Evolutionary cooperative spectrum sensing game: how to collaborate?
Cooperative spectrum sensing has been shown to be able to greatly improve the sensing performance in cognitive radio networks. However, if cognitive users belong to different service providers, they tend to contribute less in sensing in order to increase their own throughput. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game framework to answer the question of "how to collaborate" in multiuser de-centralized cooperative spectrum sensing, because evolutionary game theory provides an excellent means to address the strategic uncertainty that a user/player may face by exploring different actions, adaptively learning during the strategic interactions, and approaching the best response strategy under changing conditions and environments using replicator dynamics. We derive the behavior dynamics and the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the secondary users. We then prove that the dynamics converge to the ESS, which renders the possibility of a de-centralized implementation of the proposed sensing game. According to the dynamics, we further develop a distributed learning algorithm so that the secondary users approach the ESS solely based on their own payoff observations. Simulation results show that the average throughput achieved in the proposed cooperative sensing game is higher than the case where secondary users sense the primary user individually without cooperation. The proposed game is demonstrated to converge to the ESS, and achieve a higher system throughput than the fully cooperative scenario, where all users contribute to sensing in every time slot.