periods under a war office defence scheme in the island.
I call the attention of the house to the fact that both battalions had been mobilized for a period of nearly two years. I am not going to read the evidence in this regard, but the committee will find the evidence of General Stuart, chief of general staff, at page 32 of the report, indicating what it means to have different battalions together for that length of time. I do not think I need to emphasize that so far as the old soldiers of this house are concerned. What I mean is the esprit de corps, the morale, the training which men get from the fact of their being together, from doing regimental duties, not just being in
camp and on training but carrying on the actual duties, whatever they may be, operational duties and so on, the dependence they place upon one another, the faculties they acquire in handling weapons, the ability to learn quickly. All these things are part of the training, are part of the morale, are part of the esprit de corps, are part of the things which go to make up a good battalion when the time comes for it to go into action. General Stuart has dealt with this on pages 32 and 33 of the report, and I submit that that evidence is well worth reading.
Further than that, both these battalions had been well reported on by those who had* inspected them. The chief of the general staff,. General Crerar, had inspected the Royal Rifles twice, and the reports from the inspector general and the commanding officer with respect to the Winnipeg Grenadiers had been satisfactory. I say that that combination of circumstances and that combination of training were such as to make it highly desirable, in the interests of the course which we were pursuing at that time, that battalions of that kind might be- taken for that purpose. But I want this to be understood, and I have said it this afternoon, I would have preferred, everybody would have preferred for them to have had firing practice in all these weapons. But you can not have firing practice if you. have no ammunition.
In that connection I want to mention particularly the matter of the Bren gun in the-case of the Winnipeg Grenadiers. It has been said that the Winnipeg Grenadiers had not fired their Bren guns, and that is quite true, but I want to submit this: at that time the-Winnipeg Grenadiers had had their rifle practice. Further than that, they had fired am automatic gun, that is to say a Vickers machine gun. Further than that, they had had full training in the stripping, assembling, mechanism and tactical handling of the Bren gun. Their personnel had been taught all the details of aiming, holding, stripping and assembling. While they had not actually fired the gun, the personnel had been made familiar with firing, wind conditions, trigger pressing, aiming and all the things that go with ordinary musketry practice. This meant that the men would not be gun-shy, that they would have experience in aiming and firing under outdoor conditions.
That was the situation when this decision was made. What if someone in the Department of National Defence had said, "hold on; we cannot send the Winnipeg Grenadiers because they have not pulled the trigger of a Bren gun"? I want to ask you, sir, and those members of the house who have been
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on the range, and in camp, whether you think that would have been a satisfactory explanation for not having taken this on? I submit that when men know how to take off the barrel, how to put it on, how to load the magazine, how to place it, how to press the trigger, the actual firing of the Bren gun is an almost secondary consideration. I say about that, as I said about the tommy-gun this afternoon, I could not imagine a better target for men firing a Bren gun for the first time than a bunch of Japs coming across..
As a matter of fact, that is exactly what did happen if we are to believe the newspaper reports which have come in recently of an interview with a man by the name of Proulx, who had been with the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve at Hong Kong and who subsequently made his escape. I quote from the Montreal Star of July 18, in which he gives this interview:
Proulx then told of the 700 Japs who tried to swim the narrow 300-yard channel at Lymoon pass.
"The Canadians came down the side of the bank and wiped them out while the Japs were .still in the water."
If I remember correctly, in another place lit was mentioned expressly that that was *done by machine guns. I quote from the Winnipeg Free Press of July 18 which states:
An earlier Canadian engagement occurred December 17 at Lymoon pass, extreme east end of the island. A Canadian machine-gun company-
They must have had Bren guns.
-wiped out a force of 700 Japs who tried to swim the pass, about 300 yards wide. Many were slaughtered in the water and none landed there that day.


Charles Edward Johnston: Is that official, or is it just a news item?


James Layton Ralston: A news item. I have given the date and the name of the paper. I understand that this young man Proulx, who :is a sub-lieutenant in the navy, gave an interview in the press where he was interviewed, I presume, by twenty or thirty pressmen, and this report appeared in several papers. This young man was in Hong Kong at the time and, I understand, was with the Canadians at Repulse bay. Some one asked about calling men who had been at Hong Kong, but unfortunately we have not been able to do that. However, here is a case where a young man gave a statement which indicates that the Canadians knew something about handling a Bren gun.
As I said before, I should have liked and we all would have liked to have these men .actually having fired these weapons.
.
But there were certain conditions in mind at the time, and these were mentioned, I think, by General Stuart and by General Crerar. It was expected that there would be time for the force to have some refresher training. At that time, October 26, it was fully expected that there would be plenty of time for the men to do their firing practice and do any refresher training which was necessary. General Stuart said this, at page 45 of the report:
Therefore the problem is this: I admit that I wanted to give those units refresher training. What were we to do? To make use of the shipping that we were told would be available on the 17th, remembering the conditions as they were at the time, my lord: we were at peace; war, according to the best information we had was not imminent; therefore why should not that refresher training be carried out at the other end, namely, at Hong Kong, and let us make use of that shipping that was placed at our disposal for that purpose? And again, in view of the stress, the importance that the British authorities placed upon our taking advantage of that shipping in order to get those people there just as early as possible, we chose that alternative, and I submit that there was not a second choice.
Q. There was no alternative?-A. There was no alternative, my lord.
Q. I understand you to say that there was no practicable alternative?-A. No practicable alternative, my lord.
I want to say to this house that there was no practicable alternative at that time. What was the thing to do? We had these men; they knew their weapons thoroughly; the only question was whether they had fired a Bren gun. The British wanted them over there in order that they might create that moral effect which they believed would be helpful in at least deterring the situation, if not in preserving peace. There was the fact that the Canadians were coming to the assistance of the British; the fact that the solidarity of the British empire was being shown; the fact that we were reassuring the Chinese of help which could not come too quickly. The question was whether or not to send them on that boat or to wait for a month, which time was indicated by the telegram from the British on October 30. We had to decide whether to send them then or to keep them merely for the purpose of firing off a two-inch mortar, a three-inch mortar and in the case of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, shooting off a Bren gun.
That was the situation in which the department found itself. That was the situation in which these officers found themselves. They took the alternative which I submit should have been taken at that time, and they sent these men over. From what I have read it would rather look as if there was no doubt about the effectiveness of the Canadians when they got there.

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John Horne Blackmore: Was there any reason why the ship should sail that day? Could the ship not have been delayed for a day or two?


James Layton Ralston: I will deal with that in connection with the mechanical transport. Perhaps I did not make the matter of ammunition quite clear. It was not available because production had not started; that was all. We were making shipments just as fast as we could to the old country and to the active fronts where it was needed most. We could not possibly ask the British for ammunition for training in connection with weapons of this kind. They needed it all on the active front, and we had to take our own production just as soon as we could get it.


Mr. GLADSTONE:: Was it assured that
munitions would be available at Hong Kong?


James Layton Ralston: The munitions we were
wanting? Yes. My hon. friend will find that in the report.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Where is that in the
report?


James Layton Ralston: On page 49 where it says:
Technical stores include weapons and ammunition and the necessary supplies of reserves, spare parts, tools, et cetera. A list of technical stores supplied to the Hong Kong force was filed, together with a list showing in what respect the technical stores provided fell short of the prescribed establishment. These deficiencies were the subject of communications between Canadian and British military headquarters. There were no available Boys antitank rifles in Canada in October, 1941. Nor was there ammunition for 2-inch and 3-inch mortars available in Canada at the time. These facts were reported to the British authorities. Their reply expressed gratification respecting the equipment the Canadian units would take to Hong Kong, and stated that the deficiencies in the Boys anti-tank rifles would be made up when possible by release and delivery of such weapons direct to Hong Kong from British sources. As to the mortar ammunition, the war office arranged to provide a supply for weekly release in Hong Kong and stated that some mortar ammunition would be available immediately from stocks already in Hong Kong. Subject to these deficiencies, the full establishment of technical stores, together with large reserves, was provided by Canada and proceeded with the expedition to Hong Kong.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Did that include the
weapons which were supposed to go with them?


James Layton Ralston: I am not going to get
equipment mixed up with mechanical transport. All the equipment went with the troops on board. The only thing that did not go was transport with which I shall deal in a moment.


James Lester Douglas: Is there any
evidence that Boys anti-tank rifles were supplied at Hong Kong?


James Layton Ralston: I have no evidence of
that at the moment.
I come now to General Orerar's evidence at page 29. General Crerar says:
As regards Winnipeg Grenadiers, I had studied the periodic training reports on this unit while in the West Indies, forwarded by its O.C., which indicated that within the preoccupation of its garrison duties, it was successfully progressing in its tactical and weapons training. I also had first hand information furnished by its O.C., Lieutenant-Colonel Kay, who reported to Ottawa in the summer of 1941 to take up appointment as D.A.G. Lieutenant-Colonel Kay then informed me that his unit was ready and restless for more active service, and expressed the hope that it would not be brought hack to Canada in the meantime. I advised Lieutenant-Colonel Kay at that time that my reason for return of Winnipeg Grenadiers to Canada was that while it was probably quite fit for garrison responsibities it would be desirable to give it a short period of unit and refresher training before embodying it in field formations, destined for overseas. As this unit had been mobilized for two years, had experienced and successfully undertaken more independent responsibilities than any other unit in Canada, had been favourably reported upon to me in some detail by its late C.O., Brigadier Kay, its general fitness for active service after a short period of refresher training was specially indicated.
With regard to training on shipboard, I am not going to read General McNaughton's evidence, but evidence was given with regard to training on shipboard and that Brigadier Lawson intended to give weapon training on board ship, and he did so. I refer to page 46, where I find this:
There is considerable evidence to suggest that training was in fact vigorously carried on between October 27 and December 8. Before leaving Ottawa, Brigadier Lawson asked for information about weapons in which the two battalions were not practised so that he could make arrangements for training in those weapons on shipboard.
In his report written shortly before arrival in Hong Kong Brigadier Lawson reports as follows:
Training has been carried out regularly since October 30. . . . Emphasis has been laid on physical training, weapon training, P.A.G. (protection against gas) and such specialist training as could be carried out. Special classes have been organized for officers and N.C.O's. including a special P.T. class for the more senior officers. A series of lectures for officers and warrant officers was commenced after leaving our first port of all, dealing with conditions likely to be met in the far east, races and religion, military geography, health in the tropics, characteristics of Indian army troops likely to be met and the Japanese army. . . . Lectures were also given to all troops on sanitation and hygiene in the tropics and on security.
This report is confirmed by an extract from a letter written by one of the junior officers on November 9, in which is described the activities on board ship. This officer stated he was up at 6.30 a.m. and attended the officers' lecture from
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7.15 to 8.15 a.m.; parades took place between 9.00 and 11.30 a.m., and between 2.00 and 4.30 p.m.; he delivered two lectures each day; at 4.45 p.m. attended an officers' P.T. class for half an hour, and spent the evening in study and at a lecture at 10.00 p.m.
Weekly reports sent by cable from Hong Kong indicate that training continued vigorously after the arrival of the expedition. These messages report specifically that weapon training was carried on and that operational exercises were undertaken.
I want to point out that General Mc-Naughton, dealing with this very point, says at page 7:
If I were the commanding officer and had had the chance to select the men and know them individually-see that they were all right-I would not have worried very much whether they had completed the basic training or not, because character is the thing we lay most stress on, and, if they were people who were suitable in my judgment to incorporate in the battalion, I would have been perfectly happy to have had them ... I would not have worried from the point of view of military efficiency one iota, because, if they are the right type of men, even on the voyage over I would have completed their individual training.


Charles Edward Johnston: How was that information obtained from General McNaughton?


James Layton Ralston: He was here and gave evidence before the commission.


Thomas Reid: And he knows.


Howard Charles Green: What is meant by "individual training"?


James Layton Ralston: I suppose it means what it says.


Howard Charles Green: Oh, it is not quite that funny. Does it mean training in firing weapons, or does it mean merely such things as drill?


James Layton Ralston: I do not know, but I would suppose it meant training with individual weapons.


Howard Charles Green: It means drill and things like that.


James Layton Ralston: The director of military training was in charge of this force and was going to give weapon training on the way over. That is indicated. The director of military training has been spoken of, and with good reason-he is not here to-night because I am sorry to say he was lost in Hong Kong- and has been regarded as one of the finest training experts in Canada. That is the man who was going to do weapon training on shipboard, going over.
What I submit, Mr. Speaker, is this. The accepted view was that war was not imminent. That is the commissioner's express finding. That is the statement which is made in the last

message which was received from Canadian military headquarters, that the consensus of opinion was that war in the far east was unlikely at that time. That was the situation in which the officers at headquarters found themselves. It was expected that these two battalions were going to do a certain amount of garrison duty and other duties as well. Under these circumstances an expeditionary force was sent, and it was expected that any drill in the firing of weapons could be done after they got there.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: That is not the substance of the United States report.


James Layton Ralston: I am still addressing the Speaker and am not minding too much my hon. friends over there now. I want to continue with what I am saying. I wish to say to my hon. friend and to this house, regardless of the substance of the United States report, that the commissioner finds, and there is every reason for his finding, that no such information was conveyed to the Canadian government. That is the situation. It is no use to bring in United States officers. The officers of the Canadian government had to act on the information which it had. That information had been submitted to the commissioner; he has found as he has, and, as I said before, I think he was justified in so finding. But supposing the worst, that war did come, as it did, three weeks after they got there. Nobody expected it, not even the Americans, notwithstanding the reports they had. They did not take them too seriously, at least on the firing line where such reports might be supposed to be taken seriously.


Richard Burpee Hanson: That was the tragedy.


James Layton Ralston: But if war did come, the qualifications of these battalions outweighed any absence of actual firing. Such reports as we have had from Hong Kong with regard to the fighting of the men over there indicate this, including the report, quoted by the commissioner, from Colonel Sutcliffe himself- who I regret to say has since died-to the effect that the troops had fought magnificently and had shown a wonderful spirit. I quote from page 34:
A telegram from Colonel Sutcliffe, dated December 22, lends confirmation to General Crerar's judgment. Colonel Sutcliffe, who was at this time evidently in command following the death of Brigadier Lawson and Colonel Hennessy, says:
"Troops have done magnificent work. Spirit excellent."

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That is dated December 22, fifteen days after Pearl Harbour. General Crerar's statement, which I intended to read but neglected to, is at the top of page 34:
As I have previously stated, the training of a unit or formation is never completed. For instance neither G.O.C. first Canadian division, nor myself, would admit that first Canadian division which has trained vigorously for two years, and elements of which have partaken in actual operations, is as fit to meet enemy as we *would wish it. There is always room for improvement. On the other hand, as a general statement, with information at my disposal concerning units of force "C" and knowing professional ability and character of commanding officer, Brigadier Lawson, I would say that force "C" was certainly fit to meet an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine account of itself by December 8, 1941.
I come back, Mr. Speaker, to General Crerar's main recommendation. He says the units have had experience and are units of proven efficiency. He selected them as complying with the specifications which he had laid down in the first part of his report, that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the dominion in any circumstances.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: What page is that on?


James Layton Ralston: Page 19. He had selected them as units of proven efficiency. Both units had done good jobs on their previous assignments. That entitled them in his opinion to favourable consideration for this new task at Hong Kong. Both were experienced in garrison duty, which was what they were expected to do at the outset, when they were selected and dispatched.
I should like to know if there are any hon. members who will seriously controvert General McNaughton's statement as to the ability to complete their training. We have the statements of the chief of the general staff and other members of the general staff, and the fact that the director of military training had charge of these units and went with them at that time. I would say they were the best qualified to pass on the fitness of these units, and to suggest that the Winnipeg Grenadiers were disqualified from going to Hong Kong because at that particular time they had not actually pulled the trigger of a Bren gun is not doing justice to Canada and to that battalion.
Let me sum up. We pledged two battalions as reinforcements to Hong Kong. They were sound and well tried. They had done everything but fire certain of their weapons. They had had extensive experience, and at duties not unlike those expected. They were not selected in any haphazard way. Their presence in Hong Kong at the earliest possible
moment was the consideration which weighed with the British and weighed with us. Looking forward, then, not backward, as we do to-day, it was reasonable to suppose that there was ample time to brush them up and round out their training with actual firing of weapons if that were necessary. The post of commander of the force was given to the former director of military training, and that would ensure that no time would be lost. Even if war came, not having had actual firing practice did not disqualify them. As I said a little while ago, no more stimulating target could have been found than the enemy. Looking forward again, and not backward, as we do now, if the test should come, their ability, their experience, their efficiency and their esprit de corps, the fact that they had been together for a long time, could have been relied upon. I should like to paraphrase, if I may, the words of the commissioner when he speaks of soldiers and statesmen. I say this: men can properly be held accountable for a reasonably capable, practical judgment as to probabilities, but not on the assumption that they must have had anterior knowledge of subsequent events. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that under all the circumstances the judgment exercised was not only a reasonably capable judgment but the only judgment which could have been arrived at at that time, and that the selection of these battalions was sound and was warranted under the circumstances as they existed.
So much for the selection of the battalions. I want now to deal briefly with the matter of additions to the battalions. You will remember that this whole controversy was raised originally on the point that some men had been taken on with less than sixteen weeks training. When I made my statement to the house in January I said I had found- far from the reports 1 got then-that from 138 to 148 men had had less than sixteen weeks training and I would have inquiry made about the matter. This inquiry came on, however, and the commissioner found, not that 138 to 148 men but that about 120 men had had less than sixteen weeks training; that is, 120 out of 1,900. I wish to recall that because there has been a lot of talk about the difficulties of getting these men. We had to get them quickly. Do you realize what it means to receive a telegram on October 9 saying that a transport will sail between the 20th and the 30th, and it is to take, if you will send them, two battalions to Hong Kong. The last flight of one of these battalions had just arrived in Canada the day before; the other battalion was at Saint John, New Brunswick. It meant that the directors had to meet and deal with
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the whole matter of equipment, not simply equipment for the time being but reserve equipment for a year or more; had to deal with food, with re-outfitting of the whole unit, with medical examination, with documentation, with providing first reinforcements, with leave and with arrangements for leave as well. All these matters had to be attended to between the 9tli and the time the battalions were to leave which was fixed as the 27th. Speed was necessary; all this had to be done rapidly. It was necessary to get, I believe, 154 men for the Royal Rifles, that is 156 less two that they were over strength, and something like 280, namely 156 for reinforcements and about 130 in respect of the number below strength, for the Winnipeg Grenadiers. More than this, the men had to be volunteers. I do not mean that we could not have ordered them to go; but it was felt that, since they were not going with their own unit, and since the expedition was to a far distant country, it was only fair to give men an opportunity to volunteer. More than that, they had to volunteer to go to a place which was unnamed. The most they could be told was that they were going to a semi-tropical post.
That was the situation which faced the officers. With regard to the Royal Rifles, they immediately went to Toronto. They got men from Camp Borden and fifty-two from the Midland regiment-154 altogether. Some remarks have been made about the Midland regiment. I would just refer the house- I am not going to take time to read it- to. page 37 of the report, which indicates and goes into detail with regard to the training of the Midland regiment.
The statement is that the regiment itself was an efficient, well-trained unit. The men had not passed through training centres, but the regiment was far ahead of the prescribed syllabus in drill, marching, rifle training and bayonet training. They were well advanced in their firing practice at the ranges and possessed initiative and self-reliance beyond the average, and the commissioner was satisfied that the volunteers from the Midland regiment were well-trained in accordance with the standard prevailing in Canada. At Camp Borden they got sixteen weeks' training, and none had less than ten and a half.
All the additions to the Royal Rifles which had been inspected by the officer representing the officer commanding the Royal Rifles had been accepted. This will be found in the evidence, according to page 38. General McNaughton refers particularly to this. He says, if you have a chance to look at the men selected you need not worry so much about training. He says, I do not worry so much

about training so long as I know that they are recommended by someone who knows them. But he objected to having men dumped upon him without knowing anything about them.
The additions to the Winnipeg Grenadiers came from four training centres altogether. The situation so far as they were concerned was this. They had filled up the quota required, but on medical examination at the last minute it was found that a certain number would not pass the test, with the result that more men had to be got, and they went to Dundurn, Saskatchewan, to get them because they had to be got quickly. There were 282 men who were obtained for the Grenadiers and) fourteen officers. I could give the training of them, but all that appears at pages 39, 40 and 41, and I do not think it is necessary to take up the time of the house in that regard except to say that, with respect to the Winnipeg Grenadiers as well, all the men taken were personally accepted by Colonel Sutclifle or his second in command. There again General McNaughton's evidence is relevant to show that men, even though they had not the full training, would, if selected and accepted, be men whom he would be ready to take. At a passage I have not before quoted, he deals to some extent with selection and with the ability of the unit to absorb a small number of men. At page 43 General McNaughton is reported as follows:
Q. With regard to your answers to questions by my friend Mr. Campbell, he gave to you the figures 43 and 62 of men who had less than sixteen weeks in connection with these two battalions respectively. Could those numbers, in your opinion, be increased without affecting the answer which you gave to his lordship to any extent?-A. Well, I think I would like to answer it this way, saying that I took the first Canadian division overseas, well on towards 18,000, and not one of them had had that training; not that I was happy, but-
Q. You are speaking of the first division as now constituted?-A. Yes.
Q. I was thinking of the first division in the last war?-A. And the same thing was true in the last war, my lord. We had nothing like that training that is indicated here for these oddments that were added.
Q. Then could those numbers be reasonably increased without affecting the efficiency of a battalion which had otherwise been fairly well trained?-A. Oh, to absorb, say, 10 to 15 per cent, is no difficulty.
Q. Then the presence of men who had not had the same degree of training as what I might call the main body of the battalion while you say that their presence creates no difficulty, would you be good enough to answer that from the standpoint of the men who themselves are trained? That is, is there any effect of the presence of somewhat untrained men on the trained men? ' Does it give the trained men any feeling of insecurity or lack

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of confidence or anything of that kind by reason of the presence of somewhat lesser trained men in their battalion?-A. Not provided one has a period of a few weeks to assimilate them and ifiake sure they are brought up level with the rest. That is a thing that any combatant unit has got to be trained to do. It is part of our ordinary routine, because when we go into battle we are certain to have casualties, anything up to 25 per cent, and a good battalion must be able to take that quota of comparatively untrained people into their organization and in a matter of days rather than weeks incorporate them thoroughly into the unit.
' Q. What I am thinking of is this, General McNaughton:	you have this force going to
Hong Kong, two battalions; assume 10 per cent of them had less than sixteen weeks, of varying amounts; it was anticipated we will say they were going there on garrison duty, but we will say that expectation was disappointed and it became a combatant area; then would you be good enough to answer the question?'-A. I personally would not have given it one anxiety, subject to the condition that I knew the men, that I did not have a lot of rotters put on my hands, that I had a chance to select them. I would have taken almost raw men of my own selection rather than have had a lot of fellows dumped on me that I did not know anything about.
The evidence is then that there were something like 120 men in that whole 1,900 who had less than sixteen weeks training, and the commissioner finds that there was no unfairness to other 'battalions or to the expedition as a whole, from the addition of the men referred to who had not fully completed their prescribed training. That will be found at the top of page 43, and there is a similar finding in the general report on page 7, lines 25 to 36.
I do not think I have anything to add to that. I think I should say that in reference to the rule as to sixteen weeks training, evidence was given that that applies only to reinforcements going to the reinforcement pool to be absorbed in units overseas. It does not apply to a unit when the unit itself is recruiting men to bring it up to establishment or particularly to first reinforcements. It does not apply to the unit itself.
Be that as it may, I would prefer, as everybody would, that the men should have sixteen weeks training; but the point is that the Hong Kong expedition is not to be condemned because of the fact that 120 men out of the whole 1,900 did not happen to have sixteen weeks training, particularly when these 120 men had been accepted by the responsible officers representing the unit.
With regard to the matter of transport, somebody spoke about the responsibility for the boat. All I have to say is that the Canadian government have not very many boats at their disposal. The boats are at the disposal of the British admiralty and ministry of war
transport, and whether we liked it or not, we had to take what they provided. We might as well settle down to that, and we have had to settle down to it for these three years of war. There would be no possibility of conducting the operations necessary in connection with the movement of troops and equipment from this side to the other side and back again, or all round the world, if we had different authorities managing shipping. The British supplied the boat.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Was there any criticism of the boat?


James Layton Ralston: Yes. Someone asked,
why did we not get a boat of our own.


Richard Burpee Hanson: I did not hear it.


James Lester Douglas: That was not the suggestion at all.


James Layton Ralston: What was it?


Richard Burpee Hanson: That is a straw-man.


James Lester Douglas: If the minister is referring to me, he cannot put words in my mouth. I asked what representation had been made by the government to the British authorities to see that the boat had adequate space to take both men and equipment.
Mr. RALSTON; No boat would be available with sufficient space.


Richard Burpee Hanson: But you are putting up a straw-man now.


James Layton Ralston: With regard to the matter of transport, I do not think that to-night I ought, and I do not think the house will expect me, to take them through the evidence. The important thing is what I mentioned when I made my statement on whatever day I made it last January, namely, that a certain number of vehicles did not go on the boat and might have gone on it. As to the great mass of vehicles, the finding and the evidence are both here. It is all to the effect that the boat to carry the bulk of the vehicles was obtained as early as was possible, and no boat for that purpose could have been obtained earlier. The hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore) asked a question about the boat being held. I told him before, and I can only repeat now, that to hold the boat, that is to say to hold the troop transport for the freighter would have meant that the troops would have been in the China sea at the time of the outbreak of that war, and it would not have been possible on the information which we had to hold that troopship sufficiently long to enable
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her to arrive at Hong Kong at the same time as the transport. I told the house that the transport ship was a boat of eight and a half knots. I was wrong about that. I got my information from the navy, and that is what I was told. The Don Jose was about an eleven-knot boat, but she did not make that speed by any means. The other boat, the troopship, was much faster. Therefore you would have had to slow down the troopship to the speed of the transport if you had held it up, with the result that both would have been in the China sea at about the time fighting broke out.


John Horne Blackmore: If I may ask another question, the point I had in mind was this. Would it have been possible to hold the transport for two or three days, in order to put those twenty vehicles on board?


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Overnight would have
done it.


James Layton Ralston: I think myself it might have been, if things had been done properly. I say that as my own view. The commissioner has criticized the transaction regarding the twenty vehicles, and I am not excusing it at all. But the bulk of the vehicles would have to go on the other ship, the Don Jose, because of lack of space on the troop ship.


Richard Burpee Hanson: But this boat could have taken the priority vehicles.


James Layton Ralston: I think so, and the commissioner finds that she could have taken fifteen. I want to get this straight. I am not going to deal with the bulk of the vehicles at all, because they could not have gone on the Awatea, even if they could have been all brought together. The result is that they were put aboard the earliest boat possible, the Don Jose, which did take the vehicles and which, as the house knows and as was announced later, wound up at Manila after war had broken out.
So far as the so-called priority vehicles are concerned, there is a long and involved statement of the transactions which took place.
I am not going to trouble the house by going into that to-night, because I do not think there is any necessity for it. The commissioner deals with it as a breakdown; he says there was a breakdown or conflict between the master-general of the ordnance branch and the quartermaster-general's branch, with regard to who was responsible. The thing that emerges clearly in my mind, and what I think was in the commissioner's mind, for I think that was why he made the finding, 
is that the quartermaster-general is responsible for the transport of men and equipment by land, sea and air. That is the responsibility which runs right straight through this thing. Subject to a good many diversions on account of the fact that the transport controller came into the picture and stopped the shipment of vehicles; on account of the fact that an endeavour was being made to ascertain what space was available aboard the ship; on account of the fact that Brigadier Maeklin and Brigadier Lawson were endeavouring to work out, assuming that certain space was available on the ship and that certain hatches were of a certain size in order to take boxed' vehicles, what particular vehicles could be taken, there still remains the ultimate and primary responsibility of the quartermaster-general's branch, which was to see to the transport of equipment and men by land, sea and air.
I think I can put in a very few words the opinion of the commissioner. He says that if the quartermaster-general's branch, that is, the movement control officer, had realized on October 9 or 10, as the commissioner thinks he should have realized, that the Awatea would take practically none of the transport, he would have ascertained immediately just what her size was and found out what space was available cun her, and thereby enabled a list of the so-called priority vehicles to have been made up.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: But was he not told that?


James Layton Ralston: No, he was not told that. As a matter of fact, I think he began to endeavour to find it out on the 14th, but did not get the information until the 16th. In the meantime Brigadier Maeklin and Brigadier Lawson were waiting for that, and having a tentative list of vehicles made up. It was finally cleared up, I think, on the 18th, and it was the 20th before the transport controller actually released .the shipment.


Mr. BOUCHER:: Was it not a fact that the quartermaster-general did not know the capacity of the ship and did not know what equipment they wanted to put into that capacity, until the 17th?


James Layton Ralston: No, I do not think that is so. The quartermaster-general's branch knew what equipment had to go on board on the 11th; he had a list of the equipment then, given to him by the master-general of the ordnance branch.


George Russell Boucher: On that particular ship?

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James Layton Ralston: No, a list of the equipment [DOT]which was to go, and of course that was the only ship then available.


Mr. McGEER:: Would the minister permit me to interrupt on that point? What I read on page 58 of the report seems to throw a quite different light on the matter than that given a moment ago:
On October 25 Major Gwynne had informed Captain Bush, the staff captain of force "C", that the vehicles would not arrive before sailing time. Unquestionably this would have been reported to Brigadier Lawson. Also on that day the ship's master told Major Gwynne that even if the vehicles did arrive, he could not take them, giving as his reason that the ship was going on a long journey, that he would probably go in a roundabout way and needed extra fuel oil. On the evening of October 27 before the ship sailed the ship's captain again said to Major Gwynne and Mr. Cooke, the manager of the ship's agents, that even if the vehicles arrived he could not take them unless he pumped out some 100 tons of oil. While Mr. Cooke says this is so he goes on to say that had the vehicles arrived before the ship sailed this oil would have been pumped out and the vehicles loaded. This seems inconsistent with the captain's view that he needed this extra fuel oil and I do not understand Major Gwynne's evidence to be that Captain Martin was agreeable to dispensing with this fuel.
Apparently the captain had to do one of two things, pump out 100 tons of fuel oil which he declared he needed, or go on without these vehicles; and was it not the captain's right to determine that issue?


Karl Kenneth Homuth: You are making the case worse than ever for the government.


James Layton Ralston: All I want to say is that my hon. friend is quite right in quoting the evidence. The commissioner considered that matter, and at line 40 of page 60 the hon. member will find these words:
Mr. Lockwood seems to have thought seven trucks and the two water tanks could have been loaded but the evidence as to -whether the captain would have been willing to take any of these vehicles enables me to form no confident opinion on this point.
But when he comes to make his finding in the main report I take it that he comes to the conclusion that notwithstanding what was said about the captain refusing to take them or being reluctant to take them, he thinks that reluctance would have been overcome in some way, because he says:
Had more energy and initiative been shown by the quartermaster-general's branch, charged with the movement of the equipment for the force, the availability of this space would have been ascertained earlier and the vehicles would have arrived in time for loading on October 24; and there is, in my opinion, no good reason for thinking that, had they arrived at that time, they would not have been taken on board.


George Russell Boucher: Would the minister not read pages 56 and 57, where I understand it is stated that Colonel Spearing on October 20 did not know the capacity of the ship or the nature of the vehicles that were to go into that capacity?


James Layton Ralston: I must say I am not going to permit myself to be cross-examined too much. I would refer my hon. friend to what I stated a few moments ago, and he can read the evidence himself. On page 56, line 8, he will find that Brigadier Macklin was advised on the 18th by Colonel Spearing that possibly from 10,000 to 12,000 cubic feet would be available on the Awatea for vehicles. Colonel Spearing apparently knew that on the 18th, and he advised Brigadier Macklin on the 18th; but Colonel Spearing did not advise Mr. Connor, of the transport controller's office, of the estimated free space until the 20th, as will be found at about line 40 on the same page. What I am saying is correct, I think; namely, that regardless of when Colonel Spearing found out he did not tell Brigadier Macklin on the 18th and did not tell Mr. Connor until the 20th. That, in part, is what leads the commissioner to make the adverse finding which he does against the quartermaster-general's branch.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: When did you, as minister, know it had not gone?


James Layton Ralston: Oh, earlier than that;
considerably earlier. I was not here, you know, when the ship sailed. That is the finding against the quartermaster-general's branch. I come back to what I said originally, and the summing up of it is that the commissioner finds that Colonel Spearing, by not exercising due diligence on October 9 or 10, and not ascertaining the capacity of the Awatea was himself negligent, or showed a lack of energy, and he then contributed to these vehicles not having gone.
There are a lot of things to be said with regard to that. I must say that when the matter came to my attention first, and I am not sure that it is not my opinion to-day- and I say this frankly-I considered that it was lack of good staff work rather than anything really affecting the Hong Kong expedition.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Would the minister tell us when that was?


James Layton Ralston: When what was?


Karl Kenneth Homuth: When the matter came to his attention.


James Layton Ralston: I think it was December 15, to be exact. I thought it was a matter of staff work, rather than Hong Kong expedition.
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Richard Burpee Hanson: What does the minister mean by that?


James Layton Ralston: I mean this, that it did not seem to me and I do not think it seemed to the officers of the department that the absence of fifteen vehicles would have made very much difference in connection with the equipment of the force, in view of the fact that we had word that transport could be hired. The only vehicles which could have been in use would have been the two water tanks, which would have had capacity to supply the battalion for a day or two. I believe there is a normal allowance of one-half gallon per day per man for drinking and cooking, but put it a quarter of a gallon per man per day, and one tank would supply 800 men. Therefore the two tanks would be required to supply the two battalions for one day, even at the rate of a quart per man.


Mr. DONNELLY:: How many vehicles
were supposed to be shipped altogether?


James Layton Ralston: Two hundred and twelve.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: How about the universal carriers?


James Layton Ralston: There were fifty-seven. We are talking about six universal carriers out of the fifty-seven, and I believe it was seven trucks out of a much greater number, although I have forgotten the exact number. But out of the 212 it was a comparatively small number.
As to the findings of the commissioner, as I say there is grave doubt in my mind as to whether or not it was anything more than a question of poor staff work. The matter was gone into at the time. I had not completed the investigation before I reported to the house, and I may say that we are still looking, or are trying to find out where that letter addressed to the ordnance transit officer went.
The net result was that it appeared to me that the quartermaster-general's branch had not realized its responsibility, and I did not want an occurrence of that kind to be repeated. In connection with the matter action was taken. I want to say right here that I do not want the house to consider that the action which was taken was solely on account of this. It was a matter which I considered very carefully indeed. It seemed that in view of what had occurred, and in view of the necessity for impressing the officers with their responsibilities, it was desirable that the quartermaster-general should have some other post. A district was offered him, but he declined and was retired.
Colonel Spearing was not retired at the time. As a matter of fact, we were still investi-

gating the question of the letter to the ordnance transit officer. The investigation was going on, and it was decided to leave that matter until there was a report from the investigation. The commissioner did report, and Colonel Spearing was retired as well.
I want to say here about Colonel Spearing and the quartermaster general that they had given excellent service. I am not one who will say to a man that I am through with himf or that is the end of him just because he makes a mistake or an error. But here was a situation in which it seemed that the officers should be impressed with their responsibilities. Colonel Spearing had come back from a pension in order to occupy his post. But the report being what it was, and there seeming to be an apparent lack of appreciation of responsibilities, this action was taken. In that connection may I say that, as is probably known, there has been a very complete reorganization in the quartermaster general's branch. Not all the changes have been made because of this expedition; I do not mean that by any means. But because of the fact there were certain places which needed strengthening, that strengthening has been done.
Brigadier Macdonald has been brought back from overseas to take the position of director of transport. He has done fine work overseas. Colonel Keating has been brought up from Halifax to take the position which Colonel Spearing formerly occupied. Major-General MacKenzie, who was a brigadier overseas, has come back to take the position of quartermaster general. There have been quite a number of other changes in the quartermaster general's branch, as well as on the engineering side. But taking all in all there has been a distinct change in the transport side.
Those are the findings, and that is the action which has been taken. The commissioner finds that there is no evidence of any detriment to the troops on account of the transport not having been there. Transport was hired. The telegram which we received from overseas was to the effect that transport was being hired, as required.
At the press confidence Sub-lieutenant Proulx was asked about transport. This is the report of that interview as it appears in the Montreal Daily Star of July 18:
"How was the transport?" "Very bad." Asked at the end of the conference about trucks, he said that if the trucks from Canada had arrived, they could not have been used since the Japs cut all the communications, rendering such truck equipment useless. But up till that time, the Chinese trucking firms had enough trucks.
Then, with regard to water-mains, I think it will be remembered that very early in the engagement the water-mains were broken.

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Therefore it would scarcely appear as if the water tanks would have been of much use. However, what I said in my statement in January and what I still say is that that is a matter of speculation regarding which none of us can know the answer.


Howard Charles Green: What about the universal carriers? They would have been useful, would they not?


James Layton Ralston: I should think they would not if the trucks would not.


Howard Charles Green: They are armoured.


James Layton Ralston: If my hon. friend had seen the Proulx statement, it is to the effect that the Canadians were in guerilla warfare with the Japs infiltrating. They were in little bunches of fifteen or twenty or thirty, and apparently they were not on the roads at all, or anywhere where carriers could have been used.
I come now to my hon. friend's amendment. May I say with regard to the commissioner's report that I have tried to deal with all the evidence which I think is relevant; I have tried to give the house as nearly as possible the effect of the commissioner's findings, and the evidence there is to support them. I have given the house the cogent reasons why the commissioner's findings are sound, not only from the point of view of those portions which are favourable to the government, but from the point of view of those portions which are against the department as well. I want to say that far from being a white-wash, I would say that the commissioner's report has given credit where credit is due, explanations where explanations are called for and blame where blame is required. If I may say so, it seems to me that that is the sort of report which will impress the .people of this country.
With respect to his report on the whole evidence he concluded with these words;
In October, 1941, the Canadian military authorities undertook a task of considerable difficulty. Subject only to my observation concerning twenty of the 212 vehicles of the mechanical transport, they performed that task well.
I want to read that for the benefit of those officers who have listened to this Hong Kong matter for a good while, who have been criticized and who have not been able to speak for themselves, those men who during those hectic eighteen days worked their heads off, in spite of all the other preoccupations they had in connection with having troops go overseas. The quartermaster-general and Colonel Spearing were quite as busy as men could be arranging for transport and train
accommodation. They had to endeavour to make plans so that this particular force could go, and at the same time not interfere with the rail movements which were being made to eastern ports for very heavy embarkations there. These men had to be got together and got together fast. They had to provide some equipment which they did not normally have to provide for Canadian troops going out of Canada because it was generally easily available in England. They had to get semitropical clothing, medical supplies, and everything needed for troops making a long stay a long distance away. In addition to that, they had to keep the whole movement secret. Those men did a good job, and on the whole I think the commissioner was justified and quite proper in making the statement he did about their having performed that task well.
I think that statement should be recorded on Hansard and should be read to this house.
The amendment, if I understand it aright, calls for the reorganization of the whole Department of National Defence. I presume that the hon. member is dealing with the matter of training. I want to take the time of this house, and this gives me the opportunity, to say a word with regard to the training in Canada. We in national defence do not think we know it all. We do not think we have reached the acme in connection with training or in connection with anything else that we are trying to do. We are not complacent about what is happening there. You will find a better situation at the beginning of 1942 than you had at the beginning of 1941, and a better situation at the beginning of 1941 than you had in 1940. Month after month we are endeavouring to make changes, to make improvements in order that Canada's army may be all that Canada expects it to be. The amendment reads:
This house is of the opinion that such of the evidence taken before the inquiry into the dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force to the crown colony of Hong Kong as has been disclosed reveals convincing proof of incapacity on the part of responsible military authorities, and demonstrates the immediate and urgent need for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of National Defence.
I could stop here on the record which I have given already and say that there is nothing in the report to support any such damning indictment as that. My hon. friend or whoever drafted that is talking about conditions which existed in the summer of 1941.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Did you admit them then?


James Layton Ralston: If my hon. friend will look at anything I have ever said he will never find me boasting about what is being
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*done. He will find me telling exactly what is going on. When there was a shortage of equipment I have said so and I have told this house quite frankly. When questions in connection with training came up I have endeavoured to tell the house what they were. I have never hesitated in the face of newspapers or anybody else to make changes if changes were necessary, even though that might appear to be admitting that the situation had not been as good as I should have liked it to be.
In connection with training I would regard, and I believe the people of this country would regard the training which is done in England by the British forces to be about as near the acme as anything we could have. If anybody contradicts that, if anyone says the United States training is better, I should be glad to hear from him, because we are keeping in touch with the United States as well. What we are trying to do is to keep our training in Canada integrated with the training in England. For two years we have been exchanging officers and we are increasing this two-way movement all the time. We have been bringing them back from England and sending our officers over to England. We have sent our director of military training over there and have been bringing back our headquarters officers from England so that they will know what is going on and know what the army commander, General McNaughton, wants. At this minute a complete reorganization of the Department of National Defence is being asked for. It must be in connection with training because that is what my hon. friend dealt with most' of the time. He said very little about transport.


Howard Charles Green: I said quite a lot about transport.


James Layton Ralston: I am talking about training at the present, and I shall deal with transport in a moment. Here are the men directly in charge of training. The vice chief of the general staff, Major-General Murchie, spent over a year overseas. Brigadier Weeks went over with the second division and was there until last October when Brigadier Lawson went to Hong Kong. He came back from the second division in order to succeed Brigadier Lawson as director of military training after having had very wide experience over there. Colonel Sparling and Colonel Keeffler are both overseas officers who are in charge of training under them. These are the so-called brass hats who are sometimes talked about by people. This afternoon we heard about people being seventy years of age who do not know anything about training, who have lost touch and who are away back 
in the days of 1914-18. But the men I have mentioned with practical overseas experience in this war are the men who are in charge of training at the department. I make no apology for them whatever. I have not the faintest objection to your making a change in the minister any time you like, but as far as I am concerned you are not going to change the men in charge of training who are so valuable to us at the present time.
As a matter of fact, Colonel Sparling is going back to England to take up a post over there and Colonel Keefler will probably be taking his place. At the present time we have in Canada 282 officers from overseas who are assisting with training all across this country. They know what the training is in England; they know what the requirements are, and they are helping us to put them into force here. In addition to that, we have over 1,500 men of other ranks, non-commissioned officers, who are stationed all across this country. At the present time we are running, believe it or not, an officers training centre for what? For the Canadian army overseas. General McNaughton is sending back young men to be trained by these seventy-year old training staff down at national defence headquarters, these brass hats so much is said about. That is the confidence he has in the training we are doing in Canada. The Brockville training centre is being increased from a capacity of 1,000 to a capacity of 2,000, and the training centre at Gordon Head is operating as well and is taking a certain number of these men.
Then there is the junior war staff course where we train young staff officers, officers who have completed their training at Brockville, who have gone through the advanced training, who have gone into the regiments, who have proved their worth and who have been recommended by their commanding officers or brigadier overseas as potential staff officers. General McNaughton actually has the temerity to risk the life of the Canadian army, somebody will say, by sending back these men to be trained at the junior war staff course in Canada and has asked us to take the responsibility for it. Forty-five out of the fifty in the junior war staff course in Canada at the present time are men who have been sent from the Canadian army overseas because they have confidence in the training given here.
As a matter of fact, we have sent to the United Kingdom 721 officers and 693 other ranks, and at the present time there are in England something like 400 personnel from the fourth Canadian division. While I am speaking about training and the fourth Canadian division I might mention that the man in charge of the fourth Canadian division is

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Major-General Worthington,, who went overseas with the army tank brigade. He has no peer as an armoured corps officer, and he is back in Canada training 'his fourth division before it goes overseas.
There are or have been in Canada something like 120 British officers who have come over here to assist with the matter of training. This is done so that we will not back up on our training, so that our training will be coordinated and integrated with the training in England. At the present time there are British officers at the junior war staff course, at the senior officers course, at the company commanders course, at the small arms training centres, at the driving and maintenance school, at the coast defence and antiaircraft schools at Halifax and at the Canadian armoured corps training centres. As a matter of fact, in connection with the Canadian armoured corps, the whole group of three training centres is headed by a British officer. That is what we are trying to do in the matter of training. Training, after all, is done by men, and it is the mentality of the men who are doing the training that counts. The training is not done simply by people who can sit down in a room and make out a syllabus, but by people who know about training as it is actually done. That atmosphere and that information are being brought back from England by these men in order that we may get the very best and the latest they have in England in training methods, in the same way that our men are going over to England to learn there and then coming back to their training centres in Canada.


John Ritchie MacNicol: May I ask whether our men are being trained in commando raids?


James Layton Ralston: I will come to that in a moment. My hon. friend the member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green) mentioned one other thing-battle training. I am not sure that he is not mixing up two or three things. Paratroops, commandos, guerilla warfare, battle drill, battle training-these are all different things, and the hon. member for Vancouver South has referred particularly to battle training. I think by that he means that we ought to train men to do their field training in Canada. Am I right?


Howard Charles Green: If I might make my point clear, what I had in mind was that the troops in Canada should get complete training here just as the Canadian troops in Great Britain get complete training there. The troops who may have to fight in Alaska or on the Pacific coast will have no chance to go to England for training.


James Layton Ralston: If that is what my hon. friend means, I understand him perfectly. Battle training-that is a very good term, meaning complete training so far as possible. But battle training, as my hon. friend knows, never ends. We are still battle training the first Canadian division overseas when they are not in the line. Battle training in Canada for troops who are going overseas goes as far as it can here before they go overseas. When they are wanted overseas we send them, notwithstanding that they might not have completed their training. There are certain arrangements and certain needs with regard to sending troops overseas, and it is desirable sometimes to send men who are not completely trained overseas and far better and more useful to have them complete their training there than here if they are earmarked for overseas. They may not be up in field manoeuvres; they may not be up to brigade manoeuvres and maybe battalion manoeuvres. I had an interview with the war office in which they indicated certain types of men and certain types of units they wanted even though they had not progressed very far in their training. We are training them as far as we can in the work they are to do, consistent with the need for them over there.
I come now to those earmarked for training in Canada. They will be trained and trained completely, if you can ever do that because it is a never-ending process, here in Canada for whatever task they may be needed for on this continent or any other theatre to which they could go from this country, in cases where they would not be able to train in the area to which they would be sent. Let us bear that clearly in mind. The training of every unit earmarked for Canadian defence will be carried through to completion, if we ever reach that stage. The training for those earmarked for overseas will be done here in Canada as far as possible, having regard to the needs elsewhere.
The hon. member for Davenport (Mr. Mac-Nicol) has mentioned commando training. That is something else again. Commando training is done first with individuals, and can be done next with a unit, small or large, but generally small. Commando training begins with the hardening of the men physically, stepping up the tempo of their physical training,, having men run instead of walking or trotting, scale walls, go through barbed wire, swim, surmount obstacles. All these things have to do with commando training. The next step is to take the unit, to put a lot of these men together -and provide some scheme for their training. The word "commando" comes from the South African war and has to do
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particularly with the raids that were made there. A commando raid was intended not as an attack to capture and hold a place but rather as a diversion or sortie to some particular area to do as much damage as possible and then come back.


John Ritchie MacNicol: And to get. information.


James Layton Ralston: And to get information. As a matter of fact, we have brought back Colonel Scott of the Calgary Highlanders to teach that very work. We started with instructors at Courtenay but have now moved that training to Vernon. Instructors are now being trained at Vernon and are then being sent back to their various units to teach that particular line of work. There will probably be a number selected from various units to take that training. Then, in turn, they go back to their units and assist in putting on commando or raid schemes. That is being done in Canada, There is something else, and that is combined training. As I have, said, we have just left Courtenay to go to Vernon to do this commando training. The combined training we propose to do there is to send a battalion there at a time and train that battalion, and then another one will come and take its place. That training goes on in combination with the air force and in combination with the navy, in order that combined training may be taught to unit after unit, particularly in connection with the work of the Pacific command.
Somebody has mentioned paratroops. We have not made any announcement about paratroops, but one battalion of paratroops has been authorized. It is now forming, and instructors are leaving for the United States within three weeks to get immediate and quick instruction there and then return. In the meantime plans are being made with the air force to provide the necessary cooperation needed in connection with paratroops.
I should perhaps mention coast defence troops. I do not think anybody realizes the expansion there has been, particularly in connection with anti-aircraft defence in this country. My colleague the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) has been pretty fast in turning out anti-aircraft equipment. He has beaten his predictions; as a matter of fact, we are doing everything we can to keep up with him, and I assure the house-that it requires some doing, because it takes a longer time to train a man than to turn out a Bofors gun when the Minister of Munitions and Supply gets the wheels started. We are training unit after unit in anti-aircraft work. That is drawing on our

instructors and on our equipment, particularly in connection with coast defence work. We felt that was particularly important and we have taken that on. I may say in connection with the suggestions for reorganization of the department that perhaps we have beaten the gun in that respect, and I only want to say to my hon. friend that this is not any promise made after his amendment, because we have been at it and are actually doing it.
I was going to put on record a list of the schools of instruction we have. I do not think anybody outside the army has any idea of the number or variety of these schools. I am still talking about training. I have spoken of officers training centres. We had made provision for an output of 8,000 young officers a year, but as a matter of fact the .facilities are being increased to turn out 12,000 a year. We have a junior war staff course of four months duration, to which I have already referred and which is taking part to no small extent in the training of young officers. We have a senior officers and company commanders course. Then we have two small arms training centres. We have a junior leaders training centre for junior N.C.O.'s and potential N.C.O.'s, for giving assistance to these young men who are so important in the army organization. We have an army school of administration; and every advanced training centre has an N.C.O. school of instruction. If anybody inspects these advanced training centres they will find the school of instruction on the right of the line. Any unit in Canada that feels it wants its N.C.O.'s instructed has the opportunity to send them to these schools at the advanced training centre.
There are two army trade schools in Canada, with a total, capacity of 3,500 a month. We have a driving and maintenance school at Woodstock and, in addition to that, the battle training school, the bush and mountain warfare training centre, and the paratroops training centre will be in operation in the near future. In addition we have two antiaircraft and coast defence training centres, the chemical warfare training centre, two Canadian Women's Army Corps training centres, and the cookery schools.
That, I think, is a fairly complete list and outline of our work in connection with training. I will just add that we have forty-one basic training centres and twenty-five advanced training centres in Canada.


Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West):: Will the minister tell us whether the transport controller is still in control of all movements of mechanical vehicles?

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James Layton Ralston: He is.
Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West:) And troops?


James Layton Ralston: 
Howard Charles Green: A number of the complaints which the minister mentions were not made by me.


James Layton Ralston: Something is being done in spite of it all.
May I say this last word, Mr. Speaker? I have spoken perhaps heatedly and rather vehemently-


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Not so much so as I did.


James Layton Ralston: -and I say that seriously. With regard to the Hong Kong incident, nobody can feel more responsibility than I do. Nobody can regret more than I do, and shall to the end of my days, the fact that the expedition, so far as holding Hong Kong is concerned, was not successful, and that these young men had to go. But no one will be more thankful than I that they succeeded in the major job which came to them, and accomplished the most important thing which was asked of them, by gaining some time, even though it was comparatively short. I want that modicum of comfort to go to the families of these boys, no matter where they are in this Dominion of Canada, and I want to say, too, that notwithstanding all that has
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been said about Hong Kong, the people who had stood up to it the best and have complained the least are the people who have suffered most and whose friends have suffered. I glory in their courage; I glory in their bravery, because I do not know of anything which can be harder to bear than the uncertainty and anxiety of these last six months. But that is the situation. Probably Canada- to use my hon. friend's expression the day I made my statement-may have other Hong Kongs. But make no mistake about it; we shall have learned some lessons from Hong Kong.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: That
is the important thing.


James Layton Ralston: I know now of things which have been improved in connection with organization. Probably, growing out of this experience, we shall learn things which would have affected the sending of the expedition, which affect the efficient working of the department. I do not expect that the Department of National Defence or the officers there will ever be perfect by any means. I want chiefly to avoid any thought of complacency, of concluding that a situation is good enough, because it is never good enough if we are to win this war. I have no illusions that this Hong Kong business was a perfect job, but I do say that it was successful to the degree which I have mentioned. The objective was to get the battalions there as quickly as possible-two battalions which could be depended upon to carry out what was expected of them, and which might eventually have to defend against a major attack. That task was accomplished. In a little over two weeks the force was en route with every weapon called for, except anti-tank rifles and mortar ammunition. The expectations that hostilities were not imminent proved to be mistaken. So have many expectations been mistaken in this war.
I submit that it is time to stop unduly and everlastingly and persistently criticizing people who are prepared to act even though the future is not crystal clear.
If we must criticize; if criticism is due, perhaps we had better try blaming those, who decline to act unless there is no risk, because that policy definitely will not win this war. Canada in the Hong Kong expedition at least tried. While the enemy forces were many times greater, than ours, we at least gained precious time, and our troops, as Colonel Sutcliffe said, did magnificent work. It may be said that there was some inefficiency in the organization. I think I can confidently assert that this applies only in the case of transport, and that has been dealt

with. It is quite true that there were some squares in connection with training which were to be filled in, but that arose from a set of conditions which have been, in the progress of war production, largely overcome and which will not repeat themselves.
I wish to ask the house and the country, now that the matter has been fully discussed, to consider that the post mortem has accomplished what I hope was its purpose. That purpose was not to find a scapegoat but to see that there is something in the experience which may be useful for the future. The matter has been aired three times

in my preliminary statement to the house, in the report of the commissioner and in this debate. Officers at headquarters and in the districts have spent an enormous amount of time and energy in procuring and submitting information. They have had to work for weeks to prepare to present information to the commission, and it was necessary for a number of them to remain in attendance in connection with matters which might come up respecting their branch.
The lessons which have been learned have been driven home. What I do fear is, first, that the house and the country do not realize the dislocation which takes place in a department when officers have to be constantly in attendance, and have their minds diverted to a matter such as this instead of to the much more important things-I say more important in the light of the future- which have to be attended to. There are tremendous tasks to be done in- this country, and the least of these tasks is not that ait national defence headquarters in connection with the army. What I fear also is that if this sort of thing keeps on, or if there is too much of it, it will make men timid and fearful of assuming responsibility. If the officers of the Department of. National Defence or of any other department are to function in the shadow of an inquiry, every time we actively participate in an operation which falls short of complete success, then you are going to discourage initiative and slow up decision,, and you are going to penalize resolute action.
I suggest that this matter has been pretty thoroughly aired. I have endeavoured as well as I can-at some length, I am aware, so far as the house is concerned, but briefly in reality, having regard to the ground that had to be covered-to deal with the charges which have been brought against the department, and I wish to say this last word. You will never know the strain which was on the department to get that force away. Some people may

Hong Kong Inquiry
think it was a simple operation. The commissioner did not think so. It was not perfect; we know it was not perfect. Mistakes were made; there were slip-ups; there were delays in connection with matters to which the commissioner refers. But I want the house to understand that we cannot increase from 3,300 to between 330,000 and 350,000 men in a period of less than three years without some growing pains and some difficulties and trials. Let me say that the department is constantly in training just as well as the units. Shortage of equipment and ammunition, not because of lack of diligence, but because of limited supply, in view of the preference to active fronts, forced us to improvise, and this was one of the contributing factors. These conditions are improving but will not be over for some time.
At national defence headquarters there has been constant change and urge for improvement. I know that we shall not satisfy some people. We shall not satisfy those who for political purposes seek to cast aspersions and to undermine confidence in connection with the military organization as well as in connection with our judicial institutions. We cannot satisfy them; but I do hope that we can satisfy this house and the country that in the administration of the army there has been no lack, either of capacity or of industry, and that when remedial action was necessary it has been taken, and there has been constant and unsatisfiable searching for improvement. I do hope also that we can satisfy this house and the country that our one object, just as much as that of any other loyal Canadian, is to do whatever will best serve to win this war, and that none of us, from the minister down-or from the minister up, as you will-regards himself as indispensable at national defence headquarters. All of us there know that the Objective of winning the war must override the convenience, the interests or the ambitions of any individual, I do not care who he is.


Mr. G. S. WHITE (Hastings-Peterborough):: In rising to follow the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) after his very careful argument, I wish to point out that I have a particular interest in this Hang Kong expedition because most of the boys who came from the Midland regiment to make up part of the reinforcements of the Royal Rifles came from the county in which I reside. Many of these boys are personally known to myself, and many of their parents have been my friends for many years. Before starting in any way to discuss the report, I should like to say a word in tribute to the Canadian boys who made up the Hong Kong expedition. I
am sure all hon. members will agree when I say that these Canadian boys upheld in every way the traditions set by the Canadian army in the past and that, irrespective of the part of Canada from which these boys came, irrespective of the training they had, irrespective of the weapons they were given, these gallant and brave lads put up a magnificent fight against impossible odds.
May I say to the minister, with regard to certain remarks he made this evening, concerning criticism of judicial or military institutions, that any observations I have to offer on this occasion are not made for any political purpose.


An hon. MEMBER:: Oh, no.


George Stanley White: I beg your pardon. If anyone has anything to say, please say it. I am not afraid of any remarks hon. gentlemen may make. I may say I have no intention of being interrupted by any of those rowdies across the road.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: You couldn't get politics out of your system with a blow torch.


George Stanley White: If the member for Northumberland, Ontario, will rise in his place I may be able to hear what he says.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: You can hear me all right.


George Stanley White: As a member of this house and as a Canadian citizen I have an interest in every Canadian soldier, as I am sure all other members have, and I realize that anything that has been said in this debate or that may be said later is not going to make any difference to the welfare of those unfortunate boys who are now in a Japanese prison camp. But I do hope that this investigation and this debate will make some impression upon the Department of National Defence, just as the minister stated a few moments ago that the department had learned some lessons from the Hong Kong expedition. It is to be hoped that never again will there be a tragedy such as this; that in future when boys from Canada have to be sent overseas they will be trained as completely as it is posible to train them in Canada, and equipped with the finest of weapons in unlimited quantities.
This afternoon the minister mentioned some people who he thought had complained about the government sending an expedition to Hong Kong. I for one have never at any time said one word in disagreement with the action of the government in sending these men. Any criticism I may have had to offer, or that I may offer to-night, is in connection
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with the training or administrative facilities, because I always felt that when the British government made this request Canada simply could not refuse to send forward the two battalions if they were available. I should like to point out that when a young Canadian joins his majesty's forces and signs the attestation card he becomes a soldier and gives up many of the rights and privileges which he enjoyed as a private citizen. From then on he is subject to military law and discipline. After he joins the army his whole life is absolutely controlled by the military authorities. His training, his food, his equipment, where he lives, where he goes and everything pertaining to his welfare are controlled by the military authorities. They have the say as to what part of the world he will be sent to, in what part of the world he will fight, and all the rest of it.
So I submit, Mr. Speaker, that when the lives of thousands of young Canadians are under the absolute control of the military authorities, it is not expecting too much to assume that the general staff and the others who control the military organization of this country will be made up of the very finest military brains available, men who have already proved their worth, men who understand and appreciate what 1942 warfare is like. A few moments ago the minister made reference to brass hats at national defence headquarters, and the old school tie. When he made that reference I just wondered if perhaps there is now a new school tie. I would have been much more pleased if he had stated frankly that all appointments to headquarters or to the general staff were made on one ground only, the ground of efficiency. I often wondered if, when these appointments were made, such things as your name, your occupation, what school you attended, with what regiment you were connected, perhaps even whom you married or your past political associations, had anything to do with such appointments.


James Layton Ralston: I can say to my hon. friend that he may stop wondering; it is not so.


George Stanley White: I am very glad to hear the minister say that.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: The minister says to stop wondering, not stop wandering.


George Stanley White: I can assure the hon. member for Northumberland, Ontario, that I am not wandering, that I never have wandered, and that I do not need any guidance from him.
At various times when this matter has been discussed, the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie

King) and the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) have made special reference to the distinction between the Chief Justice of Canada when sitting as such and the same gentleman sitting as a commissioner. So far as I am concerned I have always been of the opinion that he was not the Chief Justice of Canada when he conducted the Hong Kong investigation; he was a commissioner appointed under the Inquiries Act. I would point out to the Minister of National Defence that this was not a legal investigation but an investigation of a military matter. Reference has been made to the Roberts investigation. There were several commissioners sitting on that board, including a representative of the bench, a representative of the army, a representative of the navy, and I believe, other commissioners experienced in other lines. In this investigation, however, there was only one commissioner, and his experience has always been along legal lines, though he was inquiring into purely military matters. I suggest that this would be equivalent to asking the chief of the general staff to sit as Chief Justice of Canada and decide in regard to an intricate legal point pertaining to international law.
This matter has been referred to already, but at page 3 of his report the commissioner states:
A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appears in the appendix hereto which is to be considered as part of my report.
As all hon. members know the evidence amounted to more than 2,200 pages. If this assertion is correct, and a full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appears in the appendix, one cannot help wondering why the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence refuse to produce all the evidence, because surely these words must be taken literally. It is quite true that the Prime Minister has stated many times his two stock excuses, first, that it would not be in the public interest and, second, that he must hide behind the British government. But I say to the Prime Minister that it is in the public interest that the evidence in this investigation should be produced. If it is true that a full statement of the facts has been made and a full discussion of the evidence carried out, what possible further evidence can there be which the Prime Minister does not wish to produce? Does the evidence which he refuses to produce contain some further statements or some further evidence which would damage some member of the general staff, or some other officer, or some other official, or some member of the government?

Hong Kong Inquiry
The same thing would apply to the communications which the Prime Minister has received from Colonel Drew. If a full statement has been made in the appendix, there could be no further evidence produced by Colonel Drew or anyone else. If there has been inefficiency on the part of the general staff, or on the part of any department, or on the part of any officer, the public are entitled to the information. A Canadian soldier who is willing to enlist and to offer his life in the cause of freedom is surely entitled to the very finest available military staff.
He is entitled to the finest of training, the finest of weapons and the finest of military brains for direction and operation. The families of these men have an interest in these affairs, and all parents have the right to expect that their sons will have the benefit of the very best of training and the very best of weapons, so that they can at least meet the enemy on equal terms. I hope that never again will Canadian soldiers be sent into battle untrained and without the fullest knowledge of the weapons with which they are to fight.
The Minister of National Defence made some reference to-night to the effect of the Hong Kong expedition on recruiting. It is very important that the minister should see to it that the evidence is brought down to dispel forever the rumours, the suspicions, the gossip and all the other things which have grown up and circulated so long regarding this expedition. Certainly the performance put on by the Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent) and the way in which he handled the prosecution in connection with the Hong Kong expedition did not tend to help recruiting in this country. I wonder if the Minister of Justice feels that he has done justice to counsel who appeared before the commission, when he laid a serious charge against that counsel and haled him into court. Then, before that gentleman was given the opportunity which every Canadian citizen should have, namely that of appearing in court, the minister withdrew the charge, thereby leaving that gentleman's name smeared for all time to come. That seems to me like the act of laying a charge of theft, or something of that nature, against a man, and then withdrawing the charge and not giving the accused person an opportunity to clear his name.
At page 4 of the report the then chief of the general staff, General Crerar, used the words which have been repeated many times, that the units to be sent should be well-trained and efficient battalions. I wonder how the chief of general staff could possibly consider those two units as well trained, after reading this report and seeing the array of evidence
before him showing the type of training that those units had in the eighteen to twenty-four months since their mobilization. I wonder if he would still hold that opinion after considering the type and quantity of weapons with which they had to train.
It will be noted that the commissioner does not state anywhere in his report the standard of training which had been laid down for the Canadian army. Yet on the same page the commissioner states that he accepts the statement by General Crerar that those units were well trained. At the same time he points out the very serious shortage of equipment, and even goes farther in stating that this shortage was not peculiar to those two units alone, but that it applied to all units in the Canadian army.
At page 5 he says:
In point of fact, these battalions were in a more advantageous position in respect of these weapons than the units of the army generally.
With General Crerar having that information it is most difficult to understand how he could say that those were well-trained units. The commissioner goes on to say that this was due to the fact that Canada was unprepared for war in September, 1939. Yet he apparently overlooked the fact that when this Hong Kong expedition was arranged Canada had entered the third year of the war. Those two units, as will be noticed, had been mobilized for a very long time-I think the minister said two years. Yet in that time some of the men had not even completed what might be called their elementary training. Certainly they had not completed some of the firing with ordinary weapons. This shows how little grasp the chief of the general staff had of the type of training and the length of training required by Canadian soldiers to fit them for 1942 warfare.
At page 8 of the report, referring to the lack of mechanized equipment the commissioner states:
There is no evidence, however, that the troops suffered through the lack of them, or that they were not supplied at Hong Kong.
If one examines the report carefully he will not find any evidence set out to show the important place that mechanized equipment holds to-day in the Canadian army. There is nothing to show that universal carriers are necessary; there is nothing to show that the short trucks, motorcycles, water-carts or other vehicles are necessary.
Then the commissioner goes on at page 8 to say:
Canada sent forward, in response to the British request, an expedition that was well trained.

Hong Kong Inquiry
He ends the report by saying that the expedition was neither ill-conceived nor badly managed-even after Canada had been at war for over two years.
Knowledge that the Canadian government had in regard to changed conditions in the east has been mentioned. The commissioner finds that nothing happened between the date of the expedition being authorized and the date of its sailing which would change the viewpoint held by the Canadian government as to conditions in the far east. Before the dinner recess the Minister of National Defence read from pages 16 and 17 of the report, and I should like to refer to that part of the report at this time. At page 17, there is reference to a telegram dated October 26, 1941, from Canadian military headquarters at London, stating that the Chinese government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, and were prepared to use ten divisions for this effort. I wonder if the Minister of National Defence would tell the house if that telegram of October 26 is part of the same telegram shown in the report as exhibit 45?


James Layton Ralston: My hon, friend may read the report.


George Stanley White: But it does not say whether that telegram is or is not exhibit 45. I notice it is the same date; is it the same telegram?


James Layton Ralston: To what page is the hon. member referring?


George Stanley White: About the tenth line on page 17, where there is a reference to the Chinese government undertaking to attack the Japanese if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong.


James Layton Ralston: All I can say is I think it is the same one.


George Stanley White: Would the minister say if
there is any reason why all the contents of that telegram cannot be produced instead of just the few words which appear as exhibit 45?


James Layton Ralston: I cannot tell my hon.
friend.


George Stanley White: If that is from the same
telegram, that little part which is quoted, it would lead one to believe that war in the far east was unlikely, and then if you read page 17 you find a statement that the Chinese government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong. Those two statements are hardly consistent.


James Layton Ralston: I quote from page 17:
However, shortly after the Japanese cabinet changed information reached Ottawa to the

effect that the Japanese policy of maintaining peace in the Pacific was likely to be maintained. This view was confirmed on October 26, the day before the expedition sailed, in the message from Canadian military headquarters in London already quoted.
Then, from near the top of the page:
A telegram from Canadian military headquarters in London, dated October 26, 1941, stated that the Chinese government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong.


George Stanley White: I wonder if those are from
the same telegram. If they are, one is more or less a contradiction of the other.


James Layton Ralston: I do not know what my
hon. friend means. The other states, "consensus opinion that war in the Far East unlikely at present" and then there is the statement that the Chinese were prepared to use ten divisions.


George Stanley White: On page 17 it is clearly
indicated that the matter of attack by the Japanese had been discussed and considered and that preparations had been made.


James Layton Ralston: I have no doubt the
possibility had been considered for a good while, as far as that is concerned.


George Stanley White: It had been considered since the last war, and the reports show that there was no hope of holding Hong Kong if Japan was ever against the British empire. This was an investigation into an expedition under the control of the general staff, and the same staff officers who controlled the expedition and were in charge of the administrative arrangements were called as witnesses to give evidence. It will 'be noticed from the report that in many cases their evidence is treated as being almost above criticism. For instance, take the evidence of General Crerar. I understand he was in England some time after the fall of France in 1940. If I am wrong, I ask the Minister to correct me. When General Crerar was in England he must have acquired all the information the British war office had in connection with the type of warfare being waged on the continent. He must have received all the information as to what constituted a panzer division, what a blitz was, what occurred in dive bombing and the general nature of warfare carried on by the German army. Yet in the summer of 1940 when General Crerar returned to Canada we find that he advised the department or the government to set up a scheme under the National Resources Mobilization Act which called for thirty days training. Apparently the information received about Poland, Holland, Belgium and France made little impression upon our general staff. If the minister

Hong Kong Inquiry
speaks again on this matter I should like him to tell us what changes, if any, General Crerar, after his visit to England, recommended in connection with the type and method of training the Canadian army. One is amazed to find that our chief of the general staff, after being in Europe and getting the benefit of what the British war office knew, was apparently not seized or impressed with the great change in warfare and was satisfied to institute and set up a scheme of thirty days training.
This afternoon the minister referred to the statements made by different staff officers about the training that could be done on the trip to Hong Kong which lasted three weeks. I wonder if he overlooked the fact that this boat which was capable of carrying only 500 passengers had been reconditioned to carry some 2,000 troops, in addition to large quantities of supplies. Anyone who has travelled on a troopship will realize how difficult it is to carry on much training on board. Reference has been made also to the training carried on after arrival at Hong Kong. The hon. member for Weyburn (Mr. Douglas) pointed out this afternoon that it was necessary to spend [DOT] considerable time in becoming established, unpacking stores and getting things under way.
I remember a statement last year by the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) to the effect that his department could equip a Canadian division every six weeks. In the November session the hon. member for Wey-bum asked the minister if he meant that literally, and the minister replied, "yes." If that is correct, it is rather hard to understand and appreciate why these units which had been mobilized for so long were so tragically short of the weapons so necessary for their training.


James Layton Ralston: I have said this so many times that it seems hardly worth while repeating it. This statement about equipping a division every six weeks does not mean that the equipment could be given to Canadian divisions. There are several fronts besides the Canadian front to which Canadian munitions have to go. That has been said time and time again. I have said that we have had to go short in Canada at times in order to send supplies to other fronts. In connection with this particular matter of ammunition, to which I referred particularly, we could not ask the British for mortar ammunition at that time because of the fact that they needed it over there. We had Libya; we had China; we had India; we had England; we had Russia; we had all these fronts to which equipment had to go. My hon. friend seems to have the idea that all the Minister of Munitions and Supply is doing is equipping Canadians.
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George Stanley White: Oh, no, I quite realize that. At the same time, surely it is not expecting too much, if the Minister of Munitions and Supply can equip an entire division every six weeks, to have enough retained in Canada to train our own troops. I would point out that the commissioner paid little if any attention to the importance of firing various weapons. The minister has dealt with this matter, but I should like to point out that the firing of any weapon or the throwing of a bomb is perhaps the most important part of training. It will be noticed that the report refers to how they trained with dummy bombs, but old soldiers in this house and the minister know that in throwing a bomb, if you throw it too quickly or too soon, the enemy may pick it up and throw it back at you. Many soldiers know the tragic results of that practice.


James Layton Ralston: Did my hon. friend ever train his men with a tin can filled with mud? I have.


George Stanley White: I have used tin bombs, but they were discontinued because of accidents. They did not behave very well.


James Layton Ralston: I am talking about using dummy grenades.


George Stanley White: You mean what you shoot out of the end of a rifle?


James Layton Ralston: Dummy hand grenades.


George Stanley White: Yes, I have seen dummy
ones, and I have made a jam-tin one which explodes in smoke when you throw it. But that is not complete training, because it is the timing and the throwing of the bomb which it is so essential to learn but which the minister thinks is a simple thing to do. I hope the minister did not want to leave the impression on the house that two or three days' training on a mortar would be sufficient for a soldier.


Mr. CRLICKSHANK:: He did not say
that.


George Stanley White: The minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I understood him to say that in two or three days a soldier could become perfectly familiar with a mortar and capable of firing it.


James Layton Ralston: My hon. friend can read
the speech. I am not going to make it over again.


George Stanley White: I would point out in connection with all these weapons that there is quite a difference between having them on

Hong Kong Inquiry

a table in a lecture room and receiving instruction on them from an instructor, and handling them in a trench or fox-hole in actual warfare where you are on your own.
I should like to draw the attention of the committee to the significant remarks made by Colonel Lamb at page 23 of the appendix, where he said:
One week or two at the most of the training these men got in our own recruit squad would be equivalent to four or six weeks' training at the basic training centres.
That appears to me to be a remarkable statement, because the basic training centres have always struck me as very efficient and well run. I hope the minister will at some time make some comment on that statement because, if an active service unit can squeeze into one or two weeks the equivalent amount of training that a recruit gets at the basic training centres, I should think that there must be something radically wrong with them.
During the debate on the war appropriation bill I askedl the minister if he would place on Hansard a copy of the syllabus of training at the basic and advanced training centres, and at page 1890 of Hansard of April 23 of this year there will be found a table showing the number of periods of instruction and the number of rounds to be fired by rifle, Bren gun, anti-tank rifle and the tommy machine gun. I understand that that table indicates the minimum training required by the department. I would ask hon. members to compare the standard of training and the number of rounds to be actually fired, as laid down in that syllabus, with the training and the number of rounds actually fired by the troops that went to Hong Kong. Hon. members will find that there is a great difference. As I said, I understand that the training laid down in that syllabus on Hansard is the minimum training required by the department because, after the soldier leaves the advanced1 training centre, unless he is proceeding overseas where he receives further training, he is posted to some unit in Canada where his training is continued.
There is no information given in the commissioner's report as to tactical manoeuvres of brigade or division, or manoeuvres with tanks or aircraft, or any manoeuvres on a large scale. It is quite true it is stated that these troops that were sent to Hong Kong had manoeuvres by platoon and by company-I did not notice the words "by battalion"-in the Indies, but there was no training in manoeuvres on any large scale such as would certainly enter into their operations after they went to Hong Kong.

The report sets out very clearly and fully the type of training which these units had, and the weapons on which they had completed their firing. I shall not repeat that because it has already been placed on Hansard.
The report refers at pages 37 and 38 to the young men from the Midland regiment. When the officer in command of the Midland regiment was asked if it was well trained he said that it was well trained, but he qualified his statement later by saying that it was _ well trained according to the standard of training prevailing in Canada. So far as the boys from the Midland regiment are concerned, the report shows that these mSn had not even completed firing on machine guns; that they had no experience or training with mortars, tommy guns, anti-aircraft machine guns, live bombs or grenades. I quite realize, as the minister said, that the ammunition was not available, but once again I point out that all these things merely tend to show the complete lack of training which these men had before they were sent overseas.
In conclusion, I would point out that the responsibility for this expedition rests on the members of the war cabinet. They are the ones who made the decision, and they are the ones who are responsible for those in charge of training. I would ask the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence to produce all the evidence in connection with this expedition, so that for all time there can be ended the suspicions that have entered into this Hong Kong affair, and the lowering of morale, because I am sure the minister must realize that the way in which this expedition has been conducted must have affected the morale of the Canadian army and probably has interfered with recruiting. If a full disclosure has been made in this report, I would ask the Prime Minister what possible reason or excuse there can be for not submitting to the house the full evidence taken at the inquiry?


Mr. W. R. MACDONALD (Brantford City):: Mr. Speaker, may I at the outset express to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) my sincere congratulations upon the splendid statement which he made to the house to-day. It is complete and yet concise. It was also fair. He admitted that there had been certain mistakes, but I know the house was very happy indeed to learn that changes had been effected in his department to prevent similar mistakes in the future.
My purpose, however, in rising at this time is to protest with all the vehemence at my command against a discussion taking place, without the evidence, on the findings of a

Hong Kong Inquiry
commission on an incident which is now closed. Hong Kong is history, and glorious history it is.
It has been frequently stated outside this house and intimated within this house that Canadian forces should not have been sent to Hong Kong. I ask any hon. member within this house to rise in his place now, after having heard the Minister of National Defence, and say whether if he had been Minister of National Defence or Prime Minister he would have refused to send that expedition to Hong Kong. I am sure every hon. member is proud of the action which this government took in sending the Hong Kong expedition, which carried on so admirably the great traditions of this country.


Richard Burpee Hanson: Would the hon. member indicate which hon. member said that the opposition would not have sent these troops to Hong Kong?


William Ross Macdonald: I said that it might be gathered from certain statements made in this house and from statements made without the house.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: What statements in the house?


William Ross Macdonald: That the expedition should not have taken place.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Would the hon. member indicate what hon. member made a statement to that effect?


William Ross Macdonald: I gathered from a number of statements made by members of the opposition parties that an inference such as I stated could properly be drawn.


Richard Burpee Hanson: A straw-man!


William Ross Macdonald: But Hong Kong is history. Apparently many people in this country and some in this chamber do not realize that if we are to survive we must not be concerned so much with the events of the past, but rather with present-day affairs and events which are likely to happen in the immediate future. Let me recall to hon. members what is taking place in the world to-day. The enemy is pressing forward on every front. We are losing battle after battle, and without exaggeration I think it can be said that the enemy is at our very gates. In spite of the seriousness of the present-day situation some refuse to face the facts, and we argue about battles which have been lost instead of devising ways and means of assisting our gallant allies in the great battles which are taking place to-day. If there was anything
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wrong at Hong Kong, surely we are now satisfied that adequate precautions have been taken to prevent similar mistakes in the future. It is of no assistance whatever to our warriors for parliament to continue to debate Hong Kong. Nor does it assist in building up the morale of our fellow citizens.
The people of this country are heartily sick of the words "royal commission" and the word "Drew". What we want in our leaders is not remorse over what has already happened, but rather foresight and knowledge to prevent similar disasters in the future. Let us cease wrangling about the past. Let us get on with the war and devote our strength not to fighting one another at home but to fighting and defeating the enemy abroad.
The history of this war is not pleasant reading for any of the allies. Terrific losses have been suffered by all. But it should be remembered that the losses sustained by Canada are insignificant compared with those which have befallen every other country. I often think how fortunate our friends in Australia and New Zealand would count themselves had they had the few losses we have suffered at Hong Kong.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Would the hon. member compare our losses with those of these other nations?


William Ross Macdonald: I would be glad to compare their losses if I had the time.


Karl Kenneth Homuth: Or the ability.


William Ross Macdonald: But it is now twenty-five minutes to eleven, and I do not propose to take the necessary time just now to make the comparison. I should, however, like to recall to hon. members, and particularly the hon. member for Waterloo South (Mr. Homuth), that we in Canada should be thankful that we have had such small losses. In this respect we are the most fortunate people in the whole wide world. The controversy which is taking place at the present time over our comparatively light casualty list is not doing credit to Canada or helping to keep high her fair name throughout the world. On the contrary, if we continue to argue and re-fight every battle in which we take part, I fear we shall be held in contempt by other nations.
In October, 1941, the Canadian expedition left for Hong Kong 1,895 strong. On December 7,	1941, the Japanese treacherously
attacked Pearl Harbour, sinking numerous ships and killing and wounding large numbers, and destroying much mechanized equipment. On Christmas Day Hong Kong fell, with casualties numbering 296 in killed and miss-
Hong Kong Inquiry

ing'. In the spring of 1942 our friendly neighbours and gallant allies, the Americans, lost the Philippines, with casualties running into thousands. Shortly after, what was thought to be the impregnable fortress of Singapore fell into the hands of the enemy with vast quantities of supplies and a large number of men. I will not go over our naval losses, but it must be admitted they run into hundreds of thousands of tons. Malaya then fell, with additional losses of thousands of men. In the near east we were no more successful. Libya was overrun by the enemy. At Tobruk 25,000 Britishers were captured together with ships, stores and supplies of all kinds. In Russia, Sevastopol was stormed, with casualties too numerous to mention. During all this time the losses of the British and the Americans must have run into tens of thousands, and of the Russians, into hundreds of thousands, with guns and tanks and ships and planes and other mechanized equipment amounting to billions of dollars.
Throughout this time of trial and tribulation the British, Americans and Russians, in spite of their losses, have battled on gallantly and unitedly, while we in Canada snarl at one another and wrangle in debate over our small though unfortunate reverse at Hong Kong. Is it any wonder that people are saying, let us cease this apparently never-ending bickering; by our actions let us show the world that we without a murmur are prepared to do our part, so that we shall have an equal share in the victory which eventually will be ours.
Some one may say that the Americans had a commission after the fall of Pearl Harbour. But there is no comparison between Pearl Harbour and Hong Kong. The defence of Pearl Harbour was the sole responsibility of the United States, while at Hong Kong Canada was merely helping the British. Also let me point out that the commission appointed to investigate the Pearl Harbour disaster was the first commission appointed during this war.
I often think that the Tories, who are so prone to boast about their loyalty to British institutions, would not have been prompted to ask for this commission if a similar one had not been asked for in the United States. So far as I am concerned-and I believe this is true of the Canadian people generally-I am prepared to follow the leadership and the policy of that great Prime Minister, the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, who has repeatedly refused to grant a royal commission no matter how great the loss may have been.
Royal commissions made up of civilians, no matter how well versed they are in the law, are not the best qualified to investigate military disasters. Fighting is a science, and

wars will only be won by fighting men, whether in the actual fighting or in the planning for battle. Investigations, if they are to be of the greatest value and not for the purpose of finding a scapegoat, or, to use the vernacular, for the purpose of "getting" someone, should be carried out by courts of inquiry made up of competent and experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen. We have too many armchair critics in Canada. The government should ignore them, and we should have confidence in our military advisers. When we have a disaster we should ask them to make the investigation, and we should accept their advice. This is the first royal commission we have had in Canada in this war, and I say to the government, no matter how great the clamour may be, let this be the last royal commission.
However, if a royal commission was to be appointed, I am satisfied that no finer civilian commissioner could have been found than the Chief Justice of the Dominon of Canada. There is no one in whom the Canadian people would have had greater confidence. He has a brilliant intellect and has had a wide experience. His judgments are respected and are frequently followed in Britain, in the dominions and in the United' States, and I think I can say with confidence that he is the greatest jurist in the English-speaking world. He is, of course, a man of strict integrity. Nothing under heaven could persuade him to swerve from the strict path of duty.
Who was the chief government counsel appointed to act on this commission? Was he a Liberal? Emphatically no. He was the president, not of the Liberal but of the Conservative association of Westmount. The official opposition was also invited to appoint counsel. Did the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) follow the splendid example set by our own Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) ? Emphatically no. If he had followed the Prime Minister's example he would have appointed a Liberal. But whom did he appoint? He appointed the most partisan of all the partisan Tories in the Dominion of Canada.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: He is a personal friend of Mr. Hepburn.


William Ross Macdonald: If anyone before that commission can be accused of partisanship, George Drew alone can be accused of it. For the benefit of yourself, Mr. Speaker, and of other members who do not come from the province of Ontario and therefore do not know Mr. Drew, I should like to familiarize you with his record.

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Gordon Graydon: He is not on trial.


Mr. CASSELMAN:: This is our war effort.


William Ross Macdonald: He is known as a lieutenant-colonel, and the impression has gone abroad that he served as a lieutenant-colonel in the last war.


Frederick Clayton Casselman: And got badly shot up doing it.


William Ross Macdonald: My hon. friend says he got badly shot up. He did get wounded fighting in the last war, and I do not detract from his service, but I would point out that he did not serve as a lieutenant-colonel, as is generally believed.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: That is why he got shot up.


William Ross Macdonald: He went overseas in 1915. I know whereof I speak because I happened to go overseas at the same time. He went in May, 1915, as a lieutenant. In less than four months, namely, in September, 1915, he went to France as a lieutenant. In May, 1916, he was wounded as a lieutenant and returned to England as a lieutenant, subsequently returning to Canada as a lieutenant; and at no time in the last war did he serve in any field of battle in any higher rank. I do not detract from his service; I give him every credit. But what I do object to is that he should allow people, from one end of the country to the other, to think he had a large and responsible command during the last war. What I do object to is that he should set himself up as the greatest military strategist in the whole Dominion of Canada. He would compare himself with the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston). Let me read a few statements from the Parliamentary Guide respecting the Minister of National Defence. He went overseas with the 85th battalion as major in 1916. He served continuously until the armistice, returning to England in 1919.


James Arthur Ross: Is this in the report? Several hon. members have been ruled out of order to-day who were much closer to the subject than the hon. member.


Georges Parent: Citation 294 of Beau-chesne's Parliamentary Rules and Forms states:
If a member should say nothing disrespectful to the house or the chair, or personally opprobrious to other members, or in violation of other rules of the house he may state whatever he thinks fit in debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings, or injurious to the character, of individuals; and he is protected by his privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other question or molestation.
The hon. member may, if he thinks fit, live up to all the implications of that citation. It is a matter of taste.


Gordon Graydon: On the point of order raised by the hon. member for Souris (Mr. Ross), I respectfully submit to Your Honour that the citation you have quoted is not the one with reference to the point raised by the hon. gentleman. The point is whether or not the remarks of the member for Brantford City are strictly within the limitations of the debate with respect to the amendment which has been moved. That was the point this afternoon. On two or three occasions Your Honour, quite properly I think, called members to order because they were not keeping within the purview of that amendment, and it seems to me that not only has the hon. member gone a considerable distance outside the amendment, but he is completely afield.


Georges Parent: The point of order raised by the hon. member is not affected by what the hon. member who has just taken his seat has said. In the discussion this afternoon I was dealing with something that was specifically excluded from the terms of the amendment. If a member thinks fit to make an attack upon individuals who are not members of the house, so long as he does not say anything that is opprobrious to the house he may do so under the rule. Of course it will all depend upon the taste of the hon. member who is speaking.


William Ross Macdonald: I was putting on Hansard the record of the Minister of National Defence, which I think is a most honourable one.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, I believe you took objection to hon. members mentioning anything about Chief Justice Duff in regard to this commission. Mr. George Drew was also a member of the commission.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: He
was one of the counsel, and I see no more reason why hon. members should be allowed to talk about George Drew than about the chief justice. It is simply closure; that is all.


Georges Parent: I am afraid Mr. Drew would hardly come within the category of those described in the standing order of the house, which refers to those who may be holding high positions.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


Georges Parent: I do not wish this to be taken in a spirit of levity; I am replying as
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seriously as I can to the point of order raised by the hon. member. I think he will agree with me that the characterization of a high official position, as set out in the standing order, would denote a man who might be in the position of chief justice of this country.


William Ross Macdonald: Well, Mr. Speaker, I take it that the administration of the Department of National Defence has been specifically questioned by the amendment. I am endeavouring to place on Hansard the record during the last war of the present Minister of National Defence, which I repeat, is a most honourable one. He was born of United Empire Loyalist stock; went overseas with the 85th battalion as a major in 1916; went to France on February 10, 1917; served continuously until the armistice, returning to England in April, 1919, and to Canada in June, 1919. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel on August 3, 1918, while in France; he received the C.M.G. and D.S.O. with bar. He was mentioned in dispatches twice; was gazetted colonel in 1924, after the war; was sworn in as a privy councillor and appointed Minister of National Defence in the King cabinet in 1926. He was Canada's delegate to the London naval conference of 1930. I could go on at much greater length, Mr. Speaker, and tell of the great experience he has acquired and the fine service he has rendered to Canada.


James Arthur Ross: Who wrote that?


Frederick Clayton Casselman: I hope the hon. member noticed that the Minister of National Defence answered that question by pointing to himself as the author of that biography.


William Ross Macdonald: I
do know who wrote it, but I know it is true, and I defy any hon. member to rise in his place in this house and question it. Then I should like to put on record something of the life of Lieutenant-General Andrew George McNaughton. He attended the Royal Staff College at Camberley, England, and, the Imperial Defence College at London. He was adviser to the Canadian delegation to the imperial conference in England in 1929, as well as the conference for limitation of armaments at Geneva, Switzerland, in 1932. He was a member of the committee on transAtlantic air service at the imperial economic conference at Ottawa in 1932. He has been chairman from 1933 to the present time of the national research council associate committee on survey research, and was chairman of the interdepartmental committee on the trans-Canada airways from 1933 to 1935. He was chief of the Canadian general staff from 1929 to 1935 and president of the National

Research Council of Canada from 1935 to 1939. He was in charge of a special course for university candidates for commissions in the regular army at McGill university during 1909 and 1910; was a lieutenant in the 3rd battery, Canadian Field Artillery, 1910; captain, 1911; major, 1913; major of the 4th battery, C.F.A., C.EF., 1914; wounded, second battle of Ypres, 1915; major, 21st battery, C.F.A.,	C.E.F.,	1915; promoted
lieutenant-colonel and to command 11th artillery brigade, 1916; wounded, 1918; promoted brigadier-general, 1918; in command of the Canadian corps heavy artillery, and so on. I could go on at much greater length, Mr. Speaker, and tell more of his accomplishments as a military man. I am quite ready to agree that Mr. George Drew was a splendid soldier, but Lieutenant Drew of the last war is not to be compared with Lieutenant-General McNaughton, or our own Minister of National Defence, or the other ministers of defence associated with him.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Eleven o'clock.


William Ross Macdonald: I think if I had another five minutes I could conclude my remarks.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No.


William Ross Macdonald: If hon.
members would allow me to continue for not more than ten minutes-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No.


William Ross Macdonald: Then I move the adjournment of the debate.
On motion of Mr. Macdonald (Brantford City) the debate was adjourned. _



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

William Lyon Mackenzie King: To-morrow I think it would suit the convenience of hon. members to proceed with this debate immediately after prayers, and return to motions after the debate is concluded. If that is the case, I will indicate in the morning that we will proceed to government orders and take up the particular orders we have been discussing to-day.


Mr. STIRLING:: Does the Prime Minister mean to skip the routine?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes. What I have in mind is that possibly someone might move the adoption of one of the reports of committees, in which event we might spend all day debating such report. I think hon. members would prefer to conclude this debate first.

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Grote Stirling: I quite agree on the principle. I presume the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) means that the house is a law unto itself, and can take that course if it
chooses.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, that is quite right. As it is a matter of procedure, I think I have the right to indicate the procedure which should be taken in a matter of this kind. We will take up any bills after.


[Stage Direction]
At eleven o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
Tuesday, July 28, 1942