Joint Spectrum and Power Auction With Multiauctioneer and Multibidder in Coded Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks
In the existing cooperative cognitive radio (CR), qualities of service (e.g., rate or outage probability) of primary users can be improved by cooperative transmission from secondary users. However, as owners of the spectrum, primary users' traffic demands are relatively easy to satisfy. The rationale is that they would be more interested in the benefits of other formats (e.g., revenue), rather than the enhanced rate. In this paper, we propose a new cooperative CR framework, where primary users assist in the transmissions of secondary users. In exchange for this concession, primary users receive payments from secondary users for the spectrum and cooperative transmit power being used in cooperation. An auction-theoretic model with multiple auctioneers, multiple bidders, and multiple commodities is developed for a joint spectrum and cooperative power allocation. Since the spectrum and power are two heterogeneous but correlated commodities, their properties are specifically considered in auction strategy design. Finally, we mathematically prove the convergence of the proposed auction game, and show with numerical results, that the proposed auction is beneficial to both primary and secondary users.